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EVALUATION REPORTS

The German Civil Peace Service

Synthesis Report, Volume I: Main Report

The German Civil Peace Service

Synthesis Report

Volume I: Main Report

Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP)
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

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Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany (BMZ)
Dahlmannstraße 4
53113 Bonn, Germany
www.bmz.de/en
eval@bmz.bund.de

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Foreword

Development and peace are intrinsically tied to each other and determine one another. Crisis prevention and peacebuilding are therefore standard components of the German development policy agenda.

In 1999, the German Civil Peace Service (CPS) was founded as a new instrument for civil society peacebuilding. Set up as a joint endeavour (*Gemeinschaftswerk*) of governmental and non-governmental organisations, it aims at strengthening non-violent conflict resolution and promoting peaceful approaches to conflict potentials. Thus, it contributes to conflict prevention, reduced violence and post-conflict follow-up. The CPS concentrates on deploying peace experts. At the end of 2009, 583 CPS experts had been deployed in 50 countries with a financial volume of 144 million euros.

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) commissioned this evaluation of the German Civil Peace Service, which covers the period from 1999 to 2010. It assesses the CPS's relevance, effectiveness and efficiency as well as coherence, coordination and complementarity with other activities of German development policy and those of other donors.

An evaluation team from the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva carried out the evaluation under the guidance of the head of the evaluation team, Thania Paffenholz. The evaluation includes eight country studies and was concluded in April 2011. At the BMZ, Katrin von der Mosel and Rita Walraf were responsible for managing the evaluation process.

The opinions presented in this study are those of the independent external experts and do not necessarily reflect the views of the BMZ. Comments on the evaluation by the BMZ and by the Civil Peace Service Group (the network carrying out CPS activities) can be found at the end of this report.

Michaela Zintl
Head of the division "Evaluation of Development Cooperation; Auditing"
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

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Dr Thania Paffenholz
(Head of the evaluation team)

Evaluation team

Core team

Dr Thania Paffenholz: Team leader; evaluation, peacebuilding, quality control

Daniel Fino: Organisational development, efficiency, development cooperation, expert deployment, quality control

Dr Oliver Jütersonke: Management and quality control

Sandra Reimann: Logistics and finance

Jana Krause: Project assistant

Country teams

Burundi: Dr Jean-Eudes Beuret, Laurienne Gacorekeke, Ernest Niyonizma and Pascasie Kana

Cambodia: Prof. Dr Jörn Dosch, Doung Virorth and Dr Kim Sedara

Colombia: Dr Markus Schultze-Kraft and Jennifer Florez Torres

Guatemala: Dr Björn Holmberg and Maria Mercedes Escobar Aguirre

Israel/Palestine[1]: Prof. Dr Riccardo Bocco and Paola Taiana

Niger: Bertrand Guibert and Abdoulaye Mohamadou

Serbia: Dr Roberto Belloni and Mladen Momcilovic

Uganda: Dr Thania Paffenholz and Joseph Rujumba with team

At the BMZ, Katrin von der Mosel and Rita Walraf were responsible for the management of the evaluation.

[1] The BMZ normally uses the term “Palestinian Territories”.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (German Federal Foreign Office)
AGDF	Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienste für den Frieden e.V. (Action Committee Service for Peace)
AGEH	Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Entwicklungshilfe e. V. (Association for Development Cooperation)
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
CCDP	Centre on Conflict,Development and Peacebuilding
CCHR	Cambodian Center for Human Rights
CFI	Christliche Fachkräfte International
CNA	Centre for Nonviolent Action (Serbia)
CPS	Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst)
DED[2]	Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service)
DWHH	Deutsche Welthungerhilfe
ECCC	Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
EED	Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst e.V. (Church Development Service)
EHG	Entwicklungshelfergesetz (German Development Worker Law)
EU	European Union
*forum*ZFD	Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst e.V.
FriEnt	Arbeitsgemeinschaft Entwickungspolitische Friedensarbeit (FriEnt) (Working Group on Development and Peace)
GENOVICO	Projet de Gestion Non Violente des Conflits (Niger)
GBV	Gender-based violence
GTZ[1]	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)
InWEnt	Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (Capacity Building International)
MI-PAREC	Ministère Paix et Réconciliation Sous la Croix
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

[2] DED, GTZ and InWEnt were merged into Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on 1 January 2011. As this evaluation was conducted in 2009 and 2010, the then names are used in this report.

OECD-DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PBI	Peace Brigades International
RIAMRIAM	Local Civil Society Network in Moroto, Uganda
WFD	Weltfriedensdienst
WMC	Women‘s Media Center (Cambodia)
ZFD	Ziviler Friedensdienst (Civil Peace Service (CPS))
ZKB	Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung (Civil conflict resolution)
zivik	Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung, Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (Civil Conflict Resolution, Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations)

Executive summary

1. Background

The Civil Peace Service (CPS) was founded in 1999 as a new German government instrument for civil society peacebuilding. The CPS has a number of features making it a unique instrument that does not exist in this form in other countries. From its inception, the CPS has been a joint project of governmental and non-governmental organisations.

The objective of the CPS is to contribute to securing long-term peace by developing structures that promote peace after armed conflict (post-conflict peacebuilding), prevent conflicts from breaking out (crisis prevention) and help strengthen peaceful conflict resolution (mitigation of violence).

Eight German development and peace organisations together form the Civil Peace Service Group (CPS Group – in German: *Konsortium ZFD)*. Deploying CPS experts *(ZFD-Fachkräfte)* is the main mode of cooperation between the CPS executing agencies and their partners in conflict-affected countries. For the period 1999 – 2009, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) approved a financial volume of approximately 144 million euros, which funded 583 positions for CPS experts in 50 countries to the end of 2009.

An initial evaluation of the CPS was undertaken in 2002, three years after it was established, leading to important insights into its further establishment and development. In 2009, the BMZ commissioned a second independent external evaluation covering the period from the inception of the CPS in 1999 until 2009/2010. The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, carried out the evaluation. Data collection was completed in mid 2010, and the evaluation process as a whole continued until spring 2011.

The evaluation of the CPS was conducted both in Germany and in eight selected case study countries (Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Israel/ Palestine[1], Niger, Serbia, and Uganda), ensuring that projects from all CPS executing agencies and all regions in which the CPS operates formed part of the evaluation.

The aim of the evaluation was to create accountability and learning opportunities for the CPS and its main stakeholders and to make recommendations for the future of the CPS and its projects.

The evaluation faced several constraints and limitations. First, only eight out of the 50 countries with a CPS engagement were included. Moreover, the CPS was assessed as an instrument of German development cooperation and peacebuilding policy; an in-depth assessment of each individual project was not carried out. The evaluation also had to accommodate considerable delays in implementation. In addition, methodological challenges in assessing effectiveness and impact were encountered, caused primarily by deficiencies in results-based management of and within the CPS but also by the parameters of the evaluation itself.

2. Key findings and conclusions

The evaluation concluded that the CPS is a valuable instrument that is worth continuing. The CPS's focus on civil society peacebuilding, primarily with a view to strengthening dialogue and reconciliation capacities in conflict societies, fits particularly well into the toolbox of Germany's peacebuilding and development policy, which was developed on the basis of Germany's historical experience in

promoting reconciliation after the Second World War.

The CPS has a number of strengths that set it apart from other civil society peacebuilding instruments and testify both to its achievements and to its future potential.

However, the CPS needs to be substantially strengthened in profile and operations in order for these potentials to be harnessed and for the CPS to become a more significant actor within the framework of Germany's peacebuilding and development policies. **There is also significant room for improvement in the BMZ's steering and management of the CPS.**

This means continuously developing strengths while addressing weaknesses much more systematically. Most of the proposed changes can be carried out within the context of the CPS's current framework. However, substantial changes to the current practice of management and implementation by both the CPS executing agencies and the BMZ will be required.

Core strengths of the CPS

The CPS **focuses on civil society peacebuilding** with a particular emphasis on civil society. The diversity of the German executing agencies operating within the CPS, which are characterised by multiple local entry points, partners and intervention approaches, has helped to make the voices of ordinary people heard at the local level and, in a few cases, even beyond.

The CPS is first and foremost an instrument for the deployment of experts. The core added value of sending experts to conflict countries is the **outsider perspective that these experts have to offer on the conflict context.** Over the last decade, CPS experts have clearly strengthened the peacebuilding potential of CPS partners.

CPS projects have thus achieved a number of positive changes, mostly at the local level. They have contributed to the prevention and mitigation of small local and family conflicts, mostly in the immediate environment of partner organisations.

However, much more could be achieved for local people if the programme reach were enlarged to encompass a much broader level of intervention, both locally and nationally. This is exemplified by a number of good practices within the CPS. For instance, the current programme in Cambodia stands out as a good practice model for effective CPS work. It represents a significant contribution to the strengthening of societal mechanisms for dealing with the Khmer Rouge past and provides complementary support to the immediate work and mission of the Khmer Rouge tribunal. The programme operates at local and national levels and can thus reach broad sections of the population while also influencing national policies. The programme is also based on solid strategic planning and monitoring in a complementary way with other international actors. The CPS programmes in Israel/Palestine, Niger and Burundi have also incorporated a variety of approaches to enhance their local reach. In Uganda, one CPS project has contributed substantially to reducing and preventing violence between two former conflict groups.

When looking at the overall **effectiveness** of activities supported under the CPS programme, most of the projects assessed – with the exception of Cambodia – could not simply be evaluated as effective or not effective because, in each country, partners conduct a variety of activities with different levels of effectiveness. As a general observation, however, **successful activities manage to reach more beneficiaries, expand their reach beyond the local context, focus on key actors for**

change in the conflict, and implement non-violent approaches in a way that allows issues relevant to beneficiaries to be systematically addressed in their every-day and work contexts.

Over the years, the CPS has also made progress in its overall development. The current CPS programmes are much more focused compared to the earlier generation. Moreover, the CPS Group jointly developed standards for the CPS in 2004 that provide guidance for operations in the field. These standards were revised and updated in 2008. The introduction of CPS coordinators in the field, which began around 2007, is also a positive development, greatly improving steering and liaison structures.

Core weaknesses of the CPS

After ten years of existence, the profile of the CPS remains somewhat ambiguous. The essential question of whether the CPS is a network, an institution, an instrument or a joint fund with common standards has not been clarified by the members of the CPS Group and the BMZ. The CPS and BMZ agree that the CPS has its own profile and will not be an integrated part of the bilateral German development portfolio in a given country, which usually emphasises other sectors or levels of peacebuilding. The BMZ's role in steering, planning and monitoring the activities of the CPS must also be clarified. On this basis, the BMZ should optimise its steering function. So far, the BMZ has largely adopted a reactive role (checking and approving applications) and the CPS executing agencies mainly function as a BMZ fund with considerable freedoms – including defining the CPS's own guidelines in a participatory manner, as well as a 100 per cent funding of the Programme. Precisely which role the BMZ should play in steering the CPS programme in the future is an issue that needs to be clarified as a matter of urgency.

Moreover, a substantive review is required to determine how the CPS, as a state-funded joint endeavour *(Gemeinschaftswerk)* of civil society and governmental organisations, expresses this sense of togetherness in practice. It is important to clarify whether the joint endeavour will go beyond joint financing and uniform standards of implementation on a strategic level.

The current main practice of CPS expert deployment (one CPS expert per partner) is not sufficiently oriented towards the needs of partners. Partners require support on a wide range of issues, e.g. to fund activities and local staff, as well as for institution building and management, networking and facilitation, protection, and specific competences in peace, justice and human rights. Among all these needs, facilitating and networking are the core strengths that CPS experts can contribute with their outsider perspective. They are more important than funding, which is also crucial but which can also be dealt with by other means.

The effectiveness of CPS-supported initiatives is mixed but, overall, the horizontal and vertical reach of activities under CPS programmes remains limited. Among the countries assessed, only one country programme as a whole was highly effective (Cambodia) and two are likely to become effective in the future (Burundi, Niger) if they broaden their outreach.

It was also found that the CPS executing agencies mainly support socialisation and social cohesion activities such as peace education, dialogue between conflicting groups, training in non-violence, and trauma healing. Only in two of the case study countries is there a focus on protection and lobby/advocacy activities. This demonstrates an emphasis on long-term changes in individuals' attitudes and behaviours. The evident prioritisation of specific fields of activity is not necessarily

a problem if it is in line with the partners' peacebuilding objectives, needs and potential.

However, in most countries, the evaluation identified a routine focus on activities, particularly socialisation and social cohesion, that may not always be appropriate. More openness to alternative ways of implementing these activities is required, along with a greater focus on the general public's immediate peacebuilding needs. It was also noted that socialisation activities, especially when it comes to training, are often conducted in a 'technical manner' with insufficient explanation of how partners and beneficiaries can solve their problems in practical ways with non-violent approaches. Partners' needs and CPS competencies should therefore be combined in a more effective way. The focus on a combination of peace education and dialogue only makes sense in strategic terms if based on solid analysis of immediate peacebuilding needs.

Sustainability is not mainstreamed adequately in the planning and implementation of CPS interventions. Moreover, the possibility of providing follow-up support without the presence of CPS experts – a situation that is envisaged in the 2008 CPS Standards and identified as an important instrument for achieving sustainability – is rarely utilised by the CPS executing agencies.

Apart from a few notable exceptions in Cambodia and Guatemala, and some projects in Burundi, Palestine and Uganda, **gender aspects** are not adequately mainstreamed in the programmes. In Guatemala, gender mainstreaming has been systematically strengthened. To this end, a post for a gender expert was created in the DED country office to provide support for all partner organisations. These efforts have already brought about changes in partners' attitudes and thus helped to integrate women's rights into the project framework.

As far as **efficiency** is concerned, it is noticeable that **results-based management within the CPS executing agencies and their partners** is weak (aside from recent notable efforts) and there is also **significant room for improvement in the BMZ's steering and management of the CPS.** The knowledge and capacity of the BMZ regional desks remain underutilised, as they mainly play a reactive role when it comes to assessing funding requests. At present, these regional desks are not part of a prior joint discussion process. The number of staff handling such a large programme as the CPS within the BMZ division for peace and security is also too limited for ensuring effective steering and coordination of the programme.

A major administrative weakness that impacts on the quality of implementation is the large time gap between the request for a CPS expert and his/her actual arrival in the country.

3. Recommendations

The following recommendations serve as starting points for making the CPS a more effective, efficient and sustainable peacebuilding instrument.

Overall

1. The evaluation recommends that the CPS be continued. However, considerable changes should be undertaken to make the CPS a more relevant instrument that complements other German and international peacebuilding instruments. Such a renewed CPS may serve as a specific German instrument for peacebuilding in the future. Some of the CPS programmes evaluated and a considerable number of CPS projects have demonstrated

that the CPS can help to bring about positive changes in conflict countries.

Strategic

2. Sharpening of the CPS's profile. Clarification is required as to whether the CPS is a network, an institution, an instrument or simply a joint fund with common guidelines and standards. It is crucial that this debate is not reduced to achieving a consensus on terminology but results in practical new processes. It must also be conducted via a process that involves the BMZ and all members of the CPS Group. The CPS Standards and the relevant BMZ guidelines therefore need to be revised once the CPS's profile has been defined.

3. Introduction of CPS country strategies (covering more than one CPS executing agency) to turn the CPS into a strategically planned endeavour. These strategies have to go much further than existing strategies and should agree on common objectives and results-oriented programme planning, allowing swift and practical operationalisation of the executing agencies' individual measures.

   The strategies should involve all CPS executing agencies, the BMZ division for peace and security, the BMZ regional desks as well as all stakeholders in the field, and they should be updated every three to five years. These strategies should not be managed by the BMZ alone.

   Rather, their decision-making processes should reflect the idea of a joint endeavour *(Gemeinschaftswerk)* and they have to make use of potential synergies among stakeholders to enhance relevance and effectiveness. Based on solid analyses of context and partners' needs and the know-how and capacities of the CPS executing agencies, joint intervention and deployment strategies should be developed that are supported by all stakeholders. These strategies are particularly important in countries in which several CPS executing agencies are operating. A more strategic planning process would also sharpen the CPS's profile.

Programming

4. An appropriate mix of cooperation modalities is required, e.g. flexible CPS expert deployment combined with other modes of cooperation based on analysis of the context and partners' needs. This could include the deployment of regional or local experts, funding of local staff and project activities, and cooperation with local service providers.

5. CPS expert deployment demands a change in perspective in order to better respond to partners' needs in a more relevant, effective and sustainable way. The current practice of deployment – one expert to one partner – cannot remain the main or only mode of deployment. Deployment has to be more flexibly configured and consistently targeted towards partners' needs and the CPS's strengths, i.e. its outsider role in the conflict. The option of deploying a team of CPS experts to a country to support the diverse needs of different partners should also be exercised more often.

6. Focused CPS programmes, i.e. geographical/ issue-based, should continue to be implemented.

7. The horizontal and vertical reach of CPS programmes should be expanded to make them more relevant and effective.

8. Addressing people's long-term and immediate peacebuilding needs: CPS

lines of activity should be the result of a solid peacebuilding needs assessment which takes account of support activities by other actors as well as analysing CPS executing agencies' strategic advantages and the needs of their partners. Whether the CPS continues to focus mainly on social cohesion and socialisation activities or engages in other lines of activity will largely depend on the results of these needs assessments.

9. Gender mainstreaming will also have to be improved.
10. Sustainability aspects must be substantially improved.

Management and monitoring

11. Results-based management: All CPS country programmes and projects need to be based on solid results-based management to strengthen effectiveness and sustainability. Strategies and planning processes should include a definition of objectives, fields of action and corresponding indicators as well as a predefined monitoring system. There should be a consistent focus on enhancing the reach of activities, addressing people's pressing needs and further developing conflict and human rights monitoring and lobby/advocacy work.
12. Strengthened role of CPS coordinators with training and capacity building. This management tool should be continued and consolidated, as it has contributed – and could do so to an even greater extent in the future – to strengthening exchange among CPS experts in the field and enhancing the profile of the CPS. It is also important to note that networking by coordinators may facilitate the identification of entry points for peacebuilding. In order to make better use of these opportunities, CPS coordinators should receive specialised training not only in management but also in comprehensive peacebuilding. Exchange between coordinators also needs to be organised more systematically and a liaison structure established that includes all CPS executing agencies, if more than one CPS coordinator is present in a country.
13. More robust procedures. Planning, monitoring, and management procedures and the BMZ's approval process should be strengthened to promote the implementation of an effective and efficient CPS. This must include the expansion of personnel capacities within the BMZ division for peace and security and the CPS secretariat

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1. Introduction

1.1 Objective and purpose

About a decade ago, crisis prevention and peacebuilding became an integral part of the foreign policy and development agendas of OECD countries (OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). Germany, with other countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway and Switzerland, assumed a pioneering role, creating the foundations for a whole-of-government approach with its action plan 'Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building' of May 2004. The plan seeks to pool efforts across different government departments, thereby reflecting current discussions within the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD-DAC). In addition, the June 2005 cross-sectoral strategy for peacebuilding of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (*Übersektorales Konzept Krisenprävention, Konfliktbearbeitung und Friedensentwicklung in der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*) has helped to define implementation processes for crisis prevention and peacebuilding within German development cooperation.

German development cooperation has boasted a variety of innovative implementation instruments, including the conflict-sensitive set-up of development cooperation portfolios for conflict countries. Another instrument of the German government for civil society peacebuilding is the Civil Peace Service (CPS), founded in 1999. With a number of particular features, the CPS is a unique instrument that does not exist in other countries. From its inception, the CPS has been a joint instrument by governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in peacebuilding and development activities, such as crisis prevention, violence reduction, and all other types of peacebuilding efforts also undertaken in the aftermath of large-scale violence.

Deploying CPS experts (*ZFD-Fachkräfte*)[3] is the main mode of cooperation between the CPS executing agencies and their partners in conflict-affected countries. At the end of 2009, the CPS had approved 583 CPS positions in 50 countries.[4] The CPS has also come to serve as a model for other governments – a case in point is the Norwegian Initiative NORPEACE reveals, which aims at creating a similar institution. There is also an attempt to create a European Civil Peace Service.

An initial evaluation of the CPS was undertaken in 2002, leading to important insights into its establishment and further development. As the CPS has now existed for ten years, the BMZ commissioned a new independent external evaluation covering the period since the inception of the CPS in 1999 until 2010. Data was collected until mid 2010 and the entire process lasted until spring 2011. The aim of the evaluation was to create accountability and learning for the CPS and make recommendations to its main stakeholders for the instrument's future.

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[3] There is now a general agreement between the BMZ and the CPS Group that the German term to be used is *ZFD-Fachkraft.* However, the English, French and Spanish translations used by the public awareness campaign (*Öffentlichkeitskampagne*) are not agreed upon by all CPS Group members. In agreement with the BMZ, this report will use the term *ZFD-Fachkraft* and the agreed English translation 'CPS expert'. See also the chapter 'Key terms'.

[4] Sachstand Ziviler Friedensdienst, 6.1.2010.

The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, participated in the public tendering procedure and was awarded the contract to carry out the evaluation.

The evaluation took place both in Germany and in eight selected conflict contexts.[5] Overall, CPS programmes in Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Israel/Palestine, Niger, Serbia and Uganda were evaluated, including CPS projects from all CPS executing agencies.

This synthesis report provides an overview of the results of the CPS evaluation, derives overall conclusions, and outlines the general, strategic and operational recommendations addressed to the main CPS stakeholders.

1.2 General introduction to the Civil Peace Service (CPS)

The CPS aims to promote non-violent ways of dealing with conflicts. Its objectives are to contribute to securing long-term peace by developing structures that promote peace after conflicts (post-conflict peacebuilding), seeking to prevent conflicts from breaking out violently (crisis prevention) and helping to strengthen peaceful conflict resolution (mitigation of violence).

The CPS focuses on seven main activity lines (Standards for the CPS, 2008):

- develop structures for cooperation and dialogue across the lines of the conflict (including strengthening traditional arbitration bodies);
- create contact points and safe spaces in support of, and to enable encounters between, the parties to the conflict;
- strengthen information and communication channels related to causes and effects of violent conflict (including peace journalism, networking, and monitoring of conflict development);
- reintegrate and rehabilitate groups particularly affected by violence (including psychosocial support/trauma counselling);
- provide advice and training on the instruments and strategies of civil conflict management and with regard to institution-building;
- offer peace education (including education to reduce enemy images); and
- strengthen the rule of law on the local level (monitoring of the human rights situation, protection against human rights violations, local institution-building).

CPS activities are carried out by eight development and peace services, which together form the Civil Peace Service Group (CPS Group). This group consists of:

- the Association for Development Cooperation (AGEH),
- the Christian Service International (CSI),

[5] See executive summaries of country case studies in volume 2 of this Synthesis Report as well as a list of selection criteria in the Methodological Report in volume 3, chapter 5.

- the German Development Service (DED)[6],
- EIRENE – International Christian Service for Peace,
- the Church Development Service (EED – an Association of the Protestant Churches in Germany),
- the Civil Peace Service Forum (*forum*ZFD),
- the *Weltfriedensdienst* (WFD), and
- the Action Committee Service for Peace (AGDF).

In addition, Peace Brigades International (PBI) and KURVE Wustrow implement CPS projects as member organisations of the Action Committee Service for Peace (AGDF). *Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst* (*Forum*ZFD) implements a number of CPS projects in cooperation with Pax Christi, the *Evangelische Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Betreuung von Kriegsdienstverweigerern* (EAK) and the Willy Brandt Center in Jerusalem. Their work is financed by the BMZ and coordinated with the German Federal Foreign Office (AA). The CPS has its own secretariat that was located at the DED headquarters in Bonn at the time of the evaluation.

The main CPS implementation modality is sending CPS experts to partner organisations in conflict countries. The CPS deploys its experts under the German Development Worker Law (*Entwicklungshelfergesetz – EHG*) that only allows for German and European Union citizens to be deployed. As a consequence, the CPS mainly deploys German citizens.

The CPS strategy is based on the understanding that CPS experts bring qualifications, knowledge and resources that are not available locally, thereby contributing to intercultural cooperation with their personal working habits, creativity and solidarity. Furthermore, CPS experts use their status as outsiders to the conflict to provide credibility, legitimacy, impartiality and protection (see Standards for the CPS, 2008). The deployment of CPS experts lies at the heart of CPS projects, which can also include additional implementing modalities such as funding of local experts and project activities of partner organisations.

1.3 Evaluation design, methodology and process

1.3.1 Overall design

CCDP developed a comprehensive evaluation framework that allowed for a systematic comparison of data across cases.[7] This methodology was followed in all eight case studies. A set of evaluation criteria and questions for the CPS evaluation was defined by the involved stakeholders in the Terms of Reference (TORs) of 12 March 2009. In the Inception Report, these evaluation questions were then fine-tuned and methodologies presented with regard to

[6] DED, GTZ and InWEnt were merged into Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on 1 January 2011. As this evaluation was conducted in 2009 and 2010, the then names are used in this report.

[7] See the details on the methodology in the 2009 Inception Report as well as in the Methodological Report, both to be found in volume 3 of this Synthesis Report.

how evaluation questions were to be answered. The following aspects were taken into consideration:

- the TORs themselves (i.e. the questions proposed in the TORs have been taken into account and have been reformulated or refocused after the consultation process in Germany);
- consultations with the main CPS stakeholders in Germany: during the consultation process, the priorities and needs of the involved stakeholders became clearer, hence allowing for a more focused formulation of the evaluation questions;
- standards in evaluation research (Bamberger et al. 2006; Patton 1997; Rossi et al. 1999; Bortz/Döring 2003);
- guidance and experiences in evaluation of peacebuilding initiatives (OECD-DAC 2008; Paffenholz/Reychler 2007; Church 2008);
- ideas for monitoring/evaluation of expert deployment (Egli 2008; Quack 2009); and
- evidence-based research knowledge on civil society peacebuilding (Anderson/Olson 2003; Davies 2004 and 2006; Orjuela 2004, Pouligny 2005; Paffenholz 2009 and 2010).

