

Evaluation

Peace and Development in Finland's Development Cooperation

Synthesis



Evaluation report 2014:5

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND

REPORT 2014:5	Peace and Development in Finland's Development Cooperation Synthesis ISBN: 978-952-281-259-9 (pdf), ISSN: 1235-7618
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REPORT 2011:4	Finnish Aid for Trade ISBN: 978-951-724-964-5 (printed), ISBN: 978-951-724-965-2 (pdf), ISSN: 1235-7618

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Jon Bennett
David Fleming

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This report was commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to Itad Ltd.
The Consultant authors bear the sole responsibility for the contents of the report.
The report does not necessarily reflect the views of
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

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This report can be accessed at <http://formin.finland.fi/developmentpolicy/evaluations>

ISBN 978-952-281-259-9 (pdf)

ISSN 1235-7618

Cover photo: Laura Rantanen

Cover design: Anni Palotie

Layout: Taittopalvelu Yliveto Oy

Anyone reproducing the content or part of the content of the report should acknowledge the source. Proposed reference: Bennett, J and Fleming, D 2014 *Peace and Development in Finland's Development Cooperation: Synthesis*. Evaluation report 2014:5. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Grano Oy, Jyväskylä, 67 p. ISBN 978-952-281-259-9 (pdf).

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PREFACE

This evaluation assesses how Finnish development cooperation in fragile states is contributing towards peace and security. The role of development policy as part of conflict prevention and peace mediation was included in the Programme of the Finnish Government in 2011 and further specified in the Development Policy Programme 2012. Special guidelines were also developed for the theme in 2009. This evaluation is contributing the implementation of the new guidelines of fragile states agreed in April 2014.

The evaluation includes two sections: firstly an evaluation of the Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans which showcases a region that has come out of war and is now in different stages of EU integration and secondly a three other case countries and regions, namely Afghanistan, Palestinian territories and Ethiopia, each experiencing a different situation of fragility. The findings of all four cases are presented in this synthesis report.

Some Finnish country programmes and aid portfolios in fragile states are addressing directly conflict prevention or crisis management with specific targeted activities. However, majority of the cooperation in these countries is addressing a wide range of development challenges supporting conflict prevention and mitigation in a comprehensive manner and often indirectly. Usually, development cooperation is implemented in parallel with other activities through diplomacy, crisis management and humanitarian assistance. The value of this evaluation is to assess to what extent the overall goals of peace and security had be achieved through different approaches in different contexts of fragility.

The synthesis concludes that Finland has been strong on aid coordination and predictability as well as on advocacy around key issues such as gender equality and human rights. However, the value of development cooperation contributing peace and security varies from country to country as the contexts of fragility are different. The evaluation also questions the ambition level of development cooperation. The availability of sufficient resources and the complexity of fragility are not always reflected realistically in country strategies and plans. Thus, the evaluation encourages Finland to increase the number of development staff at country level but also to develop new strategies for remote management of aid in complex security environments.

Helsinki, September 25, 2014

Jyrki Pulkkinen
Director,
Development Evaluation Unit

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Research for this evaluation was conducted between July 2013 and August 2014 by a team of consultants contracted by Itad Ltd, which is based in Hove, UK. The team comprised Jon Bennett in the role of team leader, lead author of the synthesis report and lead author of the Afghanistan case study; David Fleming as Itad evaluation manager, co-author of the synthesis report and member of the Ethiopia sub-team; Bill Sterland as lead author of the Western Balkans case study; Debi Duncan as lead author of the Palestinian Territories case study; Tuija Stenbäck as lead author of the Ethiopia case study; Zehra Kačapor Džihic and Rozeta Hajdari as members of the Western Balkans sub-team; Mohammed Mussa as member of the Ethiopia sub-team; Akbar Sarwari as member of the Afghanistan sub-team; and Samir Baidoun as member of the Palestinian Territories sub-team. Itad extends thanks to the evaluation team for their commitment and engagement throughout in what has been a very challenging and exciting evaluation.

The evaluation team was supported by a number of Itad staff and associate consultants. David Fleming (Senior Consultant) was responsible for evaluation management and coordination, with the support of Jodie Ellis (Senior Project Officer) and Dane Rogers (Managing Director). Itad's Duty of Care team comprising Julian Barr, Sarah Ockenden, Alice Parsons and Susannah Bartlett, supported by Brennan Dwyer and the Safer Edge Team, provided logistical and security arrangements for the Afghanistan fieldwork. Former Itad Director, Derek Poate, provided quality assurance and methodological insights throughout the evaluation, for which the team is extremely grateful. In Finland the team was supported by Erja Hänninen (Junior Expert). Proof-reading was carried out by editing consultant Chris Steel and abstract and summary translations were carried out by Karoliina Zschauer-Lilja and Wolfestone.

Itad Ltd and the team wish to express sincere gratitude to the Unit responsible for development evaluation (EVA-11) attached to the Office of the Under-Secretary of State in Finland's Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA): Jyrki Pulkkinen (Director), Riitta Oksanen (Senior Advisor), Sanna Pulkkinen (Senior Evaluation Officer), Riikka Miettinen (Evaluation Officer), and Kristiina Kuvaja-Xanthopolous (Counsellor).

The team is extremely grateful to all of the staff members of the MFA in Helsinki as well as the embassies in Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and the Representative Office in the Palestinian Territories for their kind support in facilitating the team's fieldwork, for being available for interviews and freely expressing their views.

The team would also like to take this opportunity to gratefully acknowledge and thank the numerous individuals interviewed. They graciously gave their valuable time to facilitate the team's country and mission visits and to provide information, analysis, interpretations and explanations. The views of all of these stakeholders were crucial in helping the team to formulate its assessments and recommendations.

The team has attempted to address all the evaluation questions in the Terms of Reference. Needless to say, the flaws and omissions are entirely ours. The team is also responsible for the views and recommendations expressed in the final report.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
ARTF	Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
AU	African Union
BMZ	Bundesministerium Für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, German Federal Ministry for Economic Development Cooperation
CCO	Cross-Cutting Objective
CDCs	Community Development Councils
CHIESA	Climate Change Impacts on Ecosystem Services and Food Security in Eastern Africa
COWASH	Community-led Accelerated Water and Sanitation Hygiene Project
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	UK Department for International Development
EMIS	Education Management Information Service
EQ	Evaluation Question
ESD	Education for Sustainable Development
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EVA-11	Evaluation Unit in Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
FLC	Fund for Local Cooperation
FOPER	Forest Policy and Economics Education and Research
GEQIP	General Education Quality Improvement Programme
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, German Society for International Cooperation
GNP	Gross National Product
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
IDEA	(International) Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDS	Institute for Development Studies
IFI	International Financial Institution
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (UN)
JC	Judgement Criteria
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
LAND	Land Administration to Nurture Development
LAP	Land Administration Project
LIFT	Land Investment for Transformation
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs (of Finland)
MISFA	Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
Nordic+	Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Estonia, Belgium
NPTF	Nepal Peace Trust Fund
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's/Development Assistance Committee
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PA	Palestinian Authority
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to end Poverty
PEGASE	European-Palestinian Management and Socio-Economic Help
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSG	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
QA	Quality Assurance
RBM	Results-based Management
SNE/IE	Special Needs Education/Inclusive Education
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region (Ethiopia)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNKT	UN Kosovo Team
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency (for Palestine Refugees)
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

Evaluointi rauhasta ja kehityksestä Suomen kehitysyhteistyössä

Synteesi

Jon Bennett ja David Fleming

Suomen ulkoasiainministeriön evaluointiraportti 2014:5

ISBN 978-952-281-259-9 (pdf)

ISSN 1235-7618

Koko raportti on luettavissa osoitteessa <http://formin.finland.fi/developmentpolicy/evaluations>

TIIVISTELMÄ

Evaluoinnin tarkoituksena on osoittaa, kuinka Suomen kehitysyhteistyö tukee rauhaa ja kehitystä hauraissa valtioissa, miten tämä on linjassa Suomen ulkoasiainministeriön (UM) 2014 kehitysyhteistyö hauraissa valtioissa toimintaohjeen kanssa ja kuinka toimintaohjetta voitaisiin soveltaa tulevaisuudessa. Neljän osaevaluoinnin (Länsi-Balkan, Afganistan, Etiopia ja Palestiinalaisalueet) tuloksia täydennettiin myös aiempaan Nepalilä evaaluointiin viitaten. Monet keskeisistä havainnoista ovat kontekstispesifisiä. Yksityiskohdat löytyvät täydentävistä osaevaluoinneista.

Metodologia keskittyi neljään arvioitavaan teemaan: tuen merkitys rauhan ja kehityksen edistämiseksi; politiikan johdonmukaisuus ja resurssien allokointi; läpileikkaavat tavoitteet sekä avun tuloksellisuus ja kehitystulokset.

Suomi on ollut vahva rahoituksen koordinoinnissa ja ennustettavuudessa, sopivalla sekoituksella monenkeskistä yhteisrahoitusta, sekä keskeisten kysymysten, kuten sukupuolten tasa-arvo- ja ihmisoikeudet, vaikuttamispyrkimyksissä. Tätä ei kuitenkaan ole tuettu selkeästi määrittelyillä ja mitattavilla tuloksilla sisältävillä maaohjelmilla, joten tuloksena onkin joskus ollut liian kunnianhimoinen ja hajanainen portfolio. Etiopiassa vaikutuksia on aikaansaatu pitkäaikaisella osallistumisella tietyille sektoreille, mutta muualla tarvitaan suurempia investointeja talouden ohjelmiin ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan instituutioiden kapasiteetin kehittämiseen. Liberaali valtion rakentamismalli Afganistanissa, sekä pienemmässä mittakaavassa Palestiinalaisalueilla, on ongelmallinen, mutta hankkekohtaiset toimet näissä ja Länsi-Balkanilla tuottavat positiivisia tuloksia. Henkilöstömäärää ja sen pysyvyyttä täytyy parantaa hauraissa valtioissa sekä luoda etäjohtamisstrategia turvallisuusympäristön heikentyessä.

Avainsanat: Suomi, evaluointi, hauraat valtiot, rauha, turvallisuus, kehitys

Utvärdering av Fred och Utveckling i Finlands utvecklingspolitik

Syntes

Jon Bennett och David Fleming
Utrikesministeriets utvärderingsrapport 2014:5
ISBN 978-952-281-259-9 (pdf)
ISSN 1235-7618

Den fullständiga rapporten finns på <http://formin.finland.fi/developmentpolicy/evaluations>

REFERAT

Syftet med utvärderingen är att dra lärdom av hur Finlands utvecklingssamarbete stöder fred och utveckling i bräckliga stater, hur detta relaterar till Finlands utrikesdepartements (UD) riktlinjer 2014 för bräckliga stater, och hur dessa kan tillämpas i framtiden. Fyra fallstudier (Västbalkan, Afghanistan, Etiopien och de Ockuperade Palestinska Territorierna) har bidragit till resultatet, med hänvisning också till en tidigare utvärdering av Nepal. Många viktiga slutsatser är specifika för sin kontext med närmare detaljer givna i de medföljande rapporterna för fallstudierna.

Den använda metoden fokuserade på fyra viktiga teman för utvärderingen: betydelsen av stödet för de som driver på för fred och utveckling; samstämmighet i policy och resursallokering; övergripande mål; och biståndets effektivitet och utvecklingsresultat.

Finland har varit starkt ifråga om samordning och förutsägbarhet för finansiering, med en lämplig blandning av multilateralt poolad finansiering och strävan efter opinionsbildning kring viktiga frågor som genus och mänskliga rättigheter. Detta har inte backats upp av tydligt beskrivna strategier med mätbara resultat för olika länder utan resultatet har ibland blivit en överambitiös och fragmenterad portfölj. I Etiopien, har man åstadkommit förändringar genom långsiktiga engagemang inom specifika sektorer, men annorstädes finns behov av ökade investeringar i ekonomiska program och kapacitetsutveckling av civilsamhällets institutioner. Den liberala modellen för uppbyggnaden av staten i Afghanistan, och i mindre utsträckning i de Ockuperade Palestinska Territorierna, är problematisk, men projektspecifika insatser där och i Västbalkan visar positiva resultat. Antalet anställda och kontinuitet behöver förbättras i bräckliga stater och det behövs en strategi för fjärrhantering i miljöer där säkerheten förfaller.

Nyckelord: Finland, utvärdering, bräckliga stater, fred, säkerhet, utveckling

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Evaluation report of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2014:5

ISBN 978-952-281-259-9 (pdf)

ISSN 1235-7618

The full report can be accessed at <http://formin.finland.fi/developmentpolicy/evaluations>

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the evaluation is to draw lessons on how Finnish development cooperation supports peace and development in fragile states, how these relate to Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA)'s 2014 Fragile States Guidelines, and how these Guidelines might be applied in the future. Four case studies (Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Palestinian Territories) informed the findings, with reference also to a previous evaluation of Nepal. Many substantive findings are context specific with details found in the accompanying case study reports.

The methodology focused on four key evaluative themes: relevance of support to the drivers of peace and development; policy coherence and resource allocation; cross-cutting objectives; and aid effectiveness and development results.

Finland has been strong on coordination and predictability of funding, with an appropriate mix of multilateral pooled funding, and the pursuit of advocacy around key issues such as gender and human rights. This has not been backed by clearly outlined country strategies with measurable outcomes and the result has sometimes been an overambitious and fragmented portfolio. In Ethiopia, impact has been achieved through longer-term involvement in specific sectors, but elsewhere greater investment in economic programmes and capacity development of civil society institutions is needed. The liberal statebuilding model in Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent in the Palestinian Territories, is problematic, but project-specific interventions here and in Western Balkans show positive results. Staff numbers and continuity need improving in fragile states and a strategy for remote management in deteriorating security environments is needed.

Keywords: Finland, evaluation, fragile states, peace, security, development.

Johdanto

Tämä raportti on neljän osaevaluoinnin (Länsi-Balkan, Afganistan, Etiopia ja Palestiinalaisalueet) tulosten synteesi ja osa Rauha ja kehitys Suomen kehitysyhteistyössä evaluointia. Evaluoinnin tarkoitus on osoittaa, kuinka Suomen kehitysyhteistyö tukee rauhaa ja kehitystä hauraisissa valtioissa, miten tämä on linjassa Ulkoasiainministeriön (UM) 2014 hauraiden valtioiden toimintaohjeen kanssa ja miten toimintaohjetta voitaisiin soveltaa tulevaisuudessa. Synteesiraportti kokoaa yhteen neljän osaevaluoinnin tärkeimmät havainnot siitä, miten Suomi on onnistunut edistämään rauhaa ja kehitystä hauraisissa valtioissa. Raportti sisältää myös suosituksia toimintaohjeiden operationaaliselle toteutukselle.

Metodologisesti analyttinen viitekehys varmisti aineiston systemaattisen keruun ja analysoinnin kaikkien neljän osaevaluoinnin kohdalla. Jokainen neljästä pääevaluointikysymyksestä pilkottiin neljästä kuuteen tutkimusalueeseen, joista yhdessä muodostui arviointikehys, mikä piti sisällään myös standardin mukaiset OECD/DAC:n arviointikriteerit.

Tulokset

Tuen merkitys rauhan ja kehityksen edistämisessä

Huomasimme, että yhdessä osaevaluoinnissa Suomi ei ollut yhdistänyt kontekstuaalisen-, kansantalous-, köyhyys- ja konfliktianalyysin elementtejä yhdeksi kattavaksi, Suomen kehitysyhteistyöohjelman strategista lähestymistapaa tukevaksi, tutkimukseksi. Täydentävyyttä hakiessa Suomi on pitkälti ollut riippuvainen muiden pääavunantajien suorittamista kontekstuaalisista analyyseistä.

Suomen poliittisen dialogin ja kehitysyhteistyön välinen linkki on mahdollistanut Suomen tehokkaan osallistumisen dialogiin kaikilla hallinnon tasoilla. Yleisesti ottaen Suomi on asianmukaisesti valinnut ja soveltanut apuinstrumenttejaan työskentelykontekstin mukaan. Siellä, missä yksittäisiä hankelähestymistapoja ei voida riittävästi monitoroida (Afganistan, Palestiinalaisalueet), ovat joko yhteisrahastot tai budjettituki suosittuja rahoitusmuotoja.

Politiikan johdonmukaisuus ja resurssien allokointi

Turvallisuus- ja oikeuskysymykset ovat hyvin kontekstispesifejä. Palestiinassa näitä sektoreita oli hädin tuskin sivuttu, ja Etiopiassa ne viittaavat vain alueelliseen dialogiin. Afganistanissa ne muodostivat suuren osan siviili-kriisinhallinnan toimista, kuten myös yhteisrahoitteisesta turvallisuussektorin reformin tuesta. Huolimatta kontekstuaalisista takaiskuista, tulokset ovat olleet yleisesti ottaen hyviä.

Taloudelliset investoinnit ja työpaikkojen luonti ovat pitkälti riippuvaisia kannustavasta ympäristöstä, ja Suomen merkittävistä ponnisteluista Länsi-Balkanilla ja Afganistanin preferoidusta rahoituksesta huolimatta, on näiden toimien makrotaloudellinen vaikutus rajallinen. Etiopiassa paikallinen taloudellinen vaikutus on helpompi jäljittää diskreettien hankeaktiviteettien, kuten kastelun, kautta, joka johtaa maanviljelyksen parempaan tuottavuuteen ja siten taloudellisiin parannuksiin kotitaloustasolla. Tosin Etiopiassa talouden ilmapiiri on huomattavasti vakaampi kuin Afganistanissa, missä keskipitkän aikavälin tuloksia ei ole helppoa saada.

Kapasiteetin kehittämisen määrittely valtion rakentamiseksi on ongelmallista, jos ensisijainen tavoite on vain avunantajien rahoittamien palveluiden tehokas tuottaminen. Afganistanissa ja Palestiinassa valtionrakentaminen oli rinnastettu vakauttamiseen ja sen tähden itsetarkoitukseksi, vaikkakin molemmissa tapauksissa kysymykset viranomaisten legitimitetistä olivat aina läsnä.

Ennakoitavuuden ja Suomen tukien maksatusten totesimme olevan tehokasta kaikissa maissa. Keskeinen haaste on ollut sopivan henkilöstömäärän saaminen hauraisiin valtioihin, missä sidosryhmät ovat herkempiä reagoimaan kansainvälisen henkilöstön läsnäoloon ja pysyvyyteen kentällä.

Läpileikkaavat tavoitteet (CCOs)

Suomen vahva ja johdonmukainen vaikuttamistyö ihmisoikeus- ja sukupuolikysymyksissä on ollut ilmeistä kaikissa osaevaluoinnissa, joko kahdenvälisen poliittisen kanssakäymisen tai yhteiskonsultaatioiden (yleensä pohjoismaisten) kautta. Suomen toimet sukupuoli- ja ihmisoikeusasioissa ovat avunantajien korkeasti arvostamia.

Kaikissa osaevaluoinneissa Suomi on varmistanut, että hankkeissa on sukupuolten välistä tasa-arvoa koskevat indikaattorit, joista osa käsittelee myös erityistarpeita ja ympäristökysymyksiä. Mutta analyysia, joka tukee hankkeiden valintaperusteita, on harvoin saatavilla. Totesimme läpileikkaavien tavoitteiden (CCOs) opitun hyödyntämisen vaihtelevan melko paljon osaevaluoinnista riippuen, hankeseurannan ollessa yleensä epäjohdonmukaista, mikä kuvastaa läpileikkaavien tavoitteiden (CCOs) vaihtelevaa käsittelyä hankesuunnittelussa.

Avun tuloksellisuus ja kehitystulokset

Kaikissa osaevaluoinneissa Suomi on osoittanut vahvaa sitoutumista avun tuloksellisuuteen sekä läpinäkyvyyden ja ennakoitavuuden varmistamiseen. Suomen saavutukset läpinäkyvyyden varmistamisessa ja avun ennakoitavuudessa ovat hyviä. Koordinaatio tärkeimpien ministerikollegoiden ja laajemman avunantajayhteisön kanssa on ollut erityisen hyvää; Suomi on myös ylläpitänyt budjettitukisitoumuksiaan siellä, missä tämä on mahdollista. Avunantajien yhdenmukaistamisperiaatteita on noudatettu johdonmukaisella yhteisrahoitusmekanismien tuella.

Suomi on yleisesti ollut johdonmukainen tukiessaan kansallista omistajuutta. On kuitenkin olemassa selvä ero sen välillä, mitä voidaan kutsua kestäväydeksi vakaisissa ja epävakaissa ympäristöissä.

Suomi on tehnyt keskitettyjä toimia varmistaakseen apupolitiikkansa olevan johdonmukaista ja täydentävää muiden avunantajien kanssa, ja evaluointi totesi Suomen saaneen tässä suhteessa hyvän arvion kaikilta avunantajilta. Yleisesti ottaen, Suomi on identifioinut ja keskittänyt resursseja sektoreille, missä rauhan- tai valtion rakennuksella voidaan saavuttaa selviä tuloksia, mutta näiden tulosten mittaaminen on ollut epäjohdonmukaista.

Päätelmät ja opit

Vaikka jotkut tulokset ja opit ovat pakostakin maakohtaisia, olemme koonneet oheen UM:lle laajempia opetuksia, joita voidaan hyödyntää myös niissä uusissa maissa, joissa Suomi on äskettäin käynnistänyt yhteistyötä, kuten Myanmar.

Tuen merkitys rauhan ja kehityksen edistämiseksi

- Kunnes Suomi kehittää indikaattoreita tai arviointivälineitä kartoittamaan valtionkehittämissuunnitelmien edistymistä, ei voida olettaa, että tämä korreloi rauhanrakentamisen kanssa.
- Liiallinen kunnianhimo Suomen toimien laajuudessa ja määrässä vaikuttaa haitallisesti Suomen kykyyn toteuttaa kehitysyhteistyönsä ”kokonaisvaltaista lähestymistapaa”.
- Investoiminen modernin liberaalin valtion konseptiin maissa kuten Afganistan, voi olla huonosti ajoitettua ja jopa haitallista. Rajoitetut resurssit voisi olla parempi käyttää ei-valtiollisten ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan instituutioiden vahvuuden ja vaikutusvallan rakentamiseen vastapainoksi patrimoniallisille ylilyönneille.

Politiikan johdonmukaisuus ja resurssien allokointi

- Turvautuminen yhteisrahoitukseen on tarkoituksenmukaista, mutta kehitysohjelman kerryttämiä taloudellisia hyötyjä ei ole systemaattisesti taltioitu.
- Todisteet Suomen aikaansaamista tuloksista inkluusivisessä ja erityisopetuksessa Etiopiassa tukevat voimakkaasti sitä näkemystä, että kehitysavun jatkuvuus pidemmällä aikavälillä on edellytys vaikutusten saavuttamiselle. Lisäksi resurssien keskittäminen yhdelle maantieteelliselle alueelle sekä synergian varmistaminen tämän alueen eri ohjelmien välillä on osoittautunut resurssien optimaaliseksi käytöksi.
- Vastuuvollisuuteen ja siviilien huonoon osallistumistasoon liittyvien huolten valossa ei ole selvää, mitä lisäarvoa Suomi tuo turvallisuussektorin reformiin.
- Keskeinen haaste hauraisissa valtioissa on taata suomalaisen henkilökunnan määrän pysyminen riittävällä tasolla kansallisten sidosryhmien luottamuksen rakentamiseksi.

Läpileikkaavat tavoitteet (CCOs)

- Suomen ohjelmatyön pitkäikäisyys Etiopiassa soveltuu kumulatiivisena kokemuksena varmistamaan sen, että hankesuunnittelu- ja toteutus ottavat huomioon ympäristönsuojelun, sukupuolen sekä muut erityistarpeet. Vaikka Suomella on muualla hyvät asetelmat vaikuttamistyölle ja sukupuolten tasa-arvon ja ihmisoikeuksien valtavirtaistamiselle korkeilla hallinnon tasoilla, se tarvitsee suurempaa jatkuvuutta ja henkilöstöosaamista toteuttaakseen näitä tehokkaasti Afganistanin kaltaisissa maissa.
- Suomen täytyy työskennellä läheisemmin hankkeen toteuttajien kanssa varmistaakseen, että ne asianmukaisesti lähestyvät, monitoroivat ja raportoivat kaikkia Suomen läpileikkaavia tavoitteita.

Avun tuloksellisuus ja kehitystulokset

- Suomen budjettituki yhteisrahoitusohjelmien kautta sekä tiivis toimiminen muiden avunantajien kanssa on ollut tehokkain tapa käyttää rajallisia resursseja.
- Suomen on tehtävä vaikeita päätöksiä toimintasektoriensa rajoittamisesta. Opetus, vesi ja maa ovat sektoreita, joilla Suomen kumulatiivinen kokemus on ilmeinen.
- Äärimmäisissä paikoissa, kuten Afganistanissa, Suomen henkilöstöpolitiikkaa ei ole vielä mukautettu etäjohtamisen suuremmalle tarpeelle.

Suosituks

- Konflikti- ja kansantalousanalyysi tulisi tehdä kaikissa niissä hauraisissa valtioissa, joissa Suomen ulkoasiainministeriö on oleellisesti läsnä.
- Maaportfolio tulisi pitää yksinkertaisena siten, että valitut sektorit täydentävät toisiaan. Ulkoasiainhallinnolla tulee olla kykyä tarvittavaan lähijohtamiseen.
- Siviilikriisinhallinnan – erityisesti turvallisuussektorin uudistamisen (SSR) – tulisi siirtyä teknisestä tuesta kohti tarpeen luomista ihmiskeskeiselle SSR:lle.
- Suomen tulisi työskennellä läheisesti avunantajakumppanien kanssa varmistaakseen resurssisuunnittelun ja riittävän monitoroinnin.
- Maaohjelmista tulisi ilmetä, mitkä ovat keskeiset läpileikkaavat kysymykset, miksi juuri nämä on valittu tähän tiettyyn kontekstiin, miten näitä tulee lähestyä ja miten niitä tullaan seuraamaan ja raportoimaan eri tasoilla.
- Kapasiteetin kehittämiseen ja palveluiden tuottamiseen tulisi aina suhtautua kahtena erillisenä tuloksena, joilla on kaksi erilaista strategiaa. Kansalaisyhteiskunnan tuen tulisi sisältää kapasiteetin kehittämisstrategia sekä kehittämisstrategian valmisteluun tarvittava määräraha.
- Jotta hauraiden valtioiden toimintaohje, erityistavoitteet ja toimet niiden saavuttamiseksi voidaan operationalisoida, tulee maaohjelman sisältää tulosperustaiset (RBM) vaikutusindikaattorit. Lisäksi maaohjelmaan tulee sisällyttää muutosteoria.
- Riskinhallintaa tulisi päivittää säännöllisesti.
- Maissa, joissa turvallisuustilanne estää pääsyn kohdeyhteisöihin, tulisi toteuttaa perusteellinen etäjohtamisen arviointi.

SAMMANFATTNING

Introduktion

Detta betänkande är en syntes av resultaten från fyra fallstudier (Västbalkan, Afghanistan, Etiopien och de Ockuperade Palestinska Territorierna) som bidrar till en utvärdering av fred och utveckling i Finlands utvecklingssamarbete. Syftet med utvärderingen är att dra lärdom av hur Finlands utvecklingssamarbete stöder fred och utveckling i bräckliga stater, hur detta relaterar till Finlands utrikesdepartements (UD) riktlinjer 2014 för bräckliga stater, och hur dessa kan tillämpas i framtiden.

Denna syntetiserade rapport sammanför viktiga slutsatser från de fyra fallstudierna gällande Finlands arbete när det gäller att främja fred och utveckling i bräckliga stater, och rekommendationer ges också för operativa implementeringar av riktlinjerna.

Metodologiskt har ett analytiskt ramverk säkerställt att data från de fyra fallstudierna systematiskt samlats in och analyserats. Fyra avgörande utvärderingsfrågor bröts var och en ned till mellan fyra och sex områden för undersökningar, och bildade så tillsammans ett ramverk för en utvärdering som också inkluderade standardkriterier för utvärdering av OECD DAC.

Resultaten

Betydelsen av stödet till de som driver på för fred och utveckling

Vi fann att i ingen av våra fallstudier har Finland kombinerat delar av kontextuell analys, politisk ekonomianalys, fattigdomsanalys och konfliktanalys till en omfattande studie som ligger till grund för en strategi för det finska utvecklingsprogrammet. Finland har genom att söka komplementaritet i stor utsträckning varit beroende av kontextuella analyser som genomförts av andra viktiga bidragsgivare.

Sambandet mellan den finska politiska dialogen och utvecklingssamarbetet har gjort det möjligt för Finland att effektivt föra dialog på alla nivåer inom statsmakten. Finland har i allmänhet valt och tillämpat sina stödinstrument korrekt för arbetets sammanhang. Där enstaka metoder att ta sig an projekt inte kunnat övervakas tillfredsställande är antingen poolade medel eller budgetstöd de föredragna formerna.

