

42nd Annual Meeting of the Network of Senior Officials from Centres of Government

OECD, Paris, France
22-23 November 2023

SESSION NOTES



**SECRÉTARIAT GÉNÉRAL
DU GOUVERNEMENT**

*Liberté
Égalité
Fraternité*



The 42nd Annual Meeting of the Network of Senior Officials from Centres of Government - Session Notes


Session 1: Centres of Governments at the centre of democratic resilience in the face of polarisation

1. **Over many decades, democracy has proven itself to be the best form of government for protecting and promoting individual rights and freedoms while allowing long-term sustainable gains in wellbeing.** In 2021, the OECD launched the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative (Box 1) with the dual goal of deepening democracy and protecting it from existing and emerging threats. The initiative was cemented in 2022, with the adoption of the OECD Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy (Luxembourg Declaration) [[OECD/LEGAL/0484](#)], which reaffirmed that “*democracy remains the system of government best placed to ensure inclusive, prosperous, sustainable and peaceful societies through constant self-assessment and self-improvement.*”
2. **In recent years, democracies have faced a series of shocks and challenges to economic and democratic resilience.** Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine and the global COVID-19 pandemic have had substantial effects on public welfare in OECD countries. These came after many countries experienced the lingering social, political and economic effects that followed the global financial crisis of 2009. At the same time, low voter turnout, rising numbers of citizens dissociating themselves from traditional democratic processes, increasing mis- and disinformation, and greater political polarisation are undermining democratic resilience and the ability of governments to prepare for and respond to external shocks.
3. **As countries fight to emerge from the largest health, economic and social crises in decades and prepare for the current and future challenges, Centres of governments (CoGs) will play a crucial role for continued sustainable long-term gains in wellbeing.** While each Centre is unique, in a world of cross-sectoral challenges and opportunities, they are often called upon to play a pivotal role in joining up players for across government. In 23 out of 26 countries, co-ordination, including the alignment of policy to government priorities, is a top or significant priority in CoGs (OECD, 2023^[1]).
4. **Trust in public institutions is particularly important for democratic resilience.** Multiple or recurrent crises can weaken trust in public institutions by undermining perceptions of the values of public institutions and their competence. While trust in public institutions has been relatively resilient across the OECD during recent crises, the first OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (OECD Trust Survey) (OECD, 2022^[2]) found that the public in OECD are evenly split between people who trust their national government and those who do not, only slightly better than in the aftermath of the global financial

crises. Only four in ten respondents (41.4%), on average, reported high or moderately high trust in their national government. Moreover, there are significant differences in trust levels across population groups. Across OECD countries, women, young people and those with lower levels of education and income report less trust in government (Figure 1 and Figure 2). Differences in trust in public institutions are reinforced by underlying inequalities in society, and not all groups view government as working well for them.

Figure 1. In most OECD countries women have lower trust in the national government than men

Difference in trust in government by gender, expressed as the share of men trusting government minus the share of women trusting government, in percentage points, 2021




Note: Figure presents the within country distribution of responses by gender to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The national government”. Shown is the proportion of respondents that “trust” based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the 11-point scale, grouped by gender. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across countries. Mexico and New Zealand show trust in civil service as respondents were not asked about trust in the national government (note that trust in civil service on average tends to be higher than trust in national government). For more detailed information please find the survey method document at <http://oe.cd/trust>.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

Figure 2. Younger people tend to have lower trust in government

Share of respondents who indicate trust in the national government (responses 6-10 on an 11-point scale) by age group, 2021



Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses by age group to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The national government”. Shown here is the proportion of respondents that “trust” based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale, grouped by age group. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across countries. Finland’s scale ranges from 1-10 and the higher trust / neutral / lower trust groupings are 1-4 / 5-6 / 7-10. Mexico and New Zealand present trust in civil service as respondents were not asked about trust in the national government (note that trust in civil service on average tends to be higher than trust in national government). Younger age group in Ireland is defined as 18-34 due to statistical disclosure measures. For more detailed information please find the survey method document at <http://oe.cd/trust>.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

5. Polarisation can be exacerbated by a lack of trust in public institutions underscoring the urgency of restoring people’s trust and understanding why and who lack trust in public institutions.

