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AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT

The World Bank's Involvement in Global and Regional Partnership Programs






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The World Bank's Involvement in Global and Regional Partnership Programs: An Independent Assessment

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Cover: Cover: **Top left:** Tajikistan aluminum smelter. Photo by Gennadiy Ratushenko, courtesy of the World Bank Photo Library (EITI). **Top right:** River and terraced farms in Bhutan. Photo by Curt Carnemark, courtesy of the World Bank Photo Library (GWP). **Middle left:** Photo by Clare McLean, University of Washington Medicine (GFHR) **Middle right:** Local women’s group in Bangladesh teaching women about nutrition, health, and basic mathematics to help them qualify for a loan. Photo by Shehzad Noorani, courtesy of the World Bank Photo Library (CGAP). **Bottom left:** Indonesian village. Photo by Curt Carnemark, courtesy of the World Bank Photo Library (CEPF). **Bottom right:** Banda Aceh, Northern Sumatra, Indonesia, January 2005. © Martin Adler, courtesy of Panos Pictures.

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Abbreviations

ADEA	Association for the Development of Education in Africa (a regional partnership program)
CEPF	Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (a global partnership program)
CFP	Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships Vice Presidency (World Bank)
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (a global partnership program)
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (a global partnership program)
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (a global partnership program)
CODE	Committee on Development Effectiveness (World Bank)
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DGF	Development Grant Facility (World Bank)
DOTS	Directly Observed Treatment Short-Course (the recommended treatment protocol for TB)
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (a global partnership program)
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (a global partnership program)
GDN	Global Development Network (a global partnership program)
GEF	Global Environment Facility (a global partnership program)
GFHR	Global Forum for Health Research (a global partnership program)
GISP	Global Invasive Species Program (a global partnership program)
GPG	Global public good
GPP	Global Programs and Partnerships (World Bank)
GPR	Global and/or Regional Program Review (IEG)
GRPP	Global and/or regional partnership program
GWP	Global Water Partnership (a global partnership program)
IAASTD	International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (a global partnership program)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report (World Bank)
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group, formerly OED (World Bank)
ILC	International Land Coalition (a global partnership program)
IWRM	Integrated water resources management
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MBC	Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (a regional partnership program)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTF-EITI	Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (a global partnership program)
MMV	Medicines for Malaria Venture (a global partnership program)
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
OP/BP	Operational Policy/Bank Procedure (World Bank)
PRHCBP	Population and Reproductive Health Capacity Building Program
PRN	Partnership Review Note (World Bank)
ProVention	The ProVention Consortium (a global partnership program)
Stop TB	Stop Tuberculosis Partnership (a global partnership program)
TFO	Trust Fund Operations Department (World Bank)
TOR	Terms of reference
VPU	Vice Presidential Unit (World Bank)
WHO	World Health Organization

Foreword

Programs with regional or global reach are increasingly being used to channel funds to specific development needs, reflecting the emergence of new funding sources and in some cases donor distrust of the established multilateral development model to deliver global goods. Evaluating the contribution of these programs is important to understanding whether their relevance and effectiveness live up to their promise and how they contribute to the new aid architecture.

The World Bank has been a leader in the development of Global and Regional Partnership Programs (GRPPs), which have become a significant line of business for addressing global challenges and sharing knowledge about development. The Bank has helped establish dozens of the programs over the past 15 years and is now involved in nearly 120 GRPPs with shared governance. These programs have enabled the Bank to engage with a wide range of partners, including other donors, private foundations, leading international nongovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, and universities.

Almost half the programs are relatively small knowledge, advocacy, and standard-setting networks; most are supported by the Development Grant Facility and located outside the Bank. A little more than a quarter of somewhat larger programs provide country-level technical assistance in support of national public goods; most are supported by donor trust funds and located inside the bank. The remaining programs are financing global or country-level investments primarily for global and regional public goods such as preserving environmental commons and controlling communicable diseases.

This biennial report on the World Bank's involvement in GRPPs—its third since 2004—synthesizes the findings and lessons from 17 GRPPs completed since 2006. It assesses the progress that the Bank has made in promoting effective partnerships and provides a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of the Development Grant Facility in providing a limited amount of grant financing for GRPPs.

The evaluation finds that many task teams have brought extraordinary dedication and ownership to their programs, despite constraints on their time and insufficient budgetary resources for oversight. The Bank has successfully convened and mobilized resources for new programs, but it has contributed less to other institutional aspects of partnership formation, growth, and sustainability. The Bank has not established reliable systems for tracking GRPPs, for fostering strong linkages with country operations, or for oversight and risk management of individual programs. In these respects, the implementation of its policy agenda to promote effective partnership arrangements has essentially stalled during the last three years.

The Independent Evaluation Group recommendations for Bank involvement in GRPPs echo the core recommendations from its Trust Fund evaluation: the Bank should improve selectivity and oversight of its GRPP portfolio, enhance the effectiveness of individual programs, and minimize the risks associated with the programs. In particular, the Bank should develop a formal policy on engaging with GRPPs, including standard approval processes for

Bank engagement independent of how individual programs are financed, and a policy for hosting the GRPP management units that are located in the Bank.

Vinod Thomas
Director-General, Evaluation

Preface

This is third biennial report of the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) on the World Bank's involvement in global and regional partnership programs (GRPPs) since the conclusion of IEG's two-phase evaluation on this topic in 2004. The first two biennial reports were discussed at the Committee on Development Effectiveness Subcommittee in May 2006 and March 2008. The present report is the first one that will be disclosed to the public—reflecting the growing maturity of this line of IEG's work.

Similar to the previous two reports, this report has three major purposes:

- To update the Bank's Board on progress in implementing the recommendations in the 2004 evaluation that were directed at IEG (then known as the Operations Evaluation Department) itself
- To synthesize the findings and lessons from the first 17 regular Global and Regional Program Reviews (GPRs) that IEG has completed since 2006
- To assess the progress that Bank management has made in implementing Bank-wide systems and accountabilities for managing and overseeing its portfolio of GRPPs.

In addition—in response to requests from several Executive Directors in June 2010 that IEG undertake an evaluation of the Bank's Development Grant Facility—the present report provides a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of the Development Grant Facility in providing a limited amount of grant financing for GRPPs.

This report has been based on the first 17 GPRs that IEG has completed and on interviews with Bank staff who have been involved in the management and oversight of GRPPs in Central, Network, and Regional Vice Presidencies. IEG greatly appreciates the time and insights provided by those interviewed for this report, including network and regional staff who confirmed the accuracy of the basic information provided in the appendixes to this report on the nearly 120 GRPPs with which the Bank is currently involved.

IEG reviews GRPPs (a) to help improve the relevance and effectiveness of the programs being reviewed and (b) to learn lessons of broader application to other programs. IEG does not, as a matter of policy, recommend the continuation or discontinuation of any programs being reviewed, because that is properly the jurisdiction of the governing bodies of each program.

Similar to IEG's reviews of Bank-supported projects and Country Assistance Strategies, the preparation of a GPR is contingent on a recently completed evaluation of the program being reviewed; such evaluations are typically commissioned by the governing body of the program. Each GPR assesses the independence and quality of that evaluation, provides a second opinion on the effectiveness of the program, assesses the performance of the Bank as a partner in the program, and draws lessons for the Bank's engagement in GRPPs. The GPRs do not formally rate these various attributes of the program.

Each GPR has involved a desk review of key documents, a review of relevant academic literature, consultations with key stakeholders, and a mission to the program management unit (secretariat) of the program if this is located outside the World Bank or Washington, DC. Key stakeholders have included the Bank's representative on the governing body of the program, the Bank's task team leader, the program chair, the head of the secretariat, other program partners (at the governance and implementing levels), and other Bank operational staff involved with the program. Most IEG reviewers have also consulted with the person(s) who conducted the evaluation of the GRPP.

Each GPR is subject to internal IEG peer review and management approval. Once cleared internally, each GPR has been reviewed by the responsible Bank unit and the management of the program. Comments received have been taken into account in finalizing each review, and the formal management response from the program has been attached as an annex to the final report. After each report has been distributed to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors, it has been disclosed to the public on IEG's external Web site.

Acknowledgments

This report has been prepared by Chris Gerrard and Anna Aghumian under the direction of Mark Sundberg, Manager, IEG Public Sector Evaluations.

IEG acknowledges the continuing contribution of the IEG staff and consultants who prepared the 17 Global and Regional Program Reviews on which this report is based. They have confirmed the accuracy of the references in this report to the programs that they reviewed, and provided other helpful comments and insights that have strengthened the report.

Ed Elmendorf: Medicines for Malaria Venture; and Global Forum for Health Research
Roy Gilbert: Cities Alliance
Catherine Gwin: Global Development Network
Kris Hallberg: Development Gateway Foundation
Silke Heuser: ProVention Consortium
Lauren Kelly: Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund; Global Invasive Species Program; and Mesoamerican Biological Corridor
Andres Liebenthal and Anna Aghumian: Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Bernard Liese: Stop Tuberculosis Partnership
Ridley Nelson: International Land Coalition; and International Assessment of Agriculture Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development
Dean Nielsen: Association for the Development of Education in Africa
Keith Pitman: Global Water Partnership
Khalid Siraj: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
Denise Vallaincourt and Elaine Ooi: Population and Reproductive Health Capacity Building Program

IEG also acknowledges all those who made time available for interviews and provided information for this report. The list of people interviewed is in Appendix M.

The report was peer-reviewed by Talib Esmail, Operations Advisor, Latin America and Caribbean Region of the World Bank, and by Markus Palenberg, Managing Director, Institute for Development Strategy, Munich.

IEG has also undertaken a separate evaluation on the use and management of trust funds administered by the Bank. The present report and that evaluation were presented to the Board at the same time because of their inherent complementarity. The evaluation team appreciates the regular interactions with members of that team which has improved the quality of both reports: Catherine Gwin (team leader), Victoria Elliott and Bowen Uhlenkamp.

William Hurlbut and Heather Dittbrenner have provided editorial support.

Vinod Thomas, Director-General, Evaluation
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Mark Sundberg, Manager, Independent Evaluation Group-Public Sector
Chris Gerrard and Anna Aghumian, Task Managers

Executive Summary

Fostering partnerships to address global challenges and share knowledge is a cornerstone of the Bank's strategic vision. Global and Regional Partnership Programs (GRPPs) with shared governance are a basic building block in this effort and have become a significant line of business for the World Bank, and hence for evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). The nearly 120 programs in which the Bank is currently involved are spending about $7 billion annually.

The objectives of the 17 programs that IEG has reviewed in depth since 2006 have been highly relevant in terms of collectively addressing important global and regional issues, but few have had a well-articulated results framework. Almost all programs can point to some positive achievements in terms of outputs. However, the sustainability of a number of programs and the benefits they foster is threatened by weak resource mobilization strategies, failure to keep up with the changing global and regional context, and difficulties in demonstrating results at the outcome level.

The Bank's management and oversight of its GRPP portfolio shows strengths and weaknesses. Many task teams have brought extraordinary dedication and ownership to their programs, despite constraints on their time and insufficient budgetary resources for oversight. The Bank has played to its comparative advantage in convening and mobilizing resources for new programs, but less in contributing to other institutional aspects of partnership formation, growth, and sustainability. So far, the Bank has not established reliable systems for keeping track of the GRPPs in which it is involved, for fostering strong linkages with country operations, or for oversight and risk management of individual programs. In contrast to the excellent foundational and strategic work that the Bank did on GRPPs in the early 2000s, the implementation of its strategic and policy agenda to promote effective partnership arrangements has essentially stalled during the last three years.

The Development Grant Facility (DGF) has provided funding to about 70 of these 120 GRPPs. It has had a number of successes, but it is no longer the umbrella facility for all the Bank's grant financing arrangements, as was envisaged when it was established in 1998. A number of significant programs have now left the DGF umbrella, but continue to be funded by other Bank resources.

There is a sound rationale for the Bank to be engaged in grant making in a small way, but the effectiveness of the DGF has been hindered by governance and management issues and by the inconsistent application of its own eligibility criteria. The ongoing strategic reorientation of the DGF toward a "venture capital" approach provides an opportunity to revitalize it. Based on IEG's findings from the experience of 16 DGF-supported programs, the DGF should focus its efforts on building sustainable institutional arrangements that can survive the Bank's financial exit and on helping to secure multidonor financing from the outset.

The Bank's Involvement in GRPPs

In the absence of a global government that can collect taxes to provide global and regional public goods directly, partnership programs with shared governance arrangements have become the principal instrument for doing this. The number of GRPPs has also grown because of dissatisfaction with traditional aid mechanisms, the involvement of new actors and constituencies in development, new information and communication technologies that facilitate collective action, and collective decisions to concentrate resources on achieving selected Millennium Development Goals.

The Bank is currently involved in nearly 85 global and 35 regional programs—and another dozen are under development. Of these, about 40 percent have management units (secretariats) located inside the Bank, about 35 percent in other international or partner organizations, and about 25 percent are freestanding independent legal entities.

The World Bank plays many roles in GRPPs, depending on the program—as convener, financial contributor, trustee, member of the governing body, chair, host of the secretariat, administrative support and/or implementing agency.

The Bank is not a major funding source. Bilateral donors and private foundations provide the lion's share of the $7.0 billion being spent by all 120 programs combined. The Bank contributes about 2.5 percent—from its administrative budget and the DGF—but has become the largest trustee, handling about 80 percent of the trust fund resources ($5 billion annually) dedicated to these 120 programs. Still, the Bank has operational responsibility for only one-fifth (about $1 billion) of these resources—the remainder being financial intermediary trust funds for programs located outside the Bank.

Almost half the programs are knowledge, advocacy, and standard-setting networks that are generating and disseminating knowledge about development in their sector. Most are being supported by the DGF and are located outside the Bank. These programs are generally small, with annual expenditures averaging less than $5 million.

An intermediate number (about 27 percent) of somewhat larger programs (averaging $16 million annually) provides country-level technical assistance to support national policy and institutional reforms and to catalyze public or private investments in their sector. Most of these are located inside the Bank, because the Bank's country-level presence enables it to supervise such activities.

The remaining programs finance global or country-level investments to support the provision of global, regional, or national public goods. The four largest of these programs—the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; the Global Environment Facility; the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research; and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization—account for 73 percent of the expenditures of all 117 programs.

Challenges for the World Bank

GRPPs with shared governance arrangements present a number of challenges for the Bank's traditional country-based business model. First, they challenge the Bank's traditional financial and managerial accountability mechanisms. Their legal and governance arrangements do not always confer sufficient clarity on how the collective responsibility for the programs works in practice and may set limits on the Bank's authority that are not consistent with its accountability.

Second, the Bank is dedicating more and more senior management time to the governance of these programs, because the programs generally seek the highest possible level of Bank representation on their governing bodies. This involves contributing to the good governance of the programs, promoting the interests of the Bank's client countries, helping to achieve the greatest possible development impacts, and ensuring that the Bank's own roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities in the program are aligned with the Bank's formal authority and actual control.

Third, the Bank expects each program's objectives to be aligned with its own sector and country strategies, and each program's activities to be appropriately linked to the Bank country operational work. But the way GRPPs plan their activities is different from the way the Bank's country teams plan theirs.

