SIGI
Methodological Background Paper

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1. Introduction

Around the world, gender inequality continues to deprive women and girls of their basic human rights and from opportunities to choose their own development pathways. Discrimination against women and girls in respect to men and boys reflects unequal power relations, which are formalized in laws and replicated in practices and traditions. The cycle of discrimination becomes cemented into social institutions that are transmitted from generation to generation.

Discrimination against women and girls affects their empowerment opportunities, and is detrimental for development. Decades of research have proven that promoting gender equality in education, employment and health not only delivers benefits for women but for whole communities and economies. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided a framework for countries and the development community to accelerate progress on gender equality on key economic and social targets in recognition of the added value of gender equality and women's empowerment for development.

However, the limited progress towards meeting the MDGs underlines the importance of looking beyond outcomes and key economic and social indicators by taking stock of the role and impact of discriminatory social institutions as the underlying causes of gender inequality. Discriminatory social institutions are defined as the formal and informal laws, social norms and practices that restrict women's and girls' access to justice, empowerment opportunities, and resources. Understanding the nature and extent of the obstacles to gender equality is critical to designing effective policies to promote equality between women and men and consequently improving development outcomes.

The OECD Development Centre's Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) is an innovative measure of discriminatory social institutions. The SIGI's indicators address the *de jure* and *de facto* situations of discriminatory social institutions across five sub-indices: discriminatory family code, restricted physical integrity, son bias, restricted resources and assets and restricted civil liberties. A methodological framework was established to best seize the complex relationship between gender equality and discriminatory social norms. The level of discrimination against women is captured through a multi-dimensional assessment that takes into account i) the legislative framework; ii) the de facto situation (customary laws and practices, implementation of laws, etc.) and practices through prevalence data; and iii) attitudinal data.

Existing gender indicators commonly focus on key economic and social indicators, like employment or education. To complement these existing measures, the SIGI focuses on social norms, offering an analytical lens to explain persistent gaps in these outcomes between women and men. By applying SIGI to major development themes, the OECD Development Centre has shown that countries which display higher levels of discrimination against women also perform more poorly on a range of development indicators (Branisa *et* al., 2014; OECD Development Centre, 2010; Jutting *et* al., 2010).

As a composite index, SIGI and its sub-indices provide a tool to compare the level of underlying discrimination against women for over 160 countries, allowing cross-country, regional and sub-regional analyses. As shown in Figure 1, the SIGI is comprised of three main components: i) country profiles containing comprehensive qualitative information on legal, cultural, and traditional laws and

practices that discriminate against women and girls in 160 countries (www.genderindex.org); ii) the Gender, Institutions and Development Database comprising 33 indicators on gender discrimination in social institutions in 160 countries (www.stats.oecd.org); and iii) the Index classifying 108 countries into five categories according to their level of discrimination in social institutions.

Figure 1. What is the SIGI

The SIGI combines both quantitative and qualitative research for each country note, giving priority to national data sources where available. The technical construction of the SIGI verifies statistical association and conceptual relevance and fits an axiomatic requirement for such measures of inequalities. This background paper aims to explain how the composite index and its sub-indices are constructed.

2. About the 2014 edition of the SIGI

The 2014 edition is the third time that the SIGI has been updated since it was first launched in 2009. An update and revision was carried out in 2012. Revisions included the removal and replacement of variables (see Annex C for more details on the changes between 2009 and 2012 and between 2012 and 2014). In the 2014 edition, the conceptual and methodological frameworks remain unchanged, and country profiles and data were updated.

New additions and developments in the 2014 edition of the SIGI include:

- Extension of the country coverage through the inclusion of OECD countries, in order to turn the SIGI into a universal reference for discriminatory social norms;
- Addition of new data capturing discriminatory social institutions to the Gender, Institutions and Development Database, in order to further reinforce its flexibility and coverage; and
- Introduction of a classification of countries to according to their levels of discrimination in the SIGI and its sub-indices, which replaces the former ranking model.

A. The SIGI: a universal index for discriminatory social norms

In order to deepen the understanding of the relationships between policies, development and discrimination in social institutions, and transform the SIGI into a universal reference point for discriminatory social institutions, this edition includes OECD countries within the SIGI framework. No country in the world has achieved full gender equality, and it is therefore important to understand the universal underlying causes of gender inequality which persist. Measuring discriminatory social institutions opens new research and analysis vistas to understand why women continue to face restrictions on their access to justice, empowerment opportunities, and resources due to discriminatory laws, attitudes or practices.

There are three main advantages for this positioning:

- Development-oriented research possibilities: Including OECD countries enlarges the scope for cross-country comparison, which will improve current understanding of how social norms are correlated with the level of income and gender inequality in outcomes.
- Conceptual credibility: Discriminatory social norms and gender discrimination exist in all countries, irrespective of income levels, and OECD countries are no exception. This approach follows the OECD's work on well-being, which is based on the premise that development needs to look beyond GDP and to understand how inequalities shape people's perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. Moreover, extending the GID-DB by including new variables that have greater relevance for OECD countries (such as the unequal distribution of caring and housework responsibilities between women and men) shows that the conceptual validity of the SIGI also holds for OECD countries.
- Benchmarking progress on the post 2015 development agenda: Increased country coverage will put the SIGI in a better position to track progress on the Post-2015 Agenda, which will have a universal framework, unlike its antecedent.

B. The Gender, Institutions and Development Database: a flexible database

The 2014 edition of the SIGI also builds on the 2012 edition's unique methodological approach, retaining comparability while allowing flexibility through reinforcing the Gender, Institutions and Development Database (GID-DB).

The GID-DB is the research base of the SIGI. Through the GID-DB, researchers have full access to all SIGI data for 160 countries, irrespective of whether the country has a full set of data for each variable. This dashboard of variables gives greater flexibility for the use of SIGI data than the "global" SIGI composite index or its sub-indices. It gives opportunities to use one or more variables from the dataset to analyse a development question.

The conceptual framework detailed in the next section presents the new selected variables and show how they fit with the SIGI conceptual framework.

C. Classification of countries: new interpretative lens on discrimination

The 2014 edition has moved from ranking countries to classifying them by level of discrimination. This change aims to provide a new interpretative lens to the SIGI results by allowing for common characteristics or trends in discriminatory laws, practices and attitudes to come to the fore. This has a dual advantage: it acts as an incentive for countries to move into categories with lower levels of

discrimination and it contextualises results, pinpointing actions and policies that can either accelerate or block gender equality.

The classification clusters countries in five groups from very low to very high levels of discrimination in social institutions. Classifications are available for the overall SIGI composite indicator results (108 countries are covered) or for each sub-index. This classification groups countries having similar levels of discrimination in the SIGI by minimising differences between countries' SIGI scores in the same class and maximising the differences between classes.

3. The SIGI's conceptual framework

The SIGI is composed of five sub-indices, each representing a distinct dimension of discrimination against women in social institutions (Figure 2). The five sub-indices for the 2014 edition of the SIGI were retained from the 2009 and 2012 editions.[1]

The five sub-indices aggregated into the SIGI are made up of 14 indicators providing detailed information on legal, cultural and traditional practices that discriminate against women and girls. As shown in Figure 2, the composition of the SIGI sub-indices remains unchanged compared to the 2012 edition, whereas the 2014 edition of the GID-DB includes new variables compared to 2012.

This section sets out the theoretical justification for the SIGI sub-indices and variables, explaining what each sub-index aims to capture and why, as well as presenting the variables that compose it (Figure 3).

Box 1: How do the names of the sub-index and variable differ between the 2014 and the 2012 editions of the SIGI?

- Restricted resources and assets changed from *Restricted resources and entitlements* – the word assets captures the concept of ownership of tangible goods (property, land, and other sources of income-generating goods)
- Reproductive autonomy as opposed to *Reproductive integrity* – autonomy more clearly describes women's ability to make their own reproductive choices
- Secure access to land as opposed to *Access to land – secure* access to land captures the challenges that women face in their decision-making and ownership rights over land, which they may have access to as labourers but not have the right to control or make decisions over it..
- Secure access to non-land assets as opposed to *Access to property other* than land – non-land assets refers to a broad category of goods within a household, including patrimony, agricultural tools, *etc*.
- Access to financial services as opposed to *Access to credit* – financial services refers to the ability to open a bank account and access a broad range of financial services, which includes credit.

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[1] However, the name of the sub-index "Restricted resources and entitlements" and some variables were amended slightly to ensure that the sub-index and variables consistently describe the dimension of discrimination against women that it seeks to capture (cf. Box 1).

Figure 2. SIGI conceptual framework

SIGI sub-indices	What they capture
Discriminatory family code	Restrictions on women's decision making power and status in the house-hold and the family
Restricted physical integrity	Restrictions on women's control over their bodies including physical integrity and reproductive autonomy
Son bias	Unequal intra-household investments in the care, nurture and ressources allocated to sons and daughters leading to the devaluation of daughters
Restricted resources and assets	Restrictions on women's secure access to, control over and ownership of resources
Restricted civil liberties	Restrictions on women's access to, participation and voice in the public and social spheres

A. Discriminatory family code

i. What we are measuring

This sub-index is intended to capture social institutions that limit and restrict women's decision-making power and status in the household and the family. It includes discriminatory formal and informal laws in relation to marriage, household headship, parental authority, divorce, inheritance, and gender roles in productive and reproductive responsibilities.

Formal and informal laws can co-exist in different types of legal systems including civil or common law, customary law and religious law. The dynamic of discrimination against women and girls created by the legal system adds to the complexity of these social institutions. Moreover, in some cases, the presence of a legal protection is insufficient to prevent discrimination, which persists in social and cultural practices. For example, in many countries where legislation defines a clear minimum age for marriage, unregistered religious and customary early marriage is still widely practiced and often overlooked by the government. Social norms operating at the community level that allow discriminatory practices such as early marriage, early childbearing and widow abuse are also examples of how discriminatory family codes can be manifested. At a household level, discriminatory family codes are played out through the unequal division of paid and unpaid work, unequal decision-making capacity, large gaps in age and education of the spouses, male household headship, women's restricted or limited parental authority, and unequal division of family assets.

ii. Why is this important for development and for gender equality?

The lack of female decision-making power and status in the family not only influences women's own development but also the development of their families and children (World Bank, 2014; Jones et al., 2010). For example, the discriminatory practice of early marriage of girls limits their access to education and therefore also has an impact on their employment opportunities (UNICEF, 2005). Marrying young, particularly with large age gaps between spouses, can also lead to high rates of adolescent fertility, high rates of infant mortality, poor maternal health and increased vulnerability to HIV (Bruce and Clark, 2004; UNFPA, 2004).

Early marriage can also have a negative inter-generational impact, as children are less likely to be educated or immunised if their mother has not been educated (Thomas, 1993). The inter-generational impact also has a gendered dimension, as women's reduced decision-making power in the household can also reinforce gender inequalities among children. Their children may then be less able to negotiate a delayed marriage or safe sexual practices (Jones *et* al., 2010).

The low status of women and girls in the household reduces their bargaining power and ability to negotiate with male family members about decisions relating to their own health and welfare or that of their children. The amount of influence women have over the decisions made in the household has been demonstrated to positively impact the nutrition, health care and education of their children and the broader community (Thomas and Strauss, 1997). Female decision-making power in the household can be shaped by discriminatory social institutions such as restricted parental authority for mothers (Jones *et* al., 2010).

iii.   Variables included in the GID-DB for describing this sub-index

The sub-index describing discriminatory social institutions within the family code is composed of six variables included in the GID database, the first four of which were used in the SIGI ranking:[2]

- Legal age of marriage captures formal and informal discrimination against women with respect to marriage, demonstrating whether women and men and men have the same minimum age of marriage.
- Early marriage provides an indication of the acceptance and practice of early marriage by giving the percentage of girls aged 15-19 who are currently married.
- Parental authority is composed of the average of two variables, capturing formal and informal discrimination with respect to women's decision-making power in the family in relation to children:
  - During marriage measures whether women and men have the same rights to children guardianship during marriage.
  - After divorce measures whether women and men have the same rights to children guardianship after divorce.
- Inheritance rights is composed of the average of two variables, capturing formal and informal discrimination with respect to women's status in the family regarding their inheritance rights:
  - For widows captures if widows and widowers have the same inheritance rights.
 - For daughters captures if daughters and sons have the same inheritance rights.

The 2014 edition of the GID-DB draws attention to the shortcomings related to the absence of indicators capturing gender roles and divorce rights. Given this, two modifications to the 2012 framework were made:

- Divorce captures formal and informal discrimination with respect to women's status in the family and their ability to dissolve a marriage in the same way as men without any formal or informal discriminatory consequence. .
- Unpaid care work provides an indication of how much unpaid care work is performed by women and men and reflects social norms regarding gender roles.

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[2] For full details, refer to the indicator dashboard and coding manual.

Figure 3. GID-DB 2014 and 2012

B. Restricted physical integrity

i. What we are measuring

This sub-index is intended to capture social institutions that limit and restrict women's and girls' control over their bodies. The dimension aims at capturing the constant potential violence experienced by women in the household and in society and the negative impacts that this has. It also includes the ability of women to make their own decisions about their bodies in terms of reproductive and sexual health. This includes formal and informal laws, norms and practices that fail to protect women's physical integrity or which serve to normalise, justify and excuse practices that impinge upon women's physical integrity. Such practices include sexual violence, domestic violence, rape, female genital mutilation (FGM), trafficking, "honour" crimes, culture of impunity, threat of violence, attitude towards sexual violence, banalisation of sexual violence in the media, sexual harassment and conflict-related sexual violence. Restrictions to women's reproductive autonomy in the form of laws or attitudes that restrict access to contraceptives, reproductive healthcare and abortion also represent discriminatory social institutions.

Women's control over their bodies is severely threatened by discriminatory social institutions manifesting at several levels: from the state to the household level. Failure or lack of legislation protecting women from all forms of violence as well as cultural norms and practices that limit women's reproductive autonomy restrict women's physical integrity.

ii. Why is this important for development and for gender equality?

Women's and girls' restricted control over their bodies has negative consequences for development and economic growth. The threat of violence at home, at school, in the workplace and the community – which is exacerbated in conflict and post-conflict contexts – not only causes long-term physical and psychological damage but also increases the vulnerability of women and girls to poverty (UNIFEM, 2010). Gender-based violence is connected to critical social and economic development issues such as poverty, lack of education, child mortality, child malnutrition, maternal ill-health and HIV (Heise *et* al.*,* 1999). Sexual violence against young women and girls in schools has negative consequences for girls' educational, health and economic outcomes which in turn undermine development (Jones *et* al.*,* 2010).

