# Mid-Term Evaluation Report

Independent Evaluation of the Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme (AREAP)



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Independent Evaluation of the Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme (AREAP)

Department for International Development

Independent Evaluation of AREAP

PO 6542

March 2015

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Signature:

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| **AB** | Afrobarometer |
| **AIHR** | Arab Institute for Human Rights |
| **ARD** | DFID Africa Regional Department |
| **AREAP** | Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme |
| **AU** | African Union |
| **CA** | Contribution Analysis |
| **CESC** | Centre for Learning and Capacity Building for Civil Society |
| **CDD-Ghana** | Ghana Center for Democratic Development |
| **CGI** | Citizens Governance Initiatives |
| **CISLAC** | Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre |
| **CLADHO** | Collectif des Ligues et Association de Défense des Droits de l'Homme |
| **COMESA** | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| **CNGO** | Council of Non-Governmental Organizations |
| **CSO** | Civil Society Organisation |
| **DFID** | Department for International Development |
| **E&A** | Empowerment and Accountability |
| **EAC** | East African Community |
| **EEI** | Enabling Environment Index |
| **EISA** | Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa |
| **IDS** | Institute of Development Studies, Kenya |
| **IP** | Implementing Partners |
| **M&G** | Mail and Guardian |
| **M&E** | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| **MoU** | Memorandum of Understanding |
| **NGO** | Non-governmental Organisation |
| **NSA** | Non-State Actor |
| **OSISA** | Open Society Foundation of Southern Africa |

| | |
|---|---|
| **PAP** | Pan-African Parliament |
| **QCA** | Qualitative Comparative Analysis |
| **R5** | Round 5 |
| **R6** | Round 6 |
| **REC** | Regional Economic Community |
| **SACAU** | Southern Africa Confederation of Agricultural Unions |
| **SACBTA** | Southern Africa Cross Border Traders Association |
| **SADC** | Southern African Development Community |
| **SADC CNGO** | Southern African Development Community - Council of Non-Governmental Organizaations |
| **SAMA** | Southern Africa Miners Association |
| **SAPSN** | Southern Africa People's Solidarity Network |
| **SEQAS** | Specialist Evaluation and Quality Assurance Services |
| **SIDA** | Swedish International Development Agency |
| **SIGMA** | Sigma Conseil |
| **SOTU** | State of the Union Coalition |
| **TBE** | Theory – Based Evaluation |
| **TOR** | Terms of Reference |
| **Trust** | Southern African Trust |
| **UK** | United Kingdom |
| **USAID** | United States Agency for International Development |
| **ZIMCODD** | Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development |

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# 1 Executive Summary

**Midterm evaluation of Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme (AREAP)**

**AREAP is a four-year project that aims to improve access to high quality relevant data, evidence and analysis for African citizens, non-state actors and policy makers. It also supports the development of coalitions of citizens to use this information, voice their concerns and interests and influence decisions of the state[1].**

**Three implementing partners (IPs) deliver AREAP:**

- **Afrobarometer conducts citizen opinion surveys across 35 countries in Africa;**
- **The Southern Africa Trust (the Trust) undertakes policy advocacy, capacity building and disbursement of grants provided for pro-poor regional integration; and**
- **The State of the Union Coalition (SOTU) focuses on engagement in policy development and monitoring state compliance with African Union decisions.**

## 1.1 Background

DFID required the evaluation of AREAP to meet the following two objectives:

1. "Accountability: The evaluations will seek to establish the extent to which the programme has been *effective,* i.e. producing the results anticipated, and *efficient,* i.e. the least costly resources possible have been used to produce these results.
2. Learning: The evaluations will identify programme and non-programme related explanations for success and failure that could be "translated" into more effective, efficient and sustainable programme interventions."[2]

While DFID funds AREAP, individual implementing partners receive funding from a variety of other key donors, and therefore this evaluation is of interest to several stakeholders, including USAID and SIDA.

## 1.2 Approach

To meet DFID's learning objective for this evaluation, the evaluation team undertook a **theory-based evaluation**. This included:

- Elaborating, testing and re-testing programme and component level theories of change through a **structured contribution analysis** to assess the contribution the intervention makes to change.
- Using **Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)** to draw learning conclusions that are applicable across different contexts.
- Undertaking **case studies** to develop a deep understanding of why and how change happens in specific cases and to identify and understand any potential synergies across programme components.

Complementing the theory-based evaluation, the evaluation team conducted a process evaluation to meet DFID's accountability objective for this evaluation, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of AREAP delivery and to ensure AREAP represents good Value for Money for DFID

AREAP implementing partners work across 36 countries in Africa, shown in Figure 1. The evaluation team conducted field work in eight countries (Tunisia, Benin, Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Botswana) for the midterm evaluation.

[1] Adapted from DFID's original Terms of Reference
[2] DFID Terms of Reference for Independent Evaluation of AREAP

**Figure 1: AREAP Countries and Midterm Evaluation Fieldwork**




## Summary of key findings and recommendations

The midterm evaluation found that the three implementing partners are delivering their activities under AREAP effectively; however, their collaboration and coordination has been limited. They have achieved key milestones in increasing access to evidence and building capacity of non-state actors, but there are areas in which they could improve.

### Section 5.1: Relevance of AREAP

**Findings:** Evidence suggests that the implementing partners have undertaken activities which build the technical and organisational capacity of their respective national partners, civil society coalitions and grantees to achieve policy change. While the SOTU coalition is still young, its influence on policy and strength of policy engagement is clear and growing. The SOTU Secretariat has provided institutional capacity building support to the national platforms to-date, but this support could be focused and increased particularly around supporting technical skills around policy advocacy and engaging with the media. The Trust is a more mature organisation, with a clear vision and strategy for supporting NSAs to engage SADC around developing more pro-poor regional policies. However, it could more clearly articulate and evidence its approach to capacity-building. Also the relevance of its work could be increased by expanding its engagement to the national level. The work of each of the implementing partners is broadly pro-poor, but gender could be mainstreamed more strongly throughout AREAP. Evaluation questions on relevance for Afrobarometer will be addressed at the endline evaluation.

**Recommendations:** The Trust may consider strengthening its M&E systems to more comprehensively reflect its' activities as a 'bridge' between NSAs and government, and to gather evidence on the impact of SADC policy

change at the national level. SOTU and the Trust should focus on providing capacity building support for engagement at both national and regional levels to leverage political pressure between these levels and ensure that policy is changed, domesticated and can trace impact.

### Section 5.2: Complementarity of AREAP

**Findings:** To date, AREAP has not functioned as a cohesive, integrated programme. Although a joint theory of change was articulated and areas of complementarity between the partners' activities and competencies were identified at the inception of the programme, the partners have not successfully engaged in any significant collaborative activities except from the Trust's brief period as SOTU's national partner in South Africa. While collaboration was encouraged under AREAP, it was not required and the logframe does not contain any joint indicators, which limited the explicit incentives for collaboration

**Recommendations:** Areas of possible collaboration between the IPs are still present, and there appears to be continuing value in taking an integrated programme approach. However, DFID should consider whether it wants AREAP to proceed as a programme and if so, work with the implementing partners to develop a coordinated approach and add clear incentives for collaboration, or if it wants AREAP to proceed as a funding window for three implementing organisations whose work is complimentary, but separate.

### Section 5.3: Coordination of AREAP with other partners and programmes

**Findings:** Each of the implementing partners works strongly through networks of national partners, national platforms made up of civil society coalitions and/or NSA grantees However, formal or informal external partnerships across AREAP have been more uneven. The Trust has been the strongest at engaging external partners such as the Mail and Guardian. While Afrobarometer partnered with Arab Barometer for its survey work and has formed partnerships at the national partner level, SOTU remained focused on national level partners.

**Recommendations:** Implementing partners should continue to strengthen partnerships. Afrobarometer and SOTU may consider looking for opportunities to strategically partner with media.

### Section 5.4: Effectiveness of AREAP

**Findings:** Each of the implementing partners have made significant improvements and achieved key milestones during the first two years of AREAP. However, there are clearly areas that could be strengthened for each of the three implementing partners. Afrobarometer has greatly increased the number of country surveys it completed from Round 4 to Round 5 without a drop in quality or the robustness of its data. However, while it has made significant improvements in its dissemination and communication activities from Round 4, the quality of its dissemination efforts and packaging of data and analysis could still be strengthened to attract more African users for its data. SOTU has successfully established 9 operational national platforms, with a 10$^{th}$ partner identified, strengthened its partners and increased their focus on the African Union. However, it has not met its targets around contributing to policy change and domestication of AU instruments at the national level. The Trust has continued to strengthen NSA grantees and facilitate their engagements with SADC policymakers to successfully influence policy change across several areas. However, the link between shaping SADC policy and real improvements in the lives of women and the poor in the SADC region is unclear and need to be more strongly evidenced. Further, the sustainability of the relationships between regional NSAs and SADC, and the durability and breadth of spaces for state-society dialogue could both be increased. It also appears that the Trust could increase its effectiveness and influence within the sector by being more inclusive and open in its strategic planning and learning processes, to leverage the high level of technical understanding and expertise within Trust staff to influence the sector more broadly.

**Recommendations:** DFID should revisit the AREAP logframe to ensure that it fully captures all IPs work under AREAP. Afrobarometer may consider strengthening its relationships with key stakeholders through continuous engagement instead of having a limited number of events around dissemination of each survey round's data release. The may consider also building the capacity of key stakeholders to use data by targeting its presentations and tailoring assistance to their needs, developing the capacity of key 'champions' who can use the data and help capacitate others. For SOTU, the SOTU secretariat may be most useful as a capacity-building support, to increase sophistication and technical skills of national platforms for policy advocacy and media engagement. The Trust could strengthen and extend its 'bridging' approach to facilitating government and NSA engagement on regional issues, continuing technocratic engagement at the SADC Secretariat level, but increasing support to partners at the

national level, to strengthen demand-side political pressure on SADC for policy change and pressure domestically for implementation of new, pro-poor SADC policies.

### Section 5.5: Efficiency of AREAP

**Findings:** All three of the implementing partners have sought to demonstrate value for money, with institutionalised procurement policies and procedures, and clear demonstrations of cost saving efficiencies that have been achieved within partner programming and activities. The implementing partners have also benefited from harmonized donor requirements, in the case of SOTU, and donor contributions to basket funds, in the case of Afrobarometer, which have resulted in efficiencies in terms of reducing staff time spent on reporting and decreasing waste or delays in project delivery due to financing.

**Recommendations:** Implementing partners should engage in discussions to identify opportunities for making the best possible use of their comparative advantages to optimize achievement of results and leverage resources**.**

## Lessons learned for other Empowerment and Accountability programmes

AREAP provides an example of an Empowerment and Accountability (E&A) programme working with three implementing partners at the regional level. At the midterm evaluation, the evaluation team has identified the following lessons for other E&A programmes:

- Through E&A programming, the understanding is that enabling people to have a stronger voice and take collective action to engage with the state in decision-making processes can improve the access and quality of services and resources, and can consequently lead to better development outcomes. Evidence from AREAP is limited[i]. In AREAP, the evaluation team found that the use of civil society coalitions that strategically advocate both regionally and nationally are successful in moving forward policy, yet progress remains slows in improvement to access and quality of services due to challenges in implementation of policy.

At the midterm evaluation, the evaluation team used Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify factors that were necessary for success. We found:

- Civil society success influencing policy is more likely in countries where government opens up space for NSAs, and where policymakers are more transparent about the policymaking process, but these conditions are not necessary for success. It appears that contributing to policy change depends more on internal capacities around use of evidence, packaging findings and strategically targeting advocacy, as well as the political acumen of national partners, than the external context.
- In terms of building the capacity of local partners, The QCA analysis also indicated that it's possible for civil society organisations to develop strengthened relationships with policymakers without being part of a coalition, and that the skills needed for political economy analysis and networking may not be the things generally developed when technical capacity is built by the IPs. Similarly, for civil society organisations seeking to influence government, developing a strong understanding of the key policymakers to target for a particular issue, their agendas and needs, combined with relationships with existing champions in government, provides a networked basis for building relationships in government with the right policymakers to influence a particular issue.

**What is the value of a regional approach to working on empowerment and accountability?**

AREAP has been designed as a regional program with three implementing partners working at a regional and continental level. The AREAP IPs seek to influence regional political organisations in Africa, including the AU, the Pan-African Parliament and SADC. From AREAP, the evaluation team has recognised that for an empowerment and accountability (E&A) program with a regional approach, having a national network and constituency, as exemplified by SOTU, enables advocacy organisations to both raise issues that are relevant and maintain demand-side political pressure at the national level for policy change and domestication of new protocols.

The regional design of all the IPs activities enhances their relevance and effectiveness. Afrobarometer data enables comparison across countries, which is valued by Afrobarometer stakeholders and

distinguishes Afrobarometer from other public opinion data available in these contexts. The Trust through its partnership with the Mail and Guardian, a South African newspaper with regional readership, has successfully amplified the voice of the poor and marginalized in Southern Africa and passed on key messages for their campaigns across the region. SOTU has supported the development of civil society platforms which successfully bridge between the national and the continental, raising awareness of the African Union at the national level. They have also leveraged their network of national platforms to share learning horizontally, to increase their effectiveness at the national level

National partners of IPs under AREAP have benefited from sharing learning with other country partners across the continent. Yet, the centralised planning of IP activities has obscured opportunities for partners at the country level to leverage each other's work and share learning across IPs. In a regional programme using different implementing partners with diverse priorities, approaches and personalities, who had not previously worked together, a coordinated approach needs to be reinforced through shared indicators and/or deliverables to make sure that comparative advantages are leveraged at country-level.

Lessons learned from AREAP on the value of a regional approach:

- Regional design of an E&A program enhances implementing partners' relevance and effectiveness.
- Leveraging comparative advantages of diverse organisations in a regional program requires clear communication and planning by senior central management, as well as, shared indicators and/or deliverables. Working in a similar sector, in overlapping countries and having identifiable comparative advantages is not enough for different implementing partners to collaborate on an E&A programme. When in a continental programme using different implementing partners with diverse priorities, approaches and personalities, who had not previously worked together, a coordinated approach needs to be reinforced through shared indicators and/or deliverables. Without concrete incentives to collaborate, it is easy for internal activities, needs and priorities within each implementing partner take precedence over joint activities and learning.
- Having both a regional and national network for advocacy work ensures that issues raised are relevant and constituencies can maintain demand-side political pressure at the national level for policy change and domestication of new protocols

At the endline evaluation, a case study question on the extent to which working at the continental / regional levels lead to inclusive (e.g. pro-poor, gender sensitive, inclusive of marginalised populations) national policy changes that would not have otherwise occurred will further inform the evaluation on the value of a regional approach.

[i] DFID, 2010 'Strengthening Empowerment and Accountability in International Development: Emerging Guidance'

# 2 Background of AREAP

## 2.1 Context in which AREAP operates

Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised, overall, by rising economic growth. In contrast, data also indicates stagnant political and civil liberties, diminishing political participation and state-dominated governance processes with only superficial citizen participation. In many countries, citizens lack the information, knowledge and power to demand greater accountability from their governments, risking not only sub-optimal development outcomes but also social unrest and political implosion[1].

In response to this situation, DFID has approved £19.9 million support to AREAP, from February 2011 to July 2016.

## 2.2 AREAP activities and division of funds

AREAP is a four-year project that aims to improve access to high quality relevant data, evidence and analysis for African citizens, non-state actors and policy makers. It also supports the development of coalitions of citizens to use this information, voice their concerns and interests and influence decisions of the state[2].

The programme funds selected regional organisations through three accountable grants to strengthen citizens' empowerment and government accountability in Africa. The programme operates only at the regional and national level and does not include any sub-national level activity.

Three regional organisations deliver AREAP:

- Afrobarometer conducts citizen opinion surveys across 35 countries in Africa. AREAP will contribute to funding of the next two rounds of surveys (Rounds 5 & 6), on citizen opinions (£8m);
- The Southern Africa Trust (the Trust) undertakes policy advocacy, capacity building and disbursement of partner civil society organisation (CSO) grants provided for pro-poor regional integration (£7m);
- The State of the Union Coalition (SOTU) focuses on engagement in policy development and monitoring state compliance with African Union decisions (£4m).

As part of AREAP, DFID will set-up a Learning Hub that will coordinate learning and knowledge generation between the three implementing partners.

It is also expected that the programme will contribute to better evidence on "what works" in making governments more accountable to citizens, especially the poor and marginalised[3].

**Table 1-- AREAP Implementing Partners**

| Implementing Partner | Afrobarometer | SOTU | The Trust |
|---|---|---|---|
| Start date: | February 15, 2012 | February 15, 2012 | February 15, 2012 |
| Length of intervention: | Four years | Four years | Four years |
| Total funding under AREAP: | £8 million | £4 million | £7 million |
| Focus Areas: | Public opinion polling<br>Evidence generation<br>Democracy and governance | African Union<br>Human rights<br>Advocacy | Poverty reduction<br>Grant making<br>Capacity building<br>Policy dialogue |

[1] AREAP Business Case
[2] Adapted from DFID's original Terms of Reference (Annex 1)
[3] Taken from DFID Terms of Reference for Independent Evaluation of AREAP (Annex 1)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Main objectives: | Implement two rounds of surveys | Engage in policy development and monitor national compliance with African Union decisions | Disburse grants in support of regional integration |
| Strengths: | Wide coverage (35 countries)<br>Diverse donors<br>Highly regarded quality of data | Range of CSO partners with alternative sources of funding<br>Notable recognition for work at AU given recent start | Extensive experience working with SADC<br>Range of regional networks |
| Weaknesses: | Research organisation with limited policy and advocacy experience | Young organisation<br>Complex internal management | Limited national presence<br>Dependent on DFID funding |

AREAP operates across Africa in the 36 countries highlighted in Figure 2. Afrobarometer is in 35 countries, SOTU is in 10 countries and the Southern Africa Trust is in 18 countries. All three implementing partners work in five countries while two of the three implementing partners work in 14 countries. IPs decided where to operate independently of AREAP: the countries are a function of where they had previously been working, where they had built their network and where they strategically selected to work. The approach for selecting the countries for the evaluation fieldwork is included in Annex 10.

**Figure 2 – AREAP Countries**



## 2.3 Intended AREAP results

Table 2 summarises AREAP's intended results as articulated in the AREAP log frame. AREAP has also been designed with a Learning, Impact and Communications Hub, managed by an independent agency, which will gather information and data from the IPs to share evidence and lessons learned during the programme implementation.

**Table 2 – Summary of AREAP log frame**

| Logframe section | Description of results |
|---|---|
| Impact | Public sector more accountable to citizens |
| Outcome | Stronger national and regional policy making and implementation through the influence of citizens and non-state actors (NSAs) |
| Outputs | 1. Independent data and evidence are available to citizens, NSAs and government bodies;<br>2. NSAs have the capacity and resources to use the evidence and data for policy analysis, development and compliance with agreed values, norms and rules;<br>3. Enabling environment for effective civil society engagement within regional and national governance structures<br>4. Learning, Impact and Communications Hub established on approaches to empowering citizens and strengthening national and regional accountability systems and relationships. |

# 3 Background of the evaluation

## 3.1 Purpose of the evaluation

DFID's TOR for the evaluation states that the purpose of the evaluation is two-fold:

- "Accountability: The evaluations will seek to establish the extent to which the programme has been *effective,* i.e. producing the results anticipated, and *efficient,* i.e. the least costly resources possible have been used to produce these results.
- Learning: The evaluations will identify programme and non-programme related explanations for success and failure that could be "translated" into more effective, efficient and sustainable programme interventions."[1]

The TOR also states that the main objective of the evaluation is to:

> "… evaluate the contribution of programme interventions (in different contexts) to observed effects on political governance and aspects of empowerment, whether intended or unintended, with a view to enhancing understanding and learning about what might work for the poor and marginalised in different contexts, and why."[2]

The evaluation team developed the evaluation approach and methodology based on these requirements and the other requirements identified in the TOR. Where stakeholder expectations or requests regarding the objectives and scope may have differed from this, the evaluation team referred them to the TOR as a guiding framework for what the evaluation can and cannot do.

## 3.2 Scope of the evaluation

The TOR provides four criteria regarding the scope of evaluation (TOR provided in Annex 1[3]):

1. "this evaluation will use a theory based evaluation (TBE) approach,
2. it is not expected that this evaluation will be suited to experimental or quasi-experimental methods of impact evaluation,
3. there will be a strong focus on use of secondary data,
4. the evaluations will develop a limited amount of primary data, which will be qualitative and not quantitative."[4]

It is also important to note that the TOR requires Coffey to evaluate both the overall performance of the programme and the performance of individual implementing partners. The evaluation explored the extent to which funding the three implementing partners together through one programme adds value to the quality and results of the work of the partners, in terms of enhanced results or efficiencies.

The evaluation team also assessed the three individual implementing partner's performance against their own theories of change. This enabled the evaluation to consider the contributions of each implementing partner to their individual theory of change

It is anticipated that this evaluation will be of interest to several donors; while DFID funds AREAP, individual implementing partners receive funding from a variety of other key donors. The Evaluation Reference Group for this evaluation includes donors, including USAID and SIDA, who provide funding to individual implementing partners.

As the AREAP report may not be relevant to all donors and stakeholders, the evaluation team has produced a separate report for each individual implementing partner in addition to the overall AREAP report. These additional reports serve as a communication tool and do not include additional analysis or information.

[1] DFID Terms of Reference for Independent Evaluation of AREAP
[2] DFID Terms of Reference for Independent Evaluation of AREAP
[3] The TOR was revised in August 2014, to reflect updated timetable for the evaluation, but was otherwise unchanged from the original version.
[4] Adapted from DFID Terms of Reference for Independent Evaluation of AREAP

All the reports produced will be shared within the Evaluation Reference Group as well as with other interested donors and stakeholders.

## 3.3 Use of the evaluation

Throughout the inception phase, Coffey engaged key AREAP stakeholders to inform the design of the evaluation.

**DFID**

The evaluation team communicated weekly with DFID any changes or concerns related to the design of the AREAP evaluation. DFID and implementing partners provided Coffey with background documents to include in the desk review. We discussed changes to the country sample with DFID and presented a proposed final list of sample countries.

**Other key donors**

During the inception phase, the evaluation team communicated with SIDA about the AREAP evaluation design. Specifically, the team discussed the timelines of the evaluation with Pierre Frühling to ensure that they also respond to SIDA's needs. The Evaluation Reference Group, which includes other donors who fund individual implementing partners, including USAID, have also provided comments on the design and focus of the evaluation.

In order to meet the needs of other donors supporting the implementing partners outside of AREAP, in addition to the main AREAP evaluation report, the evaluation team has produced three stand-alone reports which include the portions of the main analysis that are relevant to each of the three implementing partners, respectively.

This will allow other donors interested in the work of the implementing partners, as well as implementing partners and key stakeholders to easily access the parts of the AREAP evaluation which are relevant to them.

**Implementing partners: Afrobarometer, State of the Union (SOTU) Coalition and the Southern Africa Trust**

The evaluation team has worked with the implementing partners throughout the inception phase to inform the design of the evaluation, and ensure that the mid-term evaluation primary research included key stakeholders and staff:

- Introductory call with each of the implementing partners: The evaluation team explained the AREAP evaluation, the timeline of the inception phase and responded to any concerns about the evaluation. The implementing partners provided background details about their programme and asked any questions related to the evaluation design.
- Contribution of background documents: Each implementing partner provided the evaluation team with background documents to inform the evaluation and Theory of Change workshops.
- Review of sample: Each implementing partner reviewed the country sample and provided feedback based on the situation on the ground. The evaluation team developed a new iteration of the country sample that responded to implementing partners' feedback.
- Evaluation brief: The evaluation team shared with each implementing partner a brief about the overall evaluation design, timelines and key dates.
- In-country meeting: Before the Theory of Change workshops, the evaluation team met with the leadership of each implementing partner to discuss any concerns with the evaluation design and to identify what they hoped to learn from the evaluation. The evaluation team incorporated this information into the evaluation framework.
- AREAP Theory of Change Workshop: The evaluation team facilitated three AREAP Theory of Change Workshops: one with internal staff from each implementing partner (details in Annex 2). The outputs from these workshops provided a way to develop hypotheses and questions using a theory-based approach. During these workshops, to ensure that the evaluation questions will bring new learning to the implementing partners about their work, the evaluation team asked participants to identify areas that are most critical to the success of AREAP and areas that they are most interested in learning more about.
- Implementing partner Theory of Change Workshop: The evaluation team facilitated a Theory of Change Workshop for each implementing partner and their external stakeholders (details in Annex 2). The outputs from these workshops provided a way to develop hypotheses and questions for the evaluation using a

theory-based approach. Workshops participants also identified the linkages in the theory of change that they saw as the most critical and interesting to be included in the evaluation.

- Review of theory of change outputs: The evaluation team shared with each implementing partner the outputs from their Theory of Change Workshop to give them an opportunity to review, comment or make any changes.
- Stakeholder list: Based on the country sample, each implementing partner provided the evaluation team with a list of stakeholders to be interviewed during Mid-Term data collection.
- Draft inception report: The three implementing partners were invited to provide comments on the draft inception report, which were addressed in the final version of the report.
- During the mid-term research phase, the evaluation team interviewed key staff from each of the implementing partners, as well as their key stakeholders and national partners in the 8 sample countries. For the Southern Africa Trust, as their work is primarily regional, the evaluation team also conducted Skype interviews with key stakeholders based in South Africa, who have an understanding of the Trust's work in the sample countries.

**Other donors/programmes working in the same space as AREAP**

Given the regional and cross-sector work of AREAP, the programme shares the space with a variety of donors and other programmes. As the evaluation used contribution analysis as an approach, it is important to be aware of other donors/programmes working in the same space as AREAP who may be contributing to the outcomes observed.

In order to share learning with other donors, organisations and stakeholders working in the same space as AREAP, the evaluation will produce a series of three learning case studies, sharing learning from key aspects of AREAP and implementing partner activities.

According to the needs of each of the evaluations' key audiences, communication will be carefully managed throughout the life of the evaluation, as well as during the dissemination of findings. The ways in which the evaluation will support the communication needs of each key audience during the life of the evaluation are described in Table 3.

**Table 3: How we will communicate the evaluation process and findings**

| Audience | Mechanism | Purpose of communication | Frequency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coffey evaluation team | Team meetings | Update on issues and progress | Daily |
| DFID Africa Regional Department (ARD) | On-going progress reporting | Inform client of issues and progress | Weekly during evaluation |
| | Inception Report | Present evaluation framework for approval before beginning research | August 2014 |
| | Draft Mid-Term report | Receive feedback on comments on evaluation analysis | Mid-Term |
| | Summary of key findings | Discuss key findings of the evaluation before wider circulation | Mid-Term<br>End-Programme |
| | Mid-Term report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | Mid-Term |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Case Studies | Share learning on themes focused on through the evaluation case studies | Mid-Term<br>End-Programme |
| | 2015 Annual Review | Update programme progress | Spring 2015 |
| | Draft End-Programme report | Receive feedback on comments on evaluation analysis | End-Programme |
| | End-Programme report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | End-Programme |
| DFID Policy Division, empowerment and accountability advisors and country office staff | Summary of key findings | Discuss key findings of the evaluation before wider circulation | Mid-Term<br>End-Programme |
| | Mid-Term report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | Mid-Term |
| | Case Studies | Share learning on themes focused on through the evaluation case studies | Mid-Term<br>End-Programme |
| | End-Programme report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | End-Programme |
| Other donors (including Evaluation Reference Group) | Inception Report | Present evaluation framework for approval before beginning research | August 2014 |
| | Summary of key findings | Discuss key findings of the evaluation before wider circulation | Mid-Term<br>End-Programme |
| | Mid-Term report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | Mid-Term |
| | Case Studies | Share learning on themes focused on through the evaluation case studies | Mid-Term<br>End-Programme |
| | End-Programme report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | End-Programme |
| Implementing partners | On-going communication | Planning and liaison with implementing partners, to ensure understanding of evaluation approach and gather data to inform evaluation research | Inception Phase<br>Mid-Term<br>End-Programme |
| | Inception Report | Present evaluation framework for approval before beginning research | August 2014 |
| | Draft Mid-Term | Receive feedback on | Mid-Term |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | report | comments on evaluation analysis | |
| | Summary of key findings | Discuss key findings of the evaluation before wider circulation | Mid-Term<br>End-Programme |
| | Mid-Term report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | Mid-Term |
| | Case Studies | Share learning on themes focused on through the evaluation case studies | Mid-Term<br>End-Programme |
| | 2015 Annual Review | Update programme progress | Spring 2015 |
| | Draft End-Programme report | Receive feedback on comments on evaluation analysis | End-Programme |
| | End-Programme report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | End-Programme |
| Key stakeholders of implementing partners | Mid-Term report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | Mid-Term |
| | End-Programme report | Widely circulate evaluation findings | End-Programme |

# 4 Approach and Methodology

## 4.1 Approach

There are two key elements to the evaluation: a theory-based evaluation and a process and value for money evaluation. The overarching approach to these two components is provided below and further information can be found in Annex 3 which set out a detailed approach and methodology.

### 4.1.1 Theory-based evaluation

To meet DFID's learning objective for this evaluation, the evaluation team undertook a **theory-based evaluation**. This included:

- Elaborating, testing and re-testing programme and component level theories of change through a **structured contribution analysis** to assess the contribution the intervention makes to change.
- Using **Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)** to draw learning conclusions that are applicable across different contexts.
- Undertaking **case studies** to develop a deep understanding of why and how change happens in specific cases and to identify and understand any potential synergies across programme components.

The theory based evaluation was assessed against multiple theories of change: the overarching AREAP theory of change as well as the three individual implementing partner theories of change. This enabled the evaluation to consider the contributions of each implementing partner against their own theory of change, as well as the overarching contributions of the partners as a whole to the AREAP theory of change.

To build the theory-based evaluation on rich theories of change as specified in DFID's TOR, the evaluation team facilitated a two day theory of change workshop with each of the three implementing partners. Details of this exercise are captured in the evaluation team's inception report.

### 4.1.2 Process evaluation

Complementing the theory-based evaluation, the evaluation team conducted a process evaluation to meet DFID's accountability objective for this evaluation, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of AREAP delivery and to ensure AREAP represents good Value for Money for DFID. The process evaluation includes three component parts:

1. Content evaluation – an assessment of what it is the programme is delivering, compared to what it meant to deliver as set out in the original programme planning documentation.
2. Implementation evaluation – an assessment of the extent to which the programme is delivering activities as originally intended, including whether the programme is delivering the quantity and quality of activities initially planned; whether the activities and services are being used for the optimal effect; and whether programme management arrangements are facilitating the delivery process to the extent possible.
3. Other implementation features – an assessment of the key drivers and barriers to delivery that have positive and negative effects (intended and unintended) on the performance of the programme.

The "4 E's" approach guided the Value for Money analysis. This approach assessed four critical, interconnected components of value for money defined as economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity. This approach enabled the evaluation to assess the extent to which AREAP partners have done the right things, in the right ways, at the right price, for the right people.

## 4.2 Evaluation questions

Table 4 lists the specific evaluation questions developed for the midterm evaluation, based on the outputs of the Theory of Change Workshops, the TOR, and the Evaluability Assessment commissioned by DFID before the evaluation started.

After the three Theory of Change Workshops, the evaluation team mapped the overarching AREAP and individual implementing partner theories of change that emerged. The evaluation team systematically compared and

assessed the linkages and thematic areas of interest from each theory of change to identify agreement or divergence between the implementing partners' understandings of AREAP, and within their interpretations of their own work. This informed the development of the theory-based evaluation questions, focused on relevance and effectiveness. The findings of the evaluation set out in this report (Section 5) are structured by the evaluation criteria and respond to each evaluation question, listed in Table 4.

**Table 4 – List of evaluation questions for the midterm evaluation**

| OECD-DAC Criteria | Evaluation Questions | Techniques we use | Relevant sections of AREAP and IP theories of change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relevance | 5.1.1 Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change[1] at the national or regional levels and what drivers influence their participation? | Contribution Analysis (CA)<br>Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) | AREAP – SOTU: Output 1, Output 2, Output 3.<br>AREAP – Southern Africa Trust: Output 1, Output 3, Outcome – Impact. |
| | 5.1.2 To what extent have programme initiatives and results been relevant to women and the poor? | CA<br>Process Evaluation | Not applicable |
| Complementarity | 5.2.1 To what extent has the design of AREAP supported and enabled the achievement of results to date that individual components would not have otherwise been able to achieve? | CA<br>Process Evaluation | AREAP |
| | 5.2.2 What has been learnt from developing a continental programme approach in an intervention with different implementing partners with complementary skill sets? | Process Evaluation | Not applicable |
| | 5.2.3 To what the extent do the breadth of donors and their individual requirements affect (positively or negatively) programme implementation and the results achieved by implementing partners? | Process Evaluation | Not applicable |
| Coordination | 5.3.1 How successfully have programme interventions worked with other organisations to achieve results they would not have been able to achieve independently? | Process Evaluation | Not applicable |
| Effectiveness | 5.4.1 To what extent and under what conditions have planned results of individual initiatives been achieved? | Process Evaluation | Not applicable |
| | 5.4.2 To what extent have implementing | CA | AREAP Output 2. |

[1] With regards to the evaluation framework, we would like to include a key definition for the term 'policy change'. For the purposes of this evaluation, we understand policy change to refer to pro-poor, rights-based policy changes, which lead to more inclusive, rule based institutions and systems and where the poor are able to organise and claim access to services as a right.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | partners effectively built the capacity of NSA partners? | Process Evaluation | Afrobarometer theory of change: Group 3, Group 1, Group 2.<br>Southern Africa Trust theory of change: Process 1 Outcome – Impact, Process 3 Output - Outcome; Process 4 Output – Outcome; |
| | 5.4.3 To what extent has engaging at the continental / regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms? | CA<br>QCA | AREAP Outcome to Impact; AREAP Output 3; AREAP Output 2; AREAP Output 1.<br>SOTU theory of change (result area 3); Southern Africa Trust theory of change. |
| | 5.4.4 To what extent are key stakeholders able and willing to use Afrobarometer data to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates? | CA | Afrobarometer theory of change: Group 2; Group 4; |
| | 5.4.5 To what extent do alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust, both between NSAs and between NSAs and the state, contribute to increased pro-poor policy engagement and change? | CA | Southern Africa Trust theory of change: Outcome – Impact; Process 2; Process 3; Process 4; Process 5. |
| | 5.4.6 To what extent, has SOTU strengthened national and continental level relationships of accountability between governments, citizens and the AU? | CA | SOTU theory of change: Group C, Group E, Group D |
| | 5.4.7 What interventions increase the value that governments see in engaging with citizens, especially through civil society organisations and other non-state actors, and taking into account their views and goals? What makes decision makers more receptive to and responsive to informed citizen demand? | CA | AREAP Outcome to Impact; AREAP Output 3; AREAP Output 2; AREAP Output 1.<br>Afrobarometer theory of change: Group 2; Group 4;<br>Southern Africa Trust theory of change: Outcome – Impact; Process 2; Process 3; Process 4; Process 5.<br>SOTU theory of change: Group C, Group E, Group D |
| Efficiency | 5.5.1 Have the implementing partners made the best possible use of their comparative advantages to optimise achievement of results? | Process Evaluation | Not applicable |
| | 5.5.2 Could the results generated by the programme to-date have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner? | Process Evaluation | Not applicable |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 5.5.3 How have the individual components of AREAP collaborated to leverage additional resources? | Process Evaluation | Not applicable |

### Case study questions

Based on discussions with implementing partners during the Theory of Change Workshops, the outputs from the Theory of Change workshops and the evaluation framework, the evaluation team developed three questions to explore using case studies. These questions are intended to sit alongside the evaluation framework, building on and complementing the evaluation questions around effectiveness, relevance and impact. The case studies are theory-based and compare different approaches used by the AREAP IPs, assessing the value of these approaches given the needs of each partner and the contexts in which they work.

## 4.3 Analytical framework

An evaluation matrix was developed to structure the research for both the process and theory-based components of the evaluation and to serve as framework for analysis. The evaluation matrix was designed to ensure that the evaluation was objective, systematic and transparent and that the findings provide a reliable basis for recommendations. The evaluation matrix is structured according to the OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluation and the evaluation questions provided in TOR as well as the ones added during the inception phase. For each question, the matrix sets out judgement criteria, indicative indicators, data sources and research methods. Annex 3 provides further detail of how the matrix was developed and used, and the detailed evaluation framework is included in Annex 4.

As part of the theory-based evaluation at the midterm evaluation, the evaluation team conducted structured contribution analysis, qualitative comparative analysis and produced a case study.

### Contribution Analysis

The evaluation team undertook a structured contribution analysis to assess the contribution of AREAP implementing partner activities to overall observed effects and results. The contribution analysis enabled the evaluation to test hypotheses and assumptions from the AREAP programme and implementing partner theories of change around how programme activities are expected to produce given outcomes. The contribution analysis also allowed the evaluation to assess other non-programme explanations for change to test the extent to which programme activities contributed to observed change.

The structured approach had six steps:

- **Step 1:** Update and elaborate project and programme rich theories of change.
- **Step 2:** Set out the attribution problem to be addressed and develop evaluation questions.
- **Step 3:** Gather evidence against key aspects of interest within the theories of change.
- **Step 4:** Assemble and assess the contribution narrative and challenges to it.
- **Step 5:** Gather additional evidence.
- **Step 6:** Revise and strengthen the contribution narrative.

As AREAP implementing partners work in complex and dynamic settings, with results that are to some extent intangible, the precise impacts of their work can be difficult to attribute. For this reason, structured contribution analysis, based on rich theories of change, was the most robust and appropriate method to use to assess the contributions of implementing partners' work on empowerment and accountability to observed results.

The structured contribution analysis made use of secondary and primary data sources to form a rich, contextualised understanding of AREAP implementing partner activities. This included facilitating workshops to elaborate implementing partner and overall theories of change, a review of secondary data generated by implementing partners and a thematic literature review.

### Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Building on the structured contribution analysis, this evaluation undertook Qualitative Comparative Analysis[2] (QCA) to assess the causal contribution of different factors relating to project and programme theories of change to the outcomes achieved by AREAP implementing partners across contexts. This enabled the evaluation to identify key contextual factors (internal and external) which contribute to the success or limitation of AREAP impacts across different contexts.

The evaluation team did this in three steps:

1. As part of the testing and re-testing of component and programme theories of change, the evaluation team identified key assumptions and factors that contribute to project outcomes.
2. Through secondary and primary data collection, the evaluation team assessed these factors in each of the sample countries.
3. Through QCA, the evaluation team tested and assessed the relationship between each factor and observed outcomes to identify the relationships.

QCA enabled this evaluation to systematically make cross- context comparisons, which take into account the internal complexity of cases, allowing **complex causations and counterfactual analysis[3].** It also allowed the evaluation to identify key factors (or contextual conditions) which are necessary but not sufficient for a given outcome in a given context as well as across contexts, along **multiple causal pathways** and at multiple levels (regional, national and local). This enabled the evaluation to address **case and context-specific causations** (what works for whom, in what contexts and how), and identify multiple paths to a given outcome. One strength of QCA is its' **increased external validity**, as compared to case studies or other case based qualitative approaches. The extent to which the QCA has captured all of the possible internal and external factors which may influence an outcome, mirrors the extent to which the results of that analysis are generalizable to another context. Finally, QCA allowed this evaluation to assess the causal relationships between a set of factors/contextual conditions (relating to the programme theory of change) and the overall anticipated outcome of AREAP.

Through iterative consultation with key stakeholders and based on the AREAP programme and component theories of change, the evaluation team defined a set of key factors and contextual conditions affecting the success or failure of achieving the anticipated programme impact. These became the factors analysed through QCA (the basis for the QCA 'truth table'). These key assumptions and factors were further refined throughout the mid-term phase, before being finalised once data collection and the initial contribution analysis were completed. The QCA 'truth table' is included as Annex 9. After the 'truth table' was finalised, QCA analytical software was used to test the strength of the relationship between each factor (and each combination of factors) and the outcome using a logic model. Specifically, R software was used to conduct necessity analysis, fs/QCA software was used for sufficiency analysis using McCluskey and sufficiency subset methods, and Tosmana was used to visualise the analysis. Examples of the outputs from QCA are included in Annex 9.

### Political Economy Analysis

Building on the desk-based literature review and based on indicators developed by the governance advisor, the evaluation team conducted a light touch political economy analysis. It was informed by the literature review and rooted in the evaluation framework, to ensure relevance and focus. It generated contextual understanding of the sample countries, to help anchor the evaluation findings and provide insight into the wider conditions or circumstances that are critical for change. The political economy analysis was incorporated into building conditions for QCA through development of composite indicators that used relevant governance indices of each country sampled. The governance adviser also reviewed findings in the evaluation report with a political economy lens in light of his contextual understanding of the sector.

[2] Ragin, Charles. "What is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)?. University of Arizona Department of Sociology and Political Science. Retrieved from website: http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/250/1/What_is_QCA.pdf.

[3] While QCA allows counterfactual analysis, this evaluation has followed a theory-based evaluation approach as stipulated in the TOR, using the sampling strategy designed by SEQAS which does not include a counterfactual.

### Case Study

As part of the mid-term evaluation, a comparative case study has also been produced on the role of media as a conduit for civil society policy engagement, which was a question of interest to DFID, AREAP implementing partners and other key stakeholders. The case study built on the theory of change workshops and literature review conducted during the inception phase, and made use of secondary data provided by implementing partners as well as primary data collected during fieldwork through in-depth interviews. Data collection for the case study made use of structured topic guides, to ensure consistent data was gathered which would facilitate cross-context comparisons and generate a nuanced understanding of why certain activities produce particular effects, for whom and under what contextual conditions. The mix of secondary and primary data, collected for a variety of stakeholders across eight countries has allowed the case study to analyse a given hypothesis through a variety of lenses, which is particularly important for understanding complex interactions around governance and empowerment at the regional level.

## 4.4 Methodology

The evaluation was conducted in two phases- the inception phase and the implementation phase – the steps involved in each stage are set out in Table 5.

**Table 5 Summary of work plan**

| Phase | Steps | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Inception Phase: | 1. Review secondary documents | Complete |
| | 2. Finalise sample countries | Complete |
| | 3. Conduct a theory of change workshop with all AREAP IPs and external stakeholders to develop a coherent common understanding of AREAP;s theory of change and understand critical assumptions underpinning IP's theory of change | Complete |
| | 4. Develop evaluation and research questions | Complete |
| | 5. Develop an evaluation framework including indicators and data sources | Complete |
| | 6. Develop QCA truth table with conditions | Complete |
| Implementation Phase: | 7. Undertake a systematic review of available documentation | Complete |
| | 8. Finalise the topic guides and sample frame | Complete |
| | 9. Collect primary data through key informant interviews in person and over the phone | Complete |
| | 10. Analyse data and prepare final report | Complete |

Eight countries were visited for the evaluation fieldwork:

- Benin
- Botswana
- Kenya
- Mozambique
- Nigeria
- Rwanda

- Tunisia
- Zimbabwe

Annex 3 provides a detailed methodology for the evaluation, Annex 4-8 set out the data sources and research methods that were used to answer each evaluation question and the research tools used.

## 4.5 Limitations and Opportunities

The evaluation was largely conducted in accordance with the evaluation plan; however there were some limitations inherent in evaluation design and some research problems encountered which need to be taken into account when reviewing the findings.

### 4.5.1 Limitations of the approach and methodology

Difficulties inherent to evaluating empowerment and accountability programmes:

- **It is difficult to attribute results to voice, accountability and empowerment programmes** because they seek to change behaviour, institutions and capacity, which is difficult to quantify. This makes it difficult to isolate changes that are directly attributable to AREAP and the evaluation team agreed with the recommendation in DFID's Evaluability Assessment to use a theory-based approach that assessed the *contribution* AREAP makes to observed changes.
- **Change is unlikely to take place according to a predictable, linear results chain** and lots of different actors work in the same space as AREAP, including powerful non-traditional development actors. The evaluation team therefore recognised that it is important to understand that AREAP is likely to contribute to change as part of a wider "causal package" of factors. The evaluation team tracked and considered the role of a range of contextual factors that are outside of the control of AREAP implementing partners in contributing to change.
- **Key informants may have provided biased responses during fieldwork because of their political or personal agendas**. The evaluation team therefore triangulated its findings using multiple data sources (both primary and secondary), before including them in evaluation reports. The team also interviewed a range of stakeholders for each IP, which included policymakers, political parties, and media who relevant stakeholders but not direct beneficiaries of IP activities. For more information on the evaluation's approach to triangulation and addressing respondent bias, see Annex 11.

Difficulties relating specifically to this evaluation:

- **This was an evaluation of AREAP, rather than a holistic evaluation of each implementing partner**. That is to say that this was an evaluation of AREAP, and each implementing partner's work as it relates to AREAP, rather than an evaluation of the overall work of each implementing partner. This means that the evaluation team could not evaluate every aspect of partners' theories of change. Instead, the evaluation team used the theory of change workshops to help identify areas of most interest. The evaluation team defined these areas as:
  - Critical linkages in the theory of change that underpin the intervention logic; and
  - Areas of most interest to the evaluation users themselves

  Adopting this approach ensured the evaluation tested key linkages in each theory of change and produced findings that were useful for stakeholders to apply to their on-going and future work.
- **The AREAP theory of change has not been brought to life through programme activities**, as the IPs have generally worked in silo and have insufficiently coordinated their efforts or collaborated under AREAP. For a number of the IP staff especially those working outside of the IP headquarters, the AREAP theory of change workshop was their first time seeing the AREAP theory of change. This made it challenging to meaningfully elaborate the AREAP theory of change during the inception phase, and difficult to test it during the mid-term evaluation.
- **Scale of research:** Over 150 documents were reviewed and 125 stakeholders were interviewed. Field research took place over 6 weeks and provided a large amount of rich data. Nonetheless, the scale of the research was limited by the budget and time allocated for the evaluation. In most areas, adequate

information was gathered from a range of stakeholders to enable the evaluation team to triangulate evidence and make reliable assessments. In some cases, however, it was not possible to triangulate the evidence of certain stakeholders and the report is explicit in recognising that the evidence base is weaker where this is the case.

### 4.5.2 Research problems encountered

- **Limited number of stakeholders:** Whereas SOTU and Afrobarometer provided long lists of stakeholders for all of their countries, which enabled the evaluation team to sample interviewees as well as reach a wide range of stakeholders, the Trust provided a limited number of individuals in all the sampled countries, which restricted the choice in stakeholders to interview. To ensure independence and that critical voices would be heard, the evaluation team separately identified stakeholders from past conference participants, organisations working in the same space and through word of mouth. While the evaluation team contacted these individuals repeatedly, they received a very low response rate and were not able to interview any of these individuals. To mitigate for the lack of independent voices, the evaluation team asked all stakeholders about the other IPs' work in order to get alternative perspectives.
- **Availability of interviewees:** Given the seniority of some of the individuals interviewed and due to their other commitments, interviews with some stakeholders were delayed until late in the evaluation. Several interviews due to take place in person were subsequently held by phone after the evaluation team had returned to the UK.
- **Access to data:** The resources available to the evaluation also limited the data the evaluation team accessed. For example, some secondary documents provided by the IPs were not provided until late in the evaluation.

### 4.5.3 Opportunities

- **AREAP implementing partners work in 36 countries across Africa.** This created an opportunity to research whether contextual factors affect the delivery of voice, empowerment and accountability programmes.
- **AREAP works at both regional and national levels**. This offered an opportunity to investigate the relative benefits and drawbacks of working on voice, empowerment and accountability at each level, and to explore the extent to which working at both levels through one programme adds value.

# 5 Findings

## 5.1 Relevance

To determine the relevance of AREAP the evaluation considered the way in which it addressed the problems of accountability of the public sector to citizens and the extent to which it met the needs of target beneficiary groups, including women, the poor and civil society groups.

### 5.1.1 Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change at the national or regional levels, and what drivers influence their participation?

Support provided to civil society organisations under AREAP is based on the understanding that civil society will be more likely to develop a stronger voice, and be more empowered to hold government to account if they work through coalitions and alliances.

It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to exhaustively assess all of the civil society organisations supported by SOTU and the Trust under AREAP, so the primary research for this evaluation was focused on partner organisations and grantees operating in the eight sample countries. The sample included Botswana, home to the SADC Secretariat, which allowed the evaluation to also assess the Trust's work at the regional level to some extent. The Afrobarometer theory of change and activities under AREAP do not feature working with civil society coalitions, and so it was not included in the analysis for this question. As described in the evaluation framework in Annex 4, Afrobarometer will be included in key relevance evaluation questions as part of the endline evaluation. From the research, there is clear evidence that SOTU and Trust activities under AREAP have:

**Supported civil society coalitions to engage government and in some cases achieve policy change**

**SOTU**

Under AREAP, SOTU supported civil society coalitions to engage national policymakers on nationally-relevant African Union protocols. *As a direct result of AREAP support, new civil society coalitions formed and existing coalitions expanded or were strengthened in SOTU target countries*. SOTU has helped increase the capacity of national partners, as well as their focus on the AU, and helped partners strengthen their relationship with policymakers. From the sampled countries, this was most apparent in Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique and Nigeria. It is less clear whether AREAP has helped these coalitions to achieve policy change, although this is an ambitious goal at midterm and is more appropriate to assess at endline. At the time of this evaluation, SOTU had only been active at the national level for 18 months, and the organisations selected to lead the coalitions were capable, credible organisations which were already engaging policymakers. In most cases, SOTU clearly improved national partners' ability to engage policymakers and strengthened their focus on the AU, including in Kenya, Rwanda and Mozambique. In a couple cases, for instance in Nigeria, the coalitions' contributions to building the capacity are slightly less clear, given the pre-existing strength of their partners.