Preliminary analysis looking at respondents of the OECD Trust Survey, who have no trust in their national government finds significant differences in their socioeconomic characteristics and political behaviour (OECD, forthcoming^[3]). Those who lack trust in their national government face multiple structural barriers for political trust and engagement. While they are less likely to participate in electoral politics and tend to politically position themselves in opposition to government, many of them actively engage in unconventional forms of participation such as demonstrations, posting political content online, or boycotting products for political reasons. Overall, findings suggest that part of the individuals who express no trust actively participate in unconventional political activities, feel confident to participate in politics, but lack political voice – in other words, they are politically engaged but disenchanted.

6. To safeguard democratic resilience in the multi-crises environment, governments must take decisive steps to support trust in public institutions over the long-term. Democracies, characterised by checks and balances, are in a competition of ideas with governance models which advocate apparently quicker or simpler ways of responding to crises. Governments cannot safeguard economic and democratic resilience solely by relying on contingency planning and occasional exceptional responses, they need to put in place public governance processes and standards that help to systematically maintain and improve trust in institutions in a crisis environment. Action now is an investment

in cementing democratic resilience for the long-term and for future generations. The 2023 OECD Government at a Glance (OECD, 2023^[4]) explores three dimensions for action:

- **Building on democratic strengths** to drive demonstrably better outcomes for the public, in particular on the major challenges of addressing the climate and diversity crises. This means making greater use of citizens' voice to build solid consensus, particularly by using more advanced participation and representation tools; ensuring all groups in society are included; harnessing openness, innovation, learning and adaptability to seek solutions in an evolving environment; and building international co-operation so countries can mutually support each other.
- **Reinforcing key governance competencies to handle crises**, as well as the tools required to enhance coherence, prioritisation and foresight in setting policy, maintaining resilient public finances, supply chains and infrastructure; and building flexible capacity, resources and skills in the public sector.
- **Protecting against threats to democratic values** and public perceptions of their values by maintaining effective integrity rules and countering actors seeking to use crises to gain undue or malign influence, combatting mis- and disinformation, and defining how crisis-induced expectations to public governance standards are managed.

Box 1. The OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative


In the spring of 2021, the Public Governance Committee (PGC) launched the **OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative** with the dual goal of reinforcing democratic governance and protecting it from existing and emerging threats. The Initiative builds on the 2021 and 2022 OECD Ministerial Council Statements [[C/MIN\(2021\)16/FINAL](#)] and OECD Members' vision for the Organisation for the next decade [[C/MIN\(2021\)25/FINAL](#)].

The meeting of the OECD Public Governance Committee at Ministerial level held in Luxembourg on 18 November 2022 on the theme of "Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy" marked a significant milestone for the Initiative. Ministers adopted the Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy [[OECD/LEGAL/0484](#)] and welcomed three Action Plans on combatting mis- and disinformation; enhancing participation, representation and openness (including gender equality); and governing green, with commitments and a set of concrete actions to strengthen trust and democracy under five key pillars (Figure 3).

Work is underway to deliver on these commitments in lead up to the next OECD Global Forum on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy, planned for November 2024, including the following priority areas:

- The second OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions to be published in 2024;
- Development of two new action plans on stronger open democracies in a globalised world (including foreign interference) and transforming public governance for digital democracy;
- The forthcoming OECD Open, Participatory and Representative Government Index; and
- Development of an OECD Recommendation on user-centric public services.

Figure 3. The five pillars of the OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative



Source: Author's own elaboration.

Key questions for discussion

- What signs of polarisation are CoGs seeing in the current context? How does it have an impact on the ability of the CoG and wider government to perform its role and deliver on major challenges?
- Is there any work being done in your administration to look at this issue? What kind of actions are/can CoGs take in addressing it?
- Facing polarisation might include additional efforts around citizen participation, for example. What has worked well and what has not?

Session 2: Centre of Governments at the centre of combatting mis- and disinformation

7. **The rapid and global spread of mis- and disinformation presents a fundamental risk to the free and fact-based exchange of information underpinning democracy** (OECD, 2022^[5]).¹ Waves of false and misleading content can undermine societal cohesion, cast doubt on factual information, and undermine trust in public institutions (OECD, 2021^[6]). Disinformation also creates real challenges to policy implementation, including on sensitive areas such as healthcare, defense and national security issues, climate change, among others. As such, the spread of mis- and disinformation can weaken countries' abilities to protect their national interests and preserve national security and democracy.


