


The socio-economic and regional context of West African migrations



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Over the last few decades the Sahel and West Africa Club has been working on issues such as food security, agricultural development, the private sector, governance and peace, urban development, local economies, the integration of national economies into the global economy, and the challenges of regional integration.

Within all of these areas, the work that we are undertaking and the dialogue that we are initiating with our West African partners carry two important messages. The first message is that West African societies are making progress, although significant, sometimes serious, problems remain. The second message is that this progress is hidden by the “challenge of numbers”. If we do not take into account the fact that the population has increased three-fold over the last four decades, we cannot perceive the importance of the results obtained regarding health, education and production.

The big question, which summarises all the others, is how to encourage sustainable development at the local, national and regional levels which will respond to the needs of a rapidly expanding and mobile population. At a time when the “migration issue” is at the centre of Europe-Africa dialogue, it seems important to recall that a certain relationship exists between the progress recorded over the last decades and the mobility of the populations within the West African region. West Africans are six times more mobile within their region than Europeans are. Furthermore, currently 56% of the West African population is under 20 years of age; 66% are under 25 years of age as compared to 12% and 15% respectively in Europe. There has been incredible progress in education; the number of literate adults has doubled every ten years since 1970. Young girls are increasingly benefiting from this evolution; they are progressively improving their status within society; their demand on development is legitimately ever more substantial. Youth and mobility are normal signs of a society undergoing demographic change.

How can this youth be helped? How can this mobility be supported? We believe that these two questions should be at the centre of debates; responses should be geared towards investment, the valorization of agricultural zones with strong development potential and reception, town planning, rural-urban development, business facilities, promotion of trade and development of an open regional market, yet safeguarded from the brutal impacts of integration into the global market.

Women’s associations, youth associations, locally-elected officials, West African agricultural producers, with whom we maintain constant dialogue, regret that the “migration issue” is often reduced to the issue of irregular migration flows towards Europe and remittances of migrants.. They fear that the tension around this issue will have negative implications on free circulation within their region. They hope and pray for more ambitious and more coherent trade and development policies in order to build the West African region. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its member States have the same fears and the same goals.

For some time now, the dramatic images of clandestine migrants have put West Africa at the forefront. It is the responsibility of the Sahel and West Africa Club, along with its partners, to recall that the migratory stakes of the region cannot be summarized by these images. Hence, this will be one of our priority issues in the years to come.

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At a time when migration is at the centre of dialogue on development in sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) proposes to examine migration in the wider global context of social, economic and regional developments in West Africa.¹

The debate concerning migratory flows is indeed important; the SWAC and ECOWAS have contributed to this debate through the publication of a chapter on migration for the Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa. However, we believe that it is important to include the structural elements of the West African “landscape”; specifically its demography, the evolution of the major social and economic indicators, regional dynamics and challenges that characterise it.

For many years, the work carried out by the Sahel and West Africa Club, part of which is summarised here, has led us to propose an ambivalent perception of the region’s course. On one hand, it is obvious that in a large number of sectors, including health and education, but also agriculture and governance, West Africa and its development partners have made remarkable efforts which have resulted in significant improvements. On the other hand, however, the region is plagued by the “challenge of numbers”. Indeed, the proportion of immunised and school-enrolled children has sharply increased over the past decades, but at the same time, the number of children has increased three-fold whereas in other developing regions, it has only doubled. As a result, many per capita-calculated indicators have not significantly improved from what they were in the past. Therefore, while performance and dynamics must be recognised, it is important to remember that West African inhabitants are among the most underprivileged in the world and will probably remain so for another generation unless the resources available for development are greatly and rapidly increased every year (at least 7% per year, according to the African Development Bank [ADB]), at the same pace as population growth.

High demographic growth also leads to the re-composition of settlements of which migration is a result. West Africa is in the process of populating as much as it is developing. A region relatively empty after independence, West Africa has gradually developed “island” settlements, which are today are connected to each other to form a large group within which trade and movement are increasing.

During the many forums organised by the SWAC, West Africans – ministers, civil servants, farmers, mayors, entrepreneurs, men, women, young or old – have always insisted upon the innate character of “West African regionality”. There is no doubt that a Malian feels at home in Burkina Faso or that a resident of Kano feels at home in Maradi. The fact that official regional integration policies have not yielded expected results should not hide the reality as experienced and felt by West Africans. This, of course, has major implications when we refer to migration.

This document is divided into four chapters. The first sets out a review of the demographic context in West Africa. The second chapter deals with some retrospective socio-economic elements of the region. The third chapter describes the regional dynamics in West Africa and the fourth suggests a number of strategic questions and courses for action.


¹ The region covered by the Sahel and West Africa Club as referred to in this paper includes 18 countries: the 15 ECOWAS member countries plus Mauritania, Chad and Cameroon.



The components of this chapter are mainly derived from SWAC/ECOWAS work carried out within the framework of the Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa². Also, refer to Annex 1 of this document.

1.1 The strongest demographic dynamics in history

Figure 1: Population Growth and Urbanisation



Source: WDI 2004, World Bank

The population of Africa south of the Sahara and of West Africa in particular stagnated until the end of the 19th century, while most of the other continents were experiencing sharp population growth. The population started increasing significantly only at the beginning of the 20th century with the improvement of health and medical conditions. It was then that the population boom really began. Since this time, the West African population rate has increased nearly 3%

per year; from a population of 40 million in 1930 to 290 million in 2005³ according to the United Nations. This dynamic is likely to continue; the regional population is expected to reach 430 million people by 2020 and go beyond half a billion by 2040.⁴

“Africa is today a continent that is becoming quickly overcrowded, and at an accelerated pace. Saying that such a phenomenon necessarily has significant consequences, good or bad, on the state of Africa today and that there will certainly be consequences on the Africa of tomorrow, is not stating a particularly brilliant idea. But how can we understand anything about the present and the future of the continent without first considering this overcrowding?”⁵

The average United Nations projections indicate that Niger’s population could reach 50 million in 2050 compared to 12 million in 2004, Mali and Burkina Faso, a population of 40 million compared to 13 million in 2004; and Côte d’Ivoire could reach 34 million compared to 18 million in 2004. Is such population expansion humanly and economically possible? What are the implications of this prospect in regards to the mobility and migration needs of these populations?

² Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa, “Demography” chapter; D. Ouedraogo; SWAC/ECOWAS (2006, to be published).
³ Roland Pourtier clarifies: “Human history has never seen such an increase in population on such a huge continental scale. And, it is going to continue for a long time. Nowhere has the expression “population explosion” been more appropriate» (Afriques noires, 2001).
⁴ These are only projections. None of the many specialised institutions working in this sector can provide a definitive number. All agree that there will be approximately 430 million inhabitants in West Africa by about 2020; or perhaps 2022 or 2025 or even before. It is possible, for example, that the next population survey of Nigeria will “correct” what many demographers believe to be the under-estimation of the population during the last survey of 1991.
⁵ Giri J. (1986), *L’Afrique en panne : 25 ans de développement*, Paris, Karthala.


1.2 A region experiencing rapid urban development

West African cities have absorbed two thirds of the population growth registered between 1960 and 1990. Today, they host 45% of the population⁶. This urban growth essentially and initially occurred due to population movements from rural areas. This is no longer the case; population growth in cities is now mainly due to the increasing birth rate in urban areas which accounts for 70% to 80 of this growth, with the rural exodus only representing 20 to 30% of urban growth. Urban growth is no longer as rapid as it was in the 1970s and 1980s, but it will continue, and the urban population is likely to account for about 60% of the total population by 2020/2025.

The evolution of the farming⁷ to non-farming⁸ population ratio can be added to the evolution of the rural to urban population ratio. According to the FAO, the West African farming population has decreased from 80% of the total population in 1961 to 51% in 2001. Today (in 2006), the non-farming population has thus become probably the largest group.


Urban growth has not been accompanied by the depopulation of the rural areas, where the population has continued and will continue to increase according to all forecasts. The word (*rural*) *exodus* which according to the dictionary means “massive departures” and “flights” is not appropriate in most cases; even though it applies to some dramatic situations (severe drought, long lasting conflict).

Figure 2: Population growth across regions



Source: WDI 2004, World Bank

Figure 3: Superimposed Pyramids by age and sex of the West African Population in 1950 (background) and in 2005



1.3 A Young Population

The age structure in West Africa results largely from the evolution of fertility and mortality rates. The age pyramid in the region has a narrow top and a very wide base, life expectancy being relatively low (see Annex 2). The number of senior citizens is relatively low: although in absolute numbers there has been an increase in senior citizens, the number of people 60 years of age and above slightly declined between 1950 and 2005, going from 5.1% to 4.8%, while

⁶ It should be specified here that inter-governmental organisations such as the World Bank or the United Nations work on the basis of definitions of urban population derived from population surveys. Yet, such definitions are not homogenous. Thus, in Ghana, any built up agglomeration of more than 5,000 inhabitants is considered urban; in Senegal, the limit is 10,000 inhabitants. Also, there are difficulties related to administrative distribution. In many cases, only the main *Commune* centre (equivalent of a district or local government area) is counted as an urban zone. The WALTPS study attempted to make country figures comparable by recalculating urban populations based on a 5,000 person limit whatever the administrative denomination. This explains the discrepancy between the two approaches but does not affect the very high urban growth trend in West Africa.

⁷ The farming population is defined by the FAO as all of those whose livelihood depends on agriculture, hunting, fishing or forest exploitation. This estimate includes all those actively involved in these activities as well as their non-working dependents.

⁸ The non-farming population is defined by the FAO as the total population minus the farming population.

the proportion of those under 15 years of age has increased from 42.1% in 1950 to 44.1% in 2005. This age bracket represents 28 % of the total population in Brazil, 33% in India, 34% in Malaysia, and 35% in Algeria. In developed countries, the figures are around 15%.

This specificity should be kept in mind when analysing indicators such as *per capita* GDP (the more the number of youth – most of whom are inactive⁹ - the more the wealth generated by the active population will be divided) or the evolution of schooling rates (an increase in the education level of youths is more attainable in areas where the youth population has not tripled in forty years, as is the case in West Africa). The extreme youthfulness of the population has become a key factor in the understanding and in the economic, social and political management of West African realities. This is at the core of the issue of population mobility and migratory phenomena.

1.4 The stakes of the ageing population in most developed countries

At the global level, the proportion of youth (under 15 years of age) should decrease from 28% to 20 % between 2005 and 2050, and that of persons aged 60 and above should increase from 10% to 22%. In 2050, the proportion of youth could still be 30 % in sub-Saharan Africa, 29% in West Africa, 21% in North Africa but only 15 % in Europe.

