


Annual Report 2008



Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation



A person with dark skin, wearing a yellow t-shirt and black pants, stands with their back to the camera, looking out of a window. The window has a metal frame and is set into a bright blue wall. The person's hands are on their hips. The ground is dark and appears to be dirt or concrete.

Evaluation website

The Evaluation Department has its own website at norad:
<http://norad.no/evaluation>

On this website you will find updated information, based on the annual evaluation programme, on the status of the evaluations in which the department is involved. This applies to both evaluations for which we ourselves are responsible and international evaluations in which we are participating. We also publish information on evaluations that are currently being planned and update the list of future evaluations.

Invitations to tender are posted on this website, and completed evaluation reports can be downloaded or ordered here.

The purpose of this website is to provide an up-to-date, dynamic presentation of the work being done by the Evaluation Department at any given time.

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
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The View from Outside

According to an old Norwegian proverb, the person who knows best where the shoe pinches is the one who wears it. No one knows an aid programme, a support scheme or a sector better than the person who is responsible for it and works every day on planning and implementation. A certain scepticism among the people who are responsible is understandable when external consultants enter the scene to assess and evaluate their performance.

It takes time for external researchers and consultants to get to know issues in new situations. This may entail extra work and be an annoyance for the people who are being evaluated, especially when the evaluator does not appear to understand the reality in which they operate. In our experience, it is almost a law of nature that a draft from an evaluation team will contain errors and misunderstandings. A good consultation process can remedy the situation, but this does not mean that everyone will agree on the picture presented in the evaluation report.

Nevertheless, I would advocate for *the view from outside*. The essence of independent evaluations is that experts who have no vested interests undertake a critical assessment of principles and practices in the work that is done. But in addition to measuring and evaluating according to internationally accepted guidelines, the view from outside has its own inherent value. It is healthy to have someone challenge our own perception of our role and responsibilities.

This does not mean that the result of an evaluation is always more critical than the reality one can see for oneself. Many people working in development cooperation are self-critical on behalf of their profession and their institution. Last year's evaluations of Norwegian HIV/AIDS responses

as well as the one of development cooperation in the fisheries sector were largely positive. Some people suggest that foreign consultants may not be critical enough. Foreign researchers sometimes quickly take a positive view of Norwegian development policy as such, perhaps not looking closely enough at the actual practice. But it may also be the case that Norwegian and Scandinavian aid bring results precisely because we emphasise the importance of putting into practice what is regarded as good aid policy.

Another of the 2008 reports analysed the usefulness of contributions from research institutions to Norwegian peace efforts, a potentially controversial topic. The project was not a peer review, which is so common in the world of research. The view from outside was in this case provided by consultants who are used to evaluating results. The outsider's and insider's views did not always coincide in this case either, but the marks awarded for the usefulness of Norwegian peace research weren't at all bad.

Nevertheless, the view from outside does not come only from consultants and researchers who win our tender competitions. Some people would say that our consultants do not look at us from the outside because they are part of the aid environment. We also need the critical views of people outside the world of development cooperation, from research institutions, the press and interested citizens. There has been a stronger spotlight on us in recent years. We do not always think we get the critics we deserve, especially when examples of bad development assistance from twenty or thirty years ago are cited. But the debate is becoming richer and we hope that we are contributing to the critical discussion through our evaluation reports.

The shoe not only pinches the foot of the person wearing it, it also leaves footprints behind. *Footprints* has become a new buzz word in development circles. How are these footprints experienced in developing countries by the people who are supposed to benefit from development aid? Can we include voices from the South to a greater extent in our evaluation work?

We have experience of this, since scarcely any evaluation is carried out without the assistance of local consultants. However, their role is usually limited to making a contribution; they seldom have any major responsibility for the evaluation as such. In 2008 we initiated two evaluations in which we increased our use of experts from developing countries. In connection with the evaluation of assistance provided by Norwegian non-governmental organisations in North Uganda, we invited only Ugandan consultants and research institutions to submit tenders. The report from a Ugandan consultancy firm will be presented in the spring of 2009. In Nepal, the evaluation of the sector programme for education was carried out by British and Nepalese consultants after we had stipulated that Nepalese participation was a condition for awarding the contract. But do we thereby safeguard the view from the South in evaluations? We will have to keep on searching for ways to include the perspective from the South. In this way, we can make a contribution towards supporting the idea that development cooperation must begin in the South and end in the South.



Asbjørn Eidhammer
Director of Evaluation

What we Learned from Evaluation in 2008

We will draw four important lessons



1

WE DO NOT TAKE SUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURES IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

These experiences show that we need to understand more about the political context in which Norwegian development assistance operates.

The country evaluation of Zambia in 2007 showed that Norway and other donors have largely been blind to the political consequences of development cooperation. A review of dialogue on economic policy between Norway and Zambia from the 1990s onwards was an illustration of this. Several of the reports published in 2008 point in the same direction. The review of literature on anti-corruption projects shows that much of the aid in this area is provided without taking the political situation into account, and projects are often planned in isolation. At the same time, the report shows that it is most difficult to combat corruption when political interests are involved. The fisheries evaluation illustrates that political risk is underestimated in some cases.

The joint evaluation of Support to Citizens' Voice and Accountability, which was led by the UK and in which Norway was involved, is a new reminder of how difficult it is to influence power structures in a country. It also shows that we often base our activities on optimistic ideas about the amount of political influence we can achieve by supporting what we regard as democratic actors, such as civil society organisations.

The Utstein Study, published in 2004, showed that there is a "strategic deficit" between the strategic, political level and peace-building programmes in the field. The evaluation report on Norwegian research and development activities in conflict prevention and peace-building concludes that this strategic deficit has not been reduced.

These experiences show that we need to understand more about the political context in which Norwegian development assistance operates. This does not necessarily mean that the actors know too little about the political situation in partner countries, but that such knowledge and analyses are not used well enough in the planning and implementation of development cooperation.



LONG-TERM USE OF NORWEGIAN KNOW-HOW AND COMPETENCE PRODUCES RESULTS IN IMPORTANT SECTORS

2

From evaluations in the past couple of years, we have good examples of successful long-term cooperation between institutions in Norway and developing countries. The report on development cooperation in the fisheries sector points to such positive contributions, in the form of institution-building in Vietnam, Mozambique and Tanzania. Evaluations of development cooperation in the petroleum and power sectors have shown similar results. The common denominator for these cooperation programmes is that they have had a long-term perspective and have been in progress over a long period of time. In many cases, cooperation must continue into the foreseeable future if we are not to lose the results that have been achieved.

The use of Norwegian expertise is also emphasised in two other reports. The first is an evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS responses, which underlines the prominent role Norwegian experts have played, and still play, in international efforts. The second concerns contributions from Norwegian research institutions to Norway's engagement in peace efforts. The usefulness of Norwegian research for Norway's involvement in Southern Sudan was particularly emphasised. However,

these positive experiences are not without exceptions. In the fisheries evaluation, it is pointed out that in some cases the type of technical assistance that has been provided has been determined more by the availability of Norwegian expertise than by partner country needs.

In several of these sectors, such as petroleum, power and fisheries, Norway can build on its own extensive experience. However, the good marks awarded for Norwegian AIDS responses illustrate that Norway does not have to have a so-called "comparative advantage" to be able to provide good assistance. It is possible to develop such expertise, as Norway has done over a long period of time with respect to health, HIV and AIDS in developing countries.

In several of these sectors, such as petroleum, power and fisheries, Norway can build on its own extensive experience.



3

NORWAY HAS TOO LITTLE CAPACITY TO FOLLOW UP DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY AT COUNTRY LEVEL


There may be a connection between these findings and a lesson that was stressed in last year's report, namely that we have difficulty in documenting the positive effects of Norwegian development assistance for the general public.

The evaluation of Norwegian HIV and AIDS responses concludes that Norway plays a positive and flexible role at country level and listens to its cooperation partners. However, the consultants take the view that our capacity to follow up aid programmes at country level is too weak. The fisheries evaluation points out that the aid administration's technical capacity is inadequate in this sector, both in Oslo and in the partner country.