Samstämmighet i policy och resursallokering

Frågor om säkerhet och rättvisa är mycket sammanhangsberoende. I Palestina vidrördes dessa områden knappast, och i Etiopien hänför de sig bara till regional dialog. I Afghanistan utgjorde de en stor del av civil krishantering likaväl som reformstödet för säkerhetsområdet tillhandahållet genom poolade fonder. Trots kontextuella bakslag har resultaten i allmänhet varit bra.

Ekonomiska investeringar och skapande av sysselsättning beror i hög grad på en stöttande omgivning men trots betydande ansträngningar från Finland i Västbalkan och föredragen finansiering i Afghanistan, har de makroekonomiska effekterna av dessa insatser varit begränsade. I Etiopien är det lättare att spåra lokala ekonomiska effekter genom diskreta projektverksamheter såsom konstbevattning som leder till förbättrad avkastning från jordbruket och därmed också ekonomiska förbättringar på hushållsnivå. Men detta är ett betydligt mer stabilt ekonomiskt klimat än det i Afghanistan där det är svårt att erhålla data för resultat på medellång sikt.

Kapacitetsutveckling definierad som statsbildning är problematiskt om det primära målet endast är att effektivt tillhandahålla tjänster som finansieras av givarna. I Afghanistan och Palestina likställdes statsbildning med stabilisering och därför ett mål i sig, även om det i båda fallen hela tiden förekom frågeställningar beträffande de statliga myndigheternas legitimitet.

Ifråga om förutsägbarhet och utbetalningar av finska medel fann vi att dessa var effektiva för alla länder. Den viktigaste utmaningen har varit att tillse att nivån av bemanning är passande i de bräckliga stater där intressenter är mer lyhörda för internationell personals närvaro och kontinuitet på plats.

Övergripande mål (CCO:er)

Stark och konsekvent finsk opinionsbildning i frågor kring mänskliga rättigheter och genus har varit framträdande i alla fallstudier, antingen genom bilaterala démarcher eller genom gemensamma (ofta nordiska) samråd. Finska interventioner för genus och mänskliga rättigheter ses positivt av givare.

I alla våra fallstudier har Finland sett till att projekten har indikatorer för jämställdhet, medan några också inriktar sig på särskilda behov och miljöfrågor. Men den analys som ligger till grund för de valda projekten är sällan tillgänglig. Vi upptäckte att lärdomarna från CCO:er varierade för olika fallstudier, och att projektövervakningen allmänt var inkonsekvent, vilket återspeglade den varierande behandlingen av CCO:er i projektutformningen.

Biståndets effektivitet och utvecklingsresultat

Finland har i alla våra fallstudier visat att man starkt håller sig till effektivt stöd och att säkerställa transparens och förutsägbarhet i stödet. Finland har bra meriter när det gäller att säkerställa transparens och stödets förutsägbarhet. Samordningen med viktiga motsvarande ministerier och det mer vida givarsamfundet har varit mycket bra; Finland har också upprätthållit sina åtaganden gällande budgetstöd där så har varit möjligt. Harmoniseringsprinciper för givare har följts genom konsekvent finansiering av poolade mekanismer.

Finland har generellt varit konsekvent i att främja nationellt egenansvar. Det finns dock en markant skillnad mellan vad som kan kallas hållbarhet i stabila respektive instabila miljöer.

Finland har gjort samordnade ansträngningar för att säkerställa att biståndspolitiken är sammanhängande med och kompletterar andra givares, och utvärderingen fann att alla givare bedömde denna aspekt positivt. Mer allmänt har Finland identifierat och koncentrerat resurser i sektorer där fredsbyggande eller uppbyggnad av staten kan ses ha märkbara resultat, men mätningen av dessa resultat har varit inkonsekvent.

Slutsatser och lärdomar

Även om vissa slutsatser och lärdomar av nödvändighet är specifika för landet det gäller, har vi destillerat mer allmängiltiga lärdomar för Finlands UD, vilket också kan influera strategier i nya länder som Myanmar/Burma där Finland nyligen har börjat engagera sig.

Betydelsen av stödet till de som driver på för fred och utveckling

- Tills Finland utvecklar indikatorer eller utvärderande åtgärder som dokumenterar framsteg mot högre ambitionsnivåer för en självständig stat, kan inte antagandet att detta korrelerar med fredsbyggande godtas.
- Överdriven ambition i omfattningen och antalet för Finlands interventioner påverkar negativt förmågan att direkt genomdriva sin «vittomfattande strategi» för utvecklingen.
- Att investera i konceptet för en modern liberal stat i länder som Afghanistan kan passa dåligt tidsmässigt och till och med vara skadligt. Det kan vara bättre att använda begränsade resurser till att bygga upp icke-statliga och civilsamhällets institutioners styrka och influens för att motverka patriarkala överdrifter.

Samstämmighet i policy och resursallokering

- Att man stöttar sig på förenad finansiering är lämpligt, men de kumulativa ekonomiska fördelarna av utvecklingsprogrammet har inte blivit systematiskt dokumenterade.
- Bevisen på effekten Finland har på utbildning som är inkluderande och tar hänsyn till särskilda behov i Etiopien stöder starkt uppfattningen att det krävs kontinuitet i utvecklingssamarbetet på längre sikt för att uppnå önskad effekt. Det har dessutom visat sig att koncentration av resurser i ett geografiskt område, och att man säkerställer synergi mellan olika program inom detta område, ger en optimal användning av resurser.
- Mot bakgrund av oron gällande ansvarsskyldighet och ett svagt civilt engagemang är det inte klart vad Finland har tillfört för mervärde till reformer inom säkerhetssektorn.
- En viktig utmaning i bräckliga stater är tillhandahållandet av en lämpligt dimensionerad finsk personalstyrka för att bygga upp förtroendet bland nationella intressenter.

Övergripande mål (CCO:er)

- Livslängden för Finlands programmering i Etiopien lämpar sig för ackumulerad erfarenhet för att säkerställa att projektplanering och utförande tar hänsyn till genus, miljöskydd och särskilda behov. Även om Finland har goda förutsättningar för att bedriva opinionsbildning och integrering med avseende på genus och mänskliga rättigheter på höga nivåer av förvaltningen, krävs på andra platser, såsom Afghanistan, en bättre kontinuitet och kompetens hos personalen för att effektivt genomföra detta.
- Finland behöver arbeta närmare samman med partners som står för genomförandet för att säkerställa att de inriktar sig på, övervakar och rapporterar om alla Finlands CCO:er till den grad som behövs.

Biståndets effektivitet och utvecklingsresultat

- Finlands budgetstöd genom gemensam/poolad finansiering och genom nära samordning med andra givare har varit det mest effektiva sättet att använda begränsade resurser.
- Finland behöver fatta svåra beslut om att begränsa antalet sektorer man arbetar inom. Utbildning, vatten och mark är de sektorer där samlad erfarenhet är uppenbar.
- I extrema situationer, såsom Afghanistan, har Finlands policy för personalresurser inte ännu anpassats för det större behovet av fjärrhantering.

Rekommendationer

- En konfliktanalys och politisk ekonomianalys bör genomföras i alla bräckliga stater där det finns en betydande närvaro från finska UD.
- Landets portfölj bör hållas enkel, med komplementaritet mellan sektorer och UD:s färdigheter, för att det skall matcha den hantering in på livet som krävs.
- Civil krishantering – specifikt reformer för säkerhetsområdet (SSR: Security Sector Reform) – bör flyttas från teknisk assistans till att skapa en efterfrågan på människocentrerad SSR.
- Finland bör ha ett nära samarbete med partners som är givare genom att säkerställa att resultatplanering och adekvat övervakning finns på plats.
- Strategier för länder bör ange vilka de prioriterade övergripande frågorna är, varför de har valts för denna specifika kontext, hur man skall ta sig an dem och hur de skall övervakas och rapporteras på alla nivåer.
- Kapacitetsutveckling och leverans av tjänster bör alltid behandlas som två olika resultat, med två olika strategier. Stöd till det civila samhället bör innehålla en strategi för utveckling av kapacitet med särskilda medel som anslås till detta.
- När riktlinjerna för bräckliga stater anpassas för operativ verksamhet bör specifika målsättningar, processer för att uppnå dessa och effektindikatorer för resultatbaserad ledning (RBM) användas inom strategin för ett land. En teori om förändring bör åtfölja strategin för landet.
- Riskhantering bör uppdateras regelbundet.
- I länder där säkerhetsaspekter lägger hinder i vägen för tillgång till mottagande samhällen, bör det göras en grundlig bedömning av fjärrhantering.

SUMMARY

Introduction

This report is a synthesis of the findings from four case studies (Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Palestinian Territories) that contribute to an evaluation of peace and development in Finland's development cooperation. The purpose of the evaluation is to draw lessons on how Finnish development cooperation supports peace and development in fragile states, how these relate to MFA Finland's 2014 Fragile States Guidelines, and how these Guidelines might be applied in the future. This synthesis report brings together key findings from the four case studies on how Finland has performed in relation to promoting peace and development in fragile states, and includes recommendations on operational implementation of the Guidelines.

Methodologically, an analytical framework ensured the systematic collection and analysis of data across the four case studies. Four key evaluation questions were each broken down to between four and six areas of enquiry, together forming an evaluation framework that also included standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria.

Findings

Relevance of support to the drivers of peace and development

We found that in none of our case studies has Finland combined elements of contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analysis into one comprehensive study that underpins a strategic approach to the Finnish development programme. Seeking complementarity, Finland has largely been reliant upon contextual analysis undertaken by other key donors

The link between Finnish political dialogue and development cooperation has enabled Finland to effectively engage in dialogue at all levels of government. In general, Finland has appropriately chosen and applied its aid instruments to the working context. Either pooled funds or budget support are the preferred modalities where single project approaches cannot be adequately monitored

Policy coherence and resource allocation

Issues of security and justice are very context specific. In Palestine these sectors were hardly touched, and in Ethiopia they only refer to regional dialogue. In Afghanistan they formed a major part of civilian crisis management activities as well as the security sector reform support provided through pooled funds. Notwithstanding contextual setbacks, the results have been generally good.

Economic investment and employment creation depends very much on a supportive environment, and despite significant efforts by Finland in Western Balkans and preferred funding in Afghanistan, the macro-economic impact of these interventions is limited. In Ethiopia, it is easier to trace local economic impact through discreet project activities such as water irrigation that leads to improved agricultural yields and hence economic improvements at household levels. But this is a considerably more stable economic climate than Afghanistan where data on medium-term outcomes are not easily obtained.

Capacity development defined as statebuilding is problematic if the primary objective is only the efficient delivery of donor-funded services. In Afghanistan and Palestine, statebuilding was equated with stabilisation and therefore an end in itself, even though in both cases questions over the legitimacy of the state authorities were always present.

In terms of the predictability and disbursements of Finnish funds we found these to be efficient across all countries. The key challenge has been the provision of appropriate staffing levels in fragile states where stakeholders are more responsive to the presence and continuity of international staff on the ground.

Cross-cutting objectives

Strong and consistent Finnish advocacy on issues around human rights and gender have been apparent in all case studies, either through bilateral demarches or through joint (often Nordic) consultations. Finnish interventions in gender and human rights are well regarded by donors.

In all our case studies Finland has ensured that projects have indicators pertaining to gender equity, while some also address special needs and environmental issues. But the analysis that underpins the rationale for chosen projects is rarely available. We found that lesson learning on cross-cutting objectives (CCOs) varies quite considerably across the case studies, with project monitoring being generally inconsistent, reflecting the varying treatment of CCOs in project design.

Aid effectiveness and development results

In all our case studies Finland has demonstrated strong adherence to aid efficiency and in ensuring transparency and predictability of aid. Finland's record in ensuring transparency and predictability of aid is good. Co-ordination with key counterpart ministries and with the wider donor community has been very good; Finland has also upheld its commitments towards on-budget support where this is feasible. Donor harmonisation principles have been followed through consistent funding of pooled mechanisms.

Finland has generally been consistent in promoting national ownership. However, there is a marked difference between what can be termed sustainability in stable and unstable environments.

Finland has made concerted efforts towards ensuring its aid policy is coherent with, and complementary to, other donors, and the evaluation found positive appraisal from all donors in this respect. Broadly speaking, Finland has identified and concentrated resources in sectors where peacebuilding or statebuilding might be seen to have discernible results, but the measurement of those results has been inconsistent.

Conclusions and lessons

Although some conclusions and lessons are necessarily country-specific, we have derived broader lessons for MFA Finland that may also inform strategy in new countries where Finland has recently started engagement such as Myanmar.

Relevance of support to the drivers of peace and development

- Until Finland develops indicators or evaluative measures that record progress towards the higher level aspirations of statehood, the assumption that this correlates with peacebuilding cannot be upheld.
- Overambition in the scope and number of Finland's interventions adversely affects its ability to directly implement its "comprehensive approach" to development.
- Investing in the concept of a modern liberal state in countries such as Afghanistan may be ill-timed and even harmful. Limited resources might be better spent building the strength and influence of non-state and civil society institutions to counterbalance patrimonial excesses.

Policy coherence and resource allocation

- The reliance on pooled funding is appropriate, but accrued economic benefits of the development programme have not been systematically recorded.
- Evidence of impact that Finland brings to inclusive and special needs education in Ethiopia strongly supports the view that continuity of development cooperation over the longer term is required to achieve impact. Moreover, concentrating resources in one geographic area, and ensuring synergy across different programmes within this area, has shown to be the optimal use of resources.
- In light of concerns around accountability and poor levels of civilian involvement, it is not clear what added value Finland brings to security sector reform.
- A key challenge in fragile states is the provision of appropriate Finnish staffing levels to build confidence among national stakeholders.

Cross-cutting objectives

- The longevity of Finland's programming in Ethiopia lends itself to cumulative experience in ensuring that project planning and execution takes account of gender, environmental protection and special needs. Elsewhere, although Finland is well placed to pursue advocacy and mainstreaming on gender and human rights at high levels of government, it needs greater continuity and staff skills to effectively carry this out in countries such as Afghanistan.
- Finland needs to work more closely with implementing partners to ensure that they adequately address, monitor and report on all Finland's CCOs.

Aid effectiveness and development results

- Finland's on-budget support through joint/pooled funding and through close coordination with other donors has been the most effective way of using limited resources.
- Finland needs to make hard decisions over limiting the number of sectors in which it works. Education, water and land are the sectors where cumulative experience is evident.
- In extreme situations such as Afghanistan, Finland's human resource policy is not yet adapted towards the greater need for remote management.

Recommendations

- A conflict analysis and political economy analysis should be undertaken in all fragile states where there is substantial MFA Finland presence.
- The country portfolio should be kept simple, with complementarity between sectors and an MFA skill set to match the close management required.
- Civilian crisis management – particularly security sector reform (SSR) – should move from technical assistance towards creating demand for a people-centred SSR.
- Finland should work closely with donor partners in ensuring that results planning and adequate monitoring is in place.
- Country strategies should indicate what the priority cross-cutting objectives are, why they have been chosen for this particular context, how they are to be addressed, and how they will be monitored and reported at all levels.
- Capacity development and service delivery should always be treated as two different outcomes, with two different strategies. Support to civil society should include a capacity development strategy with specific funds allocated to this.
- In operationalising the Fragile States Guidelines, specific objectives, process towards achieving these, and results-based management (RBM) impact indicators should be used within a country strategy. A Theory of Change should accompany the country strategy.
- Risk management should be regularly updated.
- In countries where security prohibits access to recipient communities, a thorough appraisal of remote management should be undertaken.

Summary of key findings, conclusions and recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>In none of our case studies has Finland combined elements of contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analysis into one comprehensive study that underpins a strategic approach to the Finnish development programme and that would inform ongoing programme choices. Seeking complementarity, Finland has largely been reliant upon contextual analysis undertaken by other key donors, notably World Bank, UN and EU.</p>	<p>Without a commensurate effort made towards developing indicators or evaluative measures that record progress towards the higher level aspirations of statehood (as opposed to just capacity development), the assumption that this correlates with peacebuilding cannot be upheld. It requires a country strategy that details the country context and sets out the relationship between Finland’s sector programmes and development priorities. Risk analysis and management implies higher costs and goes hand in hand with developing new skills in the Finland MFA.</p>	<p>1 A conflict analysis and political economy analysis should be undertaken in all fragile states where there is a substantial MFA Finland presence. Some of this might draw on the work of others, but it should lead to a conflict-sensitive strategy and provide a rationale and “do no harm” assessment specifically tailored to the chosen MFA sectors.</p>
<p>In the earlier years covered by the evaluation, with the exception of Ethiopia, country portfolios comprised too many discrete interventions of often limited scope. Finland would have achieved greater overall effectiveness and coherence if it had focused on a more limited number of sectors or specific issues and themes.</p>	<p>The scope and number of Finland’s interventions has sometimes been overambitious and effective management has not been possible. This overambition adversely affects Finland’s ability to directly implement its “comprehensive approach” to development through a programme comprising too many limited projects (particularly Kosovo). Conversely, in Ethiopia the long-term and sustained commitment by Finland to supporting particular sectors and concentrating resources at sub-regional grassroots levels has contributed to economic development and employment particularly through water and land sector interventions. It has also enabled a strong and well-integrated gender strategy in water, land and education sectors with set objectives.</p>	<p>2 The country portfolio should be kept simple, with complementarity between sectors and a MFA skill set to match the close management required. The aim should be to maintain long-term and sustained funding and commitments to these sectors. These should include flexibility in delivery methods that allow rapid managerial changes where necessary. The synergy between projects and strategic themes should be made explicit, and levels of complementarity with Finnish and other donor programmes outlined. In some cases it would mean a concentration of resources in particular geographic areas.</p>
<p>Though relatively small, there are additional niche areas where Finland can claim specific expertise, e.g. civilian crisis management.</p> <p>Issues of security and justice are very context specific. In Palestine these sectors were hardly touched, and in Ethiopia they only refer to regional dialogue. In Afghanistan they formed a major part of civilian crisis management activities as</p>	<p>Finland’s added value in civilian crisis management came to the fore particularly in Afghanistan and Western Balkans, but a less consistent and strategic approach was apparent in the Palestinian Territories. Statebuilding is often equated with stabilisation and therefore an end in itself, despite questions over the legitimacy of the state authorities. Statebuilding can, however, also be about</p>	<p>3 Civilian crisis management – and more particularly SSR – should move from technical assistance towards creating demand for a people-centred SSR, including greater involvement of civil society. This requires developing the expectations and capacities of the population to demand effective and accountable security governance. Geared specifically to fragile con-</p>

<p>well as the SSR support provided through the pooled Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) funds. Notwithstanding contextual setbacks, the results have been generally good.</p>	<p>strengthening the social contract between the populous and the government. Finland has not always balanced its support to formal state institutions with support to civil society institutions that can hold the state to account.</p> <p>In light of concerns around accountability and poor levels of civilian involvement, it is not clear what added value Finland brings to SSR. Civil society oversight of this sector has yet to be effectively developed (Afghanistan).</p>	<p>texts, Finland should articulate and develop the concepts, principles and programmatic outline for this within civilian crisis management. In turn, this should be linked to a very specific set of strategic activities undertaken by viable non-governmental institutions.</p>
<p>Economic investment and employment creation depends very much on a supportive environment and despite significant efforts by Finland in Western Balkans and preferred funding in Afghanistan (through NSP), the macro-economic impact of these interventions is limited. In Ethiopia, it is easier to trace local economic impact through discreet project activities such as water irrigation that leads to improved agricultural yields and hence economic improvements at household levels. But this is a considerably more stable economic climate than Afghanistan where data on medium-term outcomes is not easily obtained.</p>	<p>The analysis that underpins the rationale for chosen projects is rarely available and monitoring has been inconsistent. There has tended to be an over-reliance on implementers (UN and others) to provide this information, notably in relation to project-specific priorities.</p>	<p>4 Finland should work closely with donor partners in ensuring that results planning and adequate monitoring is in place, particularly in programmes that aim to improve economic and employment opportunities.</p>
<p>In all our case studies Finland has ensured that projects have indicators pertaining to gender equity, while some also address special needs and environmental issues. But because monitoring depends on implementing partners, there is a lack of consistency in reporting and in purpose.</p> <p>We found that lesson learning on CCOs varies quite considerably across the case studies, with project monitoring being generally inconsistent, reflecting the varying treatment of CCOs in project design.</p>	<p>Finland needs to work more closely with implementing partners to ensure that they adequately address, monitor and report on all Finland's CCOs. In particular, it needs to ensure that ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, youth and other groups likely to be excluded are targeted in all community-level actions.</p>	<p>5 Country strategies should indicate what the priority cross-cutting objectives are, why they have been chosen for this particular fragile context, how they are to be addressed, and how they will be monitored and reported at all levels. They should be linked to specific achievable targets within a designated timescale. If these are "process" targets, they should have indicators and a means of reporting and verifying outcomes.</p>
<p>Capacity development in chosen government ministries tends to be loosely termed as "statebuilding", even if the primary objective</p>	<p>Capacity development and service delivery have to be treated as two different outcomes, with appropriate resources allocated to each.</p>	<p>6 Capacity development and service delivery should always be treated as two different outcomes, with two different</p>

<p>is more directly concerned with the efficient delivery of donor-funded services. This was certainly the case in Afghanistan (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund – ARTF, LOTFA) and Ethiopia even without direct results obtained in terms of statebuilding objectives. In Afghanistan and Palestine, statebuilding was equated with stabilisation and therefore an end in itself, even though in both cases questions over the legitimacy of the state authorities were always present.</p>		<p>strategies. Support to civil society should include a capacity development strategy with specific funds allocated to this. Rather than an ad hoc selection of projects, greater complementarity between chosen activities should be sought, including explicit linkage and synergy between the Finnish NGO programme and the FLC programme.</p>
<p>Within the evaluation period none of our case studies applied an intervention logic that explicitly identified direct or indirect outcomes for interventions. Although contribution and complementarity vis-à-vis government programmes and other donors is assumed, project partners in general did not regard their interventions as contributing to a set of wider programme objectives. RBM linked to a testable theory of change would have mapped the trajectory from effectiveness and efficiency to (potential) impact, but RBM has yet to be applied across all country programmes.</p> <p>Results-based management (RBM) that captures progress towards higher country level outcomes and objectives has not been established in any of our case studies over the evaluation period. Individual projects (Ethiopia, for instance) have used RBM, and in Afghanistan the new FLC plan (2014) includes RBM. But hitherto it has not been possible for Finland’s country managers to track progress on the cumulative impact of programme as a whole and make adjustments accordingly.</p>	<p>We therefore have stressed the importance for Finland to develop contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analysis that, for each country, would underpin a strategic approach to the Finnish development programme and that would inform ongoing programme choices. An intervention logic combined with RBM would strengthen this. This more strategic approach might also strengthen Finnish political dialogue, including the rationale for choosing certain aid instruments (e.g. pooled funds) and/or sectors over others.</p>	<p>7 In operationalising the MFA Fragile States Guidelines, specific objectives, process towards achieving these, and RBM impact indicators should be used within a country strategy. A Theory of Change should accompany the country strategy. Finland should more clearly define its political objectives and working processes for programme design and implementation to achieve them. Where political commitments (UN Security Council Resolution – UNSCR, EU) put specific obligations on Finland, these should be made explicit.</p>
<p>In Palestine although most of the Finnish project designs includes the identification of project related risks and potential mitigation measures, Finland has not carried out a risk analysis or made contingencies if the two-state solution</p>	<p>Without a commensurate effort made towards developing indicators or evaluative measures that record progress towards the higher level aspirations of statehood (as opposed to just capacity development) the assumption that this</p>	<p>8 Risk management should include a regularly updated appraisal of known risks around four key areas: (a) Contextual (emerging political and security risks with direct impact on the programme); (b) Programmatic</p>

<p>becomes no longer viable. In Ethiopia the biggest challenge has been national staff retention in projects, further compromised by high staff turnovers in government offices (regional and district – <i>woreda</i>). A strategy to manage or mitigate the risk associated with this has not yet been developed by the government and donors.</p>	<p>correlates with peacebuilding cannot be upheld. It requires a country strategy that details the country context and sets out the relationship between Finland’s sector programmes and development priorities. Risk analysis and management implies higher costs and goes hand in hand with developing new skills in the Finland MFA.</p>	<p>(risk variables associated with project/programme implementation); (c) Institutional (capacity and political independence risks associated with partners); and (d) Staffing (duty of care risks for national and international personnel).</p>
<p>In extreme situations such as Afghanistan, Finland’s human resource policy is not yet adapted towards the greater need for remote management; nor has there been sufficient investment in the capacity development of national institutions to undertake reliable and independent project monitoring on behalf of Finland.</p>	<p>In extreme situations such as in Afghanistan, Finland’s human resource policy is not yet adapted towards the greater need for remote management; nor has there been sufficient investment in the capacity development of national institutions to undertake reliable and independent project monitoring on behalf of Finland.</p>	<p>9 In countries where security prohibits access to recipient communities, a thorough appraisal of remote management should be undertaken. This should include a strategy for building local capacities for independently monitoring projects, and the training and costs associated with this. Acceptably higher risk activities should be embraced, provided the rationale for these is argued and defended on the basis of a strong conflict/peacebuilding analysis.</p>
<p>In terms of the predictability and disbursement of Finnish funds we found these to be efficient across all countries. The key challenge has been the provision of appropriate staffing levels in fragile states where stakeholders are more responsive to the presence and continuity of international staff on the ground. We question the extent to which limited NGO and Local Cooperation Funds have achieved higher ambitions set by the country programmes.</p> <p>Although CCOs – in particular those relating to gender and human rights – are prominent in all Finnish programmes, the analysis that underpins the rationale for chosen projects is rarely available. A small donor such as Finland would necessarily rely on implementers (UN and others) to provide contextual and specific analysis of capacities, etc., in relation to project-specific priorities, but this does not answer “why” Finland has chosen this particular partner/area/sector.</p>	<p>Despite ad hoc agreements being made between headquarters and embassies defining the division of labour and responsibilities, there is still a fairly high degree of centralised decision-making in Helsinki, especially on financial matters. This was particularly evident in the Western Balkans where forthcoming reductions in funding have been made without reference to, or consultation with, MFA staff on the ground.</p>	<p>10 For country programmes (as opposed to regional programmes), the level of devolved authority and responsibility for management and funding decisions within the MFA approved funding envelope should be greater. This is particularly true in fragile states where flexible rapid response should be matched to ongoing contextual analysis from experts on the ground. Helsinki should continue to provide guidance and technical advice, but where embassies have the required human resources, they should be responsible for conducting context analysis, programme scoping, identifying project interventions, and programme management, including monitoring.</p>

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose, objectives and scope of the evaluation

This report is a synthesis of the findings from four case studies (Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Palestinian Territories) that contribute to the first ever thematic evaluation of peace and development in Finland's development cooperation. The purpose of the evaluation is to both draw lessons on how Finnish development cooperation supports peace and development in fragile states¹ with a view to making recommendations to support the implementation of the new *Fragile States Guidelines* published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in 2014 (MFA 2014); and to serve as an accountability mechanism for informing the general public and wider community on the use and achievements of Finnish public funds.

The overall objective as set out in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (Annex 1) is to provide a comprehensive overall independent assessment of the achievements, contributions and weaknesses of Finnish development cooperation in supporting peace and development in fragile states, as well as to provide lessons learned from past cooperation focusing on the priorities of Finnish development policies; and to make recommendations on how to enhance implementation of policy priorities in supporting peace and development through development cooperation. More specifically, the objective of the evaluation is to provide answers to four key evaluation questions set out in the ToR:

- 1 Has Finnish development cooperation provided relevant support to the drivers of peace and development in fragile states including poverty reduction? Have the choice and mix of sectors and instruments contributed to these targets?
- 2 What have been the mechanisms to integrate the Finnish development policy priorities also stipulated in the 2009 Guidelines "Development and Security, in Finland's Development Policy", in the country level interventions? Are development interventions on the ground complying with the priorities and thematic focuses of the development policies and the 2009 Guidelines?
- 3 How have the cross-cutting objectives been integrated in Finland's development interventions in fragile states? How has their integration/non-integration affected identified and achieved results? What are the lessons learned and best practises in implementing cross-cutting objectives (CCOs)?
- 4 How have the aid effectiveness commitments been integrated in the Finnish development interventions? How has their application supported development results and the overall objective of peace and development? What have been the lessons learned and best practises?

The evaluation is not intended to be a conventional country programme evaluation, but rather an evaluation through the thematic lens of the peace, security and development nexus that focuses on how country programmes and development cooperation portfolios, combined with related policy dialogues and partnerships, support the drivers of peace and development in fragile contexts. Fragility is interpreted here in a broad sense to encompass not only those contexts currently or recently in conflict, but also those that have an important role to play in regional stability and peacebuilding. The chosen case studies, therefore, cover a spectrum from relatively stability (Ethiopia) to those still in the midst of conflict (Afghanistan).

In scope the evaluation focuses on two components:

Component A is an evaluation of Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans, encompassing the entirety of Finnish interventions in the region but with a specific focus on implementing Finland's Development Policy Framework Programme in 2009–13. It also includes the final evaluation of two projects: (a) Education for Sustainable Development in the Western Balkans (ESD); and (b) Consolidation of the Human Capacities in the Forest Policy and Economics Education and Research in the South-East Europe Region (FOPER I and II).