Many developed countries are today in a process of *depopulation*, particularly in Europe. According to Eurostat, there is not one EU member country (except for Ireland) which has reached the fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman needed for regeneration of the population. Assuming a zero level migration, the EU would lose 3% of its population or 15 million inhabitants by the year 2030¹⁰.

The United Nations suggests projections taking into account immigration rates comparable to current rates. These calculations show that if the EU population increases by 1.5% in 2030 (8 million more people), Italy would lose 2.6 million inhabitants, Poland 2.3 million, Germany 1.2 million, etc. Some countries such as Ireland, Great Britain and France are exceptions. However, for all of them, the ageing population poses the problem of maintaining the active population at an acceptable level. Certain scenarios are worrisome: thus, the 25-member EU could lose 48 million people from its workforce between 2020 and 2050¹¹.

Faced with such prospects, the European Union meeting held in Lisbon in 2000¹² set the objective of reaching an activity rate of 70% of the working age population in 2010. Furthermore, the trend to extend the length of working life, or in other words, increasing retirement age, is well established and is likely to continue. Mid-term evaluations of the Lisbon strategy indicate that the objectives will not be attained in many member countries. In order to fill the gap in the workforce evaluated at 13 million to attain the 2010 objective, 43 million migrants would be needed.

While the debate among experts on the exact level of European labour needs is not yet closed, the idea that Europe must meet the challenge of a decelerating population growth and a need for an active population from outside, is now a commonly accepted perception.

⁹ Although, a fairly large proportion of children from 5 to 15 years of age are working. According to the ILO, there are 12 million children in this situation in Nigeria. According to other sources (NGO) almost 50% of children in this age bracket are implicated in West Africa. This is probably an issue of definition. Whatever the case, child labour used in the informal urban sector and in agriculture is certainly hardly taken into account in national accounts.

¹⁰ For example: Spain (- 1.6 million inh.), Italy (- 5 million), Germany (- 7.5 million). There is no country that reaches a real demographic dynamic, even though some perform better than others, notably Ireland and France.

¹¹ UN Median scenario of the United Nations Population Division 2004.

¹² Extraordinary European Council meeting of Heads of State and Government held on 23 and 24 March 2000 on the theme of "Employment, Economic Reform and Social Cohesion, for a Society of Innovation and Understanding".



The components of this chapter are essentially drawn from the SWAC's work¹³.

2.1 *An evolving region*

While taking into account the problems and challenges of the region, the SWAC, along with its African partners, has developed a prospective vision of West Africa which focuses on the identification and promotion of the dynamics of change as well as the drivers of change. Over the last four decades, West Africa has experienced significant transformation, and should not be perceived as a stagnant region but rather as a region in constant evolution and capable of significant adaptation and progress.

Over the last two decades, the region has experienced significant social, cultural, institutional and political changes:

- A shift from single party rule to a multi-party system;
- Changes in the respective roles of the State and the private sector;
- Expansion of the employment-generating informal sector;
- Macro-economic and structural adjustments;
- Changes in the configuration and role of the media;
- Emergence of civil society's role through its representative, professional or associative organisations;
- Evolution of women's rights and their representation in society; predominance of youth in society;
- Increased priority given to local development and to the regional integration process;
- Affirmation and strengthening of regional international organisations (the WAEMU, ECOWAS, the CILSS) and regional initiatives (water resource management for the major rivers, NEPAD);
- Development and implementation of poverty reduction programmes.

The list is not exhaustive.

Furthermore, the quantitative assessment should be seen in a qualified light. Of course, the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has only increased by US\$50 over the last forty years. However, GDP has almost quadrupled in absolute terms. If it has only increased slightly on a per capita basis, it is because the population has risen three-fold over the same period of time (see Annex 4). Similarly it is true that food security per person is more or less the same today as it was forty years ago. But to maintain this level, the region's inhabitants have had to increase production by 300%. While it is also true that one quarter of the children in the region do not know how to read or write, 30 years ago this was true for over half of the children, although there were only half as many as there are today. These are but a few examples among many.

The purpose here is not to say that "everything is going well" but rather to recognise the considerable efforts made by West Africans with the support of their development partners. These evolutions have not taken place without being confronted with severe problems. They have been impeded by problems related to governance, human security, national and international strategies and policies; new pandemics; ill-adapted training systems; slow development of the local private sector; tensions and conflicts often resulting from the rapid changes in societies and the environment in which these societies are evolving.

The demographic shocks which have been endured, and continue to be endured by West Africa as on the rest of the continent, are unparalleled. No other region in the world, at no time in history, has experienced such demographic growth. Moreover, no other region has undergone such demographic expansion while at the same time entering into globalisation.


¹³ Bossard, L. and Heinriqs P. – SWAC (2004) *Regional analysis of West African socio-economic indicators*; WABI/DT/23/04.

2.1.1 Some progress in regard to health and education

Despite the unprecedented demographic shock described above¹⁴, the overall health situation in West Africa is improving. Over the long term, life expectancy has increased (+9 years) since the 1960s, although the AIDS pandemic¹⁵ has been painfully present for more than ten years. Despite terrible scourges like malaria in particular, mortality of children under 5 years of age has decreased by one third over the last forty years. Between 1985 and 2001, DTC (Diphtheria-Tetanus - Whooping Cough) and measles immunisation of children under five years of age has increased from 39% to 48 %.


Furthermore, a sizeable decline was observed in the illiteracy rate (See Annex 3) which decreased from 81% in 1970 to 44% in 2001. During this period, the number of literate adults doubled in ten years. The reduction in the youth illiteracy rate, from 68% in 1970 to 25% in 2001 is yet another illustration. West Africa's performance is particularly remarkable when it is compared to other regions. After having the highest recorded rate of youth illiteracy in the world in 1970, in 2001, West Africa was able to out-perform South Asia and has drastically reduced its delay compared to North Africa. A fact that is seldom emphasised is that the more significant performances compared to other developing countries are in West African women's education.

Figure 4: Infant Mortality Rates



Source: WDI 2004, World Bank

Figure 5: Illiteracy rates by age group and number of literate adults



Source: WDI 2004, World Bank; UNESCO

2.1.2 Economic growth and employment: the pre-eminence of the informal sector and development of the private sector

Taken individually, West Africans today hardly generate more income than in the past, but they are three times more numerous. Hence, the GDP needs to increase by more than 300% in four decades to achieve this result. However, these results are not sufficient for the region to undertake an ever-improving process of significant poverty reduction; an economic growth rate of 7% per year is considered the minimum to attain the Millennium Development Goals (See Item 2.2. below).

Although the short term prospects are relatively encouraging (about 5% for 2006), there is little chance that West African countries under going rapid population growth will see their *per capita* GDP increase significantly, which partly explains why eleven West African countries¹⁶ are on the LDC list.

For the most part, this situation is due to the rationale underpinning the functioning of the informal sector, which provides a living to the majority of non-farming workers in the region, based on the job-sharing system rather than on a capitalistic-type of accumulation. An exhaustive survey conducted recently on the capital cities of WAEMU member countries helps draw a relatively clear picture of this "people's economy":

¹⁴ Roland Poutier clarifies: "Human history has never seen such an increase in population on such a huge continental scale. And it is going to continue for a long time. Nowhere has the expression "population explosion" been more appropriate" (Afriques noires, 2001).

¹⁵ In West Africa 400 000 people per year succumb to AIDS. In 2001, according to the WHO definition (Proportion of adults –aged 15 to 49 –living with HIV), there was a 6% prevalence rate among adults. It has been generally agreed that an above 30% prevalence rate indicates a stagnating or reducing population on a scale of one generation.

¹⁶ Benin, Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo

“Thus, 86% of informal jobs are found in production plants of less than 6 workers, 47% are self-employed. Consequently, this sector has the lowest rate (18%) of paid workers of all institutional sectors. The labour force in the informal sector is young: 36% of the working population is below 25 years of age. This workforce is minimally educated with an average education level of 3.5 years, and more than three quarters of workers in the sector have not gone beyond primary school. Finally, it is the most feminised sector as 53% of the working population in the informal sector are women. The cities of Lomé and Cotonou are first with a feminisation rate of 60%, as opposed to 55% in Abidjan, between 46 and 51% in Dakar, Ouagadougou and Bamako, and finally 41% in Niamey. Contrary to the idea that highlights the role of migration to explain the genesis of the informal sector, the proportion of migrants in the informal sector is the lowest (compared to the agricultural sector and the modern private sector).¹⁷”

Since 1980, the informal sector has become the main provider of urban jobs and will most likely remain so in the medium-term, even if modern enterprises account for 80% of the non-agricultural value added. However, the simplistic division of urban employment between the modern sector and the informal sector is slowly losing its significance: the new class of entrepreneurs developing from this "informal" sector will determine to a large extent the region's economic future.

“For two decades, a decisive transformation has been made possible by the weakening of the State; the private sector, which was until now inhibited by government involvement, has largely developed; it is now recognised and solicited as a major economic actor. By liberal definition, the private sector expects the government to carry out its authoritarian functions, ensure compliance with rules, and prevent some actors, sometimes administrative, “to pay themselves” from the enterprises. The private sector wants regional integration; it is on the regional market that production of “Made in Africa” goods and services is possible¹⁸.”

2.1.3 Agricultural transformation in a growing domestic market

The following elements would be completed by the reading of the in-depth analysis of West African agricultural transformation carried out by the SWAC in 2003¹⁹.

The trends indicate that the agricultural sector plays a slightly decreasing role in the West African economy. This does not however prevent agricultural value added to increase slightly faster than the population, over the past 15 years. Between 1985 and 2001, this total increased by 1.7 while the regional population increased by 1.6. A parallel is thus observed between the agricultural sector and population growth, which leads to a virtually stagnating *per capita* agricultural value added.

Taking a closer look at food crops, there has been a slight increase in traditional cereals, but much more of an increase than demographic growth in the production of maize, tubers, fruits and vegetables. Moreover, the increase in regional meat production is slightly higher than the population growth.

“For five of the seven countries examined, the trend in West African agriculture over the last 30 to 40 years is more positive than commonly known. Despite severe droughts, brutal political changes, devaluations or budget cuts, farmers are able to increase their production, following the pace of population growth while developing exports of strategic commodities²⁰”

The increase in food imports and of cereals in particular, may seem to be alarming. Imports have increased 9-fold between the beginning of the 1960s and today, which means a pace three times faster than that of total population growth, but equivalent to that of the urban population. However, it would be wrong to establish a direct correlation between urban population growth and the increase in food imports. It has been demonstrated that an urban lifestyle incites modified eating habits with the consumption of easily prepared and eaten foods (rice, more specifically). But it is also true that the change in eating habits and lifestyle in rural areas which is implemented by the socio-economic environment, notably high competitiveness of imported goods, leads to a similar process, including with agricultural producers. The most striking example is the consumption of imported rice in Senegalese rural areas.

