Compliance programmes can be helpful complements to public enforcement activity, ideally by preventing competition law violations in the first place. Many competition agencies have implemented changes in their enforcement and sanctioning policies regarding competition compliance programmes. Furthermore, we have also seen the rise of interesting advocacy initiatives to promote compliance.
This session will explore if agencies have empirical evidence that compliance programmes lead to a decrease in the probability of violations or their gravity, and what the reasons for policy changes in agencies’ promotion of compliance or recognition of compliance efforts are. Another focus will be on the main characteristics for effective compliance programmes, as developed in case practice and guidance by agencies. Closely related, trends and experiences in advocacy measures will be discussed, and how agencies ascertain that these measures are effective and sufficiently targeted.
Background documentation
Background Note by the Secretariat • English | Español
Hearing letter • English | Español
Speakers
Anne Riley, Independent Ethics and Compliance Consultant, BIAC Bio
Agency case studies: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Spain, United States
Contributions from participants
Brazil • English | Español and see the Working Party no 3 contribution: English | Español, on Competition Compliance programmes
Canada • see the Working Party no 3 contribution: English | Español, on Competition Compliance programmes
Colombia • see the Working Party no 3 contribution: English | Español on Competition Compliance programmes
Ecuador: English | Español
Peru • see the Working Party no 3 contribution: English | Español, on Competition Compliance programmes
Mexico: English | Español
Spain: English | Español
United States: English | Español
Presentations
Suggested bibliography and related links
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Vertical restraints are competition restrictions in agreements between firms or individuals at different levels of the production and distribution process. Vertical restraints which simply determine the price and quantity for a specific sale and purchase transaction do not normally restrict competition. However, a restriction of competition may occur if the restraint contains restraints on the supplier or the buyer. Examples of such vertical restraints are an obligation on the buyer to charge customers a certain price for the supplier’s product (i.e. resale price maintenance); a restriction on the buyer not to purchase competing brands (i.e. non-compete obligation); or an obligation on the supplier to only supply a particular buyer (i.e. exclusive distribution).
The appropriate treatment of certain vertical restraints under competition law has been widely debated in recent years, in particular due to the rapidly increasing e-commerce and digital economy. This session will firstly provide an overview of different vertical restraints and the legal frameworks that exist to access vertical restraints. Following this overview, the discussion will focus on potential anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints. Finally, it will explore the role that potential efficiencies can play and what are relevant factors to consider for the assessment and procedural issues.
Background documentation
Background Note by the Secretariat • English | Español
Call for contributions • English | Español
Speakers
Priscila Brolio Gonçalves, Owner, Brolio Gonçalves Advogados Bio
Javier Coronado, Chief Economist, Garrigues Bio
Contributions from participants
Brazil: English | Español
Colombia: English | Español
Honduras: English | Español
Mexico: English | Español
Panama: English | Español
Presentations
Suggested bibliography and related links
- Workshop on vertical mergers and vertical restraints, OECD Worshop, 2020
- Vertical Mergers in the technology, media and telecom sector, OECD Best practice Roundtables, 2019
- Vertical Restraints for on-line sales OECD Best practice Roundtables, 2013
- The Role of Efficiency Claims in Antitrust Proceedings 2012, OECD Best practice Roundtables, 2012
- Resale Price Maintenance, OECD Best practice Roundtables, 2008
- Resale Price Maintenance, OECD Best practice Roundtables, 1997
- Competition and Across Platform Parity Agreements, OECD Hearing, 2015
- The digital economy, OECD Hearing, 2012
- Competition policy for vertical relations in gasoline retailing, OECD Best practice Roundtables, 2008
- Vertical Mergers OECD Best Practice Roundtables, 2007
- Refusals to deal, OECD Best Practice Roundtables, 2007
- Facilitating practices in oligopolies, OECD Best practice Roundtables, 2007
- Competition, Patents and Innovation, OECD Policy Roundables, 2006
- Competition issues in electronic commerce, OECD Policy Roundtables, 2000
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Card payment systems are complex and dynamic, and mostly regarded as two-sided markets. There is consensus in literature as to the fundamental elements of the structure of said markets: firstly, the existence of two groups of economic agents, the merchants and cardholders, requiring services from a platform with interdependent demands; secondly, the resulting network externalities from this interdependence; thirdly, the Non-Neutrality present in the price structure, and finally, the role of platforms within the market scheme.