Under AREAP, one of the SOTU national platforms, Ghana, has contributed to formal changes in policy in their country, and specifically, to the ratification of the African Youth Charter[1] (SOTU also self-report to have influenced policy change in South Sudan, a non-platform country). In a few cases, SOTU has also contributed to changes in the government's approach to engaging civil society, most notably in Rwanda. Substantial engagement, such as government participation in national partner meetings, workshops and forums which are attended by or co-hosted with government has been most notable at the national level across all SOTU countries, with less progress visible at the regional or continental levels.

**The Trust**

Under AREAP, the Trust has provided grants to a range of coalitions and associations to engage policymakers at SADC. Most of these partners had received grants from the Trust prior to AREAP funding[2]. For these grantees, the direct institutional capacity building phase of support is largely complete and Trust funding is concentrated on

[1] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[2] Trust 3

programming (which builds capacity more indirectly). In some cases the Trust has continued to directly build institutional capacity by funding grantee staff to attend forums and events, providing access to Trust knowledge products and sponsoring individual staff to participate in the Leadership for Change programme[3]. However, the quality and depth of the capacity-building support provided by the Trust to grantee organisations is not clear. The Trust could more clearly evidence and articulate its view of the capacity development journey that its grantees are on, with a more detailed assessment of progress and a specific identification of the changing roles and needs on both sides, from grant making to collaboration to ownership of change and self-reflection on the part of partner organisations.

- As part of their work as a funding agency, the Trust has worked to support the continuing institutional development of civil society coalitions under AREAP, such as Southern Africa Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA) and the Southern Africa Miners' Association. However, these appear to generally be long-term relationships which pre-date AREAP, and have continued during the funded period.

Civil society coalitions, associations and apex organisations supported by the Trust to engage SADC have influenced SADC policy, including SADC's Regional Agricultural Policy and Youth Strategy, and the Tripartite Free Trade discussions between SADC, EAC and COMESA. The Trust views itself as a 'bridge' between policymakers and civil society, facilitating engagement but leaving the content of that dialogue to the groups involved. The Trust has a long-term strategy of building the capacity of regional civil society organisations to engage government. However the long-term nature of this engagement makes it difficult to attribute changes specifically to work under AREAP. Additionally, as the Trust does not generally support its partners' work at the national level, it is difficult to trace effects of the Trust's work to national policy change, even on issues which they engage on at the regional level.

The evidence was less clear on other points, specifically:

- *The extent to which civil society coalitions have developed relationships or capacities to engage policymakers at the regional level with SADC which can be sustained*: As part of the Trust's work as a 'bridge' between civil society and SADC policymakers, they often facilitate engagements and fund opportunities for collaboration. In these cases, the Trust's role is a necessary part of the engagement. The evaluation found few instances where civil society coalitions supported by the Trust, such as the Southern Africa Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA) were able to successfully engage SADC policymakers or the SADC Secretariat without the Trust's direct support or facilitation[4] (with the exception of the SADC Council of NGOs, which has a standing MoU with the SADC Secretariat[5]). The SACBTA, for instance, opened an office in Botswana in part to engage SADC, but haven't found success and so are reconsidering their approach to advocating around regional issues (to combine technocratic engagement with increased grassroots pressure at the national level), as well as relocating this office to another country. Similarly, the Trust frequently provide support to organisations by convening spaces for dialogue and providing the financing necessary for organisations to participate, for instance supporting small-holder farmers participation in the Eastern and Southern African Farmers Forum, but it is unclear whether this results on long-term capacity or strengthened relationships. This raises questions about the depth and sustainability of these engagements, and the durability and breadth of the space for civil society engagement with SADC that has been created. Although the evaluation spoke with a number of primary stakeholders on this point, this evidence could be incomplete. If the Trust strengthened its M&E systems, it could more clearly demonstrate that its grantees have developed sustained technical strengths and capacities to engage with policymakers and that the spaces that the Trust opened for policy dialogue between non-state actors and SADC are sustainable.

  There is some evidence that by engaging closely with the SADC Secretariat, the Trust has reduced the Council of NGOs' ability to influence the SADC Secretariat[6]. The Trust's position as a 'bridge', with the ability to fund Secretariat initiatives, like the study on the relationship between SADC and non-state actors[7], to second staff to SADC and the ability to stay neutral rather than engage in direct advocacy appear to

[3] Trust Value for Money Charts;
[4] Trust Zimbabwe 1; Trust Botswana 2,
[5] Trust Botswana 1;
[6] Trust Botswana 1, SADC Secretariat 2
[7] The Trust Value for Money charts: SADC Regional Poverty Observatory: Study on SADC Mechanism of Engagement with Non State Actors'

make them a more desirable partner to the Secretariat than the Council of NGOs which cannot fund the Secretariat and engages in direct advocacy[8].

- *The extent to which SADC policies (which Trust-supported NSAs have influenced) have been domesticated and implemented, or benefited the public*: Organisations supported by the Trust under AREAP have clearly influenced SADC policies, including the SADC Regional Agricultural Policy and the SADC Strategy on Food and Nutrition Security. But it is less clear, whether these SADC policies have been adopted and operationalized by SADC member states. This makes it difficult to assess the deeper impact of the Trust's work under AREAP on key beneficiary groups, including the poor, in the SADC region. It also calls into question the linkage between the overall outcome and impact in the Trust's theory of change. In this way it questions the value of influencing SADC policy, since SADC protocols and policies historically have been implemented unevenly or superficially in SADC's member states. The evidence on the impact of the Trust's work under AREAP raising awareness and influencing policy on the portability of social benefits and pensions for migrant miners in South Africa has been much stronger; national policy in South Africa changed and funds have been dispersed from South African mining companies to migrant miners[9].

### Qualitative Comparative Analysis:

The QCA analysis[10] considered two aspects of this evaluation question:

- the extent to which strengthened civil society coalitions supported by the Trust or SOTU focused on policy change on key national and regional topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners; and
- the extent to which civil society coalitions supported by SOTU or the Trust have contributed to successful national or regional policy changes.

The QCA analysis considered a range of factors. Some were dependent on AREAP activities and others related to the external national context independent of AREAP. Civil society coalitions and associations, (termed as national partner coalitions for this analysis), supported by the Trust and SOTU, and their contributions to policy change were assessed at this point in time, without consideration of how long the IP has been active in this space or supporting these coalitions. The analysis sought to determine which factors, or combinations of factors were necessary or sufficient for success, in different contexts.

For the first sub-question, concerning **the extent to which strengthened civil society coalitions have been able to focus on policy change on key national and regional topics**, the analysis considered a range of conditions, including the level of internal research capacity of national partners and the level of national political fragmentation.

From the analysis, two conditions appear necessary for success. Both conditions are necessary in the inverse, that is having a low level of political stability and not having an enabling environment appear common throughout all successful cases. However, the same conditions are also common in unsuccessful cases, which suggests they are irrelevant to success, as there is not enough evidence to consider these conditions causally relevant for the outcome

On the other hand, other conditions appear critical. In particular, two combinations of factors appeared sufficient for success:

- **Combination 1:** Having high levels of political fragmentation, high level of policymaker transparency on decision making processes, the government opens up space for engagement with NSAs, and strong national partner internal research capacity appears sufficient for success.

  Countries in the sample which fit this description include Kenya and Nigeria. In these contexts, there is more opportunity for civil society to engage with policymakers, allowing civil society organisations to build capacity and experience engaging with policymakers more easily. In these contexts, coalitions are more able to gain experience and to build capacity through on-going engagement with the state, rather than occasional meetings or one-off dialogues.

- **Combination 2:** More challenging contexts appear to be countries where there is low political fragmentation, low policymaker transparency about decision making processes and the government does

[8] SADC Secretariat 2, Trust 3, SADC Secretariat 1.
[9] The Trust Value for Money Chart-Migration and Social Protection Initiative
[10] For more details please see Annex 9.

not open up space for engagement with NSAs, having high national partner internal research capacity and constantly engaging with diverse audiences to develop ownership of ideas and map the national political economy context appears sufficient for success.

In terms of the external contextual factors, Zimbabwe and Botswana fit this description most strongly. Rwanda and Mozambique also fit this description to a lesser extent, as they both have more open space for government to engage civil society. Contexts which fit this description are certainly more challenging for civil society organisations to operate in, as there is less opportunity for engagement and capacity building, which perhaps makes operating in a coalition less fruitful.

Coalitions supported by the Trust or SOTU have found success in these challenging contexts, like the Zimbabwe Cross-Border Traders Association. Their success is attributable to their strong internal capacity, including expertise in research for advocacy and a deep understanding of national political economy, and by constantly engaging with a wide variety of stakeholders, building strong networks and brokering broader ownership and buy- in to their policies and campaigns.

For the second sub-question, concerning the **extent to which civil society coalitions have been able to contribute to successful national or regional policy change,** a range of conditions were considered in the analysis including whether a 'champion' for the national partners activities was present in government, or the extent to which policymakers are transparent about their decision making processes.

From the analysis, four conditions appear necessary for success in all cases. Two of these conditions were trivial, as there were present in unsuccessful cases as well. However two conditions appeared closely associated with success:

- Champions for non- state actor's cause and activities are present in government
- National partners having adequate knowledge of stakeholders being targeted, their needs and agendas.

These conditions illustrate the more sophisticated capacities and understandings required to translate engagement with government into policy change. This interpretation resembles the experience of SOTU's national platform in Kenya, which has developed champions in government, strengthened its understanding of policymaker needs and agendas to successfully influence policy.

In addition to these two conditions, four conditions in the analysis appeared to be as strongly related to success:

- Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors
- Policymakers are transparent about their decision making processes (an inverse relationship, so lack of transparency is more present in successful cases)
- The extent to which evidence is used in policy making (an inverse relationship, so limited use of evidence in policymaking is more present in successful cases)
- National partners have strong capacity to package information effectively for advocacy with policymakers.

The importance of these conditions for success reinforces the theory that internal capacity and the sophistication of national partners to package policy findings and effectively target stakeholders is strongly related to their success influencing policy, even in contexts where the policymaking process isn't transparent or evidence isn't commonly used to inform policy. While success occurred more commonly in contexts where the government opens up space for engagement, this kind of engagement was also not necessary for success. This finding echoes the experience of the Trust's partners in Zimbabwe, which are entirely focused on the national and regional issues supported by the Trust and have developed strong internal capacity to use evidence and package findings for government.

*The findings from the contribution analysis suggest that civil society success influencing policy is more likely in countries where government opens up space for NSAs, and where policymakers are more transparent about the policymaking process, however, the QCA analysis suggests that these conditions are not necessary for success, as is shown in this case. From the QCA, it appears that in contexts where there is low transparency on the part of policymakers, contributing to policy change depends more on internal capacities around use of evidence, packaging findings and strategically targeting advocacy, as well as the political acumen of national partners, than the external context*.

### 5.1.2 To what extent have programme initiatives and results been relevant to women and the poor?

In order to assess the extent to which AREAP initiatives and results have been relevant to key beneficiary groups, the evaluation considered whether activities were designed in a gender-sensitive way; whether activities were designed to increase participation and voice of the poor; whether there is an explicit pro-poor or women focus in the evidence generation, research and advocacy work; and whether IPs have ensured and supported female leadership in CSO partners.

*There is clear evidence that IP activities under AREAP are sensitive to gender on a basic level and have a broad pro-poor focus. But there is less evidence that the IPs as a whole have internalised and mainstreamed and integrated gender, to ensure that project design and implementation are fully gender-sensitive.* To illustrate, the evaluation found that IPs indicated that they work to include female staff and women's organisations within their own structures and their downstream partners, Afrobarometer ensures that half of their respondents, and almost half of their survey enumerators are female, and that the majority of IPs disaggregate data on interventions, activities and outputs by gender. However, SOTU and the Trust appear to incorporate gender in their programming primarily through dispersed pockets of activities which are explicitly women focused, rather than mainstreaming gender into their work as a whole. This work includes advocacy on the AU Protocol on Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), or through the inclusion of civil society coalitions which are explicitly gender focused or composed of women (as opposed to mainstreaming gender within the IPs' work as a whole).

Additionally, the evaluation found that explicit pro-poor and women's empowerment activities vary in volume and depth among each of implementing partners and their downstream partners. For example, while the Trust explicitly funds women's empowerment activities in streams of work such as the work on women informal cross border traders', there is limited evidence that the Business for Development pathfinder mainstreams gender. SOTU has similar challenges in expanding its women's empowerment focus beyond the Maputo protocol and across all national platforms and activities.

*Of the three implementing partners, gender mainstreaming appears strongest within the work of Afrobarometer*. There is evidence to suggest that Afrobarometer is strategic in the topics and issues it focuses on its research and policy work, which include an explicit gender focus. In addition to requiring that country samples are balanced between male and female respondents, Afrobarometer produces policy papers and briefing papers which focus on gender, and which weave gender into broader discussions of other governance issues. They have also successfully worked to encourage more women, particularly African women, authors for their publications and have a large number of women in leadership roles within the Afrobarometer network

**Afrobarometer**

Afrobarometer national partners follow a strict survey protocol to ensure that survey design, implementation and analysis are consistent, high quality and representative. Aspects of the protocol specifically relate to the inclusion of female respondents, female enumerators and voices of the poor in surveys and analysis. For example, the sampling methodology requires that all surveys are conducted with an equal number of male and female respondents and that it is representative of the population at the national level, ensuring poor and rural voices are included[11]. It requires that findings are disaggregated by gender in their summaries of results and encourages the production of policy briefs and in-depth analysis with a greater focus on women[12]. In following best practice, Afrobarometer requires a gender balance among interviews, specifically 40% of women of interviews must be women in each country.[13]

It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to independently verify and back-check the survey data collected by Afrobarometer, to test whether it is in fact representative and follows the survey protocol. However, the evidence collected from primary respondents and secondary data supplied by Afrobarometer indicates that national partners do adhere to the Afrobarometer survey protocol very closely, including around including the voices of women and the poor. In some countries, such as Botswana, Benin and Mozambique, Afrobarometer is the only organisation collecting high-quality perception survey data, which makes their inclusion of women and the poor particularly impactful[14].

[11] Afrobarometer Survey Manual R6 2014;
[12] Afrobarometer Botswana 1;
[13] Afrobarometer R6 Survey Manual
[14] Afrobarometer Botswana 2;

*The evaluation found that Afrobarometer has increased focus on women and the poor in its research under AREAP.* Afrobarometer captures a number of key indicators of poverty, including a "Lived Poverty Index." The evaluation found that at least four policy papers published in 2014 had an explicit focus on gender and women, compared to fewer in the previous years[15]. In papers not explicitly focused on gender, it was frequently included as a cross-cutting factor in the analysis. Further, at midline, 31% of Afrobarometer briefing papers had been authored or co-authored by African women. The relevance of these publications was supported by interviews with CSO stakeholders in Afrobarometer countries, who indicated that they would like to see more in-depth analysis from Afrobarometer on gender and women, which could be used to inform advocacy and policy positions.

**SOTU**

The core of SOTU's work is focused on raising awareness of and adopting 10 selected African Union instruments (out of a total of 42) and four policy frameworks (out of a total of 12). As it was being developed, the SOTU coalition specifically selected these 14 legal instruments as it identified their potential for reducing poverty and promoting justice and equality including gender equality in Africa[16].

At a high level, SOTU programmes are clearly pro-poor. For instance, national platforms in Kenya and Rwanda are working to raise awareness and lobby government to adopt and implement key AU policies on health, agriculture and land rights, which materially affect the rural poor in those countries[17]. However, it is more difficult to make a direct link between the work of the SOTU national platforms and benefits to the poor, as the national platforms are focused on policy change and have not yet been able to trace the effects of domesticating AU instruments on the lives of citizens or the poor. In Rwanda, the national platform has produced a policy brief showing how implementing these policies can impact the lives of poor citizens.

The evaluation found that some of SOTU's activities are gender sensitive and aimed at empowering women. For example in 2013, six out the eight national platforms that were operational at that time selected the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (known as the Maputo Protocol) as a key focus for their work[18]. Four out of the seven national platforms (57%) have women in leadership positions: CESC in Mozambique, CGI in Ghana, CISLAC in Nigeria and Fahamu in Kenya On a national level, there is evidence to suggest that gender sensitivity has also been included in national platform programming in some SOTU countries. For example, the national platform in Rwanda has trained district counsellors in parliament on how to analyse budgets with a gender-sensitive lens[19]. *However, gender appears to be confined to a few discrete areas of national platform work and has not been mainstreamed across SOTU as a whole.*

**The Trust**

The Trust demonstrated its focus on gender and women's empowerment through its support of NSAs that largely represent women, and its research and media activities. This includes the Trust's support to the Southern Africa Cross-Border Traders association, as well as research products on household food security which included a strong gender focus, and supported articles in the Mail and Guardian newspaper on women farmers. *However, like SOTU, gender has not been mainstreamed throughout Trust activities and only appears relating to associations and SADC policies which are explicitly women-focused.*

The Trust works to increase the voice and participation of organisations representing the poor and marginalised in SADC by facilitating engagement between regional NSAs and SADC. This encourages a stronger pro-poor view of regional integration and policy change, and greater civil society voice in policymaking. To this end, the Trust has supported civil society organisations and associations such as the Eastern and Southern Africa Small Scale Farmers Forum and the SADC Council of NGOs, and supported spaces for dialogue such as the SADC People's Summit and Civil Society Forum.

The Trust has also worked to support mechanisms for participation of pro-poor NSAs in policy making, such as the SADC Regional Poverty Observatory.

However, the constituency and policies advocated by the NSA organisations the Trust supports varied. Some associations appeared clearly pro-poor with strong grassroots constituencies, such as the cross-border trader and

[15] Afrobarometer ABCV R5 2014;
[16] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013; My African Union Campaign concept ANNEX B in Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013
[17] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;SOTU Rwanda 1;
[18] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;
[19] SOTU Rwanda 2;

small-holder farmers associations supported by the Trust. Other platforms, such as the Mozambique National Poverty Observatory appear to have become an elite space, used by government to tick the 'check-box' for engaging civil society, making them less clearly pro-poor[20].

**Female leadership**

*AREAP's implementing partners all report that they have supported female leaders and female leadership as a part of their work under AREAP.* Afrobarometer and SOTU, report encouraging national partners to hire women, to include women in different roles including senior positions, and include women and women's organisations in steering committees and national platforms. Complete information about staffing was not available for the evaluation, and the information available was mixed. Afrobarometer tracks the number of women in key leadership positions within its network (22)[21]. Notably, both the AB deputy director and M&E officer are women, 75% of Operations Managers are women and 25% of project managers, assistant project managers, core partner directors and communications officers are also women. For SOTU, the evidence shows that four of the seven core countries' platforms include women in their leadership, and that about 20% of all CSOs in the seven platforms (totalling 99 organisations) are explicitly women's organisations[22].

The Trust encourages female leadership across several of their programmes. They provide direct grant to women-led organisations and organisations with explicit gender focus in their work, for example, during the first quarter of 2014 AREAP 40% of grants were dedicated to women-led organisations[23]. The Trust has also focused on attracting female participants in its Leadership for Change Programme, and hosting forums such as the Women Cross Borders Traders Forum which have an explicit gender focus and feature female leaders.

Conclusions relating to relevance:

- Despite the SOTU coalition's youth, its influence on policy and the strength of its policy engagement at the national level is clear. National platforms' focus on the AU and capacity to advocate around relevant AU protocols has increased.
- NSAs supported by the Trust have influenced policy at the regional level. The sustainability of these policy engagements over the longer term, and the impact of these policies on the poor at the national level are less clear.
- The IPs have been successful in making their interventions pro-poor and gender sensitive. This is clear in efforts designed to give voice and allow representations of the poor and of women across activities. While gender has been most strongly mainstreamed within the work of Afrobarometer, gender has not been mainstreamed across AREAP activities taken as a whole, and could be strengthened.
- More in-depth work driven by institutionalised tools and guidance is needed with regards to the issue of gender mainstreaming for SOTU and the Trust.
- From the experience of SOTU and the Trust, achieving success in terms of influencing national policy appears more likely in countries where government opens up space for NSAs, and where policymakers are more transparent about the policymaking process, but these conditions are not necessary for success. It appears that contributing to policy change depends more on internal capacities for strategic policy advocacy and the political acumen of national partners, than the external context.

Recommendations relating to relevance:

- The Trust may consider strengthening its M&E systems to more comprehensively reflect its activities as a 'bridge' between NSAs and government and the capacity-building support provided to grantees, and to gather evidence on the impact of SADC policy change at the national level, particularly on women and the poor. This is particularly critical to evidence, as it relates to the coherence of the Trust's theory of change.

[20] Trust Mozambique 1
[21] Afrobarometer ABCV R5 2014;
[22] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[23] Trust AREAP Quarterly Report Jan- Mar 2014

- While continuing to facilitate engagement between SADC and civil society, the Trust should ensure that spaces for CSO engagement are broad and inclusive, and that sustainable capacities and relationships are being built.
- The Trust should focus on providing capacity building support for engagement at both national and regional levels, to leverage political pressure between these levels and ensure that policy is changed, domesticated and trace impact.
- The SOTU Secretariat has provided technical capacity building support to the national platforms to-date, but this support can be strengthened and increased.

## 5.2 Complementarity

In the context of this evaluation, complementarity was understood as the extent to which AREAP implementing partners complemented and contributed to each other's work at the national and regional levels.

### 5.2.1 To what extent has the design of AREAP supported and enabled the achievement of results to-date that individual components would not have otherwise been able to achieve?

AREAP was designed with three IPs who have distinct, but complementary skill sets in sub-Saharan Africa.

At the inception of AREAP, all three IPs expressed intent to collaborate, as well as understanding of the complementarity of other partners' skills and benefits. The evaluation has found evidence that there were (and continue to be) possible areas for collaboration and that the IPs have complementary skill sets. *However, in practice, collaboration between the IPs to date has been irregular and limited, and varied in depth by IP, as each IP continues largely to work in silos.*

**Audience for data - Afrobarometer**

At the outset of AREAP, with a need to increase uptake of its data by policymakers, Afrobarometer saw the collaboration with the Trust and SOTU as a way to grow the audience for its data and strengthen national partner capacities for packaging data and analysis.

To this end, Afrobarometer made efforts to reach out to the other IPs. They held training workshops for the Trust and SOTU on how to use their data. Specifically, Afrobarometer attended SOTU's Annual General Meeting and trained national platform members on the use of data for policy making and advocacy. Afrobarometer also shared data with both IPs that would be relevant to their advocacy work, including data on poverty and perceptions of the AU.

After consultation with SOTU, Afrobarometer included a question about awareness of the AU in some Round 5 country surveys and will have additional questions on the AU for all countries in Round 6[24]. Afrobarometer and SOTU continue to explore opportunities to collaborate using Afrobarometer data, including adding country- specific questions in Afrobarometer surveys, and using Afrobarometer data in SOTU's State of the Union Country Reports.

The work between Afrobarometer and the Trust has been limited in comparison to Afrobarometer and SOTU. The Trust invited Afrobarometer to present its data at a meeting with heads of state[25] on African Civil Society and the two partners are exploring how Afrobarometer data can be used for the SADC Council of NGOs. The Trust also expressed the idea that it could help Afrobarometer improve the packaging of its data, but these two IPs have not yet explored this prospect.

As Afrobarometer partners are often fully occupied with survey work, Afrobarometer intends to have its new regional communication officers work with the other AREAP IPs to identify opportunities for increasing data uptake. Similarly, SOTU would like their new Policy and Research Officer to work more regularly with Afrobarometer. Afrobarometer has acknowledged the need to build capacity of SOTU national partners to use Afrobarometer data.

[24] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;
[25] Afrobarometer 3;

**Shifting relationships – SOTU and the Trust**

At the outset of AREAP, SOTU and Trust felt there were clear shared thematic interests and points of collaboration, and so SOTU selected the Trust to be its national partner in South Africa The Trust produced a State of the Union report on South Africa's compliance with the 14 AU protocols and built a coalition of organisations to advocate for ratification of AU instruments. This relationship highlights the complementarity of skills of these two IPs. However, in practice, the Trust's position as a grant making organisation, and its status as a peer implementing partner within AREAP limited its ability to operate as SOTU's national partner in South Africa. SOTU has consistent guidelines and processes for all its national platforms which prohibit national platforms from using SOTU funds for further grant making and could not make an exception for the Trust. As a result, the Trust no longer holds the position of SOTU's national partner in South Africa. At this point, the Trust has indicated some willingness to be a strategic partner to SOTU in South Africa, but this role has yet to be defined. At present, the Trust and SOTU are engaging to a limited extent around regional agendas and advocacy through the Midrand Facility, a mechanism for African CSOs to engage with inter-governmental institutions and the Pan African Parliament.

**Complementary without being coordinated**

While the three implementing partners contribute to the achievement of outputs and outcomes in the AREAP logframe, there are no shared indicators which would incentivise joined up activities. Collaboration between the IPs has been encouraged by DFID, without being required.

When the IPs were asked to explain how they believed change would happen under AREAP during the AREAP theory of change workshops, all of the IPs were limited in their understanding to their own activities. They could only identify linkages that related to their work, as they were not particularly familiar with the work of the other IPs.

*To date, the three implementing partners have not successfully worked together on any sustained programmes or activities. However, the implementation of the Learning Hub could improve implementing partners' coordination during the second half of AREAP.*

**Strengths and Weaknesses of an Integrated Programme Approach**

At the outset of AREAP, the three IPs had not previously worked together. The programme faced the challenge of bringing together three organisations which use different approaches and activities to achieve complimentary goals at the regional and continental levels in Africa. Unlike 'organic' partnerships which emerge over time through shared interests and personal relationships, successful partnership under AREAP requires a more formalised structure to incentivise collaboration and clearly defined points of commonality.

Strengths of an integrated programme approach:

- The three IPs have complementary skills sets, which can be leveraged to increase each organisations capacity, centrally and between national partners.
- There appear to be areas of possible collaboration which relate to each IP's pre—existing organisational aims and strategies, providing mutual benefits.
- As each IP works through networks of partners and grantees, in addition to collaborating at the central level between senior staff, collaboration could take place at the national level between partners and grantees, building national links between civil society organisations, survey organisations and researchers.

Weaknesses of an integrated programme approach:

- Requires more formalised structures to incentivise collaboration, as 'organic' relationships are not present.
- Externally imposed pressures to collaborate may distort internal processes, turning collaboration into an end in and of itself and forcing partners to put energy into areas which they don't find valuable internally, just for the sake of collaboration.

*Overall, the evaluation has not found evidence that challenges the basic principles around the complementarity between the work of the three IPs which would challenge the logic of an integrated programme approach. Rather, the structuring and incentive structure of the programme may require adjustment, to ensure that a formalised structure to support collaboration exists, which strengthens the work*

*of each IP rather than distorting internal processes.*

### 5.2.2 What has been learnt from developing a continental programme approach using different implementing partners with complementary skill sets?

While the three implementing partners discussed opportunities to leverage their complementary skill sets during the design of AREAP, during implementation each IP has been left working in a silo.

In a continental programme using different implementing partners with diverse priorities, approaches and personalities, who had not previously worked together, a coordinated approach needs to be reinforced through shared indicators and/or deliverables. Without concrete incentive to collaborate, it is easy for internal activities, needs and priorities within each implementing partner take precedence over joint activities and learning. Similarly, implementing partners appear to have gravitated towards organic partnerships with similar organisations in their immediate space, rather than pushing to develop collaborations with the other IPs, which are relatively distant and unknown. *Without formal incentives for collaboration, or pre-existing relationships which can act as a foundation for collaboration, it appears that AREAP IPs have had very little incentive to make space for collaboration and there is a risk of the space becoming competitive if implementing partners believe that they are vying for the same pool of funding.*

Outside of steering committee meetings which are attended by senior leadership, the staff of the implementing partners have not been meeting or engaging with one another on a regular basis. This has led to more senior implementing partner leadership knowing about the other AREAP IPs, while more junior staff members are not aware of the relationship. Personal and professional relationships across staff at the implementing partners are limited.

While the Learning Hub had not yet been established at the midterm evaluation, it is possible that it will create a space for IPs to interact and share information. Otherwise, collaboration across implementing partners will be restricted by priorities for time and resources within IPs, and competitive tendencies between them.

The use of multiple partners across a wide geographical area by all IPs also hinders development of a coordinated continental programme. Without defined roles or responsibilities AREAP's diverse NSA partners in country do not have a practical understanding of how they could engage with other AREAP IPs, particularly in countries where only one of the other IPs is active, or none. Although at the country level there are cases of IPs interacting and overlapping in their work, it is not a result of AREAP. For example, in Zimbabwe, organisations receiving Trust funding use Afrobarometer data in developing evidence-based advocacy; however, they identified the data independently, not through AREAP[26].

AREAP has succeeded in funding three IPs to strengthen and expand their respective activities; however, it has not created an integrated programme. Instead the evaluation found that beyond functioning as a funding mechanism, AREAP has fostered little coordination, joint learning, or collaboration between the implementing partners. This lack of coordination has undermined the AREAP theory of change, which envisioned an integrated programme[27]. Without expanded and explicit linkages between IP activities, collaboration and joined-up effort, it is difficult to envision how AREAP will deliver a programme-level outcome which is greater than the sum of its parts. *However, it is clear that opportunities for collaboration are present and complementary skills sets exist, if the IPs are able to act on those prospects.*

**What is the value of a regional approach for IPs and AREAP?**

AREAP has been designed as a regional program with three implementing partners working at a regional and continental level. The AREAP IPs seek to influence regional political organisations in Africa, including the AU, the Pan-African Parliament and SADC. From AREAP, the evaluation team has recognised that for an empowerment and accountability (E&A) program with a regional approach, having a national network and constituency, as exemplified by SOTU, enables advocacy organisations to both raise issues that are relevant and maintain demand-side political pressure at the national level for policy change and

[26] Trust Zimbabwe 6;
[27] Business Case and Intervention Summary: AREAP, 2010.

domestication of new protocols.

The regional design of all the IPs activities enhances their relevance and effectiveness. Afrobarometer data enables comparison across country, which is valued by Afrobarometer stakeholders and distinguishes Afrobarometer from other public opinion data. The Trust through its partnership with the Mail and Guardian, a South African newspaper with regional readership, has successfully amplified the voice of the poor and marginalized in Southern Africa and passed on key messages for their campaigns across Southern Africa.

Country partners of IPs under AREAP have benefited from sharing learning with other country partners across the continent. Yet, the centralised planning of IP activities has obscured opportunities for IPs at the country level to leverage each other's work and share learning across IPs. In a regional programme using different implementing partners with diverse priorities, approaches and personalities, who had not previously worked together, a coordinated approach needs to be reinforced through shared indicators and/or deliverables to make sure that comparative advantages are leveraged at country-level.

Lessons learned from AREAP on the value of a regional approach:

- Regional design of an E&A program enhances implementing partners' relevance and effectiveness
- Leveraging comparative advantages of diverse organisations in a regional program requires clear communication and planning by senior central management, as well as, shared indicators and/or deliverables
- Having both a regional and national network for advocacy work ensures that issues raised are relevant and constituencies can maintain demand-side political pressure at the national level for policy change and domestication of new protocols

At the endline evaluation, a case study question on the extent to which working at the continental / regional levels lead to inclusive (e.g. pro-poor, gender sensitive, inclusive of marginalised populations) national policy changes that would not have otherwise occurred will further inform the value of a regional approach.

### 5.2.3 To what extent do the breadth of donors and their individual requirements affect (positively or negatively) programme implementation and the results achieved by implementing partners?

AREAP and DFID are not the sole funding sources for the three IPs. Organisationally, the three IPs manage donor requirements and expectations differently:

- Afrobarometer funnels their donor funding into two basket funds, one managed by Michigan State University, and the second managed by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana). The funding comes in tranches and is released either quarterly or annually, which means that reports are also due annually or quarterly and prepared and submitted centrally by Michigan State or CDD-Ghana. The central network management ensures that donors' requirements are collectively reflected in core partners' contracts and reporting forms, and those are also reflected in national partners' contracts and reporting forms. This system manages duplications or conflicting requirements.

  The evaluation found that Afrobarometer's use of a basket fund has provided flexibility with regard to reporting and management, leaving adequate space for Afrobarometer to negotiate and decide how to best incorporate demands made by donors. As Afrobarometer contracts large amounts of funds to its partners for its activities, it has faced challenges with donor disbursement requirements and changes in its expenditure from disruption of planned survey activities. It was also found that in several cases, donors' interests are considered as opportunities by Afrobarometer for tackling new and interesting issues. For example, in its R6 Survey Afrobarometer has included questions of interest to the Gates Foundations related to public expenditure and corruption[28].
- SOTU also deals with donors centrally with Oxfam managing both SIDA and DFID funding. An agreement with both donors was reached in which both donors receive a single report that covers all activities and

[28] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;

achievements. This reduces reporting requirements and gives both donors a comprehensive outlook on interventions.

While this system manages the workload centrally, eliminating duplication and minimising the reporting workload on SOTU staff, there have been a few instances of differing expectations. As the periods of each donor's involvement with the coalition differ, expectations in terms of results achieved also differ, which may present a challenge for SOTU as well as for the donors.

The evaluation found that SOTU faces logistical challenges in dealing with two separate lines of internal management of SOTU, split between Oxfam Great Britain (the manager of the fund) and Oxfam Netherlands (the technical support and grant manager). This has created parallel communication channels and mechanisms which complicate coordination and collaboration between all parties. The evaluators were informed that Oxfam is currently undergoing an internal restructuring process which will resolve this issue and centralise management of SOTU within Oxfam.

- The Trust is primarily funded by DFID, which accounts for 80 - 90% of their annual budget[29], but it is also funded by other donors such as the Gates and Ford Foundations. The Trust manages each donor separately and did not report any challenges with this arrangement. Some Trust activities are funded by a single donor, such as their work in Ghana and Kenya, funded by the Gates Foundation. Other programmes are multi-donor, like the Business for Development pathfinder initiative. While donors are managed separately, they all contribute to complementary activities aiming for more inclusive businesses in the region and policy change.

Conclusions relating to complementarity:

- AREAP implementing partners have not collaborated in a sustained way, and so have not leveraged their complementary skills to achieve better results under AREAP.
- The design of AREAP did not sufficiently incentivise IPs to collaborate and engage in joint learning, although opportunities for such collaboration and learning are present.
- Each IP received funding from multiple donors, but no challenges were reported as a result of this arrangement, particularly as donor reporting requirements have been harmonized to the extent possible and basket funds have been established, which minimizes any conflicting requirements or financial inefficiencies.

Recommendations relating to complementarity:

- DFID may want to consider whether it wants AREAP to proceed as a programme and if so, work with the implementing partners to develop a coordinated approach and add clear incentives for collaboration, or whether it wants AREAP to proceed as a funding window for three implementing organisations whose work is complimentary, but separate. Accordingly, it may also want to revisit the AREAP theory of change.
- The Learning Hub which is set to be established in late 2014 – early 2015 should emphasise shared learning across IPs at the senior and country levels.

## 5.3 Coordination

In the context of this evaluation, coordination was understood as the extent to which AREAP implementing partners complimented and contributed to the work of external organisations and other existing programmes working at the national and regional levels.

[29] Trust 3;

### 5.3.1 How successfully have programme interventions worked with other organisations to achieve results they would not have otherwise been able to achieve independently?

As part of their implementation approach, each of the IPs works strongly through national partners, civil society coalitions and/or NSA grantees which can all be considered to part of their 'internal' networks of partners and supported organisations. In addition to these organisations, IPs have developed external, high level partnerships with peer organisations which can enhance or strengthen their work. *There is no evidence that AREAP, as a whole, formed any strategic partnerships with external programmes, leveraged existing donor-funded country programming, or that the three IPs agreed to a common relationship amongst themselves or with other organisations that added value to the work of the programme as a whole. However, there is evidence that the IPs partnered and collaborated individually with other organisations.*

**Afrobarometer**

Afrobarometer works internally through core and national partners to undertake its surveys. In addition, Afrobarometer collaborated at a regional level with the Arab Reform Initiative's Arab Barometer survey to expand the reach of the Round 5 survey. Afrobarometer identified the A contract was signed in the second half of 2012 in order to collaborate on surveys in five North African countries[30]. This partnership enabled Afrobarometer to achieve its 35 countries target for the Round 5 survey[31]. Other partnerships established by Afrobarometer were on an ad hoc basis at the national level, with national partners and core partners collaborating independently with other organisations, government departments and media agencies. For instance, Afrobarometer's partner in Tunisia, SIGMA have a strong working partnership with Al-Maghreb newspaper, which has built up capacity over time to competently analyse and present Afrobarometer and Arab Barometer data and uses it to inform news stories consistently throughout the year. Afrobarometer has also established a growing partnership with the University of Cape Town, which provides technical support to the Afrobarometer network as a whole.

**SOTU**

SOTU is itself a coalition, made up of national partners and platforms which generally function as umbrella organisations, representing the voices of many NSA and civil society groups. Beyond this internal network, the evaluation could not identify instances where the SOTU secretariat worked formally at a high level with other organisations to achieve better results. SOTU engage informally with other civil society organisations working at the AU level, as well as through Oxfam, but have not explicitly formalised or engaged substantively over time with any of these organisations .However, SOTU is a young network of coalitions and is still trying to institutionalise ways of working within its own coalitions, so it may be expected that it has not yet formally reached out to external organisations at the regional or continental level.

**The Trust**

The Trust is a grant making organisation, with a large network of NSAs that it has funded or engaged with at the regional level, which could to be said to make up its 'internal' network. The Trust has also partnered with a number of external peer organisations, like Trust Africa and the Open Society Foundation of Southern Africa (OSISA)[32]. These are peer organisations working to support local and regional civil society organisations, organisations that are trying to generate knowledge and innovative solutions for sustainable development, and media institutions that are trying to highlight key regional issues in line with the Trust's work on policy advocacy and poverty.

For example, the Trust worked together with OSISA and Trust Africa on issues regarding sustainability or the sustainable funding of civil society organisations in the region. Through this collaboration, the Trust and OSISA have co-sponsored forums and public dialogues, successfully convening larger networks of civil society groups in Southern Africa on key regional issues, like the recent Youth Forum they supported in Malawi. The Trust has also worked through networks like the Africa Grantmakers Network to engage with other African grant-making organisations at the continental level, sharing practice and working to increase awareness of and encourage African philanthropy[33].

Another key external partnership has been the Trust's partnership with the media, including with the Mail and Guardian. The Mail and Guardian partnership has been instrumental for the Trust in amplifying the voice of the

[30] Afrobarometer Audited Financial Statement 2012;
[31] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013
[32] Trust 4;
[33] Trust 4; Trust 7

poor and marginalized in Southern Africa and passing on key messages for their campaigns. The Trust has funded the Mail and Guardian to publish 15 thematic spreads on portability of social security benefits for migrant mineworkers, cross boarder trading, small scale farmers, SADC youth consultative forum, regional poverty observatory and women and food security. There is evidence that policy makers in South Africa have responded to these media campaigns, which has resulted in significant policy dialogue and change[34].

Conclusions relating to coordination:

- IPs vary in the number of partnerships they have established or have identified. The Trust has engaged heavily with peer organisations, Afrobarometer has one strategic partnership and SOTU has no high level partnerships (although it is a much younger organisation).
- SOTU and Afrobarometer have identified and established few horizontal partnerships with other organisations.

## 5.4 Effectiveness

In order to determine the effectiveness of AREAP to date, the evaluation considered *whether* it had achieved its objectives at the midterm from the logframe and also *how* it achieved those objectives. Assessment of *how* AREAP implementing partners achieved their objectives considered the implementing partners' respective approaches to delivering activities and how stakeholders responded to their activities in different contexts including *contextual factors* which inhibited or enhanced the achievement of results. The evaluation also considers *why* activities were or were not as effective as planned by testing key hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the approach taken by AREAP, across different contexts.

### 5.4.1 To what extent and under what conditions have planned results of individual initiatives been achieved?

A summary of progress against the AREAP outcome and output indicators set in the AREAP logframe is provided in Tables 6 and 7. The most recent logframe data available for all partners is from the DFID Annual Review undertaken on May 6th, 2014, which assesses IPs based on targets for the period ending on March 31, 2014. While the evaluation team recognises that IPs have conducted additional activities since that date, it was not within the scope of the ToR to re-assess achievement of logframe targets during the midterm evaluation.

**Outcome 1: Stronger national and regional policy making and implementation through the influence of citizens and non-state actors**

All AREAP IPs contribute to the outcome level of the AREAP logframe. Three out of the four indicator targets have been exceeded. While SOTU exceeded its target for one of its indicators, it did not meet its target for the number of government which have introduced policies that implement AU standards (which is an ambitious target, more relevant to endline).

At the end of the section we discuss whether the indicators in the logframe were appropriate to capture the activities and outcomes of AREAP.

**Table 6: Summary of progress against outcome indicators[35]**

| Impact | # | Outcome Indicator | Target | Achieved | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stronger national and regional policy making | 1 | Number of new SADC policy statements on poverty reduction that are based on evidence and informed by the active participation of partner CSOs. **(Trust)** | 5 | 6 | This target has been exceeded with the SADC passing 6 new policy |

[34] Trust 3;
[35] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| and implementation through the influence of citizens and non-state actors. | | | | | statements. |
| | 2 | Number of new ratifications by Governments of outstanding agreed continental commitments. **(SOTU)** | 20 | 33 | SOTU has exceeded its target, but this indicator may need to be revisited. |
| | 3 | Number of Governments in countries in which SOTU is active which introduce policies, plans and programmes that implement AU policy standards and targets. **(SOTU)** | 3 | 2 | SOTU has been unable to meet this outcome indicator target. |
| | 4 | Number of citations of Afrobarometer data in the African print and electronic media. **(AB)** | 300 | 850 | Afrobarometer has significantly exceeded its target for this outcome. |

***Outcome Indicator 1:*** *Number of new SADC policy statements on poverty reduction that are based on evidence and informed by the active participation of partner Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). (Trust)*

*Targeted 5; Achieved 6*

This target has been exceeded with the SADC passing 6 new policy statements[36]. These policy statements tackle problems and challenges of the poor and marginalized directly and indirectly. The policy statements tackle issues such as agriculture, food and nutrition security, regional economic integration, and trade. One of the key enablers for the achievement of this target is the Trust's broker role between SADC policy makers and NSAs, in which it facilitated policy dialogues among parties between and during SADC summits.

***Outcome Indicator 2:*** *Number of new ratifications by Governments of outstanding agreed continental commitments. (SOTU)*

*Targeted 20; Achieved 33*

SOTU has exceeded its target to date. In Ghana and Rwanda, all instruments that required ratification have been ratified, although the extent to which SOTU national platforms have contributed to this achievement is unclear. By and large, ratification by African governments of outstanding agreed continental commitments depends on the national political context, and ratifications have been high especially with respect to the ratification of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance as well as the Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources[37].

It is not straightforward to attribute these new ratifications to the work of the SOTU platform, but a strong case for contribution can be made in Ghana. In Ghana, the national partner had advocated for ratification of the Africa Youth Charter through a youth caravan, high school debate and round table dialogue. The African Youth Charter was ratified after these SOTU activities, but SOTU was not the only contributor.

The second instance of contribution to ratification claimed by SOTU is in South Sudan; however it must be noted that no platform is currently operational in South Sudan so it is a country where SOTU is active to only a limited extent. In South Sudan, SOTU engaged with the Minister of Foreign Affairs around the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which was subsequently ratified. It seems plausible that SOTU contributed to ratification in this case, but unclear how strong that influence was[38].

SOTU members have also influenced government policies and changed government positions, without leading to ratifications of AU instruments, which is not captured in this indicator. As this is an important rung in the policy

[36] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[37] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[38] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;

advocacy 'ladder', it may be useful to set an additional indicator, focused on capturing policy influence as an intermediate step towards ratification.

***Outcome Indicator 3:*** *Number of Governments in countries in which SOTU is active which introduce policies, plans and programmes that implement AU policy standards and targets. (SOTU)*

*Targeted 3; Achieved 2*

SOTU has not been able to meet this target. To evidence this indicator, SOTU has focused on tracking implementation of national platforms in the agriculture, health, and youth sectors. They have highlighted two examples within these thematic areas where governments are acting to implement commitments in AU frameworks, (i) the Government of Cameroon's and the Government of Rwanda's efforts to implement an agricultural stimulus policy in line with the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Plan (CAADP), (ii) the Government of Rwanda's steps to implement Abuja Declaration targets/objectives on health sector reforms, including minimum budget allocations[39]. It should be noted, however, that this is an ambitious target given that SOTU had only been operational for 18 months at the time of the annual review.

While SOTU have not achieved this target, they have made significant strides in terms of engaging government around key AU standards and have achieved success engaging government on these issues. For instance, the SOTU national platform in Nigeria has made significant efforts to pressure government to domesticate the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the national platform in Kenya has also successfully engaged government at a high level around the implementation of CAADP.

Assessing the implementation of ratified instruments and the programme contribution to implementation of these instruments is crucial to the programme's theory of change. However, tracking SOTU's contribution to the successful implementation of AU instruments is a challenge especially given other actors and trends, and evidence on this has not been generally collected by national partners.

However, SOTU national partners have emphasised the value in establishing a national mechanism to coordinate and monitor government implementation and compliance to AU decisions. Progress has been made in both Mozambique and Rwanda where their governments have appointed state focal points for SOTU for this mechanism, although the mechanism itself is not yet established[40].

***Outcome Indicator 4:*** *Number of citations of Afrobarometer data in the African print and electronic media. (AB)*

*Target 300; Achieved 850*

The AREAP logframe was updated to include an indicator to track the uptake of Afrobarometer data by the African print and electronic media. The target was to have 300 citations in 2014 and Afrobarometer has considerably exceeded this target with 850 citations as of March 2014.[41] Afrobarometer has also been successful in increasing its citations in international media.

Afrobarometer has increasingly focussed on its communication strategy under AREAP including a focus on dissemination of Round 5 data. For dissemination, Afrobarometer organised global release events based around thematic analytical papers, which responded to key data trends and demand from the media and policy users[42].

Afrobarometer expects national partners to complete a communication report form to track media coverage of Afrobarometer in their country. Meltwater, a media monitoring company, also helps Afrobarometer track media coverage both in Africa and globally[43]. As part of AB's increased focus on communication, Afrobarometer has hired new communications officers within each core partner. As the new communication officer had just arrived in Kenya at the point of midterm data collection, the midterm evaluation could not assess their effect on Afrobarometer's work.

**Outputs**

Based on DFID's annual review in 2014, we assessed progress of IPs against outputs. Green indicates outputs were achieved. Amber indicates outputs were partially achieved. Red indicates outputs were not achieved.

[39] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[40] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;
[41] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[42] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[43] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;

**Table 7: Summary of progress against outputs**

| Output | Achieved? | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| **Output 1:** Independent data and evidence are available and accessible to citizens, non-state actors and government bodies | Partially achieved | All three Implementing partners have partially achieved their targets. |
| **Output 2:** Non-state actors have the capacity and resources to use the evidence and data for policy analysis, development and compliance with agreed values and norms. | Partially achieved | Afrobarometer exceeded its targets.<br>SOTU failed to meet its target<br>The Trust partially achieved its targets |
| **Output 3:** Enabling environment for effective civil society engagement within continental and national governance structures | Partially achieved | Trust exceeded its target<br>SOTU partially achieved its targets |
| **Output 4:** Learning, Impact and Communications Hub established to facilitate lesson learning and sharing on empowerment and accountability approaches | N/A | This target has not been met as the Learning, Impact and Communications Hub has not been established yet |

### Output 1: Independent data and evidence are available and accessible to citizens, non-state actors and government bodies

All AREAP implementing partners contribute to the delivery of Output 1 in the AREAP logframe. AREAP IPs fell slightly short of achieving this target. Afrobarometer met one of its targets, but failed to meet its two other targets for this area. SOTU exceeded expectations in this output, but the methodology they use to collect data on this indicator may need to be revised. Finally, the Trust has met expectations for one of its indicators, but fell short on the other.

***Output Indicator 1.1:*** *The number of countries in which Round 5 (R5) and Round 6 (R6) Afrobarometer surveys are conducted. (AB)*

*Cumulative milestone: Target: 39; Achieved: 37*

*2014 Target: 9; Achieved: 8*

Afrobarometer fell just short of its target for this indicator.

At the point of the midterm evaluation, Afrobarometer had completed its Round 5 surveys (R5) and had begun implementing its Round 6 (R6) surveys. It conducted R5 surveys across all 35 countries that it had planned. For Round 5, Afrobarometer identified 10 new national partners in Burundi, Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mauritius, Niger, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Togo. Afrobarometer also partnered with Arab Barometer to conduct surveys in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia for Round 5.

