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Party Cooperation in a Results Perspective

Evaluation of the Support to Democracy through
Party Affiliated Organisations (PAOs)

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Preface

Democratic development is a priority in Swedish international development cooperation, and the Government's new policy on Democratic development and Human Rights highlights the role of the political parties in this process. Since 1995, the Government has funded collaboration between Swedish party affiliated organisations (PAOs) and their partner organisations in developing countries, the Western Balkan and Eastern Europe. The funds, with an annual budget that has gradually increased to currently SEK 75 million, are channelled through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

The Swedish Government is also strongly committed to demonstrating results of the international development cooperation. However, information on the results and experiences of the PAO cooperation has so far been limited. The Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV) therefore initiated an evaluation of this cooperation both to generate knowledge as well as to provide opportunities for dialogue and learning.

SADEV is an autonomous government-funded agency that initiates, conducts and disseminates independent evaluations of Swedish international development cooperation. SADEV is guided by the overall objective of such cooperation, i.e. to create conditions for poor people to improve their living conditions.

The evaluation confirms the central role of political parties in the democratisation process. It also shows that PAOs can make important contributions in this field. Results are found to be very mixed, however, and the evaluation identifies various problems. Our hope is that the observations made may contribute to the strengthening of the cooperation.

The evaluation was carried out by Lennart Peck (Team Leader), Eva-Marie Kjellström and Peter Sjöberg.

SADEV is grateful to the representatives of the PAOs, partner organisations, Sida, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and others who have generously contributed to this evaluation by sharing information, opinions, ideas and experiences.

Gunilla Törnqvist
Director General

February 2010

Sammanfattning

I denna rapport redogörs för resultat och slutsatser av en utvärdering av demokratistöd via svenska partianknutna organisationer (PAO). Syftet med utvärderingen har varit att bidra med kunskap om resultaten av PAOs verksamhet och möjliggöra dialog och lärande. Utvärderingen baserar sig på intervjuer i Sverige, en statistisk genomgång av samtliga projekt samt besök i tre länder (Ukraina, Uganda och Colombia) för att studera vissa projekt i sin nationella kontext. Projekten utvärderas med avseende på måluppfyllelse och relevans. Fokus har varit den senast avslutade ansökningsperioden som var 2007-2008.

Utvärderingsteamet har bestått av tre utvärderare från SADEV samt externa experter för de tre landstudierna. Teamet har även haft till sitt förfogande en extern referensgrupp med kompetens på relevanta områden.

Utvärderingen kommer fram till att utveckling av politiska partier och partisystem är en betydelsefull del i ett bredare stöd för demokratisk utveckling och att PAO kan lämna värdefulla bidrag. Resultaten är dock mycket blandade och det finns problem vad gäller projektutformning, styrning och uppföljning.

Mål för PAO-samarbetet

PAO-verksamheten syftar till att bidra till väl fungerande partiväsenden, politiskt deltagande, demokratiska politiska system, mänskliga rättigheter och till att utveckla kanaler mellan medborgare och beslutsfattare. Såsom målet uttrycks i riktlinjerna för verksamheten kan och har det tolkats på olika sätt. Alla PAO står bakom målet men som självständiga organisationer är de samtidigt bärare av olika ideologier och har sina egna mål och prioriteringar. Detta återspeglas i verksamheten och i målen för de enskilda projekten. Samtidigt som PAO har ett tydligt engagemang för att stärka demokratin finns en potentiell intressekonflikt mellan organisationernas egna mål och vad som är mest strategiskt för att stärka ett partisystem.

Översikt av verksamheten

För perioden 2007/08 uppgick den årliga budgeten för PAO-samarbetet till 75 miljoner kronor. Totalt genomfördes 157 projekt med samlingsorganisationer i 39 länder; 76 länder om även de regionala projekten räknas in. Hälften av projektmedlen gick till länder i Öst- och Centraleuropa och mindre än 10 % till länder med vilka Sverige har ett långsiktigt utvecklingsamarbete (landkategori 1). Merparten av samarbetet var med länder med en relativt hög levnadsnivå, enligt UNDPs *Human Development Index*. Däremot fanns en stor variation mellan graden av frihet enligt den klassificering som görs av *Freedom House*. I de flesta fall samarbetade PAO direkt med ett politiskt parti eller en lokal partianknuten organisation. Exempel fanns dock även på projekt där flera svenska PAO arbetade tillsammans, enskilda PAO som arbetade med flera partier lokalt, triangulärt samarbete, regionala projekt samt projekt som drivits tillsammans med partistiftelser från andra länder; samlingsformer som inte alltid ryms

inom den traditionella uppdelningen mellan ”systerpartisamarbete” och ”gemensamma” projekt. Ungefär hälften av projekten hade som huvudsyfte att stärka kapaciteten inom ett etablerat politiskt parti. Projekt för att stödja kvinnor och ungdomars politiska deltagande och för att utveckla internationella nätverk var också vanliga. Aktiviteterna utgjordes oftast av en kombination av utbildning, studiebesök och konferenser. De vanligast förekommande ämnena vid dessa var ideologi och grundläggande demokratiska värderingar, kvinnor och ungdomar i politiken samt kampanjarbete/kommunikation. Kön fördelningen bland deltagarna var vanligtvis jämn. I genomförandet användes både resurspersoner från Sverige (från PAO själv och/eller det svenska partiet) och samarbetslandet. Finansiellt stöd för lokalt genomförd verksamhet förekom i hälften av projekten. Projekten var i allmänhet små med en genomsnittlig projektbudget något under 500 000 kronor per år.

Måluppfyllelse

De flesta projekt som studerats i denna utvärdering har genomförts ungefär som planerat och uppfyllt mål på prestationsnivå (*output*). Uppfyllelsen av mål på kort och medellång sikt (*outcome*) tenderade dock att variera avsevärt. Exempel på positiva resultat omfattade att deltagare i en del projekt blivit mer politiskt medvetna och engagerade, ökat samarbete mellan oppositionspartierna i Uganda, ett begynnande samarbete mellan två socialistpartier och facket i Kharkiv (Ukraina), registrering av ett nytt liberalt parti i Ukraina och att kvinnorna i det Colombianska vänsterpartiet blivit mer enade och synliga. I några fall sågs dock inga eller mycket begränsade resultat. I vilken utsträckning de långsiktiga målen (*impact*) nåtts och partiväsendet verkligen stärkts är svårbedömbart. Till exempel är det osäkert i vilken utsträckning deltagarnas nyvunna erfarenheter också kommer att leda till handling och förändring inom de politiska partierna, om de utbildade ungdomarna kommer att fortsätta inom politiken, om det nyetablerade partiet kommer att lyckas ta sig in i parlamentet och bli en politisk kraft att räkna med etc. I flertalet fall bedöms utsikterna för långsiktiga effekter på partisystemet vara små.

Utvärderingsteamet har också noterat vissa (positiva och negativa) effekter vid sidan av programmålen. Som exempel kan nämnas att de svenska partierna ökat sitt kunnande och utvecklat sina internationella kontaktnät, att deltagare i utbildningar fått användning för sina nyvunna kunskaper på andra områden än inom partiet och att vissa ideologier har främjats. Beroende på hur och med vem PAO väljer att arbeta kan de påverka maktförhållandena såväl inom ett parti som mellan partier på ett sätt som inte nödvändigtvis bidrar till ett stärkande av demokratin.

Relevans

Projektmålen svarar oftast väl mot samarbetspartnernas önskemål vilket är positivt ur ett ägarskapsperspektiv. Önskemålen från dessa organisationer – vanligtvis partier och partianknutna organisationer som har och ska ha sina egna politiska dagordningar – svarar däremot inte nödvändigtvis mot vad som är mest strategiskt sett ur ett partisystemperspektiv. PAOs val av samarbetspartners sker i stor utsträckning på ideologisk grund och speglar, som en följd av hur verksamheten finansieras, ytterst maktförhållandena i den svenska Riksdagen. Målen i de studerade projekten är ofta relevanta för att stärka de utvalda partierna som organisationer men inte alltid för partisystemet sett i sin helhet. Ett exempel på ett mer systeminriktat arbetssätt är dock Uganda där fyra PAO försökt samla de större oppositionspartierna och på så sätt få till stånd ett alternativ till den sittande regimen. De studerade projekten överensstämde huvudsakligen med riktlinjerna för stödformen. Att få till stånd bättre fungerande partiväsanden är, allmänt sett, relevant för att förbättra de fattigas levnadsvillkor men inget av projekten har haft ett tydligt fattigdomsfokus eller fattigdomsperspektiv.

Resultatstyrning

Bland de många faktorer som kan ha påverkat resultaten studerar denna utvärdering framför allt hur verksamheten förhåller sig till grundläggande mål- och resultatstyrning. Trots vissa förbättringar under senare år noteras flera svagheter. Programålet är formulerat på ett sätt som gör det svårt att använda för styrning och uppföljning, och projektmålen är ofta vagt formulerade och saknar indikatorer. Det sätt som projekten identifieras och väljs på av PAO säkerställer inte att de på ett strategiskt sätt bidrar till väl fungerande partiväsanden. Sida har med nuvarande riktlinjer begränsade möjligheter att säkerställa kvaliteten i verksamheten. Ingen samordning eller systematiskt informationsutbyte förekommer, varken PAO sinsemellan eller mellan PAO och annat demokratistöd. PAO utvärderar sällan sina projekt, uppföljningen har i vissa fall varit bristfällig och rapporteringen till Sida har inte alltid varit tillförlitlig. Således genereras mycket lite resultatinformation och användningen av resultatinformation för ansvarsutkrävande och beslutsfattande är begränsad.

Problemen sammanhänger i hög grad med hur PAO finansieras, dvs. utifrån hur många mandat deras moderparti har i Sveriges Riksdag. Det betyder att det inte finns någon koppling mellan resultat och resursallokering, vilket begränsar möjligheterna till sanktioner om en PAO inte skulle prestera väl, liksom incitament för PAO att förbättra verksamheten eller producera resultatinformation. Vidare innebär systemet att det i hög grad är förhållanden i Sverige (dvs. hur svenska medborgare röstar) snarare än förhållanden i samarbetslandet som avgör vilka partier i som stöds.

PAOs roll – styrkor och svagheter

Utvärderingen beskriver också vad utvärderingsteamet uppfattat vara PAOs styrkor, svagheter och begränsningar. Viktiga styrkor är deras erfarenhet av partiuppbyggnad, deras internationella kontaktnät och institutionella koppling till politiska partier vilket oftast innebär en värdegemenskap med samarbetspartierna. Däremot varierar organisationernas erfarenhet av utvecklingssamarbete, och i vissa fall har PAO saknat tillräcklig projektledningskapacitet och system för kvalitetssäkring. PAOs komparativa fördel uppfattas vara att arbeta direkt med politiska partier och stärka dessa ”inifrån”

snarare än att arbeta med de bredare strukturella faktorerna som påverkar parti-väsendet ”utifrån” (till exempel adekvat lagstiftning, fungerande rättsväsende, aktivt civilt samhälle, valsysteem, välinformerade väljare). Att PAO är bärare av vissa värderingar och ideologier begränsar deras möjlighet och incitament att arbeta med hela partispektrat. Det talar för att PAO skulle ha en fördel att arbeta med systerpartistöd tillsammans med likasinnade partier med vilka man kan utveckla förtroende, tillit och utbyten. Det visade sig dock att PAOs aktiviteter inte nödvändigtvis behöver vara begränsade till detta.

Rekommendationer

Följande är rekommendationer dels med avseende på hantering av programmet som helhet och dels med avseende på projekt. De första riktar sig främst till Utrikesdepartementet och Sida och de senare främst till PAO.

Program:

- 1 Revidera programmålet så det blir otvetydigt om vad som ska uppnås samtidigt som utrymme ges för skilda arbetssätt. Målet ska återspegla vad PAO har möjlighet att åstadkomma samt relatera till det övergripande målet för svenskt utvecklings- och reformsamarbete.
- 2 Klargör och stärk Sidas mandat att granska och bedöma PAO och deras verksamhet. Det omfattar översyn/framtagande av kriterier för Sidas bedömning och klargörande av hur Sida ska agera om en PAO inte lever upp till ställda krav.
- 3 Förändra ansökningsförfarandet och gå från bedömning av enskilda projekt i riktning mot att bedöma organisationernas kapacitet och resultat. I projektansökan kan hänvisning göras till fristående projektdokument (se rekommendation nedan) utan att dessa behöver bifogas. Förändringen kan behöva ske successivt.
- 4 Genomför individuella efterlevnadsrevisioner och systemrevisioner av PAO, för såväl Sidas bedömningar som stöd för organisationernas egen verksamhetsutveckling.
- 5 Undersök vilka möjligheter som finns att i ökad grad koppla finansieringen till resultat.
- 6 Specificera i Sidas instruktioner för verksamheten vilken information PAOs rapportering till myndigheten ska innehålla.
- 7 Säkerställ att rapportering inte bara sker till Sida utan även till samarbetsparterna. Detta förutsätter att projektrapporter skrivs på engelska och/eller översätts till annat språk som samarbetsparterna behärskar.
- 8 Säkerställ nödvändig kapacitet, kompetens och kontinuitet på Sida. Sida kan överväga att utnyttja extern expertis och/eller att sätta upp någon form av ”panel” att ha till sitt förfogande.
- 9 Öka utbytet av information och erfarenheter för att förbättra samordningen och skapa förutsättningar för lärande. Ett sätt kan vara att formerna för referens-

gruppen förändras så att gruppen blir ett mer aktivt forum för informations- och erfarenhetsutbyte. Det kan också ske på initiativ av Sida och PAO själva.

- 10 Gör det till standardrutin att PAO konsulterar och informerar den svenska ambassaden i de länder där de är verksamma.
- 11 Fortsätt att främja utvecklingen av politiska partier och partisystem även genom andra aktörer, och se de olika kanalerna som kompletterande för att nå det övergripande målet i demokratistödet.
- 12 Genomför en extern utvärdering av svenskt samarbete på partiområdet om fyra till fem år. Eventuellt kan den utvärderingen omfatta både PAO-samarbetet och stöd till partisystem via andra kanaler.

Projekt:

- 13 Förbättra och bredda problemanalyserna för att säkerställa att projekten strategiskt bidrar till välfungerande partisystem och demokrati. Led i detta kan vara ökat informationsutbyte mellan PAO sinsemellan, breddande av informationskällorna i samarbetslandet och bättre utnyttjande av analyser utförda av internationella biståndsgivare.
- 14 Konsultera de andra PAO, partistiftelser från andra länder, och andra aktörer som är verksamma på området för att bedöma hur man bäst kompletterar varandra, alternativt vilka möjligheter till synergier som kan finnas.
- 15 Fortsätt arbetet med att förbättra projektens utformning med avseende på formulering av mål och indikatorer, klargörande av antaganden, riskbedömning etc.
- 16 Upprätta fristående projektdokument för varje projekt (som specificerar mål, aktivitetsplan, budget, arbetsfördelning och annat väsentligt) och sprid dessa till alla inblandade parter att fungera som gemensam utgångspunkt.
- 17 Förbättra projektuppföljningen, bl.a. mer systematisk uppföljning mot indikatorer, mer närvaro i samarbetsländerna och utnyttjande av fler informationskällor.
- 18 Ta fram resultatinformation, genom att utforma projekten så att de möjliggör uppföljning av resultat, (mål, indikatorer, analys av hur det såg ut före projektet etc.), förbättrad uppföljning och ex post-utvärderingar för vilka vedertagna utvärderingsmetoder kan användas. Samarbetsorganisationerna kan och borde ha en central roll i framtagandet av resultatinformation.
- 19 Minska antalet projekt och samarbetsländer för att uppnå en ”kritisk massa” i de projekt som genomförs, ökad kontinuitet och bättre styrning och uppföljning.
- 20 Säkerställ att alla projekt är väl institutionaliserade såväl i samarbetslandet som i Sverige.

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings and conclusions of an evaluation of the support to democracy through Swedish Party Affiliated Organisations (PAOs). The evaluation has been undertaken to increase knowledge about the results of the PAO cooperation (henceforth referred to as the Programme), to provide opportunities for dialogue and learning, and to improve future cooperation. It has been based on interviews in Sweden, a statistical review of all projects and on case studies in three countries: Ukraine, Uganda and Colombia. Projects have been assessed with respect to effectiveness and relevance. Focus has been on the last completed application period for PAOs, 2007-2008.

The evaluation team (the Team) has consisted of three evaluators from SADEV and external experts on the three country studies. The Team has also had access to an independent reference group with competence in relevant areas.

The evaluation concludes that party and party system development is an important component in a broader support to democracy and that PAOs can potentially make important contributions. However, the results of the projects studied are found to be very mixed and problems in relation to project design and management have been observed.

Objectives of the Cooperation

The Programme aims at contributing to well-functioning party systems, political participation, democratic political systems, respect for human rights and channels between citizens and political decision-makers. As expressed in the Programme Guidelines, the objective may be, and has been, interpreted in different ways. As independent organisations and carriers of different ideologies PAOs also have their own objectives and priorities. This is reflected in their activities and the objectives of the various projects. Even though the PAOs are strongly committed to strengthening democracy and all subscribe to the Programme objective, there are potential conflicts of interest between their own organisational objectives and what is most strategic to strengthen party systems.

An Overview

The yearly budget for PAO cooperation was in the period studied (2007/08) SEK 75 million. There were 157 projects with target groups in 39 partner countries; 76 countries if regional projects are included. Half of the project expenditures related to cooperation with Eastern and Central Europe and less than 10 percent to cooperation with countries with which Sweden has long-term development cooperation (category 1). Most of the partner countries had a medium or high Human Development Index. There was a mix of countries rated by Freedom House as free, partly free and not free. In most cases, the Swedish PAOs worked directly with a political party or a PAO in the partner country. However, there were also projects with several

Swedish PAOs working jointly, individual Swedish PAOs working with several parties locally, triangular cooperation, regional projects, projects implemented with party foundations of other countries etc., challenging the dichotomy between 'fraternal' and 'joint' cooperation. Approximately half of the projects had as a main focus to strengthen the capacity of an established political party. Projects to promote the political participation of women and/or youth and projects to strengthen international networks were also common. Activities consisted of training, study visits and international conferences, usually in combination. The most common topics covered in these activities were ideology and basic democratic values, women and youth in politics and campaigning/communication. The gender balance among participants was usually quite even. Resource persons from both Sweden (the PAO and/or the Swedish party) and the partner country were usually involved in the implementation of the project activities. In about half of the projects finance was transferred to partner organisations for local project implementation. Projects were generally small with an average annual project budget somewhat below SEK 0.5 million.

Effectiveness

An assessment of the effectiveness of selected projects shows that objectives related to expected *output* (i.e. concrete services and products resulting from the projects) were mostly, even if not always completely, fulfilled. Fulfilment of objectives at the *outcome* level (i.e. short- and medium-term effects) tended to vary considerably. Positive achievements include, for example, women and young persons who participated in different projects having become more politically conscious and committed, steps taken by opposition parties in Uganda to form an alliance, an emerging collaboration between two socialist parties and the labour union in the city of Kharkiv (Ukraine), a new liberal party registered in Ukraine and the women within a Colombian left party having become more united and visible. However, there appears to have been little or no outcome of some of the studied projects. The extent to which objectives at the impact level have been fulfilled, and projects have actually contributed to strengthening of the party system, is difficult to assess. It is for example uncertain whether new outlooks and behaviour of trained people will also lead to action and changes of parties, whether trained youth will remain in politics, whether a newly established party will ever reach parliament and become a political force etc. In most projects studied, the Team found prospects for longer term impact on the party system quite dim.

The Team also observed some (positive and negative) effects not envisaged in the Programme objective. These include Swedish parties having gained increased knowledge and stronger international networks, project participants applying their skills and knowledge outside of their parties and promotion of certain ideologies. Depending on how and with whom the PAOs work, they may influence power relations, both within and between parties, in ways that do not necessarily strengthen democracy.

Relevance

The project objectives generally correspond well with the demand expressed by the partner organisations, which is positive from an 'ownership' perspective. However, the demand of these organisations – mostly parties and their affiliated organisations that have and should have their own political agendas – does not necessarily reflect

what is most strategic in a party system perspective. Furthermore, the PAOs' selection of partners is largely based on ideological grounds and, due to how the Programme is financed, ultimately reflects the power relations in the Swedish Parliament. Project objectives are often relevant to strengthen selected parties as organisations, but not always to address the broader problems of the party system. In Uganda, however, the PAOs were seen to be working with more of a party system approach, cooperating with several of the opposition parties as a strategy to challenge the current semi-authoritarian government. The studied projects were mostly, but not always completely, in line with the Programme Guidelines. Generally, improving the functioning of party systems is relevant to improve the lives of poor people, but none of the projects studied had a clear poverty focus or poverty perspective.

Management for Results

Among the many factors that have influenced results, this evaluation looks primarily at how the cooperation has been managed. Despite some improvements in recent years, several weaknesses are identified: the way the Programme objective is formulated limits its usefulness for steering and follow-up, project objectives are often vague and performance indicators are usually lacking. The way projects are identified and selected does not ensure that they strategically address the problems of the party system. Sida has, with the current Programme Guidelines, limited possibilities to ensure quality of the PAO activities. There is no coordination or systematic exchange of information between PAOs themselves, nor between PAO and other Swedish support to democracy. The PAOs have rarely evaluated their projects, monitoring has in some cases been inadequate and the reporting to Sida has not always been reliable. Hence, very little results information is generated and use of any results information for accountability purposes and decision making is limited.

The problems observed are closely linked to the system of financing of PAOs, i.e. proportionally to the representation of the respective parties in the Swedish Parliament. There is no link between allocation of resources to PAOs and results, limiting the possibilities of sanctioning a PAO that is not performing well, as well as incentives for PAO to improve their work and produce results information. The system also implies that conditions in Sweden (i.e. how Swedes vote) rather than partner country conditions determine what parties are supported.

Strengths, Limitations and Roles of PAOs

The report also briefly highlights what the Team perceives as strengths, weaknesses and inherent limitations of PAOs. The main strengths of PAOs lie in their practical experience of democratic party building, their international networks and institutional party linkage. Their experience of development cooperation varies, and in some cases PAOs have lacked sufficient project management capacity and systems for quality control.

A comparative strength of PAOs appears to be for them to work directly with political parties, to strengthen these as organisations 'from within' rather than to work with the broader external factors determining the functioning of the parties (such as adequate legislation, a functioning judiciary, an active civil society, an appropriate election system, well informed voters etc.) The fact that PAOs are carriers of certain

values and ideologies limits their potential and incentives for working with the whole party spectrum. This indicates a comparative advantage of engaging in 'fraternal' cooperation with like-minded parties with which the PAO can develop trust, close links and exchanges. However, evidence was found that the activities of the PAOs do not necessarily have to be limited to this.

Recommendations:

Below are recommendations with respect to Programme management and project management, with the aim of enhancing results. The first recommendations are primarily directed to Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Sida while the latter are primarily directed to the PAOs.

- 1 The Programme objective should be revised to make the envisaged results unambiguous while at the same time leaving room for a variety of approaches. The objective should reflect what PAOs have a potential to achieve, as well as make reference to overarching objectives of the Swedish development and reform cooperation.
- 2 Sida's mandate to review and assess PAOs and their operations should be clarified and strengthened. This includes reconsidering/developing criteria on which Sida's assessment should be based and clarifying what measures Sida shall take if a PAO does not perform according to the established standard.
- 3 The application procedures should be changed, moving from project assessment towards assessment of organisational capacity and results. This change may have to be introduced gradually. Reference to project documents (see recommendation below) can be made in the applications without attaching these.
- 4 Individual compliance audits and systems audits of the PAOs should be commissioned, both as a basis for Sida's assessments and to aid the organisations' own improvement efforts.
- 5 Possible ways of linking the allocation of funds to results should be explored.
- 6 The content to be included in the PAOs' reports to Sida should be specified in Sida's instructions.
- 7 It should become a standard procedure to share the project reports with the partner organisations, requiring that the reports are written in (or translated into) a language understood by the partner organisation.
- 8 Sufficient capacity, competence and continuity at Sida should be ensured. Sida may also consider drawing on external expertise and/or to establish an own 'panel' to be at its disposal.
- 9 The exchange of information and experiences should be increased, with a view to improve coordination and enhance learning. One way could be to change the way in which the Reference Group operates, making it a more active forum for exchange. Other opportunities for dialogue should also be explored, including at the initiative of Sida and the PAOs.

- 10 PAOs informing and consulting the Swedish Embassies in the countries where they are working should be made a standard procedure.
- 11 The promotion of party and party system development also through actors other than PAOs should continue. PAOs and other actors should be viewed as complementary.
- 12 An external evaluation of Swedish support to party systems should be carried out in 4-5 years. Such an evaluation may look both at the PAO cooperation and support to party systems through other channels.

Project Management:

- 13 Problem analyses should be strengthened and broadened in order to ensure that projects strategically contribute to democracy and well-functioning party systems. Measures to achieve this may include increased information sharing among PAO and increasingly use multiple sources of information in the partner countries, as well as analyses made by the international donor community.
- 14 Other PAOs, party foundations of other countries, Swedish Embassies and other actors within the field of political party support should be consulted by PAO to explore how its own activities best complement those of others and how synergies may be obtained.
- 15 Further steps to improve project design, with respect to formulation of objectives, establishment of indicators, clarification of assumptions, consideration of alternative approaches, assessment of risks etc. should be taken.
- 16 It should be made a standard procedure to formalise each project in a separate 'project document' (specifying objectives, plan of activity, budget, division of responsibilities and other essential features of the project) and share it with all concerned parties as a common point of reference.
- 17 The quality of monitoring should be improved through, for example, increased use of performance indicators, closer presence in partner countries and use of multiple sources of information.
- 18 Efforts to generate results information should be increased through formulation of projects *that enable a follow-up of results* (including indicators and analyses of the pre-project situation), improved monitoring and implementation of ex-post evaluations for which established evaluation practices can be used. Partner organisations can and should have a central role in generating the results information.
- 19 The number of projects and partner countries should be reduced with a view to ensure a 'critical mass', achieve more continuity and enable better project management.
- 20 Efforts should be made to ensure that all projects are properly institutionalised in the partner countries as well as in Sweden.

Acronyms

CEUDES	Corporación Unidades Democráticas para el Desarrollo
CIS	Centre Party International Foundation/Centerpartiets Internationella Stiftelse
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EPP	European People's Party
EU	European Union
GF	Green Forum
HDI	Human Development Index
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
JEEMA	Justice Forum
JHS	Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation/Jarl Hjalmarson Stiftelsen
KIC	Christian Democratic International Center/Kristdemokratiskt Internationellt Center
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MSEK	Million Swedish Crowns
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
Palme Center	Olof Palme International Center
PAO	Swedish Party Affiliated Organisation
RYPLA	Regional Young Political Leadership Academy
SADEV	Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation
SEK	Swedish Crowns

Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Silc	Swedish International Liberal Center
UPLA	Unión de Partidos Latinoamericanos
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ToR	Terms of Reference
VIF	Left International Forum/Vänsterns Internationella Forum

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Democracy and human rights have long been central in Swedish international cooperation, and have in recent years been a thematic priority of the Swedish Government. Increased attention has also been given to the role of political parties in democratisation processes. Party cooperation has become an important component in the total support to democracy.¹

The Swedish Party Affiliated Organisations (PAOs) are central actors in this cooperation. In 1995, a system was created through which PAOs could receive funding for cooperation with developing countries and Eastern and Central Europe. It started on a small scale but the budget has successively increased and is currently SEK 75 million per year. Party system development is also supported through other channels, such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as indirectly, through for example support to parliaments and election processes.