¹ Even though the evaluation team notes that fragility is not necessarily contained within national boundaries nor tied to formal states (as is the case for Palestinian territories), we will use the term fragile states throughout this report as this is the language used in Finland's Development Policy and Development Cooperation Guidelines.

Component B consists of three case studies of Finnish development cooperation between the years 2007–12 in three contexts experiencing different situations of fragility: Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Palestinian Territories.

The majority of Finnish development cooperation includes a wide range of interventions supporting conflict prevention and mitigation indirectly, with development cooperation being implemented in parallel with diplomacy, crisis management and humanitarian assistance. Hence, an important element of the evaluation is a contextual analysis of events over time, how Finnish development cooperation interplays with wider international development cooperation, and how strategy has evolved in relation to national priorities and policies. Humanitarian aid and civilian crisis management operations are not included in the scope of the evaluation, but we explore the interface between development cooperation and other official development assistance (ODA)-financed activities at the country level. Likewise, individual projects will not be evaluated as such, but may be used to illustrate wider strategic learning. Although our focus is on development cooperation, the continuity between this and the totality of Finland's approach will be explored, as well as the leverage that development cooperation affords to political dialogue in the countries under review.

1.2 Structure of the synthesis report

This report is a synthesis of the four case study reports from Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Palestinian Territories, all of which are annexed to this report (Annexes 5–8). Each of the case study reports presents detailed analysis, findings, conclusions and recommendations. The purpose of this synthesis report is to take the case study conclusions as a point of departure for synthesising common lessons and recommendations on how country programming and partnerships have exemplified Finnish development policies, and if/how these have translated into peace and development outcomes in fragile states. Furthermore, it is geared towards the usability of findings both at headquarters and country levels and seeks to assess how Finnish development policy has translated into action, with a view to making recommendations to inform the implementation of the new fragile states guidance.

Section 2 sets out the evaluation approach and methodology employed by the team for the four case studies and synthesis, together with the analytical framework, methods of data collection and analysis, and methodological limitations. Section 3 presents a summary of Finland's development cooperation policies for the evaluation period, including the new fragile states guidance, as well as contextual background to the four case studies and an overview of financial disbursements. Section 4 presents a summary of conclusions across all case studies by evaluation question. Our conclusions follow in Section 5, culminating with our recommendations in Section 6.

2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

This section sets out our overall approach to the evaluation. It is based on an analytical framework (Section 2.1.3) to ensure the systematic collection and analysis of data across the four case studies, as well as the application of two analytical methods: intervention logic analysis and contribution analysis (Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2). Section 2.2 describes in detail the evaluation methodology and process applied together with the data collection tools and how the team applied these throughout the evaluation process. Section 2.3 explains our approach to synthesising the case study findings thus forming the basis of the conclusions and recommendations set out in this report. Section 2.4 provides a detailed summary of the challenges and limitations faced by the evaluation team in conducting the evaluation and applying the approach and methodology.

2.1 Evaluation approach and analytical framework

2.1.1 Intervention logic analysis

The evaluation approach is centred on *intervention logic analysis*,² which was used across all four case studies to understand the theory behind Finland's approach in each country/region and assess the results of Finnish engagement. To achieve this, we first reconstructed an intervention logic for each case study context based on existing policy and planning documents as well as interviews. This set out Finland's *planned* strategy for engagement together with an elaboration of the critical assumptions that might have impeded achievement of outcomes. This was presented as part of the desk report. The intervention logic was then tested during the field phase to assess the extent to which it was (a) realistically assessed in terms of the underlying assumptions; (b) measurable, in terms of the kind of data analysis that was in place; and (c) realised in terms of what actually occurred within the lifetime of the programmes. The intervention logics and their accompanying analysis are included in the annexes of each case study report and are summarised in Section 4.2 of this report.

2.1.2 Contribution analysis

Alongside the intervention logic analysis, our approach to assessing Finland's contribution to results across the four case studies was guided by an adaptation of *contribution analysis*,³ which was used to provide an account of not only why the observed results occurred (or not), but also other internal and external factors that influenced outcomes. It was used to confirm the intervention logic, providing evidence and a line of reasoning from which to draw plausible conclusions regarding the extent to which the programme has made an important contribution to the documented results. The approach to contribution analysis in each case study followed four steps:

- 1 The problem to be addressed was set out: For each context the team assessed the influence that the intervention had on the observed result; why the result occurred and the role that the intervention played; and whether it is reasonable to conclude that the preponderance of evidence demonstrates that the intervention made a difference.
- 2 An intervention logic was developed: This had already been established within the reconstructed intervention logic and nuanced during the desk phase, particularly in respect of individual interventions. The intervention logic included the assumptions made in the results chain and the inherent risks, as well as external influences such as donor priorities, resourcing levels and exogenous (e.g. conflict) variables.
- 3 Evidence was gathered against the intervention logic, including information from performance measures and evaluations. Any evidence on the assumptions and risks behind the links in the intervention logic was analysed, differentiating between (a) strong (good evidence available, strong logic or wide acceptance); and (b) weak (little evidence available, weak logic or little agreement among stakeholders) evidence. All evidence regarding identified influencing factors and the contribution they may have made was considered.
- 4 The initial argument was revised and strengthened using additional available evidence. This included data received from interviews conducted during field work, as well as statistical data provided by official sources and the synthesis of evidence from the two evaluations of regional projects carried out in parallel with this programme evaluation. By including careful consideration of risks and assumptions, the analysis makes a plausible case on where the intervention has made an important contribution to expected and observed results, indicating where the intervention (a) had no or very little influence; (b) should have had an influence, direct or indirect; or (c) should have had a degree of direct control.

An analysis of Finnish contribution to results is addressed at the case study context and global levels and is set out in the findings and conclusions sections of both this synthesis report and the case study reports.

² According to EuropeAid's evaluation methodology guidance, an intervention logic sets out "the expected effects of an intervention as well as the assumptions that explain how the activities will lead to the effects in the context of the intervention" (EuropeAid 2006).

³ Contribution analysis is an approach developed by John Mayne (2008) that seeks to provide "reasonable evidence about the contribution being made by the programme" through verifying the intervention logic or theory of change on which a programme is based and exploring other factors that influence outcomes.

2.1.3 Evaluation framework

The four evaluation questions (Section 1.1) were each broken down to between four and six areas of enquiry, formulated as *judgement criteria*, which enabled the team to formulate value judgements on the basis of evidence for each question.⁴ Each judgement criterion was then broken down into a number of indicators, against which the evaluation team collected and analysed data in order to arrive at an evidence-based judgement against each criterion. The evaluation questions, judgement criteria and indicators formed the basis of the evaluation framework (included in Annex 4), which served as our analytical framework and guided the systematic collection and analysis of data in all four case studies as well as the synthesis at the global level. The evaluation framework also set out the sources of information and analytical methods that were used to respond to each evaluation question, as well as the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria covered by each question. An additional evaluation framework, also centred around the four evaluation questions and based on judgement criteria, indicators, and the standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability), was produced to guide the end-term evaluation of the two regional projects in the Western Balkans (ESD and FOPER I and II).

2.2 Evaluation process and methodology

2.2.1 Evaluation methodology

Once the four evaluation questions had been agreed in discussions with EVA-11 during evaluation start-up, we refined the evaluation methodology and analytical framework as described in Section 2.1. In addition to the intervention logic analysis, three methodological tools were developed to contribute to our understanding of the “storyline” of Finnish engagement in the fragile states under review: *contextual analysis*, *events timeline analysis* and *portfolio analysis*.

A *contextual analysis* was conducted for each case study with the purpose of understanding the context in which Finnish interventions were implemented during the evaluation period, and to analyse the extent to which the country programme was sensitive to country events, including conflict, and was adjusted in response to changes in the contextual and/or conflict environment. Our starting point was the analysis used by the MFA in formulating the country strategy and programme. This was augmented by a study of key literature and other existing publicly available documents to guide the team in the construction of a context/conflict profile for the desk report. The subsequent fieldwork used interviews with Finnish Embassy staff and other key stakeholders to add current trends and dynamics to the analysis. The context analysis for each country/region is presented in Section 4.4 of each case study report and is summarised in Section 3.3 of this synthesis report.

An *events timeline analysis* was conducted alongside the contextual analysis during the desk study phase. This entailed setting out the sequential development of key national/regional and Finnish policies, instruments and programmes across the evaluation period within each case study, as well as a selective listing of three concurrent elements in recent history: (a) major political/military events; (b) events common to all donors; and (c) a selection of project interventions or initiatives undertaken by Finland. The purpose of this was to supplement the contextual analysis through a mapping of the response of MFA Finland to contextual and inter-donor events. The events timeline analysis is presented in Annex 4 of the case study reports.

In addition, a *portfolio analysis* was conducted during the desk study phase. MFA disbursement data was collated and analysed for each country/region with the purpose of constructing a picture of Finland’s commitments and disbursements over the course of the evaluation period and understanding how these compare and fit with wider collective donor commitments. Overall donor assistance to each country/region derived from OECD/DAC data is presented in Section 3 of each case study report. A summary and analysis of Finnish financial disbursements is presented in Section 4 of each case study report as well as Section 3.4 of this synthesis report.

⁴ The terminology derives from Europe Aid Co-operation Office (2006) methodology.

2.2.2 Evaluation process

Research for the evaluation began in July 2013 with a start-up phase in Helsinki, where the international team met with EVA-11 to talk through the key objectives and methodology of the evaluation. This was followed by an inception phase where we elaborated the evaluation methodology, formulated the research questions and indicators, and met EVA-11 and key informants in Helsinki for an inception meeting in September 2013.


Each case study evaluation was then carried out in two parts. First a desk study analysis was conducted of Finnish policy and programme documentation (including policy documents, embassy reports/country consultations, country and thematic evaluations, project documents, progress reports, mid-term reviews and evaluations); combined with interviews in Helsinki with MFA and implementing partners. The purpose of this was to gain an understanding of each context and Finland's achievements in each case study country/region, identify information gaps for further study/validation, and establish a set of evaluation hypotheses to test during the subsequent field phase. Then each case study team conducted an initial contextual, intervention logic and portfolio analysis as described above. Analysis and preliminary findings from the desk study were written up in a consistent format across the four case studies using the evaluation framework (Annex 4), and were presented as part of four individual desk study annexes in addition to the overall desk study report.

In addition to the summary of preliminary findings, each case study team set out lines of enquiry or evaluation hypotheses to be tested and validated in the field phase based on the initial evidence collected against each judgement criterion, as well as data gaps, constraints and proposed methodology for fieldwork. Also a strategy for sampling programme project interventions was set out for each case study based on a number of variables, including: scale and potential replication/sustainability of the intervention, linkage between more than one intervention, recent or ongoing activity, and accessibility of field sites. Given that the nature of the evaluation was focused more at the strategic level than the programme level, a limited number of interventions were selected in each case that typified the priorities pursued in the country/region concerned.

The initial findings and evaluation hypotheses were then tested and validated by each case study team during the fieldwork. Field visits were staggered to allow for learning from preceding visits. Two four-person teams spent four weeks in Western Balkans, covering Serbia, Kosovo and Croatia (January 2014), three weeks in Ethiopia (February), two weeks in West Bank and Israel (February), and one week in Afghanistan/Dubai (May). The constraints faced by the team in Afghanistan are discussed in Section 2.4. A particular focus of the fieldwork was placed on testing the intervention logic reconstructed during the desk phase; and to continue the process of gathering evidence along the intervention logic to build an overall story of Finland's performance and contribution to peace and development outcomes in each country/region. Case study teams conducted both individual interviews and focus group discussions with a wide range of stakeholders – national and local government officials, donor agency staff and implementers, and project end-users and beneficiaries – to cross-check and validate the initial findings from the desk study. The field team leader was responsible for drawing reliable and valid conclusions based on triangulated evidence. The reliability of our analysis and findings was enhanced by the preparation of interview questions drawing on the evaluation framework sub-questions, as well as the systematic writing-up and sharing of interview notes and subsequent cross-checking across the team, thus providing a systematic and harmonised data collection process. In addition, debrief meetings were held at the end of each field mission with Finnish staff in-country to validate findings.

The final reporting phase was divided into three phases: first the analysis and synthesis of case study findings leading to the preparation of semi-final draft case study reports for Western Balkans, Ethiopia and Palestine (Afghanistan was prepared later due to delays in conducting the fieldwork). Following feedback on the semi-final drafts, the team then prepared final draft reports for Western Balkans, Ethiopia and Palestine, as well as a semi-final draft for both Afghanistan and a synthesis report (final drafts for these were submitted in August), which were presented and discussed in Helsinki in June. Finally, the team presented the findings from the synthesis and case study reports in a public presentation in Helsinki in August, after which final versions of all reports were submitted before the end of August. Figure 1 illustrates the key tasks and deliverables associated with each phase of the evaluation.

Figure 1 Phases, stages, tasks and deliverables of the evaluation.



Source: elaborated by Itad.

2.3 Approach to evaluation synthesis

Given that the four case studies cover a wide spectrum of fragility – from chronic poverty to acute conflict – and each display very different historical trajectories and conflict dynamics, one of the key challenges faced by the evaluation team has been to synthesise findings from four very different contexts. A synthesis framework was developed to critically interpret the conclusions of each case study in order to generate an understanding of their applicability at the global policy level, and more specifically, at the level of implementing the new fragile states guidance. This would ensure that the case study conclusions went beyond context-specific recommendations and added up to more than the sum of their parts.

First, conclusions from the four case studies were pulled into an Excel-based mapping document (Table 1), with conclusions recorded by each evaluation question and judgement criterion. From these an interpretive judgement was used to derive a global conclusion, making note of counter-examples which contradict the overall narrative. Finally, the overall interpretation was checked back against the longer discussions of findings and conclusions in the case study reports and adjusted to reflect any additional nuances or points of interest. These overall interpretations are presented in Section 4 and form the basis of the synthesis conclusions in Section 5 and recommendations in Section 6.

2.4 Methodological challenges and limitations

The following section sets out the key limitations to data collection across the four case studies, and how our approach, methods and tools have affected the accuracy of findings, confidence in findings, and the reliability of conclusions.

Western Balkans

There are inherent limitations in pitching an evaluation at a strategic level. Less attention is paid to individual project outcomes and hence to the immediate experiences of participants and beneficiaries. To some extent this was compensated for by the inclusion of two project evaluations in the regional case study. The strategic focus of the evaluation nevertheless meant that there was insufficient time during the fieldwork phase to consult widely with participants and local stakeholders, diminishing the evaluators' understanding of the current context and of the results of individual interventions. The greatest limitation, however, was the incomplete documentary record of Finland's interventions. It has not been standard practice to carry out final evaluations of Finnish projects, so the team's assessment of results has in many places depended on completion reports written by the implementing partner. Mid-term evaluations were also not always available, and the record of progress reports for individual interventions was often not up to date.

Table 1 Outline of evaluation synthesis mapping framework.

No.	EQs and JCs	Summary of conclusions				Synthesis
		Western Balkans	Afghanistan	Ethiopia	Palestine	Overall interpretation
1	Has Finnish development cooperation provided relevant support to the drivers of peace and development including poverty reduction? Have the choice and mix of sectors and instruments contributed to these targets, and recognised issues of fragility in the country/region?					
1.1	Extent to which the design of and strategic choices made within each country programme is based on good contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analyses.	There is no documentary evidence of region specific contextual analysis of the region having been undertaken by MFA. Recourse was made to analytical material available at the time from the EU, WB, UN agencies. Complementarity has been a tool, in effect, for aligning the Programme with the context analysis of other donors and aid agencies.	The wider contextual analysis in Afghanistan has been largely dependent on partner overviews and reputable sources rather than Finland's own independent analysis. It would be useful to have an independent conflict sensitivity assessment of the specific activities undertaken by Finland, along with interim monitoring of outcomes for compliance to FS principles.	There is no evidence that Finland had undertaken studies combining the elements of contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analysis into one comprehensive study as a basis of the development programme in Ethiopia. Finland uses research data available from other stakeholders as a source of its decision making on development assistance.	Finland does not conduct its own political economy and poverty analysis of the Palestinian Territories. Finland's contextual and political analysis is derived from a variety of credible sources, including the EU, WB and UN. The links between the context and the choice of strategic priorities and design of Finland's development programme are not explicit.	In none of our case studies has Finland combined elements of contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analysis into one comprehensive study that underpins a strategic approach to the Finnish development programme. Seeking complementarity, Finland has largely been reliant upon contextual analysis undertaken by other key donors.

Afghanistan

Methodologically, we were restricted to a literature review and one-to-one interviews undertaken in Helsinki, Kabul and by phone. There was neither an opportunity to see projects in Afghanistan, nor to conduct focus group discussions with project recipients. Itad's security advisory service recommended limited time in-country due to high security threats (the Afghanistan Presidential elections compounding the usual security alert situation), and we were not able to have contact with government officials. We therefore could not explore government opinions regarding the Finnish programme. It was only possible to meet key donor, UN and non-governmental organisation (NGO) personnel in Kabul. Clearly this was a major constraint to a comprehensive evaluation, but since this was not a country programme evaluation we were not tasked to verify project results.

Ethiopia and Palestinian Territories

One of the main limitations to the team's proposed methodology in both case studies was the absence of a country strategy document or overall programme plan for Finnish engagement during the evaluation period, and thus the lack of articulation of the key assumptions and critical pathways of change on which programming is based. This complicated the task of analysing the development and management of Finnish strategy, the responsiveness of Finnish strategy to contextual changes, and the underlying intervention logic for Finn-

ish engagement. Furthermore, the evaluation was hampered in both case studies by a lack of documentation and data, particularly with respect to outcome and results. The available documentation is heavily weighted towards project inception and design with less reporting on outcomes. This made the task of generating solid evidence for impact of Finnish support on poverty reduction in Ethiopia and peace and development in the Palestinian Territories very difficult.

In **Ethiopia**, the case study team sought to mitigate these limitations through conducting extensive interviews across four regions in Ethiopia to gather additional data and perceptions of Finnish contribution to results. Owing to time limitations during the field mission and extensiveness of the bilateral programme, not enough time was spent on NGO support. The team relied on receiving the results of the then ongoing evaluation of complementarity in Finnish development policy and cooperation that assessed the activities of the Finnish NGOs in Ethiopia among other countries. The team received the evaluation report during the field mission only to find out that it did not include Ethiopia as a case study. As a result the team attempted to interview a small number of Finnish NGOs in Helsinki after the field mission. However, it was only possible to secure an interview with one of the big NGOs.

Additionally in **Palestinian Territories**, the evaluation team encountered problems with the availability of regional staff for interview. During the period covered by the evaluation the regional department comprised of three staff,⁵ out of which only one was available for interview. Other interviews were conducted with staff whose main responsibilities were for regional political affairs.

3 PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND COOPERATION (2007–12)

3.1 Summary of Finland's development cooperation policies 2007–12

There has been considerable change in the approach and emphasis of Finland's development policy over the period of the evaluation. The 2007 Development Policy (MFA 2007a) placed an emphasis on ecologically sustainable development and the pursuit of the millennium development goals (MDGs). Re-emphasising its commitments to working within the EU, multilaterally through the UN and bilaterally through NGOs, the policy was couched in quite general terms. Aside from the long-term partner countries, there was also the evolving notion of a "comprehensive approach" between military/civilian crisis management and development cooperation to be applied in countries recovering from violent crisis. The policy did not specify priorities in respect of crisis resolution, nor was there any specific mention of fragile states, though it did recognise the EU's increasing concerns with linking security and development.

In the interim period between this and the next formal development policy of 2012, the Finnish Government issued its 2009 Security and Defence Policy in which the concept of a holistic approach to security and development was stated thus:

Finland promotes coherent crisis management, development cooperation and humanitarian aid in line with EU Council decisions concerning security and development. The ambition is to bring about a comprehensive approach in preventing and controlling conflicts as well as in post-conflict management. Both security and development actors have separate, yet mutually complementary, roles and responsibilities (Prime Minister's Office 2009).

This was developed further in 2009 as Guidelines by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in which development and comprehensive security concepts were juxtaposed with OECD/DAC Fragile States Principles. Conceptually this recognised the importance of interventions in certain sectors – security sector reform (SSR) (police), peace mediation, human rights and gender equality (MFA 2010).

⁵ Between 2007 and 2010 the regional team fluctuated between two and three staff, of which only one member was assigned to manage the development portfolio.

The 2012 Development Policy Programme completes the new cycle of thinking. It establishes human rights as the basis of all Finnish development policy and cooperation, and hence introduces a major shift of emphasis within the foreign affairs administration. It implies a move away from the more needs-based and technical approach of the 2007 Development Policy Programme. Now the focus is on the more challenging issues of power relationships which in turn require a deeper knowledge of, and engagement with, political processes. There are two essential components: a focus on structural causes of inequality; and the recognition of the rights of groups and individuals to claim their rights and become moral and legal duty bearers (Development Policy Committee 2013).

The first human rights strategy of the Finnish foreign affairs administration was published in June 2013, and lists universality, non-discrimination and participation as the primary principles of the human rights-based approach (MFA 2013a). It is important to locate human rights policy within the concept of “Finnish added value”, not least because (at least in our evaluation case studies) human rights and gender are proclaimed the “niche” entry points of the Finnish programme. In the 2007 Development Policy value added was a technologically and commercially oriented concept; by 2012 it had returned much more to a liberal value-oriented concept. In short, the added value of Finnish development cooperation was now perceived in terms of its contribution to the wider endeavours of like-minded donors (EU, Nordic+ group) and the strategic advocacy and programming on specific issues (human rights, gender, environment).

3.2 Towards a policy on fragile states

Finland has been a signatory to all the major international initiatives on fragile states since the formulation of the first OECD/DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations in 2007 provided a framework to guide international actors in achieving better results in the most challenging development contexts. The Principles were validated in Accra in 2008, and in 2009 a baseline survey was conducted in six countries, including one of our case study countries (Afghanistan). Subsequently, Finland attended the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, in November 2011 at which the G7+ countries signed a “new deal” for engagement in fragile states (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2011). This was now to be the cornerstone for Finland’s policy towards fragile states, and the principles it espoused were repeated in Finland’s own *Fragile States Guidelines* published in March 2014 (MFA 2014).

The Guidelines reaffirm Finland’s holistic approach towards tackling the challenges in fragile states: a well-researched and judicious use of military and/or civil crisis management, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. Long-term cooperation should focus on three thematic priorities: conflict prevention; development of a democratic and accountable society and the rule of law; and the participation of women at all levels. Again, a human rights-based approach is at the heart of these priorities. The Guidelines take the reader through the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of the new deal with examples of how Finland has adhered to them. The goals are as follows:

- 1 *Legitimate politics*: Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution.
- 2 *Security*: Establish and strengthen people’s security.
- 3 *Justice*: Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice.
- 4 *Economic foundations*: Generate employment and improve livelihoods.
- 5 *Revenues and services*: Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

The Guidelines are a condensed recap of the central principles now underpinning OECD donor approaches towards fragile states. They include reference to “do no harm” principles. To identify where harm may be inadvertently caused is an essential element of risk analysis in a fragile context. For Finland the Guidelines have yet to be translated into operational priorities to complement the more specific Development and Security Guidelines issued in 2009 (MFA 2010a). In part, this is a question of inter-departmental collaboration. At present the Department for Development Policy administers development cooperation in multilateral organisations, humanitarian assistance and support for the development cooperation of NGOs, and also monitors the implementation of the EU’s development cooperation and policy. The various regional departments administer bilateral development cooperation, and the Political Department administers crisis management, peace mediation and the UN Peacebuilding Fund’s support for fragile states. The Guidelines also recognise the crucial role of the Foreign Service in finding the appropriate levels of expertise and training necessary for full engagement in fragile states (MFA 2014, 29).

The Guidelines do, however, begin to develop a more directive stance that anticipates future MFA policy. In Section III it states that “it is important that the Foreign Service internalises the international recommendations, actions and commitments for engagement in fragile states”. The section then outlines a series of policies and measures to be taken:

- 1 *Conflict-sensitive approach and conflict analysis.* This should include the updating of the Finnish cooperation manual to include guidance on conflict-sensitive programming. In all fragile states Finland should develop not only a comprehensive understanding of the operating context, but also the use of Conflict Analysis to support operational planning, monitoring and evaluation.
- 2 *Cooperation, coordination and influence.* This includes reinforcing the complementarity and coordination of crisis management and development cooperation in the Finnish Foreign Service; increasing the synergy between humanitarian, recovery and development activities; and strengthening the support offered through multilateral agencies and regional initiatives (UN and EU).
- 3 *Strengthening local ownership.* Local ownership should be interpreted more widely than the government and state administration; it should include dialogue and participation of civil society and increasing citizens’ and the authorities’ awareness of their rights and obligations.
- 4 *Risk management.* Closely linked to context/conflict analysis where external risks are assessed, operational risks should be outlined with appropriate measures taken to minimise them. Risk management also includes the sharing of risks between partners and donors, and hence an increased reliance on pooled funding and joint management.⁶
- 5 *Funding and support channels.* Finland should give particular attention to flexibility, transparency and predictability of funding, combining these principles with a use of funds to promote good governance, human rights, gender equality, reduction of other inequalities, and democratic values. Measurable results are linked to long-term commitment and Finland should, within the constraints of its resources, participate in and try to influence the governance structures of the entities it funds, particularly in relation to women’s participation, peace/statebuilding and human rights.

The evaluation examines Finnish performance in relation to these five central pillars, asking the extent to which the Finnish MFA has, to date, begun to take into account the particular demands of working in fragile states and what further measures will be required.

3.3 Contextual background to the case studies

As discussed in Section 2.3, the four chosen case studies for this evaluation each represent very different aspects of fragility, thus complicating the task of synthesising findings which are inherently very context specific to a global level. This becomes even more pronounced when the definition of fragility in each context points to an aspect of governance and/or political turmoil that becomes a defining feature of that country. However, as Grävingholt *et al.* (2012) contend, although state fragility can be conceptualised as a multi-dimensional phenomenon and manifests in several distinct configurations, these configurations are limited. Thus, while still upholding the importance of country-specific analysis, the authors argue that typologies or constellations of state fragility can be useful for policy design in fragile states (Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum 2012). A recent example of the use of country constellations for strategy formulation in fragile states is BMZ’s recently developed “Development for Peace and Security” strategy paper (BMZ 2013).

In order, therefore, to understand the context in which both our case study conclusions and global level synthesis findings have emerged, it is useful here to briefly set out the commonalities and differences between each of the case study contexts, drawing on some of the multi-dimensional characteristics of state fragility identified in the abovementioned papers. For example, notable differences include the fact that Afghanistan, Kosovo, Ethiopia, Palestinian Territories and Bosnia-Herzegovina can be all defined by differing levels of state authority, capacity and legitimacy: while countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia combine severe deficiencies in all three, countries such as Ethiopia display higher levels of state capacity and stability, yet reasonably high levels of state control, and countries such as Kosovo are no longer in conflict yet still suffer from shortcomings in service delivery. On the other hand, there are also notable commonalities across some of the case studies. For example, with respect to insufficient economic opportunities coupled with an increasingly young population across most of the case studies, a disconnect between the state and the population, difficult access

⁶ MFA Finland has also produced an Anti-corruption Handbook for Development Practitioners (2012).


to many regions, and a degree of regional instability. From a Finnish programming perspective there are also some commonalities with respect to sector programming and identification of Finnish added value (e.g. Ethiopia and Palestinian Territories), as well as the reliance on external context and conflict analyses.

All of these important contextual factors are captured and presented in detailed country- and regional-level contextual analyses, which can be found in Section 4 of the case study reports. These analyses form the basis of both the case study findings and conclusions, as well as the overall synthesis of findings across all studies, which is presented in Section 4 of this report.

3.4 Financial overview of Finland’s development cooperation

This section provides a brief overview of Finnish development cooperation disbursements and commitments from 2007. Until 2012 there has been an upward trajectory of steady funding with the likelihood that Finland would achieve the international target of 0,7% of gross national product (GNP) by 2015. However, the government has frozen development cooperation funding for 2013–14 at the level of 2012 and decided to reduce funding by a total of €59 million in 2015. Reductions of €30,5 and 32 million have been agreed for 2016 and 2017, respectively (Development Policy Committee 2013). These reductions were to be offset by steering emissions trading income into development cooperation, but this amount has fallen and at current rates it is unlikely that Finland will achieve the 0,7% of GNP target. Figure 2 provides an overview of global Finnish development cooperation disbursements from 2007, while Figure 3 shows the breakdown of Finnish global assistance in 2012 by different areas of cooperation.

Figure 2 Global Finnish development cooperation disbursements (€ millions).




Source: Development Policy Committee (2013).