Afrobarometer also conducted additional surveys in Mali and Zimbabwe for an interim Round 5.5 using funding by the United States Institute for Peace, the World Bank and the British Embassy.

Afrobarometer also secured dedicated funding for a R5.5 survey in South Sudan, but was unable to implement it due to the onset of conflict in December 2013. Through funding from the World Bank, the newly selected national partner will be included in the planning and training for Round 6, and depending on the political and security situation, they will conduct a survey in Round 6.

While Afrobarometer partnered with Arab Barometer in Round 5, it has planned to identify a national partner in Tunisia for Round 6[44]. Due to Ebola and other external factors, Afrobarometer is currently considering including several new countries to maintain its coverage of 35 countries. These are Gabon, Congo Brazzaville and Angola.

***Output Indicator 1.2:*** *The number of people who are directly surveyed through Afrobarometer and percentage of those surveyed who are women. (AB)*

*Cumulative milestone: a) Target: 46,800; Achieved: 60,378*

*b) Target: 50%; Achieved: 50%*[45] [46]

Afrobarometer has exceeded its target having used its robust sample methodology across its survey countries. Afrobarometer has cumulatively surveyed 60,378 individuals against its milestone of 46,800. It conducted surveys in 35 countries for Round 5 and an additional two surveys for an interim Round 5.5.Through its survey methodology, Afrobarometer maintains an equal disaggregation between female and male survey respondents[47].

***Output Indicator 1.3:*** *Afrobarometer data released a year after surveys conducted. (AB)*

*Cumulative milestone: Target 33; Achieved: 30*

Afrobarometer fell just short of meeting this target, in part because they made an explicit decision to hold back data in Ethiopia due to concerns over the nature of responses there. Afrobarometer was concerned with the nature of responses, which may indicate that respondents to the survey felt they could not be completely candid in their responses[48]. With respect to the Ethiopia case, then, this is a purposeful decision taken in order to maintain data quality and integrity.

***Output Indicator 1.4****: Number of people informed of AU decisions and relevance to their lives a) leaders and policy makers through public events, social media and publicity materials and b) citizens through mass and new media. (SOTU)*

*Target: a) 11, 200 in 10 countries; Achieved: a) 15,090 in 8 countries*

*Target b) 600,000; Achieved b) TBC*

SOTU has exceeded their target for part a) of this indicator. It exceeded its target for the number of people informed, although it reached only eight countries rather than ten. This is due to the delay in establishing and operationalizing national platforms for all targeted countries.

Continentally and nationally, SOTU partners have organised various activities that contribute to informing people including policy leaders, CSO leaders, policy makers and other members of the public about compliance with the 14 selected standards. SOTU reports that they have directly reached 15,075 leaders and policy makers through these activities[49].

At the continental level, sensitisation activities began in 2012 when the SOTU Secretariat led the Play for the Union campaign to raise public awareness of the AU. In 2013, the national partners actively organised country activities such as roundtable discussions, panel discussions, public dialogues, and conferences with different target audiences. SOTU has also reached policy and decision makers through Pan-African Parliament (PAP) Committee hearings and a training workshop for the PAP East African Caucus.[50]

Each SOTU national partner also produced compliance reports that captured progress at the national level against the 14 AU standards. However, these reports have only been released publically in 4 out of 8 SOTU countries[51].

SOTU national partners used various media to reach its audiences: websites, online publications, radio, newspaper, social media and TV broadcast. Through mass and new media, SOTU reported indirectly reaching

[44] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;
[45] AREAP Logical framework;
[46] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;
[47] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[48] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;
[49] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[50] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;
[51] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;

64,360,533 people[52]. The methodology for identifying the number of citizens reached through mass and new media is still being confirmed and may need to be revised as it does not appear robust.

***Output Indicator 1.5:*** *Number of individuals provided with information and evidence on pro-poor regional policy development. (Trust)*

*Primary target: 408,700; Achieved: 414,142*

*Secondary target: 18,000; Achieved: 4,754*

This indicator was partially achieved, as the primary target has been achieved but the secondary target has been missed substantially.

This indicator specifically examines the Trust's reach to stakeholders through direct engagement and as well as other indirect means such as through the media. The Trust is particularly successful in engaging and establishing partnerships with the media such as the Africa Review, which is part of the Nation Media Group, and its longstanding partnership with the Mail and Guardian. This strength has enabled the Trust to increase its visibility regionally and the reach of its knowledge products, findings and key messages. However, the Trust has not clearly defined how it measures or assesses against these targets, or how it defines primary and secondary targeted stakeholders. This makes it difficult to assess the significance of the shortfall on the secondary target, or the factors which may have contributed to it.

**Output 2: Non-state actors have the capacity and resources to use the evidence and data for policy analysis, development and compliance with agreed values and norms.**

The AREAP implementing partners have moderately not met their target for this output. Afrobarometer has substantially exceeded expectations, the Trust has moderately achieved expectations and SOTU has underachieved on its target indicators.

It appears that the activities included under this output do not fully capture the work of the implementing partners in this area as discussed below.

***Output Indicator 2.1:*** *Percentage of AB briefing papers (policy relevant data analysis) authored or co-authored by 1) Africans and 2) African Women. (AB)*

*Target: a) 80%; Achieved: b) 100%*

*Target a) 30%; Achieved b) 31%*

Afrobarometer has exceeded this target. As part of Afrobarometer's focus on strategic communications, it has developed 29 country thematic briefing papers, of which 100% included African authorship and 31% included authorship by African women[53].

Through Afrobarometer's summer school training programmes and additional capacity building activities provided to national partners throughout the year, Afrobarometer has tried to build its national partners' skills in writing briefs. Additionally, Afrobarometer has introduced incentives to encourage staff to publish papers using Afrobarometer data.

***Output Indicator 2.2:*** *Mean monthly visits to the Afrobarometer website from Africa. (AB)*

*Target: 750; Achieved: 1,133*

Afrobarometer has substantially exceeded expectations for this indicator. Unique monthly visits to the Afrobarometer website from Africa increased to 1,133 a month in 2013 and 2,215 in the first quarter of 2014.[54][55]

Publicity from the global releases and social media work has increased distinct visits to the website. With 3,500 followers on Twitter including African journalists, politicians and NGO staff, Afrobarometer has used Twitter to announce events, release results, reach new audiences as well as lead users to their Online Data Analysis facility. Specifically, visits to the Online Data Analysis facility from Africa were up from 1077 in 2012 to 3568 in 2013 and

[52] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;
[53] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[54] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;
[55] Afrobarometer Website Usage Report 2014

1874 in the first 6 months of 2014. This strategy has increased the Afrobarometer website's visibility in terms of visits from Africa-based users[56].

***Output Indicator 2.3*** *Percentage of partner CSOs which develop policy positions (a) informed by evidence (b) that is generated from engagement with members and policy-affected communities. (Trust)*

*Target: a) 100%; Achieved: a) 45%*

*Target: b) Targeted 60%; Achieved: b) 68%*

The targets for this indicator have been partially achieved. With regards to the first target, the underachievement is major, with less than half of targeted CSOs developing policy positions informed by evidence.

The evidence provided to the evaluation team to assess this indicator was the 2012 Knowing Civil Society Organisations report. This also indicates a low rate of 37% of CSOs using evidence to inform policy positions[57]. This indicates that while a key focus of the Trust is to build the capacity of partner CSOs to inform their policy position by evidence, this is a difficult outcome to achieve. The Trust's analysis in their Knowing Civil Society Organisations Report found that CSOs are focused on implementation rather than policy making, and that CSOs are not able to articulate how policy positions are formulated[58]. These findings are crucial for the Trust for organisational learning of what is working and what is not. The Trust has indicated that it is planning to re-visit this target and conduct further analysis to address this underachievement[59].

The target for CSOs to develop policy positions that are generated from engagement with constituencies, members and other policy affected communities has been exceeded.

***Output Indicator 2.4****: Number of key rights holders' representatives supported to articulate their assessment of progress towards implementation of African Union decisions. (SOTU)*

*Target: 170 Achieved: 112*

SOTU did not meet this target. In this area, SOTU has supported rights holders, mainly youth, in building their awareness and capacity to articulate their concerns. SOTU has been active in this area in four countries: Cameroon, Ghana, Rwanda and South Africa. Activities have included training of youth then field placement as paralegals, inter-university African Union club competitions, training of trainers and nomination of citizen ambassadors to engage citizens in SOTU campaigns[60].

***Output Indicator 2.5*** *Number of new regional civil society alliances established and active in pro-poor policy development and monitoring of implementation. (Trust)*

*Target 9; Achieved 9*

The Trust is reported to have met its planned target in establishing 9 new regional alliances. While the alliances are not all named specifically in the annual report, they appear to be[61]:

- Southern Africa Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA);
- Southern Africa Miners' Association (SAMA);
- Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU);
- The Trust's "Leadership for Change" initiative;
- Trade union, church, and NGO umbrella bodies for active citizenship in Zimbabwe, a spin off from the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions;
- A youth network emerging from the Trust's Southern Africa Youth Exchange ('SayXchange') programme;
- A Regional NGO, trade union, and church-based umbrella body;
- CSOs network emerging from the African Grant-makers Network; and

[56] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;
[57] The Southern Africa Trust (2012) Knowing Civil Society Organizations Report;
[58] The Southern Africa Trust (2012) Knowing Civil Society Organizations Report;
[59] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[60] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;
[61] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;

- Businesses committed to inclusive business emerging from the Trust's Business for Development (B4D) Pathfinder

While this target is reported to have been met, in some cases the evaluation did not find evidence that these are new regional alliances established by the Trust under AREAP. In some cases, it appears that the Trust began supporting these associations prior to AREAP, for instance with the Southern Africa Cross Border Traders Association which was established in 2009[62]. Similarly, the Business for Development Pathfinder was established in 2009, and the Trust was providing support to the Southern Africa Confederation of Agricultural Unions by 2009[63], indicating that it was in existence prior to AREAP.

In other cases, while the Trust clearly supports the association, they did not establish it. This is true for the Southern Africa Miners Association which the Trust began working with in 2012, but which was established in 2010[64]. The African Grant-makers Network was established in 2009 by a number of organisations including the Trust, but it is unclear what the Trust is referring to when they cite establishing a CSO network emerging from it.

In other cases, the alliances appear to function primarily as programmes, rather than associations. This includes the Leadership for Change programme, Southern Africa Youth Exchange or SayXchange, and the Business for Development Pathfinder. Respondents in the primary research did not describe the Leadership for Change and SayXchange initiatives as alliances; rather as capacity building and training programmes, which did not lead to continuing collaboration between participants or sustained engagement on a common agenda.

Finally, in one case alliances appear to have been established by individuals or organisations supported by the Trust in other ways unrelated to the alliance, for example, through a programme like Leadership for Change, or grant making. This makes the Trust's direct contribution to the establishment of the alliance or its operations unclear. This is the case for the trade union, church, and NGO umbrella body in Zimbabwe which has spun-off from the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

### Output 3: Enabling environment for effective civil society engagement within continental and national governance structures

Both the Trust and SOTU's activities contribute to this output. The Trust has slightly overachieved against its targets, while SOTU has met its targets for four out of its five indicators and substantially underperformed on one.

***Output Indicator 3.1:*** *Number of new institutional mechanisms that are (a) established and (b) fully operational for NSAs to engage in policy development and monitoring of implementation. (Trust)*

*Target: a) 6; Achieved: a) 7*

*Target: b) 4; Achieved: b) 4*

Targets have been achieved, although the evidence supporting achievement is weak. The four established and operational mechanisms claimed by the Trust are: the SADC Regional Poverty Observatory; the DRC National Poverty Observatory; the Mozambique Poverty and Development Observatory; and the South African National Planning Commission[65]. However, the Mozambique Poverty Observatory was established prior to AREAP, and is now described as marginally functional, having become a government 'check-box ticking exercise' to consult civil society[66]. The Regional Poverty Observatory meets yearly, but there is very limited capacity within SADC to support it (currently, just one staff person who is seconded by the Trust) and limited progress has been made in terms of operationalizing its mandate to monitor and hold SADC countries to account. To-date, a poverty matrix of indicators to measure poverty has been developed and agreed at the SADC level, but baseline reports assessing the status of each SADC country against the indicators have not yet been completed (the Regional Poverty Status Report and Map). DRC and Mauritius were not included in the sample countries, and while some evidence suggests that the Mauritius Observatory is operational, no evidence was available on the DRC Observatory.

There is strong evidence that the Trust is well-positioned to act as a broker between civil society groups and policy makers. For instance, the Trust has supported engagements between SADC and the Southern Africa Cross Border Traders Association, the Southern Africa Confederation of Agricultural Unions and the Southern Africa People's Solidarity Network  This has enabled it to facilitate the development of engagement mechanisms, like the SADC Regional Poverty Observatory. However, and as mentioned in the 2014 AREAP annual review, definitions and

[62] http://www.southernafricatrust.org/docs/Informal_Cross_Border_Traders_Association_launched_20090716.pdf
[63] http://www.southernafricatrust.org/changemakers/december2009/
[64] https://www.linkedin.com/pub/southern-africa-miners-association/6b/348/8a5
[65] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[66] Trust Mozambique 5;

benchmarks for measuring levels of effectiveness are necessary to assess this indicator[67]. Overall, there was little information available about the operational or newly established institutional mechanisms, except for the Mozambique Poverty Observatory, SADC Regional Poverty Observatory and Mauritius Poverty Observatory, making it difficult to assess the extent to which the other mechanisms have been established and/or are operational.

***Output Indicator 3.2:*** *Number of countries with national and continental CSO platforms that hold governments accountable in accordance with their continental commitments. (SOTU)*

*Target 10: Achieved 10*

At the point of the midterm evaluation, SOTU had achieved its target of having ten countries with SOTU national platforms. Initially, SOTU was delayed in starting its national level coalitions, but by mid-2013, it had national partners in eight countries. It had a call for applications for membership in Malawi and North Africa in mid-2013. By the end of the 2013, SOTU had identified the Malawi Economic Justice Network as a national partner in Malawi. SOTU then identified the Arab Institute for Human Rights (AIHR) as the national partner in Tunisia in 2014, although this partner is not yet an active part of the SOTU coalition.

***Output Indicator 3.3:*** *Number of a) organisations and b) women's organisations active in national CSO platforms that hold governments accountable in accordance with their continental commitments. (SOTU)*

*Target: a) 75; Achieved: a) 99*

*Target: b) 15; Achieved b) 22*

SOTU has exceeded its targets for this indicator. Beyond securing national partners, SOTU has formalised national coalitions in seven countries. Of the original eight countries, Cameroon was the only country which did not have a coalition by the end of 2013. The seven platforms comprise a total of 99 CSOs, of which 22 are explicitly women's organisations[68]: The seven coalitions are composed of varying numbers of members and interest areas. While most national coalitions are composed solely of NSAs, in Rwanda, the national platform is composed of NSAs as well as a government representative[69]. Through this unique structure, a government focal point has been appointed to be part of the national platform coalition in Rwanda.

***Output Indicator 3.4:*** *% of national CSO platforms holding governments accountable in accordance with their continental commitments, which have women in their leadership. (SOTU)*

*Target: 25%; Achieved: 57%[70]*

SOTU has substantially exceeded its target for this indicator. Four out of the seven national platforms (57%) have women in leadership positions. Specifically, the platforms are: CESC in Mozambique, CGI in Ghana, CISLAC in Nigeria and Fahamu in Kenya[71].

***Output Indicator 3.5:*** *Number of governments that establish a national coordinating and monitoring mechanism of AU commitments. (SOTU)*

*Target: 3; Achieved: 0*

While SOTU has made progress in this indicator area, it has substantially not met expectations, as mechanisms have not yet been established in any of the SOTU focal countries[72]. In both Mozambique and Rwanda, the government has nominated key government focal points for the SOTU campaign. Furthermore, the Rwanda Government has representatives in the wider SOTU national platform[73].

In Mozambique, the SOTU national platform is working to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the government to establish a database to monitor the number of AU instruments that have been signed.

[67] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[68] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[69] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[70] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[71] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;
[72] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[73] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;

The SOTU Secretariat and its national partners expressed at their theory of change workshop the need for national coordinating and monitoring mechanisms to reach its high level outcomes[74]. The lack of progress in establishing mechanisms given their importance to the AREAP theory of change is a risk to the programme.

The evaluation has also found that the vagueness of the term National Coordinating and Monitoring Mechanism limits SOTUs ability to achieve this target.

### Output 4: Learning, Impact and Communications Hub established to facilitate lesson learning and sharing on empowerment and accountability approaches

*This output has not been assessed at midterm as it is not yet operational.*

### Is the logframe appropriate and are indicators relevant and well defined?

The AREAP logframe captures different levels of detail and activities as well as contribution to results for each IP. The level of detail is not standard across the programme logframe, and there are some inconsistencies around gender disaggregation of indicator targets between the implementing partners. Additionally, indicators appear to miss some of the main areas of IP activity, such as the increased capacity of SOTU national platforms, or the research products produced by the Trust.

Furthermore, the logframe does not capture any cooperation or collaboration of partners, as each output and outcome indicator relates to a single implementing partners' work. This means that the collaborative and joint activities which were assumed in the design of AREAP and in the AREAP theory of change are not reflected in the logframe.

The evaluation team has identified the following gaps in specific indicators:

- The methodology for capturing outcome and output indicators for SOTU and the Trust needs to be revisited to clarify what activities are being captured as well as numbers being claimed. Currently, some activities are claimed without being specifically identified or named, which makes verification difficult.
- Outcome indicator 2, which counts the number of new ratifications of outstanding continental commitments, could be strengthened by adding a second sub-indicator which captures progress made towards this goal in terms of SOTU influence on government policies and positions. This would help capture progress being made on the 'advocacy ladder' towards ratification.
- Outcome indicator 3, which measures government's implementation of AU policies, is challenging to track, yet it is essential for the programme's theory of change, so SOTU may need to strengthen its monitoring strategy for this indicator. There is also a significant gap between the progress reflected in outcome indicator 2 and outcome indicator 3; SOTU may consider adding an indicator which marks interim progress made between these two.
- Outcome indicator 4, the indicator for Afrobarometer, refers to citations in the media, which is not a comprehensive measure of strengthened national or regional policy making and implementation through the influence of NSAs. Given the focus of Afrobarometer under AREAP to improve targeting of its stakeholders and increase use of evidence by policy makers, it is important that this data be captured in the logframe more robustly. The evaluation team recommends that Afrobarometer include an additional indicator that captures strengthened targeting of policymakers, packaging of data and use of Afrobarometer data to inform research and policy positions.
- Output indicator 2.2 for Afrobarometer, which counts visitors to the Afrobarometer website does not appropriately capture capacity building resources or use of data (which is the focus of Output 2) instead it is an indicator of access to data and reach, as visitors to the website aren't necessarily themselves users of Afrobarometer data. An additional indicator, which reflects the citation of Afrobarometer data in articles and reports (data which is already being gathered by AB) may be useful, to capture use of Afrobarometer data.
- Output indicator 2.4 for SOTU does not capture the work of SOTU national partners who have been actively building capacity of their national platform, media and the general public in articulating the assessment of progress towards implementation of AU decisions. The current indicator measures a small sub-section of this work that is not indicative of the larger change that SOTU is achieving.

[74] SOTU Theory of Change;

- The logframe does not capture the work on knowledge generation and research conducted by the Trust which is one of its pillars of work under AREAP. It also does not sufficiently capture the Trust's work around gender and women's empowerment.
- Indicators are reduced to quantitative targets, with no clear definition of the thresholds or quality of what is being achieved. For instance it is unclear what a 'fully operational' accountability mechanism is, what SOTU understands 'holding government accountable' to mean, or how an 'alliance' is defined by the Trust. This makes interpretation of results difficult, as it is hard to know what implementing partners have claimed to achieve. It also makes verification of results challenging.

Conclusions relating to effectiveness (logframe):

- The AREAP logframe does not capture IPs activities in similar detail, and does not fully capture the key areas of activity under AREAP.

Recommendations relating to effectiveness (logframe):

- The AREAP logframe needs to be revisited to ensure that it fully captures all IPs work under AREAP.
- Terms and thresholds included in the indicators should be defined in order to assess progress.
- The AREAP logframe should be redesigned to include shared indicators amongst IPs if AREAP IPs are meant to collaborate, a key aspect of the AREAP theory of change.

### 5.4.2 To what extent have implementing partners effectively built the capacity of NSA partners?

In order to assess if the implementing partners effectively built the capacity of NSA partners under AREAP, the evaluation considered:

- Evidence that NSA partners *have increased technical skill* to carry out AREAP related activities;
- Evidence that NSA partners *have increased access to evidence, research and knowledge* generated by AREAP implementing partners; and
- Evidence that NSA partners *are more effective* due to support provided by AREAP implementing partners.

Overall, there is strong evidence that AREAP IPs have built the capacity of their NSA partners to effectively deliver AREAP activities.

**AREAP IPs provide formal capacity building activities through trainings for NSA partners**

Afrobarometer ensures that its national partners have the skills to collect high quality data by providing a comprehensive survey manual and trainings throughout the year. Afrobarometer's national partners undergo survey training prior to fieldwork, which assures Afrobarometer that their national partners can effectively implement a survey according to the expected protocol. These trainings are rigorous and repeated before every round of surveys.

Afrobarometer's annual Summer School is designed to benefit the greatest number of its national partners' staff. In 2013 and 2014 respectively, 22 and 19 Afrobarometer National partners attended either Francophone or Anglophone Afrobarometer Summer School[75]. National partner staff members also mentioned participating in additional trainings offered throughout the year such as advanced data management and sessions on writing briefs. By building their partners' skills in data analysis and writing, Afrobarometer hopes to have high quality data that reaches a wide audience.

Overall, staff of national partners confidently reported that they had significantly increased capacity from their experience with Afrobarometer. Capacity building activities such as writing briefs at Afrobarometer summer school have enabled younger or more academic staff members to develop skills such as packaging data that will enable Afrobarometer to deliver its work.

SOTU's approach to formal trainings was more limited. While the SOTU secretariat conducted a capacity assessment of each SOTU National Platform, few official capacity building activities were developed for each

[75] Afrobarometer Summer School Report 2013/ 2014

partner. The SOTU secretariat hired a consultant to work with the national partners on their capacity for monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning, including developing a sound methodology to capture the number of beneficiaries. Overall, national partners received limited training from the SOTU Secretariat. The SOTU Secretariat is a small entity and may not have the expertise to build the capacity of the platforms in the skills needed to successfully deliver activities under AREAP.

SOTU national members conducted trainings to build their partners' skills and understanding in advocating for the AU instruments. For example, the national partners in Kenya, Rwanda and Nigeria have held general trainings on monitoring and implementation of AU instruments for their partners and key stakeholders.

As detailed in sections 5.1 and 5.4.5, while the Trust has clearly built the capacity of its long term regional partners, in some cases the depth and sustainability of the capacities supported by the Trust is unclear. The Trust's NSA partners who have worked with the Trust over a long period of time such as SADC CNGO and SAPSEN have benefited from capacity strengthening activities outside of the AREAP funding period. These organisations now receive support through grant-making to fund specific programming[76]. For its new NSA partners, the Trust has provided institutional capacity building such as designing management systems to help the organisation establish itself. For example, the Trust helped its grantee the Southern Africa Mining Association (SAMA) develop internal policies for finance, human resources and procurement[77]. In another case, the Trust has supported youth organisations to organise at the regional level, exert collective influence and present youth rights as a regional policy issue. In some cases, the Trust has also hired consultants to build the technical expertise of their grantees in preparation to present their positions effectively at large conferences or forums.

The Trust's Leadership for Change Programme builds the capacity of civil society leaders who work at the regional level in Southern Africa. The evaluation found that these individuals had developed new skills and strategies on forming coalitions and practical understanding on how to lead within their current environment. However, the capacities developed remained limited to the group that had participated in the programme, as it was unclear if the skills were shared more widely within the participants' organisations and there was no continued relationship among participants of the programme although they all continued to work at the regional level.

**Horizontal learning by sharing experiences across NSA partners as well as mentoring by IPs are informal ways to build capacity that also strengthen coalitions and networks**

The structure of the Afrobarometer network as well as the SOTU coalition means that their NSA partners are operating in diverse contexts, but facing similar challenges. By sharing lessons, strategies and resources across countries, NSA partners have developed new technical skills and understanding for their work.

For example, the SOTU national partner in Nigeria shared successful strategies for reaching the government with other SOTU national members[78]. Mozambique and Kenya have now adopted similar approaches. The SOTU Secretariat encourages this type of capacity building by having each SOTU national member present their work at the SOTU Annual General Meeting. The SOTU national partner in Kenya, Fahamu, also has an office in Senegal, visited Senegal's national member in Dakar to discuss areas for collaboration[79].

Afrobarometer conducts technical assistance visits for new national partners, which included sampling, survey preparation and data management support[80]. Afrobarometer's core partners also provide mentoring support to smaller and newer national partners. Kenya, as a core partner in Round 5 supported the national partners it works with on how to strategically communicate its data such as which topics for presentations and who to invite to dissemination events. Furthermore, more experienced national partners provide technical assistance to new partners through visits. Examples include teams from Burkina Faso and Mali working with teams in Senegal and Niger. Afrobarometer hopes to formalise this type of mentoring support across its network.

The apex organisations that the Trust has strengthened in the past now mentor more nascent regional organisations like Southern Africa Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA) or Southern Africa Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU). While the Trust has not provided much formal training to its grantees, staff members do provide one-on-one support and the Trust hires consultants to provide technical briefings before key events or forums.

[76] The Trust Value for Money Chart for Understanding CSOs and Building Capability
[77] The Trust Value for Money Chart-Migration and Social Protection Initiative
[78] SOTU Mozambique 3
[79] Oxfam SOTU Annual Report 2013;
[80] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;

**AREAP IPs have produced evidence, research and knowledge which is accessible; however, they have had varied success packaging the information for the targeted audience.**

The Trust has leveraged various media channels to successfully reach a large audience with its range of knowledge products, such as partnerships with highly visible newspapers, its Change Magazine and its mailing list, covering topics like food security, state of civil society and portability of miners' benefits. The Trust engages policy makers at early stages in developing their knowledge products, to ensure research is packaged to have as strong an impact as possible at the policy level. They have been successful and it has been suggested by DFID that they could provide support to the other AREAP implementing partners in this area.[81]

Afrobarometer has increased access to data through its website, social media engagement, publications and larger number of dissemination events since Round 4. In Round 5, Afrobarometer introduced a "rolling release of results" and created new formats for releasing results, which successfully improved access to their results as captured in indicators discussed above. Afrobarometer has used diverse methods of packaging data as a way to reach new audiences. Afrobarometer partners have produced 25 Country Bulletins in Round 5, which have also been turned into Afrobarometer Briefing Papers.[82] Furthermore, Afrobarometer between January 2012 and October 2014 produced 48 Briefing Papers.[83] Overall, the evaluation found that Afrobarometer data is perceived as high quality and credible, and has increased its users; yet in most countries it is not used regularly by targeted stakeholders; instead it is most often used as a 'one-off', often around a dissemination event. Very few journalists reported using Afrobarometer data, outside of coverage of the dissemination events themselves, and a number of individuals interviewed who had attended Afrobarometer dissemination events had not used Afrobarometer data in their work, particularly civil society organisations. While it is difficult to assess uptake by policymakers, most citations appeared to be one-offs, with notable exceptions being the use of Afrobarometer data by the office of the President in Botswana, the use of Afrobarometer data on the election in Malawi, and the use of data by government in select countries like Cape Verde, Benin, Madagascar and Guinea[84]. The evaluation team also found that the capacity of many targeted stakeholders to use data was low, which presented a barrier its use

Afrobarometer's national partners vary in their ability to share data and increase access to evidence. In Benin, Kenya, and Tunisia, the evaluation found that Afrobarometer's national partners successfully increased and broadened their audience for data using different tactics including targeted disseminations, work with media and continuous engagement with key civil society actors, media and government stakeholders.

Afrobarometer has developed a standardised dissemination template and allocated funding for dissemination events to nationally roll out survey results, which has markedly improved the reach of Afrobarometer data since Round 4. The overall implementation of dissemination events for Round 5 has also significantly increased and improved from Round 4. However, Afrobarometer's national partners still generally have limited capacity to implement these events, as they are academics in a research institution, or researchers in private survey firms who have little experience with research dissemination and communications, tailored to diverse groups of stakeholders. Furthermore, Afrobarometer did not consistently provide capacity-building support to its national partners around the packaging and dissemination of data in Round 5, although support was provided around the production of research products and policy briefs. Hiring of communications officers at Core Partners to support in this area was done shortly before the midterm evaluation and could not be assessed during the midterm evaluation. The evaluation found that stakeholders often reported on or used data soon after its release, but that use would drop over subsequent months. This finding reinforces the importance of continuous engagement with stakeholders in increasing access to and use of Afrobarometer data.

Awareness of the AU among CSOs and the general public was lower than many SOTU national members had anticipated. Under AREAP, the SOTU Coalition launched the Play for the Union campaign as a way to sensitise the general public on AU standards; however, it did not have the desired reach. The SOTU Coalition has planned a "My African Union" campaign to build from that effort. SOTU national members have held campaigns, roundtables, public dialogues and debates to build understanding of the AU standards among the general public. Under AREAP, national members have worked on raising awareness among civil society organisations, media and policymakers on how the AU instruments relate to national interests and debates, but have struggled to raise awareness of the AU among the general public.

[81] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[82] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;
[83] ABCV 15 October 2014
[84] AB Portfolio Policy Visibility Assessment September 2014.

To increase dialogues on the 14 selected African Union instruments, each SOTU national member developed a compliance report to capture its country's progress in ratification and implementation of these instruments. These reports varied in quality and uptake across the national members. In Mozambique, the national platform leveraged its members' expertise for sectoral analysis and successfully reached government with the report through its existing channels. As a result of this report, discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are setting up a database to monitor ratification and implementation of the instruments.

It was unclear in the evaluation how the SOTU Secretariat built the research skills of national partners to produce these reports and whether they will have greater capacity to produce them in future.

**AREAP IPs have built capacity of NSA partners and increased their effectiveness by improving their visibility and reputation.**

Prior to and as part of AREAP, the Trust has strategically supported the SADC secretariat, apex regional organisations and regional CSOs, as well as partnered with a highly visible newspaper, which has enabled it to effectively influence regional policy making from various channels both formal and informal.

The Trust's newer grantees have benefited from the Trust's position, networks and visibility to gain access to resources and conferences that enable them to also be more visible in policy debates. For example, ZIMCODD was supported by the Trust to help host the 2014 Peoples' Summit in Zimbabwe to engage citizens on regional issues, in parallel to the SADC Summit meeting. Similarly and as previously mentioned, the Trust has enabled the Southern Africa Miners Association (SAMA), a newer grantee, to gain media attention and access to ministerial meetings, which has contributed to increasing the credibility and legitimacy of the organisation[85].

Many of SOTU's national members reported that their work with the AU instruments has given them more legitimacy when engaging government in all aspects of their work. They indicate that, through SOTU, they have strengthened their relationships with other national CSOs and expanded their network to work with policy makers. In some cases, SOTU national platforms had pre-existing relationships with policymakers and AU or Pan-African Parliament representatives. However, in many cases SOTU has provided introductions and opportunities for engagement that national partners may not have had otherwise. SOTU national members have successfully engaged with their national representatives at the AU in Ethiopia and at the PAP in South Africa. These relationships are still young, and the contributions of SOTU can be difficult to assess given the coalition has only been operating at the national level for 18 months. However, there is evidence that suggests that national partners have developed stronger relationships, capacity and technical skills for advocacy through their engagements with policymakers, and been more focused and effective in engaging government around the domestication of select AU instruments, for instance in Mozambique where the national platform has become much more AU-focused and has found increased success engaging government policymakers

National partners appear to value their relationship with Afrobarometer as they have greater capacity to deliver their work and often have gained recognition in-country as well as internationally through their work with them. The standardisation of Afrobarometer work across the network through templates and the survey manual has also improved the effectiveness of their national partners, building their technical skills at conducting robust, representative surveys.

Conclusions relating to effectiveness (capacity building):

- The IPs have each built the capacity of their partners and grantees to some extent, with Afrobarometer's approach being most formalised, well evidenced and comprehensive.
- The IPs each produce data and knowledge products, but have had varied success in disseminating these products; best practice includes close partnerships with media and packaging learning in short, relevant, accessible briefs.
- The IPs have also built the capacity of their partners and grantees by increasing their visibility at the national level, and supporting their engagement in policy forums and dialogues.

Recommendations relating to effectiveness (capacity building):

- SOTU and Afrobarometer may consider providing formal training to build NSA partners' capacity in

[85] The Trust Value for Money Chart-Migration and Social Protection Initiative

packaging information and targeting stakeholders.

- The SOTU secretariat may be most useful as a capacity-building support to the national partners, to increase sophistication and technical skills of national platforms; and to institutionalise horizontal learning between the platforms to incentivise engagement within the SOTU coalition.

### 5.4.3 To what extent has engaging at the continental/ regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms?

In order to assess the extent to which engagement at the continental or regional levels by non-state actors supported under AREAP strengthened their capacity to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms, the evaluation considered:

- the extent to which implementing partners have contributed to strengthened technical skills and understanding of NSAs on how to effectively engage policymakers at the continental or regional levels;
- the extent to which organisations supported by the implementing partners under AREAP have developed strengthened relationships and shared understanding with policymakers, around the importance of citizen and civil society engagement in policymaking at the continental, regional, national levels; and
- the extent to which organisations supported by the implementing partners under AREAP engaged in regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking process

For the purposes of this question the evaluation focused on the work of SOTU and the Trust, as it does not directly relate to Afrobarometer's theory of change or activities under AREAP. In terms of the scope of this question, the evaluation assessed capacity on the part of NSAs supported by SOTU and the Trust only.

Overall, there is strong evidence that AREAP has strengthened the capacity of civil society organisations to effectively engage policymakers at national and regional levels and, in some cases, to engage in pre-existing accountability mechanisms. There is little evidence that civil society organisations have engaged at the continental level under AREAP, which is not part of the Trust's approach or objectives. There is also limited evidence that accountability mechanisms have been created or institutionalised at the regional or national levels.

**Increased capacity for effective engagement with national and regional policymakers**

- *There is evidence that SOTU have played a useful role in supporting relationships between national platforms and national policymakers, Pan-African Parliament and African Union representatives.* In some cases, including with the national partners in Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique and Nigeria there is clear evidence that SOTU have strengthened national platform capacity in terms of how to effectively engage policymakers[86]. In other cases, the support provided by SOTU has primarily concerned M&E systems and broader organisational capacity; with the platform CSOs having pre-existing skills and understandings of how to engage policymakers[87], which speaks to the strength of the national platforms, and the limited amount of time SOTU has been engaging on the national level.
- *Clear evidence suggests that the Trust have played a pivotal role facilitating engagement between non-state actors and SADC, particularly the SADC Secretariat.* For instance, at the regional level, the Trust have clearly built significant capacity of cross-border traders, mineworkers and small-holder farmers to engage policymakers, either SADC policymakers or in the case of the miners, the South African government. This capacity building has taken several forms, including financing meetings, providing training, 'bridging' between policymakers and civil society, or between different civil society organisations, and providing research and media support to increase awareness and understanding of the issues. This success reflects the Trust's clear strategy and operational vision – they have a clear understanding of their capacity and role under AREAP, and have clearly targeted the issues they want to influence and the best approaches for influencing policymakers at the regional level.

[86] SOTU Mozambique 4; DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[87] SOTU 3

- *The evidence also clearly supports the idea that the Trust's work would be relevant at the national level, which challenges aspects of the Trust's theory of change.* SADC protocols are non-binding, and any proposed policy changes at the SADC level must have a national sponsor, so national level politics are central to both SADC policy change and the domestication of SADC instruments. Despite this, the Trust's limited support to work on regional issues at the national level, limits its ability to trace SADC policy change to changes in national processes, or to ensure that the pro-poor engagement at SADC level actually translates into material benefits for the poor at the national level.

**Limited accountability mechanisms and formalised spaces for engagement currently exist but could be strengthened**

- *In terms of accountability mechanisms in countries where SOTU operates, spaces appear to exist most robustly in Kenya and Nigeria.* Weaker accountability mechanisms and 'invitation- only' spaces, which are selectively opened by government at policymakers' convenience, were described by the national platforms in Mozambique and Rwanda. In all of these cases, though, the SOTU national platforms are engaging with the mechanisms that exist and are making clear progress in terms of developing relationships with government and influencing policy.
- *With respect to the Trust's work, the most formalised mechanism for civil society to hold SADC to account appears to be the Regional Poverty Observatory*. National Poverty Observatories are also in existence with similar roles at the national level, but appear weakened. The most prominent national observatory is in Mozambique, but it is no longer the preferred channel for CSOs to engage with government and is viewed as a 'check-box' exercise for government[88]. National observatories also exist in Mauritius and DRC, supported by the Trust, but evidence on their strength and operationalization was not available to the evaluation. Several spaces for engagement also exist, most strongly the People's Summit which is held in parallel to the SADC Summit each year, and the thematic civil society meetings and workshops held on regional issues, like the Youth Summit held in Malawi in 2014[89].
- *There is strong evidence that the Trust supports civil society and non-state actors to engage with these mechanisms and spaces.* While it is still a weak mechanism, the Trust has significantly increased the capacity of the Regional Poverty Observatory, seconding staff to it and funding its development of a poverty indicator matrix as well as baseline poverty reports to evidence this matrix[90]. Engagement by organisations supported by the Trust in spaces like the Youth Forum has also led to policy change at the SADC level. However, these mechanisms and spaces have limited strength and could be deepened. The Regional Poverty Observatory has not yet released baseline figures for the poverty indicator matrix agreed at the 2014 SADC Summit, and it is unclear how the poverty indicator matrix will be used to hold SADC governments to account on their progress combating poverty and implementing SADC protocols[91]. Currently, the Regional Poverty Observatory appears fragile, with a promising but currently weak mandate and it is unclear whether it has the capacity to fulfil the opportunities presented to it and push for a stronger political mandate within SADC[92]. Similarly, the People's Summit occurs annually, but it appears that a limited amount of communication crosses over between it and the official SADC Summit, limiting its effectiveness as a space for dialogue despite its promise. Dialogue between these parallel summits could be strengthened to further strengthen the People's Summit as a channel for civil society to engage in dialogue with SADC.

### Qualitative Comparative Analysis:

The QCA analysis considered two aspects of this evaluation question, based on the judgement criteria in the evaluation framework:

- the extent to which civil society coalitions have developed strengthened relationships and a shared understanding with policymakers on key issues; and
- the extent to which civil society coalitions engage in regularised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking (if such spaces exist).

[88] Trust Mozambique 5
[89] The Trust Value for Money Chart for Understanding CSOs and Building Capability
[90] Trust 3, SADC 1,
[91] SADC 1
[92] SADC 1, Trust Botswana 1

The QCA analysis considered a range of factors, some of which were dependent on AREAP and some which related to the external national context. The strength of relationships between civil society coalitions, (termed as national partners for this analysis), supported by the Trust and SOTU, and policymakers, along with their engagement in accountability mechanisms are assessed at this point in time, without consideration of how long the IP has been active in this space or supporting these coalitions. The analysis sought to determine which factors, or combinations of factors are necessary or sufficient for success, in different contexts.

For the first sub-question, concerning **the extent to which strengthened civil society coalitions have strengthened relationships with policymakers**, a range of conditions were considered in the analysis, including the level of government sensitivity to criticism, and the extent to which NSAs supported by the IPs have adequate knowledge of their key stakeholders' needs and agendas. From the analysis, two conditions appear necessary for success in all cases, and two others factor very strongly in success:

- National partners having adequate knowledge of stakeholders being targeted, their needs and agendas.
- National partner coalitions engage in spaces that enable citizens to engage with policy makers/government
- Champions for non- state actor's cause and activities are present in government
- National partner coalitions constantly engage with diverse audiences to develop ownership of ideas and map the national political economy

To develop strengthened relationships with policymakers, the most critical conditions for success relate to developing strong networks, constant engagement with government, and having an understanding of the national political economy and key stakeholders. In terms of developing strengthened relationships with policymakers, external contextual factors relating to levels of political stability, transparency in decision making or enabling environments for civil society are less important and do not predict success. Conditions relating to the internal capacity of civil society coalitions are also less relevant.

This analysis indicates that constant engagement with a diverse network of stakeholders, including through regularised accountability mechanisms or spaces for engagement with government, provides opportunities for civil society coalitions to build relationships with policymakers and establish areas of shared interest. *Developing a strong understanding of the key policymakers to target for a particular issue, their agendas and needs, combined with relationships with existing champions in government, provides a networked basis for building relationships in government with the right policymakers to influence a particular issue.* This conclusion strongly echoes recent findings in the literature around what works in locally led development and governance in Africa[93].

This sub-question included two outcomes as conditions: the existence of strengthened civil society coalitions, and the existence of strengthened technical capacity within national partners, to test the IP theories of change and assess whether these outcomes were in fact necessary conditions for strengthened relationships with policymakers. *These outcomes did not factor as important conditions for success, indicating that it's possible for civil society organisations to develop strengthened relationships with policymakers without being part of a coalition, and that the skills needed for political economy analysis and networking may not be the things generally developed when technical capacity is built by the IPs.* It may also be the case that technical capacity building factors more strongly earlier in the causal chain, as a pre-condition for being able to engage in accountability mechanisms, having a champion in government or being able to assess key stakeholders and engage with diverse audiences.

For the second sub-question, concerning the **extent to which civil society coalitions have engaged in regularised accountability mechanisms and spaces (if such spaces and mechanisms exist)**, a range of conditions were considered in the analysis, including the extent to which evidence is used by policymakers to shape decision making, and the extent to which national partners engage with diverse stakeholder groups.

From the analysis, one condition appears necessary for success in all cases, internal research capacity, and several conditions appear to factor strongly in success.

- Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes
- Evidence is generally used to inform and shape policy making at the national level

[93] See Booth, David and Sue Unsworth. "Politically smart, locally led development" ODI Discussion Paper, September 2014. http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9158.pdf and Booth, D and Cammack, C. (2013) Governance for Development in Africa: solving collective action problems, London, Zed Books.

- The level of national political stability
- Champions for non- state actor's cause and activities are present in government
- National partner coalitions constantly engage with diverse audiences to develop ownership of ideas and map the national political economy

Some of these conditions appear to relate to different aspects of this sub-question. The first two conditions, relating to transparency in decision making and the use of evidence appear to relate to the existence of regularised accountability mechanisms. The second two, presence of champions in government and constant engagement with diverse audiences, seem to relate to the likelihood that national partners will engage in these spaces.

*In relatively politically stable contexts, like Rwanda, Zimbabwe or Mozambique where the government is not transparent about the policymaking process, the presence of a champion in government appears less critical; constant engagement by national partners with diverse audiences and the use of evidence in policymaking are more critical.*

*In contexts like Kenya where policymaking is relatively transparent, and national partners engage with external partners and diverse groups of stakeholders, but where the government is more sensitive to criticism and the use of evidence in policymaking is less common, having a champion in government is key.*

Conclusions relating to effectiveness (policymaking and accountability):

- There is evidence that SOTU have played a useful role in supporting relationships between national platforms and national policymakers, Pan-African Parliament and African Union representatives.
- The Trust has facilitated engagements between its grantees and SADC, and it has supported the SADC Regional Poverty Observatory, a mechanism which while weak is the most formalised mechanism for civil society to hold SADC to account.
- SOTU and the Trust may want to consider providing technical support to their partners around political economy analysis and networking, to help them better target policymakers and understand their needs.
- It appears that national partners that are actively working with external partners and diverse groups of stakeholders, including forming relationships with policymakers who act as champions, are more likely to engage in policy dialogue with government and take advantage of regularised accountability mechanisms and spaces for engagement with the state. In relatively transparent, champions are particularly critical; in states which are largely one party, stable states, evidence can be more influential.

### 5.4.4 To what extent are key stakeholders able and willing to use Afrobarometer data to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates?

For Afrobarometer's programme logic, it is crucial that key stakeholders are able and willing to use Afrobarometer data to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates. In order to assess these critical assumptions, the evaluation considered three key criteria:

- Evidence that key stakeholders and target audiences can access Afrobarometer data
- Evidence of increased usage of Afrobarometer data by existing key stakeholders and new stakeholders in Africa
- Evidence of increased usage of Afrobarometer data by key stakeholders to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates at the national or regional levels in Africa

**Afrobarometer uses its website, local media, events as well as other innovative channels to enable key stakeholders and target audiences to access Afrobarometer data. However, access is still a challenge.**

Overall, Afrobarometer has significantly increased access to their data under AREAP. Mean monthly visits to the Afrobarometer website have increased up to 4,315 by users based in the US, Europe and Africa. In the first quarter

of 2014, users had increased to 2,215 from Africa alone[94]. The website enables free and international access to data and analysis, as well as an online data analysis tool. However, among interviewed stakeholders in Africa, the evaluation found that the website was mainly visited by students and researchers. For media, CSOs and policy-makers, according to stakeholder interviews, their access to data depended more on their access to reports or their relationship with the Afrobarometer national partner in-country

By and large, key stakeholders reported that Afrobarometer data was considered mainly for academic use. In comparison, in Kenya, the national partner has had greater success encouraging the use by civil society and policymakers in part due to efforts undertaken by the core partner which are above and beyond the required protocols to promote and engage diverse stakeholders on the data consistently throughout the year.

Media coverage of Afrobarometer data is another channel for accessing data. The Afrobarometer global dissemination events after Round 5 gained national and international media attention led to the publication of 936 articles using or referencing Afrobarometer data.[95] Afrobarometer's national partners have limited relationships with media. In most countries, data is shared with media at dissemination events, which leads to event-driven reporting that includes Afrobarometer data. However, uptake and usage of Afrobarometer data could be increased through the use of targeted disseminations, where national partners engage over a longer period of time with selected stakeholders who it is felt Afrobarometer would be particularly relevant to, to build their familiarity with the data set and capacity to analyse the data.

Providing access to Afrobarometer data outside of large cities was consistently reported as a challenge by national partners and key stakeholders. According to Afrobarometer national partners, local governments or people in more rural areas are unable to access Afrobarometer data, due to internet connectivity issues and lack of awareness. This challenge is also related to the limited funding for dissemination events outside of large areas and of the challenges national level media outlets have reaching rural areas (with the exception of radio).

Overall, the strength of Afrobarometer's packaging of findings for policymakers has improved since Round 4. Best practice of topical presentations and distribution of brief reports with easy to understand figures have made Afrobarometer data more accessible. *Afrobarometer's use of press releases and short briefs through the Afrobarometer Dispatch series are examples of the recent emphasis on improving packaging of information. Long reports like those distributed in Mozambique remain too academic for most civil society and policymaker stakeholders.* Continuous engagement (targeted disseminations) and tailored capacity building with various stakeholders would further ensure that key stakeholders can regularly access and use Afrobarometer data

**While Afrobarometer has increased use of data by existing stakeholders and new stakeholders in Africa, it has been more successful in certain countries than others.**

Overall, the evidence suggests that Afrobarometer has had an increase in the use of its data within Africa during AREAP. Citations of Afrobarometer data in African print and electronic media increased to 850 as of May 2014 against a target of 300[96]. Afrobarometer has also used stakeholder workshops and dissemination events to grow its user base in-country. Through stakeholder workshops Afrobarometer intended to engage influential stakeholders in policy making in developing the country-specific questions as well as promoting Afrobarometer data.[97] However, it appears that Afrobarometer is reaching roughly the same individuals at the dissemination events year on year and that there is limited engagement with most of these key stakeholders in between events. Through other communication strategies including social media, its website and local media, Afrobarometer has demonstrated its reach to new users.

The evaluation has found that the majority of Afrobarometer's targeted stakeholders in countries report that they do not have capacity or understanding of how to analyse Afrobarometer data on their own. This has limited the extent to which Afrobarometer data has been taken up by new users. While Afrobarometer offers an online data analysis facility and provides simple charts and tables, the challenge may be that stakeholders do not have basic understanding of how to use public opinion data. Countries like Kenya and Benin where the Afrobarometer partner provided tailored sessions on the use of Afrobarometer data for a particular organisation are most successful in increasing the use of data by a diverse audience. Notably, in both these cases, staff are engaged on a long term basis and are able to nurture relationships as they have sustained funding and fewer competing interests.