¹⁷ AFRISTAT (2003) L'emploi, le chômage et les conditions d'activité dans la principale agglomération de sept États membres de l'UEMOA.

¹⁸ SWAC/ECOWAS (2005): *Symposium on Medium- and Long-Term Development Perspectives in West Africa; Abuja (Nigeria), 25 and 26 May 2005.*

¹⁹ Toulmin, C. and Gueye, G. (2003), *Transformation in West African Agriculture and the Role of Family Farming*, SWAC.

²⁰ Toulmin and Gueye, *op cit.*

Furthermore, it should be taken into account that the West African agriculture of the 1960s was essentially “non-market”. At the time, the farming population represented 80% of the total population of which the majority were self-subsisting. Today, the situation is quite different as the majority of the regional population (slightly more than 50%) does not depend on agriculture. By becoming the majority, consumers diversify food demands as they turn to the global market and to local producers at the same time.

The stake for West African farmers is therefore to seize the opportunity of developing a “domestic” regional market which is growing fast and diversifying, with niches (e.g animal products from Sahelian countries) which can be valorised within the framework of partnerships with emerging countries such as China. This is not exclusively a food commodities market. The stakes of West African cotton lies not only in relation to the transformation of the global market and subsidies provided by some developed countries to their producers, but it also lies in the change of part of the West African production process and hence the development of a regional textile industry²¹. Furthermore, technological progress in the production and processing sector will also be important. The role of agricultural and trade policies that promote competitiveness of agricultural sub-sectors in the region is, and will remain in the future, of critical importance.

“However, there is no assurance regarding the sustainable capacity to adapt and respond to new opportunities and to the challenges of globalisation. Farmers will not be able to continue investing humanly and financially in order to improve agricultural productivity and sustainability as long as a minimum return on investment is not guaranteed. Producers are threatened by cheap imports, by the decline in world prices, or by the difficulties in gaining access to credit and inputs”²² in a context where very few States can afford to make a minimum investment in the agricultural sector (10% of national investment budgets, according to the Maputo Declaration and restated under the ECOWAS Common Agricultural Policy adopted in January 2005)²³.

The professional agricultural organisations will definitely play a critical role in the evolution of the relationship between the global market and West African agriculture. Non-existent several decades ago, these organisations have developed and are currently present and active on the regional level, such as is the case of the West African Network of Peasant Organisations and Producers [*Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs Agricoles de l’Afrique de l’Ouest*] (ROPPA), the West African Network Chambers of Agriculture [*Réseau des Chambres d’Agriculture d’Afrique de l’Ouest*] (RECAO) and the African Cotton Producers’ Association [*Association des Producteurs de Coton Africains*] (APROCA). More and more, these organisations are defining development visions, participating in the policy and economic debates, and being heard at national and regional levels. Their influence on policies in West Africa and in Northern countries, remains still relatively weak, but it is real and will strengthen over time.

2.1.4 Integration into the global market and the need to act regionally

Increasingly exposed to external influences and undergoing rapid population growth and urban development, West African societies and economies are entering an era of competitiveness. Motivated by competition over prices and by macro-economic policies, competition between local and imported products is becoming fiercer with every day. History shows that most of today’s developed or emerging economies (notably India and China), have initially highly protected themselves to enable their economic operators to “settle” in their domestic market²⁴. Over the past four decades, many attempts by these sorts of countries were impeded either by the narrowness of domestic markets or by circumventing strategies developed in neighbouring countries of those wanting to protect themselves.

Combined statistical series indicate that the African economy remains highly dependent on the production and export of raw materials. The persistence of this pattern, “while the global trend is to develop an economy based on the production of manufactured goods and services for both the domestic market and export, is indeed the most notable of the African exceptions in the world at the beginning of the 21st century.”²⁵ This is also the only region in the world

²¹ See: SWAC (2005); Consultation on the Cotton Crisis in West and Central Africa, Timeline of key events 2001 – 2005.

²² Toulmin and Gueye, *op cit*.

²³ ECOWAS, 2005. ECOWAP. ECOWAS, Abuja, Nigeria, 18 p.

²⁴ This practice is directly inspired by one of the fathers of the theory of comparative advantages, David Ricardo, who, at the beginning of the 19th century, underlined the need for “educated protectionism” enabling a country to develop a budding industry without immediately facing competition from other countries.

²⁵ Futurs Africains, “Afrique 2025”, *op cité*.

that has to simultaneously bear the shock of demographic transition and that of integration into the globalisation process.

The West African domestic market is today nearly 300 million consumers and projected to be half a billion within the next 35 years. It therefore constitutes a major development stake in the region over the medium- and long-term. Recent history shows that this domestic market can only be regional at first:

- Because when a country tries to protect a sector of its economy, another country opens its borders;
- Because, even in the medium-term, most of the “national economies” will not reach a sufficient mass to build a market enabling economies of scale;
- Because the strong and constant increase of the population “unifies” a territory that was once an archipelago territory.

2.2 The Millennium Development Goals by 2015

It is obvious that the results of the efforts undertaken to reduce the proportion of the poor are closely linked to the increase in population. Considering the 2000 – 2015 period defined by the Millennium Conference, these objectives will be more difficult to attain in a country like Mali where the population is expected to increase by 40% than in a country like Malaysia where the population will increase only by 25%.

West Africa accounts for less than 0.3 % of total foreign direct investment (FDI) and its share of global trade is still very low: less than 1%. Official Development Aid (ODA) remains relatively modest compared to the region’s real needs (See Annex 6). It accounted for less than 5% of the regional GDP in 2001 or about \$17 per habitant²⁶. The small amounts of international transfers (See Annex 7), the considerable public debt (See Annex 5) of several countries versus their repayment capacity, the persistent difficulties of mobilising local savings and budgetary resources in countries of the region, have compounded the challenges that must be faced in order to attain the social, environmental and economic objectives of sustainable and equitable development.


In order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, considerable additional domestic and external resources must be mobilised in order to support investment programmes as regards the current and foreseeable needs. Maintaining the *status quo* would not only have considerable consequences for future generations, but would also incur higher costs for the international community over the long-term.

²⁶ With wide variations according to country.

3.1 Several perceptions of regional dynamics

The analysis of West Africa spatial dimensions sheds light on the understanding of the changes underway in the region. The work carried out by the SWAC indicates that there are several angles from which these spatial dimensions can be approached complementarily: the demo-economic evolution (Item 3.1.1); the relationship between the ecological zone and population dynamics (Item 3.1.2); groups of countries with linked destinies (Item 3.1.3) and trade zones organised around large trading networks (Item 3.1.4). These contributions should be supplemented by an analysis on ethno-linguistic areas²⁷, river basins²⁸ and still others which would sketch out a rich regional informational geography for understanding West African migration.

Figure 6: Expansion of Areas Attracting Urban Markets



Source : WALTPS

3.1.1 Economic basins

In the early 1960s, R. Dumont thus described the sub-Sahara African economy in his famous book *l'Afrique noire est mal partie* as follows: "We are in the presence of a set of highly intensive economic archipelagos. Limited centres of strong agricultural activity are separated by vast, almost empty spaces. (...) This slows down the shift to a trade economy, essential for agricultural modernisation"²⁹.

More than four decades later, things have significantly changed. Unnoticeable in Dumont's time, the rapid growth of the West African population is such that this region has become "full" in R. Pourtier's³⁰ meaning, i.e. a relatively coherent settlement area.

The WALTPS study has charted the relationship between urbanisation, densification of rural settlements and market development, i.e. trade. The maps of "market tensions" opposite (Figure 6) illustrate this diagram: the denser the urban network, the more it attracts production and trade activity and the more local economies connect with each other. The gradual unification of the "archipelagos" described by Dumont is taking place.

On these three maps, one can clearly see that between 1990 and 2020, the black zones indicating high intensity trade join up beyond national borders. West Africa is becoming a genuine regional zone.

²⁷ For more on this topic see ECOWAS/SWAC (2006): Atlas on West African languages; University of Vienna, Austria.

²⁸ For more on this topic see ECOWAS/SWAC (2006): Atlas on Transboundary River Basins in West Africa; Madiodio Niassé.

²⁹ Dumont René (1962), *L'Afrique noire est mal partie*, Paris Seuil.

³⁰ See Pourtier R. (2001), *Afriques noires*, Paris, Hachette, Carré géographie.

3.1.2 Four ecological zones

Four ecological zones with contrasted potential within West Africa

The Sahara zone, a sparsely populated desert area, has gradually lost the importance it had before colonisation; this importance was linked to the trans-Saharan trade and to the dynamism of “desert port” cities such as Timbuktu, Gao or Agadez. The zone is however highly promising because of its oil potential.

The Sahelian zone is the cradle of brilliant civilizations and empires which left behind, in the Southern part, dense and ancient settlement areas (along a line linking the capital cities of Sahelian countries), which are today among the most populated rural areas in the region. The relatively weak agricultural potential is partly offset by large hydro-agricultural territorial planning in the Senegal and Niger River valleys. This zone had the biggest drought toll in the 1970s and 1980s. Once the main livestock-rearing region in West Africa, a large part of the zone’s cattle has now moved southward. This zone is today experiencing the development of agro-pastoral systems and a certain form of agriculture and livestock integration. Just like the Sahara zone, over the last decades it has been an area with high emigration.

The Sudano-Savannah zone, relatively spared by the climate crises, has great agricultural potential. Located between the north of coastal countries and south of Sahelian countries, this zone is experiencing rapid integration of the agricultural and livestock sectors. Cotton production has undergone significant agricultural changes. It is the leading cereal production region (millet, sorghum and also increasingly maize), fruits and vegetables; the zone has also become the main livestock rearing region. Furthermore, it has taken advantage of the onchocerciasis control programme which has freed millions of hectares of fertile land in the valleys. This area is today relatively sparsely populated given its potential. Barely urbanised, its network of secondary cities is expanding rapidly. While the zone has undergone intensive emigration over the past decades, it could become a host zone in the future.