Unfortunately, it was not possible to assess the evaluability of all evaluation questions during the inception phase because the programme documents for the case studies were only provided after the Inception Report was finalised.

One case study was chosen as a pilot (Uganda) and was conducted prior to the other case studies (see also chapter 1.5 on constraints). On the basis of the pilot, the evaluation questions were once again subject to fine-tuning (see volume 3, part 1, chapter 4). It was realised that several questions in the Inception Report and the TORs were not suitable to be answered in the individual case studies, as they were either addressing the level of the overall CPS programme in Germany, or were related to overall conclusions. As a result, not all original evaluation questions appear in the list of questions taken into consideration in the case studies. However, all evaluation questions included in the TORs, the Inception Report and the case studies are addressed in this Synthesis Report. A detailed list in volume 3, part 1, chapter 4 clarifies which questions have been addressed in which chapter of this report.

For most of the case studies, short questionnaires operating with core questions were used during interviews, group discussions and meetings.[8] The different data sets received allowed for the triangulation of data, making also use of the CPS core concepts (Framework 1999, Standards 2005, 2008), CPS programmes in the eight countries (funding requests, various reports, self-evaluations by the CPS executing agencies and partner organisations), as well as the 2002 CPS evaluation. Moreover, interviews and group discussions were conducted with the main CPS stakeholders in Germany, CPS experts, coordinators, other German development actors, partner organisations, as well as beneficiaries and wider stakeholders,

[8] The interview guides can be found in the Methodological Report in volume 3 of this report.

and the results from evidence-based research on the role of civil society in peacebuilding.[9]

1.3.2 Key terms

The use of key terms relevant for this evaluation was harmonised throughout the evaluation process. The public campaign (*Öffentlichkeitskampagne*) of the CPS provided useful information on terms agreed between the BMZ and the CPS Group. However, it has become clear throughout this evaluation that a number of key terms are still not agreed upon by all CPS executing agencies. English, Spanish and French translations of *ZFD-Fachkraft* remain particularly contested (see also footnote 2 and recommendations) due to the translation of the German term *Fachkraft* into *expert/experto*. Indeed, members of the CPS Group are keen to be distinguished from experts of the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). In agreement with the BMZ, this evaluation nonetheless retains the terminology agreed upon for the CPS public campaign, i.e. **CPS expert**, the **CPS executing agencies** for the German expression *ZFD Träger*, as well as Civil Peace Service Group (**CPS Group**) for the German name *Konsortium ZFD*. The German term *Anträge* was translated into **funding requests** upon the suggestion of the BMZ.

One particular wording is also slightly contested between the BMZ and the CPS executing agencies (see also chapter 3.7): the BMZ sees the CPS as an **instrument** of German development cooperation and hence as an agent in its own right. The CPS executing agencies, by contrast, view partner organisations in conflict-affected countries as owners and agents of the programme. This divergence in understandings is reflected in different wordings regarding CPS programmes: while the BMZ talks about the 'CPS programme', the CPS executing agencies speak of 'projects under the CPS programme'. As this tension cannot be resolved by this evaluation, it has been decided to use both versions in alternation throughout this report. The issue has also been highlighted in the recommendations section. The term '**instrument'** is used to refer to the overall CPS programme, while the terms '**implementation modalities**' or **'mode of cooperation'** refer to the different ways of offering support to partner organisations, i.e. CPS expert deployment, funding local experts (*Einheimische Fachkräfte*) and staff, or funding project activities implemented by partners with or without the presence of CPS experts.

The term '**strategy'** is also subject to misunderstanding. The BMZ develops and manages the German bilateral cooperation according to country strategies. All programmes and projects with a bilateral partner have to follow sectoral priorities from these strategies to present German development cooperation as 'cast from the same mould' ('*Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss*'). According to the BMZ division for peace and security (that manages the CPS), the CPS is deliberately not considered in these strategies for reasons of flexibility because most CPS projects are implemented by civil society organisations that are not mandated to implement bilateral cooperation. However, half of the interviewed BMZ regional divisions would like to see a closer relation between the CPS and German bilateral cooperation. The CPS executing agencies have developed CPS-

[9] Lists of people interviewed and met are included in the annexes of the Inception Report and the eight case study reports. Further explanations on the role of civil society in peacebuilding can be found in chapter 1.3.3 of the Methodological Report in volume 3.

specific overall concept papers for a number of countries and regions. These have nothing to do with the above mentioned bilateral German cooperation strategies. We therefore use the term **CPS strategies** here so as not to confuse them with German bilateral cooperation strategies.

When we talk about the ZFD programme, this term refers to all ZFD activities in one country or else, the global ZFD programme with all country programmes. When we talk about ZFD projects, only a partiular project of one ZFD executing agency and partner is meant. However, a project can have more than one different activity lines.

1.3.3 Evaluation criteria and methodology

A more in-depth description of the methodology used is provided in volume 3, part 1 of this report. The evaluation of **relevance** for all case studies is based on a peacebuilding needs assessment that compares the main activity lines implemented by CPS programmes in the eight case studies with the peacebuilding needs in each country. Activities under CPS programmes are relevant for peacebuilding if any of the identified countries' peacebuilding needs are addressed. They are not relevant if none are addressed. However, a more in-depth analysis was also conducted, assessing whether the potential of the CPS as an intervening actor in terms of knowledge and comparative advantages has been sufficiently utilised, i.e. what has been done to enhance or enlarge the relevance of the CPS. In the relevance chapter we also assessed how CPS programmes and projects have adapted to changing contexts as well as the relevance of CPS expert deployment against partners' needs to achieve their goals better with support of CPS experts. Moreover, we assessed the relevance of CPS partners as well the compliance of CPS programmes with the 1999 CPS framework (*Rahmenkonzept*) and the 2005 and 2008 CPS Standards (*Standards für den ZFD*). We also assessed the ability of CPS projects to adapt projects to changing conflict contexts, as well as roles, strengths and weaknesses of partner organisations.

For evaluating **effectiveness**, four evaluation approaches to be used in all case studies were elaborated in the Inception Report: theory-based, results-based, outcome-oriented, and process-oriented. Due to the fact that the case studies were selected after the evaluation design had been already presented in the Inception Report, we received programme/project data thereafter. Hence, we had to test in exploratory ways which of the originally designed evaluation approaches were useful in light of the available data. As a result, the results-based approach only worked for one programme out of eight; the process-oriented approach proved to be less important and aspects of it were integrated into the outcome-oriented approach. Consequently, most country evaluation teams mainly applied an outcome-oriented as well as a theory-based approach. With the help of the outcome-oriented approach we identified changes at different outcome levels (see below) as perceived by stakeholders using data from interviews, group discussions, self-evaluations, as well as programme documents such as project proposals. When those data were not sufficient to assess actual changes, we used outcome plausibility. This was done based on a) an assumed continuous results chain and b) comparing the project designs and processes with the results of peacebuilding research along the identified theories of change (theory-based). It is important to note that no distinction is made between intended and unintended outcomes, because project results were in most cases not monitored. Hence, we focused on the outcomes that occurred, whether intended or unintended.

The evaluation of effectiveness is based on the analysis of theories of change and the way these are translated into programming. However, only in one country (Cambodia) were theories of change explicitly formulated and translated into results chains for the overall programme and projects. We therefore reconstructed the overall CPS intervention logic in the other seven countries. An aggregated results chain for CPS country programmes is shown in figure 1 below and was first presented in the Inception Report. The contributions of CPS experts were assessed against theories of change as formulated in the CPS 2008 Standards, because none of the country proposals included a theory of change or a results chain for CPS experts. A summary of aggregated main theories of change for project activities is presented in chapter 3.2.1. These theories of change were consequently subject to comparison with current international theory and evidence-based research. Thereafter, we evaluated the contributions of CPS experts to achieving desired processes of change within partner organisations against partners' needs (**outcome 1**); how effectively the partners had achieved changes through project activities with or without the help of CPS experts (**outcome 2**); and how these changes have contributed or could eventually contribute to the prevention of or a reduction in violence (**outcome 3**). While the distinction between the contributions of CPS experts and those of partners was clear on the level of outcome 1, in most cases attribution to CPS experts or partners was more difficult on the levels of outcomes 2 and 3, because not all CPS executing agencies support partner activities financially. Attribution was clearer in cases where the CPS executing agencies also funded particular partner activities or the roles of CPS experts were very focused on tasks that could not be fulfilled by partners.

It is important to note that the CPS has been created mainly as an instrument for expert deployment. To reflect this construction, the outcome 1 level is of crucial importance for the CPS as it tells the direct achievements of deploying experts.

For the assessment of outcome 2, we grouped project activities along the framework spelled out in the Inception Report (see also volume 3, part 1 of this report). To this end, we used a set of peacebuilding functions (protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery). This approach was preferred (see Inception Report) to using the CPS's main activity lines (*Handlungsfelder*) as a point of reference because of the following advantages:

- the civil society peacebuilding functions represent the broad range of possible options for civil society to contribute to peacebuilding within a country;
- the CPS main activity lines as presented in the CPS 2008 Standards are not sufficiently coherent; and
- effectiveness criteria from evidenced-based research exist for all seven functions against which progress in effectiveness could be measured (see methodological chapter 3.2.5 in volume 3).

To assess outcome 2 we conducted a qualitative as well as a quantitative assessment. The qualitative assessment presented in chapter 3.2.4.1 was conducted on the basis of triangulated data from the case studies, which enabled us to assess trends and success conditions for effectiveness for three reasons. First, the CPS as an instrument was evaluated, but a detailed evaluation of single projects did not take place; second, many of the implemented initiatives had only started recently, and third, the variety of initiatives assessed did allow the identification of supporting or hindering factors for effectiveness.

In order to enrich this assessment, we also conducted an assessment of future outcome plausibility against preconditions for effectiveness identified from evidence-based research (chapter 3.2.4.2). The data presented in that chapter are either based on triangulated results from the cases or else – where this was not sufficiently possible – against this kind of outcome plausibility. For the synthesis of these results we conducted a quantitative assessment of outcome likelihood.

The combination of the two methods allowed yielding conclusions for the results and potential of the overall effectiveness of the CPS. The methodology is elaborated in more detail in the Methodological Report in volume 3 of this Synthesis Report.

An assessment of impact proved to be mostly impossible in this evaluation, because of a confused understanding of impact in the CPS 2008 Standards and in most country programmes and funding requests, as well as overall weakness of data. However, this is a common problem in the peacebuilding field and the issue of whether or not such an impact assessment is relevant for interventions such as CPS projects is debated among international experts. Hence, this situation had been anticipated and has already been explained in the Inception Report. In consequence,

- this evaluation put the main emphasis on the CPS's outcome level as already explained above;
- three of the case studies worked with impact plausibility (Burundi, Cambodia and Colombia); and
- we present a discussion of whether and how it would make sense for the CPS to engage in impact assessment in the future as a means to enrich the CPS's internal debate on impact assessment.

Figure 1: The CPS's overall results chain



With regard to **sustainability,** we assessed whether procedures and institutional frameworks introduced by former CPS experts were still used, and whether the outcomes of project activities supported by CPS programmes were still visible and continued by partners and beneficiaries. We also evaluated the way issues of sustainability were included in the design of current projects and checked sustainability against provisions in the Standards (2008), reports and documentations, self-evaluations as well as partners' and CPS experts' perceptions.

Coherence, coordination and complementarity: We assessed coherence by examining the extent to which the effectiveness of CPS programmes was influenced by other fields of policy. External complementarity in this report describes the linkages and synergies with other programmes and players (e.g. German bilateral development cooperation, projects of the CPS executing agencies' core programmes, other international non-governmental

organisations or multilateral institutions). When assessing internal complementarity, we analysed to what extent the CPS executing agencies work hand in hand in the eight countries. Finally, with regard to coordination, we examined the types of mechanisms and procedures associated with the promotion of internal and external complementarity.

The **efficiency** section of this report assesses the steering and management of the CPS (administrative, financial and institutional steering and management as well as monitoring, reporting and learning). We distinguished different types of information sources. First, administrative documents (*Anträge, Gliederungsschema, Verträge, Sachberichte*), guidelines (*Richtlinien, Grundsatzdokumente*), law (*EHG*), financial figures and reports (*Kostenplan, Kostenaufstellung*) produced by the BMZ and the CPS executing agencies. This documentation refers to the CPS as an instrument as a whole and is not specific to a particular executing agency, country or project. Second, interviews with the involved stakeholders in Germany; third, information as provided in the country case studies; fourth, the 2002 CPS evaluation served as a baseline for comparison; and fifth, the self-evaluation as provided by the CPS executing agencies, the CPS secretariat and the BMZ division for peace and security.

For assessing the efficiency of the CPS as an instrument, we analysed the aggregated results for relevance, effectiveness and sustainability against the costs of the CPS. With regard to alternatives and the subsidiary principle, we assessed these questions as part of the country evaluations through key informant interviews with partners and constituencies, as well as project documents and reports.

The **conclusions** provide an overall analysis of findings presented in the assessment section, building on the analysed strengths and weaknesses of the CPS. The **recommendations** section presents, first, general recommendations, followed by strategic and operational recommendations addressed to the CPS main stakeholders, namely the BMZ and the CPS executing agencies with partner organisations. Recommendations to specific country programmes can be found within the recommendation sections of each case study (see volume 2 for the executive summaries).

1.3.4 Evaluation process

The main evaluation process consisted of the following elements:

During the inception phase, the evaluation team clarified the needs and expectations of involved actors. This task was jointly carried out with the commissioning agency, the BMZ's evaluation division and involved the CPS stakeholders (BMZ division for peace and security, BMZ country desks, the CPS executing agencies, and the CPS secretariat). Moreover, an assessment of the CPS's national and international context was conducted based on internet research, telephone and on-site interviews, as well as newspaper articles. Furthermore, an external advisory group was set up by the CCDP, comprised of representatives from Swiss and international agencies also working with expert deployment. The task of the group was to advise the CCDP on specific aspects of expert deployment in development and peacebuilding during the inception phase. In addition, we conducted an assessment of the core CPS documents to decide on the evaluability and selection criteria for CPS programmes

in the eight countries to be evaluated.[10] This information enabled the team to specify evaluation questions and methodologies and resulted in the draft Inception Report. However, not all evaluability issues could be clarified at this point in time, because the country case studies were selected at the same time as the evaluation questions were being fine-tuned. Hence, the evaluation team had not yet received the documents for the CPS country programmes. The draft Inception Report was thereafter subject to written comments and a joint discussion with the above-mentioned key CPS stakeholders in early September 2009 in Bonn.

The self-evaluation phase took place from the end of September until mid-November 2009. Subject of this process was the work of the CPS executing agencies' headquarters and field offices, the BMZ division for peace and security, the CPS secretariat, CPS coordinators, CPS experts as well as partner organisations in eight countries (depending on the availability of former CPS experts and partners from completed projects). CPS stakeholders answered a set of questions, thereby applying all kinds of suitable methods, e.g. strength and weakness analysis during workshops, open discussions during meetings, collection of narratives, etc. At the end of this phase, each CPS executing agency presented a self-evaluation report comprised of self-evaluations at headquarters and in-country evaluations. All self-evaluation reports were treated confidentially.

A preparatory phase for **external in-country evaluations** followed. International and local evaluators were selected and their CVs sent to the BMZ evaluation division prior to contracting arrangements. In-country contact points were established with CPS coordinators and programme documents analysed. The objective of this phase was to clarify what kinds of activities were subject to the evaluation in each country and prepare for the evaluation missions.

In-country missions were conducted between December 2009 and February 2010 depending on country contexts and the availability of involved actors. The following process design was applied for all in-country case studies: context analysis including an analysis of civil society; briefing workshops at the beginning of missions; de-briefing workshops at the end of missions; project visits with interviews; workshops and other methods to collect data depending on the situation in each country; debriefing notes shortly after the end of missions; draft and final country case study reports for each of the eight countries.

Quality control and commenting: An intensive quality control process by the CCDP and the BMZ evaluation division took place prior to and after circulating case study reports for comments to the CPS stakeholders. Comments were then provided that were addressed in and/or integrated into final draft reports, which were again subject to final corrections by the CPS stakeholders prior to editing and translation. Response grids were filled in to allow stakeholders to see how the evaluation teams dealt with their comments.

During the **synthesis phase**, a comparative analysis of the country case studies took place, taking also into account the assessment of the CPS in Germany. Thereafter, preliminary results were presented and discussed with CPS stakeholders in Bonn on 30 June 2010, followed by the drafting of the Synthesis Report that was also subject to quality control by

[10] Please note that some of the selection criteria were already stated in the TORs, while others were added during this process and led to a proposal by the CCDP; see annex 3 of the Inception Report.

internal CCDP experts, one external expert as well as by the BMZ division for peace and security and the evaluation division. A ZERO draft report was submitted to these BMZ divisions on 30 July 2010. Several rounds of review, editing and translation followed until the report was finalised and its summary published on the BMZ website[11] in spring 2011.

1.4 Evaluation teams

The core CCDP evaluation team consisted of Dr Thania Paffenholz (lead), Daniel Fino (senior team member), Dr Oliver Jütersonke (overall management), Jana Krause (project assistant), and Sandra Reimann (administration).The team was supported by a number of additional CCDP staff members, namely Paola Taiana (assistant), Larissa Dietrich (editing and translation), Claudia Josi (editing and translation), Rico Glaus (finance and auditing). An internal CCDP advisory group helped with the recruitment of case study evaluators, contacts for field missions and quality control when addtionally necessary.The comparative assessment of civil peace services was conducted by an external assistant. An external advisory group provided insights into expert deployment during the inception phase. Christoph Spurk provided external quality control for various versions of the synthesis report. The country case studies were conducted by the following evaluation teams:

- Burundi: Dr Jean-Eudes Beuret, Laurienne Gacorekeke, Ernest Niyonizma and Pascasie Kana
- Cambodia: Prof Dr Jörn Dosch, Doung Virorth and Dr Kim Sedara
- Colombia: Dr Markus Schultze-Kraft and Jennifer Florez Torres
- Guatemala: Dr Björn Holmberg and Maria Mercedes Escobar Aguirre
- Israel/Palestine: Prof. Dr Riccardo Bocco and Paola Taiana
- Niger: Bertrand Guibert and Abdoulaye Mohamadou
- Serbia: Dr Roberto Belloni and Mladen Momcilovic
- Uganda: Dr Thania Paffenholz and Joseph Rujumba with team

1.5 Constraints and limitations

The implementation of this evaluation was challenged by a number of constraints and limitations. First, the original evaluation design in the TORs did not envisage a pilot case study. During the course of the evaluation it was then decided that such a **pilot case study** should be conducted and the case of Uganda was chosen for this purpose. This affected the overall evaluation process in the form of a massive delay of the entire evaluation process.

Moreover, the preparation of the country case studies was challenged by the **project documents** received. The CPS stakeholders in Germany were extremely collaborative in sending or granting us access to all sorts of documents. However, the challenges emanated from the fact that there is no single document per country that would provide a

[11] See http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/index.html#evaluationn.

comprehensive overview of all CPS project activities since the beginning of the CPS involvement. The CPS secretariat updates factsheets (*Sachstand*) for the BMZ, with statistics on a quarterly basis including good and detailed statistics about the executing agencies, accepted projects, number of CPS experts, general budget and expenses. This provides a solid administrative and financial overview. However, there is no summarised overview information on the contents of CPS projects by country or agency. An overview of information about partners is also not available. This made it difficult to assess the meaning of each document sent to the evaluating teams. It also made it more difficult to determine which projects were going to be subject to the evaluation.

The **core CPS documents were exclusively written in German**, including the 2002 CPS evaluation. The CCDP had assumed that sufficient project documents would be available in the working language of these countries, given the key role of local project partners within the CPS architecture. The recruitment process for international evaluators took place prior to receiving the majority of projects documents. Hence, German language skills were not prioritised for the recruitment, and three out of eight case study evaluation teams could not read documents in German. Consequently, the major translation efforts the CCDP had to provide made the preparation of the evaluation missions more difficult and resulted in misunderstandings in the field in two cases.

The **timing for some case studies** (Burundi, partially Serbia) and the commenting period for one case study report (Israel/Palestine) fell into the holiday season. Hence, not all stakeholders were present or could comment. The CCDP tried to compensate through transparent communiation, and on the side of the CPS field staff there was an enourmous amount of commitment to support the evaluation process even during the holiday period.

Methodological challenges were faced in assessing effectiveness and impact due to a number of factors linked to insufficient results-based management of the overall CPS programme, the country programmes as well as the majority of the single projects. However, there were a few very notable exceptions (the DED programme in Cambodia as a whole, the WFD supported Ministère Paix et Réconciliation Sous la Croix (MI-PAREC) project in Burundi and the *forum*ZFD projects in Serbia). Moreover, there is no strategic monitoring of the CPS programme by the BMZ division for peace and security and the involved executing agencies in place (except for the current DED-CPS programme in Cambodia, where the DED provides such monitoring). Reports by CPS experts and partners exist, but they mainly focus on outputs. On the overall programme level, a yearly report (*Sachstandsbericht*) is written, but it only provides aggregated data of the numbers of CPS experts that were engaged since the beginning of the programme, the number per annum and the amount of financial resources disbursed per 31 December of each year. Hence, it was not possible to conduct a solid impact assessment. However, this is a common problem in the peacebuilding field and it has yet to be decided by international experts whether or not impact assessment should be done on a routine basis for such types of interventions. Hence, we worked with impact plausibility and debated whether and how impact assessment should/could be done by the CPS in the future. For assessing effectiveness and compensating for the various methodological challenges involved, the evaluation teams reconstructed the theories of change of the overall programme and country programmes. Moreover, the combination of an outcome-oriented and a theory-based approach proved to be effective in reducing the above-mentioned deficiencies for assessing effectiveness. We also decided not to make a distinction between intended and unintended outcomes, but tried to trace any outcome achieved. We also worked with stakeholders' narratives and triangulated them with

information from funding requests, reporting, self-evaluations as well as with results from evidence-based research on similar project activities.

Attributing a particular contribution of the CPS to changes achieved by partners was challenging because the specific CPS contribution is mainly the input of the CPS expert. The latter is measurable (see above outcome 1), however, not always easy to attribute to the next outcome level of partners' work. This was clearer when CPS experts fulfilled tasks that could only be carried out by outsiders or else when the CPS funded specific partner activities.

A general limitation of the evaluation is the fact that **only eight countries were selected out of a total of 50 CPS** countries and that a good number of evaluated projects had just started.

The evaluation took place in a particular **political context** that had to be taken into consideration.

2. The international context of the Civil Peace Service

2.1 Civil society, development and peacebuilding

This chapter presents an historical and conceptual overview of the current understanding of civil society in the context of development cooperation and peacebuilding. It will serve to better understand the context in which the CPS was developed as well as its objectives and strategies.

Civil society is generally understood as the arena of voluntary, collective actions of an institutional nature around shared interests, purposes, and values that are distinct from those of the state, family, and market. Civil society consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organisations, and comprises non-state actors and associations that are not purely driven by private or economic interests, are autonomously organised, show civic virtue, and interact in the public sphere. In the context of peacebuilding, civil society is understood as an important pillar for preventing armed conflicts, stabilising peace and contributing to the transition from peacebuilding to democratisation.

Many peace, human rights and development related activities have been implemented by voluntary agencies or NGOs, especially during and in the aftermath of the two World Wars. However, the concept of civil society has gained increasing importance in development cooperation starting from the 1980s onwards. This rising attention can primarily be attributed to the neo-liberal policy of the 1980s, which encouraged a highly sceptical attitude towards the state and favoured the privatisation of state welfare and infrastructure services. As a result of such policies, NGOs were assigned new service functions – especially in the social and health sectors – which had previously been the responsibility of the state.

Subsequently, civil society gained even more momentum at the beginning of the 1990s. As the Cold War ended, democratic governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law became priority objectives, and civil society came to be seen in development cooperation circles as a means of improving governance and democratisation.

Moreover, the debate about a role for civil society in peacebuilding was also fostered in the 1990s, even though different non-governmental actors such as various religious organisations have always been involved in peacebuilding of one sort or another. Prior to the

1990s, civil society involvement was considered to render the efforts of professional diplomats involved in peacebuilding more complex. In the 1990s, one of the main research debates within peacebuilding related to which external actors would achieve the best results in efforts to end armed conflicts and sustain peace after war, and with what approach. The important work of John Paul Lederach then shifted the focus of attention from external actors to the role of local actors within the conflict country, arguably leading to a paradigm shift within both the international research and practitioner communities (Lederach 1997). Indeed, the question for external actors had mainly been how to support national actors within countries experiencing armed conflict so as to best enhance their capacities. Since then, many different peacebuilding approaches and initiatives, such as peace funds, dialogue projects, peacebuilding training, and capacity building programmes for local actors have been tested. Today, support to civil society has become routine practice in peacebuilding and a wide array of civil society actors such as NGOs, associations, religious entities, grassroots organisations, communities, or individuals, are increasingly involved in different peacebuilding activities.