Some of the difficulties that arise in these types of markets are associated with the assessment of the social efficiencies that are generated by the price structure of payment platforms and how to define interchange fees and charges and the potential antitrust issues that may arise, among others. For instance, understanding and assessing price distribution and the impact of externalities on price definition, may be challenging for both competition agencies and regulators, as the price structure in these markets affects the dynamics of the transactions that take place within the market.
The goal of the session is to dive into a series of key questions on the topic and to explore how enforcement and regulatory efforts have evolved recently. Some of the key questions that will be discussed are:
- How to best define interchange fees and is it desirable? in what contexts?
- How to assess the entrance into the market of non-financial agents that may rival financial institutions?
- What are the effects of fees and charges on incentives to innovate? What have been the approaches of competition and regulatory authorities to the assessment of these interdependencies?
- What has been the impact of regulation? What has been the impact of enforcement?
- Does competition law allow me to remedy, not only at the sanctioning level, but also at the preventive level identified market failures in the payment system?
- What has been the interplay between regulation and enforcement?
Background documentation
Background Note by the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (SIC) Secretariat • English | Español
Call for contributions • English | Español
Contributions from participants
Brazil: English | Español
Costa Rica: English | Español
Chile FNE: English | Español and TDLC: English | Español
Mexico: English | Español
Peru: English | Español
Speakers
Esteban Greco, Antitrust, Competition Policy and Regulation Economist Director, Global Economics Group and former president of the National Commission for the Defense of Competition in Argentina (CNDC) Bio
Beatriz Yemail, Director, Global Economics Group Bio
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Practice Co-Leader, Global Antitrust & Competition - Brattle Bio
Presentations
Suggested bibliography (Full bibliography available in the call for contributions)
- Innovación y disrupción digital en los mercados de medios de pago: el caso de defensa de la competencia en la Argentina by Greco, E. & Viecens, F., 2020
- Payment Cards, Two-sided Market, Interchange Fees. by Prager, R. A., Manuszak, M. D., Kiser, E. K., & Borzekowski, R., 2009,
- Externalities and regulation in card payment systems. Review of Network Economics, 5(1), by Rochet, J. C., & Tirole, J. (2006a)
- Competition and Payment Systems, OECD Best Practice Roundtables, 2012
- Two-Sided Markets, OECD Best Practice Roundtables, 2009
- Competition and Efficient Usage of Payment Cards, OECD Best Practice Roundtables, 2006
- The impact of price controls in two-sided markets: evidence from US debit card interchange fee regulation by Manuszak, M. D., & Wozniak, K., 2017
- The impact of the U.S. debit-card interchange fee regulation on consumer welfare, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2015, Pages 23–67, by David S. Evans, Howard Chang, Steven Joyce
- MasterCard II: The Commission Pursues Its Antitrust Enforcement in Cross-Border Payments, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 10, Issue 5, May 2019, Pages 297–300, by Sari Suurnäkki, Jaime Rodríguez-Toquero Aymerich
- Germany’s ‘Lex Apple Pay’: Payment Services Regulation Overtakes Competition Enforcement, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 12, Issue 2, February 2021, Pages 68–81, by Jens-Uwe Franck, Dimitrios Linardatos
- An Event Study Analysis of the Impacts of the European Interchange Fee Regulation, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 17, Issue 1, March 2021, Pages 63–94, by Alen Veljan, Ali Roaidi
- Indirect network effects, usage externalities, and platform competition, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 15, Issue 2-3, June/September 2019, Pages 283–297, Paul A Johnson
See also:
Competition Law and Policy in Latin America
Full list of OECD Competition Policy Roundtables
OECD Competition
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