The forestry zone includes the main areas of urban growth in coastal countries and their immediate hinterland. Ecological conditions and proximity to the coast have provided a conducive environment for the development of cash crops, the so-called tropical crops for export, or for agribusiness plantations (hevea, palm oil trees, bananas and pineapples), or family farming (coffee, cocoa). A symbol of “outward looking” development, the zone has undergone the greatest population and economic growth over the past decades because of relatively large migratory flows from other areas.

3.1.3 Three economic sectors

The “West Africa Long Term Perspectives” study³¹, published in 1998 by the Club du Sahel, the CILSS and the ADB, suggests a reading of the regional economy which is structured in three sectors of countries with convergent paths.

The countries in the Gulf of Guinea around Nigeria (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon) accounted for more than 80 % of the regional GDP in 1990, which was highly concentrated on a shallow coastal strip. This strip attracts the bulk of the regional market and has the greatest regional trade potential. At the core of this system, Nigeria alone accounts for 50 % of the regional GDP and its abundant mining resources ensure the country’s sustainable prosperity: it is the core of the regional economy. Nigeria is up to now the most affluent area in West Africa because of its agricultural and mining resources; it is at the centre of the region’s integration into globalisation through its trade activities and the resulting financial flows.

The countries of the Atlantic coast (Cape Verde, Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia) form a relatively autonomous group in terms of the regional market and many are focusing more on international markets, specifically the European markets. Within this group, the coastal Sahelian countries are remarkably open compared to the rest of the region: they receive more aid on average than the other groups (more than the land-locked Sahelian countries which are even poorer). Their future highly depends on their capacity to diversify their sources of income. This zone is probably one of the most vulnerable in the region. The coastal forestry countries have experienced long decades of political unrest but still have great potential due to their abundant resources. In the medium-term, this group of countries has several development alternatives.

³¹ Club du Sahel / AfDB / CILSS (1998) *Preparing for the Future: A vision of West Africa in the Year 2020*; Ed. OECD.

Either they gradually connect themselves, *via* the Côte d'Ivoire, to the centre of the regional market, or they more openly join coastal Sahelian countries.

The large land-locked countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad) are facing many constraints linked to their geographic location and the vastness of their territories which correlate to their low population density and great ecological problems. However, in the southern part of these countries, there are high potential agricultural areas and large rivers. For more than a decade, because of the remarkable agricultural progress in these countries, the image of "famine countries" left by the painful droughts of the 1970s and 1980s is fading.

3.1.4 Three trade regions

The work carried out in the 1990s by the SWAC and the CILSS has suggested a regional approach based on the following trade networks:

The Eastern sub-region³² constitutes Nigeria, which is at the center, Benin, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The integration factors here rely on cross-border trade network activities of the Hausa, Ibo, and Yoruba.

The Center sub-region³³ that can be defined as the central corridor of West Africa is polarized by the economies of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana and includes Burkina-Faso and the Eastern part of Mali in its periphery. It is structured around cattle trade and the migration of populations.

The Western sub-region³⁴ includes the western part of West Africa, from Guinea to Mauritania, with Senegal as the centre. Here, the area's structuring factors are based on the importance of Islam as a cultural base and rice in agricultural activities and as a staple food for populations. Just as in the Eastern sub-region, trade activities are organised from three main trade networks of a regional scope: the Dioula, Fulani and Moor networks to which the Wolof can be added.

These three trading zones do not exist independently of one another. The rapid development of the cellular telephone contributes to creating a trade zone operating on the basis of information collected within all of West Africa.

3.2 Regional mobility and economic opportunities

The factors described above provide elements that explain the regional mobility in West Africa. However, these factors are insufficient and must be supplemented by putting into perspective the mobility of populations, migration and demography.

World history shows that the demographic transition phase is linked to a period of great mobility of the population. In fact, it is when the population increases rapidly that the need to change environment (from city to rural areas, poor zones to richer zones) is quite evident. West Africa³⁵, just like sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, is at the heart of this transition and mobility phase that other developing regions have previously experienced (see Item 1.1). Over the past 45 years, the number of West African inhabitants has multiplied by 3.3 and the urban population by 10. In other words, one can say that more than 80 million West Africans have "migrated" from the rural areas to the cities. The mobility of the West African population was primarily reflected in the rapid urban development as well as migration to the interior of the region. It is difficult to make a quantitative estimate of this intra-regional migration. Calculations made based on population surveys indicate that the countries of the region today host 7.5 million migrants³⁶ coming from another West African country, or nearly 3% of the regional population. This rate, which has been increasing since 1990, is higher than the average African rate (2%) and largely exceeds that of the European Union at 0.5%.

³² Club du Sahel (1993) *Integration by markets in the sub-region is: the impact of Nigeria on its immediate neighbours*. Synthesis report; 142 p.


³³ Club du Sahel (1998) *The stakes of regional integration in the centre sub-region in West Africa*, 70 p.

³⁴ COSTE, Jérôme; EGG, Johny (under the direction of) *Cereal trade and agricultural policies in the western sub-region (The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal) What are the regional dynamics?* Synthesis Report; Club du Sahel, 1991; 217 p.

³⁵ Defined here as all of the ECOWAS 15 member States, plus Mauritania, Chad and Cameroon.

³⁶ Migration Policy Institute, 2000.

Figure 7: West African Migration



Source: Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa; ECOWAS/SWAC

In addition, these assessments of migrants do not fully take into account the reality of migratory flows. Serious studies were carried out on migratory flows during the periods 1976-1980³⁷ and 1988-1992³⁸ when 500,000 to 1 million people changed countries of residence every year. The WALTPS³⁹ study indicates that close to 30 million West Africans changed countries of residence between 1960 and 1990, or on average one million people every year. Despite the statistical uncertainties, West Africa appears to be a melting pot of populations.

Except in the case of acute crisis, intra-regional migration is not an exodus or fleeing but the result of rational strategies based on economic opportunities. When these opportunities dry up, migration stops; sometimes the migrants turn back waiting for better days or turn to other zones that

are deemed more hospitable. For example, there is consensus on the fact that the “Ivorian miracle” of the 1980s is largely due to the inflow of Sahelian labour on cocoa and coffee plantations in the South of the country. Similarly, without migration, it is very likely that the central plateau of Burkina Faso would find it difficult to support the ever growing population on constantly degrading land. If there had not been urbanisation or migration since 1960, Burkina Faso would have today a rural population of 15 million as compared to currently 6 million. Migratory strategies follow the quest for economic opportunities and have the capacity to adapt to markets through diversification of destinations or activities. While alleviating the social and demographic pressure on departure zones, the freedom of movement “minimises the propensity of migrants to settle permanently in host zones”⁴⁰ of the region or abroad⁴¹.

After urbanisation and intra-regional migration, emigration outside the West African region is the third form of mobility. In quantitative terms, it is far below rural/urban migration and/or migration between countries in the region. The number of West Africans officially recorded in OECD countries is about 1.2 million people at the beginning of the 2000s⁴²; or 7 to 10 times less than the number of West African migrants in West Africa.

Emigration to other regions in Africa is very difficult to assess due to the lack of reliable statistics. The population census in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt reveal the presence of very small West African communities in these countries (under 10,000 to 20,000 or 30,000). The number of West Africans in Libya cannot be evaluated even though people believe that this country is the main host country in North Africa.

3.3 The regional migration process

An historical and geographical framework is particularly important in order to have a better understanding of the regional integration process in West Africa. In fact, its *a-spatial* and *a-temporal* analysis generally leads to a dismal diagnosis of mobility or even failure. On the contrary, while examining integration in its space and time, the conclusions are more positive and motivating as they give sense to the efforts undertaken at all levels to build West African regional integration.

³⁷ World Bank, 1990.

³⁸ Réseau Migrations et Urbanisation en Afrique de l'Ouest.

³⁹ Club du Sahel / OECD, 1998.

⁴⁰ D. Ouedraogo, 2002.

⁴¹ Paragraph cited from the “Migration” chapter of the Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa SWAC/OECD, 2006.

⁴² Source: DELSA/OECD Data base.

In 1970, when West Africa had 90 million people, 80% of which included a rural population essentially involved in home-consumption, no real market dynamic could support a regional integration project. Yet, it is within this unfavourable context for integration that, the regional economic communities, with ECOWAS as the lead entity, were created in the mid-1970s.

Some 30 years later, the situation has changed significantly. West Africa is about to reach 300 million inhabitants (see Item 1.1). The economic regions are linking up beyond borders (see Item 1.2). Urban demand is much greater given that the regional population is set to reach 50% of the urban population. The economic and demographic conditions of the creation of a regional market are being gradually created.

In the wake of independence, emphasis was placed on the building of a Nation-State with the idea that national unity should take precedence over diversity. Over time and mostly in the early 1990s, several countries in the region have given increased priority to the promotion of local initiatives and to decentralisation. This new approach greatly modifies the conditions for the implementation of a number of national sectoral policies, notably in the area of health, education and equipment.

The building of local decision-making, complementary to that at the national level, has an impact on the construction of West African regional integration. While political cooperation, monetary integration, the definition of common rules in the customs, financial and insurance sectors, remain under the exclusive competence of the States individually and collectively, the concerns of the local border authorities as regards to their scope of activities should be henceforth increasingly taken into consideration at both the national and regional levels.

Moreover, regional integration is making a strong comeback to the top of the African political and economic agenda:

- The African Union has made it the core component of its vision of the future;
- The implementation of NEPAD greatly relies on a regional approach anchored in ECOWAS' mandate;
- Regional integration is defined as the cornerstone or even the initial stage of the Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union and ACP countries. In West Africa, ECOWAS, along with Mauritania, has been made responsible for the implementation of this agreement;
- Other organisations that play a key role in the region such as the WAEMU and the CILSS also give top priority to the regional dimension of development;
- Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have begun to expand to take account of the regional dimensions of poverty and the efforts to be made in view of reducing it, with the perspective of accelerated economic growth in each of the countries based both on local initiatives and regional complementarities.

Since its creation in 1975, ECOWAS' role and mandate have greatly evolved. Initially created to promote regional economic integration, over the last decade ECOWAS has increasingly been solicited to address conflict and tension management issues in the region. Member States have broadened ECOWAS' mandate twice: once in 1999, by the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security; and the second time in 2001 by the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, already ratified by a sufficient number of member States to be applicable.

The Supplementary Protocol takes into account a wide range of societal issues: monitoring of elections; poverty reduction; free movement of goods and people; promotion of social dialogue; education; culture and religion; human rights; women, children and youth.