In addition, violence against women has direct and indirect economic costs related to the loss of productivity. Women who experience physical and emotional health restrictions from violence are more likely to miss work or arrive late and are less likely to reach full productivity at work (KPMG, 2014). Also, the socioeconomic cost of violence against women is linked with poorer health outcomes, in particular a higher prevalence of disability (UNIFEM, 2003). Furthermore, violence at home also impacts women's access to economic resources and their ability to provide for their children (UNICEF, 2006).

This violation of women's human rights results in high costs: in South Africa for example, where 13% of women are victims of domestic violence every year. The government spends up to USD 3.8 billion (1.3% of the country's GDP) in health and justice, such as shelters for victims (KPMG, 2014). In the United States, the cost of intimate partner violence to medical and healthcare services exceeds USD 4 billion yearly (CDC, 2003).

iii. Variables included in the GID-DB for describing this sub-index

The sub-index measuring violations of women's physical integrity and reproductive autonomy is composed of four indicators divided into eight variables in the GID-DB. The first three indicators were used to calculate the SIGI ranking:

- Violence against women is composed of an average of five variables, capturing the level of legal and social acceptance of violence against women and its prevalence.
  - Laws addressing domestic violence captures whether the legal framework offers women legal protection from domestic violence.
  - Laws addressing rape captures whether the legal framework offers women legal protection from rape.
  - Laws addressing sexual harassment captures whether the legal framework offers women legal protection from sexual harassment.
  - Attitude towards violence against women measures the percentage of women who agree that a husband/partner is justified in beating his wife/partner under certain circumstances.
  - Prevalence of domestic violence measures the percentage of women who have experienced physical and/or sexual violence from an intimate partner at some time in their lives.
- Female genital mutilation captures the prevalence of FGM, also reflecting social norms that make this practice acceptable.
- Reproductive autonomy captures the percentage of women in reproductive age who have an unmet need for family planning and contraception.

Sexual and reproductive health and rights are important characteristics of women's control over their bodies. Access to health services and family planning is critical for women's reproductive choices and decisions. Lack of access to contraception can be related to unsafe abortions, defined by the World Health Organization as "a procedure for terminating a pregnancy performed by persons lacking the necessary skills and/or in an environment not in conformity with minimal medical standards". Yet, 21.6 million women experience an unsafe abortion worldwide each year, and this remains the cause of close to 13% of all maternal deaths (WHO, 2011). Since this practice is related

to the illegality of abortion and social stigma, the following indicator was added to the 2014 edition of the GID-DB:

- Abortion captures additional elements of discrimination against women with respect to their reproductive autonomy rights in case of non-desired pregnancy following rape or due to unwanted childbearing related to the mother's mental disabilities.

C. Son bias

i. What we are measuring

This sub-index is intended to capture unequal intra-household investments in the care, nurture and resources allocated to daughters and sons. It also includes parents' preference for having sons over daughters. This sub-index captures those formal and informal laws, social norms and practices which lead to daughters and sons being treated unequally, such as female infanticide, sex-selective abortions, limited access to food and education for girls, and the discriminatory allocation of paid and unpaid work in the household.

Son bias is linked to the economic under-valuation of women and girls. That is, within the household, daughters are typically considered an economic burden while sons are viewed as a source of lifelong economic support (UNFPA, 2007). However, in addition to the economic rationale underpinning son bias, there is also a connected cultural explanation. Studies examining the sex ratios of immigrant communities in high-income countries indicate that son bias persists even where there is no economic rationale (Almond *et* al*., 2009). The reasons for son bias can therefore also be tied into the social prestige associated with sons, the social value placed on sons carrying the family name and the social stigma associated with accepting support from daughters (Almond *et* al*., 2009; Gupta *et* al., 2003).

ii. Why is this important for development and for gender equality?

Son bias can have a range of negative implications for development outcomes. Firstly, practices such as female infanticide or sex-selective abortions increase the sex ratio of boys to girls. Despite recent efforts to reduce the number of missing women, it still presents a potential demographic time-bomb to some countries with unbalanced sex-ratios at birth, namely China. Skewed sex-ratios will have serious social consequences among men unable to find female partners, which could lead to social unrest, sexual violence and increased trafficking of girls and young women (UNFPA, 2007).

Secondly, families' under-investment in girls' health, nutrition and education has a negative impact on development in terms of child and infant mortality rates (Jones *et* al., 2010). Son bias leads to gendered differences in primary and secondary enrolment, attendance and completion rates. Even where parents may support the education of daughters and sons, son bias leads to placing greater *value* on the education of sons where parents may invest in private school education or higher education for sons over daughters. This is particularly the case in the context of limited resources. For example, in South Asia, boys on average spend 2.5 years more in school than girls. In sub-Saharan Africa, boys on average spend 1.3 years more in school than girls (UNICEF 2006).

Finally, a related issue is the division of unpaid labour in the household, which also has an impact on girls' education, health, and subsequent employment and income-generating opportunities. Overall, girls are more likely than boys to allocate a larger number of hours to unpaid domestic work in the

household. Globally, 10% of girls aged 5 to 14 undertake household chores for 28 hours a week or more, which represents double the number of boys who perform the same hours of chores (International Labour Organisation, 2009). The resulting time poverty experienced by girls leaves less time for school, studies, paid work and leisure (Cerise and Francavilla, 2012).

iii. Variables included in the GID-DB for describing this sub-index

This sub-index, which measures bias in intra-household allocation towards son leading to devaluation of daughters, is composed of three variables in the GID-DB, the first two of which were included in the SIGI ranking:

- Missing women captures devaluation of daughters related to sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, and inadequate care and nurture given to baby girls.
- Fertility preferences captures the preference of parents towards having sons, providing an indication of social value given to daughters and sons (See Annex H for more details on its construction)

The existing variables in the 2012 edition of the GID-DB are closely related to health issues but do not capture gender inequalities in the intra-household resources allocated to daughters and sons. Since resources also cover education and attitudes that view sons' education as more important than daughters', this may explain the gender gap regarding school attendance. In order to strengthen the conceptual dimensions of the sub-index, one additional variable was suggested:

- Son preference in education enriches the sub-index by capturing the social and economic value given to daughters and sons through preferential treatment of sons over daughters with respect to access to higher education.

D. Restricted access to resources and assets

i. What we are measuring

This sub-index is intended to capture women's restricted access to and control over economic and natural resources and assets. This includes discriminatory laws, which deny women access to land, property and credit; discriminatory customary practices in the allocation or purchase of land, natural resources and other property; negative attitudes towards women's formal work and entrepreneurship; and social norms dictating that women's property ownership or access to credit should be mediated by men.

This discrimination may be manifested by not allowing women to access bank loans, despite the existence of laws prohibiting discrimination. Banks and authorities that allocate land and property may also require a male spouse or relative to accompany or authorise transactions, based on discriminatory attitudes towards women's role in the economic sphere. Women may also be able to obtain only micro-credit, rather than having access to larger amounts of credit that could enable them to establish small and medium-sized enterprises. Even where women's ownership of land and property is granted under law, women's de facto access may be constrained due to discriminatory social norms.

ii. Why is this important for development and for gender equality?

Discrimination in access to and control over economic resources has several negative development implications. Improving access to economic resources is critical to increasing women's economic

participation, equality and empowerment which in turn positively influence the well-being and resources of their families and communities (Klasen and Lamanna, 2009; FAO, 2011).

Equally, restrictions on women's economic resources in the form of discriminatory laws, practices and attitudes can limit women's decision-making power in the household, curb their income-earning opportunities and increase their vulnerability and that of their families to poverty and malnutrition (Bird and Epsey, 2010; Jones *et* al., 2010).

Women's lack of access to assets acts as a reinforcing cycle, which perpetuates gender inequalities in employment opportunities and economic outcomes. For instance, restricted access to productive assets such as land, water and livestock reduces their capacity to generate income. With lower incomes, women are then limited in being able to acquire further assets. Furthermore, without assets to act as collateral, it becomes more difficult for women to access credit to purchase property and productive assets (FAO, 2011).

The fact that women bring fewer assets into a marriage, often stemming from discriminatory inheritance practices, subsequently weakens their bargaining position and decision-making power in the household. This is problematic because, as noted earlier, the level of influence women have over household decisions positively influences the nutrition, healthcare and education of children. In rural areas, women's lack of ownership and control over land and farm management structures is linked to lower agricultural productivity, household consumption and nutrition. Gender inequalities in livestock holdings, where men's livestock is generally of higher value than women's, also traps women, as livestock are often a key vehicle for income generation (FAO, 2011).

iii. Variables included in the GID-DB for describing this sub-index

The sub-index related to restricting women's access to, control over and ownership of property is composed of four indicators of our dataset, the first three of which were included in the SIGI ranking:

- Secure access to land captures formal and informal laws and practices that restrict women's rights to make decisions over, control and access land.
- Secure access to non-land assets captures formal and informal laws and practices that restrict women's access to property other than land, tools and equipment, and other household assets.
- Access to financial services captures formal and informal laws and practices that restrict women's access to financial services provided by a formal institution, which include opening a bank account and obtaining a loans or credit.

The 2012 framework focused on legal dispositions regarding women's access to resources, excluding practices from the analysis. To capture the discriminatory practice regarding women's access to land, the following indicator was added:

- Land titles owned by women measures practices regarding women's land ownership.

E. Restricted civil liberties

i. What we are measuring

This sub-index is intended to capture restrictions in women's access to, participation and voice in the public and social spheres. Restricted civil liberties encompass laws, practices or social norms which

restrict the mobility or movement of girls and women and limit their access to public space. The dimension also encompasses laws which deny women the right to vote and to participate actively in politics at the local or national levels, as well as their freedom of association. Freedom of movement is also represented in women's ability to travel or apply for a passport without consent of a male family member.

Furthermore, restricted civil liberties include social norms that lead to pejorative representations of women in the media and negative attitudes towards women as political or community leaders. It also includes discrimination in early stages of life, namely gender bias in birth registration.

ii.   Why is this important for development and for gender equality?

Limitations on women's and girls' participation and influence in the public sphere have significant implications for their social and economic opportunities, as well as for political governance (Swamy *et* al., 2001; Dollar *et* al., 2001; Ferrant, 2014). For instance, laws or social norms which confine women and girls to the home negatively impact their ability to access schooling or to take up employment outside the household. The broader exclusion of women and girls from public, social, political and economic spaces through discriminatory perceptions regarding their roles in society perpetuates inequality in education, health and other areas (Jones *et* al*.,* 2010).

Such limitations might be laws or religious customs, which restrict women's ability to choose where they live or apply for passports to access public space without a male family member. These restrictions can affect women at all stages of the lifecycle, however there are specific stages, such as adolescence, where additional restrictions may take place. For instance, in South Asia, parental concerns for the safety and "honour" of girls following puberty may lessen the opportunities for young women to continue their education.

Negative attitudes towards women as political and community leaders also have development implications. There is some evidence that greater equality between women and men in public decision-making is connected to stronger democratic governance institutions positive developments in education, infrastructure and health standards (Dollar *et* al., 2001). The equal participation of women and men in social and political life means that government decision making is more likely to include a greater diversity of views and voices and thus have greater accountability to the population (Swamy *et* al., 2001). Moreover, the low representation of women in public decision-making roles can become self-perpetuating by influencing the perceptions or preferences of women regarding their ability to participate in public life. Indeed, there is evidence from India which suggests that the increase in women's representation in local authorities through political quotas has improved attitudes towards women leaders (Pande and Ford, 2011).

iii.   Variables included in the GID-DB for describing this sub-index

The sub-index related to restricted women's participation and voice in the public and social spheres is composed of three indicators divided into four variables in the GID-DB. The first two indicators were used to calculate the SIGI ranking:

- Access to public space measures the formal and informal restrictions limiting women's freedom of movement and access to public space.
- Political voice is composed of an average of two variables, capturing the level of discrimination against women with respect to their political participation.

- o Political quotas measures whether there are legal quotas to promote women's political participation at the national and/or sub-national levels.
- o Political representation describes the share of women in the national parliament.

The 2014 edition of the GID-DB draws attention to the shortcomings related to the absence of quantitative information on women's civil rights regarding the workplace, despite qualitative information already included in the country profiles. Given this, one proposed modification to the 2012 framework was made:

- Workplace rights measure the extensiveness of laws pertaining to women's economic rights, such as equal pay, job security, night work, as well as government policies towards promoting the economic role of women.

4. The construction of the SIGI and its sub-indices

The construction of the SIGI and its sub-indices involved three main stages, from constructing the database and updating the country profiles to producing the composite index which provides the SIGI ranking. They are discussed in this section, along with the main hypotheses of the process.

Step 1: Constructing the GID-DB

The SIGI is based on variables from the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database (GID-DB) which provides key data on gender-based discrimination in social institutions for 160 countries. SIGI variables were selected based on the 2009 and 2012 editions of the GID-DB, assessing the quality and coverage of new data related to discriminatory social institutions and adhering to the criteria set out below.

- Conceptual relevance: The variable should be closely related to the conceptual framework of discriminatory social institutions and measure what it is intended to capture.
- Underlying factor of gender inequality: The variable should capture an underlying factor that leads to unequal outcomes for women and men.
- Data quality, reliability and coverage: The variable should be based on high quality, reliable data. Ideally the data should be standardised across countries and have extensive coverage across countries.
- Distinction: Each variable should measure a distinct discriminatory institution and should add new information not measured by other variables.
- Statistical association: Variables included in the same sub-index should be statistically associated and thereby capture similar dimensions of social institutions without being redundant.

The GID-DB comprises both quantitative information collected from the existing gender database and qualitative information from the country profiles (See Annex D for more information on 2014 variable characteristics). Usually, quantitative variables are continuous and expressed as a percentage, where 0 represents low discrimination or a low level of discrimination and 1 represents a high level of discrimination. For example, the prevalence of female genital mutilation gives the percentage of women victims of this harmful practice: from less than 1% in Cameroon to more than 95% in Somalia. Qualitative information from the country profiles are scored according to categorical variables based on a 3- or 5-point scale following the 2012 coding manual. The same 0-1 scale is used. For example, regarding daughters' inheritance rights, New Zealand has a score of 0 since it

provides equal inheritance rights for daughters and sons, whereas Iran has a score of 1 due to discrimination in the inheritance laws where daughters inherit a smaller amount than sons.

i.   Collecting qualitative information

Updating country profiles
The source of information for qualitative data is the SIGI country profiles. The country profiles contain fully referenced qualitative and quantitative information relevant to discriminatory social institutions, organised by the sub-indices and variables of the SIGI. The SIGI country profiles have been drafted by gender and development experts following a standardised structure and format to ensure comparability across countries.