The understanding of civil society peacebuilding to date is also closely linked to a particular understanding of the term peacebuilding itself. First used by Johan Galtung in an essay written in 1975, the term constituted one of three approaches to peace: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Galtung 1975). Developed from an analysis of violence, Galtung's understanding of peacebuilding was based on the conceptual distinction between negative peace (end of violence) and positive peace (peaceful society at all levels). While negative peace achieves the absence of physical violence through peacekeeping, only positive peace can achieve the absence of structural violence through peacemaking and peacebuilding. Peacemaking aims at bringing the conflict parties to the negotiation table and strives for a peace agreement that forms the precondition for sustaining the peace thereafter. Peacebuilding attains positive peace by creating structures and institutions of peace based on justice, equity and cooperation, thereby permanently addressing the underlying causes of conflict and preventing their turn to violence (Gawrec 2006). Most current definitions and understandings of peacebuilding reflect these two antipodes of positive and negative peace as introduced by Johan Galtung.

In the context of the CPS, peacebuilding mainly follows the understanding of Galtung's positive peace and its conceptualisation by Lederach. Hence, the essence is to support local actors in conflict countries to pave the way towards positive peace. While a number of CPS activities are also more closely linked to peacemaking, the majority of activities conducted under the CPS are in support of preventing violent outbreaks of conflicts and sustaining peace after large-scale violence.

2.2 Civil peace services and civil society peacebuilding support

Historically, the idea of a civil peace service has been influenced by the non-violence and peace movements and can be traced back to the 18th century. While the roots of these movements date back to the European enlightenment and the religiously inspired moral reform movement in the United Kingdom and the United States, the peace movement gained momentum before and during the two World Wars. It was later reshaped in the form of various anti-war (e.g. Vietnam) and pro-disarmament movements during the Cold War (Cortright 2008). The rise of pacifism was another important step in the direction of mass peace movements. The demand for a civil alternative to military service, which was non-

existent at that time, led to the foundation of the first peace service, the *Service Civile International*. After World War II, peace movements became more prominent, mostly emerging in response to the political events of that period. Issues that were fought for using peaceful means included the dissolution of the British Empire, the rejection of imperialism by the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the opposition to the nuclear arms race. The famous peace movement in the 1960s in the United States succeeded in ending U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The decision of Lyndon Johnson not to run for re-election as president was the direct result of anti-war protests.

While in the first half of the 1960s only one more influential organisation, the World Peace Brigade, was founded (and incidentally dissolved soon after), activists participating in such actions and in the World Peace Brigade later took leading positions in the founding of Peace Brigades International (PBI), Witness for Peace, Christian Peacemaker Teams, and others.

Today a variety of civil peace services exist in a number of countries, comprised of movements and networks as well as including organisations offering volunteer programmes (see overview in chapter 2 of the Inception Report). Civil peace organisations vary greatly due to a) the level of qualification of their volunteers or experts, b) the specific focus of their activity lines (specific peace focus, general development focus, c) the financing of the personnel, and d) the working modalities with partners (deployment of expert with or without additional funding for local partners including funding of the local partner organisation's staff). The most fundamental differnentiation is the volunteer or professional character of the experts deployed.

In comparison to other civil peace services, the CPS has the following particularities:

- collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organisations,
- joint set-up within the CPS Group,
- 100 per cent funding provided by the German government,
- deployment and funding of qualified experts as compared to purely volunteers, and
- the possibility of funding partner organisations' staff and activities.

Next to the Civil Peace Service, the bulk of civil society support to conflict countries is providing financial support to local partner organisations. Usually this support is channelled from a donor to international NGOs or through them to national, mainly urban NGOs that then have different local partners. This has led to the creation of new urban NGOs that deal with peacebuilding. These NGOs have been criticised for their weak membership base, their lack of countrywide and/or balanced political or ethnic representation, and their link to the political establishment through kin relationships. However, there also exists direct support to local, including small, urban-based partners from, for example, faith-based or other peace motivated non-governmental organisations in the West. The main financial support goes from donors to international NGOs, donors being mainly development donors and to a lesser extent Foreign Ministries that have established their own budget lines for civil society support. In Germany, we find *Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung/Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen* (zivik) that funds organisations in conflict countries with a budget from the German Federal Foreign Office (AA). In addition, political party foundations do similar work. Church-based organisations and other NGOs also fund civil society groups beyond the CPS programme. Governmental agencies (GTZ, DED and Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (InWEnt)) fund civil society groups in peacebuilding in a number of countries, too.

2.3 The Civil Peace Service in the German context

Due to the specific historical context in Germany during and after the Second World War, a specific understanding of civil society peacebuilding has evolved that is built on particular narratives.

- First of all, an understanding prevails that peace and development are closely linked or depend on each other. Due to the experience of the Second World War and related poverty in Germany thereafter, many non-governmental organisations, especially church-based groups, started providing services for people in need. Due to positive experiences with reconstruction that led to economic development and the German *Wirtschaftswunder*, the understanding has been fostered that peacebuilding and development are interlinked.
- Second, due to Germany's experience with collective violence during World War I and II both as perpetrators and as victims, a strong non-violence orientation emerged.
- Third, the successful reconciliation process after World War II between Germany and France resulted in an understanding of civil society peacebuilding that is characterised by socialising people for values of peace and reconciliation between formerly conflicting parties. Dialogue processes and programmes additionally shaped the understanding of how peacebuilding could be achieved by civil society.

Apart from these narratives, the political and economic context wherein reconciliation and economic success took place in post-war Germany was largely shaped by the European economic and later political integration process that is seen as a tremendous peacebuilding enterprise.

While many peacebuilding activities have been implemented by a variety of German organisations over the decades, the peacebuilding terminology was only introduced through the political debates associated with the wars in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Peacebuilding activities gained a stronger momentum in Germany during that time. The peace camp in Germany (including peace activists, researchers, and politicians) was divided into two main factions: those in favour of military action to protect people, and those believing in non-violent conflict resolution also opposing any German 'out of area' military involvement. The pro-military faction far outnumbered the latter, and the German government went on to support military action within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) mission. As an alternative response, the notion of a Civil Peace Service was debated among a number of German NGOs. The start-up phase for such a CPS was planned to coincide with the implementation phase of the 1995 Dayton Agreement. Although political support was still missing for such a project, in 1996 a CPS Group was founded to further pursue the objective. With the change in government in 1998, conditions were ripe for establishing a civil peace service with governmental support. The CPS was subsequently founded in 1999 as one pillar of peacebuilding in the context of German development cooperation.

Peacebuilding has since been rapidly institutionalised in various German organisations. New divisions and posts have been created in both the BMZ and the AA, within governmental development organisations and NGOs. Moreover, the sector programme for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation (*Sektorvorhaben Krisenprävention und Friedensentwicklung*) located at GTZ was established to mainstream peacebuilding into German development cooperation; the German Foundation for Peace Research (*Deutsche*

Stiftung Friedensforschung) was created to support the development of Conflict and Peace Studies at universities and academic institutions; and the Working Group on Development and Peace (*Gruppe Friedensentwicklung – FriEnt*) was founded to foster cooperation and exchange among governmental and non-governmental organisations. These developments culminated in a number of official policy documents such as the government's 2004 action plan (*Aktionsplan Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung*) and the BMZ's 2005 cross-sectoral strategy for peacebuilding.

Since the new liberal-conservative government took office in late 2009, it has put more emphasis on coherence between development and security. This includes a closer cooperation between German development cooperation and the German armed forces within the concept of networked security (*Vernetzte Sicherheit)*. The concept has not been fully defined yet, and has so far been mainly based on German experiences in Afghanistan. The concept's introduction has led German civil society, including the CPS executing agencies, to question the significance that the German government attaches to civil society peacebuilding. At the same time, the action plan (the CPS included) has been critised for providing more of a list of options for action rather than a strategic framework for prioritised action. Hence, it also does not provide binding policy guidance for the future (Stengel/Weller 2010, statements from the parliamentary hearing on 14 June 2010, Berlin[12]). What these developments exactly mean for the CPS remains unclear. Nevertheless, a number of the CPS executing agencies have already publically criticised the new policy trend.

As both peacebuilding and security are highly political, there is always a risk of politicisation. Therefore, current concerns of the peace and development community are understandable. However, the authors are of the opinion that the re-entering of peacebuilding and security into the political realm is a positive move that allows for a wider debate beyond the operational and institutional realm and hence also presents a suitable political background for the CPS.

3. Main findings along evaluation criteria

3.1 Relevance

3.1.1 Addressing countries' peacebuilding needs

In each case study, a variety of short-, medium- and long-term peacebuilding needs were identified. To achieve sustainable peace, all these needs would have to be addressed at all levels. However, these different needs cannot be addressed by a single actor alone. A variety of actors are required to address the complex challenge of peacebuilding. Which actor is addressing what kind of need is, however, subject to the political and institutional priorities of intervening actors. It also depends on the actors' knowledge and comparative advantages as well as on their particular role within a given context. This report assumes that

[12] Hearing held by a newly formed sub-committee of the Bundestag's foreign policy committee on crisis prevention and security, see summary of experts' statements in FriEnt newsletter from July 2010 as well as http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2010/30106742_kw24_pa_krisenpraevention/index.html. [Last accessed April 2011]

an actor's activities are relevant for peacebuilding if any of the identified peacebuilding needs of a particular country are addressed. They are not relevant if none are addressed. This basic assessment of relevance has to be followed up with a more in-depth analysis assessing whether the potential of an intervening actor (in our case the CPS with partners) in terms of knowledge and comparative advantages has been sufficiently utilised, i.e. what has been done to enhance or enlarge the actor's relevance.

Against this background we concluded that the overall activities addressed by **CPS programmes are relevant for peacebuilding** in all case studies. An in-depth analysis reveals the following picture:

Current CPS programmes – as compared to their predecessors – have become more focused. We identified two phases of CPS engagement in most countries. The first programmes have been developed immediately after the CPS's inception in 1999/2000. A second round of programmes started between 2006 and 2009 and is still ongoing. Most current programmes include lessons learned from the first round of programmes and are consequently more focused with regards to activity lines, partners and/or geographical orientation. The following examples illustrate this finding: the previous CPS Uganda programme addressed a number of partners' needs spread all over the country, while the current programme is focused on the Northern region and addresses two main issues: peace education and dialogue. The first CPS programme in Cambodia addressed a number of peacebuilding needs whereas the current programme puts its emphasis on one main goal (reconciliation) and all corresponding activities with different partners are built around the Khmer Rouge Tribunal and the related government strategy. The first CPS programme in Niger focused on general awareness-building to foster an understanding of the conflict, which was pertinent at the time. The current programme builds on these experiences and is focused on non-violent conflict resolution linked to the government's strategy for rural development. The first CPS programme in Guatemala gave support to dealing with the past with a variety of partner institutions around a number of different topics. The current programme focuses more strategically on political action and community work. In sum, although the first round of CPS programmes was also relevant for peacebuilding, the second round could strengthen their relevance due to a more focused approach.

CPS programmes prioritise socialisation and social cohesion activities. Most CPS programmes focus on certain types of peacebuilding needs. The CPS executing agencies generally prefer to support socialisation and social cohesion activities such as peace education, dialogue projects, training in non-violence as well as trauma healing in post-conflict settings. This shows an emphasis on long-term changes for individual people. For example, in Burundi, Colombia, Israel/Palestine, Niger, Serbia and Uganda, projects train people in techniques of non-violence. As assessed above, these needs are relevant for long-term peacebuilding in all case studies. However, there are also other needs prevailing in the countries. CPS partners, for example, are addressing a larger range of peacebuilding needs in their local context, beyond the CPS focus on non-violence (e.g. protection or advocacy for rights). We are not concluding here that the CPS should address all needs, but the CPS has to critically assess why social cohesion and socialisation are the most supported types of activities in order to find out which activity lines can best strengthen peacebuilding at a given time in a specifc context.

CPS programmes are mostly addressing local contexts. The bulk of CPS supported activities are mainly relevant for local contexts. For example, the Projet de Gestion Non Violente des Conflicts (GENOVICO), a CPS partner in Niger, is a peacebuilding network addressing conflicts around natural resources; it is a country-wide network, but it is geared towards the local level all over the country. While the CPS executing agencies in Uganda also work with partners on the national level in Kampala, the main project focus is on the local level in Northern Uganda. In Serbia, the much needed focus on war veterans and schools is mainly directed to the local level. The same is true for most of the projects in Burundi, Colombia, and Israel/Palestine. Only the CPS programme in Cambodia combines addressing the country's national and local context in a systematic manner. In sum, although addressing local contexts is relevant for peacebuilding, the peacebuilding relevance of the CPS could be enlarged if more emphasis were put on trying to combine local and national reach as exemplified in the Cambodian case. We are not advocating here that the CPS should no longer address the local context in future, which we see as one of its core strengths. However, more assessment as to how this focus could be made more relevant in enhancing its horizontal and vertical reach would certainly help in many instances.

In sum, CPS activities are relevant for peacebuilding. Country programmes could, however, further enhance their relevance by putting more emphasis on regularly updating peacebuilding needs assessments and analysing and adapting priorities, including focusing also on people's immediate peacebuilding needs. The current programme in Cambodia serves as a model here, with a focus on one single goal (i.e. national reconciliation) that is addressed on the national and local level through a variety of complementary activities that also combine different peacebuilding functions. Programmes could also become more relevant if they were to address more peacebuilding needs in a complementary way in only one geographical region with a local and national outreach. These are only two suggested options – the particular choice depends on the very specific context, the CPS's strategy and the partners involved. Overall, a more strategic approach for each country would be required to make this happen.

3.1.2 Adaptation to changing conflict contexts

The level of conflict analysis presented in funding requests is in general of good quality. However, built-in systematic planning procedures to anticipate, monitor and analyse future developments are missing for both CPS country programmes and partners' project activities. Moreover, conflict monitoring – as envisaged in the Standards for the CPS (2008: 7) – is hardly conducted. Nevertheless, in most countries we have seen that partners and CPS experts are trying to adapt project activities to the context if needed – though mostly ad hoc. Overall, no deeper reflection takes place and systematic planning, monitoring and adaptation for the overall programme are missing. For example, the main activity lines of the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine have remained the same since its inception ten years ago, although the context has changed in the meantime, with different levels of violence.

3.1.3 Relevance of CPS partners for peacebuilding

The CPS executing agencies are working with partners that are relevant for peacebuilding. Partner organisations are relevant due to their legitimacy and influence within their constituencies. Their level of outreach varies: while only a few partners have a

national reach, most of them only reach their local constituencies. Overall, we could identify three types of partners:

- well-known and established civil society organisations such as faith-based organisations, networks, NGOs, and academic institutions;
- smaller, not yet fully-established organisations that have a high potential for contributing to peacebuilding (see also under 'effectiveness'); and
- to a far lesser extent, governmental departments (for example in Cambodia) or local district administrations (Uganda).

Based on the case studies we cannot conclude that one type of partner is more relevant than another.

We found that the **CPS executing agencies could make more use of their partners' potential for peacebuilding.** For example in Burundi, advocacy, protection and monitoring have been analysed as peacebuilding needs that are not addressed by the CPS. We do not want to say here that the CPS has to address all needs. On the contrary, a focus is certainly advisable. Nevertheless, there are local partners of the CPS that work particularly on topics of advocacy and monitoring (for example in Burundi or in Guatemala). In mainly focusing on non-violence training as a means of general violence prevention, the peacebuilding potential of these partners is underutilised. The same is true for the Catholic Church in Uganda. The Church is a well-known and accepted player in the country and has the potential to link the local with the national level through its different structures. However, the way the partnership between the AGEH and the Catholic Church in Uganda is organised, the partner is not sufficiently supported to make use of this potential (see more details on this example in chapter 3.2 and 3.7 on effectiveness and efficiency respectively).

In sum, we conclude that CPS partners are relevant for peacebuilding and smaller CPS partners' relevance has been tremendously enhanced due to CPS support. However, partners' relevance could be strengthened if their potential for peacebuilding were used more fully.

3.1.4 Relevance of CPS expert deployment

Deploying international (mostly German[13]) CPS experts is the core mode of cooperation between the CPS executing agencies and their partner organisations. The current practice is to deploy one CPS expert per partner organisation. In general, CPS experts work within partner organisations. Only one CPS executing agency establishes its own CPS office in partner countries (*forum*ZFD). All other CPS executing agencies place CPS experts within partner offices. (We found exceptions of two DED-CPS experts in offices outside partners' premises in Uganda.) While CPS experts are at the centre of any CPS project, additional activities such as the funding of local experts (*Einheimische Fachkräfte*) or project activities could also be included. However, all CPS executing agencies do have different rules and requirements. For example, DED usually deploys CPS experts together with providing a

[13] The CPS deploys experts under the German *Entwicklungshelfergesetz* (EHG), a German law that only allows for German or European citizens to be deployed; see also chapter 1.2.

budget for project activities and funding for local experts. WFD mainly deploys a few or only one CPS expert, but funds a good number of local experts in related projects, while AGEH never funds local experts but focuses on CPS expert deployment. The identification of CPS experts is based on a general profile as well as a particular one for each assignment (see also chapter 3.7 and annex 3 in volume II of this report). The underlying assumption is that the expert will support his/her partner with his/her qualifications and personality.

In order to assess how relevant the deployment of international CPS experts is, we have to assess whether partners' needs are being best addressed by this cooperation modality or by alternative ways of expert deployment, or whether other cooperation modalities could be more relevant. In the following, we therefore analyse partners' needs and discuss how they could be best addressed.

Drawing on the different case studies, we identify the following partners' needs:

- funding of activities and local staff;
- institution-building and management;
- networking;
- facilitation;
- specific competences in the peace, justice or human rights sector; and
- protection in cases of ongoing violence or targeted violence against activists.

We now analyse these different needs in more detail and assess what types of cooperation are required for which need, and subsequently analyse how the CPS executing agencies have addressed these needs.

Funding: Partners require funding for their local staff and project activities. Hence, they want the CPS executing agencies to either fund project activities and staff directly, or else, to provide CPS experts to help them with fundraising through writing proposals or networking with the donor community. In fact, fundraising takes up a great part of CPS experts' work. We therefore would like to raise the issue whether this particular partner need cannot be addressed differently, i.e. through more systematic funding of partners' project activities including institutional support; systematic partnering between CPS projects and donors (German and international), recruitment of professional fundraisers (international or local) who train and support different partners in one or more countries; or a cooperation with local organisations that provide these services. In sum, the relevance of how the CPS addresses its partners' funding needs could be tremendously enhanced by acknowledging that funding is a core partner requirement, and consequently developing a more systematic response strategy that includes CPS experts who are professional fundraisers as well as potential cooperation with other institutions that provide either funding or fund raising services. Furthermore, local fundraisers could be funded as local CPS experts for partners. The detailed response strategy naturally depends on particular national and regional contexts and the overall CPS strategic approach to that context.

Institution-building and management: Partner organisations have generally requested more support for management and institution-building, although newly founded and

supported organisations have received a lot of initial support by the CPS. Assessing the qualifications and training of CPS experts (see the two studies by Sell 2006 and Schweitzer 2009[14]), management competences are not the main focus of attention, as the Serbian case demonstrates. Here, the evaluation team found little evidence of CPS experts' extensive support to organisational growth beyond the inception and establishment phase. Less prominent among the priorities of CPS experts has been the attempt to develop local organisations' managerial, accounting, reporting, planning, monitoring and evaluation skills. In other words, capacity-building of local partners has not always been given the necessary attention. Capacity-building could be provided by specifically trained CPS experts who have professional management skills and could also serve one or more partners. An example from another field can serve as a model here: in Guatemala, the DED engaged a gender expert to mainstream gender in all projects and support all DED partner organisations in the country. This has resulted in enhanced gender awareness and competences among partners. The same could be done for institution-building and management. However, this depends on the country context and the overall CPS strategy in a country or region. Other alternatives (that do not exclude each other) could be either ongoing short-term expert deployment from headquarters or a CPS commitment to co-operation with local organisations that provide such services for all partners or specific partners, i.e. such cooperation would be funded out of the CPS budget for that country. In sum, the relevance of how the CPS addresses partners' institution-building and management needs could be enhanced by applying – on a case-specific basis – a more systematic response strategy combining general CPS expert deployment with more specific CPS expert deployment in management as well as other modes of cooperation.

Networking: Here, the picture is different. An outsider role is very helpful, especially when a new network is to be established or when existing structures within a larger organisation (e.g. different church-based institutions) are to be supported. In most cases, peacebuilding constituencies in a district, region or country are not well coordinated and, hence, more networking and information sharing is required. In such a setting, outsiders help to initiate or support networks or coordination structures. Two examples demonstrate this: EIRENE has systematically supported building the GENOVICO network in Niger as a CPS project. In Uganda, an AGEH-CPS expert was fundamental in establishing the Local Civil Society Network in Moroto, Uganda (RIAMRIAM). In sum, networking is a core strength of CPS experts and here the outsider perspective of an international or regional CPS expert is supportive, and hence highly relevant.

Facilitation: With regard to facilitation, the case studies also confirm the importance of an outsiders' involvement to the conflict setting. This finding is equally acknowledged by peacebuilding research.[15] This means that CPS experts should be either international experts (like the current practice) or qualified experts from other regions in the Global South. Whether or not experts should be integrated into partner organisations depends on the particular context. *Forum*ZFD has generally made good experiences with opening separate offices from where CPS experts work. Two DED-CPS experts in Uganda also confirmed that

[14] The studies were commissed by the *Akademie für Konflikttransformation* of *forum*ZFD.

[15] We leave aside here the discussion around inside facilitation as it is a very specific approach in negotiations (see for example Mason 2009).

a separate office allows for a more effective outsider role. In sum, the outsider perspective is needed for facilitation.

Sector specific peace, justice or human rights competences: The CPS provides specialised peace, justice or human rights competences. However, the majority of CPS experts are generalists rather than specialists for a specific field of peacebuilding or human rights issues. The deployment of an international human rights lawyer within the DED-CPS programme in Cambodia is the exception to the rule. It depends on the particular potential and needs of partners whether it is more relevant to provide this expertise by one CPS expert or in the form of a team of experts with different competences. CPS experts could support a number of partners from an office outside of partner organisations or an agreed entity within a particular partner organisation. It is also possible, as suggested in the Burundi, Cambodia, Israel/Palestine, Serbia and Uganda case study reports, to fund a CPS partner organisation and local staff directly and provide expert support with short-term expert missions. In sum, in case partners need support in specialised peacebuilding sectors, it is relevant to provide such a specialised CPS expert. Moreover, there are also alternative possibilities to provide experts, such as a team of specialised experts that support different partners' needs, or the provision of short-term experts for specialised needs in a given time.

CPS experts provide general support to partners and are not able – as a single expert – to address the entire range of needs as listed above. This might partly explain problems CPS experts are facing with integrating into partner organisations. The particular role of CPS experts is not always clear to partners. The advisory role of CPS experts as defined in the Standards for the CPS is well understood by all CPS experts. Nevertheless, partners either find the roles of the CPS experts hard to understand or they think that CPS experts have difficulties in putting their advisory role into practice. We find great variations here. For example, in Uganda partners feel uneasy when CPS experts take up too much of a leading role, while in Cambodia partners are expecting CPS experts to take up such a leadership role. In sum, the integration of CPS experts into partner organisations remains challenging. This is far less the case for a) direct protection activities, b) specialised assignments like the above mentioned human rights lawyer, and c) when highly qualified CPS experts are provided that come from neighbouring countries. Moreover, partners have explained that in the planning phase representatives of the CPS executing agencies mostly negotiate with higher management levels of partner organisations. This leaves the operational staff of partners out of the loop. Insufficient needs assessments and lack of clarity regarding the expert's role are consequences hereof.

Overall, we conclude that the current main practice – deploying one international CPS expert per partner – is not sufficiently oriented towards the needs of partners. Moreover, the deployment of international experts is not the sole answer to the requirements of partner organisations. Although CPS expert deployment is a relevant modality of cooperation – in particular, networking and facilitation require outsiders to the conflict situation and justify international CPS expert deployment – relevance depends overall on the specific context, on relevant ways of deployment as well as on the availability of and support to alternative cooperation modalities. **To enhance the relevance of CPS expert deployment and, hence, make better use of the CPS's potential, we see a need to both continue while at the same time also revisit and substantially change the way in which CPS expert are currently being deployed.** While the deployment of one expert to one partner might be still relevant, we see various alternatives to this current deployment

practice. Overall, these alternatives could contribute to enlarging the relevance of CPS expert deployment. We suggest the following options:

a) a team of CPS experts with different competences supporting a number of partners in the same country;

b) CPS experts from the Global South (depending on the requirements, this could entail qualified experts from neighbouring countries as well as from different regions);

c) cooperation with local service providers (especially when it comes to management skills); or,

d) short-term expert deployment from the headquarters of CPS executing agencies combined with other forms of cooperation.

To implement these different forms of deployment and relevant alternatives, we see a need to develop a more strategic approach in countries with CPS activities that includes not only the activity lines and partners of all involved CPS executing agencies, but also implementation strategies for expert deployment as well as other forms of cooperation.

3.1.5 Correspondence with CPS core concepts and country strategies

CPS country programmes and activities **correspond to a large extent to the CPS's core concepts** (Framework 1999; Standards 2004, updated in 2008). If CPS country or regional strategies exist, we see a large correspondence as well.

Compliance with the 1999 framework: Besides an overall compliance with the framework, there are two essential principles that are not fully respected:

1. Development and implementation of CPS projects in conjunction with German development cooperation

CPS deployment is generally developed and implemented in conjunction with German bilateral development cooperation *('ZFD-Einsätze werden grundsätzlich im Zusammenhang mit deutscher Entwicklungszusammenarbeit konzipiert und durchgeführt.').*

This is an important though very contentious principle as its interpretation remains largely open and has never been satisfactorily clarified by the CPS main stakeholders. The understanding within different BMZ divisions is not homogeneous either. While half of the interviewed BMZ regional divisions favour a close steering of CPS country programmes as part of an official German development cooperation strategy, the other half favors a more loose connection, but with strong involvement of the BMZ in strategic planning. The CPS Group is opposed to any form of steering or control.