8. **While disinformation is not a new phenomenon, digitalisation has fundamentally altered the way information is shared and understood.** The rise and rapidly growing use of generative artificial intelligence (AI) may pose an additional risk to people's trust in the information space, particularly online. This is due to the potential for the creation and dissemination of highly convincing false or misleading news, articles, and visual media. By vastly reducing the cost and language barriers to creating convincing text or visuals, and by making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between genuine and manipulated content, generative AI tools have the potential to magnify the challenges already introduced by online platforms.

9. **Responding to these challenges calls for new governance models with a whole-of-society approach to strengthen information integrity.** The existing checks and balances that helped limit the spread of mis- and disinformation in the past are no longer effective enough. OECD members have therefore prioritised this issue as part of the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative. The 2022 Luxembourg Declaration welcomes the Action Plan on Public Governance for Combating Mis- and Disinformation and the creation of the OECD DIS/MIS Resource Hub, a peer learning platform for sharing knowledge, data, and analysis of government approaches to tackling mis- and disinformation (Box 2).

10. **CoGs are increasingly engaged in addressing the challenges posed by misinformation and disinformation.** According to data from the 2023 OECD Survey on Strategic Decision-making at the Centre of Government (OECD, 2023^[7]), over the last three years, 46% of surveyed countries report an increasing role of CoGs tackling mis- and disinformation. In fact, tackling mis- and disinformation is a top priority for 23% of the surveyed CoGs and a significant priority in 27% (Figure 4).

¹ "Misinformation" can be defined as false or inaccurate information that is shared unknowingly and is not disseminated with the intention of deceiving the public, whereas "disinformation" is usually defined as false, inaccurate, or misleading information deliberately created, presented and disseminated. Misinformation is sometimes used as a catchall term for many similar but ultimately different practices, for example disinformation, information influence operation, and foreign interference in the information space, each of which may require a different approach. Mis- and disinformation are furthermore not to be confused with the dissemination of terrorist, violent or illegal content online (OECD, 2022^[5]).

Figure 4. Tackling mis- and disinformation is a priority for most CoGs



Note: n=26; Respondents to the survey were asked "How much of a priority are the following functions in the CoG? [Tackling mis-disinformation]".
Source: (OECD, 2023^[7]).

11. **OECD countries are rapidly upgrading their institutional architecture, governance, and regulatory practices to respond to threats posed by disinformation and to create an enabling environment for accurate, reliable, and plural information to thrive.** The challenge from a governance standpoint is significant and governments find themselves in a complex position. The upcoming OECD Framework for Countering Disinformation and Reinforcing Information Integrity (Box 3) aims to support countries in their efforts to put in place policy measures to counteract disinformation and reinforce information integrity.

12. **Addressing the widespread and complex issue of disinformation, which involves multiple actors, channels, and tactics, requires a strategic and co-ordinated approach where CoGs can play a key role fostering effective governance and response mechanisms.** The wide range of threats that disinformation campaigns pose – from public health conspiracy theories to foreign information manipulation and interference operations, as recently seen in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's manipulation of information to undermine international support for Ukraine – has reinforced this need. Putting in place and strengthening an institutional set-up for information integrity, including dedicated institutions, regulatory policies, strategies, and capacity building initiatives, will be essential to help ensure governments can respond to disinformation and design and implement policies that enhance information integrity.

13. **OECD countries have identified the need for strategic frameworks, enhanced co-ordination and strengthened capacities within government as key governance priorities to face disinformation and reinforce information integrity** (OECD, forthcoming^[8]). Several of these priorities touch on the some of the primary roles of CoGs. Centres are central to stewarding cross-cutting policies and overall policy co-ordination such as those needed to promote information integrity. Leading on communication activities, including crisis communications and combatting disinformation, and guiding good communication practice across government are also core CoG practices. Finally, building the skills of civil servants will be essential to help ensure they are able to better understand, react to, and develop initiatives and policies that respond to information threats and build information integrity, thereby enabling them to deliver on policy priorities and bridge the political-administrative interface (OECD, forthcoming^[8]).

14. **First, strategic frameworks are essential for supporting a coherent vision and a comprehensive response to reinforcing information integrity.** In recent years, countries have developed national strategies that specifically focus on tackling disinformation and enhancing information integrity. However, only a handful of countries (including Australia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal,

Spain, Netherlands, Italy, and United States) have developed, or are in the process of developing (Ireland and Germany) a national document providing strategic direction to guide government-wide responses.