The Swedish Government is also strongly committed to demonstrating results of its international cooperation. Results-Based Management is being strengthened and measures for increased aid effectiveness, as called for by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, are being introduced.

Very little results information from PAO cooperation has been made available, however. Two reviews (1997² and 2004³) and an evaluation (2000⁴) have been carried out, yet these dealt primarily with resource use, management issues, and some central policy issues. They also included valuable discussions on the projects' potential to strengthen parties and party systems, but none of them focused on results. While the PAOs themselves have indeed carried out some evaluations, these efforts have not been undertaken systematically and not always with a results perspective.

PAO, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Swedish international development cooperation agency (Sida) have all expressed a desire to learn more about the results of the PAO cooperation and about how results can be assessed. There has also been a discussion about the most suitable institutional arrangement for the PAO cooperation.

Similar questions are being asked also in other countries and, in 2009, evaluations of the party cooperation of Norway, Finland and International IDEA were undertaken.

¹ See 2008/09:11 Frihet från förtryck. Skrivelse om Sveriges demokratibistånd, Betänkande 2008/09:UU6 Freedom from Oppression – Sweden's Democracy Assistance, and Policy för demokratisk utveckling och mänskliga rättigheter inom svenskt utvecklingssamarbete 2010-2014, regeringsbeslut UF 2009/33076/UP.

² SPM Consultants, 1997.

³ Magnus Öhman et al. Politiska partier och demokratibistånd, Sida Evaluation 04/31, 2004.

⁴ Fredrik Ugglå et al. Stöd till de partikuntna organisationerna, Sida Evaluation 00/35, 2000.

A government decision in 2006, in connection with the issuing of new guidelines for the PAO cooperation, includes an evaluation to be undertaken by the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV) in consultation with Sida and PAO before 2010.⁵ This decision went well with SADEV's mandate and ambition to carry out relevant evaluations that can inform decision-makers and contribute to improved cooperation.

In late 2008, SADEV initiated a dialogue with the PAOs, MFA and Sida to identify needs and key issues. Academics and practitioners in Sweden and abroad were also consulted. Based on this, SADEV developed Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation. The PAOs, MFA and Sida were invited to comment on a draft version. The final ToR (dated 22 Dec 2008 and attached as Appendix 1) were decided upon by the Director General of SADEV, and have guided the planning and implementation of the evaluation.

1.2 Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of this evaluation has been to improve the Swedish support to parties and party systems by generating knowledge about the PAO cooperation and provide opportunities for dialogue and learning. Ultimately, the evaluation should benefit the citizens in the partner countries by contributing to a more effective and efficient cooperation. The report has primarily been written for MFA, Sida and the PAOs with the following intentions in mind:

- For PAO:
- to use as an input to decisions regarding working methods, approaches, target groups etc.
 - to use in efforts to strengthen project management, including evaluation.
- For Sida:
- to strengthen the administration and management of the programme.
 - to help identify areas where capacity development of PAO should be considered.
- MFA:
- to consider in future in financing decisions.
 - to use as an input to future revisions of Programme Guidelines.
 - to use in the general development of policy relating to democracy development.

1.3 The Evaluation Object


The main stakeholders of the PAO cooperation (henceforth referred to as the Programme) are the Swedish PAOs, their partner organisations (often political parties or organisations affiliated to these), Sida and MFA. Other stakeholders include the Swedish political parties, organisations that may be involved in the individual projects, other political parties in the partner countries, and most importantly, the citizens that ultimately are to benefit from the cooperation.

⁵ Regeringsbeslut, III:3, 2006-07-27, UD/2006/35490/UP.

PAOs are organisations that in different ways are closely linked to the Swedish political parties represented in the Swedish Parliament. Thus, there are currently seven PAOs engaged in the cooperation:

- Center Party International Foundation (CIS)
- Green Forum (GF)
- Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS)
- Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC)
- Olof Palme International Center (Palme Center)
- Swedish International Liberal Center (Silc)
- Left International Forum (VIF)

The illustration below can be used to describe the Programme.



The Programme *Objective* is stated in the Programme Guidelines reads:

...through the contributions of Swedish party-affiliated organisations, to contribute to and assist in the development of a well-functioning party system, political participation, and democratic political systems, promote respect for human rights, the equal value of all people, as well as building up channels between the citizens and political decision-makers in developing countries and countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The purpose shall foster representative governance in these countries that reflects the will of the people. The measures should support activities aimed at making political parties more democratic in their internal organisation and in their policies

This objective is evidently very broad. Different interpretations of it are discussed below.

Management includes the steering of the programme towards its objective and follow-up of results. The Swedish Government defines the general orientation of the Programme through the Programme Guidelines and decides upon the budget. Sida administers the Programme by receiving and reviewing project proposals from the PAOs, disbursing funds and receiving reports. The PAOs plan and manage the various projects in collaboration with their partner organisations. In addition, there is a Reference Group, consisting of representatives of the PAO, Sida and MFA, for promotion of dialogue and information exchange, general quality assurance, development of the Programme and coordination with other Swedish democracy support.⁶

Resources that go into the programmes include the government finance. In 2007/08, each PAO received a basic allocation of SEK 650 000 plus SEK 170 000 per representative in the Swedish Parliament. In addition, there was special financing for joint PAO projects. Also, the PAOs contribute with resources, such as volunteer lecturers drawn from the political parties. In addition, the partner organisations often provide financial and other inputs to the projects.

The actual cooperation takes place in the form of *Projects*, each with its own objective and activities to reach this objective. In 2007/08, there were about 150 projects implemented in 75 countries (including regional projects) and representing a variety of approaches.

Results refer to outputs, outcomes and impacts of the projects, both intended and unintended. Outputs are the concrete products or services resulting from the projects, such as courses, publications and conferences. Outcomes refer to the likely or achieved short- and medium-term effects of an intervention's output. This can include persons increasing their competence, changing their behaviour and taking some specific action within a party. Impact includes long-term effects. The envisaged impact of the PAO cooperation is positive changes on the party system and democracy.

Finally, the broader *context* in which the projects are implemented must be considered. The context includes political, historical, cultural, economic and other factors, and differs considerably among partner countries. Other Swedish and international democracy support are part of the context as well.

Like all development and reform cooperation, the PAO cooperation has its own special characteristics. It constitutes of cooperation *between parties* and could in this respect be described as a form of actor-driven cooperation (*aktörssamverkan*). There is also a strong *political* dimension: the PAOs are carriers of certain values and ideologies, and the partner organisations are local political actors. The content of the cooperation is (usually) openly ideological and party political, and the cooperation is partisan in the sense that only certain parties are supported. An additional political dimension is that the implementers – the PAOs – are affiliated with the parties that are politically responsible for Swedish international cooperation, including this Programme. The Programme is also financed and managed differently than any other

⁶ PAO also meet informally on a regular basis.

cooperation. Although it is part of the Swedish development cooperation and thereby subject to Swedish and international policy, it is at the same time *de facto* exempt from the normal policy and regulatory framework.

Meanwhile, it should be stressed that this is not the only cooperation in place to support parties and party systems (see Appendix 4) or the only cooperation that is political; other support to democracy, including that through civil society organisations, are also sometimes highly political. A question sometimes raised in discussions during the evaluation is whether the PAO cooperation should be seen as ‘ordinary’ Swedish development and reform cooperation or as ‘something different’. The Programme is, however, financed via the Swedish development and reform cooperation budget and has been evaluated as such. The Programme also resembles many other forms of development cooperation in terms of activities (training events, study visits, organisational development etc.) and in terms of how it is implemented (management of projects).

1.4 Evaluation Questions and Criteria

This evaluation is fundamentally about aid effectiveness and about how Swedish cooperation in this area may be improved. To this end, the evaluation focuses on the results of the PAO cooperation. Have there been any results in the first place? If so, what were these results? How satisfactory were they?

In order to generate useful lessons and to present practical recommendations for improvement of the cooperation, the aim has also been to learn about *how* results, if any, have been achieved. What factors may have contributed to success/failure? This requires an investigation of not only mere results but also of approaches and processes.

The evaluation criteria⁷ used in this evaluation have been:

- *Effectiveness*, i.e. the extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
- *Relevance*, i.e. the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partner and donor policies.

The effectiveness criterion was chosen as it answers the central question of whether the results, if any, correspond to what the Government has allocated funds for, and to what the PAOs themselves have set out to do. Effectiveness is assessed for selected projects against their short- and long-term objectives. The specific project objectives vary considerably, yet all projects should contribute to fulfilment of the overall Programme objective.

The relevance criterion was chosen as it gives an indication of whether the PAOs are ‘doing the right things’. The report discusses relevance from three angles: the extent to which projects are consistent with the partner organisation demand, relevance in a

⁷ An evaluation criterion is a criterion used to determine the merit or value of the evaluated intervention. OECD/DAC has established five criteria as standard yardsticks for assessment of development cooperation activities. These are effectiveness, relevance, sustainability, impact and efficiency. Definitions can be found in Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, published by Sida in cooperation with OECD/DAC 2007.

party system perspective and the extent to which the activities are in line with the Programme Guidelines.

Analysis of effectiveness requires clear and explicit objectives. The Programme objective quoted earlier can be interpreted in different ways; various interpretations are discussed in Chapter 2. For the purpose of evaluation, the Team has had to make its own interpretation of the objective. Looking at how it has been formulated over time, the Team has chosen to consider 'to contribute to and support a well functioning party system (*partiväsende*)' as the very core of the Programme. This in turn calls for a clarification of what is to be considered a well-functioning party system.

'Party system' will here be defined as the sum of political parties and how the parties relate to each other and to society. For the analysis, a distinction will be made between i) the parties as organisations, ii) the parties in the citizenry and iii) the parties in government.⁸ A 'well functioning' party system will in this evaluation be understood as one that is well functioning for a representative democracy.

There is no general consensus among political scientists and practitioners about what would constitute indicators of a well-functioning party system. However, the indicators proposed by the PAOs themselves and by other persons interviewed, as well as indicators found in literature, have been used for a tentative definition, whereby a well-functioning party system would be characterised as:

Parties as organisations: Parties have a broad membership base and active member participation; are internally democratic, united and independent; are based on ideology and have a well developed party programme, which they are capable of communicating to voters in campaigns. Moreover, they do not discriminate members on the basis of sex, age, race, religion etc.; they respect human rights and are financially transparent, are integrated in international party structures and are not corrupt.

Parties in the citizenry: There is a competitive multi-party system with ideological variability assuring that there are parties to represent the interests of all groups in society, a suitable number of parties (not too few and not too many), a moderate level of polarisation, moderate changes in electoral support between elections (volatility), public debate between parties on substantial issues, dialogue between parties and citizens, a healthy relation between parties and civil society, and that the parties respect each other and the democratic principles and that citizens have confidence in the political parties.

Parties in government: Party representatives have the capacity to work well in parliament as well as in government, political parties dominate in the representative organs (i.e. members of representative organs are aligned with parties), the parties operate as unitary actors in representative organs (limited 'floor crossing') and there is also a party linkage to the executive power (cabinet and president).

The criteria for a well-functioning party system suggested above obviously only represent an ideal that hardly exists even in well-developed democracies. Further-

⁸ This distinction, originally developed by V.O. Key, is commonly used in political science. It is obviously just one of many ways to describe a party system.

more, a certain criterion may be more or less important depending on the specific context. What is well functioning in one country is not necessarily so in another. However, the listing above should at least give an indication of what a project aiming for a 'well-functioning party system' could include.

In addition, there are a number of factors that can be seen as *preconditions* for a well-functioning party system. These include but are not limited to: respect for fundamental human rights (freedom of association, freedom of speech etc.), rule of law, a functioning judiciary, independent and active media, an adequate party legislation and a functional election system. Other factors that may affect the functioning of the party system include historical and political legacies, level of political education and awareness among voters, poverty, the role of civil society, democratic culture, and regional and international influence.

1.5 Delimitations

The evaluation only considers the democracy support through Swedish PAOs. There is also other Swedish support to parties and party cooperation (see Appendix 4), but this has not been subject to the present evaluation. This delimitation was made necessary due to the significant challenge involved in evaluating the PAO cooperation alone. Hence, the Team cannot draw any conclusions about whether or not the PAO cooperation is more effective than other party cooperation.

In terms of time period, the evaluation has focused on the last completed agreement period, i.e. 2007/08, yet some historical references are also made.

The Programme includes confidential projects in totalitarian states. For obvious reasons, this part of the cooperation is not fully reflected in the evaluation.

Although it is an important issue, the evaluation does not analyse the relation between costs and results (efficiency) as it would have required a different approach.

Even though the focus of the evaluation has been on results, several factors have limited the assessments of results, as explained in the following section.

1.6 Evaluability

Evaluation of the PAO cooperation poses some important methodological challenges. One is the lack of clear criteria for success. There is no single correct interpretation of the Programme objective, the quality of the project objectives varies considerably and performance indicators are usually lacking.

The second challenge is the problem of attribution, i.e. to point at causal linkages between the project and certain changes. This is a problem in most evaluations. In this case, however, the nature and small sizes of the projects and the complex environments in which they are implemented make attribution particularly difficult. If a certain change within a party is observed, it is most likely a result of numerous factors and actors. Baseline information has not been available for any of the projects studied. The envisaged causal-effect chains and assumptions made are often not explicit in project documents.

Thirdly, democratisation processes, as well as processes of change within parties, take time. Furthermore, they are not linear or irreversible. Therefore, what results are observed will largely depend on the timing of the evaluation.

A fourth challenge is the great number of projects and their diversity and geographical spread. To study them all would be unfeasible. At the same time, this diversity is an important feature of the Programme, and should therefore be reflected in the evaluation.

Finally, the degree to which the projects have been documented varies considerably. In some cases, it has been time consuming or even impossible to obtain basic documents, including from Sida. Furthermore, the information in project applications and reports has sometimes been of low quality.

All of these concerns imply considerable limitations in terms of evaluability. With respect to outcome, the Team has had to settle for *indications* and *examples* of results. The likeliness of fulfilment of higher level objectives has been assessed based on an assessment of the internal project logic and the realism of the assumptions made.

1.7 Methodology

The evaluation includes the following main components:

- An analysis of the Programme objective (Chapter 2).
- A statistical survey of all projects (Chapter 3).
- Case studies of specific projects in three countries, including assessment of effectiveness (Chapter 4) and relevance (Chapter 5). The country studies are published separately and also include analyses of the party systems in the respective countries.
- An analysis of how the Programme is managed and a discussion on how it may have affected the results (Chapter 6).

In addition, some strengths and limitations of the PAOs are discussed, which may contribute to explaining their results and give an indication of the role of PAOs in Sweden's overall democracy support (Chapter 7).

Finally, the above serves to formulate the conclusions and recommendations (Chapter 8).

1.7.1 Analysis of Programme Objectives

As indicated above, an assessment of effectiveness requires objectives that identified achievements can be compared against. For this reason, the evaluation started with an analysis of the original intentions of the Programme as well as of how its objective has been formulated and interpreted. The Team also studied the objectives and priorities of the PAOs as organisations.

Apart from reviewing policy and steering documents of the Government, Sida and the PAOs, the Team met with these organisations as well as with some representatives of the political parties. The Team also talked to persons who were involved

when the Programme came into effect in 1995. To complement the interviews, all PAOs were asked to answer some key questions in writing. A follow-up of a questionnaire used in the evaluation in 2000, regarding the priorities of the PAOs, was also undertaken.

Preliminary findings were presented and discussed at a joint meeting with all PAOs in May 2009.

1.7.2 Statistical Survey of Projects

To get an overall picture of the Programme in terms of resource use, activities, output etc., a statistical survey of the projects was carried out. The survey included all projects⁹ that were on-going during the last completed application period; i.e. 2007-2008.

A database was designed by the Team in consultation with all PAOs in order to ensure question alternatives that would adequately reflect the activities of the PAOs. The PAOs then submitted data directly into the database. In cases where the Team suspected that there had been a misunderstanding or an error, it asked the PAO for clarifications or additional information. However, the Team has not been in a position to verify the accuracy of the data furnished by the PAOs.

Data was obtained for all projects. In most cases, the provided information was found to be complete.¹⁰ Some questions asked were non-applicable in cases when projects were regional (involving several countries and partners) or the partner organisation was not a political party.

The data was analysed statistically and figures are presented in Chapter 3.

1.7.3 Case Studies

An understanding of the projects and an assessment of their results require a closer analysis of these in their specific contexts. For this purpose, the evaluation has studied the PAO cooperation in three different countries. The countries as well as the individual projects may be considered 'cases'.

Selection of cases

Given the many multiple dimensions of the Programme (Swedish organisations, countries, political contexts, approaches etc.), a statistically representative selection was not deemed feasible. Instead, the ambition has been to capture the diversity of the Programme and enhance learning by looking at different experiences in different contexts.

Due to resource constraints, the number of countries was limited to three. A set of criteria for country selection was formulated by the Team, according to which the selection was to cover projects of all PAOs and the most common working methods, including both fraternal and joint cooperation. There was also a variety of different political and geographical contexts. The selection was further limited to countries from which experiences could be openly discussed and circulated without putting the

⁹ Except 'projects' consisting only of evaluation, fact-finding etc. with no immediate beneficiaries in the partner countries.

¹⁰ For a few projects, data on some items is missing but not to an extent giving reason to suspect a systematic bias in the analysis.

safety of individuals or organisations at risk. After a preliminary analysis of activities, and consultation with the PAOs, Ukraine, Uganda and Colombia were chosen.¹¹

The three countries represent three different geographical, cultural and historical contexts. Their election and party systems also show considerable differences, Colombia being an electoral democracy with several older parties, Ukraine until recently semi-authoritarian but with a recent surge of new parties, and Uganda, still semi-authoritarian with a still rather weak and oppressed opposition. In terms of project expenditure in 2007/08, Ukraine was the second most significant partner country with five active PAOs. Uganda was the 10th with four active PAOs and Colombia 16th with three PAOs. This is more than in the average partner country, and should increase the likeliness of identifying results of the cooperation. Together, the three countries offered opportunities to observe the most common working methods and approaches of the PAOs.

In each country, all PAO projects were studied (except for a few sub-projects in Ukraine), providing a total of 14 projects. These represented approximately 10 % of the total cooperation. Each country was visited for approximately two weeks.

The use of case studies

The use of case studies has often been subject to debate. Observations and conclusions from the selection described above cannot be generalised to the Programme as a whole. However, a single project may still show the *potential* results of the PAO cooperation. If, for example, one project has contributed to improved internal democracy or increased participation of women, it has at least been demonstrated that such results are possible. Similarly, a problem observed in only one project has proven *the existence* of such a problem in the Programme, and opens for the possibility that it could be found also in other projects. Certain observed problems can also be indications of problems of a more general nature. For example, the observation of a poor project may indicate flaws in the system for quality control.

Furthermore, even though observations from cases cannot be generalised to the programme as a whole, it is believed that the experiences from the cases can add to already existing knowledge and thereby contribute to learning and enrich the debate on party cooperation.

Analysis of the party system

The country studies have consisted of two parts, political context analyses and analyses of the various PAO projects. The purpose of the context analyses has been to gain an understanding of the environment in which the projects have been conceived and implemented, as well as to get a basis for the assessment of relevance. The context analyses focus on the party system and on the features considered central for it to be considered 'well functioning'. The analyses also touch on some structural factors likely to affect the party system, such as poverty, legislation and respect for human rights. Other party support is also briefly mentioned.

¹¹ The evaluation team originally proposed Guatemala as there had been a strong PAO presence in this country, including a joint project. However, the PAO activities in Guatemala have been evaluated earlier and PAO expressed a certain evaluation fatigue in relation to this country. For this reason, the Team chose Colombia instead.

Analysis of projects

The project analyses have been based on the 'programme logic'¹² of each project. The diversity of the PAO cooperation was the principal reason for choosing this approach. While all projects are ultimately intended to contribute to a well-functioning party system and enhance democracy, they vary considerably in terms of content and approaches. It has therefore not been possible to apply a standard set of indicators. Studying the programme logic has also provided an opportunity to study *how* results have been produced and gain an understanding of how the PAOs reason when it comes to party and party system strengthening.

The first step was thus to try to establish the programme logic for each project. This was done by studying project documentation and through interviews. A problem encountered was that the logic of the project was often not very clearly formulated. In some cases, it was found to be quite weak in the first place.

Departing from the Programme logic, the Team then tried to verify to what extent the planned activities had been implemented and the expected output had been produced. The Team further tried to identify, or at least get indications of, results at the outcome level. The degree to which this was possible varied. The Team also assessed the likeliness of each project having contributed to higher level objectives by looking at the internal logic of the projects and the realism of the assumptions made.

Data collection

The Team reviewed existing project documentation, such as project applications, reports and material produced in connection with the projects (programmes, list of participants etc.).

Before the country visits, the Team met with the Swedish organisations responsible for the projects (usually project managers). In the respective countries, the Team met with representatives of the partner organisations, including the leaders of these organisations and the persons who had been responsible for the planning and implementation of project activities. The Team also met with a varying number of project participants. As these were contacted by the partner organisations, it may be assumed that they were not always representative of the cooperation participants as a group; persons who for example never complete a training event or who have left the organisation may be difficult to encounter. This was considered in the Team's assessment. In each country, the Team also met with a number of persons from NGOs, media, other parties than those supported and the academic world.

Upon returning to Sweden, a separate debriefing was held with each PAO.

The interviews with the PAOs and partner organisations were semi-structured following a checklist of questions in order to assure that all organisations were systematically asked the same questions. The contacted person's position and the nature of the activities discussed had to be considered. An opportunity to bring up issues not included in the checklist was also given.

¹² A 'programme logic' (or 'programme theory') represents an idea of how the project will ultimately contribute to the overarching programme objective. It spells out the causal linkages and underlying assumptions of a project. It does not necessarily assume simple linear cause-and-effect relationships or a number of pre-set levels as does the Logical Framework Approach (LFA).

1.7.4 Analysis of Programme Management

One factor considered to be crucial for achievement of results is how the Programme is managed. An analysis of compliance with some basic principles for Results-Based Management was therefore conducted. More specifically, the evaluation looks at how project objectives are established, how activities are geared towards the objectives, how results information is generated and how this information is used.

The analysis was based on separate interviews with all PAOs as well as with MFA, Sida and partner organisations in the three visited countries.

1.8 Evaluation Team and Participation

The SADEV evaluation team has consisted of Eva-Marie Kjellström, M.Sc.; Lennart Peck, M.Sc. (team leader); and Peter Sjöberg, M.Sc. To ensure required country and sector expertise, the country evaluation teams were reinforced with external experts: for Ukraine, Taras Kuzio, Ph.D in Political Science; for Uganda, Sabiti Makara, Ph.D in Political Science; and for Colombia, Anders Rudqvist, Ph.D in Sociology, and María Julieta Ramos, M.Sc. in Political Science. In Ukraine, translation and logistical support was provided by Mrs. Oksana Vynnychuk.

The evaluation team has had at its disposal a Reference Group for advice and quality assurance. It has comprised of Mr. Bjarte Torå, International IDEA; Mr. Jan Teorell, Ph.D. in Political Science University of Lund; and Mr. Anders Oljelund with a background in the Swedish Parliament and the MFA.

The evaluation has been carried out independently by SADEV. However, it has at the same time been dependent on, and enriched by, the participation and input of the various stakeholders in Sweden and in the visited countries. Various opportunities for feedback and joint reflection were included in the work programme in order to enhance learning and to correct possible misunderstandings at an early stage. A meeting with the participation of the PAOs, Sida and MFA was held in November 2009 to give feedback on findings and to discuss tentative conclusions. The PAOs were invited to comment on relevant parts of the country reports. They were also, together with MFA and Sida, invited to comment on a draft version of the main report. However, SADEV assumes full responsibility for the content of this final report, with which the reader may agree or disagree.

2 Objectives

This chapter analyses the Programme objectives, as well as the objectives of the PAOs and their partner organisations. The objectives of specific projects are discussed in relation to these projects.

2.1 Intentions and Assumptions

The Programme was established in the years following the fall of the Soviet Union and the apartheid regime in South Africa, opening up for political change in a number of countries. Democratisation was given increased attention in Swedish development cooperation and Swedish politicians saw a need as well as an opportunity to support young parties in new democracies. The party foundations in the U.S. and Germany, which have worked with parties for many years, served as a source of inspiration.

In 1993, a committee chaired by Mr. Hadar Cars was assigned to review how Sweden could assist in building up democratic structures through organisations linked to the political parties. In its report¹³, the committee proposed a new financing scheme where financing would be given to organisations linked to Swedish political parties so that they could assist in the build-up of stable democratic societies in the Third World and in Eastern Europe. The assistance was also granted to increase knowledge in Sweden, strengthen global links and sustain the Swedish willingness to provide development assistance. Sweden's historical experiences as well as being a relatively small and non-aligned country were said to give the country a special role. The report pointed at the experiences and knowledge of Swedish parties but also at the importance of not forcing Swedish models on other countries.

Although the guidelines and objectives of the Programme have been revised over time, the general intention has remained unchanged. In 2009, a parliamentary committee concluded that,

“A functioning party system is a precondition for the fulfilment of one of the most important functions of a representative democracy, i.e. to create channels between citizens and political decision makers. The Swedish parties can, due to their long experience and international contacts give a valuable support in the construction of democratic political systems.”¹⁴

The Programme thus rests on some fundamental assumptions. One is that democracy requires well-functioning parties. There is a fairly broad consensus regarding this.¹⁵ There is, however, also an intensive debate about the role of parties and whether traditional western-style parties are suitable models for other countries.

¹³ Report by The Committee on Extended Contributions towards Democratic Construction (Ds 1994:63).

¹⁴ Betänkande 2008/09:UU6 Freedom from Oppression – Sweden's Democracy Assistance.

¹⁵ See e.g. Carothers (Confronting the Weakest Link, page 10) and International IDEA.

Another assumption is that the Swedish experiences and contacts are relevant for partner organisations, and that the PAOs have the capacity to draw on these for an effective cooperation.

Finally, the Programme is based on the conviction that support to democracy and better functioning party systems will contribute to the improved living conditions of poor people, i.e. the overarching objective of Swedish development cooperation.

It has sometimes also been argued that there are additional agendas behind the PAO cooperation, i.e. to further the political agendas of the Swedish parties and to use it as a tool in Swedish foreign policy.¹⁶

2.2 Official Programme Objective

The PAO cooperation is currently financed via the budget for the so-called Global Programmes. As such, it shall contribute to fulfil the objectives for international development cooperation (i.e. to create conditions that will enable poor people to improve their lives) and reform cooperation in Eastern Europe (i.e. strengthened democracy, equitable and sustainable development and closer ties to the European Union).¹⁷

The official Programme objective has been reformulated several times since the establishment of the PAO cooperation, as shown below. Initially, it talked rather vaguely about building up stable democratic societies. In 1998, the notion of ‘party system’ was introduced. In 2001, the somewhat vaguer *‘partiväsende’* was used and it was added that the purpose of strengthening the party system was to promote ‘representative democratic governance’. In 2006, a number of new aspects were incorporated into the objectives, e.g. political participation, human rights, internal democracy and channels between the citizens and political decision-makers.

¹⁶ As expressed by e.g. VIF.

¹⁷ Strategi för globala utvecklingsinsatser 2008-2010, Regeringsbeslut III:6, UD2007/47594/USTYR.