The team has not had access to a breakdown of Finnish ODA to fragile states, but the OECD/DAC reports that in 2011 net disbursements from Finland to its list of fragile states (51 countries) was \$223 million (OECD/DAC 2014). As a percentage of Finland’s gross national income this represented 0,12%, ranking Finland eighth in the world in terms of upholding commitments made at the Istanbul conference in May 2011.⁷

Finally, Table 2 provides an overview of global ODA to the four chosen case studies in this evaluation. This is the estimated net global ODA from all providers, including the United States, EU, international finance insti-

⁷ The Istanbul Programme of Action for the LDCs (Least Developed Countries) provided UN targets for ODA to LDCs. It was attended by OECD/DAC and UN member states in May 2011.

Figure 3 Global Finnish development cooperation disbursements in 2012 by cooperation category (€ millions).



Source: Development Policy Committee (2013).

Table 2 Net global ODA to the four case study countries, 2007–11 (constant 2011 US\$ million).

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghanistan	5 413	5 103	6 644	6 743	6 711
Kosovo and B&H	0 658	0 477	1 266	1 207	1 281
Ethiopia	2 728	3 426	4 077	3 723	3 532
West Bank and Gaza Strip	1 888	2 540	2 993	2 667	2 442

Source: Figures derived from OECD/DAC (2014) *Fragile States*.

tutions, United Nations and 38 donor countries. Afghanistan is the largest aid recipient country in the world,⁸ Ethiopia the second largest, West Bank/Gaza the fourth and Kosovo/Bosnia-Herzegovina the eighth.

A more detailed analysis of Finnish development cooperation disbursements to each of the four case study countries/regions can be found in Section 4 of the case study reports.

4 ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF FINLAND'S SUPPORT TO PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1 Assessment of overall performance and results

The following section sets out our synthesis findings, which are based on the conclusions of the four case studies and our overall interpretation at a global level following the evaluation synthesis methodology described in Section 2.3. These are presented in four sub-sections, each of which relates to one of the four overarching evaluation questions. Moreover, each sub-section is further sub-divided by the judgement criteria (presented in bold), which enabled the team to formulate value judgements on the basis of evidence for each evaluation question. A short paragraph summarising the overall finding for each judgement criterion is presented first, followed by a summary of conclusions from each case study. The overall synthesis conclusions against each evaluation question are presented in Section 5.

⁸ For two years, 2007 and 2008, Iraq exceeded Afghanistan.

4.1.1 Relevance of support to the drivers of peace and development

Evaluation Question 1: Has Finnish development cooperation provided relevant support to the drivers of peace and development including poverty reduction? Have the choice and mix of sectors and instruments contributed to these targets, and recognised issues of fragility in the country/region?

Extent to which the design of and strategic choices made within each country programme is based on good contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analyses

In none of our case studies has Finland combined elements of contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analysis into one comprehensive study that underpins a strategic approach to the Finnish development programme and that would inform ongoing programme choices. Seeking complementarity, Finland has largely been reliant upon contextual analysis undertaken by other key donors, notably World Bank, UN and EU.

In **Afghanistan** the scope of programme is largely determined by UNSCR mandate. Beyond this, the strategic choices made in the government White Paper on Afghanistan and the 2009 Afghanistan Action Plan reflect the general consensus among donors on what defines “fragility” in the country. In the **Western Balkans**, Finland has supported the key driver of peace and development in the Western Balkans – the EU Stabilisation and Association Process. Project interventions have been well aligned and coordinated with Balkan country policies, as well as the policies and strategies of other donors and multilateral aid agencies. Finland has not carried out its own detailed context analysis, preferring to use that of other donors and aid agencies.

In **Ethiopia**, Finland did not have a country programme strategy before 2013–16. Prior to this (and for the evaluation period under consideration here) the mechanism for making decisions on bilateral cooperation was the biannual country negotiations between Finland and Ethiopia. These negotiations were based on situation analysis on the country’s needs and priorities when the political situation and development issues were analysed in relation to Finland’s support to the priority sectors and aid instruments. There is no evidence that Finland had undertaken studies combining the elements of contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analysis into one comprehensive study as a basis of the development programme in Ethiopia. Finland, as a small donor, uses research data available from other stakeholders as a source of its decision-making on development assistance. In the **Palestinian Territories**, there has been no strategic plan that details the country context and sets out the relationship between Finland’s development cooperation and the development priorities of the region. For the broad analysis, Finland relies heavily on the EU, World Bank and UN; but the absence of a country plan means that Finland lacks a coherent framework within which to detail the rationale behind their development cooperation. The result is that ad hoc responses tend to be the norm, and risks and opportunities are not made explicit. There is also no results chain against which to measure progress and ensure appropriate levels of human resources.

Box 1 Finland’s regional programme in Africa.

The latest Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland policy on *Africa is formulated in its Africa in Finnish Foreign Policy, 2010*. It defines a strategic framework for strengthening the partnership between Finland and Africa using development policy instruments and emphasises a comprehensive approach in conflict prevention, crisis management, crisis resolution and post-conflict recovery in Africa. Finland supports the peacebuilding work of the African Union (AU) and has granted €2,9 million for a three-year cooperation programme that aims to develop the AU’s peace mediation capacity. Finland also cooperates with the United Nations and with the regional organisation of Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa. Finland has supported the Nile Basin Initiative with the objective of promoting the sustainable use of the Nile water resources and cooperation between the countries in utilising the water resources in order to prevent potential conflicts emerging.

Extent to which intervention logics underpinned the designed strategy; and the extent to which these were relevant, valid and understood by Finland MFA and its partners

Within the evaluation period none of our case studies applied an intervention logic that explicitly identified direct or indirect outcomes for interventions. Although contribution and complementarity vis-à-vis government programmes and other donors is assumed, project partners in general did not regard their interventions as contributing to a set of wider programme objectives. Results-based management (RBM) linked to a testable theory of change would have mapped the trajectory from effectiveness and efficiency to (potential) impact, but RBM has yet to be applied across all country programmes.

In **Afghanistan**, the intervention logic, implicitly or explicitly articulated in key MFA strategy documents since 2009, reiterates the belief that bolstering the architecture of the state is a pathway to sustainable development, and that this in turn is a precondition of peace. The logic is not, however, unpacked into its constituent priority components; moreover, there are no specific indicators against which to measure progress towards these higher level outcomes.

In the **Western Balkans** the Policy Framework Programme document does not explicitly identify direct outcomes for interventions in the region, nor does it clearly establish causal links between Finnish and other internationally funded development goals. Thus the aims of the programme are not clear. Project partners in general have not understood their interventions as contributing to a set of wider programme objectives. No mechanism exists and no monitoring tool has been developed to measure programme results and track their achievement according to a logical sequence of events and a set of contextually specific assumptions; nevertheless, an annual schedule of project mid-term reviews/evaluations is delivered to the evaluation unit of the MFA. Results-oriented design would have enhanced the effectiveness, efficiency, and potential final impact of the Programme. This should have included the establishment of a manageable and realistic set of objectives, based on a rigorous process of prioritisation of areas to work in, and a set of practicable strategies setting out a testable theory of change.

In **Ethiopia**, Finland has not had a strategy underpinned by intervention logic during the evaluation period, even though a strategy can be inferred from analysis of the programme. Our own reconstructed theory of change (in the case study) demonstrates a strong embedding of programme formulation in the poverty reduction strategies of Ethiopia and shows that the focal sectors for Finnish support have been selected accordingly. In the **Palestinian Territories**, the absence of a detailed country strategy means the explicit logic underpinning Finland's development cooperation programme and desired outcomes are not readily apparent to external stakeholders. Given that Finland is a small donor, the absence of an intervention logic may not necessarily be relevant for its Palestinian Authority (PA) partners. In a complex environment, this would, however, be useful to the MFA for planning. Finland conducts an annual review with the PA on the implementation of conclusions in the bilateral agreement. This reviews programme progress though there is no monitoring and assessment of higher level policy goals.

Extent to which other MFA interventions (political dialogue, humanitarian action) have complemented and/or provided leverage to development cooperation

Although the links between political dialogue and development cooperation are not always explicitly outlined as strategy, for a small donor these are taken for granted. Most particularly in countries where a joint-donor human rights agenda is active, Finland has purposely and effectively engaged in dialogue at all levels of government and its relatively "neutral" political agenda has been used effectively. In fragile states effective diplomacy depends on tangible goods, and humanitarian as well as development funding have been an "entry card" for political dialogue and advocacy.

In **Afghanistan**, MFA interventions are multi-tiered, and for a small donor the interplay between military activities, political advocacy and development cooperation is taken for granted. In its comment on the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy Finland located its "niche" in more bottom-up programmes such as human rights, gender and livelihoods and has effectively exploited a limited degree of political leverage around these issues. In the **Western Balkans** (in particular Kosovo), Finland combines traditional diplomacy with engagement in military and civilian crisis management missions, which are viewed as being complementary to its development cooperation. Among donor organisations with a particular interest in promoting peace in Kosovo, Finland is viewed as having a valuable role as an "independent" donor that is able to contribute to a dialogue of conflict sensitivity by sharing good practice and lessons learned from its own interventions.

In **Ethiopia**, Finland has actively followed events relating to development and security and has actively and effectively engaged in political dialogue with the government. In our interviews we found that these discussions are reported as “constructive” even when delicate issues have been raised. Ethiopia is the only country within our study that is a long-term development partner for Finland, and its influence in addressing issues around peacebuilding are likely only to be indirect, through development cooperation in the priority sectors of water, education and land. In the **Palestinian Territories**, Finland complements its development cooperation with political dialogue through the EU. Finland’s support to humanitarian programming provides important assistance to Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem and enables Finland to access information on the overall situation. We are able, from existing documents, to reconstruct a rationale for Finland’s development cooperation and its close links with Finnish political work in the region: the MFA’s 2007 draft cooperation strategy; the 2008 negotiations; and the 2012 bilateral consultations, plus their background documents, set out Finland’s policies and activities with regard to political areas and development cooperation. These documents also provide information on Finland’s key concerns for peace and stability in the Palestinian Territories. From them it is possible to map the range of diplomatic and aid policy objectives and activities applied by the MFA.

Extent to which the mix of Finnish development cooperation aid instruments and modalities was appropriate to achieve objectives

In general, Finland has appropriately chosen and applied its aid instruments to the working context. Where single project approaches cannot be adequately monitored (Afghanistan, Palestinian Authorities), either pooled funds or budget support are the preferred modalities. Where targeted projects achieve greater impact in terms of community cohesion and/or sector support (Kosovo, Ethiopia), these have been chosen.

In **Afghanistan**, we found that the mix of Finnish aid instruments was appropriate to the objectives outlined in the White Paper, and to the priorities set by Finland’s own global development policies. But over a three-year period from 2009–13 it was contextual obstacles – including the curtailment of even basic supervision missions – that challenged the wisdom of continuing with such a diverse portfolio. When the impact of some project cannot be verified the rationale of the programme as a whole becomes questionable. Nevertheless, a reliance on pooled funding mechanisms maximises the effectiveness of a relatively small donor, and Finland has appropriately adhered to a combination of central (core) funding combined with preference funding for the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA), Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme and Community Recovery Intensification Programme. In the **Western Balkans**, Finland has chosen appropriate aid modalities and programme partners to address state fragility and post-conflict recovery. By giving preference to the project modality over programme-based cooperation, Finland has not adhered strictly to the aid effectiveness agenda. However, the project approach is an effective means of accessing communities directly and facilitating increased communication and cooperation between segregated or antagonistic communities. The project approach enables Finland to concentrate on sectors or issues that are of less interest to other donors, thus giving Finland’s assistance a higher profile and increased added value. Single-funding arrangements allow Finland to adopt a more flexible approach with partner organisations than would be possible through pooled funds. At the same time, the budget support provided by the MFA through the First Sustainable Employment Development Policy Operation contributes towards what is widely regarded as an example of donor coordination at its best.

In **Ethiopia**, project support in the water sector at various levels has proven an appropriate instrument in achieving objectives, with efficient and effective interventions. Finland, as the only donor in special needs education/inclusive education (SNE/IE), has contributed significantly to awareness-raising since coming to the country in 1998. Capacity development results at all levels are weakened due to high staff turnover. Finland has been playing a major role in promoting inclusiveness and equity, in the education sector and SNE in particular. Pooled funding, together with project funding in education, has had a positive effect, as the General Education Quality Improvement Project II (GEQIP) has now doubled the per capita grant for schools for disabled students. NGO and Fund for Local Cooperation (FLC) projects are aligned with the Finnish development policy and give complementary support to the same sectors and to cross-cutting objectives. In the **Palestinian Territories**, all Finland’s aid instruments are coherent with the aim of enabling the conditions for an independent Palestinian state by supporting responsible and good governance, capacity building of Palestinian institutions, and citizen participation and empowerment through strengthening of civil society. Finland’s support to humanitarian programming (about 30% of Finland’s budget) provides important assistance to Pal-

estine refugees in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem and enables Finland to access information on the overall situation. Finland's direct budget support for the PA is also an important contribution to the functioning of the PA and the maintenance of stability in the Territories. Finland's ongoing support and commitment to the European–Palestinian Management and Socio-Economic Help (PEGASE) is recognised and welcome in-country. Finland's sector-wide approach in education and technical assistance support to partner agencies – the Palestinian Land Authority and the Palestinian Water Authority – is fully in line with its institutional capacity building goals.

Extent to which the sectors chosen by Finland were done so in recognition of the characteristics and priorities relating to the fragility of the country/region

The conventional use of the term “fragile” does not apply to Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent in the Western Balkans than in Afghanistan and Palestinian Territories. In all of our case studies the choice of sectors has been an evolving process, determined by a combination of Finnish traditional expertise and the viability of chosen partners. The argument for relevance is often retrospectively applied. This is not to say that the choice was “wrong”; simply that an alternative choice might have been equally valid in countries where needs across all sectors are apparent.

In **Afghanistan**, in line with all donors, Finnish response has centred on enhancing state functions aimed at increasing security, social services and, by extension, state legitimacy. The chosen Finnish niche was human rights (including gender), but this was always strongly related to SSR, rule of law and enhanced livelihoods. In the **Western Balkans**, combining a sector-specific approach (environment) with cross-border activities as a means to address regional instability was a key strength of the Western Balkans Programme. It contributed towards increasing confidence, trust and cooperation across political and cultural boundaries. More broadly, though, there is also no evidence that Finland undertook scenario planning or provided a contingency to change its strategy in response to changing events in the region. Finland has recently sought to give increasing importance to economic development and employment generation in response to perceived threats to stability relating poverty, unemployment, especially youth unemployment, and social inequality.

Box 2 Civilian crisis management in Afghanistan.

Finland's civilian crisis management support in Afghanistan increased threefold from 2008 to 2012. Most Finnish assistance in this sector is towards the EU police mission (EUPOL) that acts as an advisor in strategic development of the Afghan Ministry of Interior. EUPOL also provides special training for the police and prosecution authorities with a particular emphasis on building capacities to promote the rule of law and human rights. Through the Crisis Management Centre in Kuopio, Finland, the MFA has trained more than 20 Afghan officials from the police and prosecution services during a pilot phase during 2009–11. In Afghanistan there has not been a civilian police force as such. With capacity constraints in the national army, much of the burden of counter-insurgency has fallen to the 150,000 police force. Likewise, there has been poor cooperation between the police and judiciary, so the focus of the mission has been on developing the Afghan police and prosecution at the central level, along with management training and certain special training areas.

In **Ethiopia**, Finnish development assistance has not directly used fragility indicators as the main justification for its development cooperation, apart from the case of Benishangul-Gumuz. High levels of poverty and a lack of basic services in the priority sectors have been the primary entry points for interventions. Tackling weak governance and lack of capacity at all levels has been a means towards achieving Ethiopia's national development goals rather than an end in itself. In the **Palestinian Territories**, there is no country strategy or plan that details the characteristics and priorities relating to the fragility of the context. Over the course of the evaluation period there have not been any changes in the sectors that Finland supports. Finland has too few human resources in order to fully support and respond to the demands of the context.

Extent to which Finnish country strategy identified specific areas of intervention where its added value would be apparent and recognised by stakeholders

In our case studies we found particular sectors where Finnish added value and expertise are well established and recognised by stakeholders; for example, SNE/IE (Western Balkans, Ethiopia). In line with other Nor-

dic donors, Finland has been prominent in advocating gender equity and human rights (Afghanistan). Though relatively small, there are additional niche areas where Finland can claim specific expertise: civilian crisis management and natural resource exploration (Afghanistan); and cross-border environmental programmes (Western Balkans).

In **Afghanistan**, Finland's added value in specific sectors – human rights, gender, and security sector – are recognised by like-minded donors. More recently there has also been an interesting explorative investment in helping to increase the capacity of the national mining authorities (Afghanistan Geological Survey, GTK) with a project that exploits a particular strength of Finnish expertise. In the **Western Balkans** (Kosovo) Finnish specific expertise to special needs and inclusive education built upon a legacy in this field that goes back to 2001. Individual project evaluations of Finland's regional projects, Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) and FOPER (in forest policy and economics) carried out as part of this Programme evaluation, confirmed how the value of Finnish expertise was introduced to beneficiaries in a participatory manner.

In **Ethiopia**, historical continuity and accumulated expertise and knowledge have been extremely important in the selection of priority sectors. Finland is recognised as the lead donor in the water sector as well as a strong advocate of SNE/IE. Finland has invested in equality in education and developed a high level SNE system and capacity in its own country, and this expertise has been carried across to overseas programmes. In the **Palestinian Territories**, there is evidence that the intended beneficiaries of Finland's development cooperation were clearly identified and their needs analysed, but there is no clearly identified area of specific expertise or added value attributed to Finland within a strategic plan. The sector-specific specialisation pursued by Finland over many years has introduced a level of “silo” thinking that inhibits a coherent country-wide strategy.

4.1.2 Policy coherence and resource allocation

Evaluation Question 2: What have been the mechanisms to integrate Finnish development policy priorities (stipulated in the 2009 Guidelines Development and Security in Finland's Development Policy) in country level interventions? Are development interventions on the ground complying with the priorities and thematic focuses of the development policies and the 2009 Guidelines?

Extent to which the policy priorities stipulated by MFA (particularly in the 2009 Guidelines) were understood and incorporated into country level interventions

Broadly speaking Finland's 2009 Guidelines have been adhered to, albeit more directly referred to in some cases (Afghanistan) than in others (Palestine). In the earlier years covered by the evaluation, with the exception of Ethiopia, country portfolios comprised too many discrete interventions of often limited scope. Finland would have achieved greater overall effectiveness and coherence if it had focused on a more limited number of sectors or specific issues and themes.

In **Afghanistan**, compliance with Finland's key policy directives has been optimal, and Finland has adhered to its commitments made at all major donor conferences, including on-budget expenditures. With an increase in development specialist staffing from 2007, there was a noticeable improvement in reporting on all aspects of development cooperation, including adherence to the MFA's 2009 policy priorities. But most internal reports were “generic”, reflecting secondary sources, and not always illustrating how compliance with objectives was achieved. This is not unique to Finland. The years 2008–12 were particularly problematic in terms of security in Afghanistan and “remote management” has become the norm for most donors. In the **Western Balkans** Finland's “comprehensive approach” to development proved to be overambitious in Kosovo. The limited timeframe of the Western Balkans Programme runs contrary to the MFA's 2009 Guidelines that call for long-term external support to post-conflict and fragile states. Also greater overall effectiveness and coherence would have been achieved through a more limited number of sectors or themes. Special expertise and comparative advantage was demonstrated successfully in its regional portfolio within the environment sector.

In **Ethiopia**, Finland's support in the priority sectors (water, education, and land) complies well with the 2009 policy priorities and thematic areas. Finland's main approach in Ethiopia is to support the implementation of its poverty reduction strategy reinforcing stability and security in the country. Education sector support gives specific attention to the most vulnerable groups through the SNE/IE intervention. Gender is an overarching objective in all sectors of Finland's support. Poverty eradication is directly addressed in the water and land sec-

tors. In the **Palestinian Territories**, the 2009 Guidelines are not explicitly referred to in documents relating to the objectives and programmes of Finland's development cooperation. The draft strategy of 2007 proposed to concentrate on a limited number of sectors and move away from project cooperation towards programme approaches.

Box 3 Bilateral funding in the water sector, Jerusalem.

Palestinian access and control over water resources is a key element of its future viability as a state. Finland has supported the Construction and Rehabilitation of Water Infrastructure Networks in Northwest Villages of Jerusalem to improve the quality of life, socioeconomy and health conditions of the inhabitants in eight target villages, with an estimated total population of more than 50,000 (MFA 2009a). Finland's support consisted of financial support for the rehabilitation, expanding and installation of water networks and main water pipelines and the development of the institutional setup for the management of the network.

Single-funding arrangements such as this allow Finland to adopt a more flexible approach with partner organisations than would be possible through pooled funds and so increase the likely achievement of specific objectives. The approach also increases Finland's leverage and enables greater influence over project design, management, monitoring, and evaluation. There are no other donor-financed water sector development projects in the area, so Finland's profile has been high.

Extent to which security and justice priorities are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these

Issues of security and justice are very context specific. In Palestine these sectors were hardly touched, and in Ethiopia they only refer to regional dialogue. In Afghanistan they formed a major part of civilian crisis management activities as well as the SSR support provided through the pooled LOTFA funds. Notwithstanding contextual setbacks, the results have been generally good. In Western Balkans there have also been notable successes in supporting municipalities and reducing tensions through cross-border initiatives.

In **Afghanistan**, Finland's contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and EUPOL have dominated thinking around the development of military and civilian crisis management efforts in recent years, causing more debate than any other overseas operation. Security sector and rule of law were relatively neglected within the international community's statebuilding agenda until the late 2000s. Finnish commentators have raised questions over the added value they bring to SSR in light of concerns around accountability and poor levels of civilian involvement. From the point of view of SSR, we contend that Finnish approaches (and, by extension, others) were too technical, neglecting the political dimensions and underplaying principles such as local ownership and synergy with other initiatives. In the **Western Balkans**, limited data suggests that Finnish interventions have been successful in increasing cooperation and interaction between ethnic groups (Civil-Military Coordination small projects), the reintegration of Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) members into civilian society (KPC Relocation), and contribution to the successful establishment of five new/extended Serb-majority municipalities.

In **Ethiopia**, the latest strategic plan of the Finnish Embassy confirms the priorities of promoting peace and security in the region through dialogue and monitoring the role of the AU in conflict prevention and reconciliation. This is implemented largely through joint monitoring with EU and Nordic+ group cooperation. In the **Palestinian Territories**, security and justice priorities do not feature significantly in Finland's interventions. Finland committed funds to support the Palestinian Civil Police but the project ran into difficulties when the PA's Interior Ministry priorities started to change. Finland decided not to commit any further funding beyond the first phase of the project. Our conclusion is that Finland has not had sufficient experience in this sector to ensure a strategic and consistent approach. There is growing fatigue among donors that there is no resolution to the conflict and some question whether ODA is effectively substituting for Israel's responsibilities under internal law. In addition to declining donor funding of PEGASE, there is concern that some EU member states *may* go through with their threat of stopping direct support to the PA; Finland is not among them.

Extent to which economic development and employment issues are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these

Economic investment and employment creation depends very much on a supportive environment and despite significant efforts by Finland in Western Balkans and preferenced funding in Afghanistan (through NSP), the macro-economic impact of these interventions is limited. In Ethiopia, it is easier to trace local economic impact through discreet project activities such as water irrigation, which leads to improved agricultural yields and hence economic improvements at household levels. But this is a considerably more stable economic climate than Afghanistan where data on medium-term outcomes is not easily obtained.

In **Afghanistan**, although there has been a huge amount of input/output disaggregated data produced by NSP, plus some positive perception data from the user community, there has been little documented impact data on the economic welfare accrued from the programme. There is still a mismatch between project delivery and capacity development, with NSP accepting that the latter lags behind. Paradoxically, there has been a temporary surge – and hence overload – of donor financing for NSP. Finland has also “preferenced” its ARTF funding towards the MISFA – MISFA has been a key instrument in employment generation. In the **Western Balkans**, Finland has correctly prioritised the promotion of economic policy and a favourable investment climate in interventions at both the national and regional levels. Yet in the absence of an enabling environment for economic development, including social stability and cohesion, the creation of sustainable jobs and increased employment is difficult to achieve.

In **Ethiopia**, Finland’s support to the water and education sectors does not have a direct employment effect. From a longer-term perspective, it is assumed that a better educated population has better prospects for employment, but the level of education (primary education) does not lead directly to employment. Capacity development is a focus in the disadvantaged region of Benishangul-Gumuz; and in Bullen *woredas* (visited by the evaluation team) sustainability of water projects has been best achieved through the Community Development Fund model that promotes financial self-sufficiency. The evaluation team was able to confirm that projects in the water sector in particular had an impact on income-generating activities (agricultural productivity, handi-craft work and selling the products), because land productivity had increased through soil conservation. In the **Palestinian Territories**, Finland’s development cooperation does not directly address economic development and employment issues.

Extent to which statebuilding and governance priorities are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these

Capacity development in chosen government ministries tends to be loosely termed as “statebuilding”, even if the primary objective is more directly concerned with the efficient delivery of donor-funded services. In Afghanistan (ARTF, LOTFA) and Ethiopia this was certainly the case, even without direct results obtained in terms of statebuilding objectives. In Afghanistan and Palestine statebuilding was equated with stabilisation and therefore an end in itself, even though in both cases questions over the legitimacy of the state authorities were always present. One lesson emerging is around definitions: is statebuilding necessarily about building government institutions, or could it also include strengthening the social contract between the populous and the government? If so, Finland has not always balanced its support to formal state institutions with support to civil society institutions that can hold the state to account.

In **Afghanistan**, the multi-donor trust funds that Finland relies heavily upon (ARTF and LOTFA in particular) are interim solutions designed to contribute towards the statebuilding process and to the development of institutional capacity. In general the consensus is that the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) “flagship” programme has been a success, and statistical evidence on the creation of Community Development Councils (CDCs), financial disbursements and project completions bear this out. There are, however, concerns over the tendency towards CDCs choosing risk-averse projects and the prevailing gender bias. Also there is some evidence to show that CDCs encourage “elite capture” in terms of representation and influence. In the **Western Balkans**, inclusive planning for sustainable development in Finland’s regional environmental projects has contributed to the strengthening of local level environmental governance. At the impact level, Finland’s support to decentralisation has contributed to the successful establishment of the four new southern Serb-majority municipalities, and the extended municipality of Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, advancing at the same time the legitimacy of Prishtina’s authority throughout Kosovo, and the potential for greater social and economic reintegration of ethnic minority communities in Kosovo.

In **Ethiopia**, Finland, together with other donors, has aimed to improve governance through sector-specific interventions. The lessons learned from these interventions are, however, not always clearly articulated – high staff turnover was mentioned as the biggest challenge for sustaining development results. Low salaries, poor service conditions and political interference further undermine prospects for sustainability. In the **Palestinian Territories**, Finland’s development cooperation aims to enable the conditions for an independent Palestinian state by focusing on specific statebuilding objectives, but there are no results or learning mechanisms in place in order to measure the extent to which their development cooperation has contributed to statebuilding objectives.

Extent to which results-based management is able to monitor and evaluate compliance and coherence with global policies

RBM that captures progress towards higher country level outcomes and objectives has not been established in any of our case studies over the evaluation period. Individual projects (Ethiopia, for instance) have used RBM, and in Afghanistan the new FLC plan (2014) includes RBM. But hitherto it has not been possible for Finland’s country managers to track progress on the accumulative impact of programme as a whole and make adjustments accordingly.

In **Afghanistan**, Finland produced a series of Quality Board and Advisor Statements, mostly annual, for the period 2007–12 in which comment on compliance with Finnish global policy as well as outcome and monitoring on major funds such as ARTF were reported on. Greater attention was paid to auditing than to performance as such. There appears to have been considerable improvement over the years in the management and monitoring of FLC projects. The new FLC plan includes RBM and financial management training organised to all partners. However, we contend that a new strategy that includes appropriate investment in capacity development of institutions and individuals is required to verify and monitor Finnish-funded projects on the ground. In the **Western Balkans**, the Programme was not designed according to RBM principles and effective programme management has not been possible owing to the low evaluability of the programme. Managers in the MFA and the embassy in Kosovo have not received the information necessary for them to track results and verify the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole effort and to make relevant adjustments to the programme with any confidence. This could be strengthened by providing management units with greater human resources and specialist expertise and by establishing clearer lines of responsibility for planning, monitoring and reporting between the MFA in Helsinki and Finland’s embassies.

In **Ethiopia**, RBM has not yet been used to monitor Finland’s overall programme during the evaluation period of 2007–12. The country strategy should have had targets and indicators to for RBM of the country programme as a whole and to systematically integrate cross-cutting objectives into the planning and implementation of interventions. Currently, RBM is linked only to sector/project-specific logical frameworks and indicators. Monitoring progress towards the relevant MDGs at national level has used the monitoring systems of different ministries. In the **Palestinian Territories**, there is no evidence that RBM has been used to monitor and evaluate compliance and coherence of Finland’s programme with global policies.