For all these reasons, IEG has focused its own evaluation work on GRPPs with shared governance, rather than on bilateral partnership arrangements or more informal multilateral partnerships.

Since a pilot phase in 2006, IEG has now completed 17 Global Program Reviews (GPRs), which are representative of the Bank's portfolio of GRPPs. All but one of these were based on an external evaluation. Among the four largest programs, IEG completed an evaluation of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research in 2003, is currently undertaking a review of the Bank's engagement with the Global Fund, and is planning to undertake a review of Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization in the near future. Three of the 17 programs reviewed have been supported by the Global Environment Facility.

This report addresses three key aspects of the Bank's involvement in GRPPs: (a) the performance of individual programs; (b) the Bank's management and oversight of its GRPP portfolio; and (c) the role of the DGF in supporting GRPPs. Key findings in each area are summarized below.

GRPP Performance

A number of findings and lessons emerge from the 17 GPRs that IEG has completed since 2006 and from the external evaluations commissioned by the programs' governing bodies.

Independence and quality of evaluations

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are critical to measuring and tracking program results, and the independence of evaluations is key to their credibility. IEG found that 10 of 16 evaluations were **independent** at all stages of the evaluation process, from initiation to the delivery of the final report, and that the **quality** of the evaluations was satisfactory in 7 of the 16 cases. The most common issues that adversely affected their quality were (a) unclear terms of reference, (b) inadequate budget and time, (c) weak M&E frameworks for the programs, and (d) lax evaluation methodology and tools.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the external evaluations have had notable impacts on the programs' governance and strategies. Led by the global health partnerships, individual GRPPs are developing a positive culture of evaluation. But many programs continue to regard periodic evaluations as a substitute for the hard work of putting adequate M&E systems in place to track program outputs and outcomes. Some programs appear to undertake regular evaluations more to mobilize funds for the programs than to learn lessons to improve their performance.

Development effectiveness

IEG found that the objectives of virtually all programs were **highly relevant** but that many programs had **design weaknesses.** Objectives were generally relevant in terms of collectively addressing important global and regional issues, but few programs had a well-articulated theory of change indicating how their strategies and priority activities were expected to lead to the achievement of their objectives. Some programs, IEG found, needed to scale down the ambition of their objectives to match their resources, or to be more selective in their choice of activities in accordance with their comparative advantage. A number of the knowledge and advocacy networks had surprisingly weak communications strategies for knowledge networks.

In the absence of robust M&E frameworks, systematic evidence relating to the achievement of the programs' objectives at the outcome level is scarce. However, almost all programs can point to some achievements in terms of outputs, as illustrated by the following positive examples.

Among the investment programs, the **Stop Tuberculosis Partnership** and its Global Drug Facility have contributed significantly to global efforts to control tuberculosis. Key drivers of its achievements have been a clearly operationalized control strategy and broad consensus among partners on the technical features of that strategy, because infectious disease control programs are to a large extent technology-driven.

The **Medicines for Malaria Venture** has been effective in efficiently managing a portfolio of candidates for new malaria drugs through the various phases of drug discovery and clinical development that precede formal registration with public authorities, as well as in raising sufficient funds to establish a strong pipeline of new malaria drugs that are expected to be affordable in developing countries.

Among the technical assistance programs, the **Cities Alliance** has become a global leader in supporting city development strategies and slum upgrading—two of the most pressing issues in urban development today. The **Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative** and its associated Multi-Donor Trust Fund in the Bank are in the process of achieving their narrowly defined objective of increasing transparency over payments and revenues in the extractive sector.

Among the knowledge networks, the **Association for the Development of Education in Africa** has become the premier forum for educational policy development and agency cooperation in Africa—promoting policy dialogue and analytical work on African educational problems through a variety of forums, such as biennial meetings, technical gatherings, and working groups. The **Consultative Group to Assist the Poor** has become a powerful and pivotal force in the microfinance field, playing a critical role in helping build inclusive financial systems by providing advisory services, developing and setting standards, advancing knowledge, and training and capacity building.

Governance and management

IEG found a strong qualitative correlation between the effectiveness of the programs' governance and the achievement of their objectives but also observed a range of legitimacy, accountability, efficiency, and transparency issues in the governance and management of the 17 programs reviewed.

There has been an observable trend from shareholder models of governance, in which only financial contributors are entitled to sit on the governing body, to stakeholder models with representation from beneficiary countries and civil society organizations as well, this often comes at a cost to efficiency if the number of participants representing diverse interests becomes so large. The overcrowded agendas of annual general meetings have often hindered considered debate and decision, particularly of budgets.

Accountability is enhanced when the roles and responsibilities of the partners, the governing bodies, and the management units are clearly articulated in a program charter and when accountabilities are well defined. IEG found many cases where accountabilities are not articulated, understood, or accepted, with negative effects on the performance of the programs.

Three-quarters of the 117 programs are located in the World Bank or other partner organizations. Such hosting arrangements are going to be a continuing feature of GRPPs, because the benefits of being located in an existing organization generally outweigh the costs, particularly for small programs. Many programs have succeeded in establishing effective working relationships with their host organizations.

Real and perceived conflicts of interest are a prevailing and essentially unavoidable feature of GRPPs, deriving primarily from multiple roles that the principal partners play in a given program. IEG agrees with the recommendations of a recent internal report, commissioned by the Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships (CFP) Vice Presidency in FY10, intended to manage these conflicts more transparently.

Sustainability

IEG found that the sustainability of half the programs was adversely affected by ineffective resource mobilization strategies, poor governance and management, failure to keep up with the changing global and regional context, or difficulty in demonstrating results. One program has closed, and several others are in danger of doing so for these reasons.

A key message that has emerged from IEG's reviews is that the governing body of each program has central responsibility for financial and organizational sustainability, as well as programmatic sustainability. This should not be a secretariat responsibility. Yet many governing bodies have not seriously addressed this issue.

Another key message is the importance of paying attention to the sustainability of program benefits early on—to focus on long-term capacity building, to establish criteria for devolving activities, and to define potential exit strategies—even when the short-run need for the partnership is regarded as indisputable. Very few programs have done this.

Bank Management and Oversight of GRPPs

The Bank has two overlapping strategies—for partnerships and for global public goods—that aim: (a) to strike an appropriate balance between global and country programs in supporting global and national public goods; (b) to establish criteria for engaging in individual GRPPs; and (c) to lay out the respective roles and responsibilities of Network, Regional, and Central vice presidential units (VPUs) in managing and overseeing the Bank's GRPPs, consistent with the decentralized nature of the Bank.

These two strategies have committed Network and Regional VPUs to strengthening global-country linkages, ensuring a results focus, mobilizing stable funding for key GRPPs, planning exit strategies, strengthening oversight, and ensuring well-functioning control environments for in-house programs. Central VPUs are responsible for putting in place business processes to facilitate the approval and tracking of the Bank's GRPPs from initial concept to evaluation. Overall, the Bank has fallen substantially short of these commitments to its Board.

Network and Regional management of GRPPs

The Bank expects all partnerships to have a clear strategic rationale consistent with the relevant Sector Strategy Paper and expects that all partnerships should demonstrate a clear linkage to the core institutional objectives and, above all, to country operational work. Sector Strategy Papers are expected to contain an explicit and focused discussion of how partnerships will help achieve goals within each sector.

Based on IEG analysis, Sector Strategy Papers have not proven useful for formulating sector partnership strategies because they focus on the Bank's country operations and because their extended time periods (typically 10 years) are not well synchronized with partnership programs' own strategic planning periods (typically 3–5 years). The Bank needs a different approach and instrument for strategic planning in relation to partnerships.

Evidence for effective operational linkages between GRPPs and country operations is weak and anecdotal. IEG found strong linkages in only 4 of the 17 programs reviewed—the Association for the Development of Education in Africa, the Cities Alliance, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor.

The broad lesson is that effective global-country linkages do not happen automatically. Strong legitimacy for a program, arising from developing country representation on the governing body, appears to foster stronger linkages. Being located in the Bank does not guarantee effective linkages with the Bank's country operations, as the cases of CGAP and the Population and Reproductive Health Capacity Building Program demonstrate. Some programs have been designed with explicit operational linkages (such as those that purchase cross-support from regional operations), and many have not. There has been no systematic assessment of whether these linkages are working effectively as designed.

The Sustainable Development Network (SDN) is currently conducting a promising effort to review its portfolio of GRPPs. It aims to provide a strategic framework for management decisions on entry into new programs or on changes to existing programs. The exercise is already influencing SDN policies and procedures related to business planning, results frameworks, improved quality-at-entry for new programs, a more strategic selection of DGF proposals, and harmonization of resource management across GRPPs in SDN. This could potentially serve as a model for other vice presidencies.

Central support

The Bank has not so far established a reliable system for keeping track of the GRPPs in which it is involved—and of the associated trust funds that finance them—in spite of a promising start in December 2004. New business processes were put in place at that time that recognized GRPPs as a separate product line and that aimed to integrate GRPPs into the Bank's regular operational and information systems. New processes were also put in place to improve selectivity and oversight, and the Quality Assurance Group initiated quality-at-entry reviews of DGF-supported programs in 2006.

In its second biennial report to the Committee on Development Effectiveness in March 2008, IEG pointed out deficiencies in the Bank's information systems on GRPPs, including inaccurate classifications of individual programs and their governance structures, the failure to update information regularly, and incomplete and unreliable financial information. Three years later, these issues persist. CFP has recently started a new effort to correct these and other deficiencies.

Recognizing the desirability of reaching a common understanding of GRRPs among the Bank's major development partners, CFP sponsored an international workshop in February 2010, along with counterparts in the World Health Organization and UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund). The goal was to improve institutional engagement in GRPPs. Also attended by bilateral donors, private foundations, international experts on GRPPs, and IEG, the workshop addressed the challenges that GRPPs present to existing international organizations, harmonization of definitions, understanding governance structures, good practice engagement, and M&E. This workshop was a positive first step in bringing about a greater degree of shared understanding about approaches to proactive engagement with GRPPs to enhance their development effectiveness.

Oversight and risk management

Oversight is the responsibility of the Bank's representative on each program's governing body, supported by the Bank's task team leader. IEG has found little evidence that Bank oversight of GRPPs has improved significantly since its 2004 evaluation on global programs. In its formal response to that evaluation, Bank management agreed with IEG's recommendation to clarify the roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities of Bank staff serving on the governing bodies of GRPPs by means of standard terms of reference and training. Bank management took some initial steps to implement this recommendation in 2009 by commissioning an internal report on the issue.

This internal report confirmed many of IEG's findings and found that the Bank lacks an effective way to monitor the risks that partnership programs pose for the Bank. The report made five recommendations to enhance the transparency and effectiveness of the

Bank's participation in the governance of partnership programs. It also noted that there would first need to be a Bank-wide decision to adopt a more disciplined approach to partnership programs to implement its recommendations, because the CFP Vice Presidency by itself currently lacks both the mandate and the tools to implement the recommendations.

IEG agrees with the substance of these recommendations and recommends that the Bank implement them expeditiously. The Bank also needs to clarify VPU responsibilities for implementation.

The Development Grant Facility

The DGF was established in 1998 to bring under one umbrella all the various grant financing arrangements that had been started over the years—the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, several health research programs, the onchocerciasis (river blindness) programs, the Institutional Development Fund, and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor—as well as two new programs that year—the Post-Conflict Fund and the Information for Development Program.

Today, the DGF is no longer the umbrella facility for all the Bank's grant financing arrangements because a number of significant grant programs—the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, the Institutional Development Fund, the Post-Conflict Fund, and the Africa Capacity Building Foundation—have now left the DGF but continue to be funded by other Bank resources.

There is still a sound rationale for the Bank to be engaged in grant making in a small way. The DGF is, in effect, the Bank's own trust fund to support partnership activities outside the Bank. But the DGF has been adversely affected by governance and management issues and by the inconsistent application of its own eligibility criteria—issues identified in previous IEG reports.

Eligibility criteria for DGF grants

IEG has found a strong qualitative correlation between programs' compliance with these criteria and their development effectiveness. This indicates that the criteria are doing a reasonable job of screening programs for likely development effectiveness to the extent that they are consistently applied. However, there has been considerable variation in compliance among the criteria and among programs. Four of the eight eligibility criteria remain sound: subsidiarity, comparative advantage, multicountry benefits, and managerial competence. The other four criteria—promoting partnerships, financial leverage, arm's length relationship, and disengagement strategy—have proven problematic.

IEG recommends several steps: (a) specifying more precisely the types of partnerships to be promoted, particularly in light of the strategic reorientation of the DGF toward a "venture capital" model; (b) enforcing the leverage requirement consistently, both ex post and ex ante, while clearly specifying allowable exceptions; (c) eliminating the arm's length requirement, which is superfluous and sends confusing signals; and (d) emphasizing the Bank's engagement strategy—rather than disengagement—with each program, along with the timeframe for the various ways in which the Bank plans to be engaged.

Governance and management of the DGF

The DGF Council is a legitimate body for allocating a fixed quantity of the Bank's own financial resources among different partnerships, because it is comprised of representatives from all the Network and Regional VPUs, as well as CFP and the Legal Department. However, IEG has observed a number of issues with respect to efficiency, transparency, and conflicts of interest.

The DGF follows an annual cycle, culminating in a presentation to the Bank's Executive Board in June each year. At this meeting, the DGF presents the Council's recommended allocation of the next year's DGF budget. Almost no one whom IEG interviewed viewed this system as efficient. The structure and content of the application forms have not been conducive to efficient consideration of existing and new proposals. IEG has identified some of the deficiencies and made suggestions for improvement. In particular, the forms should include some criteria and questions that relate to the way in which the programs will subsequently be evaluated.

IEG's GPRs have also revealed a number of deficiencies in the transparency of information reported by the DGF Council and Secretariat.

Strategic reorientation of the DGF

The ongoing strategic reorientation of the DGF toward a "venture capital" approach provides an opportunity to revitalize it, if it addresses a number of yet unanswered questions, based on the findings and lessons from IEG's review of 16 DGF-supported programs.

If the Bank is going to help initiate and then exit a new venture after a few years, it should focus on building sustainable institutional arrangements that will survive the Bank's financial exit. This would imply a preference for supporting partnership programs with formal governance structures and multidonor financing at the outset, rather than more informal types of partnerships.

The DGF has also provided long-term financial support to a number of important global partnerships, particularly in the health sector. These generally small but flexible contributions have given the Bank a "seat at the table" to contribute to the governance of the global health system for the benefit of the Bank's client countries. These contributions have also been valued by the recipient programs because the funds have contributed to core rather than earmarked funding. If such grants are still viewed as important but inconsistent with the new approach, then the Bank would have to find another instrument to make such grants.

Recommendations

This report makes the following recommendations to strengthen the Bank's management and oversight of GRPPs. The intent is to improve the development effectiveness of the programs themselves. The recommendations follow the same logical framework as those in IEG's 2004 evaluation of the Bank's involvement in global programs.

Strategic and policy framework

1. The Bank should continue to work with its global partners to develop shared understanding and information about the role and nature of GRPPs in the new aid architecture, from the initiation and establishment of new programs through their independent evaluation and impact assessment.