Objective of the PAO Cooperation

(Ds 1994:63) ‘The aim is to assist in the build-up of stable democratic societies in the Third World and in Eastern Europe. (...) This assistance should promote popular involvement in political parties and groups closely associated with them, which have the will and the capability to develop political alternatives and to seek democratic mandates.’

1995-1998: ‘...to assist the build-up of stable democratic societies in developing countries and countries in Eastern and Central Europe.’

1998-2001: ‘...to assist the build-up of a well functioning and pluralistic party system and democratic societies in developing countries and countries in Eastern and Central Europe.’

2001-2006: ‘...to assist the development of a well functioning party system (“partiväsende”) in developing countries and countries in Central and Eastern Europe with the purpose of promoting a representative democratic governance in these countries.’

2006- : ‘... to contribute to and assist in the development of a well-functioning party system (“partiväsende”), political participation, and democratic political systems, promote respect for human rights, the equal value of all people, as well as building up channels between the citizens and political decision-makers in developing countries and countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The purpose shall foster representative governance in these countries that reflects the will of the people. The measures should support activities aimed at making political parties more democratic in their internal organisation and in their policies.’

The current Programme objective was established by the Government in 2006 in consultation with the PAOs and Sida. In addition to this objective, the Programme Guidelines spell out the general orientation of the cooperation. The projects shall depart from national priorities and ownership. Capacity development and development of organisations and institutions shall be emphasised, mainly through exchange and training. Projects promoting political participation of women, youth and first-time voters are assigned special importance, as are projects to strengthen the party organisation at the local level and projects which promote contacts with citizens and civil society. Although projects are to be time bound, the cooperation shall be long term.

The current Programme objective gives room for various interpretations and does not make quite clear what are means and ends. Seen in its widest sense, the PAO cooperation could in principle consist of anything that promotes democracy and human rights. If, on the other hand, the idea is that PAOs should contribute to *all* of what is included in the objective, then the objective becomes very demanding.

Since 1998, the Programme objective has included that the cooperation shall contribute to ‘a well-functioning party system’. Exactly what this is has been left open for interpretation.

It is neither an objective nor contrary to the Programme Guidelines to promote specific ideologies, political agendas or parties.

The aims of increasing knowledge in Sweden, strengthening the international links of the Swedish parties and sustaining the willingness of Swedish citizens to give development assistance were expressed in the original proposal but are not reflected in the Programme objective.¹⁸ As will be seen below, the PAOs still consider increasing knowledge in Sweden and strengthening international links of parties to be important.

2.3 Interpretations of the Programme Objective

The Programme objective has been interpreted somewhat differently among the different PAOs. When asked what they see as most central in the project objective, they gave the following answers (summarised by the Team):

What do the PAO see as the most central in the programme objective?

- CIS: To strengthen the internal democracy and organisation of political parties and other partner organisations so that these in turn can strengthen democracy more effectively. This includes enabling women, youth and first-time voters to participate in politics.
- GF: To promote respect for human rights and the environment through practical political work internally and externally.
- JHS: To build up a well-functioning party system, which is only possible through well-functioning democratic parties.
- KIC: To contribute to and assist the development of a well-functioning party system, political participation and democratic political systems. Then the other components of the Programme objective will follow.
- Palme Center: To enhance popular participation and organising individuals for collective solutions to shared problems, and in this way contribute to a well-functioning party system.
- Silc: To strengthen democracy by giving people in partner countries a possibility to participate actively in political life.
- VIF: It is difficult to make a semantic interpretation of the objective. It is possibly more interesting to know whether there are other objectives than those explicitly stated.

¹⁸ A strategic objective of Global Programmes is, however, ‘feedback of experiences from the global development cooperation to actors in Sweden and partner countries for long term and sustainable poverty reduction’.

As seen above, the PAOs tend to highlight somewhat different things. The Palme Center stresses popular participation, following a tradition of the Swedish labour movement. JHS stresses the importance of well-functioning political parties, which it sees as essential for a well-functioning party system. Silc, to a great extent working in totalitarian states, talks about the very possibility for citizens to participate in political life. GF chooses to include the environment in its interpretation of the Programme objective. The answers of CIS and KIC are quite close to the formal Programme objective. VIF, being fundamentally critical of the PAO cooperation, questions the objective as such.¹⁹

Some differences between how the PAOs conceive ‘democracy’ may also be noted. VIF and GF tend to emphasise participatory democracy as opposed to representative democracy. This could have implications for the type of activities that the PAOs support.

The Team found that not very much thought has been given to the fundamental question of what constitutes a ‘well-functioning party system’, possibly because it has been considered to be obvious. Nevertheless, when asked about it, the answers given varied considerably. There are also different understandings of what constitutes a party system (*partiväsende*) in the first place.

Below is a summary of different criteria suggested by one or several representatives of the PAOs and political parties.

¹⁹ VIF voted against it in 1995 and recently presented a bill to the Swedish Parliament to discontinue the PAO cooperation (Motion till riksdagen, 2008/09:U5 av Hans Linde m.fl.)

Suggested Criteria for a 'Well Functioning Party System'

Parties as Organisations:

- Have broad member bases and active membership participation.
- Are internally democratic (regular congresses, possibilities to vote for leaders etc.).
- Have the capacity to make an analysis of needs in society.
- Are based on ideology and policy (as opposed to on individuals).
- Have well-formulated party programmes.
- Offer equal opportunities for all, irrespective of sex, age, ethnicity etc. to reach higher positions within the party.
- Have a transparent leadership.
- Have internal systems for accountability.
- Are not corrupt.
- Have a functional organisational structure.
- Are integrated into international and regional party groupings.
- Have capacity to communicate and campaign.
- Respect democracy and human rights.

Parties in the Citizenry

- Several parties compete for the votes of the citizens.
- There is a suitable number of parties, not too few and not too many.
- Parties are rooted in the citizenry and constitute a bridge between citizens and decision makers.
- Parties offer a variety of ideologies and programmes.
- There are parties to represent all groups and interests in society.
- The parties can stand in an election on equal terms.
- Parties respect their political opponents, democratic principles and election results.
- There is substantial political debate between the parties.
- There is a dialogue between parties and citizens.
- Parties contribute to an increased citizen interest in political issues.
- Parties are scrutinised by citizens and media.
- Parties have links to civil society.

Parties in Government

- Elected party representatives have competence to function in assemblies and government.
- The parties respect each other and the democratic principles in government.
- Parties have capacity to deliver on their promises.

In addition, the answers include what can be considered *preconditions* for a well-functioning party system as defined here. These include freedom of speech and of association, free and independent media, an adequate party legislation, functioning election authorities, free and fair elections, rule of law, a functioning judiciary, a democratic culture, well-informed citizens, that all citizens can participate in the political process on equal terms (including economic) and respect for human rights in society.

Some respondents see the definition of a well-functioning party system as contextual. Some mention that what is 'well functioning' may depend on whose perspective is taken.

The review does not show whether some criteria are considered more important than others. However, the PAOs frequently stressed the importance of several parties in order to offer voters a choice, and of parties being ideology based and internally democratic (as opposed to person-based parties). Certain differences in answers may be noted among the different PAOs. For example, JHS emphasised competition among parties and VIF stated that competition should be on equal economic terms. Yet, the picture that emerges when considering all the suggested criteria is, on the whole, rather consistent. There are no immediate contradictions among the suggested criteria.

Not very surprising, the indicators suggested by the PAOs largely reflect what Swedish parties themselves have been striving for in Sweden.

The suggested criteria also correspond quite well with what is found in the literature. Some criteria found there but *not* mentioned by the PAOs or the Swedish parties include parties being independent and internally united and adhering to certain party ethics. Others are stability in the party system (but not to the point where it prevents entry of new parties), that citizens have confidence in the political parties, that there are collaborative exchanges and dialogue with civil society, that political parties dominate in all representative organs, that they act as unitary actors in representative organs (limited floor-crossing) and that there is party linkage to the executive power. It is difficult to say whether it is a coincidence that these factors were not mentioned by the PAOs or to what extent it reflects that they are not considered to be important criteria.

Looking at the list of issues that potentially could be addressed to promote a well-functioning party system, it can be seen that the PAOs have ample room for action. The PAO evaluation carried out in 2000 noted that the broad objective could be a contributing factor to the dispersion of activities. This observation is still valid.

2.4 Objectives of the PAOs

PAOs are not merely channels of Swedish government-funded cooperation but autonomous organisations in their own right. Some of them see themselves as development organisations while others as party organisations engaged in international cooperation. However, there is a political influence in all PAOs through their statutes, which define basic values; through their board members, who usually come from the party and/or are appointed by the party; through persons with a party background working within the PAO; through informal connections between the PAO and the party; as well as through formal consultations between the two.

2.4.1 Objectives as Organisations

All PAOs have their own organisational purposes, as shown by the following excerpts of their statutes²⁰:

Organisational Purposes of PAO	
CIS	CIS shall stimulate the debate on international issues in Sweden, contribute to economic and democratic development in countries with such needs, develop the contacts of the Centre Party movement as well as contribute to international sustainable development.
KIC	The purpose of KIC is to promote democracy, well-functioning party systems as a means of achieving good governance, human rights, social development, international and Swedish understanding, as well as knowledge about globalisation, democratisation and security building in Sweden. This shall be done through international cooperation with like-minded partners and partners working to strengthen KIC's overall objective, and through projects, information and fundraising activities in Sweden and abroad.
Palme Center	The Olof Palme International Center works in the spirit of Olof Palme for democracy, human rights and peace. The Center is a body for cooperation on international issues for the Swedish labour movement. Its task is to support the international activities of its member organisations.
GF	The Purpose of the Green Forum is to act (...) for long-term sustainable democratic societies that live and function within the framework of nature. In these societies, knowledge about, as well as a sense for the ecological connections, provide the basis for decisions and people living in peaceful and equal collaboration.
VIF	VIF works primarily with projects with the objectives to promote a participatory democracy, strengthen the position and participation of women, promote ecologically and socially sustainable development and increase the respect for democratic human rights and freedoms.
Silc	The purpose of the Foundation is to strengthen processes of democratisation and increase the respect for human rights through development cooperation, as well as to advocate nationally and internationally in the areas of aid, peace, disarmament and global security.
JHS	The objective of the Foundation is to support global development in the direction of freedom, democracy and market economy, and to promote European integration for peace and cooperation.

The objectives expressed in the statutes of the PAOs are largely similar to, or at least consistent with, the Programme objective. At the same time, they go beyond the Programme objective and speak about, for example, economic development, ecology, market economy, disarmament and global security.

The objectives of the PAOs also reflect different ideological positions. Being affiliated with different political parties, the PAOs are also carriers of certain values and

²⁰ Evaluators' own translation. The excerpts generally refer to the organisational purpose (*ändamål*) of the organisations. In addition to this, PAO have further objectives, vision statements etc.

political agendas. As explained by one interviewed PAO, ‘Everything we do reflects our ideology’. Consequently, the PAOs generally aim at strengthening like-minded parties and organisations, or at least parties that do not promote opposing ideologies or values. The cooperation is in this respect partisan.

An ambition expressed by the PAOs is to promote debate and learning in Sweden. Although only mentioned explicitly in the statutes of some PAOs, interviews indicate that this is something important for all PAOs.²¹ Another objective expressed is to develop the international contacts of the respective Swedish parties. The PAO cooperation thus becomes part of the Swedish parties’ international networking activities.²²

None of the above objectives necessarily contradict the Programme objective, yet there are *potential* conflicts of interests between the Programme objective and the PAOs’ own objectives. For example, a Swedish PAO may (for ideological or tactical reasons) be tempted to support a certain party irrespective of how strategic this is in terms of strengthening the party system.

2.4.2 Strategic Objectives and Priorities

With respect to strengthening of democracy, the PAOs have different strategic objectives. By far the most common one is to strengthen the capacity of an established party. The PAOs stress the importance of strong and well-functioning political actors. It is also argued that well-functioning parties in the long run will form well-functioning party systems.²³

Party strengthening usually aims at enhancing the skills and knowledge of persons within the partner organisations. It also aims at strengthening parties ideologically, so that they will articulate policies and present ideologically driven candidates. Consequently, the cooperation is intentionally ideological and party political. Furthermore, the PAOs try to facilitate international contacts of the partner organisations through conferences and networking activities.

A PAO may sometimes also strive to promote the establishment of a new party, considered by the PAO to be missing in the party system. The PAOs may also do this because they do not consider working with the established parties to be worthwhile. The PAOs may also support parties on the grounds that their existence is threatened.

To a varying degree, and depending on the national context, the PAOs actively support parties considered to be more democratic than others in order to facilitate a shift of the balance of political power. This is most evident in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states where it takes the form of support to opposition parties.

Some PAO activities aim at building more constructive intra-party relations. It may be about forming of coalitions or promoting respect between adversary parties. The PAOs also work for greater political participation of women and youth in parties and in society. Another strategic objective is to increase knowledge and interest in Sweden in relation to international democracy issues.

²¹ The PAOs may use a maximum of 8 per cent of the financing for information in Sweden. However, learning in Sweden is not an explicit Programme objective.

²² Referring to European party cooperation in general, Thomas Carothers notes that it is not uncommon that parties use their international outreach work to develop useful contacts and nurture channels of influence and friendship with foreign political actors (Carothers, 2006, p. 144).

²³ An assumption that has been subject to discussion (see the evaluations of 2000 and 2004).

Priorities of PAOs

In the evaluation in 2000, the PAOs were asked how they prioritise certain objectives by ranking them on a 1-7 scale where 7 represented highest priority. The exercise was repeated in the present evaluation to see if there had been any changes over time. The figures should be read with great caution as i) the questionnaire was answered by different persons in 2000 and 2009, ii) the respondents may have interpreted the questions differently and iii) the alternatives formulated by the evaluators in 2000 may not be fully adequate today. However, the figures can still serve to give some very general indications.

No major changes were noted compared to in 2000. Highest priority is reported to be participation of women in politics, followed by creating stable party organisations and contributing to well-functioning party systems. It is of interest to note that the PAOs consider the latter two as equally important. Participation of youth in politics is also given high priority. Information to the Swedish public and contributing to international contacts of the respective Swedish parties are also considered quite important; in fact even somewhat more important than contributing to international networks of the partner organisation. Contributing to electoral victories of the partner organisation is seen as neither very important nor unimportant. The importance given to spreading the ideology and values of the respective Swedish parties was reported to have decreased since 2000.

Prioritisation of Objectives 2009	2009	2000	Ranking in 2000
1 Participation of women in politics.	6.6	6.7	2
2 To create stable party organisations.	6.1	6.7	3
3 Pluralistic and well-functioning party systems.	6.1	7.0	1
4 Participation of youth in politics.	6.0	6.6	4
5 Broad membership base of the partner organisation.	5.6	6.0	6
6 Create parties that through their programmes take responsibility for their respective countries' future.	5.6	5.3	9
7 Contribute to the international contacts of the Swedish party.	5.4	5.1	10
8 Information to the Swedish public.	5.4	4.7	11
9 Contribute to development of international networks of the partner organisation.	5.0	6.3	5
10 Strengthen the ties of the parties to independent social organisations.	4.4	4.1	14
11 Enable a differentiated financing.	4.0	3.5	15
12 Strengthen the ties between Sweden and the partner country.	4.0	4.3	13
13 Candidates to public offices.	3.9	5.7	7
14 Contribute to electoral victories of the partner organisation.	3.9	4.6	12
15 To spread the ideology and values of the Swedish party.	2.7	5.4	8

2.4.3 The PAOs' Opinions about the Programme Objective

The PAOs have no major objections to the current Programme objective. An interpretation of this could be that the objective corresponds well with, or at least gives sufficient room for, their own agendas. When asked about how they would have liked the Programme objective formulated, the PAOs gave the following suggestions:

Suggested changes to the Programme objective

- The last sentence in the current Programme objective is important and at the same time strange. It is self-evident that internal democracy is something PAO will work with.
- The objective should be formulated in a way that gives a reasonable limitation without preventing PAOs from designing their activities based on own experiences and choosing methods that they find relevant.
- The objective should mention poverty reduction; parties' responsiveness to (poor) voters, of whom the majority are women; and the necessity of democracy support for poverty reduction.
- The objective should highlight good governance.
- The objective should include active exchange of political experiences and development of tools for participatory democracy and the environment, which shall inspire and stimulate the project owners to dare and have the energy to deal with their situation.
- The objective should put greater emphasis on development of parties, ideologically, organisationally and politically.
- The objective should highlight possibilities for cross-party cooperation in areas that are not specifically ideological.
- The objective should include the importance of the cooperation for knowledge and international perspectives in Sweden, and the building of contacts.
- The notion of 'party system' (*partiväsende*) needs to be clarified.

2.5 Partner Objectives

The partner organisations of the PAOs are too many and too diverse for generalisations to be made regarding their objectives. It is however useful to recall that most of them are political parties. As such, they pursue different political agendas and compete with other parties for political power.

Several of the organisations contacted by the Team were strongly dedicated to strengthening democracy. Still, for obvious reasons, they did not see themselves as agents of a Swedish democracy programme but as political actors in their own right. They were generally unaware of the Swedish Programme objective, and participated in the cooperation because of the benefits it brings to their respective organisations (capacity development, contacts, strengthened finance etc.).

3 Overview of Projects

This chapter provides an overview of the PAO-implemented projects that were in effect during 2007/08. It is limited to projects for which there has been a direct target group in partner countries. ‘Projects’ consisting of fact-finding missions, evaluations, methods development in Sweden etc. are thus not included.


In most cases, a ‘project’ refers to the cooperation of one PAO in one country. However, there are also regional projects covering several countries and projects implemented jointly by several PAOs. For this particular review, the PAOs were requested to divide a project into sub-projects if it included activities in several countries or several partner organisations without any direct linkage. A total of 157 projects/sub-projects were reported.

The quantitative descriptions are based on project expenditure in Swedish crowns (SEK) unless stated otherwise. The reason for this is that the projects vary considerably in size.

3.1 Budget and Expenditures

Since the establishment of the PAO cooperation in July 1995, the yearly budget has increased from approximately SEK 10 million to SEK 75 million. Table 3.1 shows that there were considerable increases in 2002, 2006 and 2007.

Table 3.1 Annual Programme Budget 2001-2010 in MSEK



Source: Compilations by SPM Consultants and Government Decisions

Since 2007, each PAO receives SEK 170 000 per mandate in the Swedish Parliament. In addition, each PAO has a core support of SEK 650 000. A maximum of 8 % may be used for information activities. A maximum of 8 % may (and a minimum of SEK 650 000 must) be used for administrative support, i.e. the same percentage as

for the funding of Swedish civil society organisations. For the period 2007/08, there was also a special budget for joint projects amounting to SEK 11 million.²⁴

The application cycles for PAOs are 2 years. Table 3.2 shows the budget allocation, project expenditure and the number of projects (as defined above) for each PAO, for the period 2007/08.

Table 3.2 Budget, expenditures and number of projects per organisation for the period 2007/08

PAO	Budget (MSEK)	Percent of total budget	Project expenditure (MSEK)	Percent of total expenditure	Number of projects	Percent of total projects
Palme Center	45.5	30 %	26.0	27 %	61	39 %
JHS	34.3	23 %	17.5	18 %	22	14 %
CIS	11.2	7 %	8.9	9 %	14	9 %
Silc	10.8	7 %	8.5	9 %	10	6 %
KIC	9.5	6 %	4.9	5 %	8	5 %
VIF	8.8	6 %	6.5	7 %	16	10 %
GF	7.8	5 %	7.5	8 %	17	11 %
Joint projects	22.0	16 %	15.4	16 %	9	6 %
Total	149.8	100 %	95.1	100 %	157	100 %

Sources: Budget: Government decision 27 July 2006; Project expenditure and number of projects: Evaluation project data base.

Out of the total project budget of SEK 150 million, SEK 95 million or approximately two-thirds thus represented project expenditure (including direct project administration). The remaining part was used for general administration, information in Sweden, evaluation, methods development, fact finding etc. In relative terms, GF, CIS, Silc and VIF used a higher, and JHS, Palme Center and KIC a lower, share of their budgets for project expenditure. Table 3.2 also indicates that, in 2007/08, the average project size varied among the PAOs.

The average yearly project budget (as projects were presented to Sida) was slightly below SEK 200 000 in 2004 and slightly below SEK 500 000 in 2007/08.²⁵ This increase primarily reflects a shift of JHS to working with larger, regional projects.

²⁴ For the period 2009/10, it was decided to reallocate this budget to PAOs according to parliamentary mandates. The PAOs in turn should use a minimum of 5 % of their budgets for joint projects, equivalent to SEK 3.5 million (as compared to earlier SEK 11 million). The amount used for joint PAO projects in 2009/10 will according to Sida reach approximately 6.7 %. This was still a considerable decrease in joint activity in absolute terms.

²⁵ Source: SPM reports for year 2004 and 2007/08.

Table 3.3 Average expenditure per project per PAO for the two-year period 2007/08

PAO	Average two-year expenditure per project (SEK)
Silc	845 333
JHS	794 795
CIS	632 521
KIC	614 657
GF	437 678
Palme Center	427 093
VIF	405 165
Joint projects	1 709 228

Table 3.3 shows the average *two-year* expenditure per project per organisation in 2007/08, as projects were reported *for this review*. It shows an average project budget of SEK 605 000 for the two-year period but considerable variations among the PAOs. Silc and JHS had on average the highest per-project expenditures, and VIF, the Palme Center and GF the lowest. Without the division of projects requested for this review, JHS would have had the highest per-project expenditures, since many of its projects were regional.

In most cases, a project is managed by the PAO itself, but in some cases projects are managed by local party districts, youth and women's organisations affiliated with the party etc. In the studied period, 25 % of the cooperation was managed at a 'decentralised' level. However, there are big differences among the PAOs: 50 % of the cooperation of CIS and 62 % of the cooperation of the Palme Center was 'decentralised', while JHS and GF had no such projects.

3.2 Countries and Contexts

Table 3.4 shows the number of projects and project expenditure per region. In terms of project expenditure, 51 % of the cooperation was with Eastern and Central Europe,²⁶ 18 % with Africa, 13 % with Latin America, 9 % with Asia and 6 % with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Table 3.4 Number of projects and project expenditures per region 2007/08

Region	Number of projects per region	Percent	Project expenditures per region (SEK)	Percent
Eastern and Central Europe	75	48 %	48 339 123	51 %
Africa	28	18 %	16 644 295	18 %
Latin America	22	14 %	12 159 059	13 %
Asia	16	10 %	8 927 592	9 %
MENA	8	5 %	5 596 311	6 %
Several regions	8	5 %	3 403 887	4 %
Total	157	100 %	95 070 267	100 %

²⁶ Which may be compared with 60 % in the late 1990s, according to the evaluation carried out in 2000.

There were, however, considerable differences among the PAOs as seen in Table 3.5 below. For example, approximately three-fourths of the project expenditures of JHS related to projects in Eastern and Central Europe. CIS had relatively more cooperation in Africa. One-third of VIF's expenditure was for cooperation with Latin America. Two-thirds of the total project expenditure for joint projects related to activities in Eastern and Central Europe.

Table 3.5 Relative share of project expenditures per region, per PAO

Region	CIS %	GF %	JHS %	KIC %	Palme Center %	Silc %	VIF %	Joint projects %
Eastern and Central Europe	14	51	71	60	44	61	19	65
Africa	43	27	8	30	15	3	0	25
Latin America	0	11	21	10	13	22	31	0
Asia	41	0	0	0	16	0	14	1
MENA	0	0	0.2	0	12	0	17	9
Projects covering several regions	2	11	0	0	0	14	19	0

In the studied period, the PAOs have had bilateral projects in 39 countries and regional projects that included another 37 countries, making the total number of partner countries 76. In 2003, the PAOs worked (bilaterally) in 43 countries, indicating a slight decrease despite a considerably higher budget.²⁷ This decrease primarily relates to countries in Europe, which fell in number from 19 to 14. However, the number of regional projects covering several countries increased.

The number of countries that the PAO worked with bilaterally in 2007/08 and 2004 (in parentheses) were: CIS: 7 (14), GF: 7 (6), JHS: 5 (12), KIC: 6 (7), Palme Center: 21 (18), Silc: 8 (10), VIF: 12 (11). It can be seen that JHS and CIS decreased the number of countries substantially while the others remained at the 2004 level.

Table 3.6 lists the countries with which there was cooperation on a bilateral basis. Twenty-nine percent of the PAOs' project expenditures related to regional projects covering several countries. These are not reflected in the table, but involved Angola, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia (Ache), Kosovo, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mozambique, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

²⁷ SPM Consultants, yearly compilations.

Table 3.6 Number of projects and expenditures per country

Country	Number of projects	Expenditure (SEK)	Percent
Country A (confidential)	11	13 971 578	14.7 %
Ukraine	9	6 117 711	6.4 %
Russia	9	4 039 855	4.2 %
Iraq	4	3 848 733	4.0 %
Palestine	3	3 662 038	3.9 %
Serbia	8	3 650 266	3.8 %
South Africa	6	3 417 193	3.6 %
Bosnia & Herzegovina	7	3 301 116	3.5 %
Philippines	5	2 731 410	2.9 %
Uganda	1	2 711 772	2.9 %
Country B (confidential)	3	2 391 073	2.5 %
Turkey	4	2 079 978	2.2 %
Moldova	4	1 572 760	1.7 %
Burkina Faso	3	1 539 663	1.6 %
Brazil	4	1 350 000	1.4 %
Colombia	3	1 156 835	1.2 %
Guatemala	2	983 925	1.0 %
Chile	2	950 220	1.0 %
Western Sahara	1	772 346	0.8 %
Macedonia	1	709 664	0.7 %
Benin	2	638 651	0.7 %
Nepal	2	636 563	0.7 %
Namibia	2	604 536	0.6 %
Kenya	1	572 000	0.6 %
Burma	2	554 683	0.6 %
Armenia	1	524 000	0.6 %
Tunisia	1	402 724	0.4 %
El Salvador	1	399 000	0.4 %
Mongolia	1	394 355	0.4 %
Croatia	1	379 303	0.4 %
Bolivia	1	356 078	0.4 %
DR Congo	1	325 000	0.3 %
Country C (confidential)	1	296 092	0.3 %
Albania	1	243 421	0.3 %
Somaliland	1	225 586	0.2 %
Vietnam	1	131 992	0.1 %
Singapore	1	125 016	0.1 %
Cambodia	1	114 586	0.1 %

There is usually only one or a few PAOs working in one and the same country. More exactly, there was only one PAO working in 22 of the 39 countries reported in the review, two in 9 of the countries and three in 5 of the countries. There were four or more PAOs working in only 3 of the countries.

All of the partner countries (for bilateral projects) were included on OECD/DAC's list of Official Development Assistance (ODA) receivers, except Burma, Russia and Singapore.

An indication of the characteristics of the partner countries can be obtained by relating them to the Freedom House ratings, which consider political rights and civil liberties.²⁸ Table 3.7 below shows the expenditures per country categories according to the Freedom House ratings 'free' (1.0-2.5), 'partly free' (3.0-4.5) and 'not free' (5.0-7.0). Nineteen percent of the project expenditures were spent on cooperation with countries classified as free, some of them representing fairly stable democracies such as Chile but also including more problematic countries like Ukraine and Serbia. Twenty-one percent went to countries rated as partly free, ranging from countries like Colombia and Turkey at the upper end to Singapore and Uganda at the lower end. Thirty-two percent of the cooperation expenditure concerned countries classified as not free, ranging from countries like Russia and Cambodia to Burma. The remaining part, twenty-nine percent, related to regional projects involving several countries and 1 % (two countries) to countries not rated by Freedom House due to being considered 'non-recognised states'.