If conflict and crises management occupies a great deal of ECOWAS' energy, the countries of the region now need more than ever a regional economic structure in order to be supported in their development efforts and their fight against poverty. Within the context of economic globalisation and the opening of markets where only the great economic blocs can compete on the global market, ECOWAS' role becomes essential as a complementary regional structure to what is being achieved at the local and national levels. A range of diverse and ambitious initiatives were developed in this prospect, namely:

- The creation of a common currency for the countries in the West African Monetary Area (Guinea, the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone); this currency (Eco) is expected to merge with the CFA franc in due time;
- The Regional Agricultural Policy;
- The transportation facilitation plan;
- Joint or concerted actions in the health sector through the West African Health Organization (WAHO);
- Strategy and programmes aimed at facilitating cross-border cooperation.

These initiatives and others have not yet produced all of the expected results, but there has clearly been accelerated progress in the joint definition of policies and strategies over the past years which is promising indeed. Irreversible trends towards regional integration have been increasingly observed despite crises and conflicts. A West African region is emerging with economic dynamics that strengthen the existing and developing economic fabric, beyond historical and language barriers among English, French and Portuguese speaking countries.

The regional construction process will undoubtedly be at the core of future migratory stakes. In moving forward, the process will create a more integrated regional market, a more fluent economic region within which better economic opportunities will be offered to every ECOWAS citizen.

It is in this spirit that in 1979, the ECOWAS member States adopted a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Settlement⁴³. These provisions partly entered into force in 1980. An ECOWAS passport was issued⁴⁴, as the ID card alone is valid for WAEMU citizens. The ECOWAS region is institutionally asserting itself as a sphere of free movement. People migrate essentially by road through more than 15 000 km of borders between ECOWAS countries plus 8 500 km between these countries and their neighbors: Mauritania, North Africa, Chad and Cameroon. These borders do not correspond to the transnational socio-cultural areas within which mobility is so natural that it is difficult to imagine that it can be constrained. These are, for example, the Hausa territory which has 30 million people between Northern Nigeria and Niger or the Mande territory (15 million people between Senegal, Mali, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire).

3.4 The Entire West African region and its relationship with the rest of the world

While West Africa is beginning to build a regional entity and identity, the aim is not for West Africa to look inwards, but rather to positively integrate into the globalisation process.

3.4.1 Pan-African cooperation

At the institutional level, West Africa is linked to the rest of the continent under the African Union, which has the objective *inter alia*, to “Render irreversible the integration dynamics of the continent by promoting regional cooperation”⁴⁵. The role of ECOWAS - the institution responsible for the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the European Union for West Africa- has been further strengthened. Moreover, major coordination efforts have clarified the respective roles of the WAEMU and the CILSS in the West African regional integration process.

Pan African cooperation has strategic stakes with **the Maghreb and Machrek**. With this region, West Africa has shared for centuries, via the Sahara, certain cultural and religious life styles and commercial relationships, with a long time trade in gold, cola nuts, fabric, copper, salt, ivory, European manufactured goods and also slaves; the trans-Saharan slave trade having involved more than a million individuals during the 19th century⁴⁶. The 20th century and the colonial era mark the decline in these exchanges and the population flows that went along with it.

⁴³ Protocole A/P1/5/79 relating to free movement of persons, residence and establishment.

⁴⁴ Uniform format adopted at the 2000 Conference of Heads of State and Government. This passport was issued for public use in Benin and Senegal in 2003.

⁴⁵ Strategic framework of the Commission of the African Union 2004-2007; Final draft, March 2004.

⁴⁶ J. Giri, 1994.

During the last quarter of the 20th century, new events occurred that reactivated trans-Saharan trade and the labour flow towards North Africa. The development of the oil sector in Libya and Algeria has triggered a movement of job seekers, mainly from West Africa and from the Sudan.

For the past few years, North Africa has been receiving a growing number of sub-Saharan migrants “in transit” who want to enter Europe, including a great proportion of West Africans. Although the volume is minimal, such population movements pose a problem. European border controls are now more stringent; “transit” migration has now become immigration *de facto*. This leads to more or less the temporary settling of migrants for several years. This trend has been confirmed by *ad hoc* observations. Thus, the relay city of Tamanrasset in Southern Algeria has grown from 3,000 inhabitants in 1966, including 10% of Sub-Saharans, to 65,000, 50% of whom are from Africa south of the Sahara, in late 1990⁴⁷. In the same way, in 2005, the harbor city of Nouadhibou, in Northern Mauritania, hosted 10,000 West African candidates for emigration to Europe, or 10% of its population. In the same year, Morocco estimated 20,000 Sub-Saharans around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as in the city of Oujda on the border with Algeria⁴⁸. The risks of inter-community tension are real.

On its eastern side, West Africa maintains direct economic and political relationships with Central Africa via Chad and Cameroon: the former being turned towards the Sahelo-Saharan region and the latter towards the Gulf of Guinea. Furthermore, recently South African economic actors have been looking towards West Africa for investment and trade opportunities.

3.4.2 Trade with Asia and Cooperation with Europe

At the beginning of the 1970s, approximately 80% of exports and imports of ECOWAS countries were geared towards Europe and to a lesser extent North America. Added to this geographical dependence was the handicap of exporting only agricultural raw materials that were barely processed or not processed at all, hence their low value added. Thirty-five years later, the external trade pattern has not fundamentally changed. However, there is a clear diversification of trading partners. In particular from the side of emerging Asian countries, the share of exports from West Africa to Asia has increased from 2% in 1970 to 11% in 2003 and that of Asian imports to West Africa from 7% to 25%. This upward trend will undoubtedly be maintained in the years to come⁴⁹. Already, West Africa, which is the third largest cotton producer in the world, exports 80% of its production to Asia⁵⁰. A sustainable increase in global demand for iron or bauxite⁵¹ stimulated by China could have a very positive impact on West Africa. Inversely, the burst of low-cost Asian technology onto the global market (telephones, computer goods) should make such products more accessible for the African market, including the setting up of assembling factories in West Africa.

Within this context, West Africa is currently negotiating the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union. The new EU-ACP agreements, resulting from the Cotonou Convention, foresee replacing the global relationship between Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU) by Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) – or free trade zones – between the European Union and regional blocs. West Africa has made some relative progress in this process as it has already determined the group of countries appointed to negotiate the new partnership. This group will later form the regional bloc constituting the Euro-African free trade zone. This group comprises ECOWAS countries plus Mauritania.

While these negotiations around economic partnership are clearly designed and organised as “bloc to bloc” West Africa – Europe negotiations, the same does not apply to the dialogue on migratory stakes. Migratory stakes are currently limited to bilateral discussions between a European country and an African country (Spain – Senegal, Spain – Mauritania, France – Mali, France – Senegal, etc.). What will happen in the future?

⁴⁷ M. Lahlou.

⁴⁸ This city is not only the main entry point to Morocco but also the place where migrants are returned home once arrested by Moroccan authorities. See Wender, 2004.

⁴⁹ See: SWAC/ECOWAS (2005); Regional Atlas on Transport and Telecommunications in the ECOWAS zone; Ph. Heinrichs, C. Perret, L. Bossard.

⁵⁰ See: SWAC/ECOWAS (2006); Atlas on Cotton in West Africa; C. Perret under the supervision of L. Bossard.

⁵¹ China is now the world’s number one consumer of steel, copper, zinc and platinum, the second for aluminum (made from bauxite).

IV. STRATEGIC QUESTIONS AND COURSES OF ACTION

The analysis made in the above sections, although incomplete, raises indeed a number of questions about the future. The SWAC does not claim to have the answers to these questions but can submit a number of hypotheses derived from its work and forums that it facilitates. The idea is not to foresee but to anticipate. The aim is not to provide definitive answers but to pave the way for continuing strategic thinking, consultation and negotiation processes in view of making concrete decisions, specifically with regards to policies and investments.

Below is a list of strategic questions that should be further considered. Furthermore, our review is however limited to four of these questions in this document, knowing that this preliminary review should be complemented by more detailed analyses. Such analyses are likely to lead to concrete decisions that have an impact on the daily lives of the region's population and the future.

Some strategic questions:

→ Where and how will the population in the region live by the year 2020?

- How can West African States and the region as a whole be prepared to better support future migrations and develop host zones in terms of land development?
- Which voluntarist policies will enable the spatial recomposition and regional planning to benefit the inevitable movement of populations?
- How to develop the regional area to foster or structure growth areas which are capable of hosting these populations in movement?
- How to support the development of medium-size cities?
- How to support the development of cross-border urban networks?

→ How will rural areas evolve over the next 20 years?

- Which agricultural transformations will enable a better future for the farmers?
- What will be the most promising sector for the growth and well-being of agriculture, livestock rearing and fishery actors?
- What will be the potential economic conversions for the rural population in the face of trade liberalisation policies and globalisation?
- How to anticipate and manage recurrent food crises and how to establish a rapid response system in times of crisis? Which strategy for sustainable management of structural food insecurity?

→ What will be the structures of the West African economy?

- How and on which activities will West African actors live and produce?
- How to improve urban production and productivity, which is mainly assured by the informal economy?
- How to capitalize on national production to meet the challenges of competitiveness at the regional level and at the level of access to global markets, in particular in view of existing trade agreements (EU-ACP, AGOA, etc.)?
- Which social policies could be implemented to benefit those whose economic and social status will not improve?

→ What is the future for the youth?

- Which economic transformations will help meet the employment needs of a growing population of which nearly 55% is below twenty years of age?
- On which societal projects can West African youth be brought together and what are their prospects for a better future?
- What guarantees can be given to the private sector so that it can absorb a great part of this labour force?

→ What is the future for women?

- What is/will be the impact of migratory flows, specifically those of youth, on women and families?
- How to ensure the enforcement of laws (at the international, regional, national and local levels) on gender-sensitive social protection in favour of women in the West African society?

→ How to promote peace and security in the region?

- Which policy tools of a regional scope can West Africa set up to strengthen the peace and security process?
- How to manage the dynamics of crisis and conflict to improve human security in West Africa?
- Which complementary roles can the States and the region play in favor of peace and security?
- What should be the complementary role of political parties, civil society and the media in building peace and democracy in West Africa?

→ How to strengthen the regional construction process?

- Which complementary role can local institutions (both public and private) play in this construction?
- How to develop regional public property? What are the respective roles of the State –local and national level – and of the private sector?


4.1 Where and how will the population in the region live by year 2020?

All available data indicate that 55% or 60% of the nearly 430 million people who will reside in West Africa by 2020/2025 –or within one generation - will live in urban areas. The population of secondary cities, those with 100, 000 to 500,000 inhabitants, is likely to grow at a faster pace than that of big towns; this has been the trend for the past two decades. Some new cities could experience sharp population growth, notably in oil exploitation zones, which are likely to appear in the Saharo-Sahelian part of the region.