2. The Bank should develop a formal policy on engaging with GRPPs, including among other things:

- Standard approval processes for Bank engagement with new partnership programs, independent of how they are financed
- A policy for hosting the management units (secretariats) of GRPPs inside the Bank.

Financing

3. The Bank should revise the eligibility criteria for receiving DGF grants, taking into account the role of GRPPs and the DGF in the new aid architecture and the Bank's mixed experience with the existing DGF criteria.

Selectivity

4. The Bank should not formally engage in new GRPPs that do not have well-articulated governance arrangements, theory of change, monitoring and evaluation framework, and resource mobilization strategy at the outset.

5. The Bank should have an explicit engagement strategy for each GRPP in which it is involved, including the following:

- The expected roles of the Bank in the program at both the global and country levels, along with the expected duration of these roles
- How the program's activities are expected to be linked with the Bank's country operations
- How the risks to the Bank's participation will be identified and managed, including conflicts of interest among the Bank's roles in the program.

6. The approval of new programs should include criteria against which programs will subsequently be evaluated, including:

- Evidence of an international consensus
- Evidence of developing country demand
- Subsidiarity
- The absence of alternative sources of supply.

Oversight and risk management

7. The Bank should strengthen its oversight and risk management of GRPPs by:

- Establishing and maintaining a definitive, continuously updated, and searchable database of the GRPPs in which the Bank is currently engaged
- Requiring standard terms of reference for Bank staff serving on partnership boards
- Preparing Bank-wide guidelines for task team leaders of GRPPs
- Providing sufficient budgetary resources for effective oversight and risk management
- Requiring each vice presidency to produce an annual report on its involvement in GRPPs, including new entrants and exits.

Management Response

I. Introduction

Management welcomes the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) review of the World Bank's involvement in global and regional partnership programs (GRPPs). The third biennial review of GRPPs is timely, given the importance of partnerships to the growing knowledge agenda in the Bank and also provides a helpful discussion of issues for further consideration as part of the on-going reorientation of the Development Grant Facility (DGF). The findings, based largely on a detailed synthesis of 17 global program reviews (GPR) and also on a portfolio analysis of 117 GRPPs with shared governance, highlight the continued growth of partnership programs and their importance in addressing global challenges and knowledge sharing.

II. General Comments

Management broadly agrees with the direction of the IEG report and the ongoing challenges raised, such as the need for further work in clearly and transparently defining the roles and responsibilities of the Bank in partnership arrangements and ensuring that Bank roles, responsibilities and accountabilities align with its authority and control.

World Bank involvement in "shared governance" arrangements of nearly 120 GRPPs is not without challenges given the vast diversity of partnerships. Partnerships involve shared decision-making and governance with actors both internal and external to the Bank. Understanding of what constitutes "shared governance" continues to evolve. Some of the issues with which the Bank continues to struggle were raised as early as the IEG (then OED) review of global programs in 2004 (IEG 2004). Since that time, partnerships have continued to grow in line with the Accra Agenda for Action focus on partnership as a means to improve aid coordination at the global, sectoral, and country levels. Their structures—including the financing arrangements—have continued to evolve and become more complex. The growth of financial intermediary funds can be linked, in part, to the growing importance of partnerships to the international development community. Nine of the 17 financial intermediary funds currently under administration by the Bank have been created since 2004.

Clear delineation of roles, responsibilities, and accountability within partnerships is vital to their success. However, a systematic, standardized approach to management and oversight of GRPPs is difficult as arrangements generally depend on the specific nature and objectives of each partnership. The Bank is generally only one of several participants in arrangements that may or may not be housed within the Bank and where the Bank may or may not play a formal decision-making role. Even within the Bank, the decentralized matrix structure can contribute to complexities regarding roles, responsibilities, and accountability for staff participating in partnerships. The Bank has undertaken several actions to help improve the management of Bank participation in GRPPs, notably around the approval process, the evaluation of partnership programs, and the clarification of exit procedures, especially those partnerships financed through the DGF. Nevertheless, progress has been slower than anticipated and the evolving nature of partnerships and the international aid architecture means that more will always remain to be done. Hence, specific responses to the Management Action Record below reflect Management's agreement with the broad principles of many of IEG's recommendations, but with a focus on what can be realistically achieved in the next few years.

III. Recent Progress

DGF Reorientation. The DGF has provided financing for roughly 70 of the 120 GRPPs referenced in the IEG review. It was created in FY98, with the objective of encouraging innovation and catalyzing partnerships and with the intent to consolidate the Bank's grant making under a single umbrella. However, more than a decade of experience with the DGF has shown that programs requiring longer-term support consumed an increasing share of the DGF budget envelope and limited the turn over needed to create space to fund new, innovative partnerships. A reorientation of the DGF began in FY09 with the objective of focusing the DGF on a key part of its original mandate—encouraging innovation and catalyzing partnerships. At the same time, the reorientation is addressing several of the issues highlighted in this and earlier IEG reviews of partnerships and by analytical work by Management, notably the December 2009 internal report commissioned by the Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships Vice Presidency and referenced in the IEG report.

Based on a review of 16 DGF-supported programs, IEG suggests—and Management agrees—that the DGF should focus on building sustainable institutional arrangements that can survive a financial exit by the Bank. This is a key objective of the ongoing reorientation strategy as it seeks to promote greater turn-over in the DGF. As was discussed during the June 2010 Board meeting and the recent technical briefing, the DGF Secretariat has worked with sponsoring units to review exit strategies for 24 DGF-funded programs, 15 of which have received Bank funding for more than a decade. Nineteen of the 24 programs reviewed expect to graduate from DGF funding within the next 3-5 years. At the same time, financial exit should not mean the end of a valuable partnership, and in this context, Management welcomes the recommendation that partnership arrangements include a focus on a longer-term engagement strategy. Continuing work on the DGF exit strategy review will incorporate the underlying principles while still focusing on the objective of eventual financial exit.

The current IEG review finds that there is an increasing, positive results culture among partnerships, led by Human Development Network programs, but that there is room for improvement with regard to quality. The experience with DGF reinforces this conclusion. Historically, DGF programs have included overly ambitious results frameworks, with outcome targets often appropriate to the overall partnership but unrealistic given the scope of DGF funding. As a result, the DGF secretariat is working to develop a revised results framework template, suitable to shorter-term annual reporting and also the expected medium-term financial support from DGF. The end goal is a Results Framework that will track realistic indicators on DGF funded outputs and to determine the impact DGF funding has had on the overall partnership. Given the renewed focus on catalyzing innovation, the revised framework also will aim to recognize and address the possibility of failure of DGF supported partnerships, capturing of the reasons for those outcomes, and integrating lessons learned into future DGF partnerships. One element that the IEG review misses is that any program like the DGF that supports highly innovative undertakings almost by definition faces a relatively high inherent risk of failure, that the risk has to be accepted, but that lessons from failures may be as important as lessons from successes.

Finally, IEG notes that the effectiveness of the DGF has been hindered by governance and management issues. This has included ambiguous roles and responsibilities in some cases, which can lead to risks such as unclear accountability and conflicts of interest. To help address these types of issues, the DGF Secretariat has worked closely with the Office of Ethics and Business Conduct in advance of the FY11 DGF cycle to strengthen the due diligence process and help detect and manage potential conflicts of interest at the outset. Managers of sponsoring units are responsible for monitoring potential conflicts of interest and reporting them to the Office of Ethics and Business Conduct.

Analytical and Consultative Foundations. Issues associated with selectivity, governance, management, oversight, and accountability remain front and center in the Bank agenda on GRPPs. Following initial progress, notably work on developing a methodology to improve selectivity based on a pilot of some of the health sector GRPPs, several initiatives have been undertaken in recent years.[1] They provide an important foundation on which to build going forward.

In 2008, for example, broad consultations were held with operational units in the Bank to determine the most pressing challenges with regard to partnership accountability. Consistent with the findings outlined in IEG's current report—in many cases, concerns regarding accountability in GRPPs result from unclear definition of roles and responsibilities in governance and management structures—staff participating in the consultations noted that in a matrix environment they are accountable to "multiple masters" and face dilemmas when the guidance they receive from Networks and Regions on GRPPs differs.

An internal Working Group on Partnership Program Secretariats was formed in 2009 to further the work on governance and accountability. At the same time, CFP commissioned an internal report on Bank participation in the governance of partnership programs. Based on a review of the governance arrangements, the report outlined possible actions for improvements regarding information collection, clarification of roles and responsibilities, selection of Bank representatives, conflict of interest management, and risk management.

IV. Focus Going Forward

The Bank remains committed to working through partnerships as a means to foster collective action to address pressing global and regional development challenges. The question is how to ensure partnerships are most effective—linking what is often a supply side, issues-driven approach to a demand side, country-based model while simultaneously ensuring that the growing partnership portfolio is well managed. In this context, the Bank will continue to work with its global partners to develop GRPPs with enhanced selectivity and strengthened oversight. Selectivity and Management Frameworks will be structured such

1. However, momentum slowed with the disbanding of the Global Programs and Partnerships Council in 2005.

that the Bank remains flexible enough to be responsive to emerging needs, but with the nature and length of the partnership clearly defined to allow for appropriate Bank oversight of its own role.

In addition to the ongoing work on the DGF, which has provided financial support to roughly 60 percent of the 120 GRPPs cited in the IEG report, Management plans further work on selectivity and management of the broader portfolio of partnerships.

Strategic Selectivity Framework. Management believes there is a need to update the selectivity framework for global and regional partnerships and is working on the update. Such a framework will help minimize the risk of further proliferation of vertical funds as issues-driven partnerships with dedicated financing sources continue to grow and, given Bank decentralization, also help to minimize the potential for multiple partnerships with overlapping mandates.

Work on selectivity to date has focused on defining the criteria that should be used to determine the GRPPs in which the Bank should engage. Initial work on global public goods in 2000 determined that the Bank could make a special contribution primarily on five issues: (a) control of communicable diseases, (b) preservation of global commons, (c) production and dissemination of development knowledge, (d) fair and open international trade, and (e) international financial stability. In 2001, work on oversight and selectivity of global partnership programs put in place additional selectivity criteria and management processes. The 2005 *Strategic Framework for the World Bank's Global Programs and Partnership and Programs* (World Bank 2005) reinforced the principles identified earlier as the basis for selectivity, notably: (a) international consensus on the need for global action; (b) consistency with the Bank's development objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable growth; (c) need for Bank action to catalyze other resources and partners; (d) disproportionate impact on or benefits for client countries and likelihood of results at the country level; and (e) quality of partnerships.

The underlying principles remain largely valid but may need to be updated again in the context of the evolving international dialog, in addition to the growing complexity of financing arrangements for partnerships. The work on an updated selectivity will provide a basis for determining whether the Bank should engage and if so how, based on its comparative advantage. Equally important, the work will strengthen the global-country linkages in partnership arrangements, where difficulties remain. This will be done in the context of the Bank's ongoing work on business modernization for better results, including strengthening global-country linkages by improving the functioning of the matrix. Management, with inputs from the Matrix Leadership Team, is working on this issue. In a separate, but complementary exercise, a framework to guide the acceptance of new financial intermediary funds is under development in the Concessinoal Finance and Global Partnerships Vice Presidency.[2]

2. See *Trust Fund Support for Development: An Evaluation of the World Bank's Trust Fund Portfolio, Management Response*.

Management Framework. Since many GRPPs involve trust funds, the Bank's work in recent years on the Trust Fund Management Framework has had positive impact on the fund management level of GRPPs for which the Bank is trustee and program implementer. Most of the recent analytical work on GRPP governance, management and oversight, and accountability has been based on extensive reviews of samples of existing partnership arrangements. The issues are now well understood, though a comprehensive Bank-wide management framework to address the issues remains to be formulated and implemented, due in large part to the diversity of partnership arrangements.

A more comprehensive management framework, linked to selectivity, will establish clearer criteria and authority for approval of Bank participation in partnerships. In defining the process, the framework will need to balance the desired subsidiarity intended to improve country-level linkages with corporate accountability, including risk mitigation and monitoring for consistency with broader Bank policies and strategies, which in turn must be balanced against the desire of external actors for timely responsiveness on the part of the Bank.

With the development of a more comprehensive typology of partnerships, concrete actions will be determined to address issues characteristic to types of partnerships. A management framework can then be determined based on the Bank role in various types of partnerships, with priority placed on addressing those types of partnerships where the role of the Bank is most extensive or risks to the Bank are highest.

V. Recommendations

Management's responses to the specific IEG recommendations outlined in chapter 9, "Conclusions and Recommendations" are included in the attached draft Management Action Record matrix.

Management Action Record

Major Monitorable IEG Recommendations Requiring a Response	*Management Response*
Strategic and Policy Framework	
1. The Bank should continue to work with its global partners to develop shared understanding and information about the role and nature of GRPPs in the new aid architecture, from the initiation and establishment of new programs through their independent evaluation and impact assessment.	**Partially Agreed.** Management will continue to work with global partners to develop a shared understanding of the role of GRPPs, in line with the Paris and Accra agendas. Management notes that this work will not translate into a specific product such as an over-arching global partnership strategy, but rather complement and inform planned work on GRPP selectivity and improving links to country-level objectives (see below).
2. The Bank should develop a formal policy on engaging with GRPPs, including among other things: • Standard approval processes for Bank engagement with new partnership programs, independent of how they are financed • A policy for hosting the management units (secretariats) of GRPPs inside the Bank.	**Partially Agreed.** Management does not consider it would be appropriate to develop a formal operational policy at this time. Instead, Management plans to develop a partnership management framework that will entail guidelines and best practices for Bank units involved in partnership programs, including governing bodies and secretariats. This framework will include strengthened standard approval processes for new and restructured partnership programs and expected to be completed in FY12.
Financing	
3. The Bank should revise the eligibility criteria for receiving DGF grants, taking into account the role of GRPPs and the DGF in the new aid architecture and the Bank's mixed experience with the existing DGF criteria.	**Agreed.** Management plans to review the eligibility criteria for receiving grants as part of the ongoing strategic reorientation of the DGF, which is increasingly focused on support for innovative partnerships. Management will report to the Board on this issue in June 2012 through the FY13 DGF Board document. While agreeing with the recommendation, just to be clear as to Management's commitments going forward, Management does have concerns and disagreements regarding some of the more detailed suggestions outlined in Chapter 8. Specifically, the suggestions in Table16 are problematic as revisions to specific criteria at this stage may prejudge the ongoing reorientation process. Nevertheless, we recognize the importance of the underlying principles of most of the suggestions and will consider how the objectives might be met in a manner appropriate to the DGF reorientation. Management will explore the recommendation to eliminate the arm's length relationship given the challenges in applying the arrangement consistently. However, the original objective behind the arm's length relationship—minimizing risks of conflict of interest—remains of paramount importance and would need to be met through other means. Management believes that the suggestion to require a formal charter would not be applicable in all cases. As has been indicated in the past, Management does agree that depending on the nature of the partnership, clearly articulated roles and responsibilities should be a requirement whether in a charter or another instrument. As part of this, Management would further define the circumstances under which the Bank should or should not be a voting member of the partnership governance structure.