We have identified the following practice:

1. The CPS executing agencies develop and submit their proposals to the BMZ division for peace and security.
2. Prior to approval, the BMZ regional desks assess proposals and make a recommendation to the BMZ division for peace and security. These recommendations have so far always been followed.

3. Thereafter, proposals are also subject to a short assessment by the relevant country desks of the German Foreign Office as to whether they comply with German foreign policy (*Außenpolitische Unbedenklichkeitsprüfung*).

Although some CPS executing agencies already approach the BMZ regional desks prior to official submission of a proposal, there is no formal procedure for a strategic BMZ involvement beyond the approval process. Hence, the BMZ has a reactive and not a pro-active role in this process. To what extent the current practice complies with the framework is difficult to assess. As the CPS is a joint endeavour (*Gemeinschaftswerk*) between non-governmental and governmental agencies, this issue has to be clarified and an official understanding has to be formulated about this important strategic issue.

2. Subsidiarity

Subsidiarity is mentioned as a core principle for the CPS, as activities within the CPS are based on development policy criteria, such as the principle of subsidiarity, the principle of minimal intervention and the principle of self-help. Based on the case studies we conclude that the CPS executing agencies should give more priority to the subsidiarity principle, even if, by and large, the deployment of international CPS experts is to be seen as a relevant implementation modality (see chapter 3.1.4 above and more details on subsidiarity in chapter 3.7).

Compliance with 2008 Standards:

In general, there is a good degree of compliance with the 2008 Standards. Yet there are a few points for which compliance is weak or at least debatable:

Profile of the CPS: On page two of the Standards, the need of a clear CPS profile is highlighted as a precondition for effective and efficient peace work at all levels (multi-track approach) as well as joint and planned coherence with other instruments of development cooperation and human rights and peace initiatives in countries of operation. According to this understanding, the 2008 Standards are meant to serve as a means to strengthen the profile of the CPS. Assessing the level of compliance with this profound issue, we come to the conclusion that the 2008 Standards certainly have contributed a lot to strengthening guidance for CPS projects, but that the general profile of the CPS still remains unclear. Crucial questions as to how the joint endeavour of the CPS (*Gemeinschaftswerk*) is understood by the CPS Group as well as the BMZ remain under-discussed. Is the CPS a network or an instrument? How is the multi-track approach planned and implemented? Is it a result of a strategic decision-making process of all involved stakeholders or else a result of the co-incidence of different activities performed by a variety of partners? (See also chaper 3.7 as well as the conclusions and recommendations.)

Activity lines: Most of the seven activity lines as outlined in the 2008 CPS Standards are addressed. The main focus of activities is geared towards social cohesion, socialisation through peace education and dialogue and training. In a number of countries, there is a focus on trauma healing and other activities focused on rehabilitating victims of violence. Activity lines of local justice, protection and monitoring are clearly underdeveloped.

Theories of change: Theories of change as presented in the Standards are inconsistent. Hence, their application cannot be followed (see details in various sections of chapter 3.2).

Sustainability: The key approach of the CPS to sustainability, as described in the Standards, is the focus on structures as well as financial support to local experts. Whereas

CPS projects are developed around CPS experts, the Standards provide for the possibility of sending short-term experts and funding local experts for a transitional handing-over period. This is possible even if there is no CPS expert present. This sustainability provision is not reflected in the current practice of CPS projects (see also in chapter 3.4).

Systematic **conflict monitoring is rarely practiced** and the' do no harm'- approach has not yet been systematically applied (see also chapter 3.6.2).

3.2 Effectiveness

3.2.1 Theories of change

In this chapter, we analyse theories of change for the CPS by assessing main theories as described in the Standards, the country programmes and projects. We then compare these with current international research knowledge (theoretically and empirically based).

Theories of change in the CPS Standards: According to the 2008 CPS Standards, the general objective is to support partner organisations in the reduction in and prevention of violence, in fostering dialogue and in contributing to a sustainable and just peace. Project objectives are to contribute to non-violent ways of coping with conflict and conflict potentials and to support existing approaches to reconciliation, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction of a functioning civil society. CPS programmes focus on seven main activity lines whereas a CPS expert is at the centre of each project. CPS experts provide skills, knowledge and resources that are not available locally; CPS experts also use their status as an outsider to conflicts to provide credibility, legitimacy, impartiality and protection, and thereby contribute to intercultural cooperation with their personal working style, creativity and solidarity.

The analysis of the CPS's theories of change reveals the following deficiencies:

- The theories of change presented in the 2008 CPS Standards are confusing, as not all results are attributable to the correct level of change (partners, beneficiaries, society). Moreover, the effects on the level of beneficiaries and the overall societal level do not sufficiently differ from each other.
- Theories of change as outlined in the 2008 CPS Standards are not equally reflected and systematically developed in the country programmes and funding requests.
- Not all theories of change are translated into results chains. The most striking example is the fact that no programme or project proposal contains a results chain for CPS experts. As CPS experts are in the centre of any CPS project, this is more than astonishing.
- Only vague theories exist for country programmes (where overall CPS country strategies are in existence).
- Theories of change for project activities are not consistent with each other. Outputs, outcomes and impact are confused in the documents.

Hence, most theories of change are implicit or vague and had to be reconstructed by the evaluation teams. The only exception was the current DED programme in Cambodia, which has a very clearly developed theory of change. This theory is understood as the basis and

backbone of the country programme and all its related project activities are geared towards the overall goal.

Reconstruction of theories of change within case studies: We reconstructed an overall CPS results chain for general CPS country strategies as shown in figure 1 in chapter 1.3. In the country case studies, a number of theories of change have been additionally reconstructed for core activity lines. An aggregated version of this analysis from the case studies is presented below:

- Culture of peace: By socialising people for values of peace, the CPS contributes to medium- to long-term prevention of violence through peace education, non-violence training or outreach activities (e.g. DVDs, brochures, books). => *Focus on individual level of change.*
- Dialogue and reconciliation: By preparing each party of a conflict for contact with the other, and/or bringing conflicting groups in contact, space for dialogue is created that may lead to a different perception of the opponent and will contribute to violence reduction and prevention. => *Focus mostly on individual level of change.*
- Mitigating consequences of violence: Through psycho-social or legal support to victims, their potential for violent action may be reduced and their ability to take part in rebuilding society is strengthened. This creates important preconditions for reconciliation. => *Focus on individual level of change.*
- Support to and networking among actors for change: Supporting or protecting relevant actors for positive change and creating networks among them strengthens their potential for the prevention of and reduction in violence. => *Focus on individual level of change and beyond*.

We conclude that the above theories of change focus mainly on the individual level of change. They are, however, generally not well developed, as it remains unclear how exactly activities will yield results.

Comparison between theories of change and current research: The above reconstructed theories of change, which reveal the CPS's approach on focusing mainly on the individual level of change, is based on the so-called conflict resolution school of thought that was established within academic research during the 1970s, adopting strategies from socio-psychological conflict resolution at the interpersonal level to armed violence within or between countries. Theoretical foundations of the approach are to be found in John Burton's concept of human needs (Burton 1969) and Azar's concept of protracted social conflicts (Azar 1990). The conflict resolution school thus places the emphasis on listening to the voices of ordinary people (Richmond 2005, 100).

The conflict resolution school has been criticised for a number of reasons. First, building relationships does not necessarily result in an agreement to end war (Bercovitch 1984). Furthermore, working with civil society and at a grassroots level does not automatically spill over to the national level (Richmond 2001). Another critique states that the approach does not acknowledge cultural or other societal differences (Richmond 2005, 99) and does not make participants of dialogue and socialisation workshops sufficiently aware of issues of structural violence (Richmond 2005, 100-101).

When the peacebuilding field was further developed in the mid 1990s, this approach was revitalised and combined with the so-called conflict transformation approach as developed by

the US Quaker research-practitioner John Paul Lederach (1995). In line with the conflict resolution school, Lederach sees the need to rebuild destroyed relationships, focus on reconciliation within society, and strengthen society's peacebuilding potential. Third-party intervention should concentrate on supporting internal actors and coordinating external peace efforts. Sensitivity to local culture and a long timeframe are also necessary.

The conflict transformation approach has been criticised for a) unclear linkage between the tracks (levels of engagement), b) not sufficiently considering the wider peacebuilding arena beyond civil society actors – as advocacy for peacebuilding vis-à-vis other actors like regional or international governments is not developed in the approach (Paffenholz 1998, 213–215); c) lack of a power analysis (Featherstone 2000, 207) and d) bringing the 'religious fringes into the secular mainstream' (Heathershaw 2008, 608). Other critiques have also elaborated on the negative consequences of the practical application of the approach by international NGOs (Richmond 2005, 103–104). Newer research on civil society peacebuilding, which analyses the practical effects of the implementation of the approach (e.g. Pouligny 2005, Orjuela 2002, Olson/Andersson 2003, Joint Utstein Study 2004) in the last decade, concludes that most intervening actors do not sufficiently plan for and implement relevant and effective civil society support. Lessons from past interventions related to different types of activities are not being sufficiently considered in programmes, project funding and planning; the context in which civil society peacebuilding support takes place is also not sufficiently addressed by most intervening actors, in particular the level of violence and the role and influence of key actors (state, media, regional actors, donors).

Assessing the CPS's theories of change against international academic research, we conclude that the former largely build on the conflict resolution and conflict transformation school, but have not sufficiently taken into account the existing critiques of the original schools, as well as new findings about deficiencies in implementation.

According to our analysis, these deficiencies would be best addressed by:

- improved results-based management at the country programme as well as at the project level, which needs to be based on more detailed planning grounded on solid analysis beyond conflict analysis (including baselines);
- a strategic and joint approach of all CPS intervening agencies in one country;
- improved incorporation of lessons learned for the CPS; and
- making better use of existing research knowledge in education and training of CPS experts and partners.

We acknowledge that the latter point also includes general learning in the peace field that cannot only be addressed by the CPS executing agencies. For example, it is also the case for curricula of German MA programmes in peace studies in Germany as well as in conflict countries.

3.2.2 Translating theories of change into objectives and project design

All country case studies have based their assessment on the reconstructed theories of change, as the original theories presented in the funding requests were mostly inconsistent (see previous chapter). In consequence, the case studies mostly come to a positive

judgement on how theories are translated into action, because the reconstructed theories of change are more consistent with reality. Nevertheless, we still find reconstructed theories that have a weak correlation between outputs and outcomes, because implementation of a certain activity was weak and there was no underlying logic to be found. For example, in Niger, the question of how to achieve change through communication tools such as DVDs is not fully developed and, consequently, there is a lack of implementation of appropriate activities. In the Guatemala case, the specific change potential of actors supported by the CPS was not sufficiently analysed. In Uganda, the theory of change for networking is not clearly implemented.

3.2.3 Outcome 1: Main changes within CPS partners attributed to CPS experts

The following changes within partner organisations (outcome 1) could be directly attributed to contributions of CPS experts. These are listed in order of importance:

Funding enhanced: In all case studies, CPS partners received more funding. Funding has either been directly provided through CPS projects due to the presence of a CPS expert; or CPS experts were engaged in fundraising and connecting their partners to donors; or alternatively CPS experts improved the fundraising capacity of their partner organisation. In general, donors will be more willing to support a local organisation if an international expert is present to fulfil monitoring tasks.

Networking enabled: Due to the outsider role of CPS experts, in all case studies networking has been enhanced within larger partner organisations as well as among peace actors in general.

Facilitation enhanced: The same is true for facilitation/dialogue initiatives. The work of CPS experts as outsiders to a conflict setting can enable or support various forms of dialogue.

Institutional set-up enabled: Especially smaller or newly established partners benefited enormously from initial institutional support and capacity-building. We also found that in a number of cases the status and visibility of organisations were strengthened due to the presence of CPS experts. This was particularly true for most smaller partners that received substantial CPS support.

Way of working influenced: Two examples, one from Cambodia and one from Niger, show that CPS experts have positively influenced their partners' way of working. In Cambodia, prior to the arrival of a CPS expert, the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), a local CPS partner organisation, was led top-down. 'Even members of the management committee hardly dared to make suggestions and to express ideas of their own', as an interviewee put it. The presence of the CPS expert helped CCHR to extend the boundaries of internal discussion and participation in decision-making. In Niger, a CPS expert introduced a process-driven approach to project management instead of an activity-driven one which partners perceived as a positive and significant change in work modalities. We found only these two examples. However, they serve as examples of good practices.

Partners' peacebuilding know-how enhanced: Due to the presence of CPS experts, partners' capacities could be enhanced through training that has been either directly provided by CPS experts or else through CPS experts who facilitated the participation of partners in training courses.

Management procedures improved: Partners overwhelmingly stated that CPS experts contributed to strengthening management procedures within partner organisations. Partners and CPS experts confirmed that this resulted in improved planning, monitoring and reporting. Partners, in general, wished to receive even more such support. However, at first sight this judgement stands in contrast to other findings of this evaluation, as we analyse that CPS projects and programmes are in general weak in monitoring and results-based management (see chapter 3.7), which reduces effectiveness (see chapter 1.4, 3.2.4 and 3.2.5). We conclude that CPS experts have contributed to a lot of changes within partner organisations' procedures; however the overall level of results-based management is still weak.

In sum, we conclude that CPS experts have achieved changes within partner organisations in securing funds, enhancing networking, facilitation, institutional set-ups and management capacities as well as partners' knowledge about particular peacebuilding aspects. Moreover, CPS experts also managed to influence the way partners work. Overall, most changes could be achieved in networking and facilitation, which we see as the CPS experts' core strengths. We also found that the change potential of CPS experts within partner organisations can be limited by a number of factors:

- **Unclear roles of CPS experts:** The roles of CPS experts were not clear to most partners and would have needed a clarification process.
- **Insufficient follow-up support** by the CPS after the end of projects that negatively influences sustainability (see chapter 3.4 for details).
- **Weak partnership agreements***:* This can occur when the partnership is negotiated at a higher level of the partner organisation, leaving out operational staff. In these cases there has been insufficient understanding of or response to the partners' needs, which led to disappointments when the CPS expert arrived. Moreover, partners wished to be more involved in the selection of experts.

3.2.4 Outcome 2: Main changes through project activities

Most projects assessed could not simply be judged as being effective or not effective, because partners conduct a variety of activities (some of them funded by the CPS, others supported indirectly by the CPS through the work of the CPS experts, or else, activities not linked to the CPS). These activities showed different levels of effectiveness (even within an activity) depending mostly on the way they are designed and implemented and how they incorporate contextual factors. As a result, we were able to analyse supporting or hindering factors for effectiveness, which are presented below in chapter 3.2.4.1. Results presented are mostly based on an analysis of good practice within the different CPS country programmes and projects. The supporting factors identified can serve as models for future planning and implementation to enhance the effectiveness of the CPS's work.

To enrich this assessment, we have added in chapter 3.2.4.2 below a quantitative assessment of the CPS's effectiveness in seven selected civil society functions against preconditions for effectiveness identified from evidence-based research. The judgment presented in the chapter is either based on triangulated results from the cases or – where this was not sufficiently possible – against outcome plausibility (see chapter 1.3 as well as Methodological Report in volume 3 for an explanation). The combination of these methods (quantitative and qualitative, outcome results and conditions as well as plausibilities) allowed

overall conclusions to be drawn for the results and potential of CPS's effectiveness; these conclusions are presented at the end of the two following sub-chapters.

3.2.4.1 Factors supporting or hindering effectiveness

Larger reach of activities: Enhancing the reach of activities and thereby ultimately touching more people is a core success factor for effectiveness. We found different approaches in the case studies. Not all of them were used to the same extent but can serve as interesting examples of good practices.

- **Work with established institutions with significant outreach:** One prominent approach has been to work with established institutions. However, this happened rarely at the national but mostly at the local level. An example of the national level comes from Cambodia during the first CPS programme. The handbook on 'Critical Legal Thinking' developed from 2002 to 2004 at the Khmer Institute of Democracy, a DED partner, is considered the authoritative source for legal training in Cambodia, where it has been adopted as the standard textbook for training lawyers.

  There are a number of projects we found effective. They come from the local level in Palestine: AGEH is working with the University of Bethlehem and has managed to introduce new advocacy courses into the academic curriculum of a Master Programme in the English Department. The Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, with the help of a CPS expert from the DED, succeeded in including conflict resolution as a topic in the training programme for social workers of the Palestinian Ministry of Education. A new psychotherapy unit has been established, with the help of DED, in the *Dar Al-Kalima* Health and Wellness Center. Peer-mediation has been successfully integrated into most governmental schools, through the work of the General Union of Palestinian Teachers, a partner of KURVE Wustrow. WFD's support to *Yes Theatre* includes an agreement with the Palestinian Ministry of Education for ensuring annual performances in Palestinian schools. Another WFD project with *Al-Mada* (a new centre that WFD helped to establish) is implemented through United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) schools. AGEH only works with one private school in Palestine; however, since this school is attended by potential future elites, AGEH's work is significant here.

  Two of the above-mentioned projects started non-violent conflict resolution education in schools by focusing on teachers. To better achieve their objectives, students' parents were progressively included in peace education sessions. However, the success of these initiatives is contingent upon the context and is not always able to reach and spread into the wider community.

  In Serbia, CFI (*Christliche Fachkräfte International*) supported the Belgrade-based organisation Bread of Life in 2006 to implement a non-violence project in five elementary schools in Belgrade. To enlarge the outreach of this pilot, cooperation with the teachers union has been started. However, so far this cooperation has not been fully implemented as follow-up is lacking.

- **Effective dissemination strategies**: In Serbia, DVD documentaries on war veterans have been broadcasted with national coverage both in Serbia and abroad, and have been broadly useful to undermine the persistence of stereotypes and enemy images,

thereby creating preconditions for changes in behaviour.[16] In contrast, the dissemination strategy of GENOVICO with DVDs and stickers did not succeed in reaching a larger audience in Niger because there was a lack of a targeted dissemination strategy, no planning of follow-up steps and no proper assessment of the use of those tools. In autumn 2009, *forum*ZFD published a report on the dramatic economic situation in Serbia, exposing how the conflict in Sandzak has had negative effects on economic growth, in particular by hindering economic initiative and innovation. Short-term effectiveness has been achieved by raising important economic issues among governance priorities in the region. However, a one-time report clearly does not account for systematic monitoring. Besides, it is too early to assess the broader results of the report – future systematic monitoring of the economic situation, combined with targeted advocacy, could lead to important results. In Palestine, AGEH with *The Trust of Programs* has published very interesting booklets in Arabic concerning women's rights and the position of women in Islam. These publications target local communities. However, there has not been any clear dissemination strategy developed as a precondition for effectiveness. The same is true for peace exhibitions in Palestine and Guatemala.

- **Strategic partnerships for using service delivery as entry point for peacebuilding:** An alternative to directly working with established institutions is partnering up with other executing agencies. Although this has hardly happened, it is an interesting approach worth mentioning. We find a few interesting examples where CPS projects partnered up with developed actors. The most prominent and so far very successful example comes from Uganda: two partner organisations supported by a DED-CPS expert systematically used the need for water as an entry point for peacebuilding between two conflicting groups. The project brought together a large amount of settlers from two conflicting groups that had been involved in violent conflict around cattle rustling for years. Each NGO worked on 'its' side to negotiate a deal with communities and later to jointly develop a new settlement. Water was provided through the rehabilitation of dams (supported by the DED water programme) with the objective of sustaining livelihoods as a means of avoiding violence through cattle raiding, and thus creating alternative livelihoods. In addition to mitigating violence and ensuring coexistence, the biggest achievement of the project is certainly its message of peace: living together is possible. People all over Teso and Karamoja talk about the project and become aware of the possibility of this kind of future social cohesion projects that combine peacebuilding with livelihood development. Another example comes from the same region: having established offices in neighbouring Moroto, GTZ and Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (DWHH) started two food security programmes with a strong conflict/peacebuilding component. Cooperation with the CPS and partners has been agreed upon within both programmes from the start. The DED-CPS expert also has an office within the GTZ office in Moroto. Another example comes from Burundi, where the DED has just started cooperating with the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). In Serbia, a cooperation of the CPS with GTZ in the education sector was proposed by the evaluation team.

[16] An exact assessment of the specific effects could not be made by the evaluation team and no monitoring is in existence.

Establishing local structures*:* Another approach to enhance effectiveness is to support the establishment of local structures for peacebuilding with the assistance of CPS experts. EIRENE supported the country-wide peace network GENOVICO in Niger that addresses non-violent conflict resolution, particularly of conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists around land issues. The same is true for peace committees established at local level by the WFD partner organisation MI-PAREC in Burundi. It supports non-violent solutions to community conflicts. Both projects have achieved a number of changes. In Burundi, some of the peace committees have even started operating on their own, independently from MI-PAREC. The level of changes achieved in both cases depends on the way they address pertinent issues for the members of the network/committees, in addition to advocating for and conducting training on non-violent behaviour. Both projects have successes in this regard, but there is still a lot of potential for improvement.

Support to the RIAMRIAM peace coordination network in the conflict-affected Northern Ugandan Karamajong region was started with the support of an AGEH-CPS expert. Unfortunately, the network was not sufficiently supported by its members and so far no CPS follow-up strategy has been put in place.

Targeted interventions addressing relevant issues for people: We conclude that activities under CPS programmes are more effective when they address issues that are of high relevance to beneficiaries such as land rights, sexual violence or other protection issues (depending on the context); hence, they do not only offer a vision and example of non-violence but also an answer to immediate problems.

Non-violence training and the dissemination of messages for a culture of peace (including peace education) within society are overall the most performed CPS activities. Their effectiveness is mixed and overall depends on a number of factors. Non-violence training is more effective when it is directed towards needs that are related to the professional context of trainees (as witnessed in Niger: when working with teachers it is more effective to address the needs of their school work as compared to general training). However, this is not always the case. In most case studies, only general non-violence training has been conducted without a specific focus. The Burundi study exemplifies this. Non-violent behaviour is certainly an important need for long-term peacebuilding in the country. However, the way the training has been conducted, might not support this goal: Training activtities have not been accompanied by a detailed results chain showing how to achieve behaviour change. Moreover, the CPS partners in Burundi are engaged in concrete peace activities, for example, in advocacy for particular local needs. However, when working with the same partners, CPS does not sufficiently connected with these other issues in Burundi. Another example comes from Uganda: in Gulu, where land rights for returning IDPs is an important issue for beneficiaries. Those peace education projects that included this matter could achieve better effects. If peace education was done in isolation, it becomes meaningless for people that have no access to rights and justice.

Explaining non-violent behaviour is not sufficient if no solution to or perspective for immediate problems is offered. We understand very well that the CPS's approach to non-violence is broad and wants to tackle the entire transformation process. Hence, it seeks to empower people to address these issues in a non-violent way and thereby wants to go beyond the mere training of behaviour. However, what we have seen in many of those types of training is a focus on the 'technical' side of the training as compared to the conflict transformation approach to it.

A prominent good practice example of addressing highly relevant issues of beneficiaries is the current DED programme in Cambodia that is targeted towards the overall goal of reconciliation around the activities of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia – ECCC). For example, national surveys and feedback from NGOs and stakeholder interviews showed that Cambodian people are better informed about gender-based crimes (GBV) committed under the Khmer Rouge regime and about the proceedings before the ECCC as a result of the CPS interventions. Until February 2010, the Cambodian Defenders Project received 76 civil parties applications related to GBV. The project is closely associated with the work of the CPS expert who represents victims of gender-based crimes. The CPS project is the only one of its kind in the country and there would not have been a consideration of GBV at the ECCC without it.

Protection work is highly targeted and shows high effectiveness with regard to its envisaged goals (see chapter 3.2.4.2 above). The work in Colombia and Guatemala enables important civil society actors to fulfil their tasks and, hence, creates preconditions for effectiveness of other peacebuilding work.

Agenda setting: Programmes and projects that managed to put core issues systematically on national or local agendas have been assessed as very effective. Unfortunately, this has happened in only a few cases. Again, the examples of Cambodia and Niger stand out. In Cambodia, DED-CPS fundamentally shapes the way the official government strategy deals with the Khmer Rouge past. In Niger, EIRENE and DED managed to advocate for an acknowledgement of conflicts around national resources in rural development in line with the government's Rural Development Strategy. In other programmes we can find isolated attempts towards advocacy work, such as *forum*ZFD's focus on economic marginalisation in the Serbian region of Sandzak. In Palestine, an AGEH supported project with Bethlehem University managed to put advocacy onto the curriculum of an MA programme and a number of exhibition projects try to lobby for a better understanding of the difficult Palestinian conflict setting (see chapter 3.2.4.1 above). The Guatemala programme also places a lot of emphasis on advocacy. In most CPS programmes assessed, however, advocacy is not a core activity.

Key institution/actor approach: The CPS executing agencies work together with key actors in the conflict setting. Two examples are particularly striking: DED's work with the ECCC in Cambodia and AGEH's work with the Catholic Church in Uganda. The comparison of the two cases is interesting. In Cambodia, the entire programme is built systematically around the overall goal of reconciliation in the context of the ECCC. All activities are geared towards this goal and the actor's reach. In Uganda, AGEH works with a number of justice and peace commissions within the Catholic Dioceses in Kampala and mostly in the conflict affected northern region. At the same time, it supports think tanks in Kampala. Within the Dioceses, effective peace work has been carried out on the immediate local level; however, AGEH has not systematically supported the Catholic Church as a key actor in Uganda in a comprehensive way. The various projects remain scattered as they have been negotiated separately with each Diocese. There is no overall strategic approach on how to enhance the peacebuilding potential of the Catholic Church in Uganda as a whole and how to develop interventions accordingly.

