

*Thematic Global Evaluation of European  
Commission Support to agricultural  
commodities in ACP countries*

Final Report

Volume 2: Annex 4

April 2012

*Evaluation for the European Commission*







PARTICIP GmbH  
Germany



Overseas Development  
Institute,  
United Kingdom

A consortium of  
EGEVAL II (ADE-Particip)-DRN-  
DIE-ECDPM-ODI  
c/o ADE, leading company:

**ADE s.a.**  
Rue de Clairvaux, 40, Bte 101  
B - 1348 Louvain-La-Neuve /  
Belgium  
Phone: +32 10 45 45 10  
Fax: +32 10 45 40 99  
Email: [ade@ade.be](mailto:ade@ade.be)

**EGEVAL II Headquarters**  
Merzhauser Str. 183  
D - 79100 Freiburg / Germany  
Phone: +49-761-79074-0  
Fax: +49-761-79074-90  
Email: [info@egeval.org](mailto:info@egeval.org)

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Framework contract for  
**Multi-country thematic and regional/country-level strategy  
evaluation studies and synthesis in the area of external co-  
operation**

**LOT 1:  
Multi-Country Evaluation Studies of Economic  
sectors/themes of EC External Cooperation**

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**Thematic global evaluation of European  
Commission support to agricultural  
commodities in ACP countries**

**FINAL REPORT**

**VOLUME 2: ANNEX 4**

**April 2012**

**This evaluation was carried out by**





This report has been prepared by the consortium led by EGEVAL II (ADE and Particip), with DRN, ECDPM, ODIE and DIE

The author accepts sole responsibility for this report drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities.

The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.



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## EQ1 on the contextual background to the Commission's Communication relative to agricultural commodities

**In what ways has the Commission reacted to the long term agricultural commodities price decline and volatility when supporting Commodity Dependent Developing Countries?**

<b>J.1.1</b>	<b>Commodity dependence characterises a majority of ACP countries</b>																																																																																																														
<b>BF Cotton</b>	<p>L'économie du BF reste très dépendante de ses exportations agricoles: 60 à 70% des recettes d'exportation sont réalisées par la vente de coton qui contribue pour plus de 40% au PIB agricole (coton et activités connexes) et fait vivre directement ou indirectement 2,5 millions d'habitants</p> <p>Le coton est exporté à plus de 95% sous forme de fibre, les recettes générées par la filière étant donc fortement dépendantes de l'évolution des cours mondiaux du coton.</p>																																																																																																														
<b>CM</b>	<p>Le Cameroun n'est pas un PMA, ni un PDPAB (CDDC). Il dispose d'une économie "relativement" diversifiée avec des ressources de pétrole et une importante exploitation de bois. Les produits agricoles représentent moins du tiers des exportations totales, voir ci-dessous.</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; text-align: center;"> <thead> <tr> <th>Part du produit dans les exportations totales</th> <th>2001</th> <th>2002</th> <th>2003</th> <th>2004</th> <th>2005</th> <th>2006</th> <th>2007</th> <th>2008</th> <th>2009</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>part pétrole</td> <td>46%</td> <td>42%</td> <td>37%</td> <td>38%</td> <td>44%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>49%</td> <td>53%</td> <td>44%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part divers</td> <td>14%</td> <td>18%</td> <td>23%</td> <td>18%</td> <td>20%</td> <td>17%</td> <td>17%</td> <td>17%</td> <td>19%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part bois</td> <td>15%</td> <td>13%</td> <td>14%</td> <td>16%</td> <td>13%</td> <td>14%</td> <td>16%</td> <td>13%</td> <td>16%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part cacao</td> <td>8%</td> <td>12%</td> <td>10%</td> <td>10%</td> <td>8%</td> <td>7%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>7%</td> <td>10%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part aluminium</td> <td>5%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>6%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part coton</td> <td>5%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part banane</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part café</td> <td>4%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part caoutchouc naturel</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>part agricom majeurs (cacao+café+coton+banane+caoutchouc)</b></td> <td><b>20%</b></td> <td><b>23%</b></td> <td><b>22%</b></td> <td><b>22%</b></td> <td><b>18%</b></td> <td><b>15%</b></td> <td><b>13%</b></td> <td><b>13%</b></td> <td><b>18%</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Part du produit dans les exportations totales	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	part pétrole	46%	42%	37%	38%	44%	50%	49%	53%	44%	part divers	14%	18%	23%	18%	20%	17%	17%	17%	19%	part bois	15%	13%	14%	16%	13%	14%	16%	13%	16%	part cacao	8%	12%	10%	10%	8%	7%	5%	7%	10%	part aluminium	5%	4%	4%	6%	5%	4%	5%	4%	4%	part coton	5%	5%	5%	5%	4%	3%	3%	2%	2%	part banane	2%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%	part café	4%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	part caoutchouc naturel	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	<b>part agricom majeurs (cacao+café+coton+banane+caoutchouc)</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>18%</b>
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<b>GH overall</b>	<p>Ghana's economy has undergone gradual structural changes over the past ten years, with the traditional agricultural sector's importance in GDP declining relatively to that of services and industry: agriculture contributed to around 36% of GDP in 2000 (compared to 25% for industry and almost 30% for services) but only around 26% at the end of the 2000s (industry 21% and services nearly 50%). In terms of export earnings, gold has yielded the largest export proceeds and its share in total export value has increased from 35.4% in 1999 to 48.2% in 2010 whilst that of cocoa has stayed more or less around 25-30% during the ten year period. It is mostly the timber exports which have declined over the period whilst other exports seem to move more erratically.</p> <p>On the whole the commodity dependency of Ghana appears thus to have declined over the period, with the country's external trade performance being still highly influenced by cocoa exports but cocoa production being slightly less important in terms of its contribution to overall domestic production (3.5% in 2000 against 2.3% in 2010). Reduced export taxes also diminished cocoa's role in generating public revenues (8.2% of tax revenues in 2000 against 0.3% in 2010).</p> <p>One notes that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) The measurement of Ghana's GDP has recently (2010/2011?) been readjusted (upwards) quite dramatically, pushing Ghana above the threshold for least developed countries (Ghana now being considered a middle income country).</li> <li>(ii) The impending start of Ghana's oil extraction will further modify considerably the outlook on domestic production and export performance and composition.</li> <li>(iii) The figures cited in the various documents consulted are to be seen in the light of these new</li> </ul>																																																																																																														

	developments.
<b>MG</b>	<p>C'est effectivement le cas de Madagascar: les produits agricoles de base représentent la moitié des exportations totales.</p> <p>Toutefois les produits agricoles d'exportation ne représentent qu'une faible part des systèmes d'exploitation agricoles, qui sont essentiellement orientés vers l'autosubsistance.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Tanzania is not a commodity dependent country. Agriculture is an important contributor to GDP (just under a quarter) and still provides employment to 70% of the population; it is mainly geared towards food production. Although cash crops contribute for less than 10% to agricultural GDP, they provide nearly 20% of the country's foreign exchange receipts (after mineral exports – gold mainly – and tourism). The main cash crops are coffee, cotton, tobacco, cashew nuts and tea.</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Agricultural commodities make 75% of total Ugandan exports (1995-2008 average).</p> <p><u>Coffee</u>: over 8 million people (in the whole value chain) derive their livelihood directly from coffee. Coffee is mainly cultivated by smallholders (1.5 million). Coffee contributes about 20% of Uganda's foreign currency earnings and constitutes two-thirds of earnings from traditional export crops.</p> <p>However, at farm level, dependence on export commodities is limited. Farmers primarily aim at ensuring their subsistence through the production of staple crops. Export commodities are side crops, which provide an in cash additional income.</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Alors que les principaux revenus du pays proviennent du tourisme, l'économie du Vanuatu est peu dépendante de ses exportations agricoles. Il ya très peu d'exportations de vanille, café et cacao. Les principales exportations agricoles (en VATU, année 2011) sont :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Huile de coco: 33% des revenus d'exportations</li> <li>▪ Copra: 27% des revenus d'exportations</li> <li>▪ Kava: 9% des revenus d'exportations</li> </ul>
<b>I.1.1.1</b>	Some concepts, possible definitions and measures of commodity dependence
<b>BF</b>	<p>The Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP states that cotton exports represent 60% of the country's export revenues. <i>Source: 2008-2013 Burkina Faso CSP/NIP, page 24</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>The 2002-2007 states that most of the Central Africa regions' countries (Cameroun, Congo, Gabon, Guinée Equatoriale, République Centrafricaine, Tchad, São Tomé e Príncipe) are highly dependent upon agricultural and mineral (oil) resources and that their exports represent near 40% of the regional GDP (70% for Cameroun). <i>Source: RSP 2002-2007</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>According to the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II (GCSSP II) Project Synopsis, cocoa represents 70% of Ghana's agricultural export earnings.</p> <p>The project's Financial Proposal mentions that Ghana's economy is largely dependent on agriculture (40% of GDP and 50% of employment). Trade represents 80% of Ghana's GDP.</p> <p><i>Sources: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Project Synopsis.</i> <i>Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal, page 5</i></p>
<b>Overall</b>	<p>Natural resource dependent countries are defined in the IMF's Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency as countries that have an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral fiscal revenues in total fiscal revenue (including grants) of at least 25 percent during a five-year period (2000-2005 in the Guide) or an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral export proceeds in total export proceeds of at least 25 percent during these five years (IMF 2007, Appendix 1, footnotes 2 and 3). This concept of dependency is equated with that of natural resource richness and is focused on the weight of resource revenue (used to mean revenues derived from natural resource exploitation) in total fiscal revenue or on the weight of the export revenues stemming from natural resources in total export revenues.</p>

	<p>The measurement could easily be extended to agricultural natural resources but the concepts are slightly different at least as applied to CDDCs: these are not necessarily natural resource rich countries, they are rather GDP poor countries (as is pointed out in WB 2009, page 98, Chapter 3) and their dependency thus reflects low GDP rather than resource wealth. Nevertheless, adapting the IMF definition to agricultural commodities, a country would thus be commodity dependent if the average fiscal revenues from agriculture were 25% or more of total fiscal revenues (including grants) over a period of 5 years or if agricultural commodities export proceeds represented more than 25% of total export revenues over a period of 5 years. Compared to the UN measurement of commodity dependency, this threshold appears very low. Indeed, commodity dependence by the UN is based on the share of income provided by commodities and distinguishes single-commodity dependence from dependence towards ‘relatively few commodities’; in the former a single commodity provides more than 50% of the income (Burundi, Ethiopia and Uganda - coffee; Sao Tome et Principe cocoa beans; Malawi – tobacco; in these countries the export share of the commodity exceeds 50% of total merchandise exports) and in the latter two or more commodities provide more than half the income. In 2003, the UN secretary General notes that ‘Despite progress made in the diversification of many developing countries’ exports over the last decades, as many as 38 developing countries are dependent on a single commodity for more than 50 per cent of their export income, while 48 countries depend on only two.’ (p.24 UN SG 2003). The FAO in 2004 states that ‘As many as 43 developing countries depend on a single commodity for more than 20 percent of their total revenues from merchandise exports’ (FAO, 2004, p.22).</p> <p>Other commonly used measurements of commodity dependence include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The share of export earnings of the top single commodity (or top three commodities) in GDP or in total merchandise exports or in total agriculture exports;</li> <li>- Percentage of people engaged in commodity production;</li> <li>- Share in government revenue.</li> </ul> <p>The measurements (when lists of commodity countries are proposed) are often unspecified (data for one year, an average, which data were used etc.).</p> <p>The problem with most publications (including the most notable institutions dealing with agricultural commodities) is that they keep the measurement and concept of ‘dependence’ very vague, if referring to them at all. In most cases, the ‘commodity dependence’ is used to loosely refer to a group of countries which are commodity producers but where no clear definition is given on how the dependency is measured or what the rate of dependency is. This confirms the approach taken in the Communication 2004(89) <i>“CDDC” is used for convenience throughout this document as an abbreviation. It refers to countries that are particularly exposed to developments such as price variability in international agricultural commodity markets and thus share certain development challenges. It should not be taken to suggest that a specific definition exists, or indeed should exist.</i>’ (page 4, footnote 2).</p> <p>It seems that two things are important: the dependency ratio (whichever way it is measured) and the number of commodities involved: the fewer the number of commodities, the higher the exposure to the risk of fluctuating prices. It is thus that the UN and FAO tend to focus their studies (and concepts of dependency) on those countries which are dependent upon a single commodity.</p> <p><i>Sources: UNCTAD International Trade Statistics, Guide on resource revenue transparency/Fiscal Affairs Dept., International Monetary Fund, 2007. Implementation of and follow-up to commitments and agreements made at the International Conference on Financing for Development, UN General Assembly, 58th session, 5th August 2003; Global Economic Prospects, Commodities at the crossroads, WB 2009; Commission Communication 2004(89).</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>Some concepts, possible definitions and measures of commodity dependence</p> <p>The region is generally dependent on natural resources for its prosperity. This includes fish, timber and agricultural produce. <i>Source Evaluation 2007</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>The Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP does not refer to commodity dependence but rather to dependence on food aid, due to conflicts since the 80’s. <i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 70</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>The 2002-2007 CSP mentions that Vanuatu is highly dependent on a few commodity exports (in particular</p>

	<p>copra, the main source of rural income), which makes it vulnerable to changes in export prices. Four commodities (copra, beef, cocoa and kava) make up the bulk of domestic exports. <i>Source: Vanuatu 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 9 ; Vanuatu 2007-2013 CSP/NIP, page 6</i></p>																																																												
<b>I.1.1.2</b>	The evolution of the degree of commodity dependence of ACPs over time (15 years)																																																												
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The final evaluation report of the PIP mentions the importance of fruit &amp; vegetable exports in terms of shares of the GDP in certain ACP countries. The table, showing fruit &amp; vegetable importance in 2006 is represented below:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Share of the fruit and vegetable exports in the GDP of the main ACP exporting countries<sup>1</sup></b></p> <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>TOTAL export F&amp;V 2006</th> <th>GDP 2006</th> <th>GDP2006</th> <th>export F+V/GDP</th> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <th>1000 Eur</th> <th>M USD</th> <th>MEUR</th> <th></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Ivory Coast</td> <td>393 689</td> <td>17 484</td> <td>12 489</td> <td>1.8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Kenya</td> <td>376 847</td> <td>21 186</td> <td>15 133</td> <td>1.3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cameroon</td> <td>373 746</td> <td>18323</td> <td>13 088</td> <td>1.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Dominican Republic</td> <td>249 869</td> <td>30 581</td> <td>21 844</td> <td>0.6%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ghana</td> <td>124 714</td> <td>12 906</td> <td>9 219</td> <td>0.9%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Belize</td> <td>78 226</td> <td>1 217</td> <td>869</td> <td>4.5%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Senegal</td> <td>56 261</td> <td>8 936</td> <td>6 383</td> <td>0.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Namibia</td> <td>52 334</td> <td>6 372</td> <td>4 551</td> <td>0.6%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Madagascar</td> <td>50 890</td> <td>5 499</td> <td>3 928</td> <td>0.6%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Saint Lucia</td> <td>49 372</td> <td>906</td> <td>647</td> <td>3.8%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Other countries, such as Jamaica and Zimbabwe are mentioned in the report, but no statistics are given for the other countries. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 8</i></p>		TOTAL export F&V 2006	GDP 2006	GDP2006	export F+V/GDP		1000 Eur	M USD	MEUR		Ivory Coast	393 689	17 484	12 489	1.8%	Kenya	376 847	21 186	15 133	1.3%	Cameroon	373 746	18323	13 088	1.4%	Dominican Republic	249 869	30 581	21 844	0.6%	Ghana	124 714	12 906	9 219	0.9%	Belize	78 226	1 217	869	4.5%	Senegal	56 261	8 936	6 383	0.4%	Namibia	52 334	6 372	4 551	0.6%	Madagascar	50 890	5 499	3 928	0.6%	Saint Lucia	49 372	906	647	3.8%
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<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA evaluation report noted the following examples of dependency rates of banana producing/exporting countries in 2006 (Source: FAOStat):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: 22.3%</li> <li>▪ Saint Lucia: 19.7%</li> <li>▪ Dominica: 18.1%</li> <li>▪ Panama: 10%</li> <li>▪ Ecuador: 9.3%</li> <li>▪ Costa Rica: 7.7%</li> <li>▪ Honduras: 6.8%</li> <li>▪ Dominican Republic: 6.8%</li> <li>▪ Guatemala: 5.9%</li> </ul> <p>It should be noted that the report offered no explanations about the measurement of these rates (the source is quoted as UNCTAD and would thus suggest that the dependency is measured in terms of value of exports).</p> <p>The Windward Islands are heavily dependent upon the banana industry. It is estimated that one third of the population depend on the banana industry in St Lucia and almost seventy per cent in St Vincent with approximately fifty per cent of the former island's export earning dependent upon bananas. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.11</i>).</p>																																																												
<b>BF Cotton</b>	<p>Les produits de coton ont contribué, en moyenne, à 70% dans les exportations du pays sur la période 1999-2005, avec un record de 77,3% atteint en 2004.</p>																																																												

<sup>1</sup> including bananas

	<p>En milliards de FCFA</p> <p>Pourcentage</p> <p>Années</p> <p>—■— En milliards de FCFA —◆— Pourcentage</p> <p>La filière coton représente plus de 60% des recettes d'exportations totales, environ 55% des recettes en devises. Il contribue pour plus de 40% au PIB agricole (coton et activités connexes) et fait vivre directement ou indirectement 2,5 millions d'habitants (La filature locale n'absorbe que 3% de la production de fibre), la majeure partie de la production est exportée et les revenus sont fortement tributaires des cours mondiaux. Sources : <i>Diagnostic de la filière coton et identification d'axes stratégiques</i>, Rapport final 2007. <i>Etude prospective sur la filière coton au Burkina Faso. Rapport général, 2010</i> ; <i>Etude prospective sur la filière coton au Burkina Faso. Rapport d'étude rétrospective, 2009</i></p>
CI	<p>L'agriculture participant à 70% des recettes d'exportation et l'agriculture paysanne d'exportation a souffert de la crise ivoirienne qui a aggravé les dysfonctionnements internes de certaines filières (Sources : MR p.2 et Rider FA p.3) CI-REH</p> <p>La valeur ajoutée de l'agriculture d'exportation se replierait de 2,4% du fait du recul de la production de cacao, d'ananas et de coton et qui a entraîné une hausse des coûts du transport intérieur nuisible aux prix payés aux producteurs. Le contexte international a des effets contrastés : la compétitivité de toutes les productions agricoles d'exportation est affaiblie par la dégradation de la parité dollar/euro et par la hausse du coût des intrants et des carburants, mais la hausse des prix du pétrole entraîne également celle du cours des oléagineux et du caoutchouc. (Source : Annexe II FA p.2) CI-REH</p>
CI	<p>L'agriculture demeure la base et le grand atout de l'économie ivoirienne. Dans la dernière décennie, le secteur agricole a généré en moyenne 30% du PIB et 70% des recettes d'exportation tandis qu'il employait 2/3 de la population active (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.17).</p>
CM	<p>The CSPs referred to the commodity dependence of Cameroon:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ CSP 2001-2007 : « En termes structurels, le Cameroun demeure fortement tributaire des marchés des produits de base dont dépendent ses recettes de l'exportation, notamment celles du pétrole, du bois, du cacao, du café et des bananes. »</li> <li>▪ CSP 2008-2013 : « le Cameroun reste vulnérable aux chocs externes qui peuvent survenir notamment en provenance de plusieurs sources. D'une part, la détérioration des termes de l'échange vu la tendance défavorable des prix internationaux de ses principales exportations, ajoutée à la stagnation actuelle du volume des exportations, s'est déjà traduite par un déficit de la balance commerciale. »</li> </ul> <p>Sources : <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, page 12</i> ; <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, page 25.</i></p>
Coffee	<p>One of the major reasons for the level of poverty is the high dependency of the economy on low productivity agriculture, on which more than four fifths of the population is living. Agriculture in Ethiopia accounts for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of exports and more than 80% of total employment. Ethiopia has one of the lowest export rates in the world, with coffee being its dominant export crop, while leather and qat [khat] are important as well. These features of the economy make it extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and fluctuation in international commodity (coffee) prices (Source: ET-ECS Volume I:</p>

*Final Report p.5).*

CR

In terms of trade, the Caribbean economies are open, relying heavily on very limited number of products. In several countries 30% to 60% of exports are accounted for by one or two commodities. Data on the direction of exports and imports lack consistency and are scant. They indicate a fairly high degree of intra-regional trade in the small economies but, overall, intra-regional trade does not exceed 10% and has not been progressing significantly during recent years. The United States is a major trading partner in the region but the EU is also significant, and is in particular a large importer of bananas. These data relate to merchandise; tourism and financial services also constitute an essential export for several Caribbean countries.

**Table 2: Selected Trade Indicators**

Caribbean countries	Openness coefficient (1)	Main export product(s) share in total exports		Share of total exports by destination			Main import product(s) share in total imports		Share of total imports by origin		
		Products	Share of Total Export	Caribbean countries	USA	EU (15)	Products	Share of Total Imports	Caribbean countries	USA	EU (15)
Antigua & Barbuda	74.1%	Food prod.	18.3%	na	21%	34.6%	Machinery & Tpt. Equip.	26.4%	na	35.2%	22.5%
Bahamas	??	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Barbados	??	Food prod.	27.8%	44.2%	15.8%	16.3%	Machinery & Tpt. Equip.	27.8%	19.9%	41.6%	15.1%
Belize	64.6%	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Cuba	??	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Dominica	58.4%	Bananas	30.8%	54.3%	6.4%	34.7%	Machinery & Tpt. Equip.	26.9%	17.8%	41.5%	14.4%
Dominican Republic	28.0%	Iron and steel	21.0%	3.9%	39.0%	20.5%	Machinery & Tpt. Equip.	26.5%	na	52.5%	9.5%
Grenada	64.1%	Nutmeg	41.6%	16.0%	18.8%	42.1%	Machinery & Tpt. Equip.	29.0%	24.2%	41.8%	12.1%
Guyana	103.1%	Sugar, Rice, Bauxite	45.2%	9.5%						9.3%	
Haiti	23.0%	Manufact.	37.0%		88%		Food Products	24.6%	7.0%	70.0%	15.0%
Jamaica	43.0%	Mining	51.7%	3.5%	36.7%	31.2%	Machinery & Tpt. Equip.	26.7%	9.4%	52.3%	11.2%
Sr. Kitts & Nevis	58.5%	Raw sugar cane	53.0%	3.6%	57.4%	33.7%	Machinery & Tpt. Equip.	29.1%	5.3%	56.0%	12.2%
St. Lucia	54.6%	Bananas	60.4%	14.6%	15.7%	63.2%	Food Products	26.3%	18.0%	40.1%	19.0%
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	24.9%	Bananas	42.1%	50.0%	3.3%	42.3%	Machinery & Tpt. Equip.	24.3%	21.0%	38.4%	22.9%
Suriname	76.9%	Bauxite	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Trinidad & Tobago	47.2%	Fuels (crude & refined) products (NLG)	52.6%	24.8%	48.3%	9.9%	Machinery & Tpt. Equip.	30.8%	3.8%	38.1%	17.2%

(1).  $(Exports + Imports \text{ of goods and services}) / GDP$

Sources: World Bank: World Development Reports. Country as a glance. WTO: Trade Policy Reviews.

Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005

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**The 2003-2007 RSP did not refer to the commodity dependence of the Caribbean Region.** Only a few references are made to the agriculture sector in the regional diagnosis made: "Countries have also experienced diversification in their economies, with shares of agriculture and manufacturing declining in favour of services, particularly tourism. Both agriculture and manufacturing need to improve competitiveness or embrace diversification. (...) The main EU imports were aluminium, rum, sugar, bananas and oil."

**The 2008-2013 RSP explicitly refers to the commodity dependence of the Caribbean Region.** "The Region continues to rely largely on a narrow range of commodities (mainly bauxite and alumina, sugar and rum, bananas) and services for growth."


Commission interviewees highlighted the strong dependence of the Caribbean to agricultural commodities (Rum, Sugar, Banana, Rice). Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, page 10; European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, page 11; MN 700

In terms of trade, the Caribbean economies are open, relying heavily on very limited number of products (see annex 5, table 2). In several countries 30% to 60% of exports are accounted for by one or two commodities. Data on the direction of exports and imports lack consistency and are scant. They indicate a fairly high degree of intra-regional trade in the small economies but, overall, intra-regional trade does not exceed 10% and has not been progressing significantly during recent years. The United States is a major trading partner in the region but the EU is also significant, and is in particular a large importer of bananas. These data relate to merchandise; tourism and financial services also constitute an essential export for several Caribbean countries.

A number of significant global and economic changes have taken place since the early 1990s, changes that have had a significant impact on the Caribbean. The formation of WTO in 1994 resulted in a further globalisation of trading practices including - and of particular significance to the Caribbean - the agricultural sector. These new developments have severe consequences for some Caribbean traditional export products.



	<p>(Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.6).</p> <p>The Windward Islands are heavily dependent upon the banana industry. It is estimated that one third of the population depend on the banana industry in St Lucia and almost seventy per cent in St Vincent with approximately fifty per cent of the former island's export earning dependent upon bananas. (Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.11). One of the largest earners of foreign exchange in the Caribbean is sugar. (Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.12).</p>																																																																	
<b>ET</b>	<p>Over the past forty years, the share of agriculture – while remaining dominant – fell by some 20 percentage points of GDP, from close to 70% of GDP in the sixties to 48% today. While this may have reduced volatility in Ethiopia's economic performance, low agricultural growth had a depressing effect on other sectors of the economy, notably in industry which virtually stagnated at about 13% of GDP (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.9). In 1999, agricultural products (coffee, chat, pulses and hides &amp; skins) account for more than 90 % of total exports and 83% of the total population of 65 million live in rural areas and are mainly dependent on income generated through agricultural activities. This big dependence on agriculture makes the country extremely vulnerable to external shocks like a shortage of rainfall or declining commodity prices (coffee) on the international markets. (Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.7).</p> <p>Ethiopia is the home of arabica coffee. Production of the crop is virtually all by smallholders working either coffee (garden) farms or else picking coffee semi-wild or wild. Coffee is the most important export earner for Ethiopia and accounts for about 60% of the total. The number of people associated with the crop as growers, labourers and related household members amounts to between 7.5 and 8 million.</p> <p>One of the major reasons for the level of poverty is the high dependency of the economy on low productivity agriculture, on which more than four fifths of the population is living. Agriculture in Ethiopia accounts for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of exports and more than 80% of total employment. Ethiopia has one of the lowest export rates in the world, with coffee being its dominant export crop, while leather and qat [khat] are important as well. These features of the economy make it extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and fluctuation in international commodity (coffee) prices (Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.5).</p>																																																																	
<b>GH</b>	<p>In Ghana the importance of cocoa in total GDP has remained more or less constant from 2000 to 2007, fluctuating around 3 to 4,5% of GDP, before falling to 2,4% in 2008 where it has remained since. Tax revenues linked to cocoa exports have equally dwindled since 2000 with cocoa's contribution to tax revenues falling from 8,2% in 2000 to 2,3% in 2010. Cocoa has nevertheless remained a major crop in terms of contribution to the earning of foreign exchange where its share represents about a third of earnings.</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>1999</th> <th>2000</th> <th>2001</th> <th>2002</th> <th>2003</th> <th>2004</th> <th>2005</th> <th>2006</th> <th>2007</th> <th>2008</th> <th>2009</th> <th>2010</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>GDP</td> <td>3,4%</td> <td>3,5%</td> <td>3,3%</td> <td>3,1%</td> <td>3,5%</td> <td>4,3%</td> <td>4,6%</td> <td>4,4%</td> <td>4,4%</td> <td>2,4%</td> <td>2,4%</td> <td>2,3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Central Govt tax revenues</td> <td>8,2%</td> <td>4,1%</td> <td>4,6%</td> <td>3,8%</td> <td>5,7%</td> <td>5,2%</td> <td>2,9%</td> <td>5,1%</td> <td>1,9%</td> <td>0,9%</td> <td>0,3%</td> <td>(-)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Central Govt total revenues</td> <td>6,9%</td> <td>3,3%</td> <td>3,5%</td> <td>3,2%</td> <td>4,6%</td> <td>3,9%</td> <td>2,2%</td> <td>3,9%</td> <td>1,4%</td> <td>0,7%</td> <td>0,2%</td> <td>(-)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Export proceeds</td> <td>27,5%</td> <td>22,6%</td> <td>20,5%</td> <td>23,5%</td> <td>26,4%</td> <td>37,4%</td> <td>32,4%</td> <td>31,9%</td> <td>26,3%</td> <td>28,2%</td> <td>32,0%</td> <td>27,3%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	GDP	3,4%	3,5%	3,3%	3,1%	3,5%	4,3%	4,6%	4,4%	4,4%	2,4%	2,4%	2,3%	Central Govt tax revenues	8,2%	4,1%	4,6%	3,8%	5,7%	5,2%	2,9%	5,1%	1,9%	0,9%	0,3%	(-)	Central Govt total revenues	6,9%	3,3%	3,5%	3,2%	4,6%	3,9%	2,2%	3,9%	1,4%	0,7%	0,2%	(-)	Export proceeds	27,5%	22,6%	20,5%	23,5%	26,4%	37,4%	32,4%	31,9%	26,3%	28,2%	32,0%	27,3%
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	<div style="text-align: center;"> <h3>The importance of cocoa in domestic production, trade and Government revenues</h3>  </div> <table border="1" data-bbox="245 864 799 1037"> <thead> <tr> <th>In % of GDP</th> <th>2000</th> <th>2005</th> <th>2010</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Agriculture</td> <td>36,0%</td> <td>36,0%</td> <td>26,8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>cocoa</td> <td>3,5%</td> <td>4,6%</td> <td>2,3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Industry</td> <td>25,2%</td> <td>25,1%</td> <td>20,8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Service</td> <td>29,7%</td> <td>29,9%</td> <td>48,5%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p data-bbox="799 1016 1461 1048"><i>Sources: Central Bank of Ghana, statistical bulletins, various years.</i></p>	In % of GDP	2000	2005	2010	Agriculture	36,0%	36,0%	26,8%	cocoa	3,5%	4,6%	2,3%	Industry	25,2%	25,1%	20,8%	Service	29,7%	29,9%	48,5%
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<b>GH</b>	The Ghana 2008-2013 CSP notes that the country is still has a strong dependence on traditional agricultural exports, although non-traditional exports have increased sharply over the past 15 years. Gold, cocoa and timber still play a major role in the economy. <i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 12</i>																				
<b>KE</b>	The Kenya 2003-2007 CSP does not refer to the degree of commodity dependence as such. However, this paper underlines that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The trend of decline in economic performance has been due to <i>inter alia</i> exacerbated by recurrent droughts/floods and low commodity prices;</li> <li>▪ In 2001 agriculture remained the major contributor to GDP (24.1% of the GDP);</li> <li>▪ Kenya has a reasonably diversified economy, as its export earnings are spread across several agricultural crops, both traditional and new, together with manufactured goods and tourism;</li> <li>▪ 90% of Kenya's exports to the EU consist of horticultural products (flowers, vegetables, and fruit), tea and coffee;</li> <li>▪ Kenya experiences inadequate supply of water to sustain livestock and crops.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 7, 8 &amp; 9</i></p> The 2008-2013 CSP underlines that the EC recognizes the dependence of ACP countries on a number of export commodities and is developing accompanying measures to help local producers and processors adapt to the higher hygiene and food safety standards required in international trade. The forthcoming EU policy on Aid for Trade, along with the ongoing EPA negotiations, will guide programming of future EU support in this field. <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 27</i></p>																				
<b>MG</b>	Part de l'agriculture dans le PIB : 35,1 % en 1985, 28,1 % en 2005 ( <i>Source : Madagascar "at a glance" : annexe 1 CSP 2008-2013</i> )																				
<b>MG Rice</b>	L'essentiel des 2.000.000 t de riz produites à Madagascar est autoconsommé, le marché ne représentant environ qu'un tiers de cette quantité soit 700.000 t dont 200.000 t de riz importé (estimation 1999). <i>M.H.Dabat, Diagnostic du marché du riz à Madagascar en 2004 et début 2005</i>																				


**Overall**

Based on the UNCTAD's database of export statistics, over the period 1995-2008, the following 'export proceeds' dependency' ratios were calculated taking the annual value of exports of agricultural commodities (matières premières d'origine agricole – CTCI 2 – 22-27-28) and of food products, tobacco and drinks (Produits alimentaires, boissons et tabacs – CTCI 0+1+22+4) over the annual value of all exports (*detailed data can be provided*):


- 54 countries (out of a total of 81 ACP countries and territories) or 2/3 of countries had over the past 13 years had at least one year in which their agricultural exports represented more than 49% of their total exports;
- 32 countries (or 39,5% of countries) had over the past 13 years had at least one year in which their agricultural exports represented more than 75% of their total exports;
- 23 countries (or 28,4% of countries) had over the past 13 years had at least one year in which their agricultural exports represented more than 85% of their total exports;
- Over the period, agricultural exports' share of total exports exceeded 49% in each single year over the period 1995-2008 for 10 countries (Benin, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Kiribati, Malawi, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Sao Tome & Principe, Solomon Islands, Uganda and Vanuatu, see illustrations in graphs below);
- Only 2 countries (Ethiopia and Malawi) have systematically, over the 13 year period, had agricultural exports representing more than 75% of their total exports (in Malawi the rate was above 80% for all years).

The following three graphs show the evolution of dependency measured by this 'export proceeds' ratio for the 10 countries for which agricultural commodities systematically represented more than 49% of their export values over the 13 year period (1995-2008):


Graph 1 : Ten 'most dependent' ACP countries measured by export proceeds dependence towards agricultural commodities, 1995-1998



Graph 2 : Five 'most dependent' African countries measured by export proceeds dependence towards agricultural commodities, 1995-1998



Graph 3 : Ten 'most dependent' Caribbean and Pacific countries measured by export proceeds dependence towards agricultural commodities, 1995-1998



Source: ADE calculations based on UNCTAD International Trade Statistics

It is difficult from the above series of data to identify a single trend. It appears that four countries managed to reduce their reliance upon agricultural commodities exports (Uganda quite substantially and Benin only very marginally, Saint Vincent and Kiribati). The FAO in 2004 finds that 'recent data show that few of the countries concerned are reducing their commodity dependency. In 14 of the countries, dependency on a single agricultural commodity actually increased between 1986–88 and 1997–99, and only seven countries succeeded in reducing their reliance on a single commodity'. (FAO 2004, p.22)

The statistics available did not permit to calculate export proceeds' dependency ratios per agricultural

	<p>commodity; this should be possible during country visits using National Account data. Similarly, sufficiently exhaustive statistics for measuring dependency ratios based on agricultural commodities production contribution to fiscal revenues, GDP or employment were not found but could possibly be found in-country. <i>Sources: UNCTAD International Trade Statistics; FAO 2004, The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2004</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP does not refer to the degree of commodity dependence of Tanzania. However, this paper underlines that the economy is still heavily dependent on agriculture and efforts to modernise this sector have not yet yielded results. Traditionally agriculture has been the backbone of Tanzania's economy generating 60% of the country's GDP. <i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 7 &amp; 12</i></p> <p>The Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP does not refer to the degree of commodity dependence of Tanzania. However, this paper underlines that agriculture as the largest sector in the economy made the most significant contribution to growth by virtue of its large share in the economy. Farming (primary agriculture) contributes more than 40% of GDP and employs up to 80% of the labour force. Growth in the agriculture sector and the rural economy generally is therefore central to Tanzania's overall growth performance and its success in reducing poverty. The decline in traditional agricultural exports appears to have been compensated by increasing trade in food crops to urban areas, especially Dar Es Salaam, and cross border. Much of this trade is informal. In addition, recovery of traditional agricultural crop exports and continued expansion of non-traditional off-farm sales would contribute significantly to overall growth and poverty reduction.</p> <p>Emerging non-traditional floriculture and horticulture exports to Europe are constrained by problems with high cost and limited availability of freight services in Tanzania, a shortage of skilled workers, slow duty and VAT refunds, and limited access to agro-chemicals. <i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 15</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>In Tanzania, agriculture remains a dominant sector in terms of GDP and employment (70%) but its share of total GDP has been declining as a result of its slower growth compared to industry or communications. Average annual growth rates of agriculture during 1998-2009 have been between 0.8% and 5.9% compared to overall GDP between 4.1% and 7.8%. Agriculture contributes 24.6% to GDP (down from 29.3% in 2000) and about 24% of the country's export earnings. The PER 2010 argues that agriculture has strong backward and forward linkages through its value adding activities along the product value chain and through consumption effects; the PER of 2006 estimated that the spillover effects might be as high as twice the actual growth rate.</p> <p>Within agriculture, cash crops only account for about 10% of agricultural GDP.</p> <p>On the whole, the contribution of agricultural exports to foreign exchange has been much lower than that of the mining sector (gold primarily) or tourism: it has fluctuated between 15,8% in 2008 to 17.3% in 2009 and 16.4% in 2010. On the strength of agricultural commodities contribution to foreign exchange earnings, Tanzania can thus not be termed as a commodity dependent country. <i>Source: PER 2010</i></p>
<b>UG coffee rice</b>	<p>Be careful with the criteria on commodities dependence. There is a lot of informal regional trade (rice, meat...) that doesn't appear in the official statistics. (<i>Source: MN 301</i>).</p> <p>Nevertheless, according to official statistics, agricultural commodities make 75% of total Ugandan exports (1995-2008 average). Over 8 million people (in the whole value chain) derive their livelihood directly from coffee. Coffee is mainly cultivated by smallholders (1.3 million). Coffee contributes about 20% of Uganda's foreign currency earnings and constitutes two-thirds of earnings from traditional export crops.</p> <p>However, at farm level, dependence on export commodities is limited. Farmers primarily aim at ensuring their subsistence through the production of staple crops. Export commodities are side crops, which provide a cash additional income (<i>Source: MN 313</i>).</p>
<b>VU Cocoa Coffee</b>	<p>L'économie du Vanuatu est principalement orientée sur le tourisme. Au Vanuatu, 80% de l'agriculture est une agriculture de subsistance.</p> <p>Au temps des colonies, les Français et les Anglais ont développé les cultures de rente. A leur départ, ils ont passé le flambeau au Gouvernement et les différentes filières ont périclité. Aujourd'hui, l'agriculture de</p>

	<p>rente est peu développée.</p> <p>Les filières qui à l'époque étaient prospères étaient :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Le copra (<i>dried coconut albumen</i>): les arbres plantés à l'époque sont en fin de cycle de production. Il y a eu un projet dans les années 1990 (financé par la coopération française) pour redynamiser la filière à travers l'amélioration génétique (hybride des cocotiers) mais le Gouvernement et les producteurs n'ont pas cru bon de replanter les nouvelles espèces (résistantes aux maladies) développées par ce projet</li> <li>▪ Le bœuf : la viande du Vanuatu est très recherchée. Plusieurs importateurs sont intéressés, mais les quantités produites actuellement ne permettent pas l'expansion de la filière. Par ailleurs, un obstacle majeur au développement de la filière est le transport des animaux vivants d'une île à l'autre. Les bœufs pâturent dans les champs de cocotiers, puis doivent être rassemblés et emmenés pour être engraisés avant abattage, sur une île où des abattoirs sont disponibles. Il y a un abattoir sur l'île d'Efate (localisé à Port-Vila). Il y a également production de bœuf sur l'île de Santos. Ce bœuf est exporté vers le Japon.</li> <li>▪ Le café : il est produit sur l'île de Tana (île au sud du Vanuatu). La filière a été mise sur pied du temps des colons. A leur départ, laissée au Gouvernement, elle a été délaissée. Un entrepreneur italien est arrivé il y a quelques années et a redonné vie aux plantations. Le café y est décortiqué et torréfié sur place. Les petits producteurs de café ne mettent pas en œuvre les techniques de production et de cueillette appropriées (règles de l'art), par conséquent la qualité est très variable d'une récolte à l'autre. Les quantités de café produites aujourd'hui sont trop faibles pour espérer exporter.</li> <li>▪ Le cacao : il est principalement produit sur l'île de Malakula. La production est biologique de facto car les producteurs n'ont pas les moyens d'acheter des fertilisants et des produits phytosanitaires.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: MN 1067</i></p>
VU	<p>The CSPs mention that copra has been following a secular price decline and that kava exports have been subject to a ban put in place by importing countries. <i>Source: Vanuatu 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 9</i> <i>Vanuatu 2007-2013 CSP/NIP, page 6</i></p>
WAF	<p>Dans la sous-région UEMOA, la détérioration des exportations en proportion du PIB, que l'on peut attribuer à la détérioration des exportations de coton du Mali et à la baisse des prix à l'exportation du cacao de la Côte d'Ivoire, a conduit à un déficit croissant de la balance courante de cette sous-région. (<i>Source : RSP 2008-2013 p.14</i>).</p> <p>L'agriculture (productions végétales, animales, forestières et halieutiques), le développement rural, la protection de l'environnement, et la gestion des ressources naturelles constituent des enjeux majeurs en Afrique de l'Ouest en termes de poids économique, d'emploi et de source de revenu et de devises, de sécurité alimentaire, d'aménagement du territoire, de valorisation des ressources naturelles et d'intégration régionale. Le secteur agricole contribue pour environ 35 % à la formation du Produit Intérieur Brut régional (allant jusqu'à 60% dans certains pays) produit 15,3 % des exportations totales de biens et services de la région, 30% si l'on exclut le Nigeria, dont les produits pétroliers dominent la structure d'exportation ; emploie 65% des actifs de la région (<i>Source : WAF RSP 2008-2013 p.19</i>).</p> <p>Pour la majorité de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, l'agriculture constitue l'activité économique principale, fournissant un moyen de survie et un emploi à un grand nombre d'habitants. Dans la plupart des pays de la région, l'agriculture pourvoit aux besoins de plus de 70% de la population. (<i>Source : WAF RSP 2008-2013 p.71</i>).</p> <p>L'Afrique de l'ouest dispose, par ailleurs, d'énormes potentialités de production, mais est souvent confrontée à l'insécurité alimentaire et à une pauvreté rurale importante, en raison de l'insuffisance de l'offre et du mauvais fonctionnement des marchés. L'actualité marquée par une flambée généralisée des prix des denrées alimentaires, ainsi que les manifestations qu'elle engendre dans les Etats membres en témoignent. (<i>Source : WAF RSP 2008-2013 p.116</i>).</p>
I.1.1.3	<p>Main agricultural commodities exported by ACPs (falling under the criterion of commodity dependence) over the last 10 years</p>
BF-COT	<p>Le secteur coton burkinabé a connu un développement très important depuis 1994. Il concerne plus de 300.000 producteurs, touche directement plus de 3 millions de personnes, et contribue à hauteur de 60 à 70</p>

	<p>% aux recettes d'exportation selon les années et à environ 5 % du PIB (15 % du PIB agricole). Il faut noter qu'en raison des difficultés qu'a connues la filière cotonnière, les exportations du coton (qui représentaient jusqu'en fin 2006 en moyenne 60% des exportations totales) ont baissé en 2007 de 18% en valeur, soit 1.5 point de PIB. De ce fait, les exportations du coton ne représentaient plus que 56.4% des exportations totales en 2007. <i>Source : Allocation signature CF ; Note dossier CF-PAFFIC, 1<sup>ère</sup> tranche</i></p>																																																																																																														
CI	<p>L'agriculture ivoirienne est fortement centrée sur les cultures d'exportation. C'est ainsi que la Côte d'Ivoire est le premier producteur mondial de cacao, le premier exportateur africain d'hévéa et le troisième producteur mondial d'huile de palme et de café robusta. Le pays est aussi un exportateur de coton important. Les autres produits d'exportation sont la banane, l'ananas, l'anacarde, les mangues et les plantes ornementales. Les filières café-cacao fournissent, en valeur, les 2/3 du total des exportations agricoles, agroalimentaires et forestières, soit près de la moitié de l'ensemble des exportations ivoiriennes. De plus, elles contribuent à environ 30% des recettes de l'Etat sous la forme de taxes à l'exportation. (<i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.17</i>).</p>																																																																																																														
CI	<p>La valeur ajoutée de l'agriculture d'exportation se replierait de 2,4% du fait du recul de la production de cacao, d'ananas et de coton. (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.2</i>) CI-REH</p> <p>L'agriculture paysanne d'exportation a souffert de la crise ivoirienne qui a aggravé les dysfonctionnements internes de certaines filières (coton, cacao, café) et qui a entraîné une hausse des coûts du transport intérieur nuisible aux prix payés aux producteurs. Le contexte international a des effets contrastés : la compétitivité de toutes les productions agricoles d'exportation est affaiblie par la dégradation de la parité dollar/euro et par la hausse du coût des intrants et des carburants, mais la hausse des prix du pétrole entraîne également celle du cours des oléagineux et du caoutchouc. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.3</i>) CI-REH</p>																																																																																																														
CM	<p>Selon les statistiques de la banque des Etats d'Afrique Centrale, les données sont les suivantes :</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Part du produit dans les exportations totales</th> <th>2001</th> <th>2002</th> <th>2003</th> <th>2004</th> <th>2005</th> <th>2006</th> <th>2007</th> <th>2008</th> <th>2009</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>part pétrole</td> <td>46%</td> <td>42%</td> <td>37%</td> <td>38%</td> <td>44%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>49%</td> <td>53%</td> <td>44%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part divers</td> <td>14%</td> <td>18%</td> <td>23%</td> <td>18%</td> <td>20%</td> <td>17%</td> <td>17%</td> <td>17%</td> <td>19%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part bois</td> <td>15%</td> <td>13%</td> <td>14%</td> <td>16%</td> <td>13%</td> <td>14%</td> <td>16%</td> <td>13%</td> <td>16%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part cacao</td> <td>8%</td> <td>12%</td> <td>10%</td> <td>10%</td> <td>8%</td> <td>7%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>7%</td> <td>10%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part aluminium</td> <td>5%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>6%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part coton</td> <td>5%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part banane</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part café</td> <td>4%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>part caoutchouc naturel</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>part agricom majeurs (cacao+café+coton+banane+caoutchouc)</b></td> <td><b>20%</b></td> <td><b>23%</b></td> <td><b>22%</b></td> <td><b>22%</b></td> <td><b>18%</b></td> <td><b>15%</b></td> <td><b>13%</b></td> <td><b>13%</b></td> <td><b>18%</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Source : ADE based on www.beac.int</i></p>	Part du produit dans les exportations totales	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	part pétrole	46%	42%	37%	38%	44%	50%	49%	53%	44%	part divers	14%	18%	23%	18%	20%	17%	17%	17%	19%	part bois	15%	13%	14%	16%	13%	14%	16%	13%	16%	part cacao	8%	12%	10%	10%	8%	7%	5%	7%	10%	part aluminium	5%	4%	4%	6%	5%	4%	5%	4%	4%	part coton	5%	5%	5%	5%	4%	3%	3%	2%	2%	part banane	2%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%	part café	4%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	part caoutchouc naturel	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	<b>part agricom majeurs (cacao+café+coton+banane+caoutchouc)</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>18%</b>
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CR	<p><b>The 2008-2013 RSP refers to major Caribbean exports to the EU and to their lack of diversification:</b> "Caribbean exports to the EU are not diversified and have traditionally been dominated by bauxite and alumina, rum, sugar, fuels and bananas. In 2007, respective shares are as follows: alumina (10%), rum (6%), sugar (6%), fuels (15%) and bananas (5%). <i>Source: European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, page 12</i></p>																																																																																																														

<b>ESAIO</b>	The Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 Regional Strategy paper refers to commodity dependency of the region. However there is no specific reference to agricultural commodity dependence, besides mentioning that the insulation of ACP countries encouraged commodity dependency such as in the sugar sector. <i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 19 &amp; 34</i>																																																																	
<b>ET</b>	Over the past 10 years or so Ethiopia's exports lagged behind the growth of GDP, indicating low performance in the value of coffee exports, as well as slow growth in non-coffee exports. The latter, however, has begun to change through export diversification. An important example is provided by the emergence of significant floriculture and horticulture exports ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.15</i> ). One of the major reasons for the level of poverty is the high dependency of the economy on low productivity agriculture, on which more than four fifths of the population is living. Agriculture in Ethiopia accounts for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of exports and more than 80% of total employment. Ethiopia has one of the lowest export rates in the world, with coffee being its dominant export crop, while leather and qat [khat] are important as well. These features of the economy make it extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and fluctuation in international commodity (coffee) prices ( <i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.5</i> ).																																																																	
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	According to the MTE, 2011, the importance of cocoa in Ghana's agricultural sector and its economy is likely to increase: <i>'There are 800,000 smaller farmers in the sector and production is continuing on a renewed growth path. Output has increased from 395,000 metric tonnes in 2000 to over 650,000 tonnes in 2009. Also, the share of cocoa in GDP rose from 4.9% in 2000-2004 to 8.1% in 2005/2006. Further, cocoa accounts for 28.5% of agricultural GDP. Over the last three years it has contributed substantially to agricultural sector growth. Cocoa exports constituted 28% of foreign exchange earnings, 57% of overall agricultural exports. The amount contributed rises to 87% of agricultural exports if forestry and fishery are excluded.'</i> (page 18, MTE, 2011). The statement made did not however take account of the emerging role of oil in Ghana's production and exports. <i>Source: CSSP II MTE 2011.</i>																																																																	
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	Ghana's exports are dominated by cocoa: <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Ghana exports</th> <th>1999</th> <th>2000</th> <th>2001</th> <th>2002</th> <th>2003</th> <th>2004</th> <th>2005</th> <th>2006</th> <th>2007</th> <th>2008</th> <th>2009</th> <th>2010</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Cocoa beans and products</td> <td>27,5%</td> <td>22,6%</td> <td>20,5%</td> <td>23,5%</td> <td>26,4%</td> <td>37,4%</td> <td>32,4%</td> <td>31,9%</td> <td>26,3%</td> <td>28,2%</td> <td>32,0%</td> <td>27,3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Gold</td> <td>35,4%</td> <td>36,3%</td> <td>33,1%</td> <td>34,2%</td> <td>32,4%</td> <td>30,7%</td> <td>33,8%</td> <td>34,3%</td> <td>41,3%</td> <td>42,6%</td> <td>43,7%</td> <td>48,2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Timber &amp; Timber products</td> <td>8,7%</td> <td>9,0%</td> <td>9,1%</td> <td>9,1%</td> <td>6,8%</td> <td>7,7%</td> <td>8,1%</td> <td>5,5%</td> <td>6,0%</td> <td>6,0%</td> <td>3,1%</td> <td>2,4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other exports</td> <td>28,3%</td> <td>32,1%</td> <td>37,3%</td> <td>33,2%</td> <td>11,5%</td> <td>24,2%</td> <td>25,7%</td> <td>28,3%</td> <td>26,4%</td> <td>23,1%</td> <td>21,3%</td> <td>22,1%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Over the 10 year period one notes the growing importance of gold in Ghana's exports with a relative decrease of timber and other exports values. <i>Source: Central Bank of Ghana Statistical Bulletins, various years.</i></p>	Ghana exports	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Cocoa beans and products	27,5%	22,6%	20,5%	23,5%	26,4%	37,4%	32,4%	31,9%	26,3%	28,2%	32,0%	27,3%	Gold	35,4%	36,3%	33,1%	34,2%	32,4%	30,7%	33,8%	34,3%	41,3%	42,6%	43,7%	48,2%	Timber & Timber products	8,7%	9,0%	9,1%	9,1%	6,8%	7,7%	8,1%	5,5%	6,0%	6,0%	3,1%	2,4%	Other exports	28,3%	32,1%	37,3%	33,2%	11,5%	24,2%	25,7%	28,3%	26,4%	23,1%	21,3%	22,1%
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<b>MG</b>	1985 : vanille 44 M US\$ ; café : 22 M US\$; exportations totales : 291 M US\$ 2005: vanille 102 M US\$ ; café : 79 M US\$; exportations totales : 996 M US\$ ( <i>Source :Madagascar "at a glance" : annexe 1 CSP 2008-2013</i> ). Au niveau des échanges Madagascar-UE, Madagascar a réalisé 453 M€ d'exportations contre 360 M€ en 2005. Les principaux produits exportés vers l'UE sont les produits textiles et habillements (42 %), les produits agroalimentaires (46 %) dont les crustacés (20 %) et la vanille (3 %) ainsi que les minerais et matières premières (4 %) ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.9</i> )																																																																	
<b>ML- COT</b>	La filière cotonnière représente pour le Mali un enjeu fondamental dominant toutes autres productions agricoles. Le coton est le second produit d'exportation après l'or et est au centre des activités de 165.000 exploitations dont dépendent 3 millions de personnes (FIP, §3). Il contribue à hauteur de 30 à 50 % aux recettes d'exportation selon les années et à environ 10% du PIB. <i>Source ; ROM/BCS</i>																																																																	
<b>Overall</b>	The data source for this indicator is the online database UN COMTRADE (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database). Over 170 reporter countries provide the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) with their annual international trade statistics data detailed by commodities and partner countries. More information can be found on their website: <a href="http://comtrade.un.org/db/">http://comtrade.un.org/db/</a>																																																																	



The data provided here under indicates the main agricultural commodities exported by country and their percentage on the total amount of agricultural commodities' exports from 1998 to 2008 (non-agricultural commodities are not taken into account in the total amount of exports).

Out of 24 ACP countries for which data was provided in the UN COMTRADE over the period 1998-2008:

- 12 countries are highly dependent (more than 70% of their exports) on 1 type of agricultural commodity: Dominica on bananas (98%), Benin on cotton (95%) Ethiopia on coffee (90%), Suriname on rice (84%), Burundi on coffee (82%), Ghana on cocoa (94%), Mali on cotton (100%), Sudan on cotton (83%), Cote d'Ivoire on cocoa (78%), Central African Republic on cotton (73%), Malawi on tobacco (76%), Togo on cotton (72%).
- 6 countries are highly dependent on 2 types of agricultural commodities: Cameroon on cocoa and cotton (48% and 26% respectively), Kenya on tea and coffee (65% and 16% respectively), Niger on cotton and tobacco (46% and 40% respectively), Nigeria on cocoa and rubber (53% and 34% respectively), Papua New Guinea on coffee and cocoa (51% and 32% respectively) and Zimbabwe on tobacco and cotton (64% and 25% respectively).
- The 6 remaining countries are less dependent to only one or two commodities.

The data obtained from UN COMTRADE on the 23 ACP countries shows that overall, 70% of agricultural commodities exports from these countries come from 3 different types of commodities: cocoa (40%), cotton (15%), Tobacco (14%). The other main agricultural commodities exported are coffee (8%), sugar (8%), rubber (6%) and tea (5%).

Table 1 - Type of agricultural commodities by ACP country

Country	Agricultural Commodity	% on total export of agricultural commodities (1998-2008)
Benin	Cotton	48%
	Cotton, not carded or combed	47%
Burundi	Coffee, coffee husks and skins and coffee substitutes	82%
	Solid cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose	4%
	Sugars and sugar confectionery	4%
	Tea	6%
Cote d'Ivoire	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	45%
	Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	33%
	Cotton	4%
	Cotton, not carded or combed	3%
	Coffee, coffee husks and skins and coffee substitutes	3%
	Natural rubber and gums, in primary form, plates, etc	4%
	Rubber and articles thereof	4%
Cameroon	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	27%
	Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	21%
	Cotton	13%
	Cotton, not carded or combed	13%
Central African	Coffee, coffee husks and skins and coffee substitutes	26%

	Rep.	Cotton	37%
		Cotton, not carded or combed	36%
	Dominica	Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried	98%
	Dominican Rep.	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	11%
		Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	9%
		Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	28%
		Tobacco unmanufactured, tobacco refuse	7%
		Cotton	16%
	Ethiopia	Solid cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose	9%
		Sugars and sugar confectionery	10%
		Coffee, coffee husks and skins and coffee substitutes	90%
	Ghana	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	50%
		Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	44%
	Kenya	Coffee, coffee husks and skins and coffee substitutes	16%
		Tea	65%
		Sugars and sugar confectionery	5%
	Madagascar	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	13%
		Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	13%
		Coffee, coffee husks and skins and coffee substitutes	20%
		Cotton	34%
		Solid cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose	7%
		Sugars and sugar confectionery	7%
	Malawi	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	38%
		Tobacco unmanufactured, tobacco refuse	38%
		Solid cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose	6%
		Sugars and sugar confectionery	7%
		Tea	5%
	Mali	Cotton	50%
		Cotton, not carded or combed	50%
	Niger	Cotton	43%
		Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	40%
	Nigeria	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	29%
		Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	24%
Natural rubber and gums, in primary form, plates, etc		16%	
Rubber and articles thereof		18%	
Papua New Guinea	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	16%	
	Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	16%	
	Coconut, palm kernel, babassu oil, fractions, refined	8%	
	Coffee, coffee husks and skins and coffee substitutes	51%	
South Africa	Maize (corn)	13%	
	Rubber and articles thereof	22%	

		Solid cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose	20%
		Sugars and sugar confectionery	22%
		Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	10%
	Sudan	Cotton	42%
		Cotton, not carded or combed	41%
		Sugars and sugar confectionery	10%
	Suriname	Rice	84%
	Togo	Cotton	43%
		Cotton, not carded or combed	29%
		Cocoa and cocoa preparations	8%
		Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	8%
	Uganda	Coffee, coffee husks and skins and coffee substitutes	52%
		Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	10%
		Tobacco unmanufactured, tobacco refuse	10%
		Tea	10%
	Tanzania	Coffee, coffee husks and skins and coffee substitutes	18%
		Cotton	15%
		Cotton, not carded or combed	10%
		Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	17%
		Tobacco unmanufactured, tobacco refuse	17%
	Zambia	Cotton	22%
		Cotton, not carded or combed	13%
		Solid cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose	15%
		Sugars and sugar confectionery	16%
		Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	13%
		Tobacco unmanufactured, tobacco refuse	13%
	Zimbabwe	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	34%
		Tobacco unmanufactured, tobacco refuse	30%
		Cotton	13%
		Cotton, not carded or combed	12%


Source: ADE calculations on basis of UN COMTRADE data

**SADC** The Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP mentions that food agriculture continues to be the mainstay of economic activities in SADC despite its relatively small share in the regional GDP. However there is no specific reference to agricultural commodity dependence, besides that that EC and SADC have a long standing commercial experience in the context of the Sugar and the Beef Commodity Protocols. Source: *Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, pages 18&24*

**TZ** 85% of Tanzania's agricultural export revenues come from five crops. The main crops exported are (in shares of total traditional export values):

	2008	2009	2010
Coffee	27,1	21,6	21,3
Cotton	22,3	26,1	23,6
Tobacco	23,2	29,5	34,9

	<table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td>Cashew Nuts</td> <td>16,8</td> <td>11,2</td> <td>9,9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tea</td> <td>9,4</td> <td>8,4</td> <td>8,0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cloves</td> <td>1,1</td> <td>3,2</td> <td>2,3</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>In addition sisal is also exported (about half the domestic production volume) and very limited amounts of sugar. Depending on the year, about half the cotton crop is exported (the other half used in the domestic industries) and most of the coffee and the cashew nuts are exported</p> <p>In terms of area under cash crops, this has shown an increasing trend since 2004 with coffee increasing since 2006/2007, cashew nut since 2004 and sisal and tobacco increasing slowly over the period; sugarcane, tea and pyrethrum remained more or less constant. Acreage under smallholder agriculture is constrained by lack of mechanisation (land is available).</p> <p>Cash crop production increased likewise but with a strong dip in 2006 for cashew nuts, tobacco and coffee. Yields have been increasing for tea and coffee since 2004 but are very much lower than worldwide averages due to low use of fertilisers (Tanzanian farmers use 9kg/Ha of fertiliser compared to 16kg/Ha on average un SADC and 27kg/Ha in Malawi) and low use of improved seeds.</p> <p><i>Source: PER 2010, Annual performance report 2010, ASDP 2004.</i></p>	Cashew Nuts	16,8	11,2	9,9	Tea	9,4	8,4	8,0	Cloves	1,1	3,2	2,3
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Cloves	1,1	3,2	2,3										
<b>UG</b>	The 2002-2007 CSP/NIP of Uganda stated that coffee exports represented 60% of the country's total exports. <i>Source: Uganda 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 12</i>												
<b>VU</b>	<p>As shown in the figures below, Vanuatu recorded a trade deficit of 1,66 million Vatu. This is indicating an improvement of 370 million Vatu compared to March 2010. The improvement was due to an increase in total exports from 246 million vatu to 601 million vatu compared to March 2010. The significant increase in domestic exports was mainly attributable to the higher exports in copra, coconut oil, kava, beef, alcoholic drinks and fish over the same period in 2010. The latter represent 88% of the total domestic exports. Fish includes other frozen fish and chilled fish.</p> <p>In March 2011, coconut oil constituted 33 % of the total domestic exports in vatu terms, followed by copra 27 %, kava and beef 9% each, fish 5% alcoholic drinks, 4% live fish 3% and sawn timber representing 1%. Other includes products such as: tamanu oil, copper waste and scraps and other medicaments. In imports by commodity groups, imports for machines and transport registered the largest value (C.I.F) of 631 million vatu and represented 30 % of the total imports for home consumption, followed by food and live animals (19 %), basic manufactured goods (14 %), mineral fuels (11%) and chemical products (10%). Other commodities such as beverages and tobacco, crude materials and miscellaneous goods, made up less than 10 % of the total imports for home consumption.</p> <p>In March 2011, increases were recorded food and live animals imports (26 %) and mineral fuels (64%), while the rest of the imported items decreased: goods not classified elsewhere (-43%), oils and fats (-21%), miscellaneous (-19%), basic manufactured goods (-14%), and machine and transport (-11 %), when compared to March 2010.</p>												





*Source: Vanuatu Statistics Office, Overseas Trade 2011, 16 May 2011*

Goods are exported under the Cotonou agreement. For Vanuatu there is market access for few commodities. Major exports for cocoa and copra are from Vanuatu to Asia. Because of distances, logistics and transport costs. However, there is good potential in Vanuatu to export more agricultural commodities. But Vanuatu faces issues in terms of SPS measures to export to the EU (e.g. for kava). There is also a good potential for coconut exports. There are main challenges in Vanuatu: the distance with the markets, including inside the islands, and the SPS requirements to export to the EU. The MTS programme should finance scientists to check quality of products to meet standards. The Vanuatu's Ambassador in Brussels is negotiating that support in Brussels at that moment. Vanuatu tries to get assistance to export kava to the EU. *Source: MN 1011*

**WAF**


Les exportations de l'Afrique de l'Ouest étant dominées par les minéraux (i.e. pétrole, fer, aluminium et or), les produits agricoles (i.e. coton, cacao, café et fruits frais), les produits de la pêche et de la sylviculture, la contribution des produits manufacturés aux exportations demeure faible (Source : *WAF RSP 2008-2013 p.18*). Les produits agricoles exportés hors de la région sont pour l'essentiel des matières premières pas ou peu transformées exportées majoritairement vers l'Europe (café, cacao, poissons, agrumes, fleurs coupées...) ou vers l'Asie (coton). A lui seul, le cacao représente 20 % de l'ensemble des exportations de la région vers l'UE. (Source : *WAF RSP 2008-2013 p.21*). Les exportations de l'Afrique de l'Ouest vers l'Europe sont très concentrées entre trois pays, le Nigeria, la Côte d'Ivoire et le Ghana qui représentent à eux seuls près de 80 %. (Source : *WAF RSP 2008-2013 p.21*).

<b>J.1.2</b>	<b><i>Prices of agricultural commodities exported by ACPs have demonstrated a long-term declining trend and high volatility</i></b>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>La tendance baissière du prix du coton sur le long terme est confirmée pour la période allant de 1990 à 2008, mais la tendance s'infléchit et commence à s'inverser si on étend la période jusqu'avril 2011 en raison de la hausse exceptionnelle des cours du coton</p> <p>La volatilité des cours du coton est confirmée pour la période 2000-2008 et s'est encore accrue depuis 2008. La dépréciation du dollar face à l'Euro entre 2002 et 2010 a constitué un facteur aggravant pour les filières cotonnières africaines de la zone FCFA dont fait partie le BF.</p>
<b>GH Overall</b>	<p>After the price spikes (followed by price collapses) of mid-1970s and mid-1980s, cocoa prices have remained more or less stable since the 1990s and have increased since 2000. In Ghana producer prices have further benefited from the reform of the cocoa sector which increased the efficiency of internal and external marketing and enabled producers to benefit from an increasing share of the world market price (73% in 2011 against 40% in the 1980's).</p> <p>The prices of cocoa in Ghana being set at the beginning of the growing season, there is no price uncertainty and volatility is reduced for producers. Price volatility for the export agency is reduced through forward sales (70% of production sold at 3 months).</p>
<b>MG vanilla coffee</b>	<p>Le prix de la vanille, qui avait atteint des sommets en 2003-2004, est retombé dès 2005 à un niveau historiquement bas.</p> <p>Le marché du girofle étant extrêmement étroit, le prix fluctue largement d'une année à l'autre en fonction du niveau de production en Indonésie</p> <p>Le prix du café, extrêmement bas au début des années 2000, a quadruplé entre 2003 et 2008</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The effect of agricultural commodities prices development on Tanzania's production and export performances have been mixed: downward trends through the 1985-1995 period were compensated partly by Tanzania's liberalisation policies but worsened by a declining producer's share of the border price. The reforms of marketing institutions from the mid-1990s (for coffee, cashews, cotton, tea and tobacco) reversed this trend with producers receiving a higher share of the export price. In the late 1990s this reversed again with the benefits to farmers of more favourable world export crop prices (on average) being reduced by the significant appreciation over the late 1990s'. Finally the Tanzanian agricultural commodity market was hard hit by the financial crisis with cotton, coffee, tea and cloves prices declining strongly at the end of 2008 and 2009 whilst food inflation was rising fast thus lowering the purchasing power of consumers drastically (PP fell by 40% between 2002 and 2009).</p> <p>The pricing issue is particularly important in the tea sector where prices are the result of a price setting/negotiation mechanism dominated by the interests of estates who also own the processing factories. The squeeze on smallholder gross margins is exacerbated by the fact that farmers do not access price premiums depending on the quality of produce. This is not the case for coffee and no longer the case for cashew nuts where standard quality measures apply, and for cotton where (if not standardised) at least quality assessments are (loosely) applied.</p> <p>Producer price volatility is minimised through (i) the setting of minimum prices for tea – each factory being free to up on it, (ii) warehouse receipts systems for cashew nuts, (iii) first and second payments for cotton (with the second payment linked directly to the world price)</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Over the last ten years coffee prices have been very volatile. In the early 2000s, they were extremely low. They very much increased since then. Some experts forecast that they will remain at a high level because of growing domestic consumption in coffee exporting countries.</p>
<b>I.1.2.1</b>	Overall price trend of agricultural commodities over the last 50 years
<b>BAN</b>	The UNCTAD website holds records of banana prices (in US\$/tonne) in major banana producing countries (see below).

	 <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Source: <a href="http://www.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/banana/prices.htm">http://www.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/banana/prices.htm</a></i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>La volatilité des cours du cacao et du café est une réalité. Les prix étaient très déprimés depuis 1985- jusque 1993, suivi de fluctuations très importantes au cours de la décennie 90 (max en 1994-95 pour le café, ensuite chute progressive et prix planchers début 2000). Les cours se sont redressés depuis 2002 pour le cacao, vers 2005 pour le café. A cette volatilité des prix s'est ajoutée la libéralisation (brutale) des filières café-cacao avec le désengagement de l'Etat qui est devenu effectif en 1995 (source : Convention de financement PACICC/ Stratégie de développement de la filière café). Depuis plus de trente ans, le prix du café a connu une volatilité prononcée, à certaines périodes (début des années 1990, 2001-2004), le prix de vente était inférieur au coût de production (source : Stratégie de développement de la filière café au Cameroun).</p> <p>Pour les bananes le contexte est spécifique (démantèlement de l'OCMB) avec un contingent ACP vers l'UE et une taxe (revue à la baisse) sur la banane \$ (114€/t) amenée à 75 €/t en 2020 (voir un abandon de la taxe?).</p>
<b>Overall</b>	 <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Source: World Bank commodity price data</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Evolution of the agricultural commodities world constant price index (year 2000 = 100)</b></p> <p>After increasing sharply in 1973 during the oil crisis, agricultural commodity prices have declined for most of the past 40 years. This downfall has been punctuated by short term increases and rapid falls. The trend reversed around 2002 and prices rose to reach a peak in 2008, year of the food crisis. Prices then declined in 2009 but predictions show that the 2010 price level should again be higher (although not as high as in 2008). <i>Source: Product fiches (from World Bank Commodity Price Data)</i></p>
<b>Overall</b>	<b>Infléchissement de la tendance baissière depuis 1990, en comparant la période avril 1990-à avril</b>


## Cotton 2009 et avril 2009 à mars 2011

Evolution, d'avril 1990 à avril 2009, des prix du coton selon l'indice A de Cotton Outlook, en cents USD/kg et en FCFA/kg



N.B. : 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1994, dévaluation du FCFA

Evolution, d'avril 1990 à mars 2011, des prix du coton selon l'indice A de Cotton Outlook, en cents USD/kg et en FCFA/kg



N.B. : 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1994, dévaluation du FCFA

Sources: Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2009

Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2011

## TZ

Although world prices for agricultural commodities experienced downward trends through the 1985-1995 period, Tanzania's liberalisation policies during this same period (and notably the effective depreciation of the currency (thus making Tanzania's products more competitive on world markets) are found to have




	<p>more than compensated the adverse effects of declining world commodity prices.</p> <p><i>' While macro-economic policy had a large positive effect on prices, the producer's share of the border price declined over this period [1986-1995] for some key export crops (tobacco, tea and cotton), indicating that sectoral policy did little to improve export price incentives over the late 1980s and early 1990s. From the mid-1990s, there were significant changes to market institutions for major export crops (coffee, cashews, cotton, tea and tobacco) resulting in producers receiving a higher share of the export price, increasing from an average of 54 percent during 1988-94 to 63 percent during 1994-99, although this varies by crop. The benefits to farmers of more favourable world export crop prices (on average) were reduced by the significant appreciation over the late 1990s'. (ASDP, section 1.1.2)</i></p> <p>The Tanzanian agricultural commodity market has been hard hit by the financial crisis with cotton, coffee, tea and cloves prices declining strongly at the end of 2008 and 2009. Impact has been particularly hard on cotton with a quarter of the total output for the 2008/09 season piled up in ginneries due to lack of orders but horticultural products have been the most affected (price decline by 30-50% in 2009).</p> <p>Parallel to the cash crop price decline in later 2008/2009, the purchasing power of consumers has been noted to decrease during the same period with food inflation being particularly high (PP fell by 40% between 2002 and 2009). <i>Source: PER 2010, ASDP</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>This year coffee price is around 3 to 4 USD/ kg. This price may be around 7 USD/ kg for very good quality products. <i>Source: MN 677</i></p> <p>Cotton price is not really an issue: TZ has been getting good prices; the problems are more with the tempering of the scales (buyers) which do not occur with contract farming.</p> <p>Marketing system goes through agents on the field. We want to change that way: farmers should be sellers; the agent is not needed. Need to link directly the farmer and the industry. If we change that, price will be better for farmers. The price for farmers is directly linked to the world price. <i>Source: MN 649</i></p>
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<b>I.1.2.2</b>	Price trend of CDDCs main agricultural commodities over the last 50 years
<b>Cashew nuts</b>	<p>Evolution of cashew nut (W320) world prices (in constant year 2000 US cents/kg) and of the agricultural commodities world constant price index (year 2000 = 100)</p> <p>The graph displays two data series over time from 1970 to 2009. The vertical axis (Y-axis) is labeled 'Cashew nut constant world price (cents/kg)' and 'Agricultural commodities constant price index', with a scale from 0 to 300 in increments of 50. The horizontal axis (X-axis) is labeled 'year' with markers for 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009. The 'Agricultural commodities' series (black line) starts at approximately 180 in 1970, peaks at about 270 in 1973, then fluctuates between 150 and 200 until 2006, after which it rises sharply to nearly 200 by 2009. The 'Cashew nuts' series (orange line) starts at about 120 in 1970, peaks at 170 in 1976, then fluctuates between 100 and 150 until 2006, after which it rises sharply to about 180 by 2009.</p> <p>Source: UNCTAD Info Comm and World Bank commodity price data</p> <p>After a strong price increase at the end of the 1970s, cashew nut prices fluctuated strongly during the 1980s</p>

before going through a strong decrease from the mid-1980s to 2001. A slight increase followed until 2004 and data beyond that year is not available. The general trend of cashew prices has been slightly different than the one of agricultural commodities, with a slower downward trend for cashew nuts. Price peaks also differ slightly in time and amplitude. *Source: Cashew nut Product Fiche (from UNCTAD Info Comm and World Bank Commodity Price Data)*


**Cocoa**

**Evolution of cocoa world prices (in constant year 2000 US cents/kg) and of the agricultural commodities world constant price index (year 2000 = 100)**



The price indices of cocoa and agricultural commodities have been largely different between 1970 and 1990. Between 1990 and 2009, the two graphs are very similar, except for two price spikes between 1994 and 1998 which were much stronger for cocoa than for the agricultural commodities group. *Source: Cocoa Product fiche (from World Bank Commodity Price Data)*



**Coffee**



**Evolution of coffee world prices (in constant year 2000 US cents/kg) and of the agricultural commodities world constant price index (year 2000 = 100)**

Coffee prices underwent a surge between 1975 and 1977. Since then, coffee prices progressively dropped until 2002 following 5 to 7 year cycles of sharp spikes followed by slower decreases. The prices then increased between 2002 and 2008 before plummeting again in 2009. The evolution of prices is characterized by a high volatility and a progressive downfall. This trend is quite parallel to the one of agricultural commodities but with wider amplitude. During the 2000 to 2005 period, the coffee price index has been below the agricultural commodities price index while it has been above it

	the rest of the time. <i>Source: Coffee Product Fiche (From World Bank Commodity Price Data)</i>																																				
<b>Cotton</b>	<p><b>Evolution of cotton world prices (in constant year 2000 US cents/kg) and of the agricultural commodities world constant price index (year 2000 = 100)</b></p> <p>The prices of cotton have undergone important fluctuations over the 1970 to 2009 period, alternating sharp price spikes and drops in three to four year periods. The cotton index and agricultural commodities index have followed a quite similar evolution but began to diverge in the 2000s, with cotton prices stagnating and agricultural commodity prices rising. <i>Source: Cotton Product fiche (from World Bank Commodity Price Data)</i></p>																																				
<b>CR</b>	<p><b>The 2008-2013 RSP refers to the rise in commodity prices in 2007:</b> “the steadily rising commodities’ prices have already had quite a negative effect on fiscal accounts and the overall balance of payments in CARIFORUM countries, except Trinidad and Tobago, reflecting in part an increase in payments for imports.”</p> <p><i>Source: European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, page 10</i></p>																																				
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>Ghana cocoa prices have been as follows over 2000-2010 :</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>YEAR</th> <th>PRODUCER PRICE (Ghc/ tonne)</th> <th>ANNUAL EXTERNAL PRICE (US\$/tonne)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1999/2000</td> <td>225</td> <td>NA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2000/2001</td> <td>348</td> <td>NA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2001/2002</td> <td>620</td> <td>NA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2002/2003</td> <td>850</td> <td>NA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2003/2004</td> <td>900</td> <td>NA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2004/2005</td> <td>900</td> <td>1 538</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2005/2006</td> <td>900</td> <td>1 591</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2006/2007</td> <td>915</td> <td>1 952</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2007/2008</td> <td>950/1,200**</td> <td>2 581</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2008/2009</td> <td>1 632</td> <td>2 889</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2009/2010</td> <td>2,208/2,400**</td> <td>3 133</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>**The producer price was revised upward within the year</p> <p><i>Source: Cocobod</i></p>	YEAR	PRODUCER PRICE (Ghc/ tonne)	ANNUAL EXTERNAL PRICE (US\$/tonne)	1999/2000	225	NA	2000/2001	348	NA	2001/2002	620	NA	2002/2003	850	NA	2003/2004	900	NA	2004/2005	900	1 538	2005/2006	900	1 591	2006/2007	915	1 952	2007/2008	950/1,200**	2 581	2008/2009	1 632	2 889	2009/2010	2,208/2,400**	3 133
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<b>Rice</b>	<p><b>Evolution of rice world prices (in constant year 2000 US\$/tonne) and of the agricultural commodities world constant price index (year 2000 = 100)</b></p>																																				

	 <p>Given the restricted nature of the rice markets (only 6 percent of produced rice is subject to international trade) the international prices of rice are very volatile compared to those of the other main staple crops (wheat and maize). The price surges are always higher for rice than for agricultural commodities.</p> <p><i>Source: Rice Product fiche (from World Bank Commodity Price Data)</i></p>
<b>Rum</b>	No information on rum prices could be found
<b>Tea</b>	<p><b>Evolution of tea world prices (in constant year 2000 US cents/kg) and of the agricultural commodities world constant price index (year 2000 = 100)</b></p>  <p>Tea prices have followed a progressive decline from the 1970s to 1995 with a few price surges in the 1970s and 1980s. After a rise at the end of the 1990s, the tea prices slowly decreased until 2005 before increasing again during the second half of the decade. The general trend is quite similar to the one of agricultural commodities but the fluctuations are different. <i>Source: Tea Product Fiche (from World Bank Commodity Price Data)</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>La population rurale croit que le Gouvernement fixe les prix des matières agricoles. A l'approche des élections, le Gouvernement fait des annonces de prix plus élevé que sur le marché agricole international/régional et puise ans son budget pour payer la différence. Les paysans ne sont pas conscients du mécanisme de fixation des prix des matières premières agricoles.</p> <p>Le prix du copra a été très variable ces dernières années: il est passé de 18,000 VATU/ tonne à 60,000</p>

	VATU/ tonne (aujourd'hui: 1 € = environ 125 VATU). Le prix est actuellement de 24,000 VATU/ tonne. Les producteurs trouvent ce prix satisfaisant pour pouvoir produire et vendre correctement leurs productions. <i>Source : MN 1015 and MN 1067</i>
<b>Vanilla</b>	<p>Vanilla prices have undergone a significantly different trend than that of agricultural commodities. A very important price hike occurred in the first half of the 2000s.</p>
<b>I.1.2.3</b>	Product specific issues having affected individual products' prices over the last 10 years
<b>BAN</b>	<p>Traditionally, EU banana imports have been regulated by a quota-system with strong preferences for ACP countries, giving them priority access to the high-priced EU market. Following several disputes in the 1990s and 2000s, the EU changed the CMO bananas and the preferential banana trade provisions (which meant an increase in competition and a decrease in export price for ACP banana exporters) in 1998 and 2001. The quota system was then replaced by a tariff-only system as of January 2006. After further negotiations at the WTO, EU and third countries reached an agreement (in December 2009) on the tariff that will be imposed on EU banana imports in the upcoming years. Although ACP countries will benefit from a tariff-free access to the EU markets, tariffs on third country bananas will progressively decrease, from 148 to 114€/Tonne between 2009 and 2017, thus eroding preferences for ACP countries.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global report, htspe, 2008, p 4 and <a href="http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr591_e.htm">http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr591_e.htm</a></p> <p>Much of the current crisis in the Caribbean banana industry is attributed to the WTO ruling against the European Union's banana regime<sup>18</sup>. There is no doubt that the decision will have a major impact on the economies of the region and in particular the smaller islands. However, there was a gradual overall decline in production throughout the 1990s in all Caribbean countries with the exception of Belize. The EU's "New Banana Regime (NBR)" that came into force in 1993 without a doubt contributed to this decline, for example banana production in the Windward Islands dropped from 272,000 tonnes in 1992 to 135,000 in 1997. The slightly improved market opportunities for non-ACP countries that the NBR permitted, the periods of prices decline, and tighter quality requirements in a unified (EU) market place, were all factors that put considerable pressure on Caribbean producers<sup>19</sup>. This situation was further compounded by natural disasters in the region. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.11</i>).</p>
<b>BF</b>	The 2008-2013 Burkina Faso CSP/NIP mentions that the evolution of exchange rates has affected producer prices for commodity exports. <i>Source: 2008-2013 Burkina Faso CSP/NIP, pages 23-24</i>
<b>CAFR</b>	The 2008-2013 RSP mentions the importance of price developments. Firstly soaring food prices which have a more important impact upon non-oil producers which have fewer resources to cope with the situation; it notes that prices have in the medium term encourage agricultural production but in the LT this will need major investments. It also then mentions the consequences of the financial crisis which depresses

	<p>construction in Europe and thus less outlets for forestry exports from the region and depressed prices of primary commodities has meant a reduction of activities of exporters in the region which is strong because intra-regional trade is very limited.</p> <p>Furthermore it develops the vulnerability of these countries to price fluctuations and the effects upon the balance of payments. <i>Source: RSP 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>Cashew nuts</b>	<p>There are to this day no financial ratings or international contracts for cashew nuts.</p> <p>Main factors influencing cashew nut price are:<sup>2</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The supply of raw nuts (which has varied a lot in the past years)</li> <li>▪ The behaviour of certain actors on the market: market manipulation by traders, speculation, market anticipation by processors...</li> <li>▪ The price of substitute products (especially almonds)</li> <li>▪ Exchange rate fluctuations</li> </ul> <p>Cashew nuts are considered as a “lifestyle commodity” and demand for cashew nuts is therefore subject to the fluctuations of the world economy. Seasons also play a role, with a quarter of cashew nut consumption occurring during the end of year festivities. Cashew nuts prices influence demand significantly, with processors and retailers substituting different sorts of nuts on shelves or in mixes depending on their relative prices. <i>Source: Cashew nut product fiche</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission’s strategy and programming documents for Cameroon did not include reference to product specific issues having affected products’ prices over time. <i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>Cocoa</b>	<p>In the 1970s, oil prices surged due to the oil crisis and droughts in major producing countries. Since the price peak of the 1970s, the price of cocoa has progressively decreased throughout the 1970-2000 period. Cocoa prices have then risen again in the 2000s along with the prices of other commodities.</p> <p>Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the evolution of international cocoa prices seems to have been primarily due to the interaction of supply and demand rather than to the impact of international cocoa agreements implemented during that period. The cocoa stock levels have had an important impact on the prices in addition to an underlying long-term declining trend.</p> <p>Changes in the industrialized countries have also had a profound impact on the structure of cocoa markets and the price formation. There has been a decline in the level of stocks needed to carry on cocoa processing and chocolate manufacturing activities due to a concentration of trading, processing and manufacturing companies. This decline in needs for stocks, the monopsony situation of cocoa buyers and the steady increase in production have contributed to depressing world prices.</p> <p><i>Source: Cocoa Product Fiche</i></p> <p>According to Ghana’s Country Strategy Evaluation Report, the security crisis in Côte d’Ivoire (the world’s largest cocoa exporter) created a price increase starting from November 2004. At the time of the evaluation, there was no certainty whether it would have short or long term effects. If the price effects were of long term nature, they would have a negative impact on the tree replacement programme in Ghana since even old low-yielding trees would remain profitable.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Country Strategy Evaluation Report, April 2005, page 57</i></p>
<b>Coffee</b>	<p>The fundamentals of the coffee cycle are explained by frost or drought events occurring periodically (mostly in Brazil, the major coffee producer), limiting supply and driving prices up. Supply answers to prices with a certain delay, required between planting and harvesting. <i>Source: Coffee product fiche</i></p>

<sup>2</sup> Horus Entreprises, Long term trends in the international cashew market and implications for African exporters – Final report. September 2005.