Regarding the sources and references used:

- Priority is given to national sources (government sources and national research institutes) as well as international sources (international organisations such as the World Bank or the United Nations and regional organisations such as UNECA or development banks).
- Data must be up to date.

The country profiles were developed through a two-stage internal draft and review process prior to external validation of data at a country or regional level (each validator is acknowledged on the www.genderindex.org website). The following criteria guided the selection of validators for the SIGI country profiles:

- The validator should be a gender expert with knowledge of the policy and legal landscape for gender equality and women's rights at a national level.
- The validator should be based in a research institution or women's civil society organisation or have extensive consulting experience.

Alongside the SIGI, the updated country profiles are available at www.wikigender.org where country gender experts are invited to review and add information.

Scoring the qualitative information
Scoring the qualitative information is the process by which the qualitative information is given a discrete value corresponding to each category it can assume. Categorical variables are based on a scale of three categories (0, 0.5 and 1) or five categories (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1) where a qualitative assessment is made based on the available data, where 0 represents low discrimination and 1 represents a high level of discrimination. Points on the scale are defined according to the quality of the data available and cross-country comparability.

The following guidelines apply to the coding process:

- In cases where no or insufficient information exists, variables are not assigned a value.
- The legal indicators are assessed based on all applicable legal frameworks, including civil law, religious law, customary law and traditional law.

The coding manual (Annex B) sets out the detailed coding guidelines for categorising the qualitative SIGI variables. It also provides examples of how countries are coded and subsequently scored.

Gender statistics are collected from the main gender data sets. The indicator dashboard in Annex B describes the definition and the sources of the quantitative variables included in the GID-DB.

iii. Constructing the indicators

Truncating quantitative data

The SIGI and its sub-indices range from 0 for very low levels of discrimination to 1 for very high levels. However, for some variables, equality is reached at 0.5 instead of 1. Equality in political representation for example is achieved when 50% of parliament members are women. Hence, women share in parliament is truncated at 50% for countries having more than 50% of women.

Inversing the scale

For some variables, the scale from very low to very high discrimination is inverted to fit with the 0-1 scale. For female political representation, for example, a larger share of women in parliamentary seats means lower discrimination against women. Moreover, as equality in political representation for example is achieved when 50% of parliament members are women, countries having 50% of women have a score of 0.

Standardising the indicators

Standardisation of the original variables is done by subtracting from one the mean and then dividing by the standard deviation for continuous variables.

For ordinal categorical variables, the standardisation uses results of an ordered probit model.

Aggregating variables in the indicators

Some indicators are based on one variable while others on several. In the latter case, the indicator is the average of its available variables. For example:

$$\text{Parental authority } = \frac{1}{2}(Parental\ authority\ during\ marriage + Parental\ authority\ after\ divorce)$$

When the indicator aggregates categorical and continuous variables, the latter are the object of discretisation. In this process, the quantitative values of a variable are transformed into qualitative categories using quintiles. Where data is available for at least one variable of an indicator, the score is calculated based on the variables available.

Step 2: Constructing the sub-indices

The five SIGI sub-indices are made up of 14 indicators previously computed. Before aggregating the indicators with a reasonable weighting scheme endogenously defined by the polychoric principal component analysis (PCA), we check the statistical association between the indicators.

i. Measuring association between variables

The objective of the sub-indices is to provide a summary measure for each dimension of discrimination against women. Each sub-index combines variables that are assumed to describe one dimension, and for this reason the variables are expected to be statistically correlated. The statistical

association between the variables is tested using two tools: a Kendall Tau b rank correlation analysis and a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA).[3]

Kendall Tau b

The Kendall Tau b coefficient is used to test the statistical association between indicators belonging to the same dimension. As most of the indicators are ordinal, the conditions for using the Pearson correlation are not fulfilled; rank correlation tests are preferred, which show the similarity of the data rankings of each of the indicators. For each indicator, the values are ordered and ranked, and then the correspondence between the rankings is measured.

The Kendall Tau b ranges from zero, meaning no association, to a value of 1 or -1, meaning perfect positive or negative correlation, respectively.

The Kendall Tau b is computed as the excess of concordant pairs (C) over discordant pairs (D), divided by the total number of pairs:

$$\tau_{\mathrm{b}} = \frac{C - D}{\sqrt{\frac{j(j-1)}{2 - T_x} \times \frac{j(j-1)}{2 - T_y}}}$$

where *C* is the number of concordant pairs, *D* is the number of discordant pairs, *j* is the number of observations, $\frac{j(j-1)}{2}$ the number of all pairs, and T_i the number of pairs tied for the variable *i*. Under the null hypothesis of independence of variables X and Y, the sampling distribution of τ_b has an expected value of zero.

The results for Kendall Tau b are reported in Annex E. To confirm an association between two variables, instead of assuming any correlation threshold, we rely on the rejection of the null hypothesis that the Kendall Tau b value is equal to zero, which implies no association, at the 5% significance level.

Results show that within each dimension all variables are statistically associated with each other at least at the 5% significance level, providing support for the conceptual coherence behind the design of the sub-indices. In the discriminatory family code sub-index, parental authority, inheritance rights and divorce proved to be the variables with the strongest degree of association. This means that countries that perform poorly in one of these indicators relative to other countries in the sample also tend to perform poorly in the other two indicators. Similarly, in the restricted physical integrity sub-index, all variables show a positive degree of rank correlation, with violence against women and female genital mutilation (FGM) being the most strongly associated pair. Furthermore, in the son bias and the restricted resources and assets sub-indices, all correlation coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% significance level; on the other hand, the two variables that make up the restricted civil liberties sub-index are moderately correlated and significant at the 5% significance level.

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[3] For more information on Kendall Tau b and MCA, please refer to Branisa et al. (2013).

Results from Annex E also suggest that the 2014 variables that were introduced to better capture additional components underlying discriminatory social institutions proved to be highly coherent with those already included in the 2012 SIGI framework. The Kendall Tau b statistics suggest that additional variables provide additional information as compared to existing variables without being redundant.

More precisely, in the discriminatory family code sub-index, both divorce and unpaid care work show a high degree of correlation with the other variables. It is particularly noteworthy that the rank correlation between divorce and both parental authority and inheritance is around 0.6, showing that countries perform well in terms of rights to initiate divorce compared to other countries in the sample, also perform well in terms of parental authority and inheritance. In the restricted physical integrity sub-index, the newly proposed variable on abortion seems to fit particularly well with both FGM and violence against women. The same holds for son preference in education in the son bias sub-index, where the magnitude of the rank correlation coefficient with both missing women and fertility preferences reaches approximately 0.4. For the restricted resources and assets sub-index, we observe that rank correlations are lower, though still highly significant, when replacing secure access to land by secure access to land bis that includes, in addition to information on the law, the share of agricultural land holders who are women. This is deemed reasonable, as the latter variable is enriched by land titles owned by women, hence introducing an additional element of heterogeneity (i.e. practice, in addition to the law) which is not captured in access to financial services and secure access to non-land assets. Finally, workplace rights prove to be a coherent variable with the potential to grasp innovative components of gender discrimination in social institutions related to civil liberties: this additional variable is being strongly correlated to both political voice and access to public space.

MCA

Multiple correspondence analysis is used here as a second method to check the statistical association between variables before building the SIGI sub-indices. MCA analyses the association between more than two variables. Instead of using a correlation coefficient to capture the statistical association of variables as previously, these correspondences are measured using a χ2 statistic that captures the distance between them.

Since MCA processes only categorical variables, we first discretise continuous variables using quintiles. MCA produces graphs representing the structure of contingency tables: the distances between the points reflect the dissimilarities between the profiles. In the MCA graphs, one of the axes represents whether there is inequality and the other axis represents the extent of inequality. Connecting the values of a variable produces a graphical pattern. If this pattern is similar to the pattern obtained for another variable, then the two variables are associated.

The results of MCA presented in Annex F also confirm that within each sub-index all the indicators measure the same dimension without being redundant. Regarding the sub-index discriminatory family code for example, the chart shows a clear pattern of correlation between the variables. The points with the same number for each variable are close to each other: all the numbers 1 for the six

variables are in the same quadrant and a short distance apart. By connecting the three points together, the triangles formed by each variable are similar, confirming the strong association of those six variables and the fact that they all capture the same sub-index.

ii. Polychoric principal component analysis for aggregating

The five sub-indices − discriminatory family code, restricted physical integrity, son bias, restricted civil liberties, and restricted resources and assets − use the 14 indicators described in section 3 as inputs.[4] The sub-indices aim to provide a summary measure of each dimension of gender discrimination in social institutions by extracting common information captured by single indicators, avoiding redundancy and minimising statistical biases. The last step in the construction of the sub-index consists in aggregating the indicators with a reasonable weighting scheme. This is done through a polychoric principal component analysis (PCA).[5]

We use the first principal component (FPC) as a proxy for the common information contained in the indicators corresponding to one sub-index. The FPC is the weighted sum of the standardised original variables that captures as much of the variance in the data as possible. The proportion explained by the FPC is 61% for discriminatory family code, 63% for restricted physical integrity, 71% for son bias, 61% for restricted civil liberties and 84% for restricted resources and assets. The weight assigned to each variable in these linear combinations is obtained by analysing the correlation structure in the data (Table 1).

Table 1. Polychoric principal component analysis weights for each SIGI sub-index

Discriminatory Family Code	
Legal Age of Marriage	0.4484
Early Marriage	0.4023
Parental Authority	0.5602
Inheritance Rights	0.5686
Restricted Physical Integrity	
Violence against Women	0.6181
Female Genital Mutilation	0.5678
Reproductive Autonomy	0.5437
Son Bias	
Missing Women	0.7071
Fertility Preferences	0.7071
Restricted Resources and Assets	
Secure Access to Land	0.5967
Secure Access to Non-Land Assets	0.6017
Access to Financial Services	0.5310
Restricted Civil Liberties	
Access to Public Space	0.7071
Political Voice	0.7071

Next, the sub-index value is rescaled between 0 and 1. A fictitious country with the best possible performance (no inequality) is assigned the value 0 and a fictitious country with the worst possible performance (highest level of inequality) the value 1.

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[4] A sub-index score is calculated for a country or economy only if there is data for all indicators.
5 For further detail on the methodologies of these tools, refer to Branisa et al. (2013).

Step 3: Constructing the composite indicator: the SIGI

The SIGI is an unweighted average of a non-linear function of the sub-indices. Having equal weights for each sub-index implies that each dimension of discriminatory social institutions has equal value: no dimension is more important than another in terms of deprivation experienced by women.[6] The deprivation faced by women living in countries where the family code is highly discriminant is equivalent to the one faced by women living in countries where civil liberties are highly restricted.

The non-linear function arises because we assume 1) that inequality related to gender corresponds to deprivation experienced by the affected women and 2) that deprivation increases more than proportionally when inequality increases. Thus, a high level of inequality is penalised in every dimension. For example, when comparing women's deprivation related to discriminatory social institutions in two countries where only inheritance rights differ, the difference in their SIGI scores will increase with the difference in the inheritance indicator. Indeed, the two countries will have a higher difference in the SIGI score if one is scored 1 and the other one 0.5 for inheritance, than if the first country is scored 0.5 and the other one 0.

Moreover, the quadratic form represents the aversion to high levels of inequality. Reducing inequalities in the legal framework addressing domestic violence is reflected in a lower SIGI score. However, the effect on the SIGI will differ as reducing from 1 to 0.75 is not equivalent to reducing from 0.25 to 0.

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6 Weights are needed when the variance between the sub-indices differs widely, otherwise, the sub-index with a higher variance implicitly has a higher weight (Ferrant, 2014). This is not the case here.

Finally, the non-linearity also means that the SIGI does not allow for total compensation among sub-indices but permits partial compensation. Partial compensation implies that a high level of inequality in one sub-index can be only partially compensated with low inequality in another. For example, having no or little issues with son bias does not totally compensate having strong restrictions on women's civil liberties.

The value of the SIGI for a given country is calculated as follows:

$$SIGI = \frac{1}{5} Discriminatory\ family\ code^2 + \frac{1}{5} Restricted\ physical\ integrity^2 + \frac{1}{5} Son\ bias^2$$
$$+ \frac{1}{5} Restricted\ resources\ and\ assets^2 + \frac{1}{5} Restricted\ civil\ liberties^2$$

5. Results

The SIGI scores 108 countries (Figure 4) according to their level of discrimination in social institutions (see Annex A for the full scores of the SIGI and its five sub-indices). As shown by Figure 4, the SIGI classifies them into five groups, from very low levels of discrimination in social institutions (15% of the countries, with a SIGI average of 0.02) to very high levels (16% of the countries, with a SIGI average of 0.45). The SIGI also offers regional analyses describing trends and performances.

Figure 4. Share of countries by level of discrimination in the SIGI

Figure 5. SIGI map

A. SIGI classification

SIGI: The 2014 edition of the SIGI classifies countries into five groups according to their performances in the SIGI and its sub-indices, using the following threshold:[7]

0	0.04	0.12	0.22	0.35	1
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	

Among the 108 countries included, Argentina, Belgium, Mongolia, and Trinidad and Tobago have the lowest levels of gender inequality related to social institutions. On the other side of the spectrum, gender inequality in social institutions is a major problem in Bangladesh, Egypt, Niger and Yemen among others.

Discriminatory family code: 159 countries are ranked. The top performers are Australia, Korea or South Africa among others, while the lowest performers are Afghanistan, India and Mali:

0	0.06	0.24	0.41	0.55	1
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	

Restricted physical integrity: 120 countries are ranked. While in France, the United States and Uruguay women face less restriction or challenge to their physical integrity, this is an important concern for women living in Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan:

0	0.14	0.23	0.43	0.68	1
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	

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
[7] Annex G presents the threshold for all SIGI variables.