Effective monitoring: Programmes with effective monitoring have not only produced more changes due to the fact that changes could be verified more easily; they have produced more effective changes as theories of change and monitoring issues are clear. Results are

therefore rendered achievable. Moreover, project adaptations are also easier in the light of ongoing monitoring. Only in Cambodia such effective monitoring took place. There is, however, also a differentiation within the Cambodia programme: since all projects or implementation processes are based on strong theories of change and well-developed results chains across the board, projects have achieved outcomes or have high outcome likelihood. At the same time, projects in direct and immediate support of the ECCC, particularly on victims support and on assistance to civil parties and the ECCC's outreach, tend to have the highest likelihood of achieving immediate tangible outcomes. This is due to the fact that these projects have clear, very specific and reachable target indicators that can easily be measured (and are regularly monitored). In a few other CPS country programmes, we also find a number of monitoring activities (Burundi, Colombia, Uganda); however, these are localised activities and not as systematically planned and implemented as the aforementioned examples from the CPS's Cambodia programme.

Strong theories of change*:* All the above mentioned points and examples could also have been grouped under the heading of theories of change. We can conclude that programmes and projects with strong theories of change are much more effective.

3.2.4.2 Comparing CPS project activities with existing evidence-based research

The CPS has seven activity lines that we clustered into seven civil society functions (see the Inception Report as well as chapter 3.2.5 of the Methodological Report, both in volume 3). The main functions implemented by CPS programmes are socialisation, social cohesion and facilitation. The latter two can also be found in combination with service delivery. Advocacy is performed less frequently, monitoring and protection only rarely. In the following section, we assess the likelihood of performed activities to become effective in the future by comparing the evidence from case study reports with existing evidence-based research on how these initiatives work (see volume 3, part 1; the main research results are taken from: Anderson/Olson 2003; Davies 2004 and 2006; Orjuela 2004, Pouligny 2005; Paffenholz 2009 and 2010). We group functions in order of quantitative occurrence within the CPS programmes.

Socialisation

Preconditions for effective socialisation from evidence-based research	**Level of implementation within the CPS**
Low level of violence or absence of violence	More than two thirds of cases fulfil precondition (ongoing violence in Palestine and partly in Colombia; high level of homicides in Guatemala)
Engage with influential existing organisations that can ensure wider reach	One third of partners fulfils condition (e.g. Catholic church in Uganda; ECCC tribunal in Cambodia; Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA) in Serbia; education institutions in Palestine and Uganda; youth organisations of political parties in Palestine and Israel)
Long-term process instead of implementing short-term isolated initiatives	Accepted approach by the CPS executing agencies but only one third of project activities regarding socialisation fulfils condition
Strengthening democratic values	Only two examples found (one partner in Cambodia and one in Niger, see chapter 3.2.3)

Preconditions for effective socialisation from evidence-based research	Level of implementation within the CPS
No fostering of radicalisation when working with in-groups (these are specific groups from one conflict party only)	More than two thirds of the relevant projects met condition (as we did not find any counteracting evidence)
Engaging with hardliners	Only one example (Serbia: war veterans)
Targeted initiatives instead of overall awareness building	Less than one thirds of relevant project activities fulfil condition

In sum, the above assessment demonstrates that the CPS's effectiveness potential in socialisation activities is on average mixed, as one third of overall projects fulfils the above effectiveness preconditions.

Social cohesion

Preconditions for effective social cohesion from evidence-based research	Level of implementation within the CPS
Low level of violence or absence of violence	More than two thirds of cases fulfil precondition (ongoing violence in Palestine and partly in Colombia; high level of homicides in Guatemala)
Bringing people together for a clear reason	One third of these types of activities fulfils condition. Good examples come from social cohesion initiatives in Palestine and a DED-CPS project in Northern Uganda (Apetolim, see more information under 'service delivery' in this chapter)
Process-orientation rather than scattered initiatives	Two thirds of social cohesion initiatives fulfil condition
Participants should not constitute 'already converted' ones	Not sufficient data to answer question due to lack of baselines as well as monitoring during and after social cohesion events[17]
Goal should be behaviour not attitude change	Due to unclear and, in many instances, inconsistent results chains it was not possible to come to a judgement based on solid triangulation; however, we got the impression from interviews that this condition is fulfilled in two thirds of this type of project initiatives
Bringing difficult groups together	Less than one third of this type of initiatives fulfils condition (good examples from Palestine and Serbia)
Focus on other than prominent conflict lines in society	Only a few good examples (e.g. minorities in Israel; women in Palestine; setting agenda to end conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists on the local and national agenda in Niger)
Empowerment of marginalised groups within initiatives	More than two thirds of initiatives fulfil condition
Outreach strategy beyond individual level	Less than one third of projects fulfils this condition (see good practice examples in next sub-chapter 3.2.4.2)
Acknowledging political context within initiatives	Two thirds of projects fulfil condition

[17] These data cannot be gathered ex-post.

In sum, the above assessment demonstrates that the effectiveness potential of the CPS's social cohesion activities is on average mostly met, as two thirds of overall projects fulfil the above effectiveness preconditions. However, for two preconditions there are not sufficient data to support this judgement.

Facilitation

For facilitation, we do not produce a table with preconditions and the CPS performance because effectiveness of facilitation is in general entirely contingent upon the specific country or local context. There are no general patterns identified in research. Yet we found good examples from the CPS's facilitation work with the following results: In Burundi, local peace committees have settled an impressive number of local conflicts, the majority being family conflicts. In Colombia, CPS partners settled family and school conflicts. In all cases, beneficiaries acknowledged the effectiveness of local facilitation work. The main factor that is similar in all cases is certainly legitimacy and recognition of facilitating actors within their communities. However, it also remains questionable whether this local facilitation work is more effective due to the work of the CPS. This question links to the effectiveness of the work of CPS experts (see outcome 1). What we can say with certainty is that the bulk of facilitation work by established partners would also have taken place without the CPS, as the involved partners mainly perform these activities because of their legitimacy in and knowledge of the context. This is different with networks or other structures established with the main support of CPS experts. These entities would not have existed in that form without the CPS (e.g. GENOVICO in Niger, Mi-PAREC in Burundi, CNA in Serbia).

In sum, the strength of the CPS in facilitation work is the support to the establishment of relevant facilitation structures within society. The plausibility for these facilitation initiatives to be effective – particularly in their immediate local constituencies – seems mostly met, which means that it can be expected that two thirds of such initiatives will be effective in the future (considering that most of them have only started recently).

Monitoring

Monitoring of specific issues within the conflict context is rarely performed within CPS programmes.

Preconditions for effective monitoring from evidence-based research	**Level of implementation within the CPS**
Focus on relevant monitoring issues	Only one programme (i.e. Cambodia) and few projects fulfil these conditions (i.e. human rights monitoring in Colombia; two projects in Uganda; EIRENE and WFD partners in Burundi)
Systematic combination with advocacy	Not systematically performed, only a few examples such as advocacy for human rights violation in Colombia and Uganda; advocacy for acknowledgment of problematic economic situation in Serbia's Sandzak region as well as advocacy for victim protection in Burundi

In sum, it does not make sense to come to overall conclusions for the CPS's monitoring performance as this activity has hardly been practiced. What we can see from the above assessment is that when it has been performed, it mostly met the above effectiveness preconditions.

Advocacy

Advocacy has in general not been at the forefront of activities under CPS programmes. Nevertheless, some programmes do have a stronger emphasis on advocacy.

Preconditions for effective advocacy from evidence-based research	**Level of implementation within the CPS**
Support to effective campaigns	Rarely performed, few examples only (e.g. Cambodia and Niger, which have been effective, Serbia on economic issues (effectiveness conditions in place but more follow-up needs to be done))
Accompanying monitoring	A few exceptions: Cambodia, which is effective; human rights monitoring in Colombia and two partners monitoring human rights in Northern Uganda (the latter two initiatives were not effective, one, as it failed to fulfil preconditions (Omaniman Community Development Initiative), the other (Moroto Diocese) fulfils preconditions for future effectiveness but was hindered by its context). AGEH's work with Bethlehem University in Palestine managed to put advocacy onto an MA programme curriculum and a number of peace exhibitions in Palestine tried to lobby for an understanding of the difficult context in which Palestinian people live. To what extent these exhibitions are effective is difficult to assess.[18]
Targeted dissemination strategies	Overall not systematically implemented but in Cambodia (effective) and partially in Niger and Serbia (please refer to examples in assessment in next chapter 3.2.4.2)
Link to international lobbies	Only one country programme is systematically making this effort (Cambodia)
Systematic, built-in media advocacy strategy	Rarely done, few examples only (e.g. Cambodia)

[18] This is due to the absence of a clear results chain and lack of monitoring indicators for visitors. The latter is, however, difficult to undertake without focused perception surveys. Whether these would be cost-effective is another question. Hence, in the future a more clear theory of change with a precise results chain would already help sharpening such initiatives and, hence, increase their effectiveness potential.

In sum, advocacy was not performed in all case studies. However, two programmes (Cambodia, Niger) have been successful in putting core issues onto the local or national agenda. In a few cases (Colombia, Guatemala, Israel/Palestine and Serbia) effectiveness plausibility is given, as partners lobbied successfully for specific issues that were followed up by relevant forums or institutions.

Protection

Direct protection was only performed by CPS projects in Guatemala and Colombia. Hence, our assessment is based on these two cases.

Preconditions for effective protection from evidence-based research	Level of implementation within the CPS
Protection as precondition for peacebuilding work	More than two thirds of projects in Colombia fulfil these conditions through either direct protection work (PBI) but also through presence of an outsider (CPS experts) within a local organisation. In Guatemala, we find the same picture.
Protection combined with monitoring and advocacy	Insufficient data but one example from Guatemala

In sum, protection has only been performed in two out of the eight cases. However, when performed, it can be effective as more than two thirds of all interventions fulfilled the effectiveness criteria.

Service delivery

We do not produce a table with effectiveness conditions here, because we find only one precondition for its effectiveness in research which is the combination of services with social cohesion or protection activities. Service delivery through providing psycho-social rehabilitation of victims has been performed quite regularly; these activities provide protection for victims of violence (in an indirect way). Its effectiveness depends on the reach and establishment of structures (see the assessment in chapter 3.2.4.2 below). Using development needs as an entry point for social cohesion can be very effective. This has, however, almost never been on the agenda of the CPS executing agencies. However, the rare examples we find, e.g. the resettlement project of two conflicting groups in Apetolim, Northern Uganda, around water dams, have been very effective. Partnering with aid agencies to foster dialogue and reconciliation is totally underused within the CPS. A number of case studies underline this point (e.g. Burundi, Serbia, Uganda).

In sum, we assess that the effectiveness of activities under the CPS programme or its likelihood is mixed. More effective were those activities that managed to reach a greater number of beneficiaries, expanded their reach beyond the local context both horizontally and vertically, focused on key change actors in the conflict and conducted non-violence approaches in a way that allowed for systematically addressing relevant issues for beneficiaries. The overall likelihood that projects are effective is the following: socialisation and social cohesion are the two main performed CPS activity lines. **While effectiveness conditions are mostly met for social cohesion projects, only one third of socialisation projects met the criteria**; we found that two thirds of facilitation activities met the criteria as well. Also two thirds of protection activities

met the criteria; however, overall protection was only performed in two out of eight countries. For monitoring and advocacy there is no sufficient data for general conclusions, and the two activity lines have not been performed systematically either. Service delivery was almost never used as an entry point for peacebuilding (with a very successful exception of a DED supported project in Northern Uganda).

3.2.5 Outcome 3: CPS contributions to the reduction and prevention of violence, including reconciliation

The CPS aims to prevent, avoid or reduce violence in all phases of conflict (before, during and after an armed conflict). The overall vision is to contribute to 'positive peace' and justice (Standards 2008). From the case studies we conclude that the CPS mainly works in post-conflict countries to support the establishment of a culture of peace. Projects under the CPS programme are addressing the objective of long-term prevention of violence by fostering a culture of non-violent conflict resolution and by enhancing coping mechanisms of people to address consequences of past violence. When working in violent conflict settings (or in settings with continuously changing levels of violence), CPS programmes are in general geared towards long-term goals of establishing a culture of peace within society.

When assessing actual contributions of activities under the CPS programme to short and medium-term prevention of and reduction in violence, the weak data situation was challenging. Nevertheless, we identified a number of concrete contributions.

In almost all case studies we found concrete examples of how activities under CPS programmes have led to reduction and prevention of violent incidences in schools, families, CPS partner universities and local communities. With the exception of the CPS's Cambodia programme (see assessment below), these were mostly very localised or singular events. In Burundi and Niger, we have identified a potential for contributions beyond the immediate local level if activities continue to build local structures but also enhance their reach. There is evidence on a larger local scale: in Palestine, a project supported by KURVE Wustrow was part of an evaluation of the Palestinian Ministry of Education, which found a noticeable decrease of violence in schools. In Uganda, DED and two partners supported the coexistence of two former conflicting groups, which directly led to violence reduction and even the end of violence. The settlement that was initiated by the DED-CPS partners with the support of the CPS expert and a development intervention from the DED standard programme, attracted around 30,000 people over time.

On a larger scale, the current DED-CPS programme in Cambodia has made a significant contribution to supporting reconciliation in the country. The Berkeley Study (2009) (partly funded by the CPS) and a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (2008 and 2009) that analysed the Cambodian public opinion on peacebuilding, conflict resolution and the ECCC, provide sound empirical evidence of positive changes achieved. Attribution to the CPS is likely, as output and outcome indicators are well-defined in the programme. The project at the Women's Media Center (WMC), Radio FM 102 – the largest independent radio station in Cambodia – is a case in point. It produces a weekly radio programme on the Khmer Rouge history and the ECCC, and reaches a large audience in most parts of the country. The programme has achieved crucial results in the way Cambodians deal with the Khmer Rouge past, especially in terms of encouraging listeners to call in and talk about themselves, something Cambodians still find difficult to do. The show has an average of 35

callers per programme, significantly more than any other radio programme on Khmer Rouge-related issues. Most crucially, perhaps, both victims and perpetrators call in. Radio is the most important medium in Cambodia and the project has almost revolutionised the journalistic approach to coping with the country's past, remembrance and reconciliation. A WMC survey shows that listeners to 'The Truth' radio programme are far better informed about the ECCC than the average population.

In sum, projects under CPS programmes have contributed to the prevention and mitigation of small local and family conflicts, mostly in the immediate environment of partner organisations. In only a few exceptions, like the above mentioned settlement project in Northern Uganda or the example from Palestine, **CPS interventions have contributed to a reduction in and the prevention of violence on a larger local scale. However, in a number of programmes** like in Burundi or Niger (that have only started recently in their current form), **we have identified a potential for a wider contribution on the local level.** The programme in Cambodia has given a significant contribution to the strengthening of societal mechanisms of dealing with the Khmer Rouge past as well as contributions to immediate work and mission of the tribunal.

3.2.6 Effective partnership

Overall the effectiveness of different types of CPS partners depends on the quality of partnerships rather than on the nature of partners. We found a number of issues worth mentioning:

Effectiveness of local partners increases when they are part of a **wider network** as exemplified with the GENOVICO peace network in Niger or the Catholic Church in Uganda with their national and local entities. However, for an increased effectiveness these networks need to be aware of their potential and make better use of it.

The **internal democracy** of partners tends to be weak. In two case studies (Cambodia and Niger), we found that work with CPS experts has positively contributed to increased internal democracy of partners and consequently also to more effective work. Even if these are only two examples, they can serve as a good practice.

Overall, **smaller partners profit more** from CPS support than established partners. Again, however, it is the quality of each partnership that makes the difference in effectiveness.

The successful case of Cambodia also demonstrates that partners that are **part of an overall well developed programme** contribute more effectively to programme goals.

3.2.7 Effectiveness of project activities in different phases of conflict

This question could not be systematically assessed during this evaluation as most CPS programmes took place during one explicit phase of conflict, mostly post-conflict or prevention. Only programmes in Israel/Palestine and Uganda took place during different phases of conflict. However, Guatemala experiences extremely high levels of homicide and crime that outnumber deaths during some phases of armed conflict. In Colombia, the level of violence also varies in different regions and times of conflict.

The effectiveness of project activities in certain phases cannot be seen in isolation of the other above-mentioned factors that contribute to effectiveness. With this restriction in mind,

we conclude that certain activities are more influenced by the level of violence than others. In situations were the lives of activists and partners are threatened, immediate protection becomes a core need. This is exemplified in PBI projects in Guatemala and Colombia.

In times of high levels of violence, the effectiveness of activities with long-term goals like peace education or long-term reconciliation efforts are considerably reduced. The Palestinian case demonstrates this finding most explicitly: here, concepts and realities stand in stark contrast to each other. Children receive non-violence education in schools. At the same time, the level of household violence increases tremendously due to the challenging economic and social situation.[19] The overall conflict context has changed in Palestine since the CPS started its work in 2000, but CPS activities have mostly been developed for an 'after large-scale violence phase', when actually adding other types of programmes such as protection, monitoring and advocacy would have had higher chances for being effective, as shown in evidence-based research results (see the Methodological Report in volume 3). With this analysis we do not want to argue against peace education projects in times of violence. This is a strategic decision of involved actors. However, the influence of context on projects needs to be constantly assessed and project activitities changed accordingly. For example, in schools it might be necessary to add more psycho-trauma therapy to compensate for stress experienced, or additionally engage in advocacy or other types of work.

3.3 Impact

3.3.1 Challenges for the CPS impact assessment

Given the deficiencies in data for assessing outcome 2 and 3, it will not come as a surprise that a solid impact assessment was not possible in this evaluation. The question whether or not impact assessment for peacebuilding activities such as those performed by the CPS makes sense at all, and if so under which conditions, is still debated among international experts.

This evaluation did not have the means to design and undertake such an assessment, and even if field missions had been extended and larger surveys could have been conducted, their usefulness would have been questionable. This is mainly due to

- an inconsistent understanding of what constitutes the CPS's impact in the 2008 CPS Standards, i.e. the Standards state that impact shall occur on the wider societal level, but there is a mixing of outputs, outcomes and impact;
- an inconsistency between the understanding of impact in the 2008 CPS Standards and the funding requests for projects;
- an inconsistency in the presentation of impact in the funding proposals themselves;

[19] The challenging economic and social situation is a by-product of the Israeli occupation policies and has worsened in recent years due to the wall. Moreover, there are almost daily physical and psychological menaces and pressures to which most of the Palestinian population is exposed. The average Palestinian never knows when he/she leaves home in the morning whether he/she will be able to get back safe in the evening. This is the reality of daily life of the population living in the West Bank. See the relevant OCHA reports as well as the Public Perception Reports mentioned earlier.

- lack of impact indicators in the country strategies (in cases where such strategies exist);
- an absence of baselines and impact assessments since the CPS's inception ten years ago (with Cambodia as an exception).

As a consequence, this evaluation did the following to address the impact question. First, as indicated in the Inception Report, it placed the main emphasis on the CPS's outcome level and came up with a distinction of three outcome levels (see volume 3, part 1, and the three outcome chapters in this report). Second, three case studies worked with impact plausibility (Burundi, Cambodia and Colombia). Third, we offer a discussion over whether it makes sense for the CPS to engage in impact assessment in the future.

3.3.2 The CPS's impact plausibility

The CPS programme in Cambodia is a good practice example of future CPS impact assessments: DED-CPS contributed to funding of a project that resulted in the so-called Berkeley study ('So we will never forget', published in early 2009). This study provides the findings of a nationwide, population-based survey conducted in Cambodia in late 2008. Teams of interviewers used a structured questionnaire to interview 1,000 Cambodians above 18 years of age. DED-CPS would not have been able (both in terms of funding and staffing) to conduct such a study on its own. DED-CPS decided to contribute to funding of the survey because the survey investigated key issues in terms of political culture and public opinion that are central to DED-CPS's work on/with the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (ECCC) and related projects. The study's indicators are similar to a number of the CPS's own. This enabled DED (and our evaluation team in Cambodia) to use the data of the study to demonstrate that the current CPS programme is on a good path to achieving its objectives.

In more detail, the assessment of impact plausibility in the CPS's Cambodia programme shows the following results. First, it is interesting to note that the impact goal of the first programme has been much higher as compared to the current programme. The highly aggregated development impact level of the first CPS phase was to achieve 'sustained national and societal peace and stability'. In this sense, the impact of the first programme was vaguely defined, harder to achieve and measure. The second phase aims slightly lower by wanting to achieve 'reconciliation and effective approach to coping with the Khmer Rouge past as a precondition for sustained national and societal peace and stability'. In the strict sense of impact assessment, e.g. the ascription of a causal link between observed (or at least expected) changes in Cambodia's development and the specific intervention of the CPS programme, the envisioned impact has not been achieved yet. Simply put, reconciliation and an effective approach to coping with the Khmer Rouge past are still unrealised objectives. However, assessing the achievements on outcome levels 2 and 3, clear advancements towards achieving programme and project outcomes have been made. This is a significant contribution in the process of reaching the impact level.

However, even in the Cambodia case, the assessment of impact was also not straight forward: programme/project documents do not refer to any indicators to assess impact. With regard to reconstructed impact in the theory of change, it is interesting to note that while indicators have not been developed by the programme itself, risks to outcome and impact realisation are clearly stated. Due to the reconstruction of the results chain and an assumed continuation, it was possible to assume the relevant indicators and compare them with the

results of two surveys (the above mentioned Berkeley study and more details on another study in the Cambodia case study).

In all other evaluated CPS programmes, no comparable effort by the CPS executing agencies has been made. Nevertheless, an assumed continuation of results chains as reconstructed by evaluation teams comes to the following conclusions: The likelihood of achieving impact is higher when programmes:

- are planned systematically with clear and achievable goals;
- build on core strengths of partners;
- continue support of CPS partners when CPS experts leave;
- are developed in a complementary way between all CPS and other interventions in a given country;
- have a particular focus on relevant conflict issues suitable to be addressed with the CPS's approaches.

Currently, only the CPS Cambodia programme fulfils most of the above conditions to achieve impact on the societal level. All other programmes need to strengthen work on a number of preconditions, which are: the establishment of baselines and indicators for all interventions and country programmes, and working with strong theories of change that are elaborated into clear results chains on all levels of interventions. It is also crucial to have the financial means within the CPS budget to conduct or support projects that do impact assessment. The Cambodian case demonstrates, however, that the CPS budgetary rules do not restrict such endeavours.

We propose that CPS impact assessment is best done for of a few selected country programmes. Whether this makes sense for the CPS instrument and how it could be implemented is discussed in the next section.

3.3.3 Should the CPS engage in impact assessment in the future?

Currently, there is no impact assessment done for CPS programmes with the exception of the Cambodia programme (see chapter 3.3.2 above). As impact assessment is quite an effort involving both financial and human resources and requiring particular expertise, the question whether or not it makes sense for the CPS needs to be discussed. We have elaborated the following proposal. First, the CPS should stick to regularly assessing different outcome levels for both projects and programmes. Second, in selected CPS countries and for selected CPS activities, it makes sense to also undertake impact assessments. However, it does not make sense for single CPS projects to engage in such a complex exercise. We therefore suggest two models: the first would follow the Cambodian case and engage in a partnership with an external entity that conducts the impact assessment; the second would conduct such assessment mainly for the CPS and its partners (as well as related organisations that do similar work in a given country). In the second model, impact assessment would mean a CPS project that provides this service with the help of a local partner but also engages in a partnership with other organisations that will be interested in the results for their work. Such a project existed in Palestine. There, a number of donors have collaborated to fund regular (twice a year) public perception surveys. Questionnaires were jointly developed by the implementing agency, their partners in Palestine and

representatives from the involved donors. The project also involved training of partners to enhance their data collection skills. One of the partners was the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics. In this regard, the project also contributed to long-term institution-building. The results of the public perception reports were published twice a year and actively used by donors and the authorities to adjust their programmes to the needs of target groups. At the same time, they served to assess impact (see Palestine Perception Report: http://graduateinstitute.ch/palestine/ReportX.html).

We suggest that in the future all CPS programmes prepare for establishing preconditions for the assessment of impact and that impact assessment pilot projects be conducted in selected CPS countries. The preconditions for this endeavour are CPS country strategies that unite the combined activities of all CPS executing agencies and partners in a given country in a comprehensive and systematic way. This will enable the CPS executing agencies to establish baselines and selected indicators for the country programme level. With regards to the overall CPS planning and target setting, we suggest the CPS to adhere to the outcome levels where results are more realistically achievable given the CPS inputs and resources as well as the environment in which CPS activities are taking place.

3.4 Sustainability

Overall, the sustainability of CPS-funded activities has been on the lower end, as it is so far not systematically included in programming. Moreover, there is insufficient follow-up when projects close. However, we find a number of interesting approaches (explained below) that serve as models for the future. We also found procedures introduced by CPS experts still in place after the end of projects. Here are the results in detail:

Weak systematic inclusion of sustainability in programme and project planning: Even within the Cambodia programme, the most strategically planned among all evaluated CPS programmes, no systematic and institutionalised approach to achieving and increasing sustainability of interventions has so far been put in place by the DED. When funding ceases, NGOs move on to the next donor-driven project. Although current ECCC interventions offer a good chance for sustainability, there is no explicit post-ECCC strategy. What happens to psycho-social support of Khmer Rouge victims and Cambodia's memory culture once the ECCC's mandate ends and/or donor support ceases? Recently, the DED has made progress in including more aspects of sustainability into programming. It now involves more prominent multipliers among target groups and beneficiaries. Involvement of monks in an initiative on 'Buddhist healing' is a good start.