	<p>In the Action Aid 2007 article, there is a case study of the effect of market concentration on coffee prices. <i>Sources: Action Aid, Commodity dependence and development, Suggestions to tackle the commodities problems, South Centre, April 2008.</i></p> <p>One of the major reasons for the level of poverty is the high dependency of the economy on low productivity agriculture, on which more than four fifths of the population is living. Agriculture in Ethiopia accounts for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of exports and more than 80% of total employment. Ethiopia has one of the lowest export rates in the world, with coffee being its dominant export crop, while leather and qat [khat] are important as well. These features of the economy make it extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and fluctuation in international commodity (coffee) prices (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.5</i>).</p> <p>The economy of Ethiopia, relying heavily on low productivity agriculture (with more than four fifths of the population depending on it), is extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and fluctuations in international commodity (coffee) prices. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.5</i>).</p> <p>Dans la sous-région UEMOA, la détérioration des exportations en proportion du PIB, que l'on peut attribuer à la détérioration des exportations de coton du Mali et à la baisse des prix à l'exportation du cacao de la Côte d'Ivoire, a conduit à en un déficit croissant de la balance courante de cette sous-région. (<i>Source : WAF RSP 2008-2013 p.14</i>).</p>
Cotton	<p>The 1970s oil crisis led to a price boom which was followed by a general downward trend in the 1980s. The decline of the 1980s was triggered by a change in U.S. commodity policy and by China's policies increasing domestic production.</p> <p>The degree of price volatility has changed over the past 40 years. Volatility became very important between 1973 and 1984. From 1985 to 1992, price variability reduced by half but still remained significant.</p> <p>The cotton price increase of 2007-2008 has not been as important as the general commodity price boom but was still larger than the agricultural raw materials price increase. This is explained by a less important linkage of cotton to food and fuel prices than other commodities.</p> <p>World prices are also affected by movements of the U.S. dollar since world cotton prices are expressed in dollars (as are most commodities). The price decline in the end of the 1990s and early 2000s is partly due to the increase in the U.S. dollar strength after the East Asian financial crisis. Similarly, the weakness of the U.S dollar in the mid-2000s contributed to the commodity price increase.</p> <p>In CFA countries, the local currency is pegged to the Euro (to the French Franc before 2000) and is therefore dependant on exchange rate variations between the Euro and the Dollar. Devaluations of the Euro compared to the Dollar make CFA exporters more competitive.</p> <p>An important factor contributing to world prices is the subsidies granted to cotton producers, mainly in the United States. These subsidies are estimated to depress world prices by approximately 10 to 15 percent.</p> <p><i>Source: Cotton Product Fiche</i></p>
CR	<p>Commission's strategy and programming documents for the Caribbean Region did not include reference to product specific issues having affected products' prices over time.</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007 European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>Much of the current crisis in the Caribbean <b>banana industry</b> is attributed to the WTO ruling against the European Union's banana regime. There is no doubt that the decision will have a major impact on the economies of the region and in particular the smaller islands. However, there was a gradual overall decline in production throughout the 1990s in all Caribbean countries with the exception of Belize. The EU's "New Banana Regime (NBR)" that came into force in 1993 without a doubt contributed to this decline, for example banana production in the Windward Islands dropped from 272,000 tonnes in 1992 to 135,000 in 1997. The slightly improved market opportunities for non-ACP countries that the NBR permitted, the periods of prices decline, and tighter quality requirements in a unified (EU) market place, were all factors that put considerable pressure on Caribbean producers<sup>19</sup>. This situation was further compounded by natural disasters in the region. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.11</i>).</p> <p>The <b>sugar sector</b> is also facing pressures similar to those in the banana industry. They all point to the need</p>

	<p>for re-structuring, diversification and technological development. In addition, it should be noted that these reforms have to be conducted <i>within the Caribbean Context</i> that provides limited opportunities for economies of scale in the sectors under threat. This situation is seen in the region as being further exacerbated by the EU's decision to implement unilaterally its Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative that opened its markets to imports from the forty-eight poorest countries. There have been and remain fears in the Caribbean that the EBA decision will result in the destruction of the sugar and rice industries and cause serious damage to the Caribbean rum industry's prospects for competing in the European market. It is also argued that the EBA has <i>de facto</i> undermined the Cotonou Agreement and the plan to phase out of preferences before the end of the Agreement<sup>20</sup>. The recent adaptations of the Common Agricultural Policy and their likely consequences in terms of guarantees to Caribbean exporters is felt to be a major threat by some Caribbean countries. (Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.12).</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>Without being specific to certain products, the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 Regional Strategy Paper states that most countries of the region attempt to promote food self-sufficiency by placing restrictions on exports of staple crops. These restrictions drive the price of the concerned commodities down and make food export markets uncertain, which in turn reduces the food security of the region. Although this doesn't concern the majority of the commodities subject to the evaluation, it could be considered relevant for rice. Source: <i>Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 20</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>One of the major reasons for the level of poverty is the high dependency of the economy on low productivity agriculture, on which more than four fifths of the population is living. Agriculture in Ethiopia accounts for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of exports and more than 80% of total employment. Ethiopia has one of the lowest export rates in the world, with coffee being its dominant export crop, while leather and qat [khat] are important as well. These features of the economy make it extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and fluctuation in international commodity (coffee) prices (Source: <i>ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.5</i>).</p> <p>The economy, relying heavily on low productivity agriculture (with more than four fifths of the population depending on it), is extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and fluctuations in international commodity (coffee) prices. (Source: <i>ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p i</i>).</p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The farmgate price for cocoa is fixed at the beginning of the growing season (October). It is the outcome of discussions at a Producer Price Committee It is a national price. The price to farmers has increased from about 40% of world price in the 1980's to 73% in 2011 (that is in percent of the world price net of the cost of services provided by Cocobod – spraying with pesticides, fertiliser distribution...) Source: <i>MN123, FMO 1992-1993</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The role of Cote d'Ivoire outbreak of disease: 'Global cocoa prices have risen steadily from US\$2,218/tonne in January 2008 to \$3525/tonne in January 2010 (i.e. by 59%). Although price levels had fallen back to \$2910/tonne by November 2010, continued robust performance is expected over the near term, partly because Cote d'Ivoire, the world largest producer, is expecting about 100,000 tonnes less cocoa in 2010 – 2011 because of black pod disease.' (page 18, MTE, 2011) Source: <i>CSSP II MTE, 2011</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>No such information is available in Ghana's CSPs/NIPs</p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>No such information is available in the CSPs/NIPs.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les prix du litchi sont plutôt volatiles (entre 0,58 et 0,98 USD/kg au cours des 10 dernières années) et dépendent grandement de phasage de la récolte avec les fêtes de Noël en fonction des conditions climatiques de l'année. Source : <i>Délégation de l'UE à Madagascar, Rapport sur les exportations en 2009</i></p>



<b>MG</b>	<p>Le marché du girofle a traversé les phases suivantes :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Entre le début des années 1970 et la fin des années 1980, <u>triplement de la production indonésienne</u> sous l'effet des programmes d'appui à la plantation menés dans les années 1960<sup>3</sup> pour réduire la dépendance du pays vis-à-vis des importations.</li> <li>• De 1991 à 1998, monopole sur le marché indonésien du Cloves Trading and Trading Board (BPPC) qui, imposant de bas prix aux producteurs de l'archipel, a pu maintenir les cours à un <u>bas niveau</u> sur le marché international, freinant le développement de la concurrence.</li> <li>• Chute de la production indonésienne durant la seconde moitié de la décennie 1990 due à la désaffectation des planteurs et entraînant une <u>forte augmentation des cours</u>, et une flambée en 2001 et 2002</li> <li>• Depuis 2005, alors que la production indonésienne se maintient autour de 75.000 t/an et la production mondiale autour de 100.000 t, le cours de la qualité standard connaît une tendance haussière continue.</li> <li>• La <u>qualité prima</u> est constituée des plus grands et plus beaux clous, sélectionnés à la main après le séchage<sup>4</sup>. Elle bénéficie d'une prime importante, de plus de 2.500 \$ EU/t et est principalement destinée au marché de détail américain et européen, qui représente un marché étroit (de l'ordre du pourcent par rapport aux échanges internationaux).</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : Délégation de l'UE à Madagascar, Note filière girofle</i></p>
<b>MG Rice</b>	<p>La manifestation la plus visible de la situation du marché du riz en 2004 et début 2005 est une augmentation sans précédent sur plus de 10 ans des prix de détail.</p> <p>Les causes de cette crise sont une conjonction de plusieurs facteurs, internes et externes ; physiques, monétaires et politiques :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2 cyclones début 2004 : pertes de récoltes rizicoles estimées à 150.000 ha (362.000 t de paddy / 250.000 t de riz),</li> <li>• Erosion du Franc malgache et inflation monétaire (l'US\$ s'échange contre 6.021 Fmg en décembre 2003, 11438 Fmg en juin 2004),</li> <li>• Renchérissement des importations de riz (le thaï<sup>25</sup> est à 176 US\$/t FOB en moyenne 2003, 224 US\$ en juillet 2004 et 269 US\$ fin mars 2005) et du carburant,</li> <li>• Une mauvaise connaissance de la production et des besoins en riz, non spécifique à 2004, mais qui pourrait avoir joué l'effet d'amplificateur des facteurs précédents.</li> </ul> <p><i>M.H.Dabat, Diagnostic du marché du riz à Madagascar en 2004 et début 2005</i></p>
<b>MG Vanilla</b>	<p>Les cours peuvent être fortement affectés par les rumeurs concernant les perspectives de production ou l'importance des stocks, comme en 2001-2003 où le prix de la vanille à Madagascar a pu atteindre 500 \$ EU/kg soit plus de 10 fois le cours pratiqué dans les années 1990.</p> <p>Depuis 2005, les cours ont renoué avec leur plus bas niveau historique.</p> <p>Les 4 concurrents de Madagascar ont une stratégie offensive d'alignement en dessous des prix malgaches, leur permettant de gagner des parts de marchés sur le segment « commodité ».</p> <p>Les origines « gourmet » bénéficient d'une prime importante, la vanille polynésienne étant positionnée au sommet de la gamme, à plus de 200 \$ EU/kg FOB.</p>

<sup>3</sup> Le giroflier atteint sa pleine production au bout de 20 ans

<sup>4</sup> Elle correspond à la catégorie CG1 de la norme malgache (1950). Celle-ci fixe un poids minimal de 7 cg/clou. La référence pour cette catégorie est toutefois la catégorie "hand picked" du Sri Lanka, basée sur la taille des clous (moins de 1% de la masse constituée de clous inférieurs à 1 cm). Le projet de révision de la norme malgache (janv. 2010) propose une harmonisation des spécifications malgaches avec les normes internationales.

	<p>Depuis 2005, avec le retour de conditions climatiques favorables, une forte reprise de la production, dopée par l'entrée en production des plantations réalisées dans le cadre des programmes STABEX (2.800 ha de plantations intensives et semi-intensives réalisés entre 1997 et 2001), entraînant un effondrement des prix dès la campagne 2004/05. Ces conditions ont encouragé une reprise en force des exportations, à un niveau jamais atteint par la passé. Au terme des campagnes 2006/07 et 2007/08, il était estimé que, pour se prémunir d'une nouvelle envolée des prix, les opérateurs se sont constitués un stock de l'ordre de 2.000 t de vanille, représentant une année de consommation. Depuis 2008, les prévisions de baisse de la production sont systématiquement démenties par les résultats de la production. Ces pronostics, qui pourraient être exagérés afin d'influer sur les prix, se basent sur la possibilité d'un désintérêt des planteurs pour la culture et de la propagation de la fusariose et du phytophthora favorisée par l'épuisement des lianes intensément pollinisées et le moindre entretien des plantations. <i>Source : Délégation de l'UE à Madagascar, Note filière Vanille</i></p>
<b>MG Vanilla</b>	<p>Les cours élevés de la vanille pendant les années 2001-2004, supérieurs à 100 USD/kg, ont incité des pays concurrents à se lancer dans la production, amenant ainsi les exportations mondiales de 2 200 à 3 800 t/an entre 1999-2004 et 2005-2008. Cette hausse s'est accompagnée d'un effondrement des cours en dessous de 30 USD/kg. Même si les industriels reviennent à la vanille naturelle après avoir fortement réduit leur demande (moins 40% en 2005), le bas prix de la vanille depuis cinq ans les a incités à se constituer des stocks qui ont lourdement pesé sur la demande mondiale en 2009. <i>Source : Délégation de l'UE à Madagascar, Rapport sur les exportations en 2009</i></p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Mali states that the fall of cotton prices, the rise of oil prices and the Dollar/Euro parity have pulled producer prices down since 1999. It also states that US and EU subsidies affect world cotton prices <i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 20 &amp; 24</i></p>
<b>Overall</b>	<p>The overall downward trend is generally attributed to an increase in production and productivity that was larger than the increase in demand. The short term variability is generally linked the inelastic response of supply or demand to exceptional climatic conditions or political situations and choices, which influence individual commodities differently</p> <p>According to a World Bank study, the price hike in the 2000s has been fuelled by numerous factors, such as sustained economic growth, low past investment in extractive commodities, a weak dollar, fiscal expansion and a lax monetary policy in many countries and investment fund activities. Adverse weather conditions, diversion of food commodities to bio-fuel production and policies such as export bans and prohibitive taxes brought all contributed to the price culmination in 2008 although the weight of their contribution remains subject to debate.</p> <p>Future developments of the agricultural commodity markets are unknown and although price decline may no longer be the main current issue, price variability remains.</p> <p><i>Sources: FAO, Consultation on agricultural commodity price problems, <a href="http://www.fao.org/righttofood/ke/downloads/vi/docs/Consultation%20on%20agricultural%20commodity%20price%20problems.pdf">http://www.fao.org/righttofood/ke/downloads/vi/docs/Consultation%20on%20agricultural%20commodity%20price%20problems.pdf</a> online December 8 2010, page 22; World Bank, <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/prospects/placing-the-200608-commodity-price-boom-into-perspective-online-December-8-2010">http://blogs.worldbank.org/prospects/placing-the-200608-commodity-price-boom-into-perspective-online-December-8-2010</a>.</i></p> <p>It has been argued that apart from short term price volatility and long-term price decline, producers have suffered squeezed shares of the final sales value of commodities due to the increasing imbalance of market powers between them and the processors and other intermediaries and retailers (Action Aid, 2008). This market concentration, working to the expense of the producer, is held responsible for the impoverishment of commodity producers. Action Aid (2008) claims that market concentration is particularly high for foodstuffs 'where trade with multinationals accounts for about 60% of global trade. For example, four multinational corporations control over 60% of the global coffee market. Similarly three companies handle 50% of world trade in bananas and, four multinational companies control 95% of coca processing in Côte d'Ivoire. (...) In addition the number of vertically-integrated large supermarket chains, as well as their share in the retail foodstuffs, has been increasing spectacularly in developing countries.' (Action Aid, p9). According to Action Aid, agricultural commodities short term price volatility has been exacerbated by the liberalisation of the marketing agencies: international commodity</p>

	<p>organisations and national commodity boards used to stabilise (at a cost) and also used to provide trading outlets and extension services. Other factors influencing short term price volatility include: low responsiveness of demand and supply of commodities to price changes, fluctuations in exchange rates and interest rates; business cycles in consuming countries. Factors causing long term price decline are identified as the abolishment of market intervention by state trading enterprises and international commodity organisations, increased productivity and trade distortions.</p> <p>In 2003, the UN Secretary General notes that ‘(...). <i>In some cases price volatility has been caused by excessively optimistic advice to producers on potential market growth, procyclical producer response to price volatility, or from disruptions due to domestic conflicts.</i>’ (p.24 UN SG 2003)</p> <p>Sources: <i>Action Aid, Commodity dependence and development, Suggestions to tackle the commodities problems, South Centre, April 2008.</i>  <i>Implementation of and follow-up to commitments and agreements made at the International Conference on Financing for Development, UN General Assembly, 58th session, 5th August 2003.</i></p>
<b>Overall Coton</b>	<p>Quelques aspects spécifiques ont affectés les prix du coton au cours des 10 dernières années :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Des progrès technologiques conduisant à une diminution des coûts de production du coton et poussant à la baisse les cours mondiaux. En particulier, il faut mentionner le coton génétiquement modifié, qui est passé de 15% des superficies mondiales en 2000 à près de 55% en 2008/09.</li> <li>- La libéralisation du marché mondial des textiles, intervenue à l’OMC en janvier 2005, a donné une forte impulsion à l’industrie textile chinoise ce qui s’est traduit par une importante progression de la Chine dans la consommation mondiale de coton fibre.</li> <li>- Les subventions au coton accordées par de grands pays producteurs et exportateurs, en particulier les Etats-Unis (1<sup>er</sup> exportateur, 3<sup>ème</sup> producteur mondial). Ces subventions qui pèsent sur les cours mondiaux du coton sont toujours au cœur des négociations du cycle de Doha entamées en 2001 et non encore abouties</li> <li>- Le très fort développement du coton en Inde, devenue en quelques années second producteur mondial de coton derrière la Chine et 2<sup>ème</sup> exportateur après les Etats-Unis</li> <li>- En Afrique, la dépréciation du dollar face à l’Euro/FCFA a pénalisé le coton africain produit dans la zone FCFA où l’on trouve les plus grands pays producteurs africains. En effet, un long mouvement de dépréciation du dollar par rapport à l’Euro/FCFA s’est enclenché dans le courant de 2002 pour atteindre un point bas en juillet 2008 où on ne recevait plus en moyenne que 416 FCFA pour 1 USD, soit 45% de moins que lors des plus hauts de 2002 (1 USD = 753 FCFA en février 2002). D’août 2008 à mars 2011, la dépréciation du dollar s’est un peu atténuée pour se situer en moyenne à 482 FCFA pour 1 USD.</li> </ul> <p>Sources: <i>Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, juin 2010 et mai 2011. Le coton dans le monde, place du coton africain et principaux enjeux, Berti et al., 2006</i></p>
<b>Rice</b>	<p>Given the restricted nature of the rice markets (only 6 percent of produced rice is subject to international trade) the international prices of rice are very volatile compared to those of the other main staple crops (wheat and maize). The price surges are always higher for rice than for agricultural commodities. Prices have been characterized by a downward trend between 1982 and 2002. This decrease has been attributed to high levels of stocks and exportable surpluses, mainly in Asian countries. Given the fact that a significant amount of producing countries is practically self-sufficient, they can be exporters or importers depending on the world prices.</p> <p>The price volatility throughout the years is attributed to the high susceptibility of rice production to climate risks and to changes in trade policies by the main producing countries.</p> <p>The price surge during the food crisis of 2007-2008 has been attributed to various factors (world population growth and increased demand for resource-intensive food, the increase of oil prices and its impact on increasing input costs and on diversion to biofuel production, declining stocks, financial speculation, export restriction policies, biofuel subsidies, natural disasters such as droughts in Australia, etc.)</p>

	<p>Yet recent studies have showed that rice stocks were higher than in the years preceding the crisis and that production was on the rise. The price surge would therefore have been due to policies (such as export restrictions from India and Vietnam) rather than to market fundamentals. <i>Source: Rice product fiche</i></p>
<b>Rum</b>	<p>Table 2b illustrates that the <b>sugar sector</b> is also facing pressures similar to those in the banana industry. They all point to the need for re-structuring, diversification and technological development. In addition, it should be noted that these reforms have to be conducted <i>within the Caribbean Context</i> that provides limited opportunities for economies of scale in the sectors under threat. This situation is seen in the region as being further exacerbated by the EU's decision to implement unilaterally its Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative that opened its markets to imports from the forty-eight poorest countries. There have been and remain fears in the Caribbean that the EBA decision will result in the destruction of the sugar and rice industries and cause serious damage to the <b>Caribbean rum industry's</b> prospects for competing in the European market. It is also argued that the EBA has <i>de facto</i> undermined the Cotonou Agreement and the plan to phase out of preferences before the end of the Agreement<sup>20</sup>. The recent adaptations of the Common Agricultural Policy and their likely consequences in terms of guarantees to Caribbean exporters is felt to be a major threat by some Caribbean countries. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.12</i>).</p>
<b>SUG</b>	<p>The <b>sugar sector</b> is facing pressures similar to those in the banana industry. They all point to the need for re-structuring, diversification and technological development. In addition, it should be noted that these reforms have to be conducted <i>within the Caribbean Context</i> that provides limited opportunities for economies of scale in the sectors under threat. This situation is seen in the region as being further exacerbated by the EU's decision to implement unilaterally its Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative that opened its markets to imports from the forty-eight poorest countries. There have been and remain fears in the Caribbean that the EBA decision will result in the destruction of the sugar and rice industries and cause serious damage to the Caribbean rum industry's prospects for competing in the European market. It is also argued that the EBA has <i>de facto</i> undermined the Cotonou Agreement and the plan to phase out of preferences before the end of the Agreement<sup>20</sup>. The recent adaptations of the Common Agricultural Policy and their likely consequences in terms of guarantees to Caribbean exporters is felt to be a major threat by some Caribbean countries. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.12</i>).</p>
<b>Tea</b>	<p>The tea markets are quite different from the other beverage markets (cocoa and coffee) for three reasons. First of all, tea (both fresh and processed) is a perishable commodity. Tea stocks are therefore insignificant and play no role on the international level.</p> <p>Second, there is no referential international tea market that fixes a common world price. Third, most tea (84 percent) is sold by auctioning on domestic markets. The rest is sold through direct contracts.</p> <p>The general downward trend of tea prices is attributed to a growth of supply facing a stagnating demand. Competition in production is high and countries have invested considerable amounts in developing tea production, which doesn't encourage them to leave the markets.</p> <p>The amplitude of the global volatility of tea prices is less important than for the other beverages. Several explanations have been suggested for this: tea exports are less dominated by single major countries (such as Brazil for coffee and Côte d'Ivoire for cocoa) and therefore weather and diseases cannot affect world prices as much, tea markets are not subject to speculation and vertical integration in consumer countries contribute to stabilize prices at a low level. Yet the variability has been increasing since the 1970s.</p> <p>The prices seem yet to follow a cycle of approximately 7 years alternating price peaks followed by slower decreases. According to Oxfam International, these cycles could be attributed to exchange rates fluctuations and variations in demand<sup>5</sup>. Yet an FAO report states that supply shocks also play an important role. The price surges of 1976 and 1984 can be linked to the oil price peaks driving all commodity prices up, with the response of tea supply appearing with a certain delay since it is a perennial crop. The steady increase since 2006 would be due to a worldwide demand increase (particularly in emerging economies), followed by civil disturbances in Kenya and prolonged droughts in Kenya, Sri Lanka and India tightening global supply. The</p>

<sup>5</sup> Source : Oxfam international <http://www.maketrade-fair.com/assets/english/TeaMarket.pdf> online July 22 2010

	global increase in commodity demand (favoured by the weak US dollar and the expansionary credit policies in most OECD countries leading to increased speculation on commodity markets) drove tea prices up as well. <i>Source: Tea Product Fiche</i>
<b>TZ</b>	In Tanzania, the liberalisation/adjustment policies pursued since the mid-1990s also extended to the market institutions for major export crops (coffee, cashews, cotton, tea and tobacco) resulting in producers receiving a higher share of the export price, increasing from an average of 54 percent during 1988-94 to 63 percent during 1994-99. <i>Source: ASDP</i>
<b>J.1.3</b>	<b><i>The Commission has adapted its support to CDDCs to the constraints revealed by long term price decline and short term price volatility</i></b>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Deux instruments spécifiques ont été définis pour adresser la tendance baissière du prix du coton:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– STABEX: amélioration de la compétitivité (infrastructures, études et formation) et réponse partielle à la crise financière du secteur (études et apurement de dettes). Toutefois, il n’y a pas d’évidence d’un suivi/évaluation de l’utilisation du STABEX</li> <li>– Plus récemment, le FLEX: mais qui est utilisé sous forme d’appui budgétaire</li> </ul> <p>Les interventions de la Commission sont surtout orientées vers l’amélioration de la compétitivité, le déclin des prix à long terme du coton dans un environnement de plus en plus concurrentiel, en renforçant l’urgence. En plus de celles du STABEX :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– PAFFIC (sous FED): recapitalisation de la part des producteurs (UNPCB) dans les sociétés cotonnières, liée à une stratégie de sortie de crise</li> <li>– Amélioration de la fertilité des sols en coton biologique (sous ligne Food)</li> <li>– Appui à l’Université du coton (sous FED/PIR)</li> <li>– Programme Tous ACP: Développement de la chaîne de valeur orientée vers le marché (ITC), prévention de la contamination du coton (CFC/ IFDC/BM), Bonnes pratiques agricoles (BPA)/ Gestion Intégrée de la Production et des Déprédateurs(GIPD) (FAO), standardisation de la mesure expérimentale du coton (CFC)</li> </ul> <p>La problématique de la volatilité des prix du coton n’a pas été appuyée par la Commission. Toutefois, plus récemment (2010), dans le cadre du programme tous ACP, des appuis mis en œuvre par la Banque mondiale (ARMT) se sont orientés vers la problématique de la variabilité des prix dans une approche globale de la gestion des risques de la filière coton du BF (prix, climat...)</p>
<b>CM cocoa coffee</b>	Historiquement, à travers le système Stabex la Commission avait mis en place un système de compensation des baisses de recettes d’exportation (au Cameroun, principalement pour café et cacao). Ce système dont le mécanisme déclencheur a été clôturé en 2000 a encore donné lieu à des interventions au cours de la période 2000-2010 très approximativement plus de 46M€ aux produits agricoles et leurs filières au sens large (routes, développement rural...). Le STABEX sera supprimé après la conclusion des accords de partenariats économiques régionaux, en 2008. Le Flex n’est pas mobilisé au Cameroun.
<b>GH Overall</b>	The Commission’s support to the Ghana agricultural commodities sectors has been through the continuation of support to the cocoa sector (started in the 1980s with Stabex funding) and to rural/feeder roads rehabilitation. In total over the period under review, some € 61.7 m have been spent in the sector (out of €77m decided), with more than half of this having been funded from Stabex transfers and the remainder having been decided after 2004 on the 9 <sup>th</sup> and 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF; the majority of these funds (€ 45 m) have been used for feeder roads rehabilitation (transport being one of the EC’s focal sectors of intervention). The support directly benefiting the cocoa sector has been directed towards increasing its competitiveness in the face of an ageing and diseased tree population.
<b>MG vanilla coffee</b>	<p>A travers les projets Stabex la Commission a apporté une aide importante au développement des produits agricoles d’exportation (café, vanille, litchis, girofle).</p> <p>L’appui de la Commission, initialement centré sur la production, s’est progressivement étendu à l’ensemble des filières, incluant la commercialisation.</p>

<b>TZ</b>	<p>In Tanzania no evidence was found that the Commission monitored or otherwise followed the developments of commodity prices and markets and their impact upon CDDCs. On the contrary, the pricing issue of the crops supported through Stabex funding (tea, cotton and foremost coffee) seems to have been absent from policy discussions. Interviews confirmed that the price issue has not been a focus of attention.</p> <p>Tanzania has benefited from both STABEX and AMSP funds during 2000-2009: both funds were used in the initiating sectors (coffee, tea, cotton, sugar). None of the funds were used with the specific aim to counter price decline and/or variability. The funds were used mainly in providing research infrastructure (tea, cotton, coffee, sugar).</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The EC supported the GoU agricultural strategy (PMA), which benefited among others crops to agricultural commodities, of which coffee.</p> <p>The EC support to PMA focussed on research and extension with a view of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Un instrument spécifique a été mis en œuvre pour adresser la tendance baissière du prix du cacao: le STABEX 1998 Cacao en fèves. Il a servi à réhabiliter la Big Bay Road à Santo (157,090 €, plus intérêts). Il n'y a pas de rapports de monitoring et d'évaluation des fonds Stabex disponibles pour le Vanuatu.</p>
<b>I.1.3.1</b>	<p>Evidence (reports, publications, internal notes) that the Commission has monitored agricultural commodities price and market developments and analysed their impact upon CDDCs</p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The financial agreement provides lessons learnt about the commodity income declines and fluctuations through international price regulation and supply-side management. <i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP) was established as a response to the evolution of the EU market requirements. Since the EU had established new regulations concerning pesticide maximum residue limits, support was given for ACP countries to adapt production in order to comply with the new regulations. The EU had indeed foreseen that the new regulations would imply progressive European market share loss for ACP countries.</p> <p>There is also evidence that the market shares of ACP countries in the EU for fruit and vegetables have been monitored (see tables below).</p>

Tableau 13: analyse des parts de marché en Europe des pays ACP en 2001

	légumes	bananes	agrumes	ananas	autres fruits tropicaux	autres fruits	total	total hors banane et agrumes
Valeur (1000 Euros)								
exportation ACP vers EUR 15	142 137	472 337	280 081	149 263	101 579	474 041	1 619 438	867 020
(hors Afrique du Sud)	133 809	472 326	48 283	145 189	83 366	8 752	891 725	371 116
importations européennes (EUR 15)	1228299	1 936 463	819 464	275 742	697 258	3 857 285	8 814 511	6 058 584
part de marché ACP (hors Afr. Sud)	11%	24%	6%	53%	12%	0%	10%	6,1%
Volume (tonnes)								
exportation ACP vers EUR 15	74 449	731 385	471 954	215 585	71 018	387 619	1 952 010	748 671
(hors Afrique du Sud)	64 185	731 381	77 573	210 615	57 295	3 552	1 144 601	335 647
importations européennes (EUR 15)	1 510 383	3 237 000	1 443 000	365 405	409 595	2 600 617	9 566 000	4 886 000
part de marché ACP (hors Afr. Sud)	4%	23%	5%	58%	14%	0%	12%	7%

Source: COLEACP (sur base Eurostat)

Tableau 14: analyse des parts de marché en Europe des pays ACP en 2006

	légumes	bananes	agrumes	ananas	autres fruits tropicaux	autres fruits	total	total hors banane
Valeur (1000 Euros)								
exportation ACP vers EUR 15	304 571	566 882	279 271	115 116	147 256	655 236	2 068 332	1 222 179
(hors Afrique du Sud)	289 674	566 757	24 515	109 798	84 218	50 991	1 125 953	534 681
importations européennes (EUR 15)	1 675 734	2 448 608	1 026 134	523 383	584 569	5 884 393	12 142 821	8 668 079
part de marché ACP (hors Afr. Sud)	17%	23%	2%	21%	14%	1%	9%	6,2%
VOLUME (tonnes)								
exportation ACP vers EUR 15	144 787	906 508	496 296	150 146	124 376	485 260	2 307 373	904 569
(hors Afrique du Sud)	130 086	906 480	44 994	146 747	83 637	23 967	1 335 911	384 437
importations européennes (EUR 15)	2 028 842	4 150 309	1 738 496	764 814	476 822	3 572 369	12 731 652	6 842 847
part de marché ACP (hors Afr. Sud)	6%	22%	3%	19%	18%	1%	10%	6%

Source: COLEACP (sur base Eurostat)

Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages i &amp; 95

<b>BAN</b>	<p>The Impact Evaluation of the SFA mentions EU papers as source for certain data tables (data on prices, export quantities...).</p> <p>Example: EUBSP (Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country reports, htspe, 2008, p 15)</p> <p>The previous evaluations of the SFA contracted by the EC are also proofs of monitoring of the banana market developments and their impacts on CDDCs.</p> <p>Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, htspe, 2008.</li> <li>▪ Evaluation of the CMO in bananas, COGEA, 2005</li> </ul>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Burkina Faso's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions an unfavourable international context for the country's economy: high oil prices, the depreciation of the dollar compared to the euro (and therefore to the CFA franc, which is pegged to the euro) and the fall of cotton prices on international markets. <i>Source: 2008-2013 Burkina Faso CSP/NIP, page 50</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>D'après le staff en place actuellement à la Délégation de l'UE, il n'y a pas de rapports de monitoring et d'évaluation de l'utilisation des fonds STABEX disponibles à la Délégation de l'UE au Burkina Faso. Tous les éléments disponibles sur les fonds STABEX au Burkina Faso (budget, courrier d'échange entre le Gouvernement et la Délégation, types d'intervention) ont été portés à la connaissance des consultants. <i>Source : MN 572</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's strategy and programming documents did not evidence a monitoring by the Commission of agricultural commodities price and market developments or an analysis of their impact on Cameroon. The 2007-2013 CSP however mentioned, as revealed by the surveys realised for the PRSP, the negative impact of price fluctuations on the revenues of producers: "En milieu rural, l'évolution des revenus est étroitement liée aux productions agricoles de rente, à l'offre et au prix des produits vivriers. Le comportement des prix de ces facteurs a conduit à des revenus en baisse, ou tout au plus stables, pour les producteurs de coton, de cacao et de café et en hausse pour les producteurs</p>

	<p><i>d'huile de palme et de produits vivriers. »</i></p> <p><i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, page 10</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents briefly present in the regional diagnosis made elements related to agricultural commodities prices and market developments (see JC 1.1 and JC 1.2) but this cannot be considered as a monitoring. They do not refer to reports/publications presenting such analyses.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i>      Data on the direction of exports and imports lack consistency and are scant. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.6</i>).</p>
<b>ESAI0</b>	<p>The Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 Regional Strategy Paper states that mentions the impact of export-restricting food policies for staple crops, as well as the fact that “<i>Fast population growth also contributes to higher food insecurity, and the recent hikes in food prices have made the situation worse for net food importers</i>”.</p> <p>There is no information on where the statement comes from (if it's from Commission studies or not).  <i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 20</i></p>
<b>MG coffee vanilla</b>	<p>Oui. La Délégation a produit différentes notes d'analyses (assez concises mais précises) avec focus sur offre et demande au niveau mondial, échanges et cours internationaux, production et exportations malgache + perspectives :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rapport sur les exportations du secteur agriculture – élevage - pêche en 2009</li> <li>▪ La filière café septembre 2008</li> <li>▪ Note filières, Girofle, juin 2010</li> <li>▪ Note filières, Vanille, juin 2010</li> </ul>
<b>Overall</b>	<p>The Commission's DEV doesn't monitor prices and its impact. The DG Agri monitors agricultural commodities prices (and sometimes sends the information to DEV) and the FAO monitors prices (and the ICBs for commodities, IFPRI for food). The statement in the COM relative to the monitoring of prices and their impact was to underline the commitment to these issues.</p> <p>It is expected that prices are monitored at Delegation level.  <i>Source: MN912</i></p> <p>The EC doesn't have its own price monitoring system. Other organisations (World Bank, Interational Commodity Boards and the IFPRI) are more equipped for it and do it well. In the Commission, the DG Agri regularly analyses agricultural prices and sometimes transfers the information to the DG Dev.  <i>Source: MN 912</i></p>
<b>Overall Coton</b>	<p>Dans le cadre du Partenariat UE-Afrique sur le coton / COS-coton, un suivi des de l'évolution des prix du coton, des évolutions du marché et leur impact sur les filières cotonnières africaines est régulièrement mis à jour, surtout depuis 2007, annuellement.</p> <p><i>Sources : Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, juin 2010 et mai 2011</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The 2002-2007 RSP/RIP mentions that the impacts of market price fluctuations have had strong impacts on PACPs because, since they are small countries, their economies are relatively undiversified and their international trade accounts for a large share of domestic economic activity.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 18</i></p>
<b>SUG</b>	<p>The National Adaptation Strategies produced by the SP countries assess (most frequently mechanically and summarily) the impact on the sugar industry of the planned 36% price reduction of sugar exports. Since these documents were produced prior to the termination of the Sugar Protocol, the impact of this decision</p>



	is not analysed.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	The Support project to strengthen commercial capacities of agricultural producers in Tanzania (SRM project) analysed agricultural commodity prices (e.g. ripe banana, maize) on rural markets in five regions of Tanzania as well as the financial performance of these markets. The Final Narrative report underlines that all the supported markets have seen their income increasing every year since 2004. <i>Source: Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, pages 16-19</i>
<b>UG coffee</b>	No. At commodity level, the lack of reliable statistical data is an impediment to an identification of the country's needs, problems and issues. However some donors (e.g. USDA) carry out reviews of value chains and the coffee organisation (UCDA) is producing monthly reports (Source: MN 313).
<b>UG</b>	The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that Uganda's coffee sector (its main agricultural export) has rebounded during the price increase of the 2000's. The 2002-2007 CSP/NIP states that despite adverse terms of trade (low coffee prices and high oil prices in the beginning of the 2000's), the economic performance of the country had been improving. <i>Sources: Uganda 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 11 ; 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 14</i>
<b>VU</b>	The CSP mentions that copra has been following a secular price decline. No more precisions on the subject. <i>Source: Vanuatu 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 9</i>
<b>I.1.3.2</b>	Setting up by the Commission of specific instruments to tackle constraints identified in CDDCs (STABEX, FLEX, BAM, AMSP, ...)
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	The Financial agreement of the AAACP programme mentions that instruments such as Stabex (EDF 7 and EDF 8) and Flex (EDF 9) were put in place to buffer ACP producers and/or countries against the worst effects of price and revenue volatility. However, although these instruments provided and continue to provide important resources to producing countries (and in the case of STABEX specifically to the sectors), their intended countercyclical effects, whether targeting producers or the national economies, have often been undermined by their speed of disbursement. <i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i>
<b>BAN</b>	With the modification of the CMO bananas and of the preferential banana trade provisions in 1998, the council adopted the SFA, as a support mechanism in 1999 (EC 856/1999). The SFA acted as a support mechanism to grant temporary technical and financial assistance to the 12 ACP traditional banana suppliers. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 1, htspc, 2008.</i>
<b>BAN</b>	Trade provisions affecting bananas have seen major revisions in 1993 <sup>6</sup> , 1998 <sup>7</sup> , 2001 <sup>8</sup> and 2009 <sup>9</sup> triggering the creation of new financial instruments by the European Commission to assist the countries affected in

<sup>6</sup> EC Regulation 404/93.

<sup>7</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas. This regulation cancelled the ACP's preferential access to the Community market agreed under the Lomé Conventions.

<sup>8</sup> In April 2001 a major reform of the banana import arrangements into the EU took place following a WTO ruling thus solving the "banana conflict" between the United States and the European Community. It entailed the phased replacement of the quota system by a tariff-only system (effective by 1 January 2006).

<sup>9</sup> COM(2010)101 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Banana Accompanying Measures: Supporting the Sustainable Adjustment of the Main ACP Banana-Exporting Countries to New Trade Realities. The BAM (a €190 million support package) was launched following WTO's ruling against the European Union's Common Market Organisation. (CMO) in December 2008: the EU had to rebind its banana tariff rate and negotiated, in December 2009, an agreement on bananas with Latin American banana exporting countries laying down a schedule for the reduction of the EU's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff on bananas. This affects the speed with which the preferential margin for ACP banana-exporting countries will be reduced over time (it does not affect the duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) access to the EU market by ACP banana exporters).

adapting to the new market circumstances. In 1994<sup>10</sup> the Commission introduced a special system of assistance (SSA running from 1994 to 1998) to assist ACP banana exporting countries to improve the competitiveness of their banana sectors and/or to diversify their economies into other sectors in order to reduce their dependence on bananas. In 1999, a Special Assistance Framework (SAF)<sup>11</sup> was set up to assist 12 traditional ACP suppliers of bananas<sup>12</sup> in adapting to the new market conditions for accessing the Community market. The SFA, designed to last for ten years, was followed in 2010 by the Banana Accompanying Measures (BAM).

Each year, the Commission fixes the maximum amount available to each supplier on the basis of the competitiveness gap observed and the scale of banana production of the country concerned, the total aid under the SFA reducing gradually by 15% each year. The total 1999-2005 allocations to all 12 countries covered by the SFA were of € 287 million; this banana budget line is managed by the Delegations.

#### Activities eligible for assistance

The SFA and BAM fund programmes that aim to improve competitiveness in the banana sector and/or to support diversification where improvement in the competitiveness of the sector is not sustainable. Specifically support is aimed at measures to:

- increase productivity without causing damage to the environment, or to improve quality, including phytosanitary measures (P2);
- adapt production, distribution or marketing methods, particularly in the context of the standards provided for in Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 (P5);
- establish producers' organisations which have as their objective the improvement of the marketing and competitiveness of their products (P2);
- develop systems of certifying environment-friendly production methods and fair trade (P6);
- develop a production and/or marketing strategy to meet the requirements of the market (P1);
- assist with training, market intelligence, the development of environment-friendly and fair production methods, and develop infrastructure (P5 and P6);
- support diversification where improvement in the competitiveness of the sector is not sustainable (P4).

The BAM furthermore specified that it will support programmes to address the broader impact of tariff reductions on employment, education and healthcare, land use and the environment.

Transfers under the Banana lines amounted to the following over the period 2000-2009:

<sup>10</sup> Council Regulation 2686/94 of 31 October 1994 and Budget Line B7-5023

<sup>11</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 856/1999 of 22 April 1999 setting up a Special Assistance Framework (SAF) and associated budget line. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1609/1999 of 22 July 1999 lays down the detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 856/1999. It specifies the deadlines, the methods for calculating the reference price, the reference quantities and the competitiveness gap. Requests for assistance must be based on a coherent long-term strategy for the banana sector. The programmes proposed must comply with that strategy and take the form of annual action plans. The funds allocated to countries that have not presented a request for assistance before the deadline are distributed to the other countries.

<sup>12</sup> Belize, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Madagascar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Somalia and Surinam.

Regions	Transfers in Euros	Major recipients	Transfers in Euros
Caribbean	208 139 045	Saint Lucia	57 643 762
Central Africa	30 673 575	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	36 633 140
West Africa	25 323 881	Jamaica	33 395 095
Eastern Africa	16 366 610	Cameroon	30 619 583
All ACP	642 710	Ivory Coast	20 893 951
Grand Total	281 145 821	Belize	19 028 727
		Suriname	14 958 070
		Dominica	13 876 807
		Somalia	13 431 766

Source: ADE Inventory based on CRIS

**BF**

Au Burkina Faso, les fonds **STABEX**, et plus récemment le **FLEX**, ont été utilisés par la Commission européenne pour soutenir, en partie, le secteur agricole et rural.

Les informations sur **l'utilisation des fonds STABEX**, qui ont pu être collectées auprès de la Délégation de l'Union européenne et de l'Etat burkinabé (Direction de la coopération), sont données ci-dessous. Il est important de noter que **l'information obtenue sur les fonds STABEX** telle qu'obtenues par la Délégation de l'Union européenne au Burkina Faso **n'est que partielle**. Toutes les informations relatives au fonds STABEX n'ont pas pu être obtenues faute de problèmes d'archivage et de méconnaissance des dossiers STABEX par le staff actuellement en place au niveau de la Délégation.

**Année 1999 (montant temporaire, en cours) :**

Convention de transfert Stabex Haricots – transfert/2/99/BK : 677 914 EUR. **Il n'y a aucune indication que ces fonds ont été dépensés pour soutenir la filière haricots fin des années 90/ début des années 2000.**

**Etat des transactions effectuées sur le STABEX - Année 2006 :**

1) Bénéficiaire : **Union Nationale des Producteurs de coton (UNPCB)/ Société de fibreset textiles (SOFITEX)** ; nature de l'intervention : Construction d'infrastructures (**coton**) ; montant au 6 avril 2006 : 157 M FCFA

2) Bénéficiaire : CNCA/ Société de fibres et textiles (SOFITEX) ; nature de l'intervention : **apurement de dettes des groupements de producteurs de coton** au 6 avril 2006 : 325 M FCFA

3) Bénéficiaire : Société de fibres et textiles (SOFITEX) ; nature de l'intervention : **formation des correspondants coton** : montant au 15/12/2006 : 50 ,4 M FCFA

**Liste des actions non clôturées au 31/07/2011**

1) **SOFITEX/ UNPCB** : Construction d'infrastructures de stockage et d'intérêt collectif pour les groupements et les Unions de producteurs de **coton** – engagement : 750 M FCFA (clôturé)

2) CNRST/INERA/FARAKOBA : production de **semences de base d'oléagineux** – engagement 12 M FCFA

3) CIDR : Phase d'autonomisation du réseau des Caisses villageoises d'épargne et de crédit de la Sissili et du Ziro – engagement : 243 709 000 FCFA (clôturé)

4) **SOFITEX** : formation des correspondants **coton** de la SOFITEX et typologie des exploitations agricoles en zone cotonnière – engagement 200 M FCFA (en apurement)

5) BOA/ APEGA: mise en place d'un **fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations de gomme arabique** – engagement : 10 M FCFA (clôturé)

6) BOA/ **Conseils des oléagineux** : mise en place d'un **fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations de gomme arabique** – engagement : 125 M FCFA (non clôturé)

7) **Promotion gomme arabique** : projet de promotion de la gomme arabique – paiement : 35 M FCFA (clôturé)

8) **CNCA/ SOFITEX** : Apurement partiel des dettes des groupements villageois (**filierè coton**) – paiement : 325 M FCFA (clôturé)

9) **HORUS** : Etudes **secteur coton** : 6 M FCFA (clôturé)

	<p>10) URCPSO : entre la Fédération des caisses populaires du Burkina Faso et le MEF sur le redressement de l'URCPSO – pas de paiement car le rapport d'audit manque</p> <p>11) Audit financier des fonds STABEX des 7<sup>ie</sup> et 8<sup>ie</sup> FED : paiement de 53.4 M FCFA (clôturé)</p> <p>12) Mission d'appui pour l'utilisation financière des fonds STABEX au Burkina Faso (7<sup>ie</sup> et 8<sup>ie</sup> FED) : engagement : 28,2 M FCFA (situation finale non disponible, à fournir par DG COOP).</p> <p>Au 31 juillet 2007, sur un montant total engagé de 2 milliards FCFA engagés (soit environ 3 M EUR), 1,7 milliards FCFA ont été dépensés (soit environ 2,6 M EUR). Selon le bilan arrêté à fin 2007, les fonds STABEX dépensés dans le secteur agricole ont été :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ d'environ 1.3 milliards FCFA (environ 1.8 M EUR) pour le secteur du coton (principalement pour : infrastructures de stockage et d'intérêt collectif, formation, apurement de dettes, études) ;</li> <li>▪ d'environ 45 M FCFA (environ 65 000 EUR) pour le secteur de la gomme arabique (mise en place d'un fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations et promotion de la gomme arabique) ;</li> <li>▪ d'environ 14 M FCFA (environ 21 000 EUR) pour le secteur des oléagineux (mise en place d'un fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations et production de semences de base).</li> </ul> <p>Par ailleurs, il apparait que sur la période 2008-2010 des ordonnancements dans le cadre des cadres d'obligations mutuelles STABEX été programmés au niveau de la DG Coopération du Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 2008 : un montant de 1,4 milliards FCFA ;</li> <li>▪ 2009 : un montant de 179 M FCFA ;</li> <li>▪ 2010 : un montant de 600 M FCFA.</li> </ul> <p>Sur base des documents reçus et des entrevues, aucune information n'est disponible sur la nature des activités prévues pour ces ordonnancements. En outre, aucun de ces montants ne semblent avoir été versés à l'Etat burkinabé.</p> <p>En ce qui concerne le <b>FLEX</b>, le montant alloué (9,42 M EUR) a été versé <b>sous forme d'appui budgétaire</b> à l'Etat burkinabé.</p> <p><i>Sources : Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, Direction de la Coopération et Délégation de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, 2011 ; Etat des transactions effectuées sur le Stabex, année 2006; COM STABEX 1994-1995, Liste des actions non clôturées au 31/07/2007 ; AIDCO-C7-Comptabilité administrative Stabex Haricots 1999, 2000.</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	Oui. Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cameroon has benefitted since 1990 of STABEX funds (€250m in total; the outstanding amounts from the “Cadres d'Obligations Mutuelles” 1998 have been implemented until 2010) and of the Banana EC budget line (B7-8710). The latter aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the sector on international markets with a view to prepare the liberalisation of the banana sector in 2006.</li> <li>▪ Cameroon has not benefited from the FLEX mechanism. Commission's interviewees reported that since 2006 price fluctuations have not been sufficiently important to trigger the mechanism. Moreover, the government of Cameroon submitted proposals that have been refused by the Commission: Cameroon being a low-middle income country having important gas revenues, there is some reluctance in supporting it.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, page 17 ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 16-17 ; MN 701</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	Yes, in the framework of the Commission's co-operation in the Caribbean, there are different instruments available: RIPs, NIPs, All ACP project, specific facilities (STABEX, SYSMIN), EIB credits, Commission's own budget lines. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>CR</b>	The 2003-2007 RSP evidences that the Commission used <b>STABEX and the Special Assistance</b>

	<p><b>Framework (SFA) in the banana sector</b> to increase productivity, to promote diversification and to mitigate social dislocation (“current financing stocks amount to €90m”).</p> <p>It further presents <b>data over the period 1975-2001</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Stabilisation of export earnings: (Stabex and Sysmin): €252m</li> <li>▪ SFA bananas: €132m</li> </ul> <p>The 2008-2013 RSP further specifies that the Caribbean Region benefitted from the <b>SFA for the banana sector and of the AMSP for sugar</b>: “<i>To enhance competitiveness and support the diversification of the banana sector, a Special Framework of Assistance (SFA) was established in 1999. By 2008, when the SFA will have run its course, the Caribbean will have received a total allocation of around €270 million, which is more than 73% of the total value of the SFA. The "Accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries" (AMSP) include actions to make the sugar industry more competitive, to bring about diversification and to mitigate the social effects of the changes in the trade regime, which entered into force on 28 February 2006 in six Caribbean countries (Jamaica, Belize, Barbados, Trinidad &amp; Tobago, St Kitts &amp; Nevis, and Guyana). Under the 2006 budget, sums amounting to €19.4 million, nearly 50% of the total funds were made available for the six Caribbean countries. Further Commission Decisions for the Financial Years 2007-2010 are expected before the end of 2007. The total amount for the Caribbean is then expected to be around €345 million for the period 2006-2010. After this period, and following a mid-term evaluation of the AMSP, there will be additional funds for the period 2011-2013.</i>”</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, page 12; European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, page 33</i></p> <p>Annex 8 describes the general framework and principles of the Commission’s co-operation in the Caribbean and the application of the different instruments available (RIPs, NIPs, All ACP project, specific facilities (STABEX, SYSMIN), EIB credits, Commission’s own budget lines) and reconstructs the theoretical logframes underlying the regional strategies of the successive EDFs starting from the 7<sup>th</sup>. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.6</i>).</p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>In 1996 the Commission signed with the EU an agreement which foresaw a complete liberalisation of access to the EU rum market. This agreement <i>de facto</i> eliminated the preferential access granted to ACP Caribbean countries. In the framework of negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement, the EC and ACP Caribbean countries signed a Declaration though which the EC committed itself to finance from EDF Funds measures aimed at improving the competitiveness of Caribbean rum.</p> <p>This commitment led to the Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector implemented between 2002 and 2010 with a budget of €70 million.</p>
<b>FLEX</b>	<p>After the Stabex scheme was stopped in 2000, the Commission introduced another non programmable fund, the FLEX mechanism<sup>13</sup>; it was introduced in the framework of EU ACP co-operation to assist governments facing sudden losses of revenues, generally linked to the performance of the external sector. The mechanism aims at safeguarding socio-economic reforms and policies that could be affected negatively as a result of a drop in export earnings. Contrary to the STABEX mechanism which was triggered by the drop in export earnings for each individual export commodity, FLEX is triggered by the overall drop in export earnings (all goods considered) compared to a reference basis<sup>14</sup>.</p>

<sup>13</sup> ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Article 68 and Annex II, Articles 8-11 revised by Decision No 2/2004 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 30 June 2004 on the revision of the terms and conditions of financing for short-term fluctuations in export earnings (Annex II to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou) (2004/647/EC) bringing down to 10% of losses either in goods or in agricultural commodities or mineral products and a 2% worsening of the public deficit; and revised again in 2008 by decision no 1/2008 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 13 June 2008 regarding the revision of the terms and conditions of financing for short-term fluctuations in export earnings (2008/494/EC) whereby the methods of calculation have been set so as to be less stringent.

<sup>14</sup> FLEX initially provided additional budgetary support to ACP countries that registered both a 10% loss in exports earnings (2% in the case of LDCs) and a 10% worsening of the programmed public deficit. Because these eligibility criteria proved to be too stringent (only 6 FLEX supports could be disbursed during 2000-2002 for a total amount of

	The FLEX mechanism disbursed €97 million over the period 2000-2009 in the form of BS.																				
<b>Food crisis</b>	A €200 million initiative (under the 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF from the reserve for unforeseen needs) was launched in late 2008 <sup>15</sup> , to respond to the social and macro-economic (and in particular budgetary) consequences of the unexpected and significant increase in world food prices since late 2007; this special Food crisis emergency fund was to benefit the 30 most affected ACP countries. The funds were disbursed to an amount of €93 million over the period 2000-2009 in the form of BS.																				
<b>Food Facility</b>	<p>Beyond the Food crisis emergency fund mentioned above (€200 million), the Commission also responded to high and volatile food prices by setting up a €1 billion Food Facility (FF) in December 2008<sup>16</sup> as a short-medium term cooperation instrument which takes its place between emergency assistance and long-term development cooperation. The FF is to be operational for a period of 3 years (2009-2011).</p> <p>The FF has three primary objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) encouraging a positive supply response from the agricultural sector;</li> <li>ii) responding rapidly so as to mitigate the negative effects of rising and volatile food prices; and,</li> <li>iii) strengthening the productive capacity and governance of the agricultural sector to enhance the sustainability of interventions.</li> </ul> <p>The FF supports three main types of activity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) measures to improve access to agricultural inputs and services;</li> <li>ii) other smaller-scale measures aimed at increasing agricultural production; and,</li> <li>iii) safety net measures which facilitate social transfers to vulnerable population groups.</li> </ul> <p>The FF was disbursed up to an amount of €486 millions over the period 2000-2009: disbursement is realised through International and Regional Organisations. The table below sets out the amounts allocated under the Food Facility to ACP countries over the period 2000-2009 (but including an amount for 'all countries' which may contain some non ACP beneficiary countries).</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="678 1283 1029 1659"> <thead> <tr> <th>Major recipients</th> <th>Transfers in Euros</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>All Countries</td> <td>90 637 668</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mozambique</td> <td>25 801 699</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ACP Countries</td> <td>25 013 310</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Madagascar</td> <td>17 723 905</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Haiti</td> <td>2 434 987</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Burkina Faso</td> <td>1 403 049</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Burundi</td> <td>462 902</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(blank)</td> <td>164 974 188</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Grand Total</td> <td>328 451 708</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Source: ADE Inventory based on CRIS</i></p>	Major recipients	Transfers in Euros	All Countries	90 637 668	Mozambique	25 801 699	ACP Countries	25 013 310	Madagascar	17 723 905	Haiti	2 434 987	Burkina Faso	1 403 049	Burundi	462 902	(blank)	164 974 188	Grand Total	328 451 708
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€ 35.65 million), the rules were revised and eased in 2004 and again in 2008 (the 2% loss replaced a 10% loss in earnings for all ACPs and the 10% benchmark on the worsening in the programmed public deficit was eliminated).

<sup>15</sup> Commission Decision (2008)6493 of 12th of November 2008: because the Communication was not found, no details can be provided on the type of activities and/or the requirements for eligibility for accessing these funds.

<sup>16</sup> Regulation (EC) No1337/2008 of 16 December 2008 (OJ L354, 31.12.2008 page 62)

<b>KE</b>	<p>The 2003-2007 CSP/NIP mentions that Kenya has qualified for a transfer under the STABEX system for loss of earnings in coffee and tea for the year of application 1999. The total amount of the transfer was € 47,841,888 (plus interest). These funds were utilised in targeted budget support benefiting areas where export losses were originated. Previous Stabex transfers have been allocated for the development of key foreign exchange earning-productive agricultural sub-sectors, diversification and improvement of the general economic environment. Existing balances not yet allocated will be used in line with the general objectives of Stabex and according to the priorities defined in the CSP. <i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 25</i></p> <p>Stabex funds have been used in Kenya to :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To provide support for democratic governance, institutional capacity-building, including in the NAO's office, decentralisation of health services, tourism, preservation of cultural heritage and institutional capacity related to the EPA-trade negotiations (along with the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF)</li> <li>▪ To support the Roads 2000 phase II (€5m) and the Central Kenya Rural Roads Programme (€1.25m);</li> <li>▪ To support rural development and agriculture: horticulture (€2.4m), coffee-sector reform (€5m) and support for the ASCU/Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (€2m);</li> <li>▪ To advanced budget support in the period 2003-2004 (€51m).</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 22, 23 &amp; 25</i></p> <p>According to the Evaluation of EC support to Kenya (June 2008), Stabex funds have been made available in Kenya to compensate the losses of export earnings, mainly in the coffee sector, but also in tea. These funds were spent in the period 1990-1999 in the coffee sector, roads, education, tourism and local governance. In 1999, Stabex funds were spent as advance budget support and earmarked for specific sectors. On the other hand, these funds have been also utilised to bridge finance gaps (e.g. for community development) or to finance sectors that were not foreseen in the CSP (e.g. tourism and trade). In other words, Stabex funds have been used as a mechanism to make adjustments to the CSP.</p> <p>For the period 2001-2005, the total amount of committed Stabex funds was about € 105 million.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of EC support to Kenya, June 2008, page 27</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui. <b>Stabex</b> et la <b>ligne banane</b> (diversification) ont financé des interventions « filière ». La <b>ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire</b> a financé des interventions sectorielles agricoles. La <b>ligne sucre</b> a financé des actions de relance de la production sucrière.</p>
<b>Stabex</b>	<p>Stabex is a non programmable fund, a stabilisation scheme of export receipts from agricultural products introduced under Lomé in 1975. It was designed to help ACP countries to cope with the commodity crisis by offsetting losses in foreign exchange earnings from agricultural commodities exports. STABEX was designed to automatically<sup>17</sup> provide funds to ACP countries as soon as a drop in export earnings on a single product (whether due to price or quantity variations) was noted and this applied to a wide number of agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, groundnuts, tea and others.</p> <p>Through the four Lomé conventions (Stabex ceased in 2000) the use of the funds provided was increasingly being tied to the agricultural sector: finally under Lomé IV, Stabex funds were still released automatically (now in the form of grants<sup>18</sup>) but their use was subject to a formal agreement between the recipient ACP country and the Commission in the form of a Framework of Mutual Obligations setting out the exact use of the funds: whilst at first only the sector which sustained the losses could be supported, this was later extended also to diversification.</p> <p>During the 2000-2009 period, 38 countries benefited from Stabex transfers as follows:</p>

<sup>17</sup> The ACP country had to file a request with the Commission providing details about the losses in export earnings occurred relative to a reference value for the particular product affected by the earnings losses.

<sup>18</sup> Previous Lomé Conventions had foreseen that ACP beneficiaries would pay back the amounts received when export gains occurred so as to replenish the fund but this was eventually abandoned under Lomé IV.

	Major Products	Stabex transfers in Euro	Major recipients	Stabex transfers in Euro
	Coffee	309 036 128	Sudan	92 741 013
	Cotton	63 141 795	Ivory Coast	82 037 253
	Banana	38 082 637	Kenya	51 046 480
	Groundnut	14 957 004	Uganda	35 138 115
	Palm	13 840 638	Tanzania	31 757 576
	Tea	8 589 242	Rwanda	23 703 294
	Hide	8 533 978	Burundi	19 701 584
	Oil	5 330 820	Madagascar	16 007 115
	Vanilla	4 293 188	Solomon Islands	15 816 020
	coco	2 039 645	Saint Lucia	13 381 822
	Cocoa	1 597 415	Cameroun	11 854 465
	Other	1 215 681	Senegal	10 188 084
	Grand Total	470 658 173	Jamaica	9 482 060
			Togo	8 471 196

*Source: ADE Inventory based on CRIS*

**SUG** In 2006 the European Union decided a reform of its sugar market, which would result in a 36% reduction of the domestic price of sugar between the marketing years 2006/07 and 2009/10. This price reduction also applies to sugar exports by Sugar Protocol countries, which in accordance with the Sugar Protocol benefited of a duty free access to the EU market. Furthermore in September 2007 the EC formally notified the SP signatories that with effect from 1 October 2009 it intended to end the Protocol, which contradicted the WTO principle of non-discrimination. The European Union committed itself to support the adaptation process of SP countries to this new situation.

The EU commitment was expressed in Regulation (EC) No 266/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2006 establishing accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform of the EU sugar regime and reiterated in Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation.

Regulation No 266/2006 deals specifically with aid to SP countries for the year 2006 to which it allocates a total budget of €40 million.

Regulation No 1905/2006 establishing the new EC Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) reiterates in Article 17 the commitment of the EU to support the implementation of SP countries adaptation strategies and allocates to this purpose from the EC General Budget €1,244 million for the period 2007-2013.

The AMSP programme grants financial and technical assistance at the request of each Sugar Protocol country. Requests must be based on a comprehensive multi-annual National Adaptation Strategy (NAS), defined by the country concerned in consultation with all stakeholders. The NAS shall pursue one or more of the following objectives:

- to enhance the competitiveness of the sugar and cane sector, where this is a sustainable process, in particular in terms of long-term economic viability of the sector, taking into account the situation of the different stakeholders in the chain,
- to promote the economic diversification of sugar-dependent areas,

to address broader impacts generated by the adaptation process, possibly related, but not restricted, to employment and social services, land use and environmental restoration, the energy sector, research and innovation and macro-economic stability.”



<b>SUG</b>	<p>The reform of the European Common Market Organisation for sugar in 2005<sup>19</sup> and its revision in 2007<sup>20</sup> led to the denunciation of the Sugar Protocol (with effect from 2009) which gave specific preferential treatment to ACP sugar exporters for EU market access. In effect the ACPs would face both a price reduction and higher competition on the EU market. To assist the 18 sugar producer ACPs<sup>21</sup> to adapt to these new market conditions and restructure their sugar production, the Commission opened a €1.28 billion budget line (Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol countries or AMSP) to be implemented over the period 2006-2013 with the following objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• making sugar cane more competitive, where viable, taking account of the situation for different stakeholders in the chain</li> <li>• promoting economic diversity in sugar-dependent areas</li> <li>• addressing the wider impact of the adjustment process, including employment, social services, land use and environmental restoration, the energy sector, research and innovation and macroeconomic stability.</li> </ul> <p>The budget for 2006 was set at €40 million. The decisions on amounts to be allocated to each country are decided on a case by case basis, based on the needs of each country as they relate to the impact of the reform of the sugar sector in the country concerned and to the importance of the sugar sector to the economy (in 2006 based on the data of campaigns preceding 2004). As a reference point, it is foreseen in the Regulation<sup>22</sup> that individual multiannual strategy support packages would cost € 300,000 of which 3 % would cover the support's administration and supervision costs.</p> <p>After end 2009 when the terms of the Sugar Protocol would no longer be maintained, sugar exporting ACPs were also to benefit from the trade arrangements under the 'Everything But Arms' (providing more all product access to least developing countries to the EU market) and under the (to be negotiated) EPAs<sup>23</sup>.</p> <p><u>Activities that can be financed from AMSP should aim for the following:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• to enhance the competitiveness of the sugar and cane sector, where this is a sustainable process, in particular in terms of the long-term economic viability of the sector, taking into account the situation of the different stakeholders in the chain</li> <li>• to promote the economic diversification of sugar dependent areas, for example by redirecting current sugar production towards the production of bio-ethanol and other non-food applications of sugar;</li> </ul>
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<sup>19</sup> The reform of the sugar CMO aimed to align it with the rest of the reformed Common Agricultural Policy. Its central element was a 36 percent cut in the guaranteed minimum sugar price, accompanied by compensation schemes for European producers and encouragements for uncompetitive sugar producers to leave the industry. For developing countries, preferential access to the EU market at attractive prices would be maintained. See the press release of 24/11/2005 on [http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/development\\_programmes/devprog\\_sugar\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/development_programmes/devprog_sugar_en.cfm).

<sup>20</sup> In 2007, the Sugar reform was revised because insufficient quota was renounced during the first two years of the scheme.

<sup>21</sup> Barbados, Belize, Republic of Congo, Fiji, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

<sup>22</sup> Regulation (EC) No 266/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2006 establishing accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform of the EU sugar regime.

<sup>23</sup> However, sugar is one of two products (with rice) which does not benefit from the duty free quota free (DFQF) access to the EC market which is in place since 1 January 2008 under the EPA regime. A transition period applies before full liberalisation on 1 October 2015. See 'European Commission, Directorate-general for Agriculture and Rural Development "Agriculture and Preferential Trade Relations with ACP Countries" (10/2008) and Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007 (OJ L 348, 31.12.2007).

- to address broader impacts generated by the adaptation process, possibly related, but not restricted, to employment and social services, land use and environmental restoration, the energy sector, research and innovation and macroeconomic stability.

Over the period 2000-2009 the following regions benefited from the Sugar line:

Regions	Transfers in Euros	Major recipients	Transfers in Euros
Caribbean	163 539 318	Mauritius	74 823 000
Eastern Africa	98 210 130	Guyana	49 225 370
Southern Africa	11 457 644	Jamaica	48 015 978
Pacific	4 027 332	Barbados	22 660 959
West Africa	2 386 646	Saint Kitts and Nevis	21 473 295
All ACP	793 457	Trinidad and Tobago	15 513 252
Central Africa	559 325	Swaziland	11 457 644
Grand Total	280 973 853	Belize	6 516 717
		Mozambique	6 359 800
		Fiji	4 027 332
		Zambia	3 763 634
		Tanzania	3 198 755

Source: ADE Inventory based on CRIS

**TZ** On average, 35% of the 4-6<sup>th</sup> EDF NIPs were allocated to agriculture, mainly to support coffee (major beneficiary) and feeder road maintenance programmes and the STABEX facility. Smaller transfers were carried out to cotton, tea, sisal and cloves. Since the 7<sup>th</sup> EDF support to agriculture has been limited to STABEX (76 M€ since the beginning of Lomé IV) Sources: *Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 18*

An amount of €44 million was available from STABEX funds (€ 38 million transfers and € 6 million generated interest) and covered by a Framework of Mutual Obligation (FMO) which was signed in February 2003 and amended by a rider in 2005. Support is given to the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TaCRI), the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), and a programme for the rehabilitation of priority regional roads in coffee-growing areas. There have been significant achievements in the area of private research. The contribution to the Agriculture Sector development programme (ASDP) has been integrated into the ASDP basket fund which supports the sector budget at Ministry level.

Sources: *Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 65*

Stabex funds were made available as a measure to stabilize the economy affected by coffee and tea export losses. Up to 1993, Tanzania received 51 million Euros of Stabex allocations. In 2003, it received 38 million Euros to stabilize export losses between 1994 and 1999.

Stabex funds, which were previously used in the form of direct aids to farmers, are now channeled through projects. Stabex interventions are managed at the level of specific products, namely coffee and tea, and to a lesser extent, cotton. In addition, support was also provided to carry out key studies on the reform of Crop Boards, the Agricultural Census and the development of the strategic action plan to implement the Land Acts. All of these interventions have taken place in the wider reform of the sector.

Given the importance that the EC has attached to supporting policy reforms and strategies, the allocation of Stabex funds has been targeted to a strategic tool to support the Agricultural Sector Support Programme (ASDP) and the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) priorities. Around 40 million Euros (from 1994-1999 Coffee transfers plus the remaining balance from earlier funds) will be allocated to these priorities. Part of the Stabex funds will also support the development of rural roads.

Source: *Evaluation of the EC support to the United Republic of Tanzania, April 2006, page 37*

**TZ** STABEX: tool used by the EU for a very long time, notably in Tanzania. Thing not to find in the papers: from other donors in the late 80s and 90s very little was directed as support to agricultural development.

	<p>There were no crises. In the mid 2000s, people came back to agriculture, notably based on the paper of the World Bank and with the food crisis. They came back then to agriculture, technical side. E.g. GTZ left agriculture in the 90s for the social services (health, education) and infrastructures.</p> <p>STABEX was available in the late 80s and 90s with the value chain approach to agricultural commodities even though it was not fashionable at the time. In Tanzania they were especially supporting cotton, coffee and tea. It helped to establish research and public-private partnerships. <i>Source: MN 602</i></p> <p>STABEX: main component on coffee (mainly TACRI) and infrastructures (rehabilitation of building, laboratories), smaller amount devoted to tea, and establishing the tea institute buildings, cotton institute, a little bit on cloves. Contribution to the basket fund to ASDP, supported since the beginning (2006, mainly in 2007). STABEX needs to be closed by the end of 2012. A couple of audit contracts still remain. The exit strategy of STABEX: an agreement basically a budget support. The outstanding contracts will be closed and the balance will be devoted to ASDP. Agreement with TACRI and TRIT to share this money provided to the ASDP. So far the first tranche (€1.7m) has been paid and activities are finished. The EU Delegation will be not more part of the management of this money. It will be the Government of Tanzania. STABEX activities are finished. Audits are ongoing. <i>Source: MN 600</i></p>
<b>TZ Sugar</b>	<p>In TZ, according to stakeholders, the sugar industry was totally collapsed until the EU funds arrived to save it. TZ chose to make the industry more competitive with investments in infrastructure and research necessary for better varieties. <i>Source: MN173</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA-plan for Modernization of Agriculture), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds were mainly used to support specific commodity chains in particular coffee. Uganda didn't benefit from the banana and sugar support programmes which aimed at alleviating the impact on producing countries of changes in the EU policy concerning these products.</p>
<b>VU Cocoa</b>	<p>Vanuatu benefitted from Stabex funds as result of a downward trend of cocoa beans for the application year 1998. In fact, Vanuatu faced difficulties in the cocoa sector in 1998:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Marketed production of cocoa beans were equivalent to 1,501 millions VATU (against 1,757 millions VATU in 1997)</li> <li>▪ Exports of cocoa beans to the EC: 20 millions VATU and 142 tonnes (against 234.1 millions VATU and 1,536 tonnes in 1997).</li> </ul> <p>Stabex funds amounted to €157,090. These funds would be utilised to supplement the funding of the reconstruction of bridges and river crossings which was subject to the FMO relating to application years 1995 and 1996 and the balance of the funds from transfers up to 1994 (signed on 6 August 1999). Activities foreseen for the use of the Stabex funds were: studies and supervision, and works contract.</p> <p>However the STABEX funds deposited in the bank accounts have produced interest of about 6 millions VATU. To finance activities related to the rehabilitation of the Big Bay Road in Santo the following amounts were available: 129 525 Millions VATU. The amount of 21.3 Millions VATU was already disbursed to contracts passed for Technical assistance studies and supervision. Two offers to implement rehabilitation activities have been received on 19 December 2000. The lowest offer was in the range of 155.2 Millions VATU. This meant that a gap of 25.675 millions VATU existed (around €206,550). To allow these works, the gap should be paid through the Public Works Department's own budget for reparation of damages caused by cyclone Dani.</p> <p><i>Sources: Letter of 21 March 2000, Stabex in Vanuatu – Application year 1999 – collection of statistical data; Framework of Mutual Obligations for the use of STABEX funds for the application year 2008 between the Government of Vanuatu and the European Commission, May 2001; Letter of 5 January 2001, Vanuatu Stabex Report for 2000.</i></p>
<b>VFLEX</b>	<p>In 2009<sup>24</sup>, the Commission set aside €500 million (from the reserve of the national and regional indicative programmes under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF) to assist ACP countries most affected by the crisis<sup>25</sup> in mitigating the</p>

<sup>24</sup> COM (2009)160 and Council conclusions (10018/09 of May 18, 2009, paragraph 21).

	social consequences of the crisis by helping them to maintain public spending in priority areas; these funds named Vulnerability Flex (or VFLEX) were to be used in the form of budget support in countries with credible economic management and acknowledged reform commitments towards good governance; if not, support was to be delivered in close coordination with other donors through already existing projects or programmes or trust funds mitigating the social consequences of the crisis (in the areas of social safety nets, employment creating initiatives and actions aiming at maintaining social service provision and maintaining social cohesion in a post-conflict environment).
<b>I.1.3.3</b>	Periodic evaluations of the Commission's aid effectiveness relating to support to CDDCs' agricultural commodities sectors and re-orientation of the financing instruments used (STABEX, FLEX, SAF, BAM)
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	Une évaluation à mi-parcours du AAACP a eu lieu en en lieu en 2009 évaluant notamment l'efficacité des appuis aux PBA dans le cadre du Programme. <i>Source : évaluation a mi-parcours de l'AAACP - Rapport final - 2010</i>
<b>BAN</b>	The following evaluations of the SFA have been carried out over the past years: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, htspe, 2008.</li> <li>▪ Evaluation of the CMO in bananas, COGEA, 2005</li> </ul>
<b>BF</b>	Il n'y a pas d'évidence que la Commission européenne (en particulier la Délégation européenne au Burkina Faso) a suivi et évalué l'utilisation des fonds STABEX. Aucun rapport de suivi ou d'évaluation de l'utilisation des fonds STABEX n'a été communiquée à l'équipe de consultants.
<b>CI</b>	Yes through the usual system of monitoring and evaluation implemented for Stabex.
<b>CM</b>	Le Stabex a donné lieu a des évaluations (évaluations individuelles des interventions et protocoles mais pas d'évaluation globale de la contribution à la filière (hormis un rapport d'évaluation de 1996)
<b>MG</b>	Oui. L'instrument financier STABEX a fait l'objet de rapports de mise en œuvre (audit, utilisation des ressources, réunions) ainsi que de rapports d'expertise (évaluations finales, rapports d'assistance technique et rapports de monitoring).
<b>Overall</b>	The following evaluations were found to have been carried out over the past 10 years: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Global evaluation of STABEX (1998, ref. 951329)</b> of which the abstract reads: <i>The STABEX scheme, set up and operated under the ACP Lomé Conventions to mitigate the harmful consequences to primary producers of instability of agricultural export earnings, has not been able, even with large amounts of funds, to influence significantly, or compensate for, the overall worldwide drop in producers' earnings. If it is retained, it requires a major overhaul.</i></li> <li>- <b>Evaluation of EU Assistance to ACP Banana Producer (2000, ref. 951501)</b> of which the abstract follows: <i>This report evaluates Commission assistance to banana producers in four ACP countries: the Windward Islands, Belize, Jamaica and Cameroon. It concludes that the impact on competitiveness was below its potential. It recommends to change the aid allocation formula, to focus more on institutional reforms, raising field level productivity and</i></li> </ul>

<sup>25</sup> Three cumulative basic criteria (plus sufficient absorptive capacity through an ongoing BS programme or an existing social safety net or equivalent mechanism: additional funds are allocated to priority programmes) applied for eligibility to VFLEX:

- a. High economic, social and political vulnerability to the crisis as measured by the following variables for 2009 and 2010:
    - i. Year-on-year deterioration of government revenues (excl. from gas and oil exports) by at least 1% of GDP/pre-crisis fiscal year
    - ii. Deterioration of foreign reserves below two months import value
    - iii. Deterioration of the fiscal deficit (excl. grants) by at least 2% of GDP year-on-year/pre-crisis due to maintaining public priority expenditures particularly in the social sectors.
  - b. Residual financing gaps in 2009 and 2010 forecasted by IMF/regional development banks (social priority spending maintained).
  - c. As a general principle, a reduction by at least 50% of the residual financing gap.
- Special fragile state dispositions in eligibility were to be on a case-by-case decision.