Son bias: ranks 129 countries are ranked. Costa Rica, Haiti and Swaziland have very low levels of discrimination, while in Azerbaijan, Nepal and Pakistan girls are highly devaluated:

0	0.07	0.12	0.23	0.45	1
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	

Restricted resources and assets: 160 countries are ranked. Women in Mauritius, Sweden and Ukraine face very low levels of discrimination, while women in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Papua New Guinea face very high levels:

0	0.01	0.3	0.5	0.69	1
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	

Restricted civil liberties: 160 countries are ranked. Among them Bolivia, Lesotho and Zimbabwe display low levels of discrimination while Iran, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia highly restrict women's civil liberties:

0	0.18	0.3	0.5	0.7	1
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	

i.   Countries having very low levels of discrimination in the SIGI

Countries are classified as having very low levels of gender discrimination in social institutions if their SIGI scores are lower than 0.04, representing 15% of the country sample with a SIGI average of 0.02. As shown by Figure 6, these countries are mainly located in Latin America and the Caribbean (38%) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (19%) or are member of the OECD (38%).

Very low levels of gender discrimination in social institutions			
Belgium	0.0016	Trinidad and Tobago	0.0236
France	0.0034	Czech Republic	0.0283
Slovenia	0.0037	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.0333
Spain	0.0049	Belarus	0.0336
Serbia	0.0097	Mongolia	0.0345
Argentina	0.0107	Dominican Republic	0.0367
Italy	0.0116	Panama	0.0375
Cuba	0.0208	Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	0.0389

These countries are characterised by robust legal frameworks and measures that provide equal rights in the family code and in access to resources and assets and that promote women's civil liberties. In most of these countries, women and men have equal parental and inheritance rights, and early marriage is not a common practice. Women do not face restrictions on their access to public space or their participation in politics. Neither missing women nor female genital mutilation is

a concern. However, the countries lack laws to protect women from violence and measures to implement them, and women need better access to justice. On average 20% of women in these countries have been victims of domestic violence in their lifetime.

ii.   Countries having low levels of gender discrimination in the SIGI

Countries are classified as having low levels of gender discrimination in social institutions if their SIGI scores range from 0.04 to 0.12, representing 23% of the country sample with a SIGI average of 0.08. As shown by Figure 6, these countries are mainly located in Latin America and the Caribbean (36%), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (28%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (16%).

Low levels of gender discrimination in social institutions			
Ecuador	0.0422	Ukraine	0.0750
Lithuania	0.0424	Peru	0.0826
Bulgaria	0.0449	Colombia	0.0862
Brazil	0.0458	Lesotho	0.0876
Cambodia	0.0477	Madagascar	0.1002
El Salvador	0.0490	Turkey	0.1032
Costa Rica	0.0506	Morocco	0.1052
Latvia	0.0511	Thailand	0.1056
Plurinational State of Bolivia	0.0579	Honduras	0.1074
Paraguay	0.0580	Bhutan	0.1142
South Africa	0.0599	Namibia	0.1173
Republic of Moldova	0.0664	Kazakhstan	0.1196

These countries are characterised by strong laws providing equal rights for women and men in the family code, in access to resources and assets, and in civil liberties. Both sexes enjoy equal opportunities to own and make decisions over land and other resources. Female genital mutilation is not practiced, and most women have reproductive autonomy. These countries have inadequate legal frameworks regarding violence against women. On average 31% of women have been victims of domestic violence in their lifetime, and more than 29% of women agree that domestic violence is justified under certain circumstances.

Figure 6. Regional composition of the SIGI classification

i.   Countries having medium levels of gender discrimination in the SIGI

Countries are classified as having medium levels of gender discrimination in social institutions if their SIGI scores range from 0.12 to 0.22, representing 27% of the country sample with a SIGI average of 0.17. As shown by Figure 6, these countries are mainly located in Sub-Saharan Africa (45%), East Asia and the Pacific and Eastern Europe (17%) and Central Asia (17%).

These countries are characterised by inconsistent or conflicting legal frameworks covering the family code, women's access to resources and assets, and civil liberties. The strong influence of customary practices perpetuates discrimination in these areas. Specifically, women face discrimination in terms of the legal age of marriage, parental authority, inheritance, and rights to land and financial services. Women are restricted in their access to public space, as well as in their participation in political life due to the absence of quotas at the national and/or sub-national levels. Legal frameworks addressing violence against women are inadequate (e.g. certain types of violence are not included). On average, 39% of women agree that domestic violence is justified under certain circumstances.

Medium levels of gender discrimination in social institutions			
People's Republic of China	0.1310	Angola	0.1719
Guatemala	0.1318	Philippines	0.1765
Rwanda	0.1339	Togo	0.1860
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.1345	Viet Nam	0.1865
Jamaica	0.1350	Sri Lanka	0.1894
Mozambique	0.1375	Senegal	0.1985
Zimbabwe	0.1392	Tunisia	0.1986
Tajikistan	0.1393	Republic of the Congo	0.2033
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.1445	Georgia	0.2035
Haiti	0.1466	Malawi	0.2073
Uzbekistan	0.1475	Guinea-Bissau	0.2110
Indonesia	0.1532	Swaziland	0.2119
Nicaragua	0.1595	Kenya	0.2157
Kyrgyzstan	0.1598	Uganda	0.2163
Burundi	0.1662		

ii.   Countries having high levels of gender discrimination in the SIGI

Countries are classified as having high levels of gender discrimination in social institutions if their SIGI score range from 0.22 to 0.35, representing 19% of the country sample with a SIGI average of 0.28. As shown by Figure 6, these countries are mainly located in Sub-Saharan Africa (43%), South Asia (20%), Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Middle East and North Africa (14% each).

These countries are characterised by discrimination embedded in customary laws, social norms and practices and by inappropriate legal protections against gender discrimination in all dimensions of social institutions. The legal frameworks and/or the customary laws discriminate against women in respect to the legal age of marriage, parental authority and inheritance. Women's physical integrity is restricted due to inadequate legal frameworks to address violence against women and high levels of acceptance of domestic violence. Moreover, female genital mutilation is a common practice. Most of these countries have medium to very high levels of devaluation of daughters and preference for

sons, as shown by the numbers of missing women or the unbalanced sex ratios at last birth. Finally, women's access to public space and resources is limited. On average 32% of women have been victims of domestic violence in their lifetime, and more than 49% of women agree that domestic violence is justified under certain circumstances.

High levels of gender discrimination in social institutions			
Azerbaijan	0.2403	Burkina Faso	0.2819
Armenia	0.2428	Lebanon	0.2897
Ethiopia	0.2450	Myanmar	0.2935
Albania	0.2476	Ghana	0.2988
United Republic of Tanzania	0.2504	Pakistan	0.3013
Côte d'Ivoire	0.2537	Jordan	0.3119
Timor-Leste	0.2550	Guinea	0.3206
Iraq	0.2631	Afghanistan	0.3224
India	0.2650	Nepal	0.3229
Benin	0.2780	Central African Republic	0.3285
Cameroon	0.2803		

iii.   Countries having very high levels of gender discrimination in the SIGI

Countries are classified as having very high levels of gender discrimination in social institutions if their SIG scores are higher than 0.35, representing 16% of the country sample with a SIGI average of 0.45. As shown by Figure 6, these countries are mainly located in Sub-Saharan Africa (76%), Middle East and North Africa (20%) and South Asia (6%).

Very high levels of gender discrimination in social institutions			
Sierra Leone	0.3720	Niger	0.4415
Liberia	0.3828	Zambia	0.4489
Bangladesh	0.3900	Somalia	0.4594
Nigeria	0.3911	Chad	0.4665
Mauritania	0.3954	Mali	0.5164
Gabon	0.4022	Gambia	0.5240
Syrian Arab Republic	0.4162	Sudan	0.5550
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.4276	Yemen	0.5634
Egypt	0.4280		

These countries are characterised by very high levels of discrimination in legal frameworks and customary practices across most sub-indices and by very poor implementation measures. The family code greatly discriminates against women: almost one third of girls younger than 19 are married, and women face severe discrimination in their parental authority and inheritance rights. Women's rights to own and control land and other resources and to access public space are extremely limited. There are serious infringements on their physical integrity matched by high levels of acceptance and prevalence of domestic violence: 44% of women have been victims of domestic violence, and 59% accept that it is justified under certain circumstances.

B. Regional analyses

These regional analyses (Figures 7 to 14) take into account all countries covered in the 2014 edition of the SIGI. However, SIGI scores for 2014 are based only on countries with full data coverage. In addition, OECD countries are not included in their geographic regions.

Figure 7. SIGI scores by region

i. OECD countries

With a SIGI average of 0.02, OECD countries[8] perform well in the SIGI and its sub-indices, demonstrating the importance of sustained investments in gender equality to remove discrimination from social institutions. Yet challenges remain in particular in the restricted civil liberties and restricted physical integrity sub-indices.

In most OECD countries, women's rights are well protected as concerns the family code and access to land and assets. Moreover, women and men in OECD countries have equal access to public space and equal rights to political voice. However, domestic violence affects one in four women, and prevalence rates of intimate partner violence are high in certain countries (e.g. 36% in Chile, 47% in Mexico and 42% in Turkey). Most countries have introduced specific laws penalising domestic violence, rape and sexual harassment. Comprehensive action plans have accompanied most of these laws, although implementation and institutional mechanisms have been criticised as under-resourced or inadequate.

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[8] Countries and economies included in the SIGI: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey.

Figure 8. OECD scores by sub-index.

Figure 8. OECD scores by sub-index.

iv.   Latin America and the Caribbean

With a SIGI average of 0.07, the region of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)[9] is one of the top performers thanks to comprehensive legislative frameworks that ensure gender equality in economic and political rights and aiming to eliminate gender-based violence. Progress towards gender equality is stunted, however, by ongoing weak implementation of laws in the SIGI sub-indices of discriminatory family code, restricted physical integrity and restricted civil liberties.

Figure 9. LAC scores by sub-index.

Across the region, the civil liberties of women are protected, yet strong national performance can hide discrimination against women from indigenous and ethnic minorities. Moreover, reducing violence against women is high on the political agenda, with region-wide efforts to implement national legislation and commitments to the Belém do Pará Convention. Violence against women remains highly prevalent nevertheless: e.g. 64% of women in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and 46% in Ecuador report having experienced physical or sexual violence in their lifetime. In the area of

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[9] Countries and economies included in the SIGI: Argentina, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

discriminatory family code, laws on marriage and parental authority continue to limit women's decision making within the family and perpetuate traditional gender norms and roles.

v.   Eastern Europe and Central Asia

With a SIGI average of 0.11, the region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA)[10] is the second best performer in the SIGI 2014. The region shows different patterns of discrimination: son bias and early and forced marriages are of concern in Central Asia, whereas gaps in laws or poor implementation are the next challenge confronting most Eastern European countries.

Figure 10. ECA scores by sub-index.

Son bias is a central concern, with close to half of the region's countries featuring in the SIGI's lowest quintile. Gender-based violence and restricted civil liberties remain problems that cut across all countries of the region. Moreover, laws have not reduced the high rate of early and forced marriages.

vi.   East Asia and the Pacific

With a SIGI average of 0.15, the region of East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)[11] is the third best performer in the 2014 edition of the SIGI, thanks to comprehensive legislative frameworks protecting women's rights. However their implementation and weak institutional structures continue to hold back progress. Overall, moves toward gender equality are slow or patchy, particularly regarding civil liberties, secure access to land, violence against women and political voice, which are serious issues of concern for the region.

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[10] Countries and economies included in the SIGI: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
[11] Countries and economies included in the SIGI: Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Myanmar, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam.

Figure 11. EAP scores by sub-index.

Figure 11. EAP scores by sub-index.

Women's status and decision-making authority within the family paint a mixed picture, mainly due to conflict between customary, religious and civil laws. Negative stereotypes and traditional perceptions of women's roles cut across the region in public life as well, inhibiting women's empowerment.

vii.   South Asia

With a SIGI average of 0.27, South Asia (SA)[12] is the third lowest performing region. Unlike in other poor performing regions, countries in South Asia show strong homogeneity: no country in the region features in the first quintile of the SIGI, and half of the countries feature in the final quintile.

Figure 12. SA scores by sub-index.

The region has some of the highest levels of discrimination in the family code and of son bias among all regions. South Asia is characterised by pervasive violations of women's freedom from violence and in particular poor institutional mechanisms to support victims' access to justice. Moreover,

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[12] Countries and economies included in the SIGI: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

women have limited opportunities to access or own land and other productive resources in their own name.

viii.   Sub-Saharan Africa

With a SIGI average of 0.28, the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)[13] region is one of the poorest performers. It is also the most heterogeneous region, with South Africa having low levels of discrimination and Sudan very high levels. Finally, this is the region having the higher number of countries in the GID-DB (27% of country included in the database are in Sub-Saharan Africa) and ranked in the SIGI (36% of countries ranked in the index are in Sub-Saharan Africa).

Figure 13. SSA scores by sub-index.

The region displays the highest gender inequalities in the sub-indices of restricted resources and assets and restricted physical integrity. Moreover, a high level of discrimination in the family code sub-index also continues to restrict women's choices and infringe on their socio-economic rights. Having access to land and control over property remains one of the biggest challenges for women in Sub-Saharan Africa. Violence against women continues to be a major concern; 40% of women in the region have been victims of gender-based violence, and female genital mutilation is still an issue in some countries of the region.

ix.   Middle East and North Africa

With a SIGI average of 0.32, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)[14] region is the poorest performer in the 2014 edition of the SIGI. The region shows serious weaknesses in all SIGI sub-indices, particularly pronounced in restricted civil liberties and discriminatory family code. However, Morocco is well ranked thanks to changes in the legal framework promoting gender inequality and producing best practices for the region.

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[13] Countries and economies included in the SIGI: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[14] Countries and economies included in the SIGI: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and Yemen.

In the MENA region, gender-specific laws limit women's access to public space and political voice. Reports of violence targeted at women who participated in the Arab Spring also mirror women's ongoing struggle for civil liberties and freedom of movement (OECD, forthcoming). A husband's permission is required in Yemen to seek employment and in Oman to obtain a passport. Moreover, family codes are based on discriminatory customary and religious laws, which assign unequal inheritance rights to girls, identify the man as the head of the household, do not recognise female parental authority and do not allow women to initiate divorce. Violence against women is also issue that certain countries in the region need to address. Almost two-thirds of countries lack legislation on sexual harassment, rape or domestic violence. In certain countries, a rapist can escape punishment if he marries the victim, and marital rape is not recognised.

Figure 14. MENA scores by sub-index.

6. The SIGI's added value

A. Comparison with other gender-specific indices

The SIGI aims to capture a neglected aspect of gender discrimination that is social institutions, considered as the underlying drivers of gender inequality. While other gender-specific measures capture gender inequality in outcomes, the SIGI measures its underlying causes: gender inequality in opportunities.