In other CPS programmes, we see even less of a focus on sustainability from the beginning of interventions. However, we find **encouraging exceptions**: in Palestine, partners are willing to continue local networks after the end of projects. In Colombia, CPS experts had exerted more management tasks in the beginning of their involvement. Successively, they have prepared partners for a smooth handing over. Nevertheless, a continuation of activities after the end of CPS projects is unclear. In Niger, GENOVICO as a network could be built and strengthened; in Burundi, a few of the local peace committees supported by MI-PAREC have started functioning independently of MI-PAREC in order to address the needs of beneficiaries. In Uganda, paralegals supported by the Diocese continue to work for beneficiaries without further support.

Management procedures: In most case studies, partner organisations continued working with procedures introduced by CPS experts. These were procedures such as planning tools, reporting formats or information on fundraising. In Uganda, a former EED partner organisation ceased to exist once the project had stopped. Nevertheless, former local staff of the organisation is using reporting formats and planning tools as introduced by the CPS expert in their new organisations.

Strengthening a multi-donor approach: The Serbian case offers an interesting model for strengthening the sustainability of partners with the help of multi-donor funding. With the support of the CPS, partners have become key civil society actors in their fields of operation. Due to these capacities, partners have managed to attract multiple donor funding. The Trauma Centre, for example, will soon benefit from the first governmentally-funded project in the area of trauma work ever.

Insufficient follow-up: A core challenge to sustainability within current CPS procedures is the principle that project support is linked to a presence of CPS experts. When a CPS expert leaves, the CPS project shuts down. However, the 2008 CPS Standards include a possibility of sending short-term experts and continue funding local experts for a transitional handing over period, even if no CPS expert is present. We assess this provision as a fundamental aspect to ensure sustainability. The CPS executing agencies do not apply this in practice: when a CPS expert leaves and is not to be replaced by another, the cooperation ends. This is a fundamental weakness in CPS programme implementation in its current form. Achievements made in building and supporting structures are at risk. For example, for Guatemala we conclude that capacity-building, training and knowledge management are elements that bring more sustainability to the processes. Yet this requires indispensable support during and beyond the end of CPS projects, which was not the case for completed projects. Also in Niger, when a former EIRENE project ended and the CPS expert left, handing over to local staff did not proceed well due to a lack of proper follow-up.

3.5 Coherence, complementarity and coordination

3.5.1 Coherence

Overall, the effectiveness of CPS programmes has not been influenced by other fields of policies, with the exception of the very special context of the Israel-Palestine conflict setting. Here the effectiveness of CPS programme activities could be influenced by other fields of policy.

Moreover, peace and development organisations in Germany, including those of the CPS, have expressed concerns that the new German government might introduce stronger policy incoherencies due to its way of linking development, peacebuilding and security (see the chapter 2 on ‘context’). Whether this will have an impact on the CPS remains unclear.

3.5.2 Complementarity

<u>Internal complementarity</u>

Overall, we found the following trends: when there is more than one CPS executing agency working in a country (Burundi, Colombia, Israel/Palestine, Niger, Serbia, and Uganda), the complementarity among the organisations and their programmes is weak. Moreover, in such

cases, the projects of one executing agency – even if they address identical themes – are usually also not part of a joint, systematic overall CPS country strategy. When we find programmes with one dominant CPS executing agency in a country (Cambodia, Guatemala), the projects tend to be much more complementary, the Cambodian one being on top of the list, followed by the one in Niger (even though there are two agencies).

The evaluation of the Burundi programme concluded that the CPS's internal complementarity is not the main reason for more effectiveness, but rather the complementarity between similar programmes in the country, i.e. the evaluators concluded that there is a need for the CPS to be complementary with other actors working on similar issues. The Cambodia programme, however, demonstrates that when all CPS projects are complementary with each other as well as with other actor's similar activities, the effectiveness of the programme is higher.

In conclusion, we found more evidence that underlines the need to strengthen internal complementarity. However, this only makes sense if activity lines work towards similar goals.

External complementarity with other German development actors

In five countries, CPS programmes address different themes compared to official German development cooperation (Burundi, Guatemala, Serbia, Uganda, and to a large extent Israel/Palestine). Overlapping occurs in other countries (Cambodia, Colombia, Niger, and partly also Israel/Palestine in the education sector). Nevertheless, complementarity varies considerably from case to case:

In CPS programmes in Cambodia and Guatemala, which are mainly implemented by DED, complementarity with other German programmes is good. This applies also to other countries where DED operates or where cooperation between the DED standard and the DED-CPS programmes has started (see also the interesting example from Uganda elaborated in the section on outcome 2). However, systematically planned joint activities like in the case of GTZ, DWHH, DED-CPS projects in Karamajong/Northern Uganda remain exceptions.

In Burundi and Colombia, we find complementary projects. However, in the latter case, CPS experts and their partners have little knowledge of other German actors' programmes in the country. This has slightly improved since the establishment of the human rights roundtable at the German Embassy in Bogotá. In Serbia and Israel/Palestine, there is no or little complementarity with any other German programme.

In conclusion, complementarity between the CPS and the offical German development cooperation makes sense when there are joint interests. Cooperation especially makes sense when the CPS and the offical German development cooperation work in the same sector or region, or when development work (as provided by DED and others) can be used by the CPS as an entry point for peacebuilding.

External complementarity with other actors

The more systematically a CPS programme is planned and implemented, the more complementarity with other external actors' programmes and projects is found: CPS programmes in Cambodia and Niger are very complementary in this regard. In the Guatemala and Burundi CPS programmes, we found good efforts but also room for improvement. In Burundi, DED only recently started its cooperation with the UN and others. In the Uganda and Serbia CPS programmes, external complementarity is fairly weak. In the

latter cases, the general environment of the international and national peace community is characterised by the same weakness.

Overall, the church-based CPS organisations show a good level of complementarity with other (German or international) church-based aid and peace organisations.

In conclusion, complementarity of CPS-funded activities and other actors' programmes enhances effectiveness when systematically planned and combined with networking.

3.5.3 Coordination

Overall, the coordination within CPS programmes and with other German actors has improved since the establishment of CPS coordinator posts (see also chapter 3.7). However, the degree of coordination differs tremendously from case to case:

In Uganda, there is a good level of information exchange, including formal mechanisms among CPS experts and involvement of their partners. In Colombia, no formal coordination is established. However, since the arrival of the AGEH coordinator and the start of a human rights roundtable at the German Embassy, information exchange has considerably improved. In Israel/Palestine and Niger, coordination is enhanced with more room for improvement; in Serbia and Guatemala, coordination is lower. In Cambodia, the current DED-CPS programme has strengthened coordination and cooperation among the partner organisations through joint workshops and other activities. However, the scope of cooperation among NGOs is limited by the fact that they all compete for donor funding, including CPS support.

3.6 Cross-cutting issues

3.6.1 Gender

Including gender dimensions into peacebuilding strategies is essential as both conflict and peace are highly gender-relevant activities: women and men play different social and political roles, have different access to political and economic power and suffer from different consequences of violence and war. Gender dimensions within peacebuilding help to focus on how war affects men and women differently, what roles they take up within war and peacebuilding and how the unequal access to decision-making in peace processes and peace negotiations is played out. Gender-based violence is also a common feature in all armed conflicts. UN Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security of 2000 affirms the importance of gender dimensions in both conflict and peacebuilding.

Within the CPS framework (*Rahmenkonzept*) 1999 there is no mentioning of gender. The CPS 2008 Standards do not particularly address gender dimensions.There is only a half-sentence saying that knowledge of gender-specific roles of women in peace processes should be part of the competencies of CPS experts.

Overall, only two country programmes place a strong emphasis on gender roles in peacebuilding and have systematically included gender issues in all projects. In Cambodia, systematic inclusion of gender as a cross-cutting issue is a main characteristic of all current projects funded under the CPS programme. Moreover, the gender dimension is explicitly and prominently addressed through specific gender projects, for example the project on Gender Based Violence (GBV) under the Khmer Rouge regime implemented by the DED partner

Cambodian Defenders Project (see chapter 3.2.4 on its effectiveness). In Guatemala, the DED-CPS programme also systematically includes the gender dimension into all projects. These efforts have already succeeded in changing attitudes of partners and have thus contributed to the inclusion of women's rights in programmes. In part, it is possible to attribute this change to DED's decision to recruit a gender expert, who assists all DED projects and partners (standard programme and CPS) in Guatemala.

In all other programmes, gender is not systematically included, although we find notable exceptions: in Niger, GENOVICO network; in Palestine, a project on 'Combating domestic violence' implemented by *The Trust of Programs*; a *Dar Al-Kalima* project concerned with elderly women who are widows and mothers; AGEH projects at Bethlehem University (i.e. theatre activities raising gender issues, introduction of a sexuality education class) or the WFD project with *Yes-Theatre*, where gender balance is an important criterion for the selection of participants. In Burundi, the family development centres supported by DED-CPS are working with gender indicators to assess to what extent gender is included into the work of the centres. In Uganda, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Diocese in Gulu ensures an equal representation of men and women in their training activities.

Looking into the gender composition of partner organisations we find the following picture: overall, the gender composition is mixed, however, leadership is overwhelmingly male dominated. This finding matches the overall trend in the peacebuilding field.

Looking into the sex of CPS experts we find that 60 per cent of all CPS experts are female. This is also not astonishing in international comparison, as the peace field tends to be male dominated on the higher diplomatic level and in leadership positions whereas lower paid positions tend to have a good mix with a higher number of female staff. There are no data available regarding the sex of CPS coordinators. In the case studies, we found that five out of eight CPS coordinators are male.

3.6.2 Conflict sensitivity

The principle of conflict sensitivity has been adopted by the OECD in 2001 and asserts that international assistance must, at a minimum, avoid negative effects on conflict – 'do no harm' – and, where possible, make a positive contribution to conflict prevention and peacebuilding (OECD-DAC 2001). Although the principle was originally developed for humanitarian aid it is also regularly applied to development and peacebuilding interventions. In development, conflict-sensitivity has become one of various cross-cutting themes, like gender or environment. Development interventions need to address these when they analyse the context as well as plan and implement programmes. In the peacebuilding field, it has taken years to come to an understanding that even efforts that intend to address conflict issues directly or prevent violence can also do harm by failing to account for the inadvertent effects of increasing conflict through the way they intervene. The OECD DAC Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Working draft, 2008) notes: 'In other words, just because they are "conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts", does not mean they are exempt from being *conflict-sensitive*.' For the CPS, conflict sensitivity refers to how CPS experts and partners have incorporated the conflict-ridden context into their work to ensure that existing conflicts are not exacerbated by their interventions. Precondition for such a working principle is a good understanding of the conflict situation that translates into adequate planning, implementation as well as monitoring of relevant conflict issues and a

regular adaptation of activities to the context as needed. The 2008 CPS Standards confirm this understanding.

In general, CPS programme activities are based on a good analysis of the context and both, partners and CPS experts, are well aware of their working environment. Overall, the analysis of the general context is translated into programming, although with strong variations. In Colombia, there is a good analysis of the local context, but national and regional elements are missing. Moreover, dynamics of illegal drug trade – which is a core factor influencing the conflict – are not sufficiently addressed. The Burundi CPS programme provides a good context analysis that is properly integrated into programming and no obvious aggravation of conflicts through projects could be identified. However, in Burundi there is a risk that CPS-supported projects do not sufficiently address the causes of conflict as they are focusing mainly on current conflicts. The same is true in the Israel/Palestine programme that also provides a good conflict analysis, but focuses solely on the symptoms of conflict.

There are moreover CPS programmes that have introduced methods to assess the level of conflict sensitivity in the projects, like a 'Do no harm' analysis or a 'Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA)' . However, no systematic planning for adaptations of the programmes and projects to changing conflict situations take place.

3.7 Efficiency, procedures, organisational structures

3.7.1 Efficiency of the CPS instrument

3.7.1.1 Total expenditure of the CPS

The total expenditure on CPS projects from 1999 to 2009 (eleven years) amounted to **144 million euros of authorised appropriations** or roughly **132 million euros of verified expenses**. Those appropriations enabled the overall deployment of 583 CPS experts in 50 countries until the end of 2009.[20] While there have only been 174 deployed persons in the first five years, this figure has almost quadrupled to 409 persons between 2004 and 2009. The difference between authorised and disbursed funds is primarily related to the first five years of the CPS (1999 to 2004), as the efficiency of the disbursements had not been optimal during those years. As apparent from table 2 in annex 1 (volume 2), the situation has substantially improved in the past six years, where 95 per cent of the authorised appropriations have been disbursed. This represents an excellent record.

Since the benefit of the CPS projects is not quantifiable in general terms, this evaluation cannot issue a cost-benefit analysis at the level of the CPS objectives. The expenses do not concern outputs or outcomes, but actors and activities and their related costs. As per the CPS budget (see table 1 in annex 1, volume 2 of this report) those costs mainly contain the personnel costs of CPS experts, the costs of local partners, investments and material expenses as well as all administrative costs. However, an analytical distribution of single elements of expenditure to specific results and objectives is not possible.

[20] See: BMZ division for peace and security, Factsheet Civil Peace Service (*Sachstand Ziviler Friedensdienst*), 06.01.2010.

During the past six years, the average **total expenditure** on CPS projects has been 16.7 million euros per year[21]. To provide a better overview, our analysis divides expenses into the following three items:

a) **Labour costs** for CPS experts (corresponding to item 2 of the standardised budget plan, see table 1 in annex 1, volume 2 of this report),

b) **Project implementation costs** (investments, material expenses, personnel costs of local partners, and grants). This corresponds to item 3 of the budget plan, and

c) All costs, which we define as **administrative costs** of the CPS: recruitment costs (item 1 of the budget), support costs (item 4 of the budget), the fixed rate for overhead costs at the CPS organisation, and the fixed rate for overhead costs for the secretariat (all explained in detail in table 5 in annex 1, volume 2). The administrative costs hence cover all expenses that cannot be attributed to a specific activity, such as general preparation, planning, implementation, support, monitoring, secretariat and accounting costs.[22]

According to table 3 of annex 1 (volume 2), those expenses contain:

- **Labour costs for the CPS experts** (item 2 of the budget). Between 2004 and 2009 they accounted for an average of **44 per cent** of the annual budget. During the past six years, 68 CPS experts per year have been in action. The costs per expert thus amount to about 107,500 Euro per year. This mainly entails salaries and travel expenses. The costs for rent, which are covered by the project implementation costs (item 3 of the budget) and further training expenses issued under support costs (item 4), are part of the personnel costs.
- **The project implementation costs** contain investments, current material expenses as well as labour costs of the local partner and appropriations/grants to domestic partners. They account for more than **44 per cent** of the annual budget. Table 4 in annex 1 (volume 2) indicates that effectively half of the project implementation costs (24 percent of the total expenditure per year) are apportioned to expenses of local partners. **The expenses for human resource allocation and partner support**, consisting of the personnel costs of the CPS experts (44 per cent of the total expenditure) as well as the personnel costs of local partners and appropriations/grants to domestic partners, amount to roughly **68 per cent** of the CPS expenses.
- The remaining expenditures of about **12 per cent** are considered as **administrative costs**.

3.7.1.2 Adequacy of administrative costs

The aggregated administrative costs accounted on average for 11.6 per cent of the overall ascertained expenses over the past six years (table 3, annex 1 in volume 2). Since this item comprises virtually all administrative costs, the evaluation considers **this amount to be**

[21] See table 3 in annex 1, volume 2: Consitution of costs – Basis of calculation: actual numbers 2004-2009 (six years).

[22] Corresponding with the definition of the German Central Institute for Social Issues (Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen), see http://dzi.de/downloads/Was-kommt-von-der-Spende-an_DZI-Spenden-Tipps.pdf. [Last accessed April 2011]

adequate. The comparison with international figures reveals that administrative costs usually amount to 10 or 15 percent. Those numbers are nevertheless based on indications only, since the provision of accurate data is impossible in practice. A study published by the European Commission in 2009 confirms:

> 'None of the European donors and their agencies – nor their development partners – seems to have developed management information systems able to provide evidence data on the costs and benefits of using different aid/development cooperation modalities. Even basic cost data, such as costs of offices and use of staff time are difficult to obtain (...) Administrative cost information (...) is only reported in aggregate, global terms and definitions of such costs vary significantly between donors'. [23]

Given that every organisation has its own mode of calculation, the definition of 'administrative costs' varies greatly, especially when it comes to labour costs in the administration. These could either form part of the direct costs, which are bound to a specific project, or only form part of indirect costs, which relate to one intervention or programme.

The study cited above points out that the data concerning the level of administrative costs can vary greatly. In Belgium, for instance, administrative costs of between four and 25 percent are being quoted, depending on the mode of calculation. The fixed rate for administrative costs at the GTZ is 12 percent, which does not yet include the three percent the BMZ quotes to the OECD-DAC as administrative costs. During the 1970s the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated 16 percent of administrative costs, whereas nowadays five or six percent are quoted by the organisation. According to the EU study, many cost items that have formerly been declared as administrative costs, are today indicated as project expenses. Hence, there is no common appreciation of administrative costs.[24]

3.7.1.3 Cost-efficiency of alternatives

The deployment of personnel is in any case essential for the objectives of the CPS. However, it is called into question whether this deployment should primarily be covered by CPS experts (within the framework of the EHG) or more and more by local experts or staff from local partners. In some cases the latter is already being put into practice, even though no data are available on the number of local experts and their financial proportion compared to other positions in item 3.1 (table 4, annex 1, volume 2 (personnel from local partners)). This item also includes other expenses, such as local auxiliary staff, drivers, translators, etc. The indications in item 3.4 (appropriations and grants to domestic partners) concerning the number of local experts working for local partner organisations (fully or partially supported by CPS appropriations) do not permit an assessment either. Also in this case, labour costs are combined with other expenses, such as, for example, training, publications, consultants etc. The salaries for local experts are the main expenses of items 3.1 and 3.4 and amount to an average of 24 percent of the total expenses (table 4, annex 1, volume 2). This means that

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[23] Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach, EC/HTSPE, Project no 2008/170204, 2009, see http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf, page v. [Last accessed April 2011]

[24] Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach, EC/HTSPE, Project no 2008/170204, 2009, see http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf, page 10. [Last accessed April 2011]

roughly one quarter of the overall costs are at present being disbursed for local experts and staff of partner organisations. This raises the question whether local experts would be able to independently implement CPS activities – meaning without the support of CPS experts. This question is addressed in other chapters (chapter 3.1.5 and 3.7.2.4) while this chapter essentially deals with the issue of costs.

Different country case studies provide concrete indications on this issue. None of the case studies has proposed the complete abandonment of CPS experts. The inclusion of local expertise, however, has been strongly suggested (e.g. in Burundi, Cambodia, Guatemala, Uganda and Serbia). Furthermore, the clarification of the role and the working conditions of local experts has been encouraged.

An enhanced use of local experts (local consultants as well as personnel from local partners) could lower the costs for the deployment of CPS experts. This general statement has to be examined in every individual case. The use of external support (CPS experts and consultants) should depend on the level of competence of the local experts and the degree of autonomy of local partner organisations. This could result in additional costs, so that the overall costs may not substantially decrease. Besides, increasing salaries of local experts[25] is an aspect which should also be considered.

In sum, we cannot propose an alternative that essentially involves fewer costs. As a result, the enhanced use of local experts is not primarily debated because of financial considerations, but rather in view of the role of sustainability and ownership of peace-promoting activities in civil society.

3.7.1.4 Principle of subsidiarity

In order to evaluate whether the principle of subisidiarity has been respected, the institutional analysis of partner organisations is missing. This should have been undertaken during the identification of the CPS projects. In none of the eight case study countries, neither a systematic analysis of the partner organisations and their respective strengths and weaknesses, nor an analysis of the local consultant market for potential CPS experts (people who were already trained and experienced, but also potential candidates from the respective countries) had been undertaken. Corresponding references concerning this question are missing in the operational monitoring and CPS project documents.

Due to the very restricted access to information on local capacities (at the human resource and organisational levels), the actual implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in particular projects can barely be assessed. With regard to the results of the country case studies concerning the undefined role of local experts in many places,[26] the evaluation concludes that the principle of subsidiarity has definitely not been respected in all cases. Since the deployment of CPS experts still constitutes the major activity[27] of the CPS projects, the question of local capacities has rather been neglected in practice. **While the support for partner organisations reflects the principle of local capacity development, specific**

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[25] This has been explicitly mentioned in the country case study Palestine/Israel.

[26] See notably in the country case studies Burundi, Guatemala, Serbia and Colombia.

[27] See benchmark paper for the evaluation of the CPS (*Eckpunktepapier für die Evaluierung des ZFD*), CPS group, June 2008.

activities for its implementation are missing.[28] The recommendations listed in chapter 5 are aiming at taking this matter more into account in the future.

3.7.2 Procedures and organisation of the CPS

3.7.2.1 Degree of implementation of the recommendations from the 2002 CPS evaluation

As apparent in the table in annex 3 in volume 2, several important recommendations from the 2002 evaluation have been implemented (see also next section 3.7.2.2). Others did not receive any or not enough attention (see hereto the following subchapters). We have indicated our explicit support for several recommendations from the former study. This concerns notably the recommendations I/6 (promotion of local experts and local NGO), I/7 (possibility for the deployment of short-term experts), II/1 (a comprehensive preparation in the pre-phase of a project), and VII/1 (reinforcement of the participation of partner organisations/partners' experts on the ground, and this already during the conception stage). Progress has been achieved regarding the support and further training of CPS experts (IV). In light of ascertained weaknesses, especially concerning planning, monitoring and evaluation, the preparation of the CPS project management should be improved (see hereto propositions in chapter 3.2.3 and 5.).

3.7.2.2 Administrative procedures and their implications for the CPS's self-conception

Other important recommendations from the 2002 evaluation concerning the administration have been implemented as far as possible. This concerns particularly the introduction of a general authorisation process (*Rahmenbewilligungsverfahren*) of four years (recommendation I/1), the extension of project durations (recommendation II/2) and the elaboration of a renewed analysis if the timeframe between the application and CPS experts' contract formulation exceeds 12 months (recommendation II/3).

Nevertheless, solutions have to be found urgently for the following administrative problems/procedures, since they partly concern the self-conception of the CPS:

- All country reports underline that the period between the decision for deployment and the effective start of the deployment of the CPS expert remains way too long. Currently, the process might be delayed for up to two years. Surely, one reason for this is that project applications may only be filed once a year. The procedure used so far does not allow for shortening the deadlines: The elaboration of applications takes from six to eight months; further six or eight months might pass before the BMZ approves the application; the tendering, recruitment and preparation of the departure again require six to eight months.
- The country case studies furthermore criticise that far too many documents are not available in the local languages, but only in German. This impedes a transparent relationship with partner organisations.

[28] See this passage in the CPS standard from 2008: 'The CPS essentially cooperates with local partner organisations in projects to identify peace potentials in civil society and consolidate local forces for non-violent conflict management.'

- In addition, the reports point out that the notion of reinforced coordination is more appreciated where a coordination office already exists on the ground. The country case studies criticise that coordination at this stage is often limited to administration and representation. The weak coordination of CPS projects is particularly reflected in the low level of harmonisation among the CPS executing agencies in the respective countries. Thereby the CPS seems principally like a financing opportunity for the executing agencies, permitting the implementation of projects that were already planned in the relevant countries. The concept of a 'CPS as a collective endeavour' of civil society executing agencies in the field of peace promotion seems of relevance only for the German public, without having the same importance in the field. Chapter 5 names recommendations for a 'CPS compatible' country strategy that reinforces the principle of coordination and that could ameliorate the effectiveness and efficiency of CPS projects.
- In the framework of the CPS agencies' common work, the concept of the CPS as a collective or joint endeavour – understood as the interaction between governmental and civil society actors which permits interventions at several levels – has evolved. By now, the CPS already has common standards at its disposal. Further cooperation concerning the training for CPS experts is aspired. Moreover, there are common public relations. The topic of joint impact assessment has also been discussed within the CPS group, but has not resulted in many activities across executing agencies. **Two major problems are** presently connected with the principle of the CPS being a joint endeavour. On the one hand, even after ten years of existence, the CPS stakeholders do not share a common basic understanding about the content of such a 'joint endeavour'. The executing agencies perceive their joint endeavour as a network between different institutions that receive funding from the BMZ and agree upon common principles for the implementation of their mandate and their funds. The BMZ, by contrast, perceives the CPS as an instrument of German development policy, the profile of which exceeds the scope of common principles. On the other hand, the implementation of the joint endeavour in the countries themselves remains unclear, which results in discrepancy between the postulate of a 'joint endeavour' and the reality of its implementation. Different projects are being realised by different executing agencies at different levels without being concerted and based on a common (by active executing agencies in the countries, partner organisations from civil society, governmental institutions which share CPS objectives, etc.) co-authored strategy, rather than being grounded on the decisions of single executing agencies. Coordination efforts in the particular countries, with the exception of Israel/Palestine, mainly concern representation questions rather than questions of content. The cooperation among executing agencies has only been enhanced in a few countries (for example, *forum*ZFD and DED in Lebanon handed in a joint request that was approved). This approach bears the risk of a continued isolated implementation of CPS projects, a missed opportunity of synergies and hence reduced efficiency and effectiveness of CPS projects. A common basic understanding of the situations of peace and conflict and the objectives of the CPS projects is missing. These objectives are currently determined by the individual executing agency upon consultations with partner organisations, but not with other CPS executing agencies. Clarity about the specific allocation of responsibilities between different actors and the position of the partner organisations in the administrative process is often lacking. Precise organisational charts and information on the allocation of tasks and on procedures (who is doing what?) are missing in project documents. The format for funding requests for single interventions

(*Antragsschema für Einzelanträge*) contains specific requirements under item 5 and 6 (description of project executing agencies and tasks); however, an analysis of the situation of partner organisations (strengths and weaknesses) and their role in the project (see handout on the format for requests for funding of CPS interventions (*Handreichung zum Gliederungsschema für Anträge des ZFD)*, updated version from 22 July 2009) is missing.