	<p><i>income generation for those displaced from the banana industry.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Evaluation of EC Food Aid Security Policy, Food Aid Management and Programmes in support of Food Security</b>, Regulation No 1292/96 of 27 June 1996) (2001, ref. 951569) with the following abstract: <i>The new Regulation No 1292/96 introduced a major change in integrating food aid policy into global development co-operation. However, although the policy was found to be sound and state of the art, its implementation has to be considerably improved.</i></li> <li>- <b>Thematic Evaluation of Food Aid Policy and Food Aid Management and Special Operation in Support of Food Security</b> (2004, ref. 951657) of which the abstract reads: <i>The evaluation finds that the various instruments offered by the EC Regulation 1292/96 in the field of Food Aid and Food Security are appropriate to respond to the entire range of assistance needs of recipient countries and to promote a continuous transition from emergency relief to development. Effort should be made to improve the efficiency of indirect food Aid and Food Security operations.</i></li> <li>- <b>Evaluation of Trade-Related Assistance by the European Commission in Third Countries</b> (2004, ref. 95165) of which the abstract reads: <i>The Commission has not systematically and strategically addressed the issue of trade in development cooperation. A reactive approach, responding to partner countries demands, has been applied. The rigidity of Commission procedures has delayed implementation and negatively affected the efficiency. However, Commission TRA has resulted in improved knowledge and awareness of trade-related issues in central institutions of partner countries, and it has contributed to increased export performance and improved productivity of local enterprises.</i></li> <li>- <b>Evaluation de la coopération de la Commission Européenne dans le domaine du Développement rural</b> (2007, ref. 1088) dont le résumé suit: <i>La stratégie de la CE telle que définie dans la COM(2002) 429 constitue un cadre cohérent qui intègre l'ensemble des concepts de réduction de la pauvreté, de sécurité alimentaire et de développement rural et agricole. Cependant, elle ne définit pas précisément les spécificités des différents concepts et leur articulation. L'évaluation constate que le secteur agricole a connu une désaffection dans les priorités de développement alors que la croissance de la productivité agricole constitue un facteur clé dans la lutte contre la pauvreté. La CE, qui est restée relativement présente dans le secteur, est principalement intervenue sur certains déterminants spécifiques de la productivité comme la production et les rendements. L'approche multisectorielle de développement rural reste pertinente dans une approche de lutte contre la pauvreté. En intégrant une démarche plus participative et en s'appuyant davantage sur les structures institutionnelles en place, la qualité des interventions a été améliorée. Cependant, leur faible efficience ne permet pas de les utiliser sur une échelle suffisante pour obtenir un impact global significatif.</i></li> </ul> <p>The extent to which these different evaluations have been used as inputs into the design of new instruments and or the Communication is not clear. <i>Source:</i> <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports">http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports</a></p>
<b>Overall Cotton</b>	Une évaluation à mi-parcours du Partenariat UE-Afrique sur le Coton - Rapport final - Juin 2009, a été produite, évaluant notamment l'efficacité des appuis aux filières cotonnières africaines dans le cadre du Partenariat. <i>Source : évaluation a mi-parcours du Partenariat UE-Afrique sur le Coton - Rapport final - Juin 2009</i>
<b>TZ</b>	STABEX activities are finished. Audits are ongoing. STABEX successes are “evaluated”. In the coffee sector some results were not achieved (e.g. quality issues and problems with contractors regarding the coffee research.). The rest of the money will be used to improve the obtained results. There is one evaluation of the STABEX activities (done in 2007). During the evaluation of Stabex (2007), they focus on certain parts. The recommendations were to get out the basket fund devoted to ASDP. It was critical on cotton and the process of decentralisation which was not going well (absence of district agricultural plans). Then focus on coffee, tea to enabling trade. <i>Source: MN 600</i>
<b>VU</b>	No periodic evaluation of Stabex funds is available at the level of the EU Delegation in Vanuatu.
<b>I.1.3.4</b>	Launching by the Commission of specific projects to tackle the constraints faced by CDDCs due to price decline and variability
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	The AAACP programme is a key aspect of implementing the two Action Plans on Commodities and Cotton. The overall objective of the AAACP programme is to improve incomes for producers from traditional or other agricultural commodities and reduce income vulnerability at both producer and macro level. <i>Source : IF</i>

<b>ACP-GIIF</b>	The project by supporting the provision of risk insurance to ACP governments and producers is not directed at price but at weather based risks. <i>Source: Project intervention fiche</i>
<b>BAN</b>	In Cameroon, the EC funded projects for the banana sector to help it cope with the decline of export price due to changes in the market structure, by improving competitiveness. Projects were funded through the banana budget line, with ATF (Assistance Technique et Financière) contracts from 1999 to 2008 for a total of € 47 M. The Banana Accompanying Measures (BAM) foresees a € 76 M envelope for the country. <i>Source : ATF Banane au Cameroun, 1999-2008</i>
<b>BAN</b>	The modification of the CMO bananas and of the preferential banana trade provisions in 1998 meant an increase in competition and a decrease in export price for ACP banana exporters. The council therefore adopted the SFA, as a support mechanism in 1999 (EC 856/1999). The SFA acted as a support mechanism to grant temporary technical and financial assistance to the 12 ACP traditional banana suppliers. As mentioned in the SFA evaluation report, the ACP banana exporters receive “special assistance to contribute to the implementation of programs aiming at increasing the competitiveness of bananas for export. For countries where that was not possible any more, SFA resources could be used to encourage diversification on the basis of long term country strategies agreed - beforehand – with the EC and approved by the latter” <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 1 &amp; 4, htspe, 2008.</i>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Les interventions de la Commission : appuis <b>STABEX, PAFFIC, programme d’amélioration de la fertilité des sols, Programme tous ACP</b> : (GIPD/BPA), lutte contre la contamination du coton (CFC/IFDC/BM, standardisation de la mesure expérimentale du coton (CFC), développement de la chaîne de valeur orientée vers le marché (ITC), <b>Appui à l’Université du coton</b> (sous FED/PIR), sont en majorité orientées vers l’amélioration de la compétitivité de la filière, nécessité qui s’est renforcée avec la baisse tendancielle des prix dans un environnement de plus en plus concurrentiel.</p> <p>Notons que le PAFFIC (aide à recapitalisation de la part des producteurs (UNPCB) dans l’actionnariat des sociétés cotonnières suite à la crise financière très profonde débutée en 2005 et alimentée par la baisse tendancielle des prix) a permis au producteurs de rester dans l’actionnariat des sociétés cotonnières.</p> <p>Plus récemment (2010), dans le cadre du programme tous ACP, des appuis mis en œuvre par la Banque mondiale (ARMT) se sont orientés vers la problématique de la variabilité des prix dans une approche globale de la gestion des risques de la filière coton du BF: 1/ Evaluation des risques de la filière coton au BF, 2/ Gestion des risques climatiques Afrique de l’Ouest. 3/ Définition de politiques et gestion des risques liés aux prix, Afrique de l’Ouest ; 4/ Transferts de capacités à la région Afrique de l’Ouest.</p> <p>Notons également que le Partenariat UE-Afrique sur le coton comporte un volet commerce qui vise notamment pour les Etats cotonniers africains à obtenir des relations commerciales plus équitables (cadre OMC/Doha: question des subventions importantes au coton de certains, en particulier les Etats-Unis,, renforcement des capacités dans les négociations du groupe coton (y inclus pour le BF) sur les règles commerciales du système multilatérale. La problématique des subventions de grands pays exportateurs, en particulier les Etats-Unis, occupent le devant de la scène agricole de l’OMC (Doha) depuis l’initiative coton du C4 (Bénin, BF, Mali, Tchad) de 2003. Ces subventions ont contribué à tirer les cours mondiaux du coton vers le bas.</p> <p>Cependant, ce volet commercial du Partenariat n’est pas lié à un appui direct de la Commission..</p> <p><i>Sources : Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, juin 2010 et mai 2011. Banque Mondiale (ARMG), 6 monthly progress report : 1july-31 December 2010. Cadre d’Action pour le Partenariat UE-Afrique sur le coton. Ver février 2010.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	Le financement par la Commission du Plan d’Actions pour l’Organisation du Secteur Agricole (PAOSA) : appui à la structuration des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles – OPA -, épargne/ crédit, production de riz, renforcement des capacités...) sont en majorité orientées vers l’amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles. <i>Source : Evaluation du PAOSA, 2007</i>
<b>CI</b>	<b>Ligne budgétaire sucre:</b> l’accès préférentiel au marché du sucre de l’UE fournissait des avantages (prix très supérieurs à ceux pratiqués sur le marché mondial) aux pays ACP signataires du Protocole sur le sucre

	<p>(accord de Cotonou) et, notamment, et la Cote d'Ivoire qui bénéficie d'un quota annuel d'exportation de 10186 tonnes. Cependant, la baisse du prix du sucre dans l'UE est envisagée dans la réforme de l'Organisation commune de marche de l'Union européenne relative au sucre (OCM - Sucre) qui va entraîner une baisse de revenu pour l'ensemble des pays bénéficiaires du protocole. La Commission européenne s'est des lors engagée, à travers la ligne budgétaire sucre, à <b>aider les pays à faire face à la chute prévisible des revenus</b>. Afin de définir les actions sur lesquelles se concentreront les financements de la ligne budgétaire en Cote d'Ivoire, une étude de stratégie est en cours de finalisation sous l'égide du ministère de l'Agriculture. Cette étude a identifié que la filière sucre ne pourra survivre en Cote d'Ivoire à moins d'un engagement réel de l'Etat à protéger effectivement son marché intérieur, notamment en luttant contre la fraude et en mettant fin aux importations exonérées. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.26</i>).</p> <p>Dans le cadre des secteurs hors concentration et plus particulièrement de l'appui à l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles, une des interventions consistera à la mise en place de mécanismes de <b>gestion et d'atténuation des variations de prix</b>. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31, 39</i>).</p> <p>Dans les filières café-cacao, les fonds STAB EX ont permis l'institutionnalisation du Fonds de Garantie des Coopératives Café-Cacao et de <b>soutenir des prix du café</b> en 2001 et 2002 (<i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.63</i>).</p>
<p><b>CI</b> <b>cotton</b> <b>cocoa</b> <b>palm</b> <b>oil</b></p>	<p>Stabex a été utilisé (in)directement pour compenser les faibles prix payés aux producteurs, essentiellement les producteurs de coton : fourniture d'intrants (même si les paysans utilisent la moitié des intrants fournis pour les cultures alimentaires telles que le maïs), dons de bœufs (environ 2.000) et règlements des dettes des producteurs vis-à-vis des égreneurs (le chef de Délégation est allé 5 sur le terrain ans auparavant pour cette action qui a coûté environ 1 milliard FCFA).</p> <p>Toutefois, ces actions sont sporadiques ne résolvent pas les problèmes de fond qui sont identiques depuis 30 ans (de même que les solutions : dons de bœufs). La Délégation souhaiterait soutenir ou mettre en place des mécanismes plus durables de soutien des prix bord de champs car les paysans cotonniers sont ne sont toujours pas rentables.</p> <p>La production de coton a d'ailleurs chuté de 400.000 tonnes graines /an (année ?) à actuellement 90 tonnes graines / an. Les paysans abandonnent le coton pour l'huile de palme ou le cacao pour lesquels les revenus sont plus élevés et stables</p> <p>Il y a 4 zones coton en Côte d'Ivoire et 4 usines d'égrenage (1 par zone). Sur ces 4 usines, 1 seule est rentable. A travers le soutien des prix aux paysans, la CE a soutenu indirectement les égreneurs et les compagnies internationales. De plus, seuls les égreneurs non rentables ont profité de ces aides indirectes alors que l'usine rentable n'a pas bénéficié du soutien de ses producteurs (« concurrence déloyale »).</p> <p>Il serait souhaitable de supprimer cette dépendance et ce lien entre les producteurs et les égreneurs.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 819</i></p>
<p><b>CM</b></p>	<p>In Cameroon, the EC funded projects for the banana sector to help it cope with the decline of export price due to changes in the market structure, by improving competitiveness. Projects were funded through the banana budget line, with ATF (Assistance Technique et Financière) contracts from 1999 to 2008 for a total of € 47 M. The Banana Accompanying Measures (BAM) foresees a € 76 M envelope for the country.</p> <p><i>Source : ATF Banane au Cameroun, 1999-2008</i></p> <p>According to interviews, the EC moved its interest away from agriculture (and therefore its projects as well) in Cameroon in the 1990s until the 2008 hunger riots. <i>Source : MN 409</i></p> <p>Au niveau du café et du cacao, le déclin des prix des années 1990 et la libéralisation brutale des filières ont conduit à leur abandon par les producteurs (en particulier pour le café). Ces deux filières font l'objet de relances depuis mi-2005 (liée à la remontée des prix) et la Commission accompagne timidement cette relance là où c'est possible puisque le secteur agricole/rural ne fait pas partie des secteurs de concentration (exemples projets : Moungo Nkam, PACICC- 9<sup>ième</sup> FED, PAPA- 10<sup>ième</sup> FED – début octobre 2011).</p> <p><i>Source : MN 402, 403, 409</i></p>
<p><b>CM</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The first CSP/NIP (2001-2007) did not foresee any specific intervention in the rural development sector. It referred to the transfer of Stabex funds that will finance projects over the period 2001-2007 and to projects financed through the Banana Budget Line (See I.1.3.2).</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The second CSP/NIP (2008-2013) aimed at diversifying economic activities, mainly through the promotion of commodity chains and of activities in rural areas. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ In the second focal area of support (trade and regional integration), it foresees support to increase competitiveness through a strengthening of productive and export capacities, both for agricultural and industrial products : « <i>L'objectif global du programme est de renforcer la compétitivité de l'économie camerounaise pour lui permettre de développer ses productions et de diversifier ses exportations, notamment agropastorales et industrielles, sur les marchés régionaux et internationaux et de bénéficier pleinement des avantages de l'APE et d'une meilleure intégration régionale. Il s'agit, en particulier, d'améliorer la gouvernance économique et le climat des affaires, de consolider le marché unique régional et d'appuyer la diversification économique et la croissance par le renforcement de la compétitivité des secteurs productifs concernés. Ce programme sera basé, le cas échéant, sur l'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme pilote de soutien à la mise en oeuvre de l'APE au Cameroun (PASAPE 9e FED) qui va aider à la formulation et l'adoption d'une politique nationale de compétitivité et de développement des échanges dans le cadre agrégé des différentes stratégies sectorielles pertinentes (agriculture, bois, commerce, industrie, PME, etc.) et apporter une réponse au défi de l'intégration du Cameroun dans le commerce international.</i> »</li> <li>○ In the non-focal sectors, support to rural development with a view to reduce rural poverty is also envisaged : « <i>Parallèlement à l'amélioration des capacités de production agricole et afin de réduire la pauvreté et d'améliorer les conditions de vie en milieu rural, des actions seront menées pour adapter le cadre socioéconomique (densification et réhabilitation des réseaux de pistes de collecte, construction et/ou aménagement de points d'eau potable, de maisons communautaires, de magasins de stockage et de marchés ruraux, sécurisation alimentaire).</i> »</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ The second CSP/NIP (2008-2013) noted that several actions targeting the reinforcement of agricultural productive capacities, socio-economic infrastructure, local hydraulics, rural credit, and food security have been financed in the rural development sector from the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> EDFs as well as from Stabex funds and the Banana budget line.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 15-17, 22, 24</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>Several major Caribbean industries were subjected to severe shocks caused by changes in other EU policies. In some instances the response given by the Commission to these shocks proved rather <i>ad hoc</i> as they were not sufficiently anticipated and reflected in the regional strategy. <u>Examples are bananas and sugar.</u> Indeed. The slightly improved market opportunities for non-ACP countries that the NBR “<u>New Banana Regime</u>” permitted, the periods of <u>prices decline</u>, and tighter quality requirements in a unified (EU) market place, were all factors that put considerable pressure on Caribbean producers. This situation was further compounded by natural disasters in the region.</p> <p>The adaptation of the <u>price of sugar</u> under the European Common Agricultural Policy is having similarly devastating consequences on the Caribbean producers which will create pressure for an <i>ad hoc</i> response where a long term strategy should be put in place.</p> <p>Several aspects of EU domestic policies or international arrangements are thus hurting the Caribbean countries and <u>ad hoc measures are proposed to mitigate their consequences</u>. A number of major Caribbean products or industries (sugar, bananas, rum) faced an <u>inescapable and foreseeable trend of liberalisation</u>. <u>However, the strategy did not anticipate this factor and instead intervened under the pressure of crisis.</u></p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>Interventions in the field of agriculture in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP focus rather on food security and land and resource management than on facing price decline and variability.</p> <p>The document mentions that certain ESAIO countries benefit from the accompanying measures of the sugar protocol and actions funded from other instruments such as the stability instrument and in “<i>relation to</i></p>



	<i>Agriculture, the 1 billion Facility that covers short and medium term interventions to address the high food prices would also be available” to ESAIO countries. Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 55 &amp; 82</i>					
<b>GH</b>	Specific projects have been launched in Ghana with the STABEX transfers of the early 1990's specifically to improve the competitiveness of the cocoa sector. After completion, they have been followed by EDF funded projects. They include, over the period 2000-2010 the following projects/programmes:					
	Year of decision	Titles of projects/programmes	Title of decision (1)	Allocations (decision/transfer amount)	Contracts planned as of Jan.2010	Contracts paid as of Jan 2010
	1997	Cocoa Sector Support Programme I	Stabex transfers (1) (2)		11 230 214	11 230 214
	1997	Support to Feeder Roads Phases I - III (3)	Stabex transfers (1) (2)	37 230 214	26 000 000	25 421 052
	2002	pré-engagement P1 dont dépendront 190 contrats en faveur de pays en	ONG-PVD/2002/001-092	for Ghana ?	1 069 721	1 069 721
	2004	Strengthen monitoring capacities Ministry of Food & Agriculture	FED/2004/017-384 (1)	1 559 944	1 559 944	1 559 944
	2004	TCF: Survey for Cocoa Production (CIRAD)	FED/2004/016-552	1 545 000	19 635	19 635
	2006	Feeder Roads Improvement Project (FRIP)	FED/2006/017-932	27 000 000	25 930 338	19 676 882
	2006	pré-engagement dont dépendront les contrats PVD projets	ONG-PVD/2006/018-227	for Ghana ?	750 000	181 440
	2006	Private Sector and Trade Enabling Programme (PSTEP)	FED/2006/018-609	5 000 000	349 619	162 279
	2007	Farmers' Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (FAMAR)	ONG-PVD/2007/135-483 (1)	for Ghana ?		345 960
	2007	Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme - Phase II	FED/2007/019-650	5 000 000	4 493 534	1 735 577
	2010	Market Access through Cooperative Action: Empowering Rural Women	DCI-HUM/2010/236-781 (1)	for Ghana ?		315 226
		Grand Total		77 335 158	71 403 005	61 717 929
	<i>Source: ADE inventory based on CRIS complemented by information on Stabex collected from field visit.</i>					
	The main thrust has thus been on (i) support to the cocoa sector through disease control (uprooting and replanting schemes with farmers' compensation), research, seed multiplication and extension and on (ii) rural feeder roads rehabilitation in cocoa growing areas. <i>Source: Inventory, data collected from the Delegation.</i>					
<b>MG coffee vanilla cocoa</b>	<p><u>Réponse mixte.</u> Les projets STABEX ne sont pas spécifiquement et uniquement mis en œuvre en réponse au déclin et à la volatilité des prix mais ils contribuent par l'organisation de marché (constituant un des volets des projets) à renforcer la capacité des paysans à y faire face.</p> <p>En effet, depuis 2008, la Délégation a étendu ses appuis vers l'aval (commercialisation et transformation) afin d'améliorer la qualité dans une optique de diversification et de compétitivité (Source : MN 801). Les appuis sont donc plutôt centrés sur l'organisation du marché et la commercialisation. 11 projets ont été sélectionnés sur appel à propositions (café, vanille, girofle, poivre, cacao) avec en outre un <b>volet appui à la production</b> (CTHT, CNCC,...) et un <b>volet qualité</b> (formation, sensibilisation, petit matériel) mais également un <b>volet organisation des marchés au niveau des communes</b> (ce qui a le moins bien marché car ce volet est très complexe à mettre en œuvre étant donné le contexte institutionnel et la concurrence des acheteurs itinérants). (Source : MN 802).</p>					
<b>Overall</b>	According to meetings with staff members, the only specific project launched by the EC to support CDDCs in dealing with price decline and variability was the “All-ACP Agricultural Commodities Programme”. A lot of focus was brought to this programme which is supposed to catalyse more activities. The programme however has only been running for 2-3 years. <i>Sources: MN 912 &amp; MN 934</i>					
<b>UG coffee</b>	Yes through Stabex projects. For instance, the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project, with activities regarding the improvement of productivity, quality and efficiency of the coffee value chain (improvement of coffee production and better overall farm management, improvement of quality, nursery implementation and organizational development), had an objective to improve the farmers' income. Indeed, through this new marketing opportunity farmers have achieved a 23% higher price for their coffee (net of					


	<p>processing and marketing costs). Nevertheless, the major risk for these farmers and the project sustainability remains the decline and the variability coffee prices although some experts forecast that they will remain at a high level because of growing domestic consumption in coffee exporting countries (<i>Source: MN 308</i>).</p>																
<b>VU</b>	<p>There was no specific project launched by the EC in Vanuatu due to price decline and variability, with the exception of Stabex Funds. These funds have been used to rehabilitate activities related to the rehabilitation of the Big Bay Road in Sant <i>Sources: Letter of 21 March 2000, Stabex in Vanuatu – Application year 1999 – collection of statistical data; Framework of Mutual Obligations for the use of STABEX funds for the application year 2008 between the Government of Vanuatu and the European Commission, May 2001; Letter of 5 January 2001, Vanuatu Stabex Report for 2000.</i></p>																
<b>I.1.3.5</b>	Elaboration of an agricultural commodities strategy to support CDDCs																
<b>Overall</b>	<p>The survey results among 30 agricultural commodity exporting countries that benefitted from EU support shows that EDF Funds were those most often used. This is illustrated in the table below.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Use of budget lines among surveyed countries</b></p> <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="background-color: #800000; color: white;">Budget Lines</th> <th style="background-color: #800000; color: white;">Share of respondent countries where they have been used</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>EDF – Regional Programmes (All ACP, PIP, Trade.com...)</td> <td style="text-align: center;">70%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NGO</td> <td style="text-align: center;">63%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Stabex</td> <td style="text-align: center;">60%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Food Facility</td> <td style="text-align: center;">57%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sugar</td> <td style="text-align: center;">37%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Banana</td> <td style="text-align: center;">13%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FLEX</td> <td style="text-align: center;">13%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Source: Online survey, ADE 2011</i></p>	Budget Lines	Share of respondent countries where they have been used	EDF – Regional Programmes (All ACP, PIP, Trade.com...)	70%	NGO	63%	Stabex	60%	Food Facility	57%	Sugar	37%	Banana	13%	FLEX	13%
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<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>One of the key activities of the AAACP programme is the participatory development of agricultural commodities strategy in selected CDDCs.</p> <p>At the time of the MTR (April 2009), 16 commodity strategies (prepared with AAACP funding) were re either completed or under development out of which 8 are due to be completed by May-June 2009. <i>Source: Mid-term Review of the AAACP Programme, Final report, April 2009, Executive summary</i></p>																
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The EC and the countries concerned by the SFA agreed on programmes aiming at increasing the competitiveness of banana production for export. In the cases where the sustainable competitive banana production wasn't possible, the ACP countries and the EC elaborated diversification strategies. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 4, htspe, 2008.</i></p>																
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Le programme Stabex participe étroitement à <u>la stratégie de coopération développée par la CE en Cote d'Ivoire</u> tant dans le cadre des actions conduites dans le cadre du 9<sup>ème</sup> FED (PUR) que de celles programmes dans le PIN 10<sup>ème</sup> FED et le PIR 9<sup>ème</sup> FED (appuis APE). Dans le cadre du PIN 10<sup>ème</sup> FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire <u>pour les filières agricoles</u>. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex</i>)</p>																

	2009).
<b>Overall</b>	The Communications of the EC – the COM(2004)89 and COM(2004)87 – are the EC’s strategy to support CDDCs. No other declared strategies are known to this day.  <i>Source: MN 912</i>
<b>J.1.4</b>	<b><i>The Commission has adapted its interventions supporting agricultural commodities to the constraints revealed by long term price decline and short term price volatility</i></b>
<b>BF</b>	Aucune évidence d’une telle adaptation n’a été relevée au BF.
<b>CM</b>	Les appuis de la Commission aux produits agricoles de base (agricultural commodities) se limitent au Cameroun aux bananes, cacao et café. Globalement, les interventions ont appuyé la diversification (divers PDR), la structuration des OP et l’information sur les prix et les marchés (PACICC, Mounjo Nkam) et (timidement) certaines filières mais à travers des programmes de développement rural. Plus récemment, le programme tout-ACP a financé des études pour développer des stratégies spécifiques aux filières et sur gestion du risque ou la facilitation d’accès au crédit.
<b>GH overall</b>	Agriculture has not been a focal sector of Commission support in Ghana; the EC intervened in the cocoa and feeder roads sectors through Stabex funds in the 1990s and 2000s and once these were at an end, it followed with reduced levels of EDF funding for cocoa and a large transport programme (which did not focus on feeder roads). The reduced interest of the Commission in supporting the agricultural sector can further be testified by the fact that of the €10 m initially allocated to the cocoa sector after the 9 <sup>th</sup> EDF mid-term review, half was in fact redirected towards other projects (other needs arose) and the rural development advisor’s post was not refilled after departure of the last incumbent in late 2009.
<b>MG</b>	Les projets Stabex ont visé à améliorer la productivité, la qualité des produits et l’organisation des marchés des produits agricoles d’exportation
<b>TZ</b>	In Tanzania the focus of support to the agricultural sector has been through the use of Stabex funds in the tea, coffee and cotton sectors and through the use of AMSP funds in the sugar sector. The funds were thus ‘automatically’ generated and not a reasoned, justified decision of the Commission to support the agricultural sector in order to counter LT price decline or price volatility. Some limited support is being provided under EDF 10 to the same tea and coffee research institutes supported through STabex funds as the latter are running out and the two institutes have not foreseen exit strategies nor has the effect of the Stabex investments yet yielded the expected results in terms of uptake of seeds by farmers and increases in production and yield.
<b>UG coffee</b>	Specific EC-funded projects, in particular the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project, targeted the coffee sector with a view of improving productivity, quality and the efficiency of the value chain.
<b>I.1.4.1</b>	The Commission has supported interventions dealing with the long term price decline and/or price volatility by channelling funds to the six priority areas identified in the COM(2004)89. Data broken down by priority will be presented as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. static view in 2009, and</li> <li>b. dynamic view 2000-2004 and 2005-2009</li> </ul>

**CDDCs overall**


a) The analysis of the overall allocations to agricultural commodities (static view) had been presented in the inception report as follows:

**Global overview of Commission’s support to agricultural commodities**




Source: ADE Inventory analysis based on CRIS data

**Priority breakdown, contracts (€m), 2000-2009**



Source: ADE Inventory analysis based on CRIS data


**Breakdown of interventions by category, contracts (€m), 2000-2009**



Source: ADE Inventory analysis based on CRIS data

- b) The evolution of Commission support to agricultural commodities has been broken down by priority and by period to compare allocations per priority before and after the publication of the Communication as follows:

**Evolution of Commission support to agricultural commodities per priority: 2000-2004 compared to 2005-2009 (in millions of Euros)**



Source: ADE Inventory analysis based on CRIS data

**Total amounts allocated to agricultural commodities over the period 2000-2009, per priority and per period, in Euros.**

Communication 2004(89) Priorities	Amounts allocated		
	2000-2004	2005-2009	Total
Priority 1: Strategy design	1 047 803	5 545 188	6 592 991
Priority 2: Strategy implementation	535 640 176	446 538 257	982 178 434
Priority 3: Managing risks	473 274 009	25 386 300	498 660 309
Priority 4: Diversification	67 307 723	53 763 774	121 071 497
Priority 5: International Trade	103 241 431	56 669 844	159 911 275
Priority 6: CSR	19 669 350	12 291 128	31 960 478
Multi priorities	30 420 000	310 383 573	340 803 573
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1 230 600 492</b>	<b>910 578 064</b>	<b>2 141 178 556</b>

Source: ADE Inventory analysis based on CRIS data

**Commission support per product, evolution of amounts contracted per decision year, 2000-2004 compared to 2005-2009**

Product	2000-2004 Contracted amounts in Euros	2005-2009 Contracted amounts in Euros	% increase from 2000- 2004 to 2005-2009
Arabic gum		931,891	-
Banana	240,882,989	82,602,681	-66%
Bean	1,298,270		-
Cashew nut	738,216	2,698,420	266%
Citrus	8,700,000		-
coco	2,007,709		-
Cocoa	710,769	6,617,630	831%
Coffee	252,940,637	3,724,645	-99%
Cotton	63,925,089	45,426,864	-29%
Fruit	2,719,152	871,332	-68%
Grain	349,352	5,321,521	1423%
Groundnut	8,720,397	157,875	-98%
Hide	6,737,322		-
Mango	867,661	1,679,980	94%
Oil	3,901,586	1,651,850	-58%
Palm	13,840,638		-
Pineapple	69,060	79,154	15%
Potato	540,641	164,277	-70%
Pyrethre	37,568		-
Rice	24,062,103	13,201,616	-45%
Rum	66,936,652		-
Sesame	90,687		-
Sugar	1,716,302	290,667,839	16836%
Tea	6,439,073		-
Vanilla	4,180,397		-
Ylang-ylang		120,000	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>712,412,271</b>	<b>455,917,575</b>	<b>-36%</b>

Source: ADE inventory analysis based on CRIS data

The table below shows the evolution of funding by priority over the period 2000-2004 compared to 2005-2009 for EDF funded contracts only.

**Country/sub-region breakdown, contracts (€m), 2000-2009, 20 main beneficiary countries/sub-regions of support to agricultural commodities**

Country/ region	FED	Stabex	FOOD (1)	BAN	SUGAR (2)	NGO/NSA (3)	Other (4)	Grand Total
ACP COUNTRIES	254,117,778		51,220,639	642,710	793,457	1,918,260	3,018,090	311,710,934
ALL COUNTRIES			200,360,510			1,211,385	4,390,549	205,962,444
IVORY COAST	9,280,995	82,037,253		23,816,954	2,386,646	1,425,970		118,947,817
JAMAICA	8,899,512	9,482,060		37,025,541	48,015,978			103,423,090
SUDAN		92,741,013						92,741,013
CARIBBEAN REGION	90,507,164			1,308,944	67,518			91,883,626
MAURITIUS	5,054,469				74,823,000			79,877,469
SAINT LUCIA	207,619	17,478,378		58,440,947				76,126,944
UGANDA	23,160,250	35,138,115				1,210,177		59,508,543
KENYA	2,897,246	51,046,480			401,565	2,114,787		56,460,078
CAMEROUN	3,985,401	17,413,223		30,673,575		320,000		52,392,199
GUYANA					49,225,370			49,225,370
DOMINICA	5,790,386	6,942,325		34,225,126				46,957,837
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES		3,859,755		36,633,140				40,492,895
MADAGASCAR	737,183	16,007,115	17,723,905	2,934,844	1,900,427			39,303,475
SWAZILAND	25,358,345				11,457,644			36,815,989
BURKINA FASO	30,219,772	885,107	3,441,527			2,072,578		36,618,984
EAST AFRICA REGION	36,614,745							36,614,745
BELIZE	8,700,000			21,082,812	6,516,717			36,299,529
TANZANIA	593,114	31,757,576			3,198,755	734,319		36,283,764
MALAWI	27,710,128	1,038,985			5,212,580			33,961,693
GHANA	30,793,126					1,819,721		32,612,847
MOZAMBIQUE	431,861		25,801,699		6,359,800			32,593,360
ETHIOPIA	21,481,575	5,244,980	2,263,965					28,990,520
BENIN	22,208,379	813,712	2,133,028			628,728		25,783,847
RWANDA	151,025	23,703,294					303,376	24,157,695
BARBADOS	86,173				22,634,331			22,720,503
BURUNDI	527,705	19,701,584	462,902			1,042,954		21,735,145
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	43,946				21,473,295			21,517,241
SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION	20,352,033							20,352,033
ZAMBIA	16,359,176				3,763,634			20,122,810
MALI	15,207,838		2,126,869			2,658,013		19,992,721
SENEGAL	135,940	16,522,369				2,026,229		18,684,538
SURINAME	2,378,328			15,428,530				17,806,858
NAMIBIA	17,037,290							17,037,290
WEST AFRICA REGION	14,680,756					749,833	1,180,000	16,610,589
CENTRAL AFRICA REGION	16,517,178							16,517,178
SOLOMON ISLANDS		15,816,020						15,816,020
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	23,233				15,606,110			15,629,343
SOMALIA				13,431,766				13,431,766
HAITI	2,355,126	3,099,245	5,714,478			1,770,585	87,659	13,027,092
CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF)	43,709		10,407,399			710,205		11,161,313
TOGO		8,471,196	1,107,173			787,225		10,365,594
<b>Total all countries</b>	<b>738,654,642</b>	<b>470,658,173</b>	<b>328,451,708</b>	<b>281,145,821</b>	<b>280,973,853</b>	<b>27,370,537</b>	<b>16,303,785</b>	<b>2,143,558,518</b>

**Table 2: Fund allocations under the All-ACP Programme at end June 2010, by Communication priority, in Euros**

All ACP Programme	Amounts allocated
Priority 1: Strategy design	11,845,916
Priority 2: Strategy implementation	10,187,635
Priority 3: Managing risks	3,744,186
Priority 4: Diversification	47,000
Priority 5: International Trade	4,610,155
Priority 6: CSR	575,000
Multi priorities	293,000
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>31,302,892</b>

*Source: from the AAACP Coordination Unit*

**Priority / category breakdown – evolution 2000-2009: all instruments**

With regards to the evolution per priority of the Commission's support to agricultural commodities, Table below shows that comparatively to the period 2000-2004 (and excluding the peak of Stabex funds at the beginning of the period), the period 'post Communications' saw increased levels of funding being channelled to agricultural projects with contracts in some areas being particularly favoured:

- Support to National Strategy increased from almost nothing to just over €6 m;
- Priority 2 more than doubled with allocations to research (especially CGIAR) and infrastructure and equipment being particularly important; regional integration also features for the first time in the supported areas;
- Priority 3 statistically shows a sharp reduction due to the inclusion, in the period 2000-2004 of the Stabex allocations;
- Priorities 4, 5 and 6 all increase significantly as well.
- The multi category is the single most important beneficiary of increased funding: it includes the sector budget operations linked to agriculture and the All ACP project which has been launched as a direct result of the Communications.

**Table 3: Trends in funding (all instruments): contracts by priority and area (contracted amounts in Euros), 2000-2004 and 2005-2009**

Priorities and areas of support	Amounts contracted		
	2000-2004	2005-2009	Total
<b>Priority 1</b>	<b>114,734</b>	<b>6,498,257</b>	<b>6,612,991</b>
Support to national strategy	114,734	6,498,257	6,612,991
<b>Priority 2</b>	<b>289,250,164</b>	<b>692,928,269</b>	<b>982,178,434</b>
Agro-Industry	2,156,344	8,617,276	10,773,620
CGIAR	76,717,961	153,011,407	229,729,368
EPA	18,737,030	27,952,815	46,689,845
Farmer organisation	8,679,291	14,781,427	23,460,718
Infrastructure / Equipment	19,876,514	128,732,314	148,608,828
Institutional and regulatory support	25,259,007	49,139,721	74,398,728
Other	415,082	3,394,998	3,810,080
Regional Integration		13,546,834	13,546,834
Research / Study	33,971,736	74,573,154	108,544,890
Support to producer Value Chain	96,534,942	185,115,529	281,650,471
	6,902,257	34,062,793	40,965,051
<b>Priority 3</b>	<b>458,809,900</b>	<b>39,850,409</b>	<b>498,660,309</b>
Finance		2,330,318	2,330,318
Risk management	1,171,818	24,500,000	25,671,818
Stabex	457,638,082	13,020,091	470,658,173
<b>Priority 4</b>	<b>22,740,949</b>	<b>98,330,548</b>	<b>121,071,497</b>
Support to diversification	22,740,949	98,330,548	121,071,497
<b>Priority 5</b>	<b>60,632,178</b>	<b>99,279,096</b>	<b>159,911,275</b>
Trade	60,632,178	99,279,096	159,911,275
<b>Priority 6</b>	<b>1,955,235</b>	<b>30,005,243</b>	<b>31,960,478</b>
Environment/social	885,515	24,217,570	25,103,085



Fair trade	1,069,721	5,787,672	6,857,393
<b>Multi</b>		<b>343,163,535</b>	<b>343,163,535</b>
Multi		343,163,535	343,163,535
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>833,503,161</b>	<b>1,310,055,357</b>	<b>2,143,558,518</b>

*Source: ADE Inventory analysis based on CRIS data*

**It should however be noted that these trends concern contracted amounts; if one were to look at the amounts planned by year of decision, the picture would be quite different: 30% of the contracts signed during the period 2005-2009 (or €398 million) were based on decisions having taken place before 2005. On the basis of decision years, the period 2005-2009 would thus show a decrease in allocations to agricultural commodities, or excluding Stabex funds, a very modest increase only.**

#### **Priority / category breakdown – evolution 2000-2009: EDF funds only**

If it is admitted that the Communications' influence is mostly noticeable on the allocations of EDF funds (as the use of other budget lines is mostly tied to specific uses), it is interesting to look at the extent to which the Communications may have influenced the allocation of EDF funds by priority objective. Applying the same analytical principles as above, it was noted that:

- Contracted amounts in support to agricultural commodities more than doubled between 2000-2004 and 2005-2009; single projects often accounted for important shares of the quite dramatic increases in allocations, amongst them the AAACP, the EU-Africa Cotton Partnership and the GIIF projects which were directly initiated as a follow-up of the Communication.
- On the basis of contracted amounts one notes that institutional and regulatory support, regional integration and support to value chains have received increased amounts after 2004; the 'multi' category has increased dramatically, with apart from the AAACP, two cotton support programmes (Mali and Burkina Faso), one sugar support programme (Mauritius) and one sector budget support for agriculture (in Uganda) which were however not inspired by the Communications; research has received hardly any new funding since 2005.
- Most of the decisions related to this increase in contracted amounts actually predate the Communication (with the exception of those undertaken in the AAACP, which are counted in the 'Multi' category): 45% of contracts (in value) passed during 2005-2009 originated from decisions taken before 2004 and on decision-basis only, the allocations to agriculture made from EDF funds have thus actually decreased quite strongly between the two periods, from just under €400 million to just under €300 million.

**Trends in EDF funding: contracted amounts by priority and area (in Euros)**

Priorities and areas of support	Contracted amounts		
	2000-2004	2005-2009	Total
<b>Priority 1</b>		<b>1 251 701</b>	<b>1 251 701</b>
Support to national strategy		1 251 701	1 251 701
<b>Priority 2</b>	<b>145 387 729</b>	<b>285 853 676</b>	<b>431 241 405</b>
Agro-Industry	1 781 916	280 067	2 061 984
CGIAR	14 648 457		14 648 457
EPA	18 737 030	27 952 815	46 689 845
Farmer organisation	751 124	3 043 334	3 794 457
Infrastructure / Equipment	16 931 059	58 711 406	75 642 465
Institutional and regulatory support	16 712 022	21 997 520	38 709 542
Other	173 625	1 057 093	1 230 718
Regional Integration		13 546 834	13 546 834
Research / Study	33 971 736	39 146 300	73 118 036
Support to producer	41 680 759	110 606 484	152 287 243
Value Chain		9 511 822	9 511 822
<b>Priority 3</b>	<b>1 171 818</b>	<b>24 500 000</b>	<b>25 671 818</b>
Risk management	1 171 818	24 500 000	25 671 818
<b>Priority 4</b>	<b>11 204 965</b>	<b>20 391 261</b>	<b>31 596 225</b>
Support to diversification	11 204 965	20 391 261	31 596 225
<b>Priority 5</b>	<b>55 721 750</b>	<b>94 716 285</b>	<b>150 438 035</b>
Trade	55 721 750	94 716 285	150 438 035
<b>Priority 6</b>	<b>186 469</b>	<b>13 985 144</b>	<b>14 171 613</b>
Environment/social	186 469	13 079 144	13 265 613
Fair trade		906 000	906 000
<b>Multi</b>		<b>84 283 845</b>	<b>84 283 845</b>
Multi		84 283 845	84 283 845
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>213 672 730</b>	<b>524 981 911</b>	<b>738 654 642</b>

*Source: ADE Inventory analysis based on CRIS data*

In the above table, the increase of contracted amounts in support to agricultural commodities between the two periods is very marked since they more than double from one period to the next. It is interesting to note in the above table that single projects often account for important shares of the quite dramatic increases in allocations, such as:

- The start of a feeder roads project in Ghana (€25 million under P2: Infrastructure/Equipment);
- A regional integration project for the Central Africa Region (€13,5 million under P2);
- A number of product specific support projects for rum (€70 million) and rice (€ 22 million) in the Caribbean and coffee (€15 million) in Ethiopia: these programmes, all ranked under producer support (P2) were decided in 2001, 2003 and 2001 respectively and can thus not be linked to the Communications;
- The Global Index Insurance Programme (€25 million under P3);
- A diversification programme in Zambia (€25 million under P4);
- The Multilateral Trade System – Integrated Framework programme (€16 million under P5); and

- The All-ACP programme (€45 million under Multi).

Amongst these projects, the All-ACP, the EU-Africa Cotton Partnership and the GIFF projects are directly initiated as a follow-up of the Communication, the other projects having direct or potential links with agricultural commodities but having probably not been inspired by the Communications (the Central Africa Regional Integration programme being probably linked to the EPA negotiations and the MTS-IF being a result of increased focus of cooperation on AfI).

It is also of interest to look more closely at the All-ACP programme. As of June 2011, funds have been decided and allocated as follows:

Total AAACP funding								
Cost Estimates								
Region	FAO	ITC	UNCTAD	WB-SDN	WB-ARMT	CFC	Total	
PAC	935,000	846,700	610,000	146,000	44,700	0	2,582,400	
CAR	591,000	710,300	415,000	118,000	650,000	1,314,800	3,799,100	
CEN	603,000	1,542,000	217,000	815,500	52,800	0	3,230,300	
WST	2,743,000	2,280,400	327,000	1,481,750	882,200	2,336,400	10,050,750	
ESA	1,656,000	2,121,500	357,000	777,500	1,199,200	2,384,300	8,495,500	
ACP	0	0	490,000	0	711,100	2,416,650	3,617,750	
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,528,000</b>	<b>7,500,900</b>	<b>2,416,000</b>	<b>3,338,750</b>	<b>3,540,000</b>	<b>8,452,150</b>	<b>31,775,800</b>	
Disbursements								
Region	FAO	ITC	UNCTAD	WB-SDN	WB-ARMT	CFC	Total	Rate
PAC	660,205	603,963	74,751	132,715	44,712	0	1,516,346	59%
CAR	370,223	407,083	149,837	102,314	439,505	761,388	2,230,351	59%
CEN	342,667	671,448	155,138	364,035	52,818	0	1,586,107	49%
WST	1,880,028	1,377,017	225,485	862,910	231,764	320,000	4,897,205	49%
ESA	796,108	1,429,402	172,232	276,683	650,705	1,213,611	4,538,741	53%
ACP	0	0	369,376	0	665,436	2,105,000	3,139,812	87%
<b>All regions</b>	<b>4,049,232</b>	<b>4,488,914</b>	<b>1,146,819</b>	<b>1,738,657</b>	<b>2,084,940</b>	<b>4,399,999</b>	<b>17,908,561</b>	<b>56%</b>
<b>Rate</b>	<b>62%</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>59%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>56%</b>	

Source: AAACP Coordination unit

As of the end of June 2010 the project allocated its funds according to the priorities below:

#### Trends in EDF funding: contracted amounts by priority and area with the All-ACP activities broken down by priority (in Euros)

Communication 2004(89) Priorities	Contracted amounts		
	2000-2004	2005-2009	Total
Priority 1: Strategy design		13 097 617	13 097 617
Priority 2: Strategy implementation	145 387 729	296 041 311	441 429 040
Priority 3: Managing risks	1 171 818	28 244 186	29 416 004
Priority 4: Diversification	11 204 965	20 438 261	31 643 225
Priority 5: International Trade	55 721 750	99 326 440	155 048 190
Priority 6: CSR	186 469	14 560 144	14 746 613
Multi priorities		53 273 953	53 273 953
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>213 672 730</b>	<b>524 981 911</b>	<b>738 654 642</b>

Source: ADE based on CRIS Data Base and on information from the AllACP

*Programme Coordination Unit*

The All-ACP programme has put the largest emphasis on strategy design (the first priority of the Communication); according to the inventory EDF funds had hitherto not been used specifically for projects dedicated to this activity although it might have been undertaken as a component of larger projects.

Finally, likewise to the picture of overall funding to agricultural commodities highlighted above, it should be noted that the picture for EDF funds allocation to agricultural commodities looks quite different if the analysis is based on the decisions made after 2004 (and thus excluding contracts signed after 2004 that originated from decisions taken before the Communications were issued). **Indeed, 45% of contracts (in value) passed during 2005-2009 originated from decisions taken before 2004 and on decision-basis only, the allocations to agriculture made from EDF funds have thus actually decreased quite strongly between the two periods, from just under €400 million to just under €300 million.** This is illustrated in the table below.

**Allocations from EDF funds to agricultural commodities based on decision years (for contracts passed over the period 2000-2009), in Euros.**

Priorities and areas of support	Amounts contracted based on decision year			
	1997-1999	2000-2004	2005-2009	Total
<b>Priority 1</b>		<b>848 303</b>	<b>403 398</b>	<b>1 251 701</b>
Support to national strategy		848 303	403 398	1 251 701
<b>Priority 2</b>	<b>43 895 726</b>	<b>264 148 512</b>	<b>123 197 167</b>	<b>431 241 405</b>
Agro-Industry	1 781 916	280 067		2 061 984
CGIAR		14 648 457		14 648 457
EPA		25 795 766	20 894 080	46 689 845
Farmer organisation		2 924 721	869 736	3 794 457
Infrastructure / Equipment	2 117 380	41 507 012	32 018 074	75 642 465
Institutional and regulatory support	21 704 650	783 394	16 221 497	38 709 542
Other	415 099	747 342	68 277	1 230 718
Regional Integration			13 546 834	13 546 834
Research / Study	0	59 812 989	13 305 047	73 118 036
Support to producer	17 876 680	117 648 764	16 761 800	152 287 243
Value Chain			9 511 822	9 511 822
<b>Priority 3</b>		<b>1 171 818</b>	<b>24 500 000</b>	<b>25 671 818</b>
Risk management		1 171 818	24 500 000	25 671 818
<b>Priority 4</b>	<b>427 599</b>	<b>15 151 386</b>	<b>16 017 241</b>	<b>31 596 225</b>
Support to diversification	427 599	15 151 386	16 017 241	31 596 225
<b>Priority 5</b>	<b>11 655 584</b>	<b>84 813 411</b>	<b>53 969 040</b>	<b>150 438 035</b>
Trade	11 655 584	84 813 411	53 969 040	150 438 035
<b>Priority 6</b>		<b>9 879 613</b>	<b>4 292 000</b>	<b>14 171 613</b>
Environment/social		9 573 613	3 692 000	13 265 613
Fair trade		306 000	600 000	906 000
<b>Multi</b>		<b>17 500 000</b>	<b>66 783 845</b>	<b>84 283 845</b>
Multi		17 500 000	66 783 845	84 283 845
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>55 978 909</b>	<b>393 513 043</b>	<b>289 162 690</b>	<b>738 654 642</b>


*Source: ADE inventory analysis based on CRIS data*

The noteworthy features of the evolution based on decisions of EDF funding are as follows:

- Most of the decisions related to the increase noted above in contracts aimed to support the development of national strategies (P1) actually predate the Communication (with the exception of those undertaken in the All-ACP Programme, which are counted in the 'Multi' category);
- Research has received hardly any new funding since 2005;
- Institutional and regulatory support, regional integration and support to value chains have seen important increases of their allocations in the period 2005-2009;

The 'multi' category has increased dramatically; it includes the All-ACP Programme, two cotton support programmes (Mali and Burkina Faso), one sugar support programme (Mauritius) and one sector budget support for agriculture (in Uganda).

#### Evolution of contracted amounts per region and per priority, 2000-2009 in millions of Euros



Source: ADE based on CRIS Data Base

#### CDDCs overall

Autres interventions de la Commission:

- POPACA/ POP 2
- Programme Tous ACP (FAO): Improving Farmer-Buyer Linkages for the fruits and vegetables sector (Vanuatu, Samoa and Fiji – 2008/2009), Pacific Fruit and Vegetables Strategy (Samoa, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands – 2010/2011)
- Capacity building in support of preparation of Economic Partnership Agreements
- Primary Sector Growth Support Programme – Phase 1 (pas encore commencé)
- Facilitating Agricultural Commodity Trade -Pacific Regional Indicative Programme

Source: ADE inventory

I.1.4.2	The Commission has introduced new financing instruments to tackle the challenges represented by long term price decline and short term price instability	
ACP-ACP	<p>The AAACP programme is itself a tool developed and financed by the EC to tackle long term price decline and short term price instability. The overall objective of the AAACP programme is to improve incomes for producers from traditional or other agricultural commodities and reduce income vulnerability at both producer and macro level. In addition, one of the four results (result 3) of the programme is to develop market-based risk management instruments to cope with long term price decline and short term price instability. <i>Source : IF</i></p> <p>Under the All ACP programme, the World Bank (Sustainable Development Network) has implemented so far the following activities (update: 30 June 2011).</p>	
	<b>AAACP No</b>	<b>Title</b>
		<b>Status</b>
	<b>PACIFIC REGION</b>	
	1.PAC.D01	Operationalization of coffee strategy in PNG
	1.PAC.D02	Design study to enhance fresh produce value chain and crop diversification
	1.PAC.D03	Design of pilot actions to enhance supply response
	1.PAC.D04	Design of a strategy for the Fruit and Vegetables sectors
	<b>CARIBBEAN REGION</b>	
	1.CAR.D01	Pilot production/marketing operation to strengthen VC partnerships to supply domestic market
	1.CAR.D02	Support to coffee based production systems in the South-east
	1.CAR.D03	Support to the improvement of cocoa production systems in Northern Haiti
	1.CAR.D04	Information on coffee gourmet and related certification requirements
	1.CAR.D05	Control of mango fruit fly infestation and support to mango export capacities
	1.CAR.D06	Portal to enhance backward linkages of agriculture with rural tourism
	<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION</b>	
	1.CEN.D01	Improvement of food crops marketing with emphasis on distribution network
	1.CEN.D02	Feasibility of small holder oil palm expansion for industrial processing
	1.CEN.D03	Sector strategy for specialty coffee and cocoa
	1.CEN.D04	Study on commercial agriculture and domestic private sector investment
	1.CEN.D05	Improvement of harvesting and quality management for arabic gum
	2.CEN.D01	Support to Speciality Coffee production and marketing in Cameroon
	2.CEN.D03	Promotion of Cassava Processing in Cameroon
	<b>WEST AFRICAN REGION</b>	
	1.WST.D01	Continuation of fruit fly control campaign
	1.WST.D02	Ghana Horticulture Strategic Profile, Phase 2
	1.WST.D03	Cotton strategy for UEMOA
	1.WST.D04	Support to the implementation of a cashew action plan in Mali
	1.WST.D05	Technological improvements in mango processing
	1.WST.D06	Support to implementation of a sub-regional strategy for Arabic gum
	1.WST.D07	Capitalization of lessons learned in private irrigation for high value crops in Sahelian countries
	1.WST.D08	Targeted actions to support sub-regional trade in horticulture
	1.WST.D09	Preparation of a budget for the regional Fruit fly initiative
	2.WST.D01	Prevention of Seed Cotton Contamination
	2.WST.D03	Continuation of the West African Fruit Fly initiative
	2.WST.D04	Cotton Project in Ghana
	2.WST.D05	Continuation of the West African Fruit Fly initiative (4)
	<b>EAST &amp; SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION</b>	
	1.ESA.D01	Horticulture Strategy for Madagascar
	1.ESA.D02	Multi-country strategy for sisal
	1.ESA.D03	Regional Modules Seminars on High Value Agriculture using GDLN
	1.ESA.D04	Horticultural marketing strategy for Rwanda
	1.ESA.D05	Oil Seeds and Pulses Marketing Pilot in Ethiopia

1.ESA.D06	Feasibility of Cold Store for litchi export	Cancelled
1.ESA.D07	Fruit Fly Control in Mozambique	Completed
1.ESA.D08	Support to RECs and cotton chain stakeholders for implementing a regional cotton strategy	Cancelled
1.ESA.D09	Final. of guide on application of VC approaches in Africa's agribusiness	Completed
2.ESA.D01	Support to horticulture industry in Rwanda and Burundi	Ongoing
2.ESA.D02	Regional Trade in Fresh Produce in Eastern / Southern Africa	Ongoing
<b>CROSS-REGIONAL</b>		
2.ACP.D03	Analysis of cotton farming systems and implications for sector policies	Cancelled

Source: WB-Sustainable Development Network (WB-SDN), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 28 July 2011

Under the All ACP programme, UNCTAD has implemented so far the following activities (update: 30 June 2011).

AAACP No	Title	Status
<b>PACIFIC REGION</b>		
1.PAC.C01	Development of value chain strategies elements	Cancelled
1.PAC.C02	Creation of a pilot sub-regional market information system with national systems in Fiji	Merged with 2.PAC.C01
1.PAC.C03	Commodity Supply Chain Finance: review of legal and regulatory framework	Cancelled
1.PAC.C04	Sustainability Claims Portal Regional Workshop	Completed
2.PAC.C01	Regionalisation of the Pacific Market Information System - Infoshare	On-going
2.PAC.C02	Commodity Supply Chain Finance: review of legal and regulatory framework	On-going
<b>CARIBBEAN REGION</b>		
1.CAR.C01a	Development of value chain strategies elements - Grenada and Jamaica	Completed
1.CAR.C01b	Support for the financing of the nutmeg sector in Grenada	<b>COMPLETED</b>
1.CAR.C02	Information on prices and market intelligence	<b>COMPLETED</b>
1.CAR.C03	Commodity Supply Chain Finance	Completed
1.CAR.C04	Commodity Exchanges: review & promotion of Agr.Com.Exch. (ACE)	On-going
1.CAR.C05	Sustainability Claims Portal Regional Workshop	<b>COMPLETED</b>
2.CAR.C01	Strengthening of the Caribbean Sub-Reg. Marketing Inform. Service	<b>COMPLETED</b>
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION</b>		
1.CEN.C01	Support to strategies and cross-cutting activities	Completed
1.CEN.C02	Carry-over of training services to complete QSA for a MIS	Completed
1.CEN.C03	Commodity Supply Chain Finance	Completed
1.CEN.C04	Agricultural Commodity Exchanges	On-going
1.CEN.C05	Sustainability Claims Portal Regional Workshop	Cancelled
2.CEN.C01	Information Systems on Prices and Market Intelligence	<b>COMPLETED</b>
<b>WEST AFRICAN REGION</b>		
1.WST.C01	Support to strategies and cross-cutting activities	Completed
1.WST.C02a	Regional ECOWAS - Support to supply chain finance	Completed
1.WST.C02b	Regional ECOWAS - Support to commodity exchanges	Completed
1.WST.C03a	Supply chain finance: prefeasibility study and follow up- Arabic Gum	Completed
1.WST.C03b	Supply chain finance: prefeasibility study and follow up- Cotton guarantee fund	Completed
1.WST.C04	Commodity Exchanges Ghana	<b>COMPLETED</b>
1.WST.C05	Sustainability Claims Portal Regional Workshop	<b>COMPLETED</b>
<b>EAST &amp; SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION</b>		
1.ESA.C01	Support to strategies & other cross cutting activities	On-going
1.ESA.C02a	Regional COMESA - Support to supply chain finance	Completed
1.ESA.C02b	Regional COMESA - Support to Commodity Exchanges	On-going
1.ESA.C03	Commodity Exchange in Tanzania for Cashew Nuts	<b>COMPLETED</b>
1.ESA.C04	Sustainability Claims Portal Regional Workshop	On-going

<b>CROSS-REGIONAL</b>		
1.ACP.C01	Sustainability Claims Portal	On-going
1.ACP.C02	INFOCOMM e-portal on market information in the commodity area	Completed
2.ACP.C01	UNCTAD's INFOCOMM Portal Upgrading (phase 2)	On-going
2.ACP.C02	Sustainability Claims Portal consolidation	On-going

*Source: UNCTAD, Draft 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011, 22 July 2011.*

International Trade Center:

The period between 1 January 2011 and 30 June 2011 has seen acceleration in implementation activities related to sector development strategies completed during previous periods.

Significant progress was made with interim Result 2 achievements (of the COM(2004)89) in several non-cotton sectors in each region: eg: Jamaica – Agri-foods, Mali – Arabic gum, Cameroon – Coffee, Ethiopia – Spices, Samoa – Fruits & vegetables. The final six months of the All ACP Programme will see a focus on the other sectors and countries to attain similar results.

ITC originally agreed to deliver 17 sector value chain development strategies concluded through participatory stakeholder processes – including implementation plans and the establishment of stakeholder led strategy implementation coordination bodies. Four of these sector development strategies were to be regional in their scope.

ITC has now delivered 17 strategies, implementation plans and established effective functioning coordination bodies in each case. Although the completion of one regional sector development strategy remains outstanding (ESA Agri-foods schedule with RECs), ITC succeeded, with support from NGOs and other agencies under the regionalisation component of Central African coffee development project, to facilitate the completion of an additional coffee sector development strategy for conflict ravaged parts of DR Congo.

Despite longer than anticipated local arrangements for appropriate engagement and support from authorities in many countries and regions many of the early market and product development implementation activities supported by ITC have led to actual measurable results and initial increase in incomes for targeted poor communities.

As far as cotton regional strategy and implementation coordination are concerned, the ITC support led to the following outputs:

- West and Central Africa: Cotton sector development strategies for West and Central Africa have now been fully completed and endorsed by stakeholders, national and regional authorities in an unprecedented display of alignment and unity. Feedback from new customers has stimulated growers and ginners to re-examine their traditional working practices. The combined efforts of FAO, CFC (cotton quality testing facilities), UNCTAD and ITC in West Africa have provided the mechanisms to facilitate direct sales and greater transparency in cotton trade. However, further development programme support will be required for the next two years to ensure such fragile beginnings are sustained, become institutionalised and self-sustaining. The pace of capacity building may be slower than initially expected – but it is consistent and gaining momentum. These positive steps from stakeholders in the Central and West Africa are reinforced by the current positive price and demand trends in international markets.
- East & Southern Africa: During the period the sector strategy coordination body and cotton Focal Point in COMESA supported an implementation progress review and the design / alignment of national and sub-regional development plans for cotton in the MoZaZiMa group of countries. A full strategy review is planned for the final semester. The countries in this region also showed continuing progress, especially as participation in market and quality orientation missions with direct customer contact increased.

*Source: ITC, 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 30 June 2011.* Under the All ACP programme, the World Bank (risk management team) has implemented so far the following activities (update: 30 June 2011).



AAACP No	Title	Status
<b>PACIFIC REGION</b>		
1.PAC.E01	Risk management assessment for Fruit & Vegetable sector	Completed
<b>CARIBBEAN REGION</b>		
1.CAR.E01	Policy support on responses to food price volatility	Completed
1.CAR.E02	Pre-feasibility study for developing weather risk management strategy for agriculture	Finalizing
1.CAR.E03	Price risk management for the coffee sector as part of WB's promotion of coffee markets	Completed
1.CAR.E04	Pre-feasibility study for developing market based agr. risk management instr.	Finalizing
1.CAR.E05	Capacity Transfer to the region	Ongoing
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION</b>		
1.CEN.E01	Supply Chain Risk Assessment for cocoa & coffee	Completed
<b>WEST AFRICAN REGION</b>		
1.WST.E01	Supply Chain Risk Assessment	Finalizing
1.WST.E02	Weather Risk Management	Ongoing
1.WST.E04	Commodity Price Risk Management	Ongoing
1.WST.E07	Capacity Transfer to the Region	Ongoing
<b>EAST &amp; SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION</b>		
1.ESA.E01	Supply chain risk assessment	Finalizing
1.ESA.E02	Weather Risk Management	Ongoing
1.ESA.E04	Commodity Price Risk Management	Ongoing
1.ESA.E07	Capacity Transfer to the Region	Finalizing
<b>CROSS-REGIONAL</b>		
1.ACP.E01	Training and Education on Agricultural Risk management	Completed
1.ACP.E02	Cotton Market Research and Policy Dialogue	Completed
<p><i>Source: WB- Agricultural Risk Management Team (WB-ARMT), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 25 July 2011</i></p> <p>The status of the activities of the Common Fund for Commodities under the All ACP programmes are provided below by result of the COM(2004)89.</p> <p>Result Area 1 – Development of effective commodity strategies and implementation plans</p> <p>In view of the collaborative relationship between the CFC and the International Commodity Bodies (ICBs), the operational framework of the CFC assumes that development of relevant commodity sector strategies is led by the stakeholders of the ICBs who represent both producers and consumers, private sector and government in each respective commodity sector. Given its competitive advantage in the identification, formulation and implementation of project interventions, in the context of the Programme the CFC focussed on project activities following the existing commodity strategies of the ICBs and/or the newly developed strategies of the AAACP. The CFC did not seek Programme support for activities addressing the Result 1.</p> <p>Result Area 2 – Access to and use of markets, production factors and services</p> <p>Under Tranches I and II of the programme the CFC cofinances nine activities, namely:</p>		

AAACP Ref. No	CFC Project No and Activity Title	Country/Region	AAACP contribution (EUR) <sup>26</sup>	Estimated total cost <sup>27</sup> (EUR)
<u>0.ACP.F01</u>	CFC/ICAC/33 - Cotton Instrument Testing	West Africa, Mali East Africa, Tanzania	2,585,822	6,325,222
<u>2.CAR.F01</u>	CFC/FIGG/44 Increased Production of Root and Tuber Crops in the Caribbean through the Introduction of Improved Marketing and Production Technologies	Multi-country <sup>28</sup>	753,342	2,423,430
<u>2.CAR.F02</u>	CFC/FIGTF/26 Increased Production of Vegetables and Herbs through the use of Protected Agriculture in the Caribbean	Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago and Haiti	453,450	2,010,456
<u>2.CAR.F03</u>	Support to the regional Focal Point under AAACP Twinning Arrangement	Caribbean region	200,000	200,000
<u>2.WST.F02</u>	CFC/ICAC/38 – Prevention of Seed Cotton Contamination in West Africa	Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali	2,500,000	5,000,000
<u>0.ESA.F02</u>	CFC/FIGG/38FA - Warehouse receipts East Africa	East Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi	764,179	3,108,626
<u>2.ESA.F01</u>	CFC/ICAC/37 – Improving Cotton Production Efficiency in Small-scale Farming Systems in East Africa (Kenya and Mozambique) through better vertical integration of the supply chain	Kenya & Mozambique	715,000	1,810,000
<u>2.ESA.F02</u>	CFC/ICO/45 - Building Capacity in Coffee Certification and Verification in EAFCA Countries	Multi-country <sup>29</sup>	1,072,000	3,211,803
	TOTAL		<b>9,043,792</b>	<b>24,089,537</b>

<sup>26</sup> Including 7% administrative overhead of the CFC

<sup>27</sup> Contribution commitments by the CFC had been made in USD. For the purposes of reporting the total amount, a fixed rate of exchange had been applied USD 1.4 = EUR 1.0

<sup>28</sup> Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad/Tobago, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Barbados

<sup>29</sup> Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, DRC and Madagascar

	TOTAL QSA		<i>3,350,000</i>	<i>9,433,848</i>
	TOTAL Tranche II		<i>5,693,792</i>	<i>14,655,689</i>

### Result Area 3 – Market-based instruments to reduce producers' income vulnerability

The CFC did not submit any activities addressing Result 3 under the Programme. However, in the context of the discussions for the Programme, the CFC reached an agreement with the FAO to, out of CFC own funds, their proposal on "Development of risk management strategies for cotton producers in Mozambique" which was originally submitted for consideration under the Programme but withdrawn to allow more time to elaborate it as pilot project financed under the CFC Fast Track facility. The project is now operational.

*Source: Common Fund For Commodities (CFC), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 27 July 2011*

Under the All ACP programme, FAO has implemented so far the following activities (update: 30 June 2011).

AAACP No	Title	Status
<b>PACIFIC REGION</b>		
<u>1.PAC.A01</u>	Value Chain Studies	Completed
<u>1.PAC.A02</u>	Support to FAO RPPS Value Chain training	Completed
<u>1.PAC.A03</u>	Targeted policy and institutional studies	Ongoing
<u>1.PAC.A04</u>	Domestic market studies	Ongoing
<u>1.PAC.A05</u>	Participation in ITC stakeholder workshops	Completed
<u>1.PAC.A06</u>	Strategy validation and analysis	Ongoing
<u>1.PAC.A07</u>	Capacity building on commodity strategies	Completed
<u>1.PAC.A08</u>	Regional expert meeting to review gaps in organisational capacities	Completed
<u>1.PAC.A09</u>	Support to improved regional level systems on standards and certification schemes	Completed
<u>1.PAC.A10</u>	Identif. of requirements for supply chain finance & risk management instr.	Completed
<u>1.PAC.A11</u>	Finalisation of action plans that improve farmer-buyer linkages for F&V sector	Completed
<u>1.PAC.A12</u>	Implem. Activities that improve farmer-buyer linkages	Completed
<u>2.PAC.A01</u>	Implementation of key components of F&V Strategy	Ongoing
<u>2.PAC.A02</u>	Support to the Secretariat of SPC-LRD as Focal Point for the Programme in the Pacific	Ongoing
<b>CARIBBEAN REGION</b>		
<u>1.CAR.A01</u>	Support to ITC strategy formulation	Completed
<u>1.CAR.A02</u>	Policies & strategies determining enabling environment for VC dev.	Suspended
<u>1.CAR.A03</u>	Regional workshop to strengthen agribusiness capacities of producer organisations	Ongoing
<u>1.CAR.A05</u>	Identify buyers, agro-enterprises, or small businesses and develop business models	Completed
<u>1.CAR.A06</u>	Implementation of activities identified under the inclusive business models	Ongoing
<u>1.CAR.A07</u>	Standards and market certification schemes	Cancelled

<u>1.CAR.A08</u>	Dev. & test of questionnaire on risk & risk management mechanisms	Completed
<u>1.CAR.A09</u>	Supply chain risk & finance assessment	Ongoing
<u>2.CAR.A01</u>	Support to Caribbean farmers and farmer organisations in R&T VC	Ongoing
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION</b>		
<u>1.CEN.A01</u>	Support to the ITC strategy formulation	Ongoing
<u>1.CEN.A02</u>	Regional w/shop for policy formulation & instit. dev. for Cereal markets	Ongoing
<u>1.CEN.A03</u>	Regional workshop to strengthen agribusiness capacities of producer organisations	Completed
<u>1.CEN.A04</u>	Support the development of inclusive business models for upstream actors	Completed
<u>1.CEN.A05</u>	Implementation of activities identified under above + ongoing mentoring	Completed
<u>1.CEN.A06</u>	Support the use of integrated nutrient management system (IPNIS)	Completed
<u>1.CEN.A07</u>	Supply chain risk and finance assessment	Ongoing
<u>2.CEN.A01</u>	Enhancement of commercialization of cassava for Cameroon	Ongoing
<u>2.CEN.A02</u>	Support to the implementation of the Coffee Sector Strategy in Cameroon	Ongoing
<b>WEST AFRICAN REGION</b>		
<u>1.WST.A01</u>	Support to ITC strategy & policy appraisal	Ongoing
<u>1.WST.A02</u>	Regional workshop for policy formulation & inst. dev. for cereal markets	Completed
<u>1.WST.A03</u>	Regional workshop to strengthen agribusiness capacities of producer organisations	Ongoing
<u>1.WST.A04</u>	Identify buyers, agro-enterprises, or small businesses and develop business models	Completed
<u>1.WST.A05</u>	Implementation of business model for upstream actors	Ongoing
<u>1.WST.A06</u>	Support local capacities to adopt GAP & IPM for cotton-cereal livestock farming systems	Completed
<u>1.WST.A07</u>	Support to farmer groups for production/marketing of sustainable horticulture produce	Ongoing
<u>1.WST.A08</u>	Supply chain Risk & Finance Assessment	Ongoing
<u>1.WST.A09</u>	Analysis of obstacles to the creation of price risk management mechanisms for cereals (maize, sorghum, rice and millet) at the sub-regional level	Cancelled
<u>2.WST.A01</u>	Capacity building and policy support on IPPM and integration in VC for cotton producers	Ongoing
<u>2.WST.A03</u>	Improve farm income and food security for rice and maize through the development of interprofessions	Ongoing
<u>2.WST.A04</u>	Support to ROPPA as Focal Point for the Programme in West Africa	Ongoing
<b>EAST &amp; SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION</b>		
<u>1.ESA.A01</u>	Support to the ITC process of strategy formulation	Completed
<u>1.ESA.A02</u>	Policy Advocacy in ESA Grains Markets	Ongoing
<u>1.ESA.A03</u>	Assessment of alternative models of public-private partnerships	Completed
<u>1.ESA.A04</u>	Reg. workshop to strengthen agribusiness capacities of producer organ.	Ongoing
<u>1.ESA.A05</u>	Support the development of inclusive business models for upstream actors	Completed
<u>1.ESA.A06</u>	Implementation of activities identified under the inclusive business models	Ongoing

	<u>1.ESA.A07</u>	Analytical support to UNCTAD in Commodity Exchanges	Ongoing
	<u>1.ESA.A08</u>	Alternative Models of Smallholder Organisations	Completed
	<u>1.ESA.A09</u>	Analytical support to UNCTAD on WRS	Completed
	1.ESA.A10	Revitalizing of Kenya Cotton Industry	Cancelled
	1.ESA.A11	Establ. of Cassava Commission and improvement of cassava production & processing	Cancelled
	<u>1.ESA.A12</u>	Mkt Linkage between organic cotton producers and fashion industry	Ongoing
	<u>1.ESA.A13</u>	Seed systems Review for cotton and cassava production systems	Completed
	<u>1.ESA.A14</u>	Dissemination of GAP and concepts	Completed
	<u>1.ESA.A15</u>	GAP and IPM for Uganda Horticulture Sector	Cancelled
	<u>1.ESA.A16</u>	Supply chain risk & finance assessment	Completed
	<u>1.ESA.A17</u>	Risk Mgt for the import and export of cereals	Ongoing
	1.ESA.A18	Review of Mombasa Tea Auction	Cancelled
	<u>1.ESA.A19</u>	Regional Consultations on VC risk mgt and finance	Ongoing
	<u>2.ESA.A03</u>	Enhancement of the commercialisation of the cassava sector	Ongoing
	<i>Source: FAO, 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, July 2011</i>		
<b>BAN</b>	The modification of the CMO bananas and of the preferential banana trade provisions in 1998 meant an increase in competition and a decrease in export price for ACP banana exporters. The council therefore adopted the SFA, as a support mechanism in 1999 (EC 856/1999). The SFA acted as a support mechanism to grant temporary technical and financial assistance to the 12 ACP traditional banana suppliers.		
<b>I.1.4.3</b>	After 2004, in CDDCs selected for country visits, mid-term reviews and country strategy papers show increased support to the agricultural commodities sectors		
<b>BF</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Burkina Faso doesn't include support to agricultural commodities as one of the support sectors.</p> <p>The 9<sup>th</sup> EDF included a non-focal sector support to cotton and a "food security" focal support was added to the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF after the mid-term review in 2005.</p> <p>In conclusion, agricultural support increased after 2004 but decreased in 2008.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 35</i> <i>Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP addendums 1 &amp; 2</i></p>		
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>The 2002-2007 has 3 focal sectors which include (i) regional integration – economic integration and trade (25-30% of resources), transport and telecommunications (35-40%) and sustainable management of renewable natural resources (20-25%).</p> <p><b>The mid term review increased the resources allocated but did not modify the distribution amongst focal sectors.</b></p> <p>The 2008-2013 RSP has also three focal sectors but political stability has come first, then RI and natural resources (the latter two unchanged from previous RSPs). There is no mention of support to agricultural commodities (although of course RI would have an effect on all trade matters, including of agricultural commodities). <i>Source: RSP 2002-2007, RSP 2008-2013</i></p>		
<b>CI</b>	<p><b>Pas d'infos dans les CSP concernant l'augmentation de l'aide au secteur agricole</b> hormis pour la coopération allemande. Au contraire, le secteur du développement rural était prioritaire (secteur de concentration) du 1<sup>er</sup> au 9<sup>ème</sup> FED (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.19</i>) et est devenu un secteur hors concentration dans le cadre du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31</i>).</p> <p>Les secteurs d'intervention majeurs de la coopération allemande sont l'éducation, l'agriculture, la protection des ressources naturelles, la sante, l'eau ainsi que la consolidation de la paix. L'accord de coopération 2002 a <b>accru la concentration sur les projets agricoles</b> et de protection des ressources naturelles. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.24</i>).</p>		

<b>CM</b>	<p>NO. The banana sector has been supported for a long time already before 2000. The support has been maintained from 2000-2010 (and is still going on) without any changes through the COM of 2004. These interventions are guided by the liberalisation of the ACP banana sector.</p> <p>In addition, no stakeholder (DCE, other donors, Ministries) talks about agricultural commodities. Issues concern the agricultural sector as a whole and various products, including maize, manioc, palm oil (used locally), poultry, .... . Very timidly, the agricultural sector appears end of 2000 introduced shyly under various rural development programmes and end of 2011 with the PAPA programme (€20M under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF) (<i>Source MN 403, 409</i>).</p> <p>There is increased support to the agricultural subsectors from the WB including commodities (source MN 411) and maintained support from France. France is a major player in supporting the agricultural sector through the initiative HIPC as they manage a large part of this debt, converted into agricultural projects (<i>Source MN 407</i>).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>While in the first CSP, no specific support is envisaged to the agricultural commodities sectors, the second CSP includes support to the competitiveness of agricultural commodities and to rural development in rural areas. This does not seem to be linked to the issuance of the COM(2004) which was unknown to Commission's staff interviewed. Albeit the demand of the Government of Cameroon, agriculture has not been the object of a focal sector under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF because the Commission prioritised governance issues over agriculture for political reasons. Support to rural development has been included in the non-focal areas. <i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 ; MN 701</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents do not evidence increased support to the agricultural commodities sectors in the Caribbean after 2004.</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, No evidence in ECS</i></p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>Natural resource management for agriculture and food security have become part of the "Regional economic integration" focal sector in the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP whereas there was no mention of it in the 2002-2007 RSP-RIP. There are no budgets to compare but it can be considered that support increased. The focus is not on export commodity dependence though.</p> <p>There is however no justification of the change of focus.</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p><b>No information about an increase of agricultural support after 2004 in CSP</b></p> <p>In terms of programmable assistance, infrastructure (water, energy and roads) has featured as an important orientation in EC-Ethiopia cooperation. This was supplemented in the 1980s by projects to increase agricultural exports (coffee and cotton) and later by integrated rural development programmes. In the 1990s a gradual shift occurred, following a policy and <b>programming re-orientation – from agriculture &amp; rural development under EDF 6 towards roads in EDF 7 and 8</b>. EDF 9 involved a further shift: while maintaining road transport as a focal sector, priority was accorded to rural development/food security as well as to several macro-economic and sector support mechanisms, such as Direct Budget Support, a Transport Sector Policy Support operation and a project for the Protection of Basic Services. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.31</i>). No evidence in CSE</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>In Ghana one notes indeed an increased share of the programmable cooperation budget dedicated to agriculture after 2004-2005; this is mainly due to the fact that the Stabex support was coming to an end and it was decided to continue direct support to the cocoa sector as well as further rehabilitation of feeder roads, transport being the major focal sector of the Commission in Ghana. Agriculture is not, and has not been in the past, a focal sector for Commission support.</p> <p>The following interventions have been identified with an agricultural commodities direct or indirect focus:</p>

Year of decision	Titles of projects/programmes	Title of decision (1)	Allocations (decision/transfer amount)	Contracts planned as of Jan 2010	Contracts paid as of Jan 2010
1997	Cocoa Sector Support Programme I	Stabex transfers (1) (2)	37 230 214	11 230 214	11 230 214
1997	Support to Feeder Roads Phases I - III (3)	Stabex transfers (1) (2)		26 000 000	25 421 052
2002	pré-engagement P1 dont dépendront 190 contrats en faveur de pays en	ONG-PVD/2002/001-092	for Ghana ?	1 069 721	1 069 721
2004	Strengthen monitoring capacities Ministry of Food & Agriculture	FED/2004/017-384 (1)	1 559 944	1 559 944	1 559 944
2004	TCF: Survey for Cocoa Production (CIRAD)	FED/2004/016-552	1 545 000	19 635	19 635
2006	Feeder Roads Improvement Project (FRIP)	FED/2006/017-932	27 000 000	25 930 338	19 676 882
2006	pré-engagement dont dépendront les contrats PVD projets	ONG-PVD/2006/018-227	for Ghana ?	750 000	181 440
2006	Private Sector and Trade Enabling Programme (PSTEP)	FED/2006/018-609	5 000 000	349 619	162 279
2007	Farmers' Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (FAMAR)	ONG-PVD/2007/135-483 (1)	for Ghana ?		345 960
2007	Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme - Phase II	FED/2007/019-650	5 000 000	4 493 534	1 735 577
2010	Market Access through Cooperative Action: Empowering Rural Women	DCI-HUM/2010/236-781 (1)	for Ghana ?		315 226
	Grand Total		<b>77 335 158</b>	<b>71 403 005</b>	<b>61 717 929</b>

*Source: ADE inventory based on CRIS complemented by information on Stabex collected from field visit.*

In Ghana the last agricultural development advisor was not replaced (end 2009) and the Commission doesn't have a good track record of performance in the sector: these are signs that the sector is not really of interest. *Source: MN 964*

**GH** After the mid-term review of the 2002-2007 CSP & NIP, the EU budget increased its allocation to the rural development sector by € 10 M, to fund the continuation of the cocoa sector support programme. However, the end-term review realigned this budget to the committed and expected projects and programmes. There are no explanations of this realignment in the documents.

In the 2008-2013 CSP & NIP, there is no more "rural development" focal sector, but three areas are supposed to contribute to rural development (decentralisation, support for civil society & capacity building for non-executive governance institutions). The total budget (€ 95 M) of these areas is however incomparable with the "rural development" budget of the 2002-2007 NIP because the three areas cover more than just rural development issues.