Major Monitorable IEG Recommendations Requiring a Response	*Management Response*
Selectivity	
4. The Bank should not formally engage in new GRPPs that do not have well-articulated governance arrangements, theory of change, monitoring and evaluation framework, and resource mobilization strategy at the outset.	**Partially Agreed.** Management agrees that all partnerships should have well-articulated monitoring and evaluation frameworks and appropriate governance arrangements at the outset. These issues are currently being addressed in the Partnership Review Note (PRN) prepared for new GRPPs and that process will be strengthened in line with the partnership management framework noted above (see response to recommendation 2). Management does not agree that resource mobilization strategies should be required for every partnership. Instead, the requirement would depend on the nature of the partnership. We agree resource mobilization strategies should be required at the outset where financial exit from the partnership is an end objective, as is the case of the DGF. Explicit resource mobilization strategies are less appropriate in other cases. Some partnerships may be created to respond to a very specific issue and should sunset when the objective has been met, or be mainstreamed into other existing funds. Resource mobilization requirements would also need to be considered in the context of subsidiarity principles, increasing fragmentation of the aid architecture, and competition for resources. While Management recognizes the intent behind the recommendation, it does not agree with the requirement for well-articulated theories of change. As international priorities and the aid architecture evolve, partnerships will need to retain need some degree of flexibility to evolve in response. Requiring elaborate *ex-ante* plans is impractical given the number of actors involved in many partnerships and may actually undermine one of the objectives behind partnerships: timely response to global challenges. Instead, Management will explore how partnerships might implement regular internal reviews, linked to results frameworks, to achieve the underlying objective.
5. The Bank should have an explicit engagement strategy for each GRPP in which it is involved, including the following: • The expected roles of the Bank in the program at both the global and country levels, along with the expected duration of these roles • How the program's activities are expected to be linked with the Bank's country operations • How the risks to the Bank's participation will be identified and managed, including conflicts of interest among the Bank's roles in the program.	**Partially Agreed.** Management sees the need for a more holistic approach to partnerships as envisioned by explicit engagement strategies and will work to provide guidance to task team leaders of new GRPPs, informed by the work on the partnership management framework noted above and the work of the Matrix Leadership Team noted below in response to recommendation 6. However, Management would modify the recommendation on country-level linkages. Instead of an explicit "link with the Bank's country operations," the design of country-level linkages within the engagement strategy should be tailored to cases where the Bank will be the primary interface at country level, versus others where the Bank's operational role is limited, or where the program objective, such as global knowledge or research, has an indirect linkage to Bank country operations.
6. The approval of new programs should include criteria against which programs will subsequently be evaluated, including: • Evidence of an international consensus • Evidence of developing country demand • Subsidiarity • The absence of alternative sources of supply.	**Partially Agreed.** Management agrees that approvals of new programs should include clear criteria against which the programs will subsequently be evaluated. However, Management does not agree in the entirety with the recommended criteria. Management recognizes the intent behind the criteria—most of which are already applied to new partnership approvals, though not always consistently. Past reports suggest documentation at approval is quite thorough but follow-through monitoring and reporting remains the real issue. The Matrix Leadership Team work program includes

Major Monitorable IEG Recommendations Requiring a Response	*Management Response*
	the selection and monitoring of GRPPs. It will develop and implement a set of actions to address this issue and report on progress in the context of the regular updates to the Board on internal reforms. While international consensus has been used in the past, Management would call for the need for "collective action" to replace "international consensus" as consensus may be increasingly open to interpretation as the aid architecture evolves. Management disagrees with the specific requirement for evidence of developing country demand as many partnerships are created to address global and regional public goods, stimulating incentives (and demand) for action at the country-level. Instead, the link to the ultimate country beneficiaries should be defined in terms of how the partnership programs will link to country-level priorities where clear evidence of demand is not available *ex-ante*. Management agrees in principle with the subsidiarity and absence of alternative sources of supply, though it would not ask for strict adherence to these two criteria (which are in practice difficult to prove or disprove). Management agrees that partnerships should not duplicate what can be achieved by other existing instruments. Nevertheless, coordination among implementers is sometimes the objective behind partnerships driven by broader international calls for action. In this context, some degree of flexibility is called for. In terms of alternative sources of financial "supply," some partnerships are created to help leverage other sources of finance. As part of the efforts going forward, Management will look at defining better guidelines so that duplication and complementarity (versus substitution) can be assessed more readily in the selectivity and approval processes.
Oversight and Risk Management	
7. The Bank should strengthen its oversight and risk management of GRPPs by: • Establishing and maintaining a definitive, continuously updated, and searchable database of the GRPPs in which the Bank is currently engaged • Requiring standard terms of reference for Bank staff serving on partnership boards • Preparing Bank-wide guidelines for task team leaders of GRPPs • Providing sufficient budgetary resources for effective oversight and risk management • Requiring each vice presidency to produce an annual report on its involvement in GRPPs, including new entrants and exits.	**Partially Agreed.** Management agrees that strengthening oversight and risk management is needed. Guidelines for GRPP task team leaders will be prepared as part of a broader exercise to strengthen the overall partnership management framework (see response to recommendation 2 above), linking selectivity, quality assurance, resources and risk management, monitoring and reporting, and governance (including clearly defined roles and responsibilities). Management agrees that Bank staff serving on partnership boards should have terms of reference, following standard Bank policies; however, Management disagrees that all terms of reference have to be "standard." Management does not agree to mandating an annual report on GRPPs from each VPU. Instead, the immediate focus is better placed on developing better systems for information flows, and for management reporting and decision-making. Establishing a separate, definitive, searchable database is not warranted. However, Management will explore ways to improve current information systems and reporting so that relevant information on partnerships can be incorporated into and then easily retrieved from other existing reporting mechanisms.

Chairperson's Summary: Informal Meeting of the Executive Board

Executive Directors discussed the IEG evaluations on the Bank's Trust Fund Portfolio and Global and Regional Partnership Programs (GRPPs) and management's responses. Executive Directors noted that the evaluations and responses provide useful input to the Board and management to improve the Bank's approach to trust funds and partnership programs. They welcomed the largely common ground they saw in both the reports and management's responses, and they looked forward to further engagements on trust funds and partnerships. A number of Executive Directors highlighted the need to ensure that trust fund resources and partnership programs are used to support the Post-Crisis Directions and that this strategic approach should be taken forward through the implementation of the Trust Fund Management Framework and the planned partnership management framework.

On trust funds, Executive Directors encouraged management to draw on Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) findings and ideas such as "umbrella facilities," noting that it would be important to retain flexibility while improving the Bank's oversight and strategic alignment of trust funds. This will require close consultations with all stakeholders. Executive Directors agreed with IEG and management on the need to increase Board engagement on Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs), particularly in light of the Bank's reputational risks. They welcomed management's agreement with IEG's recommendation to develop a strengthened framework for the acceptance and management of FIFs, including developing relevant criteria and procedures for Board approval of new FIFs. Executive Directors also encouraged management to follow up on the recommendation to report regularly to the Board on FIF programs and their implications for the Bank's own programs and strategies. Some Executive Directors encouraged management to play a central role in analyzing the comparative advantage of trust funds and other aid vehicles, including in the context of High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness.

Several Executive Directors raised concerns about the proliferation of and growing dependency on Bank-Executed Trust Funds for core Bank work and underscored the need to ensure the alignment of these resources with Bank strategies and the Post-Crisis Directions, notably through better integration of these resources in Bank's budget and planning processes. They welcomed management's work to integrate Bank-Executed Trust Funds in work program agreements and to develop an integrated planning system. Executive Directors expressed their expectation that these questions will be adequately covered in the upcoming Board update on progress with the Trust Funds Framework. Some Executive Directors also called for a "road map" encompassing key strategy, governance, and operational issues.

With regard to Global and Regional Partnership Programs (GRPPs), several Executive Directors expressed support for the findings of IEG's report and welcomed management's further consultation with donors and beneficiaries. They underscored the importance of a stronger selectivity framework for engaging with GRPPs and stronger oversight and risk management. As with trust funds, partnership selectivity should be informed by the Post Crisis Directions and by country demand. Executive Directors also highlighted the need for improved information systems on GRPPs and better reporting to the Board.

Finally, several Executive Directors stressed the importance of adequate monitoring and evaluation systems to strengthen the results of trust funds and partnerships alike.

Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Chairperson

Chapter 1
Introduction and Background

This is the third biennial report by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) on the World Bank's involvement in global and regional partnership programs (GRPPs) since the conclusion of its two-phase evaluation on this topic in 2004 (IEG 2004). The first two reports were discussed by the Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) Subcommittee of the Board in May 2006 and March 2008. The present report is the first one that contains recommendations to Bank management and will be disclosed to the public—reflecting the growing maturity of this line of IEG's work.

This report updates IEG's progress in reviewing GRPPs.

Like the previous two reports, the first purpose of this report is to update the Bank's Executive Board on IEG's progress in implementing the two parts of the recommendation in the 2004 evaluation that were directed at IEG itself:

> **OED should include global programs in its standard evaluation and reporting processes. This includes:**
> - Working with the Bank's global partners to develop international standards for the evaluation of global programs.
> - Reviewing selected program-level evaluations conducted by Bank-supported global programs (both internally and externally managed), much as OED reviews other self-evaluations at the project and country levels.

Endorsed by CODE at its meeting on September 20, 2004, and reaffirmed by the CODE Subcommittee in May 2006 and March 2008, this recommendation has formed the foundation for IEG's subsequent evaluation and review work on GRPPs.

It synthesizes the findings of IEG's first 17 GRPs.

The second purpose of the report is to synthesize the findings from the first 17 regular Global and Regional Program Reviews (GPRs) that IEG has completed since 2006, primarily to identify and disseminate more broadly the lessons learned from the experience of these GRPPs. This also fulfills IEG's accountability function to the Bank's Board to provide an independent opinion of the effectiveness of the GRPPs in which the Bank is involved.

It reviews the Bank's progress in overseeing GRPPs.

The third purpose of the report is to assess the progress that Bank management has made in implementing Bank-wide systems and accountabilities for managing and overseeing its portfolio of GRPPs. This includes establishing corporate and sector strategies for GRPPs; convening and mobilizing financing for new programs; selecting, approving, and tracking new and existing programs; and exercising Network and Regional oversight of individual programs.

At the March 2008 meeting of the CODE Subcommittee that addressed IEG's previous biennial report, Subcommittee members expressed considerable concerns about the limited action of Bank management to implement some important recommendations from the past IEG reviews, such as undertaking the independent evaluations of trust-funded programs, developing guidelines for task team leaders and Bank representatives on partnership boards, and providing sufficient budgetary resources for effective oversight of GRPPs. Members also underlined the need for knowledge sharing and best practice dissemination, encouraged the Bank to help strengthen the governance and management of some programs, and stressed the need to align GRPPs' objectives and activities with country and sectoral strategies, especially in health and environment.

And the report provides a preliminary assessment of the DGF.

This report concludes with a chapter on the Development Grant Facility (DGF) in response to the requests from several Executive Directors in June 2010 that IEG undertake an evaluation of the DGF. Following this request, IEG and the Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships (CFP) Vice Presidency agreed that, in lieu of such an evaluation, the present report would provide a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of the DGF in providing grant financing for GRPPs.

IEG has also undertaken a separate evaluation of the use and management of trust funds administered by the Bank, which provide—among other things—much more financing for GRPPs. Both evaluations were presented to the Bank's Board at the same time because of their inherent complementarity.

Chapter 2
Overview of the Bank's GRPP Portfolio

GRPPs have become a significant line of business for the World Bank for addressing global challenges and sharing knowledge (box 2.1). In the absence of a global government that can collect taxes to provide global and regional public goods directly, partnership programs have become the principal instrument for doing so (box 2.2).

The number of partnership programs has also grown for several other reasons: expressed dissatisfaction with traditional aid mechanisms, the involvement of new actors and constituencies in development, new information and communication technologies that facilitate collective action, and, since 2000, collective decisions to concentrate resources on achieving selected Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Box 2.1. What Are Global and Regional Partnership Programs?

GRPPs are programmatic partnerships in which:

- The partners dedicate resources (financial, technical, staff, and reputational) toward achieving agreed objectives over time.
- The activities of the program are global, regional, or multicountry (not single country) in scope.
- The partners establish a new organization with shared governance and a management unit to deliver these activities.

"Global programs and partnerships" (GPP) is a broader phrase that Bank management has used to describe its various partnership strategies and management frameworks going back to January 2001. It encompasses a broader array of partnership arrangements, including bilateral partnerships (such as programmatic trust funds without shared governance) and more informal multilateral partnerships.

This report focuses on partnership programs with shared governance because these are evaluable institutional arrangements that the partners have deliberately created to achieve collective objectives that they could not achieve at all, or not achieve as efficiently, by acting alone. Thus, GRPPs present a number of particular challenges to the Bank that require special treatment in terms of management and oversight—and therefore also to IEG in terms of evaluation.

Evaluation Essentials

- GRPPs have become a significant line of business for the World Bank for addressing global challenges and sharing knowledge.
- The Bank is currently involved in nearly 120 GRPPs with shared governance arrangements, which are spending about $7 billion annually.
- GRPPs challenge the Bank's traditional financial and managerial accountability mechanisms.
- The Bank is dedicating increasing amounts of senior management time to the governance of GRPPs.
- Establishing effective linkages with the Bank's country operations is also a major challenge.

Box 2.2. What Are Global and Regional Public Goods?

Public goods produce benefits that are non-rival (many people can consume, use, or enjoy the good at the same time) and that are non-excludable (it is difficult to prevent people who do not pay for the good from consuming it). If the benefits of a particular public good accrue across all or many countries, then this is deemed a global or international public good.

In their pure form, true global public goods are rare. The International Task Force on Global Public Goods adopted a practical definition: "International public goods, global and regional, address issues that: (a) are deemed to be important to the international community, to both developed and developing countries; (b) typically cannot, or will not, be adequately addressed by individual countries or entities acting alone, and, in such cases (c) are best addressed collectively on a multilateral basis" (ITFGPG 2006).

Bank management adopted a similar definition in 2000: "Global public goods are defined as commodities, resources, services—and also systems of rules or policy regimes—with substantial cross-border spillover effects that are important for development and poverty reduction, and that can be produced in sufficient supply only through cooperation and collective action by developed and developing countries" (World Bank 2000).

These two definitions imply that information and knowledge about development—an output of many GRPPs—is not necessarily a global public good. There is, for instance, no shortage of knowledge now being disseminated globally on the Internet. Useful knowledge is also contextual, and its global public goods characteristics must be verified through empirical research.

Source: IEG.

The Bank is currently involved in nearly 120 GRPPs with shared governance arrangements, which are spending about $7.0 billion annually. About 85 are global programs and 35 are regional, and another dozen new programs are in the process of establishing their governance arrangements. About 40 percent of these programs' management units (secretariats) are located inside the Bank, about 35 percent are located in other international or partner organizations, and 25 percent are freestanding independent legal entities.

The Bank plays many roles in GRPPs, depending on the program.

The World Bank plays many roles in GRPPs, depending on the program—as convener, financial contributor, trustee, member of the governing body, chair, host of the secretariat, administrative support, implementing agency, and lender for projects in the sector (figure 2.1). The Bank is a full, voting member of the governing body of two-thirds of the programs and a nonvoting member or official observer of another 15 percent. The Bank serves as the chair or cochair of one-fifth of the programs; all but two of these programs have their secretariats in the Bank.