The objective of the SIGI is to provide additional, complementary information to other existing measures without being redundant. To check whether the SIGI adds value for researchers and policy makers comparing to existing gender indices, an empirical analysis is conducted of the statistical association between the SIGI and other existing gender-specific indices, namely the female Human Development Index (HDI), the Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Inequality Index (GII) of the United Nations Development Programme, as well as the Global Gender Gap index (GGG) of the World Economic Forum. The GGG and the GII measure gender inequality in outcomes, such as health, economic participation, education and empowerment.

Both pairwise correlation coefficients and Kendall Tau b were computed. To separate redundancy from non-redundancy using the Kendall Tau b statistic a threshold of 0.70 is used (Ferrant, 2014). For

all measures, the correlation coefficients are around 0.70 and statistically significant suggesting that the SIGI is highly correlated to other gender-specific measures. The information contained in the SIGI is relevant in a gender inequality perspective. Moreover, the Kendall Tau b is lower than 0.60 and statistically significant meaning that the SIGI is related to these gender measures but is non-redundant.

Table 2. The SIGI compared with other gender-specific measures

	Female HDI	GDI	GII	GGG
Pairwise correlation coefficients	-0.7131**	-0.7675**	0.6922**	-0.6999**
Kendall Tau b	-0.5636	-0.5899	0.5523	-0.4722
N^o of observations	91	91	98	85
P-value	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***

** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.

It seems reasonable to assume that discrimination against women in outcomes can be explained by discriminatory social institutions. A linear regression model is used to explain the GGG, the GII and the GDI, including only the SIGI as explaining variables. As a gender-specific measure, the SIGI has a high explanatory power (with a R² of 0.49, 0.48 and 0.59, meaning that the SIGI explains 49%, 48% and 59% of the gender-related measures' variance, respectively). The SIGI's significant coefficient implies that higher discrimination against women in social institutions is related to higher inequality in social and economic outcomes.[15]

B. Strengths and weaknesses of composite indicators

As other composite indicators, the SIGI provides simple comparisons to illustrate complex issues. A composite indicator is a useful means of capturing the multiple and intersecting manifestations of social institutions that affect women and girls throughout their life course. The aim of a composite indicator is to describe a multidimensional concept that could not be captured by single indicators.

Discriminatory social institutions have multiple facets that range from intra-household behaviour to legal frameworks. A single indicator, for example on prevalence of early marriage, does not capture the overall deprivation of women due to intersecting social institutions: it only reflects one form of discriminatory social institutions. Gender inequality in social institutions appears in many different ways which, while significantly correlated, are not perfect. Hence, a single variable, as acceptance of domestic violence, cannot capture the overall phenomena. Moreover, all forms of discriminatory social institutions do not appear simultaneously in all countries covered by the GID-DB. For example, female genital mutilation mainly occurs in Africa, Egypt and Yemen, while missing women is an Asian-specific issue. However, both issues arise in some countries (India for example, where the practice of genital cutting is increasing). Only a composite indicator could capture potential complementarity or substitutability between the various manifestations of gender inequality in social institutions using an appropriate weighting scheme.

However, in aggregating information, the SIGI has strengths and weaknesses of composite indicator as discuss in the following table.

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[15] These preliminary results hold when controlling for income per capita levels.

Table 3. The SIGI's position regarding strengths and weaknesses of composite indicators

Strengths of composite indicators	How the SIGI addresses these strengths
Summarise complex and multidimensional issues in order to support decision making.	The SIGI describes the overall phenomena of discriminatory social institutions. It includes five sub-indices and 14 individual indicators capturing discriminatory social institutions that restrict women's and girls' access to opportunities, resources and power.
Provide a "big picture" that is easy to interpret. Describe a general trend that is difficult to capture with many separate indicators.	Using polychoric PCA, the SIGI summarises the main information captured by 21 variables in one composite indicator.
Provide a summary figure used to compare the overall situation across countries and progress of countries over time.	The SIGI ranked 108 countries in 2014 and 86 in 2012.
Reduce the visible size of a set of indicators without dropping the underlying information base. This makes it possible to include more information within the existing size limit.	The SIGI resulted from extracting common information captured by the 14 individual indicators.
Enable users to compare complex dimensions effectively. Facilitate communication, attract public interest (e.g. citizens, media) and promote accountability. Help to construct and underpin narratives for lay and literate audiences.	With coding between 0 (no inequality) and 1 (complete inequality), the SIGI is easy to interpret.

Weaknesses of composite indicators	How the SIGI addresses these weaknesses
"Mixes oranges and apples".	By weighing together a set of well-chosen variables describing the same phenomena, the SIGI sub-indices provide a summary of a country's discriminatory social institutions in each dimension. Polychoric PCA extracts common information captured by single indicators.
Lose detailed information that could lead to simplistic policy conclusions.	The SIGI offers three levels of analysis to draw sophisticated policy conclusions: • the composite index • the sub-indices • the individual indicators and variables.

7. Annex

A. Results: Country scores according to the SIGI and its sub-indices

COUNTRY	SIGI	Discriminatory family code		Restricted physical integrity		Son bias		Restricted resources and assets		Restricted civil liberties	
VERY LOW LEVELS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE SIGI											
Belgium	0.0016	0.0038	very low	0.0316	very low	0.0824	low	0	very low	0	very low
France	0.0034	0.1002	low	0	very low	0.0828	low	0	very low	0	very low
Slovenia	0.0037	0.0031	very low	0.0891	very low	0.1023	low	0	very low	0	very low
Spain	0.0049	0.0856	low	0.0622	very low	0.1144	low	0	very low	0	very low
Serbia	0.0097	0.1094	low	0.1171	very low	0.1504	medium	0	very low	0	very low
Argentina	0.0107	0.0809	low	0.0148	very low	0.0691	very low	0.2048	low	0	very low
Italy	0.0116	0.0025	very low	0.1029	very low	0.0966	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Cuba	0.0208	0.242	medium	0.0871	very low	0	very low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Trinidad and Tobago	0.0236	0.2504	medium	0.1306	very low	0	very low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Czech Republic	0.0283	0.0013	very low	0.0956	very low	0.0855	low	0	very low	0.3539	medium
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.0333	0.2437	medium	0.0672	very low	0.1497	medium	0.2048	low	0.1951	low
Belarus	0.0336	0.0251	very low	0.3544	medium	0.0599	very low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Mongolia	0.0345	0.0226	very low	0.2584	medium	0.1582	medium	0.2048	low	0.1951	low
Dominican Republic	0.0367	0.3691	medium	0.0958	very low	0.0118	very low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Panama	0.0375	0.2344	low	0.0148	very low	0.0855	low	0	very low	0.3539	medium
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	0.0389	0.2456	medium	0.0941	very low	0.0071	very low	0	very low	0.3539	medium
LOW LEVELS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE SIGI											
Ecuador	0.0422	0.1374	low	0.3737	medium	0.1037	low	0.2048	low	0	very low
Lithuania	0.0424	0.0013	very low	0.2795	medium	0.0931	low	0	very low	0.3539	medium
Bulgaria	0.0449	0.1504	low	0.3926	medium	0.0988	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Brazil	0.0458	0.2316	low	0.1226	very low	0.0364	very low	0.1837	low	0.3539	medium
Cambodia	0.0477	0.0684	low	0.2601	medium	0	very low	0.2028	low	0.3539	medium
El Salvador	0.049	0.1066	low	0.2675	medium	0.1049	low	0.3885	medium	0	very low
Costa Rica	0.0506	0.2513	medium	0.1544	low	0.0121	very low	0.4076	medium	0	very low
Latvia	0.0511	0.0044	very low	0.3466	medium	0.1008	low	0	very low	0.3539	medium
Plurinational State of Bolivia	0.0579	0.3676	medium	0.3207	medium	0.0987	low	0.2048	low	0	very low
Paraguay	0.058	0.288	medium	0.044	very low	0.0291	very low	0.4076	medium	0.1951	low
South Africa	0.0599	0.0213	very low	0.2164	low	0.2196	medium	0.4076	medium	0.1951	low
Republic of Moldova	0.0664	0.3418	medium	0.2189	low	0	very low	0.2048	low	0.3539	medium
Romania	0.0686	0.1134	low	0.17	low	0.0994	low	0	very low	0.5399	high

Country											
Ukraine	0.075	0.0414	very low	0.1517	low	0.243	high	0	very low	0.5399	high
Peru	0.0826	0.4053	medium	0.2096	low	0.0284	very low	0.4076	medium	0.1951	low
Colombia	0.0862	0.1748	low	0.1567	low	0.0663	very low	0	very low	0.6093	high
Lesotho	0.0876	0.4266	high	0.4112	medium	0.2116	medium	0.2048	low	0	very low
Madagascar	0.1002	0.4889	high	0.3079	medium	0	very low	0.2048	low	0.3539	medium
Turkey	0.1032	0.1585	low	0.1913	low	0.4036	high	0	very low	0.5399	high
Morocco	0.1052	0.461	high	0.3159	medium	0.1574	medium	0.3885	medium	0.1951	low
Thailand	0.1056	0.377	medium	0.2935	medium	0.1533	medium	0.3885	medium	0.3539	medium
Honduras	0.1074	0.3891	medium	0.1044	very low	0.1443	medium	0.3885	medium	0.4505	medium
Bhutan	0.1142	0.3238	medium	0.2946	medium	0.2964	high	0	very low	0.5399	high
Namibia	0.1173	0.1709	low	0.3522	medium	0.0668	very low	0.5913	high	0.2812	low
Kazakhstan	0.1196	0.0282	very low	0.2176	low	0.1126	low	0.4076	medium	0.6093	high
MEDIUM LEVELS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE SIGI											
People's Republic of China	0.131	0.2885	medium	0.1246	very low	0.5578	very high	0.4076	medium	0.2812	low
Guatemala	0.1318	0.3953	medium	0.3213	medium	0.2566	high	0.2048	low	0.5399	high
Rwanda	0.1339	0.2618	medium	0.4082	medium	0.1392	medium	0.5913	high	0.2554	low
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.1345	0.1803	low	0.3911	medium	0.5666	very high	0.4076	medium	0	very low
Jamaica	0.135	0.0031	very low	0.2046	low	0.0271	very low	0	very low	0.7953	very high
Mozambique	0.1375	0.4181	high	0.3793	medium	0	very low	0.4076	medium	0.4505	medium
Zimbabwe	0.1392	0.57	very high	0.3435	medium	0.2951	high	0.4076	medium	0	very low
Tajikistan	0.1393	0.3182	medium	0.4138	medium	0.5075	very high	0.2028	low	0.3539	medium
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.1445	0.2606	medium	0.5321	high	0.0506	very low	0.4076	medium	0.4505	medium
Haiti	0.1466	0.5613	very high	0.501	high	0	very low	0.2048	low	0.3539	medium
Uzbekistan	0.1475	0.2477	medium	0.2966	medium	0.1884	medium	0.5913	high	0.4505	medium
Indonesia	0.1532	0.5612	very high	0.2511	medium	0.3891	high	0.1837	low	0.4505	medium
Nicaragua	0.1595	0.6303	very high	0.1868	low	0.1082	low	0.3885	medium	0.4505	medium
Kyrgyzstan	0.1598	0.1879	low	0.3771	medium	0.2624	high	0.5913	high	0.4505	medium
Burundi	0.1662	0.5602	very high	0.5055	high	0.1746	medium	0.4076	medium	0.2554	low
Angola	0.1719	0.4599	high	0.5041	high	0.0791	low	0.5913	high	0.1951	low
Philippines	0.1765	0.4929	high	0.2597	medium	0.1392	medium	0.5913	high	0.4505	medium
Togo	0.186	0.3696	medium	0.5488	high	0.1326	medium	0.5913	high	0.3539	medium
Viet Nam	0.1865	0.3374	medium	0.1857	low	0.4967	very high	0.4076	medium	0.6093	high
Sri Lanka	0.1894	0.4203	high	0.2681	medium	0.1483	medium	0.6207	high	0.5399	high
Senegal	0.1985	0.5931	very high	0.6337	high	0.0888	low	0.4076	medium	0.2554	low
Tunisia	0.1986	0.4314	high	0.1598	low	0.4782	very high	0.5913	high	0.4505	medium
Republic of the Congo	0.2033	0.506	high	0.4725	high	0	very low	0.4076	medium	0.6093	high
Georgia	0.2035	0.3552	medium	0.2112	low	0.6236	very high	0.4076	medium	0.5399	high
Malawi	0.2073	0.3985	medium	0.3554	medium	0.1746	medium	0.5913	high	0.6093	high
Guinea-Bissau	0.2110	0.4073	medium	0.4932	high	0.0713	low	0.5913	high	0.5399	high