Support to transport connectivity and regional transportation is also stated as a contributor to the agricultural commodities sector (by reducing transport costs, improving market access and increasing producers' margins). *Sources: Ghana 2002-2008 CSP/NIP mid-term and end-term review addendums. Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 38*

**KE** The allocations to rural development in the NIP after the MTR of the CSP 2003-2007 show that the share devoted to rural development has actually been reduced from 22% of the total envelope to 14% (with the absolute amounts being slightly reduced from €47 million to €42 million), as follows:

	Initial indicative allocation		Indicative allocation after the MTR (according to addendum)		Indicative allocation after the ETR	
<i>Roads</i>	37 MC	22%	85 ME	29%>	121.41F	41%
<i>Rural Development</i>	47 MC	28%	42 MC	14%	40.1 ME	14%
<i>Macroeconomic support</i>	75 MC	44%	150 MC	52%	115 MC	39%
<i>Programmes outside focal sectors (of which support for non-State actors' initiatives)</i>	11 A4C	6%	13 ME	4%	19MC	6%
	2 MC	1%	2 me	1%	6 MC	2%
	170 MC	100%	290 Me	100%	295.1 Me	100%

*Amounts expressed in million EUR*  
*Source: Addendum 2 to CSP 2003-2007, 2005 and 2007*

According to the Evaluation of EC support to Kenya (June 2008), commitments of the EDF 9 to agriculture and rural development will probably remain at 7% (including pipeline) instead of 25-30%. In addition, the overall strategy of EC interventions in agriculture has been poor with too much focus on agricultural research, and little or no attention to improving agricultural extension services, the legal and regulatory framework to revitalise the agricultural sector (including export), and food security by improving (basic) food crop production, including marketing and logistical systems.  
*Source: Evaluation of EC support to Kenya, June 2008, page 5*

**MG** Madagascar a **accédé à des ressources supplémentaires importantes lors de la revue à mi-parcours du 9<sup>ème</sup> FED menée en 2004** suite à son degré de performance au sein du groupe des Etats ACP confirmé par la revue de fin de parcours du 9<sup>ème</sup> FED de 2006. (*Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.26*)  
La programmation du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED s'inscrit en appui à la stratégie et aux politiques définies par le Gouvernement Malgache telles qu'elles apparaissent notamment dans la vision « Madagascar Naturellement » dans le nouveau « Madagascar Action Plan » MAP qui prend la suite du DSRP et dans la politique Générale de l'Etat approuvée annuellement (*Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.26*).  
Le premier domaine de concentration concerne les infrastructures et **le second sera le développement rural, essentiellement dans ses composantes agricoles** et de sécurité alimentaire conformément à l'engagement 4 du MAP, auquel est associé en raison de l'importance et du niveau de pauvreté de la population rurale de Madagascar, l'aménagement du territoire. La programmation du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED devra tenir compte du fait que la moitié environ des fonds engagés dans ce secteur provient d'instruments amenés à disparaître à partir de 2008. (*Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.27*).  
**Pas de précision sur les instruments amenés à disparaître dans le CSP.**

**ML** No such evidence can be found in Mali's CSP/NIPs. Agriculture is not one of the focal sectors of Mali's 2003-2007 or 2008-2013 CSP/NIPs.  
Selon l'évaluation de la stratégie pays au Mali, le secteur agricole a été retiré des secteurs d'intervention de la CE à partir du 9<sup>ème</sup> FED. *Source : Evaluation de la Stratégie pays au Mali, 2006, page 38*

**Overall** Although DEV doesn't intervene in the practical implementation of the COM, it did launch a dedicated website to spread the COM after its elaboration. DEV also assisted to some mid-term reviews in order to ensure that attention was being paid to the needs of the agricultural commodities sectors. Not all countries could however be attended to in this manner. However, even if an opportunity is thus given at these MTR to air the views about agricultural commodities, it doesn't mean that these views are taken account of: it is not within the power of DEV to 'de-prioritise' sectors. Two additional factors explain why the COM's principles might not have had such an impact at the time:

- the change in strategy at Commission level to concentrate all support in a country on one or two focal areas (with one often being BS seen as a sector), there is little place left for adding another sector for support.
- The Aft issues came into the development agenda at the time and they looked at similar issues (SPS,



	<p>customs, etc).</p> <p>Also the COM was written at the time of declining commodity prices but then things picked up. The application of the COM's principles was thus foremost through intra-ACP projects (the All ACP primarily) from which it is expected that other activities will sprout. This has enabled to provide coherence in the approach to agricultural commodities with other donors and stakeholders (participatory approach). <i>Source: MN 912</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>After the mid-term review of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF (2002-2007), the EC increased its support to the Agricultural Export Commodity Development programme, to consolidate the results and build on the 8-9<sup>th</sup> EDF Plant Protection Programme.</p> <p>The Agricultural Export Commodity Development programme is part of the "Regional economic Integration and Trade" programme, which was allocated a total of € 15.2 million.</p> <p>In the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, the Regional economic Integration and Trade programme has been allocated a total of € 45 million but the breakdown of this allocation is not available. It is therefore impossible to compare allocations between the two EDFs.</p> <p>Extra funding was also provided by the "All-ACP Agricultural Commodities Programme" launched in 2007 <i>Sources: Pacific 2002-2007 RSP/RIP addendum; Pacific 2007-2013 RSP/RIP, page 67.</i></p>
<b>SN</b>	<p>Aucun changement d'affectation des fonds n'est réalisé après la revue de 2004. Aucune mention de fonds Stabex.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>On the contrary, in TZ, the EC dropped its support to agricultural commodities in the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF because Stabex funds were still available and the JAS preconised labour division amongst donors so that the EU concentrated on infrastructure (roads and water) and education. Its support to the agricultural sector was drastically reduced from € 38.44 million initially at signature of FMO 94-99 in 2003 (increased to €46.35 million in December 2008 due to accumulated interests) to €2m to the tea and €2m to the coffee research stations under the 10th EDF Trade and Agriculture Programme (TAP). This support was introduced because the institutions so far funded with Stabex had no financial means to continue operating and because the benefits of previous support needed to be consolidated through outreach to farmers and marketing (the TAP expected result for this component states 'improved competitiveness of tea and coffee through development of planting material and better extension by stakeholder managed research; specifically TRIT and TACRI will receive support to propagate planting materials and promote their uptake by farmers.). Exit strategies had not been determined for the 2 beneficiary institutions and the new programme extends the funding for 2 years whilst ideas for making the institutions self-financing (or other means to make their existence sustainable) are being discussed. The TAP does not provide an exit strategy.</p> <p>So EDF funds have been used as a follow-up from Stabex in an effort to increase the benefits of the Stabex funding (research efforts have been made but propagation to farmers and actual results in terms of planting and production have not yet occurred) but only marginally. Similarly the next TAP foresees support to the same sectors for value chain improvements (capacity strengthening on demand). In the meantime no exit strategies have been defined as yet. <i>Sources: MN600, MN687, MN156</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p><b>Pas d'infos dans les CSP concernant l'augmentation de l'aide au secteur agricole</b> hormis pour la coopération allemande. Au contraire, le secteur du développement rural était prioritaire (il constituait un secteur à part entière voire un secteur de concentration) du 1<sup>er</sup> au 9<sup>ème</sup> FED (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.19</i>) et est devenu un sous-point du secteur « intégration régionale » dans le cadre du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31</i>).</p> <p>Les secteurs d'intervention majeurs de la coopération allemande sont l'éducation, l'agriculture, la protection des ressources naturelles, la sante, l'eau ainsi que la consolidation de la paix. L'accord de coopération 2002 a <b>accru la concentration sur les projets agricoles</b> et de protection des ressources naturelles. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.24</i>).</p>

## EQ2 on the Commission's support in terms of agricultural commodity strategy development

To what extent has the Commission's support enabled the design of agricultural commodity strategies in commodity dependent ACP countries and regions?	
<b>J.2.1</b>	<i>The Commission has promoted commodity chains and addressing dependence as a priority in national strategies</i>
<b>BF Coton</b>	La Commission n'a pas promu les filières de produits de base agricoles et la situation de dépendance comme priorités des stratégies nationales au Burkina Faso. Il convient de noter que l'agriculture n'est pas un secteur de concentration au Burkina Faso. Enfin, la Commission participe au processus d'élaboration (toujours en cours) du Programme national du secteur rural mené par le Gouvernement, en collaboration avec les partenaires techniques et financiers.
<b>CM</b>	La banane fait partie des filières promues par la CE depuis 2000 (voir avant) selon une approche stratégique filière. Pour le café, l'approche « chaîne de valeur » est plus récente (2009) et résulte du programme Tout ACP. Il n'y a pas d'approche type « chaîne de valeur » pour le cacao qui représente le premier produit agricole de base du Cameroun. La stratégie de développement du secteur rural 2005 comporte un grand nombre de filières agricoles (pas en terme de dépendance mais de relance!) mais la Commission était très peu présente dans le secteur agricole de 2000-2010. Il n'existe cependant pas de stratégie officielle approuvée de développement du secteur agricole, malgré les études récentes financées par la DCE (2008, 2009) et d'autres bailleurs de fonds.
<b>VAN</b>	La Commission n'a pas promu les filières de produits de base agricoles et la situation de dépendance comme priorités des stratégies nationales au Vanuatu. Il n'y a pas de stratégie de développement agricole au Vanuatu. Il n'y a pas non plus de dialogue spécifique en agriculture sur la période 2004-2010; ces derniers mois, le dialogue politique reste difficile vu la situation politique.
<b>GH overall</b>	Although the Commission has not been a central actor in the support to the Ghanaian agricultural sector (it does not even participate in the agricultural sector working group discussions), it did (and still does) intervene strongly in the cocoa sector and was thus supporting the sector's reform of the 1980s and '90s. It was not instrumental in the design of this strategy. The strategy is currently being revised and the project funded by the Commission indirectly contributes to this by (i) promoting the formation of farmers' organisations – thus paving the way for their greater participation in the strategy discussions and (ii) funding studies which may feed into the discussions. One of the expected results of the project is the participatory sector strategy development for cocoa. Over the period the Commission has thus not been actively involved in the policy and strategy discussions of the agricultural sector since this is not one of its focal sectors. Crop strategies are included in the national agricultural development strategy (FASDEP II) which follows a commodity chain approach. Exception to this is the Commission's recent leadership (TA provided) in the design of the banana sector strategy (to access BAM) which was not included in FASDEP. Otherwise, the Commission has been indirectly promoting diversification through its support to PS&T development.
<b>UG</b>	The GoU agricultural development strategy (PMA) supported by the EC has adopted a functional approach rather than a commodity-based approach. However within the framework of the PMA preparation agro-ecological zones have been identified and three crops selected in each zone as priority focus for research and extension. The new

	agricultural development strategy (DSIP) is fully consistent with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of NEPAD.
<b>TZ Cotton Sugar Coffee Tea</b>	<p>The Commission have had a strong and very close policy dialogue with the Government in terms of agriculture, especially in the sugar, tea and coffee sector, but also in trade. Before supporting agricultural commodities, initial sector analyses have been carried out in different sectors: sugar and coffee. It seems that this analysis was carried out for the tea sector, but due to no institutional memory this fact was not formally confirmed.</p> <p>While in the past agricultural policies – including cash crops – were left out from the attention of the Government and donors, they are again recognised as important at country level, but with a most strong attention to food crops. The Government adopted a SWAP approach. A national strategy in the agricultural sector (the ASDP), which was recently approved, leaves out more or less cash crops (sugar, tea, coffee and cotton) as they are in the hands of the private sector, even if the coffee and cotton sectors involve smallholders to a large extent. Sugar and tea are more in the hands of large estates.</p> <p>The value chain approach was however promoted in the latest agricultural strategy. This approach insists on the level of the production agricultural commodities, but also on the quality of commodities with a view to get higher prices.</p>
<b>MG rice</b>	La stratégie agricole du Gouvernement est actuellement fortement centrée sur les cultures vivrières (riz et manioc). Le développement des cultures d'exportation n'est pas la priorité. Au niveau régional l'administration de l'agriculture porte attention aux produits d'exportation mais sans stratégie clairement définie.
<b>I.2.1.1</b>	Evidence that the CDDC-EU policy dialogue has included the competitiveness or diversification of commodity sectors
<b>BF</b>	The “EU response strategy” section of the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Burkina Faso stresses the need for a diversification of the economy and the increase of competitiveness. <i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 24</i>
<b>CM</b>	There is a long-standing dialogue in Cameroon on the banana sector and its competitiveness issues. The EU has supported the national strategy with technical and financial assistance. More recently, the EU supported a study on the possibilities of diversifying Cameroon's banana export destinations. <i>Source : MN 995 ; Stratégie actualisée de la filière bananière camerounaise pour une amélioration de sa compétitivité ; Etude sur la diversification des marchés d'exportation de la banane dans la sous-région CEMAC plus le Nigeria</i>
<b>VAN</b>	Au Vanuatu, il n'y a pas de dialogue politique en agriculture, excepté au niveau des projets agricoles en cours. A l'époque il s'agissait du programme POPACA. Aujourd'hui, cela concerne l'intervention <i>Primary Sector Growth Programme Phase 1</i> , qui inclut une composante de renforcement des capacités pour le Ministère de l'Agriculture. Par ailleurs, il y a des réunions hebdomadaires entre le bureau du Premier Ministre et le Chef de Délégation de l'UE au Vanuatu (mais non spécifique à l'agriculture). Le dialogue politique est qualifié de faible depuis quatre ans. Le Gouvernement du Vanuatu connaît des problèmes de stabilité : dans les 9 derniers mois, 9 premiers Ministres se sont succédé. La Délégation organise des réunions avec le Gouvernement du Vanuatu et les autres bailleurs, pour discuter de l'aide au développement (par exemple : concernant un appui budgétaire pour le Vanuatu), mais les représentants du Gouvernement ne viennent pas aux réunions. Néanmoins, les relations entre le Gouvernement d Vanuatu et la Délégation peuvent être qualifiées de bonnes. S'il y a un problème, il y a une communication entre les parties pour le résoudre. Il y a des réunions hebdomadaires entre le bureau du Premier Ministre et le Chef de Délégation de l'UE. <i>Source : MN 1067, MN 1023 and MN 1059</i>

	<p>Vanuatu's Prioritized Action Agenda (which is supported by the EU) aims at increasing efficiency productivity, and competitiveness. It also aims at increasing trade and diversification.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2007-2013 CSP/NIP, page 24</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Diversification : réponse mixte. Globalement, le programme STABEX a contribué directement ou indirectement à la réalisation de l'objectif de lutte contre la pauvreté, tant au travers d'une consolidation de certaines filières, dans l'attente d'une éventuelle diversification, que de contributions budgétaires significatives et exceptionnelles à destination des producteurs. Le Stabex 1999 est contributif de la politique sectorielle de la Cote d'Ivoire. Toutefois, les seuls constats concernant la diversification concerne uniquement les filières ananas et rizicole. Pour l'ananas, l'intervention majeure consiste en un projet de diversification et régénération variétale, lie à un retournement de la demande aux conséquences désastreuses, en partenariat avec la profession. Concernant la filière rizicole, la culture de riz irriguée a été développée dans les Régions Centre et Centre Nord pour diversifier les revenus des agriculteurs.</p> <p>Compétitivité : oui. Le programme Stabex participe étroitement à la stratégie de coopération développée par la CE en Cote d'Ivoire tant dans le cadre des actions conduites dans le cadre du 9ème FED (PUR) que de celles programmes dans le PIN 10ème FED et le PIR 9ème FED (appui APE). Dans le cadre du PIN 10ème FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. <i>Source : Evaluation Stabex, 2009.</i></p>
<b>CI Cashew nuts</b>	<p>Pas de dialogue politique de la CE-Gouvernement en ce qui concerne la compétitivité et/ou la diversification relative à l'anacardier. Seul un projet en faveur de l'anacardier s'inscrit dans cette logique mais l'interlocuteur est contre étant donné les conditions de travail déplorables des femmes lors des opérations de décorticage. Une société indienne serait candidate pour exporter les noix en Inde pour décorticage. <i>Source : MN 819</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Depuis le 8iè et la 9iè FED, la tendance de la Commission européenne est de s'aligner sur les priorités du Gouvernement du Burkina Faso. Dans ce cadre, il est difficile d'influencer les décisions de support du Gouvernement sur base des visions stratégiques développées à partir de Bruxelles (CE, siège), dont notamment les Communications relatives aux produits de base agricoles. Les faiblesses relevées par l'évaluation du PAOSA (2007) en ce qui concerne les capacités du Gouvernement (plus précisément les services de l'agriculture) à améliorer la gestion institutionnelle ont influencé les orientations du CSP/PIN 2008-2013, qui n'ont pas inclus l'agriculture comme secteur de concentration. <i>Source : MN 572</i></p>
<b>CR rum</b>	<p>Mixed answer. With respect to trade related issues, the Commission has attempted to initiate a number of regional programmes that would contribute to mitigating the impact of the changes on the global environment and assist the Caribbean in its integration efforts both regionally and globally. These projects have included, among others CULP (Caribbean University Level Programme), in particular the international business and agricultural diversification projects and CARTF (Caribbean Agribusiness Research and Training Fund). However, there seems to have been limited dialogue between the various parties as to whether these were the appropriate solutions in the final form in</p>

	<p>which the programmes were drawn up. The programmes appear to have been “one off” solutions to deal with a pending problem (gradual exposure of the sugar and banana industries to global market forces) or an immediate problem (e.g. support to the rum industry). It is quite apparent that these pending problems were in evidence long before these programmes were initiated. A more constructive dialogue with CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market) at early stage may have resulted in more strategically viable and gradual solutions for re-structuring rather than “shock solutions” that will inevitably have limited impact and have created resentment within the regional Caribbean community. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>The regional strategies for the Central Africa region do not include any support to agricultural commodities. They include support to Regional integration (9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> EDF) and thus to trade (both intra-regional and world) and to forestry; the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF also supported regional transport networks (again with a view to develop intra-regional trade). Agricultural commodities are not a focus in the region (oil producers and many other mineral and forestry resources are the main exports except Cameroun which exports agricultural commodities). <i>Sources: RSP 2002-2007 and 2008-2031</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>MinAgri wants to have a dialogue with the EU on which commodities to support. Which commodities can trigger development in the country: maize, as export crop and as animal feed and industry processing. <i>Source: MN304</i></p> <p>The 2002-2007 Uganda CSP/NIP includes support to the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA). The PMA aims at supporting the economic growth of the food sector and stimulating rural development and diversification of incomes. The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP includes rural development as the second focal sector. It aims at supporting agricultural development and productivity enhancement, as well as recovering livelihoods in Northern Uganda. <i>Source: Uganda 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 46 &amp; 47 ; Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 9</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Reform of the crop boards in Tanzania has been very slow: “After 8 years of discussion and feet-dragging, a law to reform the crop boards has been approved by Parliament, and is awaiting signature of the President. The law would transform the Crop Boards into institutions that: have more limited powers to intervene in markets, are focused more on promotion than regulation, are managed and accountable to stakeholders, and are funded from the budget rather than commodity cesses/levies. Stakeholders in the coffee sector are most advanced in implementing some of the reforms that will become legislation, while other crop boards have moved little. Strong leadership and enforcement will be needed to make sure the new law will actually be implemented” (page 67, PER 2010) <i>Source: PER2010.</i></p> <p>Under the AMSP, Tanzania prepared a National Adaptation Strategy for its sugar sector. The NAS was not analysed by the evaluation team. The AMSP evaluation notes that Tanzania is a net importer of sugar and not in a position to play a significant role on an increasingly competitive world sugar market. The aim of the Tanzanian NAS is to develop/maintain the sugar production primarily for supplying domestic demand and possibly to export sugar to neighbouring countries in the framework of the regional trade organisations in which they participate. The extent to which the exercise included the analysis of diversification options within and outside the sugar sector has not been commented upon in the evaluation.</p> <p>The AMSP evaluation notes that the competitiveness analysis of the NAS has some major shortcomings: <i>‘Analysis of the competitiveness of the sugar sector is restricted to a comparison between the average production cost and the new EU import price. Even when the NAS include in their</i></p>

	<p><i>objectives the development of sugar exports to neighbouring countries, no analysis is made of the competitiveness of the industry at regional level vis-à-vis other sugar exporters; Productivity gains and cost reductions expected from the implementation of the NAS are not estimated.</i> (AMSP evaluation page 5). <i>Source: AMSP Evaluation.</i></p> <p>Studies for reforms of cash crop sectors: Revision of the strategy by an external consultant to improve the national strategy of coffee of Tanzania. Very close dialogue in the coffee (and the tea) sector. Strong dialogue structure in Tanzania. The EU Delegation is quite involved in discussions related to agriculture. The task manager dealing with trade issues is involved in the policy WG on trade and the one on trade and that on agriculture have a lot of interactions. Different people from the EC staff participate to that dialogue. Dialogue with the Government happens. But nothing really happens in terms of policy changes or support to agriculture.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN 138 &amp; MN 600</i></p> <p>Although the EU started engaging in political dialogue with the Government of Tanzania from 2005 onwards, the CSPs give no indication that this included the areas of competitiveness and diversification of commodity sectors. Although a sector strategy is to a large extent in place, the dialogue between the Government and development partners on the Agricultural Sector Support Programme (ASDP) has not progressed much. There is also limited Government a capacity (in the agricultural sector) in terms of ability to design, execute and monitor the policy developed with the help of development partners. The capacity limitation is particularly bad at district level. <i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to the United Republic of Tanzania, April 2006, page 37</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents did not evidence that the policy dialogue addressed commodity sectors. <i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i></p> <p><i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La stratégie de développement agricole du gouvernement est actuellement fortement centrée sur les cultures vivrières (riz et manioc). Le développement des cultures d'exportation n'est pas la priorité. Toutefois, au niveau régional, l'approche de la politique agricole appliquée par l'administration est globale mais peut également porter sur des produits d'exportation selon les régions mais sans qu'une stratégie soit clairement définie. <i>Sources : MN 808 et MN 805</i></p> <p>L'instrument banane (spécifiquement consacré à la diversification) était prévu pour 1999-2008. Madagascar a seulement soumis une stratégie de diversification en 2001 avec un appui à partir de 2002. Les actions ont seulement démarré à partir de 2005 et ont été suspendues à partir de 2009. On comptabilise seulement 6 allocations annuelles au lieu de 10. <i>Source : MN 801</i></p> <p>Le Plan d'Action pour le Développement Rural (PADR) initié en 1997 et mis à jour en 2008 a été très appuyé par l'UE à travers les programmes PASA. Il est encore opérationnel et guide la politique agricole aujourd'hui. Dans la première version l'accent était mis sur le développement rural au sens large incluant éducation, santé, infrastructures. La deuxième version (confirmée en 2008) exclut éducation et santé et retient 5 axes : environnement favorable ; productivité ; infrastructures ; valorisation des ressources naturelles ; accès au marché. <i>Source : MN 805</i></p> <p>L'objectif de la stratégie nationale d'adaptation du secteur sucrier (SNASS) adoptée en 2006 est de relancer la production nationale pour atteindre l'autosuffisance nationale à l'horizon 2012-2015. Cet objectif passe par la privatisation du secteur et l'amélioration de la productivité des sites existants, pour améliorer la compétitivité de la production nationale face à aux importations, dont les droits d'entrée ont été fortement abaissés à</p>

	<p>partir de 2006.</p> <p>Dans le cadre du programme sucre, la stratégie d'accompagnement de l'UE a pour objectif de faciliter les investissements privés et appuyer le renforcement de la compétitivité de la filière, à travers la réalisation d'études (diagnostics industriels, possibilités de diversification, etc.) et l'appui à la relance et à l'amélioration de la production paysanne. Le bilan de la première phase de mise en œuvre de la SNASS est mitigé. Les ressources nationales affectées au développement secteur sont insuffisantes. Elles proviennent essentiellement des loyers perçus par la SIRAMA, prioritairement affectés au remboursement des impayés accumulés. Au niveau institutionnel, le CIF (Comité Interministériel de la Filière Sucre) n'a pas réussi à jouer le rôle de pilotage et de coordination attendu. Il demeure un organe faible, qui manque de leadership et dont les membres sont peu impliqués en dehors de ses sessions. Le besoin de réviser la SNASS a été perçu dès 2009 mais est resté sans suite. Faute d'un dispositif formalisé de suivi du secteur, sa connaissance du secteur est lacunaire et ne lui permet pas de mesurer l'efficacité des actions conduites et de décider rapidement des éventuelles actions correctives à prendre. Son action est limitée par la faible implication à son niveau des décideurs politiques, et de fait ses propositions sont rarement traduites en décisions. La viabilité des investissements dans le secteur n'est pas encore clairement évaluée. Les analyses effectuées dans le cadre du PIP 2007-2010 situent le prix de revient du sucre à Madagascar entre 420 et 460 \$ par tonne de sucre brut et estiment que de tels projets ne sont rentables qu'en développant la cogénération ou en protégeant le marché intérieur. Aucune mise en perspective régionale n'a été faite.</p> <p><i>Source : Mesures d'accompagnement en faveur des pays signataires du protocole sucre (AMSP), Programme Indicatif Pluriannuel 2001-2013 pour Madagascar ; Italtrend, rapport de mission I, 2006</i></p> <p>En tant que membre du Groupe ACP et signataire de l'Accord de Cotonou, Madagascar a été invité à négocier un Accord de Partenariat Economique (APE) avec l'UE. Le pays a choisi de le faire au sein du groupe AfOA qui réunit 16 EM du COMESA. Les thèmes de négociation entre l'AfOA et l'UE sont les questions de développement, l'accès aux marchés, l'agriculture, la pêche, le commerce des services et les questions liées au commerce (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.9</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Annex 8 of the 2008-2013 RSP presents a Joint Communiqué of the Cariforum-EU Troika Summit (held on 17 May 2008). The latter stresses that agricultural productivity and diversification have been discussed: “<i>The Task Force would address immediate, medium and long term issues of climate change, energy and food security and agricultural productivity and diversification, with a view to ameliorate the problems in CARIFORUM states and to contribute to their sustainable development.</i>”</p> <p><i>Source: European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, annexes, page 37</i></p> <p>Under the 8<sup>th</sup> EDF support was provided for both broadening and consolidating the regional initiatives under the 7<sup>th</sup> EDF and included, among others, a major programme to enhance the competitiveness of the rum sector by making it export-oriented in the segment of branded products. The components include: (1) institutional capacity building to WISPA, (2) marketing and distribution strategies; and (3) plant modernisation and meeting of environmental needs. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.20</i>).</p> <p>9<sup>th</sup> EDF support to the Competitiveness of the Rice Sector in the Caribbean (€ 24 million) (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.17</i>).</p> <p>The Commission's support has had significant impact in a number of areas. In the agricultural sector, the CARTF project has contributed significantly to capacity development in the areas of diversification and quality improvements with the ultimate</p>

	aim of developing alternative export opportunities in this sector. ( <i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.36</i> ).
<b>ESAIO</b>	There is reference in the 2008-2013 ESAIO RSP/RIP to the need of improving compliance to European sanitary and phytosanitary regulations in order to improve competitiveness of ESAIO food exports (the question is addressed by the SPS programme). The 2008-2013 ESAIO RSP/RIP also mentions the value addition and diversification activities of the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP). <i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 33 &amp; 39</i>
<b>ET</b>	PASDEP recognizes that if Ethiopia is to maintain its economic growth under conditions of external financial viability there is need for a further stepping up of growth in exports of goods and services. PASDEP foresees the exports/GDP ratio to rise from the current 8% to close to 11% by 2009/2010. This calls for strong private sector development, vigorous measures for skills-based export diversification as well as maintenance of a realistic exchange rate, to achieve and maintain export competitiveness and dampen the growth in exports. Fast export development also needs trade policy reform acceleration, as well as more progress towards regional integration and trade development with Ethiopia's neighbours ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.15-16</i> ).
<b>GHA</b>	In the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the "trade facilitation, regional integration and support of the EPA" programme aims (among other goals) to address supply side and competitiveness constraints. The country strategy also aims at diversifying from cocoa to other cash crops for export markets. The inclusion of these elements in the CSP/NIP could be considered as a result from policy dialogue. <i>Sources: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 6 &amp; 53</i> According to the Ghana Country Strategy Evaluation report, the EC interventions in Ghana did not aim at fostering diversification and restructuring of the Ghanaian agriculture. The 9 <sup>th</sup> CSP did however adopt an agricultural component to "aim at promoting export/import substitution crops in Northern Ghana". <i>Source: Ghana Country Strategy Evaluation report 2005, page 15 &amp; report annex, page 48</i>
<b>KEN</b>	There is no evidence in the CSPs/NIPS that the EC includes a policy dialogue related to agricultural commodities in Kenya. However, it can be noted that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A large part of the EC support to Kenya under the 9th EDF was a general budget support, which allowed a good dialogue and achievements on macroeconomic and public financial management reforms and governance.</li> <li>▪ The EU's political dialogue with Kenya began in February 2002 and encompasses the following areas: democratic principles, human rights, constitutional review, economic and structural reform, governance, the environment, security and regional affairs.</li> </ul> <i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 23&amp;27</i>
<b>ML</b>	Although the paragraph describing the dialogue between Mali and the EU doesn't include diversification or competitiveness issues, there are multiple references concerning the need to increase Mali's cotton sector competitiveness or to diversify its economy. <i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 38</i>
<b>GH</b>	During the late 1980's and 1990s it would seem that the Commission, through its important support to the restructuring of the Cocobod and its support to the competitiveness of the cocoa sector (disease control, research), was involved in the ongoing policy discussions which at the time were led by the WB. More recently, the EC has not been participating in the Agricultural Sector Working Group in Ghana. <i>Source:</i>



	<p><i>MN181</i></p> <p>The Ghanaian agricultural development strategy, FASDEP II, sums up all the priorities for agricultural strategy in Ghana but it doesn't include a strategy for bananas. In Ghana, the EC promoted the idea of designing a banana sector strategy. <i>Source: MN156</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>Production diversification and increased competitiveness are considered as one of the aimed results of the RIP intervention framework. <i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 75.</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>The Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP underlines that the policy dialogue between SADC and EU has been deepened since the launch of the Berlin Initiative in 1994 and has provided the framework for dialogue in political matters. However, there is no specific reference to the policy dialogue in the agricultural commodity sector. <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 14</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>L'article 28 de l'APE (Accord de Partenariat Economique) mentionne que le partenariat doit accélérer la diversification des économies des pays ACP. La vision de la stratégie d'intégration régionale (un des secteurs de concentration du RSP/RIP 2008-2013) est que cette intégration économique permettra de réduire les coûts et d'accélérer la compétitivité, ce qui permettra de diversifier et accélérer la croissance (de l'économie et des exportations). Ces objectifs s'inscrivent également dans la volonté d'amenuiser l'impact du changement climatique sur les économies des pays et de faciliter leur adaptation. <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 10, 26, 34, 71.</i></p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The programme "Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean" included technical assistance and expertise for institutional support to formulate strategic plans for the development of the sector. One of the expected results foreseen was "National rice policy and strategies and action plans adopted by the Governments of Guyana and Suriname". However, the final evaluation of the programme highlights that the programme has not achieved this result. Indeed, the technical assistance provided suffered from delays during implementation because of inflexible and cumbersome procedures and from confusion as to its purposes ("lack of clear definition on the FA of the context in which national rice strategies were to be developed"). National sector policies (e.g Drainage and Irrigation in Guyana) and strategies for both countries have not been developed due to a lack of commitment/ownership on the part of the beneficiary governments. <i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, page 2; SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, pages 5, 6, 14, 16-19, 30</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector materialise a joint declaration of the Commission and ACP Caribbean countries negotiated in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement negotiation. It is a response to Caribbean rum producers concerns as regards their capacity to compete on a liberalised EU market.</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>As noted in the SFA impact evaluation report, the Council granted special assistance to the traditional ACP banana suppliers to contribute to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The implementation of programs aiming at increasing the competitiveness of bananas for export and;</li> <li>▪ Where the increase in competitiveness is not possible anymore, to encourage diversification on the basis of long term country strategies agreed – beforehand – with the EC and approved by the latter.</li> </ul>

	As mentioned above, the strategies supported by the EU included by definition competitiveness and diversification of the banana sector. Projects are presented by the countries concerned and approved by the EC. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 4, htspe, 2008.</i>
<b>SUG</b>	AMSP Programme: SP countries were left 2.5 months to formulate their National Adaptation Strategy. As for the EC Delegations, they were left one month to assess this document and propose the main orientations of an EC response strategy. In such a short period of time Delegations could hardly do more than endorse the NAS and design response strategies encompassing most of the activities proposed by the NAS with the exception of the investments by sugar companies.
<b>I.2.1.2</b>	Evidence that the Commission support encouraged the analysis of the sustainability, poverty implications and needs of commodity sectors as part of strategy development
<b>BF</b>	The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Burkina Faso doesn't include agricultural support. The 2001-2007 CSP/NIP does include a budget line for food security and rural development. It supports a strategy which does include sustainability and poverty implications but there is no evidence that the Commission support "encourage the analysis of sustainability, poverty implications and needs of commodity sectors as part of strategy development". <i>Source: Burkina Faso 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 56</i>
<b>CM</b>	There is no single meeting where the concept of "commodity" sector has been used by interviewees in relation with the development of the agricultural sector. The agricultural sector has been mentioned globally, with its various sub-sectors, some being "commodities" but others not. Although the Commission has founded studies for the concerned Ministries to set up a strategy for the development of the agricultural sector (in 2008 and 2009), the Commission clearly turned away from the agricultural sector over the whole period 2000-2010. The Delegation tried to admit this sector gradually through the various rural development programmes. <i>Source: MN 403, 409.</i> There is a long-standing dialogue in Cameroon on the banana sector and its competitiveness issues. The EU has supported the national strategy with technical and financial assistance. The strategy includes a study of the needs and poverty implications of the banana sector of Cameroon. <i>Source : MN 995 ; Stratégie actualisée de la filière bananière camerounaise pour une amélioration de sa compétitivité</i>
<b>VAN</b>	L'agriculture n'est pas un secteur de concentration au Vanuatu (ni 2002-2007 ni 2008-2013). Il n'y a pas d'évidence que la Commission a encouragé une analyse des besoins des filières agricoles dans le cadre de la définition de stratégies de développement de ces filières. Cependant, de nombreuses études de filières (épices, noix, cacao, café, cocotier, cultures vivrières) ont été réalisées sous le projet POP2/POPACA, avec l'appui de l'assistant technique du projet et en collaboration avec le Ministère de l'Agriculture. Ces études ont été discutées lors d'ateliers avec les représentants des différentes filières concernées. Par ailleurs, de nombreuses études de marché ont été réalisées dans le cadre de l'intervention de la Commission au développement commercial des entreprises (CDE), en appui au secteur privé. <i>Source: MN 1059 and MN 1098</i>
<b>CR</b>	No. In one hand, whereas poverty alleviation may not be regarded as the dominant priority in the region, there are no studies on the impact of regional integration and trade policies on poverty issues. In other hand, Commission interventions are relevant to address particular needs of the Caribbean in view of constructing a regional economic integrated space. Projects/programmes are designed to cope with specific constraints affecting regional integration and aim at tackling several issues directly related with

	integration among Caribbean countries and/or their integration into the world economy. However, these interventions are not clearly integrated into a global strategy which in fact fails to be clearly identified. This mainly stems from the absence of a comprehensive analysis of the Caribbean context that would be necessary to establish a prioritisation of needs and the selection of a set of interventions that would reflect genuine strategic choices based on a clear vision of the Caribbean integration process. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>KEN</b>	No such evidence appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>MG</b>	Oui, la Délégation a accompagné l'élaboration du DSRP à travers sa participation à des ateliers. <i>Source : MN 801</i>
<b>TAN</b>	No such evidence appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>BAN</b>	In the Impact Evaluation of the SFA, there are several mentions of analyses on whether or not the SAF has contributed to reducing poverty or providing sustainable benefits in targeted countries. The strategies adopted by countries have also undergone evaluations on their continuing validity in the face of the changing markets (and therefore changing needs of commodity sectors). <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country reports, page 17, 32, htspe, 2008.</i>
<b>SUG</b>	In order to benefit of the AMSP programme, Sugar Protocol countries were requested to assess the impact of the EU decisions regarding the sugar market, and to formulate through a participative approach a National Adaptation Strategy.
<b>I.2.1.3</b>	Evidence that Commission support contributed to enhance human and institutional capacity needed to design and ensure flexible and effective strategies
<b>BF</b>	Selon l'évaluation de la stratégie pays au Burkina Faso, la CE a soutenu le Programme d'Appui Institutionnel dont le but était de « renforcer la capacité nationale de définition et de mise en œuvre des politiques agricoles ». Ce programme a duré 8 ans et faisait probablement partie du 8 <sup>ème</sup> FED. <i>Source : Evaluation de la Stratégie pays au Burkina Faso 2010, page 69</i>
<b>CM</b>	The EU supported the design of Cameroon's banana sector strategy through technical and financial assistance. <i>Source : MN 995 ; Stratégie actualisée de la filière bananière camerounaise pour une amélioration de sa compétitivité</i> In the PASAPE programme supporting Cameroon in the framework of the EPA agreements, support is provided to the country's institutional capacity. However, this has to do with trade negotiations, not commodity strategies. <i>Source : MN 971</i> The AAACP programme in Cameroon also included a study to « identify buyers, agro-enterprises, or small businesses operating in the oil palm and cassava and plantain sectors in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and DRC that are interested in developing or upgrading their business model ». This action is intended to enable producers and buyers to « participate more efficiently in sector strategies » and to improve the market linkage relationship between them. The AAACP programme also supported strategy development for the coffee sector in Cameroon and the cotton sector in the whole CEMAC region. This support was implemented by the UNCTAD, through elements of supply chain strategies « relating to finance strategies, market information systems, and commodity exchanges » and « cross-cutting activities and regional activities ». <i>Source : Cameroon AAACP action fiches</i>
<b>VAN</b>	Dans le cadre du projet POPACA/POP 2, la Commission européenne a mis à disposition du Ministère de l'Agriculture un assistant technique. Cet assistant technique, en collaboration avec le Ministère de l'Agriculture, a réalisé différentes études de filières.

	<i>Source: MN 1059 and MN 1098</i>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui, le programme Stabex 1999 s'est choisi comme partenaire principal, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. Des appuis ont été mis en place pour asseoir son rôle de maîtrise d'œuvre ainsi que pour la conception de nouvelles stratégies agricoles. L'appui institutionnel apporte au MinAgri pour l'élaboration aux politiques sectorielles a eu un impact sur la disponibilité de nombreuses stratégies sectorielles. (<i>Source : Evaluation Stabex 2009</i>).</p> <p>La Côte d'Ivoire est maintenant devenue accessible à l'appui budgétaire (en-dessous d'un certain point de pauvreté). Il existe une volonté de la CE de réaliser ce type d'appui. <i>Source : MN 819</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui, le Stabex a notamment financé des appuis à l'Ordonnateur National (<i>Source : MN 802</i>) et la Délégation a accompagné l'élaboration du DSRP à travers sa participation à des ateliers. (<i>Source : MN 801</i>). Outre les interventions sur fonds FED portant sur environnement, élevage, micro-finance, il y a eu des interventions concernant la décentralisation (<i>Source : MN 802</i>). A travers la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire, il y a eu un appui aux collectivités rurales du sud (ACoRS), qui est un projet d'appui au processus de décentralisation et qui est aussi intervenu sur des filières agricoles mais ce n'était pas l'objectif central. (<i>Source : MN 804</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Yes but no strong evidence has been collected regarding the strategies design. The Commission's cooperation strategy evolved over successive EDFs to develop gradually into a strategy aiming at the construction of a regional integrated space in the CARIFORUM (Forum of Caribbean States) area. It included two major objectives: regional integration and cooperation, and building of regional capacity. Four specific objectives have been pursued with varying intensity over time: (i°) regional infrastructure network; (ii°) trade and productive sector development; (iii°) institutional capacity building; (iv) human resources capacity building (tertiary education, health and environment). Finally, a series of interventions in the area of drugs, money laundering and similar issues were conducted to contribute to the eradication of major obstacles to regional capacity building.</p> <p>Institutional capacity building: support regional integration by providing TA, support staff and other facilities and services for preparation, appraisal, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of regional programmes financed by the EDF.</p> <p>Human resources capacity building: the emphasis on the human resources development cluster is reflected in the substantial support to the education sector in the NIPs and is, in general, related to the areas of tertiary education, health and environment.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>According to the CSSPII MTE, the capacities of FO to continue participating/engaging with high level strategy is limited beyond the project life (which is less than 3 years) and will 'depend on progress towards becoming self-sustaining organisations over the next 3 – 5 years.' (...)</p> <p><i>'When put in sector decision -making context, the programme is a modest insertion into national efforts to upgrade competitiveness and boost crop yields. CSSP II is only one of at least 8 other players in the cocoa assistance space. Other examples include Cocobod, WCF, Cadbury, etc. Therefore the influence on national or sector ICB is largely due to IITA's entre into the national decision-making framework afforded by STCP-2 and reputation as an international agricultural institution operating in Ghana.'</i></p> <p><i>Source: CSSPII MTE 2011</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Yes. The EC supported (budget support) the GoU agricultural strategy (PMA-plan for Modernization of Agriculture), which benefited among others crops to agricultural commodities, of which coffee. The EC support to PMA focussed on research and extension with a view of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector (<i>Source:</i></p>

	<i>MN 301, 304).</i>
<b>UG</b>	<p>The PMA Secretariat, largely funded by the EC, was serving the PMA Steering Committee in which all stakeholders of agricultural development were represented. Its activities consisted in: policy design and planning; monitoring of the PMA implementation; studies in support of the PMA implementation. It supported the Ministry of Agriculture and coordinated between MAAIF and other ministries involved.</p> <p>The PMA Secretariat's responsibility to coordinate between MAAIF and other ministries was not adequately achieved. It is not an easy job; it requires patience and a high level of political commitment. Coordination meetings were called by the Prime Minister but the quorum was not met. During the early years of the PMA coordination was working but later it weakened. Furthermore there is another institution, the National Planning Authority, which formally had a coordination mandate. <i>(Source: MN306)</i></p>
<b>KEN</b>	Besides both focal sectors (transport infrastructure and agriculture/rural development), the EC response strategy for the period 2008-2013 includes capacity building for public policy institutions, governance and strengthening of NSA. <i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 30</i>
<b>PAC</b>	The 2007 evaluation provides evidence that the Commission strengthened capacities in planning and policy formulation for the sustainable management of natural resources. It states that 'results have been obtained in terms of transfers of know-how and creation of institutionalised think-tanks that can be mobilised for policy formulation and monitoring (...)'. It also reports on a series of different regional agriculture Programmes which enhanced policy design and formulation: early crop-research-oriented programmes (PRAP I and II) followed by more recent "Plant Protection - PPP" and "Development of Sustainable Agriculture - DSAP" programmes. In particular it reports that PPP addresses trade-related issues (pest control, quarantine services, WTO-compliance), developing the necessary knowledge base in the region, adequate infrastructure and the legal and legislative framework. DSAP is complementary to PPP and to past PRAP programmes and constitutes the core of the agriculture regional strategy and approach of SPC, focusing on farming households' production and productivity based on farmers' needs, participatory rural development, HRD and dissemination of technologies and best practices. The evaluation states that the role of Secretariat of the Pacific Community as a regional centre of excellence, policy advice and service provider for the PICs has been enhanced (through Commission support). <i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission's support to the ACP Pacific region, 2007, summary page 3 and Annex 9 page 112.</i>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	The PIP counted 5 main components, among which the fourth one was the " <i>Organisation and capacity building component</i> ". Its goals were to set up national task forces, close to small and medium producers to ensure contact between the public and private sectors and to set up certain tasks based on the needs it identified. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 19</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	With very few exceptions, the National Adaptation Strategies adopted by the SP countries had been (hastily) drafted by consultants hired by the EC.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Le projet vise à favoriser la concertation entre l'Administration, les opérateurs privés, les investisseurs potentiels et les groupements de producteurs pour l'organisation et la régulation des filières sésame et anacarde afin de relever le défi de la compétitivité d'une transformation nationale des ressources agricoles. <i>(Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 4).</i> Le projet est orienté vers le renforcement des capacités des institutions locales, particulièrement les institutions régionales décentralisées. L'intégration de ces acteurs

	<p>dans les actions proposées permettra à terme l'appropriation du soutien à ces deux filières et l'intégration des résultats du projet dans les conventions de coopérations décentralisées signées par les acteurs (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 29</i>).</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Selon le cadre logique d'intervention, l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde est de nature technique (structuration de la filière par le développement d'ateliers de décorticage de noix de cajou) et pas de nature stratégique. L'intervention a cependant contribué à la formation (augmentation des capacités humaines) technique et administrative des personnes engagées dans les unités. De plus, l'intervention a contribué à ce que le développement de la transformation des filières soit inclus dans le Document Stratégique de Réduction de la Pauvreté en 2009. <i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'action commenté</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Le café et le cacao ont également fait l'objet d'appuis STABEX pour contribuer à la réflexion sur les réformes institutionnelles. Ces réformes ont une incidence majeure sur la compétitivité du secteur et sur les conditions de rémunération des producteurs, mais elles sont actuellement suspendues. Aussi, si le processus de réforme venait à redémarrer entre 2008 et 2010, il serait utile d'apporter de nouveaux appuis institutionnels. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>)</p> <p>Dans le cadre de l'activité A. 1.b. « Appui aux petits Planteurs d'autres cultures paysannes d'exportation » : (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>)</p> <p>Pour le coton, les financements concerneront le renforcement des services apportés aux petits producteurs (vulgarisation agricole, fourniture de matériel végétal amélioré etc.), les appuis à l'équipement, le renforcement des organisations professionnelles agricoles (y compris les organisations interprofessionnelles) mais aussi les appuis aux réformes institutionnelles ou aux restructurations sectorielles.</p> <p>Pour le secteur café-cacao, il est envisagé d'intervenir qu'à travers des appuis institutionnels ponctuels (études ou renforcement des capacités) mais ayant une importance stratégique pour sa restructuration et pour la répartition des revenus en son sein.</p> <p>Pour les cultures de diversification, les appuis institutionnels (études ou renforcement des capacités) pourront être complétés par le renforcement des services apportés aux petits producteurs (vulgarisation agricole, fourniture de matériel végétal amélioré, etc.).</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>La présente action se développe selon une approche méthodologique participative qui voit la participation comme une fin; c'est-à-dire une approche méthodologique selon laquelle promouvoir la participation signifie viser à la responsabilisation, au renforcement du pouvoir des personnes bénéficiaires (empowerment) dans les processus décisionnels les concernant, au renforcement de leur capacité de mettre en œuvre, suivre avec autonomie et en tant que protagonistes les actions de développement dont ils peuvent se faire les promoteurs. Selon cette approche participative, les compétences, les capacités acquises et/ou renforcées, à travers tout le projet, par les GIC bénéficiaires et par la Fédération des GIC qui se constituera, stimuleront un rôle de plus en plus actif des organisations paysannes bénéficiaires qui va aussi au-delà de l'objectif spécifique du projet et qui peut engendrer des processus de transformation sociale de majeure portée. (<i>Source : Annexe I p.13</i>)</p> <p>Du point de vue institutionnel, la durabilité sera garantie par (<i>Source : Annexe I p.29</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ la finalité même du projet qui est celle de renforcer l'autonomie opérationnelle et économique, la capacité d'autopromotion et de représentativité des GIC groupes cibles ;</li> <li>▪ l'empreinte méthodologique caractéristique du projet selon laquelle la participation des groupes cibles - entendue comme capacité des groupes cibles d'avoir le contrôle</li> </ul>

	de leur existence et d'intervenir dans les processus décisionnels les concernant, - doit être sollicitée dans toutes les phases de l'action mais elle doit surtout représenter le but de l'action.
<b>CM-PAS</b>	NA. This intervention has not targeted agricultural commodities. It aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the economy and at facilitating its insertion into the regional and world economy through the implementation of the EU-Central Africa EPA. The various activities do not explicitly target agricultural commodities. <i>Source: Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	The Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector contributed to institutional building of the West Indies Rum and Spirits Producers Association (WIRSPA). But the programme evaluation points out that nothing was done to develop Caribbean expertise in the various professions related to rum production and marketing.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	Institutional and Management Capacity: In principle, it has been concluded that each institution has the capacity to implement the sub components each is responsible for. Where there are weaknesses additional support would be provided as follows: Coffee Research Past performance and present capacity for the difficult tasks involved have been taken into account in including locally and internationally recruited technical assistance. PMU/CTA In CIP III outside TA was used successfully to assist in the co-ordination of the Project. It is concluded that this is appropriate for the current Project. Engineering support is strong through locally contracted staff, whilst procurement still has the benefit of the staff that implemented the last Project. Coffee Extension The attainment of structural changes is proposed. This provides an impetus to change. It is understood that this has also been recognised by the Federal Government, which has requested the coffee growing Regions to implement changes in coffee extension structures so that there is better delivery Coffee Nurseries The institutional capacity to operate the nurseries is evident. The defect has been the non-sustainability of the public nurseries because they have been consistently starved of funds after the closure of CIP III. The Project would correct this situation as a transitional measure before reaching financial autonomy of remaining "wholesale" nurseries relaying the research centers. Conservation This is a new concept and hence a new organisational structure has had to be proposed, which includes the involvement of the Regional Governments, the Institute for Biodiversity Conservation and Research (IBCR) as co-ordinator, NGOs working in the areas of the forest in carrying out the community development programme, and use of an outside firm for monitoring progress. Marketing Project involvement has been kept to a minimum, since it was seen that this is essentially the preserve of the private sector. ( <i>Source : FA Annexes A to D p.6</i> )
<b>GH-COC</b>	The 2010 monitoring report gives a 3 out of 4 appreciation note on the project's contribution to institutional and management capacity. It states that the field training programmes have a positive impact on self-organising capacities of rural communities. The future step is creating interest groups to defend cocoa producers' opinions at the Ministry. <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 02, Potential sustainability sheet.</i>

<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme does not aim at designing commodity strategies but, as indicated its name, increasing the participation of African Nations in SPSOs.</p> <p>The programme is however a “human and institutional capacity” one. It aims at turning African countries into “standard producers” rather than “standard consumers” in order to enhance the up-take of the standards into national Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and food safety systems. <i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, August 2010, page 15.</i></p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>Prior to the SBS in support of the Programme of Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), the EC had supported through Stabex funds two components of the PMA: agricultural research (National Agricultural Research System – NARS) and extension services (National Agricultural Advisory Services – NAADS). The TAPs read: “the NAADS secretariat is a highly professional organisation, to which technical assistance is being provided for institutional capacity building. However, at lower local government levels and especially in farmers’ fora which provide the focus for the work of both components, capacity is weak. NAADS roll-out is actually delayed because of the larger-than-expected capacity effort required here.”</p> <p>The TAPs add: “In NARS, a critical aspect is the extent to which researchers are able to shift from their traditional “reductionist” approach to a genuine partnership with farmers and other clients. The EC has addressed this issue partly through the Decentralised Learning component of its current programme of support to NARO (National Agricultural Research Organisation). This activity will be sustained in the future through a recently-concluded agreement for collaboration between the International Centre for Development-Oriented Research in Agriculture, NARO and Makerere University”.</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) focuses inter alia on capacity building of producer organisations. This support aims at increasing their ability to improve agricultural practices as well as marketing and business aspects. It therefore doesn’t aim at the elaboration of strategies at a national level but at a micro level. <i>Source: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 1, page 1</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>There is mention that the EC supported institutional reforms and capacity building works in countries such as Jamaica. It is however unknown whether the support enhanced institutional capacity needed to design the strategies. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global report, pages 4 &amp; 20, htspe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.2.1.4</b>	<p>Evidence that the Commission promoted the participation of stakeholders, including representatives of producer/ farmer organisations, in the strategy design process and their effective engagement in the dialogue</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The PACICC programme has been supported under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF; it was submitted to the Delegation by the Ministry of Trade. The programme was based on a participatory approach, on strengthening farmer organisations and the subsectors organisation (CICC). This programme has later been included into the strategy approach for the coffee subsector. (<i>Source: MN 405; AAACP Action Fiche</i>). Through the Moungo-Nkam RDP, the Commission promoted bottom up approaches based on participatory approaches including through this RDP that has a component targeting cocoa, coffee and palm oil. The project based its approach on the careful selection of representative farmer organisations (GIC) with whom they elaborated the support. But this whole approach was not developed in the perspective of a strategy design. <i>Source: MN 988</i></p> <p>According to interviews, the EU has supported the regrouping of banana producers in Cameroon and their dialogue, with public institutions and among themselves. <i>Source :</i></p>



	<p>MN 995</p> <p>The AAACP programme in Cameroon also included a study to « <i>identify buyers, agro-enterprises, or small businesses operating in the oil palm and cassava and plantain sectors in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and DRC that are interested in developing or upgrading their business model</i> ». This action is intended to enable producers and buyers to « <i>participate more efficiently in sector strategies</i> » and to improve the market linkage relationship between them.</p>
<b>GH</b>	The EU decentralisation programme supports inter alia civil society engagement in the national dialogue and decisions. <i>Source : Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 45</i>
<b>VAN POPA CA/ POP2</b>	Dans le cadre du projet POPACA/POP 2, de nombreuses études de filières (épices, noix, cacao, café, cocotier, cultures vivrières) ont été réalisées, avec l'appui de l'assistant technique du projet et en collaboration avec le Ministère de l'Agriculture. Ces études ont été discutées lors d'ateliers avec les représentants des différentes filières concernées. <i>Source: MN 1059 and MN 1098</i>
<b>CI</b>	Oui. Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA- Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. ( <i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i> ).
<b>MG vanilla coffee</b>	Le programme Stabex a constitué un des rares et importants efforts significatifs d'investissement publics à Madagascar pour la relance des secteurs des cultures de rente en collaboration directe avec les producteurs et exportateurs. Le concept « filière » a été développé avec succès pour la vanille, le café et le litchi. Il a permis l'émergence ou le renforcement des organisations professionnelles, le développement et la diffusion de techniques pour débloquent les principaux goulots d'étranglement relatifs à la production, à la transformation et à la mise en marché, et/ou lorsque le potentiel existait, la standardisation des produits et le contrôle de la qualité, la promotion du label d'origine Madagascar, et si nécessaire des appuis pour des révisions réglementaires ou légales à Madagascar et dans l'UE. <i>Source : Stabex, Cadre d'Obligations Mutuelles 1996-1999</i>
<b>UG</b>	The EU Delegation actively participated in and helped the progress of sector working groups on agricultural and rural development. <i>Source: Uganda Country Strategy Evaluation</i>
<b>UG</b>	<p>The EC actively contributed to the elaboration of the new agricultural development strategy (Development Strategy and Investment Plan - DSIP) through the provision of notes and papers and the organisation of thematic groups between the government and the private sector. It however considers that the implication of farmers and the private sector in the development of DSIP has been too small. (Source: MN 301)</p> <p>In close cooperation with the farmers in Mubende, the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance of Uganda, the Uganda Coffee Development Authority, the Secretariat of the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture, the Secretariat of the Medium Term Competitiveness Strategy, the European Commission, the Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program, the Agricultural Sector Program Support Project, the Africa Project Development Facility and Neumann Kaffee Gruppe came together and designed this project for establishing the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance (subsequently renamed as Uganda Coffee Farmers Alliance).</p> <p><i>Source: Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	For the coffee and sugar sectors, initial sector analysis has been done. The sector strategy

	<p>for sugar was not found but is expected to have been realised in line with the guidelines usually applied for the SUCRE budget line. Subsequent studies (such as the feasibility study underlying the activities of 2006 and 2007) have used stakeholder workshops to discuss the ideas.</p> <p>For tea, although it is possible that a sector diagnostic was undertaken at the time, there is no institutional memory about this process and none of the interviewed stakeholders could recall how the EU came to support the research institute. This would point towards non involvement of stakeholders at the time since the people interviewed were already in the sector during the 1990s (when Stabex funds were received) and 2000s (when the programme was designed). <i>Sources: MN173, MN625, Feasibility study sugar 2007.</i></p>
<b>MG cocoa, coffee, vanilla</b>	<p>Les différentes industries — du cacao, du café, du girofle, du poivre et de la vanille — à Madagascar, ne sont que très faiblement structurées. Une « appropriation » des objectifs et résultats du programme STABEX, ou des recommandations de l'assistance technique d'appui, ne peut donc être le fait que de structures fugaces, comme les projets, ou de structures qui ne sont pas directement concernées—i.e., directement 'intéressées'—par les améliorations recherchées: celles de l'Etat malgache. <i>Source : Assistance Technique à la mise en œuvre du programme d'intensification et de structuration des principales filières d'exportation de produits agricoles à Madagascar, Rapport final</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The initiative to include stakeholder in strategy discussions is not an EU initiative but the CSSP II contributed to facilitate this by including FO promotion and their participation in strategy design in one of its components. <i>'Modest progress is being made in helping farmers groups to organise their positions on sector strategy via participation in stakeholder meetings. The first Cocoa Farmers' Forum organised on 15th and 16th July 2010 by Cadbury Cocoa Partnership (CCP) and STCP-2 on working together to improve cocoa production was attended by 48 farmer groups from 15 districts from the Western, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions. Other participants included Cocobod, NGOs, certification organisations, and other support groups. The forum allowed farmer groups to highlight their immediate priorities namely, input acquisition, timely supply of agrochemicals, expansion of youth farmer training centres etc. (...) However, their capacity to continue to participate at that level will depend on progress towards becoming self-sustaining organisations over the next 3 – 5 years. (...) With regard to sector strategy development, it is too early to provide a useful assessment of the extent of progress being made towards Result 3, participatory cocoa sector strategy development and implemented. In March 2010 Cocobod, with contributions from other industry stakeholders developed a draft Cocoa Sector Strategy II (CSS II) which re-iterated priorities articulated in the GPRS II and FASDEP II. In that context, CSSP II is working with the Centre for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA) on econometric modelling of price and cost factors within the Ghanaian cocoa supply chain. When completed, the results will help to inform the CSS II. However in practice, the participation of FO in strategy formulation appears nil: Cocobod recognised no role for IITA-STCP or FO in this area. Source: CSSPII MTE 2011, MN 906</i></p>
<b>KEN</b>	<p>There is no evidence in the EC-Kenyan CSPs/NIPs that the Commission promoted the participation of stakeholders, including representatives of producer/ farmer organisations, in the strategy design process and their effective engagement in the dialogue.</p>
<b>TAN</b>	<p>There is no evidence in the Tanzania CSPs/NIPs that the Commission promoted the participation of stakeholders, including representatives of producer/ farmer organisations, in the strategy design process and their effective engagement in the dialogue. However this document mentions that the draft agricultural sector development strategy (ASDS) which was elaborated in 2001 was discussed with stakeholders, including donors, before publication at the end of 2002. <i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 13</i></p>

<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme has developed a participatory approach to prepare and develop commodity strategies with selected CDDCs. This approach including discussions with all key stakeholders of a commodity chain (i.e. input providers, farmers, producer organisations, trade organisations, collectors, aggregators, transport and warehouse providers, wholesalers, processors, exporters, retailers, buying agents, and relevant parts of governmental authorities).</p> <p>The financing agreement stipulates that the situation of producers is at the centre of the analysis and that major efforts are placed on ensuring effective producer participation in the process. <i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>CR_RIC</b>	<p>The programme “Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean” aimed at supporting governments in the adoption of national rice policy and strategies. Though one of the activities stipulated clearly “<i>support to state and non-state actors in setting-up a national strategy among which through clarification of the role of the different stakeholders: administration, producers, millers and exporters</i>”, the evaluation report points out that the expected result has not been attained (no adoption of national rice policy and strategies) and there is no evidence of an active participation of non-state actors. <i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The West Indies Rum and Spirits Producers Association (WIRSPA) played a major role in the Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector. It has been the implementing agency of the programme and has benefited of the programme support for the development of its capacities.</p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>At project level, the Commission did stakeholder consultations to define the constraints and areas where support was needed. No evidence about wider efforts to implicate stakeholders in regional or national policy discussions. <i>Source: IF and FA.</i></p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Le projet appuie 3 Organisations Faïtières, et renforce leurs groupements de base, afin d’améliorer leur capacité à participer activement aux débats de politique sectoriel et à mener des actions de plaidoyer. ‘Un des outputs attendus du projet concerne la capacité des organisations consolidée à développer une véritable stratégie de défense des intérêts de leurs membres. En effet, la mise en activité des dirigeants d’OP sur le créneau de la commercialisation associative (notamment export) les amènent souvent à avoir des aspirations en matière de compréhension de leur environnement politico-économique global ainsi qu’une volonté de vouloir agir sur celui-ci. Le projet ne se limitera donc pas à renforcer les capacités techniques et commerciales des OP mais appuiera également les dirigeants des organisations faïtières à maîtriser cet environnement dans lequel ils évoluent et d’élaborer des messages de plaidoyer en faveur de leur secteur d’intervention.’ <i>Source : Descriptif Action</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>Documentation consulted at this stage does not provide evidence that the Commission involved stakeholders in the strategy design process or their effective engagement in the dialogue. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country reports, page 346, htspe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.2.1.5</b>	<p>Evidence that the Commission’s initiatives were coordinated with MS and complementary to their interventions</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The EU is the only donor in the banana sector of Cameroon. The EU supported strategy design for coffee, palm oil, cassava and plantains through the AAACP (which is a</p>

	coordinated programme with other international organisations. However there is no information on whether this programme had contacts with MSs. <i>Source : AAACP action fiches</i>
<b>CM</b>	Although thematic working groups especially for agriculture are currently quite dynamic, and exchange of practices is done, there is no coordination of initiatives on the field. The French cooperation (AFD) intervenes through an overall approach on advice to farmers on their farming systems (in which according to the country's agro-ecological region there could be one or another commodity). The beneficiary identifies the products for which he is looking for advice and thus this approach cannot be sector driven. In some regions there is in fact advice about some commodities such as cocoa. Donor interventions (WB, AFD, EC) are not coordinated, even if exchange of information takes place and even if in the field, stakeholders try to harmonise approaches. The responsibility of this lack of coordination between donors is shared between the Gvt (MINADER and MINEPIA) who still have not agreed on a strategic approach to the agricultural sector, and donors who (without official strategy) work according to their own approaches (MN 401). For example the PAPA programme (funded under the EDF starting in October 2011) and PACA (funded by the WB since 2009) concern the coffee subsector, PAPA is working on availability of plants (seeds, cuttings) PACA on an innovation in wet processing Robusta unit. (MN 411). But MS intervene under different aid modalities!! (different approaches, including in terms of co-financing of beneficiaries (free of charge or financial contribution), overall approach to the farming system or sector based approach, participatory and bottom-up or more top down,... The Commission targets poor farmers whereas the WB works with larger farmers who already showed their capacity to invest (MN 411, 404, 401).
<b>CI</b>	L'harmonisation des interventions des partenaires est assurée par plusieurs structures de coordination. Au niveau européen, l'action est coordonnée par des réunions régulières et fréquentes entre la Délégation de la Commission européenne et les Etats membres. ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.28</i> ). Les Etats Membres présents sont l'Allemagne, la Belgique, l'Espagne, la France et l'Italie ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.24 25</i> ). Les possibilités de coopération avec les Etats membres paraissent limitées, en raison du manque de ressources humaines spécialisées dans les questions de développement de la plupart de leurs représentations diplomatiques. ( <i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.63</i> ). Depuis 2004 et la chasse aux « français » ainsi qu'aux européens (slogan « à chaque ivoirien, son français »), tous les bailleurs de fonds sont partis à part l'UE et l'AFD <i>Source : MN 819</i>
<b>VAN</b>	Il y a très peu de bailleurs de fonds au Vanuatu : la CE, la France, AusAid, et NZAid. Il y a également la Chine mais on ne sait pas ce qu'ils font. La coordination est très limitée. La CE et la France sont les deux seuls à s'intéresser au secteur rural et au développement agricole au Vanuatu. Ces deux bailleurs de fonds ont mis en œuvre conjointement le projet POPACA/POP 2. <i>Source : MN 1067</i>
<b>CI</b>	Réponse mixte. Le lien du programme Stabex avec les interventions des Etats membres est délicat à mesurer, compte tenu du contexte national dans lequel la majeure partie des actions a été exécutée. La première raison est induite par le fait que durant la crise l'intervention de la plupart de ceux-ci a été interrompue, ou limitée à la mobilisation des ressources disponibles en cours. La seconde vient du fait que la coopération française en particulier ne partage pas l'opportunité et les analyses de l'intervention communautaire dans le secteur de concentration du programme Stabex 1999, à savoir le secteur cotonnier ivoirien. ( <i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i> ). Toutefois, même si les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale, ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission en dépit de l'absence de

	<p>rapport annuel de coordination du programme Stabex qui induit le fait que l'information détaillée stratégique ou d'avancement n'est que partiellement diffusée au niveau des Etats membres. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>In general, Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme. Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>In the beginning of the 1990s many donors were involved in the support to the cocoa sector (under leadership of the WB) and the Commission was also active in the same sector; it is assumed that coordination was achieved (nothing was found on the subject). More recently, although Ghana is functioning under a JAS and there is thus labour division and coordination amongst donors, the EC does not participate in the Agricultural Sector Working Group. It was represented until recently by the AFD through a silent partnership agreement but this didn't function very well (did not prevent occurrence of duplication). <i>Source: MN181</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La réponse porte sur l'ensemble des bailleurs et n'est pas spécifique aux MS. De manière générale, il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs mais très peu ou rien en matière de coordination de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 805). En outre, la crise politique a engendré une suspension plus ou moins complète des financements bailleurs. Certains ont maintenu les financements en cours dont la France qui négocie actuellement de nouveaux financements. A noter que la suspension de l'aide de l'UE sur base de l'article 96 de l'accord de Cotonou ne concerne que les financements FED. Echappe à la suspension tout ce qui ne passe pas par FED : pêche, banane (Source : MN 817).</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. Donors' coordination (not only with MS) is good but there are fluctuations of the donors' implication over time. Coordination should be translated into joint actions but there are different ways to be coordinated (sectors covered, geographical areas...). Currently donor coordination mainly consists in some sort of task and geographical sharing. Donors report on their activity in the framework of the donors working group. Lessons learned and diffusion between donors: gaps are shared at the project level and also at the strategic level: all levels of coordination are covered. There are two different groups for donor coordination:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Agriculture Sector Working Group established by the government (There are such working groups for all sectors defined by the government). Meetings take place 8 times a year and are chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MinAgri. It is supposed to involve all the stakeholders (private, donors...) and to guide the policies decisions</li> </ul>

	<p>and their implementation. Its role is especially important to discuss the ministry's budget but its performance is very uneven. Because of the political pressure on the MAAIF it becomes very difficult for the Ministry to chair such meetings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Agriculture donors group: it is a donor initiative but they can invite specific stakeholders when it is relevant to the meeting agenda (eg. NAADS director...).</li> </ul> <p>Sources : MN 301, 309 and 313.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Donors support to the PMA: EU supported the PMA Secretariat; financed studies: (e.g. the Commodity Exchange which was later handed over to the Ministry of Trade). Danida helped establish the National Agricultural Research System; financed policy studies; provided funds for non-conditional grants to local governments. All financing requests were going through the PMA Steering Committee where they were presented to the donors. Then we were informed of which donor, if any, agreed to finance. (Source: MN306)</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La coordination et la complémentarité entre les bailleurs de fond et leurs interventions dans le domaine des cultures d'exportation ne sont pas satisfaisantes. La première insuffisance est l'absence de coordination du programme STABEX et de ses 11 contrats de subvention. Certains de ces contrats couvrent des filières communes (ou avec des spécificités similaires) et sont mis en œuvre dans une même région, autant de conditions pour créer des synergies et partager bonnes pratiques et leçons apprises. <i>Source : Appui à l'amélioration de la qualité et à la commercialisation du girofle dans le District de Fénériver, Rapport de Monitoring</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No specific evidence for MS but they are included in "donors".</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>Currently 17 EU Member States are carrying out aid programmes in Ethiopia, including such new Member States as Hungary and Poland. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.35</i>). The programming cycles of EU Member States and the EC are not as yet fully harmonized. Member States and the EC have different programming cycles, ranging from two to five years. In the five-year category belong the EC, France and Sweden. The three-year group, in which the majority belongs, is DFID, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Finland and Austria. Italy has a two year programming cycle. As each EU Member State is guided by development cooperation policy directives of their national Governments, fast movement towards aligning programming cycles either with the Government's PASDEP or with the CSP for the 10th EDF cannot be expected. All EU Member States can, however, benefit from the Country Diagnostic Survey which has recently been prepared by the Commission with the participation of several Member States. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.37</i>). The work plan for 2007 is notably focused on EU Member States' Coordination: Raising awareness of co-operation commitments and opportunities and finalizing the EU Joint Response Strategy which follows on from the Joint Diagnostic that was completed in 2006 (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.40</i>). Coordination and complementarity between the Commission and the Member States have not been developed to any deeper level than with many other donors, partly because of the generally well developed donor coordination system in Ethiopia, partly because political views and operational approaches still differ widely among Member States (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p iv and 53</i>).</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les principaux bailleurs de fonds du pays se coordonnent et coopèrent très étroitement dans la recherche de la complémentarité et de la cohérence entre leurs programmes d'appui. Cette concertation s'est, par exemple, traduite par des aide-mémoire communs adressés au Gouvernement sur les points qu'il leur paraissait important d'approfondir dans la stratégie de lutte contre la pauvreté. La coordination communautaire fait l'objet</p>

	d'une attention particulière. Elle se manifeste par des réunions périodiques, entre la Délégation de la Commission et les trois Etats Membres représentés d'une manière permanente à Madagascar: l'Allemagne, la France et le Royaume Uni ( <i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.15</i> ). Concernant le Partenariat entre Madagascar et l'Union Européenne, les stratégies proposées par l'UE sont complémentaires aux priorités de la coopération germano-malgache. L'Allemagne apprécie et soutient le principe d'une coordination renforcée et participe activement aux processus de revue et de programmation du Partenariat ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.22</i> ).
<b>WAF</b>	Le RSP/RIP de l'Afrique de l'Ouest pour la période 2008-2013 comprend des « matrices des bailleurs de fonds » pour la CEDEAO et l'UEMOA au sein desquelles sont reprises, par thème d'intervention, les intervenants (dont l'UE et ses Etats membres) et les montants engagés. Selon le RSP/RIP 2008-2013, des actions complémentaires de coordination du soutien sont prévues (sans en donner les détails). <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 60, 90-101</i>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	The fourth key activity area of the AAACP programme is to capitalise on complementarities and synergies of ACP, EU and concerned International Organisations in the area of agricultural commodities, as well as to share experiences at the All-ACP level. Lessons learned will be spread quickly and allow replication in commodity chains in other ACP CDDCs. The programme is based on the premise that coordination mechanisms at national and international level will ensure a constant sharing of information. <i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	Given the PIP's long experience, it has become a reference for information and a privileged collaboration partner for practically all donors. At country levels, there are many examples of coordination of the PIP and Member states (e.g. with Spain in Senegal, with the DFID in Kenya, with Denmark in Uganda...). At the global level, they collaborate with the DFID and the GTZ on standards compliance programmes and are beginning to work with the CTB on sustainability standards. <i>Source: MN 958</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	The AMSP programme is a purely EC programme and was not coordinated with other donors.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de contributions d'autres institutions ou EM ( <i>cf. Budget – Sources de financement</i> ) et pas de référence à une éventuelle coordination pur cette intervention
<b>BF-COT</b>	Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France). <i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i>
<b>CI-REH</b>	La Commission européenne est le principal bailleur a avoir maintenu ses opérations durant les années de crise a partir de 2002. La coordination avec les autres donateurs se fait donc sur une base ad-hoc notamment avec les sections coopération des 3 Etats membres présents avec une telle section. ( <i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4</i> )
<b>CR-RIC</b>	There is no strong evidence of coordination and complementarity with EU MS interventions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Financing Agreement refers to the operations carried out by other EU MS (Guyana: DFID funds a programme on land tenure issues and the Italian</li> </ul>

	<p>government supports the maintenance equipment of the irrigation systems; Suriname: the Dutch government supports the development of a new Agriculture policy) and stresses that “<i>special care has been taken to ensure that this regional rice programme complements the efforts of other donor agencies as well as EU regional initiatives</i>”. No further details or specific measures are provided in the FA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The final evaluation does not mention specific coordination efforts undertaken during implementation and stakeholders interviewed confirmed that coordination with EU MS has not been a specific area of attention under this programme.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, December 2003, pages 5, 10; SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009; MN 700</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>No reference to Member States can be found in the intervention’s monitoring reports, financial proposal or financial agreement. The monitoring report refers to “other donors” without clarifying who they are. It mentions that there is “significant donor coordination, but no overlap in activities” since the CSSP II focuses on activities that no other donors do: training and replanting. <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 01, Quality of Project Design sheet.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) financing agreement states that a project on the harmonisation of phytosanitary policies has been led by the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) and the AU-IAPSC. The project supported the reinforcement of the AU-IAPSC capacities and the harmonisation of African phytosanitary legislations. The FA mentions that the PAN-SPSO is complementary to that intervention but no information on coordination can be found in the programme documents. <i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 17</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Suite à la conférence de Paris sur le Partenariat Coton Europe-Afrique, il a été décidé, lors de l'évaluation de mi-parcours (RMP) du 9ème FED, d'allouer 15 M€ à la mise en œuvre d'un Programme d'Appui à la Réforme de la Filière Coton (PARFC) (BCS, §1.3; CF, annexe II, p.2).</p> <p>NB. La fiche d'identification (FIP, §1), sans faire à ce niveau de référence directe à la conférence de Paris, précise que cette allocation est également consécutive à une saison 2004-2005 très mauvaise pour le coton malien, ce qui a conduit à augmenter le PIN Mali de € 80 millions, dont 15 en appui budgétaire macroéconomique et 15 pour un appui au secteur coton.</p> <p>La fiche d'identification (FIP, §8) indique que la concertation des bailleurs mise en place pour la préparation du Forum UE-Afrique sur le coton s'est renforcée et transformée en un groupe technique UE-Etats Membres (Uniquement Pays Bas et France. L'Allemagne et la Belgique ont peu d'actions dans le domaine du Coton, la Suède ne dispose pas de ressources humaines suffisantes pour participer au groupe technique) – l'USAID et la BM, avec l'AFD comme chef de file. L'AFD bénéficie d'informations de qualité grâce à ses implications tant au niveau bancaire (financement des campagnes cotonnières, crédit pour usine d'égrenage) que de projets d'appui à la filière (Programme d'amélioration des systèmes d'exploitation en zone cotonnière, PASE I). Le groupe technique permet un partage d'informations et la prise de positions communes renforçant le dialogue avec l'Etat représenté par le Ministère des Finances.</p> <p>La FIP (§8) précise également que l'AFD de son côté initie une mission d'identification pour l'élaboration du PASE II (cadre logique, CF, annexe 3b) dont un volet important est la consolidation de la structuration des Organisations Paysannes. L'intervention</p>



	<p>proposée par la FIP s'intègre dans cet environnement dynamique en appuyant notamment le gouvernement pour un financement effectif du coût de la réforme (ce qui élimine un facteur de blocage).</p> <p>L'intervention (PARFC) proposée par la FIP et qui a fait l'objet d'une identification et d'une instruction conjointe avec l'AFD, s'intègre dans cet environnement dynamique en appuyant notamment le gouvernement pour un financement effectif du coût de la réforme.</p> <p><i>Sources : FIP, ROM/BCS</i></p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	According to the project description "there are a few (USAID financed) initiatives with more or less relevance" to the project. No reference is made to EU MS.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	Some 20 donors, the major ones being the European Union, Denmark, Ireland, IFAD, African Development Bank, United Kingdom and the World Bank support implementation of the PMA using various aid modalities such as general budget support, earmarked budget support, sector programme support and project aid. The programme TAPs add that in particular "a number of development partners provide funds to NAADS in the form of sub-sector budget support, while applying a coordinated disbursement mechanism and a single planning, reporting and financial management system."
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The POP2 was designed as a follow-up to the POP1 which was funded by France and the Government of Vanuatu. The POP2 was elaborated together by the EC and France. The project's third monitoring report states that the intervention logics differed between donors, that the projects had separate badly constructed Logical Frameworks and that there was a lack of coordination mechanisms between the two donors. The donors each dealt with separate local partners (the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) for the French and the Vanuatu Research and Technical Centre (VARTC) for the EU). The projects aimed at too many Producer Organisations, which proved that they didn't learn the lessons from the first POP (POP1). The institutional structures did not allow an efficient implementation of the programme. And since the French and EU interventions operated through different modalities (focus on commercialisation of cooperatives for the French and private sector support for the EU), it resulted in "double reporting". Contributions also lacked timeliness and delays in French funding had a domino-effect on the EU interventions.</p> <p>Later on, these problems were addressed by progressively adapting the Logical Framework (2005), establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the overall programme (2006) and referring to only one implementation agency (the DARD) as it can be seen in the third project synopsis. <i>Sources: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 3, impact, efficiency and effectiveness sheets. Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 1, page 1. Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Project Synopsis 3.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	There is no mention of coordination of the EC's initiatives with member state interventions in the SFA impact evaluation report
<b>I.2.1.6</b>	Evidence that the Commission coordinated its approach to national strategy development with other donors and international organisations
<b>CM</b>	Only an outdated national strategy for rural development exists. The strategy is from 2005 and it mainly defines quantitative growth objectives for several agricultural products, some regarding commodities (cocoa, coffee, cotton, pineapples, bananas, rubber) and subsistence crops (maize, manioc, plantain, palm oil, rice and other) This strategy is vague and it does not really prioritise sectors and it does not define an agricultural policy and ways interventions should be implemented. This strategy rests on

	<p>stabilised land tenure. The MINADER mentions the “creation of a favourable regulatory framework encouraging investment in the agricultural sector”. The strategy is from 2006; in 2011 there is yet no stable framework. In addition, the Commission funded 2 studies in 2008 and 2009 for updating this strategy. These studies have been delivered by are still not validated at the level of one of the Ministries (MINEPIA). <i>Source: Stratégie de développement du secteur rural, 2006, document de travail ; MN 403, 401</i></p> <p>There is clearly a problem among Ministries on that subject. The EC funded a study for 300 000€ to support setting a policy strategy, the French cooperation did the same for 200 000€ but the studies have not been validated by Ministries. Actually, there is a struggle for competences among the MINEPAT and the MINADER.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 407; MN403</i></p> <p>The EU is the only donor in the banana sector of Cameroon. The EU supported strategy design for coffee, palm oil, cassava and plantains through the AAACP (which is a coordinated programme with other international organisations which were involved in the implementation of the programmes (UNCTAD, World Bank, FAO, ITC). <i>Source : AAACP action fiches</i></p>
CI	<p>Aucun autre donateur substantiel n'est présent en Côte d'Ivoire, à l'exception des Etats-Unis qui concentrent leur aide sur la lutte contre le sida (programme PEPFAR et Fonds mondial). La Banque mondiale et la BAD ont suspendu leurs opérations suite à l'arrêt des remboursements de leurs prêts (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25</i>). La stratégie de réponse présentée dans ce document s'inscrit dans une hypothèse où le pays aura réussi à surmonter la crise actuelle, les élections présidentielles et législatives auront été organisées avec succès et un certain nombre de réformes essentielles auront été entamées. Ainsi, la période couverte par le 10<sup>ème</sup> FED devrait-elle voir le retour de la plupart des bailleurs historiques de la Cote d'Ivoire, les interventions européennes s'inscrivant donc dans une logique d'harmonisation et de complémentarité avec ces partenaires au développement. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.28</i>). L'harmonisation des interventions des partenaires est assurée par plusieurs structures de coordination. Des consultations formelles telles que l'ISMG (Integrated senior management group) ou le GRS (Groupe de réflexion stratégique) assurent la coordination et l'échange d'informations entre les partenaires. Une mission d'évaluation multi bailleurs organisée par la BM (en collaboration avec le FMI, la CE, la BAD, la France, les USA, la CEDEAO, le PNUD et le HCR) est prévue pour le premier semestre 2007 afin d'évaluer les besoins de la reconstruction. Une conférence multi bailleurs pourrait s'en suivre dans le courant 2008.</p> <p>Néanmoins, il n'existe pas, à ce jour, de véritable coordination pour la mise en œuvre de réformes relatives à la Déclaration de Paris. Le gouvernement ivoirien bénéficiera de l'appui technique et financier des partenaires (notamment de la CE par le biais du PUR-IV) pour le suivi et la mise en œuvre des engagements de la Déclaration de Paris (voir annexe 6 « feuille de route pour l'harmonisation » page 70). De l'avis général, il est entendu que l'accent devra être porté sur les conditions préalables de l'alignement que sont la sécurisation et l'optimisation de la gestion des finances publiques. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.27 28</i>).</p> <p>La concertation entre les bailleurs en Cote d'Ivoire a traditionnellement bien fonctionné dans le passé. Elle s'articulait en « tables rondes » thématiques réunissant l'ensemble des bailleurs concernés sous la présidence du pays qui, en raison du volume de son intervention ou de son expertise dans le domaine, faisait figure de chef de file. A partir de 1998, l'incapacité de la Cote d'Ivoire et honorer les intérêts des prêts qui lui avaient été consentis ainsi que la révélation des fraudes survenues dans la gestion des fonds d'appui budgétaire de la CE ont conduit à la cessation quasi-simultanée des paiements de</p>

	<p>l'ensemble des bailleurs. En l'absence de financements, la concertation entre les bailleurs s'est progressivement distendue. Il faut souligner qu'en 2001, à la demande de leurs membres, les institutions de Bretton Woods ont subordonné la reprise de leurs relations avec la Cote d'Ivoire aux résultats du dialogue politique que l'UE conduisait avec le gouvernement ivoirien dans le cadre des consultations au titre de l'art. 96 de l'Accord de Cotonou. La Commission n'a toutefois pas été, ensuite, pleinement associée à la dizaine de missions du FMI et de la Banque mondiale en 2001, 2002 et 2003. L'échange avec les IBW gagnerait à être amélioré sur la place d'Abidjan (<i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.26</i>).</p> <p>La Commission s'est efforcée de relancer la coordination en associant les autres bailleurs à la finalisation de son Programme-cadre des mesures correctives dès le début de l'année 2002. La survenue de la crise a toutefois suspendu tous les contacts qui avaient été engagés sur les questions budgétaires. Dans un contexte de rareté de ressources, la concertation entre la Commission et la France d'une part et la Banque mondiale d'autre part s'est considérablement intensifié ces derniers mois. L'audit des flux financiers dans la filière cacao, engagé en septembre 2003 et supervisé par les trois parties, en est l'illustration la plus concrète. Par ailleurs, les relations entre la Commission et le PNUD se sont sensiblement resserrées à la faveur du renforcement des capacités de celui-ci. (<i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.26</i>).</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui même si la CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée. La complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds est avérée, des lors que ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007. Les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale mais ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission. (<i>Source : Evaluation Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Overall, Commission interventions are relevant to address particular needs of the Caribbean in view of constructing a regional economic integrated space. Projects/programmes are designed to cope with specific constraints affecting regional integration and aim at tackling several issues directly related with integration among Caribbean countries and/or their integration into the world economy. However, these interventions are not clearly integrated into a global strategy which in fact fails to be clearly identified. This mainly stems from the absence of a comprehensive analysis of the Caribbean context that would be necessary to establish a prioritisation of needs and the selection of a set of interventions that would reflect genuine strategic choices based on a clear vision of the Caribbean integration process.</p> <p>In general, Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions.</p> <p>Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of</p>

	<p>Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>De manière générale, il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB) mais très peu ou rien en matière de coordination de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 801). A noter que la crise politique a engendré une suspension plus ou moins complète des financements bailleurs et des relations officielles avec le gouvernement. Le SMB sert de pont avec le gouvernement tant qu'il n'y a pas de relations institutionnelles avec entre eux (Source : MN 817). La présidence du groupe des bailleurs en développement rural a été longtemps exercée par la Commission. Depuis un an, elle l'est par le FIDA (auparavant, ce rôle était assuré par défaut par l'UE car cela est assez contraignant) (Source : MN 817). Egalement à noter que la suspension de l'aide de l'UE sur base de l'article 96 de l'accord de Cotonou ne concerne que les financements FED. Echappe à la suspension tout ce qui ne passe pas par FED : pêche, banane (Source : MN 817).</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. The PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture) was developed in 2001 and received support from all donors involved in the agricultural sector of which the EC. Donors supported the PMA implementation through a basket fund. Because at that time the Commission was not authorised to contribute to a basket fund, it provided support to the PMA through a budget support programme but specified that its support should be used to fund agricultural research (NARO) and extension (NAADS). (Source: MN 301). Designing commodities sub-programmes as a complement to the new national agricultural development strategy (DSIP) is currently on the agenda of the policy dialogue between the Government and donors. Donors ask the Ministry of Agriculture to design a matrix crossing the functional- and commodity-based approach. (Source: MN 313).</p> <p>NAADS. The harmonisation of development assistance between the donor community, and between donors and the partner government is a key factor in aid effectiveness. The evaluation found that the management and administration of the Programme at the national level is a good example of effective cooperation and harmonisation of development assistance. However, the recent growing unease expressed by GoU on the agricultural service delivery mechanism, involving the private sector (rather than LG extension staff) is creating a sense of some uncertainty on the programme's future direction.</p> <p>In terms of programme harmonisation at field level, NAADS has successfully coordinated its operations with another advisory services programme (AAMP) funded by ADB and IFAD, and there have been some moderate achievements in other areas including in the research field. However, not all programmes have been subject to formal harmonisation arrangements and some confusion and duplication of effort occurs.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The development of the cocoa sector strategy during the 1990s was a concerted effort between the GoG, Cocobod and different donors. The CSSP II included one component which itself included a contribution to the cocoa sector strategy. The role of the EU and the project in promoting a new cocoa sector strategy seems (i) to have been (so far) very limited and(ii) mainly attributable to the IA's reputation (IITA): <i>'When put in sector decision -making context, the programme is a modest insertion into national efforts to upgrade competitiveness and boost crop yields. CSSP II is only one of at least 8 other players in the cocoa assistance space. Other examples include Cocobod, WCF, Cadbury, etc. Therefore the influence on</i></p>

	<p><i>national or sector ICB is largely due to IITA's entre into the national decision-making framework afforded by STCP-2 and reputation as an international agricultural institution operating in Ghana.'</i> Verification with Cocobod underlined that even IITA's role in the development of the new strategy is nonexistent. <i>Source: Agrifor 2005, CSSPII MTE 2011, MN 906</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>In general, Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.45</i>).</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>Ethiopia is a pioneer country in efforts towards donor harmonisation. For example, there is a Government-owned national development strategy in place – the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) - and donor coordination has been institutionalised in a 'Development Assistance Group'. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.100</i>).</p>
<b>KEN</b>	<p>The 2003-2007 CSP/ NIP underlines that 13 EU Member States are represented in Nairobi and coordination both within the EU and the wider donor community. In particular, the system of <i>lead donor</i> within specific sectors/themes is already being employed. For example, the EC is the lead donor in the roads sub-sector, UK for legal sector reforms, WB for disaster preparedness. <i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 28</i> No such information appears in the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP. However, the EC is using the Kenya Joint Assistance strategy as a basis for implementing the Kenya economic development strategy. This includes to collaborate and to coordinate more effectively with other donors and the government. <i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 28</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les principaux bailleurs de fonds du pays se coordonnent et coopèrent très étroitement dans la recherche de la complémentarité et de la cohérence entre leurs programmes d'appui. Cette concertation s'est, par exemple, traduite par des aides-mémoire communs adressés au Gouvernement sur les points qu'il leur paraissait important d'approfondir dans la stratégie de lutte contre la pauvreté (<i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.15</i>). Avec l'accord du Gouvernement et compte tenu des calendriers presque identiques de programmation de l'UE et de la Banque Mondiale, la Banque et l'UE procèdent à une programmation « coordonnée » pour renforcer les aspects de cohérence et de complémentarité entre leurs programmes respectifs (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25</i>). Un nombre relativement restreint de partenaires est représenté sur place à Madagascar. Il s'agit, au niveau multilatéral, des agences des Nations Unies (PNUD, OMS, UNICEF, FAO, FNUAP, ONUDI, PAM, BIT), des Institutions de Bretton Woods (Banque Mondiale/SFI et FMI), de la Banque Africaine de Développement (BAfD) et de la CE, et au niveau bilatéral, de la France, de l'Allemagne, de la Suisse, de la Norvège, des Etats-Unis (USAID et Millenium Challenge Corporation) et du Japon. La coordination entre le Gouvernement malgache et les partenaires de développement se caractérise par un bon niveau d'ouverture et de dialogue. Des groupes thématiques existent dans les domaines des finances publiques, du développement rural et de l'environnement, des infrastructures, de la santé et de l'éducation. Ils incluent, le cas échéant, les Acteurs Non Etatiques impliqués dans le domaine concerné. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.24</i>).</p>
<b>TAN</b>	<p>Although no new financial allocations are foreseen in the agricultural sector by the 2001-2007 CSP, the EC will continue to take an active part in sector policy dialogue to promote sector-wide strategies and programmes (notably in agriculture), in donor coordination and through concrete project investments. According to the 2001-2007</p>

	CSP, the EC is actively supporting the drawing up of a new strategy, and continued substantial support for coffee, tea, cotton and other cash crops (some 40 M€) will be programmed within this new framework. <i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 25</i>
<b>WAF</b>	Pour la coordination régionale en Afrique de l'Ouest, le soutien de la Commission s'est davantage effectué par un appui aux deux organisations régionales (CEDAO et UEMOA) au cours du 9 <sup>ème</sup> FED. De plus, le soutien de la Commission du 10 <sup>ème</sup> FED maintient cet appui et s'inscrit dans le cadre du Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance des deux organisations. Finalement, le RSP/RIP comprend des « matrices des bailleurs de fonds » pour la CEDEAO et l'UEMOA au sein desquelles sont reprises, par thème d'intervention, les intervenants (dont l'UE, ses Etats membres, d'autres pays et d'autres organisations internationales comme la Banque Mondiale, la BAD, etc.) et les montants engagés. <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 45 &amp; 56</i>
<b>BF-COT</b>	Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France). <i>Source : Allocation signature CF</i>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	L'action s'inscrit dans le plus vaste programme de développement rural promu par le CODASC (Comité Diocésain des Activités Sociales et CARITAS), bureau de l'Archidiocèse de Garoua qui organise et gère les projets de développement de l'Archidiocèse. Dans son programme rural, le CODASC a adopté, parmi les stratégies opérationnelles, le renforcement des capacités des Groupes d'Initiative Commune présents dans le diocèse, en reconnaissant leur rôle de points de repère fondamentaux pour le développement du territoire. Afin d'éviter des doubles emplois et de maximiser les synergies avec d'autres initiatives diocésaines, les stratégies d'intervention de l'action ont été choisies en tenant compte des priorités stratégiques du programme du CODASC. En coordination avec ce programme, qui a parmi ses objectifs le renforcement des capacités diocésaines dans le développement local, les animateurs diocésains impliqués dans le projet seront invités à suivre un cours de recyclage organisé par le CODASC, avec tous les animateurs diocésains. <i>(Source : Annexe I p.14).</i> L'action, en plus, s'insère dans la tendance de l'Etat camerounais, depuis la promulgation de la loi N°92/006 relative aux Sociétés Coopératives et aux Groupes d'Initiative Commune, à promouvoir les petits groupes de communauté, les organisations de paysans comme moteur de développement local. Le DSRP (Document de Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté) aussi prévoit une stratégie intégrée de développement rural qui donne une attention particulière au rôle des communautés locales et de leurs organisations dans le développement des zones rurales. <i>(Source : Annexe I p. 14).</i>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	Given the predominant role of the EC in the sub sector then the investments are complementary by the omission of others. The Swiss Government investments do not overlap the investments under the Project. It is doubtful that the other donors will become involved in the sub sector either during or after the Project. It is understood however that the World Bank is involved in discussions with the Government on macro-economic issues, which involve changes in coffee marketing. These are in line with the proposals set out in the Project document. <i>(Source : FP p.12)</i>
<b>PAC-</b>	The project fits into the existing LRD Strategic Plan which is also funded and