The rural population will continue growing at a slower pace than the urban population. The rural areas that have few natural resources and are far from big urban centres could however see their population stagnate and even decrease because of migration towards more conducive farming zones or to cities. Should mobility be hindered for any reason, these underprivileged zones could experience major crises due to increased scarcity of resources. In the same way, if higher potential regions do not receive investments in terms of infrastructures and other development support, conflict between indigenous and foreign populations could occur.

Strategic thinking on future host zones should therefore be carried out as soon as possible. The “profile” of such zones is the following: an agricultural potential, relatively low rural population density, growing cities that are likely to offer prospects and services to the rural environment.

Figure 8 : Onchocerciasis-free zones




Source: CICRED 1999.

The onchocerciasis-free zones – about 25 million hectares -- (figure 8) closely correspond to this profile. A recent publication by CICRED⁵² states that “the population density of which is overall lower than the density of all of the countries (...) appears to have good agricultural potential. The climate and oreographic conditions provide tropical ferruginous soils especially favourable for a variety of crops, notably yam, sorghum, cotton, peanuts etc. (...) River basins have soils rich in silt and minerals (...) which prove to be favourable for fluvial agriculture and irrigation.”

Great cotton basins and a very large proportion of maize, fruits and vegetables and livestock products are found in this part of West Africa. The population density is relatively low, even though large concentrations of rural populations can already be observed at the local level.

Furthermore, the same zone is under rapid urbanization. The network of about fifty cities shown in figure 9 is only a “snapshot” of an incredibly rapid process. If this same map had been drawn twenty years ago, about twenty cities would not appear. The same map in 1960 would show less than ten cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants. Over the next twenty years, some fifteen cities will appear. The very high urban density of Northern Nigeria and Northern Cameroon provides an idea of what South Niger, North Ghana, North Côte d'Ivoire and Southwest Senegal will be within one generation.

Figure 9:



Source : SWAC (2005)

This is a contact zone between Sahelian countries and coastal countries. In this regard, the above-mentioned CICRED study concludes: “It is therefore essential to clearly identify the population areas and to define its characteristics as indicators of continuity or discontinuity of national and transnational demo-economics. In other words, it is necessary to define the elements which do or do not mark the limits between the “southern” and the “northern” part of the countries concerned

and to gain an understanding of the exchanges between the different sub-regions.” Taking into account the dynamics of urbanisation (which is not incorporated in the CICRED study) sheds new light on these issues; it confirms the rapid densification of cross-border continuities.

All this should indeed be further examined, qualified and defined. It is now essential to introduce operational prospective strategic thinking on regional development into the debates on migration.

Huge investment will be required to cope with the high population growth at all levels: jobs, trade, industrialisation, promotion of the private sector, increased movement of goods and persons, housing, better future for the youth, migration and mobility of the labour force, transportation and communications, food security, peace and security. For most countries in the region, the strengthening of the regional fabric and intra-regional and continental trade will constitute a key factor in the promotion of pro-poor growth in view of achieving sustainable, equitable and peaceful development.

⁵² Committee for International Cooperation in National Research in Demography (1999); “Population Dynamics in Onchocerciasis-free zones in West Africa: Benin (CERPOD), Burkina (UERD), Côte d'Ivoire (ENSEA), Ghana (RIPS), Guinea (DNSI), Mali (DNSI), Niger (DSCN), Senegal (DPS), Togo (URD); synthesis of country monographs”; coordinated by André Quesnel (CICRED).

4.2 How will the West Africa rural environment evolve?

This question is crucial as it concerns a large proportion of the population in the region. Which transformations will the rural environment experience or should experience to simultaneously attain several objectives: food security, absorption of part of the population growth, job creation, improvement of income in rural areas, poverty reduction and contribution to economic growth?

The fact that West Africa will be mostly urban will not significantly decrease the strategic importance of agriculture and livestock rearing; quite the opposite.

Due to the increase of urban demand, a great proportion of farmers will understand market rationale and improve their standard of living. However, another proportion as great as the previous one will not benefit from this change and will remain poor. Drought periods and locust invasions will certainly and regularly continue to affect the agro-pastoralists living in the Northern part of the Sahel (below isohyets of 400 mm).

In the livestock sector, two emerging trends could be further established:

- Poultry farming could rapidly develop and become the first source of animal protein just as it already is at the global level. This global trend is due to the fact that transformation of plant protein into animal protein is cheaper and faster with chicken than with ruminants.
- The cattle and meat sector could, under the effect of rapid increase in demand, adapt to new requirements by increasing slaughter houses near animal husbandry zones and by developing transportation and trade in meat rather than live cattle. If this evolution does not take place, competition with imported bovine meat from other parts of the world, notably Southern Africa, could threaten this activity sector.

Cotton is likely to remain a major agricultural activity because of encouraging prospects by the global demand expressed mainly by Asian countries. The same applies to coffee and cocoa. For cotton, its strategic and social role could be further reaffirmed in the future because of its spill-over effect on other food crops like sorghum and maize (SWAC, 2005⁵³).

4.3 What will be the evolution of the structures of the West African economy?

West Africa is today one of the regions that depend most on global markets: its exports account for 40 % of its GDP as compared to 16 % in Brazil and 10 % in the United States. Will the situation that has remained basically unchanged from 1960 to the present be the same in the next twenty years? Some signs indicate that significant development could take place.

On the one hand, oil exports in the region could increase with the advent of new actors like Chad (for some years now), Mauritania (since last year), and also Mali, Niger and perhaps Burkina Faso. This evolution would only strengthen the dependence of the region on global markets; while increasing financial flows to West Africa.

On the other hand, the region may experience significant industrial development for the following reasons:

- With more than 400 million consumers, the domestic market of consumer goods is very likely to expand significantly, even if the majority of West Africans remain poor.
- Africa could attract Asian investment, specifically in initial mineral processing industries (in particular Bauxite and iron), which Asia greatly needs. Asia is further capable of establishing plants to produce affordable goods for certain segments of West Africans (cars for less than \$ 5,000, computers for \$ 200, cellular phones for a few dollars, etc.).

⁵³ SWAC, 2005. *The economic and social importance of cotton in West Africa: The role of cotton in development, trade and livelihoods*. SAH/D(2005)556, 72 p.

- The global downward trend in the transportation of raw materials will certainly continue because of the upward trend in transportation costs. “As industrials are increasingly buying composite semi-processed goods, Africa is less and less competitive as it fails to undertake initial processing of its raw materials”⁵⁴. There are signs that foreign investment could move towards this sector as is the case of bauxite in Guinea, for example.
- Concerning access to the European market, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between West Africa and the European Union should, over the longer term, lead to free and direct linkage between the West African and European markets. This will attract investors who are willing to access the European market at competitive prices. While other EPAs will be concluded with many other developing regions, negotiations with West Africa appear to be the most advanced. Moreover, the region benefits from its geographical closeness with the European Union.

Finally, the following two activity sectors that have so far been marginal have great growth potential:

- Distance services using information technology. Already, Senegal and Cape Verde are hosting many *hot line* companies that provide assistance to European clients of big internet access suppliers, creating electronic editions of magazines, setting up internet sites, etc. This relative conquest of the European market is made possible through the combination of two factors: broadband internet access, abundant availability of educated labour. This trend is likely to continue and to expand.
- Tourism. Global prospects for tourism are good but the irreversible increase in air transportation costs should make operators offset these higher costs by seeking low-cost destinations. West Africa could position itself in this niche for seaside tourism as in the case already of the West Atlantic side (the Gambia and Senegal)⁵⁵, as well as for “adventure and discovery” tourism the development of which is seen as a clearly emerging trend by sector specialists.

4.4 What is the future for youth of the region?

By the year 2020, West Africa could have about 200 million people under the age of 20, or the equivalent of the total population of West Africa in 1990. There will be considerable demand in terms of health, employment, housing as well as natural resources for these people.

They will certainly have an average education level that is far higher than that of their elders, due to the results of efforts undertaken over the past few years in the education sector. With this prospect, there is still currently a need for strategic thinking as regards creating consistency between the current training systems and the future needs of the youth.

While the proportion of youth that will find jobs in the modern sector will certainly increase (see Item above), the so-called informal economy is likely to remain a major workplace for young people. The informal sector is also likely to develop faster than in the past because of the average increase in the educational level of its actors. Will West Africa experience a new form of economy based on enterprises that are mid-way between the informal and formal sectors?

Young West Africans of tomorrow will, more than their elders, be “connected” to the rest of the world. They will be the attentive and assiduous spectators of global evolutions. Even in the best hypotheses (agricultural and industrial development, improvement of living standards) the motivation in the beginning to emigrate will be as strong as it is now. As it already happens, families will establish strategies for educating their children according to job “availability in the North”, more particularly in the area of care-giving (nurses, medical care providers, etc.), where the prospects are satisfactory due to the ageing of the population in developed countries. It is quite possible that some economic operators in developed countries or in West Africa will open up specialised training institutions in the region that would primarily be geared towards the northern labour market.

⁵⁴ Stephen Smith (2005) ; *Atlas de l'Afrique, un continent jeune, révolté, marginalisé* ; Ed. Autrement ; Paris.

⁵⁵ One can also imagine Sierra Leone once again becoming a fashionable tourist destination as it was in the beginning of the 1980s.

Young Africans of tomorrow will be farther from the colonial past of their region than the previous generations. They will have weaker links with the traditional mindsets and ways of doing things that their elders had learned from educational systems designed in former colonial countries. They will have greater access to schools of thought broadcast through new information technologies. Unlike their elders, they will never have known the omnipresent post-colonial era. They will more readily turn to the private sector.