15. **Second, upgrading co-ordination mechanisms is crucial, and assigning clear responsibilities to facilitate domestic and international co-operation points to the value of establishing a clear mandate and scope.** Co-ordination mechanisms vary widely across countries and can consist of central offices, units, cells, or task forces composed of public servants from across the government. Such units or task forces may also help facilitate the government's engagement with non-government organisations. At the national level, responsibilities are found across the public sector, including the centre of government, line ministries, security and intelligence agencies and regulators. Notably, the establishment of co-ordination mechanisms has been a relatively recent effort, with all relevant offices having been put in place since 2016 (OECD, forthcoming^[8]). A number of countries are centralising mis and disinformation co-ordination and guidance functions at the centre of government, such as France's *Service de vigilance et protection contre les ingérences numériques étrangères* (VIGINUM), Lithuania's National Crisis Management Center, and the U.S. Department of State Global Engagement Center.

16. **Additionally, building collective government defence to the challenges posed by disinformation starts with the public officials who confront these threats in their daily work.** The level of sophistication of disinformation campaigns requires upskilling and training at all levels of government to ensure that elected officials and policymakers have the knowledge and tools to recognise, monitor, and counter the spread of false and misleading information without impinging on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

- In Colombia, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies (MinTIC) has taken proactive steps to train its Press Office team. Those who join the Press Office team receive training on how to identify possible disinformation narratives and to better react to these situations.
- The Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations drafted "Guidance on dealing with disinformation" in 2022 to provide civil servants with an overview of the challenges faced and potential responses.
- The UK's RESIST 2 Toolkit is used in training to help government officials build individual and societal resilience to disinformation through strategic communications.

Box 2. The OECD DIS/MIS Resource Hub

Informed by the OECD Expert Group on Governance Responses to Mis- and Disinformation, the **OECD DIS/MIS Resource Hub** provides an institutional mechanism for forward-looking and anticipatory analysis on the governance mechanisms, policies and institutions needed to respond to the challenges of mis- and disinformation in a resilient manner.

The Hub facilitates engagement across OECD members by convening regular meetings of the informal OECD Expert Group on Governance Responses to Mis- and Disinformation. The Resource Hub is a country-led initiative, with support provided by 12 OECD Members that form the Steering Group, including Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, and the United States.

Responding to members' calls to increase work with non-member countries, the OECD is exploring the establishment of a mechanism to regularly convene and engage governmental and civil society actors to discuss how to strengthen information integrity in both OECD and non-OECD societies. This work will help build on, and increase collaboration between, countries' existing efforts. It will also develop new activities and initiatives focused on strengthening the global conversation around building information integrity.

Source: <https://www.oecd.org/stories/dis-misinformation-hub/>.

Box 3. Towards an OECD framework for Countering Disinformation and Reinforcing Information Integrity

Building on a comprehensive mapping of countries' ongoing efforts to strengthen information integrity, the OECD DIS/MIS Resource Hub is working towards the development on an OECD Framework for Countering Disinformation and Reinforcing Information Integrity focused on three mutually reinforcing aims:

- **Promoting transparent and healthy information spaces**, through supporting free, plural, and independent media, as well as policies to promote accountable and transparent online platforms and strengthen economic and structural incentives, including through competition and privacy.
- **Strengthening societal resilience**, including by investing in the public's skills and awareness through media and information literacy and public communication, as well as pursuing a whole-of-society effort through better public engagement, stakeholder participation, and helping ensure research informs the policy-making process.
- **Reinforcing accountable transparent and agile governance**, particularly through strengthening whole-of-government co-ordination, putting in place strategic frameworks, building international co-operation, and enhancing the skills and capacity of the public sector.

Source: (OECD, forthcoming^[8]).