<b>FACT</b>	coordinated with AU and NZ support. <i>Source: IF</i>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>In Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire, the SFA doesn't have any linkage with other programmes. No information on the subject is available in St Vincent and the Grenadines either.</p> <p>In Dominica, there are no structural linkages between SFA and other programmes, apart from the FAO agricultural review process.</p> <p>In Jamaica, the banana SFA has little linkages with other donor's activities. Jamaica also benefits from the EU Accompanying Measures to Sugar Protocol Countries and areas of synergy are being explored, particularly in the formulation of Area Development Plans. The EU is the only supporter of the banana industry but other donor-funded programmes act upon the rural areas as a whole (USAid, IDB, CARICOM-CARIFORUM, etc.) The program is also seeking synergies with the completed IDB Land Titling Project and the IDB Policy-based programme.</p> <p>In St Lucia, there is evidence of coordination with other donors in agricultural development (partnership agreement with the FAO) and in social development (close coordination with the World Bank). In economic diversification, there is no evidence of systematic coordination with other donors although focus has been brought on the OSPR (Office of Private Sector Relations of St Lucia).</p> <p>In Surinam, the SFA banana support forms an integral part of the Strategic Plan for the Agricultural Sector. Other donors (the Netherlands, IDB, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture) also intervene in different sectors influencing directly or indirectly the banana export chain.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country reports, pages 78, 150, 215, 286, 366, 435 &amp; 548 bispe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.2.1.7</b>	National development strategies have integrated a strong consideration of the problems and issues surrounding agricultural commodity dependence and these problems and issues have been addressed in a cross-sectoral manner
<b>CM</b>	The AAACP programme also supported strategy development for the coffee sector in Cameroon and the cotton sector in the whole CEMAC region. This support was implemented by the UNCTAD, through elements of supply chain strategies « <i>relating to finance strategies, market information systems, and commodity exchanges</i> » and « <i>cross-cutting activities and regional activities</i> ». Cross-cutting issues were therefore addressed, but there is no further information on the subject. <i>Source : Cameroon AAACP action fiches</i>
<b>CI</b>	L'importance de l'agriculture dans l'économie ivoirienne, notamment l'emploi et les revenus qu'elle génère pour un très grand nombre, les risques encourus par l'économie et la population du fait des fluctuations des cours des matières premières, les effets de la crise sociopolitique en particulier pour le financement des filières, le vieillissement des plantations de cultures pérennes, la pression foncière, la faiblesse des OPA, la gestion chaotique de certaines filières, les difficultés d'adaptation aux exigences SPS sur les marchés d'exportation et, d'une manière générale, la mondialisation des échanges exigent de nouvelles impulsions et des politiques adaptées permettant de relever ces défis vitaux pour l'avenir de l'agriculture ivoirienne et la lutte contre la pauvreté. A cette fin, un des secteurs hors concentration concerne l'appui et l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31). Les déterminants du choix de stratégie prennent en considération les faiblesses structurelles de l'agriculture et des conditions de vie en milieu rural (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.63) avec plus de détail dans le CSP.
<b>CI</b>	Oui. Dans un contexte critique, tant au niveau national qu'a celui des marchés des matières premières, le programme Stabex 1999 est pertinent pour les filières agricoles

	<p>ciblées, sources de revenus et de monétarisation des paysans. Le programme Stabex 1999 s'est choisi comme partenaire principal, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. Des appuis ont été mis en place pour asseoir son rôle de maîtrise d'œuvre ainsi que pour la conception de nouvelles stratégies agricoles. L'appui institutionnel apporte au MinAgri pour l'élaboration aux politiques sectorielles a eu un impact sur la disponibilité de nombreuses stratégies sectorielles. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>MG rice</b>	<p>Non. Il existe un grand nombre de documents de stratégies (globales et sectorielles) mais aucune ne concerne spécifiquement les produits agricoles d'exportation. En effet, la stratégie de développement agricole du gouvernement est actuellement fortement centrée sur les cultures vivrières (riz et manioc). Le développement des cultures d'exportation n'est pas la priorité (Source : MN 805).</p>
<b>MG rice coffee</b>	<p>Bien après les rois de l'Imerina, tous les chefs d'Etat qui se sont succédé au pouvoir à Madagascar ont utilisé le riz pour consolider celui-ci. Ceux qui ont essayé de mettre au second plan le riz ont risqué leur pouvoir car cette céréale divine reste un marqueur culturel. En voici deux exemples : (i) mécontentement de la population de la capitale quand, sous la Deuxième République, pendant les grandes crises de produits de première nécessité, le président Ratsiraka proposa le remplacement du riz par d'autres produits ; (ii) mécontentement aussi quand son prédécesseur le président Tsiranana, a favorisé les cultures d'exportation (dont le café) et introduit d'autres cultures (dont le soja) ; il se rattrapa en concentrant les aides techniques sur la région rizicole du Lac Alaotra. <i>M.H.Dabat, Diagnostic du marché du riz à Madagascar en 2004 et début 2005</i></p>
<b>UG coffee cotton</b>	<p>No. At some moment in the past, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAAIF) developed commodities specific strategies (notably for coffee, fisheries, cotton, animal health, graze lands...) which have however not been consistently implemented nor have been updated (Source: MN 301)</p> <p>Designing commodities sub-programmes as a complement to the new national agricultural development strategy (DSIP) is currently on the agenda of the policy dialogue between the Government and donors. Donors ask the Ministry of Agriculture to design a matrix crossing the functional- and commodity-based approach. (Source: MN 313)</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>In Tanzania, agricultural commodities have not been, and are still not, the focus of Government attention. In the past, agricultural sector policies were not the focus of the GoT nor of the donors; currently there is a regain of attention but mostly this concerns food crops. The ASDP which has been accepted as the national strategy for agriculture has more or less excluded cash crops from Government concern. In reality the cash crops such as sugar, tea, coffee and cotton, are in the hands of the private sector, with smallholders participating extensively in coffee and cotton but estates (in the hands of multinationals) domineering the sugar and tea sectors.</p> <p>Where cash crops are mentioned in strategic documents it is in the context of structural changes to the agricultural sector where diversification is pursued through a change from food centred agriculture to food crop-cash crop-livestock system. Crop diversification also means greater emphasis on cotton, oil bearing crops, sugar crops and vegetable and fruit crops (which experienced high increases in planting areas and yields). Food crops claim around 68% of total cultivated area (up from 64% in 1998).</p> <p>In terms of overall agricultural strategy, Tanzania Government has adopted a cross-sectoral and wide perspective on agricultural development, designing its sector strategy as a SWAP in which several ministries are involved (Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries, Ministry of</p>



	<p>Industry, Trade and Marketing, Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Prime Minister's Office).</p> <p>The value chain approach has been promoted strongly in the latest strategy document: <i>'In planning the repositioning of agriculture, therefore, the concept of the Value (Commodity Development) Chain should be followed. This approach is necessary to take advantage of the backward and forward linkages that are key elements in the realisation of the real value of agriculture. Value addition (primary processing) at farm level is one major stop to improving the value of agricultural produce and providing farmers not only with higher prices but also with the opportunity to improve the quality of their produces, which in turn would find readily available markets along the value chain.'</i> (page 62 PER 2010).</p> <p>Public resources devoted to supporting agriculture have been increasing lately but were at very low levels: 4.6% of total government spending in 2007/2008 to 6.1% in 2009/2010 and projected at 7.6% in 2010/2011 (quite far from the target of 10% of the Maputo Declaration); in total spending, agriculture comes in third place after education – around 19%, roads – around 12% and health – around 10%). In priority spending, agriculture has increased its share from 9.7% in 2007/08 to 10.6 in 2009/2010 but keeps its third place. The PER notes that expenditure for research and training (9% of public expenditure in agriculture), policy and planning and animal disease control decreased over the past three years.</p> <p><i>Sources: GOT's national strategy documents, ASDP, PER 2010</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>The context and objectives of the cooperation strategy with the Caribbean include an overview and the main issues of the Caribbean region, a description of the regional integration, and selected examples of major challenges (banana, sugar and HIV) facing the Caribbean region (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. 6-13</i>).</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>This big dependence on agriculture makes Ethiopia extremely vulnerable to external shocks like a shortage of rainfall or declining commodity prices (coffee) on the international markets. (<i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.7</i>).</p> <p>A key issue in agriculture relates to the issue of land tenure. This is recognised in PASDEP which aims to provide “improved land tenure security with more flexible and transferable rights”. Over the last 2 years Government has moved forward with the provision of land certificates which are intended to confirm user rights to promote greater tenure security. Over 2 million certificates have so far been issued, mainly in Tigray and Amhara. The Government's long-term objective is to have cadastral surveys and user title deeds. It is unclear to which extent these certificates increase tenure security, being only for user rights, are of a temporary nature and cannot be used as collateral in the formal banking system. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.28</i>).</p> <p>The EC Response Strategy is to support the Government's efforts to achieve decisive progress in reaching MDGs through faster and sustained economic development, stressing regional integration and strengthening the democratic process. It is built around three focal sectors: (i) transport and regional integration; (ii) rural development and food security, and; (iii) macroeconomic support and governance (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.68</i>).</p> <p>The overall objective of the Focal sector II « Rural development and food security » is sustainable reduction of vulnerability to food insecurity and poverty. The following specific objectives have been identified: reduce the vulnerability and improve the food security of the chronically food insecure; slow-down in growth of population density in rural areas; improve agricultural market integration and access to these markets; enhance the contribution by livestock to sustainable food security and poverty reduction; conserve natural resources and restore degrading environmental conditions in rural areas. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.71-72</i>).</p> <p>The main thrust of the economic policy was the policy of Agriculture Development Led</p>

	<p>Industrialisation (ADLI). The transition document emphasises the development of the private sector and progressive withdrawal of the public sector from productive activities. Key components of the EPRDF's Programme included encouragement of the private sector in agriculture, transport and exports with support through land, training, technical advice and credit, as well as the provision of economic and social infrastructure such as schools, health posts, roads and clean water supply. The PFPs of the early to mid 1990s focused on macro-economic stabilisation, reforms in investment and banking, and structural reforms including privatisation of selected industries and opening of the economy to foreign investment. Sector policies for agriculture, education, health, transport and energy were set out in the Economic Development Strategy Paper (February 1993) as well as individual sector policy papers (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 6</i>).</p> <p>Recommendation : Similarly, prepare a plan for phasing out of interventions left over from the 7th EDF programme in sector that are no longer the strategic focus i.e. water sector (Addis Ababa Water Supply) and agricultural exports (Coffee Improvement). (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 62</i>).</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>En dépit de ces avancées et des efforts entrepris, la pauvreté reste préoccupante, particulièrement en milieu rural et la croissance économique mais n'a que peu d'impact au niveau social. Le développement de l'agriculture nationale ne parvient pas encore à subvenir aux besoins quotidiens de la population et les travaux d'infrastructures routières et de transport sont encore insuffisants pour désenclaver les régions isolées et améliorer l'accès aux services sociaux de base et aux marchés. Les efforts devront donc être poursuivis dans ces deux secteurs. Le défi de l'équité, au niveau géographique, social et genre reste posé. Plus globalement, l'économie malgache souffre encore d'une faible compétitivité des produits et d'une faible intégration dans l'économie régionale ou mondiale. Le défi majeur porté par le MAP consistera à amorcer ce processus économique et industriel, notamment dans les secteurs de la transformation agroalimentaire ou industrielle (pharmaceutique, cosmétique, textile, transformation des produits miniers) et des services (tourisme, crédits agricoles...), en tirant également profit de l'émergence actuelle de pôles de développement sur le territoire malgache (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.17</i>).</p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Le RSP/RIP 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest met en évidence le risque posé par le changement climatique étant donné la dépendance de la région vis-à-vis de l'agriculture et la vulnérabilité de cette agriculture face aux conditions climatiques. Le même constat peut être trouvé dans le RSP/RIP de 2002-2007.</p> <p>De plus, le RSP/RIP de 2002-2007 mentionne que l'ensemble des pays de la zone (excepté la Côte d'Ivoire et le Sénégal) est dépendant d'une ou deux matières premières pour l'ensemble des devises. Ces pays sont donc très vulnérables par rapport aux cours des matières premières, aléas climatiques et protectionnisme des pays industrialisés. La diversification, inexistante depuis les années '90 sera un des défis les plus difficiles de la région.</p> <p>Il n'y a cependant pas d'intervention qui vise directement la diversification ou la réduction de la vulnérabilité de la région pour pallier à cette dépendance. <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, page 71 WAF RSP/RIP 2002-2007, pages 22 &amp; 31</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>Apart from the fact of mentioning that the horticultural sector in certain ACP countries is strongly dependent on the EU market conditions, there is no explicit mention of consideration of the problems and issues surrounding agricultural commodity dependence.</p> <p>The PIP's objective was to maintain the ACP market share in European horticultural</p>

	<p>imports in compliance with the new pesticides regulations. But the objective was addressed through different components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Regulation Component: to carry out surveys and field experiments to develop agricultural practices that would comply with EU regulations and to put requests together for import tolerances in the cases where respecting the Maximum Residue Levels (MRL) wasn't possible;</li> <li>▪ The Good Company Practice Component: to provide assistance to companies (in terms of traceability, food safety and good agricultural practices);</li> <li>▪ The Capacity Building Component: to provide support to laboratories, service providers, professional associations, task forces and pesticide registration and control bodies;</li> <li>▪ The Information/Communication component: to raise awareness on the issue dealt with by the PIP and to facilitate knowledge transfer from the PIP to local operators.</li> </ul> <p>The approach was led through different components but all these components were directly linked to the horticultural sector.</p> <p><i>Sources: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 6 to 9</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>National Adaptation Strategies were a response to the situation created by the reduction of the EU domestic price of sugar (which also applied to sugar imported from SP countries) and to the termination in 2009 of the Sugar Protocol, which since 1975 granted SP countries with a preferential access to the EU market for their sugar exports (within the limits of quotas, these exports entered the EU market duty free and were paid the EU domestic price for sugar).</p>
BF-ANSE	<p>Le MR précise que ce projet répond bien aux problématiques burkinabé, notamment par sa volonté de contribuer à la diversification des revenus agricoles des communautés rurales et de professionnaliser certaines filières, ce qui correspond à des problèmes identifiés par le gouvernement central (<i>Source : MR p. 3</i>).</p> <p>L'intervention précise les enjeux liés aux filières anacardes et sésame. (<i>Source : Annexe I, description de l'action p. 4</i>) : Les populations rurales des zones sahéliennes Burkinabè sont confrontées à des problèmes économiques et écologiques. Les difficultés écologiques sont liées au climat sahélien, à la déforestation et à la fragilité des sols. Les difficultés économiques sont principalement liées à la crise du coton et aux difficultés alimentaires. Les populations rurales des régions productrices de coton, qui pratiquent également l'agriculture vivrière, sont à la recherche d'activités alternatives génératrices de revenus. Le développement de l'arboriculture paysanne et des cultures annuelles de rente (en pures ou en associations) sont des stratégies de diversification envisageables. Le Burkina Faso possède des zones agro-écologiques favorables à la production de l'anacarde et du sésame, sources de revenus complémentaires pour les populations vulnérables des zones rurales. Ces deux filières font face à des problèmes technico-commerciaux semblables : manque de maîtrise de la qualité, difficulté de commercialisation sur le marché international, manque de services adaptés à des filières peu encadrées, difficulté d'accès aux informations technico-économiques sur le marché. Le sésame présente un potentiel de développement important au Burkina Faso, s'agissant d'une plante peu exigeante, s'intégrant facilement dans les calendriers agricoles et valorisable à l'export. La demande du marché international est en croissance et certains contrats d'achat au Burkina Faso ne sont pas remplis. Toutefois, la méconnaissance des bonnes pratiques agricoles et le manque d'accès aux informations techniques et économiques pénalisent les organisations paysannes productrices de sésame (voir par exemple les contaminations du sésame biologique à la salmonelle en 2005 et les conséquences dramatiques pour la filière burkinabè). L'anacarde (noix de cajou) présente également un potentiel de diversification des revenus intéressant,</p>

	<p>bien que la production actuelle du Burkina Faso reste faible et peu structurée. Des plantations existent dans les régions cibles de l'action mais les exigences du marché international ne sont pas maîtrisées par les producteurs. L'anacardier est un arbre rustique valorisable économiquement, c'est pourquoi il est considéré comme un arbre adapté au développement économique de zones défavorisées et a été introduit dans les zones de savanes arborées de plusieurs pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest.</p> <p>Les besoins et contraintes de ces deux filières ont été identifiés en 2007 par RONGEAD et INADES Formation Burkina Faso.</p> <p>En outre, la pertinence de l'action par rapport aux besoins et contraintes en général du pays et de la région cibles sont succinctement présentés (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 6</i>)</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le secteur coton burkinabé a connu un développement très important depuis 1994. Il concerne plus de 300.000 producteurs, touche directement plus de 3 millions de personnes, et contribue à hauteur de 60 à 70 % aux recettes d'exportation selon les années et à environ 5 % du PIB (15 % du PIB agricole).</p> <p>Depuis la campagne 2004-2005, la filière coton est confrontée à une crise financière sans précédent. De manière à assurer le financement de la campagne 2007-2008 et permettre l'achat et le paiement rapide de l'ensemble du coton graine produit, la définition et la mise en œuvre d'une stratégie ad hoc de renforcement de la filière se sont révélées d'une extrême urgence. La Commission européenne a apporté un appui à la définition de cette stratégie de sortie de crise dans le cadre du Programme d'Appui à l'Organisation du Secteur Agricole (PAOSA).</p> <p>Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France).</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Une analyse de la situation économique et sociale est présentée (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4</i>) ainsi qu'une analyse du contexte sectoriel (<i>Source : Rider FA p.3</i>) qui concerne notamment les cultures du cacao, caoutchouc, huile de palme, coton et anacarde.</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>L'identification des besoins et contraintes perçus dans le pays cible et en particulier dans la ou les régions concernées est présenté de manière détaillée et prend en compte certains facteurs tels que les problématiques agricoles changements démographiques (<i>Source : Annexe I p.4, 5</i>).</p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>A critic raised by the programme evaluation is precisely that it did not did not integrate related industries such as Caribbean tourism or sugar</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>No information on this subject can be found in the available documents. Interviews confirm that there hasn't been any integration of problems and issues surrounding commodity dependence. Focus in the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF has even gone away from commodities which is no longer a focal sector of support. <i>Source: MN 907</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme isn't a national development strategy but, as indicated its name, a Pan-African programme aimed at increasing the participation of African Nations in SPSOs.</p> <p>The Financing Agreement of the PAN-SPSO states that African countries are</p>

	<p>characterised by high dependence on primary commodities with low value addition for export. It mentions that the unfavourable economic environment and inappropriate institutional settings make it difficult for African agriculture to contribute to growth and that markets are characterised by “hardware” (road, market infrastructure, transport facilities...) and “software” (taxation, licensing controls, sanitary regulations...) constraints.</p> <p>The PAN-SPSO aims therefore at tackling one of those software constraints.</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page, 39.</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The TAPs attached to the Financing Agreements of PASAM1 and PASAM2 state): “Les actions proposées s’intègrent parfaitement dans les axes stratégiques du Plan d’Action National pour la Sécurité Alimentaire (PANSA) ».</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>The project description reads: “The adoption of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan as the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy was flawed by serious limitations. Ugandan NGOs were invited to provide inputs on the development of the poverty reduction goals, but not on the nature of the policies to achieve these goals.” The project is accordingly meant as a complement to the government policy and not as a contribution to implementation of the government strategy.</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>“The mission of the PMA is “<i>eradicating poverty by transforming subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture</i>”. Improving the welfare of poor subsistence farmers will require that they re-orient their production towards the market. More of their production must be marketed to enable them to earn higher incomes.” PMA, Executive Summary</p> <p>About the EC support to NARS, the TAPs of the programme read: “For some time the EC mainly financed commodity research, but in recent years shifted its focus more towards supporting the research reform process. The role of farmers in planning and evaluating activities in the EC-supported commodity research work has gradually increased.”</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>There is no explicit reference to the issues surrounding commodity dependence in the parts of the national development strategies mentioned in the SFA evaluation report. It does however mention that the national development strategies address cross-sectoral issues (but not explicitly that commodity dependence will be addressed in a cross sectoral manner). Examples are given below: The government of St Vincent and the Grenadines adopted a broader approach to their national development strategy than the narrow banana focus. The Jamaican development strategy is based on 4 pillars (restoring economic growth, ensuring that growth is inclusive of the poor, improving governance, efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector and ensuring sustainable development, among which the development of sustainable agriculture). National development policies are in line with the development of socioeconomic infrastructure. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global report, page 29 htspe, 2008. Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country reports, pages 62, 426, 489, htspe, 2008.</i></p> <p>The context and objectives of the cooperation strategy with the Caribbean include an overview and the main issues of the Caribbean region, a description of the regional integration, and selected examples of major challenges (banana, sugar and HIV) facing the Caribbean region (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. 6-13</i>).</p>
<b>Sugar</b>	<p>The context and objectives of the cooperation strategy with the Caribbean include an overview and the main issues of the Caribbean region, a description of the regional integration, and selected examples of major challenges (banana, sugar and HIV) facing the Caribbean region (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. 6-13</i>).</p>

<b>J.2.2</b>	<b><i>The Commission's support has stimulated the design of commodity strategies by CDDCs and their incorporation into national and regional development strategies</i></b>
<b>BF</b>	<p>La Commission a principalement appuyé l'Etat burkinabé dans le secteur du coton :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ La formulation par le Gouvernement d'une stratégie commune de sortie de crise dans le secteur du coton, suite à l'élaboration du diagnostic de la filière coton et l'identification d'axes stratégiques (financement CE)</li> <li>▪ Au niveau régional-UEMOA: appui à la révision de l'agenda coton-textile (Programme Tous ACP), en début de mise en œuvre</li> </ul> <p>La Commission a financé des études de diagnostics des filières agricoles à l'exportation :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Dans le secteur cotonnier</li> <li>▪ A travers le programme PAOSA (terminé en 2007), dans de nombreuses filières : riz, coton, bétail et viande, volaille traditionnelle, etc.</li> </ul> <p>Le Programme Tous AACP, géré à partir de Bruxelles, a appuyé la définition d'une stratégie de développement de la gomme arabique. La contribution de la Commission européenne a été mise en œuvre par le Centre du Commerce International (CCI), une des agences d'exécution du Programme Tous ACP. Il n'y a pas d'évidence d'intégration de cette stratégie dans les stratégies de développement nationales ou régionales.</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>La Commission a appuyé la mise en place de stratégie pour la banane (avant la COM-2004) et plus récemment le café – mais le secteur agricole n'était que très marginalement couvert par l'appui de la Commission sur la période 2000-2010. La DCE a financé en 2008 et en 2009 une étude pour le développement d'une stratégie agriculture – élevage (2010) – document toujours non validé au niveau d'un des deux ministères techniques (MINEPIA) en 2011.</p>
<b>VAN</b>	<p>L'appui de la Commission – à travers le POPACA/ POP2 a permis de mettre en œuvre des études de filière et d'obtenir les informations de base sur chacune de ses filières. Mais aucune stratégie de filière agricole n'a été développée avec l'appui de la CE.</p> <p>La coopération française à travers son assistant technique basé au niveau du Département de l'Agriculture a développé quelques stratégies pour le développement des filières agricoles, de manière participative (workshop): café, épices et noix, cultures vivrières (fruits et légumes en cours)</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>Although the Commission had no role in developing Ghana's commodity strategies (except recently for banana), it did undertake diagnostic studies of the cocoa sector for the design of its support programmes (CSSP I and II). National strategies already exist and the Commission only has to 'buy into them'. There have been no Commission efforts on top and above this.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>At some moment in the past, the MinAgri developed commodities specific strategies, notably for coffee, which have however not been consistently implemented nor have been updated.</p> <p>Designing commodities sub-programmes as a complement to the new national agricultural development strategy (DSIP) is currently on the agenda of the policy dialogue between the Government and donors. Donors ask the Ministry of Agriculture to design a matrix crossing the functional- and commodity-based approach.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Beaucoup de documents de stratégie ont été élaborés sans être mis en application. Il n'y a pas de stratégies nationales relatives aux produits agricoles d'exportation et les organisations professionnelles sont très faibles. Il n'y a jamais eu à Madagascar de filières d'exportation fortement organisées.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>There are no evidences that the Commission carried out or ensured diagnostics of the</p>

	<p>competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains in Tanzania. However it appears the World bank carried out such diagnostic in the coffee sector.</p> <p>With the exception of the Tanzanian Crop Reforms which were supported under the FMO 94-99 (ASDP component) and to some extent the cotton sector, the Commission did not stimulate the design of agricultural commodities in Tanzania. However, TACRI and NGO Technoserv are preparing a strategy in the coffee sector. There is no strategy adopted in the tea sector.</p>
<b>I.2.2.1</b>	Evidence that the Commission ensured the availability of diagnostics of the competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains (Domestic Resource Cost studies)
<b>BF</b>	No such evidence can be found in Burkina Faso's strategy papers.
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>In the framework of the All ACP programme, UNCTAD carried out a study in the nutmeg sector through the activity: "1.CAR.C03 - Commodity Supply Chain Finance (December 2008 - December 2010).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In 2010, UNCTAD conducted a study on the improvement of nutmeg value chain financing in Grenada. Result of the study has been included in the nutmeg strategy developed with support from ITC under the AAACP.</li> <li>▪ The objective of this activity was regional capacity building on supply chain finance for local financial institutions and stakeholders of value chain (regional level, in collaboration with Caribbean Development Bank); and capacity building in Grenada for the Nutmeg supply chain.</li> <li>▪ The main objectives of this activity are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Review of mechanisms and instruments to facilitate trade and access to finance, reduce risks of farmers and promote agricultural development (regional level, and Grenada for Nutmeg value chain);</li> <li>- Regional capacity building on supply chain finance for local financial institutions and stakeholders of value chain.</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ A field mission with Caribbean Development Bank will assess the needs and review the conditions that are required for successful development of commodity supply chain finance and the enhancement of regulatory frameworks including guarantee, warehouse receipt and collateral systems. Based on the mission, a regional training workshop will take place with the Caribbean Development bank before December 2009. A study on financing of the nutmeg value chain is planned for the first semester of 2010.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: UNCTAD, Draft 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011, 22 July 2011</i></p> <p>The World Bank, under the All ACP programme, has supported the horticulture private sector (industry) in Ghana through the following activity "1.WST.D02 - Ghana Horticulture Strategic Profile, Phase 1&amp; 2".</p> <p>The overall objective of the proposed study was to provide the Ghanaian stakeholders in the industry with a common strategic vision for the horticulture cluster development over a 10 year period.</p> <p>The study in itself had been completed back in the first half of 2010, but the editing of this substantial piece of work in order to publish it took longer than expected.</p> <p>The editing was completed by consultant and author Peter Jaeger early in the period under review, but additional delays were incurred due to the initial printer selected by the Bank going bankrupt. A new printer had to be selected and briefed about this contract before work could resume. The printing of the book has now started and should be</p>

<p>completed by the end of July.</p> <p>Under the All ACP Programme, the World Bank has supported the carrying out of three studies in the cotton sector in Ghana (“2.WST.D04 – Revival of the cotton sub-sector in Ghana”).</p> <p>In 2010, the Government of Ghana (GoG) adopted a Cotton Sector Revival Strategy, which underlined a series of reforms to revitalize the cotton sector as the alternative cash crop sector for the Northern regions. The key objectives of the Government’s Cotton Sector Revival Strategy are to: (i) reform the cotton sector and rapidly scale up cotton production; (ii) promote cotton as a cash crop for Northern Ghana similar to cocoa in southern Ghana; (iii) restructure the Ghana Cotton Company Limited (GCCL); (iv) separate the cotton production from ginning functions; and (v) promote and allocate exclusive cotton zones under concession to reputable and financially strong cotton companies.</p> <p>Given the short time span left, it was decided to use AAACP funding to fund three studies that constitute fundamental building blocks in the design of the institutional arrangements necessary to set up the appropriate regulatory environment that will govern the new Ghana Cotton Sector: 1) Proposal for a seed cotton pricing formula, possibly linked to a smoothing fund; 2) Study on the legal and regulatory framework for setting up a cotton interprofession; 3) Design of a program and action plan to build institutional capacities of cotton farmers’ organizations</p> <p>At the end of June 2011, terms of reference for the three studies had been drafted and clearance obtained from the Government of Ghana. The study on legal and regulatory framework is being procured as Consultants have been identified and have confirmed their availability. Next steps: Proceed with finalization of ToRs for the other two studies and identification of consultants. <i>Source: WB-Sustainable Development Network (WB-SDN), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 28 July 2011</i></p> <p>FAO has supported diagnostics of commodity sectors under the All ACP programme. Details are provided below:</p> <p><i>1.PAC.A03 - Targeted policy and institutional studies</i></p> <p>The studies will be used in supporting the design of implementable activities under the Samoan F&amp;V sector strategy and in support of F&amp;V sector development in other Pacific countries, e.g. Vanuatu or the Solomon Islands.</p> <p>Three country case studies designed to demonstrate the importance of collecting and analyzing domestic market data when evaluating the potential implications of policy reform and/or interventions are currently in the final stages of preparation. Following the delivery of inception reports during January and February, the case studies, being conducted in Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tonga have identified relevant policy issues, constructed and administered data collection methodologies and analysed collected data. First drafts of the studies are scheduled for delivery during July 2011</p> <p><i>1.PAC.A04 - Domestic market studies</i></p> <p>Objective: To provide crucial information in support of the development of new strategies and the updating of existing strategies for priority countries and sub-sectors</p> <p>Information on domestic market characteristics in the Pacific is extremely weak, making it difficult to determine potential market demand and potential implications of sector intervention for domestic markets. Although some information is collected on central market activities for target products, it is limited. Information collected under the value chain study in Samoa (see activity above: 1.PAC.A03) and in Fiji, information under the strategy validation and analysis activity (see below) provides a partial solution. <i>Source: FAO, 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, July 2011</i></p>
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<b>CM</b>	<p>The EC provides technical and financial assistance to Cameroon's banana sector. Stakeholders are well informed of the competitiveness issues surrounding the banana sector (such as production cost differences between Cameroon and Latin American competitors).</p> <p>However, this specific type of diagnostic study based on DRC as baseline before intervening in a commodity sector was not identified, not for banana (1999) or for coffee. For banana, a SWOT analysis was carried out. It seems that a more detailed economic analysis had taken place at the end of the 1990s. For coffee, no statistics are available on production costs. <i>Source : MN 913, MN 995</i></p> <p>Within the PASAPE programme supported by the EC (which takes place in the framework of EPA negotiations), a study of the impacts of EPA negotiations on sectors is indicated (no « competitiveness » studies, but rather an estimation of the direction of the impact : positive, negative or neutral). <i>Source : MN 938</i></p>
<b>VAN POP2</b>	<p>De nombreuses études de filières (épices, noix, cacao, café, cocotier, cultures vivrières) ont été réalisées sous le projet POP2/POPACA, avec l'appui de l'assistant technique du projet et en collaboration avec le Ministère de l'Agriculture. Ces études ont été discutées lors d'ateliers avec les représentants des différentes filières concernées. Par ailleurs, de nombreuses études de marché ont été réalisées dans le cadre de l'intervention de la Commission au développement commercial des entreprises (CDE), en appui au secteur privé. Une étude supplémentaire dans le secteur agricole a été financée en 2005 (voir documents collectés à la Délégation). La CE a financé une étude du secteur productif avant de décider de concevoir un programme (<i>Primary Growth Private Sector Programme</i>). Mais la première étude a été décevante et une deuxième étude a dû être financée. Le programme a été conçu mais n'est pas encore mis en œuvre (un an et demi de retard). <i>Sources: MN 1015, MN 1067, MN 1098 and MN 1059</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Dans le cadre du 8<sup>ie</sup> FED, la Commission européenne a financé le « Diagnostic de la filière coton et l'Identification d'axes stratégiques » au Burkina Faso, dont le rapport final a été produit en août 2007. Cette étude est justifiée par le fait que la filière coton représente un enjeu économique et financier considérable pour le Burkina Faso. Elle a été réalisée suite à la crise financière majeure du secteur cotonnier dans le pays, qui s'est aggravé durant deux campagnes et qui a menacé l'existence même de la filière. Il convenait ainsi de s'interroger d'une part sur les contours de la crise elle-même et sur les mesures requises à court terme pour y mettre fin, et d'autre part sur la viabilité à moyen et à long terme de la filière cotonnière du pays.</p> <p>Le rapport, produit par une équipe de consultants externes commissionnés par la Commission européenne à travers le Fonds d'Observation Economique et sociale du monde rural, inclut une analyse de la filière coton sur les plans institutionnel, juridique et fonctionnel, ainsi que l'analyse économique et financière de la filière et la définition des orientations stratégiques pour le devenir de la filière à court, moyen et long terme.</p> <p>Les principales conclusions de cette étude indiquent que :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ la filière coton du Burkina Faso constitue depuis plusieurs années déjà un modèle de développement dans le secteur cotonnier d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre : 1) l'organisation de producteurs dans le secteur compte parmi les plus performantes en la matière dans la sous région africaine ; 2) le double processus de privatisation et de libéralisation de la filière coton du pays a été conduit de façon pragmatique sans jamais remettre en cause les principes organisationnels propres à sécuriser les producteurs, les sociétés cotonnières, les banques/ institutions financières impliquées dans la filière.</li> <li>▪ En 2007, le modèle de la filière coton du Burkina Faso est partiellement remis en cause suite à trois évolutions majeures :</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- La crise financière dans le secteur cotonnier du pays, ayant commencé lors de la campagne 2004-2005 et toujours présente en 2007, est de nature à compromettre la survie même de la filière avec une impossibilité de mobiliser les financements nécessaires pour l'acquisition d'intrants pour la production et de payer les producteurs en temps pour la récolte produite et vendues au sociétés cotonnières ;</li> <li>- L'augmentation très conséquente de la production dissimule mal une stagnation voire une baisse des rendements qui pèse lourdement sur les revenus des producteurs de coton ;</li> <li>- La question environnementale contribue à fragiliser la durabilité de la filière coton.</li> </ul> <p>Afin de sortir de la crise, l'étude indique qu'il est primordial et urgent de recapitaliser la SOFITEX (société cotonnière la plus importante du pays représentant environ 80% de la production de coton burkinabé) et de mettre en place un Fonds de lissage. Par ailleurs, pour le moyen et le long terme, les principaux objectifs dégagés suite au diagnostic de la filière et indiquant les principaux axes stratégiques pour l'avenir de la filière sont :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ L'amélioration des performances institutionnelles de la filière en confortant le dispositif de gestion interprofessionnelle ;</li> <li>▪ L'amélioration des performances économiques de la filière en vue de prévenir de nouvelles crises et d'améliorer la compétitivité de la filière coton sur le plan international ;</li> <li>▪ L'amélioration de la durabilité environnementale de la filière ;</li> <li>▪ La diversification des revenus des producteurs</li> </ul> <p>Enfin, en matière de diversification, l'étude recommande le soutien des pouvoirs publics aux filières biocarburants et le développement de nouvelles cultures oléagineuses alors que les promoteurs de ces filières semblent avoir bien pris en compte les deux grandes problématiques de l'environnement et de la sécurité alimentaire.</p> <p><i>Source: Diagnostic de la filière coton et identification d'axes stratégiques, Projet 8 ACP BK O14 – Fonds d'observation Economique et Sociale du Monde Rural (FOESMR), Rapport final 2007</i></p> <p>Dans le cadre du programme PAOSA, il y a eu des études diagnostiques de la plupart des filières agricoles du Burkina (riz, coton, bétail et viande, volaille traditionnelle, etc.). Pour le coton, il y a eu une étude diagnostic détaillée suivie d'une proposition de stratégie/plan d'action. Les différentes études ont suivi un schéma analogue. Les aspects de compétitivité ont été abordés, notamment pour le riz. Par ailleurs, il y avait la préoccupation de diversifier les filières agricoles pour améliorer les revenus des producteurs. Les études se sont focalisées sur les filières. Ce sont des études filières globales. <i>Source : MN 567</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. L'évaluation Stabex souligne que globalement l'analyse des problèmes relatifs aux filières a été de qualité voire même très fine, imposant des délais de rédaction des documents de mise en œuvre ou des outils, souvent longs. Un certain perfectionnisme a pris le pas sur l'opérationnel. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>A titre d'exemple, il existe une multitude d'études, de stratégies ou de projets concernant le secteur cotonnier ivoirien :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Projet de relance de la culture attelée dans le bassin cotonnier de CI</li> <li>▪ Adoption d'une nouvelle stratégie pour la relance du secteur coton</li> <li>▪ Plan d'action pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de relance de la filière coton</li> <li>▪ Elaboration d'une stratégie sectorielle coton : perspectives à moyen et long termes</li> <li>▪ Faisabilité d'une nouvelle organisation du financement de l'approvisionnement en intrants de la filière coton en Côte d'Ivoire</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Diagnostic des prélèvements obligatoires sur la filière coton et révision du mécanisme de fixation du prix du coton graine</li> </ul>
<b>CI</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Travail des enfants : oui. Problème récurrent et très grave en Côte d'Ivoire surtout dans la filière café/cacao. La CE prend cette dimension très au sérieux et le nouveau gouvernement semble prendre des mesures importantes sur ce sujet. A noter que l'aide des autres bailleurs de fonds y est souvent et entre autres conditionnée.</li> <li>▪ Genre : non. Pas grand chose n'a été fait pour les femmes jusqu'à présent. Seulement quelques actions mineures et la mise en place d'un SIM (Système Information sur les Marchés) pour les produits maraîchers qui sont cultivés et vendus par les femmes et qui devrait donc améliorer leurs conditions</li> <li>▪ Environnement : oui. Cette dimension est bien prise en compte et les fonctionnaires ivoiriens y sont très attachés</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: MN 819</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La Délégation a produit différentes notes d'analyses (assez concises mais précises) avec focus sur offre et demande au niveau mondial, échanges et cours internationaux, production et exportations malgache + perspectives :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rapport sur les exportations du secteur agriculture – élevage - pêche en 2009</li> <li>▪ La filière café septembre 2008</li> <li>▪ Note filières, Girofle, juin 2010</li> <li>▪ Note filières, Vanille, juin 2010</li> </ul> <p>Par contre, selon les informations collectées, il ne semble pas que des études « Domestic Resource Cost » aient été réalisées.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The WB has done a sector analysis for coffee in Tanzania. <i>Source: MN 195</i> He has never seen any diagnostic of the tea sector before starting EC support to the sector. There is no formal strategy for the tea sector. He did never hear about a strategy. <i>Source: MN 666</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Dans le cadre du projet Analyse financière et économique du programme d'intensification et de structuration des principales filières d'exportation des comptes d'exploitation ont été établis pour quatre filières d'exportation (litchis, girofle, poivre et vanille) en distinguant pour chaque filière les producteurs, les collecteurs et les exportateurs. <i>Source : Analyse financière et économique du programme d'intensification et de structuration des principales filières d'exportation, Rapport final</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The EC has supported the cocoa sector in Ghana with Stabex funds since 1990, at a time when the sector was being profoundly reformed with donor (WB and others support). At the time the EC supported the restructuring of the sector (paying for Cocobod redundancy payments and retraining of retrenched staff, interest on cocoa bills etc.) as well as disease control. Then it followed with further support (FMO signed early 1997) for feeder roads and the CSSP I. In preparation of the cocoa sector support programme (CSSP I), at least two (possibly more) reports were prepared; in 1997 a detailed study of the constraints of the cocoa sector and in 1999 a report on the cocoa sector serving as preparation of the design of the CSSP. At the time the areas that were looked into included the swollen shoot programme (already funded through Stabex in the earlier 1990s), cocoa seed production, cocoa research and cocoa marketing. In 2005, after implementation of the CSSP I, a final evaluation of the programme was undertaken which again formed the basis of proposals for continued support under CSSP II. Although no specific 'diagnostic studies' thus seem to have been undertaken at any time</p>

	<p>(except possibly in 1997 – report not identified), the EC started its interventions at a time when the sector was in the process of major reform (with presumably lots of studies available) and continued thus with knowledge gained from its presence in the sector. In addition it carried out extensive analysis of the sector in the process of formulating CSSP II. <i>Source: FMO 1992 &amp; 1993 (1997), Agrisystems, 1999, CSSP2 project preparation report</i></p> <p>Under the CSSP II, Result 3 includes the development and implementation of a cocoa sector strategy. This has started in March 2010 led by Cocobod, with contributions from other industry stakeholders: a draft Cocoa Sector Strategy II (CSS II) has been drafted which re-iterated priorities articulated in the GPRS II and FASDEP II.</p> <p>The EC accompanied this effort by retaining the Centre for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA) to carry out a study of econometric modelling of price and cost factors within the Ghanaian cocoa supply chain. When completed, the results will help to inform the CSS II. The EC's contribution or involvement in this exercise of strategy formulation is on the whole extremely limited (IITA's role is very limited and FOs do not yet participate). <i>Source: CSSP II MTE, 2011, MN 906</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The second CSP mentions that, through PASAPE (9<sup>th</sup> EDF), the Commission financed the elaboration of a national competitiveness strategy which includes an analysis of the weaknesses of the national economy in terms of competitiveness. In particular for agriculture, the following diagnosis is made:</p> <p><u>“Agriculture faiblement compétitive</u></p> <p>Une agriculture qui n'est plus capable de nourrir la population camerounaise (des déficits entre la demande et l'offre persistent pour des produits de grande consommation tels que le riz, le sucre ou le maïs). Les contraintes qui bloquent la production, sont les suivantes :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Vieillesse de la population rurale</li> <li>▪ Difficultés d'accès à la terre ; contraintes foncières limitant l'extension des plantations industrielles</li> <li>▪ Absence d'organisations professionnelles performantes</li> <li>▪ Difficulté d'accès aux intrants (engrais, semences améliorées, etc.)</li> <li>▪ Difficultés d'accès aux techniques agricoles modernes et aux autres innovations de la recherche agronomique Difficultés d'accès au crédit</li> <li>▪ Insuffisance des infrastructures d'appui au développement du secteur rural (pistes, routes, magasins de stockages, abattoirs, énergie, irrigation, chaînes de froid etc.)</li> <li>▪ Difficultés de commercialisation de la production, souvent du fait d'une chaîne de commercialisation trop longue qui accapare l'essentiel de la valeur ajoutée agricole et freine le réinvestissement.</li> </ul> <p>L'agriculture reste gravement sous-financée et la situation des agriculteurs, qui représente l'immense majorité des pauvres en zone rurale (taux de pauvreté de 90%), a connu une aggravation entre 2001 et 2007 et le fossé entre zones urbaines et zones rurales s'est fortement creusé. » <i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013 ; ADE, Elaboration de la stratégie de compétitivité, Rapport final, 2010</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents for the Caribbean do not evidence the financing by the Commission of diagnostics of the competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains. <i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007; European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>No references are made to domestic resource costs in the Eastern and Southern Africa</p>

	and Indian Ocean RSP/RIPs.
<b>ET</b>	<p>The CSP also reflects the analysis in the Country Diagnostic Survey prepared in early 2006 by the Commission with the participation of EU Member States. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.3</i>).</p> <p>The response strategy presented here can be considered "joint" in that it has been informed by a Joint Country Diagnostic Survey carried out with Member States and provides a framework for both their and the EC's planned cooperation initiatives in Ethiopia along with the linkages between them. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.41</i>).</p> <p>Over the years the EC has conducted a dialogue with Government on the need for strengthening the statistical data base for agriculture policy making. This was felt necessary as, e.g. agricultural statistics reveal at times contradictory information regarding crop areas and yields. Recognizing the importance of strengthened information systems for food security, a contract was signed in 2006 with FAO to carry out the Food Security Information System project for an amount of €2 million. Implementation of the programme is underway. Similarly, the EC signed a contract with UNICEF to help CSA and DPPA establish and strengthen information systems for food security in order to improve the quality of food security and relief interventions. This project – together with the Productive Safety Net Program - will also help Government in pursuing the PASDEP goals of improving “under 5 children nutrition through multi-sector and community-based approaches. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.34</i>).</p>
<b>KEN</b>	There is no information about DRCS in the CSPs/NIPS. However, it should be noted that the 2008-2013 CSP includes a thematic analysis sheet dealing with agriculture and development sector. This sheet does not target directly specific needs and challenges of the agricultural commodity sector but general issues met in the agriculture and rural development sector. <i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 110-120</i>
<b>MG</b>	Le programme régional du 9ème FED prévoit un appui institutionnel pour renforcer les capacités de négociation et le financement d'études d'impact sur les économies de la région ( <i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.20</i> ).
<b>ML</b>	No reference to studies on the competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains can be found in Mali's CSP/NIPs.
<b>PAC</b>	No such studies can be found in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.
<b>SADC</b>	No reference is made to domestic resource costs in the SADC RSPs/RIPs
<b>TAN</b>	<p>In the CSP 2008-2013, the following elements are underlined:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ As the trade and regional integration focal sector of the 2008-2013 CSP – including support to the <i>Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP)</i> – is concerned, donors and government have a broad agenda based upon the <i>Integrated Framework Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS)</i>. The DTIS addresses Tanzania's trade needs from a range of perspectives including multilateral policy, regional integration, macroeconomic and supply-side: it is a suitable vehicle for improved donor harmonization, based on a rational Division of Labour according to the relative strengths of different partners.</li> <li>▪ The specific objective of the trade and regional integration focal sector will be achieved firstly through a concentration on those key commodities based on the analysis of their supply chain. This will indicatively involve quality enhancement through agricultural research (notably for coffee, tea, cotton, and potentially innovative crops such as bio-energy plants). In addition, there will be support to measures which can enhance trade, for example price risk management systems. The</li> </ul>

	<p>interventions will build on lessons learnt from previous investments, including STABEX funds. For these interventions a mix between co-financing, basket arrangements and project support is envisaged.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A second priority will be the facilitation of market access to smallholders, supporting producer organizations in their work to link small farmers (especially women) to local and regional markets.</li> <li>▪ A third priority will be to build capacities for companies and farmers or fishers organisations on food safety issues. In that field, the Commission recognizes the importance of meeting demanding sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards imposed at EU and global level, including by non-state actors such as EUREPGAP. In addition, efforts will be made to ensure coherence both with regional support on trade-related SPS (under the ESA-IOC and SADC programmes) and with a number of relevant all-ACP programmes dealing with SPS challenges.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page73 &amp; 74, 78 &amp; 79</i></p>
<b>UGA</b>	No references to domestic resource costs studies can be found in the CSP/NIPs
<b>VAN</b>	There is no such evidence in Vanuatu's CSP/NIP
<b>WAF</b>	Aucune information concernant cet indicateur ne peut être trouvée dans les CSP.
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	The first key activity area of the AAACP programme is to support the development of commodity strategies in the most commodity dependent ACP countries. This support will be organised through a highly participative approach engaging all key stakeholders of a commodity chain in diagnosing the sector, identifying and analysing options, and developing responses. <i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Un atelier de concertation, organisé par RONGEAD et INADES-Formation Burkina Faso, qui s'est tenu en décembre 2007, a permis d'identifier les principaux problèmes rencontrés par les associations de planteurs et des opérateurs qui pratiquent le décorticage des noix de cajou dans le cadre d'une analyse de la chaîne de valeur de la filière anacarde. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 4-5</i>)</p> <p>Une analyse récente de la filière intitulée « Promotion des chaînes de valeur ajoutée de la filière sésame », Programme de Développement Agricole, Coopération Burkina Faso, Coopération Allemande au Développement (Février 2008) a été réalisée et confirme les éléments diagnostiqués lors de l'analyse faite par RONGEAD et INADES FORMATION. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 5</i>)</p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pas de référence directe aux études chaînes de valeur mais de nombreuses ont été menées dans le secteur agricole :</p> <p>Dans la partie sud du pays, l'étude de l'amélioration du peuplement végétal des cultures pérennes paysannes (BDPA, 2006) a permis d'identifier les secteurs de l'hévéa et du palmier à huile, comme des secteurs où il est possible d'accompagner des dynamiques socio-économiques existantes. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.4</i>)</p> <p>L'étude d'une stratégie sectorielle coton (Italtrend 2006) a permis aux acteurs publics et privés de dégager des priorités et d'orienter l'utilisation des fonds européens. De plus, un document de stratégie sectorielle et un plan d'action ont été élaborés par le ministère de l'Agriculture et deux études (sur fonds STABEX) sont en cours pour examiner la réorganisation du financement des intrants et les modalités de gestion du risque sur les prix. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.4</i>).</p> <p>Des études sont également prévues pour l'intervention:</p> <p>Dans le cadre de l'activité A. 1.b. « Appui aux petits Planteurs d'autres cultures paysannes d'exportation » et pour le secteur café-cacao, il est envisagé d'intervenir qu'à travers des appuis institutionnels ponctuels (études ou renforcement des capacités) mais ayant une</p>

	<p>importance stratégique pour sa restructuration et pour la répartition des revenus en son sein.</p> <p>Pour les cultures de diversification, les appuis institutionnels (études ou renforcement des capacités) pourront être complétés par le renforcement des services apportés aux petits producteurs (vulgarisation agricole, fourniture de matériel végétal amélioré, etc.). (Source : Rider FA p.5)</p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The programme TAP points out ACP concerns that, following agreement between the EU and the US to liberalise rum trade, Caribbean rum producers would be unable to compete on the EC market. It further states that “rum is a value-added agro-industrial ACP product capable, if appropriate efforts are undertaken, of competing in a global economy”.</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>From November 2007 to March 2008, a team integrated by an Expatriate Expert and two National Experts carried out an analysis of the coffee sector. On the basis of this analysis, a development strategy was drawn up, which wished to be a consensual development strategy accepted by the whole community, ensuring coordinated actions by the various actors and laying down clear objectives for all of them. (Source : Completion report p.24)</p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The documents do not present evidence for this but the diagnosis of constraints to competitiveness is at the heart of the project: stakeholder consultations were held to help define the specific focus of the project and it is very clear that the commodity chain perspective loomed high in the approach followed: ‘The most serious problem is the lack of competitiveness on foreign markets. This problem concerns the whole supply chain: including all aspects of production, post harvest handling, downstream processing, packaging, marketing and presentation at points of sale’ (page 2, DAT, FA). The FA further notes in detail the aspects that can be addressed through this limited (specifically focused) project (access to information and training, orientation of extension services on production rather than post harvest technologies and systems, financing for farmers for upgraded equipment and improvement of post harvest facilities). ‘Fact will focus on increasing competitiveness of potential exports by addressing and, where necessary, upgrading standard components of the supply chain of selected products’. Source: FA</p> <p>Commodity chain studies were undertaken in Fiji, Vanuatu and Kiribati as part of the FAO’s Regional Programme for Food Security and identified key factors constraining producers from increasing their efficiency along the supply chain and producing goods suitable for export markets, including advice on post production activities, organisation of the producer base, business and management advice for producers, marketing systems and services. Another study (Pacific 2020) also identified factors for improving agricultural productivity. These studies were used by the Commission to design its project (along with stakeholder consultations). Source: FA, page 5.</p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Le projet ne présente pas d'analyse préalable de l'intérêt et de la viabilité financière et économique des activités à promouvoir : absence de comptes d'exploitation prévisionnel par agent économique et de calcul de taux de rentabilité interne (TRI) ni financier ni économique. Des calculs partiels ("plans d'affaires") ont été produits pour la mission MR et se présentent comme des comptes d'exploitations sommaires, établis au niveau d'une seule campagne, débouchant sur de simples calculs de marges brutes (mais sans valorisation de la main d'œuvre). Par contre, au cours du projet, deux analyses ont été réalisées des filières sésame et anacarde pour guider les activités du projet. Ainsi pour les deux filières, les études ont couvert les aspects suivants : présentation de la filière (le produit et ses transformations, les producteurs, les organisations associatives de collecte, les collecteurs privés/grossistes, les structures de transformation, les exportateurs, les</p>

	<p>partenaires et programmes mis en place, la production par région, le marché international, les exportations), l'analyse financière de la filière (part dans le revenu des exploitations, retombées financières de la filière, répartition de la VA), l'analyse des contraintes de la filière 9aux niveaux de la production, collecte, transformation, commercialisation), l'analyse de la stratégie des acteurs (amélioration des itinéraires techniques de production, intégration verticale de la production, recherche de valorisation, structuration de la filière en interprofession), les opportunité sur les marchés d'exportation biologique et équitable (les acteurs, évolution du marché , conditions de certification, adéquation de l'offre en matière de qualité, coût de la certification). <i>Source</i> : MR, <i>Etude de filière sésame, Etude de filière anacarde</i>.</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>No mention of Domestic Resource Cost appears in the SFA Impact Evaluation. Nevertheless, it mentions that the Commission Regulation (EC) n°1609/1999 laid out that funds allocation by country was based on the “competitvity gap”. This indicator is based on the reference quantities and the difference between the price of ACP banana exporters and the reference price of third countries. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 1, htsp, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.2.2.2</b>	<p>Evidence that the Commission promoted the design of commodity chain strategies addressing needs and challenges identified in diagnostics and taking account of important transversal and cross-sectoral issues (environment, gender, corporate responsibility including child labour and other social rights)</p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>In terms of development of effective commodity strategies and implementation plan (result area 1 of the COM (2004)89), output and results of the UNCTAD's activities until 30 June 2011 are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the activity “1.CAR.C01a - Development of value chain strategies elements - Grenada and Jamaica” is completed;</li> <li>▪ the activity “1.CAR.C01b - Support for the financing of the nutmeg sector in Grenada” is completed. The objective of the study was to assess the financing gaps and bottlenecks of the nutmeg value chain, especially those related to access to credit for smallholders; identify activities aiming to improve nutmeg value chain finance and establish necessary capacities for the sector's development. The draft report on Enhancing Access to Finance in the Nutmeg Sector in Grenada was completed. The draft report was sent to the Ministry of Agriculture of Grenada and the National Coordinating Committee (NCC) members for comments and suggestions. A workshop on Enhancing Access to Finance for the Nutmeg Sector in Grenada was organized on 7th and 8th July 2011 in St. George's, Grenada in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture and the NCC. The workshop brought together approximately 50 participants representing the Government of Grenada, the main stakeholders of the nutmeg value chain, financial institutions, experts and other partners interested in nutmeg finance. The key conclusions and recommendations from the Study on enhancing access to finance in the nutmeg sector in Grenada were examined and validated, and concrete follow-up activities identified. Main lessons learnt of this activity are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The value-chain approach is effective for analyzing the main constraints in agricultural finance and proposing appropriate solutions.</li> <li>- Reinforcing the role of farmers' organizations can facilitate access to finance by smallholder farmers.</li> <li>- Enhancing the cooperation with other IOs improved the efficiency of the activities and contributed to the success of the workshop. The draft report of the nutmeg finance study was shared with the FAO, ITC and World Bank for</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



<p>comments. In return, these IOs recommended experts or provided suggestions on the organizational aspects of the workshop.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the activity “1.WST.C01 - Support to strategies and cross-cutting activities – Ivory Coast and Mali: Arabic gum and cotton” is completed;</li> <li>▪ the activity “1.ESA.C01 - Support to strategies and cross-cutting activities – Cotton” is on-going. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Objective of the activity: UNCTAD will provide elements of supply chain strategies relating to finance strategies, information services and commodity exchanges. The supply chain selected as regional priority for such strategies development (cotton) will benefit in priority from this activity. It will also fund support staff for cross-cutting and contribution to regional activities.</li> <li>- UNCTAD continued the discussions with COMESA and ITC the best way to provide support to the regional cotton strategy initiative. In line with the objective of the activity, it was decided to utilize the funds to contribute to organization of the regional cotton strategy review workshop.</li> <li>- COMESA’s Cotton to Clothing value chain stakeholders review meeting is scheduled for 27-29 July in Nairobi, Kenya.</li> <li>- The participants were identified and invited by COMESA. COMESA also elaborated the draft program of the workshop that was reviewed by all partners.</li> <li>- UNCTAD is supporting COMESA alongside other partners in the organization of the meeting (travel of participants, etc.)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Note that in the Pacific region, the activity 1.PAC.C01 Development of value chain strategies elements - Fiji – Fruits and vegetables was cancelled the approved budget was transferred to other UNCTAD’s activities under the All ACP Programme.</p> <p><i>Source: UNCTAD, Draft 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011, 22 July 2011</i></p> <p>International Trade Center (ITC):</p> <p>The period between 1 January 2011 and 30 June 2011 has seen acceleration in implementation activities related to sector development strategies completed during previous periods.</p> <p>Significant progress was made with interim Result 2 achievements (of the COM(2004)89) in several non-cotton sectors in each region: eg: Jamaica – Agri-foods, Mali – Arabic gum, Cameroon – Coffee, Ethiopia – Spices, Samoa – Fruits &amp; vegetables. The final six months of the All ACP Programme will see a focus on the other sectors and countries to attain similar results.</p> <p>ITC originally agreed to deliver 17 sector value chain development strategies concluded through participatory stakeholder processes – including implementation plans and the establishment of stakeholder led strategy implementation coordination bodies. Four of these sector development strategies were to be regional in their scope.</p> <p>ITC has now delivered 17 strategies, implementation plans and established effective functioning coordination bodies in each case. Although the completion of one regional sector development strategy remains outstanding (ESA Agri-foods schedule with RECs), ITC succeeded, with support from NGOs and other agencies under the regionalisation component of Central African coffee development project, to facilitate the completion of an additional coffee sector development strategy for conflict ravaged parts of DR Congo.</p> <p>Despite longer than anticipated local arrangements for appropriate engagement and support from authorities in many countries and regions many of the early market and product development implementation activities supported by ITC have led to actual measurable results and initial increase in incomes for targeted poor communities.</p> <p>As far as cotton regional strategy and implementation coordination are concerned, the</p>
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ITC support led to the following outputs:

- West and Central Africa: Cotton sector development strategies for West and Central Africa have now been fully completed and endorsed by stakeholders, national and regional authorities in an unprecedented display of alignment and unity. Feedback from new customers has stimulated growers and ginners to re-examine their traditional working practices. The combined efforts of FAO, CFC (cotton quality testing facilities), UNCTAD and ITC in West Africa have provided the mechanisms to facilitate direct sales and greater transparency in cotton trade. However, further development programme support will be required for the next two years to ensure such fragile beginnings are sustained, become institutionalised and self-sustaining. The pace of capacity building may be slower than initially expected – but it is consistent and gaining momentum. These positive steps from stakeholders in the Central and West Africa are reinforced by the current positive price and demand trends in international markets.
- East & Southern Africa: During the period the sector strategy coordination body and cotton Focal Point in COMESA supported an implementation progress review and the design / alignment of national and sub-regional development plans for cotton in the MoZaZiMa group of countries. A full strategy review is planned for the final semester. The countries in this region also showed continuing progress, especially as participation in market and quality orientation missions with direct customer contact increased.

Detailed results of the ITC's support to the Development of effective commodity strategies and implementation are provided below (update of 30 June 2011):

- *Grenada, Nutmeg and Mace* : Grenada nutmeg & mace sector strategy - October 2009; Implementation plan finalised with implementing partners - March 2010; New video documentary record of strategy and product development work for training and communications - July 2010; New records of Government policy-level and public fora discussions – December 2010; Working practices in GCNA nutmeg processing centre modified with improvements in quality of outturn – December 2010; Mission reports and company audit analyses – July to December 2010.
- *Jamaica, Agri-Foods*: Jamaican Agriculture Sector Strategy & Implementation plans for Fruits & Vegetables, Herbs & Spices, Roots & Tubers March 2010; Audit of selected agro-food processing enterprises and their market supply chains; Video on development of sector strategy and agri-products – July 2010; Records of Government policy-level and public fora discussions – December 2010; Process for implementation of the first two ABCCs agreed by Committee and work started – February 2011; MoU and Grant concluded between ITC and JEA and first Phase completed well – March 2011; Colombia mission reports: results and outcomes – June 2011; MoU and grant extension in process to cover support for ABCC site selection and set-up – June 2011
- *Cameroon, coffee (with World Bank)*: Cameroon Coffee Sector development Strategy and detailed implementation plans 2010-2015; Government “Arêté” for the creation of Comité de pilotage » for coffee strategy implementation coordination (tabled, but as yet un-signed); Completed Congo coffee sector development strategy and implementation plans (Res: 1.1 to 1.4) – March 2011; Records of Government policy-level and public fora discussions in Cameroon and DR Congo– January to June 2011; Coffee washing station (CWS) and small holder coffee production manuals produced in English and French delivered to extension services and CWS operators in all regions – October 2010; Samples of ground coffee from Gabon, DRC and Cameroon packaged for regional markets – October 2010; Sales and testing reports for first coffee samples from CWS showing 25% premium price

	<p>achieved and higher outturn ratio. Investors are establishing a further 7 CWS in Cameroon and also in DR Congo along with roasting facilities (North and South Kivu) – June 2011; Reports of installation and training of four rural coffee testing and tasting stations – May 2011; Project proposals for up-scaling of pilot washing stations project across Cameroon and a project for the regeneration of 16,000 hectares of old coffee plantations – June 2011; Training manuals in English and French for coffee growers and producer associations – June 2011.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Cameroon, Manioc &amp; Banane Plantain (with World Bank):</i> Sector Strategy Manioc (<i>Stratégie sectorielle pour le manioc au Cameroun. 2006 – updated for 2009 to 2014</i>); Sector Strategy Banane plantain (<i>Stratégie sectorielle pour la filière banane plantain. 2006 – updated for 2009 to 2014</i>); Implementation Plan Manioc (Plan de mise en œuvre de la stratégie sectorielle du manioc au Cameroun de 2009 à 2014 (juin 2009)); Implementation Plan Banane plantain (Plan de mise en œuvre actualisé de la stratégie sectorielle de la banane plantain 2009 – 2014); Implementation progress report (Rapport de la Table Ronde de Yaoundé. Novembre 2009); <i>Arrêté National</i> formalising the “Comité de pilotage Manioc et banana plantain” – June 2010 ; New Cassava products value chain performance diagnostic report for pilot locations.</li> <li>▪ <i>Central Africa region, cotton :</i> Regional value chain issues and donor-funded projects map completed; Regional strategy design process outline timetable agreed with stakeholders in the region - October 2010; An Action plan and a business plan for ACA’s new strategy were elaborated and approved; areas of new business activities and roles for ACA identified; Confirmations of improved prices and significant new direct sales as a result of ITC-facilitated linkages, visits to importers and customers, and supplier development initiatives (Res.2.4/2.5); Steps taken to improve and standardize bale labelling in ACA member countries to ensure that bale origins and description cannot be easily changed by traders. (Res.2.4). Direct feedback from representatives of ginners at outturn in customers has started to prove its worth in identifying and eradicating sharp practices by traders.</li> <li>▪ <i>Ethiopia, spices:</i> Consultation and briefing mission report; Value chain and market studies - October 2010; Final draft strategy and implementation plans – February 2011; Polished Turmeric sales and report by Indian Spices Board – May 2011</li> <li>▪ <i>Zambia, Cassava:</i> Cassava sector strategy and Government validated implementation plans – June 2010; Strategy coordination committee endorsed by government and initially hosted by Zambia Development Agency – July 2010; Final draft MoU IITA-ITC agreed with PC, CU and EC Programme Manager; Minutes/reports of recent Cassava Coordination Committee meetings – June 2011.</li> <li>▪ <i>ESA region, Regional Agri-foods strategy:</i> Regional value chain issues and donor-funded projects map completed – December 2010; Aide memoire from Tri-partite group in Lusaka explaining the process and initial Expert Group Meeting sent to all key stakeholders and Ambassadors – December 2010; Expert Group meeting, Lusaka – March 2011; ESA Regional Agri-foods development strategy Outline and Action Plan – validated by RECs and participants – June 2011; Following a request from ITC dated 22 February 2011 the PSC meeting of March 2011 agreed to remove the requirements for completion of Result areas 2.4 and 2.5 under this line of funding.</li> <li>▪ <i>ESA Region, Regional Cotton Development Strategy:</i> Regional strategy for Cotton-to-Clothing Value Chain- June 2009; Regional strategy progress review – June 2010; ITC Report to the Comité de Suivi du coton (CoS) - December 2010 ; Importing country’s sector associations reports on exporter, grower and processor evaluations facilitated by ITC to promote a better image of African Cotton with buyers – December 2010; The registration of the first indigenous owned Zambian Ginning and exporting operation supported by local development banks syndicated through</li> </ul>
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the Programme – December 2010; Many media reports, mission reports and studies – July to December 2010; 3 Tanzanian ginners and one Thai spinner agreed upon first direct sales contracts for delivery of altogether 400 tons on a C&F basis, worth US\$ 1.26 million. 100 tons will come out of a pilot project on contract farming, which supposedly will provide better quality cotton. If this is confirmed by the spinner after testing the 100 tons, the spinners will buy an additional 200 tons with an agreed upon premium – June 2011; In addition, the spinning factory will provide free-of-charge training on contamination reduction in Tanzania in July 2011. Moreover, the spinner offered technical and commercial training at their factory in Thailand. All local costs will be covered by Lucky Spinning while gineries or TCB just need to pay for the air-ticket. A ginning factory from Malawi signed a sales contract for direct delivery to a Bangladeshi spinning factory for 500 tons (2400 bales) of cotton worth US\$ 2.204.600.

- Policy Changes: The Ugandan Cotton Development Organisation will introduce a new regulation for the new season, banning polypropylene, a major cause for cotton contamination, for bale packaging. Instead cotton cloth will become mandatory. The implementation of this new policy is expected to have long-term positive effects in increased premiums for cleaner cotton. Tanzania: A Cotton Development Strategic Plan as roadmap for the industry is in place. A 2nd Cotton Development Strategic Plan and Action Plan is being prepared which envisages increasing production from 130,000 tons of lint to 270,000 tons by 2014/2015. Contract farming will be rolled-out in the entire country, starting 2011/2012 farming season through which yield and crop quality are expected to go up and hence income generated by small holder producers will increase. A formal training of ginnery operators was introduced in order to control cotton contamination levels. All 3 achievements above are a direct and indirect outcome of ITC-related activities.

- *Fiji, Agri-foods*: A revised sector strategy and implementation plans for Agri-foods (the fruits and vegetables and roots and tubers) industry in Fiji – January 2011; An action plan for implementation of SMS / Mobile communications and information sharing systems and applications – Joint activity between UNCTAD and ITC in Fiji and Samoa – May 2011; Mission reports and an implementation project document from MPI based on the Strategy – June 2011.
- *Samoa, Fruit and vegetables*: Fruits and Vegetables Sector Development Strategy and implementation plans 2009-2014; Strategy coordination committee established and endorsed by Government; Video on Samoa sector strategy development; Sustainable business strategy for Samoa Association of Manufacturers and Exporters (SAME) – November 2010; Diagnostic study of quality compliance upgrading needs in the 6 participating enterprises, Mission and marketing reports, Committee meeting reports – January till June 2011.
- *Solomon Islands, coconuts*: Coconut sector market studies; Sector strategy and Implementation plans validated by stakeholders and endorsed by Government; Government pronouncements and letters of continuing support for the process and the Coordination committee; Continued alignment of stakeholders from different, formerly warring islands, around the strategy, its objectives and committee members. Government reference to the strategy and Committee in policy planning and trade negotiations – as evidenced by pronouncement at the WTO in Geneva; Video on strategy process, committee meeting minutes and ITC mission reports.
- *Liberia, Cassava*: Sector Strategy and Implementation plans validated by stakeholders and endorsed by Government; Coordination Committee endorsed by government; Donor round table outputs and Coordination Committee meeting reports;

	<p>Ibadan IITA visit mission report; Regional cassava market study; Final draft MoU IITA-ITC agreed with PC, CU and EC Programme Manager; Video on strategy process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Mali, Arabic Gum</i>: Sector strategy and Implementation Plans, validated by stakeholders and government agencies; Décret Ministériel endorses strategy and implementation plans; Mission and market reports, EIF project proposals – July to December 2010; Committee meeting reports – July to December 2010; Training materials and reports from stakeholders. Reports of improved outturns from Communities trained – April and June 2011; Interim ITC mission report - March 2011.</li> <li>▪ <i>Burkina Faso, Arabic Gum</i>: Sector Strategy and Implementation plans, validated by stakeholders and endorsed by Government; Coordination established under umbrella of EIF Coordinating Committee; Training output and mission reports. Reports of initial improved outturns from Communities trained.</li> <li>▪ <i>UEMOA region, cotton</i>: Regional Strategy and implementation plans for the “Plan d’Action - Agenda Coton Revisé” completed, validated by stakeholders, endorsed by national and regional commissions and by Heads of State. Strategy summaries now available in English for Anglophone cotton countries; Strategy coordination Committee established (STR), trained, coached and effective; Report from regional consultation and briefing workshop of May 2009; Analysis regional sector issues, opportunities &amp; potential implementation partners: June 2009; Map of relevant sector development Programmes (CoS); Several cotton companies stated that their relationship with international merchants has drastically improved after having participated in ITC training events. Relationships have become “healthy” and are based on equality (video evidence exists). Some international merchants have started their own capacity building operations by bringing cotton companies (but only the sales directors) to cotton importing countries. The importance of marketing and promoting African cotton has therefore been recognized by major market players; Serious interest of the Bangladeshi and Vietnamese T&amp;C industry to substantially increase its cotton use from West/Central Africa. Selected spinning mills are interested to visit West African countries during the next cotton marketing season (December 2010 or January 2011) and to work together with selected ginning factories for improved and cleaner cotton delivery; Recognition that bale labelling needed to be improved and standardized in ACA member countries to ensure that bale origins and description cannot be easily changed by traders; In 2010 SODEFITEX of Senegal sold 1,700 tons of cotton lint directly to a Chinese spinning mill for a total sale of US\$ 3.185.647, as well as some fair-trade cotton and cotton Linter that had previously remained unsold in warehouses for over a year; Recognition that contamination is the number one constraint to improve market promotion and increase of prices. As a result ACA’s quality committee has dedicated its entire programme towards “la lutte contre la contamination”. An ACA programme to eradicate contamination by 2012 was initiated; ACA Business Plan 2011 – 2016; ACO Committee de Commercialisation set up and operational; Linkages with Bangladeshi and Vietnamese spinning factories for clean cotton established (willingness to pay price premiums obtained); Cotton promotion video for SODEFITEX realised; Cotton Contamination survey for Indonesia realised; In-kind contributions from China in the form of South-South cooperation training in China 15 June to 5 July.</li> <li>▪ <i>WST Region – Cotton Sector CoS Decentralisation</i>: First regional coordination reports received and interventions with other agencies to ensure communications with focal point. New mutual support linkages with ECCAS/CEEAC established; Focal Point</li> </ul>
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recruited in March 2011, trained and coached by ITC and the CU during missions to Geneva, Brussels, Burkina Faso and other countries in the region. Nil financial value MoU approved by ITC and UEMOA. ITC will now directly recruit/organise administrative support, travel and office equipment. The Focal Point participated in Brussels PSC meetings and cotton strategy events. The Focal Point has been collecting information and reporting on other agencies projects in cotton and Agri-business throughout the region and submits regular reports to ITC and the CU. ITC also supported the cost of the participation of the Focal Point and other UEMOA personnel in the UNCTAD-organised Pan-African cotton Conference in June 2011

- *West Africa Cereals - Rice, Maize, Sorghum, Millet, etc.:* • Regional market and products study; International market and products pricing and demand information; The first Regional action plan for cereals approved by NEPAD-CAADP and stakeholders.

*Source: ITC, 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 30 June 2011.*

FAO support the implementation of the fruit and vegetable strategy in the Pacific region (2.PAC.A01 - Implementation of key components of F&V Strategy).

Objective of the activity and Background: Interventions under this activity will target the fruits and vegetables sector in Samoa, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands. The activity has been formulated on the basis of:

(i) The Implementation Plan developed under the ITC-led commodity chain diagnosis and strategy formulation process in Samoa, with the support of FAO under the AAACP during 2008 – 2009 focusing on the following objectives: 1) Policy coherence and linkage to other initiatives, 2) Capacity building for policy design and implementation, 3) Strengthening farmer associations to improve production and market linkages, 4) Delivery of training, 5) Developing finance delivery mechanisms and introducing risk management facilities.

(ii) Strategies emerging from the FAO-MFFN Regional Farmer Organization capacity building workshop in October 2008 under the AAACP.

(iii) In-country consultations with stakeholders from the fruits and vegetables sector in Samoa, Fiji, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands under the AAACP during 2008. Activities will address supply chain management issues for the fruits and vegetables sector. These interventions will aim to strengthen farmer organizations ability to capture value from innovation and introduce value adding activities between the smallholders and buyers.

(iv) Stakeholder consultations on the requirements for improved access to risk management instruments and value chain finance, initiated by FAO in the context of the ITC-led commodity chain diagnosis and strategy formulation process. The work is complementary to UNCTAD analysis of regulatory constraints that hinder access to finance in selected Pacific countries.