This supports the findings of previous evaluations. The Zambia evaluation clearly showed that Norway is better at planning and implementation than at following up and ensuring that aid produces results in the field. Two evaluations in the humanitarian area, of NOREPS and of the use of former military vehicles (2007), point in the same direction. The joint evaluation of how well donors phase out aid for countries or sectors also indicates that strength in the field is important in order to safeguard the results that have been achieved when aid is phased out.

There may be a connection between these findings and a lesson that was stressed in last year's report, namely that we have difficulty in documenting the positive effects of Norwegian development assistance for

the general public. The report from the fisheries evaluation addressed precisely the question of whether Norwegian assistance in this area reaches the poor majority in the partner country.



WE DON'T MANAGE TO INTEGRATE CROSS-SECTORAL THEMES

4

The fishery evaluation shows that governance, gender equality and sustainability are neglected themes in development cooperation in this sector. The evaluation of HIV and AIDS responses shows that the integration of HIV and AIDS considerations into other aid programmes could have been better. The review of literature on anti-corruption activities shows that relatively few measures to combat corruption exist in the sectors that are perhaps the most affected by this scourge, such as water supplies, health programmes and education. This is not new. The sector evaluations in 2007 showed the same tendency. And the comprehensive evaluation of the follow-up to the Norwegian strategy for women in development, which was presented in 2006, showed that the integration strategy had largely been unsuccessful.

On the other hand, an evaluation of a Norwegian-Finnish fund in the World Bank showed that, with relatively substantial earmarked funding, we have managed to influence the Bank's policy and practice in the direction of taking greater account of cross-sectoral themes, such as environmental issues and social sustainability. This indicates that earmarked funds, a well-established apparatus and continuity

are necessary if we are to gain acceptance of themes across sectors and aid modalities.

The fishery evaluation shows that governance, gender equality and sustainability are neglected themes in development cooperation in this sector.

Follow-up of Evaluation in the Aid Administration



The summary shows that evaluations, in general, are followed up in accordance with the guidelines, although deadlines are not always adhere to.

According to the evaluation mandate, the department, agency or embassy that is responsible for the activity that is evaluated must draw up a follow-up plan, to be approved by the Secretary General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs within six weeks after the report and follow-up memorandum have been received from the Evaluation Department. A status report on the follow-up plan must be submitted after one year. The Evaluation Department must be kept informed.

EVALUATION OF NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM-RELATED ASSISTANCE

Follow-up memo sent to the Secretary General on 22 June 2007. The follow-up plan was approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 5 October 2007. The plan specified follow-up action on each of the recommendations in the evaluation report and the follow-up memo.

EVALUATION OF NORWEGIAN POWER-RELATED ASSISTANCE

Follow-up memo sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2008 and follow-up plan approved in April the same year. The plan states that the responsible section in the Ministry will prepare a separate action plan.

EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF USING M-621 MILITARY CARGO TRUCKS IN HUMANITARIAN TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

Follow-up memo sent to Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of February 2008. Follow-

ing a discussion with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Red Cross prepared a "Plan of Action for phasing out of the use of M621 trucks". The decision of a gradual discontinuation has been made by the Red Cross and noted by the Ministry. The Norwegian Red Cross has further established their own department for quality assurance and internal auditing, and there has been a reorganisation in order to strengthen management of results. The capacity to such management has been strengthened.

EVALUATION OF NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT TO ZAMBIA (1991–2006)

Follow-up memo sent to the Ministry of foreign Affairs at the end of May 2008. The Norwegian Embassy in Zambia has used the recommendations of the report in the preparation of its strategic plan for 2009–2011 as well as other plans for the development co-operation with Zambia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that the report is a good one, but points at some weak aspects in the analysis. A follow-up plan was approved in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2009.

EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION THROUGH NORWEGIAN NGOS IN GUATEMALA

Follow-up memo sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2008. A follow-up plan was approved in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2009.

EVALUATION OF THE NORWEGIAN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM (NOREPS)

Follow-up memo sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of March 2008. In 2008 the advisory group for NOREPS has met quarterly to work with the follow-up of the evaluation, and the relevant section in the Ministry has initiated some work to review certain legal aspects in the system. A status report on the follow-up is being prepared in March 2009.

EVALUATION OF THE TRUST FUND FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Follow-up memo sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 2008 and follow-up plan approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October. The plan emphasises in particular clarification of roles in the governance of the fund and in the technical dialogue, demands for improved reporting, improved knowledge development and information.



International Cooperation and the Development of Evaluation Expertise



The Evaluation Department is cooperating with other evaluation agencies on several projects. The Department has spent much of the year planning a major evaluation of strategies and approaches in the fight against corruption, to be headed by Norway, in cooperation with five other evaluation agencies. In 2008 the Department has otherwise cooperated on an evaluation, led by Sweden, of bilateral donors' exit strategies, and another evaluation, headed by Sweden, of the transition from emergency relief to long-term assistance in the follow-up to the tsunami disaster. The Department worked with Finland on an evaluation of a joint fund under the World Bank, and participated in a major evaluation of voice and accountability led by the British evaluation agency. The Department carried out the evaluations of both the joint donor office in Juba, Southern Sudan, and the sector programme for education in Nepal for a number of other donor countries in addition to Norway. Some of these evaluations were carried out under the umbrella of the OECD-DAC Evaluation Network, of which we are an active member, or in connection with extended cooperation between the Nordic countries.

To promote increased evaluation expertise in Norway, the Department organised a conference in June 2008 in cooperation with Oslo University College on "Evaluating the Complex". The conference, which attracted more people than anticipated, was attended by 150 delegates from research institutions, consultancy firms, aid organisations and academic institutions. As an outcome of the conference, an Evaluation Association will be established in Norway. The Evaluation Department also participates in the EVAforum, an evaluation organisation for representatives of government agencies.

Evaluations carried out in 2008

REPORT 1/2008	Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)
REPORT 2/2008	Evaluation of World Bank's Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)
REPORT 3/2008	Mid-term Evaluation of the EEA Grants
REPORT 4/2008	Evaluation of Norwegian HIV and AIDS Responses
REPORT 5/2008	Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
REPORT 6/2008	Evaluation of Norwegian Development Co-operation in the Fisheries Sector
JOINT EVALUATION	Joint Evaluation of Support to Citizens' Voice and Accountability
JOINT EVALUATION	Managing Aid Exit and Transformation
SYNTHESIS STUDY 1/2008	Synthesis Study on Best Practices and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low-Income African Countries
SYNTHESIS STUDY 2/2008	Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings
STUDY 1/2008	The Challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A Review of Norwegian Evaluation Practice
STUDY 2/2008	Anti-Corruption Approaches: A Literature Review
UNDP	Evaluation of the Role and Contribution of UNDP in Environment and Energy
WORLD BANK	> Evaluation of World Bank Support to Public Sector Reform > Evaluation of World Bank's Assistance for Decentralisation > Evaluation of the World Bank's Economic and Sector Work and Technical Assistance
GAVI	Evaluation of the Gloval Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI)

Evaluations in progress as of 1 January 2009

- > Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, South Sudan
- > Norwegian Support to Protection of Culture Heritage
- > Joint Evaluation of Nepal's Education for All 2004–2009 Sector Programme
- > Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and Norad's Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
- > Evaluation of Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda
- > Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People's Aid
- > Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, Phase 2 (LRRD 2) (joint evaluation led by Sweden)
- > Strategies and Approaches in Efforts to Combat Corruption (joint evaluation led by Norway)
- > Norwegian Peace Efforts in Haiti
- > The Evaluation Function of UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)
- > Baseline study of the Norwegian Action Plan for Environment in Development Cooperation
- > Millennium Development Goals for Health – A desk study

Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)



EVALUATION REPORT 1/2008
Pages 94
ISBN 978-82-7548-269-1
Carried out by Nordic Consulting Group
in cooperation with Channel Research

EVALUATION OF

The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS), which was established in 1991, is a unique Norwegian system under which companies, authorities and non-governmental organisations constitute an active network and partnership. The aim is to deliver a rapid, effective response in international emergency relief situations, in the form of goods, personnel and service packages. Stockpiled goods and emergency personnel are important components of NOREPS. The evaluation particularly considers activities in the period 2000–2006.