Key questions for discussion

- *What kind of co-ordination mechanisms have been put in place in your administration to implement efforts to strengthen the information space?*
- *What role can CoGs play in developing common guidelines on combatting mis- and disinformation to strengthen the integrity of information as a necessary effort to strengthen democracy?*
- *How can CoGs work more systematically and efficiently with non-governmental stakeholders and international organisations to design and implement effective policies to promote information integrity?*
- *What is the impact of artificial intelligence in the context of information operations and what kinds of AI tools can be used for countering mis- and disinformation?*

Session 3: Centres of Government at the centre of fostering the direct involvement of citizen in policymaking

17. **The OECD Trust Survey finds a widespread sense of lack of opportunities to exercise effective political voice.** Less than one third of people (30.2%), say the political system in their country lets them have a say. In fact, more than four in ten respondents (42.8%) say it is unlikely that government would adopt opinions expressed in a public consultation. There is also a widespread sense that democratic government is working well for some, but not well enough for all (OECD, 2022^[2]).

18. **In this context, governments are closely examining how they meet the heightened expectations of citizens for public participation and democratic representation.** They are increasingly turning to participation mechanisms to directly engage citizens in decision-making. OECD Members have explicitly recognised the importance of this in Pillar 2 of the OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative (Figure 3). The Action Plan on Enhancing Representation, Participation and Openness in Public Life welcomed by Ministers in the Luxembourg Declaration identifies concrete steps governments can take to enhance participation and representation in public life, including a special focus on gender equality.

19. **CoGs have an important role to play in enhancing public participation - the involvement of citizens in politics, public policies and decision-making, public service design and delivery – allowing citizens and stakeholders to influence activities and decisions of public authorities at different stages of the policy cycle.** While line ministries are often responsible for stakeholder engagement, CoGs typically ensure consistent involvement of stakeholders at various stages of policy development. Stakeholder engagement ranks as the third most frequently cited major challenge for CoGs (OECD, forthcoming^[9]).


20. **CoGs are increasingly taking responsibility for policies and practices to foster government-citizen relationships – the core of the concept of open government** (OECD, 2023^[10]). Ensuring the successful implementation and take-up of open government strategies is reinforced by the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government [[OECD/LEGAL/0438](#)]. The 2020 OECD Survey on Open Government shows that Open Government Offices are most commonly located in CoGs. In fact, across respondents that are part of the Open Government Partnership, 33.3% of the offices (11 out of 33) co-ordinating the OGP-processes are situated in the President's or Prime Minister's Office (OECD, 2023^[10]).

21. **Citizen participation is integral to enhancing the democratic governance model, bridging the gap between governments and the public.** It refers to public institutions actively seeking input

from citizens and stakeholders. It is important here to distinguish between government engagement with stakeholders, who have a stake or special interest in an area of government policy, and the engagement of citizens as individuals with a voice shaping the direction of democratic public life more widely. The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government distinguishes citizen and stakeholder participation into three levels based on the degree of involvement. Firstly, information, a one-way relationship where government provides information to citizens and stakeholders, either on-demand or proactively disseminated. Secondly, consultation, a more advanced level of participation that involves a two-way relationship where feedback is exchanged between citizens, stakeholders and government. Finally, engagement when citizens and stakeholders are empowered with resources such as information, data, and digital tools to participate in all phases of the policy cycle, as well as in service design and delivery. This acknowledges citizens as equals in agenda-setting, proposing project or policy options, and shaping the dialogue, even though the final policy decision often rests with public authorities. The OECD Guidelines for Citizen Participation Processes highlights eight different methods that can be used to involve citizens in policy making, from consultations to more advanced deliberative processes (OECD, 2022^[11]). Beyond participatory and deliberative practices, governments can empower citizens to make decisions directly, without intermediaries, through direct democracy mechanisms such as referendum.

22. **Governments are progressively turning to various participation mechanisms to involve citizens in decision-making, extending beyond consultations.** There is an increasing adoption of deliberative processes, as part of a wider effort by democratic institutions to become more participatory and open to informed citizen input and collective intelligence (Box 4). As shown in Figure 5, in deliberative processes, a broadly representative body of people weighs evidence, deliberates to find common ground, and develops detailed recommendations on policy issues for public authorities (OECD, 2020^[12]). Common examples of one-off processes are citizens' assemblies, juries, and panels.

Figure 5. What is a representative deliberative process?



Source: (OECD, 2022^[11]).

23. **Representative deliberative processes offer a means for public authorities to involve citizens in public decision-making.** These processes can contribute to better policy outcomes by generating public judgements rather than mere public opinions. When conducted effectively, they can empower policy makers to address public policy issues and build trust between citizens and government. However, representative deliberative processes are not a silver bullet; they demand careful implementation and evaluation to ensure the desired impact on both the decision-making process and participants.