[94] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;
[95] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[96] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[97] Afrobarometer Narrative Report 2013;

Similarly, continuous, targeted engagement (termed in Afrobarometer's 2014 internal evaluation as 'targeted disseminations') with various stakeholders in addition to one off dissemination events has been captured as a best practice for Afrobarometer data dissemination. The dissemination events themselves are clearly effective: in Botswana and Mozambique, stakeholders who attended dissemination events reported that they subsequently accessed Afrobarometer data online. However, in cases where national and core partners have engaged with stakeholders beyond the dissemination events, their efforts appear to successfully driven increased uptake and use of findings. For instance, in Kenya, the core partner, Institute for Development Studies (IDS), engages regularly with a diverse audience such as different government departments, CSOs and the private sector to ensure uptake of data. They leverage existing relationships, but also proactively and confidently reach out to potential new Afrobarometer users to introduce to them to the data and offer guidance if needed. Brand Kenya (an organisation which promotes Kenya's brand abroad), the Kenya Anti-Corruption Agency, and the Kenyan Army's use of Afrobarometer data and questions for their own questionnaire shows the interest of the national government in Afrobarometer data[98]. *Rather than viewing dissemination as making data available to key stakeholders, Afrobarometer may consider taking a more targeted approach, with national partners assessing the needs and incentives driving key stakeholder groups, and packaging data products accordingly.*

**Increased usage of Afrobarometer data by key stakeholders to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates at the national or regional levels in Africa:**

The use of Afrobarometer data in policy making at the national level continues to be difficult to track, although Afrobarometer have made valuable efforts to gather data on this from their national and core partners[99]. This data gives a sense for the different audiences and uses for Afrobarometer data at the national level, including informing policy Additionally, Afrobarometer has recently completed policy-user surveys to further understand how the data is being used in the sphere; however, the evaluation team did not have access to this information for the midterm evaluation.

*Afrobarometer have had some success raising the profile of their data and increasing usage by African policymakers, journalists and civil society organisations.* The increase from Round 4 to Round 5 in this respect is clear. However, Afrobarometer has had limited success in having their data explicitly used in policy debates at the national or regional level in Africa. National partners have made efforts to increase use of Afrobarometer data by government, including organising confidential government briefings in some of its countries prior to its official releases. However, the full use of data by government is still unknown, as government continues to be reticent to openly disclose use of Afrobarometer data.

In some countries, partners have strengthened their relationships with policy makers, who now will contact them when they want to access data. In Kenya, different government departments including the Ministry of Trade call the core partner, IDS, to request assistance with their data analysis. Across Afrobarometer countries, anti-corruption boards and election bodies have been the most active users of data. Political parties are especially interested in gauging their popularity through Afrobarometer data. In Malawi and Zimbabwe, Afrobarometer data caused a stir with political parties by accurately predicting the election results, but ultimately this use of Afrobarometer data showed the ability of public perception surveys to capture the situation on the ground[100]. Overall, key stakeholders reported that they view Afrobarometer as politically neutral, which speaks to the careful political balancing act national partners must maintain, and the risks associated with releasing some types of data at politically sensitive moments in a national political cycle.

While all Afrobarometer partners may not have the capacity or time to continuously engage with various stakeholders on how to use Afrobarometer data, by establishing Afrobarometer champions in government, Afrobarometer can increase its reach. In Benin, many of the policy makers who use Afrobarometer data are individuals who previously had ties to the Afrobarometer national partner through their studies, so they are familiar with Afrobarometer and the potential of the data for their work. These individuals act as champions by advocating for the use of Afrobarometer data in their government departments.

*Overall, the media's use of Afrobarometer data has increased over the past several years*. However, as previously mentioned, evidence shows in several countries that the media will generally write articles about the new Afrobarometer data immediately after dissemination events, but that there is a lack of analytical reporting using the

[98] Afrobarometer Portfolio Policy Visibility Sep 2014; Afrobarometer Kenya 4
[99] Afrobarometer Policy Visibility 2014
[100] Afrobarometer Policy Visibility 2014;

data, or continued use of the data throughout the course of the year. In a few cases, journalists claimed that the data was not user-friendly for them, as they are "not friendly with figures". In some cases, though, Afrobarometer partners have had significant success raising media interest in the data and encouraging in- depth, substantive coverage of findings. In Tunisia, the national partner SIGMA has a stronger relationship with local journalists and key editors at a prominent national newspaper and has shared data with them on a more regular basis, developing a deeper institutional relationship[101]. In turn, the newspaper has regularly written stories using and citing Afrobarometer data, giving the data a level of national influence and visibility.

*International donors and researchers appear to highly value Afrobarometer's data for its use for designing programs and interventions, as it is unique in capturing comparable, relevant and robust perception data across the continent.* In several countries, Afrobarometer partners have organised donor briefings, as separate dissemination events, which were often funded by the donor community[102]. In some cases, donors and policy makers were also interested in using Afrobarometer data for monitoring activities at a sub-national level, but in a couple of cases, the sampling in intervention areas was not representative enough for that use, as it is only representative nationally. For example, in Kenya due to the devolved system of government, stakeholders stressed the need for representative samples at the county level. Given similar needs in other countries, donors and organisations across Afrobarometer countries have shown interest in developing a version of the Afrobarometer questionnaire that meets their specific programme requirements, and boosting the sample in countries where there is a clear value in gathering data which is representative at country, or provincial levels.

Conclusions relating to effectiveness (Afrobarometer):

- Afrobarometer has successfully increased the use of its data by stakeholders as captured through visits to its website and uptake in media.
- All of Afrobarometer's targeted stakeholders do not have the capacity to analyse Afrobarometer data at great depth and may not have basic understanding of how to use opinion polling data, underlining the need for effective packaging of data and analysis. Afrobarometer has improved packaging of information since Round 4 through the use of topical presentations, press releases and shorter briefs.
- Stakeholder workshops and other event-based dissemination have increased the use of Afrobarometer data, but could be strengthened through continuous engagement with targeted stakeholders (targeted disseminations), which appears to be a best practice as it promotes regular access and use that is tailored to the users' needs.

Recommendations relating to effectiveness (Afrobarometer):

- Afrobarometer may consider strengthening its relationships with key stakeholders through continuous engagement (targeted disseminations) and tailored capacity-building instead of having a limited number of events around dissemination of each survey round's data release.
- Afrobarometer may consider building capacity of its stakeholders to use data by targeting its presentations and tailoring assistance to their needs.
- Afrobarometer may consider exploring relationships with other stakeholders such as the private sector who could be a new audience for their data.

### 5.4.5 To what extent do alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust, both between NSAs and between NSAs and the state, contribute to increased pro-poor policy engagement and change?

This evaluation question is specific to the Southern Africa Trust, to test aspects of their theory of change which are unique to them within AREAP. To assess it, the evaluation considered three key criteria:

- the extent to which increased and strengthened policy engagement at regional and national levels by alliances and networks have been supported by the Southern Africa Trust;

[101] Afrobarometer Tunisia 5; Afrobarometer Tunisia 6
[102] Afrobarometer Policy Visibility 2014;

- the extent to which organisations and alliances supported by the Trust under AREAP have strengthened their focus on pro-poor themes and issues in policy advocacy and campaigns at regional and national levels; and
- the extent to which organisations and alliances supported by the Trust have contributed to national and regional policy change and improved governance processes.

Overall, the evidence clearly demonstrates that alliances and organisations supported by the Trust have contributed to increased pro-poor policy engagement and change at the regional level, and in some cases at the national level.

**Long-term capacity building of key non-state coalitions, associations and alliances**

The Trust has a relatively stable group of organisations and associations they support in the Southern Africa region. Many of these groups have received Trust support for a relatively long period of time, which has allowed them to develop sustained capacity and strength. Over time, the Trust has built the institutional capacity in a variety of ways, including through providing grants, connecting grantees with peer organisations in the Trust's network, providing opportunities for engagement and learning. During AREAP, it appears that the Trust has moved from focusing on capacity-building for most of its longer-term grantees, towards financing programming. For newer organisations or alliances, organisational capacity-building continues to be a focus.

The evidence suggests that organisations and alliances supported by the Trust have developed stronger systems and institutional strength over time (although much of this appears to have occurred prior to AREAP), or in some cases individual capacity through staff participation in the Trust's Leadership for Change programme. The Leadership for Change programme appears to have built the capacity of the individuals who participated in it, who report being better able to advocate and engage on key regional issues. However, as noted in Section 5.1, the quality and depth of the capacity-building support provided by the Trust to grantee organisations appears mixed; in some cases, generally with regional apex organisations like the Southern Africa Miner's Association or the Southern Africa Confederations of Agriculture Unions, the Trust has clearly supported the formalisation of these organisations and the development of internal systems,. In other cases, generally with national organisations engaging at the regional level like the Association of Mozambican Miners or ZIMCODD, the Trust's contribution is not clear, as these organisations were engaging on a regional level prior to their interactions with the Trust, which appear limited to receiving funding to attend forums. Further, at both the national and regional levels most of this capacity building appears to have taken place prior to AREAP, with the Trust's funding to grantees now concentrated on programming[103].

*The Trust could more clearly evidence and articulate its view of the capacity development journey that its national and regional grantees are on, developing a clearer assessment of the level and quality of capacities and technical skills that have been developed within supported organisations.* Additionally, in terms of building sustained relationships with policymakers and developing technical skills for advocacy, the Trust's contribution is less clear; in several cases policy engagement between organisations appears to have been a one-off, making it difficult to assess whether a deeper relationship has developed. This is particularly relevant in terms of the sustainability of the policy engagements facilitated by the Trust.

The sustainability of the Trust's contributions to the SADC Regional Poverty Observatory are also unclear. While the Trust seconds staff to the SADC Secretariat to support the Regional Poverty Observatory, it's unclear whether capacity within the Secretariat has been created to sustain support for the Observatory, or to what extent the institutional capacity of the Observatory itself has been increased.

Building on the strength of these relationships, Trust stakeholders indicated during the primary research that in terms of influencing the broader sector and engaging their networks in their organisational vision and strategy, the Trust were 'punching below their weight'. *The Trust could be more inclusive and open in their internal strategic planning, engaging their stakeholders more actively to increase their influence in the sector and increase the transparency of their approach and thinking.*

**Increased pro-poor policy engagement and change at the regional level**

Organisations and alliances supported by the Trust have had success engaging SADC at the regional level, particularly the SADC Secretariat, and influencing SADC policies and strategies. This includes the SADC Regional

[103] Trust 3

Agricultural Policy, Youth Strategy and Tripartite Trade Agreements. However, as noted in Section 5.1.1 the extent to which sustained capacity has been built, and the sustainability of these engagements is unclear in terms of whether they would continue to take place without the Trust's explicit facilitation. However, in some cases, for instance the success of the Youth Forum, the Trust contributed to success but other organisations also funded the summit and played strong supporting roles, indicating a level of sustained capacity and durable space for engagement.

In terms of the substance of these engagements, the organisations and alliances supported by the Trust in these engagements represent small holder farmers (who are primarily women), informal cross-border traders, youth and miners, which are largely constituencies of the poor. It can be taken that their policy positions would benefit and represent their constituencies and are therefore strongly pro-poor, and in some cases also gender sensitive to include and benefit women. There is less evidence, however, on whether these policies have been implemented or whether the impacts of these changes have benefited the poor. *The Trust may consider extending its M&E efforts on capturing the impacts of its work at the national level, to evidence the value of influencing SADC policies in terms of their long-term impacts on the lives of women and the poor in Southern Africa***.**

**Less evidence on pro-poor engagement or policy change on regional issues at the national level**

In terms of national policy engagement and change, there is little evidence on the extent to which organisations and alliances supported by the Trust engage on regional issues at the national level, as this is not generally part of the Trust's approach. There is clear evidence to support the relevance of the Trust's regional approach and focus. However, as noted in Section 5.1.1, regional issues are rooted in national and local problems, and after strategies are passed at the regional level they require domestication and implementation at the national level to effect change. The most notable success at the national level, which has previously been captured in this report, is around the portability of pensions and social protection for migrant miners working in South Africa. The Trust's contributions to success on the portability of pensions for migrant minders in South Africa which was achieved through national political pressure and awareness within South Africa and did not involve SADC to achieve meaningful policy change on a key regional issue. This may call into question aspects of the Trust's theory of change: *it signals that there may be a need and opportunity to expand work at the national level, to ensure SADC policies are domesticated and push for national action on regional issues, using a 'dual prong' approach to push for change at both the national and SADC- level.*

Conclusions relating to effectiveness (the Trust):

- The Trust has engaged very effectively at the regional level and has built institutional capacity within its grantees which are regional apex organisations, but could increase the impact of its work by: ensuring sustainable technical capacities for advocacy are developed within grantees; ensuring that durable and broad spaces for state-society dialogue with SADC are being created; and extending its regional focus back to the national level to capacitate national organisations engaging on regional issues support implementation of SADC policy changes and protocols.

Recommendations relating to effectiveness (the Trust):

- The Trust may want to more clearly evidence and articulate its view of the capacity development journey that its national and regional grantees are on, developing a clearer assessment of the level and quality of capacities and technical skills that have been developed within supported organisations
- The Trust may want to consider expanding its M&E activities, to gather evidence on the impacts of its work engaging SADC and influencing regional policies on the lives of women and the poor at the national level in Southern Africa. This is critical aspect of testing and assessing the coherence of the Trust's theory of change.
- The Trust could strengthen its 'dual-prong' approach to engaging government and civil society on regional issues, continuing technocratic engagement at SADC Secretariat level, but also increasing engagement at national level, to strengthen demand-side political pressure on SADC for policy change and domestication of new protocols.
- The Trust may want to consider including a wider group of grantees and partners in their internal strategic thinking, research and learning, to make their approach more transparent and participatory,

and to increase their influence in the sector more broadly.

### 5.4.6 To what extent has SOTU strengthened national and continental level relationships of accountability between governments, citizens and the AU?

In order to assess SOTU's contributions to strengthened national and continental relationships of accountability between governments, citizens and the AU, the evaluation considered three key criteria:

- the extent to which citizens demand change in the areas SOTU target;
- the extent to which national platforms and CSOs have successfully advocated in general for domestication of target AU standards; and
- the extent to which national platforms and CSOS have pressured government to follow-through and apply domesticated standards.

As this is the midterm evaluation, 'success' in terms of advocating for domestication of target AU standards was defined in terms of the level of substantive engagement with key policymakers on the target issues and AU protocols. To this end, SOTU claim contributions to the domestication of AU protocols in South Sudan and policy change has been achieved in one of the nine countries with operational SOTU national platforms, which are the focus of SOTU's work under AREAP: Ghana. As SOTU has only contributed to policy change in one partner country, relatively little evidence was available on the final criteria for this question, concerning follow-through and application of domesticated standards, although the indicator is still considered relevant and it will be assessed for the endline evaluation.

Overall, there is clear evidence that SOTU national platforms are targeting issues that are relevant at the national and continental levels. There is also evidence that national platforms have successfully engaged government around these issues, although the quality, amount and depth of this engagement has varied between platforms.

**Targeting relevant issues**

SOTU originally adopted a list of14 AU protocols that national platforms would promote. However, early into implementation, it realised that focusing made much more sense, so each national platform has selected 4 AU protocols which it feels are particularly relevant in their context or which they can influence.

In a thematic sense, the issues targeted by the SOTU platforms generally have a high level of public awareness. For instance land reform issues targeted by the national platform in Kenya are a major issue in national political discussions; agriculture is similarly debated in Rwanda. However, in terms of awareness of the AU or the specific protocols, citizen awareness continues to be fairly low across the board. The evidence suggests that SOTU national platforms tend to frame issues thematically in public, but will focus on AU protocols in policy discussions and research targeted at policymakers.

**Strengthened national platforms and increased focus on the AU**

SOTU have organised their national platforms around existing CSOs or CSO coalitions, which for the most part already had significant capacity and credibility domestically advocating on policy. Moreover, platforms selected which AU protocols they wanted to focus on, generally selecting protocols that were relevant to the areas in which they already worked. *For this reason, SOTU have been able to leverage a substantial amount of existing pre-existing expertise, networks and capacity, allowing SOTU to have an accelerated start, once national platforms were formed.*

However, this makes it more difficult to assess the extent to which SOTU have directly built additional capacity within the national platforms. The evidence clearly suggests that national platforms have become more focused in their efforts to engage policymakers, have built new relationships with government and increased their work through partnerships. Evidence also suggests that SOTU has helped national platforms reinforce the linkage in their work between the national and continental, introducing a new focus on emphasising AU protocols when advocating around a particular issue.

*Generally, the evidence suggests that SOTU national platforms have less capacity to engage in public awareness campaigns or generate awareness of AU protocols among the general public, or with the media.* National platforms appear more oriented towards higher-level policy engagement with government. Media interest appears to already exist, as platforms are targeting issues which are already generating attention and debates domestically, which

suggests that an opportunity exists for platforms to engage more effectively in these broader public debates. A notable exception to this has been the Rwandan platform's successful awareness campaign and activities in universities. The SOTU secretariat has also struggled to develop an AU focused public awareness campaigns, although they are working to build on this experience and develop a new campaign, 'My African Union'. Developing public awareness of the African Union is a significant challenge, though, particularly among the public in rural and peri-urban areas; if this is felt to be an important area for SOTU national partners then focused activities and capacities may need to be developed to achieve success.

*Evidence also supports a continuing role for the SOTU secretariat.* Without a convening secretariat, or other incentive structure supporting and incentivising collaboration and horizontal learning, it is unclear whether the national platforms would continue working together. This appears to be due to distance and competing priorities, as platforms report that collaborations and learning through SOTU have been of use, particularly between platforms operating in similar contexts. The SOTU secretariat also appears to have a continuing role in terms of building more sophisticated technical capacity for advocacy and helping national platforms maintain their focus on the AU protocols.

Conclusions relating to effectiveness (SOTU):

- SOTU has accomplished much over the past 18 months, creating and strengthening national partners, sharpening their focus on AU instruments. Vibrant national platforms have been created or strengthened, and their capacity to engage government has increased. To further strengthen the capacity of national platforms to influence government policy, the SOTU secretariat could increase the technical capacity building support it provides national partners, and further incentivise and support horizontal learning between countries.

Recommendations relating to effectiveness (SOTU):

- SOTU platforms may want to consider increasing horizontal learning, as these exchanges appear to hold promise in terms of building capacity and sharing relevant learning.
- The SOTU secretariat may want to consider providing additional capacity building support to platforms around media engagement strategies.
- SOTU national platforms should continue strengthening their capacity around engaging policymakers, to continue to push for policy change. In cases where policy change is achieved, platforms should expand activities to include monitoring the implementation of these new policies.

### 5.4.7 What interventions increase the value that governments see in engaging with citizens, especially through civil society organisations and other non-state actors, taking into account their views and goals? What makes decision makers more receptive to and responsive to informed citizen demand?

For this question, the evaluation looked across the work of the three IPs, to identify and assess interventions that appear to increase the value that government see in engaging with citizens, in different contexts. Several promising approaches have been used under AREAP to strengthen engagement between civil society and policymakers, and some key contextual factors have become apparent through primary research and the qualitative comparative analysis:

**Value of working simultaneously with government and NSAs, across both fields**

*Evidence shows that the Trust and a few SOTU national platforms have had success by operating simultaneously with the state using a more technocratic approach, and with activists raising public and grassroots awareness to apply political pressure on issues*. Rather than viewing the state through an adversarial lens, this approach encourages productive engagement between NSAs and the state, working together with the bureaucracy to change policy rather than relying solely on political pressure to effect change. In this way, both demand and supply-side pressures for change are created. In the case of the SOTU national platform in Rwanda, this has included inviting the government to join the platform, to encourage active collaboration and engagement with civil society on

policy issues. The Trust has a clear vision of their role as a 'bridge', facilitating engagement between NSAs and the state, building capacity of NSAs to engage and opening space for such dialogue within the state.

Context appears to be highly influential in the success of this approach. *In contexts where political success relies more on internal dynamics within a party, rather than external competition between parties (such as relatively stable, de facto one party states, like Botswana, Mozambique and Rwanda), it appears more difficult to convince policymakers of the necessity or value of engaging with civil society.* SADC also appears to function in this way. In these cases, channels for engagement are more likely to be 'invitation- only' spaces which exist only when government feels they are useful. Operating in close collaboration with the state and leveraging personal relationships with policymakers, working simultaneously with civil society and the state appears more successful in these cases, to create spaces where engagement with civil society is viewed as collaborative, rather than putting the state in a defensive position. However, co-option is a significant risk; civil society organisations that gain influence through their close relationships with the state may be less likely to advocate challenging stances on issues which may jeopardise that relationship with the state.

**Leveraging existing interest and publicity to push policy engagement on relevant issues**

*Another approach used by AREAP IPs has been to opportunistically capitalise on events or issues which are in the public eye, leveraging that existing interest to draw attention to areas in which the IP is working.* SOTU has employed this strategy successfully on several levels. They have allowed national platforms to focus on AU protocols which are relevant at the national level, building on pre-existing institutional capacity and public interest to emphasise the relevance of the AU in the national debate. National platforms have also taken advantage of events like the AU Year of Agriculture and Food Security in 2014, using this as an opportunity to push for the domestication of key AU protocols on agriculture in Rwanda and Kenya, including organising a high-level workshop in Nairobi with Kenya's Pan-African Parliament representative. The national platform in Nigeria has also had success using research to shape the policy focus and increase the visibility of the AU in public debates, leveraging public interest and attention to put pressure on policymakers. The Trust has also successfully employed this approach, supporting grantees in Zimbabwe to leverage the People's Summit in 2014 to strengthen relationships with government and gain traction on issues. The evidence suggests that the success of this approach is also related to context. For this approach, context appears significant in terms of determining the best approach. Countries with a more fractured, multi-party political landscape, like Nigeria, Tunisia and Kenya, appear to provide more openings for civil society participation in politics. Public pressure and voice appears more effective in these cases as a way to gain policy leverage.

**Importance of identifying individual champions in government**

*The evidence strongly suggests that civil society organisations are more likely to influence policy when they have a specific individual to act as a champion in government that they can work with, rather than engaging generally with a department or having a MoU with a ministry.* For this description, a champion is understood to be an individual with whom the organisation has a specific relationship, who can act as an entry point into a network or institution, to facilitate awareness and access for an organisation. For SOTU national platforms in Kenya and Nigeria, and Trust partners in Zimbabwe and SADC, individual champions were described as instrumental to achieving positive outcomes.

**Value of partnership and leveraging existing strengths and credibility**

Evidence from all three IPs attests to the value of working through partners, including the importance of selecting strong and credible local partners. *Each of the IPs has sought to partner with well-respected, capable organisations at the national level, to leverage these organisations and alliances' pre-existing capacity and credibility. The extent to which IPs have done this appears to have factored in their success at the national level.* Clear examples of this include the Trust's partnership with the Mail and Guardian, SOTU's early success at the national level through selecting capable organisations to act as its national partners, and the successes of Afrobarometer national partners at dissemination through partners, such as SIGMA's partnership with the Al-Maghreb newspaper The level of credibility attained by IPs and their partners at the national level, in these cases appears to primarily relate to the level of organisational capacity, existing political and technical understanding, and presence of strong networks. The presence of grassroots constituencies appear less important, and figure less often in partner organisations selected by IPs, with the possible exception of SOTU national platforms, which engage more strongly with grassroots organisations. However, acting as part of strong alliances or coalitions, or in the case of Afrobarometer partners, acting through strong networks, does appear critical to success.

**Impact of evidence on policy depends on the context**

*The evidence on impact of evidence in policy change is mixed*. In the hands of a capable, policy oriented, well connected organisation, operating in a more politically fractured, multi-party context, evidence appears to be very effective at influencing policy. This is particularly supported by the experience of Afrobarometer and SOTU in Kenya, Tunisia and Nigeria. In de facto one-party states, for instance in Mozambique, government use of evidence in policymaking appears more limited and political factors outweigh it in the policymaking process. In contexts with a weak civil society, such as Botswana, or where partner organisations are less capable, less policy oriented, or less well connected, AREAP partner organisations struggled to generate local interest in the data or push uptake by the media, policymakers or civil society. Whether or not partners were private organisations or researchers appeared less important than their capacity, connections and ability to be continuously engaged. There were some cases of success for all of the IPs in these contexts in terms of using data and research to influence policymakers and as an advocacy tool, but increased and more sustained success may require higher levels of partner capacity and support by IPs.

Conclusions relating to effectiveness (engaging government):

- Evidence shows that the Trust and a few SOTU national platforms have had success by operating simultaneously with the state using a more technocratic approach, and with activists raising public and grassroots awareness to apply political pressure on issues.
- The evidence strongly suggests that civil society organisations are more likely to influence policy when they have a specific individual to act as a champion in government that they can work with, rather than engaging generally with a department or having a MoU with a ministry.
- Each of the IPs has sought to partner with well-respected, capable organisations at the national level, to leverage these organisations and alliances' pre-existing capacity and credibility. The extent to which IPs have done this appears to have factored in their success at the national level.
- *The evidence on impact of evidence in policy change is mixed* and highly context dependent, being more influential in politically fractured, multi-party contexts.

## 5.5 Efficiency

To determine the efficiency of AREAP the evaluation considered the policies, processes and procedures the implementing partners have used in the delivery of AREAP and considered the extent to which they are able to deliver economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity.

### 5.5.1 Have implementing partners made the best possible use of their comparative advantages to optimise achievement of results?

To assess whether implementing partners have made the best possible use of their comparative advantages to optimize achievement of results, the evaluation considered evidence of collaboration for mutual benefit, for organisational strengthening or for increased effectiveness.

The evaluation found that AREAP implementing partners have not used their comparative advantages effectively to optimize achievement of results. While implementing partners acknowledge that there is potential for making use of each other's comparative advantage, incidents of collaboration were limited in number and the majority were not systematic or institutionalized (further discuss in section 1.5). This type of ad hoc based collaboration is not sufficient to optimize achievement of results. It also does not contribute sufficiently to increase cost effectiveness of programme interventions.

### 5.5.2 Could the results generated by the programme to-date have been achieved in a more cost effective manner?

In considering whether results could have been achieved in a more cost efficient manner, the evaluation considered policies, processes and procedures applied by the three implementing partners to deliver their respective activities and interventions. The evaluation considered:

- Economy: Inputs being secured at the minimum necessary cost
- Efficiency: Outputs are produced cost- efficiently

#### Economy

In assessing whether inputs are secured at the right price, the evaluation considered financial management procedures and processes. It specifically considered travel justifications and cost, hotel cost, staff salaries, and consultants' fees.

AREAP as a programme does not have unified policies or procedures across partners for determining costs. Each of the implementing partners has its own policies and procedures which are communicated to and agreed with DFID. However, the evaluation team did not have access to policies and procedures and relied on limited information from narrative reports and respondents' inputs to analyse and make a judgement.

The evidence indicates that each IP has its own procurement policies in line with DFID's requirements, and that all three partners require competitive procurement above certain threshold.

- SOTU finances and procurement systems are managed by Oxfam Netherlands and national platforms are trained on these procurements at the early stages of the partnerships.
- Afrobarometer's Project Management Unit tracks all major activities including travel and surveys and related cost across all portfolio in order to ensure spending is within allocated budget.
- The Trust has procurement policies for goods, services and consultants which also include benchmarks for costing. These also have specific approval processes and management procedures. The Trust requires two or three quotes as part of its tendering assessment process. Grantees are supplemented with guidelines on these policies and procedures and are closely managed.

With regards to travel and hotels, each IP also has its own policies and procedures.

- Travel for SOTU is decided on a case by case manner based on justification for the required travel. SOTU has internal processes for travel and hotel booking where flights are booked in advance to secure the cheapest available fare, and accommodation is chosen based on the most cost effective option available.
- Afrobarometer travel is also decided on a case by case manner. A travel agency based in Accra handles travel arrangements for the Project Management Unit. Afrobarometer core partners arrange regional travel for themselves and national partners using regional agencies that know the best approach for travel within that region. By moving the headquarters of Afrobarometer to Ghana and working through regional core partners, Afrobarometer has been able to save on flight costs.
- The Trust also has clear processes and procedures for ensuring cheapest possible options of flights and hotels. The Trust identifies programme activities including travel at the beginning of each year in order to allow for early planning and booking of flights and accommodation.

While these practices and processes are applied, it is not clear whether IPs have established formal long-standing agreements with suppliers for key services (especially in travel and accommodation) to ensure cost-effectiveness.

The evaluation found that IPs use basic technology such as Skype and teleconferencing in order to minimize need for travel and certain administrative and logistics cost. While this is a common practice, there is no evidence of policies or guidelines on institutionalizing this practice.

Cost drivers for implementing partners are their own staffing/ programme management at the central level and their wider networks and downstream partners[104]. The cost is determined and reflected in the IP's central management budget, and the budget of their downstream partners.

[104] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;

- Afrobarometer established a standard format for partner budgeting. The Project Management Unit sub-contracts core partners which in turn extend contracts to national partners, and closely tracks performance across its portfolio. Staff salaries are determined in a decentralized way by Afrobarometer with no benchmarks or common processes to determine salaries.
- SOTU has a structured allocated budget and percentages for budget lines that is standardized for its members.
- The Trust's management meets and develops its annual workplan for all its workstreams annually. The discussion considers cost drivers of all its workstreams and leads to informed decisions which ensure value for money for all interventions and activities. The Trust has developed value for money charts which are used to base these discussions on and make informed decisions. For the Trust, while consultants' rates are determined with benchmarks, the Trust allows for exceptions in order to ensure best quality of services are secured.

The 2014 annual review report states that the Joint Management Unit is "keen to explore opportunities for how each of the core implementing partners can better benchmark the salary costs of their downstream partners (in addition to their own)"[105]. The evaluation team did not note any progress on this, or whether IPs will cooperate on benchmarking salaries within countries where more than one IP operates.

### Efficiency

To assess whether outputs are produced efficiently and in the right way the evaluation considered the procedures and processes implementing partners apply in order to deliver activities and interventions and to attain outputs.

Evidence shows that implementing partners have reduced or curtailed administrative cost while increasing and improving their activities.

- Afrobarometer curtailed cost increase of each round of surveys while increasing sample sizes for countries, achieving a less than 10% increase of cost while increasing average of sample size from 1,386 to 1,543[106].
- SOTU has decreased central cost by 37% as national platforms became more active and led their own respective national activities[107].
- The Trust has reduced the percentage of the administrative expenditure from 9% to 6.46%[108].

In terms of mitigating risk to improve efficiency, the evaluation found that IPs were attentive to risks and undertook mitigating measures to manage them, which translated to efficiently produced outputs.

- SOTU's delay in programme activities and identification of national platforms was one such risk mitigating measurement as management was prudent in analysing capacity of potential national partners and in capacitating them. This conscious management decision mitigated risk of failed interventions.
- Afrobarometer's decision not to proceed with activities in South Sudan or Ebola high-risk countries is also one such risk mitigating measure.

By leveraging additional resources, IPs are able to support intervention activities and achieve value for money. There is no evidence that AREAP as a whole has leveraged additional resources to support intervention activities.

- Afrobarometer signed a contract with the Institute of Development Studies to include questions on taxation for R5[109]. For R5.5, Afrobarometer signed special agreements with World Bank, United States Institute of Peace and the British Foreign Office for additional financial resources. Afrobarometer has signed agreements with Transparency International, Gates Foundation and the World Bank to leverage additional financial resources for Round 6[110].
- There is some evidence that the Trust has been successful in leveraging additional resources for its work, building on the core investment in its work made by DFID to secure funding from the Ford Foundation and

[105] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[106] 2014 AREAP annual review
[107] 2014 AREAP annual review
[108] 2014 AREAP annual review
[109] AB R5_Yr2_Technical Narrative_2012_final
[110] 2013 Afrobarometer narrative report

Gates Foundation, among others. However, the Trust is still heavily dependent on DFID funding, as it makes up 80 – 90% of its annual budget[111].

- While SOTU has not leveraged additional resources, it has accessed in-kind donations from its national members such as venues for meetings and existing partnerships with the media. The SOTU Secretariat has also leveraged its relationship with Oxfam to access advocacy resources, networking opportunities and in-house expertise.

The evaluation found that the IPs have been relatively flexible in their approach to delivery of interventions especially in delivering capacity building activities, to ensure efficient and relevant spending of funds.

- SOTU developed capacity building plans individually with new partners, to allow for more appropriate and tailored plans and spending, and to identify areas where support can be provided using in-house expertise. SOTU also mainly uses in house expertise for capacity building instead of external consultants, which reduces costs, but may affect the quality. As discussed in Section 5.4.2, the extent to which the SOTU Secretariat has effectively built capacity of its national members is not clear. Therefore, this may not be part of their value for money offering.
- For Afrobarometer, technical support and assistance to national platforms and partners has been provided as issues emerge, although capacity has also been built across national partners in several key areas that were identified as gaps across the network. This split approach has allowed Afrobarometer to build capacity as cost-efficiently as possible. Afrobarometer is also considering synchronizing the summer school training programme for Anglophone and Francophone countries' teams in order to ensure efficiency gains[112].
- The Trust has institutionalized capacity building, knowledge sharing and learning tools which are expected (as this evaluation did not measure their impact) to increase efficiency and cost effectiveness. For example, the Trust is developing an e-learning platform valued at ZAR 55,000 for short term programmes within its Leadership for Change programme[113].There is little evidence on the actual cost effects of these tools in terms of increasing efficiency, although it seems plausible that they have increased efficiency to some extent.

The evaluation could not examine nor compare cost of capacity building activities due to a lack of sufficient evidence.

### 5.5.3 How have the individual components of AREAP collaborated to leverage additional resources?

The evaluation did not find any evidence of incidents where implementing partners have collaborated to leverage additional resources. There is however incidence where IPs have independently leveraged resources such as free venues for meetings and other financial resources leveraged by the Trust (discussed in the previous section).

Conclusions relating to efficiency:

- There is limited evidence that the implementing partners have made the best possible use of their comparative advantages to optimize achievement of results within AREAP as a whole.
- IPs have different procurement policies and procedures in line with DFID's requirements and fit for purpose. However, no common benchmarks for cost of similar services or goods have been set.
- Flexibility in delivering activities allows for contextual and tailored design of activities, especially capacity building activities. However, institutionalized tools for capacity building and knowledge sharing, especially using technology is limited.
- The evaluation could not find evidence on to what extent activities of collaboration have resulted in optimized results.
- Afrobarometer has been successful in leveraging resources from various donors other than DFID. The Trust continues to rely heavily on DFID for 80-90%of its budget.

[111] Trust 3
[112] DFID AREAP Annual Review 2014;
[113] Value for Money- Leadership for Change

Recommendations relating to efficiency:

- IPs are encouraged to engage in discussions to identify opportunities for making the best possible use of their comparative advantages to optimize achievement of results.
- Identify institutionalized tools for capacity building and knowledge sharing especially using technology.
- IPs are encouraged to identify opportunities to leverage resources in the context of reducing their dependency on DFID and achieving value for money.

# 6 Conclusions

## 6.1 Relevance

There is evidence to suggest that each of the implementing partners have undertaken activities which build the technical and organisational capacity of their respective national partners, civil society coalitions and grantees. The types of capacity building provided by SOTU and the Trust could be strengthened, however, to ensure that technical skills relevant to policy advocacy are being built, along with sustained capacities to engage policymakers. While the SOTU coalition is still young, its influence on policy and strength of policy engagement is clear and growing. The SOTU Secretariat has provided institutional capacity building support to the national platforms to-date, but this support could be focused and increased particularly around supporting technical skills around policy advocacy and engaging with the media. The Trust is a more mature organisation, with a clear vision and strategy for supporting NSAs to engage SADC around developing more pro-poor regional policies. However, it could more clearly articulate and evidence its approach to capacity-building. Also the relevance of its work could be increased by expanding its engagement to the national level, to increase national political demand for policy change within SADC, and to strengthen implementation of pro-poor SADC policies at the national level. While the work of each of the implementing partners is broadly pro-poor, gender could be mainstreamed more strongly throughout AREAP.

## 6.2 Complementarity

To-date, AREAP has not functioned as a cohesive, integrated programme. Although areas of complementarity between the partners' activities and competencies were identified at the inception of the programme, the partners have not successfully engaged in any significant collaborative activities, aside from the Trust's brief period as SOTU's national partner in South Africa. Afrobarometer has made repeated attempts to engage the other implementing partners, with limited success. This has been a missed opportunity to leverage complementary skills sets to achieve better results. However, while collaboration was encouraged under AREAP, it was not required and the logframe does not contain any joint indicators, which limited the explicit incentives for collaboration. Although a joint theory of change was articulated at the inception of AREAP, it appears little understood within the implementing partners and the lack of collaboration makes it difficult to test and evidence.

## 6.3 Coordination

Each of the implementing partners works strongly through networks of national partners, national platforms made up of civil society coalitions and/or NSA grantees. However, formal or informal external partnerships across AREAP have been more uneven. At an institutional level, the Trust has most strongly engaged with external partners including Trust Africa, the Mail and Guardian newspaper and the Africa Grantmakers Network, to enhance its results and effectiveness. Afrobarometer have also made use of partnerships with the Arab Barometer survey to extend the reach of its work, and national. SOTU, a younger coalition, have focused on developing their national level partnerships and relationships and have not yet engaged partners at the continental level.

## 6.4 Effectiveness

Each of the implementing partners have made significant improvements and achieved key milestones during the first two years of AREAP. However, there are clearly areas that could be strengthened for each of the three implementing partners. Afrobarometer has greatly increased the number of country surveys it completed from Round 4 to Round 5 without a drop in quality or the robustness of its data. However, while it has made significant improvements in its dissemination and communication activities from Round 4, the quality of its dissemination efforts and packaging of data and analysis could still be strengthened to attract more African users for its data. SOTU has successfully established 9 operational national platforms, with a 10$^{th}$ partner identified, strengthened its partners and increased their focus on the African Union. However, it has not met its targets around contributing to policy change and domestication of AU instruments at the national level, and the role of the SOTU secretariat could be strengthened to provide stronger technical capacity-building support to national platforms and facilitate further horizontal learning within the coalition. The Trust has continued to strengthen NSA grantees and facilitate their engagements with SADC policymakers to successfully influence policy change across several areas. However, the link between shaping SADC policy and real improvements in the lives of women and the poor in the SADC region

is unclear and need to be more strongly evidenced. Further, the sustainability of the relationships between regional NSAs and SADC, and the durability and breadth of spaces for state-society dialogue could both be increased. It also appears that the Trust could increase its effectiveness and influence within the sector by being more inclusive and open in its strategic planning and learning processes, to leverage the high level of technical understanding and expertise within Trust staff to influence the sector more broadly.

## 6.5 Efficiency

All three of the implementing partners have sought to demonstrate value for money, with institutionalised procurement policies and procedures, and clear demonstrations of cost saving efficiencies that have been achieved within partner programming and activities. The implementing partners have also benefited from harmonised donor requirements, in the case of SOTU, and donor contributions to basket funds, in the case of Afrobarometer, which have resulted in efficiencies in terms of reducing staff time spent on reporting and decreasing waste or delays in project delivery due to financing. While DFID provides the large majority of the Trust's funding (80 – 90%), the Trust have successfully leveraged funding from the Gates and Ford Foundations, among others, and have succeeded in reducing their reliance on DFID by about 10% over the past two years. The Trust remains highly reliant on DFID for funding, which raises sustainability concerns for the organisation as a whole, but they have made some efforts to diversify their funding sources and reduce dependence.

# 7 Recommendations

## 7.1 Recommendations for Implementing Partners

**Recommendations for Afrobarometer:**

1. Clear interest appears at the national level for Afrobarometer data, which is accessible, but dissemination and packaging of data and findings could be strengthened to increase usage. Afrobarometer may consider strengthening its relationships with key stakeholders through continuous engagement ('targeted dissemination') in addition to having a limited number of events around dissemination of each survey round's data release, as the experience of some partners suggests that this would significantly increase update and usage of Afrobarometer data at the national level. Afrobarometer may consider also building the capacity of key stakeholders to use data by targeting its presentations and tailoring assistance to their needs, developing the capacity of key 'champions' who can use the data and help capacitate others. Afrobarometer may also consider exploring relationships with other stakeholders such as the private sector who could be a new audience for their data.

**Recommendations for SOTU:**

2. The SOTU Secretariat has a clear role to play in providing technical support to national platforms and facilitating engagement between platforms, but this role could be strengthened. The SOTU secretariat may be most useful as a capacity-building and technical support provider to the national platforms, to increase the platform's level of sophistication and technical skills around policy advocacy and media engagement. National platforms may want to consider increasing horizontal learning within the SOTU coalition, as these exchanges appear to hold promise in terms of building capacity and sharing relevant learning. The SOTU Secretariat may also have a role to play to help institutionalise these horizontal learning exchanges. SOTU national platforms should also continue strengthening their capacity around engaging policymakers, to continue to push for policy change. In cases where policy change is achieved, platforms should expand activities to include monitoring the implementation of these new policies.

**Recommendations for the Trust:**

3. The Trust has clear strengths and a focused strategic approach; however this approach could be extended and made more inclusive to increase the effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of the Trust's work. The Trust could strengthen and extend its 'bridging' approach to facilitating government and NSA engagement on regional issues, continuing technocratic engagement at the SADC Secretariat level, but increasing support to partners at the national level, to strengthen demand-side political pressure on SADC for policy change and pressure domestically for implementation of new, pro-poor SADC policies. The Trust may also want to consider strategies for making the space for dialogue it facilitates more durable and open for NSAs to engage SADC, to allow opportunities for a wider selection of NSAs to engage and increasing the long-term capacity of accountability mechanisms like the Regional Poverty Observatory to hold SADC governments to account. To make their approach more transparent and participatory, and to increase their influence in the sector more broadly, the Trust may want to consider including a wider group of grantees and partners in their internal strategic thinking, research and learning. They may also want to consider strengthening their M&E systems to more comprehensively reflect its' activities as a 'bridge' between NSAs and government, and to gather evidence on the impact of SADC policy change on the lives of women and the poor at the national level.

## 7.2 Recommendations for DFID and the Learning Hub

**Recommendations for DFID:**

4. AREAP has funded three strong civil society organisations working at the national and regional level in Africa, but it hasn't functioned as a cohesive, integrated programme. DFID may want to consider whether it wants

AREAP to proceed as a programme and if so, work with the implementing partners to develop a coordinated approach and add clear incentives for collaboration, or if it wants AREAP to proceed as a funding window for three implementing organisations whose work is complimentary, but separate. The AREAP logframe may also need to be revisited to ensure that it fully captures all IPs work under AREAP. The current AREAP Theory of Change may also want to be revisited, in light of DFID's decision on shape of AREAP as a programme and evolving implementing partner insights into how they believe their individual and joint activities will effect change.

**Recommendations for the Learning Hub**

5. The Learning Hub, which is set to be established in late 2014 – early 2015, should emphasise shared learning across IPs at the senior and country levels. While the implementing partners appear to have complementary skill sets and capacities, these synergies have not been explored to-date. The Learning Hub could help the implementing partners assess the relative value and prioritise the opportunities available in terms of collaboration, and establish learning objectives for joint collaboration.
6. The Learning Hub may consider facilitating IPs to share resources on capacity building for downstream partners. All of the implementing partners work with downstream partners at the national and regional level, which often involves capacity building activities. The Learning Hub may be an opportunity to share resources among implementing partners for building the capacity of their partners in for example policy advocacy activities.
7. The Learning Hub may also consider focusing on supporting the IPs around learning and improving M&E of empowerment and accountability programs. Findings on the effectiveness of the AREAP implementing partners indicate that results are not being appropriately captured in the current AREAP logframe. The Learning Hub could work with the IPs to develop guidance on M&E that can both inform AREAP's M&E systems, better evidence the impacts of IP activities, and the empowerment and accountability sector M&E frameworks.
8. The Learning Hub could provide valuable findings by conducting a case study to explore in what contexts does a strengthened evidence base on national and regional policy issues lead to increased legitimacy of civil society voice and space for civil society policy engagement. The evaluation team has conducted one case study at the midterm evaluation and will conduct another two case studies at the midterm evaluation. Undertaking a fourth case study is not within the scope of this evaluation, so the evaluation team would like to recommend the Learning Hub to undertake the fourth case study listed in the evaluation framework as an area of study.

## 7.3 Recommendations for the end-programme evaluation

9. Allow for a more iterative approach to data collection and analysis. The mid-term evaluation has been conducted on a slightly compressed time scale to accommodate donor timelines and requirements, which has limited the amount of iterative learning and data collection possible. It has also limited the number of interviews that the evaluation team was able to collect. The end-programme evaluation will work to increase the timescale for the evaluation data collection and analysis, so that primary and secondary data can be collected across a longer period, allowing for data collection and analysis to be more iterative and explorative.

# Annexes


Annex 1: Evaluation Terms of Reference

Annex 2: Theory of Change Workshop Report

Annex 3: Detailed Evaluation Methodology

Annex 4: Evaluation Framework

Annex 5: Interview Plan

Annex 6: Stakeholders Interviewed

Annex 7: Stakeholder References

Annex 8: Document List

Annex 9: QCA Report

Annex 10: SEQAS Methodology for Sample Selection

Annex 11: Assessment of Evaluation Bias

# Annex 1: Evaluation ToR

# Annex 1: AREAP Evaluation Terms of Reference

# Terms of Reference

## Evaluation of the Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme

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# INTRODUCTION

The Africa Regional Empowerment & Accountability Programme (AREAP) seeks to improve access to high quality relevant data, evidence and analysis for African citizens, non-state actors and policy makers. It also aims to support the development of coalitions of citizens to use this information, voice their concerns and interests and influence decisions of the state.

The programme is implemented by three regional organisations: (i) the Afrobarometer Network which conducts citizen opinion surveys across 35 countries in Africa, (ii) the Southern Africa Trust, which undertakes policy advocacy, capacity building and disbursement of grants provided for pro-poor regional integration, and (iii) the State of the Union Coalition, which focuses on engagement in policy development and monitoring state compliance with African Union decisions.

The Department for International Development (DFID) will provide up to £19.9m for AREAP which commenced in February 2012 and is scheduled to conclude in July 2016.

## 1. OBJECTIVE

These Terms of Reference set out the requirements for evaluation of AREAP. There will be two evaluation periods – a mid-Term Evaluation in 2014 and an End-Programme Evaluation in 2016. Evaluations will be conducted at (i) the level of each individual implementing partner (i.e. looking at implementing partner performance and testing individual partner theories of change), and (ii) the overall programme level (i.e. looking at the interaction between implementing partner activities and testing the overall programme theory of change).

The purpose of the evaluations will be both accountability and learning at the level of both the overall programme and its individual components.

Accountability: The evaluations will seek to establish the extent to which the programme has been *effective,* i.e. producing the results anticipated, and *efficient,* i.e. the least costly resources possible have been used to produce these results.

Learning: The evaluations will identify programme and non-programme related explanations for success and failure that could be "translated" into more effective, efficient and sustainable programme interventions.

The main objective of the evaluations will be to evaluate the contribution of programme interventions (in different contexts) to observed effects on political governance and aspects of empowerment, whether intended or unintended, with a

view to enhancing understanding and learning about what might work for the poor and marginalised in different contexts, and why.

## 2. RECIPIENT

DFID will be the recipient of the services on behalf of an Evaluation Steering Group. The primary audience for the evaluations will be the three implementing agencies, DFID as funder of this programme, and other funding partners contributing to the three implementing agencies *(see Annex 8)*. In addition, the evaluations are expected to be of interest to other funding agencies supporting similar initiatives on empowerment and accountability in Africa and elsewhere, civil society organisations and academics working on transparency, empowerment and accountability, and to decision makers in national governments and regional bodies in Africa.

## 3. SCOPE

AREAP is active in a total of 39 countries in Africa (see *Annex 3: Country Coverage*) which between them represent a range of political, social and economic contexts. Completing the evaluations envisaged by these terms of reference will require field work in a number of the countries in which this programme is active. A proposed sampling approach for field work selection is discussed in more detail as part of the methodology in section 5 (Requirements).

As noted in the Background section, the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) and implementing partners have taken several firm decisions regarding the overall scope of the evaluation:

- this evaluation will use a theory based evaluation (TBE) approach, i.e. an approach that elaborates and then test and re-tests the theories of change for the individual components and the overall programme. Our understanding of a TBE is that it is not method specific;
- it is not expected that this evaluation will be suited to experimental or quasi-experimental methods of impact evaluation. Bidders should propose other robust designs and approaches that will demonstrate contribution;
- there will be a strong focus on use of secondary data. This should include building on previous evaluations of Afrobarometer and Southern Africa Trust *(see Annex 5)*, though we do not have fixed views on how these previous evaluations should be used to inform the present one; and

- the evaluations will develop a limited amount of primary data, which will be qualitative and not quantitative. This may include illustrative case studies, interviews and surveys with key informants, country field visits.

# 5. REQUIREMENTS

## 5.1 Evaluation Approach

Both the Mid-Term Evaluations and End-Programme Evaluations are expected to use a theory based evaluation approach that elaborates and then tests and re-tests "rich" theories of change for the individual components and the overall programme, as recommended in the Evaluability Assessment *(Annex 4)*. They should seek to answer why a set of interventions produces certain effects, intended as well as unintended, for whom and in which contexts. The evaluations will test hypotheses within the overarching theory of change and for the individual programmes about how programme elements are expected to produce particular changes.

The evaluation team should take as a starting point the theory of change for the overall programme presented in the Business Case (*Annex 1)* and the draft theories of change for individual programme components presented in implementing partners' Inception Reports *(Annex 6)*. The evaluation team is expected to work with implementing partners and other stakeholders to further elaborate these individual "rich" theories of change, and to use them to further develop the overall programme theory of change, during the inception phase.

The evaluations should then seek to establish the extent to which the programme elements have been implemented, the extent to which the expected changes have occurred and the plausibility or otherwise of one having contributed to the other.