Figure 2.1. Bank's Roles in 117 GRPPs



Source: IEG data.
Note: The Bank's DGF is currently (2010–11) supporting 37 programs and supported another 34 programs in previous years. The World Bank is the trustee for 11 programs that are supported by financial intermediary trust funds, in which—unlike regular IBRD/IDA trust funds—the Bank does not necessarily play an operational role. The Bank is one of the implementing agencies in seven of these programs. The GEF Secretariat, which manages four programs, is a special case. Although it is physically located inside World Bank buildings in Washington, DC, it has its own independent governance structure. DGF = Development Grant Facility; FIF = Financial Intermediary Fund; GEF = Global Environment Facility; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Association.

The DGF and trust funds are largely independent sources of financing for GRPPs.

The Bank's DGF is currently providing financial support (in FY10 or FY11) for 37 programs and has provided support for an additional 34 of the 117 programs in previous years. Bank-administered trust funds are currently providing financial support for 70 programs. DGF grants and Bank-administered trust funds have proven to be largely independent sources of finance for partnership programs because DGF grants generally flow to partnerships outside the Bank and trust funds generally support partnerships located inside the Bank. Only 13 programs currently receive financial support from both sources.

GRPPs account for about 60 percent of the Bank's trust fund disbursements.

GRPPs with shared governance arrangements have accounted for approximately 60 percent of the Bank's trust fund disbursements over the last three years (FY08–10), including from financial intermediary trust funds. Country-level responses to conflicts and natural disasters have accounted for another 13 percent and debt relief for another 4 percent. The remaining 23 percent of trust fund disbursements has been from Bank-managed funds at the global or country levels, which do not have shared governance arrangements.

Principal Activities of GRPPs

GRPPs cover the entire range of development assistance activities.

The activities of GRPPs cover the entire range of development activities from (a) generating information and knowledge about development to (b) providing technical assistance to (c) financing investments in developing countries. Upstream programs that support social scientific research about development are by nature relatively small and have more indirect impacts. Downstream programs that finance technical assistance and investments are relatively larger and have more direct impacts.

The largest number of GRPPs consists of relatively small knowledge, advocacy, and standard-setting networks.

The largest number of programs (about 45 percent) are knowledge, advocacy, and standard-setting networks, most of which are being supported by the DGF and are located outside the World Bank. These are facilitating communication among practitioners in their sector or area of development, generating and disseminating information and knowledge, improving donor coordination, and advocating approaches to development, including, in some cases, going so far as establishing formal or informal standards. Some also provide training, but not usually in the context of specific institutional reforms in particular countries. Very few of these are spending more than $5 million annually (table 2.1).

Technical assistance programs are generally somewhat larger.

An intermediate number (about 27 percent) of somewhat larger programs (averaging $16 million annually) provide country-level technical assistance—either in kind or through grants—to support specific policy and institutional reforms in their sector or area of development, strengthening human resource capacity through proactive project-related training, and improving regulatory frameworks to catalyze public or private investments in their sector. The majority of these are located inside the Bank because the Bank's country-level presence enables it to supervise such activities.

The largest programs are financing global or country-level investments.

The remaining 27 percent of programs—half of which are located inside the Bank—are financing global or country-level investments to support the provision of global, regional, or national public goods. The four largest of these programs—the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; the Global Environment Facility (GEF); the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR); and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)—account for 73 percent of the entire $7.0 billion being spent by all 117 programs.

All types of programs have an important role to play. Small investments in new knowledge about development, for example, have the potential for a large payoff relative to the small financial outlay, as demonstrated by the path-breaking social science research on the risk of natural disasters that ProVention commissioned (box 2.3).

Table 2.1. Number and Size of GRPPs by Activities and Location of the Secretariat[a]

	In the World Bank	*In the GEF secretariat[b]*	*In another partner organization*	*Independent legal entity*	*Total*
			NO. OF PROGRAMS		
Networks	11		31	11	53
Technical assistance					
For NPGs	20		4	6	30
For GPGs/RPGs			1	1	2
Financing county-level investments					
For NPGs	3				3
For GPGs/RPGs	9	4	3	6	22
Financing global investments for GPGs	1		2	4	7
Total	44	4	41	28	117
ANNUAL EXPENDITURES ($ MILLIONS)					
Networks	51.8		67.6	51.8	171.2
Technical assistance					
For NPGs	184.4		2.9	94.3	281.6
For GPGs/RPGs			13.6	240.9	254.5
Financing county-level investments					
For NPGs	291.3				291.3
For GPGs/RPGs	334.4	635.1	124.3	4,045.1	5,139.0
Financing global investments for GPGs	580.0		65.6	180.1	825.7
Total	1,442.0	635.1	274.0	4,612.3	6,963.4

Source: IEG data.
Note: GEF = Global Environment Facility; GPG = global public good; NPG = national public good; RPG = regional public good.
a. See appendix C for a more detailed description of this classification of partnership programs by activities. Programs that are financing technical assistance and investments are typically also engaged in networking activities such as generating and disseminating knowledge, and advocacy.
b. The GEF Secretariat is reported separately because it is a special case. Although it is physically located inside World Bank buildings in Washington, DC, it has its own independent governance structure.

In addition, those programs that support the provision of **national public goods** in sectors such as agriculture and rural development, urban development, transportation, water, energy and mining, education, and social protection generally limit their support to technical assistance in order to not compete with the Bank's country lending operations. The overwhelming majority of investment programs support the provision of **global and regional public goods**—such as preserving environmental commons or controlling communicable diseases—specifically to overcome the limitations of the Bank's country-based model, because the benefits of such country-level investments are less easily appropriated at the national level or because the costs of these investments fall disproportionately on individual countries.[1]

Technical assistance programs tend to support national public goods and investment programs to support global public goods.

Box 2.3. Enduring Impacts of a Path-Breaking Research Study Commissioned by ProVention

In its global risk analysis of natural disaster hotspots, ProVention created a hazard risk index to identify risk levels of developing countries (Dilley et al. 2005). The study presented data on the risks of mortality and economic losses associated with six types of major natural disaster and determined the prevalence of natural disasters using a common geospatial unit of reference in all countries. Then the report ranked countries in terms of their vulnerability to natural disasters to influence risk mitigation investments.

This study profoundly changed the previous global perception of disasters as random and unpredictable events and made hazard risk more predictable. The hazard risk index has enabled both developing countries and donors to take a proactive approach to natural disasters and incorporate disaster risk when planning investment projects.

Building on the hotspots study, the subsequent IEG evaluation *Hazards of Nature: Risks to Development* (IEG 2006a) recommended that Bank management prepare an assistance strategy relating to natural disasters that takes into account the different vulnerabilities of borrowing countries. As a result, Bank management fundamentally changed the Bank's approach from a reactive to a strategic way of dealing with natural disasters.

In particular, the Bank's Executive Board approved a new policy for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (Operational Policy/Bank Procedure 8.00) that recommends integrating disaster risk reduction in the development strategies of high-risk countries. This includes mainstreaming and expanding prevention and mitigation measures for disaster risk reduction into country strategies via Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Country Assistance Strategies. Working in partnership with governments, the United Nations, and other multilateral development banks, the World Bank has established the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery to provide technical and financial assistance to client countries for developing national risk-management strategies and action plans for disaster mitigation and emergency preparedness.

For middle-income countries, the Bank has created a deferred drawdown option for catastrophic risks. For Development Policy Loans supporting programs for catastrophic risk management, the drawdown option for a catastrophic risk Development Policy Loan (introduced in March 2008) gives IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) borrowers the assurance that—over a period of 3 years, renewable for up to 15 years—they can withdraw funds (up to $500 million) when a natural disaster occurs that requires them to declare a state of emergency. The purpose of this option is to provide bridge financing while other sources of funding are mobilized. To be eligible for such a loan, the borrower must have an adequate hazard risk management program in place. Several such drawdown options for countries vulnerable to natural catastrophes have since been approved—to Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.

Two significant exceptions to these patterns are the Education for All–Fast Track Initiative (started in 2002) and the new Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (started in 2010). These investment programs have been justified in terms of providing supplementary financing to help countries achieve the MDGs.[2]

Principal Partners

Through these partnership programs, the Bank is engaged with other international and regional organizations, other donors, private foundations, leading international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations, and universities around the world. Former Bank President Wolfensohn explicitly—and by this evidence successfully—promoted the establishment of such partnerships during his tenure (1995–2005) to open up the Bank and to improve the efficiency of international development assistance:

The Bank is engaged with many types of development partners through GRPPs, but bilateral donors and private foundations provide most of the financing.

> I emphasized that development was not an issue for attention by institutions like the World Bank alone. I argued that it was essential to conceive the attack on poverty with the governments and the people of developing countries in the driver's seat. We had to bring together all the players and coordinate efforts to avoid replication and waste. Our partnerships must involve bilateral and multilaterals, the United Nations, the European Union, regional organizations, NGOs, foundations, and the private sector. Only with each of us playing to our respective strengths in coordinated interventions could we leverage up the entire development effort and avoid duplication (Wolfensohn 2010, pp. 305–6).

Other donors and international organizations are the Bank's principal partners at the governance level (figure 2.2). Bilateral donors and private foundations are providing the lion's share of the financial resources for these programs. The Bank only contributes about 2.5 percent—about $30 million from its administrative budget and $140 million from the DGF. However, it has become the largest trustee, handling about 80 percent ($5 billion annually) of the trust fund resources dedicated to these 117 programs. Still, the Bank has operational responsibility for only about one-fifth (about $1 billion) of these resources in the form of Bank- or recipient-executed trust funds. The remainder are financial intermediary trust funds for programs that are located outside the Bank (figure 2.3).

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has become a significant financier of GRPPs. It has provided support for three global programs (the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund; the Coral Reef Management Program; and the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development) and six regional programs (the Africa Stockpiles Program, the Nile Basin Initiative, TerrAfrica, the Black Sea-Danube Partnership, the Inter-American Biodiversity Information Network, and the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor) and has pledged up to $50 million for the Global Tiger Initiative. The Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program and the Policy and

The GEF has become a significant financier of global and regional environmental programs.

Human Resources Development trust funds have also supported a number of GRPPs.

Figure 2.2. Partners at the Governance Level: Representation of Other Donors and International Organizations on Partnership Boards

a. Donors



b. International and Regional (Public Sector) Organizations



Source: IEG.

Figure 2.3. Sources of Financing for GRPPs



Source: IEG data.

Principal Sectors and Regions

The programs are concentrated in the few sectors most closely associated with global and regional public goods: 20 percent of the programs are in the environment sector, 14 percent in health, 12 percent in agriculture and rural development, and 9 percent in public sector governance (figure 2.4). But the first three sectors account for more than 90 percent of the financing because of the presence of the Global Fund, the GEF, and the CGIAR.

Programs are concentrated in a few sectors and in a few network and regional vice presidencies.

Responsibility for overseeing and managing the programs is similarly concentrated in a few Network and Regional vice presidencies. The Sustainable Development Network Vice Presidency (VPU) is responsible for 36 percent of the programs, the Human Development Network VPU for 18 percent, and the Africa Region for 11 percent—the largest of any Region. Whereas sector boards are responsible for ensuring the quality of new programs at entry, VPUs are responsible for overseeing and managing the programs once established, whether located in the World Bank or elsewhere.

Figure 2.4. Distribution of Programs by Sector Board and Responsible VPU



Source: IEG based on appendix D.
Note: VPU = vice presidential unit. **Sectors**: ARD = Agriculture and Rural Development; EP = Economic Policy; EDU = Education; EMT = Energy and Mining; ENV = Environment; FOD = Financial and Private Sector Development; GE = Gender and Development; GIC = Global Information/Communications Technology; HNP = Health, Nutrition and Population; OS = Operational Services; PO = Poverty Reduction; PSG = Public Sector Governance; SDV = Social Development; SP = Social Protection; TR = Transport; UD = Urban Development; WAT = Water. **VPUs:** AFR = Africa Region; DEC = Development Economics; EAP = East Asia and Pacific Region; ECA = Europe and Central Asia Region; EXT = External Communications; FPD = Finance and Private Sector Development; HDN = Human Development Network; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean Region; MNA = Middle East and North Africa Region; OPCS = Operations Policy and Country Services; PREM = Poverty Reduction and Economic Management; WBI = World Bank Institute.

Major Challenges for the Bank

GRPPs challenge the Bank's traditional financial accountability mechanisms.

GRPPs with shared governance present a number of challenges for the Bank's traditional country-based business model (box 2.4). First, they challenge the Bank's traditional financial and managerial accountability mechanisms. Unlike the Bank's bilateral financial relationships with client governments, GRPPs are collective entities in which the partners have collective responsibility for the financial resources that they have dedicated to the global and regional activities of the programs. Their legal and governance arrangements do not always confer the same clarity on how this collective responsibility works in practice and may set limits on the Bank's authority that are not fully consistent with its accountability.

GRPPs absorb increasing amounts of senior management time.

Second, the Bank is dedicating increasing amounts of senior management time to the governance of these programs. Because the programs generally seek the highest possible level of Bank representation on their governing bodies, the Bank's representation on partnership boards is at the Director level or higher for half of the 91 programs for which the Bank is a member or official observer. This involves contributing to the good governance of these programs; promoting the interests of the Bank's client countries; helping achieve the greatest possible development impacts; and ensuring that the Bank's own roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities in the program are aligned with the Bank's formal authority and actual control.

Box 2.4. What Is Shared Governance?

"Shared governance" involves an institutional separation of governance and management functions between a program's governing body and management unit at the level at which the activities of the partnership are being conducted. This will almost automatically be the case for those partnership programs that are established as independent legal entities, in accordance with the national or international laws under which they are incorporated. This is also the case for programs located in the World Bank or other partner organizations, where the partners have established a governing body to provide strategic direction and oversight of the program.

However, this is not the case where, for example, the Bank provides a DGF grant to support the activities of another organization that are managed by a staff member of that organization, without a separate governing body, two or more organizational levels below the board of that organization. Nor is it the case where single or multiple donors provide funds for a Bank-administered trust fund that is managed by a task manager, without a separate governing body, several levels below the Executive Board of the Bank.

If such a body exists—whether it is called a board, a consultative group, a program council, or a steering committee—its responsibilities should encompass generally accepted governance functions, including strategic direction, management oversight, risk management, and evaluation, as laid out in a program charter or other constitutive document of the program. Well-known partnership programs located in the Bank, such as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the Cities Alliance, clearly qualify. Activities supported by a programmatic trust fund, where a Bank line manager is fully responsible for overseeing the task manager, would not generally qualify, even if there is a Bank-donor steering committee that is allocating the trust fund resources to various activities on an annual basis.

The Bank is not necessarily represented on the governing body of all the partnership programs in which it is involved, particularly those that are located outside the Bank. Representation on the governing body also takes a number of forms, from full voting member, to nonvoting member, to official observer, to unofficial observer. Decision making is usually by consensus but sometimes occurs by actual voting. For this report, IEG has produced the first definitive list of the Bank's representatives on GRPP boards, as well as information on the other ways in which the Bank is involved in these programs (appendix D).