Extent to which the totality of resources made available and disbursed was equal to the ambitions set by programme objectives

In terms of the predictability and disbursements of Finnish funds we found these to be efficient across all countries. The key challenge has been the provision of appropriate staffing levels in fragile states where stakeholders are more responsive to the presence and continuity of international staff on the ground. We question the extent to which limited NGO and Local Cooperation Funds have achieved higher ambitions set by the country programmes.

In **Afghanistan**, the evaluation finds the Finnish portfolio to be generally cost-efficient, well-planned, predictable, and responsive to needs expressed by government bodies. The rationalisation of the programme from 2009 was necessary, allowing MFA personnel greater scope for advocacy at higher levels of government. But the “civil society enhancement” objectives of the FLC are far too ambitious in relation to the available choice of NGO partners and the scale of projects undertaken. Transactional costs remain high, but the added value of a small donor such as Finland in this field could and should be reinforced with greater resources. In the **Western Balkans**, Finland’s sector-specific approach to regional programming achieved visible results. The programme has been insufficiently oriented around Finland’s recognised specific expertise, and greater human

resources are required to achieve the set ambitions. In particular, Finland has given insufficient resources and attention to inclusive education and disability, areas where Finland's expertise is particularly valued.

In **Ethiopia**, funds from Finland are disbursed on a timely basis and used efficiently, and project objectives are realistically set in relation to available resources. As a small donor Finland has attempted to pilot innovative models on a small scale and attract bigger donors for cooperation and up-scaling. The biggest challenge has been national staff retention in projects, further compromised by high staff turnovers in government offices (regional and *woreda*). A strategy to manage or mitigate the risk associated with this has not yet been developed by the government and donors. In the **Palestinian Territories**, a chronic lack of human resources has impaired Finland's capacity to effectively analyse and plan a development strategy, necessary for decision-making and flexibility of response required at country level where the political situation can very rapidly change. With regard to the OECD Guidelines on fragile states that emphasise the importance of staff continuity and presence,, we note that severe human resource constraints in the regional department mean that there is no capacity for internal analysis and planning in order to respond to emerging issues. For example Finland is committed to supporting the EU plans to implement initiatives in Area C, but neither the Ramallah office nor the regional desk have the capacity to develop an appropriate strategy. The MFA does have a conflict advisor with a global remit, but access to this resource by the Palestinian Territories programme is rare.

4.1.3 Cross-cutting objectives

Evaluation Question 3: How have the cross-cutting objectives been integrated in Finland's development interventions in fragile states? How has their integration/non-integration affected identified and achieved results? What are the lessons learned and best practices in implementing cross-cutting objectives?

Extent to which cross-cutting objectives were taken into account in the analysis and design of Finnish interventions

Although cross-cutting objectives (CCOs) – in particular those relating to gender and human rights – are prominent in all Finnish programmes, the analysis that underpins the rationale for chosen projects is rarely available. A small donor such as Finland would necessarily rely on implementers (UN and others) to provide contextual and specific analysis of capacities, etc., in relation to project-specific priorities, but this does not answer “why” Finland has chosen this particular partner/area/sector.

In **Afghanistan**, Finland has advocated for, and participated in, the Gender Working Group within the ARTF. It has also given particular attention to women's access to justice, notably for – and even within – the police force. Beyond the advocacy interventions mentioned above, CCOs have been dealt with most directly through the somewhat ad hoc selection of NGOs and related project themes within the Finnish portfolio. Gender mainstreaming in conjunction with other like-minded donors has been good, but the complementary range of programmes are fragmentary. In the **Western Balkans**, it is not clear what sources of information were accessed to understand the status of the CCOs in the region, nor whether any baseline studies were undertaken. Almost all proposal and project documents recognise the need to include the above groups and to promote the rights of those easily excluded. There is considerable variation, however, in the treatment given by individual projects to CCOs. Detailed gender analysis and/or relevant baseline studies have usually only been provided by projects undertaken by UN agencies in Kosovo. The aim of increasing gender equality or the empowerment of women is only fully integrated into the project design by means of inclusion in expected results in a very small number of projects. In general, project monitoring systems establish few if any indicators or targets for gender equality and women's empowerment, and gender has been rarely reported on. Except in the few cases where projects focus specifically on the excluded, recognition of other vulnerable or excluded groups deserving special attention are in general absent from the Programme's interventions in both Kosovo and the wider region. Ethnic minorities, on the other hand, are almost universally recognised.

In **Ethiopia**, the 2007 and 2012 Finnish Development Policy Programme cross-cutting objectives have been integrated into the project interventions in various degrees. Gender is well integrated in Finland's development cooperation in water, education and land sector interventions as stated objectives. Our visit to the Bullen *woreda*, for example, confirmed a strong representation of women in water sector projects. Disadvantaged areas have been targeted in provision of clean water and sanitation, hence addressing inequalities. Environmental sustainability has been the objective in improved soil and water conservation and reforestation. In the **Pales-**

stinian Territories, CCOs are explicitly referred to in Finnish-Palestinian cooperation agreements, featuring as principles and commitments. For example, in the land administration programme supported by Finland gender and human rights issues form part of the overall objectives of the project and are included in the design and implementation plans. The programme design pays specific attention to incorporating the views and needs of women through group and individual consultations in order to understand how they are affected by inheritance issues.

Extent to which cross-cutting objectives were taken into account in political and policy dialogue

Strong and consistent Finnish advocacy on issues around human rights and gender have been apparent in all case studies, either through bilateral demarches or through joint (often Nordic+ group) consultations. Finnish interventions in gender and human rights in particular are well regarded by donors.

In **Afghanistan**, Finland's advocacy alongside other Nordic+ group donors has been strong. The development of a national action plan (NAP) for UNSCR 1325 has been slow – a reflection of national (and UN) capacities – but the process is often as important as the product. UN Women has not had the necessary in-country capacity to help draft the NAP; the MFA has declined to share its draft of the NAP with UN Women; and the general inertia pending presidential elections in 2014 has halted all work on this. In the **Western Balkans**, Finland's CCOs have been mainstreamed fairly consistently. The commencement in early 2014 of Finland's seventh twinning project in Kosovo that deals with the rights of sexual and gender minorities indicates that the embassy in Prishtina takes the CCOs into account when lobbying and negotiating for Finnish technical assistance missions. Finnish expertise on air quality and climate (Finnish Meteorological Institute) is also included in a twinning mission with the Kosovo Environment Protection Agency. This is one of the current set of CCOs established in Finland's Development Policy Programme 2012.

In **Ethiopia**, documentation of political and policy dialogue provided to the evaluation team has only included agreed minutes of 2007 and 2009 country consultations. The 2009 negotiations took up issues related to environmental sustainability and climate change when discussing the progress of Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to end Poverty (PASDEP). Concerns were also expressed about democracy and human rights after the passing of the CSO Law. The 2007 minutes of consultations between Ethiopia and Finland report that the cross-cutting themes such as gender, environment, human rights and HIV/AIDS feature within the existing cooperation. These themes were seen as essential and it was furthermore noted that they are well embedded in PASDEP. In the **Palestinian Territories**, CCOs are explicitly referred to in Finnish-Palestinian cooperation agreements, featuring as principles and commitments, but there is no evidence of follow-up with the PA on implementation and progress.

Extent to which Finnish development cooperation has contributed to the stated objectives and intended outcomes of its interventions with respect to cross-cutting objectives

In all our case studies Finland has ensured that projects have indicators pertaining to gender equity, while some also address special needs and environmental issues. But because monitoring depends on implementing partners, there is a lack of consistency in reporting and in purpose.

In **Afghanistan**, Finland has recognised the compromises inherent in supporting pooled funding mechanisms. For instance, its advisor's report in 2007 stated that one of the ARTF's biggest problems has been the lack of a gender strategy. Gender has always been designated as a "cross-cutting" issue/objective within the fund's Financing Strategy, and therefore not in receipt of specific gender project funding. Though the situation has improved considerably, there is still reticence within the donor community to confront anomalies head on, made more difficult by the increased confidence and conservatism of the government. In the **Western Balkans**, monitoring of CCOs has been partial and it has been inconsistently applied across the Programme; monitoring has relied solely on implementing partners. Variable results have been achieved. There is no evidence to suggest that significant progress has been made in promoting women's rights in areas such as economic empowerment, education, and ensuring greater control over, and flows of resources to women and girls.

In **Ethiopia**, gender has been well integrated into all interventions, including those in the water, land and education sectors, with increased female participation in water sector interventions in particular. Universal access to primary education has nearly been achieved, with gender parity. Combating climate change has been directly targeted in the regional Climate Change Impacts on Ecosystem Services and Food Security in Eastern Africa

(CHIESA) project. With respect to the rights of easily excluded groups, Finnish support has targeted SNE/IE, and has been implemented in Ethiopia for a decade with the overall objective of enhancing access to and quality of education for disabled children. Finnish assistance has not been targeted directly at ethnic minorities, even though support in Benishangul-Gumuz has included all groups in the region. In the **Palestinian Territories**, there is no evidence on how the integration of these cross-cutting objectives has contributed to results. At the programme level, all Finland's interventions have indicators pertaining to gender and equality issues, while the water programme also addresses environmental issues. But there is no focused reporting on these issues and no mechanism for identifying lessons and good practice.

Extent to which lessons on implementing cross-cutting objectives have been recorded and disseminated

We found that lesson learning on CCOs varies quite considerably across the case studies, with project monitoring being generally inconsistent, reflecting the varying treatment of CCOs in project design.

In **Afghanistan**, on human rights, Finland has been instrumental in funding and to some extent guiding the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to its current high national profile. The Commission is an example of an independent statal (as opposed to government) body with a unique profile and outreach in most provinces. Typical of successes in Afghanistan, though, the AIHRC has been overloaded with financial and donor demands. On environmental issues, capacity building in the National Environment Protection Agency in 2009 was at the heart of earlier work, and Finland has recently resumed its partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). In the **Western Balkans**, with respect to human rights, Finland's programme management has not consistently monitored CCOs and has done little to provide implementing partners with a coherent set of guidelines and conditions to assist them plan for, implement, monitor and report back on these. In general, project logframes show that disaggregated indicators have rarely been set, except for participation in project processes. Dissemination of learning for scaling up of practice is incorporated into the design of Support to Inclusive Education (for wider application of inclusive education decentralised to municipalities) and the promotion of women's security (application of the law on domestic violence in all municipalities). It is perhaps still too early for this to have taken place.

In **Ethiopia**, there were no separate reports on the implementation of CCOs. The results are included in the project progress and evaluation reports. Of particular note, gender equality has improved in the water sector through improved participation in decision-making. Monitoring systems are weak at the *woreda* level – data has not been collected for the water and land sectors – although anecdotal evidence exists. The education sector monitoring system, through the Education Management Information Service, is the most efficient, but still lacks data on students with special needs. In the **Palestinian Territories**, there is no evidence of lessons learned and best practices in their implementation nor is there a dissemination strategy to capture and transmit lessons on CCOs.

4.1.4 Aid effectiveness and development results

Evaluation Question 4: How have the aid effectiveness commitments been integrated in the Finnish development interventions? How has their application supported development results and the overall objective of peace and development?

Extent to which Finland has applied and integrated its aid efficiency commitments in the country/region

Finland's commitment to aid efficiency principles and its record in ensuring transparency and predictability of aid is good. Coordination with key counterpart ministries and with the wider donor community has been very good; Finland has also upheld its commitments towards on-budget support where this is feasible. Donor harmonisation principles have been followed through consistent funding of pooled mechanisms.

In **Afghanistan**, Finland has successfully sought close coordination with Nordic donors, as well as upholding its commitments to proportional on-budget support to the Government of Afghanistan. Like many donors, Finland's ambitions with respect to balancing pooled funds with bilateral NGO projects are compromised by capacity (both Finnish and Afghan) and monitoring constraints. In the **Western Balkans**, Finland has broadly applied the Paris Principles in its Kosovo-focused interventions, but made important adjustments to take into

account specific features of Kosovo's state fragility and to maximise the use of Finnish expertise. Finland's support however, is generally not channelled through and reported on in Kosovo's national budget and has therefore not been fully aligned behind Kosovo's strategies. Finland has applied the principle of donor harmonisation by channelling finance to Kosovo through pooled funds of various kinds, including budget support via the World Bank's Trust Fund. Finland has fulfilled its obligation to provide information to the Kosovo government on its bilateral contributions by means of the AMP.

In **Ethiopia**, Finland's alignment with national priorities is optimal. It has also adhered to the Paris Principles with respect to harmonisation and coordination, engaging with the Government of Ethiopia particularly through the EU and has actively participated in the donor coordination group. Finland has aligned all its development cooperation interventions under the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty in Ethiopia (PASDEP) and Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), the two key government strategies for poverty reduction. Coordination between the donors and the government has been most effective in the education sector. In the **Palestinian Territories**, Finland's record on ensuring transparency and predictability of aid is good; as is coordination with key counterpart ministries. Finnish-Palestinian agreements are explicit about Finland's commitment to working in line with the Paris Principles. Finland is regarded as an open and responsive donor, providing detailed information. Their pioneering approach to harmonisation in the education sector is widely recognised and held as a model for replication by the PA and donors.

Extent to which national ownership and alignment with national policies is incorporated into interventions undertaken

Finland has generally been consistent in promoting national ownership through, for example, including representatives from all relevant ministries on the project steering committees and at the design stages.

In **Afghanistan**, Finnish aid is well aligned with government priorities and with the priorities set out in international agreements, the latest of which was the 2012 Tokyo Agreement. Finnish aid appears to have been strategically well placed in terms of (a) alignment with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and other key government priorities; and (b) alignment with like-minded donors, notably the Nordic+ group and EU. In the **Western Balkans**, Finland has enhanced relevance by aligning its interventions with the policies and country strategies of the countries of the Western Balkans. Finland's interventions promote national ownership by including representatives from all relevant ministries on the project steering committees. However, in general a lack of sector or issue-based focus has led to under-funding in areas of Finland's acknowledged expertise and influence. Finland's contribution to acknowledged positive results in social and economic policy reform in Kosovo and regional economic cooperation by means of pooled interventions is difficult to discern.

In **Ethiopia**, Finland has aligned all its development cooperation interventions under the PASDEP and GTP. In bilateral programmes and projects, Ethiopian management and financial systems are used to channel aid. Government procurement systems are widely used. Some parallel structures have been put in place specifically for capacity building purposes. In the **Palestinian Territories**, all Finnish bilateral programmes are aligned with the strategic priorities of the PA, although these priorities are very wide. In general, the statebuilding aims pursued by donors have been deemed a success, but the focus has been mostly on institutional development and reform and not on strengthening civil society and citizen empowerment. Moreover, the PA faces a severe fiscal crisis, has limited control over its revenues, and remains heavily dependent on donor assistance.

Extent to which Finnish development cooperation is coherent with and complementary to the development strategies and programmes of other major bilateral and multilateral donors, notably United Nations' agencies, European Union and its member states, World Bank and United States of America

Finland has made concerted efforts towards ensuring its aid policy is coherent with, and complementary to, other donors, and the evaluation found positive appraisal from all donors in this respect.

In **Afghanistan**, the lack of donor coordination has been the subject of much internal (Afghan) and external (evaluative) criticism over the years. For Finland, the Busan Agreement (Fragile States) and common approaches to this as advocated by Nordic+ group has been represented best through the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). Notwithstanding the continuing dominance of the United States within the donor fold, Finland within the Nordic+ group may be able to retain some important influence beyond the current transi-

tional stage. An important landmark for Finland has been its recent accession to the “key donor” group within the ARTF by reaching the minimum of US\$10 million/year disbursed through this. In the **Western Balkans** Finland’s Kosovo interventions are clearly coherent with EU IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) and the wider international development strategy. Donors consulted expressed satisfaction with the coordination of their programmes with those of Finland. Finland has taken considerable care in areas such as forestry and education to focus on specific issues that have so far been neglected by other donors, but which nonetheless are complementary to and supportive of other initiatives in these fields. Added value is particularly apparent in special needs and inclusive education, as well as forestry and the environment. Finland was probably the only donor with an interest in disability, and was now one of the few remaining donors with a commitment to the environment beyond the related fields of energy and water. Finland was particularly suited to contributing to twinning missions in Kosovo. Finland’s environmental projects are fully aligned with and complementary to the efforts the region’s countries are all making to adjust environmental policy and practice to European standards and also to promote good community-based environmental governance within the framework of decentralised government. At the same time, these projects have been fully coherent and coordinated with UN’s environment policy in the region over the programme period.

Box 4 Project complementarity in Kosovo.

Finland has since 2008 supported the UNDP-implemented Sustainable Development in Dragash Municipality project. The aim is to protect the diversity of the local nature while supporting economic activities, support employment and prevent migration out of Dragash. Effective donor coordination in the area has allowed considerable synergy and follow-on actions to the project. For example, the UN Kosovo Team (UNKT) has delivered Finland’s Promotion of Women’s Security (linked to UNSCR 1325) in parallel to the project, while Finland’s Aid for Trade will continue with some of the project’s income generation activities under the aegis of the Regional Development Association in Prizren.

Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) has been running a rural development project in the Sharr National Park that includes Dragash in its area. It has successfully coordinated with the Dragash project and included some of the project’s village working groups in economic activities in the national park. The Austrian Development Agency (ADA), extending an approach already tested in neighbouring Suhareka, is due to start a rural development project which will, in effect, work on implementing the municipal development plan developed by the Dragash project. ADA will also work with UNDP in Dragash and three other municipalities on a project to promote energy efficiency, thus also building upon the results of Finland’s project.

In **Ethiopia**, in bilateral programmes and projects, Ethiopian management and financial systems are used in channelling aid. Finland’s active role in harmonisation at all levels has resulted in the development of large multi-donor programmes such as the Protection of Basic Services the Productive Safety Net Project, the General Education Quality Improvement Project (GEQIP) and the project for Water and Sanitation Hygiene (WASH). In the **Palestinian Territories**, Finland’s development cooperation is complementary to the EU’s local development strategy. Finland’s highest profile is in the education sector, where its role in establishing the sector-wide approach is well recognised. Finland is the only bilateral donor working in the land sector, though its profile here has, until recently, been limited.

Extent to which the results of Finnish development cooperation have, through the choice of its aid modalities, contributed to peacebuilding and/or statebuilding objectives

Broadly speaking, Finland has identified and concentrated resources in sectors where either peacebuilding or statebuilding can be seen to have discernible results.

In **Afghanistan**, the statebuilding agenda is more problematic because of rife corruption, elite capture and the contested legitimacy of the government; nevertheless, Finland has used its strengths in SSR, for instance, while also following broader statebuilding endeavours through the multi-donor ARTF. Finland’s heavy reliance on ARTF (and NSP within it) seems to have been vindicated by external evaluation. On a smaller scale, Finland has adhered to the notion that for a military presence and engagement to gain traction and maintain security on a sustainable footing, quick impact projects provide simple, visible, quickly achievable, relevant small-scale projects for village communities to win the trust of the local population for international security forces and

the central administration. In the **Western Balkans**, the choice of environment projects as an entry point for peacebuilding at the local level was particularly well regarded. Facilitation of greater engagement in environmental protection and environmentally sustainable development is an appropriate way of building bridges between hitherto antagonistic or distrustful communities. The evaluation found that in general the project-based approach in Kosovo, though not entirely in keeping with the Paris Principles or the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States, was reasonably justified on the basis of low government absorptive capacity and poor government-donor coordination. It has proved effective in incorporating stakeholder participation, including that of direct beneficiaries, in needs analysis and the design and management of projects.

In **Ethiopia**, government procurement systems are widely used. Some parallel structures have been put in place specifically for capacity building purposes. Finland channels support through UN particularly in programmes relating to human rights and famine relief and for the refugee camps. In the **Palestinian Territories**, Finland's key contribution to statebuilding has been through enabling the functioning (via support for civil servant salaries and pension payments) and the strengthening of the PA to deliver services (in education).

Extent to which the results and achievements to date are likely to endure in the longer term

There is a marked difference between what can be termed sustainability in stable and unstable environments. In our case studies, Ethiopia represents one end of the spectrum; yet in other programmes the time horizon has been too short to achieve sustainable outcomes and to contribute significantly to wider impact.

In **Afghanistan**, smaller and relatively “neutral” Nordic donors have a comparative advantage both politically and in terms of flexible use of resources. More conventional development “projects” – education, women's access to justice, environment, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – still have traction. There may have been too much misplaced emphasis on the formation of a modern state, and not enough on incremental and sustained support to civil society to counterbalance patrimonial excesses. Looking towards longevity of results, it is important to return again to the structure and driving forces within Afghanistan that broadly speaking run contrary to the modern state model promulgated by international donors. Finland has not fully exploited the added value it could potentially bring to supporting civil society entities that can be of lasting value irrespective of the state model that emerges in Afghanistan over the coming years. In the **Western Balkans**, the Programme's time horizon was too short to achieve sustainable outcomes and to contribute significantly to wider impact. The medium-term approach and the decision to significantly reduce support to Kosovo from 2014 onwards are both contrary to the Fragile States Principles. Continuity of development cooperation over the longer term is required to achieve impact, such as that achieved in the field of SNE/IE in Kosovo, which has been the result of the continuous application of Finland's technical expertise in this field since 2001.

In **Ethiopia**, the community-based development fund model is likely to be sustained as communities take on full financial responsibility after the investment and capacity building. Also Finland's long-term support to SNE/IE will most likely sustain the awareness of the rights to education of children with disabilities and enhance their access. In the **Palestinian Territories**, although most of the Finnish project designs includes the identification of project related risks and potential mitigation measures, Finland has not carried out a risk analysis or made contingencies if the two-state solution becomes no longer viable. The impact of the conflict is a key factor in the achievement of sustainability of Finland's development programme. There is evidence that Finland assessed and integrated sustainability issues in the design and implementation stages of the land administration programme and water project.

4.2 Fragile states and theories of change

In the desk phase of this study we developed an intervention logic (or theory of change) for each case study. This captured the intentions and the underlying assumptions of Finnish development cooperation in the countries concerned. In many cases it was speculative since the expected outcomes of Finnish assistance and their intended contribution to wider change were not explicitly stated. We also found that none of the country programmes, and only a few of their respective projects, developed a risk analysis that anticipated context-related setbacks or changes in the political landscape. Thus our intervention logics represented “strategy planned” rather than “strategy realised”.

Closely related to an intervention logic is contribution analysis. For a relatively small donor choosing to channel a significant proportion of funds through pooled mechanisms, this is an essential tool for evaluating effectiveness. It is more than just application of the DAC criteria on outcomes and impact. It asks not only “has X occurred” (because it may not yet have done so) but “are we confident that Finland’s contribution has had a positive influence in moving towards the upper level goals of our theory of change”.

We found repeatedly that the extent of Finland’s contribution to higher level outcomes and impact identified in the theory of change were difficult to establish with any degree of confidence, not least because these outcomes are themselves not in evidence. In the **Western Balkans**, for instance, although Finnish projects have contributed to community confidence at local levels in specific locations, there has been no means of monitoring the wider influence, if any, of projects on social, economic and political change in the region. Increased economic activity and employment generation (in Kosovo) are not yet evident, so here the intervention logic cannot be verified. The quality of governance, nationally and locally, according to measures such as the World-wide Indicators has not risen appreciably. On the other hand, the assumptions that predetermined these higher level outcomes have held true. These include the complementarity of Finland’s interventions to a wide range of internationally supported activities and to broader national sector development policies, and the implementation of national strategy and action plans, as well as the increased absorptive capacity of the Kosovo government to make use of wider international development funding.

The same is true of **Afghanistan**. The assumption here is that the very cause of fragility is the fragmentation of social, political and economic enterprises and the social exclusion that this has engendered. Aid has reinforced “client” relations in the country, and Afghanistan has often been referred to as a “rentier” state.⁹ It accumulates the biggest share of its income from external sources, with an unelected state class benefiting from political autonomy. State funds are used to co-opt or neutralise opposition – hence the enormous size of the public sector – and governance is delivered through patrimonial networks. The neo-liberal state model is thus distorted and although the components of such a model may be built they will not function in the manner intended. Indeed, despite their being some advocates within the Afghan government, the only reason why many of the constituents of the liberal state exist in Afghanistan is because of external funding accompanied by the shoring up of policy apparatus by external advisors. As an aspiration the individual components may have been desirable; as a sustainable model based on a social contract and attitudinal change, it is less viable.

Our contention is that the malleable governance models that will emerge in Afghanistan in the coming decades will nevertheless still be responsive to lobbying and influence of stratified groups able to exert a degree of power within their communities. The intervention theory of change is that support to civil society will help hold public institutions to account and provide some countervailing influence against patrimonial power. In this improving environment, changes in the reach and coverage of public services will slowly emerge and enable economic and social development.

In the **Palestinian Territories** the underlying assumption of Finland’s development cooperation has been that building strong and accountable institutions will pave the way for an independent state by decreasing internal instability, reducing the risks of regional insecurity and thereby fostering conditions for a negotiated settlement with Israel. The problem is that regional insecurity has increased, and this may have implications, positive or negative on the Israel/Palestine peace process. Meanwhile, the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah is still tenuous. Even with a fairly stable PA, the people themselves are facing increasing economic hardships, to a large extent as a direct result of Israel’s occupation. Moreover, the prevailing analysis of the PA is skewed towards its relationship with the Israel government and the international community. It rarely takes into account the perceptions of the Palestinian people. Statebuilding in the Palestinian Territories has largely overlooked the social expectations of the PA, civil society’s ability to articulate demands and where the current PA derives its source of legitimacy.

As a relatively small donor in the Palestinian Territories, Finland has largely focused on policy, with relatively less emphasis on project delivery. Where there have been individual sector programmes (including the UN Relief and Works Agency – UNRWA), these have been in sectors where Finland always works, introducing a level of “silo” thinking that inhibits innovative or coherent country-wide strategy. For the most part, resources are disproportionate to what is expected to be delivered. Finland has yet to demonstrate the geographical im-

⁹ See Verkoren and Kamphuis (2013) for a recent exposition.

plications of not working in Gaza as part of a statebuilding approach. Finally, if the PA collapses there is no “plan B” for Finland.

Fragility in **Ethiopia** is conceptually at a different level. Finland’s intervention logic is rooted in a poverty reduction strategy aligned closely to Ethiopia’s two national development policies (PASDEP and GTP). Ethiopia is not a country in conflict, and the rationale for Finland’s long-term partnership is to trigger economic growth, reach the MDGs by 2015, and contribute towards Ethiopia’s upward trajectory to becoming a middle-income country possibly 2025. In many areas weak governance is prevalent and big regional disparities in wealth exist.

Country programming is deemed to have an indirect effect on peace and stability in the wider Horn of Africa, but only in so far as Ethiopia has a role as a regional player and a centre of stability. The latest Strategic Plan of the Embassy (Embassy of Finland Addis Ababa 2013) confirms the priorities of promoting peace and security in the region through dialogue and monitoring the role of the AU in conflict prevention and reconciliation. This is implemented largely through joint monitoring with EU and Nordic cooperation, but is a relatively very small area of intervention compared to the large conventional programmes that Finland supports in land, water and education.

Finland’s contribution to achieving medium-term outcomes in Ethiopia is tangible and supported by evidence. The focus has been on economic development and employment and our evaluation suggests that Finnish contributions to these, particularly through water and land sector interventions at regional and local levels, have been consistent. In particular, there is strong evidence of improvements in gender equality and empowerment in all sectors. In the land sector, longer-term outcomes relating to security and justice are likely to be strengthened with progress in land registration which is also being promoting through Finnish interventions.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED: TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THE NEW FRAGILE STATES GUIDANCE

The evaluation was undertaken at a time when Finnish development cooperation in each of the four case studies was at a different historical juncture. Politically and economically, Ethiopia is relatively stable and on an upward trajectory in terms of growth, despite still having chronic poverty in some areas. The Western Balkans is a decade on from the destructive violence that tore apart Yugoslavia in the 1990s, yet still suffers economically and politically from ethnic fault lines and poor growth rates. Violent conflict and political unrest in the Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan are very much current and here there is greater urgency for measures to dissipate and address the consequences of these.

In drawing out conclusions and lessons from the evaluation, we return to the four key themes of the evaluation. Rather than repeat the findings related to each country we have tried to conflate these to higher level generic lessons pertaining to, and informing the application of Finland’s Fragile States Guidelines.

5.1 Relevance of support to the drivers of peace and development

Finland has given comparatively greater emphasis to statebuilding than to conflict prevention per se. The inherent assumption is that by working *in* conflict (Afghanistan, Palestinian Territories and to a lesser extent Kosovo) rather than directly *on* conflict, Finland will contribute towards peacebuilding by helping build a responsive and stable state. Thus one must work within the confines of an existing state, with all the compromises that this entails. But at the same time, the statebuilding agenda depends on a coherent definition of statehood among donors which is not always apparent. Statebuilding within the “coalition of the willing” – including the sub-sets of donors such as the Nordic+ and EU groups in which Finland invests – has often been an end in itself; it drives and informs Finland’s approach, but is neither challenged as a concept, nor broken into its constituent elements so that priorities can be set.