PURPOSE

The objective of the evaluation was to assess the contribution and value added to humanitarian action by the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) with a view to securing an appropriate and best possible Norwegian response and contribution to humanitarian relief assistance that meets the needs of the affected population. The main questions were:

- > The extent to which NOREPS was achieving its objectives
- > How compliant it was with humanitarian and other relevant principles
- > Whether the mandate and underlying assumptions were still appropriate given the changes in the context

FINDINGS

The evaluation report largely makes a positive assessment of how NOREPS has functioned in the past ten years. The main findings are as follows:

- > The main conclusion is that NOREPS has helped to improve the effectiveness and coordination of humanitarian activities. It has ensured a more rapid response and lives have been saved. The importance of the various components has differed according to the emergency relief situation concerned, but they have all been relevant and made an effective contribution. The various elements have not functioned as a system but have been used separately. This has not prevented the components from provid-

ing good responses when there have been deficiencies in the emergency relief system.

- > The quality of goods, services and personnel is considered to be high. The picture is somewhat less uniform as regards the cost-effectiveness of the goods that are supplied.
- > The NOREPS Forum is regarded as a unique arena for communication between Norwegian suppliers and humanitarian actors.
- > Both the international humanitarian system and the market are changing, which means that the NOREPS system will have to change and adapt. Although Norwegian assistance is untied in principle, the evaluation team takes the view that it is not always regarded as such by outsiders.
- > According to the report, NOREPS operates in accordance with humanitarian and other relevant principles.
- > The report points to general weaknesses in NOREPS' reporting and statistical procedures.
- > The report points out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' administration of the system is too detailed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The team points to various choices for the NOREPS of the future. In a situation where there is a great deal of uncertainty about how the humanitarian landscape will develop, it is advisable not to make any drastic decisions at this time. Instead, practical changes and adaptation should take place over a five-year period.

The evaluation team takes the view that the current trend indicates that NOREPS' products and service packages will have to change and adapt. Among other things, the team suggests that direct deliveries of goods in kind should be wound up over a five-year period, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should draw up a strategic plan for NOREPS and that the Ministry should change its administrative focus with respect to NOREPS from individual contributions to framework agreements. On the other hand, the personnel recruitment system NORSTAFF can continue to function well without any major changes.

FOLLOW-UP

The results of the evaluation were presented at a meeting of the NOREPS Forum on 12 February 2008 in connection with a round of consultations with involved parties. The Evaluation Department in Norad presented its recommendations in a follow-up memo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2008.

Evaluation of the World Bank's Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)



EVALUATION REPORT 2/2008
Pages 80
ISBN 978-82-7548-287-5
Carried out by COWI AS, Denmark

EVALUATION OF

The World Bank's Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development, was established by Norway and the World Bank in 1999. Finland joined the Trust Fund in 2002. The goal of the Fund is to act as a catalyst for the mainstreaming of environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development and for inclusion of these cross-cutting issues into the Bank's operations. Many of the Fund's projects are of an analytical nature. The Fund has received USD 78.5 million from Norway and approximately USD 10 million from Finland since its establishment. As of January 2007, the Fund had financed 321 projects in more than 50 countries.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was two-fold:

- > To assess the added-value created by the Fund and its contributions towards improving the way in which the World Bank works in the fields of environment, poverty reduction and social development.
- > To propose improvements for the Fund and the way it operates. The evaluation was also to document results and case studies in Ethiopia, Zambia and Indonesia were carried out.

FINDINGS

The World Bank's Trust Fund's complex and broad-based goal of "acting as a catalyst for the mainstreaming of environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development and for inclusion of these cross-cutting issues into the Bank's own operations, both at headquarters and in the field" posed operationalisation problems in the evaluation.

- > Nonetheless, the main conclusion of the report is that the Trust Fund has succeeded in achieving its goal of influencing mainstreaming of environmentally and socially sustainable development in the work of the World Bank. This was done despite the fact that the resources in the Trust Fund are small compared with the funds available from other trust funds and from the Bank's own resources.

- > The evaluation, which is based on a study of 26 out of more than 300 projects financed by the Trust Fund, found that most of the projects that have focused on recipient countries' policies have made an impact by presenting new ideas and approaches, thereby expanding the knowledge base for decision-making.
- > The team also found that global projects financed by the Trust Fund were particularly innovative. A few examples of this are the World Bank's Strategy for Social Development and its new Social Policy, both of which resulted from projects supported by the Trust Fund. Other instruments that the Trust Fund has helped to develop and utilise are the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA), Country Environmental Assessments (CEAs), and Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs).
- > Furthermore, the team found that the close dialogue between donors, the World Bank and the Reference Group, a feature that distinguishes this fund from other funds, has been instrumental in the constructive partnership between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the World Bank, and has opened up opportunities for influencing the work of the World Bank. Continuity of key staff members on both sides has contributed strongly to this relationship. However, the close dialogue has also caused confusion as regards the roles and responsibilities of more recent Reference Group members and the cooperation partners in the World Bank.
- > The Trust Fund has used the World Bank's own monitoring system to monitor the projects. There have been few reports of setbacks or reasons for not achieving the targeted objectives. Reports focus primarily on successful projects. Moreover, the monitoring reports place little emphasis on the general Trust Fund goals.
- > The evaluation found little evidence to show that the Trust Fund had promoted increased cooperation between the various units in the World Bank, which was one of the objectives.
- > The report also states that the Reference Group for the Trust Fund has largely not succeeded in achieving its objective of making the Fund more widely known in Norway and Finland.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The report recommends that the Trust Fund should be organised more strategically in terms of goals, composition and long-term approach. In particular, it recommended that the Trust Fund should switch from one-year to three-year programme periods. It also recommends that the donors clarify the mandate and the operative role of the Reference Group. At a more operational level, it recommends that the monitoring reports should also cover unsuccessful efforts, thereby providing greater insight into what the Trust Fund's activities have and have not achieved.

FOLLOW-UP

The Evaluation Department presented the results of the evaluation at a Norad seminar on 17 April 2008. The Department received comments from the Trust Fund's Reference Group, and from the Multilateral Bank and Finance Section of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the World Bank. The Evaluation Department presented its recommendations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a follow-up memorandum dated 21 May 2008. On 16 October 2008, the Multilateral Bank and Finance Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a separate memorandum explaining how it intends to follow up most of the recommendations.

There have been few reports of set backs or reasons for not achieving the targeted objectives. Reports focus primarily on successful projects

Mid-term Evaluation of the EEA Grants



EVALUATION REPORT 3/2008
Pages 84
ISBN 978-82-7548-320-9
Carried out by PriceWaterhouseCoopers

EVALUATION OF

Grants provided under the EEA Agreement. This mid-term evaluation focuses on the EEA grant programme, in particular the system and structure for project approval and funds management. It is too early to assess the results of the development assistance. A total of EUR 1.3 billion is to be distributed in the period from 2004 to 2009. Norway is financing 95 percent of the total sum. The entire programme has been evaluated, and studies were conducted in three countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia, to which 57 percent of the funds are allocated.

Only 46 percent of the total budget had been allocated by the first quarter of 2008, and only 3 percent had actually been disbursed

PURPOSE

The main purpose of this evaluation was to compile lessons learned as regards how the programme has functioned so far with a view to planning further support. The evaluation therefore focuses on the cost effectiveness of the programme itself.