Establishing effective linkages with the Bank's country operations is also a major challenge.

Third, the Bank expects each program's objectives to be aligned with its own sector and country strategies and each program's activities to be appropriately linked to the Bank's country operational work. Network and technical assistance programs, in particular, require the inclusion of their priorities in country development strategies, as well as follow-on investments, to achieve positive results on the ground. But the way partnership programs plan their activities is different from the way the Bank's country teams plan theirs.

For all these reasons, in its evaluation and review work, IEG has paid the greatest attention to those global and regional partnerships with shared governance arrangements, as opposed to bilateral partnership arrangements or more informal multilateral arrangements.

Chapter 3
IEG's Global and Regional Program Reviews

Evaluation Essentials

- The 17 programs that IEG has reviewed since 2006 are representative of the Bank's GRPP portfolio.
- Nine of these programs have been knowledge, advocacy, or standard-setting networks.
- Three programs have been providing country-level technical assistance to support the provision of national public goods.
- Five programs have been financing global or country-level investments to provide global, regional, or national public goods.

Since a pilot phase in 2006, IEG has completed reviews of 17 GRPPs in which the Bank is involved—seven reviews by the time of the last CODE Subcommittee meeting on this topic in March 2008 and 10 reviews since then. The principal objectives of these reviews have been (a) to help improve the relevance and effectiveness of the programs being reviewed and (b) to learn lessons of broader application for other programs. IEG does not, as a matter of policy, recommend the continuation or discontinuation of any programs being reviewed, because this is properly the jurisdiction of the governing bodies of each program.

Similar to IEG's reviews of Bank-supported projects and country assistance strategies, the preparation of a GPR is contingent on a recently completed evaluation of the program being reviewed, typically commissioned by the governing body of the program. Each GPR (a) assesses the independence and quality of that evaluation, (b) provides a second opinion on the effectiveness of the program, (c) assesses the performance of the Bank as a partner in the program, and (d) draws lessons for the Bank's engagement in GRPPs more generally. The GPRs do not formally rate these program attributes. [1]

Overview of the 17 Programs

Each GPR has been based on a recently completed evaluation of the program.

The 17 programs that IEG has reviewed are representative of the Bank's GRPP portfolio. Nine have been knowledge, advocacy, or standard-setting networks; three have been providing country-level technical assistance; and five have been financing global or country-level investments to provide global, regional, or national public goods (tables 3.1 and 3.2). All but one of the programs—the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor—have received grants from the DGF at some time during their existence, and 11 programs have been supported by Bank-administered trust funds.

All but two programs—International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) and ProVention—are still operational. Of those that are operational, the Bank remains involved in all but the Global Invasive Species Program and the Development Gateway Foundation,

Table 3.1. Seventeen Global and Regional Programs at a Glance

Acronym	*Full name*	*Annual expenditures[a] (millions)*	*Operational start date*	*Most recent evaluation*	*IEG review period*
KNOWLEDGE, ADVOCACY, AND STANDARD-SETTING NETWORKS					
GISP	Global Invasive Species Program	$1.04	July 1996	June 2006	2003–07
ProVention	ProVention Consortium	$1.47	February 2000	February 2005	2000–06
IAASTD	International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development	$2.98	September 2004	June 2009	2004–09
ILC	International Land Coalition	$3.67	1996	2006	2003–08
GFHR	Global Forum for Health Research	$4.09	January 1998	August 2007	1998–2007
ADEA	Association for the Development of Education in Africa	$5.96	1988	December 2005	2000–08
GDN	Global Development Network	$9.66	December 1999	December 2007	2004–09
GWP	Global Water Partnership	$15.1	1996	March 2008	2004–08
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	$21.3	1995	March 2007	2004–08
PROVIDING COUNTRY-LEVEL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE					
PRHCBP	Population and Reproductive Health Capacity Building Program	$1.66	1998	March 2005	2000–08
MDTF-EITI	Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	$3.50	2004	March 2009	2004–10
CA	Cities Alliance	$18.9	December 1999	October 2006	2002–07
FINANCING GLOBAL OR COUNTRY-LEVEL INVESTMENTS					
MBC	Mesoamerican Biological Corridor	$4.54	1997	[b]	1997–2009
DG	Development Gateway Foundation	$12.9	July 2000	April 2005	2000–07
CEPF	Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund	$18.8	November 2000	January 2006	2000–07
MMV	Medicines for Malaria Venture	$36.3	November 1999	May 2005	1999–2007
Stop TB	Stop Tuberculosis Partnership	$72.2	2001	April 2008	2001–09

Source: IEG.
a. Average of the three most recent fiscal years for which information is available.
b. This Regional Program Review was based on the evaluation of two regional projects (implemented by USAID and UNDP) and the Implementation Completion Reports of five GEF-financed, Bank-implemented projects that had the objectives of consolidating the MBC in their respective countries.

even though it is no longer providing financial support for two others (the International Land Coalition and the Global Water Partnership).

KNOWLEDGE, ADVOCACY, AND STANDARD-SETTING NETWORKS

The **Global Invasive Species Program (GISP)** is a small network—started in 1996 and now located at the Nairobi office of the Centre for Agriculture and Biosciences International—that develops and disseminates information and good practices to minimize the

Table 3.2. Principal Activities and Location of the 17 Programs

	Location of the secretariat		
Principal activities[a]	*In the World Bank*	*In another partner organization*	*Independent legal entity*
Knowledge, advocacy, and standard-setting networks	**CGAP** (FPDVP) **IAASTD** (ARD)	**ADEA** (AfDB) **GISP** (CABI–Nairobi) **ILC** (IFAD) **ProVention** (IFRC)	**GDN** (New Delhi) **GFHR** (Geneva) **GWP** (Stockholm)
Providing country-level technical assistance	**PRHCBP** (HDNHE) **MDTF-EITI** (SEG) **Cities Alliance** (FEU)		
Financing Investments Country-level investments to provide global and regional public goods		**Stop TB** (WHO) **CEPF** (CI)	**MBC** (San Salvador)
Global investments to provide global public goods			**Development Gateway** (Washington, DC) **MMV** (Geneva)

Source: IEG.
a. Programs that are financing technical assistance and investments are typically also engaged in networking activities such as generating and disseminating knowledge, and advocacy.
Note: **Host institutions:** AfDB = African Development Bank; CABI = Centre for Agriculture and Biosciences International, Nairobi; CI = Conservation International, Arlington, Virginia; IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development; IFRC = International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva; WHO = World Health Organization.

spread and impact of invasive alien species. It disseminates scientific and technical information to inform and equip developing countries with knowledge and tool kits to address the introduction, spread and management of invasive alien species. The Bank is no longer formally involved in GISP, although it maintains institutional relationships with its major partners. (See appendix F for the goals, objectives, and major activities of the 17 programs.)

The knowledge networks are generating and disseminating information and knowledge about development in many sectors.

ProVention was primarily a research network. It started in the World Bank in 2000 and then moved to the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Geneva in 2003. Its goal was to help developing countries reduce the risk and the social, economic, and environmental impacts of natural hazards on vulnerable populations in developing countries. It commissioned research, organized conferences, raised awareness, advocated improved policies and practices, and shared knowledge about hazard risk management before it closed at the end of 2009.

The **IAASTD** was a multidisciplinary, multistakeholder assessment by about 400 experts that sought to improve scientific understanding of agricultural knowledge, science, and technology—particularly modern biotechnology, genetically modified organisms, and organic agriculture in the context of sustainable development. Its goal was to provide relevant information for decision makers at all levels, from small producers to those who create international policy. The Bank helped convene and finance the assessment and hosted a small secretariat to handle administrative matters. But it did not, by design, oversee or manage the assessment.

The organization that is now called the **International Land Coalition (ILC)** was founded in 1996 following the Conference on Hunger and Poverty in 1995 in Brussels. Located in the International Fund for Agricultural Development in Rome, it is a global alliance of civil society and intergovernmental organizations (including the World Bank) that promotes— through advocacy, dialogue, and capacity building—secure and equitable access to and control over land for poor women and men.

The **Global Forum for Health Research** is an independent Swiss foundation, established in 1998, that promotes health research on the problems of poor countries and people. It has become known as the principal advocate for bridging the "10/90" gap—a metaphor for the global imbalance in spending on health research, which suggests that less than 10 percent of global health research expenditures are being devoted to developing countries, where more than 90 percent of preventable mortality is to be found.

The Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) is a forum for evidence-based policy dialogue among African ministries of education and development agencies active in African education. The goal of ADEA is to improve educational policies and enhance cooperation among development agencies. Started in the World Bank in 1998, it moved to UNESCO's International Institute of Educational Planning in Paris in 1991 and then to the African Development Bank in Tunis in 2008. ADEA promotes dialogue and analytical work on African educational problems through a variety of forums, including biennial meetings, technical gatherings, and working groups.

The **Global Development Network (GDN)** is an international network of 11 regional networks to foster policy-relevant development research from within developing and transition countries. Its mission is to build the research and policy outreach capacities of researchers in these countries and to promote the use of research in policy-making processes. Started in the World Bank in 1999, it was spun off as an independent not-for-profit organization based in Washington, DC, in 2001, and then relocated to New Delhi as an international organization in 2005.

The **Global Water Partnership (GWP)** is an advocacy network based on the principles of integrated water resources management (IWRM).

Started in 1996, it now comprises more than 2,100 individual partners that have grouped themselves into regional, country, and area water partnerships. Located in Stockholm, initially in the Swedish International Development Agency but now as an independent intergovernmental organization, it promotes IWRM as a means to foster equitable and efficient management and sustainable use of water resources.

CGAP is a consortium of public and private agencies, established in 1995 and located in the World Bank, with the mission of expanding access to financial services for the poor. Its current activities focus on providing advisory services, developing and setting standards, advancing knowledge, and offering training and capacity building to help build efficient local financial markets that reach poor and harder-to-reach clients with increasingly innovative, convenient, and affordable financial services.

PROVIDING COUNTRY-LEVEL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The **Population and Reproductive Health Capacity Building Programs (PRHCBP)** is a small-grants program—located in the World Bank and financed almost entirely by the DGF—that provides grants to civil society organizations to build their capacity to develop and implement culturally appropriate interventions in the sensitive fields of population and reproductive health. This program seeks to (a) promote healthier behavior at the individual and community levels, (b) reduce the impoverishing effects of poor reproductive health, and (c) improve reproductive health outcomes.

The three technical assistance programs are providing grants to support reforms at the country level.

The **Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)** was launched at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 to encourage governments, companies involved in extractive industries, international organizations, NGOs, and others to work together voluntarily to promote transparency of payments and revenues to address the paradoxical "resource curse," which says that two-thirds of the world's poorest people live in countries that are rich in natural resources.[2] Two related organizations—EITI in Oslo and a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF-EITI) in the World Bank—work together to achieve their shared objectives, with the MDTF-EITI providing technical assistance in support of country-level EITI processes.

Founded in 1999, the **Cities Alliance** is a partnership of about 20 donors and other stakeholders, including developing country and city association members, to help implement the "Livable Cities" agenda of the 1996 United Nations Human Settlements Conference in Istanbul. It provides technical assistance grants at global, country, and city levels to support (a) slum upgrading (city and nationwide upgrading of low-income urban settlements) and (b) the design and preparation of City Development Strategies.

FINANCING GLOBAL AND COUNTRY-LEVEL INVESTMENTS

The five investment programs are financing global and country-level investments in support of global and regional public goods.

The **Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC)** is a land-use planning system that spans Central America and the five southern-most states of Mexico. It is designed to promote the conservation and sustainable use of the region's natural resources. Formally endorsed by the Central American Heads of State in 1997, the MBC seeks to enhance the effectiveness of the Central American System of Protected Areas by strengthening the environmental management of existing key sites while developing a network of sustainable-use land corridors to link them. The World Bank has implemented a number of country-level GEF-financed projects since 1997, supplemented by Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program–financed activities, to help consolidate the MBC.

The **Development Gateway** is developing Web-based platforms and Internet solutions to improve aid effectiveness around the world and to strengthen public sector governance by increasing transparency. Started in the World Bank in 1999, it was spun off as an independent not-for-profit organization based in Washington, DC, in 2000. The Bank is no longer formally involved in the Gateway, although a number of former Bank staff serve on its governing body; the Bank continues to advertise upcoming consulting and procurement opportunities through dgMarket.[3]

The **Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF)** is providing grants to NGOs, community groups, and private sector entities to conserve biodiversity in selected vital ecosystems (hotspots) in IBRD member countries that have ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity. One of its primary goals is to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations to participate in and influence the conservation of critical ecosystems. Located in Conservation International in Washington, DC, both the DGF and the GEF have provided and continue to provide substantial financial support to its first two phases (2001–07 and 2009–14).

The **Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV)** is a product development public-private partnership that was established in 1999 as a Swiss foundation in response to the withdrawal of major pharmaceutical firms from malaria drug research. It functions as a "virtual" pharmaceutical research and development company by screening, financing, and overseeing a portfolio of competitive research and development projects for antimalarial drugs that will be affordable in poor countries.

The **Stop Tuberculosis Partnership** is a loose coalition of more than 900 international and national public and private sector organizations and individuals aiming to eliminate tuberculosis (TB) as a public health problem. Established in 2001 and located in the World Health Organization (WHO), its work includes a Global Drug Facility that provides free and affordable drugs, as well as quality-assurance and technical assistance, to countries through grant making and direct procurement of both first and second-line anti-tuberculosis drugs.

Lessons for Improving the GPR Guidelines and Procedures

IEG's current guidelines for preparing GPRs—dated February 2007—were shared with the CODE Subcommittee in March 2008 and are available on IEG's external Web site: www.globalevaluations.org. These incorporate improvements resulting from the preparation of the *GRPP Evaluation Sourcebook* in 2006–07 (see next chapter). IEG has added three additional dimensions to its reviews since then, which are not yet reflected in the written guidelines:

- Starting in 2008, a systematic assessment of the design, implementation, and utilization of each program's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system
- Starting in 2009, an assessment of the program's efficiency from the donor and beneficiary perspectives
- Also starting in 2009, an assessment of the sustainability of the benefits arising from the activities of each program, not just the sustainability of each program itself.

GPRs are based on desk reviews and interviews, supplemented by surveys and field missions.

The principal review instruments have been a desk review of key documents (including the external evaluation of the program), a review of relevant academic literature, interviews with partners and stakeholders, and a mission to the secretariat of the program if this is located outside Washington, DC. Key partners and stakeholders have included the Bank's representative on the governing body, the Bank's task team leader, the program chair, the head of the secretariat, other program partners at both the governance and implementing levels, and other Bank operational staff involved with the program. Most reviewers have also consulted with the person(s) who conducted the external evaluation.