Bidders should also consider whether there is value in additionally using realistic evaluation approaches to allow for testing of emergent or unpredictable effects, such as synergies between the individual programme components. The choice and balance of planned evaluation approach(es) should be indicated and justified in evaluation bids. The evaluation approach should then be further elaborated, along with the theories of change and a detailed evaluation framework and questions, during the evaluation inception phase.

## 5.2 Evaluation questions

Evaluation questions should be informed by the theories of change, and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria. It is expected that the Mid-Term Evaluations will focus particularly on the DAC evaluation criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance. The End-Programme Evaluations should additionally cover the criteria of impact and sustainability.[1]

The section below lists some indicative evaluation questions which DFID and partners have selected as likely priorities amongst the list of possible questions suggested in the Evaluability Assessment *(see Annex 4)*. This is not a fixed list and

[1] DFID expects questions of impact and sustainability are more feasible to answer in the End Programme Evaluation. This differs from the initial suggestions in the Evaluability Assessment

should be refined by the evaluation team, informed by further work on the theories of change, and additional consultation during the evaluation inception period.

Mid-Term Evaluations

Questions that might be relevant and realistic to ask by the Mid-Term Evaluations include the following:

*Efficiency:*

- Have the implementing partners made the best possible use of their strengths and comparative advantages to optimise achievement of results? How can this be strengthened?

*Effectiveness:*

- To what extent have planned results of individual initiatives been achieved and are the individual intervention logics working?
    - Have existing interventions worked and is the intervention strategy working? Are we doing the right things? Are we making the right assumptions about what is required and what would work?
- To what extent has the overarching theory of change and the design intentions inherent to the overall programme contributed to, or impeded, the achievement of results?
    - Is the "general direction of travel" favourable in terms of creating the necessary conditions for change to make the public sector more accountable to citizens?

*Relevance:*

- To what extent have programme initiatives and results been relevant to women and the poor?
- What has been learnt from developing a continental programme approach in an intervention of this nature?

End-Programme Evaluations

The End-Programme Evaluations would be expected to provide further analysis of some of the questions above; additional relevant questions are suggested below:

*Efficiency:*

- Could the results generated by the programme and individual components have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner?

*Effectiveness:*

- What interventions increase the value that governments see in engaging with citizens, especially through civil society organisations and other non-state actors, and taking into account their views and goals? What makes decision makers more receptive to and responsive to informed citizen demand?

- What roles have tools such as media and new technology played in empowering people and groups?

*Relevance:*

- Are the poor engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change and what drivers influence their participation?
- Does evidence generation and civic engagement at continental and regional level support improvements in national governance?
- To what extent are lessons learnt from this programme relevant for working effectively with regional economic communities?

*Impact:*

- What have been the immediate intended and unintended results achieved by different interventions? And by the overall programme? What are the likely longer-term effects of these results?
- For whom have the results made a difference?

*Sustainability:*

- Are the results that have been achieved by the programme to date likely to be sustained?
- Have the programme interventions created capacities for sustained results?

## 5.3 Evaluation Methodology

There will be two evaluation phases: Mid-Term Evaluations in Year 3, to be finalised by November 2014; and End-Programme Evaluations in Year 5 of the programme, to be finalised by May 2016.[2]

The Mid Term and End Programme Evaluations (at the component and programme level) will be Theory-Based Evaluations that will test hypotheses against the evaluations questions outlined above and refined during inception. The Mid-Term Evaluations in Year 3 will also incorporate elements of design/process to the extent necessary to evaluate how the roles and management of the different implementing partners and funding partners have contributed to/detracted from achievement of results and to inform the Annual Review which will also be produced during Year 3.

By way of guidance, the PSC decided that in order to ensure sufficient contextual analysis the evaluation should entail, as a minimum, field work in:

- two countries where three of the implementing partners are operating the programme;
- two countries where two of the implementing partners are operating the programme; and

[2] These dates for the Mid-Term Evaluation and End of Programme Evaluation replace those set out in the Evaluability Assessment.

- three countries where only one implementing partner is operating the programme (one per implementing partner).

DFID has built on this guidance and commissioned its independent Specialist Evaluation and Quality Assurance Service provider to develop and apply a country sampling approach. This approach has been developed at this stage to ensure adequate coverage through field work and enable potential bidders to detail their ability to implement the ToRs in the range of contexts required (including managing safety and security risks).

The sampling approach is set out at *Annex 7: Sampling Approach*. The approach provides a two-way stratification (using governance performance and country context criteria) and then sets out a random approach to sampling across partitions. This approach identifies 8 countries (2 for each quartile of the governance partitioning) which also meets the criteria set out above on implementing partner coverage.

The 8 suggested countries identified for field work are: Benin, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and Uganda. There will be an opportunity to review country selection during the evaluation inception phase alongside development of the full evaluation methodology.

## 5.4 Information Sources

The programme will generate a range of data which the evaluators will be able to draw upon, outlined below. It is expected that the evaluation team will need to use a mixture of secondary data generated by the project, and additional primary data collection through interviews and/or questionnaires of key individual stakeholders. There is no expectation of quantitative primary data collection.

The evaluations will be able to draw on data and information generated by different programme stakeholders, including implementing partners, the Hub and management bodies and other funding partners, during the course of their programme activities. These will include past evaluations of individual components *(see Annex 5)*, programme Inception Reports prepared 6 months into the programme, which include further elaboration of the theory of change for each component and the overall programme *(Annex 6)*, Annual Reviews of progress against the logical framework indicators, and additional narrative progress reports for each programme component. *(See Annex 4: Evaluability Assessment for further details on responsibility for routine progress monitoring by implementing partners, the Hub and the JMU.)*

In addition, the evaluations will be able to draw on Case Studies produced by the Hub, drawing on the experiences of implementing partners, to illustrate what has worked and what has worked less well in different contexts, and why.

Case studies could be constructed around standard frameworks with clearly specified questions to facilitate comparison, building on the possible questions suggested in the Evaluability Assessment *(see Annex 4, p22)*. The explanations of why certain interventions have worked well and less well could be related to various assumptions in the theory of change. The evaluators are encouraged to provide early advice to the Hub and implementing partners to ensure the format of these Case Studies will meet

information needs for evaluation. Evaluation bids may also propose other qualitative data collection and analysis that would help to answer evaluation questions, to be undertaken by the evaluation team or the Hub or others. These would be negotiated during the evaluation inception phase.

## 5.5 Evaluation Proposals

Evaluation proposals should, as a minimum, include the following information:

- the choice and balance of evaluation approaches proposed to address the identified evaluation requirements set out in these terms of reference;
- a clear outline of the relevant skills and experience of proposed evaluation team members, including any Southern-based research partners, in using these types of approaches;
- expected data sources, and sampling methods, including the extent to which the team propose the use of existing monitoring data or engage in new qualitative data collection;
- a proposed approach to the inception phase, including a work plan, timeline and responsibilities for the evaluation;
- how they would quality assure the inception design and evaluation reports;
- identify relevant risks, challenges and proposed responses (building on the potential challenges identified in the Evaluability Assessment); and
- costings for the evaluation methods expected to be used, including any qualitative primary data collection expected to be necessary.

Finally, in order to meet the quality standards expected of DFID-funded evaluations, the following requirements should be addressed in the proposal:

- how the evaluations will address how the programme has focused on the poorest and issues of equity, exclusion and gender;
- how the evaluators will ensure they adhere to DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation; and
- how the evaluators will ensure they adhere to DFID's Ethical Guidance for Research and Evaluation.

## 5.6 Outputs

These Terms of Reference require the contractors to produce the following outputs, within the indicative timelines set out:

- Evaluation Inception Report within three months of contract start date which addresses the following areas:
    - development of an agreed full analytical framework for the evaluation, ensuring consistency with logframes and programme monitoring plans;

- elaboration of the three component theories of change and the overall programme theory of change with inputs from implementing partners and other stakeholders, ensuring a sufficiently clear basis for evaluation;
- determination of what evaluation questions will be used to test the theories of change;
- elaboration of the overarching evaluation design and methodology, including details of the analytical basis on which evaluative judgments will be made and how they will address the issue of bias;
- detail of (a) the data (quantitative and qualitative) required to address questions and assumptions, (b) the data sources that will be used, identifying where they expect to use existing data and where new data will be collected, (c) the methods for collecting new data, and (d) how country visits will be used;
- set out the overall process map, work plan, timeline and responsibilities for the evaluation;
- identify the full set of relevant stakeholders, including other funding partners, building on the list of suggested stakeholders (*Annex 8)*; and
- set out the design for a communications and dissemination plan for the evaluation to ensure evaluation findings will be accessible to the identified audience and wider stakeholders for the evaluations. There will be a presumption in favour of publication in peer reviewed journals.

- Progress Reports (up to 5 pages) every 3 months after completion of the inception phase, summarising the ongoing evaluation process for the past 3 months, with any recommendations for changes and justification of these.
- Annual Review in DFID format in Year 4: Draft by April 2015 (*See Annex 10: DFID Guidance for Reviewing and Scoring Projects and Annex 11: DFID Annual Review Template)*
- Project Completion Review in DFID format in Year 5: Draft by April 2016 *(See Annex 12: DFID Project Completion Review Template)*
- Mid-Term Evaluation Reports at level of programme and individual components, to include a set of actionable recommendations: Draft component reports by October 2014, Final Reports by November 2014. Draft programme report by November 2014, final report by December 2014.
- End-Programme Evaluation Reports at level of programme and individual components, to include a set of actionable recommendations: Draft component reports by January 2016, final component reports by March 2016. Draft programme report by March 2016, final programme report by May 2016.

All outputs must be 12 point Arial font using non-technical, accessible English.

## 5.7 Skills and Expertise

It is anticipated that the evaluations would require a team of consultants with the following expertise and/or experience:

- team leader experience of designing and managing multi-country research or evaluation studies, that test across contexts and are concerned with external validity;
- proven experience of evaluation of complex governance / political governance / empowerment and accountability programmes in sub-Saharan Africa including programmes operating at a regional level;
- good understanding of the interaction between political governance challenges and state-society dynamics in different contexts and stages of state-building;
- experience of policy related work, in particular in a poverty reduction context;
- knowledge and experience of developing and using theories of change;
- in-depth knowledge of different approaches to impact evaluation, that are appropriate to Theory Based Evaluation and that demonstrate cause and effect;
- proven expertise in use and analysis of qualitative and quantitative data and statistical sampling expertise;
- expertise in social, gender, equity and diversity analysis and their application in evaluation and / or research; and
- sound evaluation record, including knowledge of international evaluation standards, and research ethics.

## 5.8 Timeline

This contract will commence in June 2014 for a period of 24 months expiring in June 2016. The inception phase will be for a period of up to 3 months. DFID reserves the right to extend the contract for up to 12 months, on the basis of continued need, and availability of funding.

| | |
|---|---|
| June 2014 | Evaluation inception phase commences (3 months) |
| August 2014 | Inception report & finalised Evaluation Framework and Designs |
| October 2014 | Draft Component Mid-Term Evaluation Reports |
| November 2014 | Final Component Mid-Term Evaluation Reports<br><br>Draft Programme Mid-Term Evaluation Report |

| | |
|---|---|
| | Progress Report |
| December 2014 | Final Programme Mid-Term Evaluation Report |
| February 2015 | Progress Report |
| April 2015 | Draft Annual Review |
| May 2015 | Progress Report |
| August 2015 | Progress Report |
| November 2015 | Progress Report |
| January 2016 | Draft Component End-Programme Evaluation Reports |
| February 2016 | Progress Report |
| March 2016 | Draft Programme Evaluation Report<br>Final Component End-Programme Evaluation Reports |
| June 2016 | Final Programme Evaluation Report<br>Draft Project Completion Report<br>End of evaluation management report |

## 6. IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

Progression to the implementation phase of these terms of reference will be subject to satisfactory completion of the three month inception phase.

The inception report and draft evaluation reports will be subject to review by the Evaluation Steering Group (ESG), informed by a technical assessment by DFID's External Quality Assurance Panel *(see template at Annex 9)*. Three weeks should be allowed between submission of each report to ARD and receipt of comments.

More detail is provided on the composition of the ESG below.

## 7. REPORTING

Reports will be delivered at the end of the inception period, and thereafter progress reports will be delivered every three months (as set out in the Requirements section).

All evaluation outputs should be sent to the chair of the Evaluation Steering Group or in their absence ARD's Governance Adviser. The Evaluation Steering Group will be responsible for assuring the future utility of the evaluations, and to ensure that international quality standards are met, including adherence of the evaluation process to the DAC Evaluation Principles of impartiality, transparency, independence, credibility and partnership and the DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation.

Membership of the Evaluation Steering Group is intended to include: an independent evaluation expert; a representative of DFID's Empowerment and Accountability Team in Policy Division; DFID's thematic Evaluation Adviser for Governance & Social Development; DFID's Africa Regional Department Governance Adviser and/or DFID Southern Africa Social Development Adviser; and one or two NSA representatives from countries where at least two of the three implementing agencies operate.

DFID reserves the option to scale back (or terminate) or scale up funding depending on performance (including quality of deliverables) an on-going need.

## 8. MILESTONE PAYMENTS

When a Supplier reaches and has achieved a key milestone satisfactorily the sooner the supplier will be paid. Any milestones to be reached as part of this contract will be identified throughout the Terms of Reference and as agreed with DFID for the life of the evaluation programme.

An invoice will be issued to DFID by the Supplier on satisfactory completion of each key milestone.

## 9. DFID CO-ORDINATION/LOGISTICS

The first point of contact for consultant/s regarding the content and process for the evaluations will be DFID Africa Regional Department (ARD)'s Governance Adviser. Matters regarding the contract for evaluation work will be handled by ARD's Deputy Programme Manager.

The consultant/s will be introduced by DFID's African Regional Department (ARD) and Southern Africa Regional Office to DFID Country Office (CO) contacts and the Implementing Partners nominated lead contacts. The latter will introduce the consultant/s to national representative where required.

DFID's African Regional Department will be responsible for compiling initial documentation although consultant/s will request component level documentation directly from implementing partners, copied to DFID ARD or relevant COs.

Field work will be conducted after ARD has informed the relevant DFID CO.

## 10. DUTY OF CARE/RISK ASSESSMENT

The supplier shall be responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel and Third Parties affected by their activities under these ToRs, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

DFID will share available information with the supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate and may be able to offer in-country briefings at the request of the supplier. All personnel must register with their respective Embassies to ensure that they are included in emergency procedures.

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training and safety in the field training prior to deployment.

Tenderers must develop their Tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and the initial risk assessments matrix developed by DFID (see the attached Appendix B: Risk Assessments Matrix). They must confirm in their Tender that:

- they fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.
- they understand the potential risks and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
- they have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your Tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.

Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence. In providing evidence Tenderers should consider the following questions:

a) Have you completed an initial assessment of potential risks that demonstrates your knowledge and understanding, and are you satisfied that you understand the risk management implications (not solely relying on information provided by DFID)?

b) Have you prepared an outline plan that you consider appropriate to manage these risks at this stage (or will you do so if you are awarded the contract) and are you confident/comfortable that you can implement this effectively?

c) Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are appropriately trained (including specialist training where required) before they are deployed and will you ensure that on-going training is provided where necessary?

d) Have you an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor risk on a live/on-going basis (or will you put one in place if you are awarded the contract)?

e) Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are provided with and have access to suitable equipment and will you ensure that this is reviewed and provided on an on-going basis?

f) Have you appropriate systems in place to manage an emergency/incident if one arises?

# 11. BACKGROUND

## 11.1 DFID's Approach to Empowerment & Accountability and Evaluation

The Department for International Development (DFID) leads the UK's work to end extreme poverty. We are ending the need for aid by creating jobs, unlocking the potential of girls and women and helping to save lives when humanitarian emergencies hit. As part of this, DFID is supporting a range of programmes seeking to enhance empowerment and accountability. For DFID "Empowerment and Accountability" covers interventions that enable poor people to have the resources and capability to have greater choice and control over their own development and to hold decision-makers – including governments and service providers – to account.

In addition to scaling up work on accountability, DFID is also placing increased focus on evaluation. Evaluation is being embedded across the organisation to ensure that lessons are learned during the development process and resources allocated where they are most effective. Empowerment & Accountability has been identified as a priority theme for evaluation. Further information on DFID's approach to evaluation can be found in DFID's 2013 International Development Evaluation Policy (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-evaluation-policy-2013).

## 11.2 Context for and Nature of the AREAP Intervention

Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised, on the whole, by rising economic growth. In contrast, data also indicates stagnant political and civil liberties, diminishing political participation and state-dominated governance processes with only superficial citizen participation. In many countries, citizens lack the information, knowledge and power

to demand greater accountability from their governments, risking not only sub-optimal development outcomes but also social unrest and political implosion.

In response to this situation, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) has approved £19.9 million support to the Africa Regional Programme for Improved Empowerment and Accountability, from February 2011 to July 2016. *(See Annex 1: Business Case and Annex 2: Logical Framework)*.

The programme funds selected regional organisations through three accountable grants to strengthen citizens' empowerment and government accountability in Africa. The programme operates only at the regional and national level and does not include any sub-national level activity.

The regional organisations implementing the programme are:

- Afrobarometer Network. The programme will fund the next two rounds of surveys (Rounds 5 & 6), on citizen opinions (£8m);
- Southern Africa Trust (The Trust). Its main focus is on policy advocacy, capacity building work and disbursement of partner civil society organisation (CSO) grants provided for pro-poor regional integration (£7m);
- State of the Union Coalition of African CSOs (SOTU). It focuses on engagement in policy development and monitoring state compliance with African Union decisions (£4m).

It is also expected that the programme will contribute to better evidence on "what works" in making governments more accountable to citizens, especially the poor and marginalised. Therefore, the programme will also fund a Learning, Impact and Communication (LIC) Hub to increase the evidence base on what and how interventions have an impact, and to share this learning with a wider audience of stakeholders. *(See Annex 9: Concept Note on Learning, Impact and Communication Hub)*

The programme results, as articulated in the approved logframe, are as follows:

*Impact:* Public sector more accountable to citizens.

*Outcome:* Stronger national and regional policy making and implementation through the influence of citizens and non-state actors (NSAs).

*Outputs:* 1. Independent data and evidence are available to citizens, NSAs and government bodies;

2. NSAs have the capacity and resources to use the evidence and data for policy analysis, development and compliance with agreed values, norms and rules;

3. Enabling environment for effective civil society engagement within regional and national governance structures; and

4. Learning, Impact and Communications Hub established on approaches to empowering citizens and strengthening national and regional accountability systems and relationships.

This programme is intended to enhance the availability of information, e.g. information about the decisions taken by government representatives, which can empower individuals, and enable them to have more choice and to hold decision makers to account. As such, this intervention seeks the following changes: citizens, NSAs and policy makers have better access to high quality relevant data, evidence and analysis; more citizens voice their concerns and interests; and informed coalitions of citizens influence decisions of the state.

The overall theory of change for the programme can be found in the Business Case *(see Annex 1, p34)*. Further detail on the theories of change for the three main programme components are shown in the Programme Inception Reports by each implementing agency *(see Annex 6: Programme Inception Reports, p4 of Afrobarometer Inception Report, p11 of Southern Africa Trust Inception Report, p8 of SOTU Inception Report).* It is expected that this programme will complement and add-value to existing national level support, including by DFID country offices, for greater citizen empowerment and government accountability in Africa. *(See Annex 3: Country coverage for programme components for details of where each component is planning to work and overlap with DFID focus countries.)*

The programme is managed by a Joint Management Unit (JMU), comprising staff of DFID's African Regional Department and Southern Africa Regional Office, which will lead on programme monitoring, overseeing performance and financial reporting by the implementing partners. There is also a Programme Steering Committee (PSC), comprising members of the JMU, 2 DFID country office representatives, 2 representatives from each implementing agency, 1 representative from the LIC Hub and up to 3 other funding partner representatives. The PSC will meet at the inception, mid-point and end of the programme and at other points as required. The PSC will discuss programme progress and results, ensure complementary individual agency work plans and recommend ways to increase coordination, communications and other institutional synergies.

The JMU and implementing partners of the programme agreed that it would be beneficial to conduct an Evaluability Assessment during the inception phase of the programme. This was conducted in June 2012. Informed by this Assessment, and further consideration of programme design and evaluation needs, the JMU and implementing partners made the following decisions (*see Annex 4 for annotated Evaluability Assessment including further details on evaluation decisions agreed upon by the Joint Management Unit):*

- the purpose of the Evaluations should be both learning and accountability;
- Mid-Term Evaluations should be scheduled for Year 3 (2013/14). End-Programme Evaluations should be scheduled for Year 5 (2015/16). (NB This reflects Option 3 from the Evaluability Assessment, p17. Design and process issues should be examined through the inception phase and annual reviews rather than undertaking an additional early design/process evaluation);

- evaluations should focus on evaluating contribution rather than attribution;
- evaluations should be designed to evaluate the individual components delivered by the Afrobarometer, The Trust and SOTU, and also to evaluate the overall programme (including the synergies and overall results of the combined components);
- there should be peer involvement in evaluations of the individual programme components to facilitate learning, insofar as this is possible without compromising independence. For example, The Trust colleagues might participate in the evaluation of the Afrobarometer component. (NB This decision was based on a suggestion by implementing partners);
- annual Reviews of Years 3 and 5 to be incorporated as part of independent evaluations in those years. (NB This decision was taken by the JMU to ensure the project review process benefits from the rigorous and objective analysis undertaken by the evaluation team in these years. Annual reviews in Years 1, 2 and 4 will be undertaken internally, led by the JMU with inputs from implementing partners and the Hub.)

Note: The Business Case and Evaluability Assessment are provided for background context and reference on some details, but it should be noted that these Terms of Reference represent latest thinking on evaluation requirements for the programme. Details in these Terms of Reference should be treated as correct in the case of any discrepancies between documents.

## Annexes **(The following list of Annexes were included as part of the Invitation to Tender pack issued out to all tenderers via DFID's portal for downloading)**

1. Business Case
2. Logical Framework
3. Country coverage for programme components
4. Evaluability Assessment for current programme
5. Past evaluations of individual components
6. Programme Inception Reports
7. Sampling Approach to Selection of Countries for Field Visit
8. List of suggested stakeholders
9. Concept Note on Learning, Impact and Communication Hub
10. Template for DFID External Quality Assurance of evaluation reports
11. DFID Guidance for Reviewing and Scoring Projects
12. DFID Annual Review Template
13. DFID Project Completion Review Template
14. Risk Assessment Matrix (now Appendix B of this contract)

# Annex 2: Theory of Change Workshop Report

# Annex 2 – Theory of Change Workshops Report

# 1 Introduction and overview

Coffey facilitated three theory of change workshops with AREAP implementing partners, with EISA and some of their key local stakeholders July – August, 2014. This theory of change workshop report is intended to provide a brief summary of the purpose and outputs of the three theory of change workshops.

- The first theory of change workshop with the Southern Africa Trust took place July 17- 18, 2014 in Midrand, South Africa.
- The second theory of change workshop with the State of the Union Coalition took place July 30- August 1, 2014 in Nairobi, Kenya.
- The final theory of change workshop with the Afrobarometer Network took place August 4 -5, 2014 in Accra, Ghana.

## 1.1 Purpose of the workshops

### 1.1.1 Building the basis for a theory- based evaluation

The primary aim of the workshop was to develop a deeper contextual understanding of the root problems AREAP implementing partners face and the current theories of change that have been developed to describe the ways in which each partner understands their work and how they achieve change. The theory of change workshops focused on elaborating existing theories of change, concentrating on causal linkages, contextual factors which affect success and identifying alternative, non-programme pathways for change.

At each theory of change workshop, two separate sessions were held: a theory of change session which elaborated each implementing partner's understanding of the overarching AREAP theory of change, and a second session which elaborated each partner's understanding of their own theory of change.

In both sessions, using a common understanding of the root problems developed through workshop activities, participants identified causal linkages and pathways which bridge the outputs, outcomes and impacts developed in their existing theories of change. Participants then identified which linkages or pathways were felt to be most critical to success or were 'least established' – of most interest for future learning. Contextual factors for each linkage were then described, providing an in-depth, contextualised understanding of how implementing partners understand change in different contexts. Finally, possible alternative pathways for change were mapped, to enable a rigorous assessment of non-programme pathways for change as part of the contribution analysis.

The evaluation team will review and systematically map the linkages and contextual factors identified during the three theory of change workshops, to identified key linkages and areas of interest for AREAP as a whole, as well as for each implementing partner, to test as part of the theory-based strand of this evaluation. Based on this systematic mapping, a set of evaluation questions will be developed to meet DFID's requirement for a theory-based evaluation that provides learning insights about what works when working on empowerment and accountability at the national and regional levels in Africa.

### 1.1.2 Improving participants' understanding of their work

A secondary purpose of the workshop was to provide participants with the opportunity to consider the appropriateness of their own activities which address these issues. The theory of change process maps the changes we expect to see in the short, medium and long-term, focusing on the causal linkages between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact. By considering their own work in more detail, the theory of change workshop provided an opportunity for participants to improve the work of their own organisations and develop a greater shared understanding about how they as an organisation work to make change.

# 2 Summary of the theories of change

Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the different levels of AREAP's overarching theory of change illustrating the high-level causal linkages between implementing partner activities and more accountable and inclusive government. This is the pre-existing theory of change which was elaborated during the 3 theory of change workshops.

**Figure 1- Overview of the AREAP theory of change**

Figures 2, 3 and 4 provide simplified overviews of the individual AREAP implementing partner theories of change. These are the pre-existing theories of change which were elaborated during the 3 theory of change workshops.

**Figure 2- Overview of the Southern Africa Trust theory of change**




**Figure 3- Overview of the State of the Union Coalition theory of change**



**Figure 4- Overview of the Afrobarometer Network theory of change**




The reality of these theories of change is much more complex and difficult to capture in a single, digestible diagram. Additional, more detailed diagrams were also developed during the workshops to provide the granular-level illustrations developed during the theory of change workshops themselves of the intermediary linkages building up to outcome and impact for each key activity of regional bodies identified and discussed during the workshop. These granular-level illustrations are more suited to consider the causal logic underpinning an individual activity. They also include identifications of key linkages and the accompanying contextual factors which participants felt would need to be in place for the linkage to be successful.

# 3 Workshop activities

The theory of change workshop focused around a series of linked activities designed to elaborate on the existing theory of change. Each activity delivered a specific output that fulfilled a specific component of the theory of change and provided information needed for the theory-based strand of the evaluation. When considered together, the activity outputs form a cohesive theory of change that articulates:

- what the underlying root problems are;
- maps detailed activities and linkages which address these problems, overcome barriers and are assumed to bring about change (linkages between outputs, outcomes and impacts);
- linkages of most interest for the evaluation, which were identified as being most critical to the success of a given outcome or impact, or which are 'least established' and therefore of most interesting in terms of learning;
- contextual factors seen as critical to success for each key linkage;
- assumptions underpinning the linkages between intermediary steps and anticipated outcomes; and
- alternative pathways for change and other external actors working in the same space;

Table 1 briefly explains the purpose of each key activity undertaken during the workshop:

**Table 1: Activity summaries**

| | Activity | Output | Application within evaluation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Describe the problem the partner is trying to address to understand the rationale behind their activities | Problem statement | Development of Relevance evaluation questions and judgment criteria |
| 2 | Map the intermediary steps between the partner's proposed outputs, outcomes and impact. | Expanded Theory of Change diagram | Development of Effectiveness evaluation questions and judgment criteria to test the programme logic |
| 3 | Identify areas of most interest to the evaluation, defined as critical linkages in the project logic and linkages that are least established. | Selection of 1-3 linkages or sets of linkages from the expanded Theory of Change diagram | |
| 4 | List conditions for change and assumptions for the areas of most interest | Bullet-point list of specific expected conditions for change | Development of Qualitative Comparative Analysis framework |
| 5 | Develop alternative pathways to change | Statement of other plausible ways change might happen | Identification of other actors, dynamics and trends to monitor as part of Contribution Analysis |

# 4 Detailed workshop outputs

## 4.1 Problem statement

Participants identified the root causes that their activities are seeking to address and the observable symptoms of these problems. Below is a selection of the key root causes identified during the workshops:

**Southern Africa Trust:**

- Lack of formalised knowledge on key groups, e.g 'the poor', ex-miners, youth, women, small-holder farmers.
- Lack of knowledge on financial flows; within the aid system and capacity within the sector.
- Tension between horizontal and vertical (or formal & informal) systems, networks and knowledge.
- Donors and institutions which only understand vertical /formal processes, try to 'project-ise things, continuing to impose vertical or formal approaches. Tensions between CSOs, donors and government trying to work in the same space.
- Whose knowledge counts? Lack of recognition of different types of knowledge.
- Lack of political will (e.g. SADC).
- Political economy (drivers / champions).
- Protecting economic interest on the part of corporations and national governments.
- Lack of empathy.
- Multinational corporation perpetuating colonialism.

**State of the Union Coalition:**

- Citizens are not informed; citizens are not empowered.
- Lack of freedom of expression/lack of awareness of governance issues by citizens.
- Citizen rights are infringed upon/rights and freedoms are not guaranteed.
- No mechanisms for citizens to air their grievances to government.
- Abuse of power on the part of government.
- Lack of free flow of information amongst citizens.
- Lack of knowledge around AU related issues (privy only to state actors).
- Disjointed initiatives led by CSOs (there is a need for coordination in order to have greater impact).
- Lack of a multi-sectorial approach in addressing continental/national development issues (gender/youth/agriculture/health).
- Lack of citizen voice in the formulation of policies by government (Need for greater numbers/expertise to show credibility and hold people accountable).
- Need for efficiency and effectiveness of government institutions, structures and programmes.

**Afrobarometer:**

- Want to expand number of countries Afrobarometer covers in East Africa as part of Africa wide expansion.
- Need effective management of Afrobarometer national partners (poor management of national partners).
- Insufficient use of data by policymakers and media.
- Lack of reliable data on public opinion and methods wanting.
- Bad data leading to bad policies.
- Lack of appropriate/required skill sets within national partners and key stakeholders.
- Turnover of skilled personnel in national partner institutions.
- Inability of national partners to negotiate with key stakeholders, including policymakers.
- Lack of knowledge management skills (including institutional memory effect) within national partners.

## 4.2 Causal maps

Based on the problem described above and the existing theories of change, participants identified the activities that need to be undertaken to address the problems, as well as the symptoms and articulated how activities contribute to the higher level objectives and the changes in behaviour (individual and organisational), systems and processes that they expect as a result of activities in the short, medium and long term.

## 4.3 Linkages of most interest and conditions for change

Building on the causal maps of linkages between outputs, outcomes and impacts, participants identified a select number of linkages which they felt would be of most interest to the evaluation, either because they were felt to be most critical to the success of the given outcome or impact, or because they were felt to be ‘least established’ and therefore of most interest in terms of learning.

## 4.4 Alternative pathways to change

After elaborating the overarching AREAP or component theories of change, participants were asked to consider other pathways for achieving the same outcomes and impacts they have set themselves; other non-programme pathways for change.

# 5 List of workshop participants

## 5.1 Southern Africa Trust

| Name | Organisation |
|---|---|
| Mr Ishmael Sunga | Southern Africa Coordination of Agricultural Unions |
| Ms Paula Nimpuno | Ford Foundation |
| Dr Tendai Murisa | Trust Africa |
| Ms. Roshnee Narrandes | Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa |
| Mr Vama Jele | Swaziland Migrant Mineworkers Association and Southern Africa Miners Association |
| Ms Alice Mogwe | Trust Board of Trustees |
| Professor Alan Fowler | Independent associate of the Trust |
| Mr Bhekinkosi Moyo | The Trust's Executive Director |
| Mr McBride Nkhalamba | The Trust's Head of Programmes |
| Mr Marlon Zakeyo | Programme Manage, Policy Dialogue Mechanisms |
| Dr Jozet Muller | Programme Manager, Civil Society Funding |
| Dr Ulrich Klins | Programme Manager, Business Development (B4D) Pathfinder |
| Ms Christabel Phiri | Programme Manager, Social Capital |
| Ms Lusungu Kanchenche | Manager responsible for the quality of the programme as well as for monitoring and evaluation, reporting and learning |

## 5.2 State of the Union Coalition

| Name | Organisation |
|---|---|
| Nicholas Ngigi | State of the Union Coalition Secretariat |
| Jamillah Mwanjisi | State of the Union Coalition Secretariat |
| Celine Bankumuhari | State of the Union Coalition Secretariat |
| Andrew Osiany | State of the Union Coalition Secretariat |
| Janah Ncube | State of the Union Coalition Secretariat |
| Monique Van Es | State of the Union Coalition Secretariat |
| Belinda Okungu | State of the Union Coalition Secretariat |

| | |
|---|---|
| Stella Gichana | State of the Union Coalition Secretariat |
| Edward Chireka | State of the Union Coalition Malawi |
| June Kabalamatore | State of the Union Coalition Malawi |
| Yves Niyirangira | State of the Union Coalition Kenya |
| Paul Mwangi | State of the Union Coalition Kenya |
| Okeke Anya | State of the Union Coalition Nigeria |
| Ehis Omomhenle | State of the Union Coalition NIgeria |
| Jean Leonard Sekanyange | State of the Union Coalition Rwanda |
| Alexis Nkurunziza | State of the Union Coalition Rwanda |
| Teresa Tabi | State of the Union Coalition Ghana |
| Ester Mamle Tawiah | State of the Union Coalition Ghana |
| Amoko Lizouret Marcel | State of the Union Coalition Cameroun |
| Ibar Sarrr | State of the Union Coalition Senegal |
| Aboubacry Mbondji | State of the Union Coalition Senegal |
| Carla Marchavane | State of the Union Coalition Mozambique |

## 5.3 Afrobarometer Network

| Name | Organization |
|---|---|
| Gyimah-Boadi | AB Executive Director |
| Carolyn Logan | AB Deputy Executive Director |
| Aba Kittoe | AB Operations Manager – Operations |
| Boniface Dulani | AB Operations Manager – Field |
| Edem E. Selormey | AB Operations Manager – Field |
| Paula Park | AB Operations Manager – Communications |
| Sharon Parku | AB Monitoring and Evaluation Officer - PMU |
| Nestor Odjoumani | AB Monitoring and Evaluation Officer - IREEP |
| Richard Houessou | AB Project Manager – Francophone Africa |
| Anyway Chingwete | AB Project Manager – Southern Africa |
| Abel Oyuke | AB Project Manager – East Africa |
| Daniel Armah-Attoh | AB Project Manager – Anglophone Africa |
| Sibusiso Nkomo | AB Communications Coordinator – Southern Africa |
| Gerard Guedegbe | AB Communications Coordinator – Francophone Africa |
| Anthony Wafula | AB Communications Coordinator – Eastern Africa |
| Mina Okuru | AB Communications Coordinator – Anglophone West Africa |
| Isaac Owusu Asare | AB Monitoring and Evaluation & Communications Assistant |
| Major Ashifie-Gogo | AB Project Accountant - PMU |
| Linda Ofori-Kwafo | Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition Executive Secretary |
| Mary Addah | Ghana Integrity Initiative Programs Manager |
| Bernard Avle | Citi FM – Programs Manager |
| Richard Asante | Lecturer - University of Ghana |
| Kofi Blankson-Ocansey | Consultant – Dixcove Ventures |

# Annex 3: Detailed Evaluation Methodology

# Annex 3- Detailed Evaluation Methodology

# 1 Evaluation methodology

The research methods and data sources for each evaluation question asked are set out in the evaluation matric provided in Annex 4. This is summarised into a list of stakeholders to be interviewed and the documents that were reviewed. This section provides an overview of how the research instruments were developed and how data was collated for analysis.

## 1.1 Developing research instruments

### 1.1.1 Data quality assessment

The evaluation relied on secondary data sources – both programme documentation from AREAP implementing partners and data from other stakeholders collected through interviews. To ensure that the evaluation findings are as robust as possible, it is important that they be based on high quality data. All data sources were reviewed against the dimensions of data quality listed in Annex 7. Where there were serious concerns about the quality of the data source, data was either discounted completely or acknowledged as comparatively weak in the main body of the report.

**Table: Definitions of data quality dimensions**

| Dimension of Data Quality | Operational Definition |
|---|---|
| **Accuracy** | Also known as validity. Accurate data are considered correct: the data measure what they are intended to measure. Accurate data minimize errors (e.g., recording or interviewer bias, transcription error, sampling error) to a point of being negligible. |
| **Reliability** | The data generated by a programmes information system are based on protocols and procedures that do not change according to who is using them and when or how often they are used. The data are reliable because they are measured and collected consistently. |
| **Precision** | This means that the data have sufficient detail. An information system lacks precision if it is not designed to capture the required characteristics defined in the description of the indicator. |
| **Completeness** | Completeness means that an information system from which the results are derived is appropriately inclusive: it represents the *complete* list of eligible persons or units and not just a fraction of the list. |
| **Timeliness** | Data are timely when they are up-to-date (current), and when the information is available on time. Timeliness is affected by: (1) the rate at which the program's information system is updated; (2) the rate of change of actual program activities; and (3) when the information is actually used or required. |
| **Integrity** | Data have integrity when the system used to generate them is protected from deliberate bias or manipulation for political or personal reasons. |
| **Confidentiality** | Confidentiality means that clients are assured that their data will be maintained according to national and/or international standards for data. This means that personal data are not disclosed inappropriately, and that data in hard copy and electronic form are treated with appropriate levels of security |

(e.g. kept in locked cabinets and in password protected files).

### 1.1.2 Interviews

The evaluation matrix clearly sets out the information sought from each stakeholder in the form of 'indicators'. The interview plan (Annex 4.2) is structured by stakeholder, and for each one sets out the indicators against which the evaluation team sought evidence. The evaluation team developed detailed topic guides for each respondent prior to interviews to guide conversations. Examples of these are provided in Section 3, below.

## 1.2 Data collection

### 1.2.1 Secondary data

Secondary data was both provided directly by DFID, AREAP IPs and through the team's independent research. Documents reviewed are logged in the document register in Annex 4.5. Additional data sources were added throughout the evaluation providing the team with a rich base of contextual and theoretical knowledge.

### 1.2.2 Key informant interviews

**Sampling methodology**

The evaluation team undertook key informant interviews in a sample of the 36 countries in which AREAP is active. DFID included a proposed sample in the original TOR that SEQAS developed using a randomised approach. Prior to the start of the Inception Phase, the list of countries in which AREAP implementing partners are working reduced from 39 to 36, to reflect the countries in which AREAP is in fact being implemented and this revised list was provided by DFID to the evaluation team. The evaluation team drew a new country sample based on this revised list of, following the randomised approach developed by SEQAS and described in Annex 6.

The revised list of sampled countries was:

- Benin
- Botswana
- Kenya
- Mozambique
- Nigeria
- Rwanda
- Tunisia
- Zimbabwe

Interviewees included implementing partners' key delivery partners, beneficiaries, counterparts in regional and continental bodies, staff from other organisations working in the same sector, and subject matter experts. Implementing partners provided lists of possible stakeholders to interview in each country (lists which are generally longer than the number of interview spots available); the evaluation team also independently identified individuals or organisations who can be reasonably expected to have knowledge of implementing partner activities. The team identified these voices through review of secondary data sources provided by DFID and the implementing partners, including lists of individuals who have attended trainings or workshops held by the implementing partners, organisations who are reported to have worked with the implementing partners over the past two years, and organisations who contribute to platforms which implementing partners also engage in or support. A full list of stakeholders interviewed is included in Annex 4.3.

**Topic Guides**

The indicators in the evaluation framework set out the information required from each stakeholder. These indicators and criteria were used to develop the topic guides for each stakeholder group, listing the key types of information needed from each stakeholder to evidence the relevant evaluation criteria and questions. This formed the basis of the topic guides and questions, to ensure that all necessary questions and topics are covered during the key informant interviews with each stakeholder. A selection of the topic guides is included in section 5 below.

### 1.2.3 Interview transcripts

After each interview or meeting, a detailed transcript was prepared by a professional transcription service to record the contents of the interview. Interviewees are not referenced by name in the main report and not quoted directly, to ensure confidentiality of sources.

## 1.3 Data collation and analysis

The Evaluation team used qualitative data analysis software (Atlas TI) to collate data according to the relevant evaluation questions, specific judgement criteria and conditions for QCA.

### 1.3.1 Coding framework

The team developed a detailed coding framework and trialled this before roll-out to ensure that 1) the framework is comprehensive and 2) that all team members are coding in a consistent manner. The coding framework is provided in Section 6, below.

The coding framework developed was based on the evaluation matrix and the team coded against key themes and judgement criteria. This enabled the evaluation team to systematically map the available evidence against the evaluation matrix, so that the resulting analysis is as comprehensive and detailed as possible. This also helped ensure that the analytical framework drives the analysis of the evidence, upholding the integrity of the theory-based evaluation. The evaluation matrix provides the analytical framework that was used to answer the evaluation questions.

### 1.3.2 Political economy analysis

Building on the desk-based literature review and based on indicators developed by the governance advisor, the evaluation team conducted a light touch political economy analysis. It was informed by the literature review and rooted in the evaluation framework, to ensure relevance and focus. It generated contextual understanding of the sample countries, to help anchor the evaluation findings and provide insight into the wider conditions or circumstances that are critical for change. The political economy analysis was incorporated into building conditions for QCA through development of composite indicators that used relevant governance indices of each country sampled. The governance adviser also reviewed findings in the evaluation report with a political economy lens in light of his contextual understanding of the sector.

### 1.3.3 Methodological triangulation

The evaluation collected data on politically sensitive issues that are subjective. There is therefore a risk that the data collected, particularly through primary research, is biased to a particular viewpoint. To address this risk, the evaluation team triangulated its analysis by using at least three separate data sources before including a finding in an evaluation report. Annex 7 provides a full description of our strategies to mitigate the risk of stakeholder bias.

# 2 Evaluation process

Although the analytical framework distinguishes between the process and theory-based components, Coffey conducted an integrated evaluation. The table below summarises the work plan used by the team.

## 2.1 Summary of work plan

**Table: Summary of work plan**

| Phase | Steps | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Inception Phase: | 1. Review secondary documents | Complete |
| | 2. Finalise sample countries | Complete |
| | 3. Conduct a theory of change workshop with all AREAP IPs and external stakeholders to develop a coherent common | Complete |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | understanding of AREAP;s theory of change and understand critical assumptions underpinning IP's theory of change | |
| | 4. | Develop evaluation and research questions | Complete |
| | 5. | Develop an evaluation framework including indicators and data sources | Complete |
| | 6. | Develop QCA truth table with conditions | Complete |
| Implementation Phase: | 7. | Undertake a systematic review of available documentation | Complete |
| | 8. | Finalise the topic guides and sample frame | Complete |
| | 9. | Collect primary data through key informant interviews and phone interviews | Complete |
| | 10. | Analyse data and prepare final report | Complete |

# 3 Sample Topic Guides

## 3.1 Afrobarometer stakeholders

### 3.1.1 CSOs

**Role and relationship with IP**

- Ask about organisation and individual's role
  - Can you tell me about your organisation's research capacity, including how many years you have been producing research, level of expertise of staff, how many publications, how many surveys?
  - What proportion of your organisation's work consists of IP-related activities? To what extent is IP-related work a priority?
- Ask about work with IP
- Can you tell me about your relationship with the IP? What is the basis for the relationship – a shared agenda, shared resources, shared learning and capacity, shared approach?
- Can you tell me about any new technical skills or capacities that your organisation has developed, with support from the IP? To what extent has IP helped build technical skills or capacities within your organisation? How likely is it that these skills will be maintained?
- Can you tell me about any cases where by working with IP or (other CSOs funded by IP) your organisation has achieved better results? Results that wouldn't have otherwise been possible?
- To what extent does your organisation's work have an explicit gender focus? An explicit pro-poor focus? Has this changed over the past few years?

**Work using AB data/evidence**

- Use of data
  - How does your organisation use AB data? How often? How significant – what difference does AB data make and what types of things do you do with it?
  - Can you tell me about any cases where your organisation has used AB data to raise awareness of key issues? In what way?
  - How common is it that other organisations (and others) in your sector use AB data? How is AB data viewed more broadly – is it seen to be quality? Relevant?

- Use of data in policy-making/citizen engagement
  - What policy areas does your organisation focus on?
  - To what extent does your organisation directly use evidence to inform policy positions? How strong would you rate your organisation's technical capacity to analyse evidence and build policy or advocacy positions off it?
  - Can you tell me about the way in which your organisation engages policymakers on key (continental/ regional) issues? Have you used any new capacities or technical skills to facilitate these engagements?
  - Can you tell me about any areas in which your organisation has contributed to national or regional policy changes over the past few years? What/ how/ when? (How did you contribute to that change?) Was there any involvement or support provided from the IP? Did you use evidence generated by any of the IPs? Have there been any changes to your approach or areas of focus over the past few years?
  - Can you tell me about the general level of citizen awareness in the areas in which your organisation works – is this something your organisation is trying to increase?
  - To what extent would you say that use of AB has led to increased awareness of the issues? (On the part of which stakeholders groups, in what ways?)
  - As a result of IP efforts (evidence or awareness generated by IP), have you seen any changes in terms of citizen or non-state engagement on regional /continental issues?

**Work with others**

- To what extent can CSOs exist in a third space where it is not tied to either political party?
- Can you tell me about any formalised relationships your organisation, or organisations you work with, have with the state? How strong are these links, and do you think they will be maintained? And informal relationships?
- To what extent do formalised accountability mechanisms or spaces for civil society engagement in policymaking currently exist in national /regional policymaking? How has this changed over the past few years?
- Does your organisations have any champions in government, in terms of the policies you put forward or your key relationships or focal points?
- How do you share learning from your work with other CSOs?
- To what extent does horizontal learning and sharing happen between national partners and core partners?
- How does your organisation assess and map the space in which you operate – other stakeholders, policymaker agendas etc? How often to you engage with your audiences, peers and key stakeholders during the policy engagement and advocacy process?
- To what extent does the media use AB data? Please provide us with examples of your work with the media (Take pictures of hard copies or ask them to email)
- To what extent have you used the media in your work? Please provide us with examples of your work with the media (Take pictures of hard copies or ask them to email)

**Reputation of IP**

- How strong do you think IP's reputation on (relevant issues) is? Are they seen as a credible stakeholder informing policy debates?
- To what extent is Afrobarometer viewed as independent (politically neutral)?

**AREAP**

- Have you heard of Trust or SOTU/name of national platform?
- Can you tell me about any cases where you or your team have worked with Trust or SOTU/name of national platform?

- How strong is Trust or SOTU's/name of national platform's reputation on its work with the AU?

### 3.1.2 Media

**Role and relationship with IP**

- Ask about role
  - When developing stories how much time are you able to devote to background research? What are the demands on your time in terms of the number of stories you have to produce each day, other commitments?
- Ask about relationship with IP
  - Can you tell me about any new technical skills or capacities that your organisation has developed, with support from the IP? To what extent has IP helped build technical skills or capacities within your organisation? How likely is it that these skills will be maintained?
  - Can you tell me about the relationship between your team and the IP? What is the basis for the relationship – a shared agenda, shared resources, shared learning and capacity, shared approach?
  - Understand area of work (policy areas, methodology) and area of work with AB

**Use of data**

- How often do you use AB or Trust data? Why do you use it / why not? How common is it that other organisations in your sector uses AB data?
- Please provide us with examples of your work using AB data (Take pictures of hard copies or ask them to email)
- To what extent would you say that your use of AB data has led to increased awareness of the issues? (On the part of which stakeholders groups, in what ways?)

**Citizen Awareness/Policy Change**

- To what extent do you think there is general citizen interest in (IP- relevant) issues? How do citizens engage with these issues? How has this changed over the past few years? Did you use evidence generated by any of the IPs? Have there been any changes to your approach or areas of focus over the past few years?
- Can you tell me about any key organisations who have contributed to national or regional policy changes in (relevant) areas over the past few years? What/ how/ when? Was there any involvement or support provided from the IP / NP/ National platform?
- As a result of IP efforts (evidence or awareness generated by IP), have you seen any changes in terms of citizen or non-state engagement on regional /continental issues?
- To what extent do formalised accountability mechanisms or spaces for civil society engagement in policymaking currently exist in national /regional policymaking? How has this changed over the past few years?
- To what extent can CSOs exist in a third space where it is not tied to either political party?

**Reputation of IP**

- How strong do you think IP's reputation on (relevant issues) is? Are they seen as a credible stakeholder informing policy debates? Are they seen as legitimate and credible policy advocates and knowledge generators?
- To what extent do you see IP engaging at the national/ regional level and in what ways? What has worked about their approach and what hasn't?
- To what extent is Afrobarometer viewed as independent (politically neutral)?

### 3.1.3 Policy Makers

**Role and relationship with IP**

- Ask about role
- Ask about relationship with IP
    - Can you tell me about the relationship between your team and the IP? What is the basis for the relationship – a shared agenda, shared resources, shared learning and capacity, shared approach?
    - Can you tell me about any formalised relationships you, have with CSOs? How strong are these links and how do they function? Why these CSOs?