Table 3.7 Project expenditure per country categories according to Freedom House ratings

Combined average Freedom House ratings	Expenditure (SEK)	Percent
1.0 (free)	950 220	1 %
2.0 (free)	6 884 038	7 %
2.5 (free)	10 166 977	11 %
3.0 (partly free)	4 545 976	5 %
3.5 (partly free)	9 161 211	10 %
4.0 (partly free)	1 539 663	2 %
4.5 (partly free)	3 997 351	4 %
5.5 (not free)	8 141 479	9 %
6.0 (not free)	4 383 449	5 %
6.5 (not free)	14 267 670	15 %
7.0 (not free)	2 945 756	3 %
Not applicable	997 932	1 %
Several countries	27 088 545	29 %
Total	95 070 267	100 %

The Human Development Index (HDI)²⁹, which indicates a country's level of 'human development' on a scale from 0 to 1 where 1 implies a high level, is another useful indicator of partner country characteristics. As Table 3.8 shows, the PAOs worked

²⁸ <http://www.freedomhouse.org>

²⁹ As reflected by life expectancy, literacy and standard of living.

mainly with countries with a rather high HDI. Thirty-six percent of expenditures were spent on cooperation with countries with an HDI from 0.8 to 0.899, such as Chile and Turkey. Only 12 % went to countries with an HDI below 0.7, i.e. lower middle income countries such as Namibia and down to the least developed countries like Burkina Faso and DRC Congo. Only 2 % of the project expenditures went to countries in the HDI interval 0.3-0.399.

Table 3.8 Project expenditures per country categories according to the Human Development Index

Human Development Index		Expenditure (SEK)	Percent
0.3 - 0.399	Low HD	1 864 663	2.0 %
0.4 – 0.499		638 651	0.7 %
0.5 – 0.599	Medium HD	4 589 604	4.8 %
0.6 – 0.699		4 021 729	4.2 %
0.7 – 0.799		17 275 993	18.2 %
0.8 – 0.899	High HD	34 323 309	36.1 %
0.9 – 0.999	Very high HD	125 016	0.1 %
Not applicable, several countries		27 088 545	28.5 %
No index available		5 142 757	5.4 %
Total		95 070 267	100.0 %

Eighty-five percent of the expenditures³⁰ went to countries for which there was a Swedish cooperation strategy in 2007/08, reflecting that these were countries with which Sweden has had some form of regular cooperation.

During the period 2007/08, the Swedish Government introduced a concentration of Swedish cooperation to fewer countries and divided them into six categories. Table 3.9 shows the PAO cooperation in relation to this classification. In terms of proportion of total expenditures, 18 % went to cooperation with category 3 countries (Reform Cooperation in Eastern Europe)³¹ and category 4 countries (Alternative Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights) which are significantly larger shares than for any other category. Only a small share was spent on cooperation with countries in the category long-term development. Part of the total cooperation expenditure involved countries not even included in the classification.

³⁰ Excluding projects covering several countries, corresponding to 29 % of project expenditures.

³¹ The support to Eastern and Central Europe as a region was seen to be considerably larger. The reason for this is that a substantial share of the cooperation to this region is directed to category 2, 4 and 6 countries, as well as to some countries not classified.

Table 3.9 Expenditure in relation to country categories

Country category	Expenditure (SEK)	Percent
1: Long-term development cooperation	5 294 099	6 %
2: Conflict/Post-conflict situations	9 976 531	11 %
3: Reform cooperation in Eastern Europe	17 466 504	18 %
4: Alternative Promotion of Democracy and HR	17 213 426	18 %
5: Selective cooperation	4 153 721	4 %
6: Countries for out-phasing	4 434 210	5 %
Countries not classified	9 952 826	10 %
Not applicable - Several countries	26 578 950	28 %
Total	95 070 267	100 %

Table 3.10 shows how long each PAO had been active in the partner countries that they still cooperated with in 2007/08. There is a considerable spread in terms of when the different cooperations commenced. In seven cases, the PAOs had been active in a partner country for 14 years or more. At the same time, ten partner countries were new (for that organisation) for the period 2007/08.

Table 3.10 Year cooperation was initiated with a partner country

Year cooperation started	CIS	GF	JHS	KIC	Palme Center	Silc	VIF	Total
	No. of countries	No. of countries	No. of countries	No. of countries	No. of countries	No. of countries	No. of countries	
2008	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
2007	1	0	0	3	0	0	3	7
2006	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2
2005	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	3
2004	1	2	0	1	0	1	1	6
2003	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	5
2002	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	3
2001	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	3
2000	0	0	2	0	3	1	3	9
1999	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
1998	2	0	1	0	0	4	0	7
1997	0	1	1	0	3	2	0	7
1996	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
1995	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994 -	2	0	0	0	4	0	1	7
Missing	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Total	7	7	5	7	21	8	12	67

3.3 Partner Organisations

Table 3.11 shows the different categories of the PAOs' *principal* partner organisations and how the project expenditure was divided by category. The most common partner was a political party, either at the central (37 %) or local (15 %) level. Twenty percent of the expenditure was spent on cooperation with party affiliated organisations including youth organisations (9 %) and women's organisations (2 %). Twenty-nine percent of the project expenditure related to cooperation with other organisations, including civil society organisations, party foundations and regional party organisations, which in turn may work with political parties.

Table 3.11 Expenditure divided by category of partner organisation

Category of partner organisation	Expenditure (SEK)	Percent
Political party at central level	34 766 977	37 %
Political party at local level	14 170 378	15 %
Party affiliated women's organisation	2 094 456	2 %
Party affiliated youth organisation	8 724 894	9 %
Other party affiliated organisation	8 108 647	9 %
Other	27 016 463	29 %
Missing	188 452	0,2 %
Total	94 774 175	100 %

JHS, VIF and the Palme Center are the most frequently represented PAOs among those that worked with political parties at the central level. The Palme Center and Silc are overrepresented in terms of cooperation with political parties at the local level, and the projects of CIS, GF, KIC, as well as joint projects, are seen more often than projects of other PAOs in the list of cooperations with 'other' party organisations.

To the extent that the principal partner organisation was a political party, 68 % of the cooperation (in financial terms) was with parties represented in the respective national parliaments and 82 % of the cooperation was with parties represented in local assemblies.³²

Some of the cooperation was with parties that were neither represented in national parliament nor in local assemblies, either because they were too small or because this was impossible due to the political situation.

Among the partner organisations, there were 31 political parties with parliamentary representation. Table 3.12 shows the voter support given to these parties in the most recent parliamentary election. Fourteen parties had 5 % or less of the voters' support and seven had less than 1 %. There was also cooperation with a few political parties with a very high representation in parliament (such as the African National Congress and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party).

³² A party is often represented in both.

Table 3.12 Number of political parties represented in a national parliament, their level of representation and percent of expenditures spent on parties at the different levels of representation

Party representation % in national parliament	Number of parties	Percent of expenditures for projects with these parties
0-5	14	38 %
5.1 -10	3	5 %
10.1 – 20	5	27 %
20.1 – 30	3	2 %
30.1 – 40	1	2 %
40.1 – 50	2	15 %
>50	3	11 %
Total number of parties	31	100 %

Table 3.13 shows when the PAOs started to work with the partner organisations they had in 2008. Of the 101 ‘partnerships’ in 2007/08, slightly over half were initiated in 2005 or later, and 13 were started before 2000. Comparing with the table, which shows how long the PAOs had worked in each country (3.10), the figures indicate that the PAOs often had worked longer in a partner country than with their current (in 2008) partner organisations.

Table 3.13 Year when cooperation started with current (in 2008) partner organisations

Start of cooperation	CIS	GF	JHS	KIC	Palme Center	Silc	VIF	Total
	No. of org	No. of org	No. of org	No. of org	No. of org	No. of org	No. of org	
2008	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	9
2007	6	0	0	3	7	0	3	19
2006	1	1	1	2	3	2	0	10
2005	2	2	1	1	8	1	1	16
2004	0	3	0	0	3	2	1	9
2003	0	1	0	0	3	1	2	7
2002	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	5
2001	0	0	2	0	4	1	0	7
2000	0	1	0	0	2	0	3	6
1999	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
1998	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
1997	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	4
1996	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
1994	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Missing	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	3
Total	10	9	5	7	48	10	12	101

3.4 Collaboration

The most common form of cooperation is between one PAO and one partner organisation, sometimes referred to as fraternal cooperation. However, there are also various forms of joint approaches.

As shown in Table 3.2, SEK 22 million of the 2007/08 PAO budget was earmarked for joint PAO projects. The following projects of this type were implemented during the period:

Table 3.14 Joint projects implemented in 2007/08

PAO ('lead')	... in cooperation with	Region/country	Expenditure (SEK)
CIS	KIC, GF, VIF	Africa	1 095 909
JHS	KIC	Confidential A	3 901 415
KIC	Silc, CIS, JHS	Uganda	2 711 772
Palme Center	CIS	Palestine	667 038
Palme Center	CIS	Eastern and Central Europe	345 757
Palme Center	Silc	Eastern and Central Europe	334 830
Palme Center	CIS, VIF, Silc	Western Sahara	772 346
Silc	CIS, GF, Palme Center	Confidential A	5 428 971
Silc	Palme Center	Singapore	125 016
Total			15 383 054

The PAO involved in the most joint projects were CIS and the Palme Center while JHS, GF and VIF were relatively less involved. It may be noted that a majority of the joint projects involved PAOs from both of the two Swedish political blocks.

In every joint project, one PAO has had the 'lead' in terms of project administration. The Palme Center had the lead in more joint projects than any other PAO. Its total expenditure for these was 8 % of that for its individual projects. Silc led two joint projects, and its expenditure for these was 66 % of that for its individual projects. KIC led one project, and its expenditure for this equalled 59 % of the total expenditure for its individual projects.

Apart from the joint PAO projects, there were a number of other joint approaches, including:

- One PAO working with several parties in the partner country.
- Regional projects, engaging sister parties in different countries.
- Several Swedish PAO working (coordinated or uncoordinated) with the same party.
- PAO working jointly with party foundations in other countries (such as the National Democratic Institute, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung).

In approximately 30 % of the PAO cooperation, there was some form of collaboration with party foundations in other countries, such as joint financing of the project, joint implementation or active coordination.

In 36 % of the cooperation, some organisation(s) from the partner country other than the actual partner organisation was involved in implementation.

3.5 Principal Focus

A project may have several simultaneous objectives and components. Table 3.15 presents the *principal* focus of the projects. Capacity development/reform of an established party stands out as the most common one; 50 % of the total project expenditures was spent on projects with this principal focus. Increasing the political participation of youth and/or women was the second most common principal focus, followed by projects to enhance international networks and contacts and then projects to improve intra-party relations. Only 5 % had improving the general environment for political party work as a principal focus. The category 'other' included establishment of a new party, dissemination of information and improvement of working methods.

Table 3.15 Principle focus of the projects and percent of expenditures

Principal focus of projects	Percent of expenditures
Capacity development/reform of an established party	50 %
Increasing the political participation of youth and/or women	18 %
Enhancing international networks and contacts	12 %
Improving intra-party relations	10 %
Improving the environment for political party work	5 %
Other	5 %
Total	100 %

Again, there were differences among the PAOs. Almost all of JHS' projects had a principle focus on building capacity/reform an establish party. Almost half of KIC's, CIS's and VIF's cooperation focused mainly on increasing the political participation of youth and/or women. Silc and VIF had a relatively greater share of project expenditures focusing on enhancing international networks and contacts. The joint projects often had a focus on improving intra-party relations.

3.6 Target Groups

Cooperation may target persons at different levels of a partner organisation. As Table 3.16 shows, 18 % of the cooperation was mainly directed to persons in the local party organisation, 16 % to persons in the central party organisation and 9 % to PAOs (such as a youth organisations, women's organisations and regional party organisations). However, almost half (49 %) of the cooperation targeted several of the mentioned groups to a similar extent.

Table 3.16 Primary target groups and percent of the expenditures to these groups

Main target group of project	Percent of expenditure
Mainly persons in the central party organisation	16 %
Mainly persons in the local party organisation	18 %
Mainly persons in a party affiliated organisation	9 %
Other	8 %
Several of the above equally	49 %
Total	100 %

JHS was the PAO with the largest share of its cooperation targeted to persons at the central level. CIS and the Palme Center relatively more frequently targeted persons in the local party organisations and KIC relatively more frequently targeted persons within PAOs. However, the most common strategy for all organisations was to target persons at several levels.

Table 3.17 shows to what extent project expenditures principally targeted women or included a component primarily targeted to women. Fifteen percent of all project expenditures related to projects where women constituted a primary target group, and 45 % was linked to projects with a component primarily targeting women. The remaining 40 % was spent on projects that did not specifically target women.

Table 3.17 Percent of expenditure for projects targeting women to various extents

Extent to which projects target women	Per cent of expenditure
The project as a whole primarily targeted women	15 %
The project included a component primarily targeting women	45 %
The project did not specifically target women	40 %
Total	100 %

All PAOs had projects in all of the above-mentioned categories. VIF and CIS were the PAOs with the highest share of their cooperation specifically targeting women. GF and CIS had a relatively high proportion of projects with a component targeting women. JHS had the most cooperation (in financial terms) not specifically targeted to women.

Table 3.18 shows to what extent cooperation targeted youth. Twenty-one percent of the total expenditures related to projects that, as a whole, primarily targeted youth, and 48 % was spent on projects that included a component that primarily targeted youth.

Table 3.18 Percent of expenditure for projects targeting youth to various extents

Extent to which projects target youth	Percent of expenditure
The project as whole primarily targeted youth	21 %
The project included a component primarily targeting youth	48 %
The project did not specifically target youth	32 %
Total	100 %

KIC was the PAO with the highest share of its cooperation specifically targeting youth. Relative to the other PAOs, a large proportion of CIS' and GF's projects had a component that targeted youth. Relative to other PAOs, a large proportion of JHS' and VIF's projects did not specifically target youth. However, all PAOs did have projects targeting youth.

3.7 Activities and Topics

Most projects contained a combination of different activities, such as training, study visits, conferences, dissemination of information, coaching etc.³³

The most common activity was *training*, included in 76 % of all projects. In 63 % of these projects, the training was mainly conducted in the partner country, in 2 % mainly in Sweden, in 6 % mainly in a third country and in 30 % in a combination of these three locations. The number of persons trained in each project varied considerably, from 11 to 5624. In most projects, the number of persons trained was 10-50. Forty-five percent of the persons trained were women. Training person days also varied considerably, from 11 to 7000. The most common number of training person days was in the 60-140 range. Please note that this was for the two-year period.

Forty-five percent of the projects included *study visits*. In 59 % of the projects, the study visits were held in Sweden, in 6 % in the partner country, in 7 % in a third country, and in 28 % in several of these locations. The number of persons participating in these study visits varied from 1 to 1313 but was usually 5-15. Fifty-two percent of the participants in the study visits were women. Person days of study visits varied from 1 to 5000, but were usually 20-40.

Conferences were included in 60 % of all projects. In 45 % of the projects, they were held in the partner country, in 6 % in Sweden, in 14 % in a third country and in 35 % in a combination of these locations. At 37 %, the female representation was somewhat lower in this activity than in training and study visits.

The projects also included other activities such as dissemination of information (54 % of the projects), general advice and 'coaching' of the partner organisation (39 %) and advocacy work (32 %).

In the above-mentioned activities (training, study visits etc.), the PAOs and their partner organisations addressed a variety of topics. Table 3.19 shows the *principal*

³³ It may at times be difficult to categorise activities. The figures should therefore be read with some care.

topics of the projects. The most common principal topic was ideology, basic values and democracy, followed by political participation of women or youth.

Table 3.19 Principal topics of projects

Topic	Percent of projects with this as <i>principal</i> topic
Ideology, basic values/democracy generally	29 %
Political participation of women/youth	23 %
Party organisation	12 %
Intra-party relations and coalition building	7 %
Policy	6 %
Campaigning and communication	5 %
Project management and methods	3 %
Other	15 %
Work in parliament	0 %
Missing	1 %
Total	100 %

To only consider the principal topic may be misleading as, usually, several topics are addressed in the same project. Table 3.20 therefore shows the ranking of the second and third most important topic as well.

Table 3.20 Ranking of principal, and second and third most important topics in the activities

Principal topic	Second most important topic	Third most important topic
Ideology basic values/democracy generally	Political participation of women/youth	Other
Political participation of women/youth	Policy	Campaigning and communication
Other	Ideology basic values/democracy generally	Ideology basic values/democracy generally
Party organisation	Campaigning and communication	Political participation of women/youth
Intra-party relations and coalition building	Party organisation	Party organisation
Policy	Other	Policy
Campaigning and communication	Project management and methods	Intra-party relations and coalition building
Project management and methods	Intra-party relations and coalition building	Project management and methods
Work in parliament	Work in parliament	Work in parliament

3.8 Resource Persons and Other Support

The Swedish PAOs may support their partner organisations in different ways, drawing on different types of resource persons. Table 3.21 shows to what extent different types of resource persons were engaged in the implementation of the

projects. It can be seen that in almost all projects, there was a combination of persons attached to the Swedish party and resource persons from the partner country. In almost half of the projects, persons employed by the respective PAOs were involved in the implementation. Almost half of the projects also drew on other Swedish persons as well as on persons from a third country.

Please note that the table does not reflect *how many* persons from the respective categories were engaged in project implementation.

Table 3.21 Resource persons used in project implementation

Category of resource persons	Percentage of projects using these in project implementation
Persons employed by the PAO	45 %
Persons linked to Swedish party	86 %
Other Swedish persons	47 %
Persons from partner country	87 %
Persons from third country	46 %

Cooperation may also consist of Swedish PAOs transferring funds to their partner organisations for various purposes, such as local training, conferences etc. Fifty-two percent of all projects included transfer of funds. However, considerable differences among the PAOs can be observed. All of Silc's and almost all of VIF's, GF's, and KIC's projects included such an element. A little over half of the projects of the Palme Center and CIS also did, but none of JHS' projects. Other provided resources usually consisted of literature, study material etc.

3.9 Overall Picture

The picture that emerges is one of many, small and geographically dispersed projects with individual parties on the receiving end. There is however a strong focus on Eastern and Central Europe and on capacity development and/or reform of individual parties. Many projects also aim at promoting political participation of women and youth. The project activities usually consist of courses, seminars, study visits etc. to build competence and/or to promote international networking. There is generally a fairly equal participation of men and women. Resource persons for project implementation and training are to varying degrees drawn from Sweden, the partner country and sometimes third countries. Also, many projects involve transfer of Swedish funds to the respective partner organisations for various project activities.

4 Effectiveness

In this chapter, the projects in Ukraine, Colombia and Uganda are assessed with respect to effectiveness. Effectiveness refers to *'The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance'*.³⁴ Some observations regarding side-effects, i.e. positive and negative effects not envisaged in project objectives, are also mentioned. A more detailed account of the projects can be found in the respective country reports.

4.1 Results Observed

4.1.1 Results in Ukraine

Ukraine is a country with a strong presence of PAOs. In the period 2007/08, the expenditures for projects in Ukraine totalled SEK 6.1 million, making it the second most significant partner country for PAO cooperation in financial terms. CIS, JHS, KIC, the Palme Center and Silc had projects in Ukraine during this period.³⁵

CIS – Our Ukraine, Lviv

In 2007/08, CIS cooperated with Our Ukraine in Lviv. The objective of the project was to strengthen the democratic forces (to be understood as the Orange movement) by contributing to increased political competence within Our Ukraine, with a focus on youth, students and women. The sub-objectives of the project were a) to arrange a series of seminars for existing and new members, b) to contribute to the participation of women and youth in party activities at the local and regional levels, c) to strengthen party activists' understanding of the political process and to raise competence within selected policy areas, and d) to contribute to strengthening of Our Ukraine's party structure and organisation in the city of Lviv and the region.

Outputs consisted of a joint planning exercise (40 persons) based on the 'Logical Framework Approach' (LFA) and five two-day seminars on energy and environment (42 participants), local government and coalition building (43 participants), communication and media (25 participants), gender equality (31 participants) and local government/environmental protection (20 participants). A 7-day study visit to Sweden for 17 persons from the Our Ukraine youth wing was also offered.

Interviews indicate that the participants appreciated and learned from the seminars but that there was limited strengthening of Our Ukraine as a party, reasons being that the seminars were relatively few, not linked to processes within the party and not followed up. The impact is likely to have been affected by many Our Ukraine members, including some participants of the different events, having left the party. The proportion of men and women at the different events was quite even and one seminar focused exclusively on the gender issue. However, according to the arrangers,

³⁴ Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, Sida in cooperation with OECD/DAC, 2007.

³⁵ GF supported the Green Party until 2005 and still does so through a regional project.

the party paid limited attention to the recommendations of this seminar. The Team has not been in a position to assess the results of the study visit. Generally, any benefits of such activities must be seen in a very long-term perspective.

JHS – Our Ukraine

The overall objective of this project was to develop Our Ukraine organisationally at the central, regional and local levels, as well as to build a solid ideological basis. There were two sub-projects: Democratic Governance (*den demokratiska rättsstaten*) as a prerequisite for Ukraine to become a member of the European Union (EU) and Youth and Younger Politicians, which aimed to strengthen the participation of youth in politics and thereby contribute to political renewal and a generational shift.

The outputs with respect to the democratic governance component consisted of a three-day conference (10 participants) on Europe taking place in Sweden, five three-day study visits to Brussels (EU institutions and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO) for a total of 77 persons, a three-day study visit to Sweden (24 participants) focusing on local government and two one-day seminars in Ukraine on corruption (approximately 25 participants in each). The outputs with respect to the youth component were a three-day study visit to Sweden on the theme ‘campaign management’ (for a total of 50 participants from Our Ukraine’s youth wing) and participation in the JHS four-day summer school on ‘Principles of a Free Society’ (eight participants).

The participants that the Team met with were in most cases enthusiastic about these events, stating that they had gained new insights, perspectives and sometimes contacts. However, they all had difficulties explaining how they would use the information in party work. Thus, the positive impact appears to have been limited to the individual level. The crucial question is (as for the CIS-Our Ukraine cooperation) how new insights, knowledge and perspectives from the participation in relatively brief events may influence their actions in the future and how this may possibly strengthen the party. Furthermore, the Team questions whether the emphasis on study visits to EU institutions and NATO were effective in promoting democratic governance in Ukraine.³⁶

KIC – Democratic Alliance

The Democratic Alliance is a political youth organisation with a mission to contribute to a new generation of politicians in Ukraine. KIC has supported Democratic Alliance in this mission. An additional objective has been to help the organisation transform into a new Christian Democratic party that could constitute an alternative in Ukrainian politics. This objective was, however, not explicitly stated in the project application.

In 2007/08, KIC supported ‘School of Young Politicians’, one of the Democratic Alliance’s many programmes. Output consisted of twelve three-day seminars (for 120 participants aged 18-25, each person participating in three seminars) on political ideologies and Christian democracy and advocacy. As part of the training, the

³⁶ In its comments to the draft report, JHS stresses its ambition to introduce its European sister parties to the EU structures, however.

participants carried out civic actions, addressing different problems in society. There were also two national conferences (60 participants each) held in Kiev.

The immediate outcome was that 120 youth became more ideologically aware and politically/civically active. How many of these persons that will one day engage in party politics is an open question. Most of the participants were either existing members of Democratic Alliance or joined following participation. Democratic Alliance has currently around 400 active members. It is not unlikely that the organisation, now building up its local branches, may in the future transform into a party and possibly participate in the 2012 elections. However, whether Democratic Alliance has the ambition and capacity to do this, and what role it will play if it becomes a political party, is still uncertain.

The Palme Center – Socialist Party of Ukraine

The Palme Center-Socialist Party of Ukraine cooperation consisted of several sub-projects aimed at strengthening the Socialist Party of Ukraine organisationally and ideologically at the central and local levels.

The output of the cooperation between the Palme Center and the party centrally included two regional seminars on the energy issue, with the objective to elaborate an energy policy for the party and thereby strengthen it in the 2007 parliamentary election. This objective failed as the energy issue proved too complex for the seminar to deal with and due to a lack of interest from the party leadership. The output also included publishing of the magazine *Socialist Globe* (24 issues, 800-1500 copies). While the original purpose of this publication was to disseminate findings of the energy seminars, it instead became a channel for international (primarily European) news on social democracy. The magazine also published letters from readers and an analysis of why the Socialist Party of Ukraine failed in the 2007 election. It is thereby likely to have promoted a critical debate within the party, and thus indirectly internal democracy. It apparently did not influence the party leadership and policy, however.

The cooperation between the Palme Center through the Social-Democratic Party branch of Oskarshamn, Sweden, and the local branches of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU) in Kharkiv aimed at strengthening the Socialist Party of Ukraine organisationally, promoting cooperation between the parties and the trade unions, and advancing the position of women in politics. The project had a slow start, due to capacity reasons on the Swedish side. The output consisted of a series of training events. The cooperation has, after several years, resulted in an emerging collaboration between the parties and the labour unions, as well as an increase in party memberships. Very few activities to strengthen the Socialist Party of Ukraine organisationally took place, though.

The cooperation through the Social Democratic Party District of Värmland and the Socialist Party of Ukraine, Kiev aimed at supporting the party in its organisational development and working for democratic reforms, strengthening cooperation between the party and the trade unions, and increasing the political participation of women in politics and union work. The activities included dissemination of the Palme Center's 'On-line Academy' and a study visit to Brussels for three persons. However, the Team could not see any results in relation to the set objectives.

Silc – Party for Public Rule

The overall objective of the cooperation between Silc and the Party for Public Rule was to contribute to the establishment of a well-functioning social-liberal party in Ukraine. Silc supported the party mainly with funds for a range of different activities. The reported output in 2007/08 period consisted of 25 seminars on liberalism and gender equality (590 participants), 20 seminars on organisation building (350 persons), publication of a monthly party bulletin (22 issues), participation in six international events on election and activism, and two events on ‘liberalism today and tomorrow’ and ‘elections in Ukraine’. Swedish funds were also used for activities in connection with the registration of the party.

The Silc cooperation has helped the party to grow in terms of number of memberships and branches, and in 2009 the party became formally registered as a national political party. It remains to be seen whether the Party for Public Rule will reach parliament and, if so, what role it will play in Ukrainian politics. However, interviews indicated that the party is still rather unknown even in its home base of Donetsk, and as a liberal party from eastern Ukraine, the Party for Public Rule is likely to be met with suspicion in the rest of the country.

4.1.2 Results in Colombia

In the period 2007/08, the expenditures for projects in Colombia totalled SEK 1.6 million, making it the 16th most significant partner country in financial terms. Three PAOs had projects in Colombia: GF, the Palme Center (two projects) and VIF. In addition, a regional JHS project covered Colombia.

*GF – Fundación Tercera Colombia/ Corporación Unidades Democráticas para el Desarrollo (CEUDES)*³⁷

The objective of this project has shifted over time from revival of the Colombian Green Party Partido Verde Oxígeno to strengthening of the leadership for promoting and defending human rights in Colombia (in 2007/08) to supporting networks that promote human rights as well as the green agenda and green thinking in Colombia (2009/10).

In 2007/08, the output consisted of 15 one-day seminars with community groups (local leaders and citizens including children and youth) reaching approximately 240 persons of all ages including children. Ninety of the persons were reported to have been local civil society leaders. These seminars dealt primarily with the environment, green thinking and human rights. In addition, six issues (500-1000 copies) of the Carta Verde newsletter were produced.