FINDINGS

- > The EEA grant programme was given an enthusiastic reception by the groups that can benefit from it, and the funds are in great demand in partner countries. The system has made it possible to support groups and projects that would not otherwise have received financing.
- > A competent implementation system has been established with skilled and experienced administrative staffs. The system and the staffs have shown great willingness to learn from the experience they acquire

- > The fund is highly visible in partner countries, promoting increased cooperation with donor countries, i.e. chiefly Norway.
- > There are considerable inefficiencies in the implementation of the programme, which have resulted in significant delays. The direct alternative costs of these delays are estimated at between 10 and 30 percent of total programme costs.
- > Effectiveness is particularly reduced by the replication of tasks in preliminary assessments and control of funds. The donors' monitoring and reporting system is too rigid, and adds little value to extensive national controls. There are too many guidelines. Since the national processing of applications takes 6–9 months, at the start of the programme it took an average of 350 days for a project to be approved and 446 days for the contract to be signed. But in the last eighteen months, there has been a marked improvement, and it now takes an average of 191 days between the receipt of an application in Brussels and the signing of the contract.
- > The objectives of the programme are vaguely defined and are not supported by indicators and targets. This has affected prioritisation and the implementation of projects and the ability to measure performance.
- > Programme support and block grants seem to be more effective than support for individual projects.
- > There is a risk that it will not be possible to allocate all the funds until March 2009 and to disburse them all by October 2011 due to the delay in the initial stage. Only 46 percent of the total budget had been allocated by the first quarter of 2008, and only 3 percent had actually been disbursed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The report also contained a number of recommendations aimed at remedying the inadequacies in both the current programme and in the longer term. These include:

- > In future financing arrangements, greater use should be made of a programme approach, where objectives and targets are negotiated bilaterally with the recipient countries.
- > Efforts must be made to ensure better linkages between the overall goals of the programme, goals at country level and goals for the individual projects.
- > Efforts should be based on the principles of additionality and proportionality in order to avoid overlapping and replication of work in preliminary assessments and monitoring.
- > Implementation should to a greater degree be based on the countries' own routines and established institutions.

Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses



EVALUATION REPORT 4/2008
VOL I AND VOL II
Pages 66/295
ISBN 978-82-7548-324-7/978-82-7548-326-1
Carried out by ITAD

EVALUATION OF

The Norwegian government has been supporting the fight against HIV and AIDS since 1986. However, there was a shift in Norway's approach in 2000, when HIV and AIDS became a priority area in Norwegian development cooperation, both globally and locally. A policy paper was drawn up for Norwegian assistance for this area, and resources to combat the epidemic were channelled through many different organisations and programmes at both international and local levels.

The report has been divided into a synthesis report (main report), country reports from Ethiopia, Malawi and Tanzania, and a report on Norway's HIV and AIDS responses at the global level.

PURPOSE

The main purpose of the evaluation was to document results, extract lessons learnt and suggest recommendations on how to enhance the development effectiveness of Norwegian HIV/AIDS responses at country level.

The objectives of the evaluation were to assess:

- > the degree to which changes have taken place in the HIV and AIDS situation in the three selected countries based on behavioural changes,
- > which factors have influenced behavioural changes in the three countries,
- > the degree to which Norway has contributed to such changes in the three countries, and
- > the strategic choice of partners at country level.

FINDINGS

- > The report shows that there has been a slight decline in the number of young people infected with HIV in the 15–24 age-group in the three countries studied. Knowledge about HIV and AIDS has increased in two of the three countries, while increased use of condoms has been registered in all three countries.
- > The study shows that Norway's support has contributed to positive national results in the fight against HIV and AIDS.

- > Norway is presented as a donor who is prepared to listen and, perhaps to a greater extent than others, is flexible and willing to support national leadership in efforts to combat HIV. This type of support produces less directly visible results from Norwegian funding but, according to the report, will have a greater effect in the longer term.
- > It is also worth noting that the report sees indications that Norway's willingness to be flexible and take risks is declining.
- > At the international level, the report shows that Norway has made an active contribution towards developing the international aid architecture and that Norwegian experts have played a prominent role in this area.
- > With respect to inadequacies, the report points out that the assistance provided by Norway through different channels in partner countries is not sufficiently coordinated.
- > There is also room for improvement in the integration of HIV and AIDS into other development activities.
- > The report also points out that Norway's capacity to follow up measures at country level is too weak.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation team has made several recommendations to the Norwegian authorities, including the recommendation that Norway should:

- > continue to provide assistance through a variety of channels, including non-governmental organisations, but should ensure that the interventions supported by Norway are better coordinated,
- > develop clear country programmes and partnership strategies at country level which define the rationale, goals and expected results of the programmes,
- > cooperate with other partners to ensure cross-sector integration of HIV and AIDS activities at country level. Norway should also ensure that HIV and AIDS activities are integrated into the new priority areas for Norwegian development cooperation, e.g. environmental projects,
- > work with other partners to improve weak monitoring and evaluation systems at country level,
- > strengthen capacity at Norwegian embassies in order to ensure that Norwegian assistance is followed up and coordinated.

FOLLOW-UP

The results of the evaluation were presented at an open seminar on 30 October 2008. Evaluation Department in Norad presented its recommendations to the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a follow-up memorandum in January 2009.

Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building



EVALUATION REPORT 5/2008
Pages 111
ISBN 978-82-7548-344-3
Carried out by Channel Research, Brussel

EVALUATION OF

The contributions made by the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI), Fafo Applied International Studies (FAFO), the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) towards reaching the goals of the Norwegian authorities in the fields of conflict prevention and peace-building. Five case studies were carried out, in Sudan, the Palestinian Areas and Sri Lanka, of the Training for Peace project for the civilian components of African peace support operations, and of research in connection with UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was to review developments in the research activities of the four institutes in this field and evaluate the consequences of research having become such an important element of “the Norwegian model”. The study draws conclusions regarding trends in Norwegian research and research funding in the fields of conflict prevention and peace-building.

FINDINGS

- > Norwegian research on conflict prevention and peace-building has reached a high level of maturity in the past few years and constitutes a unique resource for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- > A viable, diversified system of funding has been established. However, funding sources have increased and rapidly become more diversified, resulting in significant variations in the criteria for research, a lack of an overall view of research and limited collaboration between the partners.
- > The relatively small research and diplomatic community has avoided visible conflicts of interest related to funding mechanisms.
- > In Sudan, Norwegian research has made a significant contribution by supplying decision-makers with factual information and by helping to establish priorities, build up expertise and develop networks. With regard to the Palestinian Areas, the report concludes that information and the understanding of the situation reflected in the research is exceptionally

good, while capacity building has gradually been given lower priority. In Sri Lanka, the Norwegian authorities have used international rather than Norwegian sources. The Training for Peace programme in Africa is a good example of the way research institutions can contribute by building up regional knowledge bases and networks. Finally, Norwegian research institutes have had a significant influence on Norwegian efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

- > The Utstein study carried out in 2004 found that there was a “strategic deficit” between strategic policies and programmes in the field where Norwegian assistance for peace-building is concerned. Much of the research conducted in the past few years has consisted of studies commissioned to provide quick answers. The research agenda has therefore been influenced by short-term needs, and has been unable to reduce the strategic deficit
- > There is an unnecessary contrast between long-term and short-term research funding in this field, where the former seeks to build up expertise and the latter aims at supplying information rapidly. This has led to a loss of efficiency, and substantial resources have been spent on poorly coordinated proposals that have not been followed up or political initiatives that are not underpinned by research. Norad’s role has been limited to keeping track of research support.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation team does not propose any new policy or the introduction of any new structures, but does suggest that certain steps be taken to improve the general management of knowledge and strategic thinking:

- > The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is advised to create a consultation mechanism for the various government bodies and research institutions that are engaged in conflict prevention and peace-building
- > It also recommends that specific objectives be formulated for the research, with emphasis on capacity-building in Norway and abroad
- > Research institutions are advised to design and implement strategies for national capacity-building
- > The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad should develop a knowledge management framework for research in this field, and
- > Norad should consider strengthening its role from that of purely practical oversight to developing capacity to assess the substantive content of research.

Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector



EVALUATION REPORT 6/2008
Pages 99
ISBN 978-82-7548-366-7
Carried out by MRAG Limited,
Natural Resources Institute (NRI)
and ECON Pöyry

EVALUATION OF

Norway has provided support to the fisheries sector to 57 countries totalling NOK 1,500 million (US\$ 221 million) over the period 1985–2006. Over half has been directed to Africa (principally Namibia, Mozambique and Tanzania). This is followed by Asia (principally Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Philippines and China) and then Latin America. The main channels were bilateral (42%) and multilateral (42%) support, with the remainder through private sector development.