Outputs, results and main lessons:

- An Inception workshop report detailing follow-up steps has been finalized. For capacity development activities to advance significant data collection and basic analysis of market data will be required. Training in these areas is foreseen as an integral component of the development of capacity in policy analysis in the Region
- Final activity reports for all of the three national support activities have been completed.
- Training materials have been technically cleared and finalized for respective training in the Samoa, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands.
- Natures Way in Fiji has been assisting in organizing regional events successfully, the group has been in
- Contact with FAO throughout the implementation of the project on related

	<p>activities under result 2 and proven to be a reliable source of information, technical expertise as well as a high quality service provider. NWC is being considered as a partner in organizing the final regional lessons learnt workshop</p> <p>FAO has carried out the activity 2.CEN.A02 – Support to the implementation of the Coffee Sector Strategy in Cameroon</p> <p>Objective of the activity: Strengthen the producer-buyer linkages and the institutional capacity of coffee cooperatives in Cameroon.</p> <p>The AAACP is supporting the implementation of the Cameroon Coffee Sector Development Strategy (2010-2015) which is being supported by ITC, UNCTAD and the World Bank, with ITC responsible for a training of trainers to work with Producer Organizations (POs) to strengthen their capacity to improve agriculture and primary processing practices. Targeted farmers will supply Central Processing Units (CPUs) which the World Bank is piloting to demonstrate the viability of improved technology for washing both Robusta and Arabica coffee. Depending on the results of the pilots, the World Bank may separately finance the construction of additional numbers of washing stations. UNCTAD is delivering support for sub objective 2.1 which focuses on modernizing the sector’s information system and setting up a coffee exchange.</p> <p>Based on a request from the Cocoa and Coffee Board of Cameroon (ONCC) and partner IO’S FAO had proposed the implementation of the business model approach to strengthen linkages between the CPU’s and farmer groups. However since the approval of the activity the ONCC has maintained that a revolving fund to be put in place to improve access to inputs and finance for the target smallholders groups. Based on good practice guidelines by FAO on revolving funds, an appraisal of the financial services available compared with the needs of the target groups has been recommended to ONCC to identify a sustainable financial mechanism for improving access to inputs and finance.</p> <p><i>Source: FAO, 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, July 2011</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP doesn’t include commodity chain support. The 2001-2007 CSP/NIP mentions that gender, environment and institutional capacity development are systematically taken into account in all the interventions. It is however a “blanket paragraph” and further information cannot be found concerning transversal issues in agricultural support.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 7</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The EC supported the PACICC in 2007 (Programme d’Appui au Conseil Interprofessionnel Café-Cacao) that was submitted by the Ministry of Trade. This programme, and other interventions, were later included in the strategy for coffee supported by the All-ACP programme in 2009. EC support has also been used in designing the banana sector strategy of Cameroon. This strategy includes cross-sectoral issues (and not just as « blanket paragraphs ») such as environment, corporate responsibility and other social implications of banana production. <i>Source : MN 913 ; MN 995 ; Stratégie actualisée de la filière bananière camerounaise pour une amélioration de sa compétitivité</i></p> <p>The AAACP programme also supported strategy development for the coffee sector in Cameroon and the cotton sector in the whole CEMAC region. This support was implemented by the UNCTAD, through elements of supply chain strategies « relating to finance strategies, market information systems, and commodity exchanges » and « cross-cutting activities and regional activities ». Cross-cutting issues were addressed, but there is no further detail on the subject. <i>Source : Cameroon AAACP action fiches</i></p>

<b>VAN POP2</b>	Il n'y a eu aucune stratégie de filières agricoles qui a été développée avec le support de la CE. Le Gouvernement n'a pas de stratégie de développement rurale et agricole. La FAO essaie de développer une stratégie des secteurs productifs (sur fonds FAO). Pas plus d'information disponible. La France à travers son assistant technique basé au niveau du Département de l'Agriculture a développé quelques stratégies pour le développement des filières agricoles, de manière participative (workshop): café, épices et noix, cultures vivrières (fruits et légumes en cours). <i>Source: MN 1067 and MN 1098</i>
<b>CR</b>	No evidence regarding the commodity chain strategy design in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005. However, the evaluation highlights that apart from the environment for which specific projects have been implemented (e.g. CULP Natural Resources Management) and EIA obligations for EIB projects, cross-cutting issues have not been specifically addressed throughout all the EDFs that fall under the scope of this evaluation. The evaluation has not found any evidence of base-line bench marking material for monitoring purposes, particularly in the case of gender. Whilst it is acknowledged that poverty alleviation may not be regarded as a priority area in the region, there are concerns that the combination of the specific climatic conditions of the region and increased globalisation are having a significant impact on poverty levels. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>MG</b>	Selon AIM (Association Intercoopération Madagascar), les appels à propositions imposaient la prise en compte ses dimensions transversales genre et environnement dont le suivi en cours d'exécution était assuré par la Délégation (Source : MN 806). Toutefois, la Délégation fait part de ses difficultés à assurer le suivi de ces dimensions sur le terrain dont les effets ne sont pas très tangibles mais qui sont pris en compte au démarrage ( <i>Source : MN 801</i> ).
<b>BF</b>	<p>Suite au rapport de « Diagnostic de la filière coton et l'Identification d'axes stratégiques » au Burkina Faso (août 2007), la Commission européenne a soutenu sous le 8<sup>i</sup>e FED dans le cadre des interventions du Fonds d'Observation Economique et sociale du monde rural la définition des « Stratégies de développement durable de la filière coton au Burkina Faso ». Sous forme d'une approche participative, ces stratégies ont été définies avec la contribution de consultants internationaux, du Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (Direction Générale de la Coopération), du Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Hydraulique et des ressources halieutiques (Secrétariat permanent de la Coordination des Politiques sectorielles Agricoles), du Ministère du Commerce, de la Promotion de l'entreprise et de l'Artisanat (Secrétariat permanent du suivi de la filière coton libéralisée), ainsi que l'ensemble des partenaires de la filière coton (représentants des producteurs, représentants des sociétés cotonnières, représentants du secteur financier, etc.).</p> <p>Deux stratégies (cadres logiques assortis de commentaires) ont ainsi été développées pour le secteur cotonnier du Burkina Faso :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ La stratégie de sortie de crise.</li> <li>▪ La stratégie à moyen long terme.</li> </ul> <p>Dans le cadre de la stratégie de crise, deux axes stratégiques ont été définis :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ L'assainissement de la situation financière des sociétés cotonnières, et plus particulièrement de la SOFITEX (pour 34 milliards de FCFA). La Commission européenne portera une partie de ce financement (10 millions EUR) sous forme d'un don dans le cadre d'une aide budgétaire. Un Fonds de lissage a été mis en place par l'AFD (pour garantir les nouveaux crédits auprès des banques).</li> <li>▪ Le rétablissement de la confiance avec le système bancaire national et international. Cet axe comprend l'accès à l'information sur la filière et des échanges réguliers entre la filière coton du pays, l'Etat et les partenaires techniques et financiers.</li> </ul>



	<p>Suite à la définition des « Stratégies de développement durable de la filière coton au Burkina Faso » appuyées par la Commission européenne, l'Etat burkinabé et l'Association Interprofessionnelle du Coton du Burkina (AICB) ont défini la « Stratégie commune de sortie de crise ». Cette stratégie reprend les éléments clés développés dans la partie « Stratégie de crise » du document « Stratégies de développement durable de la filière coton au Burkina Faso ».</p> <p>En accord entre l'Etat et les PTF, la stratégie à moyen long terme est axée sur l'amélioration de la compétitivité de la filière par une augmentation des rendements au champ, une maîtrise des coûts à tous les niveaux de la filière et une politique de reconquête de la qualité du coton graine et de la fibre. Cette stratégie sectorielle pour le coton s'inscrit dans le cadre plus général de la lutte contre la pauvreté. Son objectif général est de conforter la filière coton comme vecteur de la lutte contre la pauvreté en termes de croissance économique et plus spécifiquement de revenus et d'emplois dans le secteur rural et agricole. Elle met l'accent sur la durabilité de la filière à trois niveaux :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Durabilité financière et économique, pour faire face à la faiblesse et la volatilité des cours et à la concurrence des pays plus compétitifs ;</li> <li>▪ Durabilité sociale, pour accroître l'autonomie des producteurs et de leurs organisations ;</li> <li>▪ Durabilité environnementale, pour tendre à limiter les impacts négatifs du coton sur la santé des personnes, des animaux et de l'environnement en général par un emploi raisonné des intrants chimiques le développement de nouvelles méthodes de traitement, le recours à des pratique agricoles plus respectueuses de la fertilité des sols.</li> </ul> <p>Il n'y a pas d'évidence dans la stratégie du secteur cotonnier de la prise en compte des aspects genre, du travail des enfants ou d'autres aspects de droits sociaux.</p> <p><i>Sources: Stratégies de développement durable de la filière coton au Burkina Faso, Projet 8 ACP BK O14 – Fonds d'observation Economique et Sociale du Monde Rural (FOESMR), Rapport amendé, Août 2007 ; Filière coton au Burkina Faso, Stratégie commune de sortie de crise, ETAT-AICB, 2007</i></p>
UG	<p>No such evidence regarding the strategy design. However, a Stabex project (Coffee Farmers Alliance support project) supported by the EC will take into account in the near future the gender issues (women work a lot for coffee production but are not responsible for the sales) and climate change issues (that already has a visible impact on the field) (<i>Source: MN 308</i>).</p> <p>Crosscutting issues (i.e. gender and HIV/AIDS) were appropriately incorporated at the formulation stage of EC projects in the agricultural sector and taken into account during implementation. <i>Source: Uganda Country Strategy Evaluation</i></p> <p>Further to encouraging women participation in meetings and in taking up roles in the leadership of farmer organizations, a comprehensive focus on gender and youth was not part of the project. However, from observations it has become evident that, generally, farms perform better when there is dialog and cooperation between husband and wife within the household. <i>Source: Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report</i></p> <p>The Luwero coffee project is founded on the experiences from the Kaweri Coffe Farmers' Alliance Support project, but, in addition, will also be incorporating the following components to further complement the concept of the project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Access to credit shall be substantially improved. In addition to short term funds for commercial operations, also financing for the crop cycle is planned.</li> <li>▪ Farmers and their organizations shall be trained in financial literacy and business planning in order to better assess production costs, improve farm management and</li> </ul>

	<p>to plan the economic development of the organizational structures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Commercial partnerships between farmer organizations and their downstream supply chain partners shall be strengthened.</li> <li>▪ A focus will be put on farm households, strengthening the potential to evolve as a whole (women, men and children). This includes enabling household members to better develop their potential, as well as looking at possibilities to raise income through diversification while reducing risk.</li> <li>▪ A comprehensive mainstreaming gender approach will be designed and implemented as cross cutting through the entire project.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report</i></p> <p>Cross-Cutting Issues: While NAADS is committed to mainstreaming crosscutting issues of environment and natural resource management, gender, HIV/AIDS and youth involvement into the programme, achievement on the ground has been patchy. Service Providers (SPs) are in most cases required to include proposals for mainstreaming these issues. But poor guidance is given on what is required and other than limited provision of information (with no follow-up material resources), the aims of the programme for this component have not been fully realised. On the specific issue of gender, the majority of farmers are women, yet the management and decision-making process is predominantly led by men, requiring positive action to address this. <i>Source: Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The MTE states that the CSSP II <i>'programme is a GoG/EU "buy-in" into an emerging national strategy to enhance sector sustainability. The strategy aims to strengthen competitiveness by bringing all stakeholders of the commodity chain closer together, i.e. input providers, farmers, producer organisations, buyers, transport and warehousing, processors, exporters, the chocolate industry, financial and government institutions and conservationists. It promotes increased private sector participation in cocoa governance structures. Similar strategies are being invoked through collaborative initiatives between farmers, their representative organisations and chocolate companies. Driven by social, environmental, and health consciousness in OECD countries, fair trade, social support, and traceability are being increasingly promoted by some of Ghana's major cocoa sector stakeholders. (...)</i></p> <p>According to discussions and the MTE, the EC thus rather fitted into an existing effort but did not 'promote' the effort itself. Rather, <i>'One of the leading instigators of this bottom-up inclusive approach is the World Cocoa Foundation's (WCF) Cocoa Livelihoods Programme (CLP) a 5-year US\$40 million grant commitment aimed at improving the overall well being of 200,000 small farmers in 5 West African countries including Ghana. WCF is funded by the Bill and Linda Gates Foundation (BLGF) and by 15 of the world's leading chocolate companies. Up to 40% of WCF's budget is allocated to Ghana. CLP focuses on enhancing farm productivity, business training, community organisation, accessing inputs and production loans, and on improving access to business services and to market information.'</i> (Page 13 MTE, 2011). <i>Source: Mid-term Evaluation of CSSP II, 2011</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The EC did not support the development of agricultural commodities, with the exception of the Tanzanian Crop Reforms which were supported under the FMO 94-99, ASDP component. No strategy is available in the tea sector while there is one in preparation in the coffee sector. The Coffee sector have also produced action plans to cover the development of its activities. The EC has been consulted on the development of the marketing strategy of agricultural commodities in Tanzania. Stabex supported the ASDP through the basket fund (this support stopped recently) and also to the FAO secretariat. The 2011-2016 National Strategy for the coffee sector is under preparation. TACRI helped by the NGO Technoserv is preparing this strategy. It is the time to share it with the stakeholders and amend and improve it. In the coffee sector, the Commission is funding TACRI to develop milestones, targets, resources allocation and planning.</p> <p>Cotton sector: the Commission supported (through Stabex funds) Tanzanian</p>

	<p>stakeholders the definition and the implementation of the cotton strategy. Working closely with the regional African cotton Association which is also assisted by the CDC. Development of a regional strategy for cotton to address Western and Eastern African regions in a more coherent way and are in a process to make the national strategic plan for cotton coherent with this regional strategy. Strategy in the tea sector: there was one but not adopted/ agreed by all the stakeholders. No strategic plan at the moment for tea development in Tanzania. Tea Board has hired services of a consultant (who will start very soon) to tackle pricing issues and adopt pricing mechanisms. Tea research continues contract with farmers for extension services.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 677, MN 649, MN 138 and MN 623</i></p> <p>No strategy is available in the tea sector while there is one in preparation in the coffee sector. The Coffee sector have also produced action plans to cover the development of its activities. The EC has been consulted on the development of the marketing strategy of agricultural commodities in Tanzania. Stabex supported the ASDP through the basket fund (this support stopped recently) and also to the FAO secretariat. <i>Source: MN 138</i></p> <p>The 2011-2016 National Strategy for the coffee sector is not yet completed. NGO Technoserv helps TACRI to prepare the strategy. Now it is the time to share it with the stakeholders and amend and improve it. There is a need for a consensus. The EU is funding TACRI to develop milestones, targets, resources allocation and planning. The role of each actor needs to be defined. <i>Source: MN 677</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Le Programme Tous ACP via le Centre du Commerce International (CCI) IC a appuyé les acteurs de la filière de la gomme arabique du Burkina Faso dans la définition d'une stratégie de développement de la filière. <i>Source : <a href="http://www.intracen.org/Burkina_Faso_fr/">http://www.intracen.org/Burkina_Faso_fr/</a></i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The 2007-2013 CSP/NIP refers to a 9<sup>th</sup> EDF intervention (PASAPE) which will help in the formulation and adoption of a national policy for competitiveness and developing exchanges within the framework of various sectoral strategies (agriculture, wood, trade, industry, SME, etc.). This study, finalised in August 2010, proposes to articulate the strategy around five main pillars (one of them including agriculture): « <i>Cinq piliers ont été sélectionnés pour constituer la stratégie globale de compétitivité :</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <i>La consolidation des bases de compétitivité, tout particulièrement les infrastructures économiques (capital humain et infrastructures physiques) ainsi que le développement et la diversification des capacités productives nationales (agriculture et filières de croissance)</i></li> <li>2) <i>Le renforcement du secteur privé et la mise à niveau des entreprises qui constitue le maillon essentiel de la stratégie de compétitivité.</i></li> <li>3) <i>Le renforcement des capacités commerciales et la facilitation du cadre des échanges</i></li> <li>4) <i>L'amélioration de l'efficacité de l'action publique et de l'efficacité du cadre de promotion de la compétitivité.</i></li> <li>5) <i>Le renforcement de l'interface secteur public-secteur privé-société civile au service de la croissance et pour libérer l'initiative privée. »</i> <p>The first pillar –agriculture part- aims at : <i>“la levée des principaux obstacles à l'émergence d'une agriculture de seconde génération, c'est-à-dire une agriculture semi intensive et industrielle capable d'assurer la sécurité et l'autosuffisance alimentaire, d'approvisionner l'industrie de transformation et créer un marché et une consommation internes pour les filières extravertie et enfin de développer les exportations et améliorer ainsi la balance commerciale.”</i></p> <p><i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, page 22 ; ADE, Elaboration de la stratégie de compétitivité, Rapport final, 2010</i></p> </li></ol>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Les questions environnementales n'occupent pas une place prioritaire dans les décisions</p>

	<p>politiques et stratégiques (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.15). La plus importante des lignes budgétaires est celle décentralisée (€26,85 millions pour la période 1999-2008) pour appuyer le secteur bananes afin de maintenir les parts de marché de la banane ivoirienne et des autres fruits exportés sur le marché européen suite à la mise en cause du Protocole bananes par l'OMC. En plus d'investissements directs de compétitivité en plantation, des efforts sont réalisés pour la mise aux normes du marché (traçabilité et certification), sociales et environnementales des plantations. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.23). Le secteur hors concentration « appui et l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles » est déclinée selon 4 interventions dont l'amélioration de l'accès aux marchés extérieurs en renforçant aux niveaux public et privé la promotion de la qualité et le respect des standards sanitaires, sociaux et environnementaux en vigueur sur les marchés d'exportation, notamment celui de l'Union européenne . (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>The 2003-2007 RSP foresaw to support under its focal sector “Regional economic integration” to the improvements of the policy, legal and regulatory frameworks. This includes the development of sectoral policies in areas like agriculture, fisheries, environment and health. No further details are provided. The 2008-2013 RSP does not include support to the design of commodity strategies.</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, page 22; European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>Cross-cutting issues have not been specifically addressed throughout the regional programmes covered by this evaluation. There is no evidence of benchmarking material for monitoring gender issues, for example. Whereas poverty alleviation may not be regarded as the dominant priority in the region, there are no studies on the impact of regional integration and trade policies on poverty issues. Environment is a notable exception. Specific projects have been implemented and when non-environmental projects have probable environmental impact this dimension is usually taken into account. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. vii</i>).</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>There is no reference to commodity chain strategies in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regional Strategy Papers. Concerning the needs and challenges of the sector, the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP states that the regional food policies combined bad environmental conditions (droughts, floods, etc.) and recent international market conditions have led to increased food insecurity. The paper advises the adoption of more appropriate food policies for trading staple foods, the move away from rain-fed agriculture and towards irrigation, development of new adapted crop varieties and the adoption of new technologies. No specific statement is made in the agriculture and food strategy concerning cross-cutting issues. In the RSP/RIP, it is mentioned that cross-cutting issues “<i>will be mainstreamed through all interventions supported by the RIP</i>”. <i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 20 &amp; 54</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>The mainstreaming approach will be strengthened for four cross-cutting issues: economic and democratic governance, gender equity; environmental sustainability; and the fight against HIV/AIDS (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.3</i>).</p> <p>For both the EC and the EU Member States the Joint Response will ensure that cross-cutting issues such as human rights, gender equality, the rights of children, environmental sustainability and HIV/AIDS are either addressed by direct interventions or mainstreamed into other programmes. They may also be funded under the EC's thematic and global programmes which likewise provide funding for action on health, food security, water, energy, and trade and private-sector development. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.46</i>).</p>

	<p>Cross-cutting issues are not integrated into the main components of the Commission programme. Gender and conflict prevention have not been mainstreamed in the Commission programme. A few separate projects, addressing gender issues have been implemented successfully, but with low impact due to their limited scope. HIV/AIDS and environment appear better integrated into focal sector operations (food security and transport). (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p iii</i>).</p>
<b>GHA</b>	<p>The 2002-2007 CSP/NIP states that cross-sectoral issues (such as gender, environment, institutional development and capacity building) are systematically taken into account in all areas of cooperation. There is however no mention to commodity strategies in these programming papers. There has however been a country environmental study which underlined the land degradation constraint on the sustainability of agriculture. <i>Sources: Ghana 2002-2008 CSP/NIP, pages 8 &amp; 126</i></p>
<b>KEN</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP underlines that under the “EC assistance under the accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries”, Kenya developed an elaborate strategy to revitalise the sugar sector for 2007. The outcome of this strategy will inform the decision on the support to be requested for 2007. Major issues that continue to affect the sector include: inadequate diversification at farm and factory levels, minimal privatisation, high inefficiencies and low productivity. In addition, the CSP notes that the EC was an active partner in the process that led to adoption of the Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA). <i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 21 &amp; 37</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Peu d'infos concernant cet indicateur et plus particulièrement sur la prise en compte des enjeux transversaux au sein même des stratégies de développement des filières agricoles dans les CSP. Le principal défi, auquel le Gouvernement malgache aura à faire face au cours des années à venir, est de réussir à réduire fortement la pauvreté dans le pays, c'est-à-dire à atteindre les objectifs fixés dans le DSRP intérimaire à partir de la prise en considération des trois axes stratégiques identifiés dans ce document. Aussi, pour relever ce défi, le Gouvernement sera-t-il amené à apporter une attention particulière à l'augmentation du taux de croissance économique, afin d'en faire profiter les pauvres, en particulier dans les zones rurales. Pour ces derniers, les actions devront, tout en protégeant l'environnement à Madagascar, être intensifiées au bénéfice de la riziculture irriguée. En effet, selon de nombreuses études existantes et utilisées pour l'élaboration du DSRP-I, il apparaît clairement que, si les facteurs explicatifs de la pauvreté s'entretiennent entre eux, la riziculture constitue «le point focal de la pauvreté en milieu rural» et «un facteur clé de lutte contre la pauvreté». En outre, la question foncière devra être prise en considération, car elle constitue un obstacle au développement du secteur privé et à la relance de l'agriculture. Enfin, pour faciliter l'accès aux marchés, le réseau de pistes rurales devra être étendu (<i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.11</i>).</p> <p>La mission externe d'élaboration du profil environnemental a proposé des recommandations prioritaires dont l'appui aux filières de produits exploités durablement. En effet, l'intégration environnementale dans le monde de la production (notamment agricole) entraîne des coûts supplémentaires dont la rentabilité à court terme manque de visibilité. Une valorisation explicite de filières de produits exploités durablement permet de modifier cette image négative. Les produits résultant de filières d'exploitation durable disposent de marchés spécifiques dont la rentabilité n'est pas contestable. Différents modes de valorisation pourront être appuyés, notamment l'éco-certification ; l'appui filière s'adresse au niveau producteur (formation), aux différents niveaux de la commercialisation (local et à l'export) (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p50</i>).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>According to Mali's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, support to Mali's rice sector was part of the 8<sup>th</sup> EDF. Support is brought indirectly to the sector through co-financing of hydraulic</p>

	<p>projects along the Niger. However there is no detail on taking account of transversal issues. It states that the project seems to be an appropriate framework for pro-poor oriented growth. No information on whether the past EU-supported cotton interventions took account of needs and transversal issues. The 2008/2013 CSP/NIP states that Mali's "Cadre Stratégique de Croissance et Réduction de la Pauvreté" (CSCR) in which the CSP/NIP is embedded, takes account of transversal issues such as social inequality, gender, judicial reinforcement and fight against corruption. <i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 27 &amp; 41</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>There is no mention of commodity chain strategies in the Pacific RSP/RIPs. The need to improve agricultural practices to reduce environmental pressure is mentioned in the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP. The 2002-2007 RSP/RIP addressed the need to minimize pest problems to allow sustainable production. The "Facilitating Agricultural Commodity Trade" programme also identified a series of constraints to agricultural trade. The programme is still ongoing in the 2008-2013 strategy. Cross-cutting issues such as health, gender, environmental management and education are mentioned in a "blanket paragraph". <i>Source: Pacific 2007-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 33, 109 &amp; 138</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>There is no reference to support to commodity chain strategies in the Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, except that that EC and SADC have a long standing commercial experience in the context of the Sugar and the Beef Commodity Protocols. <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 14</i></p>
<b>TAN</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that the mainstreaming approach will be strengthened for four cross-cutting issues: democracy, good governance, human rights, the rights of children and indigenous peoples; gender equality; environmental sustainability; and the fight against HIV/AIDS. This is true for all interventions supported by the EC, including those related to agricultural commodities. In the transport sector (including feeder roads), the main commitments by the government to ensure mainstreaming of the crosscutting issues are: the appropriate type of environmental assessment, ensuring the use of HIV/AIDS awareness and control programmes along the main highways during and after construction or upgrading of main roads, effective participation of local stakeholders in prioritisation of rural roads bottleneck sections to be upgraded and compliance to a transparent and economic procurement process. <i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 59</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>There are no commodity chain strategies in Uganda's CSP/NIPs. Certain interventions are linked to the commodity sector (e.g. rural development and upgrading the transport network in the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, which are needed to increase rural incomes and export opportunities, the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture to increase competitiveness and diversify rural incomes). These interventions are linked to the needs identified in the economic situation performance. Cross-sectoral issues are considered to be "mainstreamed throughout the programme" but there is no further specification of how they are supposed to be. <i>Source: Uganda 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 12 &amp; 15 ; Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 18, 23 &amp; 29.</i></p>
<b>VAN</b>	<p>Although evaluations have concluded that the EC interventions were responsive to the needs of the country, there is no mention of the design of commodity chain strategies in the CSP/NIPs. The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP does however mention the aim to increase commodity exports and develop agriculture. The NIP includes the government's commitments to addressing cross-cutting issues such as good governance, children's rights and the rights of indigenous people, gender equality, environmental sustainability and HIV/AIDS. <i>Sources: Vanuatu 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 14 ; Vanuatu 2007-2013</i></p>

	<i>CSP/NIP, pages 4 &amp; 68.</i>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Le RSP/RIP 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest comporte un volet « sécurité alimentaire » dans son soutien à « l'approfondissement de l'intégration régionale, amélioration de la compétitivité et APE ». Ce volet est s'inscrit les politiques agricoles communes de la CEDEAO et de l'UEMOA et les objectifs du volet sont cités :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ l'appui au processus de mise en oeuvre du Programme Régional d'Investissement Agricole;</li> <li>▪ la valorisation, la transformation et la gestion des ressources naturelles et agricoles,</li> <li>▪ la productivité et la compétitivité des filières agricoles ciblées;</li> <li>▪ le fonctionnement des cadres régionales de concertation des filières agricoles;</li> <li>▪ la facilitation du commerce intra-régionale des produits agricoles;</li> <li>▪ l'appui au dispositif pour la préparation et la conduite des négociations internationales agricoles;</li> <li>▪ la mise en place et le fonctionnement des systèmes d'information de marchés, y compris les statistiques agricoles, et d'aide à la décision. »</li> </ul> <p>Les besoins auxquels ils doivent répondre et l'utilisation d'une approche transversale ne sont par contre pas évoqués. Le RSP/RIP contient cependant des programmes de soutien en faveur de l'environnement (secteur non-focal d'intervention). Les questions de genre sont, selon le RSP/RIP 2008-2013 incluses en articulation avec toute la stratégie d'intervention. Le respect et la promotion des droits humains sont également compris dans les documents.</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 57, 60, 61 &amp; 63</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>One of the four expected results of the AAACP programme is to assist ACPs in designing commodity strategies and implementation plans (result 1). It is expected that the programme will add value to a range of agricultural and rural development efforts funded by ACP countries, the EU and other donors, for example under National Indicative Programmes.</p> <p>The AAACP programme will essentially make available a pool of key services and tools to ACP commodity chain actors. Two out of four key activity areas of the programme are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Participatory strategy development: at the core of the programme lies support to the development of commodity strategies in the most commodity dependent ACP countries.</li> <li>▪ Follow-up on key priorities emerging from the strategy development; and specific all-ACP actions to improve access to relevant markets, production factors and services.</li> </ul> <p>Specific measures to include cross-cutting issues in the AAACP programme supporting agricultural commodities will be as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Gender issues will be taken into consideration by starting with the family/livelihoods analysis where gender issues will be documented, by promoting gender balance in capacity building for participation to strategy development and implementation, notably in the distribution of benefits;</li> <li>▪ Environment: Environmental issues will be considered throughout the programme activities, starting with the farming /livelihood systems analysis, and continuing in strategy development and implementation, including due attention to sustainable commodity farming practices and the use of ecological/fair trade market niches;</li> <li>▪ Governance: Stakeholder participation and consensus building in national decision making is an essential aspect of the programme and will be actively encouraged.</li> </ul>

	<p>Similarly, transparency and accountability in the management of commodity chains will be promoted.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>According to the PIP final evaluation report, the environmental issue is logically linked to a reduction in the use of pesticides and particularly in the most dangerous ones. Although it wasn't the main objective of the programme, it was a logical consequence of it. All the same, through the support of the programme, working conditions have improved in stations and for small producers. Since stations employ mostly women and that small producers include large numbers of women, the evaluation report states that the impact on gender has been positive. No mention is however made to women's rights or incomes. No reference is made to corporate responsibility or to social rights. <i>Sources: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 11 &amp; 84.</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>In order to benefit of the AMSP programme SP countries have had to produce national adaptation strategies (NAS) indicating how they would cope with the situation created by the price reduction of their sugar exports and the termination of the Sugar Protocol. These NAS should deal with three issues: (i) improvement of the sugar sector competitiveness; (ii) diversification; (ii) mitigation of the broader impacts (social, environmental) of the strategy implementation.</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Concernant la prise en compte des enjeux transversaux, l'intervention précise que l'appui aux processus durables de développement social, humain, environnemental et économique vise l'intégration économique et l'autonomie des groupements cibles. Le renforcement des capacités de gestion des organisations de producteurs par des sessions de formation et de suivi des projets permettront une meilleure valorisation des ressources locales. L'appui à la gestion d'une activité économique vise l'intégration des groupements de producteurs et des micro-entreprises dans des marchés internationaux spécifiques (promotion du Commerce Equitable, de l'Agriculture Biologique et d'autres modes de production certifiés par des standards internationaux). La promotion de pratiques culturelles agrobiologiques est un moyen de promouvoir des activités économiques durables. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 5</i>).</p> <p>Toutefois, le MR précise que les impacts sociaux sont pour l'instant peu évidents et la question du genre a été insuffisamment considérée. Il existe certes des contraintes liées à la structure foncière au Burkina, mais le projet contribue à renforcer ces inégalités, en donnant prioritairement accès aux hommes aux formations. (<i>Source : MR p. 3</i>).</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Depuis la campagne 2004-2005, la filière coton est confrontée à une crise financière sans précédent, due notamment à la forte dépréciation du dollar US par rapport à l'euro, à la baisse des prix du coton fibre sur les marchés internationaux et à la baisse de la compétitivité de la filière. Cette crise financière s'est d'abord traduite par un retard dans les achats et le paiement du coton graine de la campagne 2006-2007, ensuite par la difficulté de mobiliser les financements pour l'acquisition des intrants de la campagne 2007-2008.</p> <p>De manière à assurer le financement de la campagne 2007-2008 et permettre l'achat et le paiement rapide de l'ensemble du coton graine produit, la définition et la mise en œuvre d'une stratégie ad hoc de renforcement de la filière se sont révélées d'une extrême urgence.</p> <p>Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant</p>



	notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). <i>Source : Allocation signature CF</i>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Selon le cadre logique d'intervention, l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » ne concerne pas la conception d'une stratégie de filière mais le développement d'une activité de décorticage des noix de cajou.</p> <p>Cette activité vise un développement durable de la filière et incorpore certains aspects transversaux, à savoir :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Les questions de genre : les unités de décorticage emploient 90% de femmes</li> <li>▪ Les questions environnementales : le soutien a favorisé l'accès à la certification d'agriculture biologique. De plus, l'intervention a permis le développement de la valorisation des coques d'anacarde sous forme de briquettes de combustion.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'action commenté</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pas de référence aux enjeux transversaux dans les documents consultés sauf concernant l'environnement (situation + étude impacts)</p> <p>La dégradation de l'environnement, déjà peu maîtrisée avant la crise dans certains domaines (pollution d'eau, déchets, déforestation), s'accélère suite à l'absence de mécanismes de contrôle dans plusieurs zones, à l'appauvrissement rapide de la population et à l'exploitation illicite de certaines ressources naturelles. Les questions environnementales n'occupent pas une place prioritaire dans les décisions politiques et stratégiques. La dégradation alarmante des conditions de vie, surtout des jeunes, présente un haut risque pour la stabilité sociopolitique future du pays. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.8</i>)</p> <p>Activité A. 3. Pistes rurales ; A,3.a Etudes préalables : Les études techniques fourniront des APS et APD et une étude d'impact environnemental sera effectuée pour identifier des mesures de précaution au de correction à prévoir dans la conception et la conduite des travaux. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.8</i>). Toutefois, il est précisé que les questions environnementales n'occupent pas une place prioritaire dans les décisions politiques et stratégiques. (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.2</i>)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>Genre : A côté de l'approche participative on adoptera aussi une perspective de genre: la promotion de l'égalité de genre n'est pas assumée comme objectif indépendant mais comme perspective stratégique transversale à la réalisation de tout le projet. On connaît, en effet, la condition de marginalisation, de discrimination économique et sociale des femmes dans la zone d'intervention – même dans la réalité des GIC – et, d'autre part, l'importance de leur contribution pour atteindre les objectifs du projet. La discrimination de genre, en effet, en limitant les capacités et les potentialités des femmes, limite aussi l'apport fondamental qu'elles peuvent amener au développement économique et social. Le choix des animateurs (agents techniques d'agriculture et d'élevage) affectés à l'action, le choix des groupes cibles, les élections des organes directeurs des Unions et de la Fédération des GIC, toutes les activités de formation seront empreintes de cette perspective de genre. (<i>Source : Annexe I p. 14</i>).</p> <p>La durabilité socioculturelle est largement détaillée <i>Source : Annexe I p. 14</i>.</p> <p>Peu de référence à l'environnement : L'action aura un impact sur le contexte social et environnemental aussi bien à court terme qu'à long terme. (<i>Source : Annexe I p. 26</i>).</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>Through the “Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'UE et l'Afrique Centrale” (PASAPE) (9<sup>th</sup> EDF), the Commission financed the elaboration of a national competitiveness strategy (August 2010) which includes an analysis of the weaknesses of the national economy in terms of competitiveness. See general part on Cameroon for additional information on this national competitiveness</p>

	<p>strategy. <i>Sources: Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007 ; ADE, Elaboration de la stratégie de compétitivité, Rapport final, 2010</i></p>
<b>CR- RIC</b>	<p>The “Support to the competitiveness to the rice sector in the Caribbean” programme aimed at promoting the design of rice strategies addressing challenges identified in diagnostic studies but has not achieved the expected result because of unclear design and lack of ownership.</p> <p>During the identification phase of the programme, the Commission commissioned a “Diagnostic study of the CARIFORUM rice industry” (2001). For Suriname, the diagnostic stressed that policies for the rice sector “concentrate on the improvement of competitiveness and profitability of the rice farms and the processing plants”. It highlighted the “need for more vibrant sector’s policies: the lack of enforcement or weak sector’s policies are refraining the development of the sector”. It recommended: “Stakeholders are requesting clearer sector’s policies and steady enforcement of those policy decisions taken in the past and not yet enforced. This refers to a policy for the management of irrigation/drainage infrastructures; payment of irrigation water by its users; privatisation of parastatals involved in the rice production and a more general streamlining of the industry’s structure. Unless these new, and long awaited, policies are put in place, any major investment into any rice production infrastructure (such as for drainage and irrigation purposes) would largely result into a waste of resources.” For Guyana, the diagnostic has not identified specific policy-related constraints. The Commission programme aimed at the adoption by the Government of Guyana and Suriname of national rice policy and strategies through technical assistance (FA). However, the final evaluation pointed out that the “FA has not clarified enough the context in which national rice strategies were to be developed and adopted” and that there was a lack of “ownership by the respective national governments”. In that context, the TA failed to achieve the expected result.</p> <p>The FA of the Commission programme also noted that the project would also “directly address environmental issues, especially in the research of alternative practices to the excessive use of chemicals in agriculture and of the destination of industrial wastes.” Moreover, it stresses that the “programme will positively impact on rural incomes, rural employment and women”. However, no specific activities in the Logframe mainstream environment and/or gender. <i>Sources: Agrotec Spa, “Diagnostic Study of the CARIFORUM rice industry”, 2001, pages 117, 123; SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, page 17; Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, page 5</i></p>
<b>CR- RUM</b>	<p>Besides investments in the modernisation of production equipment, a key objective of the programme is to support a switch of Caribbean rum production from low quality rum exported in bulk to branded products. Environment is explicitly taken into account in the programme. Out of a total budget of €70 million, €9.8 million have been allocated to subsidies to waste management investments.</p>
<b>ET- CIP</b>	<p>For transversal issues, evidences in the consulted document are only related to gender et environment. Cross Sectoral Appraisals (<i>Source : FP p.7</i>) : Gender review indicated the need for further study under the Project. Earlier environmental reviews indicated the need for a material significant component and this has been included. The gender study included in the Project involving the future role of women in coffee will provide insights into the present position and the way efforts can be directed for positive change. (<i>Source : FA Annexes A to D p.5</i>). Nevertheless, it must be noted that out of the four service</p>

	<p>tenders budgeted under PE No 5 the respective tenders dealing with the survey of further forest conservation areas and with the survey of gender issues in coffee were cancelled (<i>Source : Completion report p.14</i>) but in the framework of sub-component 5.7: Community development, it is said that a survey of gender issues in coffee was due to be outsourced to a local ONG (<i>Source : Completion report p.14</i>)</p> <p>In the framework of sub-component 4.4: Coffee by-product utilization and regarding environmental pollution, as early as September 2002 JARC undertook an intensive investigation in 4 woredas and 17 rivers and streams around Jimma of the extent of pollution created. In early December 2004, at the request of the State Minister the TATL conducted an inspection and analysis of the washing stations operating in Sidamo and Gefeo zone. The workshop below mentioned was the occasion for the presentation of a working paper based on a coffee processing waste water monitoring conducted in collaboration with Jimma University. A short term mission was conducted from 11/01 to 6/02/2009 and focused on “Improvement of effluents management and by-products utilization” (<i>Source : Completion report p.19</i>)</p> <p>The MR 2007 said that coffee washing and pulping machine plants have also increased, unfortunately volumes of coffee effluent have also increased causing water pollution and environmental hazards. (<i>Source : MR 2007 p.2</i>)</p>
GH-COC	<p>The project’s financing proposal identifies a series of constraints limiting the cocoa sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Low yields and productivity;</li> <li>▪ End of availability of forest to extend cocoa production;</li> <li>▪ Inadequate access to agricultural credit;</li> <li>▪ Land tenure systems;</li> <li>▪ Declining fertility in cocoa growing areas;</li> <li>▪ Poor farm-level technical knowledge combined with weak cocoa extension systems and an inefficient cocoa extension system methodology;</li> <li>▪ Poorly organised cocoa farmers and low cocoa farmers’ welfare;</li> <li>▪ Ageing cocoa farming population;</li> <li>▪ Distribution of roles of the Government and private sector in cocoa sector governance issues;</li> <li>▪ Weak supportive cocoa policies;</li> <li>▪ Impediments to private sector involvement in the cocoa sector;</li> <li>▪ Socio-cultural issues (child labour, HIV/AIDS, gender equality);</li> <li>▪ Maintenance of cocoa beans quality at producer level.</li> </ul> <p>(There are further explanations on these issues in the Financing Proposal)</p> <p>The Financing Proposal states that the Programme will “<i>address most of these issues through a number of interlinked activities</i>” which are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Intensifying extension through participatory training methods and tools;</li> <li>▪ Addressing the environmental and social impact of cocoa production;</li> <li>▪ Improving farmers’ access to high quality planting material;</li> <li>▪ Supporting the replanting of large areas with high yielding material;</li> <li>▪ Strengthening governance and management capacities of cocoa farmers and farming organisations;</li> <li>▪ Strengthening service provision capacities of farmers organisations;</li> <li>▪ Fostering vertical integration;</li> <li>▪ Supporting participatory sector strategy formulation;</li> <li>▪ Carrying out specific cocoa sector studies.</li> </ul> <p>Further details of the activities are given in the Financing Proposal.</p>

	<p>According to the monitoring reports, the “level of relevance of the project” has been considered as a “very good” level (level a) in the first report and “good” level (level b) in the second report. <i>Sources: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal, pages 10 to 14; Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring reports 01 &amp; 02 Impact Prospects sheet.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO programme <i>isn't a/doesn't aim at designing a commodity strategy</i> but, as indicated its name, increasing the participation of African Nations in SPSOs. The intervention is based on an identified need to increase their participation in order to ensure better compliance with Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and therefore increase the agricultural commodity markets access. This increased market access is in turn supposed to increase the agricultural sector’s potential for growth and development and therefore to reduce poverty. The financing agreement states that since the PAN-SPSO is a training and capacity building intervention, it will pay attention to ensure an equal gender distribution among trainees. It also states that beneficiaries will be advised to take environmental impacts into account when elaborating their national SPS standards. <i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, pages 15, 37, 38 &amp; 39.</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The TAPs attached to the Financing Agreements of PASAM1 and PASAM2 do not make reference to any cross-cutting issue.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence selon les documents consultés</p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>The project (financed by the EC but designed by Solidaridad) aims at promoting adoption by coffee growers in the Kamuli District of the “UTZ Code of Conduct”, which is an internationally recognized set of economic, social and environmental criteria for responsible coffee production. Being UTZ certified should allow coffee growers to get a higher (although not guaranteed) price for their deliveries.</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>“The overall PMA design is responsive to gender and environmental issues. With women providing the bulk of agricultural labour force, increasing agricultural productivity for women means a greater return to their labour. (...) Both NAADS and NARS have natural resources management components built in their design, while the NAADS programme is seeking to operationalise its recently-published Poverty and Gender Strategy”. TAPs of the SBS</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The project’s financial agreement states that it will respect the socio-cultural aspects of the Melanesian society and the agro-ecological environment (by promoting “organic” certified production). It also states that since women are key role players in production and marketing, the project will assure their presence in all the stages of the POP2 development and creation.</p> <p>The project’s third monitoring report states that there was no gender discrimination in the process and that there was no real need for a gender focus in the project execution. The report also states that the project did respect the local socio-political structure, the prevailing cultural realities and religious beliefs. The good relations between the project beneficiaries and managers encouraged its sustainability. <i>Sources: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 3, sustainability sheet Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Financing Agreement, page 14</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA evaluation found no examples of systematic environmental impact assessment of banana production, despite high levels of agrochemical applications. According to the</p>

	<p>evaluators, there is a tacit assumption that they are “necessary evils” and a sine qua non of commercial agro-industry. Only one EC delegation assigned funds for environmental monitoring. However, improvements to production methods in line with agricultural and environmental practices required for certification have been operated in all countries (e.g. adhering to international phytosanitary regulations, reducing levels of agrochemical applications, etc.). These improvements were mostly funded by the industry with co-funding by the SFA. Although the improvement of working conditions were mainly driven by market quality and safety protocols, the SFA (co-)funding facilitated the necessary adaptations (packing sheds, improved observance of worker health and safety practices, etc.). Diversification funds have been used to support social development programs, developing socioeconomic infrastructure (water, sanitation, roads, etc.) and investing in education programmes. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 29, btspe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.2.2.3</b>	<p>Evidence that the Commission’s support led countries to embed their national commodity strategies into their national development strategy and to include them at a regional level into regional strategies</p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>The RSP 2008-2013 mentions that the FAO has been instrumental in coordinating the agricultural strategies at regional level: ‘ <i>La stratégie agricole commune élaborée par la CEMAC avec l’appui de la FAO met l’accent sur l’harmonisation des politiques agricoles, l’intensification de la production et des réformes institutionnelles. Des programmes fédérateurs ont été mis sur pied dans les domaines suivants : semences, biosécurité, pêche continentale et aquaculture, homologation des pesticides, qualité et recherche agricole. Au niveau de la CEEAC, un Fonds spécial régional de développement agricole a été créé et une politique agricole commune est en cours d’élaboration. La CEMAC et la CEEAC ont élaboré avec l’appui de la FAO un programme régional de sécurité alimentaire</i>’ (RSP p29) <i>Source : RSP 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>La stratégie nationale de développement du Cameroun (le DSCE – Document Stratégique pour la Croissance et l’Emploi) reprend les grandes lignes des objectifs de développement du secteur rural. Il reprend les objectifs chiffrés de production pour 2015 selon les cultures et les objectifs globaux de modernisation de l’agriculture. Les stratégies des produits ne sont pas reprises telles quelles. Il n’y a aucune preuve de lien avec le soutien de la CE. <i>Source : Cameroun DSCE, p. 64</i></p> <p>The AAACP programme also supported strategy development for the coffee sector in Cameroon and the cotton sector in the whole CEMAC region. It is not an « embedding of the national strategy in the regional strategy » per se, rather a direct regional integration of the cotton commodity strategy. <i>Source : Cameroon AAACP action fiches</i></p>
<b>VAN PACT-FACT</b>	<p>The Farm Support association got some support from the FACT project to strengthen capacities of extension services which helps farmers to grow vanilla. It allowed strengthening capacities of field extension services at the level: 1) one session on production techniques and 2) one session on curing techniques. The trainings have been organised by the FSA. After receiving training field staff got back on the field to show techniques to farmers. As a result the quality and the quantity of the production have improved. <i>Source: MN1098</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Le programme Stabex 1999 s’est choisi comme partenaire principal, le Ministère de l’Agriculture. Des appuis ont été mis en place pour asseoir son rôle de maîtrise d’œuvre ainsi que pour la conception de nouvelles stratégies agricoles. L’appui institutionnel apporte au MinAgri pour l’élaboration aux politiques sectorielles a eu un impact sur la disponibilité de nombreuses stratégies sectorielles. Le Stabex 1999 est contributif de la politique sectorielle de la Cote d’Ivoire. De plus, d’une manière globale, le programme</p>

	<p>Stabex 1999 est en parfaite compatibilité avec le cadre politique du Gouvernement puisqu'il participe aux objectifs de celui-ci, à savoir la réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural. Le programme participe à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté, exposée par le Gouvernement dans le document intérimaire de janvier 2002 et rendue définitive dans le document finalise de janvier 2009. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No evidence regarding the commodities strategy in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005. However, the evaluation highlights that the Commission's strategy of support to the Caribbean region has evolved across successive EDF programmes and it includes a large spectrum of interventions. Its "fil conducteur" is the strengthening and the construction of a regional integrated space. The characteristics of the region and the potential gains in terms of economies of scale make this objective rather compelling and it is supported by historical development. The geographical area for the integrated space, the CARIFORUM zone, results from signature of the Lome IV Agreement, and is not the result of analysis demonstrating its relevance. The potential and implications of the region's integration as a tool for development has not been sufficiently analysed and therefore not fully grasped, and as a result national interests tend to prevail over regional concerns. Notwithstanding these limitations the need for the construction of a regional integrated space is shared by the partners. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Burkina Faso's 2001-2007 CSP/NIP mentions that actions in the field of rural development and food security will take the regional situation into account and will build on regional organisations' projects (such as those of the CILSS (Comité permanent Inter-états de Lutte Contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel) or the UEMOA (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine)). There is no evidence however that this was due to EC support. <i>Source: Burkina Faso 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 23</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Il existe un grand nombre de documents de stratégies (globales et sectorielles) mais aucune ne concerne spécifiquement les produits agricoles d'exportation. En effet, la stratégie de développement agricole du gouvernement est actuellement fortement centrée sur les cultures vivrières (riz et manioc). Le développement des cultures d'exportation n'est pas la priorité (<i>Source : MN 805</i>).</p> <p>En 2006 le Conseil des Ministres de la République Malgache a adopté le Plan National de Développement Rural (PNDR, révisé et actualisé en 2008, qui a été en 2007 décliné en 22 plans régionaux de développement rural. Le DSRP fait explicitement référence au PNDR auquel il renvoie pour ce qui concerne les actions à entreprendre en direction du secteur agricole et rural.</p> <p>Le PNDR définit 5 orientations stratégiques, notamment Améliorer la sécurité alimentaire et augmenter la production et la transformation agricoles (orientation 3) et Développer les marchés et organiser les filières (Orientation 5). <i>Sources : DSRP et Programme National de Développement Rural</i></p> <p>Pour la vanille, produit emblématique de Madagascar, pour lequel il est l'exportateur principal au niveau mondial, aucune stratégie concertée n'est mise en œuvre par les opérateurs ni par les autorités pour s'assurer un leadership et définir les modalités d'intégration dans les marchés mondiaux. <i>Source : Commission Européenne, Organisation des marchés (bourses) de produits agricoles des principales filières d'exportation à Madagascar, rapport final, juin 2009</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>As of mid 2010, no significant progress had been made on Result 3 outputs (participatory cocoa strategy development). In March 2010 Cocobod, with contributions from other industry stakeholders developed a draft Cocoa Sector Strategy II (CSS II but this hasn't been finalised as yet). <i>Sources: C SSP MTE 2011, MN 906</i></p>

<b>CI</b>	<p>La consolidation des différentes propositions du DSP revues a été faite au cours d'un atelier organisé par la Cellule de Coopération et de Coordination Cote d'Ivoire - Union européenne en 2006 sous la présidence de la Primature. Pendant ces assises, quatre groupes de travail ont été constitués pour produire une première version du DSP et du Programme indicatif national autour de trois secteurs de concentration qui auraient été pré-identifiés: (i) sortie de crise et bonne gouvernance, (ii) lutte contre la pauvreté - réhabilitation des secteurs sociaux, (iii) réhabilitation des infrastructures économiques et inter connectivité. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.69).</p> <p>Les déterminants du choix de stratégie prennent en considération au-delà du contexte politique, quatre faiblesses structurelles apparaissent prédominantes dans la situation de pauvreté croissante que connaît le pays : la situation de l'agriculture (faiblesses structurelles de l'agriculture et des conditions de vie en milieu rural), le développement de certaines mauvaises pratiques de gouvernance, le poids de l'endettement du pays, l'insuffisance des infrastructures permettant de développer les échanges régionaux (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.63).</p> <p>Bien qu'il occupe traditionnellement un rôle fondamental avec des exportations représentant en moyenne 40% du PIB, le commerce extérieur de la Cote d'Ivoire est à l'image de son économie : affaibli par l'allongement de la crise, concurrence progressivement sur ses points forts, produits agricoles (cacao, bananes, coton etc.) ou logistiques (plate forme de redistribution sous-régionale). Souffrant de sa partition et d'une dégradation de l'Etat de droit, il résiste pourtant grâce à ses acquis, à la capacité d'adaptation de ses entreprises et à quelques secteurs porteurs (pétrole, télécommunications, etc.) Mais ses marges s'amenuisent face à une concurrence qui s'avive. Pour pallier l'érosion des préférences commerciales, élargir son accès au marché régional, développer sa compétitivité et instaurer un environnement des affaires attractif, l'Etat de Cote d'Ivoire est engagé dans l'approfondissement de l'intégration économique et commerciale sous régionale (UEMOA), régionale (CEDEAO), interrégionale (APE) et multilatérale (OMC). Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.10 et 11 avec de nombreux détails concernant ces intégrations et notamment sur la négociation d'un APE avec l'UE avec description des produits stratégiques.</p> <p>L'approfondissement de l'intégration régionale est un point de passage obligé pour une intégration progressive et harmonieuse des économies dans l'économie mondiale, notamment par le biais de l'accord de partenariat économique et l'appui à l'intégration régionale est un secteur hors concentration (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.32)</p> <p>L'appui à l'intégration régionale et à l'APE s'inscrit en synergie notamment avec les objectifs d'appui au développement des filières agricoles (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.39)</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>No. At some moment in the past, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAAIF) developed commodities specific strategies (notably for coffee, fisheries, cotton, animal health, graze lands...) which have however not been consistently implemented nor have been updated (Source: MN 301). Designing commodities sub-programmes as a complement to the new national agricultural development strategy (DSIP) is currently on the agenda of the policy dialogue between the Government and donors. Donors ask the Ministry of Agriculture to design a matrix crossing the functional- and commodity-based approach. (Source: MN 313)</p> <p>But it must be pointed out that the agricultural development strategy (PMA then DSIP) are sectoral developments of the overall poverty reduction strategy.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>PMA was sector wide. It was to the MinAgri to define how to achieve the programme objectives and on the basis of which crops. When we carried out the PMA evaluation MinAgri was unable to tell what had been the results of PMA. Earlier the President had asked MinAgri to identify strategic expenses (enterprises or commodities). Now the</p>

	<p>MinAgri has decided to have a two-entry approach: transversal and on a commodity basis.</p> <p>The initial design of the DSIP (the new agricultural development strategy) was structured in relation with the key functions of MinAgri. The two-entry approach is the vision of the PMA Director. Donors wanted the PMA to adopt a transversal approach. They have now come to this view. It is inspired from the example of Vietnam. (Source: MN 306)</p> <p>PMA was good but too ambitious. At the time the Government was willing to reform. It is very different today. PMA is defunct. There are no more Steering Committee meetings. Only two pillars of the PMA were implemented: NAADS and NARO.</p> <p>The DSIP is a shopping list not operationalised. The government is implementing short term approaches: giving up seeds to the farmers. It is very frustrating for donors.</p> <p>(Source: MN 309)</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the Commission's strategy documents. <i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>The Commission's cooperation strategy evolved over successive EDFs to develop gradually into a strategy aiming at the construction of a regional integrated space in the CARIFORUM area. It included two major objectives: regional integration and cooperation, and building of regional capacity. (Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. vi).</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regional Strategy Papers.</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>PASDEP is Ethiopia's guiding strategic framework for the five-year period 2005/6-2009/10. It carries forward key strategic directions pursued under the first poverty reduction programme (SDPRP), but also embodies new directions. Foremost among these is a major focus on economic growth and a scaling-up of efforts to achieve Millennium Development Goals. PASDEP includes fresh approaches to economic growth and poverty reduction in Ethiopia and notably accelerating market-based agricultural development. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.25).</p> <p>Until a few years ago agricultural growth rates over the longer-term has been sluggish, economic growth being driven by services and trade. This has been so since agriculture was largely stuck in subsistence production of food grains, with limited market integration, while the service and trade sectors have been growing quickly, and are concentrated in urban areas where the first stages of renewed private activity and expenditure have taken place following liberalization. Thus, under PASDEP the dynamic achievements in trade, services, and industry will be sustained and deepened, while an aggressive effort will be launched to maintain the high momentum of recent agricultural growth. Government recognizes that in order to achieve the latter, there has to be a shift away from reliance on publicly funded spending to private sector led growth. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.25, 26).</p> <p>10th EDF, Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), € XXX million : this allocation will cover long-term programmable development operations under the regional strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). The allocation is not part of the Indicative Programme but will have synergies with the NIP. The extent will depend on the participation by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in the programmes proposed under the regional framework. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.67)</p> <p>The intervention is to help to ensure that Ethiopia benefits effectively from the programmes and projects in support of regional economic integration proposed in the</p>



	<p>Regional Strategy Paper (RSP)/Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.71</i>).</p> <p>In general terms, the proposed interventions have been designed to contribute to reducing regional income inequalities within Ethiopia, as well as to the achievement and maintenance of economic prosperity, food security, peace and political stability in the Horn of Africa, and are consistent with the approaches and measures included in the EC-ESA Regional Strategy Paper (RSP). (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.43</i>).</p> <p>The choice of focal sectors appear to have been fully agreed by the Commission and the GoE and reflect both the sectors in which the Commission has identified its value added and sectors, which the Government has given high priority in its development strategies. The sector choice also reflect a high degree of continuity, at each new strategy formulation basically cutting one sector from the previous programme while making some adjustments to definition of the remaining sectors (e.g. from 'agriculture and rural development' to 'food security'). (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 12</i>).</p>
<b>GHA</b>	There is no such evidence in Ghana's CSPs/NIPs
<b>KEN</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>MG</b>	Peu d'infos dans les CSP. Pas d'analyse de la politique gouvernementale. Seuls les aspects de la politique de développement rural sont très succinctement mentionnés et concernent principalement la politique de décentralisation mais peu d'infos sur la politique agricole. L'objectif général de l'accord de Cotonou est de promouvoir une approche stratégique commune de la réduction de la pauvreté qui soit compatible avec les objectifs de développement durable ainsi que l'intégration progressive des pays ACP dans l'économie mondiale. La coopération entre la Communauté et Madagascar poursuivra ces objectifs, en prenant en compte les principes fondamentaux définis à l'article 2, notamment l'encouragement de « l'appropriation » de la stratégie par les pays et les populations concernés. ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p50</i> ).
<b>ML</b>	There is no evidence that the Commission's support led to embedding Mali's national commodity strategies in the national and regional development strategies. The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP states that the CSCRIP gives a lot of importance to its agricultural strategy and that the national and regional strategies (including the agricultural ones) are going to be aligned. <i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 27.</i>
<b>PAC</b>	There is no mention of commodity strategies in the Pacific RSP/RIPs
<b>SADC</b>	No such evidence can be found in the Southern African Development Community RSPs/RIPs.
<b>TAN</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>UGA</b>	No national commodity strategy can be found in Uganda's CSP/NIPs.
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Le RSP/RIP 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest comporte un volet « sécurité alimentaire » dans son soutien à « l'approfondissement de l'intégration régionale, amélioration de la compétitivité et APE ». Ce volet est s'inscrit les politiques agricoles communes de la CEDEAO et de l'UEMOA et les objectifs du volet sont cités, mais sans détails sur la coordination national-régional. Dans l'ensemble, les documents visent par contre une forte articulation et cohérence entre les niveaux nationaux et régionaux. <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 57 &amp; 64</i></p> <p>Selon l'évaluation de la stratégie pays au Burkina Faso, l'UE a appuyé le « hub régional » à Dakar, visant à aider les acteurs d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du centre à mettre en cohérence les programmes menés en monde rural. La phase pilote, évaluée en 2007,</p>

	aurait atteint les résultats attendus. <i>Source : Evaluation de la stratégie pays au Burkina Faso, 2010, page 72</i>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme is <i>inter alia</i> designed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reinforce initiatives to promote trade and regional integration that are implemented under Regional Indicative Programmes and/or linked with Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), as well as other types of Trade Related Assistance, such as the Integrated Framework.</li> <li>▪ Complement other Intra-ACP programmes such as those concerning Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, Index Insurance, agricultural research; specific commodity programmes such as banana and sugar support.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Le MR précise que la logique du projet est clairement orientée vers le marché mais le projet présente de fortes synergies avec d'autres programmes, certains de grande envergure, notamment sur l'anacarde avec l'Initiative pour le Cajou Africain, financé par la Fondation Gates et la coopération allemande GTZ. (<i>Source : MR p. 2</i>).</p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés. Il est simplement précisé que la production d'huile de palme tourne autour de 280.000 tonnes depuis 10 ans provenant pour une moitié des plantations industrielles et pour l'autre moitié de 35 000 plantations villageoises. Elle représente 80% de celle de la zone UEMOA. La crise a considérablement ralenti le rythme d'extension et de renouvellement des plantations ivoiriennes alors que la demande sous-régionale d'huile de palme ne cesse d'augmenter. Toutefois, les phénomènes de plantation ont connu un certain regain d'intérêt, grâce aux prix de la dernière campagne. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.3</i>)</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Le coton est la filière sur laquelle la CE intervient le plus (47% des ressources Stabex) et sans le soutien de la CE, il est certain que la filière coton se serait effondrée totalement. La production de coton a tout de même chuté de 400.000 tonnes graines/an à actuellement 90 tonnes graines/an. <i>Source : MN 819</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>L'action, en plus, s'insère dans la tendance de l'Etat camerounais, depuis la promulgation de la loi N°92/006 relative aux Sociétés Coopératives et aux Groupes d'Initiative Commune, à promouvoir les petits groupes de communauté, les organisations de paysans comme moteur de développement local. Le DSRP (Document de Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté) aussi prévoit une stratégie intégrée de développement rural qui donne une attention particulière au rôle des communautés locales et de leurs organisations dans le développement des zones rurales. (<i>Source : Annexe I p.14</i>).</p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector is a regional programme implemented by the West Indies Rum and Spirits Producers Association (WIRSPA) and involves 13 of the 15 Caribbean ACP countries.</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>Since the Project formulation has been approved by the concerned bodies of the GoE, and because of the previous and continued joint participation of the GoE and the EU, there were many links in the Programme to the Government policies and EU dialogue. The prime aim is to alleviate poverty in rural areas through the coffee sub-sector. (<i>Source : Completion report p.8</i>)</p> <p>A mutually agreed National Indicative Programme (NIP), within an overall strategy is a part, sets development targets in focal sectors and contains a five year spending pledge by the EU tailored to meet the needs of the country (<i>Source : FP p.2</i>)</p> <p>National Policy Measures (<i>Source : FA Annexes A to D p.5</i>)</p> <p>The Evaluation Report on CIP III highlighted weaknesses in policy making for the</p>

	<p>coffee sector, whilst recognizing there have been considerable market liberalization changes in the years 1989 to 1997. There are, thus, aspects that may be considered in the longer term and which should be taken up by Government and donors. These include the establishment of a Coffee Board or similar type organization. This would be achieved through modifications to the way CTA operates and is funded, the powers currently bestowed upon it, and the composition of its Board. Whilst important, it is not considered to be a matter, which requires conditionality at this stage.</p> <p>Another area of concern, highlighted in the Evaluation Report, is the lack of accountability of coffee research to the sector. The mechanisms are such that there is still no regular and consistent review and approval of the coffee research programme by the sub sector's stakeholders. Research is still a 'Government organization' and its approach includes a lack of prioritization and a programme that is over ambitious and nearly impossible to fulfill. Again this is a matter, which is important for the longer-term future of the coffee sector and should be tackled by the Government and donors during the course of the Project.</p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>BAN</b>	According to the SFA evaluation report, goals of the SFA have been included in the national development strategies of certain ACP countries: The Jamaican development strategy is based on 4 pillars (restoring economic growth, ensuring that growth is inclusive of the poor, improving governance, efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector and ensuring sustainable development, among which the development of sustainable agriculture). National development policies have in most cases included the development of socioeconomic infrastructure. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global report, pages 18 &amp; 29, htspc, 2008.</i>
<b>I.2.2.4</b>	Evidence that the Commission initiatives in promoting national commodity chain strategies were coordinated with and complementary to Member States' initiatives and coordinated with other donors and international organisations
<b>CM</b>	The AAACP programme supported strategy development for the coffee, cotton, cassava and plantain sectors in Cameroon. <i>Source : Cameroon AAACP action fiches</i>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Peu d'infos dans les CSP sur la coordination des stratégies des filières agricoles. Aucun autre donateur substantiel n'est présent en Cote d'Ivoire, à l'exception des Etats-Unis qui concentrent leur aide sur la lutte contre le sida (programme PEPFAR et Fonds mondial). La Banque mondiale et la BAD ont suspendu leurs opérations suite à l'arrêt des remboursements de leurs prêts (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25</i>). La stratégie de réponse présentée dans ce document s'inscrit dans une hypothèse où le pays aura réussi à surmonter la crise actuelle, les élections présidentielles et législatives auront été organisées avec succès et un certain nombre de réformes essentielles auront été entamées. Ainsi, la période couverte par le 10<sup>ème</sup> FED devrait-elle voir le retour de la plupart des bailleurs historiques de la Cote d'Ivoire, les interventions européennes s'inscrivant donc dans une logique d'harmonisation et de complémentarité avec ces partenaires au développement. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.28</i>).</p> <p>L'harmonisation des interventions des partenaires est assurée par plusieurs structures de coordination. Au niveau européen, l'action est coordonnée par des réunions régulières et fréquentes entre la Délégation de la Commission européenne et les Etats membres. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.27 28</i>).</p> <p>Les Etats Membres présents sont l'Allemagne, la Belgique, l'Espagne, la France et l'Italie (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.24 25</i>).</p>

	<p>Les possibilités de coopération avec les Etats membres paraissent limitées, en raison du manque de ressources humaines spécialisées dans les questions de développement de la plupart de leurs représentations diplomatiques. (<i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.63</i>).</p> <p>Dans un contexte de rareté de ressources, la concertation entre la Commission et la France d'une part et la Banque mondiale d'autre part s'est considérablement intensifiée ces derniers mois. L'audit des flux financiers dans la filière cacao, engagé en septembre 2003 et supervisé par les trois parties, en est l'illustration la plus concrète. (<i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.26</i>).</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Etats-membres : réponse mixte. Le lien du programme Stabex avec les interventions des Etats membres est délicat à mesurer, compte tenu du contexte national dans lequel la majeure partie des actions a été exécutée. La première raison est induite par le fait que durant la crise l'intervention de la plupart de ceux-ci a été interrompue, ou limitée à la mobilisation des ressources disponibles en cours. La seconde vient du fait que la coopération française en particulier ne partage pas l'opportunité et les analyses de l'intervention communautaire dans le secteur de concentration du programme Stabex 1999, à savoir le secteur cotonnier ivoirien. Toutefois, même si les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale, ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission en dépit de l'absence de rapport annuel de coordination du programme Stabex qui induit le fait que l'information détaillée stratégique ou d'avancement n'est que partiellement diffusée au niveau des Etats membres. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p> <p>Autres bailleurs : réponse mixte. La CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée. La complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds est avérée, des lors que ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No evidence regarding the commodities chain the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005. However, the evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>De manière générale, il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB) mais très peu ou rien en matière de coordination de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris</p>

	<p>(Source : MN 801).</p> <p>Par contre, on peut affirmer qu'il existe une complémentarité de fait car les bailleurs observent une répartition selon des critères géographiques ("chacun son aire d'intervention") et/ou en fonction du montant de l'aide (Source: MN 804, 812, 817).</p> <p>La coordination et la complémentarité entre les bailleurs de fond et leurs interventions dans le domaine des cultures d'exportation ne sont pas satisfaisantes. La première insuffisance est l'absence de coordination du programme STABEX et de ses 11 contrats de subvention. Certains de ces contrats couvrent des filières communes (ou avec des spécificités similaires) et sont mis en œuvre dans une même région, autant de conditions pour créer des synergies et partager bonnes pratiques et leçons apprises.</p> <p><i>Source : Appui à l'amélioration de la qualité et à la commercialisation du girofle dans le District de Fénérite, Rapport de Monitoring</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	The EC does not participate in the Agricultural Sector Working Group in Ghana.
<b>BF</b>	<p>On peut seulement observer une certaine complémentarité entre l'appui DUE à travers le PAFFIC et l'appui de l'AFD à la mise en place d'un fonds de lissage (FdL) pour mieux stabiliser les prix payés au producteur pour le coton graine. Notons que, liée à l'intervention PAFFIC de la DUE, la stratégie commune de sortie de crise de la filière coton adoptée en 2008 comporte également un axe dédié au FdL. Cependant, l'appui du PAFFIC a été ponctuel (terminé en 2010) alors que le FdL appuyé par l'AFD, est toujours en fonctionnement depuis sa création en 2007 et a fait l'objet d'une révision récente de son mécanisme suite à la spectaculaire envolée des cours du coton en 2010-début 2011. <i>Source : stratégie commune de sortie de crise de la filière coton, mars 2008 ; MN 512</i></p> <p>Par ailleurs, bien que cela ne concerne pas directement les stratégies liées aux PBA, on peut noter qu'elle est impliquée avec les autres PTFs, dans le processus d'élaboration du PNSR (Programme national du secteur rural), lancé en juillet 2010, dans le cadre des accords du NEPAD (PDDAA/CAADEP). <i>Source : MN 518 ; Note de cadrage pour l'élaboration du PNSR, 2010</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the Commission's strategy documents. <i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>In general, Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.45</i>).</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. Donors report on their activity in the framework of the donors working group. Lessons learned and dissemination of information between donors: gaps are shared at the project level and also at the strategic level: all levels of coordination are covered. Currently donor coordination mainly consists in some sort of task and geographical sharing</p> <p>There are two different groups for donor coordination:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Agriculture Sector Working Group established by the government (There are such working groups for all sectors defined by the government). Meetings take place 8 times a year and are chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MinAgri. It is supposed to involve all the stakeholders (private, donors...) and to guide the policies decisions and their implementation. Its role is especially important to discuss the ministry's</li> </ul>

	<p>budget but its performance is very uneven. Because of the political pressure on the MAAIF it becomes very difficult for the Ministry to chair such meetings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Agriculture donors group: it is a donor initiative but they can invite specific stakeholders when it is relevant to the meeting agenda (eg. NAADS director...).</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: MN 301, 309 and 313.</i></p> <p>The harmonisation of development assistance between the donor community, and between donors and the partner government is a key factor in aid effectiveness. The evaluation found that the management and administration of the Programme at the national level is a good example of effective cooperation and harmonisation of development assistance. However, the recent growing unease expressed by GoU on the agricultural service delivery mechanism, involving the private sector (rather than LG extension staff) is creating a sense of some uncertainty on the programme's future direction.</p> <p>In terms of programme harmonisation at field level, NAADS has successfully coordinated its operations with another advisory services programme (AAMP) funded by ADB and IFAD, and there have been some moderate achievements in other areas including in the research field. However, not all programmes have been subject to formal harmonisation arrangements and some confusion and duplication of effort occurs. <i>Source: Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>The Commission has played an active role in coordination and harmonisation with the Government and other donors, both at sector level and in connection with budget support for SDPRP implementation. If anything, the Commission Delegation has undertaken a leading role in sector and donor coordination in too many coordination groups, and not always related to themes that have been at the core of the country strategies. SDPs have been promoted with Commission assistance in roads since the early 1990s and recently in education, while the initiatives to move towards SWAp have not yet been successful. An SDP or SWAp has not yet been developed for food security in spite of the pivotal position of the sector in the Commission strategies and Commission's leading role in coordination of donor assistance in food security. However, the Commission has been active in coordination of budget support and related PFM issues, particularly in providing the basis for budget support for PRSP/SDPRP implementation since 2001. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p iv</i>).</p>
<b>KEN</b>	<p>No such information appears in the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP. However, the EC is using the Kenya Joint Assistance strategy as a basis for implementing the Kenya economic development strategy. This includes to collaborate and to coordinate more effectively with other donors. <i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 28</i></p>
<b>TAN</b>	<p>Although no new financial allocations are foreseen in the agricultural sector by the 2001-2007 CSP, the EC will continue to take an active part in sector policy dialogue to promote sector-wide strategies and programmes (notably in agriculture), in donor coordination and through concrete project investments. According to the 2001-2007 CSP, the EC is actively supporting the drawing up of a new strategy, and continued substantial support for coffee, tea, cotton and other cash crops (some 40 M€) will be programmed within this new framework. <i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 25</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Le RSP/RIP 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest comporte un volet « sécurité alimentaire » dans son soutien à « l'approfondissement de l'intégration régionale, amélioration de la compétitivité et APE ». Ce volet est s'inscrit les politiques agricoles communes de la CEDEAO et de l'UEMOA et les objectifs du volet sont cités, mais sans détails sur la coordination avec d'autres bailleurs. Dans l'ensemble cependant, les interventions ciblées par la Commission sont accordées avec celles des Etats membres et</p>

	des autres bailleurs de fonds, ce qui est par exemple visible dans les « matrices de coordination des bailleurs de fonds ». <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 57, 90-101</i>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	Programming documents mentions that the implementation of the Cotton Action Plan is furthermore supported at the national level in key cotton growing countries from NIP and Stabex resources, as well as from EU Member States. Finally, there is coordination with other donors through the implementation of the programme itself as the execution agencies of the programme are five international organisations: FAO, WB, UNCTAD, ITC and CFC. <i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i>
<b>BF-COT</b>	« L'Etat burkinabè, ses Partenaires, ainsi que tous les acteurs de la filière coton, sont pleinement conscients tant des potentialités de la filière coton pour le développement du pays, que des risques actuels qui pèsent sur elle. Ils se sont résolument engagés dans la prise des mesures qui permettront le redressement de celle-ci ». Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France). <i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	In the case of Ethiopia the relationship and objectives are determined by the new Partnership Agreement between the 15 EU Member States and the ACP States that is characterized by non-reciprocal trade benefits for ACP States. A mutually agreed National Indicative Programme (NIP ), within an overall strategy is a part, sets development targets in focal sectors and contains a five year spending pledge by the EU tailored to meet the needs of the country ( <i>Source : FP p.2</i> ). Given the predominant role of the EC in the sub sector then the investments are complementary by the omission of others. The Swiss Government investments do not overlap the investments under the Project. It is doubtful that the other donors will become involved in the sub sector either during or after the Project. It is understood however that the World Bank is involved in discussions with the Government on macro-economic issues, which involve changes in coffee marketing. These are in line with the proposals set out in the Project document. ( <i>Source : FP p.12</i> )
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>Overall</b>	The Joint ACP-EU cotton steering committee (COS-coton) was created in September 2004, to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the EU-Africa Partnership on Cotton – development aspect (July 2004). The coordination is organised on three levels: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ National level (interprofessional, public-private partnership , government, donors, etc.) ;</li> <li>▪ Regional (regional producer associations, regional initiatives, etc.)</li> <li>▪ International (COS-coton, Cotton club).</li> </ul> The mission of the COS-coton entails handling the needs of the stakeholders, the coherence and appropriation of the cotton action plan as well as the associated programs, including the specific aspect concerning cotton in the All ACP Agricultural Commodities Programme. <i>Source : AAACP, leaflet on the EU – ACP partnership on cotton, www.acp-cotton.org</i>
<b>BAN</b>	There is no such evidence in the SFA impact evaluation report.

<b>I.2.2.5</b>	Evidence that the integration of national commodity chain strategies in national and regional strategies was sustained beyond the period of support from the Commission
<b>KEN</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>CI</b>	Oui. Le programme Stabex 1999 s'est choisi comme partenaire principal, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. Des appuis ont été mis en place pour asseoir son rôle de maîtrise d'œuvre ainsi que pour la conception de nouvelles stratégies agricoles. L'appui institutionnel apporte au MinAgri pour l'élaboration aux politiques sectorielles a eu un impact sur la disponibilité de nombreuses stratégies sectorielles. Le Stabex 1999 est contributif de la politique sectorielle de la Cote d'Ivoire. De plus, d'une manière globale, le programme Stabex 1999 est en parfaite compatibilité avec le cadre politique du Gouvernement puisqu'il participe aux objectifs de celui-ci, a avoir la réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural. Le programme participe à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté, exposée par Le Gouvernement dans le document intérimaire de janvier 2002 et rendue définitive dans le document finalise de janvier 2009. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CR</b>	No evidence regarding the commodities strategy in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005. However, the evaluation highlights that the Commission's strategy of support to the Caribbean region has evolved across successive EDF programmes and it includes a large spectrum of interventions. Its "fil conducteur" is the strengthening and the construction of a regional integrated space. The characteristics of the region and the potential gains in terms of economies of scale make this objective rather compelling and it is supported by historical development. The geographical area for the integrated space, the CARIFORUM zone, results from signature of the Lome IV Agreement, and is not the result of analysis demonstrating its relevance. The potential and implications of the region's integration as a tool for development has not been sufficiently analysed and therefore not fully grasped, and as a result national interests tend to prevail over regional concerns. Notwithstanding these limitations the need for the construction of a regional integrated space is shared by the partners. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>MG</b>	Oui mais l'appropriation des stratégies par le gouvernement et les résultats qui s'en sont suivis sont plus que mitigés, notamment suite à la crise politique et l'accent qui a été mis sur les cultures vivrières (Source : MN 805). De plus, s'il existe un grand nombre de documents de stratégies (sectorielles et vivrières), aucune ne concerne spécifiquement les produits agricoles d'exportation. L'instrument banane (spécifiquement consacré à la diversification) était prévu pour 1999-2008. Madagascar a seulement soumis une stratégie de diversification en 2001 avec un appui à partir de 2002. Les actions ont seulement démarré à partir de 2005 et ont été suspendues à partir de 2009. On comptabilise seulement 6 allocations annuelles au lieu de 10. (Source : MN 801). Le Plan d'Action pour le Développement Rural (PADR) initié en 1997 et mis à jour en 2008 a été très appuyé par l'UE à travers les programmes PASA. Il est encore opérationnel et guide la politique agricole aujourd'hui. (Source : MN 805). Le Ministère de l'Agriculture a également été associé à la formulation des appuis Stabex. (Source : MN 805).
<b>UG</b>	No. At some moment in the past, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAAIF) developed commodities specific strategies (notably for coffee, fisheries, cotton, animal health, graze lands...) which have however not been consistently implemented nor have been updated (Source: MN 301). Nevertheless, designing commodities sub-programmes as a complement to the new national agricultural development strategy (DSIP) is currently on the agenda of the policy dialogue between the Government and donors. Donors ask the Ministry of Agriculture to design a matrix crossing the functional- and commodity-based approach. (Source: MN 313)



<b>TAN</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no such evidence from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>I.2.2.6</b>	Views of beneficiary governments on the effectiveness of Commission support to the sustained development of national and regional strategies
<b>CM</b>	According to stakeholders, the EC support to designing strategies (e.g. through the All-ACP programme) is quite dependent on the EU views and should take further account of the country's priorities. <i>Source: MN 990</i>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Le point de vue du Secrétariat permanent de la filière coton libéralisée (SPCL) est que le soutien de l'UE (et d'autres PTs) à la filière cotonnière (PAFFIC) dans le cadre de la stratégie de sortie de crise (mars 2008) a été assez efficace mais trop limité et ponctuel. Par la suite, un plan de soutien triennal (2009-2011) a été élaboré et mis en œuvre sur ressources propres (Etat et sociétés cotonnières). Les actions ont essentiellement porté sur l'assainissement financier de la filière coton. En 2010, sur fonds propre et sans l'appui de la DUE, une étude prospective a été menée afin de définir une vision et des axes stratégiques pour le développement futur de la filière coton. Le SPCL reconnaît l'intérêt de l'appui de la CE à la stratégie régionale coton-textile de l'UEMOA qui a été validée en novembre 2010. Il espère qu'elle soit réellement opérationnelle. A ce sujet, il rappelle qu'un agenda coton-textile existe depuis 2003 au niveau de l'UEMOA mais les moyens de sa mise en œuvre n'ont jamais été apportés, l'UEMOA faisant également preuve d'une grande léthargie dans la mobilisation des efforts au niveau de ses états membres. <i>Source : MN 523</i></p> <p>L'UEMOA reconnaît que l'appui de la CE, à travers le volet coton du Programme tous ACP/CCI-ITC, a été opportun car il a permis d'actualiser un Agenda coton-textile qui existe depuis 2003 mais qui n'a jamais été vraiment opérationnel. En effet, l'UEMOA estime que l'Agenda coton-textile, qui constitue la stratégie de la filière coton-textile au niveau régional (UEMOA), comportaient plusieurs points faibles empêchant sa mise en œuvre : mauvaise définitions des rôles des intervenants ; irréalisme de certains investissements).</p> <p>Cependant, l'appui dévolu à une des agences de mise en œuvre du Programme tous ACP : le CCI/ITC, à la révision de l'agenda coton-textile a démarré fort tardivement (2010) pour aboutir seulement en novembre 2010 à un atelier de validation de l'Agenda révisé. Les causes de ce retard sont diverses (incompréhensions de départ entre le CCI et l'UEMOA quand au rôle du CCI dans son appui, échanges insuffisants entre l'UEMOA Bruxelles et le siège de Ouagadougou sur les enjeux et perspectives offertes dans le cadre du Programme tous ACP, renouvellement des commissaires de l'UEMOA, blocage temporaire de l'association des producteurs de coton africain (APROCA) qui avaient l'impression qu'on voulait dicter d'en haut (de Bruxelles) la stratégie coton de l'UEMOA. Il en est résulté que la mise en œuvre de la stratégie régionale coton-textile de l'UEMOA, pour laquelle un plan de mise en œuvre d'activités prioritaires vient d'être établi, ne peut plus prétendre recevoir beaucoup de ressources du volet coton du Programme tous ACP dont les activités de terrain se terminent fin 2011.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 581</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	Prior to the new agricultural development strategy (DSIP - Development strategy and investments plans), the EC has supported the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture) developed by GoU (Source: MN 301) and the PMA secretariat. This

	support was highly appreciated by the government and by the other stakeholders, although they criticize EU heavy and cumbersome procedures (for instance, it takes up to 6 months before money is disbursed) (Source: MN 306)
<b>I.2.2.7</b>	Producer/ farmer organisations and producers views on the effectiveness of Commission support to the sustained development of national and regional strategies
<b>CM</b>	<p>According to interviews with private stakeholders of the coffee and cocoa value chains in Cameroon, the EC support is considered useful but highly dependent on the donor's priorities rather than those of the beneficiary and it's real needs. An example of that is the fact of the donors wanting to include risk management for producers (and particularly price risk management) in strategies whereas the beneficiary is convinced it is out of the scope of farmers (who will simply not harvest or not care for the crop if prices are too low). <i>Source : MN 913</i></p> <p>The EU support to the banana strategy of Cameroon is considered to be important. However, effectiveness issues were raised: important delays in EU support make it difficult to effectively design and implement strategies. The responsibility seems to be shared between the EC and beneficiaries. <i>Source : MN 993, 994, 995, 990</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	The programme evaluation states that "according to all parties involved the programme has had a major impact on enhancing the long-term competitiveness of the Caribbean rum industry while improving compliance with environmental standards".
<b>MG</b>	Les producteurs et organisations de producteurs ont une appréciation positive des activités menées dans le cadre des projets STABEX. Mais ceux-ci sont des actions ponctuelles au niveau local et non pas la mise en œuvre d'une stratégie nationale ou même régionale (Source : pas de MN de référence mais appréciation personnelle)
<b>UG</b>	No information has been collected regarding the producer organizations views on the strategies' design.
<b>J.2.3</b>	<b><i>The Commission's attention paid to commodity chain strategies in CDDCs has had more results than could have been attained by MS alone</i></b>
<b>CM</b>	En matière de support au développement de la stratégie « chaîne de valeur » cette notion est utilisée par les bailleurs (BM, ONUDI, AFD, ..) mais elle n'a été appliquée que récemment par le programme tout ACP pour la filière café. A noter que cette approche est en place pour le coton depuis plusieurs années.
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	The EC is totally absent of the agricultural sector discussions in Ghana since it doesn't participate in the Government-donor working group. Within this group it appears that there is no common political agenda other than the alignment to FASDEP and interestingly, although all seem to have adopted the value chain approach there is no common understanding of what this entails (even amongst MS and this despite the Communication).
<b>UG</b>	Agriculture has permanently been a focal sector of the EC country strategy in Uganda. There is evidence of strong convergence between donors' support strategies to the agricultural sector, notably between the EC and EU Member States. The EC played an active role in promoting donor coordination, notably as it chaired for several years the agriculture donors group. In some cases (e.g. NARO), the EC support contributed to attract other donors.
<b>TZ</b>	In Tanzania, there is no evidence that the Commission supported agricultural commodities with added value to MS interventions in the same sector. However, the Commission has a long standing proven experience in Tanzania as far as cotton, coffee and tea are

	concerned.
<b>MG</b>	Aucun bailleur bilatéral n'aurait pu engager en appui aux produits de base le montant des ressources que le Stabex a mobilisées.
<b>I.2.3.1</b>	Evidence that the Commission and EU MS have a common political agenda in the area of commodity chain strategies
<b>CI</b>	Le lien du programme Stabex avec les interventions des Etats membres est délicat à mesurer, compte tenu du contexte national dans lequel la majeure partie des actions a été exécutée. La première raison est induite par le fait que durant la crise l'intervention de la plupart de ceux-ci a été interrompue, ou limitée à la mobilisation des ressources disponibles en cours. La seconde vient du fait que la coopération française en particulier ne partage pas l'opportunité et les analyses de l'intervention communautaire dans le secteur de concentration du programme Stabex 1999, à savoir le secteur cotonnier ivoirien. Toutefois, même si les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale, ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission en dépit de l'absence de rapport annuel de coordination du programme Stabex qui induit le fait que l'information détaillée stratégique ou d'avancement n'est que partiellement diffusée au niveau des Etats membres. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	The WB is clearly supporting the commodity chain strategy. According to interviewees, the origin of this approach does however not come from the COM 2004 from the Commission but from the CAADP (Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme) that comes from NEPAD. The links are the following : NEPAD → CAADP → DSCE (DSCE being the most recent strategic document for development elaborated by Cameroon authorities. (Source: MN 411). Within its support to Banana research, the EC also developed a commodity chain approach. (Source: MN 996). The EC and the French cooperation do not have a common political agenda in the area of commodity chain strategies. Indeed, the French cooperation is more intervening through an overall farm advice (based on a bottom up approach – through demands submitted by farmers) then through a commodity chain strategy. Except for cotton (supported in Cameroon by the French cooperation and not by the EC) where the commodity chain strategy is applied (MN 401, 407).
<b>CR</b>	No evidence regarding the commodities chain in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005. However, the evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>

<b>CR</b>	There is no such evidence in Commission's strategy documents. <i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i>
<b>GH</b>	Although the Ghanaian agricultural strategy adopts the value chain approach and donors adhere to this policy document and fit into its strategic plan for agriculture (METASIP), there seem to be very different interpretation between different donors of what the value chain approach entails. Amongst MS this is no different: there are reportedly clear differences in the approaches of MS to value chain perspective understanding and implementation. There is no common political agenda between the EU and MS. There is no coherent position on agriculture between MS (as say inspired by the head offices and the 2 Communications which are EU documents). Nevertheless, the evaluation team noted that the approach taken by the GIZ programme 'MOAP' seems to follow exactly the approach laid out in the Communication even though it was conceived in 2002 and reportedly there is no collaboration with the EC on any of the GIZ programmes for this in the region (there are 3 programmes on value chains in Africa, one in Nigeria, one in Kenya and this one in Ghana). The GIZ cooperated with USAID on these programmes. <i>Source: MN181</i>
<b>UG</b>	Yes. There is evidence of strong convergence between donors' support strategies to the agricultural sector, notably between the EC and EU Member States. Although it seems that there is no evidence on a common political agenda, the donors' coordination (not only with MS) is good through the donors working group. There are two different groups for donor coordination: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Agriculture Sector Working Group established by the government (There are such working groups for all sectors defined by the government). Meetings take place 8 times a year and are chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MinAgri. It is supposed to involve all the stakeholders (private, donors...) and to guide the policies decisions and their implementation. Its role is especially important to discuss the ministry's budget but its performance is very uneven. Because of the political pressure on the MAAIF it becomes very difficult for the Ministry to chair such meetings</li> <li>▪ Agriculture donors group: it is a donor initiative but they can invite specific stakeholders when it is relevant to the meeting agenda (eg. NAADS director...).</li> </ul> <i>Sources: MN 301, 309 and 313.</i>
<b>MG</b>	Pas de telle évidence surtout dans le contexte actuel de crise politique et de la suspension plus ou moins complète des financements des bailleurs de fonds dont certains EM (sauf la France) (Source : MN 817). De plus, s'il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB) il y a très peu ou rien en matière de coordination de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 801).
<b>GH</b>	In fact there are 11+ donors in the ASWG (the EU is not in there): not everybody brings money on the table, it can be TA, analytical work, networking, etc. Meetings are every month; it's also a training/seminar platform where concepts and projects are shared. The platform is chaired by the deputy minister of Ghana (or one of his directors) and includes different organisations with different interests, which makes the platform very rich and diverse. The guiding comes from FASDEP (national agricultural policy) and METASIP (the investment plan) all linked through CAADP. There are 3 DP-MOFA meetings/year, first after the budget has been read, the last before the closure of the year. Also joint sector reviews once a year with clear terms of reference, a framework where the GoG and donors put their interests. It's signed by the GoG and the donors. The

	evaluation's recommendations are the third guiding document (along with FASDEP and METASIP). To treat complex issues there are 3 task groups (include public and private sector): policy & extension, human resource development, and financial management & coordination. <i>Source: MN181</i>
<b>KEN</b>	No such information appears in the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP. However, the EC is using the Kenya Joint Assistance strategy as a basis for implementing the Kenya economic development strategy. This includes to collaborate and to coordinate more effectively with other donors. <i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 28</i>
<b>TAN</b>	As there is a Joint Assistance Strategy and a Division of Labour, a common political agenda is thus foreseen. <i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 6</i>
<b>I.2.3.2</b>	Programming documents refer to a comparative advantage of the Commission in this area
<b>Overall</b>	<p>The Commission provides value added in the field of agricultural commodities for many reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ it is one of the only donors who has had and kept a consistent presence in the sector and has had a consistent view on agricultural commodities;</li> <li>▪ the EU can link agricultural commodities to trade, to the agricultural policy</li> <li>▪ the Commission is very involved in the trade negotiations (WTO) and other international fora and is thus continuously aware of the problems and constraints of CDDCs;</li> <li>▪ the Commission has financial and increasingly political clout and it has presence in the field;</li> <li>▪ finally the Commission can take a much more neutral position than bilateral agencies.</li> </ul> <p>The Commission's comparative advantages are also accompanied by a long term involvement on agricultural issues, moving from agriculture to wider agricultural issues and trade. <i>Source: MN912</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	Agricultural commodities are not a subject of support under the 9 <sup>th</sup> and 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF in the Central Africa regional programme. <i>Source: RSP 2002-2007, RSP 2008-2013</i>
<b>CR</b>	Yes but no specific evidence regarding the commodities sector. Indeed, the evaluation highlight that regarding the Commission's comparative advantages, the main ones are the large variety of resources (and particularly grant funds) it can offer, its institutional experience in regional integration, the whole partnership context of Cotonou, and its specific experience in some sectors (for instance, transport). No other donor can bring to bear such diversity, but the Commission does not greatly exercise its comparative advantage, at least from a strategic point of view. For instance, the substantial experience of the Commission in developing regional integration among its Member States and in promoting it in other part of the world has not been systematically used to identify the strategic steps and priorities appropriate to constructing an integrated space in the Caribbean region. The Commission's comparative advantages are used in a very pragmatic way, not strategically. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>CM</b>	The second CSP/NIP refers to a comparative advantage of the Commission in rural development. <i>« C'est ainsi que la Communauté concentrera son activité dans les neuf domaines suivants, eu égard aux avantages comparatifs de la CE dans certains d'entre eux: le commerce et l'intégration régionale; l'environnement et la gestion durable des ressources naturelles; les infrastructures, les communications et les transports; l'eau et l'énergie; le développement rural, l'aménagement du territoire, l'agriculture et la sécurité alimentaire; la gouvernance, la démocratie, les droits de l'homme et le</i>

	<p><i>soutien aux réformes économiques et institutionnelles; la prévention des conflits dans les États fragiles; le développement humain; la cohésion sociale et l'emploi. ». Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>La programmation nationale et régionale de la Communauté se fondera sur le principe de concentration, à savoir la sélection, grâce au dialogue avec les pays partenaires, d'un nombre limité de domaines prioritaires plutôt qu'une dispersion des efforts dans des secteurs trop variés. La Communauté concentrera donc son activité dans neuf domaines eu égard aux avantages comparatifs de la CE dans certains d'entre eux : le commerce et l'intégration régionale, l'environnement et la gestion durable des ressources naturelles ; les infrastructures, les communications et les transports, l'eau et l'énergie ; le développement rural, l'aménagement du territoire, l'agriculture et la sécurité alimentaire ; la gouvernance, la démocratie, les droits de l'homme et le soutien aux réformes économiques et institutionnelles ; la prévention des conflits ; le développement humain ; la cohésion sociale et l'emploi (Source : <i>CSP 2008-2013 p3</i>). Face aux besoins très importants du secteur de l'agriculture, les interventions probables des autres bailleurs, principalement la France et la Banque mondiale, ne sont pas susceptibles de réunir la masse critique nécessaire et une action d'envergure. Avant tout cependant, les infrastructures rurales et surtout la sécurisation foncière, quoique indispensables dans la perspective d'un développement durable, n'ont pas de rentabilité financière directe. Il s'agit donc d'interventions où l'aide communautaire, qui s'effectue sous forme de dons, dispose d'un avantage comparatif vis à vis des financements sous forme de prêts remboursables des autres grands bailleurs. (Source : <i>CSP 2002-2007 p.33</i>).</p> <p>Dans leur déclaration sur la politique de développement de la Communauté européenne du 10 novembre 2000, le Conseil de l'Union européenne et la Commission européenne ont décidé de concentrer les activités de la Communauté dans un nombre limité de domaines, choisis en fonction de leur contribution à la réduction de la pauvreté et pour lesquelles l'action communautaire offre une valeur ajoutée (Source : <i>CSP 2002-2007 p.9</i>). Pas plus de détail concernant l'explication de ces avantages comparatifs dans les CSP hormis pour le secteur agricole.</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents do not refer to a comparative advantage of the Commission in the agricultural commodity sector. The 2003-2007 RSP refers to a comparative advantage of the Commission in regional integration and co-operation. The 2008-2013 RSP does not refer to specific comparative advantages.</p> <p>Sources: <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>Whilst much of the period that is the subject of this evaluation precedes the commitment to the UN Millennium Declaration, from the distribution of projects it can be interpreted that the interventions have been consistent with the six areas where the Commission's assistance can offer comparative advantage<sup>26</sup>: - trade and development;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ regional integration and cooperation;</li> <li>▪ macro-economic policies linked to poverty reduction strategies, in particular strengthening of social services such as health and education;</li> <li>▪ reliable and sustainable transport, which plays a key role in access to basic social services and to economic progress;</li> <li>▪ food security and sustainable rural development strategies; and</li> <li>▪ institutional capacity-building, good governance and the rule of the law.</li> </ul>