It has not been possible to collect information about the outcome of the workshops. These and the newsletter are likely to have increased awareness of human rights and green thinking among the participants. However, there has not been any systematic follow-up of the seminars, only limited effects in terms of creation of networks and no effects on the party system, as perceived by the Team.

³⁷ The green party led by Ingrid Betancourt was called Partido Verde Oxígeno. It lost its legal status as a party in 2003. GF's partner organisation was therefore instead first Fundación Tercera Colombia, a foundation established by Ingrid Betancourt. Fundación Tercera Colombia was closed in 2008. Project implementation has thereafter been through the human rights NGO CEUDES.

The Palme Center – Alternative Democratic Pole

This project was originally intended to focus on the political participation of youth. The objective was eventually shifted to advance the position of women within the Alternative Democratic Pole, by working with the Women's Collective. On the Swedish side, the project was implemented by the Social Democratic Party Districts of Skåne and Uppsala.

The output included two two-day national workshops (85-100 participants) and three two-day regional workshops (around 40 participants in each). This was followed by a half-day women's 'pre-congress' held before the official party congress (204 participants).

The interviews indicate that the project gave women within the party opportunities to gather, and thereby become more united. The workshops resulted in a process of dialogue among women belonging to different political wings of the Alternative Democratic Pole, and in the formulation of a joint declaration presented at the party congress. The project also contributed to increased visibility and recognition of the Women's Collective and raised the gender awareness among women. However, the challenge to advance the position of women within the party is considerable, and the project is best seen as one small step towards such advancement.

The Palme Center – University of Ibagué – Partido Por la Democracia, Chile

This project is a triangular cooperation between Sweden (Stockholm branch of Social Democratic Party), Chile (Partido Por la Democracia) and Colombia (main partner University of Ibagué, and since 2009 also the NGO Tolipaz). The project was launched in 2008 and the assessment is limited to results in Colombia. The objective of the cooperation is to strengthen democracy and peaceful coexistence in Colombia through exchange and leadership training directed to young politicians at the local and provincial levels, not the least women, in Chile and Colombia.

In 2008, outputs consisted of a computer-based course (approximately 40 participants), a three-day course at the University of Ibagué (20 participants from different parties), an open seminar (attended by approximately 100 persons) at the University, a two-hour workshop (for approximately 15 persons from the Alternative Democratic Pole) in Bogotá in cooperation with UNDP/IDEA, and a one-week visit to Chile for eight persons from Colombia. The project content was similar in 2009. However, the process of participant selection changed. Earlier, anyone interested could join while in 2009 all parties (represented in the region) proposed candidates for the programme.

The interviews indicate that the seminars and study visits were interesting and inspiring for the participants. However, given the number of persons trained, the way in which they were selected, the lack of party connection and the lack of focus in activities, the Team considers impact on the political party level highly uncertain.

*VIF – Colombian Communist Party*³⁸

The persecution against the leadership and members of the Colombian Communist Party has affected the party both financially and as an organisation. VIF finds the continued existence of the party important for political pluralism. The project objective is to strengthen the Colombian Communist Party with respect to organisation, education of cadres, and policy formulation, including education of party members and strengthening the party's youth work as well as its work in defending human rights.

VIF provided financial support that was used for the training of party members and leaders (a youth association national school, a seminar for political updating, a basic party school and preparation of study materials), transport and accommodation for 60 delegates and purchase of materials for party conference, publicity for election campaign in four councils, two publications (1000 copies each) for promotion of human rights and peace, and humanitarian support (soap, shampoo, underwear) to 70 prisoners.

The cooperation has thus contributed to a continued existence of the Colombian Communist Party by, inter alia, enabling more persons to participate in training and congresses and by having contributed to the election of its candidates to public offices. The impacts of the human rights and peace activities have not been possible to assess.

JHS – Colombian Conservative Party; through Unión de Partidos Latinoamericanos (UPLA).

JHS has been financing a regional project in Latin America, implemented in collaboration with UPLA, which unites centre-right parties in Latin America. The Colombian Conservative Party is one of 14 parties participating in this project. The Team has not been in a position to assess the programme as a whole, but only the Colombian component.

The overall project objective is an all-around strengthening of the JHS sister parties, which includes strengthening them in terms of policy development, organisational development and networks, as well as strengthening the capacity and self-confidence of women so that they can take a more active role in political life, and of young people in politics and thereby contribute to a generational shift and renewal of politics.

The output consisted of a number of training events and seminars, usually of a duration of 2-3 days, dealing with ideology (for young politicians), empowerment of women, campaigning, leftist tendencies in Latin America and other topics. Eight persons from Colombia participated in these training events in 2007/08.

Persons from the party who participated in the regional UPLA seminars found these seminars highly useful on a personal level. However, the number of participants from Colombia was limited and, again, the impact will depend of how they will make use of the new knowledge and contacts. A concern expressed by the party itself was the lack of continuity. A positive feature of the programme is that it strengthens networks among the centre-right parties in the region.

³⁸ The Colombian Communist Party, with roots from the 1930s maintains its structure as a party but is part of the Alternative Democratic Pole and is not formally registered as a party.

4.1.3 Results in Uganda

There were two PAO projects in Uganda, one for inter-party cooperation, implemented jointly by KIC (lead), Silc, CIS and JHS,³⁹ and one directed to the youth wings of the major political parties, implemented jointly by KIC and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). In 2007/08, project expenditures totalled SEK 2.7 million, making it the 10th most significant country in financial terms.

Joint Project for Inter-Party Cooperation

The original objective of this project was to enhance cooperation among individual parties, to strengthen the parties internally and to increase the influence of women and youth. During the course of the cooperation, the focus shifted from individual strengthening of parties to the forging of a coalition among the opposition parties in order to challenge the current government. The main approach was to facilitate the establishment of a joint structure for inter-party cooperation, signing of the Inter-Party Cooperation joint protocol and elaboration of a joint electoral platform.

Partners on the Swedish side were four PAOs affiliated with the current 'Alliance' Government. The Swedish cooperation primarily consisted of supporting the Inter-Party Cooperation financially through a local secretariat. It also included visits of Ugandan politicians to Sweden and participation of PAO representatives in two conferences in Uganda.

An initial meeting between the Conservative Party, Democratic Party and Forum for Democratic Change was held in September 2007. It was at this meeting that the idea of establishing the inter-party cooperation was established. In February 2008, the Conservative Party, Democratic Party and Forum for Democratic Change visited Sweden. In April 2008, the Inter-Party Cooperation Steering Committee was formed consisting of the Conservative Party, Forum for Democratic Change, Uganda People's Congress and the Justice Forum (JEEMA). This was followed by summit meetings in April and May 2008, assignment of ten Thematic Committees in August 2008, and the signing of the Protocol of Cooperation on 5 August 2008. The first inter-party conference was held 14-16 August 2008 to ratify the Protocol and to approve a number of recommendations. Internally, each cooperating party has held a National Delegates' Conference. Four such conferences were held from November 2008 to February 2009, facilitated by the support of KIC. Sweden financed 32 % of the total costs of the conferences. Parties under the Inter-Party Cooperation are now reported to share common visions, objectives and positions on policies, and consultations are underway for a joint electoral platform for the 2011 election.

Although it is difficult to assess how much of the process described above can be attributed to the Swedish cooperation, the Team considers the project to indeed have contributed to it. It is still too early to assess the full impact of the project; it depends both on whether the opposition parties will be capable of staying united all the way to the election and on the results of these elections. Another concern is the internal weaknesses of the opposition parties that were never addressed by the project. As a consequence of the change of priorities within the project, activities to strengthen the

³⁹ The project has continued from in 2009/10 without the participation of JHS.

parties internally and to promote the political participation of women and youth were not implemented in the studied period.

KIC – National Democratic Institute (NDI) – Regional Young Political Leadership Academy (RYPLA)

This project was jointly supported and coordinated by KIC and NDI, with an overall aim to empower the youth wing leaders and enable them to gain increased influence in politics and their parties. While the target groups consisted of youth wing leaders from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, this evaluation has only considered results in Uganda.

The output of the project has been a number of training sessions directed to the youth wing leaders. In 2008, 11 persons from Uganda⁴⁰ were trained (6 men and 5 women). Three training sessions were held, covering various issues related to political party work. The training also included design and implementation of a ‘mini-project’.

The interviewed participants stated that the training had increased their self-confidence and strengthened them in terms of communicating and packaging their political messages, leadership, exerting influence and reaching more influential positions. The interviewed persons also felt better equipped in the dialogue with the party leadership.

The outcome has so far mainly been noted at the individual level, although the trained participants to some extent have also contributed to strengthening their party youth wings. The responses from the political parties have been mixed and not always favourable to an increased independence of the youth wings.

4.2 Broader Observations Regarding Effectiveness

Section 4.1 above briefly accounted for the fulfilment of the objectives of each of the reviewed projects. Project objectives were stated in terms of envisaged output, outcome and impact. The effectiveness may consequently also be assessed at these different levels.

4.2.1 Achievement of Output Objectives

The extent to which the PAOs have specified the expected output, i.e. the concrete products and services that the project should result in, has varied considerably. Furthermore, output objectives were in several cases not established before the start of a project but instead during the course of it. Examples include the JHS cooperation with Our Ukraine and with UPLA and the CIS cooperation with Our Ukraine where topics were defined during the initial LFA exercise. This makes comparison of achievements in relation to original objectives difficult.

The general impression, however, is that the output objectives in most cases were achieved or nearly achieved. For example, 120 young persons were trained by the Democratic Alliance and 20 persons were offered training in Ibagué (first course) as set out in plans. The envisaged gender balance was also mainly achieved. However, somewhat fewer persons than expected from the Ibagué course went on the study

⁴⁰ 41 persons from the three countries.

visit to Chile (due to budget reasons), there were fewer seminars than originally planned by the Socialist Party of Ukraine, fewer seminars than planned by the Women's Collective of Alternative Democratic Pole etc. Delays were also seen in several projects. The reasons include delays in the transfer of funds, and capacity limitations either on the Swedish side or on the side of the partner country. In one case (CIS-Our Ukraine, Lviv), a delay was motivated by the holding of elections.

In several cases, the project focus was altered or narrowed down resulting in some activities never taking place. The joint project in Uganda was intended to include internal strengthening of the parties and promotion of participation of women and youth, but the activities for this purpose were postponed (and priority given to coalition building). The 'youth project' with the Alternative Democratic Pole turned out to become a women's project.

4.2.2 Achievement of Outcome Objectives

The assessment of outcome, i.e. short- and medium-term effects, in relation to objectives cannot be fully ascertained, as objectives were often vaguely formulated and for other reasons explained in the Evaluability (1.6) section.

There were frequent indications that the various training sessions, study visits etc. had contributed to participants becoming more knowledgeable, skilled and inspired. In some cases, it was also seen to have led to some concrete action. For example, a communications officer of the Our Ukraine youth wing in Lviv who had participated in a CIS funded seminar stated that he had started to package messages and write press releases differently. Some members of the Our Ukraine youth wing said that they had become more politically active after participating in the JHS summer school. Personal contacts were established between young politically active persons in Colombia and Chile, and at least one Colombian participant stated that her participation in the project had inspired her to run for a public office. Women in Alternative Democratic Pole presented a joint declaration at the party congress, partly as a result of the project activities. The project activities in Kharkiv that had involved both the parties and the trade union resulted in a dialogue between the two. Inter-party cooperation between four Ugandan opposition parties was intensified. RYPLA participants reported that they were applying new skills to deal with media and the public.

Many such individual examples of positive effects can be seen. However, the *extent* to which outcome objectives were fulfilled tends to vary considerably. For example, the Team was also repeatedly told by project participants that they found it difficult to use what they had learned in different project activities, indicating that the intended outcome had been limited. There were also a few projects or project components for which the outcome objectives were not achieved, e.g. the energy seminars in Ukraine.

4.2.3 Achievement of Impact Objectives

An assessment of impact effectiveness is bound to be limited to indications of how cooperation *may* have contributed to overall objectives. It may again be useful to make a distinction between parties as organisations, parties in the citizenry and parties in government.

A strengthening of the *parties as organisations* would require that the outcome – to the extent there was such an outcome – also impacts the party. In a few instances, there were indications of this. Some parties/organisations (Party for Public Rule, Democratic Alliance, Socialist Party of Ukraine in Kharkiv) gained new members as a result of the cooperation. Other projects are likely to have given an impetus to the inclusion of women and youth (JHS-Our Ukraine, JHS-UPLA, the Palme Center-Ibagué, the Palme Center-Alternative Democratic Pole, RYPLA). The campaigning and communication capacity of parties may have increased to the extent that a few persons became better skilled.

However, there are also projects that seem to have not resulted in any or only limited changes at the party level. Examples include the CIS-Our Ukraine Lviv project, components of the JHS-Our Ukraine project, and the Socialist Globus journal that despite facilitating some internal debate appears to have made no dents in the party and its leadership.

Among the studied projects, several were primarily directed to young persons. It is impossible to say what participation in a short course or a study visit may mean for these persons later in life since there is no way to tell, for example, who the courses and visits will prove to be important for and who will and will not remain in politics.

Broadening the perspective to the party system as a whole, and looking at the parties in the citizenry and in government, the results appear very limited. In Ukraine, the Swedish cooperation has had marginal impact on the position of the two established parties supported (Our Ukraine and Socialist Party of Ukraine) while the Party for Public Rule and Democratic Alliance have a long way to go to become the political alternatives envisaged by Silc and KIC. Similarly, there are no indications that the projects in Colombia have had any impact on the systemic level, apart from possibly contributing to the survival of the Colombian Communist Party. However, although it is still too early to judge the impact of the Uganda project, it was found to have contributed to uniting some main opposition parties, potentially affecting the balance of power in the party system.

The observed projects rarely had any objectives in relation to ‘parties in government’, and there are therefore no grounds for assessment of effectiveness in this respect.

Based on the above, the Team considers the likeliness that the projects fulfilled their overall objectives and contributed to a well-functioning party system to be low in most observed cases.

4.2.4 Some Tentative Explanations

In order to explain why a project has succeeded or failed, it may be useful to differentiate between whether it was implemented successfully and whether it was well designed.

A few projects were not implemented as originally intended. The reasons for this include both unforeseen external events and capacity constraints in Sweden or the partner country. However, in most projects, implementation does not appear to have been the main problem.

Rather, the problem has related to the design of the projects and that the activities undertaken have not effectively led to the fulfilment of higher level objectives. Examples of this include informing school children in Colombia about ecology and human rights, which can be justified from certain perspectives but is, according to the Team's opinion, not effective for strengthening the party system. And even though Our Ukraine expressed an interest in visiting NATO, the study visits to NATO do not appear effective for promoting democratic governance in Ukraine. The seminars held in Lviv were intended to strengthen Our Ukraine, yet there were indications that the results in relation to this objective were limited.

Chapter 3 showed that a majority of the projects aim at enhancing skills and knowledge of party representatives by offering training, study visits etc. Implicitly, this builds on the assumption that what is lacking for the party system is more knowledge and skills. While building competence is important, the question is whether it is sufficient and how it is best done.⁴¹

Another aspect in relation to project design is the small size of most projects. It is possible that projects can make positive contributions at a micro level even if small. However, there is a risk that they will lack the 'critical mass' required for any permanent impact. In several cases, it was often seen that effectiveness had been hampered by a lack of continuity. Small projects also become costly and cumbersome to plan, administer and follow up.

4.3 Side Effects

Side effects refer to results (positive or negative, foreseen or unforeseen) that did not relate to the project objectives. Some side effects observed are the following:

Promotion of ideologies and agendas

Many observed projects have a clear ideological content. For example, GF has promoted 'green thinking', JHS bases its summer school on liberal-conservative material, VIF funds are used for Marxist-Leninist training in Colombia, Socialist Globus is used to spread the social-democratic ideas etc. Ideological training may be well motivated in order to strengthen sister parties ideologically; a problem seen is often that parties are ideologically weak. However, promotion of certain ideologies is not a Programme objective as such.

Influence on political power relations

Strengthening of certain parties, among many, implies an influence on the power relations in the party system. This may be the very intention of the support, as for example when supporting oppressed opposition parties in countries with an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian party system. However, there is also a possibility that there is an influence not necessarily motivated from a democratisation point of view.⁴²

⁴¹ The weaknesses of this 'standard method' of party aid are discussed in Carothers, 2006, p. 123 ff.

⁴² It should be observed that there may also be an influence on political power relations in other cooperation, such as in cooperation in countries with *de facto* one-party states where the role of the state and the ruling party is blurred and cooperation therefore becomes a support to the ruling party.

Increased fragmentation

Of the supported parties, many were found to have had a limited voter support in the most recent parliamentary election. Small parties may very well be important in a democratisation process and supporting them to pluralism. However, support to small parties may also contribute to fragmentation of the party system. Ukraine could be a case in point.

Effects on power relations within a party

A potential effect of the cooperation is that certain persons or fractions of a party gain power. Again, this may be the very objective of cooperation, such as when supporting women or youth, but it may also be unintended. For example, the support to the Colombian Communist Party has strengthened one wing of the Alternative Democratic Pole. The Palme Center's campaign training within the same party in 2005, on the other hand, was exclusively directed to another wing. Indirectly, the cooperation may both fuel and ease internal conflicts in a partner organisation.

Participants making use of knowledge and skills in other contexts

Interviewed participants sometimes stated that they were able to personally use things they had learned in PAO training. Examples range from women in the Alternative Democratic Pole using what they had learned about gender in their trade union work to participants in the energy seminar in Lviv trying harder to save energy. In some cases, it was observed that persons after having participated in a PAO event had joined another party, possibly making use of their new skills and outlooks there.

Impact on parties in Sweden

All PAOs stated that the cooperation is important also for the Swedish political parties, since it contributes to increased knowledge and interest in international issues, broadens the perspectives of party members and generates engagement. It also contributes to the international contacts and networking of the Swedish parties. Even though the Programme objective does not include effects in Sweden, it may be recalled that this was one of the intentions in the original proposal for the support and is included in the objectives of the PAOs. The strategy for actor-driven cooperation also stresses mutuality.

Other

Various other side effects were observed as well. The Democratic Alliance training, for example, included taking action on the streets to address different societal problems. Following a CIS-Our Ukraine event in Turka, Ukraine, certain measures to reduce deforestation were reported to have been taken. The Socialist Party of Ukraine-SDPU-Trade union cooperation in Kharkiv brought some benefits to the trade unions, including new members and a link to political power. A side effect of the RYPLA project in Uganda was that the 11 trained young persons changed their attitudes towards one another as political adversaries.

5 Relevance

Relevance refers to *'The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies'*.⁴³ The objectives of the PAO projects are often expressed in terms of strengthening the democracy of a specific country, supporting a particular partner organisation and/or achieving some kind of change within or through this organisation. Below, we discuss the consistency among project objectives, relevance from a party system perspective and how well the cooperation is in line with Swedish policies as expressed in the Programme Guidelines.

While it is concluded that projects often are well in line with the demand of the partner organisations, there is no mechanism ensuring that projects are relevant to strengthen the party system as a whole.

5.1 Consistency with the Demand of the Partner Organisations

In several cases, the project proposal came from the partner organisation and was then further developed in a dialogue with Sweden (for example KIC-Democratic Alliance, Silc-the Party for Public Rule and VIF-the Colombian Communist Party). Other projects were designed mainly by the PAOs but in dialogue with the partner organisations (for example JHS-Our Ukraine and KIC-NDI-RYPLA). In one project (CIS-Our Ukraine), the final project content was defined in an LFA workshop with the partner organisation. The case projects have thus generally been consistent with the demand of the partner organisations. In several cases, partner organisations described the Swedish cooperation as more flexible and 'demand driven' than some other party cooperations.

In a few cases, there were, however, indications that the PAOs and the respective partner organisations had partly different perceptions of the project objectives (for example the Palme Center-Partido Por la Democracia-Ibagué).

The existence of different interests within a party also became apparent in a few cases. For example, the leadership of the Socialist Party of Ukraine did not appreciate the critical character of the journal Socialist Globus, published by a group of persons close to the (former) international secretary; the political parties in Uganda had mixed feelings about the strengthening of the party youth wings; and even though the party leadership of the Alternative Democratic Pole gave their full support to the Women's Collective, the women themselves talked about considerable resistance to increased gender equality.

It should also be observed that in this type of cooperation, there is a natural tendency for the partner organisation to 'request' what it knows that the Swedish organisation is in a position to offer. It is not uncommon that partner organisations would have

⁴³ Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, Sida in cooperation with OECD/DAC, 2007.

preferred support for e.g. election campaigns and other things that fall outside the Programme guidelines.

Consistency with demands of a partner organisation is positive in many respects. The organisation knows the local context and supposedly also its own needs. Further, a genuine interest from the partner organisation increases the chances of successful implementation. It is also positive from an ‘ownership’ perspective. However, what is requested from a particular partner organisation – or certain persons within it – is not necessarily what is most strategic in order to strengthen the party system and promote democracy. The partner organisations, which in most cases are political parties, have, and should have, their own agendas, which may or may not coincide with party system needs.

5.2 Relevance in a Party System Perspective

A first very general observation is about the relevance of strengthening parties and party systems as such. In Ukraine, Colombia and Uganda, it was clearly seen that the way in which the political parties function is a key factor for democracy. In this perspective, support to well-functioning party systems is highly relevant. A second general observation is that, due to its limited size, it is impossible for the cooperation to address all problems in the party system. It is more important, therefore, that the interventions are selected strategically.

Looking at what the PAOs are actually doing, it may be observed that they are addressing some of the criteria for a well-functioning society (see Chapter 2) but not others.

Chapter 3 as well as the case studies indicate an emphasis on strengthening parties as organisations, and the Team notes that the projects often address concrete needs and problems of the partner organisations. For example, for the Party for Public Rule, registration of the party was crucial to be able to stand in coming elections. The Alternative Democratic Pole, just like many other parties, has had a problem of limited women’s representation, making the support to the Women’s Collective relevant. The financial support to the Colombian Communist Party has been relevant considering this party’s resource constraints and need for training party leaders and bringing members to the party congresses. There has been a lack of critical debate within the Socialist Party of Ukraine, rendering the journal Socialist Globus relevant. In view of the ideological weaknesses in certain parties, ideological training can be seen as relevant.

The Team is not in a position to say whether *other* interventions would have been equally important. For example, in the Alternative Democratic Pole, the problem to be addressed was initially the participation of youth, yet it is also a party with considerable problems in terms of internal unity. The Colombian Communist Party is an unreformed marxist-leninist party and it is possible that an exchange of experiences with the Swedish Left Party would have been more relevant than strengthening party finances. Corruption is a central problem in all three countries visited, yet very few activities dealt with this problem.

Looking beyond the individual party but at the parties in the citizenry, the question of which parties to support becomes crucial.

In Ukraine, Sweden has worked with two established parties (Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine), one newly formed party (the Party for Public Rule) and one potential future party (DA). Support to Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine builds on the conviction that these have roles to play in the Ukrainian party system. Our Ukraine is represented in parliament and is a member of the European People's Party (EPP). The Socialist Party of Ukraine has been the major centre-left party, and research shows that some 10-12 % of the Ukrainian population have social democratic sympathies. Both parties are, however, struggling with severe internal problems and have faced a loss of sympathisers. The Socialist Party of Ukraine failed to enter the parliament in the 2007 election and the support for Our Ukraine was, according to opinion polls, 2-4 % in 2009. The Party for Public Rule and the Democratic Alliance have been supported on the grounds of constituting potential future political alternatives, according to the Swedish organisations filling a 'gap' of parties representing a social-liberal and a Christian democratic agenda. However, the prospects of the Party for Public Rule and the Democratic Alliance becoming influential parties in the future are still very uncertain.

The PAOs are not working with any of the currently more influential political forces in Ukraine. Although there may be good reasons for this, it also entails a *risk* that the impact on the party system will be marginal. Another observation is that, despite the fact that party fragmentation is a major problem in the Ukrainian party system, the PAOs have chosen to work separately and in two cases support local processes to establish new parties. An alternative approach would be to work with party segments and support coalitions of likeminded parties,⁴⁴ an area in which Sweden ought to have valuable experiences to share.

Turning to Colombia, the Alternative Democratic Pole is the country's only leftist political alternative as well as a young party in the process of consolidation. The Colombian Communist Party has been present in the Colombian party system since the 1930s but has been weakened considerably by violence and persecution. Today, it is part of the Alternative Democratic Pole while maintaining its structure as a party. The support to these parties may be seen as a support for increased pluralism and a counterweight to the concentration of power to the president. However, that the Palme Center supports one wing within the Alternative Democratic Pole and VIF another does not contribute to party unity, which is currently the party's main challenge.

The Colombian Conservative Party is the country's oldest party. It is financially strong and therefore not in need of support. However, the Swedish support has been well in line with the party's recent efforts to reform itself to become a modern centre-right party.

⁴⁴ As JHS is reported to have done in the late 1990s and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is currently doing. The only cross-party cooperation seen in 2007/08 was the inclusion of both the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine in the Kharkiv project. The Värmlands Partidistrikt/Socialist Party of Ukraine Kyiv project also recently sponsored a conference in which different left parties participated. This initiative came from 'dissident' SPU party members.

Partido Verde Oxígeno had not only lost its status as a political party but was also extremely weak organisationally when GF initiated its support to revive it. The support was closely linked to the efforts to release Ingrid Betancourt. Following Mrs. Betancourt's decision to leave politics, efforts were directed to promote human rights and green thinking through an NGO and to build the basis for a new green party.

Promotion of respect for human rights is urgently needed considering the human rights situation in Colombia, yet the relevance of such activities for strengthening of the party system is limited. The relevance of establishing a new green party in Colombia depends on what kind of analysis is made of the importance of the system including such a party.

The triangular cooperation of the Palme Center has drawn on the University of Ibagué for training, but has had a weak institutional connection to any party.

The selection of partner organisations in Colombia has thus been partly relevant. However, there are also other parties that could have been equally or possibly even more relevant to support such as the Liberal party, being the largest opposition party and probably having the greatest potential to challenge the current government.⁴⁵

In Uganda, the partner organisations have been chosen more strategically. In order to challenge the current semi-authoritarian government, the Swedish PAOs have supported the opposition parties and their efforts to form a joint election platform. In the RYPLA project, youth from all political parties have been given the possibility to undergo training as the youth wings of all parties have been considered quite weak and having limited influence in the parties.

At this point, it may be useful also to recall that Ukraine, Colombia and Uganda are countries where there has been a relatively strong presence of PAOs. In most countries where PAOs are active, support has been given only to one or two parties.

The relevance of supporting a certain organisation depends on the analysis made of the party system and how it is best strengthened. The analyses made by the Team in connection with the country studies indicate that the relevance has varied.

A main criterion for the PAOs' selection of partner organisations is to what extent they are politically 'like-minded'. This is natural considering the nature of PAOs and may provide a basis for close cooperation and fruitful exchanges. However, it does not ensure that the choice of partner organisation is strategic from a party system point of view. Many parties will never even be considered for cooperation or have the opportunity to express their demand (sometimes referred to as 'party aid orphans').

The PAOs have often developed close contacts with 'their' respective parties, and for obvious reasons have less contact with other parties. A consequence of basing the cooperation on the demands put forth by these organisations may be that the need for multi-party approaches is never articulated.

⁴⁵ The only support to the the Liberal Party has been indirect, in the triangular project, by including some young politicians from this party.

The way PAOs are financed implies that the choice of partner organisations will ultimately reflect how the Swedish citizens have voted for their own parliament rather than party system needs.