Focus on Norwegian expertise has taken priority over poverty reduction objectives although some trickle down effects in terms of job creation can be registered from private sector development projects

PURPOSE

The main purpose of this evaluation is to document the results of Norwegian fisheries sector assistance, and outline lessons that can be used in design and implementation of future assistance to partner countries. The evaluation focuses on evaluating the outcomes and impacts of following three components of bilateral assistance since 1985:

- > Technical assistance to support fisheries management policy formation
- > Support to fisheries research, education and training of personnel, and
- > Activities directed towards fisheries-based private sector development (PSD).

FINDINGS

- > The cooperation has made use of Norwegian expertise in fisheries management for the industrial and/or semi-industrial sectors and resulted in strengthening capacity and fisheries sector institutions in the partner countries. Focus on Norwegian expertise has taken priority over poverty reduction objectives although some trickle down effects in terms of job creation can be registered from private sector development projects.
- > Efficiency and effectiveness of projects have varied across countries and among projects, although overall have been satisfactory. This has depended on the type of intervention (e.g. some technical support projects were less efficient and effective) and on changes in government policies. In some cases the political risks affecting project implementation were underestimated.
- > Most impacts have been felt at central (national) level, where the majority of the support has been channeled through the main sector institutions. Impacts at the regional and local levels have been less evident.
- > Norwegian support to private sector has been effective. Efficiency with regard to Norad support has been high, with substantial results achieved from limited initial funding. With regard to Norfund, profitability of projects has been substantially negative, although the wider development impacts (technology transfer, technical assistance and training) have been positive.
- > Cross cutting issues related to gender, good governance, and biological sustainability of the fisheries remain to be addressed explicitly. There is evidence of favorable gender-related outcomes. However, these have tended to be more coincidental to, rather than a result of, project design.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- > The long-term support provided has been flexible and Norwegian bilateral support is considered to be one of the best development programmes by many stakeholders, and it is recommended that this support be continued to developing countries.
- > There is a need to define strategic priorities, particularly related to whether to continue to focus on areas of Norwegian expertise, or to extend the focus more directly on poverty reduction in the fisheries sector in partner countries. The latter can be achieved both by interventions aimed at improving the standard of living of poor fishing communities, or by better management of large-scale fisheries whilst ensuring that government income from the fisheries is channelled to appropriate poverty reduction programmes.

- > A focus on poverty reduction implies integrated and cross-sectoral interventions affecting small-scale fisheries, for which current Norwegian capacity is inadequate. This has implications for capacity development in Norway and sourcing of expertise beyond Norwegian institutions, particularly the expertise in the partner countries. Irrespective of the focus, efficiency considerations call for the use of competitive recruitment processes for sourcing expertise for future co-operation.
- > Norwegian co-operation should attempt to influence the partner agenda, to ensure that the partner government has poverty reduction, good governance and gender issues at the heart of its policies. There needs to be transparency with respect to government policy and the degree to which there is a real commitment to poverty alleviation. If the links to poverty reduction are indirect, the way and means by which poverty reduction is expected should be clear from the outset. Transparency also applies to any issues of corruption. Commitment to good governance and gender issues should be explicit in the design of Norwegian-funded projects.
- > There is a need for future co-operation to focus on results: the implementation of policy, not just policy development; putting into practice at all levels (particularly the regional and local levels) the lessons that have been learnt.
- > There is a need for strengthening the expertise and management information systems within Norad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies to monitor and evaluate the impacts of programme and project support to the fisheries sector. Linked to this, is a need to improve project planning by clearly defined objectives and performance indicators to allow for monitoring the progress on poverty alleviation, governance and gender issues, environmental and financial sustainability of the assistance to the partner countries.

Joint Evaluation of Support of Citizens' Voice and Accountability



JOINT EVALUATION (UK IN LEAD)
Pages 109
ISBN 186192959
Carried out by
The Overseas Development Institute, UK

EVALUATION OF

Citizens' Voice and Accountability, i.e. measures to strengthen citizens' influence on policy, and measures aimed at strengthening mechanisms to make authorities more accountable to their citizens.

Seven donors joined forces on the evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability. The evaluation was headed by the UK. The other donor countries were Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Norway. Five country studies were carried out in connection with the evaluation: Nicaragua, Benin, Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique. Fifty-seven projects in seven countries were evaluated.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was twofold:

- > To identify and document donors' approaches and strategies to strengthen voice and accountability in various development contexts, and to find out which approaches have worked best, why and how.
- > To assess the aid-effectiveness and sustainability of development assistance projects.

FINDINGS

The donors have worked more on strengthening civil society's/citizens' possibilities for influence than on authorities' accountability. Part of the reason for this is that in some cases donors have been unwilling to cooperate directly with government (Nepal), some aid-independent countries, such as Indonesia, are unwilling to cooperate with donors on increasing their accountability, and in DR Congo the state has more or less collapsed and donors have to rely on civil society organisations to get anything done.

Some/certain examples were found of positive changes in behaviour and practices as a result of measures analysed in this evaluation, such as increased citizen awareness, the strengthening of certain marginalised groups and of encouraging state officials to

be more responsive, especially at sub-national level. However, such effects have been limited and isolated and have proved difficult to transfer to other (broader) contexts. It has been particularly difficult to achieve changes in power relationships. One of the reasons why donors have achieved only limited results is that donors' expectations have been too high and based on a set of assumptions that are not always realistic include the following:

- > an assumed automatic relationship between enhanced citizens' voice and improved government accountability,
- > an assumption that citizens' voice represent the interests, needs and demands of a homogeneous (poor) people,
- > an assumption that efficient institutions will naturally be more transparent, responsive and accountable,
- > an assumption that traditional focus on capacity-building of formal institutions can support efforts to strengthen citizens' voice and government accountability
- > an assumption that democratic processes necessarily lead to improved developmental outcomes (including poverty reduction).

Voice is often treated as an unproblematic concept without addressing the fundamental question of whose voice is being heard. In reality, the voices of the poor are far from homogeneous and these voices may not necessarily be complementary but actually compete with one another. In other words, not all voices are equal or equally heard.

Another problem is the tension between the long-term processes that are required to change state-society relations and donors' desire to produce quick results.

With respect to aid effectiveness, it was found that there was little coordination of donors' efforts in this area. Furthermore, the authors found that there is a lack of strategic planning and coherent approaches in these types of programmes, at both the design phase and the implementation phase. This in turn results in overlapping, gaps and competition between donors.

The donors have worked more on strengthening civil society's/citizens' possibilities for influence than on authorities' accountability

RECOMMENDATIONS

- > donors should, to a greater extent, undertake political-economic analyses with emphasis on power and change in a country, context or sector in order to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between informal and formal institutions and incentives that motivate the various actors. The implications of these analyses should thereafter be operationalised in connection with the design of individual measures,
- > donors should, to a greater extent, share their experiences,
- > donors must work with the institutions they have, and not with the institutions they wish they had,
- > donors should engage with the informal structures that exist, which often dominate the formal institutions,
- > capacity-building must focus not only on technical but also on political skills
- > support must be provided for capacity-building at the local level,
- > donors must also consider cooperating with non-traditional civil society organisations, such as religious organisations (successful in Indonesia), trade union movements and social movements (Bangladesh),
- > aid measures should include specific, practical measures to promote the voice and influence of marginalised groups,
- > donors must, to a greater extent, support measures that cover both the “voice” and the “accountability” aspects in the same project (however, it is somewhat uncertain what this recommendation is based on).

FOLLOW-UP

The evaluation report has been distributed to those parts of the aid administration that are assumed to be interested, with a discussion memo attached. A seminar will be arranged in spring 2009 to which interested parties are invited to participate in order to discuss the content of the reports.

Managing Aid Exit and Transformation



JOINT EVALUATION (SWEDEN IN LEAD)

Pages 222

ISBN 978586-4056-6

Carried out by ECORYS and

Chr. Michelsen Institute

EVALUATION OF

This is an evaluation of the way four donor countries, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have planned and carried out their phase-out of development assistance in five partner countries, Botswana, Eritrea, India, Malawi and South Africa. In each of these developing countries, one or more of the donors has closed down either all or parts of its development cooperation efforts.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was to identify the consequences for partner countries of donor countries withdrawing from bilateral cooperation. Is such termination of development assistance carried out in accordance with established principles of partnership and mutuality in development cooperation?