Reviewers have also supplemented these instruments in a number of ways to come up with a sound assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of the programs:

- For the **ADEA** review, a telephone survey of World Bank task team leaders for education projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (some who had attended ADEA events and others who had not); for the **GWP**, a questionnaire survey of Bank staff working in the water sector; and for the **ILC** review, an electronic survey of civil society organizations involved in land policy, reform, and administration in developing countries
- A quality assessment of a random sample of 20 analytical products produced by **ADEA,** and a text analysis and refer-

ence search of the final reports produced by **IAASTD**

- For the **MDTF-EITI**, **GISP, GWP,** and **MMV** reviews, keyword searches of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, and project appraisal documents for references to the programs being reviewed and to the issues which they are addressing
- For the **CGAP** and **Stop TB** reviews, an analysis of the Bank's lending portfolio in the sector
- For the **Cities Alliance** review, participating in an annual meeting of the Consultative Group
- Undertaking a field-level assessment of the Southern Mesoamerican Hotspot for the **CEPF** review and field-level assessments of Bank-implemented projects in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama for the **MBC** review.

IEG acknowledges that the biggest weakness in its current methodology has been the inability, because of cost considerations, to undertake a field mission for every program that is undertaking country-level activities, especially where the external evaluation itself did not undertake any field work. Generally speaking, the cost would be prohibitive for IEG to undertake extensive field work for global programs that have activities in many countries.[4] Nonetheless, IEG reviewers attempt to undertake field work by combining this with other IEG missions (for Project Performance Assessment Reports, Country Program Evaluations, and other IEG evaluations).

Each draft report is reviewed by the sponsoring Bank unit and the program's management before being submitted to CODE and disclosed to the public.

Each draft report has been circulated for review and comment to the management of the program, to the Bank's task team leader, to the unit responsible for the Bank's involvement in the program, and to other units responsible for the Bank's engagement with global programs more generally (CFP, Operations Policy and Country Services, Legal, the Quality Assurance Group, and the Trust Fund Quality Assurance and Compliance Group).[5] Their comments are taken into account in finalizing the review before it is submitted to CODE and disclosed to the public. The formal response of the program has been appended to each review. Although this review process has been somewhat lengthy at times, it has added to the validity of IEG's findings, which are summarized in the present report.

Overall, as the following sections in this progress report demonstrate, the GPRs are reviewing a standard set of issues that enable comparisons across the programs reviewed. The 17 GPRs are also demonstrating the benefits of IEG's moving ahead on two fronts at the same time. The preparation of the *GRPP Evaluation Sourcebook* helped improve the methodology for GPRs, and the GPRs are helping identify good-practice examples for evaluating global programs. Each track is contributing and lending credibility to the other.

Chapter 4
The Current State of GRPP Evaluation Practice

Evaluation Essentials

- Led by the global health partnerships, individual GRPPs are slowly developing a positive culture of evaluation.
- Ten of the 16 external evaluations reviewed were independent at all stages of the evaluation process, and 7 of 16 were of satisfactory quality with few shortcomings.
- Weak monitoring and evaluation frameworks adversely affected the quality of virtually all evaluations, especially in assessing the programs' achievements at the outcome level.
- The external evaluations have had notable impacts on the programs, prompting programs to improve their governance arrangements, adopt new program strategies, and strengthen M&E frameworks.

The World Bank has been playing a leading role in encouraging evaluations of GRPPs. The DGF requires all programs receiving DGF funding of $300,000 or more over the life of the program to undertake an independent evaluation every three to five years. Bank Procedure 14.40 on trust funds requires GRPPs financed by trust funds to have an evaluation at least once every five years if total contributions are greater than or equal to $5 million (appendix B). As a result, 73 of the 93 programs that are five years old or more have had external evaluations, typically commissioned by the governing body of the programs (appendix D, table D.4). Notable exceptions are three carbon finance programs, two World Bank Institute programs, and several regional programs in East Asia and Latin America. The global health partnerships are generally setting the standard for regular, well-funded, and quality evaluations.

Few programs have posted their evaluations and a management response on their Web sites.

However, only 28 of the 73 programs have posted their evaluations on their Web sites and only 12 have posted a formal management response to the evaluation.[1] Unlike the case for Implementation Completion Reports of Bank-supported projects and Country Assistance Strategy Completion Reports, there have been no regular processes in place to ensure that the task team leaders provide IEG with copies of these completed evaluations, and there has been no central depository of these evaluations available for Bank management or staff on the Bank's intranet.

In 2010, the CFP Program Administration and Management Unit agreed to revise the DGF guidelines to make it mandatory for task team leaders to provide copies of completed evaluations to IEG—a requirement that should be extended to all GRPPs in which the Bank is involved.[2] Greater transparency and accessibility would enhance accountability and performance, consistent with the Bank's new Access to Information policy.

IEG has prepared a sourcebook for evaluating GRPPs in collaboration with the OECD/DAC Evaluation Network.

IEG has been leading an effort under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Network on Development Evaluation to develop consensus standards for evaluating GRPPs. The first result of this effort was the publication of the *Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Programs: Indicative Principles and* Standards

(IEG and OECD/DAC 2007). This synthesized and applied to GRPPs existing evaluation principles, norms, and standards that had already been developed by the DAC Evaluation Network, the United Nations Evaluation Group, the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the Multilateral Development Banks, professional evaluation associations, and others.

The second result of this work will be a companion *Guidebook of Good-Practice Guidelines and Examples*, which is nearing completion. Each chapter of the *Guidebook* will provide overall guidance for addressing the standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability), suggested evaluation questions in relation to five to six evaluation issues under each criterion, common approaches and methodologies to address each issue, and some good-practice examples taken from the evaluations that IEG has reviewed. Suggested evaluation questions for global program evaluations in relation to the standard DAC criteria can be found in appendix G.

Independence and Quality of the External Evaluations

INDEPENDENCE

To ensure their credibility, evaluations should be independent from any process involving program policy making, management, or activity implementation, as well as impartial. Such independence and impartiality should be present during all stages of the evaluation process, from initiation to delivery of the final report. IEG assesses independence based on four criteria established by the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the Multilateral Development Banks: organizational independence, behavioral independence, protection from outside interference, and avoidance of conflicts of interest (ECG 2004).

Ten of 16 evaluations were effectively independent.

Based on these four criteria, IEG found that 10 of the 16 external evaluations reviewed were effectively independent at all stages of the evaluation process (appendix H, table H.1).[3] These evaluations were generally commissioned and managed by the programs' governing bodies (or by oversight committees appointed by these bodies), or in two cases—ILC and IAASTD—by the host organizations. The evaluation teams were selected competitively, operated independently with adequate logistical support from the programs' secretariats, and reported directly to the commissioners of the evaluation. There were no apparent conflicts of interest or interference from interested parties during the evaluation process.

In two cases—GWP and the Global Forum for Health Research (GFHR)—IEG found that the independence of the external evaluation was compromised during at least one stage of the evaluation process.

The way in which the **GWP** evaluation was procured created a number of potential conflicts of interests, because the evaluation was managed and paid for by the largest donor, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), which selected the same firm of consultants that had conducted the previous evaluation. However, the Joint Donor Group of the GWP managed to resolve in a transparent way the expressed concerns that DFID might be protecting its own interests, or that the evaluation team might be evaluating their earlier recommendations. IEG found that the evaluation of the **GFHR** was not fully independent at the review stage. IEG interviews and the extended delays in completing the final evaluation report strongly suggested that the evaluation team went beyond the standard of submitting a draft report, receiving comments, and then immediately completing the final text.[4]

Independence was compromised somewhat in two cases and extensively in four cases.

IEG found that the independence of four evaluations—those for GISP, ProVention, PRHCBP, and MDTF-EITI—was seriously compromised from the outset. In all four cases, the program's management rather than the governing body commissioned and oversaw the evaluation, thus compromising organizational independence. Although this was mitigated to some extent by the behavioral independence of the evaluators in the cases of **GISP** and **MDTF-EITI**, the independence of these evaluations was also compromised at their review stages. In the cases of **ProVention** and **PRHCBP**, there were also apparent conflicts of interest in the selection of the evaluators that were not mitigated.

QUALITY

IEG found that the quality of the external evaluations was satisfactory in 7 of 16 cases, had moderate shortcomings in 6 cases, and had significant shortcomings in 3 cases. The most common issues that adversely affected the quality of the evaluations were the following:

The quality of the evaluations was satisfactory in 7 of 16 cases.

- An unclear terms of reference (TOR)
- Insufficient budget and time
- Weak M&E frameworks for the programs
- Lax evaluation methodology and tools.

Unclear TOR: This was the most common problem at the initiation stage—an incomplete, broad or vague TOR that did not set a clear framework for the evaluation. Examples included the evaluations of GISP, ProVention, the GFHR, and Stop TB. The evaluation of Stop TB is a good-practice example of effectively overcoming a cumbersome TOR to produce a high-quality report. The TOR had articulated two purposes for the evaluation in very broad terms, had presented an overly ambitious set of questions to be answered, and had not provided an evaluation framework. Faced with this issue, as well as unclear objectives and boundaries for the Partnership, which made it

An unclear TOR was the most common problem at initiation.

difficult to conduct an objectives-based evaluation, the evaluation team developed its own approach, which may be characterized as "results-based" as opposed to "objectives-based." But this evaluation team had an adequate budget ($1 million) and timeframe (one year) to do this.

Insufficient budget and time: As an initial benchmark, IEG suggests that a program-level evaluation should be budgeted at 1–3 percent of annual program expenditures—closer to 3 percent for smaller programs and closer to 1 percent for larger programs. The size of the budget should also be influenced by the scope and methodology that have been specified for the evaluation (those requiring field work cost more) and by the quality of the program's M&E system (those with weaker M&E systems cost more to evaluate). The budgets of most evaluations were within this range—the major exceptions being the Development Gateway, MMV, CGAP, and GDN (table 4.1). However, the quality of these four evaluations was not significantly affected by an inadequate evaluation budget.

Table 4.1. Relative Costs of the External Evaluations

Program	*Final cost of the evaluation*	*Annual program expenditures[a] (millions)*	*Share of annual program expenditures*
GISP	$30,000	$1.04	2.88%
ProVention	$17,700	$1.47	1.20%
IAASTD	$80,000	$2.98	2.68%
ILC	$200,000	$3.67	5.45%
GFHR	$105,000	$4.09	2.56%
ADEA	$100,000	$5.96	1.70%
GDN	$70,000	$9.66	0.86%
GWP	$560,000	$15.60	3.58%
CGAP	$132,425	$21.30	0.61%
PRHCBP	$16,500	$1.66	1.00%
MDTF-EITI	$58,500	$3.50	1.67%
Cities Alliance	$400,000	$18.90	2.12%
Development Gateway	$34,000	$12.90	0.26%
CEPF	$345,000	$18.80	1.84%
MMV	$150,000	$36.30	0.41%
Stop TB	$1,000,000	$72.20	1.39%

Source: IEG.
a. Average of the three most recent fiscal years.

An insufficient budget compromised the quality of the four smallest programs.

IEG found that the quality of the evaluations of GISP, ProVention, PRHCBP, and MDTF-EITI were adversely affected by an insufficient budget and time for the evaluation. These were the four smallest ongoing programs at the time of their evaluations, and their evaluation budgets were insufficient to overcome the deficiencies in each program's monitoring frameworks. Particularly in the case of MDTF-EITI, which provides country-level assistance, the evaluation team did not have a sufficient budget or time to compensate for existing information gaps with country visits, interviews with recipient country officials, and possibly a survey of country partners and/or recipients, as could have been expected from the TOR. In any case, the evaluation was based primarily on a desk review and interviews with World Bank Group management and staff, donors, and EITI stakeholders. There was only one client country official and one client country civil society organization among the 30 people consulted.

Weak M&E frameworks adversely affected the quality of virtually all evaluations.

Weak M&E frameworks: The quality of virtually all evaluations was compromised by weak M&E systems. The most common problems were the following:

- The objectives and strategies of the program were not well defined (not focused, too process oriented, difficult to measure, or open to different interpretations by different stakeholders)—GISP, ILC, Cities Alliance, and Stop TB.
- The M&E system was not well designed (focusing only on inputs and outputs, not outcomes)—GISP, GFHR, CGAP, MDTF-EITI, Cities Alliance, and the Development Gateway.
- The data on the progress of activities and the achievement of outcomes were not systematically collected—GFHR, GWP, and CGAP.

These weak M&E frameworks adversely affected the quality of evaluations, especially in terms of assessing the overall effectiveness of the programs:

- Little systematic evidence was provided on achievements at the outcome level, or the extent to which outcomes could be attributed to the program's activities.
- With two exceptions (GDN and GFHR), little effort was made to assess the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of the program's individual outputs.
- All the external evaluations had to spend some resources—if resources were available—attempting to reconstruct the historical inputs, outputs, and outcomes of the program.

Evaluation instruments often lacked methodological rigor.

Lax evaluation methodology and tools: The evaluation instruments used by some evaluations to gather evidence were not methodologically rigorous or appropriate. A common problem was selection and sampling bias during the data gathering stage. Other recurring problems were an overreliance on interviews and surveys at the data reporting stage, faulty interpretation of survey data, and the lack of independent judgment in the evaluation report (GISP, Global Forum, and ADEA).

A common shortcoming was the absence of benchmarking of the programs' outputs and outcomes against similar or comparable programs or initiatives (GFHR and GDN). Some evaluations failed to address key aspects of the programs because they lacked sufficient expertise in the evaluation team (GFHR, GDN, and Stop TB). In the case of Stop TB, for example, the lack of epidemiological expertise on the evaluation team impaired its ability to evaluate this aspect of the partnership's work.

Impact of the Evaluations on the Programs

The evaluations have had notable impacts on almost all programs.

Notwithstanding their shortcomings, the external evaluations of the 16 GRPPs have had notable impacts on the programs, with the exceptions of GISP and MDTF-EITI (table 4.2). The changes initiated by the governing bodies of the ILC and the GWP have been the most comprehensive. The ILC, for instance, further clarified its legal status and relationship with its host institution, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, adopted a new M&E framework, doubled its membership, started a regionalization process, and obtained a large amount of new funding to support its revamping.

The three most frequent impacts have been the following:

- **Changes in their governance arrangements**. Seven programs—ProVention, ADEA, GDN, GWP, Development Gateway, MMV, and Stop TB—introduced structural and procedural changes in the governance and management of their programs as a result of the evaluations.

- **Revision of their strategies**. Six programs—ILC, GFHR, ADEA, GWP, Cities Alliance, and CEFP—adopted new strategies to improve their relevance and effectiveness.

- **Developing M&E frameworks.** Four programs—ILC, CGAP, Cities Alliance, and Development Gateway—took steps to improved their M&E frameworks.

Individual GRPPs are developing a positive evaluation culture.

Led by the global health partnerships, individual GRPPs are slowly developing a culture of evaluation. There is a growing awareness of the importance of independence in evaluation and a clear trend toward more independent evaluations. Commissioners of evaluations are identifying the important issues to be addressed (including governance and management issues), and evaluators are developing instruments to address them. But many programs continue to regard periodic evaluations as a substitute for the hard work of putting in place adequate monitoring systems to track outputs and outcomes in relation to plans, to identify reasons for success or failure, and to take the necessary actions to improve performance.[5] Few programs have established adequate M&E systems prior to or even immediately after their first evaluation. And there is still the sense that some program management units are going along with the pressure from donors to undertake regular evaluations more to mobilize funds for the programs than to learn lessons to improve the program's effectiveness.