24. **OECD work highlights seven reasons why representative deliberative processes can contribute to better public decision-making** (OECD, 2020^[12]):

- **Giving decision-makers greater legitimacy to make difficult choices**, by helping policy makers gain better understanding of public priorities and values. They can help identify areas where consensus is feasible and where it may be challenging to achieve. Evidence suggests that they are particularly useful in situations characterised by political deadlock.

- **Strengthening public trust in government and democratic institutions by giving citizens an effective role in public decision making.** People tend to trust decisions influenced by ordinary citizens more than those made solely behind closed doors. Trust is reciprocal - for governments to build trust, they must trust the public participate in decision making. This highlights the challenges of making collective decisions and foster a sense of collective democratic life among citizens.
- **Making governance more inclusive by welcoming a diverse group of people.** With their use of random selection and stratified sampling, they incorporate typically excluded categories such as youth, the disadvantaged, women, or other minorities into public policy and decision-making.
- **Strengthening integrity and preventing corruption by safeguarding against undue influence on public decisions.** Key principles include transparent and visible processes and provides an opportunity for all stakeholders to present to the participants. Participants' identities are often protected until after the process is over to protect them from being targeted by interest groups.

25. **Governments are also turning to Civic Tech, or the use of digital technologies for democratic governance, to enhance participatory and deliberative practices.** Civic Tech can help create new ways for citizens to interact with public institutions and with each other or complement existing in-person mechanisms. Among the benefits, Civic Tech can help reach out to a larger number of individuals, allow asynchronous participation, innovate in how citizens express their opinion, and process large amounts of citizen inputs (OECD, 2023^[13]). For example:

- Governments have used digital platforms to involve large numbers of participants for high level national issues. [Iceland](#) used a combination of digital engagement methods (including an online deliberation and an online game) to crowdsource its Constitution.
- Some governments have used Civic Tech to enable transnational processes, such as [Our Europe, Our Future](#), a consultation initiated by France and Germany as part of the Conference for the Future of Europe which reached 95 000 young people in both countries.
- Organisers of in-person deliberative processes can embed Civic Tech tools to increase the number of voices in the discussion and connect the process with the broader public. In 2022, the Austrian National Council embedded deliberation tool Pol.is in the Austrian Citizens' Climate Council (Paice, 2022^[14]). The OECD has identified at least 10 deliberative processes that used a hybrid format (OECD, 2021^[15]).

Box 4. Countries using deliberative democracy mechanisms

The French Citizens' Convention on Climate (2019-2020)

The French Citizens' Convention on Climate was announced by President Emmanuel Macron in 2019 after the Great National Debate of that same year. It involved 150 randomly selected citizens who met for seven long weekends from October 2019 until April 2020 to develop detailed recommendations on how France could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2030 considering social justice. The Convention submitted 149 propositions to the Élysée in 2021.

The Irish Citizens' Assembly (2016-2018)

The Irish Citizens' Assembly involved 100 randomly selected citizen members who considered five important legal & policy issues: the 8th amendment of the constitution on abortion; ageing populations; referendum processes; fixed-term parliaments & climate change. The Assembly's recommendations were submitted to parliament for further debate. Based on its recommendations, the government called a referendum on amending the 8th amendment and declared a climate emergency.

Canadian Citizens' Assembly on Democratic Expression (2020-2023)

To strengthen Canada's response to new digital technologies and reduce the harm caused by their misuse, the Canadian Government announced in 2020 the creation of three Citizens' Assemblies on Democratic Expression to take place over the next three years. More than 120 randomly selected Canadians examined the impact of digital technologies on Canadian society. Each Assembly issued a detailed report to the Canadian Commission on Democratic Expression, to the federal government, and to the Canadian public.

Note: More information can be found here for each of the assemblies:

<https://www.conventioncitoyennepourleclimat.fr/>, <https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/>, <https://ppforum.ca/project/demx/>.

Key questions for discussion:

- *What experience have you had in the CoG promoting co-ordination and integration of participatory processes in your country?*
- *What are promising avenues related to deliberative democracy mechanisms and what are their limitations? What mechanisms have worked well, and which ones have not?*
- *How can centres of government create more opportunities for inclusive public participation, particularly for those who are more marginalised from political processes and institutions?*

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