FINDINGS

- > All decisions to phase out development cooperation were made unilaterally. Only in the case of India was the decision made by a recipient country. There was little to indicate that the phasing-out processes took place within the framework of a partnership. Lack of dialogue was one of the criticisms voiced by the cooperation partners in several of the studies.
- > Planning of the phase-out process is more the exception than the rule. There is little focus on results in these processes. As a rule, the agreements signed are fulfilled, but these are only to a small degree amended with a view to including special measures to strengthen sustainability.
- > The phase-out of assistance in countries that are little dependent on aid has not given rise to any major problems.
- > In several cases, an abrupt halt in the provision of assistance to aid-dependent countries has had disastrous consequences.
- > The fact that all the parties concerned are actively involved in the phase-out process seemed to strengthen the final results of the aid that was provided.

- > The capacity and competence of both donors and recipients to handle the phase-out process have an impact in terms of achieving an acceptable result.
- > There are examples of measures that have been able to continue and been better integrated into the structure of the recipient country when the donor has exited.
- > It has proved difficult to get other donors to take over the funding of programmes when a donor withdraws.
- > The termination of government cooperation also caused major difficulties for local non-governmental organisations, since there is a lack of alternatives to donor financing in most countries.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- > Due to increased use of development assistance as a political instrument in conflict-ridden countries, the number of “difficult partnerships” is on the rise. This calls for more careful consideration of how development assistance efforts can be terminated, if necessary, in a way that minimises the adverse impacts.
- > Development assistance capacity and expertise must be available throughout the phasing-out period, primarily at the embassy in question.
- > In all countries, the context, time frame, sustainability and administrative capacity of the parties concerned must be considered prior to phasing out aid. In this connection, too, an analysis of the financial and technical aspects of development cooperation is necessary when planning the phase-out. The entire process must be based on good dialogue at every level.
- > Donor countries should draw up guidelines for the phasing out of development assistance. The phase-out process must be adapted to the situation in individual countries.

FOLLOW-UP

The evaluation report was presented at a well-attended meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 2008. The Evaluation Department recommended that if it proves necessary, as part of the rationalisation and reordering of priorities in bilateral development assistance, to close down important cooperation programmes or to phase out or substantially reduce development assistance to partner countries, the lessons learned and recommendations in this evaluation should form part of the basis for the decisions that are made.

Synthesis Study on Best Practices and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low-Income African Countries



SYNTHESIS REPORT 1/2008
Pages 166
ISBN 978-82-7548-321-6
Carried out by Arne Disch and
Karstein Haarberg, Scanteam,
Adom Baisie Ghartey, Ghana

SYNTHESIS OF

Synthesis study of evaluation reports and studies that discuss new, improved approaches to capacity-building in low-income African countries in connection with poverty reduction.

PURPOSE

To draw lessons from supporting innovative forms of capacity-building and assess the effectiveness of this type of assistance. To propose methods for how we can learn from this experience and develop an analytical approach to the evaluation of capacity-building. The evaluation is intended to support DAC's efforts to harmonise assistance in the area of capacity-building.

One of the main findings is that we do not know as much as we think we know about poverty-oriented capacity-building, and we appear to understand even less

FINDINGS

- > One of the main findings is that we do not know as much as we think we know about poverty-oriented capacity-building, and we appear to understand even less.
- > The synthesis study shows that there have been many evaluations and studies of innovative approaches to capacity-building, but they have had little focus on capacity-building in relation to poverty reduction in African countries.
- > There are even fewer studies that link capacity-building to strengthening the development of sustainable local communities.
- > The evaluations and studies mainly discuss capacity-building in relation to the organisational level rather than in relation to the individual or institutional level.

- > The evaluations show that one of the prerequisites for success in new forms for capacity-building is strong local ownership and participation in projects intended to promote capacity-building.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The synthesis study makes several recommendations as to how evaluations should be organised in future. It is necessary to clarify the concept of capacity-building and link this concept to poverty reduction. In this connection, it is important to draw on the accumulated experience of non-governmental organisations in the field of capacity development. Evaluations should be linked to specific examples in the field and involve the authorities of recipient countries and representatives of civil society.

Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings



SYNTHESIS REPORT 2/2008
Pages 34
ISBN 978-82-7548-334-6
Carried out by Chr. Michelsen Institute,
Espen Villanger

SYNTHESIS OF

Evaluations carried out in the past five years of the use of cash transfers in development cooperation, with special focus on transfers that promote social protection, where a reduction in the vulnerability of exposed groups is a key factor. This includes different types of transfers: conditional and unconditional cash transfers, and universal and targeted cash transfers. Conditional cash transfers mean that the transfer is conditional upon a certain type of action on the part of the recipient, as opposed to transfers where no such conditions apply. Universal transfers cover everyone, while the other main category targets particular groups.

PURPOSE

The objective of the synthesis report is to identify the experience that has been gained and the lessons that can be learned from using cash transfers in development cooperation. Transfers in connection with humanitarian responses are included, but there is no special emphasis on them. The synthesis report considers the lessons learned from using different types of cash transfer and from different geographical regions. It also discusses the implications for Norwegian development cooperation.

FINDINGS

- > The positive experience gained from using conditional cash transfers in Latin America is not necessarily generally transferable, for example to Africa. There is little knowledge about critical factors, and social conditions can vary significantly. It is therefore too early to draw any general conclusions.
- > Before considering whether to use conditional cash transfers, certain prerequisites should be in place: if the arrangement is conditional upon using a public service, the public service must function, must be safe and accessible, and must have sufficient capacity to include new users.
- > In areas suffering from humanitarian crises, an inadequate supply of food and weak links to nearby markets, cash transfers should not be used. If market mechanisms are functioning, cash transfers can make an effective contribution towards helping vulnerable households.

- > As a means of reducing poverty, it is effective to channel cash transfers, regardless of type, with a view to reaching children. Transferring cash to mothers does more to improve the situation for children than transferring cash to men.
- > Finely-tuned programmes (that seek to measure and give according to need) and models can be extremely expensive, their impact on poverty reduction is difficult to measure, and they may lead to poverty traps, where the target groups have no incentive to rise out of poverty. Universal cash transfer programmes may be preferable from the point of view of effectiveness.
- > Universal programmes will be financially viable in all developing countries, are easier to implement and are sustainable – but this is a matter of political will.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The report points to several implications for Norwegian development cooperation:

- > The implications of conditional cash transfers should be carefully considered before embarking on such programmes because they have a tendency to exclude the most vulnerable groups.
- > More poverty reduction will usually be achieved for the money by using universal programmes.
- > Gender and equality should be included in the design of cash transfer programmes.
- > Ensuring sound evaluations of the impact of universal cash transfer programmes may be important for their future popularity.

FOLLOW-UP

There are plans to arrange an open seminar in 2009 at which cash transfers, the conclusions and the recommendations will be discussed.

The Challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A Review of Norwegian Evaluation Practice



STUDY 1/2008
Pages 37
ISBN 978-82-754-272-1
Carried out by Alf Morten Jerve and
Espen Villanger, Chr. Michelsen Institute

STUDY OF

The extent to which, in a selection of evaluations, it has been possible to measure the long-term impact of Norwegian development assistance. The study considers seven different reports from evaluations carried out in the period 2002–2007.

PURPOSE

In its strategic plan for 2006–2010, Norad maintains that we know too little about the impacts of Norwegian development assistance. By assessing the terms of reference and methods used in a selection of evaluation reports, this study aimed to show gaps in knowledge and present proposals for practical recommendations to improve such evaluations.

FINDINGS

The selected reports were assessed against international standards for impact evaluations and the following points were emphasised:

- > Even with a limited budget, it is possible to carry out a contra-factual analysis. This entails gathering data about both participants and non-participants in a project and using both qualitative and quantitative methods to deduce which impacts the project has had.
- > The terms of reference should discuss any possible unintentional impacts of the project that is to be evaluated.
- > If the terms of reference are vague, the consultants can define the objective of the evaluation themselves, even if this does not necessarily correspond to the original objective of the assignment. Such changes should be discussed and clarified with the client.
- > Method triangulation, i.e. using different methods to shed light on the same issue, provides a better basis for drawing conclusions about long-term impacts than using only one method.
- > Consultants must have the necessary expertise and analytical ability to carry out impact evaluations.
- > In cases where the goals are more physical in nature, the assumed achievement of goals proves to be higher.