	<p>(<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. 21</i>).</p> <p>Regarding the Commission's comparative advantages, the main ones are the large variety of resources (and particularly grant funds) it can offer, its institutional experience in regional integration, the whole partnership context of Cotonou, and its specific experience in some sectors (for instance, transport). No other donor can bring to bear such diversity, but the Commission does not greatly exercise its comparative advantage, at least from a strategic point of view. For instance, the substantial experience of the Commission in developing regional integration among its Member States and in promoting it in other part of the world has not been systematically used to identify the strategic steps and priorities appropriate to constructing an integrated space in the Caribbean region. The Commission's comparative advantages are used in a very pragmatic way, not strategically. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. 29</i>).</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>The principle of concentration will guide the Community country and regional programming. This means selecting a limited number of priority areas of action, through dialogue with partner countries, rather than spreading efforts in too many sectors. In this context the Community will be primarily active in the following nine areas, bearing in mind its comparative advantages in a number of these: trade and regional integration; the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources; infrastructure, communications and transport; water and energy; rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security; governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms; conflict prevention and fragile states; human development; social cohesion and employment. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.3</i>).</p> <p>As to the EU, the Commission has played an active role in coordination and harmonisation with the Government, Member States and other donors, both at the sector level and in connection with budget support for SDPRP implementation. The large size of the EU aid programme helped to strengthen the EU policy dialogue with Government. EU coordination was particularly strong with regard to the political agenda. Here the EU has shown its comparative advantage, with a structured political dialogue with Government under Article 8. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.39</i>).</p> <p>The Commission's Strategies 1996-2001 and 2002-2007 are comprehensive and have made the right choices of focal sectors, based on areas which are high priority to the Ethiopian government and in which the Commission has identified its value-added. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p v</i>).</p> <p>Food security and the linking of trade with development are two areas that have been given increasing priority by the Commission since 1996, which has led to substantial change in the development policy. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 4</i>).</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	No such evidence can be found in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regional Strategy Papers.
<b>GHA</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP refers to a comparative advantage of the Commission in the areas of trade and regional integration, environment and sustainable management of natural resources, rural development, agriculture and food security, etc.</p> <p>There is however no proof of such comparative advantages, it is only stated that "<i>the Community will be primarily active in the following nine areas, taking into account its comparative advantages in a number of these: trade and regional integration; the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources; infrastructure, communications and transport; water and energy; rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security; governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms; conflict prevention and fragile states; human development; social cohesion and employment.</i>"</p> <p>Sources: <i>Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 8</i></p>

<b>KEN</b>	The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that the EC response to the economic development and poverty reduction challenges in Kenya is designed to assist in sectors considered key for the future development of the country in Vision 2030, and also in the context of the EPA implementation, through addressing major supply side constraints in areas for which EC has a comparative advantage. One of the focal sectors of the EC response strategy is agriculture and rural development. <i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 29</i>
<b>MG</b>	La programmation nationale et régionale de la Communauté se fondera sur le principe de concentration, à savoir la sélection, grâce au dialogue avec les pays partenaires, d'un nombre limité de domaines prioritaires plutôt qu'une dispersion des efforts dans des secteurs trop variés. La Communauté concentrera donc son activité dans neuf domaines eu égard aux avantages comparatifs de la CE dans certains d'entre eux : le commerce et l'intégration régionale, l'environnement et la gestion durable des ressources naturelles ; les infrastructures, les communications et les transports, l'eau et l'énergie ; le développement rural, l'aménagement du territoire, l'agriculture et la sécurité alimentaire ; la gouvernance, la démocratie, les droits de l'homme et le soutien aux réformes économiques et institutionnelles ; la prévention des conflits ; le développement humain ; la cohésion sociale et l'emploi (Source : <i>CSP 2008-2013 p3</i> ). Depuis le début de son partenariat avec la République de Madagascar, la Commission européenne est très présente dans le domaine des infrastructures routières, ainsi que dans le secteur du développement rural. C'est pourquoi, elle dispose d'une connaissance approfondie de la situation et de l'évolution de ces deux secteurs et reste un partenaire qualifié pour accompagner le Gouvernement. De plus, dans d'autres domaines, elle figure parmi les bailleurs de fonds en nombre limité et dispose d'une expertise reconnue ( <i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.16</i> ).
<b>ML</b>	According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Mali, the EC support will concentrate on nine areas where it has a comparative advantage (rural development, agriculture and food safety are included in those nine areas). There are however no further explanations on that subject. It does explain however why the EU has a comparative advantage in its focal areas of support of the 9 <sup>th</sup> EDF (transport and decentralisation). <i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 12 &amp; 37.</i>
<b>PAC</b>	The Pacific RSP/RIPs never mention that the EC has a comparative advantage in the support to agricultural commodity chains. However, there is a reference to Europe's comparative advantage in regional economic integration, which does have links with trade policies and therefore indirectly affects agricultural commodity chains: The 2002-2007 RSP/RIP mentions that the EU focused inter alia on support to Regional Economic Integration in the Pacific, " <i>given the provisions of the Cotonou agreement and the European Union's experience and comparative advantage in such matters</i> ". Trade, trade negotiations, customs & standards, agriculture, fisheries, tourism and the TVET are the focal areas of support in the Pacific even though the Commission has no particular comparative advantage in the areas of trade or export promotion in the Pacific because the export markets are mainly Australia and Japan and the EU market access is thus relatively irrelevant to Pacific producers. <i>Source: MN947</i>
<b>SADC</b>	No such evidence can be found in the Southern African Development Community RSPs/RIPs.
<b>TAN</b>	The EC's comparative advantage in agriculture is considered <i>medium</i> in Tanzania, including proven and potential experience. The 2001-2007 CSP mentions that agriculture is at the third rank of future EC-Tanzania co-operation, behind transport infrastructure



	<p>(including feeder roads). Agriculture is not a focal sector of the EC cooperation to Tanzania. <i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 20</i></p> <p>In the CSP 2008-2013, the following elements are underlined:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The EC has been involved in the transport sector for many years, and has actively contributed towards improving the road network through the financing of a large number of road rehabilitation and upgrading projects on the one hand and through the institutional reforms on the other.</li> <li>▪ The Commission currently leads donors in the fields of public financial management, transport and agriculture and has a specific mandate from Member States in the field of trade. At regional level, it has played the informal role of joint lead donor to EAC. This profile fits exactly the choice of focal areas under 10th EDF. In addition, the Commission will seek to make a specific input in the field of evaluation and to have a leading role in discussing with government possibilities for a solid, transparent and accountable methodology to suit the Joint Assistance Strategy context.</li> <li>▪ The comparative advantage stems from the specific EU mandate for the Commission in the field of <i>trade</i>, coupled with the long history of support to agriculture recognized by government and endorsed by EU Member States during consultative meetings on the 10th EDF. Finally, the Commission's particular vocation in this area was reflected in the independent Country Strategy Evaluation published in early 2006 programming.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 61, 68 &amp; 73</i></p>
<b>UGA</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Uganda states that the Commission's focal sectors of support (including rural development) were built on its comparative advantages in the areas. No further explanation can be found in the programme documents. <i>Source : Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 46 &amp; 47</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Aucune référence à des avantages comparatifs de la Commission dans le domaine des stratégies de filières agricoles ne peut être trouvée dans les RSP/RIPs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>According to interview information, the EC doesn't have a comparative advantage in agricultural commodity support for the Pacific region, given the fact that Pacific countries mainly trade with Eastern Asia, Australia and New Zealand. <i>Source: MN 947</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The IF has a section on the added value of the Community intervention but it doesn't spell out why the Commission would have a comparative advantage for this particular project (or at all) other than stating that the EU is a major donor in the region and that it's support is complementing support from AU and NZ. <i>Source: IF.</i></p>
<b>I.2.3.3</b>	<p>Evidence of a long standing proven positive experience of the Commission in the partner country and in the commodity sector</p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>Agricultural commodities are not a subject of support under the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> EDF in the Central Africa regional programme and were not included either in earlier (8<sup>th</sup> EDF) programmes. <i>Source: RSP 2002-2007, RSP 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La Commission a consacré aux produits d'exportation une part importante des financements Stabex pour les années 1991 à 1999. La Délégation réfléchit actuellement à la manière d'orienter ses soutiens (appuis sectoriels, approches filières, appui budgétaire) étant donné, de manière générale et à l'exception de quelques interventions, l'évaluation très négative des interventions passées en termes d'efficacité et de durabilité (<i>Source : MN 802 et débriefing</i>)</p>

<b>BF</b>	Interventions in the fields of rural development, agriculture and the cotton sector have occurred in the 9 <sup>th</sup> and previous EDFs. The conclusions of evaluations concerning those interventions are that their goals are very pertinent although certain aspects were not sufficiently taken into account. They also suffered from important delays in funding and the lack of strategies and institutional capacities. <i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 14</i>
<b>CR</b>	Yes but few evidence. The evaluation highlight that the support to the agricultural sector was already under the 7th EDF and was confined to four countries (Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia and St Vincent & Grenadines), arguably among the poorer smaller island communities and still highly dependent upon this sector. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents referred to a long presence (since 1990) of the Commission in the rural development area in Cameroon. The second CSP highlights that rural development projects funded from the 8th and 9th EDF and from Stabex benefitted from a strong ownership but that their sustainability was limited: « <i>Les évaluations finales des programmes d'actions ont montré l'importance d'améliorer durablement les moyens d'intervention des services techniques de l'administration publique et des communes rurales que l'insuffisance des ressources financières, humaines et matérielles empêche d'assurer leurs missions avec efficacité. De manière générale, ces évaluations, ainsi que les monitorages réalisés, ont démontré l'intérêt des acteurs et des parties prenantes directement impliquées pendant la durée propre de ces programmes; elles ont souligné les carences de durabilité après leur clôture. L'analyse plus fine a établi la valeur pérenne des actions ciblées directement sur les populations et les parties prenantes présentes en continu pour suivre l'appui à ces programmes; elle a en revanche constaté que celles qui relèvent d'une approche purement technocratique ou politique s'inscrivent mal dans la durée.</i> » <i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, page 15</i></p> <p>La Commission avait un appui beaucoup plus marqué envers les produits agricoles dit de base dans le passé, avant 2000. Il y a eu d'importantes interventions sur fonds STABEX (café/cacao). Ceux-ci ont notamment joué un rôle primordial dans le cadre de la libéralisation progressive des filières au cours des années 90 avec une première phase d'assainissement et d'atténuation de la paralysie des filières (apurement de dettes de campagnes auprès des opérateurs (planteurs, coopératives, exportateurs) – primes de licenciement. A partir de 1993, les fonds ont visé l'amélioration de l'environnement économique (routes, diversification, recherche, amélioration de la compétitivité, développement rural). (source: <i>Evaluation du projet d'entretien et d'amélioration des pistes rurales et routes de collecte et de desserte en zone de production café/cacao, ADE 1999</i>).</p> <p>Concernant l'organisation commune du marché de la banane (OMCB), celui-ci a commence en 1993. La banane dispose d'appuis de la DCE depuis les années 1990. En 1999, le soutien au développement de la stratégie de la filière banane a permis d'organiser les aides en ATF (assistance technique et financière), sur base d'aides annuelles. Le soutien au secteur a été indispensable à son maintien. Cependant, l'expérience n'est pas uniquement positive et de nombreux problèmes de décaissements et procédures ont été soulevés. (source: <i>Evaluation du programme ...ATF Cameroun par Italtrend en 2008, ATF Banane Cameroun 1999-2008, MN 990 ; 988 ; 993 ; 994 ; 995</i>)</p> <p>Autres produits touchés (riz: Logone et Chari, et indirectement via le développement rural).</p>
<b>UG</b>	Yes. Agricultural has permanently been a focal sector of the EC country strategy in Uganda and the EC played an active role in promoting donors coordination, notably as it

	chaired for several years the agriculture donors group (Source: MN 313).
<b>CI</b>	<p>La Commission européenne est le seul bailleur de taille présent ayant maintenu ses opérations durant les années de crise à partir de 2002, suite à l'arrêt de la coopération des trois autres partenaires traditionnels de taille, la France, la Banque mondiale et la BAD, dont les interventions étaient centrées sur les infrastructures, les transports, les secteurs sociaux et l'appui au secteur privé. La Commission européenne est, par conséquent, le partenaire avec une expérience de première importance dans la coopération avec la Côte d'Ivoire (Source : <i>CSP 2008-2013 p28</i>).</p> <p>Du 1er au 8e FED, la coopération de la Commission a donné dès l'origine la priorité au secteur de l'agriculture et du développement rural, qui a été retenu comme « secteur de concentration » par tous les FED successifs. Les autres axes d'intervention fluctuent en revanche dans le temps. (Source : <i>CSP 2002-2007 p.33</i>). Attention, l'« appui et l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles » est devenu un secteur hors concentration dans le cadre du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED (Source : <i>CSP 2008-2013 p.31</i>).</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>STABEX: tool used by the EU for a very long time, notably in Tanzania. Thing not to find in the papers: from other donors in the late 80s and 90s very little was directed as support to agricultural development. There were no crises. In the mid 2000s, people came back to agriculture, notably based on the paper of the World Bank and with the food crisis. They came back then to agriculture, technical side. E.g. GTZ left agriculture in the 90s for the social services (health, education) and infrastructures.</p> <p>STABEX was available in the late 80s and 90s with the value chain approach to agricultural commodities even though it was not fashionable at the time. In Tanzania they were especially supporting cotton, coffee and tea. It helped to establish research and public-private partnerships. Source: <i>MN 602</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents do not refer to a long standing positive experience of the Commission in the agricultural commodity sector. Sources: <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The RSP/RIP only refers to past interventions in East Africa and in the Indian Ocean, not to Southern Africa. It states that EC interventions in the Region have allowed progress in many areas (economic integration, capacity building for WTO negotiations, liberalisation of trade in services, regional competition policy design, etc.). It mentions that the EC has supported and continues to support co-operation programmes in the areas of natural resources management, food security, agricultural research and prevention of livestock diseases, etc. There are however no results mentioned for these interventions. Source: <i>Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 24 &amp; 25</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>EC assistance dates back to 1975 when Ethiopia became a party to the Lomé Convention. Over the years, Ethiopia has been one of the larger beneficiaries of EC support among the ACP states. The assistance has taken several forms. The several European Development Funds have contributed most to this assistance (total EDF € 1.3 billion), both in the form of programmable resources and (NIPs) and non-programmable resources (mainly Stabex and Structural Adjustment Facility). Very substantial assistance has also been provided in the form of food security/food aid. (Source: <i>CSP 2008-2013 p.31</i>).</p> <p>In terms of programmable assistance, infrastructure (water, energy and roads) has featured as an important orientation in EC-Ethiopia cooperation. This was</p>

	<p>supplemented in the 1980s by projects to increase agricultural exports (coffee and cotton) and later by integrated rural development programmes. In the 1990s a gradual shift occurred, following a policy and programming re-orientation – from agriculture &amp; rural development under EDF 6 towards roads in EDF 7 and 8. EDF 9 involved a further shift: while maintaining road transport as a focal sector, priority was accorded to rural development/food security as well as to several macro-economic and sector support mechanisms, such as Direct Budget Support, a Transport Sector Policy Support operation and a project for the Protection of Basic Services. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.31</i>). The problems and lessons learned and the highlights of programme implementation at p.32 33 of CSP 2008-2013. Lessons of experience of the past five years regarding aid provision to Ethiopia indicate that the interaction between donors and the Government of Ethiopia has been positive and productive. As to the EU, the Commission has played an active role in coordination and harmonization with the Government, Member States and other donors, both at the sector level and in connection with budget support for SDPRP implementation (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.39</i>).</p> <p>the 8th European Development Fund (EDF), effective from 1996, and the related National Indicative Programme of 1997; Commission’s confirmed EDF and budget line Programmes from 1996 to 2003 including programmes implemented by non state actors; and an assessment of the relevance of the 2002-2007 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and Indicative Programme. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p i</i>).</p> <p>The overriding objective of the Commission’s Strategy for 1996-2001 was overcoming poverty through modernisation of the Ethiopian society and economy based on sustainable and regionally balanced growth. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p ii</i>).</p> <p>The Country Strategy for 2002-2007 presented a high degree of continuity, its overall objective being the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, by removing structural constraints in sectors that are key to future development. Complementary to the overall objectives were specific objectives in the chosen focal sectors: Food Security (improve food supply, effective demand and crisis management/prevention) and Transport (improved trunk and rural road network, connectivity with neighbouring countries, and sector policy development and implementation). (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p ii</i>).</p>
<b>GHA</b>	<p>There is explicit reference in the 2002-2007 CSP/NIP that the past experience of the EC and Ghana implementing development programmes is positive. However they do not make specific reference to the commodity sector.</p> <p><i>Sources: Ghana 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 18</i></p>
<b>KEN</b>	<p>The EC was in 2003 Kenya's second-largest cooperation partner, after the World Bank. EC development cooperation experience comprises STABEX, structural adjustment and emergency aid. In addition, Kenya has received support under EDF Regional Programmes and from the Community Budget, mainly NGO programmes and food aid. The 2003-2007 CSP mentions that until 1995 EC cooperation with Kenya was highly concentrated on the cereals sector (50% of programmable resources and 100% of STABEX). The programme was re-oriented away from the cereals sector, towards supporting policy and institutional reforms and on greater effectiveness through management improvements. The use of STABEX resources was also entirely re-structured, to focus on the coffee sector and economic diversification.</p> <p>In terms of <i>agriculture and rural development</i>, EC support has mainly been provided towards institutional and management capacity, but also through specific projects. The Commission has particular experience in four agricultural sub-sectors: livestock (and in particular animal health), coffee, fisheries and agricultural research.</p>

	<p>Other support has been brought to the transport sector (roads), public sector reforms, institutional capacity development and governance, human resources development (health, education), private sector development, trade and tourism. <i>Source: CSP/NIP 2003-2007, page 20</i></p> <p>On agricultural research, the EC initiated a €7.9m programme under the Kenya Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) research project. The purpose of the programme is to generate and validate agricultural knowledge and technologies for ASALs with the aid of research for development. It pays special attention to developing models that can enhance adoption of research results amongst farmers and pastoralists.</p> <p>Under the “EC assistance under the accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries”, Kenya developed an elaborate strategy to revitalize the sugar sector for 2007. The outcome of this strategy will inform the decision on the support to be requested for 2007. In addition, the 2008-2013 CSP mentions that the EC has continued to use STABEX funds on a number of programmes to support the 9th EDF strategy. Action has focused on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ roads: Roads 2000 phase II (€5m) and the Central Kenya Rural Roads Programme (€1.25m);</li> <li>▪ rural development and agriculture: horticulture (€2.4m), coffee-sector reform (€5m) and support for the ASCU/Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (€2m);</li> <li>▪ budget support: advanced budget support in financial year 2003-2004 (€51m).</li> </ul> <p>In the 9th EDF Regional Strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa, Kenya has also benefited from:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the Regional Integration Support Programme which has enhanced regional harmonisation and standardisation and strengthened the capacity for EPA negotiations</li> <li>▪ intra-ACP cooperation, inter alia under the Pan-African Programme for the Control of Epizootics (PACE - €77m), the Pesticide Initiative Programme (PIP) and Strengthening Fishery Health Conditions in ACP/OCT countries.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: CSP/NIP 2008-2013, pages 21, 22 &amp; 25</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les infos dans les CSP concernent essentiellement le domaine du développement rural. Le partenariat avec la République de Madagascar, qui a plus de quarante ans d'existence, a connu des adaptations au fil des Conventions pour accompagner les évolutions de l'économie malgache, passant des aides/projets au financement de programmes et enfin à l'appui à des politiques macro-économiques et sectorielles. La diversité de son champ d'application a entraîné l'utilisation de tous les instruments prévus dans les Conventions de Lomé (Sysmin excepté), ainsi que de certaines lignes budgétaires, comme celle relative à la sécurité alimentaire. Ce partenariat est passé d'une dispersion sectorielle assez marquée à une concentration sur un nombre réduit de domaines prioritaires. Les infrastructures routières et le développement rural ont toujours constitué les deux axes principaux de l'aide européenne à Madagascar, auxquels se sont souvent ajoutés des appuis à la santé, l'éducation, le secteur privé et l'ajustement structurel (Source : <i>CSP 2002-2007 p12</i>).</p> <p>Le bilan global dans le domaine du développement rural montre, au cours de ces dernières années, une nette amélioration découlant de politiques visant à responsabiliser les producteurs et à un désengagement de l'Etat des secteurs de production et de commercialisation des produits agricoles, d'élevage et de pêche.</p> <p>Une évaluation globale approfondie des actions communautaires dans le secteur du développement rural à Madagascar a confirmé le bien fondé de cette approche qui mérite d'être poursuivie dans le cadre du PADR. (Source : <i>CSP 2002-2007 p13-14</i>).</p>

	Le Gouvernement de Madagascar et la CE peuvent dresser un bilan positif de la coopération menée au cours des FED précédents et relever l'ampleur des résultats concrets qui ont été obtenus dans les différents domaines de coopération notamment depuis 2002 (Source : <i>CSP 2008-2013 p26</i> ).
<b>ML</b>	According to the 2008-2013 CPS/NIP of Mali, rural development has been one of the main areas of support in Mali. Interventions in the rice sector have proven to have very positive impacts. However, the experience showed that for most interventions, there was a need for a "proximity approach" for which EDF means were not well adapted. Interventions are now rather focused on supporting NGO interventions or on supporting infrastructure. <i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 31.</i>
<b>PAC</b>	Evaluations quoted in the 2008-2013 Pacific RSP/RIP mention that EU trade assistance over the past decade has been of great help in the formulation of trade policies and in the undertaking of trade negotiations in the context of the EPAs or the WTO. Contributions to private sector development have however been considered limited. <i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 53-54.</i>
<b>SADC</b>	The Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP mentions that that EC and SADC have a long standing commercial experience in the context of the Sugar and the Beef Commodity Protocols. In addition, the RIPs have assisted in the past in containing animal diseases, supporting agricultural research (maize and wheat research projects) by providing a framework for increased regional cooperation and coordination, and food security. <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, pages 14 &amp; 21</i> The Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP mentions that the EC support during the EDF 9 concentrates part of its efforts on customs modernisation, EPA, standards and quality insurance, food safety and finance and investment. The second focal in the SADC region is transport and communication (e.g. rehabilitation of roads). In addition, the EC supported capacity building for regional integration (SADC secretariat). <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 34</i>
<b>TAN</b>	To some extent, the EC has experience in the field of agriculture in Tanzania. On average, 35% of the 4-6 <sup>th</sup> EDF NIPs were allocated to agriculture, mainly to support coffee (major beneficiary) and feeder road maintenance programmes and the STABEX facility. Smaller transfers were carried out to cotton, tea, sisal and cloves. Since the 7 <sup>th</sup> EDF support to agriculture has been limited to STABEX (76 M€ since the beginning of Lomé IV). <i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 18.</i>
<b>UGA</b>	The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Uganda states that the Commission's focal sectors of support (including rural development) were built on its comparative advantages in the areas. No further explanation can be found in the programme documents. <i>Source : Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 46 &amp; 47</i>
<b>VAN</b>	The CSP/NIP mentions that the "EC is currently identified as the donor with highest expertise in Public Finance Management (PFM) and very valuable inputs in Agriculture, Tourism and Education. The EC has successfully assisted Vanuatu in the past in such areas and has a good track record of intervention in this regard." <i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 34</i>
<b>WAF</b>	Le RSP/RIP de 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest mentionne que l'UE est le bailleur de fonds le plus important au niveau régional (57% de l'aide régionale est engagée par la Commission). L'aide de la Commission a été régulière et constante dans le domaine de l'agriculture et de l'élevage. Les impacts de l'aide ne peuvent, selon le RSP, pas être mesurables mais les organismes régionaux (CEDEAO et UEMOA) ont reconnu

	l'importance de l'appui européen. Cependant, dans l'ensemble, le constat est que le soutien n'a pas réussi à augmenter les échanges commerciaux entre la région et le reste du monde. Aucun constat spécifique à l'agriculture ou les filières des produits agricoles ne peut être trouvé cependant. <i>Sources : W/AF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 41-43</i>
<b>BF-COT</b>	Par le passé, la CE a largement participé au développement de la filière coton dans le cadre du mécanisme de stabilisation des exportations "STABEX", à travers des appuis directs à la SOFITEX et à l'UNPCB ainsi qu'aux groupements de producteurs de coton. La construction d'infrastructures villageoises et la réhabilitation des routes nationales RN1 et RN4 utilisées pour le transport du coton, en sont des exemples. <i>Source : Allocation signature CF</i>
<b>BAN</b>	The EU traditionally applied a quota system to regulate banana imports, with preferential treatment for ACP countries. Since the CMO reform in 1999, the EC has implemented the SFA to help ACP banana suppliers cope with market modifications. According to previous evaluations, the SFA has made important contributions to the realisation of two sets of objectives established by the eight ACP beneficiaries. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improved competitiveness: Certain countries (Belize, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Suriname), are competing more effectively than they would have without the EC's support;</li> <li>▪ Improved country-level capacity for successful economic diversification: the Windward Islands are now focusing on the prerequisites for successful economic diversification. The degree of success has yet to be quantified since half of SFA funding had been disbursed at the time of the evaluation.</li> </ul> <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 1 &amp; 2, htsp, 2008.</i>
<b>I.2.3.4</b>	Evidence that Commission initiatives were complementary to and created synergies with the initiatives of MS
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos dans les CSP sur les complémentarités/synergies avec MS. L'info concerne seulement la coordination. Au niveau européen, l'action est coordonnée par des réunions régulières et fréquentes entre la Délégation de la Commission européenne et les Etats membres. ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p 28</i> ). Les Etats Membres présents sont l'Allemagne, la Belgique, l'Espagne, la France et l'Italie ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.24 25</i> ). Les possibilités de coopération avec les Etats membres paraissent limitées, en raison du manque de ressources humaines spécialisées dans les questions de développement de la plupart de leurs représentations diplomatiques. ( <i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.63</i> ).
<b>CI</b>	Le lien du programme Stabex avec les interventions des Etats membres est délicat à mesurer, compte tenu du contexte national dans lequel la majeure partie des actions a été exécutée. La première raison est induite par le fait que durant la crise l'intervention de la plupart de ceux-ci a été interrompue, ou limitée à la mobilisation des ressources disponibles en cours. La seconde vient du fait que la coopération française en particulier ne partage pas l'opportunité et les analyses de l'intervention communautaire dans le secteur de concentration du programme Stabex 1999, à savoir le secteur cotonnier ivoirien. Toutefois, même si les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale, ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission en dépit de l'absence de rapport annuel de coordination du programme Stabex qui induit le fait que l'information détaillée stratégique ou d'avancement n'est que partiellement diffusée au niveau des Etats membres. ( <i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i> ).
<b>CM</b>	Les initiatives de la CE et celles des EM dans le secteur agricole ne sont pas coordonnées, malgré le dialogue qui est en place entre bailleurs de fonds dans le cadre

	<p>des groupes thématiques. Les bailleurs de fonds essayent également, malgré cette situation, de se coordonner au mieux dans les faits sur le terrain. Par exemple, il y a des complémentarités et synergies entre les interventions de la BM (via le PACA) et le PAPA qui va être financé par la CE. Il y a un dialogue avec les autres BF et la CE. Il y a des complémentarités au niveau des interventions mais il n'est pas clair si c'est le résultat de discussions ou plus du hasard. Sur le terrain, le souhait est de parvenir à des complémentarités. <i>Source : MN 401, 411.</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No evidence regarding the commodities chain in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005. However, the evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Pas de telle évidence surtout dans le contexte actuel de crise politique et de la suspension plus ou moins complète des financements des bailleurs de fonds dont certains EM (sauf la France). La coordination et la complémentarité entre les bailleurs de fond et leurs interventions dans le domaine des cultures d'exportation ne sont pas satisfaisantes. La première insuffisance est l'absence de coordination du programme STABEX et de ses 11 contrats de subvention. Certains de ces contrats couvrent des filières communes (ou avec des spécificités similaires) et sont mis en œuvre dans une même région, autant de conditions pour créer des synergies et partager bonnes pratiques et leçons apprises. <i>Source : Appui à l'amélioration de la qualité et à la commercialisation du girofle dans le District de Fénérive, Rapport de Monitoring</i></p> <p>La coordination communautaire fait l'objet d'une attention particulière. Elle se manifeste par des réunions périodiques, entre la Délégation de la Commission et les trois Etats Membres représentés d'une manière permanente à Madagascar: l'Allemagne, la France et le Royaume Uni (Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.15). La collaboration entre la CE et le Gouvernement, sous l'autorité de l'Ordonnateur National du FED, pour la mise en œuvre du partenariat est excellente notamment facilitée par la tenue de revues trimestrielles. La CE et les deux EM (France et Allemagne) sur place ont mis en place une étroite coordination sur les questions politiques et de développement (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p24</i>).</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. There is evidence of strong convergence between donors' support strategies to the agricultural sector, notably between the EC and EU Member States. Although it seems that there is no evidence on a common political agenda, the donors' coordination (not only with MS) is good through the donors working group. (Sources: MN 301, 309 and 313).</p>



<b>CR</b>	There is no such evidence in Commission's strategy documents. <i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i>
<b>ET</b>	<p>As exposed for I.2.1.5, the programming cycles of EU Member States and the EC are not as yet fully harmonized. Member States and the EC have different programming cycles, ranging from two to five years. In the five-year category belong the EC, France and Sweden. The three-year group, in which the majority belongs, are DFID, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Finland and Austria. Italy has a two year programming cycle. As each EU Member State is guided by development cooperation policy directives of their national Governments, fast movement towards aligning programming cycles either with the Government's PASDEP or with the CSP for the 10th EDF cannot be expected. All EU Member States can, however, benefit from the Country Diagnostic Survey which has recently been prepared by the Commission with the participation of several Member States. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.37</i>).</p> <p>The work plan for 2007 is notably focused on EU Member States' Coordination: Raising awareness of co-operation commitments and opportunities and finalising the EU Joint Response Strategy which follows on from the Joint Diagnostic that was completed in 2006 (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.40</i>).</p> <p>Coordination and complementarity between the Commission and the Member States have not been developed to any deeper level than with many other donors, partly because of the generally well developed donor coordination system in Ethiopia, partly because political views and operational approaches still differ widely among Member States (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p iv and 53</i>).</p>
<b>KEN</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>TAN</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>WAF</b>	Les sections des RSP/RIP évaluant la coopération passée de la Commission n'évoquent pas la complémentarité et la coopération avec les initiatives des Etats membres. La seule preuve de complémentarité avec les Etats membres est la présence de la « matrice des interventions des bailleurs de fonds » dans la région, où sont évoquées entre autres les interventions de la CE et des Etats membres. <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 90-101</i>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	There is no mention of complementarity with member states initiatives in the PIP evaluation reports.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de contributions d'autres institutions ou EM ( <i>cf. Budget – Sources de financement</i> ) et pas de référence à une éventuelle coordination pour cette intervention
<b>BF-COT</b>	L'Etat burkinabè, ses Partenaires, ainsi que tous les acteurs de la filière coton, sont pleinement conscients tant des potentialités de la filière pour le développement du pays, que des risques actuels qui pèsent sur elle. Ils se sont résolument engagés dans la prise des mesures qui permettront le redressement de celle-ci. Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France). <i>Source : Allocation signature CF</i>

<b>CI-ONG</b>	Hormis le fait qu'une étude a été réalisée en partenariat avec l'AFD sur la mise en place d'un dispositif d'accès au crédit pour les unités, aucune référence aux interventions des Etats membres n'est faite dans les documents disponibles sur l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » en Côte d'Ivoire. <i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'action commenté</i>
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence aux éventuelles complémentarités et synergies dans les documents consultés. Seule la coordination est évoquée. La Commission européenne est le principal bailleur à avoir maintenu ses opérations durant les années de crise à partir de 2002. La coordination avec les autres donateurs se fait donc sur une base ad-hoc notamment avec les sections coopération des 3 Etats membres présents avec une telle section. ( <i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4</i> )
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>There is no strong evidence of complementarity and synergies with EU MS interventions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Financing Agreement refers to the operations carried out by other EU MS (Guyana: DFID funds a programme on land tenure issues and the Italian government supports the maintenance equipment of the irrigation systems; Suriname: the Dutch government supports the development of a new Agriculture policy) and stresses that “special care has been taken to ensure that this regional rice programme complements the efforts of other donor agencies as well as EU regional initiatives”. No further details or specific measures are provided in the FA.</li> <li>▪ The final evaluation does not mention complementarities and synergies with other EU MS interventions during implementation and stakeholders interviewed confirmed that coordination with EU MS has not been a specific area of attention under this programme.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, pages 5, 10; SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009; MN 700</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	There has been no other donor intervention in the Caribbean rum sector. The programme TAPs mention complementarity of the environment component of the programme with activities implemented by the EU and other donors, but does not provide any detail.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	In the case of Ethiopia the relationship and objectives are determined by the new Partnership Agreement between the 15 EU Member States and the ACP States that is characterized by non-reciprocal trade benefits for ACP States. A mutually agreed National Indicative Programme (NIP), within an overall strategy is a part, sets development targets in focal sectors and contains a five year spending pledge by the EU tailored to meet the needs of the country ( <i>Source : FP p.2</i> )
<b>GH-COC</b>	No reference to Member States can be found in the intervention's monitoring reports, financial proposal or financial agreement. The monitoring report refers to “other donors” without clarifying who they are. It mentions that there is “significant donor coordination, but no overlap in activities” since the CSSP II focuses on activities that no other donors do: training and replanting. <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 01, Quality of Project Design sheet.</i>

<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The TAPs attached to the Financing Agreements of PASAM1 and PASAM2 indicate that a multi-donor secretariat coordinate donors interventions in the field of environment and that “la mise en place d’une telle coordination pour les interventions dans le développement rural dont le présent programme, le programme national foncier et le programme national d’amélioration des bassins versants seraient des composantes clés, est en cours”.
<b>ML-COT</b>	La FIP (§8) indique que la concertation des bailleurs mise en place pour la préparation du Forum UE-Afrique sur le coton s'est renforcée et transformée en un groupe technique UE - Etats Membres (Uniquement Pays Bas et France. L'Allemagne et la Belgique ont peu d'actions dans le domaine du Coton, la Suède ne dispose pas de ressources humaines suffisantes pour participer au groupe technique) - l'USAID et la BM, avec l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD) comme chef de file. L'AFD bénéficie d'informations de qualité grâce à ses implications tant au niveau bancaire (financement des campagnes cotonnières, crédit pour usine d'égrenage) que de projets d'appui à la filière (amélioration des systèmes d'exploitation, PASE I). Le groupe technique permet un partage d'informations et la prise de positions communes renforçant le dialogue avec l'Etat représenté par le Ministère des Finances. La FIP (§8) précise également que l'AFD de son côté initie une mission d'identification pour l'élaboration du PASE II (cadre logique, CF, annexe 3b) dont un volet important est la consolidation de la structuration des Organisations Paysannes. L'intervention (PARFC) proposée par la FIP et qui a fait l'objet d'une identification et d'une instruction conjointes avec l'AFD, s'intègre dans cet environnement dynamique en appuyant notamment le gouvernement pour un financement effectif du coût de la réforme. (ce qui élimine un facteur de blocage) (FIP, §8). <i>Source : FIP</i>
<b>UG-COF</b>	According to the project description “there are a few (USAID financed) initiatives with more or less relevance” to the project. No reference is made to EU MS.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	Some 20 donors, the major ones being the European Union, Denmark, Ireland, IFAD, African Development Bank, United Kingdom and the World Bank support implementation of the PMA using various aid modalities such as general budget support, earmarked budget support, sector programme support and project aid. The programme TAPs add that in particular “a number of development partners provide funds to NAADS in the form of sub-sector budget support, while applying a coordinated disbursement mechanism and a single planning, reporting and financial management system.”
<b>VU-POP</b>	The POP2 was designed as a follow-up to the POP1 which was funded by France and the Government of Vanuatu. The POP2 was elaborated together by the EC and France. The project’s third monitoring report states that the intervention logics differed between donors, that the projects had separate badly constructed Logical Frameworks and that there was a lack of coordination mechanisms between the two donors. The donors each dealt with separate local partners (the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) for the French and the Vanuatu Research and Technical Centre (VARTC) for the EU). The projects aimed at too many Producer Organisations, which proved that they didn’t learn the lessons from the first POP (POP1). The institutional structures did not allow an efficient implementation of the programme. And since the French and EU interventions operated through different modalities (focus on commercialisation of cooperatives for the French and private sector support for the EU), it resulted in “double reporting”. Contributions also lacked timeliness and delays in French funding had a domino-effect on the EU interventions. Later on, these problems were addressed by progressively adapting the Logical Framework (2005), establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the overall programme (2006) and referring to only

	one implementation agency (the DARD) as it can be seen in the third project synopsis. <i>Sources: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 3, impact, efficiency and effectiveness sheets. Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 1, page 1. Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Project Synopsis 3.</i>
<b>BAN</b>	There is no mention of coordination of the EC's initiatives with member state interventions in the SFA impact evaluation report.

### EQ3 on the Commission's coordination with international organisations including ICBs

To what extent has the Commission encouraged other international organisations including ICBs to adopt the Communications' approach to agricultural commodity chains?	
<b>J.3.1</b>	<i>Coordination with relevant international organisations has increased following adoption of the Action Plans</i>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Suite à l'adoption des plans d'action issus des deux Communications (2004):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– La coordination avec les organisations internationales ne s'est pas renforcée dans le domaine des produits de base agricoles. Néanmoins, un cadre général de concertation dans le secteur rural existe (Troïka: Banque Mondiale, DANIDA et Coopération suisse), et la CE y est partie prenante;</li> <li>– Un cadre de concertation existe pour le coton (AFD chef de file), avec participation variable de la CE en fonction de l'évolution des ses appuis au coton).</li> <li>– Il y a recherche de coordination sous le Programme Tous ACP, entre les organisations internationales et la CE à Bruxelles (siège) mais pas au niveau de la Délégation et de la représentation des OI du Programme présentes au BF ou une absence de cadre de concertation est constatée.</li> </ul>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Coordination mechanisms exist, with multi-donor committees per sector. The EU is active in the agricultural working group, along with the AFD and World Bank. However, no link between the action plans and coordination could be established: the setting up of the committees are a consequence of the Paris Declaration and although coordination has stepped up in the past year, it seems to be rather due to personal initiatives of different members of the institutions. Important problems still exist however, and both the donors (who pursue with their own aid modalities) and the institutions of Cameroon (who did not yet adopt a strategy for the agricultural sector and do not guide IO) seem to share the responsibility.</p>
<b>GH overall</b>	<p>No evidence that the Action Plans had an influence on coordination could be found.</p> <p>The coordination with MS is difficult and there seems to be a very different perspective seen from Headquarters (good cooperation with MS) and the field where bilateral cooperation from MS remains limited to bilateral contacts, without sharing between the MS and the Delegation. More widely, although there are WG in fields such as agriculture, the donors do not coordinate between them to form coherent views/strategies or a offer a concerted image to the Government; each donor sticks to their own patch.</p>
<b>MG</b>	Non pertinent pour la mission à Madagascar
<b>TZ Cotton Coffee Tea</b>	<p>As far as agriculture is concerned, the Commission have participated to discussions with other donors. It is active in consultations for the tea and the coffee sectors. In addition, it supported the basket fund in agriculture (through STABEX) with four other donors, but stopped it. This limits its influence on the Government when discussing development of agricultural commodity value chains.</p> <p>In the cotton sector, the Cos cotton, which is supported through the All ACP Programme, have organised several meetings and trainings for all involved stakeholders, including those from Tanzania. This support has help to shape activities related to cotton in Tanzania.</p>
<b>UG</b>	Very little has been done in Uganda through a limited AAACP funding
<b>VU</b>	Suite à l'adoption des plans d'action issus des deux Communications (2004), la coordination avec les organisations internationales (FAO principalement) au Vanuatu ne s'est pas renforcée dans le

	<p>domaine des produits de base agricoles. Pour les activités du programme ACP, la FAO aide directement avec les organisations de producteurs, sans coordination ni communication avec la Délégation.</p>
<b>I.3.1.1</b>	<p>Evidence that the adoption of the Action Plans triggered coordination initiatives led by the EC/EU</p>
<b>Overall ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The Action Plans triggered coordination initiatives around the All ACP programme. Initially there was also a Working Group but this was later absorbed into the Steering Committee of the All ACP (all MS are invited as members of the Steering Committee).</p> <p>There is also the EU-Africa partnership on cotton.</p> <p>The coordination and the coherence in approach are seen as a major value added of the COM and this has been worked out through the All ACP programme mainly; it provides a useful platform for coordinating and exchanging between different international organisations.</p> <p>An important result to be attained by the AAACP intervention is to capitalize on complementarities and synergies of the ACP, EU and IOs in the area of agricultural commodities as well as to share experiences at the all ACP level.</p> <p>The programme has taken into account comments and needs provided by ACP commodity chains stakeholders, EU stakeholders, including Member States, during consultation workshops at its formulation and implementation (Kick-off regional workshops) stages.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 912, MN 934 ; ALL ACP financial agreement and reports</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme directly results from both Action Plans. It is implemented through centralised management (for the service contract) and joint management (for the contribution agreements with the International organisations. Indeed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Five International Organisations (FAO, ITC, WB, CFC, ITC) implement the activities of the programme, according to a division of tasks which is based on an assessment of comparative advantages as relevant for the programmes ;</li> <li>▪ A Steering Committee (SC) chaired by one of the ACP representatives meets the Programme's specific needs of guidance ;</li> <li>▪ A coordination Unit is the focal point of the programme and facilitate its day-to-day successful implementation, including the regular Interagency Coordination.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>Overall COT</b>	<p><b>Quelques points importants sur le Partenariat Union européenne-Afrique sur le Coton</b></p> <p>C'est à l'occasion du Forum de Paris en 2004 que l'Union Européenne et les pays africains ont approuvé la création du Partenariat ainsi que de son Cadre d'Action.</p> <p>Le Partenariat comporte d'une part un volet 'Commerce' visant l'établissement de relations commerciales équitables dans le cadre de l'OMC; d'autre part, un volet 'Développement' ayant pour objectif l'amélioration durable de la compétitivité, de la valeur ajoutée et de la viabilité des filières cotonnières africaines en optimisant l'impact sur le revenu du producteur.</p> <p>Le Cadre d'Action traduit les objectifs de ces deux composantes à travers six axes stratégiques qui se rapportent aux stratégies nationales et régionales sur le coton, à l'amélioration de l'environnement institutionnel des filières cotonnières et de leur organisation interne ainsi qu'à celle de leur compétitivité tout en réduisant leur vulnérabilité et en favorisant l'accroissement de la valeur ajoutée qu'elles génèrent. Le dernier axe concerne le renforcement de la coordination des appuis.</p> <p>La coordination et le suivi de la mise en œuvre du Cadre d'Action, sont assurés par le Comité d'orientation et de suivi du Partenariat UE-Afrique sur le coton (COS-Coton). Le COS-Coton</p>

représente cinq catégories d'acteurs, à savoir les Etats ACP, l'Union Européenne, les Organisations d'intégration régionale africaine, les organisations UE-ACP et les associations professionnelles régionales africaines, comprenant l'AProCA (producteurs), l'ACA (égreneurs) et l'ACTIF (industrie textile).

Le rapport final d'évaluation du partenariat UE\_Afrique sur le coton (juin 2009) indique que le COS coton n'a pas rempli de façon satisfaisante le rôle qu'on pouvait en attendre en matière de coordination, de suivi et d'orientation des programmes. La fonction d'information/communication qu'il devait remplir, a été clairement défailante, ainsi que l'atteste la très faible notoriété du Partenariat dans les pays africains concernés. Une refonte du dispositif apparaît donc très souhaitable.

Selon le rapport d'évaluation, les causes de cette défaillance tiennent d'abord à l'absence de financement au cours des trois premières années, qui l'a privé de moyens de communication et d'une assistance technique indispensable. Plus fondamentalement, sa capacité à orienter les appuis ne pouvait être, au niveau central, que quasi-inexistante, chaque institution partenaire ayant sa logique propre d'intervention. Il en eût été sans doute différemment si le COS avait été plus proche du terrain, ce qui lui aurait permis de promouvoir une coordination régionale, et d'influer ainsi sur la programmation des appuis, notamment pour les institutions déconcentrées comme les DCE.

L'évaluation a recommandé de déconcentrer le COS Coton en créant en Afrique des antennes régionales du COS. Le maintien d'une instance de concertation au niveau de Bruxelles est néanmoins recommandé, car indispensable pour afficher la volonté politique de l'UE en faveur du soutien au développement des filières coton

#### **Faits majeurs de la mise en œuvre du Partenariat**

De 2004 à juin 2011, près de 160 interventions d'appui spécifique au coton africain, en formulation, en cours ou terminées ont été répertoriées auprès de l'ensemble des partenaires financiers. Au total, ces appuis représentent un montant total estimé à environ 460 millions d'Euro dont plus des deux-tiers sont apportés par l'Union européenne dans le cadre du Partenariat.

Parmi les programmes actuellement en cours, signalons le programme tous ACP relatif aux produits de base agricole, financé par la Commission européenne et mis en œuvre par cinq organisations internationales. Ce programme consacre un volet spécifique au coton de 16 millions d'Euro sur la période 2007-2011, dont les activités s'inscrivent dans le Cadre d'Action du partenariat. Les appuis majeurs apportés par ce programme portent notamment sur l'amélioration de la qualité du coton (lutte contre la contamination, standardisation de la mesure instrumentale), la diffusion de bonnes pratiques agricoles, la promotion des relations acheteurs-vendeurs-producteurs et de la coopération sud-sud ainsi que le développement d'outils de gestion des risques.

Toujours avec l'appui du programme tous ACP, l'Afrique a pu se doter de trois stratégies régionales pour le coton qui ont été élaborées de manière très participative en impliquant tous les acteurs des filières cotonnières. Ces trois stratégies sont officialisées et portées par les organismes d'intégration économique régionale que sont l'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), la Communauté Economique des Etats d'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) et le « Common Market for Eastern and South Africa » (COMESA). Complémentairement, des points focaux coton sont mis en place au niveau de ces instances régionales. Ces points focaux pourraient constituer une étape dans la décentralisation du COS-coton qui reste à rendre effective

Partant des stratégies régionales coton, des synergies d'appui sont également recherchées au niveau panafricain. C'est dans ce cadre que s'est tenue à Cotonou au Bénin, en juin dernier, une réunion panafricaine sur le coton qui vise à établir une feuille de route panafricaine pour le secteur coton

	<p>pour les dix prochaines années.</p> <p>Il faut également vous informer que le COS-coton a initié une réunion avec les bailleurs de fonds coton qui devrait se tenir au Mali à la fin du mois de novembre. L'objet de la réunion est de communiquer sur les résultats des appuis au coton africain et de mobiliser les bailleurs afin de renforcer la coordination des efforts dans la mise en œuvre des stratégies régionales.</p> <p>Enfin, l'identification d'un nouveau programme tous ACP sur le coton africain qui avait été annoncée lors de la réunion plénière de l'ICAC, l'année dernière à Lubbock, a été suivie d'une phase de formulation qui est maintenant terminée. Ce programme, d'un montant de 11 millions d'Euro, devrait pouvoir être soumis au comité du FED en novembre prochain.</p> <p>Par ailleurs, il est utile de rappeler que le COS-coton dispose d'un site internet : <a href="http://www.coton-acp.org">http://www.coton-acp.org</a> où vous trouverez toutes les informations, régulièrement mises à jour, relatives au Partenariat et aux filières cotonnières africaines.</p> <p><i>Source : <a href="http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/sectoral_development_policies/r13017_fr.htm">http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/sectoral_development_policies/r13017_fr.htm</a>;; Evaluation à mi-parcours du Partenariat UE-Afrique sur le coton (juin 2009, mai 2010 et 2011) <a href="http://www.coton-acp.org/en/evaluation-mi-parcours-du-partenariat-ue-afrique-sur-le-coton-rapport-final-juin-2009">http://www.coton-acp.org/en/evaluation-mi-parcours-du-partenariat-ue-afrique-sur-le-coton-rapport-final-juin-2009</a></i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>There is no evidence of a link between the Action Plans and EU coordination initiatives.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 10 &amp; 14</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>L'UE par ce programme, veut contribuer de façon significative à la relance de la filière coton au Burkina Faso, conformément aux engagements pris suite au Forum de Paris de juillet 2004 dans le cadre du Partenariat Coton Europe-Afrique. <i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p><b>Pas d'infos dans les CSP concernant des Plans d'Actions pour le secteur agricole. Seuls les plans d'action suivants sont cités :</b></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Coordination initiatives exist since more or less since 2003 but they do result from the Paris Declaration (and the HIPC initiative) and not from the COM (MN-406, 404).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005. Commission's strategy documents do not refer to the Action Plans. No evidence in ECS</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP of East and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean refers to the Sugar Action Plan but not to coordination initiatives led by the EC/EU in the field of agriculture or food.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 43.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>No evidence in CSE</p> <p><i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.41</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>No such evidence appears in the CSP/NIP</p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Aucun plan d'action n'a été adopté suite à la publication des deux COMs.</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>There is no reference to the Action Plans in Mali's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP. However, the paper states that support to food security will inter alia focus on improving coordination and other donors. It considers food security and not commodity strategies though.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 52.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La CF (annexe II, §2.7) indique que, suite au sommet OMC à Cancun et la présentation du dossier du coton africain, la mise en place du partenariat UE-Afrique pour le coton, et le Plan d'actions</p>



	<p>adopté à l'issue du Forum de Paris en juillet 2004, la CE s'est engagée à soutenir un certain nombre d'initiatives pour soutenir le développement du secteur coton. Elle a notamment élaboré un projet interrégional, "Agricultural Commodities Programme" (ACP), dont une composante Coton reprend les conclusions du Forum.</p> <p><i>Source : CF, FIP</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>No such evidence appears in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.</p> <p>Beyond the field of commodities though, the EU adopted a Strategy for Strengthening Partnership in 2006, in response to the Pacific Plan. The strategy aims at enhancing political dialogue, focusing development with a greater emphasis on regional cooperation and improving the effectiveness of aid delivery.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 59</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>The SADC 2008-2013 RSP/RIP does not refer to coordination initiatives led by the EC/EU in the field of agriculture or food, except to accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 24</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no evidence that programming documents refers to the Action Plans.
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	Neither the ROM reports nor the final narrative report mention actions plans.
<b>UG</b>	<p>The COMs were probably sent to delegations when they were produced but the EC delegation doesn't know them. However, EC delegation thinks to be in line with their priorities (Source: MN 301).</p> <p>Note that the Nairobi office is in charge of the management of the AAACP programs in Uganda (Source: MN 312).</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>The EC agreed on aid effectiveness indicators which should be incorporated in discussions with Vanuatu's government and the donors. Indicators such as the reduction of un-coordinated missions by 50%, providing all capacity building assistance through coordinated programmes, etc aim at increasing donor coordination.</p> <p>Source: Vanuatu 2007-2013 CSP/NIP, page 50.</p>
<b>WAF</b>	Aucune référence aux plans d'action concernant les produits agricoles ne peut être trouvée dans le RSP/RIP 2008-2013 d'Afrique de l'Ouest. De plus, rien n'indique que la Commission ait pu initier des mécanismes de coordination dans la région.
<b>I.3.1.2</b>	After 2004 general and product specific meetings have been held at international level between the EC/EU and other international organisations to discuss the coordination of strategies and interventions in agricultural commodities sectors
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>In the framework of the AAACP programme specific meetings should be hold at national or international level with the participation of the EC/EU and other international organisations. In fact, one of the activities of the AAACP programme is to implement a participatory approach to support the development of commodity strategies in most of the commodity dependent ACP countries. It is foreseen that this approach engages all the key stakeholders (input providers, farmers, producer organisation, trade organisations, retailers, buying agents, and relevant parts of governmental authorities) in diagnosing the commodity sectors and analysing options, and developing responses.</p> <p>AAACP organized five kick-off regional workshops (Pacific, Caribbean, West, Central and East&amp;Southern Africa in 2008 The programme has taken into account comments and needs provided by ACP commodity chains stakeholders, EU stakeholders, including Member States,</p>

	during consultation workshops at its formulation and implementation () stages. <i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2 and ALL ACP reports</i>
<b>Overall</b>	At a policy level, the Commission (DEV B) participates in all international fora and puts its views on agricultural commodities forward there. There are different fora such as UNCTAD conferences (every 4 years), FAO (every 6 months), CFC, ICBs, WTO, etc which put out policy statements and the role of DEV is to check that these are compatible with the principles laid out in the COM and if not to influence them so that the results of these negotiations reflect the Commission's position. The PROBA Council has meetings all the time and they work out , Depending on the forum, the Commission may speak for the EU (for example for WTO negotiations) and sometimes it just speaks for the Commission, with MS putting their own views forward <i>Source: MN912.</i>
<b>BF</b>	No such evidence can be found in Burkina Faso's CSP/NIPs.
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés.
<b>CM</b>	No evidence of product specific meetings after 2004 in the Commission's strategy documents. <i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i>
<b>ESAIO</b>	The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP of East and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean refers to donor coordination meetings initiated by the EU but there is no specification of the subject of the meeting (whether or not it concerned agricultural commodity sectors cannot be determined). <i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 41.</i>
<b>GH</b>	No such evidence appears in the CSP/NIP
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>ML</b>	No such evidence can be found in Mali's CSP/NIPs.
<b>ML-COT</b>	Suite à la conférence de Paris sur le Partenariat Coton Europe-Afrique, il a été décidé, lors de l'évaluation de mi-parcours (RMP) du 9 <sup>ème</sup> FED, d'allouer 15 M€ à la mise en œuvre d'un Programme d'Appui à la Réforme de la Filière Coton (PARFC) (BCS, §1.3; CF, annexe II, p.2).
<b>PAC</b>	No such evidence appears in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.

<b>SADC</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 SADC RSP/RIP refers to donor coordination meetings initiated by the EU but there is no specification of the subject of the meeting (whether or not it concerned agricultural commodity sectors cannot be determined).</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 36</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	<p>No such evidence in the programming documents.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 66-67</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence can be found in the CSP/NIPs.
<b>VU</b>	No such evidence appears in Vanuatu's CSP/NIPs
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the SFA evaluation.
<b>I.3.1.3</b>	After 2004 discussion fora (such as thematic working groups) were set up at country level to discuss general and product specific issues between representatives of the Commission and other donors/organisations active in the field of agricultural commodities
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The programme has taken into account comments and needs provided by ACP commodity chains stakeholders, EU stakeholders, including Member States, during consultation workshops at its formulation and implementation (Kick-off regional workshops) stages.</p> <p>Under the All ACP programme the World Bank has organised a serie of workshops to discuss specific issues in the field of flowers, through he activity “ <a href="#">2.ESA.D02 - Regional Trade in Fresh Produce in ESA</a>”.</p> <p>A Series of Video Conferences (VCs) hosted by the Kenya Flower Council on Issues related to the East Africa Flower Industry.</p> <p>The objective of the activity is to take advantage of the Global Distance Learning Network (GDLN) developed by the World Bank Institute (WBI) to deliver a series of interactive seminars on various issues related to the flower industry. The five VCs will address global competitiveness of the flower industry in East Africa, agro bacterium and other soil borne diseases and the impact of climate change on productivity and the erosion of competitiveness. The countries participating will be Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia.</p> <p>These VCs will be integrated into a larger project of around \$ 500,000 of the Kenya Flower Council (KFC) to be funded by the Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE) at \$255,000 with a</p>

	<p>KFC contribution of \$ 114,890 and around \$136,000 from the Agriculture and Rural Development unit of the World Bank funded by the EU AAACP.</p> <p><i>Source: WB-Sustainable Development Network (WB-SDN), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 28 July 2011</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>In the framework of the Cotton Partnership which was approved in July 2004 together with a Plan of Action in support to the development of the African cotton sector, the <i>COS-Coton</i> was formed. In the framework of the Cotton Partnership which was approved in July 2004 together with a Plan of Action in support to the development of the African cotton sector, the <i>COS-Coton</i> was formed. This joint EU-ACP Steering Group has been set up to follow the implementation of activities of the EU-Africa Cotton Action Plan.</p> <p>The <i>COS-Coton</i> organised in September 2008 in Ouagadougou a seminar on the issues at stake related to the introduction in Africa of the genetically modified cotton plant.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2 and <a href="http://www.cotton-ACP.org">www.cotton-ACP.org</a></i></p>
<b>ACP-GIIF</b>	<p>The project was designed after consultations with other donors, notably international discussions held at the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management led by the WB and involving also FAO and WFP and the private sector.</p> <p><i>Source: IF</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in Burkina Faso's CSP/NIPs.</p> <p>Au Burkina Faso, la Banque Mondiale est chef de file des PTF pour la thématique agricole (à la tête de la Troïka, incluant DANIDA et la coopération suisse). Il y a des réunions fréquentes ; mais aucune ne porte directement sur l'appui aux produits agricoles de base (pour exportation).</p> <p>La DUE est chef de file dans le secteur eau-assainissement, infrastructures, finances publiques, et suivi de la Stratégie de croissance accélérée pour le développement durable. La Commission sectorielle thématique regroupe les PTF intéressés par le secteur rural et alimentaire ; il y a une concertation périodique (une fois par trimestre) dans le secteur ; Il y a un processus de discussion sur l'élaboration du Programme National du Secteur Rural (PNSR = déclinaison du PDDAA/NEPAAD). En fait, le PDDAA doit se décliner au niveau de chaque pays africain par un programme national d'investissement du secteur agricole. L'approche PNSR reconnaît l'agriculture comme étant le moteur de la croissance (revenus durables pour les producteurs). Le PNSR est la base stratégique du secteur agricole.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 599, MN 567</i></p>
<b>BF ACP-ACP (Coton et autres)</b>	<p>Même au niveau des réunions régulières des PTFs dans le cadre de la commission sectorielle thématique "Développement rural et sécurité alimentaire", aucun aspect lié à la coordination d'activités du Programme Tous ACP n'est mis à l'ordre du jour.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 518</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>L'AFD/France est le chef de file officiel d'un groupe technique coton. A l'instar de la commission thématique "Développement rural et sécurité alimentaire," il s'agit avant tout d'échanger les informations et avis sur les divers appuis/projets financés par chacun des PTFs mais pour des appuis relatifs à la filière coton. Ce groupe semblait mieux fonctionner par le passé (2007-2008) quand la DUE était entrain de mettre en œuvre le PAFFIC. Depuis, l'AFD se sent bien seule dans ce groupe. Les PTFs, dont la DUE, ne répondent pas ou peu aux demandes de concertation de l'AFD (ex. (i) l'envoi aux PTFs des résultats d'une étude sur le bilan et révision des mécanismes du fonds de lissage et (ii) l'invitation faite aux PTFs par l'AFD pour discuter des TdRs d'une étude portant sur les conditions et modalités de mise en place d'un fonds intrants, notamment pour</p>

	<p>réduire le coût des intrants n'a pas connu de retour de la part des PTFs à l'exception de la Banque Mondiale. La BM apparaît être le seul bailleur réceptif à la coordination dans le secteur du coton. Cela s'est également traduit par une revue conjointe du secteur coton début 2010. L'aide mémoire de cette revue a été envoyé aux PTFs.</p> <p>Il y a eu beaucoup d'initiatives sur le coton depuis la crise cotonnière en 2007. La Banque Mondiale a initié des activités en coordination avec les autres partenaires (AFD, UE, USAID/WACIP). Avant la crise, il y a avait l'appui direct à la filière. La Banque Mondiale travaille beaucoup avec l'AFD pour soutenir le coton au Burkina Faso (depuis 2007 à travers le PAFASPE). La Banque mondiale apporte 5 millions USD et l'AfD a apporté 10 millions € dont 3 millions € ont été alloués comme subvention dans l'abondement du fonds de lissage, le reste étant destiné au renforcement des organisations de producteurs comprenant notamment le conseil à l'exploitation familiale. Dans ce programme, la Commission n'intervient pas.</p> <p><i>Sources:: MN 512 ; MN 599</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Pas d'infos dans CSP sur groupes thématiques secteur agricole après 2004</p> <p>La concertation entre les bailleurs en Cote d'Ivoire a traditionnellement bien fonctionné dans le passé. Elle s'articulait en «<b>tables rondes</b>» <b>thématiques</b> réunissant l'ensemble des bailleurs concernés sous la présidence du pays qui, en raison du volume de son intervention ou de son expertise dans le domaine, faisait figure de chef de file. (<i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.26</i>).</p> <p>La CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Il y a des <b>groupes thématiques agriculture et développement</b> rural qui existent (sous le chapeau du CMB= Comité multibailleurs). Il manque également d'une politique agricole définie par le Gvt et de consignes en termes d'approches. (MN-411, 404) Ces groupes thématiques constituent de forum de discussion important. Comme mentionné, ils ont été mis en place suite à la déclaration de Paris et à l'initiative envers les pays pauvres très endettés (PPTÉ) (MN 404,406)</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p> <p>No such evidence in Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p>No evidence in ECS</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIPs.</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p><b>No specific information in CSP about agricultural working group after 2004.</b></p> <p>At the operational level, the Commission has undertaken a leading role in sector and donor coordination in <b>several Thematic Working Groups of the DAG</b>, including those for governance and private sector development. The Commission also <b>played a lead role</b> in coordinating donor assistance in food security, budget support and related PFM issues. In line with EU policy on harmonisation, EU coordination efforts in Ethiopia form part of the wider donor effort rather than a separate track. The EU aims to be a driver of closer cooperation and set an example of best-practice for the wider community. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.39</i>).</p> <p>(<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p iv</i>).</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>No such evidence appears in the CSP/NIP</p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 mentions that the EC financed in 2005 two workshops for stakeholders to discuss</p>

	<p>pertinent issues on EU food safety regulations. The EC also designed a programme to support Kenya Plan Health Inspectorate Service to strengthen sanitary and phytosanitary measures and requirements for horticultural products for the export market.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 24</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Pas d'infos sur groupes thématiques au niveau agricole.</b></p> <p>Un nombre relativement restreint de partenaires est représenté sur place à Madagascar. Il s'agit, au niveau multilatéral, des agences des Nations Unies (PNUD, OMS, UNICEF, FAO, FNUAP, ONUDI, PAM, BIT), des Institutions de Bretton Woods (Banque Mondiale/SFI et FMI), de la Banque Africaine de Développement (BAfD) et de la CE, et au niveau bilatéral, de la France, de l'Allemagne, de la Suisse, de la Norvège, des Etats-Unis (USAID et Millenium Challenge Corporation) et du Japon. La <b>coordination entre le Gouvernement malgache et les partenaires de développement se caractérise par un bon niveau d'ouverture et de dialogue</b>. Des <b>groupes thématiques</b> existent dans les domaines des finances publiques, du <b>développement rural</b> et de l'environnement, des infrastructures, de la santé et de l'éducation. Ils incluent, le cas échéant, les Acteurs Non Etatiques impliqués dans le domaine concerné.</p> <p>De manière générale, il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB) mais <u>très peu ou rien en matière de coordination</u> de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 801).</p> <p>De plus, la crise politique a engendré une suspension plus ou moins complète des financements bailleurs et des relations officielles avec le gouvernement.</p> <p><i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.24, MN 817</i></p>
<b>ML</b>	No such evidence can be found in Mali's CSP/NIPs.
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La fiche d'identification (FIP, §8) indique que la concertation des bailleurs mise en place pour la préparation du Forum UE-Afrique sur le coton s'est renforcée et transformée en un groupe technique UE- Etats Membres (Uniquement Pays Bas et France. L'Allemagne et la Belgique ont peu d'actions dans le domaine du Coton, la Suède ne dispose pas de ressources humaines suffisantes pour participer au groupe technique) – l'USAID et la BM, avec l'AFD comme chef de file. L'AFD bénéficie d'informations de qualité grâce à ses implications tant au niveau bancaire (financement des campagnes cotonnières, crédit pour usine d'égrenage) que de projets d'appui à la filière (amélioration des systèmes d'exploitation, PASE I). Le groupe technique permet un partage d'informations et la prise de positions communes renforçant le dialogue avec l'Etat représenté par le Ministère des Finances.</p> <p><i>Sources : ROM/BCS, FIP, CF</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	No such evidence appears in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.
<b>SADC</b>	No such evidence can be found in the SADC RSP/RIPs.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	There is no information in the CSPs/NIPs about possible organisation of discussion fora in the field of agricultural commodities after 2004. However, one can note that on the agriculture side of the growth-related cluster of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, World Bank, African Development Bank and IFAD are major donors - Netherlands, UK, Sweden and Denmark have significant programmes of private sector development, though with only limited coverage of broader trade policy issues.

	<p>In the CSP 2008-2013, it is also noted that the Commission Delegation has regularly informed Member States on its trade and regional policies (including the Doha process, EPA negotiations and support to the East African Community), preparing a number of notes for the information of Heads of Mission. The Delegation has also participated in discussions on Member States' own programming, for example recently in the cases of France, Denmark and the United Kingdom.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 66-67, 73</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the CSP/NIPs. The EU became member of the UJAS, but there is no information on discussions on product specific issues</p> <p>There is a strong coordination of donors through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Agriculture Sector Working Group chaired by the government</li> <li>• The Agriculture Donors Group</li> </ul> <p>Besides the multi-donor support to the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture), donor coordination results in some sort of task and geographical sharing between donors by regions and by nature of intervention.</p> <p>Indeed, donors' coordination (not only with MS) is good but there are fluctuations of the donors' implication over time. Coordination should be translated into joint actions but there are different ways to be coordinated (sectors covered, geographical areas...). <u>Currently donor coordination mainly consists in some sort of task sharing.</u></p> <p>Donors report on their activity in the framework of the <u>donors working group</u>. Lessons learned and diffusion between donors: gaps are shared at the project level and also at the strategic level: <u>all levels of coordination are covered</u></p> <p>Two different groups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The <u>Agriculture Sector Working Group</u> established by the government (There are such working groups for all sectors defined by the government).</li> <li>• <u>Agriculture donors group</u>: it is a donor initiative but they can invite specific stakeholders when it is relevant to the meeting agenda (eg. NAADS director...).</li> </ul> <p>Sources : MN 301, 309 and 313.</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>The EC has discussed and negotiated coordination and synergies with France in the sector of agriculture and food security (under the economic growth and job creation strategy).</p> <p>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 32</p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Aucune référence à des forums de discussions ou groupes de travail sur certains produits agricoles ne peut être trouvée dans les RSP/RIP de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.</p> <p>Le RSP/RIP 2008-2013 évoque cependant la tenue d'une réunion en 2008 sur les questions de sécurité alimentaire liées à la crise. Un des axes identifiés par cette réunion était la structuration des filières et la régulation des marchés.</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, page 49</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the SFA evaluation.
<b>I.3.1.4</b>	After 2004, the level of coordination between donors concerning activities in the field of agricultural commodities was stepped up
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	The financial agreement mentions that the AAACP programme will facilitate exchange of

experiences across commodity sectors, and with other linked activities such as overall agriculture sector development support by supporting a coordination structure that includes the ACP countries, the Commission, EU Member States, relevant international organisations, as well as NGOs and private sector. In addition, it should be noted that these programme have taken into account comments provided by ACP and EU stakeholders, including Member States, during consultation workshops at its formulation stage. In particular, it includes elements to ensure it will be demand-driven and respond to expressed needs in ACP commodity chains.

An important result to be attained by the AAACP intervention is to capitalize on complementarities and synergies of the ACP, EU and IOs in the area of agricultural commodities as well as to share experiences at the all ACP level.

The programme has taken into account comments and needs provided by ACP commodity chains stakeholders, EU stakeholders, including Member States, during consultation workshops at its formulation and implementation (Kick-off regional workshops) stages.

*Source: ALL Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2, ALL ACP reports.ACP financial agreement and reports*

According to UNCTAD report about the implementation of the All ACP Programme (period: 1 January 2011 till June 2011), complementarities and synergies between IOs, EU and ACP actors are as detailed below.

#### ***Inter-agency collaboration***

Collaborations of UNCTAD with the other implementing organizations of the AAACP including the following:

- Collaboration with ITC for the organization and implementation of the COMESA Cotton to Clothing Strategy (CtC) review meeting (July 2011). This collaboration will allow a greater number of stakeholders to participate at the meeting and to link the meeting with the Pan African cotton initiative.
- Collaboration with ITC to align INFOSHARE to ITCs "Trade-in-hand" system. This integration will allow INFOSHARE market data to be disseminated over mobile telephone systems.
- Collaboration with the FAO in the preparation of the Workshop on the Establishment of a regional Agricultural Market Intelligence system in the Pacific (August 2011). The local experience and presence of the FAO contributed to a better definition of the scope of UNCTAD's activities.
- Collaboration with ITC, FAO and the World Bank in the preparation of the Grenada finance workshop. (July 2011). The draft report of the access to finance study was shared with the FAO, ITC and World Bank for comments. In return, these IOs recommended experts or provided suggestions on the organizational aspect of the workshop.
- Collaboration with the FAO on the MIS and SCP workshop in the Caribbean (February 2011). Participants also benefitted from FAO presentation at the workshop.
- Participation as a speaker at the meeting organized by FAO and East African Grain Council (EAGC) on the alternative methods to policy intervention in grain markets in Nairobi, Kenya (July 2011).

#### ***Collaboration with Regional/National organisations***

UNCTAD relies extensively on collaborations with regional and national organisations to implement activities, in particular because the agency does not have field offices in the regions. Examples of collaborations are given by region below.

##### **Pacific**

- UNCTAD is co-operation with the Secretariat of Pacific Countries in the preparation of the workshop on the Establishment of a regional Agricultural Market Intelligence system in the Pacific (scheduled for August 2011).



**Caribbean**

- UNCTAD collaborated with the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Coordinating Committee (NCC) to hold the workshop on Enhancing Access to Finance for the Nutmeg Sector in Grenada (July 2011).
- UNCTAD collaborated extensively with the CARICOM Secretariat and CARDI to hold the dual workshop on MIS and SCP in Port-of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 15-17 February. The collaboration experience was especially positive due to the responsiveness and enthusiasm of local partner.
- An additional cooperation with CARDI on the preparation of 5 commodity profiles, relevant for ACP countries, for INFOSHARE is on-going.

**Central Africa**

Collaborations with the Office National du Café – Cacao (ONCC) of Cameroon continue during this time period in the context of the training of the database managers on INFOSHARE held in Geneva.

**West Africa**

UNCTAD initiated collaboration with ROPPA in the organization of the West African SCP launch and capacity building workshop (May 2011). ROPPA's contribution to the identification of participants was very valuable.

**East & Southern Africa**

UNCTAD is collaborating with COMESA in the organization of the cotton strategy review meeting (scheduled for July 2011).

WB-ARMT is collaborating with a number of the IOs under the programme. In both East and West Africa WB-ARMT is closely coordinating with IFPRI, IADB, ADB, UNCTAD, ITC, FAO, and other Non-governmental organizations on the work being done on risk assessment for particular commodity supply chains. In Mozambique WB-ARMT and FAO are working together in order to best satisfy the demands of both the government and the cotton sector. In Burkina Faso, the work on cotton is part of a broader intervention in support of cotton in partnership with Rockefeller Foundation and local ACP actors. In the Caribbean the lessons learned and experiences of the work done in various countries are closely coordinated with FAO, Caribbean Development Bank, CCRIF, CARDI, and CAFAN.

For WB-ARMT, the main focus on regional and national organisations is also centred on the issue of knowledge sharing and capacity transfer to regional and local organizations. Additionally, WB-ARMT is closely linking the communication/dissemination strategy with the capacity transfer activities at regional levels through programmed regional training workshops. ACP organisations are intrinsically linked in this process and they actually have their capacity strengthened to enable them to assist their national and regional stakeholders in risk management activities after the closing of the AAACP program. It is considered that this level of cooperation and collaboration will potentially lead to sustainability of activities.

*Source: WB- Agricultural Risk Management Team (WB-ARMT), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 25 July 2011*

**Inter-agency collaboration according to CFC**

Cooperation with other International Organizations (IOs) participating in the AAACP continues as indicated in the previous report. The following notable developments took place:

- the holding of a “pan African meeting on cotton” proposal, financed by the CFC and Cos-Coton and coordinated with UNCTAD and ITC;
- collaboration with UNCTAD on the organization and holding of a special side event

	<p>on commodity markets on the occasion of the UN LDC IV in May 2011;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- coordination with UNCTAD and the World Bank of contributions to the Islamic Development Bank conference on commodity finance.</li> </ul> <p>Coordination continues between the Communications Officer of the CFC and the officer of the Coordinating Unit to facilitate exchange of public information on the Programme and the activities implemented by the CFC.</p> <p><u>Collaboration with Regional/National organisations according to CFC</u></p> <p><i>Involvement of International Commodity Bodies</i></p> <p>According to CFC rules, all projects receiving CFC support have been endorsed by one of the designated International Commodity Bodies. The progress of the projects is being reported to the ICBs for their feedback as expert bodies in their respective commodity sectors. In line with its established practice the CFC involves the representatives of the ICBs in the monitoring and evaluation of the project activities.</p> <p>The most recent annual meeting between the CFC and ICBs took place in Lisbon in April 2011. The CFC briefed the ICBs on the current status of collaboration with EU and the Programme, and received feedback, particularly discussing the following issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- commodity market volatility and its impact on development, as well as the initiatives of the G20 in this regard;</li> <li>- EU commodity policy and the role of the CFC and the ICBs. The subject had been discussed with the representative of the EU who participated in the meeting;</li> <li>- a joint communications strategy of CFC and ICBs. The emphasis of the joint communication strategy should be on the identification of the right audiences and relevant issues to be pursued as a coordinated effort.</li> </ul> <p>The meeting agreed on the terms of reference for the formulation of a joint CFC-ICB communication strategy, which will be initiated by the CFC. It was agreed that subsequent contributions to the implementation of this joint strategy would be shared between the CFC and the ICBs.</p> <p>The cooperation also covers a number of ICBs which are hosted by the FAO as Intergovernmental Groups, which strengthens the CFC connection with the FAO. The next Annual Meeting will be hosted by the FAO and held back-to-back with its meeting of the Committee on Commodities Problems. Reports on all project activities continue to be shared with the relevant FAO IGGs, and their representatives receive, in the context of a CFC-FAO Memorandum of Understanding, financial support from the CFC to participate in the monitoring and evaluation of the project activities. This concerns the following projects being subject of CFC participation in AAACP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Grain Farmers' Access to Warehouse Inventory Credit in Ethiopia and Tanzania (CFC/FIGG/38/FA), FAO IGG on Grains;</li> <li>- Production of rootcrops in the Caribbean; (CFC/FIGG/44) FAO IGG on Grains;</li> <li>- Greenhouse vegetables production in the Caribbean; (CFC/FIGTF/26) FAO IGG on Tropical Fruits and Vegetables;</li> </ul> <p>The representatives of the FAO Commodities Division have commented on the activities of these projects and would be given opportunity to comment on project reports, as well as participate in the relevant project meetings.</p> <p><u><i>Collaboration with regional organizations</i></u></p>
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The mid-term review of the Third Five Year Action Plan acknowledged the CFC collaboration with regional organizations substantively involved in the matters of commodity development. The implementation of CFC-AAACP projects continues to involve the following cooperation arrangements with regional organizations:

- Support to the regional Focal Point under AAACP Twinning Arrangement: [see activity fiche 2.CAR.F03](#)
- CARICOM. CARICOM, through CARDI, has contributed significantly in the formulation and implementation of the projects for greenhouse vegetables and the rootcrop productivity in the Caribbean as identified in the Caribbean KOW;
- East African Fine Coffee Association (EAFCA). EAFCA as the key implementation partner in the project on coffee quality in East Africa co-funded by CFC and the Programme;
- CFC and UNCTAD collaborated with the regional cotton bodies in the organization of the Pan-African Cotton Meeting in June 2011. The regional organizations involved included UEMOA and CEMAC.

Furthermore, the CFC is preparing the Terms of Reference to carry out a study on the regionalization of the system of warehouse receipts in East Africa with COMESA, producing agreed regional guidelines to improve the compatibility of warehouse receipts and grades used in different countries.

The CFC maintains collaboration with other IOs, donor agencies, regional and national bodies in the implementation of the projects receiving Programme funds. The particular elements of this collaboration include:

- in April 2011 Annual CFC-ICB meeting the CFC reported to International Commodity Bodies on the status of collaboration with the Programme.
- a Pan-African meeting on cotton was sponsored jointly by the CFC and AAACP, and implemented by UNCTAD;
- the CFC continues its involvement with regional organizations, i.e. EAFCA, CARDI, ACA and COMESA in implementation of actions in the context of the AAACP;
- the CFC continues to seek to identify complementary in activities with FAO, ITC, UNCTAD and the World Bank in project financed by CFC jointly with AAACP, as well as in other CFC project where no AAACP financing is involved.

FAO has continued to deepen its collaboration with International Organization partners across all regions, details of which have been highlighted in the Progress Report. Collaboration has continued in Cameroon with the World Bank and ITC in support of the cassava and coffee sectors which has shown good results and synergies; with UNCTAD in preparation for the PAN-Africa workshop on Cotton; on risk management strategies for the grains sector in the ESA region; and with ITC in Zambia for Cassava and in Samoa for the Fruits and Vegetables sector. FAO has also continued to strengthen its partnerships with regional farmer federations and national farmer organizations with regional training workshops and a workshop in Rome on lessons on the business model approach which brought together a selection of counterparts from all the ACP regions. Activities with Focal Points under the twinning arrangements have continued with ROPPA on supporting the regional information sharing and appraisals on national programmes for investment in agriculture, and with SPC on ensuring that synergies related to value chain development are realized through better collaboration between major regional development of PARDI, PHAMA, IACT, FACT, FSSLP.

*Source: UNCTAD, Draft 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to*

	<p><i>June 2011, 22 July 2011; Common Fund For Commodities (CFC), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 27 July 2011; FAO, 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, July 2011</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>The major coordination initiatives in the field of agriculture were done before 2004.</p> <p>La commission sectorielle thématique “Développement rural et sécurité alimentaire,” qui se réunit régulièrement, comprend les principaux PTFs dont la DUE. Il s’agit avant tout d’échanger les informations et avis sur les diverses appuis/projets financés par chacun des PTFs.</p> <p>En ce qui concerne le Programme Tous ACP, la Délégation de l’UE regrette qu’il n’y a aucune discussion avec elle en ce qui concerne les activités. Quand les missions viennent, la Délégation est informée de leur arrivée. La Délégation n’est pas impliquée ni informée davantage. Après passage des consultants du Programme, aucun compte rendu et pas de feedback de la part du Programme Tous ACP n’est envoyé à la Délégation. Il faudrait faire une évaluation en termes de pertinence, d’impact et de résultats de ce programme. Il faudrait à l’avenir impliquer les Délégations.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 518, MN 567 ; Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 14.</i></p>
<b>BF ACP-ACP (Coton et autres)</b>	<p>Pour la FAO, la coordination (CE-OIs/Agences d’exécution) avec le Programme Tous ACP se passe au niveau de Bruxelles et des sièges des OIs. Sur le terrain, ils ne voient aucune coordination structurée pour mettre en œuvre les activités du Programme Tous ACP : les agences d’exécution travaillent chacune de leur côté.</p> <p>L’UEMOA (siège) a mis longtemps à comprendre le mécanisme de coordination entre CE-OIs développé dans le programme tous ACP, de même que la conception même du programme, d’où elle s’est sentie exclue jusqu’en 2010.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 518, MN 581</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Malgré l’existence d’un groupe technique coton dont l’AFD/France est le chef de file officiel, la coordination entre PTFs est restée faible, bien qu’elle semblait mieux fonctionner par le passé (2007-2008) quand la DUE était entrain de mettre en œuvre le PAFFIC. Depuis, l’AFD se sent bien seule dans ce groupe. Les PTFs, dont la DUE, ne répondent pas ou peu au demandes de concertation de l’AFD, à l’exception de la Banque Mondiale. La BM apparaît être le seul bailleur réceptif à la coordination dans le secteur du coton. Cela s’est également traduit par une revue conjointe du secteur coton début 2010. L’aide mémoire de cette revue a été envoyé aux PTFs.</p> <p>NB. Dans d’autres domaines/secteurs l’AFD travaille en étroite coordination avec la DUE : l’eau/assainissement et dans le cadre du groupe de Ouaga (groupe de PTFs du CILSS sur la sécurité alimentaire, les changements climatiques...).</p> <p>L’appui de la Délégation de l’UE (via le 9<sup>ème</sup> FED/PIR) à l’Université du Coton (UdC) qui est abritée à l’Université de Bobo-Dioulasso (Institut Polytechnique) et l’établissement d’une convention UEMUA-AProCA, a connu un important retard qui révèle un déficit de coordination entre les parties prenantes impliquées (DUE-UEMOA-UNPCB). À la fin du I<sup>er</sup> semestre 2011, la convention n’était toujours pas opérationnelle et le financement du programme de formation de l’UdC risque d’être compromis car ce financement doit être utilisé avant la fin 2011.</p> <p>Le programme d’amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière (2008-2011, ligne FOOD) mis en œuvre par ICCO, en collaboration avec Helvetas et l’UNPCB semble avoir connu des problèmes de coordination entre les parties prenantes impliquées. Cela se traduit par des retards dans la mise en place d’activités qui nuisent à l’efficacité du programme.</p> <p><i>Sources : MN 51, MN 523, MN 581</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	No agricultural commodities supported by the regional programme during the period.