Country											
Swaziland	0.2119	0.4944	high	0.3071	medium	0	very low	0.5913	high	0.6093	high
Kenya	0.2157	0.3502	medium	0.6122	high	0.4397	high	0.5913	high	0.1951	low
Uganda	0.2163	0.5093	high	0.5635	high	0.2991	high	0.5913	high	0.2554	low
HIGH LEVELS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE SIGI											
Azerbaijan	0.2403	0.1301	low	0.2057	low	0.8587	very high	0.1837	low	0.6093	high
Armenia	0.2428	0.191	low	0.1853	low	0.988	very high	0.2048	low	0.3539	medium
Ethiopia	0.245	0.282	medium	0.8662	very high	0.0878	low	0.5913	high	0.1951	low
Albania	0.2476	0.1822	low	0.2596	medium	0.8767	very high	0.4076	medium	0.4505	medium
United Republic of Tanzania	0.2504	0.7166	very high	0.5415	high	0.1746	medium	0.5913	high	0.2554	low
Côte d'Ivoire	0.2537	0.4955	high	0.5895	high	0.1858	medium	0.5913	high	0.5399	high
Timor-Leste	0.255	0.3882	medium	0.5421	high	0.2271	medium	0.5913	high	0.6552	high
Iraq	0.2631	0.7035	very high	0.3347	medium	0.3834	high	0.5913	high	0.4601	medium
India	0.265	0.644	very high	0.3772	medium	0.5415	very high	0.5913	high	0.3539	medium
Benin	0.278	0.2763	medium	0.4432	high	0.3677	high	0.5913	high	0.7953	very high
Cameroon	0.2803	0.5024	high	0.5333	high	0.2066	medium	0.7869	very high	0.4505	medium
Burkina Faso	0.2819	0.5419	high	0.7257	very high	0.191	medium	0.5913	high	0.4505	medium
Lebanon	0.2897	0.6143	very high	0.2488	medium	0.1639	medium	0.5913	high	0.7953	very high
Myanmar	0.2935	0.4963	high	0.4891	high	0	very low	0.5913	high	0.7953	very high
Ghana	0.2988	0.3946	medium	0.5491	high	0.3136	high	0.8044	very high	0.5399	high
Pakistan	0.3013	0.6908	very high	0.4127	medium	0.6998	very high	0.4076	medium	0.4505	medium
Jordan	0.3119	0.5274	high	0.315	medium	0.679	very high	0.5913	high	0.6093	high
Guinea	0.3206	0.5413	high	0.9515	very high	0.2253	medium	0.3885	medium	0.4505	medium
Afghanistan	0.3224	0.7316	very high	0.5473	high	0.4644	very high	0.5913	high	0.4601	medium
Nepal	0.3229	0.1813	low	0.4083	medium	1	very high	0.5913	high	0.2554	low
Central African Republic	0.3285	0.5327	high	0.6135	high	0.0071	very low	0.5913	high	0.7953	very high
VERY HIGH LEVELS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE SIGI											
Sierra Leone	0.372	0.3309	medium	0.855	very high	0.0364	very low	0.8044	very high	0.6093	high
Liberia	0.3828	0.5669	very high	0.8907	very high	0.0236	very low	0.4076	medium	0.7953	very high
Bangladesh	0.39	0.973	very high	0.3323	medium	0.5831	very high	0.5913	high	0.4505	medium
Nigeria	0.3911	0.6723	very high	0.4766	high	0.2494	high	0.7626	very high	0.7953	very high
Mauritania	0.3954	0.7556	very high	0.9939	very high	0.1746	medium	0.5913	high	0.1951	low
Gabon	0.4022	0.6457	very high	0.5308	high	0.1746	medium	0.7869	very high	0.814	very high
Syrian Arab Republic	0.4162	0.6914	very high	0.2598	medium	0.4312	high	0.5913	high	1	very high
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.4276	0.5169	high	0.5338	high	0.0691	very low	0.9582	very high	0.814	very high
Egypt	0.428	0.6665	very high	0.7373	very high	0.3741	high	0.5913	high	0.814	very high
Niger	0.4415	1	very high	0.4059	medium	0.1746	medium	0.5913	high	0.814	very high
Zambia	0.4489	0.5149	high	0.5624	high	0.1746	medium	1	very high	0.7953	very high

Somalia	0.4594	0.5958	very high	0.9905	very high	0.0891	low	0.7626	very high	0.6093	high
Chad	0.4665	0.9705	very high	0.8185	very high	0.0014	very low	0.5913	high	0.6093	high
Mali	0.5164	0.8309	very high	1	very high	0.3048	high	0.4076	medium	0.7953	very high
Gambia	0.524	0.5131	high	0.8509	very high	0	very low	1	very high	0.7953	very high
Sudan[16]	0.555	0.8382	very high	0.9781	very high	0.1426	medium	0.8163	very high	0.6552	high
Yemen	0.5634	0.7942	very high	0.8485	very high	0.3414	high	0.5913	high	1	very high
NOT RANKED IN THE SIGI											
Algeria	n.a.	0.4296	high	0.336	medium	n.a.		0.5913	high	0.2554	low
Australia	n.a.	0.1021	low	n.a.		n.a.		0	very low	0.1951	low
Austria	n.a.	0	very low	n.a.		0.1052	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Bahrain	n.a.	0.7127	very high	n.a.		n.a.		0.1837	low	0.7953	very high
Botswana	n.a.	0.3996	medium	0.306	medium	n.a.		0.5913	high	0.7953	very high
Canada	n.a.	0.0194	very low	n.a.		n.a.		0	very low	0.1951	low
Chile	n.a.	0.3996	medium	n.a.		n.a.		0	very low	0.5399	high
Croatia	n.a.	0.1121	low	n.a.		0.1002	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Cyprus[17, 18]	n.a.	0.0107	very low	n.a.		0.0897	low	0	very low	0.5399	high
Denmark	n.a.	0.0006	very low	n.a.		0.0955	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Equatorial Guinea	n.a.	0.5545	very high	n.a.		n.a.		0.4076	medium	0.7953	very high
Eritrea	n.a.	0.3321	medium	0.9712	very high	n.a.		0.2048	low	0.1951	low
Estonia	n.a.	0.0307	very low	n.a.		0.0954	low	0	very low	0.3539	medium
Fiji	n.a.	0.1998	low	n.a.		n.a.		0.5913	high	0.5399	high
Finland	n.a.	0.0031	very low	n.a.		0.0759	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Germany	n.a.	0.0019	very low	n.a.		0.0905	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Greece	n.a.	0.3889	medium	n.a.		0.0872	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Hong Kong, China	n.a.	0.0805	low	n.a.		n.a.		0.4076	medium	0.1951	low
Hungary	n.a.	n.a.		0.119	very low	0.0948	low	0	very low	0.5399	high
Iceland	n.a.	0.0031	very low	n.a.		0.094	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Islamic Republic of Iran	n.a.	0.7573	very high	n.a.				0.5913	high	1	very high
Ireland	n.a.	0.0025	very low	n.a.		0.072	low	0	very low	0.3539	medium

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[16] The data for South Sudan corresponds to the period up to 2011 and were collected as part of data of Sudan before the independence of South Sudan. There is no data available yet for the period 2012-14.

[17] The information in this document with reference to "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus issue".

[18] The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Country											
Israel[19]	n.a.	0.1178	low	n.a.		n.a.		0	very low	0.6093	high
Japan	n.a.	0.2053	low	n.a.		n.a.		0	very low	0.5399	high
Korea	n.a.	0.0025	very low	n.a.		n.a.		0.4076	medium	0.1951	low
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	n.a.	0.2417	medium	n.a.		n.a.		0	very low	0.6093	high
Kuwait	n.a.	0.6544	very high	n.a.		n.a.		0	very low	0.7953	very high
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	n.a.	0.434	high	0.3554	medium	n.a.		0.5913	high	0.6093	high
Luxembourg	n.a.	0.1471	low	n.a.		0.0988	low	0	very low	0.3539	medium
Malaysia	n.a.	0.5267	high	0.2682	medium	n.a.		0.4076	medium	0.7953	very high
Mauritius	n.a.	0.1998	low	0.3151	medium	n.a.		0	very low	0.2812	low
Mexico	n.a.	0.3408	medium	0.2377	medium	n.a.		0.3885	medium	0	very low
Netherlands	n.a.	0.0013	very low	n.a.		0.087	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
New Zealand	n.a.	0.0527	very low	n.a.		n.a.		0	very low	0.1951	low
Norway	n.a.	0.0013	very low	n.a.		0.0968	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Oman	n.a.	0.6082	very high	n.a.		n.a.		0.5913	high	1	very high
Palestinian Authority	n.a.	0.6613	very high	n.a.		0.5752	very high	0.5913	high	0.6093	high
Papua New Guinea	n.a.	0.4773	high	n.a.		n.a.		0.8044	very high	0.5399	high
Poland	n.a.	0.1071	low	n.a.		0.095	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Portugal	n.a.	0.097	low	n.a.		0.0784	low	0	very low	0	very low
Qatar	n.a.	0.7353	very high	n.a.		n.a.		0.5913	high	1	very high
Russian Federation	n.a.	0.0496	very low	0.2891	medium	n.a.		0	very low	0.5399	high
Saudi Arabia	n.a.	0.7114	very high	n.a.		n.a.		0.5913	high	0.814	very high
Singapore	n.a.	0.1396	low	n.a.		n.a.		0.2048	low	0.3539	medium
Slovak Republic	n.a.	0.0063	very low	n.a.		0.0906	low	0	very low	0.3539	medium
Sweden	n.a.	0.0031	very low	n.a.		0.0986	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Switzerland	n.a.	0.0824	low	n.a.		0.1037	low	0	very low	0.1951	low
Turkmenistan	n.a.	0.1703	low	0.3271	medium	n.a.		0.2048	low	0.6093	high
United Arab Emirates	n.a.	0.5274	high	n.a.		n.a.		0.5913	high	0.814	very high
United Kingdom	n.a.	0.1041	low	n.a.		0.0843	low	0.3885	medium	0.3539	medium
United States	n.a.	0.1146	low	0.1308	very low	n.a.		0	very low	0.3539	medium
Uruguay	n.a.	0.2761	medium	0.0933	very low	n.a.		0.1837	low	0.3539	medium

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[19] The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

B. Coding manual & indicator dashboard

Discriminatory family code			
Indicator	*Variable and definition*	*Coding*	*Sources*
Legal age of marriage	**Legal age of marriage**: Whether women and men have the same legal minimum age of marriage	**0**: The law guarantees the same minimum age of marriage to both women and men, and the minimum age is 18* *Example: Recent amendments to the Marriage in the Country Code have raised the age of marriage to 20 for both sexes. (Nepal country profile)* **0.25**: The law guarantees the same minimum age of marriage to both women and men, and the minimum age is lower than 18 *Example: The minimum age of marriage is 16 for both males and females. (Paraguay country profile)* **0.5**: The law guarantees the same minimum age of marriage to both women and men, but there are customary, traditional or religious laws that discriminate against some women by allowing them to be married at a younger age than men *Example: The Marriage Act 1964 places minimum age at marriage at 21 for both males and females. In addition, the Constitution (Section 27) provides that marriage may be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. However, with parental consent (or that of a legal guardian), a female can marry at the age of 16 and a male at the age of 18. (Swaziland country profile)* **0.75:** The law does not guarantee the same minimum age of marriage to women and men, and the gap between women's minimum age and men's minimum age of marriage is less than or equal to 2 years *Example: The Family Code of 1973 (Art. 111) provides a minimum age at marriage of 16 for women and 18 for men, unless an exemption is granted for "serious reasons" by the president of the regional court. (Senegal country profile)* **1:** The law does not guarantee the same minimum age of marriage to women and men, and the gap between women's minimum age and men's minimum age of marriage is greater than 2 years. However, there is no law on the minimum age of marriage *Example: Under Article 203 of the Civil Code, the minimum legal age of heterosexual marriage in Gabon is 15 years for women and 18 years for men. (Gabon country profile)*	*SIGI Country Profiles*

Early marriage	**Prevalence of early marriage**: Percentage of women married between 15-19 years of age	0-100%	*UN World Marriage Data (2012); Demographic Health Survey; Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey*
Parental authority (average of two variables)	**Parental authority in marriage**: Whether women and men have the same right to be the legal guardian of a child during marriage	**0**: The law guarantees the same parental authority to women and men during marriage *Example: Reform of the Civil Code in 1982 established equality between men and women in relation to parental authority, effectively overriding the long-held principle that husbands had authority over their wives. (Venezuela country profile)* **0.5**: The law guarantees the same parental authority to women and men during marriage, but there are some customary, traditional or religious practices that discriminate against some women *Example: Although some personal status codes assign rights and duties equally to both spouses during married life (e.g. the Catholic and the Greek Orthodox personal codes), the Muslim personal codes designate the husband as the head of the family and assign parental authority to fathers. In addition, upon birth, children are assigned to the religious sect of their father. (Lebanon country profile)* **1**: The law does not guarantee the same parental authority to women and men during marriage, or women have no rights to parental authority *Example: The 2011 Family Code provides that husbands are the heads of families, and the Civil Code grants them sole family and parental authority. (Mali country profile)*	*SIGI Country Profiles*
	Parental authority in divorce: Whether women and men have the same right to be the legal guardian of and have custody rights over a child after divorce	**0**: The law guarantees the same parental authority to women and men after divorce *Example: Parental authority is shared by the parents, both within the marriage and after divorce, unless a competent court specifies otherwise. […] The 1993 Guardianship Act stipulates that divorced parents have joint custody of their children. (South Africa country profile)* **0.5**: The law guarantees the same parental authority to women and men after divorce, but there are some customary, traditional or religious practices that discriminate against women	*SIGI Country Profiles*

		Example: The Children's Act of 1998 grants parental authority to both parents and states that both are responsible for a child's health, wellbeing and education. However, under patrilineal systems of customary law, children are deemed to belong to the father's extended family, meaning that in most cases, if they want it, fathers gain custody of non-infant children in the event of separation or divorce (Ghana country profile) **1**: The law does not guarantee the same parental authority to women and men after divorce, or women have no rights to parental authority *Example: Since parental authority during marriage is granted to men by Article 1749 of the Civil Code, this means that, despite being separated, the father's permission or presence is required to execute certain legal deeds affecting a minor child under the mother's custody. (Chile country profile)*	
Inheritance (average of two variables)	**Inheritance rights of spouses**: Whether widows and widowers have equal inheritance rights	**0**: The law guarantees the same inheritance rights to both widows and widowers *Example: The law in Jamaica does not discriminate on the basis of gender with respect to inheritance. Under the Inheritance (provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1993, the wishes of the deceased are paramount and the estate is distributed according to the will of the deceased. If the deceased leaves no will, the estate is distributed to the surviving spouse, children, parents and other eligible relatives according to the Intestates' Estates and Property Charges Act. The law applies equally to male and female spouses. (Jamaica country profile)* **0.5**: The law guarantees the same inheritance rights to both widows and widowers, but there are some customary, traditional or religious practices that discriminate against widows *Example: Women and girls have equal inheritance rights as wives and as daughters. However, women living in unregistered, religious marriages have no protected inheritance rights in the event of widowhood. (Tajikistan country profile)* **1**: The law does not guarantee the same inheritance rights to widows and widowers, or widows have no inheritance rights at all *Example: The law does not provide women with equal inheritance rights, either as wives or as daughters. (Iran country profile)*	*SIGI Country Profiles*

		0: The law guarantees the same inheritance rights to both daughters and sons *Example: New Zealand law provides for equal inheritance rights for sons and daughters, and there is no evidence that there is discrimination in practice or under any informal customary systems. (New Zealand Country Profile)* **0.5**: The law guarantees the same inheritance rights to both daughters and sons, but there are some customary, traditional or religious practices that discriminate against daughters *Example: With respect to inheritance rights, the Family Code provides for the inheritance rights of daughters. However, as a matter of practice under customary law, daughters may not inherit land or inherit a smaller amount than sons. (Angola country profile)* **1**: The law does not guarantee the same inheritance rights to daughters and sons, or daughters have no inheritance rights at all *Example: The law does not provide women with equal inheritance rights, either as wives or as daughters. (Iran country profile)*	
	Inheritance rights of daughters: Whether daughters and sons have equal inheritance rights		*SIGI Country Profiles*
Divorce	**Divorce:** measures whether women and men have the same rights to initiate divorce	**0**: The law guarantees the same rights to initiate divorce to both women and men *Example: Angola: Both spouses may initiate divorce, as established by the Civil Code (Article 16 1677º-B). No evidence of discrimination was found.* **0.5**: The law guarantees the same rights to initiate divorce to both men and women, but there are some customary, traditional or religious practices that prevent or restrict some women's ability to initiate divorce *Example: In Albania, women have the same right to initiate divorce as men; however, divorce carries a high social stigma for women: divorced women are marginalised and discriminated against (ACPAR (2010) ; CEDAW (2010))* **1**: The law does not guarantee the same rights to initiate divorce to men and women, or women have no rights to initiate divorce at all *Example: Qatar: Men in Qatar have the right to divorce (repudiate) their wives unilaterally for any reason. Women's rights to divorce are restricted.*	*SIGI Country Profiles*

			Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; Eurostat (HETUS); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe; SIGI Country profiles
Unpaid care work	**Unpaid care work**: Female to male ratio of time devoted to unpaid care work.	**0-1**	
		Restricted physical integrity	
Violence against women (average of five variables)	**Laws on domestic violence**: Whether the legal framework offers women legal protection from domestic violence	**0**: There is specific legislation in place to address domestic violence; the law is adequate overall, and there are no reported problems of implementation *Example: In the Dominican Republic, violence against women is addressed through two major laws: Law 24-97, on violence against women and domestic violence, and Law 88-03, which provides for safe houses and shelters. In addition, the state is also party to the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women. […] Domestic violence policy and legislation is overseen by the Ministry of Women, and violence against women is included in topic 6 of the country's 2007-2017 National Gender Equality Plan, its 10 year Health Plan (2006-2015) and the National Strategy to Address the link between HIV and AIDS. There have also been special units set up under the Office of the Attorney General for the reporting and prosecution of violence against women crimes, as well as the collection of statistics. (Dominican Republic country profile)* **0.25**: There is specific legislation in place to address domestic violence; the law is adequate overall, but there are reported problems of implementation	*SIGI Country Profiles*

		Example: The Law on Prevention of Domestic Violence includes a comprehensive definition of domestic violence, which encompasses physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence. […] It appears that in practice, the law is not effectively implemented. During her visit to Kazakhstan, the OSCE's Special Representative on Gender Issues heard from women's rights activists that few of the crisis centres established under the law actually accept women who have suffered domestic violence. In addition, according to the official CEDAW report, in many cases of domestic violence, couples "reconcile" and the complaint is withdrawn, indicating that victims of domestic violence may not be receiving the support they need to follow proceed with prosecution. (Kazakhstan country profile) **0.5**: There is specific legislation in place to address domestic violence, but the law is inadequate *Example: The new Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence was adopted in March 2013. However, this law is designed to prevent domestic violence, rather than criminalising those who perpetrate it. (Tajikistan country profile)* **0.75**: There is no specific legislation in place to address domestic violence, but there is evidence of legislation being planned or drafted *Example: There is no criminal or civil legislation in place in Bahrain protecting women from domestic violence. As of 2011, a draft domestic violence law was under discussion, according to the official CEDAW report. (Bahrain country profile)* **1**: There is no legislation in place to address domestic violence *Example: There is no specific law prohibiting domestic violence. (Cameroon country profile)*	
	Laws on rape: Whether the legal framework offers women legal protection from rape	**0**: There is specific legislation in place to address rape, marital rape is included, perpetrators cannot escape prosecution if they marry the victim and implementation is effectively enforced *Example: In Austria, rape, including spousal rape, is punishable by up to 15 years' imprisonment. The Criminal Law Amendment Act (2004) abolished the privileged treatment previously applied to rape and sexual coercion within the context of marriage or cohabitation. […] Statutory rape of an underage minor is punishable by ten years' imprisonment. […] Since 2000, public funding has been provided to minor or female victims of sexual violence for psychosocial counselling and legal aid. The Government conducted police training programmes on gender-based violence. (Austria country profile)*	*SIGI Country Profiles*

		0.25: There is specific legislation in place to address rape, marital rape is included and perpetrators cannot escape prosecution if they marry the victim, although implementation is not effectively enforced	
		Example: Rape is criminalised under the Law on Protection for Victims of Crimes against Sexual Freedom, No. 2033, enacted 29 October 1999 and, more recently, under the Comprehensive Law to guarantee women a life free from violence in Bolivia, Law 348, enacted 9 March 2013. Spousal rape is included under the definition of rape as of the most recent legislation and carries an additional five years to a typical rape sentence. The typical sentence itself increased from 4-10 to 20-30 years under the new legislation, and the perpetrator can no longer escape prosecution by marrying the victim. […] However, according to a recent report to the UN Committee on Torture by several women's rights NGOs, there are a "series of obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Law because the courts on family matters refuse to receive the new complaints without waiting for the gradual implementation of the Comprehensive Law, leaving in the legal vacuum to women in a situation of violence." (Bolivia country profile)	
		0.5: There is specific legislation in place to address rape, marital rape is not included and perpetrators cannot escape prosecution if they marry the victim	
		Example: Rape is a criminal offence under Azerbaijan's 2000 Criminal Code. The law specifically mentions rape and sexual assault during conflict as being criminal offences. The Criminal Code makes no specific reference to spousal rape. […] There are no clauses in the Criminal Code to allow a rapist to escape prosecution by marrying his victim. (Azerbaijan country profile)	
		0.75: There is specific legislation in place to address rape, marital rape is not included and perpetrators can escape prosecution if they marry the victim. However, legislation is being planned or drafted	
		Example: Although rape is illegal in Eritrea, the Penal Code provides that if the perpetrator marries the victim with consent the prosecution of the rape does not continue, and additionally, spousal or marital rape is not illegal, since the Code defines rape as an act "outside of wedlock". (Eritrea country profile)	
		1: There is no legislation in place to address rape	

| | | *Example: While the law defines abuse as bodily, psychological or sexual, it does not specifically address rape or criminalise marital rape. Rape remains a taboo issue that is not discussed openly; very few cases are reported, as victims fear societal reprisal or punishment by the court for illegal "mixing of genders". (Saudi Arabia country profile)* | |
| | **Laws on sexual harassment**: Whether the legal framework offers women legal protection from sexual harassment | **0**: There is specific legislation in place to address sexual harassment, the law is adequate overall and there are no reported problems of implementation
Example: Sexual harassment is addressed in the 2009 Law on Prohibition of Discrimination and the 2003 Law on Gender Equality, including its 2009 amendments. The 2009 Law on Prohibition of Discrimination includes a comprehensive definition and covers sexual harassment in all areas. The 2003 Law on Gender Equality also includes a comprehensive definition of sexual violence and covers all areas, including the workplace. Under the 2003 Law on Gender Equality, sexual harassment can be punished by a prison term of between six months and five years. (Bosnia and Herzegovina country profile)
0.25: There is specific legislation in place to address sexual harassment, the law is adequate overall but there are reported problems of implementation
Example: The Republic of Benin's National Assembly approved, on 5 September 2006, the country's first comprehensive sexual harassment legislation, aimed at protecting women in schools, workplaces and homes. In addition to perpetrators of sexual harassment, the Act (No. 2006-19) also penalises persons who are aware of sexual harassment and do not report it. Those convicted face sentences from one to two years in prison as well as fines. Enforcement of these acts remains however an issue, due to a lack of legal knowledge and skills needed to pursue such cases and victims' fears of social stigma. (Benin country profile)
0.5: There is specific legislation in place to address sexual harassment, but the law is inadequate
Example: While not explicitly defining "sexual harassment" as such, the Sexual Offenses Act of 2003 bans "compelled sexual acts," defined as "a person who compels another person to engage in a sexual act with himself/herself or to engage in a sexual act with a third person" (Lesotho country profile)
0.75: There is no specific legislation to address sexual harassment, but there is evidence of legislation being planned or drafted | *SIGI Country Profiles* |

		Example: As of the latest report to CEDAW, a Sexual Harassment Act was pending in Congress. It is unclear whether this Act was passed. (Guatemala country profile) **1**: There is no legislation in place to address sexual harassment *Example: There is no law in place in Belarus that specifically addresses sexual harassment, either in the criminal code or the labour code. (Belarus country profile)*	
	Attitudes towards violence: Percentage of women who agree that a husband/partner is justified in beating his wife/partner under certain circumstances	**0-100%**	*Demographic Health Surveys; Multiple Cluster Indicator Surveys; World Value Survey*
	Prevalence of violence in the lifetime: Percentage of women who have experienced physical and/or sexual violence from an intimate partner at some time in their lives	**0-100%**	*Demographic Health Surveys; World Health Organization; International Violence Against Women Survey; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights*
Female genital mutilation	**FGM prevalence**: Percentage of women who have undergone any type of female genital mutilation	**0-100%**	*World Health Organization; Population Reference Bureau; Multiple Cluster Indicator Surveys; Demographic Health Surveys*

Reproductive autonomy	**Unmet need for family planning**: Percentage of married women aged 15-49 with an unmet need for family planning, i.e. who do not want any more children for the next two years and who are not using contraception	**0-100%**	*Demographic Health Surveys; Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys; World Health Organization*
Abortion	**Abortion**: Measures whether abortion is legal	**0**: Abortion is legal *Example: Abortion is available on request in Cuba.* **0.5**: Abortion is legal only under specific circumstances *Example: Abortion is legal in Honduras only to save the life of the woman.* **1**: Abortion is not legal *Example: Nicaragua: Under Articles 143 and 145 of the revised Penal Code, introduced in 2008, abortion is illegal in all instances, even in cases of rape or incest, or to save a woman's life.*	*SIGI Country Profiles*
Son bias			
Missing women	**Missing women****: Shortfall in the number of women in sex ratios for ages 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-64, 65+ relative to the expected number if there were no sex-selective abortions, no female infanticide or similar levels of health care and nutrition	**0**: There is no evidence of missing women **0.25**: The incidence of missing women is low to moderate **0.5**: The incidence of missing women is moderate **0.75**: The incidence of missing women is moderate to high **1**: The incidence of missing women is severe	*Central Intelligence Authority; United Nations Population Division*
Fertility preferences	**Fertility preferences**: Share of males as the last child from women currently not desiring additional children or sterilised	**0-100%**	*Demographic Health Surveys; Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys; EUROSTAT; Household surveys*

Son preference in education	**Son preference in education:** Percentage of people agreeing that university is more important for boys than for girls.	**0-100%**	*World Value Survey*
Restricted resources and assets			
Secure access to land	**Secure access to land:** Whether women and men have equal and secure access to land use, control and ownership	**0**: The law guarantees the same rights to own, use and control land to both women and men *Example: The Land Act of 1979 allows registration of land in the names of women or men aged 18. […] According to a recent World Bank report on the preponderance of matrilineal inheritance practices in large parts of Bhutan, about 60%of rural women and about 45% of urban women have land and property titles registered in their name. (Bhutan country profile)* **0.5**: The law guarantees the same rights to own, use and control land to women and men, but there are some customary, traditional or religious practices that discriminate against women *Example: By law, Moroccan women have the same ownership rights as men, but tradition often limits those rights. Despite a favourable legal framework, women's access to land is often restricted, particularly in rural areas, and few women own land. Where they do, it is often managed by male relatives. (Morocco country profile)* **1**: The law does not guarantee the same rights to own, use and control land to women and men, or women have no legal rights to own, use and control land *Example: Customary rules of inheritance may lawfully operate in conflict with the legislation even if they discriminate against women. About 90% of land is under customary tenure. Women have historically exercised very limited rights over land that is held under customary tenure. (Papua New Guinea country profile)*	*SIGI Country Profiles*
Land titles owned by women	**Land titles owned by women:** Percentage of agricultural holdings headed by women	**0-100%**	*Food and Agricultural Organization*

| Secure access to non-land assets | **Secure access to non-land assets**: Whether women and men have equal and secure access to non-land assets use, control and ownership | **0**: The law guarantees the same rights to own and administer property other than land to both women and men
Example: Women and men have exactly the same rights in relation to non-land assets. The Civil Code does not permit execution of contracts with third parties by either spouse without the acknowledgement and authorised signature of both spouses; however this applies equally to women and men. (Paraguay country profile)
0.5: The law guarantees the same rights to own and administer property other than land to both women and men, but there are some customary, traditional or religious practices that discriminate against women
Example: Recent amendments to the Country Code of Nepal have improved women's access to property other than land. Unmarried daughters now have the right to inherit ancestral property irrespective of age, whereas previous conditions required that they be above the age of 35. The CEDAW reports ongoing restrictions in relation to women's independent use of their property, such as requiring women to receive permission from a male relative before disposing of any immovable property. (Nepal country profile)
1: The law does not guarantee the same rights to own and administer property other than land to women and men, or women have no legal rights to own and administer property other than land
Example: Women's access to property other than land is subject to a number of restrictions, particularly for married women. Single women can independently hold and administer assets (including property). For married women, administration of assets is governed by the regime under which they marry. (Gabon country profile) | *SIGI Country Profiles* |
| Access to financial services | **Access to financial services**: Whether women and men have equal access to financial services | **0**: The law guarantees the same rights to access formal financial services (e.g. credit, bank account and bank loans) to both women and men
Example: There is no legal discrimination against women in regard to access to bank loans and credit. However, according to one of the 2010 shadow reports to the CEDAW Committee, it is difficult for anyone to gain access to credit, male or female, as credit is expensive and inaccessible. (Belarus country profile)
0.5: The law guarantees the same rights to access formal financial services to both women and men, but there are some customary, traditional or religious practices that discriminate against women | *SIGI Country Profiles* |

		Example: Officially, women have equal access to bank loans and credit and have the right to independently conclude contracts. However, Article 108 of the Civil Code creates a significant barrier to the acquisition of assets, as it prevents married women from entering into contracts on their own behalf and from receiving any payment from individual business activities. (Indonesia country profile) **1**: The law does not guarantee the same rights to access formal financial services to women and men, or women have no legal rights to access financial services *Example: Discriminatory practices also restrict Somali women's access to bank loans. The 2007 MDG report for Somalia stated that women have limited control over family resources, particularly ownership of land, and therefore, limited access to collateral for investment and larger business enterprises. (Somalia country profile)*	
Restricted civil liberties			
Access to public space	**Access to public space**: Whether women face restrictions on their freedom of movement and access to public space, such as restricted ability to choose their places of residence, visit their families and friends or to apply for a passport	**0**: The law guarantees the same rights to freely move to both women and men *Example: There are no reported legal restrictions on women's freedom of access to public space in Mongolia. (Mongolia country profile)* **0.5**: The law guarantees the same rights to freely move to women and men, but there are some customary, traditional or religious practices that discriminate against women *Example: Although women have the legal right to freedom of movement, widespread discriminatory practices limit their ability to exercise this right, particularly in Taliban-controlled tribal areas. (Pakistan country profile)* **1**: The law does not guarantee the same rights to freely move to women and men, or women have no freedom of movement *Example: Women face restrictions on their freedom of movement. Married women are obliged to live in a residence of their husband's choosing and cannot apply for a passport without their husband's consent. (Democratic Republic of Congo country profile)*	*SIGI Country Profiles*