- > At the same time, the study concludes that development assistance per se is often regarded as successful despite a more general negative trend.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations addressed to the client emphasise that the terms of reference must be consistent in order to avoid different interpretations of the assignment, and that the part relating to method must clearly state what kind of analysis is to be carried out. The authors also argue that money is better spent on carrying out a single, scientifically-based evaluation of long-term impacts than on two smaller evaluations that are unable to draw robust conclusions.

With respect to the actual implementation of evaluations, the report emphasises that consultants must ensure that there is an analytical basis for their conclusions about long-term impacts, among other things by developing a programme theory, undertaking a contra-factual analysis, and being aware of distortions in the sample.

Even with a limited budget, it is possible to carry out a contra-factual analysis

FOLLOW-UP

Evaluation Department in Norad has discussed the report's findings and recommendations with a view to improving the terms of reference on which evaluations are based. The study was also presented at an evaluation conference in Oslo in May 2008 in order to provide insights and encourage debate on the challenges involved in attempting to measure long-term impacts.

Anti-corruption Approaches: A Literature Review



STUDY 2/2008
Pages 64
ISBN 978-827548-362-9
Carried out by Arne Disch, Endre Vigeland
and Geir Sundet, Scanteam

PURPOSE

The purpose of this study was to obtain an overview over the lessons learned from different approaches to combating corruption. The study was carried out in connection with the planning of a joint evaluation of development assistance in this area commissioned by the Asian Development Bank, Danida (Denmark), the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV), Sida (Sweden), DFID (Great Britain) and the Evaluation Department in Norad.

FINDINGS

- > There are few evident successes as far as support for general efforts to combat corruption is concerned, and the results of specific anti-corruption efforts have been limited.
- > A successful fight against corruption, which has been achieved in a few countries, appears to necessitate strong political support, good laws and a functioning judicial system. The absence of such prerequisites is an important part of the problem in many countries.
- > Much of the support for anti-corruption measures has been provided without taking sufficient account of the political and economic conditions and the specific nature of corruption in the country concerned. Voices from the South or from impoverished groups are rare in anti-corruption literature.
- > Weak institutions and weak legislation can, to a certain extent, be remedied by reform and education. It is more difficult to combat systemic corruption related to political interests. In recent years, several analyses of political and economic factors have been carried out that have helped to improve understanding of the possibilities and limitations in many countries, but so far this does not appear to have led to any significant change in how donors support anti-corruption activities.
- > Much of the corruption takes place in the service sectors, e.g. as kickbacks in large infrastructure projects or bribes to get water, health or education services. Nevertheless, specific anti-corruption support to these areas is relatively rare.
- > It is often argued that decentralisation reduces the distance between service-providers and citizens, thus reinforcing the

feeling of responsibility and transparency of service providers. However, responsibility and accountability issues are often more complex than is assumed. In neo-patrimonial political systems (master-subject systems), where public servants are protected by an established system of dependency, dissident voices will often be suppressed. In some cases, decentralisation has led to more corruption.

Voices from the South or from impoverished groups are rare in anti-corruption literature

RECOMMENDATIONS

- > The authors conclude that there is insufficient knowledge of how to fight corruption and point to the need for more research, especially into how changed attitudes can lead to improved behaviour and practices. They also recommend more research into the relationship between gender and corruption.
- > The authors find that inconsistent donor practices have sometimes weakened the international community's demand for recipient countries to combat corruption, and recommend that this issue be considered in more detail/greater depth.

FOLLOW-UP

The review will be followed up with an evaluation of the five donors' assistance for anti-corruption activities in order to find out more about what has worked well and less well.

Evaluation of the Role and Contribution of UNDP in Environment and Energy



Pages: 138
ISBN Not stated
Carried out by a team organised
by UNDP's Evaluation Office
<http://www.undp.org/eo/thematic/ee.html>

EVALUATION OF

UNDP's work in environment and energy in general, with focus on four thematic areas: climate change, energy, biodiversity and reliance on the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The total use of resources has not been determined, but so far UNDP has received at least USD 2.3 billion from GEF for projects in this field.

PURPOSE

The evaluation assessed the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP's work in environment and energy at the global, regional and national levels. Long-term effects were not assessed. The evaluation primarily focused on UNDP work in the period from 2002 to 2007.

FINDINGS

- > UNDP has been an important player in the environmental sector in developing countries, and activities in the fields of environment and energy will be key elements in UNDP's future efforts to reduce poverty. However, work in environmental and natural resource management has had low priority since 2000.
- > So far UNDP has played only a limited role in the energy sector.
- > GEF currently funds most of UNDP's activities in the field and the focus is therefore on global environmental issues. Important environmental and energy challenges at national level have received a varying degree of attention, making it difficult to coordinate these efforts with UNDP's other activities.
- > UNDP's capacity for planning and managing environmental and energy work varies. The fact that many country offices lack expertise poses internal challenges.
- > The reduction in UNDP's general budget increases the importance of GEF funding. This poses external challenges in the form of increased competition with the World Bank and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) for GEF funds.
- > There is uncertainty with regard to several assessments due to the lack of reliable data on UNDP's use of its own resources in the field. The lack of useful indicators for UNDP performance has also been a technical challenge.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- > UNDP should give more strategic priority to environmental and energy measures, based on its mandate of poverty reduction and its comparative advantages.
- > UNDP must strengthen its policy dialogue in order to better meet the needs of partner countries as regards sustainable development.
- > UNDP must also strengthen its own environmental and energy capacity, particularly in its country offices.

FOLLOW-UP

Task-sharing and cooperation between UNDP, the World Bank and UNEP must be followed up, and Norway should also make active use of GEF's governing body to influence UNDP's environmental and energy work. It is important to ensure that a better system for reporting resource use and results is developed by all these actors.

Evaluation of the World Bank's Assistance for Decentralization



Pages 118
ISBN ISBN-13 978-0-8213-7635-5
Carried out by the
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG).
[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTDECENTR/Resources/
decentralization_eval.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDECENTR/Resources/decentralization_eval.pdf)

EVALUATION OF

The effectiveness of Bank support for decentralization provided to 20 countries during the period 1990–2007. These countries were selected to ensure regional representation, and they accounted for 47 percent of all Bank commitments containing decentralization components during the period under study.

Improved understanding of political economy issues is essential to help frame more realistic objectives

PURPOSE

The aim was to examine what worked and what did not, to inform the design and implementation of future Bank support for decentralization to the client countries.

FINDINGS

- > At the sectoral level, Bank's support for decentralization was driven largely by considerations of efficiency. The quality of Bank support improved in two-thirds of the 20 countries in the last five years of the evaluation period.
- > Bank support was effective when it was linked to a country-led decentralization strategy. Better coordination between units within the Bank providing support for decentralization would be very helpful.
- > Bank support may be justified in the absence of client commitment (e.g., to forestall potentially adverse measures), however under such circumstances Bank interventions are not usually effective.
- > Strengthening local governments both in rural and urban areas is critical when they are responsible for delivering basic services. Improved understanding of political economy issues is essential to help frame more realistic objectives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Ensure that Bank support at the country level is founded upon a clear and integrative understanding of economic, political, and institutional factors at different levels of government and across sectors affected by decentralization:

- > Strengthen institutional arrangements within the Bank to ensure that an integrative view underpins Bank interventions.
- > Ensure that Bank support, particularly lending, is underpinned by genuine client commitment to decentralized service delivery.
- > Encourage the adoption of a more results-based approach to decentralization by helping develop in-country and Bank capacity for monitoring and evaluation that focuses on local outcomes rather than on just the process of decentralization.

Evaluation of World Bank Support to Public Sector Reform



Pages 120
ISBN-13 978-0-8213-7589-1
Prepared by
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/07/30/000334955_20080730084421/Rendered/PDF/448180PUB0Box310only109780821375891.pdf

EVALUATION OF

The Bank's lending, and other kinds of Bank support during the period 1999–2006 for public sector reform in four areas: public financial management, administrative and civil service, revenue administration, and anticorruption and transparency. The Bank has devoted an increasing share of its lending and advisory support to the reform of central governments.

although development policy lending can help secure the enabling policy changes

PURPOSE

The main objective is to help the Bank learn how to contribute more effectively to Public Sector Reforms in its member countries. The intended audience also includes government officials and other stakeholders that want to see what lessons are available for improving project and program design.