ANNEX 1: POPULATION TABLE

	Land area		Population							Age Structure			
	Total (000) km ²	Share of total land area %	in (000)		Annual growth (%)	Annual growth (%)	Density (people per km ²)	Urban population (%)	Share of total regional (%)	0 - 14	15 - 64	65+	Dependency ratio (<15 + >65 / 15-64)
			2001	1980	2001	1980-2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001
Benin	111	1	6 437	3 459	2.6	3.0	58	43	2	45.8	51.5	2.7	0.93
Burkina Faso	274	4	11 553	6 962	2.4	2.4	42	17	4	47.1	50.2	2.7	0.99
Cameroon	465	6	15 197	8 724	2.1	2.7	33	50	6	41.7	54.6	3.7	0.9
Cape Verde	4	0	446	289	2.6	2.1	112	63	0	43.4	52.9	3.7	0.79
Chad	1 259	16	7 916	4 477	2.8	2.8	6	24	3	49.6	47.4	3	1.12
Cote d'Ivoire	318	4	16 410	8 194	2.2	3.4	52	44	6	41.9	55.6	2.5	0.83
Gambia, The	10	0	1 341	641	2.6	3.6	134	31	1	40.1	56.7	3.2	0.86
Ghana	230	3	19 708	10 740	1.8	2.9	86	36	7	43.1	52.4	4.5	0.83
Guinea	246	3	7 580	4 461	2.1	2.6	31	28	3	44.3	53.1	2.6	0.88
Guinea-Bissau	28	0	1 226	763	2.2	2.3	44	32	0	43.6	52.8	3.6	0.88
Liberia	96	1	3 214	1 876	2.5	2.6	33	45	1	44.3	53	2.7	0.9
Mali	1 220	16	11 094	6 590	2.2	2.5	9	31	4	47	50	3	1
Mauritania	1 025	13	2 749	1 551	2.8	2.8	3	59	1	43.7	53.2	3.1	0.86
Niger	1 266	16	11 184	5 617	3.1	3.3	9	21	4	48.9	48.7	2.4	1.06
Nigeria	910	12	129 875	71 148	2.2	2.9	143	45	49	43.8	53.6	2.6	0.87
Senegal	192	2	9 768	5 538	2.4	2.7	51	48	4	44.3	53	2.7	0.9
Sierra Leone	72	1	5 133	3 236	2	2.2	71	37	2	44.5	52.9	2.6	0.89
Togo	54	1	4 653	2 519	2.4	3.0	86	34	2	43.6	53.3	3.1	0.93
Land-locked countries	4 019	52	41 747	23 646	2.7	2.7	10	23	16	48.1	49.2	2.7	1.03
Atlantic coast countries	1 673	22	31 457	18 355	2.4	2.6	19	40	12	44.2	53.1	2.8	0.88
Guinean golf countries	2 088	27	192 280	104 784	2.3	2.9	92	44	72	43.5	53.6	2.9	0.87
West Africa	7 462	100	265 484	146 785	2.4	2.9	36	40	100	44.3	52.8	2.8	0.89
Sub-Saharan Africa	23 603		673 893	381 735	2.3	2.7	29	32		44.0	53.0	3.0	0.89

Source: *World Development Indicators* – The World Bank, 2004.

ANNEX 2: LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE

	Life expectancy at birth (years)												Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)			Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)		
	Total				Female				Male				2001	1980	1960	2001	1980	1960
	2001	1995	1980	1960	2001	1995	1980	1960	2001	1995	1980	1960						
Benin	52.8	53.1	48.4	38.9	54.6	54.9	50.5	39.7	51.1	51.3	46.5	38.1	158	214	296	94	127	176
Burkina Faso	43.5	45.3	44.0	36.2	44.2	46.6	45.3	37.6	42.9	44.1	42.7	35.0	197	247	315	104	140	181
Cameroon	49.2	53.6	50.0	39.5	50.3	55.0	51.5	41.0	48.3	52.3	48.5	38.0	155	173	255	96	105	151
Cape Verde	68.9	67.5	61.0	52.2	71.9	70.4	63.0	53.7	66.1	64.7	59.1	50.7	38	80	164	29	61	108
Chad	48.4	47.8	42.2	34.9	50.0	49.5	43.8	36.4	46.9	46.2	40.6	33.4	200	225	..	117	124	195
Cote d'Ivoire	45.5	47.6	49.3	39.5	46.0	48.5	51.1	41.1	45.1	46.8	47.6	37.9	175	172	290	102	114	195
Gambia, The	53.3	52.2	40.2	32.4	55.0	54.2	41.8	33.9	51.7	50.3	38.6	30.9	126	231	364	91	144	207
Ghana	55.9	59.2	53.2	45.2	56.8	61.0	54.9	46.9	55.1	57.5	51.6	43.7	100	157	215	57	92	126
Guinea	46.2	45.7	39.8	33.7	46.8	46.2	40.3	34.2	45.8	45.2	39.3	33.2	169	300	380	109	175	215
Guinea-Bissau	45.1	43.6	38.6	34.1	46.6	45.1	40.2	35.6	43.7	42.2	37.1	32.6	211	290	..	130	173	200
Liberia	47.1	44.1	50.7	41.5	48.3	45.5	52.2	43.0	46.0	42.9	49.2	40.0	235	235	288	157	157	190
Mali	41.5	44.0	42.1	36.6	42.6	45.0	42.8	37.6	40.4	43.0	41.4	35.6	231	295	517	141	171	293
Mauritania	50.9	50.1	46.7	38.7	52.5	51.7	48.3	40.2	49.3	48.5	45.1	37.2	183	175	310	120	118	180
Niger	45.7	45.5	41.7	35.4	47.5	47.3	43.3	36.9	44.0	43.8	40.1	33.9	265	320	354	156	191	211
Nigeria	46.1	49.9	45.8	39.7	46.7	51.4	47.5	41.2	45.5	48.5	44.2	38.2	183	196	207	110	117	123
Senegal	52.3	51.5	45.3	37.9	54.1	53.6	47.5	39.6	50.6	49.6	43.3	36.3	138	218	300	79	128	173
Sierra Leone	37.3	36.0	35.4	31.6	38.7	37.4	36.9	33.1	36.1	34.8	33.9	30.2	316	336	390	182	192	220
Togo	49.5	49.2	49.3	39.5	50.6	50.6	51.1	41.1	48.4	47.9	47.7	38.0	141	175	267	79	106	158
Land-locked countries	44.5	45.5	42.6	35.9	45.8	46.9	43.9	37.2	43.3	44.1	41.3	34.6	225	273	317	130	158	222
Atlantic coast countries	47.7	46.6	42.7	35.8	49.1	48.0	44.2	37.1	46.5	45.2	41.3	34.6	190	258	324	116	154	197
Guinean golf countries	47.6	51.1	47.4	40.3	48.3	52.6	49.1	41.8	46.9	49.7	45.7	38.8	170	188	222	102	113	133
West Africa*	47.1	49.7	46.0	38.9	48.0	51.1	47.6	40.3	46.3	48.3	44.5	37.5	181	211	252	108	126	157
Sub-Saharan Africa	46.2	49.2	47.6	40.2	47.0	50.6	49.4	41.8	45.4	47.9	46.0	38.7	171	192	249	105	118	151

Source: *World Development Indicators* – The World Bank, 2004.

ANNEX 3: EDUCATION AND LITERACY TABLE

	Adult illiteracy rates (% of people ages 15 and above)									Youth illiteracy rates (% of people ages 15-24)									Ratio of literate women to men	
	Total			Female			Male			Total			Female			Male			2001	1970
	2001	1990	1970	2001	1990	1970	2001	1990	1970	2001	1990	1970	2001	1990	1970	2001	1990	1970		
Benin	61	74	89	75	85	94	47	62	84	46	60	81	63	75	90	28	43	71	0.49	0.38
Burkina Faso	75	84	93	85	92	98	65	75	88	64	75	88	75	86	96	53	64	81	0.45	0.19
Cameroon	28	42	70	35	52	83	20	31	57	9	19	49	11	24	64	8	14	35	0.83	0.42
Cape Verde	25	36	61	33	46	75	15	24	46	11	19	41	14	24	55	8	13	28	0.97	0.55
Chad	56	72	91	64	81	96	47	63	85	32	52	82	38	62	91	25	42	73	0.74	0.29
Cote d'Ivoire	50	61	79	62	74	91	40	50	68	38	47	67	46	60	82	29	35	53	0.61	0.26
Gambia, The	62	74	90	69	80	93	55	68	87	41	58	82	49	66	87	34	50	77	0.72	0.56
Ghana	27	42	71	35	53	83	19	30	57	8	18	51	11	25	67	6	12	34	0.85	0.41
Guinea																				
Guinea-Bissau	60	73	88	75	87	97	45	58	79	41	56	78	54	74	93	26	38	63	0.47	0.15
Liberia	45	61	82	62	77	93	29	45	70	30	43	69	46	61	88	14	25	51	0.52	0.24
Mali	74	81	91	83	90	96	63	72	85	63	72	86	74	83	93	52	62	78	0.50	0.29
Mauritania	59	65	73	69	76	83	49	54	64	51	54	70	59	64	80	43	45	60	0.63	0.48
Niger	83	89	94	91	95	99	76	82	90	76	83	92	86	91	98	67	75	87	0.39	0.10
Nigeria	35	51	80	42	62	90	27	41	70	12	26	64	15	34	79	10	19	50	0.83	0.34
Senegal	62	72	85	71	81	94	52	62	77	48	60	77	57	70	87	40	50	66	0.62	0.26
Sierra Leone																				
Togo	42	56	78	56	71	90	27	40	65	24	37	64	35	52	81	12	21	46	0.62	0.30
Land-locked countries	73	82	92	82	90	97	64	74	87	61	72	87	71	82	94	51	62	80	0.53	0.23
Atlantic coast countries	58	69	82	68	79	92	46	57	74	44	56	75	55	68	86	35	44	62	0.61	0.32
Guinean golf countries	36	51	78	44	62	89	27	40	67	15	28	62	19	36	77	12	20	47	0.81	0.35
West Africa*	43	57	81	52	68	91	34	47	71	25	38	68	31	47	81	20	30	55	0.77	0.34
Sub-Saharan Africa	38	50	72	46	60	82	30	40	62	22	33	58	27	40	71	17	25	46		

Source: *World Development Indicators* – The World Bank, 2004.