Political voice	**Quotas**: Whether there are legal quotas to promote women's political participation at national and sub-national levels	**0**: There are legal quotas to promote women's political participation both at the national and sub-national levels *Example: Quotas exist at the national and subnational levels to promote women's political participation. According to ECLAC, following the most recent reforms (2008), Mexico saw an increase of 14% in female participation in the Federal Congress (Mexico country profile).* **0.5**: There are legal quotas to promote women's political participation either at the national or at the sub-national level *Example: A Presidential decree led to the establishment of 30% quotas for women in the two legislative chambers. There do not appear to be any quotas in place at the sub-regional level to promote women's political participation. (Belarus country profile)* **1**: There are no legal quotas to promote women's political participation *Example: The United Nations Statistics Division reported that in 2012 women made up 6.8% of the national parliament. There are no quotas at either the national or sub-national level to promote women's political participation. (Nigeria country profile)*	*SIGI Country Profiles*
	Political representation: Share of women in national parliaments	**0-100%**	*World Bank (World Development Indicators), Inter-Parliamentary Union (Quota Project)*
Workplace rights	**Workplace rights**: Measures women's economic rights at work (equal pay, job security, work at night, etc.)	**0**: All women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. **0.5**: There are some economic rights for women under law. The enforcement of laws is effective or weak However, the government still tolerates a low/moderate level of discrimination against women. **1**: There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law.	*CIRI Human Rights Project*

* The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child considers that adulthood begins at age 18 (www.unicef.org.uk/Documents/Publication-pdfs/UNCRC_PRESS200910web.pdf).

** Computed by Pr. S. Klasen using the method discussed in Klasen and Wink (2002), "A Turning Point in Gender Bias in Mortality? An Update on the Number of Missing Women", *Population and Development Review*, 28, pp 285-312.

C. GID-DB Variables 2009, 2012, 2014

2009	2012	2014
12 indicators • 15 variables	14 indicators • 21 variables	19 Indicators • 27 variables
Family code	**Discriminatory family code**	**Discriminatory family code**
Early marriage Polygamy Parental authority • During marriage • After divorce Inheritance • Spouses	Early marriage Parental authority • During marriage • After divorce Inheritance • Spouses • Daughters Legal age of marriage	Early marriage Parental authority • During marriage • After divorce Inheritance • Widows • Daughters Legal age of marriage Divorce [a] Unpaid care work [a]
Physical integrity	**Restricted physical integrity**	**Restricted physical integrity**

Female genital mutilation
 	
Violence against women
• Law
  o Law on rape
  o Law on domestic violence
  o Law on sexual harassment
	Female genital mutilation
	
	Violence against women
	• Law
	  o Law on rape
	  o Law on domestic violence
	  o Law on sexual harassment
	• Attitudes
	• Prevalence in the lifetime
	Reproductive integrity
		Female genital mutilation
		
		Violence against women
		• Law
		  o Law on rape
		  o Law on domestic violence
		  o Law on sexual harassment
		• Attitudes
		• Prevalence in the lifetime
		Reproductive autonomy
		
		Abortion [a]

Son preference	**Son bias**	**Son bias**
Missing women[20]	Missing women Fertility preferences	Missing women Fertility preferences Son preference in education [a]

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[20] This variable was originally included in the Physical Integrity dimension, meaning that the SIGI 2009 was designed to measure four different dimensions of social institutions, instead of five. Due to low statistical associations with "Female Genital Mutilation" and "Violence Against Women", the authors (Branisa *et* al. (2013) and the OECD Development Centre) decided then to use the variable "Missing Women" as a new sub-index called Son Preference.

Civil liberties	Restricted civil liberties	Restricted civil liberties
Freedom of dress Freedom of movement	Access to public space Political voice • Quotas • Political representation	Access to public space Political voice • Quotas • Political representation
Ownership rights	**Restricted resources and entitlements**	**Restricted resources and assets**
Access to land Access to bank loans Access to property other than land	Access to land Access to bank loans Access to property other than land	Secure access to land • Law • Land titles owned by women Access to financial services Secure access to non-land assets Secure access to work [a] Percentage of agricultural holdings headed by women [a]

[a]: New variables included in the 2014 edition of the GID-DB but not in the SIGI.

D. 2014 Indicators and variables characteristics

2014 SIGI variables	Data Characteristics
Discriminatory family code	
Legal Age of Marriage	categorical (5 categories = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) 0 missing countries
Early marriage	continuous, range 0-0.606 0 missing countries
Parental authority: during marriage	categorical (3 categories = 0, 0.5, 1) 1 missing country[21]
Parental authority: after divorce	categorical (3 categories = 0, 0.5, 1) 1 missing country[22]
Inheritance: widows	categorical (3 categories = 0, 0.5, 1) 2 missing countries[23]
Inheritance: daughters	categorical (3 categories = 0, 0.5, 1) 2 missing countries[24]
Restricted physical integrity	
Violence against Women: Law on Rape	categorical (5 categories = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) 0 missing countries
Violence against Women: Law on Domestic Violence	categorical (5 categories = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) 0 missing countries
Violence against Women: Law on Harassment	categorical (5 categories = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) 0 missing countries

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[21] Bhutan
[22] Cameroon
[23] Guinea-Bissau, Hungary
[24] Bulgaria, Hungary

Attitudes towards Domestic Violence	continuous, range 0.029-0.921
	35 missing countries[25]
Prevalence of Domestic Violence	continuous, range 0.064-0.78
	57 missing countries[26]
Female genital mutilation	continuous, range 0-0.979
	0 missing countries
Reproductive autonomy	continuous, range 0.017-0.4
	40 missing countries[27]
Son bias	
Missing women	categorical (5 categories = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1)
	0 missing countries
Fertility preferences	continuous, range 0.475-0.616
	31 missing countries[28]
Restricted resources and assets	
Access to Land	categorical (3 categories = 0, 0.5, 1)
	0 missing countries
Secure Access to Non-Land Assets	categorical (3 categories = 0, 0.5, 1)
	0 missing countries
Access to Financial Services	categorical (3 categories = 0, 0.5, 1)
	0 missing countries
Restricted civil liberties	
Access to Public Space	categorical (3 categories = 0, 0.5, 1)
	0 missing countries
Political representation	continuous, range 0-0.638
	1 missing countries[29]
Quotas	categorical (3 categories = 0, 0.5, 1)
	0 missing countries

In the case of *Parental Authority, Inheritance Rights, Violence against Women* and *Political Voice* the variables were averaged to create indicators. Because of this averaging, *Violence against Women* was transformed into a categorical variable with 15 categories and treated as a continuous variable and re-scaled from 0 to 1. The characteristics of these indicators are summarised below:

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[25] Angola, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mauritius, Myanmar, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

[26] Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Eritrea, Fiji, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Panama, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen

[27] Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom

[28] Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Hong Kong (China), Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Japan, Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uruguay

[29] Hong Kong (China)

2014 indicators	Data Characteristics
Discriminatory family code	
Parental authority	categorical (5 categories = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) 0 missing countries
Inheritance	categorical (5 categories = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) 1 missing country[30]
Restricted physical integrity	
Violence against women	categorical / continuous, range 0.04-0.92 0 missing countries
Restricted civil liberties	
Political voice	continuous, range 0-1 0 missing countries

E. Kendall Tau b tests

Discriminatory family code		Early marriage	Parental authority	Inheritance	Divorce [a]	Unpaid care work [a]
Legal Age of Marriage	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value	0.2908 160 0.0000***	0.3064 161 0.0000***	0.2983 160 0.0000***	0.2533 158 0.0003***	0.2108 69 0.0231**
Early marriage	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value		0.2439 160 0.0001***	0.3301 159 0.0000***	0.1789 157 0.0047***	0.3101 69 0.0002***
Parental authority	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value			0.6239 160 0.0000***	0.6272 158 0.0000***	0.2090 69 0.0287**
Inheritance	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value				0.5699 157 0.0000***	0.2700 68 0.0050***
Divorce [a]	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value					0.2755 69 0.0049***

Restricted physical integrity		Female genital mutilation	Reproductive integrity	Abortion[a]
Violence against women	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value	0.3910 162 0.0000***	0.3292 120 0.0000***	0.3174 162 0.0000***
Violence against women bis[a,c]	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value	0.4200 162 0.0000***	0.3607 120 0.0000***	0.3055 162 0.0000***
Female genital mutilation	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value		0.2352 120 0.0000***	0.2625 162 0.0004***
Reproductive integrity	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value			0.1826 120 0.0144**

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[30] Hungary

Son bias		Fertility preferences	Son preference in education [a]
Missing women	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value	0.2173 129 0.0023***	0.4021 85 0.0000***
Fertility preferences	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value		0.3816 66 0.0000***

Restricted resources and assets		Secure access to land bis[a,b]	Access to financial services	Secure access to non-land assets
Secure access to land	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value	0.7743 162 0.0000***	0.4927 162 0.0000***	0.7189 162 0.0000***
Secure access to land bis[a,b]	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value		0.4021 162 0.0000***	0.5593 162 0.0000***
Access to financial services	Kendall Tau b No of observations p-value			0.5039 162 0.0000***

Restricted civil liberties		Workplace rights[a]	Political voice
Access to public space	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value	0.4888 158 0.0000***	0.1383 162 0.0428**
Workplace rights[a]	Kendall Tau b N° of observations p-value		0.1354 158 0.0447**

* = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%;

[a]: New variables included in the 2014 edition of the GID-DB but not in the SIGI.

[b]:This variable also takes into account the share of agricultural land holders who are women, i.e. it accounts for both law and practice.

[c]: This variable look at victims of domestic violence in the last 12 months.

F. Multiple correspondence analysis graphs

Discriminatory family code

Restricted physical integrity

Son bias

Restricted resources and assets

Restricted civil liberties

G. Threshold for classification

For the categorical variables, the categories are used to define the five groups:

- 0: very low levels of discrimination
- 0.25: low levels of discrimination
- 0.5: medium levels of discrimination
- 0.75: high levels of discrimination
- 1: very high levels of discrimination

For the continuous variables, the Jenks classification is used as for the SIGI and its sub-indices:

- Early marriage
    - very low levels of discrimination: [0; 0.05[
    - low levels of discrimination:[0.05; 0.1[
    - medium levels of discrimination: [0.1; 0.2[
    - high levels of discrimination: [0.2; 0.33[
    - very high levels of discrimination: [0.33; 0.61]
- Female genital mutilation (FGM)
    - very low levels of discrimination: [0; 0]
    - low levels of discrimination:[0; 0.1[
    - medium levels of discrimination: [0.1; 0.33[
    - high levels of discrimination: [0.33; 0.75[
    - very high levels of discrimination: [0.75; 0.98]
- Attitudes towards domestic violence
    - very low levels of discrimination: [0; 0.05[
    - low levels of discrimination: [0.05; 0.15[
    - medium levels of discrimination: [0.15; 0.5[
    - high levels of discrimination: [0.5; 0.75[
    - very high levels of discrimination: [0.75;1]
- Prevalence of violence against women (VAW)
    - very low levels of discrimination: [0.06; 0.1[
    - low levels of discrimination: [0.1; 0.15[
    - medium levels of discrimination: [0.15; 0.25[
    - high levels of discrimination: [0.25; 0.4[
    - very high levels of discrimination: [0.4; 0.8]
- Reproductive autonomy
    - very low levels of discrimination: [0; 0.1[
    - low levels of discrimination: [0.1; 0.15[
    - medium levels of discrimination: [0.15; 0.25[
    - high levels of discrimination: [0.25; 0.30[
    - very high levels of discrimination: [0.3; 0.4]
- Fertility preferences
    - very low levels of discrimination: [0.48; 0.51[
    - low levels of discrimination: [0.51; 0.515[
    - medium levels of discrimination: [0.515; 0.52[
    - high levels of discrimination: [0.52; 0.53[
    - very high levels of discrimination: [0.53; 0.62]

- Political representation
    - very low levels of discrimination: [0.41; 0.5[
    - low levels of discrimination:[0.33; 0.41[
    - medium levels of discrimination: [0.2; 0.33[
    - high levels of discrimination: [0.13; 0.2[
    - very high levels of discrimination: [0; 0.13]

H. How fertility preference was scored

Fertility preference as the sex-ratio at last birth has computed country by country through nationally representative micro-level surveys, namely Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), EUROSTAT and household-level surveys. In all cases, the variable is measured by the percentage of last child being male per woman currently not desiring additional children or having been sterilised.

These procedures have been followed:

- On **DHS** data, the share of last children being male in each country was computed through the "individual" questionnaire. This questionnaire contained the birth history of each mother. We computed two alternative values, one on all women and one restricted to the sub-sample of women not desiring additional children or having been sterilised (through the variable *v605*). Hence, the youngest child per mother was identified through the variable age (*b8*). After restricting the sample to the sub-population of youngest child per mother, we checked its gender composition through the variable sex (*b4*). Differences between the two were not significant, hence we decided to use the number computed on the sub-sample.
- On **MICS** data, the share of last child being male in each country was computed through both the "women" and the "household" questionnaires, as the former does not include information on women's birth history. The two datasets were merged as the former allowed to identify the siblings/relatives of each woman, and the latter provided the mother identifier for each child together with socio-demographic characteristics of all household members, such as age and sex. Therefore, after generating the mother identifier (*mid*) in both datasets, we merged them by *mid*, and we kept only the sample of mothers currently not desiring additional children or having been sterilised. At this stage, we had the birth history of each mother and could hence identify the youngest child per mother through the variable age (*HL6*). After restricting the sample to the sub-population of youngest children per mother, we again checked its gender composition through the variable *sex* (*HL4*), i.e. we computed the average of the dummy variable sex.
- **EUROSTAT** data were useful to fill most of the gaps on European countries. Those data were computed by EUROSTAT as the share of youngest children being male by women currently not desiring additional children or having been sterilised.

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