The same lessons emerge in post-war Nepal where Finland has supported the constitutional process through its funding of NPTF trust fund and through the support to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). Yet no agreement has been reached on the constitution because of different definitions of basic principles. Development partners have themselves not provided sufficient guidance on this (MFA 2012a).¹⁰

We therefore have stressed the importance for Finland to develop contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analysis that, for each country, would underpin a strategic approach to the Finnish development programme and that would inform ongoing programme choices. An intervention logic combined with RBM would strengthen this. This more strategic approach might also strengthen Finnish political dialogue, including the rationale for choosing certain aid instruments (e.g. pooled funds) and/or sectors over others. We have demonstrated, for instance, the added value Finland brings to advocacy and programming in gender and human rights.

Several lessons emerge here (reference to specific countries in brackets):

- 1 Without a commensurate effort made towards developing indicators or evaluative measures that record progress towards the higher level aspirations of statehood (as opposed to just capacity development), the assumption that this correlates with peacebuilding cannot be upheld. It requires a country strategy that details the country context and sets out the relationship between Finland's sector programmes and development priorities. Risk analysis and management implies higher costs and goes hand in hand with developing new skills in the Finland MFA.
- 2 The scope and number of Finland's interventions has sometimes been overambitious and effective management has not been possible. This overambition adversely affects Finland's ability to directly implement its "comprehensive approach" to development through a programme comprising too many limited projects (particularly Kosovo).
- 3 Conversely, in Ethiopia the long-term and sustained commitment by Finland to supporting particular sectors and concentrating resources at sub-regional grassroots levels has contributed to economic development and employment particularly through water and land sector interventions. It has also enabled a strong and well-integrated gender strategy in water, land and education sectors with set objectives.
- 4 Investing in the concept of a modern liberal state may be ill-timed and, where it reinforces corrupt practices, even harmful. Limited resources might be better spent building the strength and influence of non-state and civil society institutions to counterbalance patrimonial excesses (Afghanistan).
- 5 Finland has not developed a consistent approach towards remotely managing its programme in deteriorating security settings (Afghanistan).

5.2 Policy coherence and resource allocation

We recognise Finland's increased dialogue on actions in fragile states since 2007, including efforts to combine and incorporate guidelines on development and security with the priorities outlined in the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* in 2011 in Busan. Finland's own *Fragile States Guidelines* (MFA 2014) have yet to be developed into a comprehensive inter-ministerial policy with clearly defined development objectives.

In all of our case studies we noted a broadly de-linked relationship between Finland's contribution to humanitarian and development programmes. For the most part, Finland gets around this challenge by putting recovery funding through multilateral agencies, pooled funding mechanisms and NGOs operating in post-crisis countries. The new Finnish Guidelines on Fragile States emphasise the clear division of responsibilities between civilian and military actors in humanitarian action and that Finland has undertaken to comply with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA's) Oslo Guidelines on the use of military assets in humanitarian action (OCHA 2007). Unfortunately the OCHA's Guidelines, particularly those relating to complementarity with existing UN-led humanitarian actions, have been too widely interpreted. The use of quick impact projects through the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) model in Afghanistan was developed autonomously and arguably in contradiction to another Oslo principle: not to use civil/military assets where the implementers are perceived as belligerents representing one protagonist within a conflict (Haysone 2013).

¹⁰ This MFA evaluation report contributed to a Joint Evaluation of International Support to the Peace Process in Nepal, 2006–12 (with Denmark and Switzerland).

Finland's added value in civilian crisis management came to the fore particularly in Afghanistan and Western Balkans, but a less consistent and strategic approach was apparent in the Palestinian Territories. Statebuilding is often equated with stabilisation and therefore an end in itself, despite questions over the legitimacy of the state authorities. Statebuilding can, however, also be about strengthening the social contract between the populous and the government. Finland has not always balanced its support to formal state institutions with support to civil society institutions that can hold the state to account.

The lessons emerging here are:

- 1 In light of concerns around accountability and poor levels of civilian involvement, it is not clear what added value Finland brings to SSR. Civil society oversight of this sector has yet to be effectively developed (Afghanistan).
- 2 The reliance on pooled funding is appropriate, but accrued economic benefits of the development programme have not been systematically recorded; the higher level impact of these key programmes is still unknown (Afghanistan, Western Balkans).
- 3 The evidence of impact Finland has achieved in the field of inclusive and SNE strongly supports the view that continuity of development cooperation over the longer term is required to achieve impact (Ethiopia and Western Balkans).
- 4 Capacity development and service delivery have to be treated as two different outcomes, with appropriate resources allocated to each.
- 5 Concentrating resources in one geographic area, and ensuring synergy across different programmes within this area, has shown to be the optimal use of resources, particularly where learning comes from long-term investments in that area (Ethiopia).
- 6 The key challenge in fragile states is the provision of appropriate staffing levels to build confidence among national stakeholders.

5.3 Cross-cutting objectives

In 2009 Finland issued "Instructions on Integration of Cross-cutting Themes in all Development Cooperation", and training modules were made available online or organised in person. It is not clear to the evaluation how consistently these have been applied in the countries we visited. The problem is the turnover of Finnish staff in the countries concerned, the rather restrictive selection processes for the FLC, and the lack of follow-through in "mainstreaming" gender, for example. CCOs – in particular those relating to gender and human rights – are prominent in all Finnish programmes, and well regarded by other donors. But the analysis that underpins the rationale for chosen projects is rarely available and monitoring has been inconsistent. There has tended to be an over-reliance on implementers (UN and others) to provide this information, notably in relation to project-specific priorities.

The lessons emerging are:

- 1 Finland is well placed to pursue advocacy and mainstreaming on gender (including UNSCR 1325) and human rights at high levels of government but needs greater continuity and staff skills to effectively carry this out (Afghanistan).
- 2 Developing individual transferable skills through "exposure" programmes in Finland (e.g. women journalists from Afghanistan) is useful, but medium-term outcomes should be followed up.
- 3 Finland needs to work more closely with implementing partners to ensure that they adequately address, monitor and report on all Finland's CCOs. In particular, it needs to ensure that ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, youth and other groups likely to be excluded are targeted in all community-level actions.
- 4 The longevity of Finland's programming lends itself to cumulative experience in ensuring that project planning and execution takes account of gender, environmental protection and special needs. Attention to gender issues has been particularly noticeable in water and land sector interventions with evidence indicating the increased empowered of women at the local level (Ethiopia).

5.4 Aid effectiveness and development results

In all our case studies we recognise Finland's strong adherence to the aid efficiency and in ensuring transparency and predictability of aid. Substantial funds have been channelled through multilateral channels and core budget contributions, with above 60% of its multilateral aid allocated in this manner. There have been two general reviews of Finnish aid efficiency in recent years – the OECD/DAC peer review in 2012 (OECD/DAC 2012a), and a meta-evaluation carried out in 2010–11 (MFA 2012b). Though generally applauding the high levels of multilateral spending, and Finland's exemplary adherence to the Paris Principles, the 2012 Peer Review indicated the need for a clearer guidance on priorities, processes and implementation to ensure that Finland's assistance was more focused and effective. This would mean setting strategic objectives and strengthening Finnish capacity for analysis to make its policies coherent with development goals (OECD/DAC 2012a). We concur with this view, finding that in all our country case studies there was inconsistency in both sources and the analysis of meta-data that would allow “contribution” to be firmly evidenced.

We find that the concept of “Finnish added value” is vague and unlikely to translate into specific policy guidelines that inform the development of country programmes. There is no way to determine a general relationship between Finnish value added and aid effectiveness because it depends on how these two concepts are being defined and used (Koponen, Suoheimo, Rugumamu, Sharma and Kanner 2012). However, as a smaller and relatively “neutral” Nordic donor, Finland has been able to exercise comparative advantage both politically and in terms of flexible use of resources. This was noticeable in Afghanistan through its support to the independent human rights commission and in Western Balkans where, although not strictly in adherence with Paris Principles, Finland's project-based approach in Kosovo has proved the most effective way of encouraging stakeholder participation and including direct beneficiaries in the management of projects.

The evaluation notes that despite ad hoc agreements being made between headquarters and embassies defining the division of labour and responsibilities, there is still a fairly high degree of centralised decision-making in Helsinki, especially on financial matters. This was particularly evident in the Western Balkans where forthcoming reductions in funding have been made without reference to, or consultation with, MFA staff on the ground.

From our case studies, the following lessons emerge:

- 1 Finland's on-budget support through joint/pooled funding and through close coordination with other donors, notably through the EU and Nordic+ groups, has been the most effective way of using limited resources, particularly when a “seat at the table” enables Finland to advocate around single issues such as gender and human rights.
- 2 Finland has ensured that the predictability and consistency of funding over several years has been optimal and well-communicated.
- 3 Finland needs to make hard decisions over limiting the number of sectors in which it works. Education, water and land are those sectors where cumulative experience is evident. Closer linkages between these and NGO/FLC projects on human rights and gender programming need to be developed.
- 4 In extreme situations such as Afghanistan, Finland's human resource policy is not yet adapted towards the greater need for remote management; nor has there been sufficient investment in the capacity development of national institutions to undertake reliable and independent project monitoring on behalf of Finland.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE NEW FRAGILE STATES GUIDANCE

Much of the foregoing analysis reflects on the manner in which Finland's 2007 and 2012 development policies have been applied in our four case studies. Retrospectively we also examine how general international principles on development cooperation in all fragile states have been applied, but we accept that in terms of Finnish policy this was an emerging landscape across the period considered (2007–12). Finland's 2014 Fragile States Guidelines (MFA 2014) post-date the evaluation and have not yet been translated into policy. They do, how-

ever, reflect international commitments that Finland is a signatory to, and they encompass many elements of existing MFA policy. Most importantly, they provide a firm basis upon which to build a country or regional strategy pertaining to development cooperation in particular circumstances where the operating environment requires a more precise and distinct response to the challenges that fragile and transition-stage states present. They are built around five key principles:

- **Conflict-sensitive approach and conflict analysis**, whereby the specific elements that trigger conflict are accounted for and no adverse effects emerge from Finland's interventions. [The recommendations here are derived mainly from conclusions in Section 5.1.]
- **Cooperation, coordination and influence**, whereby Finland works closely with other parties, bilaterally and multilaterally, in terms of advocacy as well as in implementation, and provides appropriate skill sets to accomplish this. [The recommendations here are derived mainly from conclusions in Section 5.2.]
- **Strengthening local ownership**, whereby Finland not only strengthens the country's lead responsibility for its own development, but also supports civil society and the country's citizens to strengthen trust with the state. [The recommendations here are derived mostly from Sections 5.2 and 5.3.]
- **Risk management**, whereby Finland accepts higher operational risks in fragile states, and analyses and manages these risks. Open communication with partners and an acceptance of higher costs is part of this. [The recommendations here are mostly drawn from Sections 5.1 and 5.2.]
- **Funding and support channels**, whereby flexible, transparent and predictable funding is channelled primarily through joint funds, multilateral organisations and civil society. Finland also accepts that measurable results are achieved slowly and achieving lasting results require long-term commitment. [The recommendations here are drawn mostly from Section 5.4.]

In the case studies we developed recommendations specific to the countries. Here we propose a more generic level of recommendations that reflect common conclusions across all countries covered and are forward looking in respect of future engagement in fragile states. We order these along the lines of the five principles. Implementation of these will be the responsibility of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to identify responsible units and task them accordingly.

6.1 Conflict-sensitive approach and conflict analysis

- A conflict analysis and political economy analysis should be undertaken in all fragile states where there is a substantial MFA Finland presence. Some of this might draw on the work of others, but it should lead to a conflict-sensitive strategy and provide a rationale and "do no harm" assessment specifically tailored to the chosen MFA sectors.
- The country portfolio should be kept simple, with complementarity between sectors and a MFA skill set to match the close management required. The aim should be to maintain long-term and sustained funding and commitments to these sectors. These should include flexibility in delivery methods that allow rapid managerial changes where necessary. The synergy between projects and strategic themes should be made explicit, and levels of complementarity with Finnish and other donor programmes outlined. In some cases it would mean a concentration of resources in particular geographic areas.
- Civilian crisis management – and more particularly security sector reform (SSR) – should move from technical assistance towards creating demand for a people-centred SSR, including greater involvement of civil society. This requires developing the expectations and capacities of the population to demand effective and accountable security governance. Geared specifically to fragile contexts, Finland should articulate and develop the concepts, principles and programmatic outline for this within civilian crisis management. In turn, this should be linked to a very specific set of strategic activities undertaken by viable non-governmental institutions.

6.2 Cooperation, coordination and influence

- Finland should work closely with donor partners in ensuring that results planning and adequate monitoring is in place, particularly in programmes that aim to improve economic and employment opportunities.

6.3 Strengthening local ownership

- Country strategies should indicate what the priority cross-cutting objectives are, why they have been chosen for this particular fragile context, how they are to be addressed, and how they will be monitored and reported at all levels. They should be linked to specific achievable targets within a designated timescale. If these are “process” targets, they should have indicators and a means of reporting and verifying outcomes.
- Capacity development and service delivery should always be treated as two different outcomes, with two different strategies. Support to civil society should include a capacity development strategy with specific funds allocated to this. Rather than an ad hoc selection of projects, greater complementarity between chosen activities should be sought, including explicit linkage and synergy between the Finnish NGO programme and the FLC programme.

6.4 Risk management

- In operationalising the MFA Fragile States Guidelines, specific objectives, process towards achieving these, and RBM impact indicators should be used within a country strategy. A Theory of Change should accompany the country strategy. Finland should more clearly define its political objectives and working processes for programme design and implementation to achieve them. Where political commitments (UNSCR, EU) put specific obligations on Finland, these should be made explicit.
- Risk management should include a regularly updated appraisal of known risks around four key areas: (a) Contextual (emerging political and security risks with direct impact on the programme); (b) Programmatic (risk variables associated with project/programme implementation); (c) Institutional (capacity and political independence risks associated with partners); and (d) Staffing (duty of care risks for national and international personnel).
- In countries where security prohibits access to recipient communities, a thorough appraisal of remote management should be undertaken. This should include a strategy for building local capacities for independently monitoring projects, and the training and costs associated with this. Acceptably higher risk activities should be embraced, provided the rationale for these is argued and defended on the basis of a strong conflict/peacebuilding analysis.

6.5 Funding and support channels

- For country programmes (as opposed to regional programmes), the level of devolved authority and responsibility for management and funding decisions within the MFA approved funding envelope should be greater. This is particularly true in fragile states where flexible rapid response should be matched to ongoing contextual analysis from experts on the ground. Helsinki should continue to provide guidance and technical advice, but where embassies have the required human resources, they should be responsible for conducting context analysis, programme scoping, identifying project interventions, and programme management, including monitoring.

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THE EVALUATION TEAM

Synthesis Report

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Jon held a Senior UN post in Sudan during the North/South peace process 2003–05 developing a comprehensive post-war development package and approach to peacebuilding, conflict prevention and mitigation. Some of the most important evaluations that he has led (several with Itad) include: a multi-donor evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Southern Sudan; an evaluation of the WFP country portfolio in Afghanistan; a thematic evaluation of UNDP support to conflict-affected countries; evaluations of DFID country and regional programmes in Afghanistan, Western Balkans, Yemen, Sudan, Indonesia and Pakistan; and a beneficiary impact assessment of World Bank Ethiopia demobilisation and reintegration programme.

David Fleming (Evaluation Manager and Team Member) is a Senior Consultant and leads Itad's work on monitoring and evaluation in conflict and post-conflict settings. He is experienced in applying a range of evaluation approaches and methodologies to evaluate donor programmes and strategies focusing on peace, conflict, humanitarian assistance, security and justice in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Current and recent evaluation work includes an evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Southern Sudan; an evaluation of Denmark's humanitarian strategy; an evaluation of DFID's Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Programme, focusing on a number of case studies related to delivering aid in insecure environments; an evaluation of Norway's Training for Peace Programme; an evaluation of EC development strategy in Yemen; and independent monitoring of DFID's programmes in Yemen. He also guest lectures annually at the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York on the challenges of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Case Study Teams

Bill Sterland (Western Balkans Lead) is an evaluation expert with 14 years' experience in international development cooperation, mostly in Western Balkans and Afghanistan. He has conducted numerous evaluations and studies over the last ten years, including multi-donor governance programmes in Serbia for UNDP; an NGO capacity building programme for UNDP in Montenegro; a Regional field-based study of Faith Communities as Potential Agents of Peacebuilding in the Balkans; and a wide range of NGO projects to strengthen peacebuilding, participation, and governance in post-conflict countries. All of his work between 2000 and 2010 was connected with civil society strengthening, capacity development of sub-national government, and/or local governance.

He specialises in institutional and organisational capacity building and was member of a major study for UNDP Kosovo on municipality functionality to establish capacity building demands for decentralisation. He is also experienced in employment and livelihoods, having developed projects with communities, farmers' cooperatives and local authorities for sustainable agriculture and rural development in Bosnia and Kosovo, conducted an evaluation of various community development projects in Bosnia with livelihoods components, and organisational development with local NGOs promoting economic opportunities, especially youth in Bosnia & Kosovo.

Debi Duncan (Palestinian Territories Lead) is an evaluation expert with 20 years' experience in development cooperation, particularly policy, strategy and programme development in fragile states. She has either led or contributed to a number of evaluations, including: Evaluation of Donor Activities in Support of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka (OECD), where she was lead consultant covering conflict and peacebuilding; Country Programme Evaluations for DFID in Nepal as lead consultant covering conflict and peacebuilding, and Yemen as lead consultant on justice and policing programme and gender.

She has strong experience of Palestine and the Middle East, where she was DFID Senior Conflict Advisor responsible for the development of the UK's security sector reform programme. She undertook analysis and assessment of the impact of international financial institution budget cuts on the Palestinian security sector, with a specific focus on conflict sensitive aspects. She was responsible for providing conflict related inputs for DFID's programme planning and more broadly the UK Government's strategy for peacebuilding in Palestine. She was also principal DFID contact for the appraisal and monitoring of UK funded peacebuilding projects with local partners in Israel and Palestine.

Tuija Stenbäck (Ethiopia Lead) is an evaluation expert with nearly 30 years' experience in development policy and cooperation. She has led or participated in a number of evaluations, including: Meta-analysis of all evaluations undertaken in 2006 commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland; Evaluation of the North-South Higher Education Network Programme funded by the Government of Finland; Evaluation of EC support to education sector in ACP countries; and Evaluation of the Finnish Country Programme in Nepal during the 1990s. She is also co-author of the new evaluation and monitoring guidelines for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland.

She has extensive working experience in Ethiopia, including: Evaluation of the training programme related to Chemical Weapons Convention implementation in developing countries; and Mid-term Review mission of the multi-donor funded Education Sector Development Programme in 1999. Her long-term overseas experience has seen her work as Chief Technical Adviser in Pakistan of the Primary Education Programme of North West Frontier Province, Education Sector Support Programme Coordinator in Zambia, and EC funded Adviser to the Department of Schools and Literacy of North West Frontier Province, Pakistan.

Zehra Kačapor Džihić (Western Balkans) is a youth empowerment and peace building expert with 15 years of experience in post-conflict and conflict-prone societies as programme manager, consultant, evaluator, policy and academic researcher, and policy adviser. She has proven expertise in designing and conducting comprehensive research and policy analyses and studies, with special focus on institutional and legal analyses in the area of social development and good governance and post-conflict and conflict-prone societies.

Rozeta Hajdari (Western Balkans) is a development policy and cooperation expert with 15 years of experience in public and private sector development, and 12 years experience in policy advocacy on aid coordination in fragile states. She has monitoring and evaluation expertise on macro and micro aid management, and is experienced in public institution building in Kosovo, as well as economic development and supporting employment and livelihoods in Kosovo. Recent evaluations include: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to the Western Balkans (2009-10), Evaluation of the Education Sector Support Programme in Kosovo, and Evaluation of the Capacity Building and Education Reform Project in Kosovo.

Mohammed Mussa (Ethiopia) is a Senior Evaluation expert based in Addis Ababa and has over 20 years of experience in international development cooperation, in particular evaluation. He has worked on a number of recent high-profile donor programmes in Ethiopia and other countries in the Horn of Africa including: fiduciary risk assessment of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), including cash transfers and food distribution for DFID Ethiopia and Rwanda; Public Works Reviews in the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) for the World Bank; Preparation of Project Completion Report of Promoting Basic Services Programme (PBS I); and impact monitoring of the Integrated Food Security Program for the EU in different parts of Ethiopia. He recently worked with Itad on two country programme evaluations in Ethiopia for DFID and Irish Aid, as well as on the evaluation of Danida intervention support in Somalia. He has also worked on evaluations of the Netherlands Fellowship Program (NFP) in Ethiopia, and evaluation of the Policy-Based Lending (PBL) aid instrument of the Asian Development Bank in Ethiopia.

Akbar Sarwari (Afghanistan) is an evaluation consultant based in Kabul with 10 years' experience of working in development cooperation and policy. He has strong expertise in public institution capacity building and has conducted a number of evaluations for international donors in Afghanistan, including: evaluation of Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), evaluation of United State Institute of Peace (USIP) pilot projects linking state and non-state justice actors in Afghanistan, and a multi-donor evaluation to assess State Building in Afghanistan.

Samir Baidoun (Palestinian Territories) is an evaluation consultant based in Birzeit, Palestine with 18 years' experience in development cooperation and policy in Palestine and the Middle East for a wide range of international donor agencies. He has been team leader of evaluation teams of numerous development projects in the Middle East (Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt), including projects implemented by Palestinian Ministry of Culture, Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture and Save the Children, and funded by a range of donors, including EU, World Bank, Norway and Netherlands.

Project Support

Dr Erja Hänninen (Junior Expert) has a PhD in development studies from University of Helsinki. Her research background is in water governance in Nepal, and before this, she worked on community development projects in integrated rural development in Nepal, India and Vietnam. She currently works as consultant at Niras International Consulting in Finland.

Derek Poate (Quality Assurance) has recently retired as Director at Itad where he was a co-founder in 1984. He has very extensive experience as evaluation team leader, project director and quality assurance expert dealing with the evaluation of institutions, programmes and projects in sustainable development. He has led high-profile evaluations of the Irish Aid Country Strategy for Ethiopia, 2008-2012; the Stockholm Environment Institute; the Rockefeller Foundation support to African Agriculture resilience in the face of climate change; and joint donor support to anti-corruption in five countries. His large-scale institutional assignments include evaluations of Norwegian support to HIV/AIDS in Africa, evaluations of Results-based Management at both Finnish MFA and UNDP, the Independent External Evaluation of IFAD, and both external evaluations of UNAIDS, in 2002 and 2009. For four years he led the Rural Development Advisory Team for Sida in Vietnam and led a quasi-experimental design Impact Assessment of the World Bank's Village Level Participatory Approach. Derek also led country programme evaluations for DFID in Rwanda, Ghana, Kenya and Sierra Leone.

1 BACKGROUND TO THE EVALUATION

The evaluation at hand is the first evaluation of the Finnish development cooperation focusing on the peace, security and development nexus. Finnish development cooperation has been evaluated in several partner countries considered as fragile states; however, a large thematic evaluation combining analysis from different countries has not yet been conducted.

This evaluation will assess peace, security and development in the Finnish development cooperation through country and regional case studies. Some Finnish country programmes and aid portfolios in fragile states are directly addressing conflict prevention or crisis management with specific targeted activities. However, majority of the cooperation in these countries is addressing a wide range of development challenges supporting conflict prevention and mitigation in a comprehensive manner and often indirectly. Usually, development cooperation is implemented in parallel with other activities through diplomacy, crisis management and humanitarian assistance.

The evaluation will include two components. First component contains evaluation of the Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans which showcases a region that has come out of war and is now in different stages of EU integration. The second component, in turn, includes three other case study countries and areas each experiencing a different situation of fragility. The evaluation of the two components is organised in such way that the cross-fertilisation between them can take place. The findings of the both components are going to be merged into synthesis evaluation report and as such the two components are closely interlinked. This will guide the organisation of the evaluation process and the work of the evaluation team.

2 CONTEXT

Peace, security and development as well as the particular needs of fragile states have gained increasing attention in the international development discourse during the past decade. United Nations Millennium Declaration placed peace and security in the core of development together with poverty reduction, protection of the environment as well as human rights, democracy and good governance. The EU, in turn, in its key development policy document “The European Consensus on Development” of 2006 considered the needs of the fragile states as one of the five common principles defining EU’s response to development. The importance of fragile states was reaffirmed in the EU Council Conclusions “Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change” of May 2012. In addition, OECD agreed on the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations in 2007. They contain commitments to maximise the contribution of development partners in fragile states and their implementation was monitored also in connection to the Paris declaration monitoring process.

A new approach to the development of fragile states called a “new deal” was agreed at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness which was held in Busan in 2011. New Deal commits fragile states and their development partners to “do things differently” by designing and implementing interventions with an even greater consideration for the specific characteristics of fragile states; and to focus on “different things” by structuring development interventions around peacebuilding and statebuilding goals.

There are nearly 50 states in the world that are classified as fragile states. More than 1.5 billion people live in countries that suffer from violent conflicts or constant political and criminal violence. At the same time development is curtailed. Very often violence erodes the base underpinning peace processes that have brought an end to political violence. Weak institutions suffering from a lack of legitimacy are unable to generate security, justice or economic development that supports employment. This can lead to crises also in countries that appear to be stable.

The nature of conflicts and fragile situations has changed during the last decades. Conflict and fragility does not necessarily result from one-off episode of war but from a repeated cycle of violence, weak governance, instability, poverty and competition over environmental resources as well as environmental hazards. While the repetitive nature of conflicts increases in some countries and regions, their possibilities to achieve sustainable development are diminished. Some of the fragile states are on track in achieving part of the MDGs; however, achieving the targets is particularly challenged in low-income fragile states. According to the OECD, ODA is the biggest financial inflow in fragile states.

2.1 Peace and development in Finnish development policy

The role of development policy as part of conflict prevention and peace mediation is included in the Programme of the Finnish Government (2011). The Programme states that Finnish development cooperation funds can be increased towards supporting comprehensive security. This is also stated in the Government Report of 2012 on Finnish Security and Defence Policy. Also the previous Government Programme of 2007 emphasised the role of crisis prevention and support to peace processes in the Finnish development policy. In addition, both government programmes have emphasised women's role in crises and conflict prevention. Finland has a national action plan on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security for the period 2012–16.

Peace, security and development nexus has been one of the key elements of Finnish development policy during the past two decades. It is also a central element in the Finnish Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012 which emphasise the interconnectedness between security and development. Key concept in Finnish development policies has been “comprehensive security” that encompasses human rights, development and security. In overall, comprehensive security can be supported through complementarity of different means: development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, diplomacy as well as military and civilian crisis management. Finland perceives development cooperation to have a particular role in conflict prevention and crisis recovery. In addition, Finnish development policies have emphasised the continuum between humanitarian aid and development cooperation in responding to the reconstruction and development needs of countries recovering from crises.

Finnish Development Policy Programme of 2012 emphasises long-term vision and commitment in supporting fragile states. These countries' ability to fulfil their basic functions and create economic growth is the key prerequisite for poverty reduction. Basic functions include security and justice as well as the ability to collect tax and customs revenues, which in turn can secure basic services and promote employment. Security and justice encompass human rights, democratic governance and a functioning civil society. Legitimacy and authority of the state are built through transparency and efficiency of governance as well as state's accountability to its citizens.

In 2009 the MFA published *Development and Security in Finland's Development Policy: Guidelines on Cooperation*. Being based on the development policy programme of 2007, the document outlines priorities for Finland's work in the peace, security and development in activities financed through development cooperation. The document takes as a starting point the multiplicity of factors affecting fragility and places the concept of comprehensive security into the core of development policy response. Guidelines showcase policy work and operational activities Finland is promoting globally as well as in different regions. It also stipulates the geographic and thematic priorities of Finnish development cooperation. While geographic focus is on selected fragile states and areas, the thematic focuses, in turn, are stipulated as: (a) ensuring security and justice, (b) creating enabling environment for economic development and employment, and (c) strengthening the legitimacy of the state by supporting transparency, efficiency and accountability of the state and its governance structures towards citizens. The document also lists the methods and channels of development cooperation.

3 SCOPE

The evaluation focuses on Finland's country programmes and development cooperation portfolios, related policy dialogues and partnerships in selected fragile states and areas. While the focus of the evaluation is on

country programmes and aid portfolios, the evaluation also looks into how development cooperation programmes interact with other Finnish ODA-financed activities supporting peace and development at the country level.

The evaluation concentrates particularly on the aspects of peace and development in the peace, security and development nexus. Security is only addressed when it is part of the country programme and development cooperation portfolio. Crisis management operations are not included in the evaluation.

The evaluation consists of two components:

Component 1 includes the evaluation of the Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans encompassing Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. While assessing the entirety of the Finnish development interventions in the region, the particular scope of Component 1 is the implementation of Finland's Development Policy Framework Programme in the Western Balkans for the years 2009–13. Component 1 also contains the final evaluation of two regional projects, namely (a) Education for Sustainable Development in the Western Balkans (ESD) and (b) Consolidation of the Human Capacities in the Forest Policy and Economics Education and Research in the South-East Europe Region (FOPER I and II). The evaluation of the two projects will contribute also to the evaluation of the entirety of the Finnish development interventions in the region.