ANNEX 4: GDP TABLE

	GDP			GDP growth (constant 1995 US\$)				GDP per capita			GDP per capita growth constant 1995 US\$ (annual %)		
	PPP	Million US\$ (current)	Share of total regional GDP	Average annual growth rate (%)				PPP	US\$	West Africa = 100			
	2001	2001	2001	2001	1960-2001	1981-2001	1960-1980	2001	2001	2001	2001	1960-2001	1991-2001
Benin	6 316	2 372	2.7	5	3.3	3.5	2.8	980	368	110	2.3	0.7	1.9
Burkina Faso	12 966	2 486	2.8	5.6	3.6	4.0	3.1	1 120	215	64	3.1	1.3	1.7
Cameroon	25 572	8 501	9.6	5.3	3.3	1.8	4.3	1 680	559	167	3.1	0.7	-0.1
Cape Verde	2 487	588	0.7	3.3		5.6		5 570	1318	393	0.7		3.4
Chad	8 452	1 600	1.8	8.5	1.8	4.2	-0.6	1 070	202	60	5.5	-0.6	-0.5
Cote d'Ivoire	24 429	10 411	11.7	-0.9	4.1	1.4	7.0	1 490	634	189	-3.3	0.5	-0.5
Gambia, The	2 747	390	0.4	6		3.7		2 050	291	87	3.0		0.4
Ghana	44 323	5 301	6.0	4	2.5	3.6	1.7	2 250	269	80	1.9	-0.2	1.8
Guinea	14 839	2 989	3.4	3.6				1 960	394	118	1.3		1.6
Guinea-Bissau	1 187	199	0.2	0.2		2.4		970	162	48	-1.8		-1.3
Liberia	..	523	0.6	5.3	-0.6	-4.3	3.4		163	49	2.6	-3.3	1.6
Mali	8 980	2 647	3.0	1.4		2.6		810	239	71	-0.9		1.6
Mauritania	5 458	1 007	1.1	4.6	3.9	2.9	4.9	1 990	366	109	1.4	1.3	1.2
Niger	9 926	1 954	2.2	7.6	1.6	1.2	2.0	890	175	52	4.2	-1.5	-1.2
Nigeria	110 621	41 373	46.5	3.9	3.2	2.8	4.6	850	319	95	1.5	0.3	-0.2
Senegal	14 681	4 645	5.2	5.7	2.6	3.6	1.8	1 500	476	142	3.2	-0.2	1.3
Sierra Leone	2 419	749	0.8	5.4	0.8	-1.8	3.3	470	146	44	3.4	-1.2	-6.4
Togo	7 700	1 259	1.4	2.7	3.6	1.4	6.3	1 650	271	81	-0.1	0.8	-1.3
Land-locked countries		8 687	9.8	5.2	2.3	2.8	1.6		208	62	2.4	-0.3	0.5
Atlantic coast countries		11 090	12.5	4.8	2.1	1.7	2.7		353	105	2.3	-0.4	0.7
Guinean golf countries		69 805	78.4	3.3	3.3	2.4	4.5		363	108	0.9	0.4	0.0
ECOWAS		77 886	87.5	3.4	3.0	2.5	4.1		325	97	1.0	0.2	0.2
West Africa	303 103	88 994	100	3.7	3.0	2.4	4.0	1 606	335	100	1.3	0.3	0.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	1 230 529	315 705		2.9	3.2	1.9	4.4	1 826	468	140	0.7	0.6	-0.1

Source: *World Development Indicators* – The World Bank, 2004.

ANNEX 5: EXTERNAL DEBT TABLE

	External Debt						Debt service							
	Total debt stock (in US\$ million current)			As % of GDP			Total debt service (in million US\$ current)			As % of exports			Debt service per capita (in US\$)	
	2002	1990	1970	2002	1990	1970	2002	1990	1970	2002	1990	1970	2002	1990
Benin	1 843	1 292	41	68	70	12	63	38	2	16	14	3	10	8
Burkina Faso	1 580	834	21	51	30	5	53	34	2	19	10	8	4	4
Cameroon	8 503	6 676	145	94	60	13	358	518	11	15	23	4	23	45
Cape Verde	414	134		67	40		22	6		11	13		47	17
Chad	1 281	524	35	64	30	7	29	12	3	12	5	4	3	2
Cote d'Ivoire	11 816	17 251	374	101	160	26	832	1 262	43	15	37	8	50	107
Gambia, The	573	369	5	161	116	10	19	38	0	10	20	1	14	41
Ghana	7 338	3 881	571	119	66	26	211	367	51	8	37	11	10	24
Guinea	3 401	2 476	328	106	88		136	169	15	17	19		18	29
Guinea-Bissau	699	692	0	344	284	0	15	8	0	16	35	0	10	9
Liberia	2 324	1 849	162	414	482	46	1	3	23				0	1
Mali	2 803	2 468	249	83	102	70	90	68	5	8	16	10	8	8
Mauritania	2 309	2 096	26	238	205	12	64	146	4	17	31	4	23	73
Niger	1 797	1 726	32	83	70	5	28	99	2	8	27	3	2	13
Nigeria	30 476	33 439	837	70	117	7	1 490	3 336	96	9	27	9	11	35
Senegal	3 918	3 736	145	78	66	17	219	325	12	14	22	5	22	44
Sierra Leone	1 448	1 197	61	185	184	14	23	21	19	16	15	14	4	5
Togo	1 581	1 281	40	114	79	16	13	86	2	3	16	2	3	25
Land-locked countries	7 461	5 552	337	70	59	18	200	213	12	10	15	6	5	7
Atlantic coast countries	15 086	12 549	727	129	109	36	498	715	71	15	22	15	15	30
Guinean golf countries	61 557	63 820	2 008	82	106	11	2 967	5 606	205	11	28	8	15	39
West Africa	84 104	81 921	3 072	87	102	14	3 664	6 534	288	11	27	9	13	33
Sub-Saharan Africa	210 350	176 906	6 921	66	60	11	12 422	10 888	646	12	14	5	18	21

Source: *World Development Indicators* – The World Bank, 2004.

ANNEX 6: OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TABLE

	Official Development Assistance											
	Flows, net (in US\$ million, current)			ODA per capita (in US\$)			ODA as share of GDP (in %)			ODA as share of total regional (in %)		
	2002	1990	1980	2002	1990	1980	2002	1990	1980	2002	1990	1980
Benin	220	268	90	33	57	26	8	15	6	4	5	4
Burkina Faso	473	331	212	40	37	30	15	12	12	8	6	9
Cameroon	632	446	265	41	38	30	7	4	4	10	8	11
Cape Verde	92	108	64	201	317	221	15	32		2	2	3
Chad	233	314	35	29	55	8	12	18	3	4	5	1
Cote d'Ivoire	1 069	688	210	64	58	26	9	6	2	18	12	9
Gambia, The	61	99	55	44	107	86	17	31	23	1	2	2
Ghana	653	563	192	33	37	18	11	10	4	11	10	8
Guinea	250	293	90	32	51	20	8	10		4	5	4
Guinea-Bissau	59	129	59	47	136	77	29	53	53	1	2	2
Liberia	52	114	98	16	47	52	9	30	10	1	2	4
Mali	472	482	267	42	57	41	14	20	15	8	8	11
Mauritania	355	237	176	126	119	113	37	23	25	6	4	7
Niger	298	396	170	26	51	30	14	16	7	5	7	7
Nigeria	314	258	36	2	3	1	1	1	0	5	4	1
Senegal	449	818	263	45	112	47	9	14	9	7	14	11
Sierra Leone	353	61	91	67	15	28	45	9	8	6	1	4
Togo	51	260	91	11	75	36	4	16	8	1	4	4
Land-locked countries	1 476	1 523	684	34	49	29	14	16	10	24	26	28
Atlantic coast countries	1 672	1 859	896	52	78	49	14	16	15	27	32	36
Guinean golf countries	2 939	2 483	884	15	17	8	4	4	1	48	42	36
West Africa	6 087	5 865	2 464	22	30	17	6	7	2	100	100	100
Sub-Saharan Africa	18 615	18 058	7 615	27	36	20	6	6	3			

Source: *World Development Indicators* – The World Bank, 2004.

ANNEX 7: PRIVATE FINANCIAL FLOWS TABLE

	Total net private flows					Foreign Direct Investment							Workers' Remittances				
	Net flows (in million US\$ current)					Net inflows (in million US\$ current)					in % of GDP	in US\$ per capita	Receipts (million US\$ current)			in % of GDP	in US\$ per capita
	2002	2001	2000	1990	1980	2002	2001	2000	1990	1980	2002	2002	2002	1990	1980	2002	2002
Benin	17	18	-1	-53	296	41	131	64	62	4	1.5	6	68	89	77	2.5	10
Burkina Faso	26	2	13	14	2	8	26	23	0	0	0.3	1	45	140	150	1.4	4
Cameroon	266	-60	-87	10	363	86	75	31	-113	130	0.9	5	9	19	11	0.1	1
Cape Verde	69	53	27	0	-	15	1	21	0	..	2.4	33	85	56	40	13.8	186
Chad	11	3	-355	1	-1	901	80	15	9	0	45.0	108	1	0	0	0.1	0.1
Cote d'Ivoire	-304	-164	453	-327	548	230	246	235	48	95	2.0	14	0	0	0	0.0	0
Gambia, The	-12	-7	-4	0	20	43	36	44	0	0	12.0	31	0	0	0	0.0	0
Ghana	-83	-40	-59	11	13	50	89	110	15	16	0.8	2	44	6	1	0.7	2
Guinea	-4	-31	190	-17	46	0	2	10	18	1	0.0	0	15	0		0.5	2
Guinea-Bissau	-2	0	4	8	3	1	30	23	2	0	0.5	1	2	1		1.0	1
Liberia	-312	998	563	452	316	-65	13	12	0	0	-11.6	-20					
Mali	-136	-2	42	-9	1	102	103	106	6	2	3.0	9	89	107	59	2.6	8
Mauritania	-40	1	3	-7	-11	12	30	9	7	27	1.2	4	2	14	6	0.2	1
Niger	9	10	-1	-20	61	8	13	19	41	49	0.4	1	6	13	6	0.3	1
Nigeria	1 343	1 417	-1 604	-1 206	1 065	1 281	1 104	930	588	-739	2.9	10	1 301	10	13	3.0	10
Senegal	67	51	56	-71	77	93	126	88	57	15	1.8	9	173	91	75	3.4	17
Sierra Leone	-16	2	6	8	-7	5	4	5	32	-19	0.6	1	0	0	0	0.0	0
Togo	9	0	-14	3	-8	75	67	42	18	43	5.4	16	53	27	10	3.8	11
Land-locked countries	-89	14	-301	-13	64	1 019	222	163	56	51	9.6	24	141	260	215	1.3	3
Atlantic coast countries	-249	1 068	846	373	444	104	242	212	116	24	0.9	3	277	106	81	2.5	10
Guinean golf countries	1 317	1 224	-1 286	-1 562	2 278	1 763	1 712	1 412	618	-451	2.3	9	1 560	151	112	2.1	8
West Africa	910	2 253	-768	-1 202	2 785	2 886	2 176	1 787	790	-376	3.0	11	1 893	573	448	2.0	7
Sub-Saharan Africa	-225	3 238	132	-1 062	3 922	7 822	13 815	6 076	1 008	121	2.4	11					

Source: *World Development Indicators* – The World Bank, 2004.