FINDINGS

The efficacy of the Bank's support during 1999–2006 for public sector reforms has been variable. Although a majority of countries that borrowed to support public sector reform experienced improved performance in some dimensions, there were shortcomings in important areas and in overall coordination.


- > It takes time to get significant results. Institutional change usually needs the sustained support of investment projects, although development policy lending can help secure the enabling policy changes.
- > The frequency of improvements was higher among IBRD borrowers than among IDA borrowers.

- > Performance usually improved for public financial management, tax administration, and transparency, but did not usually with respect to civil service.
- > Strong political will and an adequate judiciary system are prerequisites for the success of anticorruption laws and commissions.
- > Direct measures to reduce corruption – such as anticorruption laws and commissions – rarely succeeded.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- > Focus first on the basic reforms that a country needs in its initial situation.
- > Set priorities for anticorruption efforts based on assessments of which types of corruption are most harmful to poverty reduction and growth. Emphasize building country systems that reduce the opportunities for corruption, and making information public in ways that stimulate popular demand for more efficient and less corrupt service delivery.
- > Strengthen the civil service and administrative components of public sector reform, providing them with actionable indicators for performance, and more linkage between the implementation of reforms for civil service and for financial management. Give more attention to the budget execution phases of financial management.

Evaluation of the World Bank's Economic and Sector Work and Technical Assistance



Pages 172

ISBN 978-0-8213-7725-3

This evaluation was prepared by the Country Evaluation and Regional Relations Unit of the Independent Evaluation Group.

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTOED/EXTECOSECWOR/0,,menuPK:5249466~pagePK:64829575~piPK:64829612~theSitePK:5249459,00.html>

EVALUATION OF

The two of the Bank's analytical and advisory activities: namely Economic and Sector work (to inform lending, support government policy formation, build capacity, stimulate public debate and influence the development community); and Technical assistance (to assist in policy implementation, strengthen institutions, and facilitate knowledge exchange). The Bank spent \$910 million (or 26 percent of its spending on country services) on these activities during the period 2000–2006.

PURPOSE

The main purpose is to assess the extent to which the two main analytical and advisory activities of the Bank met their stated objectives and outline recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness with which these activities meet their objectives in the future.

FINDINGS

- > The report confirms the general wisdom: on the whole the performance indicators are satisfactory but there is substantial variation across individual countries; the underperformance being in countries where the need is most acute; the IDA countries and especially Africa.
- > Middle-income countries prefer services without a lending component, and clients in all countries prefer Technical Assistance over Economic and Sector work.
- > Close collaboration with client countries from task initiation through the formulation of recommendations, and sustained follow-up after the completion of the tasks was important for effectiveness.
- > Direct involvement of the client countries did not matter for effectiveness, although all tasks needed to be tailored to individual countries needs and interests to be effective.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- > Maintain a strong knowledge base on countries and sectors where the Bank is providing or planning to provide funds.
- > Ensure Economic Sector Work in IDA countries is adequately resourced since cost matters for quality, and quality matters for effectiveness.
- > Enhance institutional arrangements for the two activities by ensuring substantive task team presence in Bank's country offices, particularly in countries with low institutional capacity to facilitate closer client collaboration.
- > Recognize feedback from client countries to counter-balance current Bank incentives for lending over non-lending and Economic Sector Work over Technical Assistance.

Evaluation of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)



Pages 104
Carried out by Abt. Associates Inc.

EVALUATION OF

The GAVI Alliance – formerly the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization. From its inception in 2000 and up to 2005, GAVI administered a total of USD 1.67 billion. GAVI's mission has been to save children's lives and protect people's health through the widespread use of safe vaccines, with particular focus on the needs of developing countries. Norway has been an important contributor and partner in the Alliance. The evaluation was commissioned by GAVI's Executive Committee, which established an independent steering committee co-chaired by the Evaluation Department in Norad.

Immunisation is now a more prominent topic in international health literature, and it is recognised as a core health service

PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was to identify and learn from the successes and weaknesses of the GAVI Alliance in Phase 1 (2000–2005). The evaluation was to be used in the formulation of GAVI policy in the next strategic phase. Finally, the report was to document the impact of the Alliance's efforts.

FINDINGS

> During Phase 1, the GAVI Alliance increased access to immunisation and expanded the use of new vaccines in developing countries. In countries that received funding through GAVI, the DTP3 (against diphtheria, tetanus, and Pertussis (whooping cough)) coverage rate increased from 64 to 71 percent, vaccination coverage against hepatitis B (chronic liver inflammation) rose from 16 to 46 percent and the Hib (against infectious meningitis) coverage rate increased from 1 to 7 per cent.

- > Out of a total of 15.8 million additional children who received a DTP3 vaccination in Phase 1, it is estimated, based on statistical analyses, that 2.4 million would not have been immunised without GAVI. Of 90.5 million additional children who were vaccinated against hepatitis B, it is similarly estimated that 40.2 million were vaccinated thanks to GAVI, as were 14.1 million vaccinated against Hib and 13 million against yellow fever.
- > The report shows that GAVI was directly instrumental in preventing 1,480,000 deaths caused by hepatitis B and 141,000 deaths due to whooping cough, and in saving the lives of 112,000 children through immunisation against Hib.
- > GAVI has not been effective in supporting underperforming states.
- > The results achieved by GAVI are not entirely positive when it comes to efforts to reduce the price of vaccines. The price of the two main vaccines used in the programme did not decrease during the period, and it was unrealistic to expect it to do so.
- > GAVI succeeded in making immunisation a pivotal focus of international development. Immunisation is now a more prominent topic in international health literature, and it is recognised as a core health service.
- > The GAVI Alliance was established to create a partnership between governments, aid agencies and private actors. The rapid growth of the GAVI Alliance and the GAVI Fund gave rise to challenges that the GAVI leadership tried to address as the situation became increasingly complex. However, two problems were never solved: poorly defined roles for partners and management entities, and poor accountability. Nevertheless, a true partnership evolved between the senior leaders and the technical staff in the programme and in the partner organisations.
- > GAVI's policy strongly encouraged the partner countries to apply for new vaccines. This policy was not always based on data and analyses, and could be seen as poorly adapted to the situation in the various countries. During Phase 1, 18 percent of funding was allocated to increasing access to vaccination services, 73 percent to expanding use of new vaccines, 4 percent on accelerated disease control and 4 percent to accelerating the development and introduction of new vaccines. These allocations do not appear to have been based on consideration of strategic priorities and cost effectiveness.
- > Overall funding for immunisation increased during Phase 1 of GAVI's activities, largely because of GAVI and largely for new vaccines. Even though local economic sustainability was a key element of GAVI activities, limited progress was made in this field.

- > GAVI has had limited success in influencing vaccine prices, and has had no strategy for exerting influence on the market in order to obtain more favourable prices. In terms of finding new ways of obtaining funds, GAVI has achieved good results.
- > GAVI lived up to its principle of building on and improving, but not replacing, the work that GAVI partners were already doing. GAVI has played a strong role in promoting coordination and building consensus as regards immunisation. GAVI utilised its possibilities of procuring new funding to the fullest extent, and raised immunisation funding to unprecedented levels. The GAVI partners are aware that, individually, they could not have achieved the same results.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The GAVI Board has been advised to:

- > initiate a discussion on better ways of supporting under-performing countries
- > propose processes to improve information in partner countries
- > commission an independent study on how efforts at country level can best be adapted to GAVI's and partner countries' priorities
- > obtain better information on the costs of achieving various objectives
- > work with partners on developing a clear advocacy strategy
- > appoint a team to ensure consensus on evaluation frameworks and indicators
- > commission an in-depth study of the vaccine markets
- > commission a study of innovative ways to structure procurement of vaccines
- > appoint a team to coordinate efforts to promote more sustainable services.





PHOTOGRAPHY

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