**Reputation of IP**

- How strong do you think IP's reputation on (relevant issues) is? Are they seen as a credible stakeholder informing policy debates?
- To what extent do you see IP engaging at the national regional level and in what ways? What has worked about their approach and what hasn't?
- What is the IP's reputation; are they seen as legitimate and credible policy advocates and knowledge generators?

**Policy-making/engagement of CSOs**

- Use of data in policy-making/citizen engagement
    - To what extent does your organisation directly use evidence to inform policy positions? How strong would you rate your organisation's technical capacity to analyse evidence and build policy or advocacy positions off it?
    - How does your department use AB data? How often? How significant – what difference does AB data make and what types of things do you do with it?
    - Can you tell me about any cases where your department has used AB data to raise awareness of key issues? In what way?
    - How common is it that other organisations (and others) in your sector use AB data? How is AB data viewed more broadly – is it seen to be quality? Relevant?
- Changes in policy-making
    - Can you tell me about any ways in which the policymaking process within your team or department has changed over the past few years? Has it become more transparent or open to civil society? In what ways? What impact has this had on policy?
    - When your department or the government more generally is working to develop policy, what kinds of pressures or incentives do you face? To what extent is your policy evidence based? Are there any requirements or pressures in terms of the evidence base of your policies?
    - Have you seen any evidence that African Union policies are being taken up at the national level? To what extent/ in what ways?
- Involvement of CSOs in policy making
    - Have you observed any changes to the effectiveness or quality of civil society participation or advocacy to government at the national or regional over the past few years?
    - To what extent do formalised accountability mechanisms or spaces for civil society engagement in policymaking currently exist in national /regional policymaking? How has this changed over the past few years?
    - To what extent do you see NSA coalitions engaging on policy in your area? Other alliances or networks? Less/ more than before?
    - To what extent have you seen alliances and networks ( such as….) engage with national and regional policymakers? To what effect?

- Can you tell me about any areas in which CSOs or coalitions in your field have contributed to national or regional policy changes over the past few years? What/ how/ when did they contribute? Was there any involvement or support provided from the IP? Have there been any changes to their approach or areas of focus over the past few years?
- Can you describe the policymaking process in your department, in particular how you engage outside groups in this process? How do you identify key stakeholders involved in or affected by the policy? How do you assess their needs? How do you engage them in the policymaking process?
- Are there any champions (liaisons or focal points) of CSO or NSA policy engagement in your team or department?
- Can you describe any ways in which your department or the government more generally engages or opens space for dialogue with NSAs?

- Citizen engagement
  - Can you tell me about the general level of citizen awareness in the (relevant) policy areas in which you work?
  - As a result of IP efforts (evidence or awareness generated by IP), have you seen any changes in terms of citizen or non-state engagement on regional /continental issues?

**AREAP**

- Have you heard of Trust or SOTU/name of national platform?
- Can you tell me about any cases where you or your team have worked with Trust or SOTU/name of national platform?
- How strong is Trust or SOTU's/name of national platform's reputation on its work with the AU?

## 3.2 SOTU stakeholders

### 3.2.1 CSOs

**Role and relationship with IP**

- Ask about organisation and individual's role
  - To what extent does your organisation's work have an explicit gender focus? An explicit pro-poor focus? Has this changed over the past few years?
- Ask about work with IP
- Can you tell me about your relationship with the IP? What is the basis for the relationship – a shared agenda, shared resources, shared learning and capacity, shared approach?
- What proportion of your organisation's work consists of IP-related activities? To what extent is IP-related work a priority?
- Can you tell me about any new technical skills or capacities that your organisation has developed, with support from the IP? To what extent has IP helped build technical skills or capacities within your organisation? How likely is it that these skills will be maintained?
- Can you tell me about any cases where by working with IP or (other CSOs funded by IP) your organisation has achieved better results? Results that wouldn't have otherwise been possible?
- Can you tell me about any campaigns that you have engaged with SOTU on? What did these campaigns look like? What was SOTU's contribution? How successful were these campaigns?

**Policy-Change**

- What policy areas does your organisation focus on?

- Can you tell me about your organisations policy advocacy approach? Do you feel you have the necessary resources and capacities in place to advocate effectively at the national/ regional levels?
- Can you tell me about the way in which your organisation engages policymakers on key (continental/ regional) issues? Have you used any new capacities or technical skills to facilitate these engagements?
- Can you tell me about how your organisation frames and packages its policy advocacy at the regional or national levels to ensure success?
- To what extent does your organisation directly use evidence to inform policy positions? How strong would you rate your organisation's technical capacity to analyse evidence and build policy or advocacy positions off it?
- To what extent, does your organisation use the SOTU report? How have they used it?
- Can you tell me about any areas in which your organisation has contributed to national or regional policy changes over the past few years? What/ how/ when? (How did you contribute to that change?) Was there any involvement or support provided from the IP? Did you use evidence generated by any of the IPs? Have there been any changes to your approach or areas of focus over the past few years?
- Have you seen any evidence that African Union policies are being taken up at the national level? To what extent/ in what ways?
- Can you tell me the ways in which your organisation engages with the African Union, or with national government on regional /AU policy? What do you hope to get from these engagements/ are they successful? What role does the SOTU play?
- To what extent can CSOs exist in a third space where it is not tied to either political party?

**Citizen Engagement:**

- Can you tell me about the general level of citizen awareness in the areas in which your organisation works – is this something your organisation is trying to increase?
- As a result of IP efforts (evidence or awareness generated by IP), have you seen any changes in terms of citizen or non-state engagement on regional /continental issues?

**Work with others**

- Can you tell me about any formalised relationships your organisation, or organisations you work with, have with the state? How strong are these links, and do you think they will be maintained? And informal relationships?
- To what extent do formalised accountability mechanisms or spaces for civil society engagement in policymaking currently exist in national /regional policymaking? How has this changed over the past few years?
- Does your organisations have any champions in government, in terms of the policies you put forward or your key relationships or focal points?
- How does your organisation assess and map the space in which you operate – other stakeholders, policymaker agendas etc? How often to you engage with your audiences, peers and key stakeholders during the policy engagement and advocacy process?
- How do other organisations working on similar issues as you engage with AU issues at the national level Are they successful? To what extent is there learning/ collaboration in terms of policy engagement in your sector?
- To what extent is your policy work done through a coalition? Other alliances or networks? Less/ more than before?
- How do you share learning from your work with other CSOs?
- To what extent does horizontal learning and sharing happen between national platforms (without SOTU secretariat)?

- To what extent have you used the media in your work? Please provide us with examples of your work with the media (Take pictures of hard copies or ask them to email)

**Reputation of IP**

- What is the IP's reputation; are they seen as legitimate and credible policy advocates and knowledge generators?

**AREAP**

- Familiar with Afrobarometer or Trust?
- Can you tell me about any cases where you or your team have used AB data to raise awareness of key issues? In what ways? On the part of which stakeholder groups? Are you familiar with any cases where IP data or research was used to argue a policy position or advocate with government? Any instances where you used IP data or research as a part of your work?

### 3.2.2 Media

**Role and relationship with IP**

- Ask about role
  - When developing stories how much time are you able to devote to background research? What are the demands on your time in terms of the number of stories you have to produce each day, other commitments?
- Ask about relationship with IP
  - Can you tell me about any new technical skills or capacities that your organisation has developed, with support from the IP? To what extent has IP helped build technical skills or capacities within your organisation? How likely is it that these skills will be maintained?
  - Can you tell me about the relationship between your team and the IP? What is the basis for the relationship – a shared agenda, shared resources, shared learning and capacity, shared approach?
  - Understand area of work (policy areas, methodology) and area of work with SOTU

**Use of data**

- How often do you use evidence by SOTU (SOTU report)? Why do you use it / why not? How common is it that other organisations in your sector uses it?
- To what extent would you say that your use of evidence has led to increased awareness of the issues? (On the part of which stakeholders groups, in what ways?)

**Citizen Awareness/Policy Change**

- To what extent do you think there is general citizen interest in (IP- relevant) issues? How do citizens engage with these issues? How has this changed over the past few years?
- As a result of IP efforts (evidence or awareness generated by IP), have you seen any changes in terms of citizen or non-state engagement on regional /continental issues?
- Can you tell me about any key organisations who have contributed to national or regional policy changes in (relevant) areas over the past few years? What/ how/ when? Was there any involvement or support provided from the IP / NP/ National platform?
- To what extent have you seen alliances and networks supported by SOTU such as….) engaging with national and regional policymakers? To what effect?
- Have you seen any evidence that African Union policies are being taken up at the national level? To what extent/ in what ways?
- To what extent do formalised accountability mechanisms or spaces for civil society engagement in policymaking currently exist in national /regional policymaking? How has this changed over the past few years?
- To what extent can CSOs exist in a third space where it is not tied to either political party?

**Reputation of IP**

- How strong do you think IP's reputation on (relevant issues) is? Are they seen as a credible stakeholder informing policy debates? Are they seen as legitimate and credible policy advocates and knowledge generators?
- To what extent do you see IP engaging at the national/ regional level and in what ways? What has worked about their approach and what hasn't?

### 3.2.3 Policy Makers

**Role and relationship with IP**

- Ask about role
- Ask about relationship with IP
  - Can you tell me about the relationship between your team and the IP? What is the basis for the relationship – a shared agenda, shared resources, shared learning and capacity, shared approach?
  - Can you tell me about any formalised relationships you, have with CSOs? How strong are these links and how do they function? Why these CSOs?

**Reputation of IP**

- How strong do you think IP's reputation on (relevant issues) is? Are they seen as a credible stakeholder informing policy debates?
- To what extent do you see IP engaging at the national regional level and in what ways? What has worked about their approach and what hasn't?
- What is the IP's reputation; are they seen as legitimate and credible policy advocates and knowledge generators?

**Policy-making/engagement of CSOs**

- Use of data in policy-making/citizen engagement
  - To what extent does your organisation directly use evidence to inform policy positions? How strong would you rate your organisation's technical capacity to analyse evidence and build policy or advocacy positions off it?
  - How does your department use the SOTU report? How often? How significant – what difference does SOTU report make and what types of things do you do with it?
  - Can you tell me about any cases where your department has used the SOTU report to raise awareness of key issues? In what way?
  - How common is it that other organisations (and others) in your sector use the SOTU report? How is the SOTU report viewed more broadly – is it seen to be quality? Relevant?
- Changes in policy-making
  - Can you tell me about any ways in which the policymaking process within your team or department has changed over the past few years? Has it become more transparent or open to civil society? In what ways? What impact has this had on policy?
  - When your department or the government more generally is working to develop policy, what kinds of pressures or incentives do you face? To what extent is your policy evidence based? Are there any requirements or pressures in terms of the evidence base of your policies?
  - Have you seen any evidence that African Union policies are being taken up at the national level? To what extent/ in what ways?

- Involvement of CSOs in policy making

- Have you observed any changes to the effectiveness or quality of civil society participation or advocacy to government at the national or regional over the past few years?
- To what extent do formalised accountability mechanisms or spaces for civil society engagement in policymaking currently exist in national /regional policymaking? How has this changed over the past few years?
- To what extent do you see NSA coalitions engaging on policy in your area? Other alliances or networks? Less/ more than before?
- To what extent have you seen alliances and networks ( such as….) engage with national and regional policymakers? To what effect?
- Can you tell me about any areas in which CSOs or coalitions in your field have contributed to national or regional policy changes over the past few years? What/ how/ when did they contribute? Was there any involvement or support provided from the IP? Have there been any changes to their approach or areas of focus over the past few years?
- Can you describe the policymaking process in your department, in particular how you engage outside groups in this process? How do you identify key stakeholders involved in or affected by the policy? How do you assess their needs? How do you engage them in the policymaking process?
- Are there any champions (liaisons or focal points) of CSO or NSA policy engagement in your team or department?
- Can you describe any ways in which your department or the government more generally engages or opens space for dialogue with NSAs?

- Citizen engagement
  - Can you tell me about the general level of citizen awareness in the (relevant) policy areas in which you work?
  - As a result of IP efforts (evidence or awareness generated by IP), have you seen any changes in terms of citizen or non-state engagement on regional /continental issues?

**AREAP (knowledge of other IPs)**

- Heard of AB
  - Can you tell me about any cases where you or your team have used AB data to raise awareness of key issues? In what ways? On the part of which stakeholder groups?
  - Are you familiar with any cases where AB data or research was used to argue a policy position or advocate with government? Any instances where you used AB data or research as a part of your work?
- Heard of Trust
  - How have you worked with the Trust?

## 3.3 The Trust stakeholders

### 3.3.1 CSOs

**Role and relationship with IP**

- Ask about organisation and individual's role
- Ask about work with IP
  - Can you tell me about any new technical skills or capacities that your organisation has developed, with support from the IP? To what extent has IP helped build technical skills or capacities within your organisation? How likely is it that these skills will be maintained?
  - Can you tell me about your relationship with the IP? What is the basis for the relationship – a shared agenda, shared resources, shared learning and capacity, shared approach?

- Can you tell me about any cases where by working with IP or (other CSOs funded by IP) your organisation has achieved better results? Results that wouldn't have otherwise been possible?
- To what extent does your organisation's work have an explicit gender focus? An explicit pro-poor focus? And explicit participatory focus? Has this changed over the past few years?

**Policy Making**

- Engaging policy makers/approach/change in policy
  - What policy areas does your organisation focus on?
  - Can you tell me about the way in which your organisation engages policymakers on key (continental/ regional) issues? Have you used any new capacities or technical skills to facilitate these engagements?
  - Can you tell me the ways in which your organisation engages with SADC? What do you hope to get from these engagements/ are they successful? What role does the Trust play?
  - How do other organisations working on similar issues as you engage with SADC? Are they successful? To what extent is there learning/ collaboration in terms of SADC policy engagement in your sector?
  - Can you tell me about your organisations policy advocacy approach? Do you feel you have the necessary resources and capacities in place to advocate effectively at the national/ regional levels?
  - Can you tell me about any areas in which your organisation has contributed to national or regional policy changes over the past few years? What/ how/ when? (How did you contribute to that change?) Was there any involvement or support provided from the IP? Did you use evidence generated by any of the IPs? Have there been any changes to your approach or areas of focus over the past few years?
  - Can you tell me about how your organisation frames and packages its policy advocacy at the regional or national levels to ensure success?
- Use of evidence
  - To what extent does your organisation directly use evidence to inform policy positions? How strong would you rate your organisation's technical capacity to analyse evidence and build policy or advocacy positions off it?
  - How common is it that other organisations in your sector use Trust data?
- Work with others
  - Can you tell me about any formalised relationships your organisation, or organisations you work with, have with the state? How strong are these links, and do you think they will be maintained? And informal relationships?
  - To what extent do formalised accountability mechanisms or spaces for civil society engagement in policymaking currently exist in national /regional policymaking? How has this changed over the past few years?
  - Does your organisations have any champions in government, in terms of the policies you put forward or your key relationships or focal points?
  - How does your organisation assess and map the space in which you operate – other stakeholders, policymaker agendas etc? How often to you engage with your audiences, peers and key stakeholders during the policy engagement and advocacy process?

**Citizen awareness**

- Can you tell me about the general level of citizen awareness in the areas in which your organisation works – is this something your organisation is trying to increase?
- As a result of IP efforts (evidence or awareness generated by IP), have you seen any changes in terms of citizen or non-state engagement on regional /continental issues?

**Reputation of IP**

- How strong do you think IP's reputation on (relevant issues) is? Are they seen as a credible stakeholder informing policy debates?

**Knowledge of other AREAP IP**

- Familiar with Afrobarometer or SOTU?
- Can you tell me about any cases where you or your team have used AB data to raise awareness of key issues? In what ways? On the part of which stakeholder groups?

### 3.3.2 Media

**Role and relationship with IP**

- Ask about role
  - When developing stories how much time are you able to devote to background research? What are the demands on your time in terms of the number of stories you have to produce each day, other commitments?
- Ask about relationship with IP
  - Can you tell me about any new technical skills or capacities that your organisation has developed, with support from the IP? To what extent has IP helped build technical skills or capacities within your organisation? How likely is it that these skills will be maintained?
  - Can you tell me about the relationship between your team and the IP? What is the basis for the relationship – a shared agenda, shared resources, shared learning and capacity, shared approach?
  - Understand area of work (policy areas, methodology) and area of work with the Trust/CSOs

**Citizen Awareness/Policy Change**

- To what extent do you think there is general citizen interest in (IP- relevant) issues? How do citizens engage with these issues? How has this changed over the past few years?
- Can you tell me about any key organisations who have contributed to national or regional policy changes in (relevant) areas over the past few years? What/ how/ when? Was there any involvement or support provided from the IP / NP/ National platform?
- To what extent have you seen alliances and networks supported by the Trust ( such as….) engaging with national and regional policymakers? To what effect?
- Have you seen any evidence that African Union policies are being taken up at the national level? To what extent/ in what ways?

**Reputation of IP**

- How strong do you think IP's reputation on (relevant issues) is? Are they seen as a credible stakeholder informing policy debates?
- To what extent do you see IP engaging at the national regional level and in what ways? What has worked about their approach and what hasn't?
- What is the IP's reputation; are they seen as legitimate and credible policy advocates and knowledge generators?

**Use of data/knowledge of AB/Trust**

- How often do you use AB or Trust data? Why do you use it / why not? How common is it that other organisations in your sector uses AB data? Trust data?
- To what extent would you say that your use of AB/ Trust data has led to increased awareness of the issues? (On the part of which stakeholders groups, in what ways?)

### 3.3.3 Policy Makers

**Role and relationship with IP**

- Ask about role
- Ask about relationship with IP
    - Can you tell me about the relationship between your team and the IP? What is the basis for the relationship – a shared agenda, shared resources, shared learning and capacity, shared approach?
    - Can you tell me about any formalised relationships you, have with CSOs? How strong are these links and how do they function? Why these CSOs?

**Reputation of IP**

- How strong do you think IP's reputation on (relevant issues) is? Are they seen as a credible stakeholder informing policy debates?
- To what extent do you see IP engaging at the national regional level and in what ways? What has worked about their approach and what hasn't?
- What is the IP's reputation; are they seen as legitimate and credible policy advocates and knowledge generators?

**Policy-making/engagement of CSOs**

- Changes in policy-making
    - Can you tell me about any ways in which the policymaking process within your team or department has changed over the past few years? Has it become more transparent or open to civil society? In what ways? What impact has this had on policy?
    - When your department or the government more generally is working to develop policy, what kinds of pressures or incentives do you face? To what extent is your policy evidence based? Are there any requirements or pressures in terms of the evidence base of your policies?
- Involvement of CSOs in policy making
    - Have you observed any changes to the effectiveness or quality of civil society participation or advocacy to government at the national or regional over the past few years?
    - To what extent do formalised accountability mechanisms or spaces for civil society engagement in policymaking currently exist in national /regional policymaking? How has this changed over the past few years?
    - To what extent do you see NSA coalitions engaging on policy in your area? Other alliances or networks? Less/ more than before?
    - To what extent have you seen alliances and networks ( such as….) engage with national and regional policymakers? To what effect?
    - Can you tell me about any areas in which CSOs or coalitions in your field have contributed to national or regional policy changes over the past few years? What/ how/ when did they contribute? Was there any involvement or support provided from the IP? Have there been any changes to their approach or areas of focus over the past few years?
    - Can you describe the policymaking process in your department, in particular how you engage outside groups in this process? How do you identify key stakeholders involved in or affected by the policy? How do you assess their needs? How do you engage them in the policymaking process?
    - Are there any champions (liaisons or focal points) of CSO or NSA policy engagement in your team or department?
    - Can you describe any ways in which your department or the government more generally engages or opens space for dialogue with NSAs?
- Citizen engagement

- Can you tell me about the general level of citizen awareness in the (relevant) policy areas in which you work?
- As a result of IP efforts (evidence or awareness generated by IP), have you seen any changes in terms of citizen or non-state engagement on regional /continental issues?

**AREAP (knowledge of other IPs)**

- Heard of AB
  - Can you tell me about any cases where you or your team have used AB/ Trust data to raise awareness of key issues? In what ways? On the part of which stakeholder groups?
  - Are you familiar with any cases where IP data or research was used to argue a policy position or advocate with government? Any instances where you used IP data or research as a part of your work?

# 4 AREAP Coding Framework

## 4.1 Protocols for selecting quotes:

- Quoted text should be several sentences or a paragraph in length, to provide sufficient context to whatever evidence is being captured.
- Each piece of evidence should only be quoted once per source--- if a particular piece of evidence is mentioned multiple times in the same source, it should only be coded one time.
- Both positive and negative evidence relating to a thematic area should be coded, to ensure that there isn't a positive or negative bias in analysis.
- Quotes can be assigned multiple codes.

## 4.2 Codes:

### 4.2.1 Evaluation questions

**1.1.1** Evidence of existence of **strengthened civil society coalitions** focused on policy change on key national and regional topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners.

**1.1.2** Evidence of **demand or preference for engaging in national or regional policy advocacy through coalitions**, on the part of civil society organisations.

**1.1.3** Evidence of civil society coalition **contributions to successful national or regional policy change** on topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners.

**2.1.1** Evidence AREAP implementing partner activities are designed in a **gender-sensitive** way.

**2.1.2** Evidence that AREAP implementing partners' activities are designed **to increase participation and voice of the poor**.

**2.1.3** Evidence of increased focus on topics that have an **explicit pro-poor or women** focus in AREAP implementing partner **evidence generation**, **research and advocacy**.

**2.1.4** Evidence of **female leadership** in national partners and civil society organisations supported by and partnered with AREAP implementing partners.

**3.1.1** Evidence that the AREAP implementing **partners engage with the work of the other partners**.

**3.1.2** Evidence that engagement between AREAP implementing partners enables **achievement of better results**.

**3.1.3** Evidence that results achieved through engagement between AREAP implementing partners would not have been achieved otherwise.

**3.3.1** Evidence that **donor reporting and programme requirements** have affected (positively or negatively) programme implementation and results achieved by implementing partners.

**4.1.1** Evidence that AREAP implementing partners have **partnered with other organisations** to achieve results they would not have been able to achieve independently.

**5.1.1** Evidence that AREAP implementing partners have **achieved respective logframe targets** to-date.

**5.2.1** Evidence that NSA partners have **increased technical skill** to carry out AREAP related activities.

**5.2.2** Evidence that NSA partners have **increased access to evidence, research and knowledge** generated by AREAP implementing partners.

**5.2.3** Evidence that NSA **partners are more effective** due to support provided by AREAP implementing partners.

**6.1.1** Evidence of **strengthened technical skills and understanding** of NSAs on how to effectively engage policymakers at the continental / regional levels

**6.1.2** Evidence of **strengthened relationships and shared understanding with policymakers**, around the importance of citizen and civil society engagement in policymaking at the continental, regional, national levels

**6.1.3** Evidence of existence of **regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms** and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking process (national, regional, continental levels)

**6.2.1** Evidence that key stakeholders and target audiences **can access Afrobarometer data**

**6.2.2** Evidence of **increased usage of Afrobarometer data** by existing key stakeholders.

**6.2.3** Evidence of **use of Afrobarometer by new stakeholders** in Africa.

**6.2.4** Evidence of increased usage of Afrobarometer data by key stakeholders **to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates** at the national or regional levels in Africa.

**6.2.5** Evidence of **broader uses for Afrobarometer data**, including awareness raising, education, programme planning and measuring impact.

**6.3.1** Evidence of increased and **strengthened policy engagement at regional and national levels** by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust.

**6.3.2** Evidence **of strengthened focus on pro-poor themes and issues in policy advocacy** and campaigns at regional and national levels by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust.

**6.3.3** Evidence of **contributions to national and regional policy change** and improved governance processes by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust.

**6.4.1** Evidence that **citizens demand change** in the areas SOTU target

**6.4.2** Evidence that national platforms and CSOs **successfully advocate for domestication** of target AU standards

**6.4.3** Evidence that national platforms and CSOs **pressure government to follow-through and apply** domesticated standards, drawing on pressure for change

**6.5.1** Repeat of 6.3.3.

**6.5.2** Repeat of 6.4.3

**6.5.3** Repeat of 6.2.4

**6.5.4** Repeat of 6.1.2

**7.1.1** Evidence of **collaboration between AREAP implementing partners**, for mutual benefit, organisational strengthening or increased effectiveness.

**7.2.1** **Economy**: Inputs being secured at the minimum necessary cost

**7.2.2** **Efficiency**: Outputs are produced efficiently (ratio of inputs to outputs)

**7.2.3** **Effectiveness**: Outputs achieve desired outcomes

**7.2.4** **Equity**: benefits are distributed fairly

**7.3.1** Evidence of **collaboration** between AREAP implementing partners, **to leverage additional resources and made best use of existing resources** (e.g. additional funding, programme and activity efficiencies).

### 4.2.2 Case study questions

**C1.** Assessment of extent to which AREAP implementing partners have successfully **engaged the media on target issues** in different contexts.

**C2.** Assessment of the **significance and depth of engagement between AREAP implementing partners and the media** on target issues in different contexts

**C3.** Assessment of extent to which **civil society groups** supported by AREAP implementing partners **have successfully engaged the media on target issues** in different contexts.

**C4.** Assessment of extent to which the **media has acted as a conduit for representing civil society voices and opinions** on national and regional policy in different contexts.

**C5.** Assessment of extent to which the media has acted as a **conduit for increasing civil society voice** in national and regional policy debates in different contexts.

**C6.** Assessment of extent to which the media has acted as **a conduit for increasing civil society awareness of key national and regional policy issues** in different contexts.

### 4.2.3 Conditions for QCA

**QCA.2** Evidence of perception that citizens listen to or engage with campaigns on regional issues

**QCA.8** Evidence of NSAs feeling that they have adequate technical capacity to use evidence

**QCA.10** Evidence that NSAs do not have a high staff turnover and/or have systems in place for organisational memory

**QCA.11** Evidence that NSAs have changed policy or approach based on new evidence

**QCA.12** Evidence that evidence is packaged for SADC/AU/National governance/target audience

**QCA.16** Evidence of use of strong evidence in policy-making

**QCA.18** Evidence that policy-makers are transparent about decision making processes

**QCA.19** Evidence that there is an open space for government to interact with non-state actors

**QCA.21** Evidence that key CSOs/IPs have access to finances to attend regional/continental meetings

**QCA.22** Evidence that CSOs prefer to work in alliances

**QCA.26** Evidence that NSAs have the resources necessary for policy advocacy

**QCA.27** Evidence that NSAs are able to make IP work a priority

**QCA.28** Evidence that NSAs are leading engagement at national/continental level

**QCA.29** Evidence that NSA engage with diverse audiences

**QCA.30** Evidence of mechanisms existing for citizens to engage with policy-makers/government

**QCA.33** Evidence of IP champion in government

**QCA.36** Evidence of NSAs knowledge of stakeholders, agendas and their needs

**QCA.38** Evidence of IP having good reputation and credibility

**QCA.43** Evidence of strength of relationship between IP core/hq and national partner

**QCA.13** Evidence of national partner's research capacity

**QCA.45** Evidence of capacity of NP (work in general, not just research)

**QCA.47** Evidence that IP prioritises IP work

**QCA.48** Evidence that IP has other competing work

**QCA.50** Evidence that NP prioritises IP work

**QCA.51** Evidence that NP has other competing work

# Annex 4: Evaluation Framework

# Annex 4 - Evaluation Framework

| Criteria | | Overarching evaluation questions | | Specific evaluation question | Applies | Mid-Line | End-Programme | # | Judgement criteria | Indicators | Research methodology | Data sources | Linkages to AREAP & Implementing Partner theories of change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relevance | 1 | Does the initiative address the problem? | 1.1 | Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change at the national or regional levels and what drivers influence their participation? | SOTU & SAT | ✓ | ✓ | 1.1.1 | Evidence of existence of strengthened civil society coalitions focused on policy change on key national and regional topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners. | Number of new CSO coalitions<br>Increased levels of activity of existing CSO coalitions<br>Increased capacity of CSO coalitions<br>Increased focus on key national and regional topics by CSO coalitions | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSO and media<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | AREAP – SOTU: Output 1, Output 2, Output 3. AREAP – Southern Africa Trust: Output 1, Output 3, Outcome – Impact. |
| | | | | | | | | 1.1.2 | Evidence of demand or preference for engaging in national or regional policy advocacy through coalitions, on the part of civil society organisations. | Increase in CSO activities through coalitions<br>Incidence of demand or preference for increased coalition activity | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 1.1.3 | Evidence of civil society coalition contributions to successful national or regional policy change on topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners. | Incidence of successful national and regional policy change in topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners<br>Incidence and significance of CSO involvement in national and regional policy change | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media and policy makers<br>National or Regional policies<br>Media records<br>Secondary Data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 1.2 | Does evidence generation and citizen awareness about national, governance issues, and/or regional or continental issues support improvements/changes in national governance? | All | | ✓ | 1.2.1 | Evidence of existence of new evidence and citizen awareness about national governance, regional and continental issues in Africa by AREAP implementing partners. | Number of new datasets, research papers and reports produced by implementing partners<br>Perception of increased citizen awareness of targeted topics by policy makers and NSAs | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media and policy makers<br>Media records<br>Secondary Data provided by implementing partners | AREAP – SOTU: Output 3, Output 1. AREAP – Southern Africa Trust: Output 1, Output 2, Output 3, Outcome – Impact. AREAP - Afrobarometer: Output 1, Output 2. |
| | | | | | | | | 1.2.2 | Evidence of citizen and NSA engagement on national, regional or continental issues which uses evidence generated by AREAP implementing partners. | Incidence and significance of citizen engagement on national governance, regional or continental issues which uses evidence generated by implementing partners<br>Incidence and significance of NSA engagement on national governance, regional or continental issues which uses evidence generated by implementing partners | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media and policy makers<br>Media records<br>Secondary Data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 1.2.3 | Evidence of citizen and NSA engagement on national, regional or continental issues which follows increased awareness generated by AREAP implementing partners. | Incidence and significance of citizen engagement on national governance, regional or continental issues following increased awareness generated by implementing partners<br>Incidence and significance of NSA engagement on national governance, regional or continental issues following increased awareness by implementing partners | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media and policy makers<br>Media records<br>Secondary Data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 1.2.4 | Evidence of improvements or changes at the national or regional levels as a result of citizen or NSA engagement on issues being targeted by AREAP implementing partners. | Changes in national or regional policy on issues being targeted<br>Improvement in governance process<br>Incidence and significance of citizen or NSA involvement in improvements or changes at the national or regional level | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media and policy makers<br>National or Regional policies/processes<br>Media records<br>Secondary Data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 1.3 | To what extent, are lessons learned from this programme relevant for CSOs working with supra national institutions in Africa? | SAT & SOTU | | ✓ | 1.3.1 | Evidence of common approaches to working with supra-national institutions in Africa shared between AREAP implementing partners. | Incidence and significance of common approaches to working with supra-national institutions in Africa shared between AREAP implementing partners. | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | AREAP – Southern Africa Trust: Output 1, Output 2, Output 3, Outcome - Impact. AREAP – SOTU: Output 1, Output 2, Output 3. |
| | | | | | | | | 1.3.2 | Evidence of common approaches to working with supra-national institutions in Africa shared with other CSOs working with same institutions | Incidence and significance of common approaches to working with supra-national institutions in Africa shared with other CSOs working with same institutions | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 1.3.3 | Evidence of shared learning with other CSOs working with same institutions. | Incidence and significance of shared learning with other CSOs working with same institutions. | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | 2 | Is the initiative in line with beneficiary needs? | 2.1 | To what extent have programme initiatives and results been relevant to women and the poor? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 2.1.1 | Evidence AREAP implementing partner activities are designed in a gender-sensitive way. | Number of programmatic activities that have an explicit gender focus or gender component | CA/Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | N/A |
| | | | | | | | | 2.1.2 | Evidence that AREAP implementing partners' activities are designed to increase participation and voice of the poor. | Number of programmatic activities that have an explicit pro-poor focus or participatory component | | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 2.1.3 | Evidence of increased focus on topics that have an explicit pro-poor or women focus in AREAP implementing partner evidence generation, research and advocacy. | Change in number of implementing partner activities that have an explicit pro poor or women focus | | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 2.1.4 | Evidence of female leadership in national partners and civil society organisations supported by and partnered with AREAP implementing partners. | Number of women in high ranking position in CSOs supported by AREAP implementing partners | | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| Complementarity | 3 | To what extent has this programme complemented and contributed the work of other stakeholders? | 3.1 | To what extent has the design of AREAP supported and enabled the achievement of results to-date that individual components would not have otherwise been able to achieve? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 3.1.1 | Evidence that the AREAP implementing partners engage with the work of the other partners. | Incidence of professional engagement between AREAP implementing partners | CA/Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | N/A |
| | | | | | | | | 3.1.2 | Evidence that engagement between AREAP implementing partners enables achievement of better results. | Incidences of professional engagement between AREAP implementing partners where collaboration led to increased results | CA/Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 3.1.3 | Evidence that results achieved through engagement between AREAP implementing partners would not have been achieved otherwise. | Incidences of professional engagement between AREAP implementing partners where collaboration led to results that would not have been achieved otherwise | CA/Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 3.2 | What has been learnt from developing a continental programme approach using different implementing partners with complementary skills sets? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 3.2.1 | N/A | | | | N/A |
| | | | 3.3 | To what the extent do the breadth of donors and their individual requirements affect (positively or negatively) programme implementation and the results achieved by implementing partners? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 3.3.1 | Evidence that donor reporting and progamme requirements have affected (positively or negatively) programme implementiation and results achieved by implementing partners. | Evidence that donor requirements conflict or are duplicative.<br>Evidence that donor requirements (from multiple donors) incentivise or encourage improved programme implementation or results.<br>Evidence that that the breadth of donors shapes programme implementiation or achievement of results (in ways that wouldn't be present if only a single donor were present, or donor approaches were further harmonised). | Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with donors and implementing partners' staff | N/A |
| Coordination | 4 | How successfully have programme interventions worked with other partners? | 4.1 | How successfully have programme interventions worked with other organisations to achieve results they would not have been able to achieve independently? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 4.1.1 | Evidence that AREAP implementing partners have partnered with other organisations to achieve results they would not have been able to achieve independently. | Evidence that implementing partners have engaged the comparative strengths of their partners to achieve outcomes in more collaborative, efficient and effective ways | Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with donors and implementing partners' staff | N/A |
| | | | | | | | | 4.1.2 | | Evidence that AREAP implementing partners have strengthened partnership, in terms of increasing the scope of partnership or in terms of collaboration in new areas of work. | Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with donors and implementing partners' staff | |

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| **Effectiveness** | **5** | Has the initative achieved its objectives? | 5.1 | To what extent and under what conditions have planned results of individual initiatives been achieved? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 5.1.1 | Evidence that AREAP implementing partners have achieved respective logframe targets to-date. | Achievement of log frame targets | Process Evaluation | Secondary data provided by implementing partners<br>Political Economy Analysis | N/A |
| | | | 5.2 | To what extent have implementing partners have effectively built the capacity of NSA partners? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 5.2.1 | Evidence that NSA partners have increased technical skill to carry out AREAP related activities. | Number of formal trainings and capacity building activities provided to NSAs<br>Incidence and significance of demonstrated use of new technical skills provided to NSA partners | CA/Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO and policy makers<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | AREAP Output 2. Afrobarometer theory of change: Group 3, Group 1, Group 2. Southern Africa Trust theory of change: Process 1 Outcome – Impact, Process 3 Output - Outcome; Process 4 Output – Outcome; |
| | | | | | | | | 5.2.2 | Evidence that NSA partners have increased access to evidence, research and knowledge generated by AREAP implementing partners. | Incidences of NSA partners using evidence, research and knowledge generated by implementing partners | CA/Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media and policy makers<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 5.2.3 | Evidence that NSA partners are more effective due to support provided by AREAP implementing partners. | NSA partners report better capacity due to support provided by implementing partners<br>NSA report being more effective due to support provided by implementing partners<br>Incidence of improved results achieved by NSA partners due to support provided by implementing partners | CA/Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media and policy makers<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | **6** | Do the assumptions in the program logic hold true? | 6.1 | To what extent has engaging at the continental / regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms? | SOTU/ Trust | ✓ | ✓ | 6.1.1 | Evidence of strengthened technical skills and understanding of NSAs on how to effectively engage policymakers at the continental / regional levels | Number of formal trainings and capacity building activities provided to NSAs on how to effectively engage policymakers at the continental/regional levels<br>Incidence and significance of use of new technical skills provided to NSAs n how to effectively engage policymakers at the continental/regional levels | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO and policy makers<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | AREAP outcome to impact; AREAP output 3; AREAP Output 2; AREAP Output 1. SOTU theory of change; Trust theory of change. |
| | | | | | | | | 6.1.2 | Evidence of strengthened relationships and shared understanding with policymakers, around the importance of citizen and civil society engagement in policymaking at the continental, regional, national levels | Established relationships between AREAP implementing partners (and supported NSAs) with policymakers<br>Incidence of shared understanding and engagement between AREAP implementing partners (and supported NSAs) with policy makers | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO and policy makers<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 6.1.3 | Evidence of existence of regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking process (national, regional, continental levels) | Number of regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policy making process | CA/QCA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO and policy makers<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 6.2 | AB: To what extent are key stakeholders able and willing to use Afrobarometer data to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates? | AB | ✓ | ✓ | 6.2.1 | Evidence that key stakeholders and target audiences can access Afrobarometer data | Incidence of stakeholders and target audiences accessing Afrobarometer data | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO and policy makers<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | Afrobarometer theory of change: Group 2; Group 4; |
| | | | | | | | | 6.2.2 | Evidence of increased usage of Afrobarometer data by existing key stakeholders. | Incidence and significance of use of Afrobarometer data by existing key stakeholders | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 6.2.3 | Evidence of use of Afrobarometer by new stakeholders in Africa. | Incidence and significance of use of Afrobarometer by new stakeholders | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 6.2.4 | Evidence of increased usage of Afrobarometer data by key stakeholders to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates at the national or regional levels in Africa. | Incidence and significance of use of Afrobarometer by key stakeholders to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates at the national or regional levels in Africa | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 6.2.5 | Evidence of broader uses for Afrobarometer data, including awareness raising, education, programem planning and measuring impact. | Incidence and significance of broader uses of Afrobarometer by key stakeholders at the national or regional levels in Africa | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 6.3 | SAT: To what extent do alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust, both between NSAs and between NSAs and the state, contribute to increased pro-poor policy engagement and change? | SAT | ✓ | ✓ | 6.3.1 | Evidence of increased and strengthened policy engagement at regional and national by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust. | Incidence and significance of policy engagement at regional and national by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | Southern Africa Trust theory of change: Outcome – Impact; Process 2; Process 3; Process 4; Process 5. |
| | | | | | | | | 6.3.2 | Evidence of strengthened focus on pro-poor themes and issues in policy advocacy and campaigns at regional and national levels by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust. | Number of policy advocacy and campaign activities that have an explicit pro-poor focus or participatory component | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 6.3.3 | Evidence of contributions to national and regional policy change and improved governance processes by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust. | Incidence and significance of contributions to national and regional policy change and improved governance processes by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust. | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 6.4 | SOTU: To what extent, has SOTU strengthened national and continental level relationships of accountability between governments, citizens and the AU? | SOTU | ✓ | ✓ | 6.4.1 | Evidence that citizens demand change in the areas SOTU target | - Incidences of public engagement on issues (demonstrations, campaigns, rallies)<br>- Citizen groups include AU instruments in their stated objectives | CA | - Media records (newspapers, TV shows, radio shows)<br>- Interviews with citizen groups and representatives | SOTU theory of change: Group C, Group E, Group D |
| | | | | | | | | 6.4.2 | Evidence that national platforms and CSOs successfully advocate for domestication of target AU standards | - Percentage of target AU instruments successfully domesticated<br>- Convincing national platform strategies to advocate change<br>- Established relationships between national platforms and key counterparts | CA | - National laws<br>- Interviews with government stakeholders<br>- Work plans and strategy documents of national partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 6.4.3 | Evidence that national platforms and CSOs pressure government to follow-through and apply domesticated standards, drawing on pressure for change | - Key decision-makers in national governments refer to SOTU national platforms as drivers for change | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 6.5 | What interventions increase the value that governments see in engaging with citizens, especially through civil society organisations and other non-state actors, and taking into account their views and goals? What makes decision makers more receptive to and responsive to informed citizen demand? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 6.5.1 | Evidence of contributions to national and regional policy change and improved governance processes by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust. | Incidence and significance of contributions to national and regional policy change and improved governance processes by alliances and networks supported by the Southern Africa Trust. | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | AREAP outcome to impact; AREAP output 3; AREAP Output 2; AREAP Output 1. Afrobarometer theory of change: Group 2; Group 4; Southern Africa Trust theory of change: Outcome – Impact; Process 2; Process 3; Process 4; Process 5. SOTU theory of change: Group C, Group E, Group D |
| | | | | | | | | 6.5.2 | Evidence that national platforms and CSOs pressure government to follow-through and apply domesticated standards, drawing on pressure for change | - Key decision-makers in national governments refer to SOTU national platforms as drivers for change | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 6.5.3 | Evidence of increased usage of Afrobarometer data by key stakeholders to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates at the national or regional levels in Africa. | Incidence and significance of use of Afrobarometer by key stakeholders to raise awareness of key issues or engage in policy debates at the national or regional levels in Africa | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Media records<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 6.5.4 | Evidence of strengthened relationships and shared understanding with policymakers, around the importance of citizen and civil society engagement in policymaking at the continental, regional, national levels | Established relationships between AREAP implementing partners (and supported NSAs) with policymakers<br>Incidence of shared understanding and engagement between AREAP implementing partners (and supported NSAs) with policy makers | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO and policy makers<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |

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| **Efficiency** | **7** | Is the initiative cost effective? | 7.1 | Have the implementing partners made the best possible use of their comparative advantages to optimise achievement of results? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 7.1.1 | Evidence of collaboration between AREAP implementing partners, for mutual benefit, organisational strengthening or increased effectiveness. | Incidence and significance of collaboration between AREAP implementing partners to share resources and comparitive advantages | Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff, staff members of CSOs, policy makers and media<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | N/A |
| | | | 7.2 | Could the results generated by the programme to-date have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 7.2.1 | Economy: Inputs being secured at the minimum necessary cost | - All travel is supported by a sound business case<br>- Flights are procured at the minimum necessary cost<br>- Hotels are procured at the minimum necessary cost<br>- Staff salaries are in line with market rates<br>- Consultant fees are in line with market rates | Process Evaluation | Secondary data provided by implementing partners | N/A |
| | | | | | All | ✓ | ✓ | 7.2.2 | Efficiency: Outputs are produced efficiently (ratio of inputs to outputs) | - Comparison of cost per training workshop<br>- Cost per evidence generated (new report, new round of survey data)<br>- Cost of CSOs meeting with policy makers at regional or continental level | Process Evaluation | Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | All | ✓ | ✓ | 7.2.3 | Effectiveness: Outputs achieve desired outcomes | - Evidence that the implementing partner has levered in additional resources (financial or in-kind)<br>- Evidence of the effect (and scale of effect) of the programme<br>- Assumptions underpinning interventions are credible and realistic<br>- Risks associated with activities are effectively mitigated | Process Evaluation | Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | All | ✓ | ✓ | 7.2.4 | Equity: benefits are distributed fairly | - Evidence that AREAP implementing partners are reaching the poor and women through AREAP activities | Process Evaluation | Key informant interviews with AREAP implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSOs<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 7.3 | How have the individual components of AREAP collaborated to leverage additional resources? | All | ✓ | ✓ | 7.3.1 | Evidence of collaboration between AREAP implementing partners, to leverage additional resources and made best use of existing resources (e.g. additional funding, programme and activity efficiencies). | Incidence and significance of collaboration between AREAP implementing partners to leverage additional resources | Process Evaluation | Key informant interviews with AREAP implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSOs<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | N/A |
| **Impact** | **8** | Has the initiative achieved its planned outcomes? | 8.1 | What have been the immediate intended and unintended impacts of different interventions? And by the overall programme? What are the likely longer-term effects of these results? | All | | ✓ | 8.1.1 | Evidence of immediate intended impacts of AREAP implementing partners. | Results reported for AREAP implementing partners from logframe | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partner staff, donors, CSOs and policy makers<br>Media sources<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | N/A |
| | | | | | | | | 8.1.2 | Evidence of immediate unintended impacts of AREAP implementing partners. | Results reported for AREAP implementing partners | CA | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partner staff, donors CSOs and policy makers<br>Media sources<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | | | | | | 8.1.3 | Evidence of immediate intended and unintended effects of the overall AREAP | Results reported for the overall AREAP | CA | Key Informant Interviews with donors, implementing partner staff, CSOs and policy makers<br>Media sources<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 8.2 | For whom have the results made a difference? | All | | ✓ | 8.2.1 | Evidence of effects of AREAP implementing partner activities on sub-groups of interest, including women, youth and the poor. | Reporting on AREAP implementing partner activities on sub-groups of interest including women and the poor | CA | Key Informant Interviews with donors, implementing partner staff, CSOs and policy makers<br>Media sources<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | N/A |
| **Sustainability** | **9** | Are the benefits that have been achieved by the programme to date likely to be sustained? | 9.1 | Are the results that have been achieved by the programme to date likely to be sustained? | All | | ✓ | 9.1.1 | Evidence of strengthened organisational and institutional relationships supported between NSAs, the state, and key AREAP stakeholders. | Number of reported formal relationships between NSAs, the state and key AREAP stakeholders<br>Perception that organisational and institutional relationships will be maintained between NSAs, the state and key AREAP stakeholders | Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with donors, implementing partner staff, CSOs and policy makers<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | N/A |
| | | | | | | | | 9.1.2 | Evidence that increased technical capacities within AREAP implementing partners, and their national and NSA partners are likely to be maintained. | Perception that technical capacities within AREAP implementing partners and their national and NSA partners are likely to be maintained | Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with donors, implementing partner staff and CSOs<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | |
| | | | 9.2 | Have the programme interventions created capacities for sustained results? | All | | ✓ | 9.2.1 | Evidence of increased internal organisational capacities created within national and NSA partners of the AREAP implementing partners. | Reports that internal organisations capacities have been increased<br>Perception that internal organisational capacities of AREAP implementing partners and their national and NSA partners are likely to be maintained | Process Evaluation | Key Informant Interviews with donors, implementing partner staff and CSOs<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners | N/A |
| Case Study Questions | | | 1 | To what extent does working at the continental / regional levels lead to inclusive (e.g. pro-poor, gender sensitive, inclusive of marginalised populations) national policy changes that would not have otherwise occurred? | SOTU & Trust | | ✓ | | Assessment of extent to which strengthened citizen awareness of topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners has been created in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which strengthened civil society and citizen voice on topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners has been created in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which increased space for engagement with policy makers has been created in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which strengthened platforms and networks for NSA engagement with policymakers at regional / national levels has been created in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which leverage and coordination at regional / continental levels contributed to national changes that would not have otherwise occurred through national-level NSA engagement and voice.<br>Assessment of extent to which NSAs use strengthened knowledge and data base to inform policy positions and policy debates in different contexts. | N/A | Case Study | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media, donors and policy makers.<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners.<br>Literature review of academic and grey literature. | AREAP outcome to impact; AREAP output 3; AREAP Output 2; AREAP Output 1. SOTU theory of change; Trust theory of change. |
| | | | 2 | In what contexts does the media act as a conduit for civil society policy engagement and voice? | All | ✓ | | | Assessment of extent to which AREAP implementing partners have successfully engaged the media on target issues in different contexts.<br>Assessment of the significance and depth of engagement between AREAP implementing partner and the media on target issues in different contexts<br>Assessment of extent to which civil society groups supported by AREAP implementing partners have successfully engaged the media on target issues in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which the media has acted as a conduit for representing civil society voices and opinions on national and regional policy in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which the media has acted as a conduit for increasing civil society voice in national and regional policy debates in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which the media has acted as a conduit for increasing civil society awareness of key national and regional policy issues in different contexts. | N/A | Case Study | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media, donors and policy makers.<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners.<br>Literature review of academic and grey literature. | Southern Africa Trust theory of change: Outcome – Impact; Process 2; Process 3; Process 4; Process 5.<br>Afrobarometer theory of change: Group 2; Group 4;<br>SOTU theory of change: Group C, Group E, Group D |
| | | | 3 | In what contexts does technical capacity building and support lead to sustained institutional strengthening of key stakeholders and partner organisations? | All | | ✓ | | Assessment of extent to which AREAP implementing partners have built technical capacity of key stakeholders and partners in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which increased technical capacity has enabled key stakeholders and partners to increase internal organisational capacity and strength in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which increased capacity is being built in most relevant areas, to improve effectiveness, in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which increased technical and organisational capacity of key stakeholders has enabled increased effectiveness in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which increased technical and organisational capacity of key stakeholders is likely to be sustained, in different contexts. | N/A | Cast Study | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media, donors and policy makers.<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners.<br>Literature review of academic and grey literature. | Southern Africa Trust theory of change: Outcome – Impact; Process 2; Process 3; Process 4; Process 5.<br>Afrobarometer theory of change: Group 2; Group 4;<br>SOTU theory of change: Group C, Group E, Group D |
| | | (Suggested Learning Hub Question) | 4 | (Suggested Learning Hub Question) In what contexts does a strengthened evidence base on national and regional policy issues lead to increased legitimacy of civil society voice and space for civil society policy engagement? | AB & Trust | | | | Assessment of extent to which a strengthened evidence base on national and regional policy issues has been created, in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which a strengthened evidence base on national and regional policy issues is new, or builds on existing public resources, in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which a strengthened evidence base on national policy issues has been used for awareness, campaigns and advocacy by civil society organisations, in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which use of strengthened evidence by civil society organisations, leads to increased perceptions of legitimacy (of the activities being implemented, or organisations themselves), in different contexts.<br>Assessment of extent to which use of strengthened evidence by civil society organisations leads to increased spaces for voice and policy engagement, in different contexts. | N/A | Cast Study | Key Informant Interviews with implementing partners' staff and staff members of CSO, media, donors and policy makers.<br>Secondary data provided by implementing partners.<br>Literature review of academic and grey literature. | AREAP – SOTU: Output 3, Output 1. AREAP – Southern Africa Trust: Output 1, Output 2, Output 3, Outcome – Impact. AREAP - Afrobarometer: Output 1, Output 2. |