The linkage between relevance and the steering of cooperation is further discussed in Chapter 6.

Broadening the perspective even further, there are structural factors shaping the party system, such as legal and constitutional factors, the functioning of the judiciary, poverty, the position of civil society etc. The PAOs are generally not working in these areas. In this perspective, the support to parties can be seen as necessary but not sufficient to strengthen party systems.

5.3 Consistency with Programme Guidelines

Below are some observations regarding the projects' consistency with the Programme Guidelines.

The overall Programme objective, discussed in Chapter 2, was observed to be quite broad and all evaluated projects could be said to fit under it, in one way or another. However, whether the interventions have been the most strategic to promote this objective was found to vary. Overall, the PAOs tend to work more with a party than with the party system perspective expressed in the objective.

Even though not explicitly stated in the Guidelines, the Programme shall ultimately contribute to the same overall objectives as all other international cooperation, and Swedish development cooperation should be permeated by a poverty perspective. The PAO cooperation is based on the conviction that a well-functioning party system is a way to improve the lives of poor people. Applying a multi-dimensional definition of poverty, this follows almost by definition as a well-functioning party system includes that all citizens have a voice.⁴⁶ However, it does not follow that all party cooperation is equally relevant to the needs of poor people. Even if the PAO cooperation can generally be considered poverty relevant, there has been a limited poverty focus or poverty perspective in the projects studied, with the possible exception of VIF-Colombian Communist Party and GF-CEUDES in Colombia. For example, problem analyses hardly ever include a discussion on how poverty impacts the party system, on what groups are excluded from political influence, or on how a project could improve the situation of poor people. As shown in Chapter 3, partner countries have included both poor and upper-middle income countries. However, most of the cooperation was with countries with a fairly high Human Development Index.

Partner organisations shall, according to the Guidelines, be parties or associations that work for and under no circumstances counteract democratic governance, equal opportunities for women and men, respect for human rights, tolerance of minorities and dissidents and reconciliation of religious and ethnic differences where these exist in the country/region. The Team is not in a position to judge how the evaluated partner organisations live up to this. While none of them are outright undemocratic, some have evident problems in the contexts of internal democracy and gender equality and/or a murky history with respect to human rights. Some of these parties

⁴⁶ The relationship between democracy and economic development has been, and still is, subject to debate.

may at the same time be the ones in greatest need of international contacts and cooperation.

According to the Guidelines, partner organisations may also include political interest groups or popular movements with a potential to become political parties. The party for Public Rule (up till recently) and Democratic Alliance in Ukraine are examples of such organisations. CEUDES in Colombia is, however, an NGO without party ambitions.

Great caution shall, according to the Guidelines, be exercised in projects conducted in conjunction with elections. This has not always been adhered to. For example, the energy conferences of the Socialist Party of Ukraine were largely initiated with the very purpose to support the party's election campaign and VIF funds were used to finance campaigns of the Colombian Communist Party⁴⁷.

There is, however, a fine line between election-related activities and a general strengthening of a party, and both, if successful, will ultimately be reflected in the election results. For example, campaign training one year before the election may be just as crucial for an election victory as support conducted in direct connection with the elections.⁴⁸

The projects shall, according to the Guidelines, consist of dialogue, capacity development and institution building relating to a well-functioning party system, political participation and democratic political systems, primarily through exchange and training projects. Both the case studies and the statistical review indicate that projects have had such an emphasis.

Projects that promote political participation of women, youth and first-time voters are said to be of special importance. There has been a considerable emphasis on promoting political participation of women and youth. No activities addressed to first-time voters were observed, although 'youth' are also often first-time voters.

The Guidelines also underline the importance of strengthening the parties' organisational base, to give support at the local level and promote contacts with the citizens and civil society organisations. A considerable share of the projects have aimed at strengthening the parties' organisational base and many have been implemented at the local level, as shown in Chapter 3. However, there have only been limited efforts to establish linkages with civil society organisations.

Despite being in the form of time-bound projects, cooperation shall be of long-term character. As observed in Chapter 3, the duration of cooperation tended to vary. Looking at Ukraine, for example, KIC, Silc and the Palme Center had been working with their current partners for many years, as opposed to CIS. Generally, all PAOs strive to build long-term relations. However, the Team sometimes observed a lack of continuity in terms of activities to deepen and broaden the capacity of the target groups in the partner organisations.

⁴⁷ Contrary to what had been agreed, states VIF.

⁴⁸ The Programme review in 2004 questions the Guidelines on this matter, arguing that elections constitute a moment when parties actually meet the citizens. Elections could therefore instead be seen as an opportunity for cooperation.

The Guidelines also call for an increased concentration of projects, in accordance with the Swedish Policy for Global Development⁴⁹ and the Paris Declaration. The number of projects and countries was found to have been relatively stable despite the budget increase in recent years. However, the average project size is still very small and the geographical dispersion considerable. In most partner countries, only one or two PAOs are working and the regional projects may actually have implied an increase in the number of countries and partners that the PAOs work with.

Support in the form of tangible gifts and money that is not project related should, according to the Guidelines, be avoided. If such contributions are made, they should be closely linked to projects to develop capacity, training, exchange and institutions. In the projects studied, the financial support given has usually had such a linkage. Examples include the financing of the training by the Democratic Alliance, the Party for Public Rule and the Colombian Communist Party. Costs in connection with the Socialist Globus journal of the Socialist Party of Ukraine come close to regular budget support and the Colombian Communist Party's use of VIF funds to fund the election campaign of some of their candidates was clearly contrary to the Guidelines.

The Guidelines state that projects shall mainly target developing countries and countries in the Western Balkans and in Eastern Europe that are eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA).⁵⁰ As observed in Chapter 3, PAO partner countries are almost always ODA countries, with the exception of Singapore, Burma, Russia and a few countries included in the regional projects.

Furthermore, it is said that a balance between the groups of countries should be strived for, based on an assessment of needs. Such assessments have not been made, and it is not quite clear from the Guidelines what such a balance should look like or what should be considered a 'need'. The PAOs have apparently made very different assessments of where there is a need to work, alternatively based their decisions on other considerations.⁵¹ Approximately half of the Programme budget was spent in Eastern and Central Europe, but there were considerable variations among the PAOs.⁵² Thirty-one percent of the cooperation went to countries classified by Freedom house as unfree, 24 % to countries classified as partly free and 19 % to countries classified as free.

Cooperation strategies and other Swedish measures in the country should be taken into account in the plans of the PAO where applicable. No signs of consideration of country strategies or other Swedish measures were found in Ukraine, Colombia and Uganda; yet, neither were any contradictions identified.⁵³

⁴⁹ Proposition 2002/03:122, Gemensamt ansvar: Sveriges politik för global utveckling.

⁵⁰ The instructions issued by Sida state that 'the party-affiliated organisations themselves decide in which countries they will work, but the projects must be in developing countries (*Democratic Alliance countries*). Exceptions may be made for Russia and other countries on condition that the Government assigns Sida the task of administering support to other countries'.

⁵¹ In a comment to the draft report, five PAOs state that they want to work in countries where prospects of making a difference are the greatest and that they naturally strive to work in countries with strongly felt needs. Given the nature of the activities, they do not want to be restricted in their choice of countries or follow the priorities of broader development cooperation. A point to be made, however, is that PAOs can 'make a difference' in different ways and for different persons depending on where they are working. Furthermore, very different assessments can be made of where there is a 'need' depending on who makes the assessment and on what is to be considered a need in the first place.

⁵² As a comparison, in 2008 the budget line for development cooperation (7.8.1) was SEK 14.5 million while the budget line for reform cooperation in Eastern Europe (7.49:1) was SEK 1.1 million.

⁵³ For example, the main components of the Swedish cooperation strategy for Colombia are peace and security, human rights and democratic governance. Strengthening of the party systems connects to all of these things but there was no linkage between the projects and the specific objectives of the cooperation strategy.

6 Management for Results

Among the many factors that may have influenced results, this chapter looks at how the Programme has been managed.⁵⁴ To what extent has the management been ‘results based’ and how is this likely to have affected the results? Results-Based Management (*mål- och resultatstyrning*) has been defined in various ways, but is usually considered to include the following main components:

- 1 Clear and achievable objectives at relevant levels are established.
- 2 Activities are systematically geared towards the achievement of the established objectives.
- 3 Relevant and reliable results information is produced enabling comparisons with the objectives.
- 4 Results information is used for accountability purposes, management and decision making.

6.1 Establishment of Objectives

As observed earlier in this report, objectives have been established for the Programme as a whole as well as for the individual projects.

6.1.1 Programme Objective

In Chapter 2, it was concluded that the Programme objective was very broad and open for a variety of interpretations, containing concepts that have been understood in different ways. There is no reference upwards to the overall objectives of Swedish development and reform cooperation, including poverty reduction. There is also a discrepancy between the systems perspective expressed in the Programme objective and what the PAOs are mainly doing, namely supporting individual parties. This limits the usefulness of the Programme objective in terms of steering and follow-up.

⁵⁴An important aspect of Programme management, problematic from accountability and constitutional perspectives, is the arrangement whereby Sida has the function to control the cooperation of the political parties, at the same time as it is an agency under the Government. Another aspect is PAOs' close contacts to the political parties, giving them a possibility to influence both Programme Guidelines and budget. However, this lies outside the focus of this evaluation. For a discussion, see the evaluation in 2000 and *Huvudmannaskapet för stöd genom partianknutna organisationer*, Anders Oljelund, 2008.

As understood by the Team, there are objectives of the PAO cooperation that are equally important but at different levels. One way of expressing the Programme objective could be to show the chain of envisaged results at different levels, for example as below:

Conditions that will enable poor people to improve their lives/ Strengthened democracy, equitable and sustainable development and closer ties to the EU



Strengthened democracy and respect for human rights



A well-functioning party system, defined as...



Well-functioning parties, in terms of...

6.1.2 Project Objectives

In practice, the way in which project objectives are expressed varies considerably. Compared to a few years ago, there has been considerable improvement in terms of how objectives are presented in project applications, but there are still a number of important weaknesses.

One is the lack of a consistent chain of objectives linking planned activities to the ultimate aim of the project. Furthermore, the assumptions on which the projects are based (for one objective to lead to the next) are not accounted for. Reference is seldom made to the overall Programme objective, one reason probably being its vagueness.

Sida instructions require PAOs to specify the objectives for each project in terms of overarching objective, project objective and sub-objective/expected results. The way project documents have been written indicates that there is some confusion regarding this terminology.

A further problem observed is the lack of indicators for measurement of goal fulfilment. Sometimes there are no indicators at all. In other cases, the indicators are inadequate by not really reflecting the objectives, by being too vague or by being practically impossible to apply.

In many cases, objectives are clearly overambitious, resulting in them not being achieved.

Problems have also been observed with respect to how objectives are communicated to different stakeholders. Project objectives were mainly formulated in dialogues between the PAOs and the respective partner organisations. However, in many cases, there was a process of translation to Swedish and reformulation before the project proposal was presented to Sida. In several cases the partner organisation had therefore not had access to the objectives finally agreed upon by Sida. In a few cases, it was even found that organisations in Sweden responsible for management and implementation of the project had not seen the version approved by Sida. Contracts are signed with the partner organisations, with more or less detailed reference to what

has been approved by Sida. There is, however, no standard practice of establishing a 'project document' as a common point of reference for all concerned actors.

6.2 Steering Towards the Objectives

The Swedish Government establishes the general orientation of the Programme and decides upon financing. Sida's main role in steering is to administer the Programme according to the Guidelines, including reviewing and assessing the PAOs' applications, disbursing funds and receiving reports. Sida has no mandate to guide the programme in terms of content. The PAOs develop their own programmes and projects, and define project content in dialogue with their partner organisations.

6.2.1 Programme Guidelines and Instructions

The two main steering documents are the Programme Guidelines established by the Government and the Instructions issued by Sida.

The *Programme Guidelines* provide the general framework for the Programme. Apart from defining the Programme objective, they specify requirements on partner organisations, how the Programme shall be administered (including the role of Sida), the basis for financing, reporting requirements, the financing of joint projects and the functioning of the Reference Group. There is, however, no steering in terms of with whom the PAOs should cooperate and where or how they should do it. The guidelines thus give the PAOs ample room for shaping their own programmes.

The current Guidelines were developed in a consultative process with the PAOs in 2006. A further dimension to recall is that the Guidelines ultimately are decided upon by the very same parties that the PAOs are affiliated with.

Sida's *Instructions* have been elaborated for the practical administration of the Programme and specify the responsibilities of Sida and the PAOs, the content and structure of applications, the grounds for Sida's assessment as well as administrative procedures and reporting. Appendices to the Instructions provide administrative information and specify how the projects and budget shall be presented. The Instructions are based on the Guidelines.

The PAOs themselves stated in interviews that the Guidelines and Instructions largely reflect what they would be doing under any circumstances. However, certain changes introduced in the Guidelines, including stricter requirements on applications and reports, were reported to have led to changes in the way in which the PAOs work. The Guidelines are also important for PAOs to counter pressure from partner organisations as well as from the Swedish political parties to use funds for non-intended purposes, such as direct support to campaigns and to projects with a social or economic objective.

6.2.2 The Financing Mechanism

Guidelines also establish the principle for financing PAOs, i.e. proportionally to representation in the Swedish Parliament (apart from the core support of SEK 650 000 each).

This system implies that there is no link between resource allocation and results, contradicting the very essence of results-based management. This implies a risk that money is not put to its best use and does not give any incentives for PAOs to raise their performance ('carrots') nor any instruments to sanction PAOs financially, should this be motivated from a results perspective ('sticks').⁵⁵

It also implies that the cooperation is largely determined by conditions in Sweden and not by the situation in the partner country. This contradicts a cornerstone Swedish and international development policy as expressed in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda of Action.

The main argument for the current system is that Sida, for various reasons, is said not to be in a position to decide upon the allocation of finance to PAOs in a similar way as for other cooperation. As a Swedish government agency, Sida ultimately depends on the governing political parties and should therefore not decide upon financing to organisations affiliated with the parties, it is argued. It is further claimed that Sida risks being accused of being politically partisan.⁵⁶ Another argument is that Sida lacks sufficient competence for assessing the work of the PAOs. Furthermore, if Sida takes a more active role in decision making, it is said that there is a greater risk that the activities of PAOs will become confusing with government policies. It has also been argued that the financing principle reflects the democratic principles where power relations are tested in open elections. The financing principle has support among PAOs themselves.⁵⁷ It is generally thought of as fair, simple and predictable. Furthermore, the PAOs state that they would not collaborate to the same extent as they do today if they had to compete for funding.

While these are important arguments, most of them are based on the presumption that Sida bases its financing decisions on reviews and approvals of separate projects. If decisions were instead based on capacity and results, and Sida also used external expertise (as the Agency often does in other fields), it would be considerably harder to accuse Sida of being partisan, lacking competence or becoming too closely connected with PAO projects.

The present system gives predictability during the four-year mandate period but becomes highly unpredictable in connection with elections; there is a risk that good projects have to be terminated, while some PAOs will have to develop new projects on short notice.

The fairness argument is also questionable; it would seem more fair for all PAOs to receive the same amount unless some PAOs proved better than others. PAOs receive government funding for their contributions to the Programme objective and not as representatives of certain constituencies in Sweden, and there are no indications from this evaluation that the bigger PAOs – generally speaking – are more effective than the smaller ones. No solid argument for why the PAOs affiliated with smaller parties should receive less money has so far been presented to the Team.

⁵⁵ This obviously does not exclude that the PAOs themselves strive to improve and develop their activities, which has also been observed.

⁵⁶ A somewhat contradictory argument considering that the PAOs themselves state that their aim is not to promote a specific ideology but to promote democracy.

⁵⁷ In their comments to the draft report, the PAOs state that they want to keep the current system.

When Sida provides financial support to Swedish civil society organisations for their own activities in accordance with Government Policy, a requirement is that they must finance a minimum of 10 % of their project costs (apart from in-kind contributions) as a sign of their priorities and organisational commitment. The Team notes that no such requirement is placed on the PAOs (as originally proposed in 1994) and questions why they should be looked upon differently in this particular respect.⁵⁸

6.2.3 Project Identification and Formulation

There is little systemacy in how projects are initiated. Contacts and project ideas are often established through international party networks. Many projects have been launched as a result of personal contacts and coincidences.

As explained in the *Relevance* chapter, the way projects have been elaborated has varied, but proposals often originate from the partner organisations and are then further elaborated in dialogue.

This implies that needs assessments are largely made by the partner organisations. This is positive in many respects, but as observed in the *Relevance* chapter, it does not ensure relevance to the needs of the party system as a whole.

The Swedish PAOs also make their own independent assessments. However, these assessments rarely include a comprehensive diagnosis of problems and needs at the organisational level. This reflects a trust in the partner organisation assessments, but is also likely to be a question of resources and access to make such assessments.

The PAOs' assessments of problems and needs at the national level inevitably reflect the ideological position of the PAOs and the fact that they are generally restricted to working with certain parties. While the PAOs have different sources of information, their partner organisations are obviously major ones and, for obvious reasons, there is limited consultation with other parties. The problem analyses presented in the applications to Sida usually seem to have been written with support to a certain organisation already in mind. Comprehensive analyses of the party system and needs to be addressed are generally not made, and should perhaps not be expected considering the nature of PAOs.

6.2.4 Selection of Partner Countries, Partners and Projects

The choices made by PAOs are guided on the one hand by their own statutes, policy documents, board decisions etc. and on the other hand by the Programme Guidelines and Instructions. In addition, the PAOs need to consider the requests and priorities of their partners.

The decision of which countries, partner organisation and activities are to be supported is formally taken by the Board of each PAO, based on proposals from their secretariats. No PAOs have formalised selection criteria. The decisions are instead usually based on:

⁵⁸ In a comment to the draft report, five PAOs state that the party foundations cannot be compared to civil society organisations, as the PAOs' point of departure is the Government's policy underlining the importance of strong political actors. However, also the financing of civil society organisations is based on Government policy. Furthermore, the PAOs often stress that they do not act on behalf of the Swedish government but that this is a government financing of *their* activities.

- The political orientation and/or value ground of the potential partner organisation.
- The level of trust that has been established with a particular organisation and persons linked to it.
- The qualities of the project as such (realism, potential impact).
- The capacity and potential contribution of the Swedish PAO.
- The degree of coherence with the PAO's own strategies and geographical priorities.
- The priorities expressed by individual board members, Swedish constituencies or the Swedish party.

These criteria may, but not necessarily will, lead to a selection of countries, partner organisations and projects contributing strategically to the Programme objective. As mentioned in earlier chapters, there is a potential conflict between the priorities of a PAO and what is most needed to address problems of the party system as a whole (see discussion on relevance).

That the cooperation is largely based on close relations between the PAOs and their partner organisation is likely to lead to an emphasis on individual party development.

6.2.5 Coordination

Coordination implies that projects are planned and implemented with consideration to what others are doing, in order to increase complementarity and/or achieve synergies.

There is no coordination among the PAO projects and no cohesive approaches at the country level. In most cases, the PAOs work independently with their own partners and usually also in different countries. Not even in the two identified cases where two PAOs supported the same party had there been any systematic exchange of information.

In the three visited countries, there was no coordination with other Swedish-funded initiatives to promote democracy, including other party system strengthening activities (such as the UNDP/IDEA project in Colombia). However, a certain complementarity could be seen in for example Uganda with the 'Deepening Democracy Programme'.

The Swedish cooperation strategies did not guide the work of the PAOs in the three visited countries. On the other hand, these strategies are silent with respect to party system development.

The extent to which support to a particular partner had been coordinated with that of other organisations and countries varied but was usually found to be limited. In some but not all cases, the PAOs were aware of how much and what type of support was given to their partners by others. However, the PAOs sometimes exchanged information with the party foundations in other countries. In a few cases, projects had been implemented jointly with these, for example KIC's Uganda project (with NDI) and JHS' regional project in Latin America (implemented through a regional

organisation for centre-right parties, UPLA, sometimes with the co-funding of Hanns Seidel Stiftung of Germany.)

The arguments for and against coordination of the PAO cooperation have been subject to debate. The principal argument is that of effectiveness: A coherent approach, addressing the multiple obstacles to democracy in a systematic way, should have better prospects to succeed than isolated interventions. The present evaluation also indicated that the small sizes of projects, their scatteredness and lack of concerted approaches are likely to reduce the effectiveness of cooperation. The PAOs often argue, however, that they can work more effectively if given full flexibility. This may be a question of at what level effectiveness is considered.⁵⁹

Another aspect to consider is the new policy framework expressed in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, calling for a higher degree of harmonisation and coordination. The new policy framework has also changed the landscape of democracy support, with an increased number of joint donor initiatives. The PAOs need to find ways to relate to this policy framework. As sometimes stressed, political parties are independent organisations acting in competition with each other, making it different than the bilateral cooperation. Yet, this does not mean that Swedish policy does not apply.

As seen above, coordination can take place at different levels: between PAOs, with other Swedish democracy support and with other international actors active in partner countries.

As long as there is no steering of the PAOs by MFA or Sida, initiatives for coordination must come from the PAOs themselves. A beginning could be an increased exchange of information and a more active Reference Group.

The above discussion borders on the question of to what extent the PAOs should work jointly. As the Team sees it, the central question is not whether the PAOs – seven quite small Swedish organisations – are working jointly with each other, but to what extent the principal problems with respect to democracy and party systems are strategically and effectively addressed. Different problems have to be addressed in different ways, some calling for joint approaches and others not. Furthermore, it was seen in Chapter 3 that there are many different ways of working jointly.

6.2.6 Approval and Quality Assurance

Sida reviews and assesses the two-year applications submitted by the PAOs against the Programme Guidelines. However, it is not quite clear from the Guidelines, however, how far Sida's responsibility stretches in terms of ensuring a minimum *quality* standard of the projects.

In its Instructions, Sida has established five assessment criteria: i) whether the application contains all components specified in the Guidelines, ii) feasibility of the project including capacity of the partner organisation, iii) relevance in relation to the Programme objective, iv) expected results and v) cost-effectiveness and sustainability. These criteria indicate that Sida has assumed a role as quality assurer.

⁵⁹ It may also be so that the PAOs, representing different political agendas, have limited interest in coordination.

One problem for Sida's assessment is the difficulty of making a reliable assessment based on a fairly brief project description.

Another problem is Sida's limited room to act if it is found that a project does not meet the above criteria. According to the Guidelines, Sida shall withhold financing as long as complete two-year plans and reports have not been submitted. However, there is no mechanism to respond flexibly when a project proposal presented by a PAO simply is of low quality. Nor is Sida in a position to increase or decrease financing to a PAO in response to its capacity, performance or results.

Finally, considering the way in which Sida normally operates, it is unviable from an administrative point of view for the Agency to make a detailed review of about 150 projects with an annual average budget of a few hundred thousand SEK. On this issue, comparison can again be made with the civil society cooperation, where Sida has long moved towards assessing capacity, performance and results⁶⁰, both for administrative reasons and because it is found to be a better way to safeguard quality.⁶¹

The need to review each project is partly a consequence of the financing mechanism; as the PAOs' funding is not based on capacity or performance, it is the only remaining option (unless the PAOs should have *both* a privileged form of financing and milder treatment than other organisations). Paradoxically, however, the current system constitutes a combination of 'micro management' and lack of real control.⁶²

Over the years, Sida has turned down projects only in exceptional cases. In some cases, Sida has asked for additional information, suggested changes and possibly influenced through its dialogue with the PAOs. Interviews with former Sida officials indicate that there has been a tendency to avoid conflicts with the PAOs due to a fear of this striking back at Sida. Sida officials have been aware, and sometimes explicitly reminded, of the PAOs' direct links to political parties and Sida board/council members.

Some of the projects studied in connection with this evaluation had been approved by Sida despite evident flaws, such as poorly formulated objectives and indicators, or weak problem analyses. However, weaknesses, in other cases were impossible to detect by a Sida officer, for example when projects were inadequately prepared, when there were capacity constraints and when preconditions for implementation were lacking for other reasons.

The Reference Group should, according to the Guidelines, have 'a general' responsibility for quality assurance of the Programme. The Team cannot see, however, that the group has had such a function.

In sum, through its assessments, Sida can fairly well ensure that the activities of the PAOs comply formally with the Programme Guidelines. However, there is no system in place to ensure quality and that projects effectively contribute to the Programme objective.

⁶⁰ With instruments such as capacity studies, systems audits and compliance audits.

⁶¹ In addition, there was during a period (2006-2008) a high turnover at the position of Programme officer at Sida, perceived by the PAOs as a problem.

⁶² As a comparison, when the Palme Center receives financing from the budget for Civil Society cooperation, the organisation is also subject to systems and compliance audits. The assessment of a project proposal recently presented by KIC to the Swedish Embassy in Uganda is considerably more demanding than if the project would have been financed as a PAO project.

A benefit of the standards set by Sida, however, is that they pressure the PAOs to prepare their projects more solidly.

As noted earlier, a considerable improvement in the PAO project proposals can be seen, if compared with how they looked in 2000. This is a result both of the increased Sida requirements and efforts made by the PAOs in response to these requirements. It is not quite clear, however, whether the requirements imposed by Sida have implied a general change in substance or rather a ‘repackaging’ of the project to fit the Sida format. The latter would be counterproductive as it creates a discrepancy between the intentions of the implementing partners and what is expressed in documents.

6.3 Generation of Results Information

According to the Guidelines, the PAOs shall analyse their activities and assess the effects of each project in relation to the overall Programme objective. The instruments used for generation of results information normally consist of monitoring and evaluation.

6.3.1 Monitoring

Monitoring refers to the continuous collection of data on specific indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives. It normally focuses on activities, output and events in the project environment.

The PAOs’ monitoring activities are often conducted on an informal basis, reflecting the usually close and friendly relation with the partner organisations. The way in which projects have been monitored has also depended a lot on project content and the respective roles in project implementation. In most (but not all) projects, PAOs are in frequent direct contact with their partners. However, no PAO has a well-developed *system* for monitoring that specifies what is to be monitored, when, by whom and for whom.

In the evaluated cases, the quality of the PAOs’ monitoring varied considerably. Some had a rather good grip on how the cooperation progressed, but not all. In a few cases, the PAO was not very updated on the project environment.

Several PAOs employed a regular follow-up procedure of training events, conferences etc. in the form of questionnaires to participants to get their views. However, there was no follow-up by asking participants after a period of time about the usefulness or applicability of the knowledge and skills gained.

A factor limiting the possibilities to monitor the projects has been the absence of indicators. Another has been the number of projects and countries in relation to the capacity of the PAOs. In one case, one person had to monitor eleven bilateral projects in eight countries, plus six regional projects (covering several countries).

6.3.2 Evaluation

Evaluation here refers to a more systematic assessment of the value or merit of a project. It goes beyond mere activities and output and focuses on results at the

outcome and impact levels. Each PAO shall, according to Sida's Instructions, allocate finances for a results evaluation by the end of each mandate period.