Table 4.2. Major Impacts of the External Evaluations

Program	Major impacts
KNOWLEDGE, ADVOCACY, AND STANDARD-SETTING NETWORKS	
Global Invasive Species Program (GISP)	The evaluation had little impact, only a few of the recommendations being implemented. In some cases, the program acted in direct opposition to the evaluation's recommendations.
International Land Coalition (ILC)	The program developed a new strategic document and action plan, an operating framework, an important paper on its legal status, an M&E framework, and a communications strategy. It also started a regionalization process with regional meetings and a membership drive leading to a doubling of its membership. IFAD and the ILC are discussing a Memorandum of Understanding to govern their relationship. A large amount of new funding has been obtained in support of this renewal process, partly due to a substantial fund-raising effort by the ILC, partly due to the ILC's positive response to the evaluation, and partly due to the increasingly high profile of land issues globally.
ProVention Consortium	The program adopted a new governance structure in September 2005, including the creation of an Advisory Committee as the main governing body to provide advice on major strategic, policy, and organizational decisions. The host organization (IFRC) retained legal responsibility for the program, and the secretariat retained responsibility for executing and implementing ProVention activities.
Global Forum for Health Research (GFHR)	The program adopted a new Global Forum Strategy, which improved the program's strategic focus and required a higher degree of selectivity in Global Forum's activities compared with its first 10 years.
Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA)	The program formulated a new strategic plan, including a new set of medium-term objectives and an M&E framework, which were approved in October 2007. The program realigned its working groups to its strategic plan and put greater emphasis on outreach activities toward key partners and stakeholders. The program created an Executive Committee to manage its operation and exercise management oversight, leaving its Steering Committee to focus on more strategic and substantive matters.
Global Development Network (GDN)	The program developed an action plan for addressing many of the evaluation's recommendations and incorporated the plan into an ongoing strategic review. Some of the key actions have been (a) diversification of the eligibility criteria for GDN awards, (b) improvements in Board representation and selection procedures, and (c) improvements in Board-management interaction.
Global Water Partnership (GWP)	The program issued a new strategy in January 2009, taking into consideration the findings and recommendations of the evaluation, and developed with GWP Network-wide participation and consultation. The program is reviewing the legitimacy of the Network and, among several options under consideration, may transform regional governance arrangements into representative bodies, rather than relying on the partners through the annual consulting partners meeting. This annual meeting could evolve in line with other governance changes to be more representative of the Network—rather than partners at random.
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor(CGAP)	The program has developed performance benchmarks for microfinance investment funds and developed a results-management system in collaboration with members of the Council of Governors and the Executive Committee.

Program	Major impacts
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS	
Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	The MDTF-EITI disagreed with the recommendations of the external evaluation on strategy and governance, on the grounds that these did not reflect a clear understanding of the separate roles of the MDTF and the EITI Board/Secretariat. The MDTF-EITI Management Committee concluded that, while there was no need to change its structure, it would consider more interaction with selected stakeholders on specific topics, but not at every meeting.
Cities Alliance	The program drew up a new Medium-Term Plan for 2008–10 and transformed its former Steering Committee into an executive body (partly in response to the findings of IEG's GPR). The program has scaled up the issue of slum-upgrading, developing a new M&E framework and dedicated working group, and implemented a knowledge management system. The program has drawn up plans to enhance dissemination and advocacy.
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS	
Development Gateway Foundation	The program moved towards a stakeholder model of governance, with three types of members on the Board of Governors, each with a third of the seats: donors; partners/beneficiaries; and individuals with particular expertise. The program reconsidered its mix of activities and dropped some of its smaller activities. The program adopted a clearer fund-raising strategy and hired a Director of Development/Resource Mobilization. The program developed an M&E framework and appointed a staff member responsible for M&E.
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund	The evaluation contributed to the approval of a second phase of operations with financing from Conservation International, the French Development Agency, GEF, the MacArthur Foundation, and the World Bank (DGF). The evaluation influenced the strategic design of the second phase in several ways: (a) All proposed grants of more than $250,000 would require additional external review; (b) decision making for grants less than or equal to $20,000 would be devolved to the field; and (c) organizations that comprised the Regional Implementation Team would not be eligible for additional grants in that hotspot.
Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV)	The evaluation enhanced MMV's legitimacy and contributed directly to additional financial support from DFID and the Wellcome Trust. The evaluation validated a shift in MMV's agenda, which was already underway, to include access and delivery of new drugs in its work program, and to give increasing attention to beneficiary country perspectives. The evaluation contributed to decisions to increase MMV staff numbers and technical capacity, and to expand its Expert Scientific Advisory Committee with technical experts in areas not previously represented.
Stop TB Partnership	The Board of the program abolished the Working Group on Advocacy and reassigned its functions. The Board subsequently established a new Global Laboratory Initiative with a subgroup on infection control (created as a full Working Group in October 2008).

Sources: IEG.
Note: DFID = UK Department for International Development; DGF = Development Grant Facility; GEF = Global Environment Facility; GPR = Global/Regional Program Review; IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development; MDTF = multidonor trust fund; M&E = monitoring and evaluation.

Chapter 5
Findings and Lessons Concerning the Effectiveness of the GRPPs Reviewed

Evaluation Essentials

- The objectives of virtually all programs were highly relevant, but many programs had design weaknesses.
- All programs can point to achievements in terms of outputs, but few have systematic evidence of achievements at the outcome level.
- Programs with narrower, more focused objectives have generally been more successful.
- Most program management units (secretariats) appear to be lean and flexible.
- The sustainability of half the programs was adversely affected by weak resource mobilization strategies, declining relevance in a changing global and regional context, or difficulty in demonstrating results at the outcome level.

This chapter synthesizes the findings of the first 17 GPRs that IEG has completed and draws lessons for improving the performance of GRPPs more generally in the following four areas: (a) relevance of objectives and design, (b) efficacy, (c) efficiency or cost-effectiveness, and (d) sustainability. Appendix H provides a complete summary of the findings from all 17 GPRs. It goes without saying that these findings relate to the review periods of each of the 17 GPRs (table 3.1).

Relevance of the Programs

Relevance is the extent to which the objectives and design of a program are consistent with (a) current global/regional challenges and concerns in a particular development sector and (b) the needs and priorities of beneficiary countries and groups. Each of IEG's reviews assesses four dimensions of relevance arising from the nature of GRPPs as international collective action, plus the relevance of each program's design, as follows:

- **Supply-side relevance**—The existence of an international consensus that global/regional collective action is required[1]
- **Demand-side relevance**—Consistency with the needs, priorities, and strategies of beneficiary countries and groups
- **Vertical relevance**—Consistency with the subsidiarity principle, namely, the most appropriate level (global, regional, national, or local) at which particular activities should be carried out in terms of filling gaps, efficient delivery, and responsiveness to the needs of beneficiaries
- **Horizontal relevance**—The absence of alternative sources of supply of the same goods and services
- **Relevance of the design**—The extent to which the strategies and priority activities of the program are appropriate for achieving its objectives.

Most programs' objectives were substantially or highly relevant.

Overall, IEG found that the stated objectives of almost all 17 programs GRPPs were substantially or highly relevant in relation to these four dimensions of relevance, but that many programs had design weaknesses. This was true across all three types of programs: knowledge networks, technical assistance, and investment programs.

The most common deficiencies were weak beneficiary demand and unclear comparative advantage.

Relevance of objectives. The most common deficiencies relating to the relevance of objectives in these 17 programs were the following:

- Some programs were overly supply-driven by one or a few donors. The evidence was weak that beneficiary countries were part of the international consensus underlying the way the programs were designed—GISP, IAASTD, CEPF, and MMV.
- The comparative advantage of the program in relation to alternative sources of supply was not obvious. It was not clear if the programs intended to complement or compete with other programs in the same area—ILC, GFHR, PRHCBP, and Development Gateway.
- The program's stated objectives and/or design gradually became less relevant in a changing global and regional context—ILC, and GFHR.

Many programs had design weaknesses and lacked a well-articulated theory of change.

Relevance of design: The general weaknesses in the programs' M&E frameworks were discussed in chapter 4. IEG found that many programs lacked a well-articulated theory of change (box 1) to indicate how each program's strategies and priority activities were expected to lead to the achievement of the program's objectives (ProVention, ADEA, GDN, CGAP, PRHCBP, and MDTF-EITI). That many programs revised their strategies or improved their M&E frameworks in response to their recent evaluations is further evidence of initial design weaknesses (table 4.2).

Some programs needed to scale down the ambition of their objectives to match their resources, or to be more selective in their choice of activities in accordance with their comparative advantages (ILC, GFHR, GWP, and Development Gateway). A number of the knowledge and advocacy networks had surprisingly weak communications strategies for such networks (GISP, ILC, and GWP). The activities of a few programs were not carried out at the level most appropriate to achieve their objectives (GISP and MBC). The design of CEPF needed to be augmented by building more effective livelihoods-based approaches into its individual grant schemes.

The broad lesson is that having relevant objectives alone is not sufficient to justify a program's continued operation in the absence of a well-articulated program design or evidence of results. There needs to be a consensus among the partners not only on the need for action, but also on the definition of the problem, on priorities, and on strategies for action. Programs need to specify their objectives—not just in terms of desired processes, but also in terms of desired outcomes, along with measurable performance indicators.

Box 5.1. What Is a Theory of Change?

A theory of change is a "specific and measurable description of a social change initiative that forms the basis for strategic planning, on-going decision-making and evaluation." It allows both stakeholders and evaluators to work together to build a "commonly understood vision of the long-term goals, how they will be reached, and what will be used to measure progress along the way" (ActKnowledge and Aspen Institute 2003).

A theory of change takes a wider view of a desired change than a traditional logic model, "carefully probing the assumptions in what may be a long and complex process. Articulating a theory of change often entails thinking through all the steps along a path toward a desired change, identifying the preconditions that will enable (and possibly inhibit) each step, listing the activities that will produce those conditions, and explaining why those activities are likely to work. It is often, but not always presented in a flowchart" (GrantCraft 2006).

"A theory of change should:

- Depict a sequence of the inputs the project, program, or policy will use; the activities the inputs will support; the outputs toward which the project, program, or policy is budgeting; and the outcomes and impacts expected
- Identify events and conditions that may affect obtaining the outcomes
- Identify the assumptions the program is making about causes and effects
- Identify critical assumptions that, based on the policy and environmental context and a review of the literature, the evaluation needs to examine" (Morra Imas and Rist 2009, p. 151).

Sources: ActKnowledge and Aspen Institute 2003; Grantcraft 2006; Morra Imas and Rist 2009.

Efficacy of the Programs

Efficacy is the extent to which the program has achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, taking into account the relative importance of different objectives. Each of IEG's reviews assesses efficacy by systematically reviewing the progress of the program's activities (outputs) in relation to plans and the extent to which these outputs are contributing to the achievement of the program's objectives (outcomes) in accordance with its theory of change.

Assessing the efficacy of the different types of programs (networks, technical assistance, or investments) presents different methodological challenges, because different types of activities contribute in different ways—upstream activities only indirectly and downstream activities more directly—to domestic policy and institutional reforms, to the strengthening of human resource capacities, and to total investments in the sector, as well as to long-term goals such as poverty reduction, environmental sustainability, and welfare improvements. Generally speaking, it has proven easier to assess the outcomes of investment activities than technical assistance and networking activities, although this may reflect the greater efforts that evaluators have paid to evaluating investment activities in the past.

There is little systematic evidence of the achievement of objectives at the outcome level.

The first broad lesson from the 17 programs is the importance of formulating a well-articulated theory of change and establishing a robust M&E framework at the outset of a program. In the absence of these, neither the external evaluations nor IEG found much systematic evidence relating to the achievement of programs' objectives at the outcome level. Both the evaluations and IEG's reviews had to rely on the results of program activities at the output level and anecdotal evidence at the outcome level.

Programs with narrower, more focused objectives have generally been more successful.

A second lesson is that programs that are more strategically focused (such as Stop TB and MMV) and have narrower objectives (such as the Cities Alliance and MDTF-EITI) have generally been more successful in achieving their outputs and outcomes. In contrast to these investment and technical assistance programs, the network programs have tended to have greater difficulty in focusing their objectives and activities to the same degree.

KNOWLEDGE, ADVOCACY, AND STANDARD-SETTING NETWORKS

The nine knowledge and advocacy network programs have a range of achievements, and some are now the recognized leaders in their fields.

ADEA has become the premier forum for educational policy development and agency cooperation in Africa—promoting analytical work and policy dialogue on African educational problems through a variety of forums. Its Biennial Meetings bring together all major donors to education in Africa, most ministers of education, and a variety of stakeholders from academia and civil society groups, resulting in proceedings and publications that inform education policies and dialogue at the country level.

Other thematic and subregional conferences have drawn attention to important topics such as the use of contract teachers, education in rural areas, and language of instruction. ADEA's Working Groups have also produced a considerable volume and breadth of analytical studies, albeit of varying quality, on African education. There is anecdotal evidence that these activities have led to enhanced donor coordination and improved educational policies at the country level, especially with respect to girls' education.

CGAP has become a powerful and pivotal force in the microfinance field, playing a critical role in helping build inclusive financial systems by providing advisory services, developing and setting standards, and advancing knowledge, training and capacity building. CGAP's activities have been impressive in each of its five priority areas: (a) promoting institutional diversity, (b) promoting diverse financial services to a broad range of clients, (c) building financial market infrastructure, (d) fostering sound policy and legal frameworks, and (e) improving the effectiveness of microfinance funding. But there was little systematic evidence relating to its achievements at the outcome level, or their attribution to CGAP's activities during the review period, because of weaknesses in CGAP's monitoring system.

Founded in February 2000**,** the **ProVention Consortium** quickly became a premier forum for evidence-based discussions in relation to hazard risk management. The program was largely successful in a short period of time in terms of networking, advocating, and disseminating research findings and good practices for reducing the social, economic and environmental impacts of natural disasters on vulnerable populations in developing countries. The program commissioned the ground-breaking study—*Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis*—that changed policies in international organizations, bilateral donors, and developing countries. However, weak program governance and competition from better-funded sources of supply—such as the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery—led to its closing down at the end of 2009.

GFHR has been somewhat effective in promoting more research on the health problems of low- and middle-income countries, and the relevance of such an effort has increased with the growth in global spending on health research to $160 billion annually. Yet the minuscule resources available to the program have been dwarfed by those available to the major commercial, philanthropic, and public financiers and promoters of health research. The growing numbers of participants at the Annual Forum Meetings, the large share of developing country participants, the GFHR's publications, and the number of visitors to and downloads from its Web site testify to the program's success in producing its expected outputs. However, the absence of a clear results framework contributed to an environment allowing low levels of institutional accountability for outcomes, despite all intentions to the contrary.

GDN has been successful in implementing a menu of activities, including (a) regional research competitions, (b) global research projects, (c) an annual conference, and (d) a Global Development Awards and Medal Competition. But its progress in achieving its outcome objectives appears to have been more modest. GDN has made only moderate progress in terms of generating new policy-relevant research and enhanced research capacity, and little progress on informing policy.

GWP—now comprising more than 2,100 individual partners that have grouped themselves into regional, country, and area water partnerships—is a recognized global leader in facilitating multi-stakeholder dialogues on IWRM. It has been successful in facilitating