Component 2 consists of case studies on Finnish development cooperation in Afghanistan, Palestinian Territories and Ethiopia. All of them are identified by the OECD/DAC as countries or areas in fragile situations.

When analysing the country programmes and development cooperation portfolios in the case study countries, the evaluation is not intended to examine each individual intervention meticulously but rather focus on how the entire country programme or cooperation portfolio and the related policy dialogue and partnerships support the drivers of peace and development in that particular context.

The evaluation covers bilateral instruments and bilateral contributions through multilateral channels (so-called multi-bi cooperation). In addition to sector support, programmes and projects, the bilateral cooperation instruments include Funds for Local Cooperation (FLC) administered by the Finnish Embassies and projects under the Institutional Cooperation Instrument. Activities of the Finnish civil society organisations in the case study countries are looked at as an entirety and as part of the overall Finnish contribution in a country. Similarly, while humanitarian aid and civilian crisis management operations are not included in the scope of this task, the evaluation looks at the interface between development cooperation and other ODA-financed activities at the country level in enhancing comprehensive approach to peace, security and development.

The scope of information sources include the development strategies of the case study governments, Finland's Development Policy Programmes, thematic and geographic guidance documents, previously conducted country programme or thematic evaluations, country analyses, reviews and reports, country-specific development cooperation plans, agreed minutes of the bilateral or other consultations, programme and project documents and similar documents. The evaluation team is also encouraged to use different local sources of information when available.

The temporal scope of the evaluation is 2007–12 covering the two Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012. As an exception, the evaluation of Western Balkans (Component 1) covers the entire span of Finland's development interventions in the region.

4 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the evaluation is to draw lessons on how Finnish development cooperation supports peace and development in fragile states. In addition, the purpose of Component 1 is to provide an assessment on the overall results and lessons learned of the Finnish development interventions in the Western Balkans region.

It is expected that the evaluation will bring forward issues, lessons learned and recommendations on Finland's contributions to peace and development in fragile states to support decision-makers at different departments of the Ministry. The purpose of the evaluation is to benefit the overall development policy-making of the MFA and, in addition, to support the guidelines on fragile states which the MFA is in the process of drafting.

Evaluation serves as a tool for accountability and its purpose is to inform also the general public, parliamentarians, academia and the wider community of development professionals on the use and achievements of the development cooperation which is financed by public funds.

5 OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION

The objective is to provide a comprehensive overall independent view on the achievements, contributions and weaknesses of Finnish development cooperation in supporting peace and development in fragile states. Evaluation will provide lessons learned from the past cooperation focusing on the priorities of the Finnish development policies. Finally, the evaluation will give recommendations on how to enhance the implementation of policy priorities in supporting peace and development through development cooperation.

The specific objective of the evaluation is to seek answers to the following main evaluation questions:

- 1 Has Finnish development cooperation provided relevant support to the drivers of peace and development in fragile states including poverty reduction? Have the choice and mix of sectors and instruments contributed to these targets?
- 2 What have been the mechanisms to integrate the Finnish development policy priorities also stipulated in the 2009 Guidelines *Development and Security in Finland's Development Policy* in the country level interventions? Are development interventions on the ground complying with the priorities and thematic focuses of the development policies and the 2009 Guidelines?
- 3 How have the cross-cutting objectives been integrated in Finland's development interventions in fragile states? How has their integration/non-integration affected identified and achieved results? What are the lessons learned and best practises in implementing cross-cutting objectives?
- 4 How have the aid effectiveness commitments been integrated in the Finnish development interventions? How has their application supported development results and the overall objective of peace and development? What have been the lessons learned and best practises?

The main evaluation questions will be studied through total of four case studies covering countries and areas in different situations of fragility.

6 ISSUES BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

The following **issues by evaluation criteria** will guide the evaluation in all of the case studies. Priority issues for each criterion are indicated below. The listed priority issues have also benefitted from the DAC Guidelines on Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility (2012). It is expected that the evaluation team will develop more detailed evaluation questions based on the priorities set below and expand the set of questions where it deems this necessary.

Relevance

- Assesses the choice of development interventions and their stated objectives in the context of partner country's policies and development objectives as well as the particular situation of conflict and fragility of the country under examination.
- Analyses the extent to which the objectives of Finland's country programmes or cooperation portfolios are consistent with the objectives of the Finland's development policies also stipulated in the 2009 Guidelines *Development and Security in Finland's Development Policy*.
- Includes assessment of relevance through the perceptions of different beneficiary groups at different levels of interventions (national, regional, local) with the particular focus on the final users and groups, including those addressed through cross-cutting objectives.

- *For Component 1 only:* Analyses the extent to which the objectives of Finland's development cooperation in the Western Balkans are consistent with the objectives of Finland's Development Policy Framework Programme 2009–13 for the Western Balkans.

Effectiveness

- Considers how Finland has contributed to countries' capacities to produce basic services and reduce poverty taking into account the context of fragility. Assessment includes an analysis on how the trends of fragility have affected the achieved objectives, how risks have been managed and how the implementation of aid effectiveness commitments has contributed to the achieved results.
- *For Component 1 only:* Assesses to what extent Finnish development cooperation has achieved its objectives in the Western Balkans as stated in the consecutive regional strategies and Development Policy Framework Programme.

Impact

- Refers to the wider achievements of Finnish development cooperation in the country under examination in terms of contributions to security and justice, economic development and employment as well as strengthened the authority and legitimacy of the state.
- Focuses on how the impact is perceived by the different beneficiary groups with the particular focus on the final users and groups, including those addressed through cross-cutting objectives.
- *For Component 1 only:* Refers to the wider impact of Finnish development cooperation to Western Balkan's development towards multiethnic societies, rule of law and European democracy.

Sustainability

- In the context of fragile states, sustainability refers particularly to how different interventions support the sustainability of resilience towards trends of fragility and conflict. The analysis includes assessment if Finnish development cooperation has contributed to the long-term drivers of peace as a key element for sustainability.
- Assessment focuses on how leadership, ownership and capacity have been supported to strengthen sustainability of interventions. Analysis also considers how participation of men and women as well as different beneficiary groups have been organised.
- *For Component 1 only:* assesses if the exit from the overall regional framework programme has been managed in a way to support sustainability.

Coordination

- Looks into the costs and benefits of investing in division of labour and other coordination activities. The analysis examines if Finnish development cooperation activities are coordinated with other development partners and if this coordination has improved the relevance, effectiveness and impact of Finnish development cooperation.

Coherence

- Assesses the internal coherence of Finnish policies, policy dialogue and development cooperation including an assessment on how development cooperation has interacted with other Finnish ODA-financed activities at the country level.
- Assesses the coherence of Finnish policies and development cooperation with wider donor communities' policies and interventions.

Efficiency

- Focuses on the working modalities related to aid delivery and management. The assessment considers particularly if the chosen working modalities as well as the number and size of interventions have supported efficient aid delivery and reaching of the intended beneficiaries.

For the **final evaluation of the two regional projects (ESD and FOPER I & II) included in the Component 1** the priority issues for each criterion are indicated below. It is expected that the evaluation team will develop more detailed evaluation questions based on the priorities set below and expand the set of questions where it deems this necessary.

Relevance

- Focuses on the objectives and achievements of the project and their consistency with the policies of the partner countries and with the needs and priorities of the different stakeholders, including all final beneficiaries.

Effectiveness

- Focuses on the achievement of project's immediate objectives.
- Assesses to what extent the achievements of the project have supported human rights and cross-cutting objectives of gender equality, reduction of inequalities and promotion of climate sustainability.

Impact

- Assesses the progress towards achieving the overall objectives of the project taking also into account the aspects of strengthening regional integration.
- Analyses the overall impact of the project, intended and unintended, positive and negative.
- Focuses on how the impact is perceived by the different beneficiary groups with the particular focus on the final users and groups.

Sustainability

- Assesses if the benefits produced by the project will be maintained, including the achievements in human rights, gender equality, reduction of inequalities and promotion of climate sustainability.
- Examines if the phasing out/exit from the project has supported the sustainability of the benefits produced.

Efficiency

- Focuses on the project's working modalities. The assessment considers particularly if the chosen working modalities and the size of the project have supported efficient aid delivery and reaching of the intended beneficiaries.

7 STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATION: COMPONENTS 1 AND 2

The evaluation consists of two components. It is organised in such a way that the two components can learn from each other. While their findings are presented separate reports, they are also merged into one synthesis report.

7.1 Component 1: Evaluation of the Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans

Component 1 of the evaluation contains the evaluation of Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans and the final evaluation of two regional projects, namely (a) Education for Sustainable Development in the Western Balkans (ESD) and (b) Consolidation of the Human Capacities in the Forest Policy and Economics Education and Research in the South-East Europe Region, (FOPER I & II). Out of the Western Balkan countries Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina are considered as fragile states and they are also included into the geographic priorities of the 2009 Guidelines.

Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans started in 1996. Cooperation has been guided by strategy papers of 1999, 2003 and 2009. The 1999 strategy paper identified livelihoods and support to civil society as priority areas for bilateral development cooperation. In the 2003 strategy, in turn, supporting human resources development, administrative capacities and civil society were identified as priority areas. Both strategies contained the use of different financing instruments (for example bilateral development cooperation, humanitarian aid and civil crisis management) in supporting stabilisation of the Western Balkans.

In 2009 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a Development Policy Framework Programme of the Western Balkans for the years 2009–13. The Policy Framework Programme has been implemented under government Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012. The thematic priorities of the Finnish development

cooperation were identified as stability and security, aid for trade, environment and social sustainability. In addition to country-specific programmes, the framework programme identified regional programmes particularly in the environment sector. The strategy emphasises complementarity and coordination of Finnish development cooperation with other donors, placing particular attention to the complementarity of the Finnish cooperation to the IPA and other programmes of the European Commission. While the evaluation will assess the entirety of the Finnish development interventions, the particular focus will be on the implementation of the Policy Framework Programme of 2009–13.

The current framework policy programme is ending in 2013. There is no new framework policy programme or regional development cooperation strategy expected after this. In practise this means that Finnish development cooperation is scaled down. The scaling down has already started during the implementation of the current framework policy programme.

Comprehensive evaluations on the Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans have been conducted on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 and on Kosovo in 2008. In Bosnia-Herzegovina Finnish development cooperation was considered generally relevant including the post-conflict perspective and that the set goals were reached. Development cooperation instruments were assessed to be well chosen and the management of projects effective and inclusive. According to the evaluation the main challenge was sustainability. The evaluation on Finland's development cooperation in Kosovo, in turn, found out that the cooperation had been innovative in terms of solutions and instruments. In addition, Finnish contributions were able to make a difference due to thematic concentration and the country programme had not suffered from deficient donor coordination. While Finnish support was found out to be successfully switched from emergency phase to development cooperation, the evaluation considered the planned cooperation in Kosovo too detached from the general goal of EU integration.

During the years Finland has supported the Western Balkans' regional stability and security and EU integration comprehensively by means of foreign and security policy measures, including military and civilian crisis management, economic and commercial activities, and development cooperation. In 2011, the Finnish ODA to the Western Balkan countries was €9,8 million.

7.2. Component 2: Other case studies on peace and development in Finnish development cooperation

Component 2 consists of further case studies on how Finland has contributed to the peace and development in fragile states. The selected case study countries and areas represent different situations of fragility. In addition, the content and the programming process of Finnish development cooperation vary among the case study countries.

Afghanistan

Finland's Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012 as well as the 2009 Guidelines refer to Afghanistan as fragile country where Finland is committed to long-term development cooperation. Large part of the Finnish development cooperation in Afghanistan is channelled through multilateral trust funds such as the ARTF by the World Bank and LOTFA by the UNDP. Aid is also channelled, for example, through civil society organisations. Humanitarian aid and civilian crisis management constitute of a considerable share of the ODA in Afghanistan. In year 2011, the Finnish ODA to Afghanistan was €22,3million.

Finnish development cooperation in Afghanistan was evaluated in 2007. According to the evaluation Finnish aid in Afghanistan has been coherent and relevant to the priorities of Afghanistan and many programmes have had a positive impact with high impact potential. The evaluation recommended more considerations on possible negative consequences as part of the aid may have adverse effects.

Palestinian Territories

Finland's Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012 as well as the 2009 Guidelines refer to Palestinian Territories as a fragile area where Finland is carrying out development cooperation. Finland's development cooperation portfolio can be described as a statebuilding programme with an aim to support the peace process

and the capacities of the Palestinian institutions to take care of state functions. Finnish development cooperation concentrates on education, land registration and water sectors. In addition to the bilateral programme, support has been channelled through multilateral organisations and the EU. Finland is also providing humanitarian aid in the Palestinian Territories and participates in the civilian crisis management operation in the country. In 2011, the Finnish ODA to the Palestinian Territories was €11,6 million.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is one of Finland's long-term partner countries and Finland has a comprehensive country programme to support drivers for peace and development. The Guidelines of 2009 note that support to Ethiopia is justified from the perspective of fragility in addition to the overall development needs. In addition, Ethiopia is an important regional player and a centre of stability in the conflict prone and volatile Horn of Africa. The country programme concentrates on education, water and rural economic development. In addition to development cooperation through various instruments, humanitarian aid can constitute a large part of the ODA in Ethiopia. In 2011, the Finnish ODA to Ethiopia was €17,0 million.

Finnish country programme in Ethiopia has been evaluated in 2010. The evaluation found Finnish development cooperation tightly focused, relatively coherent and highly relevant. Development cooperation was also found reasonably effective and efficient. Its impact particularly on the water sector was considered significant. The overall sustainability and impact was found satisfactory. In addition to the country programme evaluation, Finnish cooperation in the Ethiopian water sector was evaluated part of a large thematic evaluation in 2010 (evaluation report 2010:3). This evaluation will also benefit from the results of the ongoing evaluation of the complementarity in the Finnish development policy and cooperation. The evaluation will assess the activities of the Finnish NGOs in Ethiopia among other countries. The results of the complementary evaluation will be available during second half of 2013.

Other evaluations

In addition to the case studies listed above, the evaluation will benefit from the findings on the evaluation that assessed Finnish support to the peace process in Nepal which is one of Finland's long-term partner countries and considered as a fragile state by the OECD/DAC. The evaluation was done as part of a joint evaluation led by Denmark including also Switzerland and Finland (the report "Evaluation of the International Support to the Peace Process in Nepal 2006–12" is expected to be available during first half of 2013). Finland's contribution in the evaluation focused on the different peacebuilding activities at the level of individual people, in particular women and ethnic minorities in rural areas. The report of the Finnish sub-evaluation was published in 2012 (*Finland's Contribution to Building Inclusive Peace and Nepal. Evaluation Report 2012:7*). The findings of the evaluation can be used also in the context of Nepal's country programme evaluation report published in 2012.

8 GENERAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

As mentioned earlier, the evaluation looks at the country programmes or development cooperation portfolios as a whole. In addition, evaluation looks into the related policy dialogue and established development partnerships in the partner countries. Finland's contributions are analysed in the light of partner countries' policies and actions as well as part of the wider donor community operating in the country.

The evaluation takes as its starting point context analysis of the situation of fragility done during the desk study phase in each case study country or area and assesses Finland's development cooperation within this context.

The evaluation will involve stakeholders in the Ministry and Finnish Embassies as well as relevant institutions and stakeholder groups in the partner countries. Principles of participatory evaluation are applied and during the field work particular attention will be paid to ensure that women, marginalised and vulnerable groups are included.

Interview groups for the desk study and field visit phases are to be identified by the evaluation team in advance. EVA-11 will inform those concerned within the Ministry and in the case study countries the evaluation team is introduced to the main governmental and administrative authorities by the Finnish Embassy. The actual logistics and arrangement of interviews is the task of the evaluation team. EVA-11 will provide also team with

an introductory letter with the help of which the team can approach different stakeholders for interviews and document retrieval.

The field visits will be divided in the following way between the two phases:

Component 1: Western Balkans focusing on Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the Policy Framework Programme of 2009–13 bilateral programmes have focused on Kosovo while Bosnia-Herzegovina was former focus country in the region. In current Policy Framework Programme Bosnia-Herzegovina is a partner in the regional programmes and projects. Other shorter field visit countries in the region are Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia including also visits to the two regional projects.

Component 2: Afghanistan, Palestinian Territories and Ethiopia.

Particular attention is paid to the adequate length of the field visits to enable sufficient collection of data also from sources outside of the institutional stakeholders. Some of the case study countries pose particular practical issues related to the security of the evaluation team members. These issues are discussed more in detail in the beginning of the evaluation process and the evaluation team will conduct the field work taking the security instructions into account. The timing and organisation of the field visit to Afghanistan will be planned in close collaboration with the Finnish Embassy in Kabul and it will be conducted according to the security procedures of the embassy.

The team is expected to use methods suitable to fragile contexts and take advantage of local sources of information including information collected from the final beneficiaries when possible. Evaluation team is expected to propose a detailed methodology in the evaluation matrix which will be presented in the inception report covering both Components 1 and 2. The methods used will be mixed multiple methods which enable triangulation in the drawing of results. Validation of results must be done through multiple sources. No single statements should be taken as a general outcome.

During the process particular attention is paid to a strong inter-team coordination and information sharing between the two components. In addition, the evaluation team is expected to show sensitivity to gender roles, ethnicity, beliefs, manners and customs of all stakeholders. The evaluators shall respect the rights and desire of the interviewees and stakeholders to provide information in confidence. Direct quotes from interviewees and stakeholders are not used in the reports.

The evaluation team is expected to raise issues which it deems important to the evaluation but are not mentioned in these ToR. Similarly, the team is expected to take up issues included in the ToR which it does not deem feasible.

9 EVALUATION PROCESS, TIMELINES AND DELIVERABLES

The evaluation consists of the following phases and will produce the respective deliverables. The process will move forward according to the phases described below and new phase is initiated when all the deliverables of the previous phase are approved by EVA-11.

I Start-up meeting

Deliverable: Start-up note and start-up meeting

The purpose of the start-up meeting is to discuss the entire evaluation process including practical issues related to the field visits, reporting and administrative matters. Start-up meeting can be organised also as a video conference or a webinar. The start-up meeting is expected to be organised during the month of July 2013.

In the start-up note the evaluation team presents how it intends to approach the entire evaluation task. The start-up note will look more in detail to the issues related to the both components as described in these ToR. The start-up note is presented four (4) weeks after the signing of the contract.

II Inception

Deliverable: Inception report

This phase includes the preparation of the inception report for both components and organisation of the inception meeting in Helsinki.

Production of the work plan and the evaluation matrix of the main evaluation questions presented in these ToR constitute the inception report. Evaluation questions are presented through more specific research questions, respective indicators and judgement criteria. Sources of verification are also indicated. Separate evaluation matrix is prepared for the two regional projects to be evaluated in the Western Balkans.

The methodology will be explained, including the methods and tools of analyses. The inception report will make special attention to the methodological needs of evaluating development cooperation in the context of fragility. It will also elaborate specific issues related to the fragility trends in the cases of Component 1 and 2 and how they affect the approach and methods.

The inception report will show the fine-tuning of the tasks between the team members involved in both components, present a list of stakeholder groups to be included into the interviews as well as an outline of the interview questions to be used for the interviews in Finland. The inception report will also suggest an outline of the final reports. The structure of reports will follow the established overall structure of the evaluation reports of the Ministry.

Inception should be kept concise and should not exceed 20–25 pages, annexes included. The inception report will be submitted in September 2013.

III Desk study

Deliverable: Desk study report

Desk study phase consists of analysis of the written material. Desk study report will provide a concise analysis of the policies, guidelines, and other documents related to the evaluation subject. It will also present a plan for the field visits including the identification of local interviewee groups (government authorities, academia, research groups/institutes, civil society representatives, other donors etc.) and sources of information (studies, publications etc.) and an outline of the interview questions according to the interviewee groups in each of the field visit countries.

Draft desk study report will be submitted to EVA-11 prior to the interviews in Finland and is subject to approval by EVA-11 prior to the field visit. The report should be kept concise and clear. It should be submitted latest six (6) weeks after the inception meeting.

Interviews in Finland will be conducted based on the analysis of the written material. This will enable informed discussions with the interviewees. Interviews with the high policy level interviewees of the Ministry will be organised as joint sessions including both components and all case studies of the evaluation.

IV Field visits to Western Balkans (Component 1) and to other case study countries (Component 2)

Deliverable: Presentation supported by power point on the preliminary results

The field visits of Components 1 and 2 are organised in such a way that the field visit to the Western Balkans is initiated first and is expected in January 2014. The field visit is going to focus on Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, however; it will also contain shorter visits to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro including also visits related to the final evaluation of the two regional projects ESD and FOPER I & II.

Field visit to the three (3) other case study countries is expected to be conducted in January – February 2014.

The purpose of the field visits is to reflect and validate the results of the desk study phase and assess the situation on the ground in the light of policy and programming analysis. The purpose of the field visit is to make further assessments and fill any gaps in the information. The field visit will contain the collection of local sources of information as a key element of the evaluation.

The preliminary results of field visits will be presented, supported by a power point, to EVA-11 after the return from the field. Results are presented in a form of a webinar. The team is also expected to provide an oral presentation on the preliminary results at the end of the each field visit to the staff of the respective Finnish Embassy or Representative Office. Webinars can also be used in the case of possible shared sessions between the embassies.

After the field visit further interviews and document study in Finland may still be needed to complement the information collected during the desk study phase and the field visits.

V Final reporting

Deliverable: Final reports (including semi-final draft reports, final draft reports and final reports) and public presentation supported by power point

The final reporting contains the following deliverables:

- Evaluation report on Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans including the findings of the final evaluation of the projects (a) Education for Sustainable Development in Western Balkans (ESD) and (b) Forest Policy and Economics Education and Research (FOPER I & II) as annexes.
- Synthesis report on peace and development in Finnish development cooperation. In addition to the synthesis, the results of each three cases of Component 2 will be presented and reported either as part of the synthesis report or separately.

The timetable of the delivery of semi-final draft reports, final draft reports and final reports is as follows:

- The semi-final draft reports are available six (6) weeks after the end of the field visits. The semi-final draft reports will be commented by EVA-11. It is possible that semi-final draft reports will be also shared with some key informants.
- Final draft reports will be available within three (3) weeks after the comments to the semi-final draft reports.
- Final draft reports will be subjected to a round of comments by the parties concerned. It should be noted that the comments are meant only to correct any misunderstandings or factual mistakes instead of rewriting the report.
- The reports will be finalised based on the comments received and will be ready within three weeks after receipts of the comments. The final reports are expected no later than in June 2014.
- A special effort should be made by the evaluation team to produce concise the informative reports. Detailed instructions on writing the report are given in 8.1.
- Presentation of the findings of the evaluation will be held in Helsinki no later than June 2014.
- In addition to the presentations in Finland, a presentation of the findings of the evaluation will be organised through also through a webinar. Special attention is going to be made to include representatives of the partner countries in the webinar.

9.1 Writing of the reports

The evaluation team will ensure that the evaluation reports are concise and informative and can be easily understood also by those who are not specialists in development cooperation.

Final reports must follow the “Instructions to Evaluation Report Authors” which will be provided to the evaluation team in the beginning of the assignment. The team should agree on common formats (type of bullet points, format of tables etc.) and to ensure that all team members are following the overall instructions to the authors. The final reports shall be subjected to a language check and a thorough check of details before reports are submitted to EVA-11. The editorial and linguistic quality of the final report must be ready-to-print. The Ministry will be responsible for the translation of the abstract and the summary into Finnish and Swedish.

In addition to the assessments of the quality assurance experts, evaluation reports will be subjected to a peer review of international experts. The views of the peer reviewers shall be available on the basis of anonymity to the evaluation team.

Overall, the evaluation teams should observe in its work the OECD/DAC and EU aid evaluation quality standards of the evaluation process and reports. A matrix combining the OECD/DAC and EU quality standards for evaluations is made available to the team in the beginning of the assignment.

Should it happen that the final evaluation reports do not comply with the requirements spelled herein, the instructions to authors and the quality standards of the OECD/DAC and EU, there will be penalties to the service provide as specified in the contract.

Finally, each deliverable is subjected to EVA-11's approval. The evaluation team is able to move to the next phase only after receiving a written statement of acceptance by EVA-11.

10 EXPERTISE REQUIRED

In overall, successful conduct of the evaluation requires a deep understanding of peace, security and development nexus. It also requires experience in and knowledge of the case study countries as an operating environment for development cooperation. Finally, the successful conduct of the evaluation requires experience on fragile states as a subject and environment for evaluations.

The evaluation team will include a mix of senior male and female experts. The team also includes experts from both developed and developing countries.

All experts shall have a minimum of MSc/MA university education and be fluent in oral and written English (level 6). One of the senior experts shall be a native speaker of Finnish language. Knowledge of local administrative languages of the case study countries among the experts will be an asset.

One of the senior experts of the team will be identified as the team leader. The team leader will lead the work of both components and will be ultimately responsible for the deliverables. The evaluation team will work under the leadership of the team leader who carries the final responsibility of completing the evaluation. The identified team leader will lead the work of both Component 1 and 2 of the evaluation to ensure the continuity of the process and feeding of the findings between the two components.

Detailed team requirements are included in the Instructions to the Tenderers (Annex A to the Invitation to the Tenderers).

10.1 Document retrieval and other assistance to the evaluation team

It is necessary that the evaluation team consists of one junior expert to support the team in document retrieval as well as logistical arrangements.

Part of the documentation, particularly concerning the Western Balkans, is already collected and is available to the team. However, document retrieval is still needed and should be initiated in the beginning of the evaluation process. Document retrieval should be done by the junior member of the team under a supervision of a senior team member. EVA-11 will provide support in the document retrieval to the extent possible. However, it is the responsibility of the evaluation team to ensure that all documentation necessary to a successful conduct of the evaluation has been collected.

The junior expert will be a native speaker of Finnish language. She/he will serve in the document retrieval, practical organisation, logistics, and similar tasks in Finland. She/he may be required to review and summarise some documentation that exists only in Finnish language. His/her residential location should enable him/her to be available on a short notice.

The junior expert is required to have a minimum academic qualification of MSc or MA, and a minimum of two years of working experience after the graduation. The junior expert will be fluent in oral and written English (level 6).

There is no opportunity to claim per diems, rental or residential expenses, or other travel than local public transport fees to the junior expert from the evaluation budget.

10.2 Quality assurance

Two quality assurance experts will be required. These two experts need to be highly experienced, their expertise and experience corresponding the level and qualifications of team leader position. They have provided quality assurance services at least for three (3) processes, and are familiar with the international frameworks of the OECD/DAC and the EU regarding the aid evaluation quality standards and of the evaluation reports.

The quality assurance experts will review all the deliverables and offer advice at each juncture of the evaluation process that includes submission of a deliverables. The reports of the quality assurance experts will also be submitted to EVA-11. At the end of the evaluation process the quality assurance experts will fill in the EU's quality grid for evaluation reports.

11 BUDGET

The total budget of the evaluation including both Component 1 and Component 2 is 600 000 euro (VAT excluded).

12 MANDATE

The evaluation team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this evaluation with pertinent persons and organisations. However, it is not authorised to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland. The evaluation team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity.

The evaluation team has no immaterial rights to any of the material collected in the course of the evaluation or to any draft or final reports produced as a result of this assignment.