The PAOs carry out evaluations on an ad hoc basis. No PAO has a system for evaluation, although some have recently made efforts to strengthen their evaluation systems and methodology. During 2007/08, the following evaluations were carried out:

PAO	Object of Evaluation	Evaluation Purpose
CIS	Capacity development project of l'Adf Rda., Burkina Faso	To measure the effects and impact of the activities of the partnership on the performance of ADF/RDA.
	The project 'Women Political Leaders' in Ouahigouya, Burkina Faso	To measure the effects of influence of activities in relation to the strengthening of competence among women in the political parties in Ouahigouya.
	The project 'Democracy and Development of Political Parties', Burkina Faso	To measure the effects of the project and assess capacity development of the organisation.
	The Democracy Project for Women in Mbekweni 2004–2008, South Africa (mid-term review)	To assess progress made so far and make recommendations for the rest of the project period.
	Support to Early Childhood Education in Mbekweni 2004–2008, South Africa (mid-term review)	To assess progress made so far and make recommendations for the rest of the project period.
JHS	Cooperation with the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP), 2007-2008, Bosnia	<i>Information not available</i>
	JHS - Cooperation with country (confidential)	<i>Information not available</i>
KIC	Youth Assembly Project, Kenya	To assess the project in terms of relevance and efficiency, and to identify lessons learnt and recommend ways forward
	Democratic Alliance, Ukraine	To provide KIC and its partner organisations with an overall analysis of the cooperation between KDU and Democratic Alliance, with focus on the three-party cooperation, organisation and implementation processes.
Palme Center	Political education projects, Akbayan, Philippines, 2001-	To assess the impact of three Palme Center projects with Akbayan.
Silc	Project in Serbia 2004-2008	Assessment of the relevance and to give examples of results, 'good practice' and areas in need of improvement.
	Silc's Projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Assessment of the relevance and to give examples of results, 'good practice' and areas in need of improvement.
VIF	Project MST/Bahia, Brazil 2002-2007	To assess achieved results of the activities
	Project to improve participation in community affairs of ethnic minority women, Vietnam.	Not stated in the evaluation. Focus on implementation and immediate achievements.

Fourteen evaluations were carried out, whereof five by CIS despite being a relatively small PAO. All of the evaluations focused on individual projects.⁶³ The level of ambition of the evaluations varies considerably; some provide rather in-depth analyses of the projects while others are very brief and general. In a majority of the evaluations, there is a discussion on results, although mostly in terms of implemented activities, output and immediate outcome. There is generally no discussion about the likely impact on the party system. Some evaluations focus primarily on implementation and organisational aspects.

All evaluations were carried out by external evaluators, of which a majority were from Sweden and some (as the CIS evaluations in Burkina Faso and the Palme Center evaluation in Kenya) were national consultants.

Another form of 'evaluation' is when a PAO gathers its partner organisations to discuss experiences, achievements and lessons. An example of this is the workshop arranged by Green Forum in September 2008 to plan future activities. The outcome of this exercise was documented in a report. Another example is the gathering of partner organisations arranged by VIF in the fall of 2009.

The difficulties in assessing results commented on initially in this evaluation obviously also apply to the PAOs; it is not an easy task. However, factors that the PAOs can affect include the number and the sizes of projects, which are currently complicating evaluations and making them costly, and project design, a factor currently making projects difficult to evaluate.

Even though it will probably never be possible to demonstrate results at the country level, there is considerable potential for better follow-up of results in the short- and medium-term (for example, participants use of knowledge, changes taking place within a party etc.), and to be more explicit about how likely it is that these results contribute to better functioning party systems.

With respect to *external* evaluations, it was noted that the present one is the first one in 14 years with a results focus (see Chapter 1).

Monitoring and evaluation is important for any cooperation, but particularly when involving high-risk projects implemented in unpredictable environments, such as the PAO projects. However, the fact that the funding of PAOs is not based on demonstrated results reduces incentives to generate results information.

6.4 Use of Results Information

With a results based management, results information is expected to be used for reporting and accountability purposes as well as for management and decision making.

6.4.1 Reporting and Accountability

The PAOs shall present an interim report after year one and a final report after year two. The final report shall include an assessment of results of each project in relation to the approved application.

⁶³As opposed to thematic evaluations, evaluations of a group of projects etc.

In most observed cases, the reports were written by the Swedish PAO with a varying amount of input from the partner organisation. There are also examples of reports that were written by the partner organisation and then translated into Swedish, as well as of reports prepared by the Swedish PAO only. This largely reflects the division of responsibilities in the respective projects.

The quality of the final reports varies considerably. Most of them, but not all, specify implemented activities and produced output. The reports include very little verified data on the results of this output. Rather, they tend to be repetitions of how the projects were originally *intended* to contribute to certain results.

In a few cases, the reports to Sida were found to contain misleading or outright incorrect information. In some other cases, the reported results referred to something different than what the PAO had applied for.

According to Sida's Instructions, the reports shall follow the same structure as the two-year application. Still, several PAOs expressed uncertainty about what exactly to include in the report. As a result, the reports look quite different, limiting the possibilities to make comparisons and/or aggregate results.

The reports are submitted to the responsible Sida officer, who reads them and, when required, asks for clarifications and/or additional information. Unless complete reports are presented by a PAO, Sida shall withhold further financing. This has occasionally happened.

There are, however, no provisions to hold PAOs accountable for how they have used funds or for what they have achieved in terms of results. Nor is there any further dissemination of information provided by the PAOs.

The Reference Group should function as a forum for exchange of information and experiences. The discussions in the Reference Group have, however, dealt with form rather than content. Moreover, there has been no regular reporting of results to the Group.

The partner organisations never get to see the PAOs' final reports to Sida. While reports are in many cases certainly based on input from partner organisations, there is no systematic reporting *to* these organisations.

6.4.2 Management and Decision Making

The limited amount of results information indicates that the PAOs' decision making is largely based on other things than actual results; it may instead be based on for example how smooth the cooperation has been, the rate of implemented activities, the importance given to working with a particular organisation or a particular country, or what results the project is believed to have achieved.

Sida has no mandate to make any decisions based on the results of the PAOs' work. What Sida can do, and does, is merely to give feedback and suggestions to the PAOs. Sida could also use information to identify areas in need of capacity strengthening.

As mentioned earlier, there is no use of results information for the allocation of government finance. The amount to be received by each PAO is already fixed

according to the established model. The successive increases of the total Programme budget have not been based on results information either.

6.5 General Observations

The analysis above shows that there are a number of weaknesses in terms of results-based management, which are likely to reduce effectiveness. Even though there has been an improvement in some respects in recent years (for example in terms of project applications and reports), there is still a need for better formulated objectives and indicators, strengthened systems ensuring that activities contribute to the overall Programme objective, improved monitoring and evaluation as well as more effective use of results information. The level of transparency could also be considerably improved.

Some of the observed weaknesses observed are related to the capacity of the PAOs, such as capacity to formulate objectives and indicators and to monitor and follow up activities. Such capacity has apparently varied. Other weaknesses have to do with the way the Programme is set up, in particular the financing mechanism, which assures each PAO a certain financing independently of results.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ In their comments to the draft report, five PAOs stated that there should be a discussion between Sida and the PAOs regarding the professional development of the PAOs, but that such development should mainly be a permanent component of the activities of each organisation. The Team fully agrees. Sida cannot and should not take a main role in the capacity development of PAOs, particularly considering its function to approve PAO applications and reports.

7 Strengths and Limitations of PAO

This evaluation has not included an analysis of the capacity of PAOs. However, the Team's observations have given some indications of their strengths as well as of their weaknesses and inherent limitations. These observations can partly explain the findings regarding effectiveness and relevance. They may also indicate needs for capacity development of the PAOs, as well as give an indication of what role PAOs should have in Swedish support to democracy.

7.1 Some Observations from the Evaluation

As stated initially in this report, the PAO cooperation builds on the idea that the PAOs' institutional linkage to the Swedish parties makes them particularly well suited to work with party development, drawing on their experiences of party building, international contacts and ideological foundations.

Experience of democratic party building

The Swedish parties have substantial experience of democratic party building from Sweden. Most persons working within the PAOs have some political background. In addition, they draw on resource persons from the Swedish political parties.

The extent to which Swedish experiences are relevant depends on the problem to be addressed by a project. The Team found examples of transfer of experiences that participants in projects had found useful, but also of experiences that participants said were not very relevant for their situation.

Local competence was used, to a certain extent, in most PAO projects, and some PAOs (such as Silc and KIC) have an explicit policy to always use local competence when available. This is likely to increase effectiveness and efficiency. At the same time, it changes the role of the Swedish PAOs to become more of a financier, limiting the 'added value' of funds coming from a Swedish PAO. In several reviewed projects, the specific Swedish input has been rather limited, such as when the support has primarily been financial.

It should also be recalled that if competence in party building is necessary, it is not sufficient for effective cooperation. PAOs also need capacity to turn their contacts and competence into well-designed and well-managed projects. Project management capacity appears to vary considerably among the PAOs, and there is room for improvement in all of them. All PAOs have persons with experience in party building. Some, but not all, have persons with experience in development cooperation.

Contacts and international networks

The Swedish political parties and PAOs are all part of wider networks that include party internationals, youth associations, personal relations between politicians etc. To a varying degree, the PAOs also have contacts with party foundations of other

countries. These networks were central for the initiation of the projects observed in Ukraine, Uganda and Colombia. It was also noted that the PAOs used their networks to put partner organisations in contact with colleagues in other countries. This was often much appreciated by the partner organisations.

At the same time, building the cooperation on established contacts also implies a risk, in the sense that it may not necessarily lead the PAO to the best potential partner organisations. Furthermore, it tends to be easier for some PAOs than others to find ideologically like-minded parties. The party spectra in the partner countries often differ significantly from that in Sweden.

Shared values

The observations also support the frequent claims by PAOs that relations are strengthened by the fact that both sides share a similar ideology and/or political agenda. This creates confidence and opportunities for dialogue on ideological issues, as well as networking opportunities. On the other hand, being value-based organisations also implies that PAOs are likely to be met with suspicion by those not sharing these values. It is also explicitly inscribed in the statutes of several PAOs that they are to work with and/or support like-minded parties. Generally speaking, this gives them a comparative advantage to work with particular parties or party segments, but limits their potential to work with the party system as a whole (unless working jointly).

Staff and financial resources

In addition to the above, it may be useful to consider the capacity of PAOs in terms of finance and staff. The budgets of the PAOs were accounted for in Chapter 3, showing considerable differences in how much the organisations receive. In addition to the Swedish Government's PAO funding, the Palme Center has an extensive civil society programme while Silc, KIC and CIS have certain other funding, including from Forum Syd.⁶⁵ The other PAOs have no other regular funding sources.

The number of persons (converted into full-time positions) working with party cooperation also varies considerably, as can be seen below.

	CIS	GF	JHS	KIC	Palme Center	Silc	VIF
No. of staff for party cooperation	2.5	1	7	3	7.5	5	1.5

These differences largely reflect the level of PAO funding. However, the figures also reflect the way in which the PAOs operate. For example, JHS has been relatively more involved in project implementation than the other PAOs, and GF is largely managed by one person without a permanent office and a minimum of administration.

7.2 Role of PAOs in Swedish Democracy Support

In 2008, Sweden's cooperation for democracy and human rights through Sida amounted to SEK 5.1 billion, i.e. approximately one-third of the Agency's budget.

⁶⁵ Where PAOs may seek financing given that that the partner organisation is not a political party.

This included support to parliaments, elections, public administration and civil society. It also included strengthening of political party systems through channels other than PAOs. It is impossible to tell the exact size of the total Swedish support to party system development, but an indication can be given by Annex 4, listing party support other than PAO cooperation identified in connection with this evaluation. The support to Democracy over Global Programmes currently amounts to approximately SEK 95 million, out of which SEK 75 million goes to the PAO cooperation and the remaining part is shared among organisations such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliamentarians for Global Action, UNDP and Transparency International. The PAO cooperation is in other words a very large share of the support to democracy through Global Programmes.

Looking at the PAO cooperation as one component among many to support democracy gives reason to reflect on the specific role of PAOs. The observations presented in the previous section indicate that PAOs are well suited to work directly with political parties to strengthen these as organisations from the “inside”. PAOs do not have the same potential to work with the broader structural factors determining the functioning of the party system, such as adequate legislation, a functioning judiciary, an active civil society, an appropriate election system, well-informed voters etc.

The fact that PAOs are carriers of certain values and ideologies further limits their potential and incentives for working across the whole party spectrum. This indicates a comparative advantage to engage in ‘fraternal’ cooperation with like-minded parties with which PAOs can develop trust, close links and exchanges. Chapter 3 as well as the case studies showed that this is also what PAOs are primarily engaged in.

Such a conclusion at the same time limits the role of PAOs in Swedish democracy support considerably, as fraternal cooperation with one or a couple of parties in a partner country can provide only part of the solution to problems of that party system. Many parties in the partner country will not receive any support and it can not be taken for granted that these will be taken care of via the cooperation of others.

The Team also believes that limiting the cooperation to fraternal support would be an underutilisation of PAOs and the competence they represent. Evidence was seen in for example Uganda that PAOs have a capacity to do more than provide organisational support to sister parties. As autonomous organisations, it is ultimately up to the individual PAOs to demonstrate whether they have the capacity and interest to assume a broader role than to support like-minded parties, and whether they are competitive in relation to alternative actors.

In connection with this discussion, it should be recalled that even though fraternal and multi-party cooperation represent different approaches, their objective is the same, namely to improve party systems and ultimately democracy. It is in relation to this objective the PAOs’ achievements should be assessed, irrespective of the chosen approach.

The evaluation has touched upon the fact that the PAO cooperation is treated differently than most other development and reform cooperation. *If* the PAO cooperation is so different in nature that the existing and regulatory framework is not applicable to it, it must be questioned whether it should be financed via the development

cooperation budget in the first place. However, being financed via the development and reform cooperation budget, it should reasonably also comply with this framework.

One important dimension of the PAO cooperation identified in the evaluation is the mutual interests of the partners. There is a government policy for actor-driven cooperation⁶⁶ that says that such cooperation is ‘to stimulate and strengthen the emergence of self-supporting relationships of mutual interest between Swedish actors and actors in low and medium income countries within the framework of Sweden’s policy for global development.’ The actors are expected to drive the cooperation by themselves and shared ownership along with mutual interest and a division of responsibility are stressed. Currently, it is not quite clear how the PAO cooperation relates to this strategy. However, there may be reason to see the role of PAOs increasingly in terms of actor-driven cooperation. This would both imply a greater recognition of effects in Sweden and reconsideration of how the cooperation is financed.

It was at the same time observed that PAOs are not the only actors engaged in party and party system support. From a results perspective, it is difficult to justify a special treatment of PAOs, at least in areas where there are many actors working. This would speak for opening up the system of financing and introducing an increased degree of competition.

⁶⁶ UD2007/46452/UP, Aktörssamverkan för global utveckling – policy för aktörssamverkan inom utvecklingssamarbetet.

8 Recommendations

Below are recommendations in relation to Programme management as well as project management, with the aim of enhancing results. The first are primarily directed to MFA and Sida while the latter are primarily directed to the PAOs.

8.1 Programme Management

It was observed that the way in which the Programme objective is formulated today limits its usefulness for steering and follow-up.

1. The Programme objective should be revised to make the envisaged results unambiguous while at the same time leaving room for a variety of approaches. The objective should reflect what PAOs have a potential to achieve, as well as make reference to overarching objectives of the Swedish cooperation.

Sida's mandate to review and assess the applications from the PAOs is not quite clear from the Guidelines. Such an assessment is of particular importance considering the way in which PAOs are financed. The current system of assessment is not sufficient to ensure project quality. In addition, there are no flexible and effective mechanisms in place for Sida to rely on should the performance of a PAO not be up to standard.

2. Sida's mandate to review and assess PAOs and their operations should be clarified and strengthened. This includes reconsidering/developing criteria on which Sida's assessment should be based and clarifying what measures Sida shall take if a PAO does not perform according to the established standard.

The current practice of assessing individual projects is not very functional, neither to ensure quality of the cooperation nor from an administrative point of view.

3. The application procedures should be changed, moving from project assessment towards assessment of organisational capacity and results. This change may have to be introduced gradually. Reference to project documents (see recommendation below) can be made in the applications without attaching these.

Both strengths and weaknesses were observed with respect to organisation and capacity of individual PAOs. The Team observed a few instances of non-compliance with the Programme Guidelines.

4. Individual compliance audits and systems audits of the PAOs should be commissioned, both as a basis for Sida's assessments and to aid the organisations' own improvement efforts.

Allocation of government funds is currently independent of the achieved results of a PAO. Such a system gives no incentives for PAOs to raise their performance, nor possibilities to reduce finance should this be motivated from a results perspective. It also contradicts Swedish and international development policy that cooperation shall depart from the situation and needs in the partner country.

5. Possible ways of linking allocation of funds to results should be explored.

The content and quality of the PAOs' reports to Sida vary considerably. Several PAOs express an uncertainty regarding what to include in the reports.

6. The content to be included in the PAOs' reports to Sida should be specified in Sida's instructions.

The partner organisations have in most cases not had access to the final project reports. This limits transparency.

7. It should become a standard procedure to share the project reports with the partner organisations, requiring that the reports are written in (or translated into) a language understood by the partner organisation.

Administration of the programme is demanding, requiring a high competence level as well as continuity. For a period of time, there was a high turnover of the programme officer position.

8. Sufficient capacity, competence and continuity at Sida should be ensured. Sida may also consider drawing on external expertise and/or to establish an own 'panel' to be at its disposal.

There is little exchange of information and dialogue on content and strategic issues among the PAOs, as well as between the PAOs and Sida and other actors in the field. The PAOs may serve as a source of learning for Sida, MFA and other actors in Swedish democracy support, and vice versa.

9. The exchange of information and experiences should be increased, with a view to improve coordination and enhance learning. One way could be to change the way in which the Reference Group operates, making it a more active forum for exchange. Other opportunities for dialogue should also be explored, including at the initiative of Sida and the PAOs.

Embassies are only sporadically informed about the activities of the PAOs. Embassies may possess information and contacts useful for the PAOs, and vice versa. Furthermore, the Swedish Embassies should be informed about on-going cooperation in the respective countries.

10. PAOs informing and consulting the Swedish Embassies in the countries where they are working should be made a standard procedure.

Strengthening of party systems depends on a number of things, of which the PAOs work with a few; primarily with the strengthening of individual parties as organisations for which they have a comparative advantage. The PAOs are not always present in countries where the Swedish Government may consider party system strengthening important.

11. The promotion of party and party system development also through actors other than PAOs should continue. PAOs and other actors should be viewed as complementary.

The PAOs' own evaluations and external programme evaluations fill partly different functions. The present evaluation has focused on PAOs, which were observed to make up only one component in Swedish party system support.

12. An external evaluation of Swedish support to party systems should be carried out in 4-5 years. Such an evaluation may look both at the PAO cooperation and support to party systems through other channels.

8.2 Project Management

The problem analyses presented by PAO are generally quite weak and narrow in scope. Comprehensive analyses of the party system as a whole and its main challenges are seldom made. The PAOs have different perspectives and sources of information.

13. Problem analyses should be strengthened and broadened in order to ensure that projects strategically contribute to democracy and well-functioning party systems. Measures to achieve this may include increased information sharing among PAO and increasingly use multiple sources of information in the partner countries, as well as analyses made by the international donor community.

There is little or no coordination among PAO projects and with other efforts to strengthen democracy.

14. Other PAOs, party foundations of other countries, Swedish Embassies and other actors within the field of political party support should be consulted by PAO to explore how its own activities best complement those of others and how synergies may be obtained.

Weaknesses were observed in the design of several projects, both in terms of how projects were formulated and in terms of content. This is likely to have reduced effectiveness and complicated follow-up.

15. Further steps to improve project design, with respect to formulation of objectives, establishment of indicators, clarification of assumptions, consideration of alternative approaches, assessment of risks etc. should be taken.

Projects are normally developed in a dialogue between the PAOs and their partner organisations, and are then presented in the applications to Sida, who formally approves them. In several cases, it was observed that the partner organisations (and sometimes the Swedish implementers) had not seen the final project approved by Sida.

16. It should be made a standard procedure to formalise each project in a separate 'project document' (specifying objectives, plan of activity, budget, division of responsibilities and other essential features of the project) and share it with all concerned parties as a common point of reference.

The project monitoring was observed to vary considerably in quality among the PAOs, sometimes resulting in inadequate reporting to Sida.

17. The quality of monitoring should be improved through, for example, increased use of performance indicators, closer presence in partner countries and use of multiple sources of information.

There is limited results information from the PAOs regarding their activities. The difficulties in generating such information should not be underestimated, but considerably more could, according to the Team, be done to follow up the effects in the short and medium term, being a first condition for further impact.

18. Efforts to generate results information should be increased through formulation of projects that enable a follow-up of results (including indicators and analyses of the pre-project situation), improved monitoring and implementation of ex-post evaluations for which established evaluation practices can be used. Partner organisations can and should have a central role in generating the results information.

It was observed that projects were geographically scattered and usually very small. This makes them relatively more costly to administer and difficult to monitor. Furthermore, there is a risk that they fail to reach the 'critical mass' required to make a change.

19. The number of projects and partner countries should be reduced with a view to ensure a 'critical mass', achieve more continuity and enable better project management.

In a few instances, it was found that dependency on individuals and a low degree of institutionalisation of a project affected its results negatively.

20. Efforts should be made to ensure that all projects are properly institutionalised in the partner countries as well as in Sweden.

Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

Evaluation of the support to democracy through Swedish Party Affiliated Organisations (PAO), 2008-12-22

SADEV (Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation) is a government-funded organisation that initiates and carries out evaluations of Swedish international development cooperation. Its mission is to increase the knowledge about the effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation. SADEV is guided by the overall objective of Swedish international development cooperation, i.e. to create conditions for poor people to improve their living conditions.

1. Background

The Swedish Government has since 1995 funded collaboration between Swedish party affiliated organisations (PAO) and their partner organisations in developing countries and the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. Funds are channelled through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). According to the programme guidelines⁶⁷ the overall objective of the programme is

to contribute to, and support, the development of a well functioning party system, political participation and democratic political systems, to promote the respect of human rights and equality of all people, and to create channels between citizens and political decision-makers in developing countries and countries in Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The purpose is to promote a representative government in these countries reflecting the will of the people. Interventions aiming at making the organisations and the politics of political parties more democratic should be included in the support.

Democratisation is a priority area of Swedish international development cooperation. In its recently issued *Freedom from Oppression*⁶⁸, the Government highlights the role of the political parties in the democratisation process as well as the importance of party cooperation as a component of the total support to democracy. In 2007 the annual budget of the PAO cooperation was nearly doubled to a total of SEK 75 million.

In accordance with international agreements, the Swedish Government is also strongly committed to demonstrating results of the international development cooperation. Information on the results of the PAO cooperation is, however, rather limited. The programme was evaluated in 2000 by the Department of Government of Uppsala University⁶⁹ but the focus was not primarily on results. A more general review was

⁶⁷ Revised guidelines, Government decision 27/07/2006

⁶⁸ 2008/09:11 Frihet från förtryck. Skrivelse om Sveriges demokratibistånd

⁶⁹ Fredrik Ugglå et. al. Stöd till de partiankunnna organisationerna, Sida Evaluation 00/35

made by the same department in 2004⁷⁰. PAO have carried out some evaluations themselves, but not systematically and only occasionally focusing on results.

The revised programme guidelines therefore call for an evaluation of the PAO cooperation to be carried out by SADEV. During the preparation of these Terms of Reference, PAO, MFA and Sida, have all expressed their interest in the evaluation.

2. Objective

The overarching objective of the evaluation is to improve the Swedish support to democracy by generating knowledge about the PAO cooperation and provide opportunities for dialogue and learning. The evaluation is carried out primarily for the use of PAO, MFA and Sida. The intention is that it be useful in the following ways.

- PAO:
- For the enhancement of the internal learning of PAO.
 - For the development of the programmes of PAO and as an input to PAO's decisions on working methods, approaches, target groups etc.
 - For the enhancement of results based management, including evaluation.
- Sida:
- For the enhancement of the internal learning of Sida.
 - As a basis for the strengthening of Sida's management of the programme
 - For the identification of areas where capacity development of PAO should be considered.
- MFA:
- For the enhancement of the internal learning of MFA.
 - As an input to MFA's future financing decisions.
 - As a basis for possible changes of the programme guidelines.
 - As an input to policy development in the area of democracy.

Ultimately, the evaluation should benefit the citizens in the partner countries by contributing to a more effective and efficient cooperation. It is the intention that the evaluation will be used as an input into the dialogue between PAO and their partner organisations. However, the evaluation is not targeted primarily to the partner organisations.

The evaluation may also serve as a source of inspiration for the evaluation work of PAO. However, the main purpose of this exercise is to evaluate the programme, not development of methods which would require a different approach.


The Swedish Parliament has commissioned a separate study on alternative arrangements for the management of the PAO programme. The evaluation is not carried out to address organisational issues specifically but observations of the evaluation may well have a bearing on it.

⁷⁰ Magnus Öhman et. al. Politiska partier och demokratibistånd, Sida Evaluation 04/31

3. The Programme

Party assistance can be defined as “any type of assistance geared towards individual parties or the party system as a whole, with the purpose of strengthening democracy in a given country”⁷¹. This evaluation focuses on the party assistance implemented by the Swedish PAO with funding under the MFA guidelines. In order to broaden perspectives and to enrich the discussion, reference may also be made to other kinds of party and democracy assistance. However, only the PAO cooperation is subject to evaluation.

The model below can be used to illustrate the main components of the programme (as a whole, of a specific PAO, or of a particular project).



Objectives are stated in the MFA guidelines, strategy documents of PAO, project documents etc. The overall programme objective has been somewhat elaborated and reformulated over time. It may give room for various interpretations.

Management refers to the steering of the programme towards its objectives, follow-up of results and feed-back into planning. This takes place at several levels: MFA, Sida and PAO and partner organisation. A component of the system for steering and follow-up is the Reference Group, consisting of representatives of PAO, Sida and MFA.

Resources include the government funding, allocated on the basis of the number of mandates of the parties in the Swedish parliament. In addition there is the professional and administrative capacity of PAO to manage and execute the programme, including resources drawn from the parties that PAO are affiliated to. Finally, there is Sida’s capacity to assess applications, to monitor the programme and to support PAO.

Operations vary considerably with regard to activities and output, working methods, target groups, project size etc. The PAO projects are numerous and generally small. In year 2007, about 120 projects were implemented in 38 countries with an average budget of SEK 0.5 million. Most projects consist of so called fraternal collaboration, but there are also projects in which several PAO work together (“multipartisan cooperation”).

⁷¹ Matthias Catón, *Effective Party Assistance, Stronger Parties for Better Democracy*, IDEA Policy Paper, November 2007.

Results include the outcome⁷² and impact⁷³ of the projects. This can largely be translated into effects within the party or organisation supported, and effects at party system level and democracy at large. Results may be intended and unintended, positive and negative.

Furthermore, all projects take place in a specific *context*, including the party system and structural factors (political, cultural, economic and other) affecting party behaviour and the PAO projects. The context also includes other Swedish and international cooperation to promote democracy.

MFA defines the overall direction of the programme. Sida receives and approves applications. It is to ensure that the projects stay within the MFA guidelines but does not decide on content. There are currently seven Swedish PAO, varying considerably in terms of size, administrative capacity, working methods and ideology. Their national partner organisations are usually political parties and sometimes national party affiliated organisations or other actors at the political arena. PAO and their counterparts share the responsibility for project planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting. The ultimate target group of the PAO cooperation are the citizens in the partner country whose democratic rights are to be strengthened.

4. Evaluation questions

The evaluation shall focus on results and three main questions. First: *what* are the results of the programme? Have there been any results in the first place? If so, what type of result and how satisfactory are the results? This question is fundamental as the programme ultimately is justified by its results. It is also of interest to know more exactly what the programme contributes to and what it does not achieve.