# Annex 5: Interview Plan

## Annex 5 Interview Plan

| Organisation/Category | Individual/group | Information sought in the interview | Evaluation Question | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that CSOs are working more as coalitions now | 1.1 | 1.1.1 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that CSOs are working more as coalitions now | 1.1 | 1.1.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that CSOs are working on topics targeted by AREAP IP | 1.1 | 1.1.1 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that CSOs are working on topics targeted by AREAP IP | 1.1 | 1.1.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of demanding or prefering to engage in policy advocacy through coalitions | 1.1 | 1.1.2 |
| Policy Makers | | Evidence that CSO coalitions have contributed to successful national or regional policy change on AREAP IP topics (number of times policy has changed, involvement of CSOs in policy change) | 1.1 | 1.1.3 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that they have contributed to successful national or regional policy change on AREAP IP topics (number of times policy has changed, involvement of CSOs in policy change) | 1.1 | 1.1.3 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that CSO coalitions have contributed to successful national or regional policy change on AREAP IP topics (number of times policy has changed, involvement of CSOs in policy change) | 1.1. | 1.1.3 |
| IP staff | | To what extent do they believe citizen awareness has increased? | 1.2 | 1.2.1 |
| Policy Makers | | To what extent do they believe citizen awareness has increased? | 1.2 | 1.2.1 |
| CSO Staff | | To what extent do they believe citizen awareness has increased? | 1.2 | 1.2.1 |
| Media | | To what extent do they believe citizen awareness has increased? | 1.2 | 1.2.1 |
| Secondary Records | | Number of new data sets, papers, etc | 1.2 | 1.2.1 |
| Media | | Use of AREAP IP evidence | 1.2 | 1.2.2 |
| Media | | Knowledge about citizens' or other NSAs use of AREAP IP evidence | 1.2 | 1.2.2 |
| Other NSA | | Use of AREAP IP evidence | 1.2 | 1.2.2 |
| Other NSA | | Knowledge about citizens' or other NSAs use of AREAP IP evidence | 1.2 | 1.2.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Knowledge about citizens' or NSAs use of AREAP IP evidence | 1.2 | 1.2.2 |
| IP Staff | | Knowledge about citizens' or NSAs use of AREAP IP evidence | 1.2 | 1.2.2 |
| Media | | Evidence of citizens/ NSAs enagement on regional/continental issues (using AREAP IP evidence OR after awareness generated by IP) | 1.2 | 1.2.2; 1.2.3 |
| NSA | | Evidence of citizens/ NSAs enagement on regional/continental issues (using AREAP IP evidence OR after awareness generated by IP) | 1.2 | 1.2.2;1.2.3 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of citizens/ NSAs enagement on regional/continental issues (using AREAP IP evidence OR after awareness generated by IP) | 1.2 | 1.2.2; 1.2.3 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of citizens/ NSAs enagement on regional/continental issues (using AREAP IP evidence OR after awareness generated by IP) | 1.2 | 1.2.2; 1.2.3 |
| Policy makers | | Evidence of citizens/ NSAs enagement on regional/continental issues (using AREAP IP evidence OR after awareness generated by IP) | 1.2 | 1.2.2; 1.2.3 |
| Policy makers | | Knowledge about citizens' or NSAs use of AREAP IP evidence | 1.2 | 1.2.2; 1.2.3 |
| Media | | Provide evidence of changes in national/regional policy on issues being targeted (how have NSAs/CSOs been involved) | 1.2 | 1.2.4 |
| NSA | | Provide evidence of changes in national/regional policy on issues being targeted (how have NSAs/CSOs been involved) | 1.2 | 1.2.4 |
| CSO Staff | | Provide evidence of changes in national/regional policy on issues being targeted (how have NSAs/CSOs been involved) | 1.2 | 1.2.4 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| IP Staff | | Provide evidence of changes in national/regional policy on issues being targeted (how have NSAs/CSOs been involved) | 1.2 | 1.2.4 |
| Policy makers | | Provide evidence of changes in national/regional policy on issues being targeted (how have NSAs/CSOs been involved) | 1.2 | 1.2.4 |
| CSO Staff | | How are they engaging with AU/SADC (supra-national institution) | 1.3 | 1.3.1; 1.3.2 |
| CSO Staff | | How are other CSOs (AREAP and non-AREAP) engaging with AU/SADC (supra-national institution)? | 1.3 | 1.3.1; 1.3.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Are their approaches to engaging with supra-national institutions shared with other CSOs (AREAP and non-AREAP) working with these institutions? | 1.3 | 1.3.1; 1.3.2 |
| IP Staff | | How are their funded CSOs engaging with AU/SADC (supra-national institution)? | 1.3 | 1.3.1; 1.3.2 |
| IP Staff | | How are other CSOs (non-AREAP) engaging with AU/SADC (supra-national institution)? | 1.3 | 1.3.1; 1.3.2 |
| IP Staff | | Are IP's CSO approaches to engaging with supra-national institutions shared with other CSOs (AREAP and non-AREAP) working with these institutions? | 1.3 | 1.3.1; 1.3.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of how they share learning with other CSOs in the sector | 1.3 | 1.3.3 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of how CSOs share learning in the sector | 1.3 | 1.3.3 |
| Secondary Records | | Number of programmatic activities that have an explicit gender focus or gender component | 2.1 | 2.1.1 |
| IP Staff | | Number of programmatic activities that have an explicit gender focus or gender component | 2.1 | 2.1.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Number of programmatic activities that have an explicit gender focus or gender component | 2.1 | 2.1.1 |
| Secondary Records | | Number of programmatic activities that have an explicit pro-poor focus or participatory component | 2.1 | 2.1.2 |
| IP Staff | | Number of programmatic activities that have an explicit pro-poor focus or participatory component | 2.1 | 2.1.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Number of programmatic activities that have an explicit pro-poor focus or participatory component | 2.1 | 2.1.2 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that work has changed to increase focus on on pro-poor or women in evidence generation, researcha and advocacay | 2.1 | 2.1.3 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that work has changed to increase focus on on pro-poor or women in evidence generation, researcha and advocacay | 2.1 | 2.1.3 |
| Secondary Records | | Women in female leadership at national partners and CSOs | 2.1 | 2.1.4 |
| IP staff | | Evidence that they engage professionally with other IP | 3.1 | 3.1.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that they work with/get funding from other IP staff | 3.1 | 3.1.1 |
| IP staff | | Evidence that by working with other IP, they reached better results | 3.1 | 3.1.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that by working with other IP or other CSO funded by other IP, they reached better results | 3.1 | 3.1.2 |
| IP staff | | Evidence that by working with other IP, they reached results that were otherwise not possible | 3.1 | 3.1.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that by working with other IP or other CSO funded by other IP, they reached results that were otherwise not possible | 3.1 | 3.1.2 |
| Donors | | Evidence that implementing partners have engaged the comparative strengths of their partners to achieve outcomes in more collaborative, efficient and effective ways | 4.1 | 4.1.1 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that implementing partners have engaged the comparative strengths of their partners to achieve outcomes in more collaborative, efficient and effective ways | 4.1 | 4.1.1 |
| Donors | | Evidence that AREAP implementing partners have strengthened partnership, in terms of increasing the scope of partnership or in terms of collaboration in new areas of work. | 4.1 | 4.1.2 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that AREAP implementing partners have strengthened partnership, in terms of increasing the scope of partnership or in terms of collaboration in new areas of work. | 4.1 | 4.1.2 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| Secondary Records | | Achieved logframe targets to-date | 5.1 | 5.1.1 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of NSAs using new technical skills (from IP trainings/capacity building activities) | 5.2 | 5.2.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of NSAs using new technical skills (from IP trainings/capacity building activities) | 5.2 | 5.2.1 |
| Other NSA | | Evidence of NSAs using new technical skills (from IP trainings/capacity building activities) | 5.2 | 5.2.1 |
| Policy makers | | Evidence of NSAs using new technical skills (from IP trainings/capacity building activities) | 5.2 | 5.2.1 |
| Other NSA | | Examples of using evidence, research and knowledged generated by IP | 5.2 | 5.2.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Listing incidences of NSA partners using evidence, research and knowledge generated by IP | 5.2 | 5.2.2 |
| IP Staff | | Listing incidences of NSA partners using evidence, research and knowledge generated by IP | 5.2 | 5.2.2 |
| Policy Makers | | Listing incidences of NSA partners using evidence, research and knowledge generated by IP | 5.2 | 5.2.2 |
| Secondary Records | | Incidence of NSA partners using eivdence/research and knowledged generated by IP | 5.2 | 5.2.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Report better capacity/more effective due to IP support | 5.2 | 5.2.3 |
| Policy Makers | | Report improved results achieved by NSA partners (with IP support) | 5.2 | 5.2.3 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of NSAs with bettter capacity/more effective due to IP support | 5.2 | 5.2.3 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of improved results achieved by NSA partners through their support | 5.2 | 5.2.3 |
| Other NSAs | | Report better capacity/more effective due to IP support | 5.2 | 5.2.3 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of NSAs using new technical skills (from IP trainings/capacity building activities) to engage policy makers at continental/regional level | 6.1 | 6.1.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of NSAs using new technical skills (from IP trainings/capacity building activities) to engage policy makers at continental/regional level | 6.1 | 6.1.1 |
| Other NSA | | Evidence of NSAs using new technical skills (from IP trainings/capacity building activities) to engage policy makers at continental/regional level | 6.1 | 6.1.1 |
| Policy makers | | Evidence of NSAs using new technical skills (from IP trainings/capacity building activities) to engage them at continental/regional level | 6.1 | 6.1.1 |
| Policy Makers | | Evidence of established relationship between them and AREAP IP | 6.1 | 6.1.2 |
| Policy Makers | | Evidence of shared understanding between them and AREAP IP | 6.1 | 6.1.2 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of established relationship between them and AREAP IP | 6.1 | 6.1.2 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of shared understanding between them and AREAP IP | 6.1 | 6.1.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of established relationship between them and AREAP IP | 6.1 | 6.1.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of shared understanding between them and AREAP IP | 6.1 | 6.1.2 |
| Media Records | | Evidence of regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and space for civil society | 6.1 | 6.1.3 |
| IP Staff | | List regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and space for civil society | 6.1 | 6.1.3 |
| CSO Staff | | List regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and space for civil society | 6.1 | 6.1.3 |
| Policy Makers | | List regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and space for civil society | 6.1 | 6.1.3 |
| Secondary Records | | Access of AB data | 6.2 | 6.2.1 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of stakeholders and target audiences accessing AB data | 6.2 | 6.2.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of stakeholders and target audiences accessing AB data | 6.2 | 6.2.1 |
| Policy Makers | | Evidence of themselves, stakeholders and target audiences accessing AB data | 6.2 | 6.2.1 |
| IP Staff | | How are stakeholders and target audiences using AB data | 6.2 | 6.2.2 |

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| CSO Staff | | How are stakeholders and target audiences using AB data | 6.2 | 6.2.2 |
| Policy Makers | | How are they and other stakeholders and target audiences using AB data | 6.2 | 6.2.2 |
| Policy Makers | | Access of AB data by new users in Africa | 6.2 | 6.2.3 |
| IP Staff | | Access of AB data by new users in Africa | 6.2 | 6.2.3 |
| CSO Staff | | Access of AB data by new users in Africa | 6.2 | 6.2.3 |
| Policy Makers | | Access of AB data by new users in Africa | 6.2 | 6.2.3 |
| Media | | Access of AB data by new users in Africa | 6.2 | 6.2.3 |
| Other NSAs | | Access of AB data by new users in Africa | 6.2 | 6.2.3 |
| Secondary Records | | Access of AB data by new users in Africa | 6.2 | 6.2.3 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of use of AB data by key stakeholders to raise awareness | 6.2 | 6.2.4 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of use of AB data by key stakeholders to raise awareness | 6.2 | 6.2.4 |
| Policy Makers | | Evidence of use of AB data by key stakeholders to raise awareness | 6.2 | 6.2.4 |
| Media | | Evidence of use of AB data by key stakeholders to raise awareness | 6.2 | 6.2.4 |
| Other NSAs | | Evidence of use of AB data by key stakeholders to raise awareness | 6.2 | 6.2.4 |
| Secondary Records | | Evidence of use of AB data by key stakeholders to raise awareness | 6.2 | 6.2.4 |
| IP Staff (SAT) | | Evidence of alliances and networks supported by SAT engaging with policy at national and regional level | 6.3 | 6.3.1 |
| CSO Staff (SAT) | | Evidence of alliances and networks supported by SAT engaging with policy at national and regional level | 6.3 | 6.3.1 |
| Policy Makers (SAT) | | Evidence of alliances and networks supported by SAT engaging with policy at national and regional level (how often do you work with SAT supported alliances/networks) | 6.3 | 6.3.1 |
| Media (SAT) | | Evidence of alliances and networks supported by SAT engaging with policy at national and regional level | 6.3 | 6.3.1 |
| Secondary Records | | Evidence of alliances and networks supported by SAT engaging with policy at national and regional level | 6.3 | 6.3.1 |
| Secondary Records | | Number of policy advocacy and campaign activities that have an explicit pro-poor focus or participatory component | 6.3 | 6.3.2 |
| IP staff | | Evidence of policy advocacy or research campaign activities with pro-poor focus or participatory component | 6.3 | 6.3.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of policy advocacy and research campaign activities with pro-poor focus or participatory component | 6.3 | 6.3.2 |
| Policy makers | | Evidence of contributions by alliances and networks to government processes and national/regional policy change | 6.3 | 6.3.3 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of contributions by alliances and networks to government processes and national/regional policy change | 6.3 | 6.3.3 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of contributions by alliances and networks to government processes and national/regional policy change | 6.3 | 6.3.3 |
| Media | | Evidence of contributions by alliances and networks to government processes and national/regional policy change | 6.3 | 6.3.3 |
| Media Records | | Evidence of contributions by alliances and networks to government processes and national/regional policy change | 6.3 | 6.3.3 |
| Secondary Records | | Evidence of contributions by alliances and networks to government processes and national/regional policy change | 6.3 | 6.3.3 |
| Media Records | | Evidence of demonstrations, campaigns, rallies on areas targeted by SOTU | 6.4 | 6.4.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of demonstrations, campaigns, rallies on areas targeted by SOTU | 6.4 | 6.4.1 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence of demonstrations, campaigns, rallies on areas targeted by SOTU | 6.4 | 6.4.1 |
| Secondary Records | | CSOs include AU instruments in their objectives | 6.4 | 6.4.1 |

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| Policy makers | | Evidence that target AU instruments have been domesticated | 6.4 | 6.4.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that target AU instruments have been domesticated | 6.4 | 6.4.2 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that target AU instruments have been domesticated | 6.4 | 6.4.2 |
| Media | | Evidence that target AU instruments have been domesticated | 6.4 | 6.4.2 |
| Policy makers | | Established relationship between policy maker at AU/National level and national platform | 6.4 | 6.4.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Established relationship between policy maker at AU/National level and national platform | 6.4 | 6.4.2 |
| IP Staff | | Established relationship between policy maker at AU/National level and national platform | 6.4 | 6.4.2 |
| Policy makers | | Evidence that national platforms have contributed to change through advocacy | 6.4 | 6.4.2; 6.4.3 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that national platforms have contributed to change through advocacy | 6.4 | 6.4.2; 6.4.3 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that national platforms have contributed to change through advocacy | 6.4 | 6.4.2; 6.4.3 |
| Media | | Evidence that national platforms have contributed to change through advocacy | 6.4 | 6.4.2; 6.4.3 |
| Policy makers | | Key decision makers in National governments see SOTU as driver for change | 6.4 | 6.4.3 |
| IP Staff | | Key decision makers in National governments see SOTU as driver for change | 6.4 | 6.4.3 |
| CSO Staff | | Key decision makers in National governments see SOTU as driver for change | 6.4 | 6.4.3 |
| Media | | Key decision makers in National governments see SOTU as driver for change | 6.4 | 6.4.3 |
| Policy makers | | Evidence that AREAP IP share resources and comparative advantages | 7.1 | 7.1.1 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that AREAP IP share resources and comparative advantages | 7.1 | 7.1.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that AREAP IP share resources and comparative advantages | 7.1 | 7.1.1 |
| Media | | Evidence that AREAP IP share resources and comparative advantages | 7.1 | 7.1.1 |
| Secondary Records | | AREAP IP reaching poor and women in their activities | 7.2 | 7.2.4 |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that AREAP IP reaching poor and women in their activities | 7.2 | 7.2.4 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence that AREAP IP reaching poor and women in their activities | 7.2 | 7.2.4 |
| IP staff | | All results for AREAP IP are captured in the logframe | 8.1 | 8.1.1 |
| CSO Staff | | All results for AREAP IP are captured in the logframe | 8.1 | 8.1.1 |
| Donors | | All results for AREAP IP are captured in the logframe | 8.1 | 8.1.1 |
| Policy makers | | All results for AREAP IP are captured in the logframe | 8.1 | 8.1.1 |
| Secondary Records | | Results from logframe | 8.1 | 8.1.1 |
| IP staff | | Results for AREAP IP that are not captured in the logframe | 8.1 | 8.1.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Results for AREAP IP that are not captured in the logframe | 8.1 | 8.1.2 |
| Donors | | Results for AREAP IP that are not captured in the logframe | 8.1 | 8.1.2 |
| Policy makers | | Results for AREAP IP that are not captured in the logframe | 8.1 | 8.1.2 |
| IP staff | | Results for overall AREAP (intended and unintended effects) | 8.1 | 8.1.3 |
| CSO Staff | | Results for overall AREAP (intended and unintended effects) | 8.1 | 8.1.3 |
| Policy makers | | Results for overall AREAP (intended and unintended effects) | 8.1 | 8.1.3 |
| Donors | | Results for overall AREAP (intended and unintended effects) | 8.1 | 8.1.3 |
| IP staff | | Evidence of effects of AREAP IP on sub-groups of interest | 8.2 | 8.2.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of effects of AREAP IP on sub-groups of interest | 8.2 | 8.2.1 |
| Policy makers | | Evidence of effects of AREAP IP on sub-groups of interest | 8.2 | 8.2.1 |
| Donors | | Evidence of effects of AREAP IP on sub-groups of interest | 8.2 | 8.2.1 |

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| Media Records | | Evidence of effects of AREAP IP on sub-groups of interest | 8.2 | 8.2.1 |
| IP staff | | Evidence of formal relationships between NSAs, the stat and key AREAP stakeholders (and perception that they will be maintained) | 9.1 | 9.1.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of formal relationships between NSAs, the stat and key AREAP stakeholders (and perception that they will be maintained) | 9.1 | 9.1.1 |
| Policy makers | | Evidence of formal relationships between NSAs, the stat and key AREAP stakeholders (and perception that they will be maintained) | 9.1 | 9.1.1 |
| Donors | | Evidence of formal relationships between NSAs, the stat and key AREAP stakeholders (and perception that they will be maintained) | 9.1 | 9.1.1 |
| IP staff | | Perception that technical skills within AREAP IP and their national/NSA partners will be maintained | 9.1 | 9.1.2 |
| CSO Staff | | Perception that technical skills within AREAP IP and their national/NSA partners will be maintained | 9.1 | 9.1.2 |
| Donors | | Perception that technical skills within AREAP IP and their national/NSA partners will be maintained | 9.1 | 9.1.2 |
| IP staff | | Evidence of increased internal organisational capacities of national/NSA partners and perception that it will be maintained | 9.2 | 9.2.1 |
| CSO Staff | | Evidence of increased internal organisational capacities of national/NSA partners and perception that it will be maintained | 9.2 | 9.2.1 |
| Donors | | Evidence of increased internal organisational capacities of national/NSA partners and perception that it will be maintained | 9.2 | 9.2.1 |
| Secondary sources/CSO staff/IP staff | | Number of established/regierested active groups of citizens | Condition 1 | Organised and active groups of citizens (strength of civil society at national / level) |
| CSO/Media/IP | | Perception of citizens listening to/engaging with campaigns on regional issues (all campaigns) | Condition 2 | Extent to which citizens engage/listen to campaigns on regional issues (All campaigns) |
| Secondary Sources | | | Condition 3 | Literacy levels in population |
| | | Perception of citizens listening to/engaging on regional issues (IP campaigns) | Condition 4 | Extent to which citizens engage/listen to campaigns on regional issues |
| Secondary Sources | | | Condition 5 | Level of citizen access to functioning and accessible internet |
| Secondary Sources | | | Condition 6 | Free media in place at national level |
| Secondary Sources | | | Condition 7 | Level of national/ regional political stability |
| CSO/Media | | What are other demands on your time? | Condition 8 | Time demands on users in relation to their use of evidence (evidenced by media/csos) |
| NSA/IP staff | | NSAs feel thet have technical capacity to use evidence | Condition 9 | Adequate technical capacity available to targeted NSAs |
| Policy makers/CSOs/Ips | | Evidence that data is requested in a timely manner | Condition 10 | Policy-makers are timely in their request for data |
| Secondary Sources/NSA | | Evidence that NSA does not have high staff turnover/systems in place for organisational memory | Condition 11 | Institutional relationship with NSA (Rate of NSA staff turnover and level of organisational memory) |
| NSA/IP staff | | Evidence that NSAs have changed policy/approach based on new evidence | Condition 12 | NSAs have an openness to new ideas (Willing of NSAs to change policy based on new evidence) |

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| IP staff/CSO staff/NSA/Policy makers | | Evidence that policy advice is framed(..) | Condition 13 | Policy advice is framed for national governance (timing, respect, appropriateness, elaborateness, modelling) |
| IP staff | | Evidence that NP has reseach capacity (years working/How many projects/How many publications (NP)? | Condition 14 | Strength of national partner research capacity |
| | | Evidence that ? Is sensitised on usefulness of data/research to affect policy change | Condition 15 | Sensitization on usefulness of data/ research to affect policy change |
| IP Staff | | Evidence that IP has capacity for effective packaging | Condition 16 | In-house capacity of IP for effective packaging of information around civil society views |
| Policy Makers | | | Condition 17 | Strength of evidence in policy making |
| | | | Condition 18 | Enabling environment for non-partisan and empowered CSOs at national level |
| Policy makers | | How do they communicate decision making processes/policymaking? | Condition 19 | Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (levels of secrecy in government policymaking) |
| Secondary sources; policy makers | | Evidence that government works/opens space with non-state actors | Condition 20 | Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors |
| Secondary sources/index | | | Condition 21 | Political fragmentation |
| Secondary sources | | | Condition 22 | Key CSOs/ implementing partners have finances to attend key regional / continental meetings. |
| Outcome (X?)/ NSA/IP | | Evidence for preference of working in alliances | Condition 23 | NSA willing to act through alliances |
| | | | Condition 24 | Enabling legal environment that enables CSOs to operate |
| Secondary Sources | | | Condition 25 | International funding levels of CSOs in the governance sector |
| | | | Condition 26 | Sensitization on usefulness of data/ research to affect policy change |
| Policy makers/CSOs/Ips/NSAs | | Evidence of champions for NSA's cause/activities. | Condition 27 | Existence of champions for NSA's cause/activities |
| Policy makers/IP/NSA | | Evidence that government works/opens space with non-state actors | Condition 28 | Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors |
| NSA/IP staff | | Evidence that NSAs have the resources needed for policy advocacy | Condition 29 | IP produce or link NSAs to resources necessary for policy advocacy |
| NSA staff | | What are NSAs other activities/priorities and what time can they spend on IP activities? | Condition 30 | Time demands on users (Priority of NSAs) |
| NSA staff/Secondary resources | | (Invitation/participation in conferences, meetings, forums, levels of press coverage) | Condition 31 | Stature of NSAs, which are leading engagement at the national/continental level |

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| IP Staff/NSA staff | | Evidence engagement with diverse audiences | Condition 32 | Constant engagement with audiences (donors, government, private sector, CSOs etc.) to develop ownership and understand political economy |
| Secondary sources/CSO staff/IP staff | | Financial resources exist | Condition 33 | Key CSOs/ implementing partners have finances to attend key regional / continental meetings. (Financial resources to attend continental) |
| Secondary sources/policy makers/csos | | What forums exist for citizens to express their opinions with policymakers/governments? | Condition 34 | Forums (community forums, etc) exist for citizens to express their opinions on policy/ government |
| | | | Condition 35 | Perceived legitimacy of the views of ordinary citizens |
| Index | | | Condition 36 | Government sensitivity to criticism |
| IP Staff/policy makers | | Evidence of IP champion in government | Condition 37 | Presence of IP champion in government |
| N/A | | | Condition 38 | Outcome 4: Strengthened platforms… |
| N/A | | | Condition 39 | Outcome 5: Strengthened technical skills… |
| NSA/CSO staff | | Evidence of NSAs knowledge of stakeholders, agendas etc | Condition 40 | NSAs have adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs, agendas |
| Policy makers | | Evience that they have adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs | Condition 41 | Policy makers have adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs, agendas |
| IP Staff/Policy Makers/NSA staff | | Evidence of IP reputation/credibility | Condition 42 | Strength of IP reputation/credibility on relevant issues |
| Policy Makers | | Evidence of incentives to use data on citizens' opinions | Condition 43 | Policy makers have incentives to utilise data on citizens' opinions |
| | | | Condition 44 | Enabling policy and legislative regulatory framework. |
| IP Staff/Policy Makers | | Evidence that IP works through regional bodies | Condition 45 | Working through regional bodies |
| Secondary sources/IP staff/Other NSA staff | | Evidence that IP has been in country for an extended period of time and is established | Condition 46 | Extended and established presence on the ground (time) |
| IP Staff | | Evidence (communication, years, quality) between IP core/hq and national partners | Condition 47 | Strength of relationship with national partner |
| Secondary documents | | Size of NP budget | Condition 48 | Size of budget |
| Secondary documents/IP Staff/NSA staff | | Evidence (invitations to conferences, activities) of capacity of NP | Condition 49 | Capacity of national partner |
| Secondary documents | | Evidence that IP-national/CSO staff is qualified | Condition 50 | Qualified staff |
| IP staff | | % of time that IP spends on X/prioritises it when necessary | Condition 51 | Extent to which IP staff prioritises (X) out of other tasks |
| IP staff | | What are IPs other activities/priorities? | Condition 52 | Number of other competing priorities of IP that affect time spent on X |
| Secondary documents/IP Staff/NSA staff | | Evidence that there is limited staff turnover | Condition 53 | Limited staff turnover |
| IP (NP) staff | | % of time that NP spends on X/prioritises it when necessary | Condition 54 | Extent to which NP prioritises (X) out of other tasks |
| IP (NP) staff | | What are NPs other activities/priorities? | Condition 55 | Number of other competing priorities of NP that affect time spent on X |

# Annex 6: Stakeholders Interviewed

## Annex 6 Stakeholders Interviewed

| Country | Institution | Contact person | IP |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benin | Université d'Abomey-Calavi | Attanasso Marie-Odile | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | University of Abomey-Calavi | Théodule Nouatchi | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | Droit de l'Homme Paix et Développement –ONG | Bassa Scholastique | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | Ministry of Public Policy Evaluation and Denationalization Programmes | Sossou Damase | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy | Andre Gueguehoun | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy | Richard Houessou | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | Institut National pour la Promotion de la Femme | Didas William Tossou | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | ONG ALCRER | Gouton Koami | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | Ministère de pétrolière de l'eau et du dé | Kponou Relault | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | IREEP | Victor Daye | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy | Guedegue Gerard | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | WANEP | Landry Ganye | Afrobarometer |
| Benin | Ministry of the Environment | Ousseynou Kasse | Afrobarometer |
| Botswana | University of Botswana | Seabo Batlang | Afrobarometer |
| Botswana | University of Botswana | Gladys Mokhawa | Afrobarometer |
| Botswana | Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana | Mogopodi Lekorwe | Afrobarometer |
| Botswana | Botswana Congress Party | Taolo Lucas | Afrobarometer |
| Botswana | Southern Africa Cross Border Trade Association (SACBTA) | Francis Ngambi | Trust |
| Botswana | SADC Council of NGOs | Glenn Fareed | Trust |
| Botswana | SADC Secretariat | Mabel Mpofu | Trust |
| Botswana | | Govenius | Trust |
| Botswana | SADC Secretariat | Manasa Dzirikure | Trust |
| Botswana | SADC Secretariat | Thembinkosi (Themba) Mhlongo | Trust |
| Botswana | SADC Secretariat | Angelo Mondlane | Trust |
| Kenya | Afrobarometer EA | Mr. Abel Oyuke | Afrobarometer |
| Kenya | Afrobarometer EA | Mr. Samuel Balongo | Afrobarometer |
| Kenya | World Bank | Annette Omolo | Afrobarometer |
| Kenya | Transparency International (TI) -Kenya | Dalmas Okendo | Afrobarometer |
| Kenya | Transparency International (TI) -Kenya | Samuel Kimeu | Afrobarometer |
| Kenya | Institute for Development Studies, UoN | Prof. Winnie V. Mitullah | Afrobarometer |
| Kenya | Institute for Development Studies, UoN | Dr. Paul Kamau | Afrobarometer |

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| Kenya | SOTU | Celine Bankumumhari | SOTU |
| Kenya | SOTU | Nicholas Ngigi | SOTU |
| Kenya | SOTU | Jamillah Mwanjisi | SOTU |
| Kenya | Fahamu | Mwangi Maina | SOTU |
| Kenya | Oxfam | Janah Ncube | SOTU |
| Kenya | People Daily | Githari Mguni | SOTU |
| Kenya | Assistant to PAP | Victor Kilimo | SOTU |
| Kenya | CCI | David Cidi | SOTU |
| Kenya | NDI | Dennis Omondi | SOTU |
| Kenya | KCDF | Wairu Kinyori | Trust |
| Kenya | Nation Media Group | Charles Ormondi | Trust |
| Kenya | Akiba Uhaki Foundation | Ezra Mbogori | Trust |
| Mozambique | CPGD | Carlos Shenga | Afrobarometer |
| Mozambique | Consultant | Alberto Da Cruz | Afrobarometer |
| Mozambique | MASC | Phillip Mahon | Afrobarometer |
| Mozambique | Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Den | Hermenegild Mulhovo | Afrobarometer |
| Mozambique | DFID | Jonas Pohlmann | All |
| Mozambique | Paliament of Mozambique | Acacio Beleza | SOTU |
| Mozambique | CESC - Centro de Aprendizagem e Capac | Carla Machavane | SOTU |
| Mozambique | OdA | Catarina Camal | SOTU |
| Mozambique | Concern Universal | Paulo Gentil | SOTU |
| Mozambique | Ministy of Foreign Affairs | Fernando Manhica | SOTU |
| Mozambique | MARP | Momad Saíde | SOTU |
| Mozambique | SAVANA- Newspaper | Raul Senda | SOTU |
| Mozambique | Human Rights League | Salvador Nkamati | SOTU |
| Mozambique | Mocambican Association for the Development of the Family | Mr. Gabriel de Barros | Trust |
| Mozambique | AMIMO Association of Mozambican Miners | Moises Uamusse | Trust |
| Mozambique | Former Director of G20, Mozambique | Paulo Cuinica | Trust |
| Mozambique | National Farmers' Union | Adriano Vicente | Trust |
| Mozambique | CESC - Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil | Paula Monjane | Trust and SOTU |
| Nigeria | CLEEN | Asiwaju Kemi | Afrobarometer |
| Nigeria | Open Society Justice Initiative OSJI Abuja | Stanley Ibe | Afrobarometer |
| Nigeria | TY Danjuma Foundation Abuja | Tersoo Akula | Afrobarometer |
| Nigeria | | Akaito Aaron | SOTU |
| Nigeria | Zero Corrupt Coalition | Lukman Adefolahan | SOTU |
| Nigeria | USAID Nigeria | Adamu Igoche | SOTU |
| Nigeria | | Dutse Salka | SOTU |
| Nigeria | National Association of Nigerian Traders, Abuja | Ken Ukoha | SOTU |
| Nigeria | Centre Leadership, Strategy and Development, Abuja | Monday Osasah | SOTU |
| Nigeria | Publish What You Pay, Abuja | Oluwaseyi Moses | SOTU |
| Nigeria | CISLAC | Okeke Anya | SOTU |
| Nigeria | ICCPC | Raheem Adesina | SOTU |
| Nigeria | CISLAC | Augustine Erameh | SOTU |

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| Rwanda | CLADHO | NKURUNZIZA Alexis | SOTU |
| Rwanda | CLADHO | Me Emmanuel SAFARI | SOTU |
| Rwanda | Ministry of Justice | RUSANGANWA Eugene | SOTU |
| Rwanda | | John Rusimbi | SOTU |
| Rwanda | Center for economic and plocy priorities | John Kalisa | SOTU |
| Rwanda | | Joseph | SOTU |
| Rwanda | | Kimulu | SOTU |
| Rwanda | AVP | RUZIGANA Maximilien | SOTU |
| Rwanda | | Placide | SOTU |
| Rwanda | ABASIRWA | NGARUKIYE STANY | SOTU |
| Rwanda | | Vincent | SOTU |
| Skype | Southern Africa Trust | Vusi Gumede | Trust |
| Skype- Ghana | Afrobarometer | E. Gyimah-Boadi | Afrobarometer |
| Skype- Ghana | Afrobarometer | Sharon Parku | Afrobarometer |
| Skype- Kenya | Oxfam NB | Monique Van Es | SOTU |
| Skype- Kenya | Oxfam NB | Belinda Okungu | SOTU |
| Skype- SA | Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA) | Siphosami Malunga | Trust |
| Skype- SA | Mail & Guardian Media Ltd | Anastacia Martin | Trust |
| Skype- US | DFID | Tanweena Chowdhury | All |
| Skype- US | Afrobarometer | Aba Kittoe | Afrobarometer |
| Skype- US | Afrobarometer | Carolyn Logan | Afrobarometer |
| South Africa | Southern Africa Trust | Jozet Muller | Trust |
| South Africa | Southern Africa Trust | Lusungu Kanchenche | Trust |
| South Africa | Southern Africa Trust | Angeline Chitate | Trust |
| South Africa | Southern Africa Trust | McBride Nkhalamba | Trust |
| South Africa | Southern Africa Trust | Christabel Phiri | Trust |
| South Africa | Southern Africa Trust | Bhekinkos Moyo | Trust |
| Tunisia | Tunis Conseil | Faiza Kefi | Afrobarometer |
| Tunisia | SIGMA | Youssef Meddeb | Afrobarometer |
| Tunisia | EXPRESS FM | Oueslati Amani | Afrobarometer |
| Tunisia | Kolna Tounes | Menef Emna | Afrobarometer |
| Tunisia | CNFCE | Faiza Chabchoub | Afrobarometer |
| Tunisia | AFEK Tounes | Narjes Babay | Afrobarometer |
| Tunisia | Femmes Maghrebines | Rim Ouerghi | Afrobarometer |
| Tunisia | Le Maghreb | Zyed Krichen | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | MPOI | Eldred Masunungure | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | Daily News | Everson Mushava | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | MPOI | Florence | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | MPOI | Heather Koga | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | Crisis Coalition | Joy Mabenge | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | MPOI | Stephen Ndoma | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | RAU | Tony | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | USAID | Washington Katema | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | Poverty Reduction Forum Trust | Judith Kaulem | Afrobarometer |
| Zimbabwe | Alpha Media Trust | Rita Chinyoka | Trust |
| Zimbabwe | Alpha Media Trust | Nikita Chingaya | Trust |
| Zimbabwe | Zimbabwe Cross Border Traders | Augustine Tawanda | Trust |
| Zimbabwe | Trust Africa | Briggs Bomba | Trust |
| Zimbabwe | ZIMCODD | Janet Mudzviti | Trust |

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|---|---|---|---|
| Zimbabwe | Consultant | Jesimen Chipika | Trust |
| Zimbabwe | Southern Africa Youth Movement | Vimbai Nhapi | Trust |
| Zimbabwe | Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions | Vimbai Mushongera | Trust |

# Annex 7: Stakeholder References

# Annex 7- List of Interview References

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Afrobarometer Botswana 2 - Afrobarometer stakeholder in Botswana

Afrobarometer 3 - Staff of Afrobarometer

Afrobarometer Kenya 4 - Afrobarometer stakeholder in Kenya

Afrobarometer Tunisia 5 - Afrobarometer

Afrobarometer Tunisia 6 - Afrobarometer stakeholder in Tunisia

SADC Secretariat 1 - SADC Secretariat representative

SADC Secretariat 2 - SADC Secretariat representative

SOTU Rwanda 1 - Stakeholder for SOTU in Rwanda

SOTU Rwanda 2 - Stakeholder for SOTU in Rwanda

SOTU Mozambique 3 - Stakeholder for SOTU in Mozambique

SOTU Mozambique 4 - Stakeholder for SOTU in Mozambique

Trust Botswana 1 - Civil society stakeholders for the Trust in Botswana

Trust Botswana 2 - Civil society stakeholders for the Trust in Botswana

Trust 3 - The Trust staff member in South Africa

Trust 4 - Civil society stakeholders for the Trust

Trust Mozambique 5 – Civil Society stakeholder in Mozambique

Trust Zimbabwe 1 - Civil society stakeholders for the Trust in Zimbabwe

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Trust 8 - The Trust staff in South Africa

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# Annex 8 - Document List

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# Annex 9: QCA Report

# Annex 9- Qualitative Comparative Analysis

## 9.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis Overview and General Approach

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was carried out to complement and triangulate findings generated through contribution analysis for this evaluation. As noted in the evaluation matrix, QCA was not conducted for all key evaluation questions or findings; two key evaluations questions were selected where it was felt QCA could add most value to the contribution analysis being conducted and where sufficient and appropriate data would be available for this analysis.

The two evaluation questions selected for QCA were:

- **Relevance:** Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change at the national or regional levels and what drivers influence their participation?
- **Effectiveness:** To what extent has engaging at the continental/ regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms?

At the outset of the evaluation, theory of change workshops were held with each of the AREAP implementing partners, to refine and elaborate on the overarching programme theory of change, as well as individual project theories of change.

Particular outcomes of interest were identified which were relevant to assessing the selected evaluation questions:

**Relevance:** Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change at the national or regional levels and what drivers influence their participation?

- Outcome 1: the extent to which strengthened civil society coalitions supported by the Trust or SOTU focused on policy change on key national and regional topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners;
- Outcome 2: the extent to which civil society coalitions supported by SOTU or the Trust have contributed to successful national or regional policy changes.

**Effectiveness:** To what extent has engaging at the continental/ regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms?

- Outcome 1: the extent to which civil society coalitions have developed strengthened relationships and a shared understanding with policymakers on key issues;
- Outcome 2: the extent to which civil society coalitions engage in regularised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking (if such spaces exist).

The theory of change workshops also identified key conditions which projects felt were required for success achieving a given outcome; these conditions included internal and external factors, some of which were under the control of the project and some which were not.

Prior to fieldwork, the evaluation team mapped the conditions identified by the implementing partners for each outcome of interest, to form a ‘long list’ of conditions which may be included in the QCA analysis. Cases were defined as the work of a particular implementing partner in one of the 8 sample countries (for instance, Mozambique – Trust was one case, and Mozambique- SOTU is a separate case). As noted in the evaluation framework, the two evaluation questions selected for QCA analysis were only relevant to the work of the Southern Africa Trust and SOTU, so their cases were the only ones included in the QCA analysis.

Possible data sources for each condition were then identified, to see what conditions could be assessed using secondary data and which required primary data. The conditions which required primary data were included in the topic guides for fieldwork, to ensure that consistent data was collected for each condition across the 8 sampled countries included in the fieldwork.

Once fieldwork was complete, the team re-assessed the ‘long list’ of possible conditions for inclusion in the QCA analysis, to remove any conditions where consistent data was not available across all 8 sample countries, or any conditions which in light of the fieldwork and emerging analysis were clearly not relevant to the outcome.

Once the final list of conditions to be analysed for each outcome was complete, the team began analysing the primary and secondary data to develop benchmarks for each condition. The primary data collected during fieldwork was methodically coded using Atlas T.i,, with specific codes for the QCA conditions. Coded quotations were organised and then summarised for each code and case, to assess the quantity and quality of data available for each condition and case, and set benchmarks appropriately for each condition. Each condition was assessed using a scale of 1- 4 with '4' being the most positive rating for a given condition (translated into the fuzzy set analysis as 0, .33, .67 and 1), to ensure consistency in calibration across the dataset.

Once benchmarks were set, the conditions and outcomes for each case were assessed against these benchmarks. This resulted in finalised data sets for the QCA analysis. These data sets are included in Section 9.3 of this annex, along with the benchmarks developed for each condition.

The QCA analysis proceeded in slightly different ways for each outcome, depending on the conditions included in the analysis and the results at each step. A generic overview of the process is provided here, and more specific details on the steps used for each outcome are described in the next section.

- Broadly, the analysis for each outcome began with necessity analysis (superset analysis) of the fuzzy dataset, performed using R[1] over the long list of conditions considered initially plausible for that specific outcome, on which data of sufficient quality was available, on the basis of the Theory of Change workshops. The long lists ranged from 8 to 17 conditions, depending on the outcome. This phase identified any conditions which were necessary for success, (but not sufficient), either in and of themselves or in disjunctions.
- Subset analysis was then performed on the same lists of conditions using R[2], on the same fuzzy dataset. This phase identified any conditions which were sufficient for success, either in and of themselves or in combinations, Note that subset sufficiency is a weaker type of sufficiency than that analysed with Boolean minimisation[3].
- In cases where the long list of conditions was too long for the Boolean minimisation[4], a shorter list of conditions was selected on the basis of the findings of the supersubset analysis, and also removing any trivial condition[5] which would not add any further insight in terms of discriminating between success and failure. After removing the trivial conditions, the aim was to prioritise the conditions with the highest consistency and coverage scores.
- The standard analysis was then performed on the short lists of conditions with fsQCA, over the fuzzy data set. Only 'complex' solutions were used, in order to avoid having to justify the inclusion of logical cases[6]. If consistency scores for some combinations were different from 0 or 1, different solutions were found for different cut-off points and compared. If models were too complex or could not be represented with Venn diagrams, then they were gradually reduced to 5 or less conditions by removing those conditions that did not appear as the most relevant in the findings from each successive model. Relevance was judged by the number of times a condition appeared in the solution, the coverage of that solution, and the consistency with which it did so (e.g. always present, or always absent). The most important criterion was to give priority to the conditions appearing in the combination with the highest coverage, so as not to lose coverage with the subsequent, simpler model. Consistency was almost always perfect as solutions with a cut-off point of 1.00 were generally preferred over others.
- In general, different models for each outcome were tested, gradually removing what appeared to be the least relevant conditions, until obtaining models of 5 conditions max. These models were also tested on the "crisped" datasets[7] and findings between the Boolean minimisation of the fuzzy data set and "crisped"

[1] Dusa, Adrian, and Alrik Thiem. 2014. Qualitative Comparative Analysis. R Package Version 1.1-4. URL: http://cran.r-project.org/package=QCA
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[3] Befani, B. (2016) *Evaluating Development Interventions with QCA: Potential and Pitfalls*, ongoing EBA study, forthcoming at http://eba.se/en/evaluating-development-interventions-with-qca-potential-and-pitfalls/
[4] While there is no fixed number of conditions allowed in Boolean minimisation, due to practical limitations around the difficulty in interpreting increasingly complex solutions, and the inability of software platforms to handle a high number of conditions (generally more than 13), the number of conditions included in the minimisation analysis was capped at 13.
[5] A trivial condition is a condition which is always present or always absent across all cases, either successful or unsuccessful. In other words it appears necessary for success, but also necessary for lack of success.
[6] Also known as 'logical remainders'.
[7] The "crisped" dataset is the dataset obtained by assigning a zero to 0.33 values and a one to 0.67 values.

dataset compared, which were always fully consistent. The 5 condition models were then represented with Venn diagrams.

Once a finalised set of solutions were developed, the team interpreted the findings in light of the data and evidence generated through the fieldwork and contribution analysis process, to develop the interpretation and findings for the QCA.

## 9.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis Methodology and Results

This section will provide additional detail on the analysis methodology and results for each of the outcomes analysed for the two evaluation questions selected for analysis using QCA. This will include interpretation and findings for the solutions developed for each outcome.

A narrative description of the analysis process for the necessity and sufficiency analysis is presented first, providing insight into how the analysis team considered and assessed the various possible models to arrive at a final solution for each outcome. **The description presented in the necessity and sufficiency analysis sections for each outcome should not be considered as final analysis or findings. The findings from the QCA are presented in the 'Interpretation and findings' sub-section for each outcome.**

### 9.2.1 Relevance Evaluation Question: Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change at the national or regional levels and what drivers influence their participation?

The QCA analysis considered two outcomes for this evaluation question:

- **Outcome 1:** the extent to which strengthened civil society coalitions supported by the Trust or SOTU focused on policy change on key national and regional topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners;
- **Outcome 2:** the extent to which civil society coalitions supported by SOTU or the Trust have contributed to successful national or regional policy changes.

The QCA analysis considered a range of factors, some of which were dependent on AREAP activities and some which were independent of AREAP, related to the external national context.

#### Outcome 1: The extent to which strengthened civil society coalitions supported by the Trust or SOTU focused on policy change on key national and regional topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners

The long list of conditions considered plausible, initially, were:

1. Enabling environment for non-partisan and empowered CSOs at national level (EnEnv).
2. Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (levels of secrecy in government policymaking) (Transp).
3. Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors (GovEng).
4. Political pluralism (PolPlur).
5. Constant engagement with diverse audiences (donors, government, private sector, CSOs etc.) to develop ownership and understand political economy (EngDiv).
6. Level of national/ regional political stability (PolStab).
7. Internal Research capacity (IntResCap).
8. National partner has other competing work (NatParComp).
9. Level of visibility and perceived credibility of the national partner (NatParCred).
10. Internal general capacity of national partner (IntGenCap).

**Necessity analysis**

The necessity (superset) analysis was carried out on all conditions above, using R[8]. The findings point to four conditions being necessary in and of themselves:

[8] Cite as above

1. Level of visibility and perceived credibility of the national partner (NatParCred).
2. Internal general capacity of national partner (IntGenCap).
3. Level of national/ regional political stability (PolStab).
4. Enabling environment for non-partisan and empowered CSOs at national level (EnEnv).

The first two conditions (NatParCred and IntGenGap) appear trivial[9], that is they are equally present[10] in successful and unsuccessful cases, so they have little explanatory power for the outcome in this analysis. They appear necessary and trivial for all of the outcomes analysed using QCA, so although initially included in the analysis they do not figure in any of the solutions or findings. It is unclear whether this reflects the true explanatory power of these conditions, or whether the data set did not represent them accurately.

The last two cases have an inverse relationship with success; that is it would seem that low political stability and poor enabling environment are inversely related with strengthened civil society. This shows that the relation between political stability and success, or enabling environment and success, is complex and cannot be explained by the simple association emerged from the case comparison.

**Sufficiency analysis**

Since two conditions are trivial, being either always present or being equally present in successful and unsuccessful cases, the standard (sufficiency) analysis, carried out with fsQCA, has included the following 8 conditions:

1. Enabling environment for non-partisan and empowered CSOs at national level (EnEnv)
2. Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (levels of secrecy in government policymaking) (Transp)
3. Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors (GovEng)
4. Political pluralism (PolPlur)
5. Constant engagement with diverse audiences (donors, government, private sector, CSOs etc.) to develop ownership and understand political economy (EngDIV)
6. Level of national/ regional political stability (PolStab)
7. Internal Research capacity (IntResCap)
8. National partner has other competing work (NatParComp)

Different complex solutions were found for cut-off points of 1.00, 0.83 and 0.80. They all have the same coverage; however the solution with the best consistency score (and thus overall best values of the parameters of fit) is the one with a cut-off point of 1.00 (see Table 1 below).