Helsinki, 2 April 2013

Aira Päivöke
Director
Development Evaluation

ANNEX 2 PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Western Balkans

Name	Organisation	Position
Ismo Kolehmainen	MFA Helsinki	Former Deputy Head, Unit for EU Enlargement and Western Balkans
Anu Rämä	MFA Helsinki	1st Secretary, Unit for EU Enlargement and Western Balkans
Olli Ruohomäki	MFA Helsinki	former Sr. Advisor on Conflict, Governance and Fragile States
Outi Isotalo	Embassy of Finland, Belgrade	1st Secretary/Deputy Head of Mission
Martti Eirola	MFA	former Deputy Head, Unit for EU Enlargement and Western Balkans
Svetlana Garić	Embassy of Finland, Belgrade	FLC Officer/Assistant to the Ambassador
Anne Meskanen	Embassy of Finland, Prishtina	Chargée d'Affaires
Vesa Kotilainen	Embassy of Finland, Prishtina	1st Secretary/Development Expert
Jehona Sejdiu	Embassy of Finland, Prishtina	FLC Coordinator
Florim Canolli	Ministry of European Integration, Prishtina	Director, Dept. of Development Assistance
Jeton Karaqica	Ministry of European Integration, Prishtina	Director, Dept. for Economic Criteria and Internal Markets
Miranda Krasneci	Ministry of Education, Sport and Technology	Dep. Director, Dept. of Pre-University Education
Kathrina Ramberg	Embassy of Norway, Prishtina	Deputy Head of Mission
Illir Deda	KIPRED, Prishtina	Executive Director
Jan-Peter Olters	World Bank, Prishtina	Country Manager
Flora Kelmendi	World Bank, Prishtina	Senior Operations Officer
Halil Ibrahimimi	UNDP Kosovo	Project Manager, Conservation of Biodiversity and Sustainable Land Use Management in Dragash
Steliana Nedera	UNDP Kosovo	Deputy Resident Representative
Valbona Bogujevci	UNDP Kosovo	Programme Coordinator, Inclusive Growth Team
Yllka Gëdovci	UNDP Kosovo	Programme Analyst
Ardian Spahiu	UNDP Kosovo	Project Manager, DEED
Teuta Purrini	UNDP Kosovo	Project Manager, Aid for Trade Project
Shkipe Deda-Gjurgjiali	UNDP Kosovo	Portfolio Manager, Environment and Energy
Hjortur Sverrisson	OSCE Kosovo	Head of Human Rights Protection
Kanuko Terui	JICA Kosovo	ODA Advisor to the Ministry of European Integration
Ito Ryuichi	JICA Balkan Office	Assistant Resident Representative
Anton Kobakov	EBRD Kosovo	Head of Office
Chris Edwards	USAID Kosovo	Deputy Head of Mission
Aleksandar Nikolovski	FAO Kosovo	Chief Technical Advisor
Naser Krasniqi	FAO Kosovo	National Team Leader
Melvin Asin	EU Office in Kosovo	Deputy Head of Cooperation Section
Gaby Hagmüller	EU Office in Kosovo	Social Development Team Leader
Paul Partner	UNKT	UN Peace and Development Advisor
Ahmet Kryeziu	Save the Children Kosovo	Country Director
Rudina Ademi Shala	Save the Children Kosovo	Manager for Programme Development

Markus Baechler	Swiss Cooperation Office, Kosovo	Director
Maria Melbing	Embassy of Sweden, Prishtina	Head of Development Cooperation
Agim Krasniqi.	Ministry of Finance, Kosovo	Director, Budget Department
Jeremie Zeytouni	ECMI, Prishtina	Project Manager
Gazmend Tahiri	Ministry of Education, Sport and Technology	Project National Team Leader, Special Education Unit
Qemajl Marmullkaj	Office of the Prime Minister, Strategic Planning Office	Head of Strategic Planning Office
Vedat Sogojeva	Office of the Prime Minister, Strategic Planning Office	Senior Officer
Ekrehem Gjokaj	Ministry of Agriculture, Forest- ry and Rural Development	Director, Dept. of Forestry
Tahir Ahmeti	Ministry of Agriculture, Forest- ry and Rural Development	Head of Forestry Policy
Afrim Maliqi	Handikos	Executive Director
Arton Osmani	EU Office in Kosovo	Agriculture Project Officer
Sophie Beaumont	EU Office in Kosovo	Social Development Task Manager
Muhamet Arifi	Balkan Sunflowers Kosovo	Executive Director
Angela Lasarte	Balkan Sunflowers Kosovo	Programme Assistant
Fatmir Curri	Kosovo Civil Society Founda- tion	Executive Director
Faidan Hallaaqi	Kosovo Civil Society Founda- tion	Programme Coordinator
Igballe Rugova	Kosovo Women's Network	Executive Director
Nicole Farnsworth	Kosovo Women's Network	Programme Manager
Igballe Asllani Potera	Resource Centre "Perparimi", Fushe Kosove	Director
Ismet Gashi	Primary School "Mihail Grame- no", Fushe Kosove	Head Teacher
Remzije Bogujevci	Model School "Selman Riza", Fushe Kosove	Head Teacher
Sahit Dragusha	Model School "Selman Riza", Fushe Kosove	Deputy Head Teacher
Ardita Metaj-Dika	TACSO Kosovo Office	Resident Advisor
Aferdita Spahiu	UNICEF Kosovo	Programme Manager
Ilir Morina	Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning	Head, Kosovo Environment Protection Agency
Hazer Dana	Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning	Director of Sharr National Park
Goran Svilanović	Regional Cooperation Centre, Sarajevo	Secretary-General
Kaltrina Salihu	UNDP Kosovo	Project Coordinator, Conservation of Biodiversity and Sustainable Land Use Management in Dragash

<p>Shahadin Tershajaku, Vice Mayor of Dragash Tafil Krasniqi, Director of Public Services Ramadan Jashari, Director of Main Family Medical Centre Lindita Kozmaqi-Pirall-Municipal Office for gender Equality Hasan Dashallari, Municipal Officer for Environment Avni Nebiu, Director of Administration Kamber Kamberi, Director of Culture, Youth, and Sport Uzair Hamza, Office for Communities Suad Tosuni, NGO representative Florim Krasniqi, Officer for Urban Planning</p>	<p>Dragash Municipal Working Group</p>	<p>Project participants: Conservation of Biodiversity and Sustainable Land Use Management in Dragash</p>
<p>Shasene Maliqi Hebip Osmani Aledin Sylejmani Gezim Selmani Rrustem Haliti Artan Sulejmani Fari Nafezi Xhemli Skenderi</p>	<p>Kuk Village Working Group</p>	<p>Project participants: Conservation of Biodiversity and Sustainable Land Use Management in Dragash</p>
<p>Kuclar Jasminka Kuclar Ajsa Hasan Kuclar Gazmen Tairovci Halim Kuclar Sadik Duseoki Mukadesa Tairovci Ismael Tairovci Adnan Redzeplari</p>	<p>Zlipotok Village Working Group</p>	<p>Project participants: Conservation of Biodiversity and Sustainable Land Use Management in Dragash</p>

Afghanistan

Name	Organisation	Position
Niko Heimola	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	AFG & PAK Desk Officer (Development Cooperation) 2008–
Ms Anja Paaanen	MFA Finland	Development Advisor PRT, Faryab, July 2004-Jan 2007 and Mazar-e-Sharif Jan 2008-Dec 2009
Ms Merja Färm	MFA Finland	Special Advisor/1st secretary – Good Governance and Rule of Law – Kabul 2010–12
Mr Janne Heiskanen	MFA Finland	Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation, Kabul, 2009–11

Mr Antti Kuusi	MFA Finland	Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation, Kabul, 2011–
Mr Mikko Harjulehto	MFA Finland	Political Advisor to the Senior Civilian Representative, Regional Command North, Mazar-e-Sharif, 2011–13
Mr Marko Pajunen	MFA Finland	Political Advisor, PRT Mazar-e-Sharif, 2007–09
Mr Sam Karvonen	MFA Finland	Senior Advisor for Development, Jun 2007–May 2009
Dr Olli Ruohomäki	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	Team Leader South Asia, previously Senior Advisor on Fragile States, Dept of Development Policy, 2007–12
Ms Merja Lahtinen	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	Advisor for Rule of Law
Mr Jaakko Jakkila	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	Advisor for Democracy and Good Governance
Ms Tanja Viikki	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	Advisor for Conflict and Governance
Pamela Fatima Husain	UN Women	Deputy Country Representative
Nina Hal Schjelderup	Norwegian Embassy	Counsellor
Karin Boven	Netherlands Embassy	Head of Development Cooperation
Nasrin Hoseni	Swedish Embassy	Program Manager (Education & Gender)
Bill Massey	UNDP	Programme Manager, LOTFA
Naila Ahmed	World Bank	NSP manager
Andrew Scanlon	UNEP	Country Manager
Ashita Mittal	UNODC Afghanistan	Deputy Representative

Ethiopia

Name	Organisation	Position
Leo Olasvirta	MFA Finland	Department for Africa and Middle East, former Ambassador to Ethiopia
Jussi Karakoski	MFA Finland	Department for Development Policy, Education Advisor
Minna Hares	MFA Finland	Department for Africa and Middle East, Desk Officer for Ethiopia
Kirsi Pulkkinen	MFA Finland	Department for Development Policy, NGO Unit, Desk Officer for Ethiopia
Harri Seppänen	NIRAS	Home Office Coordinator for Finn-WASH-BG
Henna Tanskanen	NIRAS	Home Office Coordinator for Tana-Beles WME
Tommi Tenno	NIRAS	Home Office Coordinator for REILA
Mikaela Kruskopf	NIRAS	Monitoring specialist, Tana-Beles WME
Elis Karsten	RAMBOLL	Home Office Coordinator for COWASH and former CTA for Rural Water Supply and Environmental Programme in Amhara Region, Phase IV 2007–12
Anja Koskinen	Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission (FELM)	Project Coordinator
Yalemzewd Demissie	Ministry of Agriculture	Senior Land Admin Expert
David Harris	Ministry of Agriculture	REILA Team Leader
Dr Zerfu Hailu	Ministry of Agriculture	Deputy Team Leader, REILA
Mohammed	Ministry of Education	SNE Directorate, MoE
Solomon Shiferaw	Ministry of Education	Head of Planning and Policy

Mohammed	Ministry of Education	In-service training of Teacher Development Programme
Mesfin Zewdie	Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs	Program resource mobilisation expert
Abay Amare	Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs	Communications Officer
Kokeb Misrak	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED)	Director of Bilateral Cooperation
Arto Suominen	Ministry of Water, Energy and Irrigation	Chief Technical Advisor, COWASH
Abraham Ayalew	Human Rights Commission	Legal Advisor
Diribu Jamal	Oromia Bureau of Land Admin and Environmental Protection	Head of Bureau
Yadessa Dinsa	Oromia Bureau of Land Admin and Environmental Protection	Senior expert
Herpassa Yadessa	Oromia Bureau of Land Admin and Environmental Protection	Expert
Kebede Feyisa	Ilu Woreda (Oromia) Land Admin and Environmental Protection Office	Head
Kumesa Workneh	Ilu Woreda (Oromia) Land Admin and Environmental Protection Office	Surveyor
Tenya Gudissa	Ilu Woreda (Oromia) Land Admin and Environmental Protection Office	Surveyor
Abele Keterma	Ilu Woreda (Oromia) Land Admin and Environmental Protection Office	Registrar
Belay Bizuneh	SNNPR Education Bureau	GEQIP focal person
Solomon Gizachew	SNNPR Education Bureau	Finland SNE focal person
Seifu Bekele	SNNPR Education Bureau	Learning and Teaching Assessment Head
Abera Willa	SNNPR Land Administration, Use and Environmental Protection	Head and Process Owner
Woliyou Mohammed	Maskan Woreda (SNNPR) Land Admin and Use	Coordinator
Shewaye Tesfaye	Maskan Woreda (SNNPR) Land Admin and Use	Quality Control
Eyuraselem Feleke	Maskan Woreda (SNNPR) Land Admin and Use	Information and Documentation
Sherifa Nuru	Wolensho 2 Kebele (Meskan woreda)	Land Admin and Use Committee Member
Mekonnen Lema	Wolensho 2 Kebele (Meskan woreda)	Land Admin and Use Committee Member
Etagegn Gebre	Wolensho 2 Kebele (Meskan woreda)	Holder of land from the first husband and now the 2nd wife
Tikunesh Sitota	Wolensho 2 Kebele (Meskan woreda)	Holder of land and widow
Mitiku	Amhara region Bureau of Agriculture	Manager of Tana-Beles Watershed Management Project

Ato Lakew Desta	Amhara region Bureau of Agriculture	former Capacity Building Expert in Tana-Beles WME
Desalegn Simache Mihretie	Benishangul- Gumuz Region Metekel Zonal Office (Finn-WASH team)	Field Advisor
Tilahun Abebe	Benishangul- Gumuz Region Metekel Zonal Office (Finn-WASH team)	BoFed WASH & Finn-WASH Coordinator
Tapio Niemi	Benishangul- Gumuz Region Metekel Zonal Office (Finn-WASH team)	Finn-WASH Programme Coordinator
Dawud Adowe	Benishangul- Gumuz Region Metekel Zonal Office (Finn-WASH team)	Water specialist, Woreda Office
AbelnehTeshare	Benishangul- Gumuz Region Metekel Zonal Office (Finn-WASH team)	Chairman Water Users' Association
Lakew Desta	Benishangul- Gumuz Region Metekel Zonal Office (Finn-WASH team)	former Capacity Building Expert in Tana-Beles WME
Anne Sillanpää	Bulen Woreda	REILA Junior Expert
Debash Yiderasal	Bulen Woreda	Land Administration Expert
Dawud Adowe	Bulen Woreda	Land Administration Expert
Desalelu Gediu	Gilgel Beles woreda	Principal of Primary School
Sirpa Maenpaa	Embassy of Finland	Ambassador
Marko Saarinen	Embassy of Finland	Counsellor, Water, Land Administration
Janne Oksanen	Embassy of Finland	First Secretary, Head of Cooperation (Trade)
Paula Malan	Embassy of Finland	Councillor, Education
Meseret Mengistu	Embassy of Finland	FLC Coordinator
Abdi Aden	DFID	Peace and Development Programme Advisor
Toby Sexton	DFID	Peace and Development Programme Advisor
Martha Solomon	DFID	WASH Advisor
Shewit Emmanuel	DFID	Private Sector Development (PSD) Advisor
Simon Lapper	DFID	LIFT Team Leader
Menbere Alebachew	DFID	LIFT Consultant
Belay Addise	DFID	Education Advisor
Tesfaye Bekalu	World Bank	WASH Specialist
Thanh Thi Mai	World Bank	Senior Education Specialist
Dr Samuel Godfrey	UNICEF	WASH Section Chief
Dr Sibeso Luswata	UNICEF	Chief Education Advisor
Alembanchi Molla	UNICEF	Project Officer
Setotaw Yimam	UNICEF	Education Specialist
Michelle Shen	USAID	Chief, Education Office
Dr Solomon Bekure	USAID	Land Administration to Nurture Development Programme, Team Leader
Prof Belay Kassa Tegegne	USAID	Land Administration to Nurture Development (Deputy Team Leader)
Paul Sherlock	Irish Aid	Head of Development
Commander Abebe Mulu	IGAD	Head of Security Sector Programme

Ato Abraham	Human Rights Commission	Legal Advisor
Yoseph Endeshaw	FLC	NGO Support Complementarity Evaluator
Masresha Kibret	JeCDDO	Managing Director, Awassa Branch

Palestinian Territories

Name	Organisation	Position
Ms Helena Tuuri	MFA Finland	Head of the Unit for Middle East and North Africa (2009–13)
Ms Marja Rosvall	MFA Finland	Team Leader for the Middle East Peace Process team (as of August 2013)
Ms Riikka Eela	MFA Finland	Team Leader for the Middle East Peace Process team (2009–13)
Ms Jenny Sjöberg	MFA Finland	Desk Officer for Palestine Development Cooperation (as of August 2013)
Ms Anna Savolainen	MFA Finland	Desk Officer for Palestine Development Cooperation (2008–10)
Ms Anu Saxen	MFA Finland	Land Advisor
Ms Anna Merrifield	MFA Finland	Desk officer, humanitarian aid, UNRWA (current)
Dr Martti Eirola	MFA Finland	Head of Mission, Representative office in Ramallah
Ms Marianne Mäkinen	MFA Finland	Deputy Head of Mission, Representative office in Ramallah
Ms Minna Härkönen	MFA Finland	Counsellor, Development Cooperation, Representative office in Ramallah
Mr Jani Raappana	MFA Finland	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Finland, Tel Aviv
Ms Dana Erekat	Ministry of Planning and Administration Development	PA Special Advisor to the Minister, Head of Aid Management and Coordination Directorate
Estephan Salameh	Independent Consultant	Former Head of Aid Management and Coordination Directorate, Ministry of Planning and Administration Development (2009–13)
Mr Jihad Draidi	PA, Ministry of Education	Director General for International and Public Relations
Ms Sahar Eljallad	PA	Project Director, PLA
Mr Motaz Abadi	PA	Advisor to the Minister PWA
Mr David Sharp	NIRAS	LAP II TA Team Leader
Mr Timothy Heath	DFID	Governance Advisor
Mr Sergio Piccolo	EU Representative Office	Head of Cooperation
Mr Emile Makhoul	Ireland	Programme Advisor
Mr Stein Torgersbraten	Norway	Head of Development
Ms Rima Tadros	Norway	Programme Officer
Mr Johan Berggren	IPE	Office of the Quartet Representative
Mr Johan Schaar	Sweden	Head of Development Cooperation
Mr Björn Philipp	World Bank	Senior Urban Development Specialist
Ms Lina Abdallah	World Bank	Programme Manager
Dr Rami Nasrallah	IPCC	Chairman International Peace and Cooperation Centre
May Jayyusi	Muwatin	Executive Director

ANNEX 3 DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

- Alava H (ed.) 2010 *Exploring the Security-Development Nexus. Perspectives from Nepal, Northern Uganda and “Sugango”*. Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Erweko Painotuote Oy: Helsinki.
- Baliamoune-Lutz M and McGillivray M 2008 *State Fragility. Concept and Measurement*. United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research Paper No. 2008/44, UNU-WIDER: Helsinki.
- Banerjee P, Poutiainen P, Dey I, Dunghana S, Kioko W, Mattila P and Muhindi M 2010 *Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325: “Women, Peace and Security” in the Context of Finnish Development Policy*. Erweko Painotuote Oy: Helsinki.
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ANNEX 4 EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

<p>EQ1: Has Finnish development cooperation provided relevant support to the drivers of peace and development including poverty reduction? Have the choice and mix of sectors and instruments contributed to these targets, and recognised issues of fragility in the country/region?</p>	
<p><i>Evaluation criteria</i></p>	
<p>Relevance, complementarity, Finnish value added</p>	
<p><i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i></p>	
<p>This EQ aims to analyse the extent to which Finnish development cooperation has engaged in activities likely to support peace and development. The first stage would be a judgment of whether the drivers of peace and development were adequately understood and analysed. If there is a demonstrated corollary between poverty reduction and peacebuilding this will be reviewed in light of the chosen interventions. We will then go on to examine whether the chosen mix of sectors and aid instruments were most appropriate to achieve the results sought.</p>	
<p><i>Judgment Criteria</i></p>	<p><i>Potential Indicators (to be developed further in the Desk Report)</i></p>
<p>1.1 Extent to which the design of and strategic choices made within each country programme is based on good contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analyses.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alignment of Finnish strategy with UN, EU, World Bank and Finland's own contextual analysis. • How/if context analysis was used at programme design stage. • Evidence that the drivers of peace/development were identified and that Finnish development cooperation responded to these.
<p>1.2 Extent to which intervention logics underpinned the designed strategy, and the extent to which these were relevant, valid and understood by Finland MFA and its partners?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring systems available that link activities to outcomes and higher level goals, and the extent to which contingency and adaptability were built into the programme design. • Learning systems in place that map the relationships between the planned, emergent, dropped and actual implemented strategies.
<p>1.3 Extent to which other MFA interventions (political dialogue, humanitarian action) have complemented and/or provided leverage to development cooperation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceived influence and importance of Finnish MFA interventions/dialogue as expressed by national actors and/or other donors
<p>1.4 Extent to which the mix of Finnish development cooperation aid instruments and modalities was appropriate to achieve objectives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that the selection of instruments and aid modalities was made on the basis of an analysis of their relative merits. • Evidence from key informants of the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument applied in the country/region with regard to flexibility, and their fit (coordination, complementarity and coherence) with other donor interventions.
<p>1.5 Extent to which the sectors chosen by Finland were done so in recognition of the characteristics and priorities relating to the fragility of the country/region.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that Finnish development cooperation sourced and analysed suitable information to ensure that strategy took adequate account of context • Evidence that Finland engaged appropriately in scenario and contingency planning and used relevant information sources and analysis to maintain the ongoing relevance and effectiveness of strategy and programmes • Evidence that changes in strategy or implementation (including differences between planned and realised strategy) responded appropriately to context analysis and scenario planning • Examples of dialogue, agendas and coalitions in which there is plausible evidence of Finnish influence on the strategies undertaken collectively by donors

1.6 Extent to which Finnish country strategy identified specific areas of intervention where its added value would be apparent and recognised by stakeholders.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that the intended beneficiaries of Finnish development cooperation were clearly identified and their needs analysed. • Evidence that the proposed strategy was prepared in consultation with representatives of the intended beneficiaries. • Evidence that the strategy intended to strengthen state-society relations.
<i>Sources of Information</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inventory of contributions • Sub-regional strategy papers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial instruments • Internal/external evaluations • Government policy and planning documents • Interviews with Govt, civil society, donors, EU, UN, and IFIs
<i>Analytical Methods</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document analysis of the analytical base for Finnish development cooperation • Intervention logic analyses to identify strengths and weaknesses in relation to the analytical base • Document analysis and interviews to analyse the process by which strategy was prepared, including an assessment of the scope and quality of consultation • Mapping of the documented results of Finnish development cooperation against the identified needs of the country/region and its population and the policy objectives and priorities of the respective Governments 	
<p>EQ2: What have been the mechanisms to integrate Finnish development policy priorities (stipulated in the 2009 guidelines ‘Development and security in Finland’s development policy’) in country level interventions? Are development interventions on the ground complying with the priorities and thematic focuses of the development policies and the 2009 guidelines?</p>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
Coherence , relevance, complementarity, effectiveness	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
<p>This EQ aims to analyse how Finnish development cooperation in-country has complied with the global policy priorities set by MFA: ensuring security and justice; creating an enabling environment for economic development and employment; and strengthening the legitimacy of the state by supporting transparency, efficiency and accountability of the state and its governance structures towards citizens. The evaluation will examine how these policies were understood and applied and how they were managed in practice. We will also examine whether the resources made available matched the ambitions set by these policies, what the limitations were and what compromises had to be made.</p>	
<i>Judgment Criteria</i>	<i>Potential Indicators</i>
2.1 Extent to which the policy priorities stipulated by MFA (particularly in the 2009 Guidelines) were understood and incorporated into country-level interventions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that Finnish objectives and actions in-country are consistent with the objectives and requirements of global MFA policies. • How Finland addresses the objectives and requirements of relevant MFA policies
2.2 Extent to which security and justice priorities are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project levels results, including impact • Evidence of the assimilation of lessons and best practices.
2.3 Extent to which economic development and employment issues are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project levels results, including impact • Evidence of the assimilation of lessons and best practices.
2.4 Extent to which statebuilding and governance priorities are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project levels results, including impact • Evidence of the assimilation of lessons and best practices.

2.5 Extent to which results-based management is able to monitor and evaluate compliance and coherence with global policies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of robust M&E systems that map not only results but also levels of compliance with global policy.
2.6 Extent to which the totality of resources made available and disbursed was equal to the ambitions set by programme objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that absorptive capacity of partners was adequately assessed. • Evidence that disbursements against pledges were optimal and disbursed in a timely manner.
<i>Sources of Information</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inventory of contributions • Financial instruments • Internal/external evaluations • Interviews with Helsinki MFA staff, in-country staff, Government, civil society, donors, UN, EU and IFIs 	
<i>Analytical methods</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy timeline analysis to map Finnish objectives against those of relevant MFA policies and instruments, to identify coverage, gaps and contradictions • Case study analysis of a limited number of cases where Finnish development cooperation did or did not comply with global policy and analysis of these cases to explain how and why they occurred and what lessons can be drawn • Development of an intervention logic analysis of planned versus realised strategy and the adjustments made in accordance with emerging realities on the ground • Document analysis and interviews to assess strengths, weaknesses and opportunities in the level of Finland's responsiveness 	
<p>EQ3: How have the cross-cutting objectives been integrated in Finland's development interventions in fragile states? How has their integration/non-integration affected identified and achieved results? What are the lessons learned and best practices in implementing cross-cutting objectives?</p>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
Impact, Effectiveness , Sustainability, Consistency	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
<p>The MFA's Development Policy Programme (MFA 2007) requires that a human rights-based approach be adopted across all programmes. With respect to cross-cutting objectives (CCOs) the subsequent 2012 Development Policy Programme (MFA 2012) refers particularly to gender equality, reduction of inequalities and promotion of climate sustainability. This EQ will analyse the extent to which CCOs were addressed in the design and management of Finnish development cooperation and the positive and negative effects and impacts that have occurred as a result of Finland's treatment (or lack thereof) of CCOs. The evaluation will consider how CCOs were treated in design and management processes, including monitoring and evaluation, and what positive and/or negative effects and impacts resulted from this treatment. We will also look at the specific recognition and response to the 2000 UN Security Council adoption of Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on "Women, Peace and Security". The three CCOs will be assessed in terms of whether they received adequate analysis and attention within Finnish interventions, and the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of those interventions.</p>	
<i>Judgment Criteria</i>	<i>Potential Indicators</i>
3.1 Extent to which CCOs were taken into account in the analysis and design of Finnish interventions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that Finnish staff and consultants had adequate access to guidance and support on whether and how to address CCOs • Evidence that CCOs were addressed adequately in the development of country strategies, including baseline studies • Evidence that mainstreaming has been consistent throughout project/programme cycles • Separate targeted actions or projects if mainstreaming alone is not sufficient • Evidence of specific application of Resolution 1325

3.2 Extent to which CCOs were taken into account in political and policy dialogue.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that CCOs were addressed adequately in analysis and preparations for political and policy dialogue • Evidence of CCO mainstreaming or specific actions in political and policy dialogue
3.3 Extent to which Finnish development cooperation has contributed to the stated objectives and intended outcomes of its interventions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that the treatment of CCOs was monitored and evaluated and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) findings acted on • Evidence of results against each of the three CCOs. • Evidence of negative effects or impacts against any CCOs
3.4 Extent to which lessons on implementing cross-cutting objectives have been recorded and disseminated.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M&E systems able to effectively record disaggregated data. • Effective dissemination strategy to capture and transmit lessons.
<i>Sources of Information</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual reports on implementation of the Finnish development cooperation plans. • Strategy papers • Monitoring reports of partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inventory of contributions • Financial instruments • Internal/external evaluations • Interviews with Government, civil society, donors, EU, UN, and IFIs
<i>Analytical Methods</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews to assess access to and quality of guidance and support on addressing CCOs in programme preparation and execution • Document analysis and interviews to assess the extent to which CCOs have been addressed in policy and political dialogue • Mapping of the documented results of CCOs 	
EQ4: How have the aid effectiveness commitments been integrated in the Finnish development interventions? How has their application supported development results and the overall objective of peace and development?	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence, Alignment, Impact, Finnish value added	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
This EQ aims to analyse how Finnish development cooperation in the country/region has complied with internationally accepted norms with respect to aid effectiveness (Paris Principles, Busan agreements, etc.) and the extent to which these are appropriately applied within the fragile state/region under review. The evaluation will also examine how coherence was planned, how it was managed in practice and how ongoing coordination has been handled by Finland. Lessons learned and best practices will be captured for each country/region.	
<i>Judgment Criteria</i>	<i>Potential Indicators</i>
4.1 Extent to which Finland has applied and integrated its aid efficiency commitments in the country/region.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of application of Paris Principles and Fragile States principles • Evidence of the assimilation of lessons and best practices.
4.2 Extent to which national ownership and alignment with national policies is incorporated into interventions undertaken.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adherence with national development priorities and policies • Evidence of consultation processes with national actors - government and civil society.
4.3 Extent to which Finnish development cooperation is coherent with and complementary to the development strategies and programmes of other major bilateral and multilateral donors, notably UN agencies, EU and its member states, World Bank and USA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that Finnish decisions on strategy and programming have taken into account the strategies and programmes of other donors. • Evidence of other donors' perceptions of Finland's added value. • Evidence of joint actions, added value or synergies achieved. • Evidence of contradictions or duplications.

<p>4.4 Extent to which the results of Finnish development cooperation have, through the choice of its aid modalities, contributed to peacebuilding and/or state-building objectives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence from stakeholders (including civil society) that Finnish support improved or deepened state-society relations. • Evidence that Finland contributed to more effective, accountable and transparent public institutions. • Evidence that Finland has contributed to more accountable and democratic practices and that these benefits are sustainable. • Evidence that Finnish interventions have contributed to changes in the enabling environment for political participation and to the ability of citizens to engage in political dialogue and exercise their human rights and that these benefits are sustainable.
<p>4.5 Extent to which the results and achievements to date are likely to endure in the longer term</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that Finnish development cooperation assessed and integrated sustainability at the design and implementation stages, including risk assessment and contingency planning.
<p><i>Sources of Information</i></p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MFA strategy papers • Inventory of contributions • Sub-regional strategy papers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial instruments • Internal/external evaluations • Interviews with Govt, donors, EU, UN, and IFIs
<p><i>Analytical Methods</i></p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document analysis and interviews with other major donors to assess the extent to which coordination and coherence were planned and executed • Document analysis and interviews with other major donors to examine the extent and quality of Finland's participation in relevant national donor and government coordination mechanisms • Intervention logic analysis of Finnish peacebuilding/state-building actions and dialogue to identify cases of perceived success or failure. • Portfolio analysis of a sample of peacebuilding/state-building interventions to map results and prospects for sustainability and to and draw lessons from their contribution to peacebuilding/state-building objectives. • Interviews to gather stakeholder perceptions of Finland's contribution and added value to a coherent donor stance on peacebuilding/state-building and to validate perceived successes and failures. • Focus group and conflict analysis discussions to analysis factors that have supported or hindered effective promotion and support for peacebuilding/state-building processes. 	

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