- Even though the reinforcement of partner organisations remains a central objective of the CPS and certain requirements regarding the profile of local partners (see CPS 2008 standards) do exist, these aspects are not systematically addressed in CPS project documents. Hence no specific statement about the question of the substitution of locally available staff can be given. The recommendations in chapter 5 entail suggestions as to how to give more attention to these institutional questions in CPS project documents.
- With the exception of financial information (see next paragraph), there are information deficits concerning different administrative aspects. Comprehensive project lists with executing agencies, countries, project titles, and date of authorisation, financial contributions and the number of deployed CPS experts do exist, but summarizing overviews containing the number of CPS experts deployed per year and country or type of action are missing. An overview of the number of CPS experts per country and year, including the duration of their deployment, is also not available. The BMZ division for peace and security is currently introducing a new database, which should substantially contribute to an amelioration of the data and knowledge management of the CPS in future.
- An overview of all partner organisations working with the CPS is also lacking. This problem occurs both at the central level (BMZ) and in individual countries.

3.7.2.3 Financial administration

Important recommendations from the evaluation in 2002 have been implemented in the CPS's financial administration. For example, the flexibility has been improved through the introduction of virement (*Deckungsfähigkeit)*, i.e. the agreed transfer of money from one budget line – income or expenditure – to another, within a financial year (recommendation I/2). Also, the disbursement deadlines for appropriations have been prolonged (recommendation I/3) and the transferability of funds (while considering the 20 per cent clause of the German Federal Budget Code (*Bundeshaushaltsordung),* which stipulates that CPS agencies can assign up to 20 percent of the project cost to other activities or groups of cost without submitting a justifying funding request)to other projects of the executing agency has been approved (recommendation I/5). On the other hand, the recommendation I/4 concerning the omission of the attachment of the calculation of project costs to annual budgets has not been implemented, since the attachment to the annual budget further subsists. The possibility to place the non-exhausted funds of one executing agency at the disposal of the projects of other executing agencies does exist. However, the expenses have to be incurred in the course of the same year. This restriction rather limits the established flexibility.

The CPS secretariat and the BMZ division for peace and security issued a clear overview of the contributions (debits and actual numbers) of approved projects, structured by executing agencies and countries. Thus we do not see any problems for the financial overall monitoring.

There are however some questions to be clarified regarding some administrative aspects in the countries:

- It has been criticised that the partner organisations have not been included more extensively in the administration of financial appropriations. In Serbia, for example, the funds are administered by CPS experts. By contrast, the handover of the financial administration to the partner organisation has been appreciated where implemented, the case of the WFD in Burundi being one example.
- It is not apparent to all stakeholders, that the principle of 'preliminary budget management' (cautious expenditure policy until the government got its annual budget approved) has to be respected only in the case of new projects and project phase extensions. The principle does not apply for approved multiannual project budgets.
- The low salaries for local staff in some countries (e.g. Cambodia and Uganda) have been questioned. Apparently, there do not exist any clear guidelines concerning this question.
- An important point, which concerns the revision of the local accounting system, has been raised in Uganda. As per the BMZ guidelines on the approval of CPS projects (which are based on the German Federal Budget Code (*Bundeshaushaltsordnung*), local auditors might be used if local partner organisations manage CPS funds (see article 9 in the draft contract for the redirection of appropriations). This is done to a great extent. Problems might arise if local auditors request for original vouchers which as per BMZ guidelines are supposed to remain in the accounting department of the partner organisation. In this case a provision applies which is probably not known by all parties involved. The responsible division for peace and security at the BMZ points out that after their submission, the original vouchers might be copied, tagged with a stamp and filed. This ensures that expenditures cannot be billed again, even elsewhere. The original vouchers might be returned to the partner organisation after the elaboration of the auditor's attestation.

3.7.2.4 Deployment of CPS experts and other personnel

As mentioned under 3.7.1.3, the central role for the CPS of the deployment of personnel through CPS experts from the North has to be discussed.[29] This is necessary not only because of changes in the institutional context but also because of considerations regarding the sustainability and ownership of civil society peace activities.

All country case studies have underlined that the deployment of local staff and other types of human resources deserves more attention. The deployment of CPS experts would admittedly remain an essential activity. At the same time, the deployment of local staff, the cooperation with temporary consultants as well as the deployment of local personnel from partner organisations (see chapter 3.1.4 and 5) could constitute an option. The intention is not to highlight what should have been done in individual cases, but to offer a concept and an approach for the future. The deployment of CPS experts is often not oriented towards the benefit of the partners. As a result, the objective of the deployment often remains vague, which in practice might lead to conflicts in the roles of the various actors. The possible division of tasks between different actors depends on the respective situation. CPS experts'

[29] This has also been pointed out in the different CPS documents and the first paragraph of the benchmark paper of the CPS Group, June 2001.

possible roles are diverse: know-how transfer, provision of consulting services, support during project implementation, etc.

The way how objectives should be accomplished is not systematically analysed during the identification phase of CPS projects, since the deployment of CPS experts is predetermined from the beginning. The same conclusion can be drawn from single project documents: neither the institutional context of the project nor particular roles and tasks of partners involved have been analysed. There is also no strategy for the transfer of responsibility from CPS experts to local staff. Chapter 5 presents suggestions to this end.

3.7.2.5 Planning, management and coordination (including reporting and knowledge management)

Planning and, in a broader sense, management methods are treated at two levels: the central, strategic level and the operational project level.

At the central level a distinction is made between the major CPS actors. The following overview provides a short assessment of these actors:

Actors	Assessment of planning, management and coordination processes
Secretariat	The role of the secretariat (registration of funding requests, plausibility assessment and the issuing of lists, handling of petitions and transfer to BMZ division for peace and security, etc.) is perceived as efficient in the framework of existing resources. Nevertheless, the duration between the receipt of funding requests (30 September) and the transmission of the consolidated list of requests to the BMZ requires too much time. One of our recommendations (see Chapter 5) thus targets a temporal enforcement of the secretariat in order to shorten this period. Yet another question concerns the geographic location of the secretariat in immediate proximity to the DED. According to the BMZ, 'the administrative execution of the CPS programme… [*is handled*] by the CPS secretariat at the DED, which transfers the provided appropriations of the CPS to the other concerned executing agencies.' (Factsheet CPS, 6.1.2010) Not all executing agencies share this position. Even though the question has recently been raised in a less urgent manner, it has to be addressed.
Executing agencies	Every executing agency is responsible for its CPS planning and operative work in the respective countries. The executing agencies are informally interconnected at the central level. Cooperation takes place during qualification, departure preparations and an experience exchange. There are no formal arrangements among the executing agencies concerning the orientation of the CPS in terms of content. All in all, the common strategic orientation of the CPS work does not gain much attention. [30] The CPS group represents the executing agencies vis-à-vis the BMZ and organises public relations. It formulated standards which define the general orientation and the principles of the CPS.

[30] The 2008 Standards only state: 'The involved organisations are verifying on a regular basis on how country or regional specific strategy development and an approach based on the division of tasks could contribute to an amelioration of their work.'.

Actors	Assessment of planning, management and coordination processes
BMZ division for peace and security	The BMZ division for peace and security has a key role within the CPS since it represents the BMZ, whose decisive role is described in the CPS concept from 1999 in the following terms: 'The BMZ decides in accordance with the German Federal Foreign Office on the basis of a regular reconcilement with all involved executing agencies about the overall programme and the interventions of the CPS'. [31] As previously mentioned, we regard the planning and management mechanisms for the administrative and financial aspects as relatively developed and efficient. With regard to the content-related level, we perceive them as insufficient. The BMZ division for peace and security does not possess the capacity to review the overall programme content-wise in terms of coherence, coordination with other BMZ activities, and criteria of development policy. Guidelines on this point are also missing. The plausibility assessment of the secretariat must be followed by an examination of all dossiers by the BMZ division for peace and security (which should demand for consultations) in order to make decisions in time. Yet the amount of filed projects exceeds the capacities of the unit. The same problem applies to monitoring. It is virtually impossible for the division to offer a qualitatively satisfactory monitoring of all projects. Even though an evaluation based on source and disposition statements (*Verwendungsnachweise*) as well the reports of the executing agencies does take place after the completion of an authorisation phase, no in-depth analysis can occur. This only happens through random sampling. Short-term consultancy mandates could fill this gap.
BMZ country divisions	We have observed that the country divisions are not sufficiently used in the planning and monitoring phase. This is apparently due to the fact that it is not clear enough how the reconcilement of the CPS project with the other activities of the BMZ in the country should take place. The BMZ country divisions should in principle be perceived as 'advisors' of the BMZ division for peace and security, which is responsible for the overall management of CPS projects. According to the evaluation, the potential of the country divisions is not sufficiently exploited.
German Federal Foreign Office	The position of the AA primarily concentrates on the 'political compatibility' of the projects. It is responsible for the highly important security assessment (*Unbedenklichkeitsprüfung*) with regard to foreign affairs. Even though the AA does not comment on aspects related to content, finance and administration, it clearly possesses a veto power.

After going through interviews with all involved actors and the reading of the relevant documentation, we deem the planning, management and coordination procedures at the central level to be insufficient.

[31] See page 3 of the document: 123 – T 8341 – 20/93, Bonn, den 09.06.1999, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, Ziviler Friedensdienst – Ein neues Element der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.

We now address the second, operational level that concerns the projects:

The country case studies reveal that in virtually all cases (with the exception of Cambodia) the planning and monitoring procedures are insufficient. This is one of the main reasons for the insufficiently quantified impacts of the CPS projects (chapter 3).

The planning and monitoring cycle of CPS projects has to be based on a specific initial situation. The country case studies indicate that this initial situation is not adequately defined and recorded. 'Baseline studies' are broadly missing. This concerns different aspects:

While the **analysis of the peace and conflict situation** is accurate in all cases, it is nevertheless limited to the general situation in the country. The specific initial situation within which the CPS project is supposed to intervene is insufficiently analysed. Yet, a description of the specific field of application (niche) as well as the formulation of the impacts to be achieved with the CPS project require a precise analysis of the initial situation.

The **specific situation of the target population** is not subject to an analysis. This inventory is, nevertheless, equally a condition for the elaboration of results chains and their monitoring.

The systematic and precise **analysis of actors** is missing. The situation of the partner organisation and the existing competences of the staff within and outside the organisations are not captured. As mentioned before, the institutional initial analysis for the sustainability and the transferral of responsibility to local partners is of fundamental importance.

Besides, there exist formal problems with the funding requests. Even though a handout for the structure schemes of CPS funding requests (*Handreichung zum Gliederungsschema für Anträge des ZFD)* is available[32], the formulation of the projects requests substantially varies from case to case. Precision and a coherent terminology are absent. The length of the documents also varies considerably. While general and secondary objectives and activities/measures are mentioned in the main text of a request, the terms 'input', 'output', 'outcome' and 'impact' are used in the annex of the very same document. Sometimes indicators are used, sometimes not. This results in insufficient definitions of the hierarchy of objectives and the results chains. The results-linked approach is not sufficiently accentuated. Considerable need for clarification concerns the partner organisations and local competences. Finally, an accurate description of the organisation and the project is often missing.

It remains to conclude that even in light of its deficiencies, the handout it is not respected enough.

The current format of project funding requests (version of 22 July 2009) delivers important indications for the content and length of single paragraphs. The handout is complete with regard to project description, problem analysis, the analysis of specific initial situations, analysis of actors, the integration of the project in development and peace policies and synergies, etc. However, the handout remains too vague concerning the project objectives (project objective/general and secondary objective) and the results chains. Who is responsible for the achievement of which objective (CPS experts, other instances) has not been explicitly determined. The frequently used term of 'joint endeavour' in the completed

[32] See the updated version of 22 July 2009.

documents does not permit the analysis of ownership processes and the promotion of autonomy of the partner organisation.

Those deficiencies at the planning level are hampering the monitoring and the reporting at the project level. Regardless of the general weak classification of the reporting, we could draw from the country case studies that[33]

- frequently no reference to the project documents and results chains (if existent) is made in the reporting;
- monitoring is limited to reporting about activities and outputs and no systematic distinction between the different levels and actors is made;
- the development at the outcome level is not being systematically analysed, nor is the periodic analysis of the development of the peace and security context of the country. In the absence of a specific initial analysis, no monitoring of the specific context of the CPS project intervention exists;
- the analyses delivered were approximate and superficial;
- uncertainty about the responsibilities for monitoring and reporting and the allocation of work between CPS experts and partner organisations persists;
- the reports are mainly written in German, which hampers the communication with domestic instances and harmonisation efforts with other international partners;
- distinct instructions and guidelines for the implementation of the monitoring are lacking.

This critical assessment of monitoring and reporting has different causes:

In general, the projects have a large-scale conception, pursue many objectives and are relatively ambitious. The lack of precision of outputs and outcomes complicates an adequate illustration of the achieved results.

Guidelines and instructions on how to conduct planning, monitoring and evaluation and who is responsible for them are missing. This raises the question for the partner organisations whether a certain deficit concerning the preparation of the CPS expert persists.

We assume that organisational causes (vague formulations in contracts, certain CPS experts perceive management tasks as a burden and time-consuming!) are probably more responsible for this negligence then actual competence problems. In the light of the qualification profile of the CPS experts, there is no reason why this extremely important task is not accomplished.

The country case studies only mention a few examples of lessons learned. Those solely concern workshops about certain topics (in Uganda and Cambodia). This is not supposed to mean that there is no knowledge management taking place in the CPS. It simply shows that ‘lessons learned’ activities have not really been included in the project work. Without the intention to be exhaustive, the following documents can serve as positive examples:

[33] The statements made herein apply to virtually all country case studies. The monitoring system in Cambodia has been improved in the past years.

- Impact orientation and priority setting in the CPS/A contribution to the discussion on the subject of ‘CPS country lists’ and ‘policy paper’. From Günter Schönegg, 8.4.2008.
- AGEH documentation of the international conference from the personnel service of development cooperation/ ”Mehr-Wert Mensch – Fachkräfte zeigen Wirkung”/ methods and instruments of impact coverage in human resource development cooperation, Lindau, Lake Constance, 02.-03. April 2008
- 2002-2008/ Documentation, Results, Perspectives/ the CPS as an instrument of crisis prevention in Niger. From Günter Schönegg, FriEnt, with support from Salifou Noufou, GENOVICO-network Niger/CPS-EIRENE-DED, 2008
- Islamic arguments for the promotion of peace and peaceful conflict managements, document of GENOVICO (Eirene/Karkara/CPS, Niamey, December, 2007).

The question of the **participation of local actors of civil society**, especially from partner organisations, in the conceptualisation and management of CPS projects seems debatable. It also concerns the recommendation of the 2002 evaluation (paragraph VII.1 in annex 3) regarding ownership (reinforcement of the participation of partner organisations/CPS experts on the ground as early as during the conception phase).

The question has to be differentiated in project cycle phases. In general, local civil society actors are actively participating in the execution of the CPS projects (elaboration of annual planning, workshops, etc.) during the implementation phase (local partner organisations). Nevertheless, some partner organisations (e.g. Cambodia) have complained that they are not included in the process of the selection of the CPS expert. It could not be continuously analysed to what extend and intensity the local partner organisations are consulting civil society target groups. All country case studies reveal that the local CPS partner organisations in all countries pursue a participative approach.

Participation in the identification phase is equally weak. It is not apparent from the documents and the country reports whether project requests (which should be considered as a result of the identification phase) have truly been elaborated with local partners. The executing agencies have clearly cooperated directly and indirectly and exchanged ideas with local partners during the preparation phase. However, the project requests have not been written collectively.

We hence come to the conclusion that the ownership principle has only been implemented in a rudimentary manner.

4. Conclusions

Overall, we come to the conclusion that the CPS as an instrument is worth proceeding as a number of strengths make it different from other civil society peacebuilding instruments and demonstrate its achievements and future potential. However, the CPS has to be substantially strengthened in profile and operations to become a more significant actor within the framework of Germany’s peacebuilding policies and strategies.

The focus of the CPS on civil society peacebuilding with an understanding of strengthening primarily the dialogue and reconciliation capacities of civil society actors in conflict societies fits particularly well into the toolbox of Germany’s development and foreign policy. Given the

historical experience of Germany after World War II in promoting reconciliation with its former enemies through socialising people with peace values and dialogue, Germany is internationally well suited to promote civilian peacebuilding and reconciliation from different angles and with multiple instruments and approaches. Approaching such an undertaking with a joint endeavour of civil society and governmental organisations represented within the CPS is a suitable outlet and complements other German instruments and tools.

For the CPS to play a more significant role within the framework of Germany's peacebuilding policies and to make more use of its potential for peacebuilding, it needs to be further strengthened in profile as well as in operations. Changes can mostly be carried out within the context of the CPS's current framework, but require substantial improvements in the existing practice of implementation by both the CPS executing agencies and the management division within the BMZ. This also implies continuing to develop its strengths and addressing much more systematically the CPS's weaknesses in a systematic and strategic manner.

Core strengths of the CPS

The CPS focuses on civil society peacebuilding with a particular emphasis on the local context. This positively distinguishes it from other instruments that have primarily worked with established urban elite-based non-governmental organisations over the last decade. The diversity of the executing agencies operating within the CPS, which is characterised by various entry points, partners and intervention approaches, has helped over the years to make the voices of people heard in their constituencies and in a few cases, even beyond the local reach.

The CPS is primarily an instrument for the deployment of experts. The core strength of sending experts to conflict countries is their outsider perspective to the conflict. Over the last decade, CPS experts have strengthened the peacebuilding potential of CPS partners. Without the CPS, established partners would still exist and work for peacebuilding but the quality of work, particularly when it comes to facilitation, dialogue and networking, would be reduced. Smaller partners and networks would not even exist without the CPS, as its interventions have contributed significantly to making these actors relevant players in their fields of operations. Moreover, CPS experts have also contributed to making partners' peacebuilding work possible by raising or providing funds or, in a few cases, by ensuring protection of partners in order for them to continue their work.

CPS projects have achieved a number of positive changes, mostly for peacebuilding on the local level. They have contributed to the prevention and mitigation of small local and family conflicts, mostly in the immediate environment of partner organisations. As mentioned above, this is a positive distinction to other programmes. However, much more could be achieved for local people when the reach of programmes is enlarged to a broader level of intervention both locally as well as nationally, as exemplified in a number of good practices within the CPS: the programmes in Burundi and Niger (which have only started recently in their current form) also offer potential for a wider contribution at the local level, if activities continue to build local structures and enhance their reach. The programme in Israel/Palestine has built in a variety of approaches to enhance its local reach. In Uganda, one CPS project has also contributed substantially to reducing and preventing violence between two formerly conflicting groups. **The current programme in Cambodia, as a whole, stands out as a good practice model for effective CPS work.** It has given a significant contribution to the strengthening of societal mechanisms of dealing with the Khmer Rouge past as well as

contributions to the immediate work and mission of the Tribunal. It is also a good example of a multi-track and actor approach that combines a people-centred approach linking the local and national levels. It is moreover based on solid strategic planning and monitoring in a complementary way with other actors.

When looking at the overall effectiveness of activities supported under the CPS, most projects assessed could not be simply evaluated as being 'effective' or 'not effective', because partners conduct a variety of activities with different levels of effectiveness (even within a single activity). Hence, effectiveness depends mostly on the way projects are designed and implemented and how they incorporate contextual factors. Effective activities managed to reach more beneficiaries, expanded their reach beyond the local context, focused on key change actors in the conflict and conducted non-violence approaches in a way that allowed for systematically addressing relevant issues for beneficiaries. The overall likelihood that projects are effective is higher for social cohesion projects, facilitation and protection activities.

Over the years, the CPS has also made progress in its overall development: The first CPS country programmes started in early 2000 and implemented a variety of approaches with different partners mostly spread out in many geographical areas in a country, addressing different peacebuilding themes. The current CPS programmes are much more focused both in activity lines, themes and geographical concentration. Moreover, the CPS Group has jointly developed and updated Standards for the CPS in 2004 and 2008 that provide guidance for operations in the field. Efforts have also been made to realise joint training for CPS experts and the CPS Group conducts a joint public awareness campaign in Germany. Moreover, the introduction of CPS coordinators in the field is a positive move that already demonstrates results in enhanced cooperation among CPS executing agencies and improved representation of the CPS at country level.

Another strong point is the CPS's solid financial administration with a 95 per cent spending ratio of all funds committed. This is a notable achievement.

The above mentioned strengths demonstrate the CPS's experiences, achievements as well as its rich potential. It is therefore crucial that the CPS builds on these good practices and starts addressing its main weaknesses in a much more strategic manner.

CPS's core weaknesses

The CPS's **profile** after ten years of existence is still insufficiently clarified. Essential questions remain between the CPS Group and the BMZ as to whether the CPS is a network, an institution, an instrument or a joint fund with common standards. It is agreed between the BMZ and the CPS that the CPS has its own profile and will not be an integrated part of the German development portfolio that usually emphasises other sectors or levels of peacebuilding. However, the BMZ's role in steering, planning and monitoring the CPS must also be clarified. So far, the BMZ has largely adopted for a reactive role and the CPS mainly functions as a BMZ fund with considerable freedom in defining its own guidance in a participatory way, as well as 100 per cent funding level. What the BMZ's role should look like in a future CPS needs clarification.

How the CPS as a **joint endeavour** (*Gemeinschaftswerk*) of civil society and governmental organisations will express this togetherness also requires substantial clarification. Currently, the CPS is making considerable efforts to provide more guidance for all organisations that send experts and funds to partners via the CPS. However, whether the joint endeavour will

go beyond this frame remains open. We found the most effective CPS programmes in countries where there is only one main (Cambodia) or two equally engaged CPS partners present (Burundi, Niger), or else, the CPS has made an effort to achieve joint strategic guidance on programming – an example of this is the Israel/Palestine programme. Effective CPS work does not only depend on the number of agencies involved. Certainly, being more strategic is easier when fewer organisations work together, but other cases demonstrate that strategic planning can also be possible when more actors are involved. The only country programme that was overall effective (Cambodia) also demonstrated a high level of strategic planning and results-based monitoring of activities on different levels of engagement. This shows additionally that the level of strategic planning and a country approach has led to more effective work.

For making the CPS more relevant, effective and sustainable, we also found a number of other weaknesses that need to be addressed in the future:

The current main practice of CPS **expert deployment** (one European CPS expert per partner) is not sufficiently oriented towards partners' needs. Partners require support to fund activities and local staff, as well as for institution-building and management, networking and facilitation, protection and specific competences in peace, justice and human rights. Among all these needs, facilitation and networking are the ones that the CPS experts with their outsider perspective can best contribute to (besides funding, which is crucial, but could also be delivered by other means). Certainly, deploying one CPS expert to one partner can in some cases fulfil partners' specific needs if done at the right time and in the right set-up. However, it is impossible for one CPS expert to address all these needs for one partner effectively and efficiently. Hence, a much more flexible approach to expert deployment is required with a combination of:

- more specialised CPS experts (with expertise in fundraising, management, networking, facilitation, specific peace/human rights sectors) who could serve a number of partners;
- alternatives to international CPS expert deployment (internationally qualified regional experts, local experts, work with local service providers, etc.);
- support to partners after a CPS expert assignment ends (continuation of funding of local staff and activities without the presence of CPS experts, short-term expert support).

These options should by no means downplay the observation that besides qualifications, CPS experts also bring in their personal working style and are supposed to be examples in the transformation process by providing critical reflections about partners' practices and peacebuilding processes. However, we believe that CPS experts are able to share these qualities with one or more partners.

A more flexible approach to expert deployment would need to be reflected in revised recruitment and qualification practices. We are aware that elements of the above mentioned points are already practised (e.g. *forum*ZFD always opens its own offices; EIRENE operates its own offices in Burundi and Niger that host the coordination and another one hosting a project team and one CPS expert offering training and consultation services to partner organisations; WFD sends only few CPS experts and supports many local experts; PBI provides targeted protection; DED combines a number of modalities). Whether it makes sense that experts are deployed to partners or support partners from outside entirely

depends on the peacebuilding needs the CPS wishes to address and the needs of the partners. We found that deployment of one expert to one partner is the general mode of operation and routine. A more flexible approach to expert deployment would enhance the CPS's peacebuilding potential.

The **effectiveness** of CPS supported initiatives is mixed: the **reach of activities** under CPS programmes remains limited. We were able to identify a number of factors contributing to effectiveness from examples in the case studies that could serve for future planning. These are: working with established institutions; establishing local structures; planning and implementing effective dissemination strategies; initiating a comprehensive key actor approach or strategic partnership with development agencies. Projects that did not apply these criteria were generally less effective. Only one country programme was highly effective (Cambodia) and two do have a likelihood of becoming effective in the future (Burundi, Niger).