**Table 1: Solution parameters of fit for different cut-off points (8 condition model)**

| Cut-off point | Solution Coverage | Solution Consistency |
|---|---|---|
| 0.80 | 0.923963 | 0.855011 |
| 0.83 | 0.923963 | 0.921839 |
| **1.00** | **0.923963** | **1.000000** |

The solution shows two conditions being present in all combinations: EnEnv and PolStab. This is understandable as these had been found to be necessary for the outcome anyway in the necessity analysis. These two conditions were then removed and a six condition model was tested. In the solutions of the six condition model, there are only

[9] IntGenCap is almost trivial, not 100% so – however it is still the least informative of all the non-trivial conditions, hence its exclusion from the Boolean minimisation.
[10] See note above.

two conditions that are not consistently present across all combinations: NatParComp and EngDiv. In order to test a 5-condition model, we decided for the moment to remove the former and prioritise the latter because the former appeared in negated form (counter to directional expectations) and interpretation would have been more difficult.

The five condition model (GovEng, EngDiv, Transp, PolPlur and IntResCap) was then tested and solutions found for three cut-off points (0.80. 0.89 and 1.00). The two best solutions are found for 0.89 (coverage and consistency both 92%) and 1.00 (perfect consistency and 85% coverage). The same model tested on the "crisped" dataset returns the same solution as the fuzzy model with cut-off 1.00, so we decided that this was the strongest model to use in the interpretation stage, and also one that could be displayed graphically. The solutions and parameters of fit for the "crisped" data are presented in Table 2.

**Table 2: Five condition model solutions**

| | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Combination 1:<br>GOVENG*TRANSP*POLPLUR*INTRESCAP | 0.600000 | 0.600000 | 1.000000 |
| Combination 2:<br>goveng*transp*polplur*INTRESCAP*ENGDIV | 0.200000 | 0.200000 | 1.000000 |
| Entire Solution | 0.800000 | | 1.000000 |

**Interpretation and findings**

- **Combination 1:** This combination covers 3 out of 5 successful cases (Kenya SOTU, Kenya TRUST and Nigeria SOTU). It is not supported by Zimbabwe Trust or Mozambique SOTU. For Zimbabwe Trust, GOVENG is low, TRANSP is low, POLPLUR is low, but INTRESCAP is high. For Mozambique SOTU, GOVENG is high, but TRANSP is low, POLPLUR is low, and INTRESCAP is low.

  This combination supports the idea that having high levels of political pluralism, high level of policymaker transparency on decision making processes, the government opening up space for engagement with NSAs, and strong national partner internal research capacity is sufficient for success.

  As shown in the graph below (figure 1) countries in the sample which fit this description include Kenya and Nigeria. In these contexts, there is more opportunity for civil society to engage with policymakers, allowing civil society organisations to build capacity and experience engaging with policymakers more easily. In these contexts, coalitions are more able to gain experience, building strength and capacity on an on-going basis through constant engagement with the state, rather than through occasional meetings or one-off dialogues.

- **Combination 2:** This combination covers one of five successful cases (Zimbabwe Trust). Three of the other successful cases (Kenya SOTU, Kenya SOTU and Nigeria TRUST) are covered by combination 1 above. The remaining successful case, Mozambique SOTU, is somewhat similar to the Zimbabwe case, in that TRANSP is low, POLPLUR is low, and ENGDIV is high, but GOVENG is high and INTRESCAP is low.

  This combination supports the idea that, when the abovementioned contextual conditions are absent, success is still possible if CSOs are able to engage with a wide variety of actors. In other words, in cases where there is low political pluralism, low policymaker transparency about decision making processes and the government does not open up space for engagement with NSAs, constantly engaging with diverse audiences to develop ownership of ideas and map the national political economy context appears sufficient for coalitions to focus on policy change around key themes.

  As shown in the graph below (Figure 1) countries in the sample which fit this description include Zimbabwe and Botswana. It is interesting that Zimbabwe and Botswana only differ in internal research capacity and in the extent to which diverse audiences are engaged, and this seems to make the difference in terms of success. To a lesser extent, Rwanda and Mozambique also fit this description, although they both have more open space for government to engage civil society. Contexts which fit this description are certainly

more challenging to civil society organisations to operate in, as there is less opportunity for engagement and capacity building, which perhaps makes operating in a coalition less fruitful.

However, coalitions supported by the Trust or SOTU have found success in these contexts, circumventing these challenges by constantly engaging with a wide variety of stakeholders, building strong networks, a deep understanding of national political economy and brokering broader ownership and buy- in to their policies and campaigns.

To illustrate, Figure 1 below provides a graphical representation of the findings. Unsuccessful cases are represented in pink and successful cases in green (a mix of green and pink indicates one successful case and one unsuccessful one). Successful cases are clustered in the bottom half of the diagram, where GovEng is positive. This supports the finding that success is more likely when government opens up space for engagement with NSAs. More significantly, no unsuccessful cases have high political pluralism[11], indicating it plays a role in success and supporting the finding that having high political pluralism makes success more likely. Combination 1 is evident in the green boxes for Kenya SOTU, Kenya TRUST and Nigeria SOTU, while combination 2 is evident in the green box for Zimbabwe Trust.

**Figure 1**




## Outcome 2: The extent to which civil society coalitions supported by SOTU or the Trust have contributed to successful national or regional policy changes

The conditions initially considered in this analysis (what has been referred to above as the "long list") were:

1. Internal capacity of national partner coalitions to package information effectively for advocacy with policymakers. (IPinHouseCap)

[11] This is indicated as "PolFRAG", the central, large and short rectangle. "PolFRAG" was the original name of this condition.

2. Adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs, agendas (KnowStake)
3. Strength of use of evidence in policy making (EvidencepPm)
4. Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors (GovEng)
5. Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (Transp)
6. Existence of champions for non- state actor's cause and activities (ChampNSA)
7. Internal research capacity of national partner coalitions (IntResCap)
8. National partner coalitions have other competing work (NatParComp)
9. Internal general capacity of national partner coalitions (IntGenCap)
10. Visibility and perceived credibility of national partner coalitions (NatParCred)

**Necessity analysis**

The necessity (superset) analysis carried out on all conditions points to three conditions being perfectly necessary (consistency = 1.00) in and of themselves:

1. Visibility and perceived credibility of national partner coalitions (NatParCred)
2. Internal general capacity of national partner coalitions (IntGenCap)
3. Adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs, agendas (KnowStake)

However, two of these conditions (IntGenCap and NatParCred) are considered trivial as they are present in both successful and unsuccessful cases (see analysis of previous outcome), and so are not included in the rest of the analysis.

Additionally, five more conditions have a necessity consistency of over 0.9, while maintaining an acceptable coverage of no less than 0.5:

1. Existence of champions for non- state actor's cause and activities (ChampNSA) with .910 consistency.
2. Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors (GovEng) with .907 consistency.
3. Internal capacity of national partner coalitions to package information effectively for advocacy with policymakers. (IPinHouseCap) with .907 consistency.
4. Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (Transp) with .907 consistency.
5. Strength of use of evidence in policy making (EvidencepPm) with .907 consistency.

The first three of these conditions (ChampNSA, GovEng and IPinHouseCap) are directly related to success, the last two (Transp and EvidencePm) have an inverse relationship – that is, low transparency and weak use of evidence in policymaking appear related to success.

In short, six conditions emerge from the necessity analysis that potentially deserve to be included in the standard analysis: KnowStake, ChampNSA, GovEng, IPInHouseCap, Transp and EvidencePm.

**Sufficiency analysis**

The subset analysis further identified two conditions which appear mostly sufficient (IntResCap and EvidencePm).

As all of the conditions appear to have some relevance to the outcome (except IntGenCap and NatParCred), the first model tried included all 8 conditions:

1. Internal capacity of national partner coalitions to package information effectively for advocacy with policymakers. (IPinHouseCap)
2. Adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs, agendas (KnowStake)
3. Strength of use of evidence in policy making (EvidencepPm)
4. Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors (GovEng)

5. Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (Transp)
6. Existence of champions for non- state actor's cause and activities (ChampNSA)
7. Internal research capacity of national partner coalitions (IntResCap)
8. National partner coalitions have other competing work (NatParComp)

Three solutions are obtained in the standard analysis, with the three cut-off points of 0.67, 0.74 and 1.00 (see Table 3 below).

**Table 3: Solution parameters of fit for different cut-off points (8 condition model)**

| Cut-off point | Solution Coverage | Solution Consistency |
|---|---|---|
| 0.67 | 1.000000 | 0.782516 |
| 0.74 | 1.000000 | 0.915212 |
| **1.00** | **0.910082** | **1.000000** |

The last two solutions are almost equivalent in terms of parameters of fit: a choice between them can only be made if we decide to give priority to consistency over coverage or vice versa. Since the number of cases is low, it is important to give priority to consistency over coverage (we can always analyse the one or two cases that remain outside the solution separately), while when *n* is larger it is more important to prioritise coverage over consistency: first, because consistency is rarer and second because even with high coverage there might be several cases not covered by the solution (the same % of cases means more cases, when is large). This is why we choose the last solution with a cut-off point of 1 to be carried forward to the interpretation stage. This solution is illustrated in Table 4.

**Table 4: Eight condition model solutions**

| CUTOFF = 1.00, COMPLEX SOLUTION | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
|---|---|---|---|
| KNOWSTAKE*CHAMPNSA*GOVENG*intrescap*natparcomp*evidencepm*transp | 0.724796 | 0.275204 | 1.000000 |
| KNOWSTAKE*CHAMPNSA*GOVENG*INTRESCAP*NATPARCOMP*evidencepm*TRANSP*IPINHOUSECAP | 0.452316 | 0.092643 | 1.000000 |
| KNOWSTAKE*CHAMPNSA*<br>*goveng* INTRESCAP*NATPARCOMP*<br>EVIDENCEPM*transp*IPINHOUSECAP | 0.362398 | 0.092643 | 1.000000 |
| Entire Solution | 0.910082 | | 1.000000 |

Since KnowStake is necessary, and ChampNSA can be considered necessary (it is perfectly necessary in the "crisped" analysis), they can be removed from the analysis.

**Interpretation and findings**

Two conditions, knowledge of stakeholders and champions in government (KnowStake and ChampNSA) appeared to be the most relevant conditions, appearing positively in all of the solutions and being the two (non-trivial) conditions which figured most strongly in the necessity analysis.

The remaining six conditions (GovEng, IntResCap, NatParComp, EvidencePm, IPinHouseCap and Transp) have varying levels of explanatory power, as they are sometimes present in solutions and sometimes absent. These conditions, as well as the two (perfectly, or nearly perfectly) necessary conditions listed above, speak to the

importance of the national partner, their capacities around mapping stakeholders and packaging data, as well as their credibility. They also reflect the challenging contexts in which the AREAP implementing partners are working, where evidence isn't generally used in policy making, government may not be transparent about the policymaking process, and it is difficult for non-state actors to engage with government.

Beyond the existence of strong civil society coalitions, then, in order to contribute to policy change it appears that having individual champions in government and having clearly mapped key stakeholders, their needs and agendas are critical. This speaks to the more sophisticated capacities and understandings required to translate engagement with government into policy change. This interpretation resembles the experience of SOTU's national platform in Kenya, which has developed champions in government, strengthened its understanding of policymaker needs and agendas to successfully influence policy. As all of the successful cases had champions in government, and knowledge of stakeholders and their needs (positive KnowStake and ChampNSA), this interpretation fits all four of the successful cases (Rwanda SOTU, Kenya SOTU, Zimbabwe Trust and Mozambique SOTU).

The importance of these conditions for success also reinforce the theory that internal capacity and the sophistication of national partners to package policy findings and effectively target stakeholders is strongly related to their success influencing policy. This finding echoes the experience of the Trust's partners in Zimbabwe, which are entirely focused on the national and regional issues supported by the Trust and have developed strong internal capacity to use research and package findings for government. This interpretation is supported by Kenya SOTU which has positive IntResCap and IPinHouseCap, and to a lesser extent Rwanda SOTU which has positive IPinHouseCap, but not Mozambique SOTU.

One would expect that success would more likely in countries where government opens up space for engagement with NSAs, or where policymakers are more transparent about the policymaking process, but it appears from the analysis that these conditions are not required for success. It appears that contributing to policy change depends more on internal capacities and political acumen of national partners, than the external context.

Figure 2 below illustrates these connections, particularly between the presence of champions and having a strong knowledge of key stakeholders. Unsuccessful cases are represented in pink and successful cases in green.

It shows the clear importance of KnowStake and ChampNSA, as all three successful cases fall within those fields, and the lesser (but still significant) importance of IPinHouseCap, and finally InResCap and NatParComp (along with the other relevant conditions GovEng, EvidencePm, and Transp not included in the Venn diagram presented in Figure 2).

**Figure 2**




### 9.2.2 Effectiveness Evaluation Question: To what extent has engaging at the continental/ regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms?

The QCA analysis considered two aspects of this evaluation question:

- **Outcome 1:** the extent to which civil society coalitions have developed strengthened relationships and a shared understanding with policymakers on key issues;
- **Outcome 2:** the extent to which civil society coalitions engage in regularised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking (if such spaces exist).

The QCA analysis considered a range of factors, some of which were dependent on AREAP and some which related to the external national context. The strength of relationships between civil society coalitions, (termed as national partners for this analysis), supported by the Trust and SOTU, and policymakers, along with their engagement in accountability mechanisms are assessed at this point in time, without consideration of how long the IP has been active in this space or supporting these coalitions. The analysis sought to determine which factors, or combinations of factors are necessary or sufficient for success, in different contexts.

### Outcome 1: The extent to which civil society coalitions have developed strengthened relationships and a shared understanding with policymakers on key issues.

The long list of conditions initially considered in the analysis were:

1. Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors (GovEng)
2. National partner coalition engagement in spaces that enable citizens to engage with policy makers/government (CitizenEng)
3. Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (Transp)

4. Level of national/ regional political stability (PolStab)
5. Enabling environment for non-partisan and empowered CSOs at national level (EnEnv)
6. Level of government sensitivity to criticism (GovSens)
7. Outcome 4.4.3 Strengthened technical skills within civil society coalitions for policy engagement (StrengthTech)
8. Strength of use of evidence in policy making (EvidencePm)
9. NSAs have adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs, agendas (KnowStake)
10. In-house capacity of IP for effective packaging of information around civil society views (IPinHouseCap)
11. Strength of national partner reputation and credibility on relevant issues (StrengthPlat)
12. Constantly engagement by national partner coalitions with diverse audiences to develop ownership of ideas and map the national political economy (EngDiv)
13. Existence of champions for non- state actor's cause and activities (ChampNSA, here termed IPChampGov)
14. Internal research capacity of national partner coalitions (IntResCap)
15. National partner coalitions have other competing work (NatParComp)
16. Internal general capacity of national partner coalitions (IntGenCap)
17. Visibility and perceived credibility of national partner (NatParCred)

The external and internal conditions were initially analysed separately. A necessity analysis was carried out first on the first 13 conditions of the list, Only one condition was perfectly necessary (KnowStake) but several disjunctions had necessity consistency scores of over 90%. The subset analysis revealed only one combination of two conditions that was perfectly sufficient (IPCHAMPGOV*STRENGTHPLAT).

Two groups of conditions emerged from the subset analysis of the external group: one group with the 7 most important conditions (KnowStake, IPinHouseCap, StrengthPlat, EngDiv, StrengthTech, IPChampGov aka ChampNSA, and CitizenEng) and another group with less important conditions that could be added later (EvidencePm, GovSens, PolStab, Transp). Finally, the analysis of the internal group returned IntResCap and NatParComp as worthy of inclusion in the standard analysis.

The first test (the standard analysis) on the 7-condition model confirmed the importance of CitizenEng and KnowStake, which appeared in all combinations in the various solutions. By removing them, we were able to test a five condition model, which downplayed the importance of StrengthTech, StrengthPlat and IPInHouseCap. The two remaining conditions (IPChamp and EngDiv) were thus added to the four conditions of the second group, and the necessary conditions brought back, The model CitizenEng, KnowStake, IPChamp, EngDiv, EvidencePm, GovSens, PolStab, Transp was thus tested, and the relatively low important of the four conditions confirmed (see Table 5).

At this point the two internal conditions surviving the supersubset analysis (IntResCap and NatParComp) were added to the four conditions which, up to this point, seemed more strongly associated with success (citizeneng, knowstake, ipchamp, engdiv). The six condition model downplayed the importance of the two internal conditions; between them, IntResCap was chosen as its role seemed easier to interpret in light of the findings from the other phases of the study.

The 5 condition model CitizenEng, KnowStake, IPChamp, EngDiv, IntResCap was also tested on the “crisped” dataset and returned a solution which was identical to the fuzzy-set model with a 0.75 cut-off point; it is reported in Table 5.

**Summary of the necessity analysis**

The necessity (superset) analysis carried out on all conditions points to two conditions being perfectly necessary (consistency = 1.00) in and of themselves

- National partners having adequate knowledge of stakeholders being targeted, their needs and agendas. (KnowStake)
- Engagement in spaces that enable citizens to engage with policy makers/government (CitizenEng)[12]

Two other conditions appeared to be largely necessary for success (over .90 consistency):

- Existence of champions for non- state actor's cause and activities (ChampNSA, here termed IPChampGov)[13]
- National partners are constantly engaging with diverse audiences to develop ownership of ideas and map the national political economy context. (EngDiv)

**Summary of the sufficiency analysis**

As seen above, several models were tested with the standard analysis. Table 5 reports the findings of the model including the most important conditions of the first group, plus the four conditions of the second group, which confirms the relatively low importance of the latter.

**Table 5: Eight condition model solutions**

| CUTOFF = 1.00, COMPLEX SOLUTION | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
|---|---|---|---|
| CITIZENENG*KNOWSTAKE*<br>*IPCHAMPGOV*ENGDIV*<br>polstab*GOVSENS*evidencepm | 0.428265 | 0.145610 | 1.000000 |
| CITIZENENG*KNOWSTAKE*<br>*IPCHAMPGOV*ENGDIV*<br>transp*POLSTAB*govsens*evidencepm | 0.355460 | 0.143469 | 1.000000 |
| CITIZENENG*KNOWSTAKE*<br>*IPCHAMPGOV*ENGDIV*<br>transp*polstab*govsens*EVIDENCEPM | 0.355460 | 0.143469 | 1.000000 |
| Entire Solution | 0.715203 | | 1.000000 |

Table 6 illustrates the findings from the final five-condition model described above, with the consistency scores obtained from the “crisped” dataset. The first combination covers 4 cases, and the second combination covers one case.

**Table 6: Five condition model solutions**

| | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
|---|---|---|---|
| CITIZENENG*KNOWSTAKE**IPCHAMPGOV*ENGDIV* | 0.800000 | 0.800000 | 1.000000 |
| CITIZENENG*KNOWSTAKE**ipchampgov*engdiv*<br>*INTRESCAP | 0.200000 | 0.200000 | 1.000000 |

[12] This is perfectly necessary only in the “crisped” dataset
[13] This is perfectly necessary in the “crisped” dataset

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Entire Solution | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |

**Interpretation and findings**

In terms of developing strengthened relationships with policymakers, external contextual factors relating to levels of political stability, transparency in decision making or enabling environments for civil society are less important and do not predict success. Conditions relating to the internal capacity of civil society coalitions are also less relevant. To develop strengthened relationships with policymakers, the most critical conditions for success relate to developing strong networks, constant engagement with government, having champions, and having an understanding of the national political economy and key stakeholders (ChampNSA/IPChampGov, EngDiv, KnowStake and CitizenEng). KnowStake and CitizenEng were positive in all 5 successful cases, while ChampNSA and EngDiv were positive in all successful cases except for Nigeria SOTU.

This analysis indicates that constant engagement with a diverse network of stakeholders, including through regularised accountability mechanisms or spaces for engagement with government, provides opportunities for civil society coalitions to build relationships with policymakers and establish areas of shared interest. Developing a strong understanding of the key policymakers to target for a particular issue, their agendas and needs, combined with relationships with existing champions in government, provides a networked basis for building relationships in government with the right policymakers to influence a particular issue. This interpretation reflects the experience of Rwanda SOTU, Kenya SOTU, Zimbabwe Trust and Mozambique SOTU.

This sub-question included two outcomes from Implementing Partner theories of change as conditions: the existence of strengthened civil society coalitions, and the existence of strengthened technical capacity within national partners, to test the IP theories of change and assess whether these outcomes were in fact necessary conditions for strengthened relationships with policymakers. These outcomes did not factor as important conditions for success, indicating that it's possible for civil society organisations to develop strengthened relationships with policymakers without being part of a coalition, and that the skills needed for political economy analysis and networking may not be the things generally developed when technical capacity is built by the IPs. It may also be the case that technical capacity building factors more strongly earlier in the causal chain, as a pre-condition for being able to engage in accountability mechanisms, having a champion in government or being able to assess key stakeholders and engage with diverse audiences.

Figure 3 describes the final five-condition model. Unsuccessful cases are represented in pink and successful cases in green. It underlines the importance of KnowStake and CitizenEng, as all three successful cases fall within the intersection of the areas related to these conditions (the central large, short rectangle and the right hand side of the diagram). All successful / green cases lie within the intersection of these two areas, which is also described as CITIZENG*KNOWSTAKE. Although, clearly, KnowStake isn't sufficient for success as an unsuccessful case falls within the field as well: Mozambique Trust. IPChampGov aka Champ NSA also appears relevant, as only successful cases have positive values for this condition and the area (the bottom of the diagram) does not include any unsuccessful / pink cases (it is subset-sufficient in the "crisped" dataset). However, IPChampGov is not necessary for success as there is a successful case without it (Nigeria SOTU).

**Figure 3**




**Outcome 2: The extent to which civil society coalitions engage in regularised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking (if such spaces exist).**

The conditions considered in the analysis were:

1. Constant engagement with diverse audiences (donors, government, private sector, CSOs etc.) to develop ownership and understand political economy (EngDiv)
2. Government sensitivity to criticism (GovSens)
3. Level of national political stability (PolStab)
4. Policymakers not being transparent about decision making processes (an inverse relationship with the 'Transp' condition)
5. Strength of evidence in policy making (EvidencePm)
6. The national partner having other competing work (NatParComp)
7. Internal research capacity (IntResCap)
8. Existence of champions for non- state actor's cause and activities (ChampNSA) (included in the Venn Diagram only, as it was not part of the original set of conditions for this outcome)

**Necessity analysis**

From the analysis, two conditions appear mostly necessary for success with a consistency of .910:

- Internal research capacity (IntResCap)
- Level of national political stability (PolStab), which had an inverse relationship, so lack of political stability was necessary for success

Two other factors had strong scores, in terms of being individually necessary for success (.817 consistency):

- National partners are constantly engaging with diverse audiences to develop ownership of ideas and map the national political economy context (EngDIV)
- Government sensitivity to criticism (GovSens), which had an inverse relationship, so high government sensitivity was necessary for success.
- Several other conditions were also common in the supersubset analysis. The subset analysis in particular points to EvidencePm, which seems sufficient in a subset sense for success (whenever EvidencePm is observed, the case is successful); and Transp which has 89% sufficiency consistency.

**Sufficiency analysis**

As there were only eight conditions for this outcome, they were all included in the sufficiency analysis. Initially, internal research capacity (IntResCap) and political instability (PolStab) appeared in the most important conditions as they are present in all combinations of the solution (see Table 7). This is understandable as they are necessary.

**Table 7: Eight condition model solutions**

| CUTOFF = 1.00, COMPLEX SOLUTION | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
|---|---|---|---|
| INTRESCAP*polstab*<br>*ENGDIV*EVIDENCEPM*NATPARCOMP<br>*transp*govsens | 0.543716 | 0.183060 | 1.000000 |
| INTRESCAP*polstab*<br>*ENGDIV*TRANSP*GOVSENS*<br>*evidencepm | 0.543716 | 0.183060 | 1.000000 |
| INTRESCAP*polstab*<br>*TRANSP*EVIDENCEPM*<br>*engdiv*govsens*natparcomp | 0.363388 | 0.092896 | 1.000000 |
| Entire Solution | 0.819672 | | 1.000000 |

Taking out IntResCap and PolStab, we are left with a group of six conditions. Initially ChampNSA was not included as it was not a condition identified by projects as part of their theories of change; however it was empahsised strongly in the anlaysis of other outcomes and so it was tried in this case. Initially, the following 5-condition model was tested: EngDiv, EvidencePm, NatParComp, Transp and GovSens. The solution obtained with a cutoff point of 1.00 is identical to the one obtained by testing the same model on the “crisped” dataset and is illustrated in Table 8:

**Table 8: Six condition model solutions**

| CUTOFF = 1.00, COMPLEX SOLUTION | Raw coverage | Unique coverage | Consistency |
|---|---|---|---|
| *ENGDIV*EVIDENCEPM*NATPARCOMP<br>*transp*govsens | 0.333333 | 0.333333 | 1.000000 |
| *ENGDIV*TRANSP*GOVSENS*NATPARCOMP<br>*evidencepm | 0.333333 | 0.333333 | 1.000000 |
| *TRANSP*EVIDENCEPM*<br>*engdiv*govsens*natparcomp | 0.333333 | 0.333333 | 1.000000 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Entire Solution | 0.819672 | 1.000000 |

Although not included in this model, the condition ChampNSA was subsequently included in a new 5-condition model, replacing NatParComp which had emerged as not particularly relevant from the subset[14] and superset analyses, so that we could see how it combined with the other important conditions in a Venn diagram. It was felt that it might be helpful in interpreting the findings, being present in both the successful Zimbabwe and Kenya cases.

**Interpretation and findings**

As there were 3 successful cases, each solution in this model in effect covers one case, which limits interpretation across the successful cases. This limits the amount of emphasis placed on any one solution. Additionally, some of these conditions appear to relate to different aspects of this outcome. The first two conditions, relating to transparency in decision making, and the use of evidence appear to relate to the existence of regularised accountability mechanisms. The last two, presence of champions in government and constant engagement with diverse audiences, seem to relate to the likelihood that national partners will engage in these spaces.

In a relatively politically stable context, like Zimbabwe where the government is not transparent about the policymaking process, the presence of a champion in government appears important but constant engagement by national partners with diverse audiences and the use of evidence in policymaking are more critical. This fits the experience of Zimbabwe Trust, which has high EngDiv, EvidencePm, ChampNSA and low Transp.

In a context like Kenya where policymaking is relatively transparent, and national partners engage with external partners and diverse groups of stakeholders, but where the government is more sensitive to criticism and the use of evidence in policymaking is less common, having a champion in government is key. This fits the experience of Kenya SOTU, which has high ChampNSA, Transp, EngDiv and GovSens, but low EvidencePM.

Figure 4 illustrates the findings of the last model, tested on the "crisped" dataset, with unsuccessful cases represented in pink and successful cases in green. As there are only three successful cases, the combinations which appear as solutions are quite mixed with equal coverage between the three solutions (each combination is represented by one case). However, two solutions have positive EngDiv, two have positive Transp, two have positive EvidencePM and two have positive ChampNSA, indicating that while all of these factors are important, they interact in different ways depending on the context (the level of political stability) and the internal capacity of the national partner. With the Kenya case, presence of a champion in government appears to make the difference in terms of achieving success.

[14] Perhaps this note could be included further up the text… in the fsQCA software, the subset analysis is called "supersubset analysis" but it has nothing to do with the necessity analysis, properly called "superset" analysis in the most respected textbook. (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012) and in the R software.

**Figure 4**


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## 9.3 Qualitative Comparative Analysis- Data and benchmarks

**Data set and benchmarks for conditions for change**

Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change at the national or regional levels and what drivers influence their participation?

- **Outcome 1:** Existence of strengthened civil society coalitions supported by the Trust or SOTU focused on policy change on key national and regional topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners;

| Outcome 1 | Outcome | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change at the national or regional levels and what drivers influence their participation? | Existance of strengthened civil society coalitions focused on policy change on key national and regional topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners | Enabling environment for non-partisan and empowered CSOs at national level | Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (levels of | Government opens up space for engagement with non-state | Political fragmentation | Constant engagement with diverse audiences (donors, government, private | Level of national/ regional political stability | Internal Research capacity | National partner has other competing work | Internal General Capacity | Visibility and perceived credibility of national partner |
| Nigeria - SOTU | **4** | **1** | **3** | **3** | **3** | 2 | **1** | **3** | **2** | **4** | 4 |
| Rwanda - SOTU | **2** | **1** | 2 | **3** | **1** | 4 | **3** | **2** | **1** | **4** | 4 |
| Kenya - SOTU | **3** | **2** | **3** | 4 | **3** | **3** | **2** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **3** |
| Kenya - Trust | **3** | **2** | **3** | 4 | **3** | **3** | **2** | **3** | **2** | **3** | **3** |
| Zimabwe - Trust | **3** | **1** | 1 | 2 | **2** | 4 | **1** | **3** | **3** | **3** | 4 |
| Mozambique - SOTU | **3** | **2** | 2 | **3** | **2** | 4 | **2** | **2** | **2** | **3** | 4 |
| Mozambique - Trust | **2** | **2** | 2 | **3** | **2** | 2 | **2** | **3** | **2** | **4** | **3** |
| Botswana - Trust | **1** | **4** | **1** | 1 | **1** | 2 | **4** | **1** | **4** | **2** | **3** |

Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change at the national or regional levels and what drivers influence their participation?

- **Outcome 2:** Evidence of civil society coalitions' contributions to successful national or regional policy change on topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners.

**Part 1:**

| **Outcome 2** | **Outcome** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Are civil society organisations engaging in coalitions to achieve policy change at the national or regional levels and what drivers influence their participation? | Evidence of civil society coalitions' contributions to successful national or regional policy change on topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners | In-house capacity of IP for effective packaging of information around civil society views | Adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs, agendas | Strength of evidence in policy making | Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors |
| Nigeria - SOTU | **2** | **3** | **4** | **3** | **3** |
| Rwanda - SOTU | **3** | **3** | **4** | 1 | **3** |
| Kenya - SOTU | **3** | **4** | **3** | 2 | **4** |
| Kenya - Trust | **2** | 2 | 2 | 2 | **4** |
| Zimbabwe - Trust | **3** | **4** | **4** | **3** | 2 |
| Mozambique - SOTU | **3** | 2 | **4** | 2 | **3** |
| Mozambique - Trust | **2** | **3** | **3** | 1 | **3** |
| Botswana - Trust | **1** | **2** | **2** | 1 | 1 |

**Part 2:**

| Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (levels of secrecy in government policymaking) | Existence of champions for Non- state actor's cause/activities | Internal Research capacity | National partner has other competing work | Internal General Capacity | Visibility and perceived credibility of national partner |
| **3** | 2 | **3** | **2** | **4** | **4** |
| 2 | **4** | **2** | **1** | **4** | **4** |
| **3** | **4** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **3** |
| **3** | 1 | **3** | **2** | **3** | **3** |
| 1 | **4** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **4** |
| 2 | **4** | **2** | **2** | **3** | **4** |
| 2 | 2 | **3** | **2** | **4** | **3** |
| **1** | 1 | **1** | **4** | **2** | **3** |

ANNEX 9 – QCA ANALYSIS

To what extent has engaging at the continental/ regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms?

- **Outcome 1:** Evidence of strengthened relationships and shared understanding with policymakers on importance of CSO engagement in policymaking.

**Part 1**

| **Outcome 1** | **Outcome** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| To what extent has engaging at the continental / regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms? | Evidence of strengthened relationships and shared understanding with policymakers on importance of CSO engagement …. | Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors | Engagement in spaces that enable citizens to engage with policy makers/government | Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes | Level of national/ regional political stability | Enabling environment for non-partisan and empowered CSOs at national level | Government sensitivity to criticism | Existence of champions for Non-State Actor's cause/activities in government |
| Nigeria - SOTU | 4 | **3** | **3** | **3** | **1** | **1** | **2** | 2 |
| Rwanda - SOTU | **3** | **3** | **3** | 2 | **3** | **1** | **1** | 4 |
| Kenya - SOTU | **3** | 4 | 4 | **3** | **2** | **2** | **3** | 4 |
| Kenya - Trust | **1** | 4 | 2 | **3** | **2** | **2** | **3** | 1 |
| Zimbabwe - Trust | **3** | 2 | **3** | 1 | **1** | **1** | **1** | 4 |
| Mozambique - SOTU | 4 | **3** | **3** | 2 | **2** | **2** | **3** | 4 |
| Mozambique - Trust | 2 | **3** | 2 | 2 | **2** | **2** | **3** | 2 |
| Botswana - Trust | 2 | 1 | 2 | **1** | **4** | **4** | 4 | 1 |

**Part 2:**

| Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition | Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome A: Strengthened platforms… | Outcome B: Strengthened technical skills… | Strength of evidence in policy making | NSAs have adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs, agendas | In-house capacity of IP for effective packaging of information around civil society views | Strength of IP reputation/credibility on relevant issues | Constant engagement with audiences to develop ownership and understand political economy | Internal Research capacity | National partner has other competing work | Internal General Capacity | Visibility and perceived credibility of national partner |
| **4** | 2 | **3** | 4 | **3** | 4 | 2 | **3** | **2** | **4** | 4 |
| **2** | 2 | 1 | 4 | **3** | 4 | 4 | **2** | **1** | **4** | 4 |
| **3** | 4 | 2 | **3** | 4 | **3** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **3** |
| **3** | **3** | 2 | 2 | 2 | **3** | **3** | **3** | **2** | **3** | **3** |
| **3** | **3** | **3** | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | **3** | **3** | **3** | 4 |
| **3** | **3** | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | **2** | **2** | **3** | 4 |
| **2** | 1 | 1 | **3** | **3** | **3** | 2 | **3** | **2** | **4** | **3** |
| **1** | 2 | 1 | **2** | **2** | **3** | 2 | **1** | **4** | **2** | **3** |

To what extent has engaging at the continental/ regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms?

- **Outcome 2:** Existence of regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking process.

| **Outcome 2** | **Outcome** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** | **Condition** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| To what extent has engaging at the continental / regional levels strengthened the capacity of NSAs to effectively engage policymakers and institutionalise accountability mechanisms? | Existence of regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking process. | Constant engagement with audiences to develop ownership and understand political economy | Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes | Strength of evidence in policy making | Govt sensitivity to criticism | Level of political stability | Internal Research capacity | National partner has other competing work | Internal General Capacity | Visibility and perceived credibility of national partner |
| Nigeria - SOTU | **3** | 2 | **3** | **3** | **2** | **1** | **3** | **2** | **4** | 4 |
| Rwanda - SOTU | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | **1** | **3** | **2** | **1** | **4** | 4 |
| Kenya - SOTU | 4 | **3** | **3** | 2 | **3** | **2** | **3** | **3** | **3** | **3** |
| Kenya - Trust | 2 | **3** | **3** | 2 | **3** | **2** | **3** | **2** | **3** | **3** |
| Zimbabwe - Trust | **3** | 4 | 1 | **3** | **1** | **1** | **3** | **3** | **3** | 4 |
| Mozambique - SOTU | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | **3** | **2** | **2** | **2** | **3** | 4 |
| Mozambique - Trust | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | **3** | **2** | **3** | **2** | **4** | **3** |
| Botswana - Trust | **1** | 2 | **1** | 1 | **4** | **4** | **1** | **4** | **2** | **3** |

# Benchmarks for conditions:

## Benchmarks for conditions set from primary and secondary data analysis:

**Enabling environment for non-partisan and empowered CSOs at national level (EnEv)**

**Civicus EEI Index**

**Bertelsmann Stiftung Status Index (quality of democracy and political participation)**

**Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' - political rights and civil liberties Index 2014**

1. Averaged scores across the three indexes puts in lowest quartile for the sampled countries
2. Averaged scores across the indexes puts between lower and middle quartile for the sampled countries
3. Averaged scores across the indexes puts between the middle and upper quartiles for the sampled countries
4. Averaged scores across the indexes puts in the upper quartile for the sampled countries

**Policymakers are transparent about decision making processes (Transp)**

1. Policy makers are not transparent at all
2. Policy makers are not transparent, but they somehow engage NSA
3. Policy makers are open throughout the clear and communicated process and afterwards but decision making itself is closed, exclusive and non-democratic. Or transparent on certain levels but not others.
4. Policy makers are transparent

**Government opens up space for engagement with non-state actors (GovEng)**

1. Space is closed completely
2. It is generally closed with some limited channels opening up mostly informal without real recognition by the gov that they are
3. An acknowledged informal space, invited, or contained space is open for negotiations, for exclusive stakeholders or on some issues
4. space is open

**Political pluralism (PolFrag)**

1. State with one dominant political party
2. State with two dominant political parties
3. Multiparty, with 2 - 3 strong parties.
4. Multiple strong political parties (more than 4)

**Constant engagement with diverse audiences to develop ownership and understand political economy (EngDiv)**

1. Not able to engage with diverse audience
2. Only engage with audience similar to themselves
3. Engage with diverse audience one off
4. Engage with diverse audience on a regular basis

**Level of national/ regional political stability (PolStab)**

World Governance Indicators: Aggregate Indicator, Political Stability and Absence of Violence (percentile rank)

Mo Ibrahim Index 2014

Bertelsmann-Stifung Management Index 2014

1. Averaged scores across the thre index puts in lowest quartile for the sampled countries
2. Averaged scores across the indexes puts between lower and middle quartile for the sampled countries
3. Averaged scores across the indexes puts between the middle and upper quartiles for the sampled countries
4. Averaged scores across the indexes puts in the upper quartile for the sampled countries

**Internal Research capacity (IntResCap)**

1. Poor research examples, years of experience, credibility..
2. Limited research examples, years of experience, credibility as a research institution
3. Some research examples, years of experience, credibility as a research institution
4. Extensive research examples, years of experience, credibility as a research institution

**National partner has other competing work (NatParComp)**

1. People have a lot of other competing activities, which takes away from their work with IP
2. People have a lot of other competing activities, but they overlap with the work of IP
3. People do not have a lot of other competing activities and it does not take away from IP
4. People do not have other competing activities

**Internal General Capacity (IntGenCap)**

1. Low level of capacity
2. Medium level of capacity
3. High medium level of capacity
4. High level of capacity ( (funding source, size, years of experience, qualified staff, engaging with stakeholders/advocacy experience)

**Visibility and perceived credibility of national partner (NatParCred)**

1. Poor credibility in eyes of external peers, stakeholders
2. Limited credibility in eyes of external peers, stakeholders
3. Good credibility in eyes of external peers, stakeholders
4. Deep credibility in eyes of external peers, stakeholders

**In-house capacity of IP for effective packaging of information around civil society views (IPHouseCap)**

1. Does not demonstrate understanding of diverse audiences or need to package information
2. Only packages for one audience
3. Demonstrate understanding of diverse audience and targets evidence to a small extent to fit it
4. Demonstrates high understanding, targets evidence and recipient reads it/receives it well because it is well packaged

**Adequate knowledge of stakeholders and their needs, agendas (KnowStake)**

**1** Does not differentiate audience
**2** Understands audience but has not been able to target needs
**3** Understands audience and needs, tries to address their agenda
**4** Fully understands audience, agenda and needs and has evidence

**Strength of evidence in policy making (EvidencePM)**

**1** No evidence that policy making is based on evidence, not even indirectly
**2** No formal evidence that policymaking is based on evidence, but suspecting that they do
**3** Potential use of evidence in policy making, or weak use of evidence
**4** Use of evidence in policy making

**Existence of champions for Non- State Actor's cause/activities in government (ChampNSA or IPChampGov)**

**1** No IP Champion
**2** Politicians in general support, but no 1 person identified
**3** IP Champion exists (can name someone)-- politician supports IP but not clear exactly how
**4** Relationship with IP champion (established, shows examples)

**Engagement in spaces that enable citizens to engage with policy makers/government (CitizenEng)**

**1** Forums and mechanisms do not exist
**2** Some forums and mechanisms exist but can be informal, or not very well developed, tested, or effective. They are one way and not engaging.
**3** Forums and mechanisms exist, are formal and can be effective but on certain issues or with certain institutions.
**4** Forums and mechanisms exist and are effective

**Government sensitivity to criticism (GovSens)**

Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index 2014;

Freedom House freedom of the Press;

Worldwide Governance Indicators: Voice and Accountability 2013

**1** Averaged scores across the three indexes puts in lowest quartile for the sampled countries
**2** Averaged scores across the indexes puts between lower and middle quartile for the sampled countries
**3** Averaged scores across the indexes puts between the middle and upper quartiles for the sampled countries
**4** Averaged scores across the indexes puts in the upper quartile for the sampled countries

**Strength of IP reputation/credibility on relevant issues (StrengthPlat)**

**1** IP is seen as not credible, bad reputation. Data or reports is considered non-reliable and weak
**2** IP has a weak reputation. Data is often questioned or IP is often or harshly under attack when data is not in favour of some stakeholders in the country, or IP is not completely seen as local but US driven
**3** IP is generally well perceived and reputed with some weaknesses and space for improvement. Data sometimes questioned by some stakeholders, but the public perception is that it is credible, also, credibility is attached to person

**4** IP perceived as well reputed, credible. Data is reliable

**Benchmarks for outcomes set from primary and secondary data analysis:**

**Existence of strengthened civil society coalitions supported by the Trust or SOTU focused on policy change on key national and regional topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners;**

**1** No evidence of civil society coalitions

**2** Presence of civil society coalitions, but not strengthened or focusing on relevant policy change

**3** Presence of civil society coalitions, which have been strengthened or which are focusing on relevant policy change

**4** Clear evidence of strengthened coalitions, also focused on relevant policy change

**Evidence of civil society coalitions' contributions to successful national or regional policy change on topics targeted by AREAP implementing partners**

**1** No instances of contributions to policymaking process

**2** Some instances of engagement, but relatively superficial

**3** Instances of significant policy engagement, substantive discussions and meetings

**4** Instances of successful policy change

**Evidence of strengthened relationships and shared understanding with policymakers on importance of CSO engagement in policymaking.**

**1** No relationships with policymakers or shared understandings

**2** Limited or more superficial relationships, limited explicit evidence of value for engaging CSOs

**3** Evidence of some relationships with policymakers, instances of engagement with CSOs

**4** Wide ranging, sustained relationships with policymakers, clear value for engaging CSOs in policymaking

**Existence of regularised or formalised accountability mechanisms and spaces for civil society participation in policymaking process.**

**1** No evidence of accountability mechanisms

**2** Some evidence of weak mechanisms

**3** Good evidence of mechanisms, some functionality

**4** Evidence of functioning mechanisms

# Annex 10: SEQAS Country Sample Approach

# Annex 10- SEQAS Sample Approach to Selection of Countries for Field Visit

## 1.1 Summary

This Annex sets out the sampling scheme for the country field visits set out in the Terms of Reference for the evaluation of the Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme. The sampling scheme was developed by DFID's independent Specialist Evaluation and Quality Assurance Service (SEQAS).

The approach uses a partition (stratification) of the 39 countries in which programme partners are active using the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator for Voice and Accountability and the United Nation's sub-regional country grouping for Africa. Within this partition countries are chosen randomly whilst ensuring adequate coverage of the breadth of programme interventions according to criteria agreed by the Programme Steering Committee.

Establishing the sample in this manner should ensure provision for a range of national operating contexts. Consistent results from each field visit can be aggregated but generally the results obtained from the field visits should be taken as individual case studies rather than as from a representative, randomised sample.

### 1.1.1 Sampling Approach

The three regional operating partners cover 39 countries between them (see Annex 3 to Evaluation Terms of Reference (ToRs)). There is considerable overlap with the distribution of operations by country as follows:

1. All 3 operating partners — 5 countries
2. Afrobarometer and the Trust — 10 countries
3. Afrobarometer and SoTU — 4 countries
4. Afrobarometer only — 16 countries
5. the Trust only — 3 countries
6. SoTU only — 1 country

The countries are scattered throughout Africa and offer an extremely wide range of social, political and economic operating contexts with implications for the ways in which national governments respond to their citizens' requests and aspirations. In developing the sampling scheme, SEQAS was asked to take into account the qualitative expectations of the evaluation ToRs by ensuring exploration of programme results in a range of operating contexts.

The analysis underpinning the sampling explored a range of country-level governance indicator sets which might serve to reflect the most relevant ways in which countries' operating contexts differ. To reduce the complexity of each indicator set, each country's score was ranked into quartile groupings, to allow for a simpler comparative assessment of country classifications by indicator set. Some explanatory power is lost in reducing a rank to a quartile but this was necessary in order to make a sensible sampling judgement. The results showed a noticeable correlation between the separate indices, implying a large measure of agreement in what they are trying to measure. On this basis the SEQAS suggested that little additional explanatory power could be expected by factoring more than one governance indicator into the sampling scheme. (NB SEQAS also highlighted this finding as one which the evaluator may wish to be aware of when conducting the evaluation.)

Taking into account the heavy correlation between indicators, SEQAS determined that any choice of governance indicator should be equally useful in partitioning countries to obtain a spread of governance operating contexts at country level. On this basis the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator for Voice and Accountability (WGI V&A) was adopted as the most directly relevant for this programme. Each of the 39 countries was grouped into quartiles according to their WGI V&A scores (rebased to focus on the 39 countries) to provide a governance dimension to stratification.

The governance indices do not pick up every nuance of operating context. Rather than attempting to identify indices which look at other political and social factors affecting the environment for empowerment and accountability interventions, SEQAS proposed use of UN sub-regional groupings as a reasonable and straightforward proxy for other factors. These groupings (North, West, East, Central and South) provided a second

dimension for stratification of the 39 countries in which the programme is active.

In order to achieve a balanced sample, the selection approach was designed to identify 8 countries in total for field visits – 2 from each quartile of the stratification by governance indicator. The Project Steering Committee also identified that the breadth of country level engagement should also be taken into account during selection, with a minimum as follows:

a. 2 countries in which all three partners are active (in red);
b. 2 countries in which two implementing partners are active (Afrobarometer/SoTU in blue, Afrobarometer/the Trust in green); and
c. 3 countries in which only one implementing partner is active (one per implementing partner – Afrobarometer in black, SoTU in orange, and the Trust in dark red).

**Table 1: Country selection grid**

| UN Sub-Regional Grouping | WGI – Voice and Accountability | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Quartile 1 | Quartile 2 | Quartile 3 | Quartile 4 |
| North | | | Algeria<br>Morocco<br>Tunisia | Egypt<br>Sudan |
| West | Benin<br>Cape Verde<br>Ghana<br>Mali | Burkina Faso<br>Liberia<br>Niger<br>Senegal<br>Sierra Leone | Guinea<br>Nigeria<br>Togo | Cote d'Ivoire |
| Middle | | | Cameroon | Angola<br>DRC |
| East | Mauritius<br>Seychelles<br>Tanzania | Kenya<br>Malawi<br>Mozambique<br>Zambia | Burundi<br>Madagascar<br>Uganda | Ethiopia<br>Rwanda<br>Zimbabwe |
| South | Botswana<br>Namibia<br>South Africa | Lesotho | | Swaziland |

Since there was more than one country unit within the 'implementing partner' groupings, a random sampling approach was used to select within group. This resulted in the following approach to sampling:

a. for each implementing partner grouping, countries were randomly selected for field visits. To ensure a spread across the partition, once a country in any cell of the partition was chosen all other countries in that

cell were removed from the process. This process selected the following 7 countries: Benin; South Africa; Malawi; Tunisia; Uganda; DRC, and; Rwanda;

b. it was also agreed that, for balance, 2 countries would be selected from each quartile. On inspection the 7 countries chosen provided two for each quartile except for quartile 2. An 8th country was randomly selected for this quartile from the countries remaining - that is countries not already selected nor in cell partitions from which a country had already been selected. This selected Senegal as the final country.

The 8 countries selected for country field visits are underlined in Table 1.

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# Annex 11: Evaluation Bias

# Annex 11 – Strategy to address stakeholder bias

The table below summarises the most pertinent bias risks and key mitigation strategies for stakeholder groups.

| Stakeholder group | Risks of bias | Strategies to mitigate bias |
|---|---|---|
| Staff in regional and continental organisations | • Stakeholders may feel threatened by activities of implementing partners<br>• Stakeholders may have their own political agendas (at national, regional or continental level) and see the evaluation as a means to advance these causes<br>• Stakeholders may not want to admit to needing support from implementing partners in areas of low technical capacity | **Triangulation** – we will triangulate testimony from KIIs with secondary data and testimonies from academic and political economy experts<br>**Political economy analysis** – we will undertake and update a political economy analysis before each wave of research to provide us with up-to-date understanding of different stakeholders' organisational and personal priorities |
| Staff of Afrobarometer, SOTU and the Trust | • Extensive research with implementing partners' staff could create exposure bias because evaluators give disproportionate weight to their vision for addressing problems<br>• Self-serving bias may affect how staff present events, with a tendency to attribute success to their own interventions and issues to contextual factors<br>• Staff may want to downplay important issues and suggest they handled them as well as possible | **Verification** – we will verify implementing partners' accounts through reviewing emails and other documented records<br>**Technical expertise** – we will verify the plausibility of implementing partners' accounts for how change happens through the governance expertise of our Governance Expert and other short-term experts as required<br>**Anonymity** – we will advise interviewees that their testimony will remain anonymous to create an atmosphere in which they feel more comfortable providing open responses |
| Members of the implementing partners' key national delivery partners | • Delivery partners may feel that they need to protect their relationship with AREAP implementing partners to secure future funding | **Anonymity** – we will advise interviewees that their testimony will remain anonymous to create an atmosphere in which they feel more comfortable providing open responses |