The second question is: *how* are the results achieved? The answer to this question may provide lessons on how democracy may be strengthened by PAO in different contexts and on what has been found to work. This requires going behind the actual results, to look at processes and to identify the different ways in which results were produced.

Thirdly, if results were *not* produced as expected, what were the reasons for this? Was it implementation that failed, the project design that was inappropriate or unforeseeable external factors that affected the project? How come the project was originally passed? Answers may be used to draw lessons on what does not work, potential pitfalls and things in the programme that need to be changed/improved.

Conclusions should be drawn regarding the above questions and recommendations be formulated regarding how Swedish support to democracy to and through parties may be improved and further developed.

In addition to the above, there are some broader questions of interest that relate to PAO cooperation as part of the total Swedish support for democracy. How does the

⁷² Outcome is defined as the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs. The term can also be defined as the effects that can be directly attributed to an intervention (as opposed to indirect effects) or its effects on the target group (in contrast to its effects on people outside that group). In so-called outcome mapping focus is placed on changes on individuals and organisations that, at a later stage, may contribute to higher level objectives.

⁷³ Impact is defined as positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

work of PAO complement other Swedish efforts to strengthen democracy and how can integration be enhanced, as called for by the Government in *Freedom from Oppression?* Answers to these questions would require a broader approach, looking also at other forms of democracy assistance. However, the analysis of the PAO cooperation may still be a contribution to the broader discussion.

5. Evaluation criteria⁷⁴

While the focus of this evaluation is on results, it is important also to recognise some factors that severely may limit the possibilities of determining results, at party system level but also at party/organisational level. The projects are generally small and implemented in a complex environment where observable changes are a result of several factors and numerous actors. Objectives do not easily lend themselves to measurement. There is usually no baseline data. The envisaged causal effect chains and assumptions are not always explicit in project documents. Democratisation takes time and is not a linear process.

The main evaluation criterion for this evaluation shall be *effectiveness*, i.e. the extent to which the programme and project objectives were achieved. The first step will be to assess achievement of objectives at activity and output level, basically reflecting project implementation. In addition, the aim is to trace outcome as far as possible, and by general reasoning, looking at the programme logic and assumptions, make an assessment of the projects' likely contribution (rather than attribution)⁷⁵ to higher level objectives.

Another evaluation criterion shall be *relevance*. An assessment shall be made of the relevance of the projects (objectives, choice of partner organisation, working methods etc.) in relation to identified problems at party and party system level, demand from the local partner, the needs of both men and women, other Swedish and international support for democracy and Swedish policy for international cooperation.

Due to the factors mentioned above it is not deemed feasible to make a full impact evaluation. The evaluators shall, however, present possible findings regarding side effects (positive and negative/foreseen and unforeseen) and present a general discussion on such effects.

Similarly the evaluation shall include a general discussion on sustainability, including how projects have been designed with sustainability in mind and the very conditions for sustainability in this type of work.

How the merit or value of an evaluated intervention is assessed is largely dependent on the choice of perspective. The PAO cooperation may be seen in the perspective of the Swedish PAO themselves, the partner organisations, MFA, Sida etc. All of these perspectives are important for an understanding of the programme. However, it is ultimately in the perspective of poor men and women that the programme shall be assessed. The programme shall also be seen in a rights perspective.

⁷⁴ An evaluation criterion is a criterion used to determine the merit or value of the evaluated intervention. The five evaluation criteria established by OECD/DAC are effectiveness, impact, relevance, sustainability and efficiency.

⁷⁵ Attribution analysis aims to assess the proportion of observed change which can really be attributed to the evaluated intervention. Contribution analysis aims to demonstrate whether or not the evaluated intervention is one of the causes of observed change.

6. Methodology and implementation

The evaluation will be guided by the questions indicated above. It shall provide a general review of the programme as a whole as well as case studies of projects within specific countries (tentatively 3-4). The cases are to permit a more detailed analysis of the projects in their specific national context.

The general programme review shall start with an analysis of programme objectives. How do PAO, MFA, Sida and the partner organisations interpret a well functioning party system (“partiväsende”) and well functioning parties? On the basis of this, indicators for the evaluation will be developed. The review shall also include a survey of the project activities of PAO and a classification of different approaches, methods, target groups etc. Furthermore, a general analysis of how the programme is managed, including the systems for steering and follow-up of results, shall be made.

The case studies shall include a contextual analysis at national level, an assessment of implementation and results as described above and analysis of factors contributing to results, alternatively explaining absence of results. For each project, a review of the programme theory will be done (hierarchies of objectives, indicators and the assumptions made). If the projects have not been planned according to LFA, the project logic shall be reconstructed ex post in discussion with PAO and their partners. An analysis shall also be made of the management of the specific project.

The selection of cases will be based on a number of criteria to be developed. Given the number of organisations, countries, working methods etc. a statistically representative sampling is not deemed realistic, nor is this necessarily desired. To enhance learning, it is probably more valuable to capture the diversity of the programme and differences between the projects.

Methodology and implementation issues will be further elaborated upon in a separate implementation plan for the evaluation to be submitted in January 2009.

7. Roles and responsibilities

SADEV is an independent evaluation organisation and the forthcoming evaluation will thus be external. Nevertheless, MFA, Sida, PAO and their partners have important roles as providers of information and as dialogue partners. PAO are also expected to facilitate contacts with the partner organisations.

The evaluators shall give regular feed-back to the above mentioned stakeholders on observations in order to permit a joint reflection and a discussion on lessons to be drawn. SADEV then has the full responsibility for the final report with which the stakeholders may agree or disagree.

8. Evaluation team

An evaluation team will be assigned by the Director General of SADEV. In addition, an external reference group will be established for advice and quality assurance. Competence in the following areas should be represented: democracy building and political party work, development cooperation, specific country knowledge (including language), gender, organisational development and evaluation methodology.

9. Time frame

The evaluation shall be started and completed during 2009. An implementation plan will be elaborated in January, containing a specified time plan.

Appendix 2: List of Persons Met

Sweden

CIS

Lennart Karlsson	Senior Programme Officer
Lars Nordgren	Programme Officer for Ukraine
Siv Ramsell Westberg	Secretary General

GF

Eva Goës	Chairman of the Board
Lars-Olof Karlsson	Board Member
Inger Schörling	Board Member
Ellinor Sheffer	Board Member

JHS

Jens Ahl	Deputy Director
Eva Gustavsson	Managing Director
Evelina Lorenzon	Senior Project Manager
Bertil Persson	Board Member

KIC

Henrik Ehrenberg	Chairman of Board
Ulrika Eriksson	Programme Officer
Maria Folkegård	Secretary General
Magnus Ramstrand	Programme Officer
Rasmus Rasmusson	Senior Consultant, Ambassador
Erike Tanghöj	Programme Officer
Adina Trunk	Programme Officer

Palme Center

Christina Bergman	Programme Manager for Western Balkans
Gert Björnvall	Project Coordinator, Social Democratic Party District of Värmland
Olle Burell	Head of Operations
Eric Clifford	EU-Secretary, Social Democratic Party District of Värmland
Juan Espitia (by phone)	Project Coordinator, Social Democratic Party District of Malmö
Emma Frost	SSU Kalmar
Anna-Karin Gauding	Regional Project Manager
Mats Griph	Ombudsman LO-distriktet Sydost
Roger Johansson	SEKO Växjö
Johan Moström	Deputy Head of Operations

Tormod Nasset (by phone)	Project Coordinator, Social Democratic Party, Oskarshamn Branch
Kaj Nordquist	Project Coordinator, Social Democratic Party, Stockholm Branch
Mikael Näve Ljunggren	Programme Officer, Latin America
Liselotte Olsson	Programme Officer Ukraine
Silc	
Gunilla Davidsson	Secretary General (former)
Amanda Lökvist	Programme Officer
Mae Liz Orrego	Programme Officer
Martin Ängeby	Secretary General (current)
VIF	
Jens Holm	Fomer MP and Board Member
Anita Persson	Chairman of the Board
Johan Sommansson	Programme Officer
Sida	
Helena Bjuremalm	Senior Policy Advisor
Mikael Boström	Head of Division, Democratic Governance
Anders Emanuel	Head, Democracy and Public Administration Team
Ulrika Hjerstrand	Programme Officer/Democracy and Human Rights
Ulf Källstig	Head of Team for Global Programmes
Michael Otto	Programme Officer
Maja Tjernström (by phone)	Programme Officer Democracy and HR Ethiopia
Fredrik Ugglå	Programme Officer/Democratic Governance Bolivia
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	
Tomas Brundin	Deputy Director, Department for Development Policy
Maria Leissner	Ambassador for Democracy
International Department of the Swedish Parliament	
Ann Dismorr	Head of International Department of the Swedish Parliament
Ulrika Funered	Senior Advisor
Lars Starell	Senior Advisor
Karin Svedberg	Secretary

Various

Urban Ahlin	Member of Parliament, Social Democratic Party
Sef Ashaigbor (by phone)	National Democratic Institute, Senior Advisor, Political Party Development
Hadar Cars	Former Minister and Member of European Parliament
Matthias Catón (by phone)	World Economic Forum, Global Redesign Initiative (formerly at International IDEA)
Elin Falguera	International IDEA, Assistant Programme Officer
Holger Gustafsson	Member of Parliament, Christian Democratic Party
Roger Hällhag	Managing Director, Rud Pedersen Global Affairs
Göran Lennmarker	Member of Parliament, Moderaterna
Hans Linde	Member of Parliament, Left Party
Birgitta Ohlsson	Member of Parliament, Liberal Party
Marina Ottaway	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Director Middle East Program
Martin Sandgren	Deputy International Secretary, Social Democratic Party
Martin Schmidt	SPM Consultants
Edward Shalala	International IDEA, Head of DDIP Programme
Emil Uddhammar (by phone)	University of Växjö, Professor, Political Science
Magnus Öhman (by phone)	International Foundations for Electoral Systems (IFES), Programme Manager

Ukraine**Our Ukraine***Kiev*

Stepan Barna	President, Youth Union Our Ukraine
Roman Bezsmertnyi	Head of Central Executive Committee of OU
Elina Foinska	Participant, JHS Summer School
Mychailo Gorovoy	Participant, Conference on Europe
Yiliya Hladkova	Former International Secretary
Larysa Hrynychuk	Former Project Manager
Tanya Karchenko	Organiser of party activities
Igor Kazmirchuk	Participant, Conference on Europe
O Kravtsenyuk	Participant, JHS Summer School
Yuriy Mindyuk	International Secretary, Youth Union
Olga Miroshnychenko	Participant, Conference on Europe
Viktoria Mykha	Former International Secretary, Youth Union
Khrystyna Nadraga	Participant, JHS Summer School
Mariya Naumenko	Party functionary

Oleg Pavlyshyn	Head, Dept. for education and methods support
Maksumiv Volobumr	Participant, Campaign training
Petro Yaroshynsky	Participant, Conference on Europe
Nadia Yershov	Participant, JHS Summer School

Lviv

Yiriy Dikanev	Founder and former head of Youth Union, Lviv
Andriy Dybravsky	Participant, Turka seminar
Bohdan Horbovyy	Former Project Manager
Roman Ivanovych Yasinsky	Deputy of Lviv city council; organiser of seminars
Andriana Khvorostyak	Project participant
Rostyslav Koval	Press secretary, participant in seminars
Ivan Kruts	Participant, Turka seminar
Oksana Krystyniak	Head of Executive Committee, Lviv City
Emiliya Podlyashetska	Member of Lviv Regional Council
Kseniya Rozhak	Executive Committee of OU Lviv, and organiser of project activities
Natalya Tsenova	Participant, gender seminar
Emiliya Volodymyrivna	Organiser/participant of gender seminar
Oksana Yamschukova	Participant
Oksana Yevstahiyivna	Organiser/participant of gender seminar

Donetsk

Andriy Fishchuk	Head of regional branch Youth Union
Sergey Medvid	Our Ukraine Youth Union
Nebrat Vladlen	Our Ukraine YenaKiyvo youth

Kharkiv

Lilia Avdyeeva	Local council Kharkiv city/participant governance
Yaroslav Markevych	Our Ukraine Youth Union
Svitlana Semko	Our Ukraine Youth Union, International relations

Socialist Party of Ukraine*Kiev*

Bohdan Ferens	Project participant
Tetiana Kachanovska	SPU Kiev Branch
Viktor Khomenko	SPU Dniprovskly region of Kiev
Irina Kovalenko	Contributor Socialist Globus
Olena Lukaniuk	Project Coordinator, former International Secretary of Youth Wing
Lyndmila Protasenko	Contributor Socialist Globus
Rastislav (-)	Secretary, ideological issues, SPU Kiev branch

Yevhen Shchwab	SPU Dniprovskly branch
Vitaliy Yakovych Shybko	Former International Secretary of SPU, Editor of Socialist Globus
Kateryna Vezeleiva	Project participant, Coordinator (Krim), SPU Youth Wing
Dennis Voloshyn	International Secretary of SPU
Yuriy Zubko	First Secretary of SPU Kiev branch

Kharkiv

Oleksandr Dubynskiy	Second secretary SPU Kharkiv Regional branch
Vasiyl Goncharenko	Second secretary SPU Kharkiv City
Tatiana Kilpiakova	Participant (NGO women's right)
Viktor Alexic Mikukov	Participant (NGO defence of children of the war)

Donetsk

Ksinia Tiuterva	Head of SPU Youth Wing
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Crimea

Oleksandr Chernetsky (by phone)	Head of the Socialist Youth Union, Crimea
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Social Democratic Party of Ukraine

Oleksandr Antonov	Party leader SDPU
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Party for Public Rule

Andriy Drevyskyi	Chairperson PNP
Natalia Golovchenko	Member PNP
Natalia Lazarik	Euroleader/PNP
Sergey Maltser	Euroleader/PNP
Volodymyr Shyhus	Euroleader/PNP
Juliya Skiperskih	Head of Board of Euroleader/PNP

Democratic Alliance*Kiev*

Victor Andrusiv	Vice Chairman of the Board
Vasyl Gatsko	Chairman of the Board
Kateryna Gozbluyk	Project participant
Julia Horodyska	Project participant
Oleksandr Iarema	Former leader of DA
Anatolii Korol	Secretary of the Board
Olena Kzylyyuk	Project participant
Olia Muliarchuk	Project participant
Marina Pavlenchik	Project participant
Maksym Studilko	Project participant
Vladyslav Syniagovskiy	Former leader of DA

Lugansk

Andrey Petrov	Head
Lyudmila Petrukhan	Former leader Board Member

Donetsk

Zoya Buinicka	Head
Alyona Matveychuk	Board Member
Yevgen Semenikhin	Board Member

Kharkiv

Viktoriiia Cherevko	Head
Ielyzaveta Salitska	Board Member
Natalya Serpukhova	Board Member
Iryna Shevalchuk	Board Member

Green Party

Serhiy Kurykin	Deputy Head
----------------	-------------

Labour Unions (Kharkiv):

Viktor Antonov	Automobile and Agricultural Machine Worker union
Anatolyi Kaduun	Post and Telecom workers union Ukrtelecom

Swedish Embassy/Sida

Mirja Peterson	Country Director
Olga Sandakova	Programme Officer Development Cooperation Section

Other

Marta Chumalo	West-Ukrainian center “Women’s perspectives”
Gabriel Gatehouse	BBC Correspondent in Ukraine
Leonid Kozhara	Member of Parliament, Party of Regions
Nico Lange	Director, Konrad Adenauer Foundation
Oleg Marsekh	Hromadsky (Citizens) Forum/Speaker Corruption seminar
Oleksiy Melnyk	Senior Fellow, Razumkov Centre for Economics and Political Studies, Kiev
Scott Person	Senior Political Party and Parliamentary Programme Officer, National Democratic Institute
Åke Peterson	Representative of the Secretary General, Council of Europe
Oleg Rybachuk	Head of the board of Foundation Suspilnist

Sergiy Shtukarin	Executive Director, Center for Political Studies, Donetsk
Eugene Tarasov	Sociologist, Center for Political Studies, Donetsk
Bodhan Vitvitsky	MCC Resident Legal Advisor, Millennium Corporation project of law and corruption

Uganda

Uganda People's Congress

Hon. Moses Apiriga	Secretary Foreign Affairs
Ms. Asiimwe Ariya	Assistant treasurer
Ms. Goretti Byarugaba	Secretary for Women
Mr. Dolamulira	Youth leader
Mr. Yona Kanyomoozi	National chairman
Hon. Patrick Mwendha	Treasurer
Ms. Miria Obote	Party President
Mr. Chris Opoka	Secretary General
Ms. Constance Osoru	Youth Leader/participant RYPLA
Mr. Badru Wegulo	Vice President

JEEMA

Mr. Matovu Dasim	Assistant secretary Jeema youth wing
Mr. Muhamad Kateregga	Vice chairman & member of IPC Steering committee
Ms. Nanjago Khadnah	Secretary for women/participant joint programme
Mr. Mohammad Kibirige	Party president
Mr. Sadat Mayambala	Youth Leader/participant RYPLA
Ms. Faridah Nakanwagi	Member of IPC steering committee
Ms. Khadisah Naryego	Youth Leader/participant RYPLA
Mr. Yahya Sseremba	Administrator
Ms. Kakembo Zaharah	Women's affairs & general secretary youth/participant joint programme and RYPLA

Democratic Party

Mr. Mwesigwa Fred	Dep Publicity secretary
Mr. Sebaana Kizito	Party president
Mr. Deo Njoki	Organising secretary
Mr. Matia Nsubuga	Secretary general

Conservative Party

Ms. Nassuwana Asia	Women's wing
Mr. Ssebina Elis Grace	Vice President
Ms. Asia Kamulali	Member of IPC steering committee
Hon. Ken Lukyamuzi	Party President

Mr. Wasibi Magira	Member of IPC steering committee
Mr. Walyemera Masumba	Secretary Legal Affairs
Ms. Asia K. Nassuna	Youth Leader/participant RYPLA
Forum for Democratic Change	
Mr. Frank Atukunda	Youth leader/participant RYPLA
Dr. Kizza Besigye	Party President
Hon. Professor Ogenga-Latigo	Leader of opposition in Parliament & vice president FDC
Mr. Wafula Oguttu	Member of IPC steering committee
Ms. Ingrid Turinawe	Secretary women affairs/participant joint programme and RYPLA
National Resistance Movement	
Hon Daudi Migereko	Minister/Government Chief Whip
Mr. Abudu Muheirwe	Youth leader/participant RYPLA
Change Initiative Limited	
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Mr. Siragi Balinda	IPC
Mr. Robert Italo	Accounts Officer
Eng. Omar Kalinge-Nnyago	Program Officer
Mr. Raymond Lweterozo	Program Officer
Ben B. Mugual	Program Development Officer
Frank Nabwiso	Head of secretariat
Ms. Cissy Ssemuwemba	Assistant
National Democratic Institute	
Ms. Heather Kashner	Country Director
Mr. Emmy Otim	Senior Program Assistant
Swedish Embassy/Sida	
Carl Fredrik Birkoff	First Secretary Democracy and Human Rights
Anders Johnson	Ambassador
Anna Wrange	Counsellor Political and Cultural Affairs
Other	
Mr. Joseph Ambrose Oneka	Head of human rights and good governance, Uganda Joint Christian Council
Mr. Silvester Arinaitwe	Executive Secretary, Uganda Joint Christian Council
Mr. Henry Kasacca	Senior programme officer, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Mr. Yusuf Kiranda	Programme officer, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Mr. Jeremy Liebowitz	Resident country director, International Republican Institute
Mr. David Opü Aira	Youth Leader/participant RYPLA, PPP
Mr. Simon Osborne	Programme Manager, Deepening Democracy Programme
Mr. Livingstone Sewanyana	Executive Director, Foundation for Human rights initiative

Colombia

CEUDES/Fundación Tercera/Green Movement

Marelby Agatón	Personal Assistant of Ingrid Betancourt
Linsay Benitez Barajas	Social worker, teacher of the project, Bogotá
Olga Luz Cifuentes Toro	Chairman CEUDES
Juan Carlos Lecompte	Formerly in PVO
Fabio Mariño	Project coordinator
Diana Pardo	<i>Personera municipal</i> , Municipio de Paz del Río, Boyacá
Nelson Andrés Pérez	<i>Personera municipal</i> , Municipio de Soracá, President Association of Personeros, Boyacá
Nestor Ramírez	Former mayor, PVO
Nubia Ronderos	Accountant, Fundación Tercera

Colombian Communist Party

Magnolia Agudelo	Women's wing, Las Polas
Milady Barrera	Board Member of Juco in Barranquilla, Atlántico
Jaime Caycedo	Secretary General
Claudia Flores	Finance director
Carlos Arturo García	Coordinator of PC Human Rights commission
Jorge Gómez	PC Secretary and Board member PDA
Nely Andrea Niño	Party youth wing (JUCO), Barranquilla
Juan David Ortega	Trainer of the party, Barranquilla, Atlántico
Gloria Inéz Ramírez	Senator
Juan Carlos Sandoval	Party coordinator for Barranquilla, Atlántico

Colombian Conservative Party

Mariela Ayala	National Women's Organisation
Luis Andrés Bernaza	Legal expert
Soraya Galvis Cobo	<i>Secretaria Alterna</i>
Angélica Gutiérrez,	Assistant to the <i>Veeduría</i> (oversight) of the party
Beatriz Elena Jaramillo	Member of national Board
Mauricio Prieto	Legal expert
Alfonso Ramírez	Assistant to party president
Juan Pablo Tovar	Youth secretary
José Jaime Uscátegui Pastrana	Director of international relations department

Alternative Democratic Pole

Carlos Bula	Secretary General
Bertina Calderon	Women's Collective, Project coordinator
Astrid Coronado	Women's Collective, Barranquilla, Atlántico
Rosalba Gómez	Women's Collective, Project coordinator
Eva Herrera	Women's Collective, Barranquilla, Atlántico
Lina Mora	Women's Collective, Barranquilla, Atlántico
Gloria Oramas	Women's Collective, local councillor
Nancy Ramos	Women's Collective, Barranquilla, Atlántico
Maria Fernanda Rojas	Women's Collective, local councillor
Lina Mora Tirado	Women's Collective, Barranquilla, Atlántico
Marta Valderama	Women's Collective, Project coord.
Yohana Yepes	Women's Collective, Barranquilla, Atlántico

University of Ibagué/Tolipaz

Adriana Aviles Alvarado	Course participant
Rodrigo Castañeda	University teacher
Cecilia Correa Valdes	Project co-ordinator
Diego Wilmar Gómez	Executive director, Tolipaz
Alejandro Suárez	Course participant
Carlos Trejo	Director of Governance, Tolipaz

Swedish Embassy/Sida

Catalina Hoyos	National Programme Officer
Susanna Jansson-Landin	Programme Officer
Lena Nordström	Ambassador
Torgny Svennungsson	Programme Director

Other

Martha Balaguera	Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris
Hernando Gómez Buendía	Academic
Francisco Leal Buitraigo	Academic
Marta Cárdenas	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Luis Eduardo Celis	Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris
Francisco Herrero	Country Director, National Democratic Institute
Javier Loaiza	Director General, Fundación Tomás Moro
Juan Fernando Londoño	International IDEA/UNDP
Lucy Malo	Program Manager, USAID
Hans Mathieu	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Pedro Moura	Local Deputy, Partido de la U, Ibagué
Henry Pava	Cambio Democrático Radical, Ibagué
Mauricio Romero	Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris
Willian Rosas	Local Deputy, PDA, Ibagué
Cara Thanassi	Sub-director, USAID

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Specific project and country related documents

Appendix 4: Support to Party Systems Development other than through PAO

Country	Implementing organisation and disbursements in 2008 (SEK)	Short description
Bolivia	Fundación UNIR SEK 1 143 012	Training of party members on issues related to public management, electoral issues, and conflict management. Project working closely with the National Electoral Court.
Bolivia	UNDP SEK 6 590 053	The programme includes different components with a main emphasis on direct work with the eight main parties in Bolivia. For each party, a specially designed programme is implemented addressing its weaknesses.
Burkina Faso	National Democratic Institute SEK 1 060 000	The two main objectives of the 2005-2008 programme were: 1) Increase women's role and responsibilities within political parties and local governments; 2) Strengthen women's ability to compete in elections and to serve as elected officials.
Burkina Faso	Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique SEK 1 000 000	The programme aims to: 1) Reinforce the representativity of the elected; 2) Reinforce the accountability of the public authorities vis-a-vis the people and their representatives; and 3) Identify lacunas in the governance system of Burkina Faso and propose reforms.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Electoral Institute of South Africa, EISA SEK 15 800 000	Promotion of good governance through institutional capacity building of the electoral commission and building and supporting capacity for accountable governance (including strengthening the capacities of political parties).
Honduras	UNDP SEK 48 000 000 (2008-2010)	Increased knowledge and analytical capacity of civil society, media, political parties and citizens in general in order to participate actively in the formulation and discussion on public policies.
Mozambique	AWEPA country office Mozambique SEK 5 000 000	The programme has four components: 1) Parliamentary programme; 2) Local governance programme; 3) Political parties programme; and 4) Research and documentation programme.
Nicaragua	UNDP SEK 4 200 000 (May 2005 to June 2009)	Contributing to the process of modernisation and democratisation of the party institutions in Nicaragua through four programs areas: 1) Capacity of programming and management; 2) Internal democracy; 3) Openness and modernization; and 4) Analysis of the political parties and the international support to their modernisation.

Country	Implementing organisation and disbursements in 2008 (SEK)	Short description
Peru	Asociación civil transparencia SEK 133 550 (2007) 300 000 (2009)	One component of the project is the reform of the electoral system, strengthening of the law of political parties and the internal democratic management of political parties. One of their working partners is International IDEA. They have also an ongoing project with KIC – Christian Democratic International Center – to support participation of young people in political organisations.
Sudan	UNDP and the Elections Commission SEK 25 000 000 (2009)	UNDP will assist the newly established Political Parties Affairs Council (PPAC) in fulfilling its mandate as per the Political Parties Act 2008. Specifically, the PPAC holds the responsibility to: 1) Register political parties in accordance with provisions of the Political Parties Act; 2) Maintain a record of the changes in a political party; 3) Receive complaints relating to the application of the Political Parties Act, or the statute and rules of a political party, and to investigate and decide on them; 4) Demand any political party to follow the Constitution, rules and obligations in accordance with the Act; and 5) Issue Rules and Regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of the Act.
Tanzania	UNDP & Tanzania Centre for Democracy SEK 4 000 000	The program will support efforts to advocate reforms for a more liberalised and pluralistic political environment, make political institutions more responsive, efficient and effective, and promote democratic culture. Four components are included in the programme: 1) The African Peer Review Mechanism process; 2) The National Elections Commission and Zanzibar Elections Commission; 3) Accountable governance including the Bunge (Parliament), Zanzibar House of Representatives, and the political party system; and 4) Civic education.
Uganda	Deepening democracy programme SEK 5 000 000	Support country led processes aimed at deepening democracy and to build the capacity of those institutions that have the mandate to promote and safeguard increasing public participation in decision making. During 2007-2009, the contribution is earmarked and evenly distributed for three components: parliament, political parties and media in democracy. The Swedish contribution will be coupled with a strong dialogue.

Country	Implementing organisation and disbursements in 2008 (SEK)	Short description
International program with main focus on Sudan and Latin America	International IDEA The Swedish contribution to IDEA's budget was € 5.7 million (equivalent to approx SEK 53.5 million) 7.7 % of the budget was used for party support. 7.7 % of the Swedish contribution corresponds to SEK 4.1 million.	