Types of peacebuilding needs addressed: The CPS executing agencies mainly support socialisation and social cohesion activities such as peace education, dialogue between conflicting groups, training in non-violence and trauma healing. This demonstrates an emphasis on long-term individual people's changes, which might be linked to the aforementioned German historical experiences in post-conflict reconciliation after World War II. We are not arguing that the CPS should necessarily focus on other needs. However, we have found that the CPS's training and peace education or outreach activities have focused in many cases too much on techniques of non-violence without addressing issues relevant for beneficiaries, such as advocacy for land or human rights-based monitoring combined with effective dissemination strategies. Dialogue and socialisation have to offer not only a vision and practice of non-violence but also an answer to immediate problems that enables people to see how they can use the acquired skills for changing conflict situations. A good practice example are some of the WFD supported local peace committees in Burundi that provide local conflict resolution to address tensions, or Eirene's GENOVICO network in Niger that trains facilitators for mediating in agro-pastoralist conflicts.

Moreover, we have seen that partners often address other needs of beneficiaries. CPS agencies have only supported those in a few programmes, such as in Cambodia where successful agenda setting for victim inclusion by DED-CPS projects was mainstreamed into proceedings of the Tribunal; EIRENE's advocacy for putting conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists on the agenda of rural development in Niger; *forum*ZFD's advocacy for economic problems in the Sandzak region in Serbia; or PBI's protection work in Guatemala and Colombia.

In sum, we conclude that the choice of activity lines should be based on both the general public's long-term and immediate peacebuilding needs. Moreover, partners' needs and CPS competences should be combined in an effective way. So far, the CPS has generally applied a combination of peace education and dialogue activities. This might be the right approach but should be based on solid analysis and strategic choices that include a focus on immediate peacebuilding needs.

Sustainability was not mainstreamed from the beginning of interventions. Moreover, the possibility of providing support without the presence of CPS experts – that is envisaged in the 2008 CPS Standards and identified as an important instrument to achieve sustainability – is largely under-utilised by the CPS executing agencies.

The context of engagement is not sufficiently reflected in programming: We find a good quality of conflict analyses in project documents. However, consequences of these analyses

are not sufficiently reflected in activities. For example, in the CPS Israel/Palestine programme the involved CPS stakeholders are very aware of the difficult context they are operating in. However, the main activity lines of the programme have remained almost unchanged for the past ten years.

Results-based management: In recent years, the CPS executing agencies have started to put more emphasis on results-based management. For example, EIRENE strengthened outcome monitoring and basic principles of results-based management through a two-year process of advising projects through a short-term expert. The same is true for AGEH. Moreover, most CPS executing agencies conduct planning workshops with partners a few months after the arrival of CPS experts. Experts and partners also prepare monitoring reports and the executing agencies have conducted or commissioned project evaluations. For example, PBI evaluates all its projects every three years. However, results-based monitoring is still weak. No CPS country planning exists that involves all executing agencies operating in a country as a means to jointly identify entry points for change in a country and how and with what kinds of modalities these can be best addressed by the CPS instrument. The CPS executing agencies in a country usually do not work towards the same achievable over-arching goals with clear theories of change for all activities, baseline studies, monitoring issues and indicators; and also conflict and peacebuilding monitoring is not performed very often.

BMZ steering and management of the CPS: The overall strategic steering and monitoring of the CPS by the BMZ division for peace and security is weak. The division largely operates in a reactive mode. There are also no proper guidelines in place and there does not exist any joint decision making mechanism between the BMZ and the CPS Group on larger strategic matters (see chapter 3.7.2.5). The BMZ regional desks' knowledge and potential are still underutilized. They mainly comment on ready-made funding requests and are in general not part of a prior joint discussion process. The amount of staff to deal with such a large programme as the CPS within the BMZ division for peace and security is also insufficient. Major administrative weaknesses are the large time gap between the request for a CPS expert and his/her actual arrival in the country (one to two years), the difficulties regarding formats for funding requests, insufficient assessment of partners' needs, and insufficient participation of partners in the planning and recruitment of CPS experts.

5. Recommendations

5.1 General recommendations

The following recommendations serve as starting points for making the CPS a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable instrument. It is hoped that the points presented will provide ideas and options for reflection and decision-making.

Overall

1. **The evaluation recommends that the CPS be continued. However, considerable changes should be undertaken because the CPS has the potential to become an even more relevant instrument that complements other peacebuilding instruments**, both in Germany and internationally. A more effective CPS in the future may serve as a specific German instrument that builds on its comparative advantages. Some of the evaluated CPS programmes and a considerable number of CPS projects have demonstrated that change can be achieved.

Strategic steering

2. **Sharpening of the CPS's profile.** Clarification is required as to whether the CPS is a network, an institution, an instrument or a joint fund with common guidelines. It is crucial that this debate is not reduced to achieving a consensus on terminology but is conducted via a process involving the BMZ and all members of the CPS Group. In consequence, the CPS Standards and the relevant BMZ guidelines need to be revised.
3. **Introduction of CPS country strategies** to turn the CPS into a more strategically planned endeavour. These strategies have to go further than those currently in existence and should focus on joint goals and results-based programmes considering baseline studies, monitoring issues and indicators. The strategic process should take place every three to five years and involve all CPS executing agencies working in a country, the CPS management division within the BMZ, and the relevant regional desks and stakeholders in the field – the most appropriate level for the discussion process. A discussion process does not imply a decision-making process driven by the BMZ. Instead, it should promote the idea of a 'joint endeavour' (*Gemeinschaftswerk*) and make use of potential synergies to enhance relevance and effectiveness. Based on peacebuilding and partners' needs, the know-how and capacities of the CPS executing agencies, intervention and deployment strategies should be developed. Such a process should not exclude the possibility of having only one CPS executing agency operating in a country, as also the work of a single agency benefits from strategic planning. A more strategic planning process would also sharpen the CPS's profile.

Programming

4. **Appropriate mix of cooperation modalities**, i.e. flexible CPS expert deployment combined with other modes of cooperation suitable to the needs of the context and the partners. This could include deployment of regional or local experts, funding of local staff, project activities and cooperation with local service providers.
5. **CPS expert deployment requires a change in perspective** to better respond to partners' needs in a more relevant, effective and sustainable way. The current practice of deployment – one expert to one partner – cannot remain the main mode of deployment only. Deployment has to be done more flexibly and consistently targeted towards partners' needs and the CPS's strengths, i.e. its outsider role in the conflict. The option of deploying a team of CPS experts to a country to support the needs of different partners should also be practised more often.
6. **Focused CPS programmes,** i.e. geographically and issue-based, should continue to be implemented.
7. **The horizontal and vertical reach of CPS programmes should be strengthened** to make them more relevant and effective.
8. **Addressing people's long-term and immediate peacebuilding needs: The decision on** CPS activity lines should be based on the result of a solid peacebuilding needs assessment which takes account of activities by other actors as well as the analysis of the CPS executing agencies' strategic advantages and the needs and capacities of their partners. Whether the CPS continues to focus mainly on social cohesion and

socialisation activities or engages in other activity lines will depend on the results of such assessment.

9. **Gender mainstreaming has to be improved**.
10. **The sustainability of CPS programmes and projects will have to be considerably strengthened**.

Management and monitoring

11. **Results-based management:** All CPS country programmes and projects need to be based on solid results-based management to strengthen effectiveness and sustainability. Planning should include the definition of objectives and corresponding indicators. A monitoring system needs to be established thereafter. There should be a consistent focus on enhancing the reach of activities, addressing people's pressing needs and further developing monitoring and advocacy work.
12. **Strengthened role of CPS coordinators**. This management tool should be continued and strengthened, as it has contributed – and could do so to an even greater extent in the future – to strengthening exchange among CPS experts and enhancing the profile of the CPS. Most importantly, networking by coordinators may facilitate the identification of entry points for peacebuilding. To enhance the use of these opportunities, CPS coordinators should receive specialised training not only in management but also in comprehensive peacebuilding requirements. The exchange between coordinators also needs to be organised if more than one CPS coordinator is present in a country.
13. **Procedures to be strengthened**: Monitoring and management procedures should be strengthened to promote the implementation of an effective and efficient CPS.

In order to apply the above recommendations, we propose a set of strategic and operational recommendations to the main CPS stakeholders.

5.2 Strategic recommendations

5.2.1 Strategic recommendations to the BMZ

14. The CPS profile needs to be further sharpened as a means to clarify the different understandings of the CPS either as an instrument, a network or a fund with participatively developed guidance. During this profile development process, it is also essential to clarify the level of steering, management and monitoring of the BMZ division for peace and security.
15. The BMZ division for peace and security has to ensure that the CPS becomes a more strategically planned endeavour. The introduction of **CPS country strategies** to be developed every three to five years would seem an appropriate procedure. These strategies should be based on a coherent concept for all executing agencies (even if there was only one agency working in a country) that agree on the same objectives and jointly define core activity lines in order to make maximum use of the added value of the CPS. This evaluation recommends a real joint CPS country programme with joint responsibilities and not just a joint document for external visibility. This would include strategic decision-making on the most appropriate ways of CPS expert deployment (how many experts to the country, which partners and peacebuilding needs are served, etc.)

as well as alternative implementation modalities based on a solid assessment of partners' needs. To facilitate the implementation of the strategy, mandatory CPS in-country coordinators should be established. The BMZ division for peace and security should become more proactive in this process and include the BMZ regional desks that need to be part of the country planning processes. However, this does not mean that CPS interventions should be part of the bilateral German development portfolio in a country. The objective of the process would be to make CPS interventions more relevant, effective and sustainable.

16. The BMZ has to provide **adequate resources for the development of country strategies** and joint planning processes.
17. The BMZ and the CPS Group need to come to an agreement on whether a general budget will be provided for CPS country programmes or detailed project funding requests will be continued. One option would involve having more **flexibility in financial planning** in order to enable the CPS executing agencies to implement country strategies, deployments and other means within a suitable timeframe.
18. A pilot period during which **different modes of flexibility** could be tried should result in guidelines for country programme planning. In order to better comply with the 1999 CPS framework, the roles of all involved actors (CPS executing agencies at headquarters and in the field, CPS country coordinators and CPS experts, the BMZ division for peace and security, the BMZ regional desks, the German Federal Foreign Office, embassies, including the BMZ in-country representation, and partners) in this process have to be clearly defined within such guidelines.
19. It would be advisable to conduct these processes in the relevant countries and involve the embassies (including the BMZ in-country representation and partners where appropriate). CPS country strategies should be developed for a three to five year period accompanied by annual planning (see operational recommendations for members of the CPS Group).
20. We recommend that the **number of CPS executing agencies working in one country** is decided as part of country strategy planning. However, how many CPS executing agencies and which ones should operate in one country depends entirely on the context and the comparative advantages of the different agencies.
21. Whether the decision-making processes illustrated above ought to be accompanied by a reduction in CPS countries of operation cannot be answered in this evaluation, as we have only assessed eight countries. However, if this process will be conducted in all countries and the overall CPS budget and the management capacity of the BMZ division's for peace and security do not substantially increase, it might be sensible to reduce the **number of countries of operation**. In this case, selection criteria should be established based on the results of this evaluation. This should help to analyse in which countries CPS activities are likely to be most effective.
22. We recommend that such a prioritisation of countries should not limit flexibility and opportunities for the CPS in other countries, as long as appropriate reasons are given in each case.
23. The **monitoring of the CPS** by the BMZ needs to be strengthened. Monitoring of country strategies by the BMZ needs to be established at the CPS country programme level. As

part of the aforementioned joint planning process, baselines and country monitoring systems including measurable indicators should be established for each country monitoring process (see also operational recommendation no. 36 to establish a CPS planning, monitoring and evaluation unit at the CPS secretariat).

5.2.2 Strategic recommendations to the CPS Group

24. To further consolidate the CPS as a relevant, effective and sustainable instrument of civil society peacebuilding based on continued and solid funding, the **profile of the CPS** has to be strengthened considerably. It is important to clarify whether the CPS is an instrument or network and who steers, manages and monitors it under which conditions. However, it is crucial to make a distinction between the CPS public profile in Germany (and Europe) and the internal one used for the executing agencies and partners. While the public profile serves as a lobbying tool for civilian peacebuilding in general as well as for the CPS as an instrument in particular, the internal profile can serve as a means of further developing the CPS.
25. To strengthen the **public profile** of the CPS:
    a. Short but substantial information papers should be drafted for different target groups. Due to the discussions around a future European Civil Peace Service, it is important that relevant documents will also be provided in English.
    b. Targeted advocacy in Germany (and Europe) has to be continued more systematically, not only for the CPS but also for civil society peacebuilding as a means to sustain the achievements of the last decade. This will ensure the support base of the CPS among decision-makers.
26. To strengthen the **internal profile** of the CPS, the 2008 CPS Standards should be revised and updated, as well as accompanied by operational guidance as to how to apply them (see operational recommendations for details).
27. To strengthen the relevance and effectiveness of the CPS, its operations have to be planned and implemented in a much more strategic manner. This evaluation recommends introducing **country strategies** (see above under the BMZ). Such a process will also strengthen internal and external complementarity and provide a solid base for funding, planning, monitoring and evaluation of deployments and other activities. Whether or not it makes sense to engage only one CPS executing agency per country or else combine the strategic advantages of more agencies entirely depends on the country context and solid planning and managing for results.
28. CPS expert deployment should be geared more systematically towards partners' needs and the strengths of expert deployment, i.e. the CPS expert's outsider role in conflict settings. Different needs require different CPS expert deployment and cooperation modalities beyond the current practice of 'one expert to one partner'. The evaluation identified the following options for **CPS expert deployment and other modes of cooperation** that could also be combined with each other. While all options are relevant and their use depends on the case, we would like to particularly encourage option a) below.
    a. Establishment of country teams of CPS experts with different competences that support a number of partners in the same country (or region); depending on the

case, they could operate from a separate CPS office or else be attached to a core partner. The advantage of a CPS country office is its visibility as well as the strengthening of the outsider perspective of the CPS to the conflict, thereby enabling networking and facilitation work;

b. CPS experts from the Global South (depending on the requirements, this could entail qualified experts from neighbouring countries or from different regions);

c. One international CPS expert to one partner;

d. Cooperation with local service providers (especially with regard to management skills);

e. Direct funding of partner activities;

f. Partnering up with other agencies;

g. Direct funding of partners' local experts and staff;

h. Direct funding of local/national CPS experts who could be part of CPS country teams or work within partner organisations;

i. Short-term expert deployment;

29. Strengthen the **subsidiarity principle**: in applying the above proposal, we see a contribution in this regard.

30. Strengthen the **relevance** of the CPS country programmes:

    a. Country programmes shall continue to be focused (geographically or issue-based);

    b. The reach of CPS country programmes should be enlarged and range from the very localised to a broader local and national context;

    c. CPS activity lines should also be a result of a solid peacebuilding needs assessment including the support activities of other actors as well as the analysis of strategic advantages of the CPS executing agencies and the needs of their partners. Whether the CPS continues to mainly focus on social cohesion and socialisation activities or engages in other activity lines depends on the results of such an assessment.

31. Assess whether it would make sense in some cases to establish a link or exchange between CPS programmes in conflict countries and CPS initiatives in Germany, including advocacy (this refers to ideas made by CPS stakeholders in Germany, expressed during the inception phase).

32. Strengthen the effectiveness of activities under CPS programmes in making systematic use of the CPS's **good practice examples** as well as findings from research about civil society peacebuilding (see operational recommendations).

33. Consolidate the peacebuilding **potential of partners** by making better use of their strengths, needs and influence.

34. Continue to place particular emphasis on smaller partners with high peacebuilding potential (besides established organisations).

5.3 Operational recommendations

5.3.1 Operational recommendations to the BMZ

35. Clarify jointly with the CPS Group the use of **key terms** in German, English, French and Spanish; especially the use of *ZFD-Fachkraft* in other languages needs to be agreed upon by all members of the group.
36. Enhance the **monitoring and evaluation** of CPS country programmes. There are different options for this, of which three are presented below:
    a. Establish a unit at the CPS secretariat, which should
        - support the BMZ division for peace and security and CPS organisations in coordinating the development, monitoring and adjustment of CPS country strategies;
        - provide the BMZ division for peace and security annually with CPS country strategies and corresponding monitoring reports;
        - support and/or fund planning, monitoring and evaluation efforts of the CPS executing agencies and partners at headquarters and in the field.
    b. Establish a post for this purpose at the BMZ division for peace and security;
    c. Mandate an external organisation with this task.
37. Strengthen the **efficiency of CPS procedures**:
    a. Introduce the use of the principal languages of the host countries as much as possible (e.g. English, French, Spanish) for all relevant CPS documents that need to be shared with partners (German translations or summaries can be provided if necessary).
    b. Enhance the capacity of the BMZ division for peace and security in crucial CPS administrative time periods, when most work for planning and programme/project approval is required.
    c. Assess how the CPS secretariat could further support the BMZ division for peace and security.
    d. Improve data collection and analysis for local staff and partners.
    e. Improve the quality of the current overview document (*Sachstand*) with data on detailed projects per country and partners.
    f. Considerably reduce the time between a funding request for CPS experts and their actual deployment. This could also be part of a new modus of CPS country programme planning.
    g. The current format for funding requests has to be improved. However, first it needs to be clarified whether new ways of funding will be introduced in the context of CPS country strategies. In case the current format continues to be adhered to, it needs to be strengthened in the following aspects:

- the institutional set-up and needs of partners must be analysed as an additional point under *Handreichung zum Gliederungsschema für Anträge des ZFD (Fassung vom 22. Juli 2009),* chapter B;
- the guidance note has to include project monitoring and evaluation;
- results chains need to be harmonised;
- funding requests have to be rendered more consistent and be simplified.

38. **Cost-benefit analysis** needs to be improved and the financial administration of the CPS may want to consider the following points:
    a. Clarify the responsibilities for each budget line of all CPS projects (e.g. role of partner organisation(s) or CPS expert);
    b. Develop guidelines for local staff salaries that are coherent with the CPS philosophy as well as local standards;
    c. Revise the practice of interim budgets (*vorläufige Haushaltsführung*) for three year programmes;
    d. Ensure that the modalities of local auditing better reflect partners' needs and responsibilities vis-à-vis their country authorities.

5.3.2 Operational recommendations to the CPS Group

39. Clarify the use of **key terms** in German, English, French and Spanish jointly with the BMZ (see recommendation 22 above).
40. Strengthen the use of the main **languages** of the host countries (e.g. English, French, Spanish) for all relevant CPS documents that are not exclusively for the BMZ.
41. Revise and update the **2008 CPS Standards**. To strengthen the use of the Standards and adapt them to the developments of the CPS and the findings of this evaluation, a series of changes could be envisaged:
    a. The document has to be available in all languages used in places in which the CPS operates, the main ones being English, French and Spanish. The current 2008 Standards are only available in German, which tremendously restricts their use.
    b. The general section about the CPS could be strengthened with a few sentences on a sharpened CPS's profile which are based on a discussion process to take place after the evaluation.
    c. The CPS country strategies (see above) could be included in the work modalities of the CPS. Details need to later be included in the operational guidance.
    d. For CPS expert deployment, a separate chapter could be added or else the relevant section be amended with options of different ways of CPS expert deployment (see below), as well as alternative implementation modalities that could be (but do not have to be) combined with CPS expert deployment.
    e. The main CPS activity lines (*Handlungsfelder*) need to be sharpened in profile.

f. The chapter on effectiveness and impact (*Wirkungen*) should be revised and current inconsistencies eliminated. We also propose to include more outcome levels in the overall CPS results chain.

g. Strengthen the sustainability part.

h. Include gender more prominently.

i. As far as the chapter on the competencies of CPS experts is concerned, a distinction could be made between what the CPS requires in terms of competencies and what variety a single CPS expert could offer. The idea of CPS experts working in teams and thus provide this variety together should also be included.

j. Competencies of and working modalities for local CPS experts should be included.

k. The use of key terms needs to be agreed upon.

42. Strengthen the **effectiveness** of activities under CPS programmes. For this, we propose a number of measures:

    a. Enlarging the horizontal and vertical reach of activities from very localised to a broader local and national context by using good practice examples from CPS projects in combination with current research findings (see examples in the chapter on outcome 2).

    b. Continue to strengthen the collaboration with established institutions (i.e. make strategic use of a key actor approach).

    c. Strengthen agenda setting for important needs of partners and beneficiaries on the basis of solid analysis, monitoring and targeted dissemination strategies (combining advocacy with other activities; this will also foster the combination of general peacebuilding theories of change with those of beneficiaries and partners).

    d. Work for non-violence should be continued and combined with other activities that reflect the needs of partners.

    e. Continue and strengthen the establishment of local institutions, including networks.

    f. Work more with groups that are difficult to reach, including hardliners – where this is feasible and fits into a particular CPS country strategy.

    g. Develop strategic partnerships with development agencies for using service delivery as an entry point for peacebuilding.

    h. Strengthen cross-border activities as already done in a number of country programmes.

    i. Make use of effectiveness criteria from research findings of similar activities.

43. Strengthen **planning, monitoring and evaluation** of CPS country programmes and projects:

    a. Cooperate with the BMZ division for peace and security (or any other entity that this division has commissioned for monitoring or evaluation tasks related to CPS country programmes and projects).

    b. Ensure adequate funding for planning, monitoring and evaluation. This can be done through asking the BMZ to install a specific facility for this purpose or else, include this type of funding into funding requests.

    c. Improve and harmonise the understanding of effectiveness and impact across CPS standards and funding requests.

    d. Enhance monitoring and evaluation capacities in the field: one option is to establish a post for monitoring and evaluation in CPS countries of operation as part of a CPS country team (as exemplified with DED's gender expert in Guatemala); this could be a specialised CPS expert (international, regional, local or provided by a local institution). Another option would be sending short-term experts to provide this service (as exemplified by AGEH's outcome mapping project).

    e. Start working with results-based management for improving planning, monitoring and evaluation in all projects including the conduct of baselines of partners, the definition of main activity lines (including indicators) and clear theories of change that are translated into results chains with indicators jointly developed with partners in a participatory and action-oriented way. Additional funding should be provided for such exercise. However, there should be a difference between results-based monitoring on the level of country programmes and partner projects. For partner projects, processes and methods have to meet local needs and feasibilities.

    f. Engage in a discussion within the CPS Group on whether or not impact assessment for the CPS makes sense or not. A pilot impact assessment project in one or more countries (in addition to the current efforts in Cambodia), and along with proposals made in chapter 3.3.3., may be one possibility.

    g. Introduce more conflict monitoring as an activity where it enriches a particular programme.

    h. Pay more attention to adapting activities to changing conflict situations. How this is to be done depends on the context and programme. It is certainly necessary to be introduced on a country programme level for strategic planning every couple of years. How this could be implemented for single projects is subject to the partner organisation's capacities and mandate.

44. Strengthen the **sustainability** of initiatives more systematically:

    a. Include sustainability strategies from the beginning of project planning.

    b. Plan for follow-up strategies when a CPS project ends (e.g. providing short-term expert support, which is easier when a CPS country team will be established, continue funding of activities and local staff).

    c. Strengthen ownership of administrative and financial procedures.

d. Prepare hand-over strategies, i.e. partnering up with other funders or working with established institutions that could take over activities (as exemplified with a number of school projects).

45. Strengthen **networking and joint learning** among CPS partners in one country, region or on a larger scale.
46. Apply more **differentiated support strategies** for different types of partners, i.e. smaller and more established partners.
47. **Gender** needs to be more systematically strengthened within CPS activities. One option is to follow the Guatemala model in other countries and establish a post for a gender expert that supports all CPS projects in a country/region. The gender expert could be a CPS expert working in a CPS country team or else a local expert recruited for the CPS country team. Another option would be to engage a local institution that could provide this support. Yet another option is to enhance gender training. Options could also be combined.
48. Implications for **training** (and education):
    a. The introduction of different forms of CPS expert deployment impacts on training and education of CPS experts and partners. The current training seems to be much too focused on the 'one expert to one partner' approach. More specialised expertise is required and might also help overcome current recruitment problems that a few CPS executing agencies are facing.
    b. We recommend the CPS to consider introducing a specialised training course for CPS coordinators, as their requirements are specific. It is important that they have sufficient skills in analysis, comprehensive strategic peacebuilding as well as management.
    c. More training in networking and advocacy should be offered.
    d. More training on peacebuilding effectiveness has to be provided for staff of the CPS executing agencies. The training of CPS international and other experts as well as local staff should also be enhanced.
    e. Additional training on 'gender in peacebuilding and conflict' should be provided.
    f. Training in methods for planning, monitoring, evaluation and adapting programming to conflict situations should also be made a priority.
    g. Training and capacity building for local experts could be pursued more systematically.
49. Strengthen the documentation, analysis and dissemination of **lessons learned** from the CPS. This could for example also be part of a specialised post or be done by commissioning lessons learned studies for specific aspects; or else, specific learning aspects could be documented regularly in the country programmes with a local post for this purpose.
50. Further establish posts of **CPS coordinators** and adapt this management modality to joint CPS country programmes. Different options exist and depend on a specific country programme: one CPS coordinator could be the coordinator for all CPS interventions in a country with a mandate given by all CPS executing agencies in a country that goes

beyond their simple representation; else, different coordinators from different CPS executing agencies could work together in a common office; or the different coordinators could meet on a regular basis for coordination meetings. However, the regular exchange of people working in the same office should not be underestimated.

5.3.3 Operational recommendations to CPS partners

51. Engage in a debate with the CPS executing agencies on the role of CPS and local experts prior to project commencement to clarify scope of tasks, duties, expectations and obligations of partners.
52. Lobby for a strengthened participation in the selection process of CPS experts.
53. Use full potential of each organisation’s activity lines in cooperation with the CPS.

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