CI	<p>La CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée. La <u>complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds est avérée</u>, des lors que ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
CI	<p><b>Peu d'infos dans les CSP concernant le degré de coordination dans le secteur agricole après 2004.</b></p> <p>La <b>Commission s'est efforcée de relancer la coordination en associant les autres bailleurs à la finalisation de son Programme-cadre des mesures correctives dès le début de l'année 2002.</b> La survenue de la crise a toutefois suspendu tous les contacts qui avaient été engagés sur les questions budgétaires. Dans un contexte de rareté de ressources, la concertation entre la Commission et la France d'une part et la Banque mondiale d'autre part s'est considérablement intensifiée ces derniers mois. L'audit des flux financiers dans la <b>filiale cacao</b>, engagé en septembre 2003 et supervisé par les trois parties, en est l'illustration la plus concrète. Par ailleurs, les relations entre la Commission et le PNUD se sont sensiblement resserrées à la faveur du renforcement des capacités de celui-ci.</p> <p><i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.26.</i></p>
CM	<p>The level of coordination between donors on agriculture has not been stepped up after 2004.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 701</i></p>
CM	<p>Il semblerait effectivement que le niveau <u>de concertation</u> se soit accru en 2010, mais ce serait plus une question d'hommes que de la COM. D'ailleurs, la COM n'est pas connue des interlocuteurs. Sur le terrain, il y a toujours un manque de coordination.</p> <p>(Source : MN 407)</p>
CR	<p>There is no such evidence in Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i>  No evidence in ECS; RSP 2005</p>
ESAIO	<p>The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP of East and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean refers to donor coordination meetings initiated by the EU but there is no specification of the subject of the meeting (whether or not it concerned agricultural commodity sectors cannot be determined).</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 41.</i></p>
ET	<p>No information in CSP about coordination after 2004.</p> <p>Lessons of experience of the past five years regarding aid provision to Ethiopia indicate that <b>the interaction between donors and the Government of Ethiopia has been positive and productive.</b> As to the EU, the <b>Commission has played an active role in coordination and harmonization with the Government, Member States and other donors</b>, both at the sector level and in connection with budget support for SDPRP implementation (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.39</i>).</p> <p><b>In each sub-sector of the "Focal sector II: Rural development and food security", the coordination between donors is exposed.</b></p> <p>For insce, in the subsector « Support to agricultural markets and livestock development », the approach for this intervention will be agreed in close co-ordination between the EC, Austria, Germany, [Italy (IDC),] the Netherlands, Sweden (SIDA) and the United Kingdom (DfID), and in</p>

	<p>consultation with the AfDB, the World Bank, UNDP and USAID. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.50</i>).</p> <p>No information in CSE about coordination after 2004.</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>According to the CSP, the Country Strategy Evaluation stated that labour divisions have been implemented to concentrate efforts where donors have a comparative advantage. But it also states that this complementarity is not the case for agriculture and food security.</p> <p>The coordination with MS is difficult and there seems to be a very different perspective seen from Headquarters (good cooperation with MS) and the field where bilateral cooperation from MS remains limited to bilateral contacts, without sharing between the MS and the Delegation. More widely, although there are WG in fields such as agriculture, the donors do not coordinate between them to form coherent views/strategies or a offer a concerted image to the Government; each donor sticks to their own patch.</p> <p>Source: MN156, MN 966; <i>Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 30</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the Strategy for revitalizing agriculture (SRA) – which includes support to the agricultural commodities and which is supported by the EC – is coordinated through different coordination mechanisms but without clear links with agricultural commodities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ National Steering Committee (NSC): Members include the Permanent secretaries in the sector Ministries (Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Development, Cooperative, Water and Irrigation, regional Development, Development Partners and Farmer organizations ;</li> <li>▪ Technical Committee (TC): Members are the Departmental heads of various sector Ministries, Development Partners, Private Sector representative, and different other coordinators in the field of agriculture;</li> <li>▪ The Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU): ASCU is an inter-ministerial coordination unit whose role is to coordinate the sector ministries' and other stakeholders' efforts towards the implementation of the SRA vision;</li> <li>▪ Thematic Working Groups (TWGs): The Thematic Working Groups (TWGs) were established to address specific themes. The following thematic groups, chaired by representatives from the private sector have therefore been identified to fast track the issues needed to revitalize the sector: (i) Legal, Policy and Regulatory (ii) Agricultural Extension and Research (iii) Parastatal reforms (iv) Food and Nutritional Security (v) Value Addition and Marketing and (vi) Inputs and Rural financial services.</li> </ul> <p>Tools for enhancing ASCU'S efficiency: ASCU will initiate the process of mainstreaming the SRA into the Sector Working Groups in addition to institutionalizing an M&amp;E strategy for all sector programmes and projects. The aim is to make all programmes and projects SRA - compliant for maximizing impact.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 112-113</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Non car la crise politique a engendré une suspension plus ou moins complète des financements bailleurs et des relations officielles avec le gouvernement. Le SMB sert de pont avec le gouvernement tant qu'il n'y a pas de relations institutionnelles avec entre eux (Source : MN 817).</p> <p><b>Peu d'infos dans les CSP concernant cet indicateur et plus particulièrement sur les filières agricoles.</b></p> <p>Depuis octobre 2000, le Secrétariat Multibailleurs qui assurait le «suivi» du Programme Environnemental pour le compte des partenaires techniques et financiers, a été élargi au développement rural et à la sécurité alimentaire. Non seulement cette initiative permet <b>d'améliorer la coordination des donateurs entre eux et par rapport au Plan d'Action pour le Développement Rural</b>, mais elle permet également de renforcer les synergies indispensables entre les actions de développement rural et celles de protection ou gestion de l'environnement (<i>Source :</i></p>

	<i>CSP 2002-2007 p.15).</i>
<b>ML</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in Mali's CSP/NIPs, besides the fact that overall coordination in the country has been stepped up by the elaboration of an aid harmonisation roadmap and a donor complementarity matrix. But this isn't specific to agricultural commodities.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 89.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La fiche d'identification (FIP, §8) indique que la concertation des bailleurs mise en place pour la préparation du Forum UE-Afrique sur le coton s'est renforcée et transformée en un groupe technique UE — Etats Membres (Uniquement Pays Bas et France), l'USAID et la BM, avec l'AFD comme chef de file. L'AFD bénéficie d'informations de qualité grâce à ses implications tant au niveau bancaire (financement des campagnes cotonnières, crédit pour usine d'égrenage) que de projets d'appui à la filière (amélioration des systèmes d'exploitation, PASE I). Le groupe technique permet un partage d'informations et la prise de positions communes renforçant le dialogue avec l'Etat représenté par le Ministère des Finances.</p> <p>La FIP (§8) précise également que, dans le cadre de la réforme de la filière, plusieurs interventions en phase d'identification viendront renforcer les actions déjà en cours : AFD, PASAOP (Projet d'Appui aux Services Agricoles et Organisations Paysannes, BM) et PCDA (Programme de Compétitivité et Diversification Agricoles, BM &amp; Suisse). Au niveau de la FAO une intervention régionale (4 pays, 72 M\$) axée principalement sur un appui à l'industrialisation de la filière est prévu. L'AFD de son côté initie une mission d'identification pour l'élaboration du PASE II (cadre logique, CF, annexe 3b) dont un volet important sera la consolidation de la structuration des Organisations Paysannes. L'intervention (PARFC) proposée par la FIP et qui a fait l'objet d'une identification et d'une instruction conjointe avec l'AFD, s'intègre dans cet environnement dynamique en appuyant notamment le gouvernement pour un financement effectif du coût de la réforme. (ce qui élimine un facteur de blocage) (FIP, §8).</p> <p>La CF stipule (annexe II, p2-3) que Le PARFC a fait l'objet d'une identification et d'une instruction conjointe avec l'AFD. La CE se propose au travers de son intervention PARFC, qui est complémentaire au programme PASE II de l'AFD, d'appuyer la mise en œuvre du processus de réforme du secteur coton par le biais:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ d'un appui budgétaire de 8,7 M€ assurant le financement des activités inscrites au CRPRSC (CF, annexe 1) mises en œuvre par la MRSC dont une contribution au Fonds de Soutien (Annexe 5) garantissant la fonctionnalité de la filière jusqu'à la privatisation et amorçant la mise en place d'un dispositif de lissage;</li> <li>▪ <b>d'un appui projet de 6,3 M€ (budget engagé) comprenant :</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- des actions d'alphabétisation fonctionnelle en direction des organes dirigeants des Coopératives de Producteurs afin de contribuer, en étroite complémentarité avec les actions du PASE II, au renforcement des capacités des producteurs en matière de pilotage de la réforme puis de fonctionnement de la filière;</li> <li>- un appui projet de réhabilitation de pistes cotonnières en direction de zones particulièrement enclavées et amenées à prendre une place significative dans le cadre du zonage des zones de production afin de préserver la qualité du coton graine récolte en réduisant le temps de stockage avant enlèvement pour égrenage.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Notons également que le rapport ROM souligne le fait qu'avec le 10ème FED, la CE s'extrait de l'apport au secteur coton du Mali, ne laissant que l'AFD comme acteur européen de poids dans la filière coton. L'AFD prévoit de ne plus agir dans une logique principalement sociale, mais de centrer ses activités de support sur les producteurs performants dans une approche "secteur privé". (BCS, §5.1).</p>

	<i>Source : FIP, CF</i>
<b>PAC</b>	Coordination has been stepped up on a general level (no information is available concerning agricultural commodities). <i>Sources: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 32, 59 &amp; 158.</i>
<b>SADC</b>	The 2008-2013 SADC RSP/RIP refers to donor coordination meetings initiated by the EU but there is no specification of the subject of the meeting (whether or not it concerned agricultural commodity sectors cannot be determined). <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 36</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	The EC has been involved in discussions related to agriculture with other donors. <i>Source: MN 649</i>
<b>TZ Cotton</b>	CosCotton: Work with the ITC (International Trade Centre) to increase Tanzanian direct cotton exports (instead of through agents). Since 2006 there is a lot of training visits in India, Thailand, Taiwan, Senegal, etc. To visit the Ministers to expand the business. For the industry we are exposed to other countries (like India). Training helped to shape activities in Tanzania. After training, we have defined a new model to contract farming (between ginners and farmers) to support the farmers. It has been pilot tested and will now be extended. TZ cotton is discounted because of quality but now with contract farming the quality is improving and prices rise. Working closely with the regional African cotton Association which is also assisted by the CDC. Development of a regional strategy for cotton to address Western and Eastern African regions in a more coherent way and are in a process to make the national strategic plan for cotton coherent with this regional strategy. STABEX helped to define and implement the cotton strategy, including the corporate strategy. <i>Source: MN 649</i>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	Coordination of interventions in the country is guided by the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS). The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP however states that it isn't clear yet how to align the UJAS with the 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF CSP. The EU is a member of the UJAS but did not initiate it. The UJAS was elaborated in 2005. <i>Source : Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 53.</i>
<b>VU</b>	Efforts have been made to enhance sector coordination (as already existed in the education and public finance management sectors, to review coordination mechanisms and adopt a 3-year Donor Intervention Matrix.  The EC agreed on aid effectiveness indicators which should be incorporated in discussions with Vanuatu's government and the donors. Indicators such as the reduction of un-coordinated missions by 50%, providing all capacity building assistance through coordinated programmes, etc aim at increasing donor coordination.  <i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 33, 50</i>
<b>VU POPACA/POP2</b>	Il y a très peu de bailleurs de fonds au Vanuatu : la CE, la France, AusAid, et NZAid. Il y a également la Chine mais on ne sait pas ce qu'ils font. La coordination est très limitée. La CE et la France sont les deux seuls à s'intéresser au secteur rural et au développement agricole au Vanuatu. Ils ont mis en œuvre conjointement le projet POPACA/POP 2 (2001-2007). Au-delà des réunions spécifiques à ce projet, il n'y a pas eu d'accroissement de la coordination entre les bailleurs dans le



	<p>domaine des produits de base agricoles. Il n'y a pas de concertation régulière dans le secteur agricole entre les bailleurs. Cependant, l'Ambassadrice de la France au Vanuatu rencontre régulièrement le Chargé d'affaires de la CE en poste au Vanuatu pour discuter de la coopération en général. Il n'y a pas eu de contacts récents et spécifiques en termes d'agriculture.</p> <p>Pour les interventions du Programme Tous ACP au Vanuatu, il n'y a pas de cadre de concertation/coordination, incluant la Délégation, avec la FAO (agence d'exécution du programme active au Vanuatu). La coordination est faite au niveau de l'Unité de coordination du Programme à Bruxelles. La FAO travaille directement avec la Farm Support Association (FSA) du Vanuatu.</p> <p><i>Sources : MN 1005 and MN 1067</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Les sections des RSP/RIP évaluant la coopération passée de la Commission n'évoquent pas la complémentarité et la coopération avec les initiatives des Etats membres. La seule preuve de complémentarité entre bailleurs est la présence de « matrices des interventions des bailleurs de fonds » dans la région, où sont évoquées les interventions de la CE et des autres bailleurs. La Commission ne présente cependant aucune intervention dans le domaine des produits agricoles. Seules la Banque Mondiale et la Banque Africaine de Développement le font.</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 90-101</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the SFA evaluation.
<b>I.3.1.5</b>	Evidence of Commission leadership in the promotion of cooperation and the search for complementarities on agricultural commodities interventions
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme is an evidence of the Commission leadership in the promotion of cooperation and search for complementarities in the field of agricultural commodities. Indeed, it involves a series of development actors such as FAO, ITC, UNCTAD, CFC and WB. In addition, one of the four expected results of the programme is looking for <i>Complementary aspects of and synergies between the international organisations, the EU and the ACP actors</i> (result 4).</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>No evidence of European leadership can be found in Burkina Faso's CSP/NIPs. Coordination strategies in the agricultural sector (such as the Rural Development strategy, validated in 2003) were established without EU support.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 14.</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>L'UE par le PAFFIC a voulu contribuer de façon significative à la relance de la filière coton au Burkina Faso, conformément aux engagements pris suite au Forum de Paris de juillet 2004 dans le cadre du Partenariat Coton Europe-Afrique.</p> <p>Par contre, la programmation du 10ème FED ne prévoit plus d'appui spécifique à la filière coton. Elle établit une stratégie de coopération focalisée sur l'appui budgétaire pour la croissance et la réduction de la pauvreté et deux secteurs de concentration : les infrastructures de base et la bonne gouvernance.</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	No agricultural commodities supported by the regional programme during the period.
<b>CI</b>	<p><b>Pas d'infos dans les CSP sur le leadership de la CE dans le domaine agricole.</b></p> <p><b>En l'absence de financements, la concertation entre les bailleurs s'est progressivement distendue.</b> Il faut souligner qu'en 2001, à la demande de leurs membres, les <b>institutions de Bretton Woods ont subordonné la reprise de leurs relations avec la Cote d'Ivoire aux résultats du dialogue politique que l'UE conduisait avec le gouvernement ivoirien dans le cadre des consultations au titre de l'art. 96 de l'Accord de Cotonou.</b> La Commission n'a</p>

	<p>toutefois pas été, ensuite, pleinement associée à la dizaine de missions du FMI et de la Banque mondiale en 2001, 2002 et 2003. L'échange avec les IBW gagnerait à être amélioré sur la place d'Abidjan.</p> <p>La CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée. (Source : <i>CSP 2004-2007 p.26</i> ; Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Le Comité multi-bailleurs (CMB) existe depuis 2003. Il est plus au moins actif selon la personnalité des participants. La question des produits agricoles de base est discutée dans les groupes thématiques. La mise en place d'approches coordonnées semble relever de la Déclaration de Paris (et pas de la COM 2004). La CE y est un acteur important, par contre, il n'est pas certain qu'elle ait eu un rôle de leadership unique. Celui-ci semble partagé avec d'autres comme la coopération française.</p> <p>Commission's interviewees have not highlighted a leadership of the Commission in agriculture. They have also stressed that there was no specific key player among donors in agriculture.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 407 et 701</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Yes but there is no specific evidence regarding the commodities sector.</p> <p>Indeed, the evaluation highlight that regarding the Commission's <b>comparative advantages</b>, the main ones are the <u>large variety of resources (and particularly grant funds) it can offer, its institutional experience in regional integration, the whole partnership context of Cotonou, and its specific experience in some sectors</u> (for instance, transport). No other donor can bring to bear such diversity, but the Commission does not greatly exercise its comparative advantage, at least from a strategic point of view. For instance, the substantial experience of the Commission in developing regional integration among its Member States and in promoting it in other part of the world has not been systematically used to identify the strategic steps and priorities appropriate to constructing an integrated space in the Caribbean region. The Commission's comparative advantages are used in a very pragmatic way, not strategically.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP of East and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean refers to donor coordination meetings initiated by the EU but there is no specification of the subject of the meeting (whether or not it concerned agricultural commodity sectors cannot be determined).</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 41.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p><b>No specific information in CSP about the EC leadership in commodities sector.</b></p> <p>At the operational level, the Commission has undertaken a leading role in sector and donor coordination in <b>several Thematic Working Groups of the DAG</b>, including those for governance and private sector development. The Commission also <b>played a lead role</b> in coordinating donor assistance in food security, budget support and related PFM issues. In line with EU policy on harmonisation, EU coordination efforts in Ethiopia form part of the wider donor effort rather than a separate track. The EU aims to be a driver of closer cooperation and set an example of best-practice for the wider community. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.39</i>).</p> <p>As recognized by the European Consensus on Development and the draft Code of Conduct on Division of Labour, EU harmonization efforts should bring in other donors wherever possible. This is essential in Ethiopia where a well developed harmonization structure already exists. A parallel 'EU only' track would only duplicate this, in addition to lacking legitimacy vis-à-vis the Government and lacking support from EU Member States. Therefore, the <b>EU seeks to act as a driver and 'first mover' of harmonization in Ethiopia.</b> (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.39</i>).</p>

	<b>No specific information in CSE about the EC leadership in commodities sector.</b>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The CSP states that “<i>the EU will advance coordination, harmonisation and alignment. It will promote better donor complementarity by working towards joint multi-annual programming based on partner countries’ strategies and processes, common implementation mechanisms, joint donor-wide missions, and the use of co-financing arrangements.</i>” Yet the country strategy evaluation stated that agriculture and food security aid lacks complementarity.</p> <p><i>Sources: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 5 &amp; 30</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs. However, the EC is using the Kenya Joint Assistance strategy as a basis for implementing the Kenya economic development strategy. This includes to collaborate and to coordinate more effectively with other donors and the government.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 28</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Pas d’infos dans les CSP sur le leadership de la CE dans le domaine agricole.</b></p> <p>Une meilleure efficacité de l’aide est essentielle à la réduction de la pauvreté et l’UE fera progresser la coordination, l’harmonisation et l’alignement ainsi qu’elle favorisera une meilleure complémentarité des donateurs en œuvrant en faveur d’une programmation pluriannuelle commune fondée sur les stratégies et les procédures des pays partenaires, les instruments communs de mise en œuvre, les missions communes menées par les donateurs et l’utilisation de dispositifs de cofinancement. <b>L’UE aura le premier rôle dans la mise en œuvre des engagements relatifs à l’efficacité de l’aide</b> énoncés dans la déclaration de Paris et tirera profit de l’expérience des nouveaux EM afin de renforcer leur rôle en tant que donateurs.</p> <p>La présidence du groupe des bailleurs en développement rural a été longtemps exercée par la Commission. Depuis un an (suspension de l’aide UE dans le cadre de l’article 96 de l’accord de Cotonou), elle est assurée par le FIDA (auparavant, ce rôle était assuré par défaut par l’UE car cela est assez contraignant)</p> <p><i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.3. ; MN 817</i></p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in Mali’s CSP/NIPs. However, the paper states that support to food security will inter alia focus on improving coordination and other donors. It considers food security and not commodity strategies though.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 52.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La fiche d’identification (FIP, §8) indique que la concertation des bailleurs mise en place pour la préparation du Forum UE-Afrique sur le coton s’est renforcée et transformée en un groupe technique UE — Etats Membres (Uniquement Pays Bas et France. — l’USAID et la BM avec l’AFD comme chef de file.</p> <p>Notons également que le rapport ROM souligne le fait qu’avec le 10eme FED, la CE s’extrait de l’apport au secteur coton du Mali, ne laissant que l’AFD comme acteur européen de poids dans la filière coton. L’AFD prévoit de ne plus agir dans une logique principalement sociale, mais de centrer ses activités de support sur les producteurs performants dans une approche "secteur privé". (BCS, §5.1).</p> <p><i>Source : FIP, ROM/BCS</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>There is evidence that the EC supports complementarity with other donors in their assistance by working with the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP). But no evidence of leadership in searching for complementarities can be found.</p>

	<p>The RSP/RIP also mentions that support through the RSP/RIP shall be complementary to that provided by the Sugar Protocol (but no details on that).</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 63, 67 &amp; 68.</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>The EC has been selected in 2002 to act as chef de file in the SADC region for the Donor Community, especially in the run up to the Donor Conference (October 2002). In the past the donor coordination was limited to the annual SADC consultative conferences.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 24</i></p> <p>The EC still serves as the lead agent for donor coordination efforts in the joint SADC-ICP Task Force, which aims at improving coordination between International Cooperating Partners and SADC. All the thematic groups, including agriculture, are operational (except peace and security).</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 36</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>In Tanzania, five donors support a basket fund, which finances the Agricultural Support development Programme (ASDP) implemented by the Government. The EC was one of the donors through STABEX; but now the EC stopped support through the basket fund. In the ASDP, cash crops and food crops have been separated. Cash crops left to the private sector. The EU is member of the development actors. It is active in the broader consultative group, with a focus on tea and also coffee. Traditional support of EU to these cash crops (long-term crops) as long commitment/ support to tea and coffee. Addressing the whole value chain is a good point. Ireland has started to address value chain. The ASDP works in this area about market development/ private sector. The contribution of the private sector to the ASDP is important as far as value chains are concerned. The ASDP does not focus on one particular crop; more on more annual crops.</p> <p>The CSP 2008-2013 notes that the EC Commission currently leads donors in the fields of public financial management, transport and <i>agriculture</i> and has a specific mandate from Member States in the field of trade. At regional level, it has played the informal role of joint lead donor to East African Community (EAC).</p> <p><i>Source: MN 195; Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 68</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>The EC played an active role in promoting donors coordination, notably as it chaired for several years the agriculture donors group. Some stakeholders value them as dialogue partner and underline that it is important that the EC is at the table of the policy dialogue because small donors cannot manage the World Bank, which behaves unilaterally (Source: MN 309).</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found. The EU is a recent member of the UJAS, but the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP states that it doesn't know how to articulate the UJAS with the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF yet.</p> <p><i>Source : Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 53.</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>The EC has discussed and negotiated coordination and synergies with France in the sector of agriculture and food security (under the economic growth and job creation strategy).</p> <p>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 32</p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Aucune telle preuve ne peut être trouvée dans les RSP/RIPs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Bien qu'ils</p>

	évoquent la recherche de complémentarité de leurs interventions avec les autres organismes, aucune intervention dans le domaine des produits agricoles n'est mentionnée dans les RSP/RIP.
<b>J.3.2</b>	<b><i>The Commission's interventions have been complementary to those of other donors in the field of agricultural commodities</i></b>
<b>BF</b> <b>Anacarde</b>	Pour l'anacarde-sésame, l'intervention de la Commission menée à partir de la Délégation a été complémentaire : Anacarde: encadrement RONGEAD/ INADES-B (CE) et support Fondation Gates/ GDL
<b>BF</b> <b>Coton</b>	Pour le coton, certaines interventions de la Commission menées à partir de la Délégation ont été complémentaires de celles d'autres PTFs :PAFFIC (DUE) et gestion des risques (Programme Tous ACP, Banque Mondiale-ARMG) /Fonds de lissage (AFD/France)
<b>CM</b>	In practice, the interventions of the different donors lack coordination and each donor follows his own approach. Cases of overlaps are not frequent, but there are some conflicts in the intervention approaches of donors. No common funding exists either (e.g. basket funds). In the field, donors try to harmonise as good as possible.
<b>GH overall</b>	In Ghana, the EC support to agricultural commodities can be considered complementary to those of other donors to a limited extent. No cases of contradictions or conflicts were noted, but there was one case of an overlap for a study on oil palm which was launched by both the EC and the AFD (the issue had been solved before the field visit).  No synergies with other donors were noted either and most people interviewed did not know that EC was active in the agricultural sector.
<b>MG</b>	Le FIDA (projet PPRR) a mené des actions en appui aux produits agricoles d'exportation analogues à celles de la Commission mais sans réelle coordination entre les unes et les autres  Les appuis filières de la Commission ont été complémentaires d'interventions de caractère transversal d'autres bailleurs, en particulier la Banque Mondiale (PSDR), le FIDA et la Coopération Suisse (appuis aux FRDA), la FAO (sécurité alimentaire)
<b>TZ</b> <b>Tea</b> <b>Coffee</b>	The Commission is the only donor which has supported the tea sector. Before recently the Commission supported the basket fund related to agriculture with four other donors. This EC support to the basket fund stopped. The EC is still supporting the tea and the coffee sector. There is no evidence that this is made with complementarities with support from other donors.
<b>UG</b>	There is a strong coordination of donors through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Agriculture Sector Working Group chaired by the government</li> <li>• The Agriculture Donors Group.</li> </ul> Besides the multi-donor support to the PMA, donor coordination results in some sort of task sharing between donors by regions and by nature of intervention
<b>VU</b>	LA CE et la France ont été les deux principaux bailleurs de fonds ayant supporté le domaine agricole au Vanuatu durant la période 2000-2010. Ils ont mis en œuvre conjointement l'intervention POPACA/ POP2, supportant les filières agricoles. Ce projet donne suite aujourd'hui à la mise en place d'une chambre d'agriculture, avec le soutien initial de la France et un prochain complément d'aide de la CE.
<b>I.3.2.1</b>	Synergies have been noted between interventions supported by the Commission with those supported by other donors
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	The financial agreement mentions that the AAACP programme will facilitate exchange of

experiences across commodity sectors, and with other linked activities such as overall agriculture sector development support by supporting a coordination structure that includes the ACP countries, the Commission, EU Member States, relevant international organisations, as well as NGOs and private sector.

In addition, it is supposed that such synergies appears as the implementation agencies of the programme are five international organisations (FAO, UNCTAD, ITC, WB and CFC) which have their own agenda and activities, notably in the field of agricultural commodities.

According to the World Bank, all of WB-SDN's activities under the EU AAACP program are being carried within the framework of the World Bank's country programs. In terms of sector strategy, they are expected to contribute to the scaling-up of public investment in agriculture as outlined in the Africa Agriculture Road Map, and more specifically to the implementation of CAADP pillar 2. Collaboration with other IOs of the AAACP has been globally successful, yet dependent on IOs and regional and country situations.

WB-SDN has also striven to seek additional funding from other donors, whenever possible. Clear complementarities and co-financing have been identified in the following activities:

- Fruit flies – the QSA activity was carried out for \$300,000 financed 100% by the EU AAACP. The second stage (1.WST.D01 - 2009/10) for \$600,000 was financed 50/50 between the AAACP and WTO-STDF and the third stage (2.WST.D03 - 2010/11) was financed with \$100,000 from the AAACP and \$500,000 from WTO-STDF.
- Mango processing 1.WST.D05 – The AAACP funds have been used to finance the Dutch organization KIT to contract expert international consultants in food technology. The aim being to carry out a study on technological options for Burkina Faso and Mali to modernize their cottage industries in mango processing/drying. Along with the two existing World Bank projects in these countries (PCDA in Mali and PAFASP in Burkina Faso) one of the major recommendations from the study will be put into action. Dryers will be imported to both of these countries from South Africa from 'Dryers for Africa Ltd'. A contribution of \$300,000 has been obtained from the Trade Facilitation Fund (a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank) to provide technical assistance linked to the pilots surrounding the use of these dryers.
- Support to the horticulture industry in Rwanda 2.ESA.D01 – We have joined forces with the Belgian Technical Corporation (CTB) in Rwanda to fund all necessary requirements to certify horticultural producer groups. The CTB will do all of the work linked to upgrading the producer associations and financing organic and fair trade certifications for an amount of around 300,000€. The World Bank is using the AAACP allocation to finance GLOBALGAP certification for up to 30 groups of producers.
- Support to improving coffee washing techniques in Cameroun 2.CEN.D01 – AAACP funds were used for a feasibility study (1.CEN.D03) and CABI of Kenya was recruited for the technical assistance in tranche 2. WB-SDN took advantage of a new value chains promotion program (PACA) getting started in Cameroun to obtain funding for the purchase of four compact coffee eco-pulping machines from Colombia. The civil works to install two machines for café Robusta and two for Arabica in the four selected sites have also been funded by the Bank. To date PACA has contributed around \$150,000.
- Cassava processing 2.CEN.D03 – Based on the results and recommendations given by the French consultancy HORUS in the AAACP (Phase I)-funded study, pilots will be co-financed between AAACP (Phase II balance of funds remaining will finance corresponding TA) and PACA (Procurement of the cassava-processing equipment for approximately \$150,000).

	<p>The CFC involves other donors, cofinanciers and collaborators in the implementation of projects financed jointly with the AAACP. The composition of contributions remains as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Project CFC/FIGG/38FA: grain farmers' access to warehouse inventory credit in Ethiopia and Tanzania. The project is cofinanced by the Netherlands through Commodity Trust Fund with the CFC. Consultations on cofinancing for expansion of the project activities and for complementary support measures have being held at various times with the AFD and CIDA. In Malawi component,</li> <li>- Project CFC/ICAC/33: Standardization of commercial instrument testing of cotton for the cotton producing developing countries in Africa. In this project, a range of collaborating parties are jointly contributing around USD2.8mln. These parties include government agencies (USDA, CIRAD) as well as private sector participants.</li> <li>- Project CFC/ICAC/37: Improving cotton production efficiency in small-scale farming systems in East Africa (Kenya and Mozambique) through better vertical integration of the supply chain: In this project, the participating institutions (CABI) contribute the equivalent of USD992,000 in kind. Furthermore, the project is receiving cofinancing from the OPEC Fund for International Development in the amount of USD250,000;</li> <li>- Project CFC/ICAC/38: Prevention of Seed Cotton Contamination in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali). In this project, the participating institutions (IFDC) contribute the equivalent of USD1,500,000 in kind. Furthermore, the project is receiving cofinancing from the OPEC Fund for International Development in the amount of USD500,000;</li> <li>- Project CFC/FIGG/44: Increased production of Root in the Carribean through the introduction of improved marketing and production technologies. The project is receiving cofinancing from the OPEC Fund for International Development in the amount of USD500,000.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2; WB-Sustainable Development Network (WB-SDN), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 28 July 2011; Common Fund For Commodities (CFC), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 27 July 2011</i></p>
<b>ACP-GIIF</b>	<p>The project is too early to be able to tell but at least in design it was going to be complementary. The project was designed after consultations with other donors, notably international discussions held at the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management led by the WB and involving also FAO and WFP and the private sector. NL and CH also support work of the CRMG and USAID and DK paid the premium for Ethiopia's food security index insurance pilot. Most technical work is done by the WB.</p> <p><i>Source: IF</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>Given the PIP's long experience, it has become a reference for information and a privileged collaboration partner for practically all donors. They have active collaborations with</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ EU programmes: EDES, the CTA, Capacity4Development, Proinvest</li> <li>▪ Member states interventions: DFID, GTZ and CTB (at a global level. There are much more collaboration at national levels.)</li> <li>▪ International programmes: World Bank, ITC, UNIDO, FAO and UNCTAD.</li> <li>▪ Research institutions: Endure, Paepard, CIRAD and NRI</li> <li>▪ European global private sector forums: GlobalGap, GFSI, GSCP, Coabisco, FreshFel, European Food Chain Round Table, FPC, CropLife and members.</li> </ul> <p>They also share information with the following:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ EU programmes: BTSF, SFP, MTS, CTA, CDE, BizClim, AAACP and FVO.</li> <li>▪ Member state interventions: PTC+, Coopération française</li> </ul> International programmes : STDF and the WTO SPS Committee.
<b>BF</b>	<p>La GTZ entend qu'il y a des rencontres et des ateliers. Mais il n'y pas de mariage systématique de projets et programmes. Il y a un cadre de convergence (le PNRS) mais les projets et programmes se conçoivent sans lien avec le PNSR qui devra s'accompagner d'un budget-programme. Il n'y a pas adhésion au PNRS. Les bailleurs de fonds, en général, ne vont pas dans le sens de programmes nationaux. Des projets continuent alors que nous savons que cela ne fonctionne pas. Par exemple, les champs écoles ont montré ailleurs qu'ils ne fonctionnent pas et certains bailleurs persistent avec les champs-écoles. Il faudrait avoir une vraie analyse financière et économique des filières. C'est vraiment un point de faiblesse fort. Or, les choix de support aux filières ne sont pas supportés par des analyses financières et économiques.</p> <p>Comment coordonner les actions nationales dans les prochaines années? Il faudrait des cadres pour voir comment affecter les ressources. Les intentions sont là au niveau du NEPAAD et de la CEDEAO. Mais il faut composer avec les réalités et se mettre en cohérence avec les stratégies nationales.</p> <p>Au Burkina Faso, il n'est pas possible de retracer l'argent investi dans le secteur agricole et de coordonner les activités de support car les projets sont partagés entre différents Ministères. Le Ministère de l'Agriculture a beaucoup de mal à comptabiliser l'ensemble des projets et programmes, tellement ils sont nombreux et dépendantes d'instruments et modalités très diverses. Les trois Ministres gouvernant le secteur rural se sont réunis, il y aurait sous peu l'avènement d'un programme national du secteur rural (PNSR). qui s'attaquerait au support de productions agricoles (pas du développement rural intégré). Le processus a démarré depuis 2-3ans à partir d'une note de cadrage pour l'agriculture-élevage et développement rural. La coordination devrait être meilleure dans le futur. Mais le processus a duré trop longtemps. Le tout serait appuyé dans le cadre du NEPAAD. Un basket fund est en route pour lancer le PNSR. Il y a une énorme possibilité de coordonner l'ensemble dans l'esprit de la Déclaration de Paris. L'idéal serait que les différents PTFs prennent cela au sérieux, au lieu de parachuter différents programmes et projets. Cela ne fait pas avancer les choses. L'UE voit le PNSR de manière plutôt pessimiste. Personne ne s'en occupe à l'UE.</p> <p><i>Sources : MN 504</i></p>
<b>BF Anacarde</b>	<p>Pas de synergies. On peut trouver une complémentarité au niveau des appuis à l'anacarde l-sésame: encadrement RONGEAD et INADES-B (DUE) et support Fondation Gates/ GDL</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Le <b>MR précise que</b> la logique du projet est clairement orientée vers le marché mais le projet présente de fortes synergies avec d'autres programmes, certains de grande envergure, notamment sur l'anacarde avec l'Initiative pour le Cajou Africain, financé par la Fondation Gates et la coopération allemande GTZ. (<i>Source : MR p. 2</i>).</p> <p>Dans le cadre d'un partenariat entre Inades Formation Burkina et Broederlijk Delen (organisation Belge de solidarité internationale), des actions de mise en place de caisses villageoises sont réalisées auprès des populations ciblées par le projet. C'est dans ce cadre que les bénéficiaires ont manifesté leur volonté d'investir des fonds dans la production de sésame. Ce <b>projet d'appui technique à la filière vient donc renforcer cette action et offre une synergie novatrice entre approche filière et mobilisation endogène des fonds.</b></p> <p><i>Source : Rapport narratif intermédiaire p.8.</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Pas de synergies. On peut seulement observer une complémentarité entre l'appui DUE à travers le PAFFIC (aide à recapitalisation de la part des producteurs dans l'actionnariat des sociétés cotonnières suite à la crise financière très profonde débutée en 2005) et l'appui de l'AFD à la mise en place d'un fonds de lissage (FdL) pour mieux stabiliser les prix payés au producteur pour le</p>



	<p>coton graine. Notons que, liée à l'intervention PAFFIC de la DUE, la stratégie commune de sortie de crise de la filière coton adoptée en 2008 comporte également un axe dédié au FdL. Cependant, l'appui du PAFFIC a été ponctuel (terminé en 2010) alors que le FdL appuyé par l'AFD, est toujours en fonctionnement depuis sa création en 2007 et a fait l'objet d'une révision récente de son mécanisme suite à la spectaculaire envolée des cours du coton en 2010-début 2011.</p> <p>Le Secrétariat permanent de la filière coton libéralisée (SPCL) déplore que l'AFD soit restée seule pour soutenir le Fonds de lissage. D'après lui, si la DUE avait voulu fédérer ses efforts avec d'autres partenaires, elle aurait dû participer au FdL, vu l'importance qu'il revêt pour la filière et pour les producteurs. <i>Source : MN 523</i></p> <p>Il en est de même au niveau de la SOFITEX. Selon elle, il était envisagé au départ (2006) une contribution DUE à hauteur de 10 millions €. Puis, cette possibilité a été abandonnée en s'orientant vers les pistes cotonnières. Finalement, ce budget a été utilisé pour le PAFFIC.</p> <p>Le coton est soutenu par la Banque Mondiale dans le cadre du PAFASP (documents disponibles sur le site web de la Banque Mondiale), sur toute la zone cotonnière. Il y a un volet sur :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ l'alphabétisation fonctionnelle, avec une formation sur la gestion des exploitations agricoles;</li> <li>▪ la conservation des sols, réalisation de fosses fumières, appui à la construction de magasins à intrants.</li> </ul> <p>Il y a coordination au niveau des interventions du coton avec les autres bailleurs ; surtout avec l'AFD qui est chef de file du coton au Burkina Faso. La question de la gestion du risque est menée par la Banque Mondiale, dossier sur lequel travail des consultants externes. Il y échange avec l'AFD sur les termes de références, sur les missions.</p> <p><i>Sources : MN 55, MN 504, MN 512, MN 575, MN 599. Stratégie commune de sortie de crise de la filière coton, mars 2008 ;</i></p>
CI	<p><b>Pas d'infos dans les CSP concernant les synergies dans le secteur agricole.</b></p> <p><b>Aucun autre donateur substantiel n'est présent en Cote d'Ivoire</b>, à l'exception des Etats-Unis qui concentrent leur aide sur la lutte contre le sida (programme PEPFAR et Fonds mondial). La Banque mondiale et la BAD ont suspendu leurs opérations suite à l'arrêt des remboursements de leurs prêts (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25</i>). Toutefois, la période couverte par le 10<sup>ème</sup> FED devrait-elle voir le retour de la plupart des bailleurs historiques de la Cote d'Ivoire, les <b>interventions européennes s'inscrivant donc dans une logique d'harmonisation et de complémentarité avec ces partenaires au développement.</b> (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.28</i>).</p>
CI	<p>Oui mais la <u>complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds n'est avérée</u> que lorsque ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). La <u>CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée.</u> Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007.</p> <p>Même si les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale, ils ont <u>appuyé les initiatives de la Commission</u> en dépit de l'absence de rapport annuel de coordination du programme Stabex qui induit le fait que l'information détaillée stratégique ou d'avancement n'est que partiellement diffusée au niveau des Etats membres (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
CI-ONG	<p>Deux cas de synergie ont été notés dans le cadre logique d'action commenté de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Le PNUD a financé le développement d'activités de 2 des unités</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Une étude a été réalisée avec l'AFD sur la mise en place d'un dispositif d'accès au crédit pour les unités</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'action commenté</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p><b>Seules complémentarités abordées :</b></p> <p>Les cultures de diversification telles que l'anacarde offrent des opportunités majeures pour augmenter les revenus en milieu rural. Des reformes sont en cours pour améliorer la structuration de ces filières nouvelles, et reçoivent déjà des appuis d'autres bailleurs (Banque Mondiale, USAID, GTZ) mais, en réponse aux sollicitations des acteurs publics et privés, les fonds FLEX pourraient apporter une <b>contribution complémentaire utile</b> pour améliorer la compétitivité de ces secteurs au pour contribuer aux efforts visant à améliorer la productivité des planteurs. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>)</p> <p>Les interactions avec le projet LICUS (Hévéa, Banque Mondiale) sont très riches : i) retour d'expériences ; ii) approvisionnement en bois de greffe pour les PEPMV du PA4P (<i>Source : MR p.2</i>)</p> <p><b>Pas de référence aux synergies dans les documents consultés. Seule la coordination et la concertation sont évoquées :</b></p> <p>La Commission européenne est le principal bailleur à avoir maintenu ses opérations durant les années de crise à partir de 2002. La coordination avec les autres donateurs se fait donc sur une base ad-hoc notamment avec les sections coopération des 3 Etats membres présents avec une telle section. Des contacts et échanges réguliers ont lieu avec les Institutions de Bretton Woods pour préparer et harmoniser leurs interventions futures.</p> <p>Depuis juin 2006, la Délégation copréside avec le PNUD un groupe de réflexion stratégique, compose de représentants des ambassades et des partenaires au développement sur place, qui formule des recommandations au Gouvernement sous la forme d'Aide-mémoires.</p> <p>De façon plus spécifique, en ce qui concerne les appuis aux secteurs du palmier et d'hévéa, la Délégation a engagé une concertation avec la Coopération technique allemande (GTZ) qui conduit différents projets de développement rural et de protection environnementale dans le sud-ouest du pays (Programme de développement économique en milieu rural et Programme de conservation du Parc National de Tai). Dans le cadre de ce projet, il est ici prévu d'établir un partenariat formalisé entre la CE et la GTZ. (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4</i>)</p> <p>En 2008, les institutions de Bretton Woods ont repris leur coopération avec la Côte d'Ivoire. Une collaboration régulière de la DCE a repris avec le FMI pour les questions relatives aux finances publiques et avec la Banque Mondiale pour ce qui concerne notamment les appuis aux secteurs des cultures pérennes et au Programme National de Sécurisation du Foncier Rural (<i>Source : Rider FA p.4</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Il y a un réel manqué de coordination sur le terrain. Chaque bailleur de fonds intervient selon ses propres approches. Il manque aussi un fil de conduite élaboré par le Ministère technique le MINADER (le MINEPIA ne trouve pas sa place). Or il n'y a rien. Qu'une vague stratégie. Même si <i>in fine</i> des complémentarités peuvent être identifiés sur le terrain (PAPA-PACA) les opérations n'interviennent pas du tout selon les mêmes principes. (ACEFA). C'est préjudiciable sur le terrain et la faute est partagée selon l'AFD entre les bailleurs et le Ministère technique. (MN 401)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>L'action s'inscrit dans le plus vaste programme de développement rural promu par le CODASC (Comité Diocésain des Activités Sociales et CARITAS), bureau de l'Archidiocèse de Garoua qui organise et gère les projets de développement de l'Archidiocèse. Dans son programme rural, le CODASC a adopté, parmi les stratégies opérationnelles, le renforcement des capacités des Groupes d'Initiative Commune présents dans le diocèse, en reconnaissant leur rôle de points de repère fondamentaux pour le développement du territoire. Afin d'éviter des doubles emplois et de maximiser les synergies avec d'autres initiatives diocésaines, les stratégies d'intervention de l'action ont été choisies en tenant compte des priorités stratégiques du programme du CODASC. En</p>

	<p>coordination avec ce programme, qui a parmi ses objectifs le renforcement des capacités diocésaines dans le développement local, les animateurs diocésains impliqués dans le projet seront invités à suivre un cours de recyclage organisé par le CODASC, avec tous les animateurs diocésains. (Source : Annexe I p.14).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>No evidence regarding the commodities in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005.</p> <p>However, the evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, <u>genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases</u>. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions.</p> <p>Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p><b>In each sub-sector of the “Focal sector II: Rural development and food security”, the coordination between donors is exposed.</b></p> <p>For instance, in the subsector « Support to agricultural markets and livestock development », the approach for this intervention will be agreed in close co-ordination between the EC, Austria, Germany, [Italy (IDC),] the Netherlands, Sweden (SIDA) and the United Kingdom (DfID), and in consultation with the AfDB, the World Bank, UNDP and USAID. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.50</i>).</p> <p>The <b>EIB</b> aims to play a catalytic role by mobilizing local and foreign resources, and in addition to complementarities with the European Commission grant aid, <b>will seek synergies with the operations and instruments of the EU Member States' bilateral institutions and of multilateral institutions operating in Ethiopia.</b> (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.47</i>).</p> <p><b>No specific information in CSE about synergies in commodities sector.</b></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>Given the predominant role of the EC in the sub sector then the investments are complementary by the omission of others. The Swiss Government investments do not overlap the investments under the Project. It is doubtful that the other donors will become involved in the sub sector either during or after the Project. It is understood however that the World Bank is involved in discussions with the Government on macro-economic issues, which involve changes in coffee marketing. These are in line with the proposals set out in the Project document. (Source : FP p.12)</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>No synergies have been noted. Most people interviewed did not know that EC was active in the agricultural sector.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 118,</i></p>

<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The monitoring report refers to “other donors” without clarifying who they are. It mentions that there is “significant donor coordination, but no overlap in activities” since the CSSP II focuses on activities that no other donors do: training and replanting.</p> <p>The programme’s financing agreement states that donor coordination in Ghana is generally very strong, due to the joint elaboration by the government and donors of the “Harmonization and Alignment in Ghana for Aid Effectiveness: A Common Approach for Ghana and its Development Partners” and the “Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy”.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 01, Quality of Project Design sheet. Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal, page 4.</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The AU-IBAR (African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources) and the AU-IAPSC (African Union Inter-African Phytosanitary Commission), which are the main implementation agencies of the programme, are also considered as donors for the intervention. As they are the implementers of the programme, the question of synergies between them is not relevant though.</p> <p>Interventions supported by other donors that were mentioned in the financing agreement although there is no evidence of synergies with them:</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, pages 16 &amp; 17</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Peu d’infos dans les CSP concernant cet indicateur dans le domaine agricole.</b></p> <p>Dans le domaine du développement rural, la <b>réalisation du PADR</b> (Plan d’Action pour le développement rural institutionnalisé en 18999) se fera dans l’optique d’utiliser <b>de façon coordonnée et optimale</b> les aides fournies par les bailleurs de fonds. C’est ainsi que des critères d’éligibilité pour assurer la viabilité des périmètres irrigués seront retenus par le Gouvernement et appliqués par les partenaires. Au niveau des structures décentralisées du PADR et de la réhabilitation des périmètres irrigués, une répartition, et aussi une synergie des appuis, sera mise au point entre la France, la Banque Mondiale et la Commission européenne. De même, la sécurité alimentaire fera l’objet d’interventions complémentaires entre la France et la Commission européenne. Quant au financement du monde rural, la France sera en première ligne ainsi que la Banque Mondiale</p> <p><i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.21)</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les synergies sont plus formelles que recherchées. On peut affirmer qu’il existe une <u>complémentarité de fait</u> car les bailleurs observent une répartition selon des critères géographiques (“chacun son aire d’intervention”) et/ou en fonction du montant de l’aide (Source: MN 804, 812, 817). En outre, s’il il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB), il y a <b>très peu ou rien en matière de coordination</b> de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l’application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 801).</p> <p>Seul le programme national foncier a bénéficié d’un appui bailleur assez bien coordonné (Source: MN 817).</p> <p>Une autre complémentarité : Programme FIDA (Programme de promotion des revenus des ruraux-PPRR) (huile essentielles, cannelle, baie rose) est convergent avec les appuis CE à la diversification financés par le programme banane (Source : MN 802)</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La FIP (§8) précise que, dans le cadre de la réforme de la filière, plusieurs interventions en phase d’identification viendront renforcer les actions déjà en cours : AFD, PASAOP (Projet d’Appui aux Services Agricoles et Organisations Paysannes, BM) et PCDA (Programme de Compétitivité et Diversification Agricoles, BM &amp; Suisse). Ainsi au niveau de la FAO une intervention régionale (4 pays, 72 M\$) axée principalement sur un appui à l’industrialisation de la filière est prévu. L’AFD de son côté initie une mission d’identification pour l’élaboration du PASE II (cadre logique, CF, annexe 3b) (Programme d’Amélioration des Systèmes d’Exploitations en zones cotonnières) dont un volet</p>

	<p>important sera la consolidation de la structuration des Organisations Paysannes. La FIP précise que le PARFC s'intègre dans cet environnement dynamique en appuyant notamment le gouvernement pour un financement effectif du coût de la réforme (ce qui élimine un facteur de blocage).</p> <p><i>Sources : FIP, ROM/BCS, CF</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>Co-ordination with other similar interventions in order to encourage synergies and avoid overlaps has been designed into the project more or less from the beginning, and is made easier by the fact that SPC (and LRD) co-operate closely with several donors in projects funded by those donors and implemented by SPC. These include the Biosecurity and Trade component of the PACREIP project funded by the EC, managed by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and implemented by SPC, forestry projects funded by GTZ and AusAID Forestry, ACIAR/NZAID/AusAID support for plant genetic resources conservation and use, and SPC programme support for LRD.</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>The Financing agreement mentions that several other donors are supporting SADC agricultural research activities and will continue to do so during the programme (USAID, GTZ, and AfDB) either to support Research Networks or Research Programme. The financial support of the SADC member States for the agricultural research and training programme will also continue through financial and technical supports from the SADC-FANR directorate.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p> <p>Most of the agricultural research in the SADC region is carried out by national or regional projects financed by international funding. Most of the SADC Member States do not increase their own budgets for agricultural research. Universities and research centre do, however, pay salaries and maintain a minimal infrastructure. Consequently many ICART activities and results are rather stand alone initiatives without substantiation complementary input from SADC Member States. There have been any reports regarding significant SADC MS government commitments to ICART activities.</p> <p><i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, pages 20, 22 &amp; 23</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Within the Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS) process, the large group of donors within Tanzania who belong to the Development Partner Group have committed themselves to a rational Division of Labour. EU Member States and the Commission came together as a distinct group during 2006 to discuss and agree their relative roles. This resulted in the Commission's decision to withdraw from direct support to the Education sector under 10th EDF, where Sweden and the United Kingdom are expected to play a strong role from 2007 onwards, and to focus its core support on the growth area where it already has a policy mandate on behalf of the Member States.</p> <p>The Commission Delegation has regularly informed Member States on its trade and regional policies (including the Doha process, EPA negotiations and support to the East African Community), preparing a number of notes for the information of Heads of Mission. The Delegation has also participated in discussions on Member States' own programming, for example recently in the cases of France, Denmark and the United Kingdom.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 66-67</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is evidence that the project worked to some extent with support from other organisations. Decision to build the two markets was partly taken thanks the support of IFAD provided through its governmental project. In Handeni, the project received the support from the World Vision NGO staff through advice, information and facilities, and was complementary to the action of this NGO. In Ingagala, a partnership has been developed between the market and N'ganda Saccos. This included the preparation of a Warehouse Receipt System (storage loan) for 2009. There were</p>

	<p>synergies between the market and the Saccos that benefited to all market users.</p> <p><i>Source: Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, page 38</i></p>
<b>TZ Tea</b>	<p>In Tanzania, the tea sector is supported by the EC only. In addition, five donors support a basket fund, which finances the Agricultural Support development Programme (ASDP) implemented by the Government. The EC was one of the donors through STABEX; but now the EC stopped support through the basket fund. In the ASDP, cash crops and food crops have been separated. Cash crops left to the private sector.</p> <p>The EU is member of the development actors. It is active in the broader consultative group, with a focus on tea and also coffee. Traditional support of EU to these cash crops (long-term crops) as long commitment/ support to tea and coffee. Addressing the whole value chain is a good point. Irish has started to address value chain too. The ASDP works in this area about market development/ private sector. The contribution of the private sector to the ASDP is important as far as value chains are concerned. The ASDP does not focus on one particular crop; more on more annual crops.</p> <p>A joint evaluation of DFID and Irish aid, focusing notably on agriculture, was released. One of the findings was that the aid was too tied to GoT and missed some niche opportunities. More focus on CSO would be called for and this links also to their governance programme.</p> <p>2009 – Cocoa: projects started to the private sector implemented by Technoserv. Some good progress has been reached in terms of market access. There is no incentive to the farmer to start with the quality. They tried to connect farmers to US markets. This coming July (2011) Tanzanian quality products will be bought by Americans. It is beneficial to everybody: farmers (through revenue) and the Government (taxes). The EC did not support cocoa in Tanzania.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 195 and MN 623</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes but the synergies mainly took place through the multi-donors support to the implementation of the PMA (GoU agricultural strategy-plan for Modernization of Agriculture) than between different interventions of the donors. Implementation of the PMA was funded through a multi-donor basket fund and a EC-funded budget support (because at that time the EC was not authorised to contribute to a basket fund)</p> <p>Indeed, <u>currently donor coordination mainly consists in some sort of task and geographical sharing although donors' coordination (not only with MS) is good through donors working groups.</u> Coordination should be translated into joint actions but there are different ways for coordination (sectors covered, geographical areas...). (Sources: MN 301 and 313).</p> <p>Nevertheless, some donors support projects initially implemented by the EC such as the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance project is currently continued through funding by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and will be further supported by Danida (Danish cooperation) (Source: MN 309).</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>According to the project description “there are a few (USAID financed) initiatives with more or less relevance” to the project. These initiatives are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support for Private Enterprise Expansion and Development (SPEED), which supported coffee growers of the Kamuli District in improving farm management and strengthening their business;</li> <li>▪ Eastern African Coffee Association, which aims at establishing a member network for coffee associations;</li> <li>▪ Agriculture Productivity Enhancement Programme, which aims at building producer organisations for the marketing of agricultural products.</li> </ul> <p>Surprisingly the project description does not make any reference to the extension component of the</p>

	Programme for Modernisation of Agriculture, which has been supported by the EC.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>“During the last 3-4 years coordination amongst the development partners has matured, with the establishment and continued active operation of a PMA coordination group, as well as through the joint reviews and basket funding mechanisms that have been put in place”.</p> <p>TAPs of the SBS</p>
<b>VU POP</b>	<p>The POP2 was designed as a follow-up to the POP1 which was funded by France and the Government of Vanuatu. The POP2 was elaborated together by the EC and France. Contributions also lacked timeliness and delays in French funding had a domino-effect on the EU interventions.</p> <p><i>Sources: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 3, impact, efficiency and effectiveness sheets; Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 1, page 1; Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Project Synopsis 3.</i></p> <p>La CE et la France sont les deux seuls à s’intéresser au secteur rural et au développement agricole au Vanuatu. Il y a une réelle implication de la coopération française dans le secteur agricole au Vanuatu. Les deux secteurs focaux du DCP 2006-2010 de la coopération française au Vanuatu (en cours de révision) sont l’agriculture et l’éducation.</p> <p>La CE et la France ont mis en œuvre conjointement le projet POPACA/POP 2 (2001-2007) en soutien aux filières agricoles du Vanuatu. Depuis la fin du projet POPACA, la France assume le financement de l’assistant technique au service du Ministère de l’Agriculture du Vanuatu (son contrat se termine fin 2011 et aucun renouvellement de contrat n’est prévu actuellement). Avant fin 2007, l’assistance technique était financée par le projet POAPCA.</p> <p>Le projet POPACA/POP2 a permis de créer un effet levier pour un autre projet : la constitution de la chambre d’agriculture. Le projet de constitution de la chambre d’agriculture est financé par la France sur fonds de coopération, dont le fonds pacifique français (40,000€ en 2010) avec une rallonge prochaine en 2011 à travers les fonds de coopération du Gouvernement de la Nouvelle Calédonie (entre 15,000 et 20,000 €). Une demande de complément de subventionnement a été introduite auprès de la Délégation de l’UE au Vanuatu. La Délégation a émis un avis positif. Le dossier est en cours de traitement. La convention entre la France et le Ministère de l’Agriculture a été signé en novembre 2010, après approbation du Conseil des Ministres de la création de la chambre d’agriculture. L’appui à la Chambre de l’agriculture est surtout un appui en termes de renforcement des capacités.</p> <p>Outre le projet de la chambre d’agriculture, la France et la CE n’ont plus de projets ni de programmes communs pour soutenir l’agriculture au Vanuatu. La CE compte supporter le Vanuatu via un appui budgétaire, principalement.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 1005 et MN 1067</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Les sections des RSP/RIP évaluant la coopération passée de la Commission n’évoquent pas la complémentarité et la coopération avec les initiatives des autres bailleurs. La seule preuve de complémentarité avec les Etats membres est la présence des « matrices des interventions des bailleurs de fonds » dans la région, où sont évoquées entre autres les interventions de la CE et des Etats membres. La Commission ne présente cependant aucune intervention dans le domaine des produits agricoles. Seules la Banque Mondiale et la Banque Africaine de Développement le font.</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 90-101</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA evaluation notes a successful example of the education programme of St Vincent and the Grenadines, where funding from the SFA, EDF, CDB and WB are integrated in a coherent long-term programme.</p>

	<p>Otherwise, it seems like possible synergies among different programmes are overlooked.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 28, htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>Palm oil</b>	<p>De façon plus spécifique, en ce qui concerne les appuis aux secteurs du palmier et d'hévéa, la Délégation a engagé une concertation avec la Coopération technique allemande (GTZ) qui conduit différents projets de développement rural et de protection environnementale dans le sud-ouest du pays (Programme de développement économique en milieu rural et Programme de conservation du Parc National de Tai). Dans le cadre de ce projet, il est ici prévu d'établir un partenariat formalisé entre la CE et la GTZ. (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4 CI-REH</i>)</p>
<b>Rubber</b>	<p>De façon plus spécifique, en ce qui concerne les appuis aux secteurs du palmier et d'hévéa, la Délégation a engagé une concertation avec la Coopération technique allemande (GTZ) qui conduit différents projets de développement rural et de protection environnementale dans le sud-ouest du pays (Programme de développement économique en milieu rural et Programme de conservation du Parc National de Tai). Dans le cadre de ce projet, il est ici prévu d'établir un partenariat formalisé entre la CE et la GTZ. (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4 CI-REH</i>)</p> <p>Les interactions avec le projet LICUS (Hévéa, Banque Mondiale) sont très riches : i) retour d'expériences ; ii) approvisionnement en bois de greffe pour les PEPMV du PA4P (<i>Source : MR p.2 CI-REH</i>)</p>
<b>Sesame</b>	<p>Dans le cadre d'un partenariat entre Inades Formation Burkina et Broederlijk Delen (organisation Belge de solidarité internationale), des actions de mise en place de caisses villageoises sont réalisées auprès des populations ciblées par le projet. C'est dans ce cadre que les bénéficiaires ont manifesté leur volonté d'investir des fonds dans la production de sésame. Ce <b>projet d'appui technique à la filière vient donc renforcer cette action et offre une synergie novatrice entre approche filière et mobilisation endogène des fonds.</b> (<i>Source : Rapport narratif intermédiaire p.8</i>).</p>
<b>I.3.2.2</b>	<p>In country, no conflicts, cases of overlap or duplication were noted between the interventions supported by the Commission and those of other donors</p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The MTR underlines that the weak level of involvement of the field stakeholders (IOs field offices, EC delegations) jeopardizes the sustainability of the contribution of the AAACP programme to a more effective Donors coordination.</p> <p><i>Source: Mid-term Review of the AAACP Programme, Final report, April 2009, page 71</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>No cases of overlap were mentioned in the PIP evaluation reports. There is reference to the development of an increased dialogue between international donors in the field of sanitary quality and European fruit &amp; vegetable markets, thanks to PIP's participation to seminars and workshops.</p> <p>According to interview information, there has been a case of action duplications with the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in the past. Such events no longer occur however due to enhanced collaboration with the institution.</p> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 67 MN 958</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>R.A.S dans les documents consultés</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Non car la CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi</p>



	<p>permanent durant cette période mouvementée.</p> <p>La <u>complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds n'est avérée</u> que lorsque ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). La <u>CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée</u>. Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007.</p> <p>Même si les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale, ils ont <u>appuyé les initiatives de la Commission</u> en dépit de l'absence de rapport annuel de coordination du programme Stabex qui induit le fait que l'information détaillée stratégique ou d'avancement n'est que partiellement diffusée au niveau des Etats membres (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Deux cas de synergie ont été notés dans le cadre logique d'action commenté de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Le PNUD a financé le développement d'activités de 2 des unités</li> <li>▪ Une étude a été réalisée avec l'AFD sur la mise en place d'un dispositif d'accès au crédit pour les unités</li> </ul> <p>Il n'y a aucune mention de cas de conflits ou duplications des interventions.</p> <p><i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'action commenté</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>CM</b>	<p>Cases of overlap are not frequent, however there is a conflict about the way of intervening at the level of stakeholders that differs from one donor to another.</p> <p>Problème Programme d'Amélioration de la Productivité Agricole (PAPA) CRIS FED/2009/21465 qui a prévu la multiplication du matériel végétal café/cacao alors que cet appui est également mis en oeuvre dans le cadre du PPDMVCC Projet d'appui à la production et à la diffusion du matériel végétal café cacao mis en oeuvre par le MINADER sur fonds FODECC.... (Source : MIN 401, 403, 407)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>L'action s'inscrit dans le plus vaste programme de développement rural promu par le CODASC (Comité Diocésain des Activités Sociales et CARITAS), bureau de l'Archidiocèse de Garoua qui organise et gère les projets de développement de l'Archidiocèse. Dans son programme rural, le CODASC a adopté, parmi les stratégies opérationnelles, le renforcement des capacités des Groupes d'Initiative Commune présents dans le diocèse, en reconnaissant leur rôle de points de repère fondamentaux pour le développement du territoire. Afin d'éviter des doubles emplois et de maximiser les synergies avec d'autres initiatives diocésaines, les stratégies d'intervention de l'action ont été choisies en tenant compte des priorités stratégiques du programme du CODASC. En coordination avec ce programme, qui a parmi ses objectifs le renforcement des capacités diocésaines dans le développement local, les animateurs diocésains impliqués dans le projet seront invités à suivre un cours de recyclage organisé par le CODASC, avec tous les animateurs diocésains. (Source : Annexe I p.14).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>The evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so <u>as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions</u>. However, <u>genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases</u>. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions.</p>

	Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>ET-CIP</b>	Given the predominant role of the EC in the sub sector then the investments are complementary by the omission of others. The Swiss Government investments do not overlap the investments under the Project. It is doubtful that the other donors will become involved in the sub sector either during or after the Project. It is understood however that the World Bank is involved in discussions with the Government on macro-economic issues, which involve changes in coffee marketing. These are in line with the proposals set out in the Project document. ( <i>Source : FP p.12</i> )
<b>GH</b>	There are no cases of overlap in actual interventions. In the cocoa sector there are lots of similar initiatives to the one CSSP funded by the EC. There are several donors (including MS) active in supporting value chains in different crops. One case of overlap has been noted for a study on palm oil.  <i>Source: MN 181,</i>
<b>GH-COC</b>	The monitoring report refers to “other donors” without clarifying who they are. It mentions that there is “significant donor coordination, but no overlap in activities” since the CSSP II focuses on activities that no other donors do: training and replanting.  The programme’s financing agreement states that donor coordination in Ghana is generally very strong, due to the joint elaboration by the government and donors of the “Harmonization and Alignment in Ghana for Aid Effectiveness: A Common Approach for Ghana and its Development Partners” and the “Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy”.  <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 01, Quality of Project Design sheet. Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal, page 4.</i>
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>KE-PAN</b>	Interventions supported by other donors that were mentioned in the financing agreement are stated below, although there is no evidence of overlap, conflicts or duplications with them. <i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, pages 16 &amp; 17</i>
<b>MG</b>	Oui. <u>Conflit</u> : A titre d’illustration, il existe des tensions entre l’ « urgence d’agir » et le « développement à long terme » : il y a par exemple des divergences entre les bailleurs sur le financement des intrants : oui pour le FIDA, non pour la CE. (Source: MN 804). <u>Overlap ou duplication</u> : il y a eu un gros problème de coordination avec le PSDR de la Banque Mondiale, qui met en place des structures d’appui analogues aux CSA-FRDA appuyés par la Commission mais sans réelle coordination avec la Commission (Source: MN 804)
<b>ML-COT</b>	Le rapport ROM ne peut se prononcer sur la question liée à l’harmonisation au titre la coopération technique de la CE par rapport à celle des autres bailleurs, (N/A) (BCS, §6.2). Le rapport ROM mentionne un retard dans la mise en oeuvre du volet alphabétisation du programme dû au retard du projet PASE II (AFD) (BCS, §2.1).  <i>Source : ROM/BCS</i>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	Co-ordination with other similar interventions in order to encourage synergies and avoid overlaps has been designed into the project more or less from the beginning, and is made easier by the fact that SPC (and LRD) co-operate closely with several donors in projects funded by those donors and implemented by SPC. These include the Biosecurity and Trade component of the PACREIP project funded by the EC, managed by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and implemented by

	<p>SPC, forestry projects funded by GTZ and AusAID Forestry, ACIAR/NZAID/AusAID support for plant genetic resources conservation and use, and SPC programme support for LRD.</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Roles of the donors in the future? EU value added: Institutional support to R&amp;D in agriculture and reducing costs of doing business (rationalize taxation), extension services, information/communication (Ward information centres). Local area resources farmers: place to network with us to address production, marketing areas. Commodity exchange will be also an interesting area to support. Legislation is in place. Need now to organise things together to create the commodity exchange market.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 602</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	<p>No because donors' coordination (not only with MS) is good through <u>donors working groups</u>. <u>Donor coordination mainly consists in some sort of task and geographical sharing</u>. Nevertheless, some stakeholders note that the World Bank behaves unilaterally by developing parallel programs and that ADB, FAO and IFAD did not join the donors dialogue on a stable basis (Source: MN 301, 309 and 313).</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	See above I.3.2.1 on donor coordination.
<b>VU</b>	<p>Il n'y pas de cas d'<i>overlapping</i> qui a pu être identifié au Vanuatu au niveau des interventions de la CE dans le domaine des produits de base agricoles, avec les interventions d'autres bailleurs (principaux autres bailleurs : France, AusAid et NzAid). Que du contraire, le projet POPACA/POP 2 a été mis en œuvre de 2001 à 2007 par la France et la CE.</p> <p><i>Sources : MN 1015, MN 1067, MN 1005</i></p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The POP2 was designed as a follow-up to the POP1 which was funded by France and the Government of Vanuatu. The POP2 was elaborated together by the EC and France.</p> <p>The project's third monitoring report states that the intervention logics differed between donors, that the projects had separate badly constructed Logical Frameworks and that there was a lack of coordination mechanisms between the two donors. The donors each dealt with separate local partners (the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) for the French and the Vanuatu Research and Technical Centre (VARTC) for the EU).</p> <p>The projects aimed at too many Producer Organisations, which proved that they didn't learn the lessons from the first POP (POP1).</p> <p>The institutional structures did not allow an efficient implementation of the programme. And since the French and EU interventions operated through different modalities (focus on commercialisation of cooperatives for the French and private sector support for the EU), it resulted in "double reporting".</p> <p>Contributions also lacked timeliness and delays in French funding had a domino-effect on the EU interventions.</p>

	<p>Later on, these problems were addressed by progressively adapting the Logical Framework (2005), establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the overall programme (2006) and referring to only one implementation agency (the DARD) as it can be seen in the third project synopsis.</p> <p><i>Sources: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 3, impact, efficiency and effectiveness sheets.</i>  <i>Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 1, page 1.</i>  <i>Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Project Synopsis 3.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	No such cases have been signalled in the SFA evaluation report.
<b>I.3.2.3</b>	After 2004, the Commission co-financed multi-donor funds in favour of agricultural commodities support in CDDCs
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no such information from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>BF</b>	<p>Selon l'évaluation de la Stratégie pays de la CE au Burkina Faso, la CE ne vise pas l'agriculture comme secteur de concentration du 10ème FED. En réponse à la crise alimentaire et aux investissements massifs dans l'agriculture préconisés par la Banque Mondiale et l'UE dans les pays les moins avancés, la CE a toutefois débloqué une « facilité alimentaire » de 27 M€ pour le Burkina Faso, mise en œuvre par la FAO et des ONG. Le document ne précise cependant pas si cette facilité concerne des « agricultural commodities » ou pas.</p> <p><i>Source : Evaluation de la stratégie pays au Burkina Faso, 2010, page 47</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	R.A.S dans les documents consultés
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui il y a deux exemples correspondant à cet indicateur malgré la CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée.</p> <p>Le <u>dossier Foncier Rural</u> s'inscrit dans un processus initié par le Gouvernement depuis 1998. Il se base sur les acquis du PNGTER, financé par la Banque Mondiale, et interrompu par la crise. Une négociation est actuellement en cours pour la reprise du programme avec la Banque Mondiale (51 milliards FCFA) qui interviendrait en complémentarité du projet financé par la CE. Un autre appui est intervenu en complément du projet, sur le Cadastre rural, financé sur le 9 ACP/PUR 1, apportant notamment une aide logistique à la DFRCR.</p> <p>Le dossier <u>Réhabilitation des pistes cotonnières</u> est également un bon exemple. Par rapport à d'autres interventions, le projet a démarré dans un contexte de sortie de crise, au cours de laquelle les autres partenaires internationaux ont suspendu leurs appuis. Cette situation a été prise en compte dans le choix de certains ouvrages repris par le projet. En dehors de travaux financés sur les fonds de l'Etat (AGEROUTE, Conseils Généraux), il s'agissait du seul financement extérieur dans le secteur. La composante « infrastructures rurales » du PUR 4 (9ème FED) s'inscrit en complémentarité du projet, pour un montant de 15 millions d'euros, principalement dans les ouvrages de franchissement. Il reprend des ouvrages initiés sous financement de la Banque Mondiale (18) et de l'Agence française de Développement (51) dont certains étaient inclus dans le projet et est mis en œuvre par un bureau d'étude international, sous la supervision d'AGEROUTE.</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
<b>CM</b>	No, there is no budget support, no basket fund and no SWAP for agriculture. Interventions are programmes or projects financed under various financing instruments at EC level and financed through various donors. A SWAP is foreseen for 2013.

<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>CR</b>	There is no such evidence in Commission's strategy documents. <i>Sources:</i> <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i>  No evidence in ECS
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>MG</b>	Oui, d'une certain manière à travers les CSA-FRDA dans la mesure où la Commission finance ces structures dans certains districts et d'autres bailleurs dans d'autres districts.
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>TZ</b>	In Tanzania, five donors support a basket fund, which finances the Agricultural Support development Programme (ASDP) implemented by the Government. The EC was one of the donors through STABEX; but now the EC stopped support through the basket fund. In the ASDP, cash crops and food crops have been separated. Cash crops left to the private sector. <i>Source: MN 195</i>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>UG</b>	The EC supported the GoU agricultural strategy (PMA-plan for Modernization of Agriculture) in <b>2001</b> , which benefited among others crops to agricultural commodities, of which coffee. The EC support to PMA focussed on research (NARO-National Agricultural Research Organisation) and extension (NAADS-National Agricultural Advisory Services) with a view of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector The support to PMA was a multi-donors support (Source: MN 301).  Nevertheless, EC took recently the decision to withdraw its support because of a change in NAADS activities. NAADS core activity was to subsidise extension services provided on demand to the farmer groups by private service providers. It is evolving towards a provider of free-of-charge agricultural inputs; the ruling party is taking control of the farmer groups; extension services are delivered by government employees. (Source: MN 301).
<b>BAN</b>	According to the SFA impact evaluation report, many projects have been co-funded by the EC and the private sector. (but it's not other "donors")  Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 3, 26, 35 40, htspe, 2008.
<b>J.3.3</b>	<b><i>The Commission's support to ICBs has enabled them to adopt a commodity chain perspective and to spread it to other international organisations</i></b>
<b>BF</b>	Dans une perspective d'approche filière, la Commission européenne introduit de nouvelles demandes d'adaptation lors de la renégociation de chaque accord pour un ICB donné qui a ses caractéristiques propres. Mais, chaque accord est valable 10 et plus souvent 15 ans et ne peut être modifiée durant cette période. C'est donc plutôt une lenteur des réformes des ICBs qu'une volonté de réforme de la part de la Commission qui semble être observée.
<b>CM</b>	No information on the subject was found during the field mission in Cameroon.

<b>GH Overall</b>	No information on this Judgment Criteria was collected in the field phase.
<b>MG</b>	Non pertinent pour la mission à Madagascar
<b>UG</b>	Not relevant for the field mission to Uganda
<b>I.3.3.1</b>	The Commission has undertaken assessments and promoted the reform of the ICBs objectives and functions towards: (i) improved integration of environmental and socio-economic sustainability principles into their current focus on market functioning, and (ii) improved responsiveness to stakeholders in both producing and consuming countries and to the commodity market challenges
<b>ICBs</b>	<p>In 2007, EC and the French Government financed a Study (IDC) on the future of ICBs.</p> <p><b><u>EVOLUTION OF ICBS OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS</u></b></p> <p>The resolution 93(IV) at the UNCTAD conference in Nairobi, 1976, called for an Integrated Program of Commodities that aimed at reducing short-term instability of the commodity markets and at dealing with long-term developmental issues. The roles of these intergovernmental bodies have changed over time, from institutions that intervened in the market by setting quota or managing a buffer stock toward organisations servicing commodity communities, including governments but also the private sector from producer to consumer and other stakeholders As a consequence, ICBs no longer aim at intervention but focus on providing a forum for consultations, on distributing statistics and other market information, and on implementing projects. Supporting primary commodities has now become a means to reach out to a particular group of countries, namely Africa, and possibly to growers in the countries for which the export share is no longer a reason for concern. With the inclusion of new issues in the Uruguay Round, like trade in services and intellectual property rights, came requirements on trade that not just referred to border regulation (like tariffs, taxes) but also to domestic regulation</p> <p>The goals of the ICBs are formulated in their respective agreements. Major objectives are to provide a forum for consultations; collect and disseminate market information; promote trade, transfer of technology and sustainability.</p> <p>Due to their intergovernmental nature, ICBs are in a privileged position to collect and disseminate statistics in an impartial manner and to organize the exchange of information between the wider range of stakeholders.</p> <p>The ICBs are to a varying degree engaged in projects. Most of the ICBs rely on the CFC for funding of their projects, with INBAR and ITTO as exceptions. These ICBs have other sponsors for their many projects which frequently have an environmental focus.</p> <p><i>Source: IDC study</i></p> <p><b><u>IMPROVING ICBs FUNCTIONS</u></b></p> <p><b><u>Widening towards the private sector</u></b></p> <p>The widening toward the community calls for inclusion of the private sector and civil society groups to the extent that this has not yet been done and it is relevant. It also calls for voting rights to reflect production and consumption, rather than export and import. The change in role from being intergovernmental to servicing the commodity-community calls for a stronger mandate of the secretariat, with governing councils operating ‘at some distance’. At the same time, member countries become more customers than governors.</p> <p>The independent ICBs have in most cases a special forum for contacts with the private sector. Seven of the ten ICBs have this, with IGC, ISO and INBAR doing without such special committee. The private sector boards, where these exist, function well, apart from the IJSG where participation on the consumer side is lacking. The open structure, as employed by ITTO and IRSG is better than the limited number of private sector representatives permitted in ICO, ICCO or ICAC. IRSG’s two-tier system where the larger group of affiliate members is represented by a smaller group which has a say in the work programme, appears the more advisable form. In all cases, the chairs of the</p>

advisory groups should be given the opportunity to address the governing council. The concern of civil society groups is that the position of small farmers is receiving too little attention by the ICBs, and that this also holds for the environmental issues, and for the degree of competition and value distribution in the supply chain. The recommendations of the study are to devote more attention to these issues. At the same time, it would be good to provide a forum for these groups. Special civil society advisory boards as installed by the ITTO for example, should be considered in other ICBs too.

#### **Adapting involvement of Governments**

In addition to the private sector and civil society stakeholders, governments must participate not only in their capacity as trade-law makers and enforcers, but also as those responsible for the institutional environment that should facilitate trade in the new conditions. This requires not just input from Trade Departments, but also from Justice, Health, Industry, Agriculture.

The challenge is to make the value chains work for poor producers, and work for sustainable development.

The ICBs that form the Intergovernmental Groups in the FAO have no specialized committees. They do have a council, consisting of all member countries.

#### **Adapting ICBs internal organisation**

A clear residual of the ICBs' past is the distinction between exporting and importing members. Typically in many ICBs 50% of the votes is for either group. The adoption of the commodity supply chain concept implies that one should look at producers, rather than exporters, and at consumers, rather importers.

More recent agreements such as for jute and timber already distinguish other factors as elements of the weights, such as domestic production or forest area. The financial contribution can be related to these votes, or in the absence of votes be related to the UN norms for contributions, as INBAR does. It is important to keep the marginal fee for poorer new members low. IRSG's minimum contribution of some €30,000 is high, in most cases it is below €10,000.

The institutional lay-out of many ICBs is leaving almost all decisions to the highest authority, the council. There is only limited use of mandated committees or boards, or a strong mandate for the secretariat. INBAR is an example of an ICB with a small executive board. Council meetings in other ICBs are burdened with administrative matters, whereas the meeting time can better be used for more thematic discussions.

#### **Reconsidering CFC governance and functions**

While some tedious procedures could be improved in the short run, in the long run the governance structure for CFC should be reconsidered. The type of projects done by the ICBs with CFC financing shows a reasonable balance between producer oriented projects and marketing related projects. There are few environment-oriented projects, or projects (outside ITTO) addressing market institutions. What also missing are projects to improve the statistical data collection at grass root level for the commodities in question. Apart from ITTO, no ICB appears to be undertaking such projects.

#### **A better international architecture of the work on commodities**

The present guidance given by the member country representatives in the various governing bodies appears uncoordinated and not quite adequate to the expertise of the people working in the organisations. Collaborative work of ICBs and UNCTAD/FAO would also benefit from more joint inter-ICB meetings on common issues, such as standards, traceability, carbon sequestration, collecting tree planting statistics, etc. Finally, from this joint work, a natural spokesman on behalf of commodities should emerge. The common organisation of the ICBs at present is CFC, but the mandate of its staff does not include research and it cannot therefore play a representative role. In the longer run, it would be good to combine the financial resources of CFC more closely with the intellectual resources such as are present in UNCTAD

*Source: IDC study*

<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Madagascar
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Uganda
<b>ALL ICBs</b>	<p>La Communauté européenne, par la voix de la Commission européenne, introduit de nouvelles demandes d'adaptation (en termes de secteur privé, d'environnement, du travail des enfants, etc.) lors de la renégociation de chaque accord. Une fois un accord produit (ICB) négocié, il est valable pour une période donnée (10 ans en général, de plus en plus 15/16 ans) et ne peut être modifié. Cet état de fait expliquerait au moins en partie que c'est plutôt une lenteur des réformes qu'un manque de volonté de réforme qui est en cause. Exemple: le nouvel accord sur le cacao (ICCO<sup>o</sup> en 2010 a intégré le soutien aux petits exploitants, des normes sur le travail des femmes et des enfants, des normes environnementales, l'acceptation du principe d'économie durable, etc. Cependant, il y a eu une bataille farouche avec les pays ACP qui étaient réticents à ces nouvelles normes car elles induisent des coûts et qu'il faut déterminer qui les prendra en charge. L'accord cacao n'est pas encore mis en œuvre aujourd'hui. Notons également que lors des négociations sur le nouvel accord cacao, les petits producteurs étaient représentés dans les discussions pour l'accord cacao. Les pays ACP ont désigné une délégation de producteurs pouvant y participer. Ils n'avaient cependant pas de droits de vote. Ce sont les gouvernements qui votent.</p> <p><i>Source : MN689</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the SFA evaluation or on the Intergovernmental Group on Bananas and Tropical Fruits website.
<b>I.3.3.2</b>	The Commission has undertaken assessments and promoted the reform of the ICBs with regard to their justification and membership by: (i) re-evaluating its membership in ICBs, (ii) considering withdrawing from ICBs with low relevance, continuous poor performance or very small size and (iii) proposing to merge ICBs covering related commodities
<b>All ICBs</b>	<p>In 2007, EC and the French Government financed a Study (IDC) on the future of ICBs. The 10 independent agricultural ICBs, consisting of ICO, ICCO, IGC, ISO and IRSG in London, and IJSG (in Dhaka), INBAR (in Beijing), ITTO (in Yokohama), ICAC (in Washington) and IOOC (in Madrid) jointly have 136 countries (inc. the EC) as members. Of these countries, 33 are member of just one ICB and the membership of 2, 3 or 4 ICBs is held by around 27 countries. Only two are member of eight of the ICBs, namely the European Community and India.</p> <p><b><i>(i) re-evaluating its membership in ICBs</i></b></p> <p><b><i>Role of EU/EC</i></b></p> <p>Without coming straight to that issue, nevertheless, IDC study provides some relevant information.</p> <p>The Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), that the EU Council adopted in 2006, calls for 'promotion of sustainable consumption and production patterns', and 'stepping up efforts to see that international trade and investment are used as a tool to achieve genuine global sustainable development'. As institutions and devices for international cooperation, ICBs can play an active role in meeting this challenge in four distinct ways: (1) by reducing transaction costs. Relevant statistics and other market information and meetings facilitate trade, reduce transaction costs between the actors in the chain and should improve producer prices relative to consumer prices; (2) by governing competition to facilitate the adoption of national environmental and social standards coherent with the EU SDS and to promote that benefits of reduced transaction costs</p>



reach producers; (3) promoting a fair value distribution within the value chains; (4) supporting sustainable practices throughout the supply chain by facilitating technology transfers  
The issues of competition and the fair value distribution in the value chain have gained in importance and demand closer monitoring, if not policy action.

The EU, EC and Member States are important members of almost all ICBs. The EU is now participating in all but one (INBAR) of the commodity organisations. In most ICBs the EC speaks on behalf of the members states. In the IRSG, the EC is 'just' a member in addition to some other EU member states. In the ICAC, the EC is not a member, while ten EU countries are. In the CFC, the EC is a member, but some EU countries are not. In the meetings of the FAO groups, both the EC and all the member states are member, with competences and votes that may change from one agenda item to the next.

The efficacy of the EU membership would certainly benefit from a single form of representation. The functioning of the ICBs is best served by having the EC as a member representing the EU member states. As the ICBs focus on trade of the commodities, this appears also to be in line with the rulings of the European Court of Justice in such matters. There is a clear lack of harmonization of the EU representation in the ICB.

The EU is a major consumer of all the commodities and is a major producer of some of the commodities. This provides a reason for EU membership of the organisations, in so far as these lead to lower transaction costs between producers and consumers. In this case, EU citizens benefit. To the extent that the organisations implement projects or oversee the implementation, EU membership can also be considered, when the projects' objectives meet those of the EU, as is the case with poverty alleviation, sustainable development and the efficiency of markets in the real world of the commodities concerned. In such cases, the organisations play a useful role in screening the projects and safeguarding efficient use of EU funding. Coherence of these views for many commodities and in many fora, would benefit from having the EU being represented by the EC rather than via the member's states (too).

#### **Role of member countries**

The need for continued government involvement with the ICBs lies in their usefulness as source of information for the very governments, and the beneficial effects that the intergovernmental status has on the reputation of the organisation and the quality of the information they can collect and disseminate. Member country representatives may see their roles change with the inclusion of the private sector and civil society consultative boards. The need to voice the interests of these stakeholders diminishes, giving room to providing a voice to the interests of those not so well represented: consumers, smallholders, future generations.

#### ***Role of other international organizations***

Other organizations and in particular CFC, UNCTAD and FAO are actively undertaking activities in the field of the commodities covered by the ICBs. They have their own governing bodies and priorities. Closer collaboration with them and greater harmonization of these priorities and those of the ICBs should be achieved. This could be more easily accomplished if these organizations too would have stronger mandates and less specific priorities were set by their governing bodies. Joint meetings of the executives of the relevant divisions or organizations should help align their agendas. UNCTAD continues to work in the field of commodities, but has shifted from single commodity-focussed work to the wider issues of environmental concerns, diversification, institutions, standards and tariff & nontariff barriers. The FAO has moved in the same direction: towards more cross-commodity work, and so has the World Bank. Much of the work done by these organizations is of great value and should be brought to the attention of the commodity-specific groups, the ICB-communities. The new tasks that lay ahead of the ICBs if the recommendations are adopted bring more work for their staff, which cannot be done, should not be done, without

	<p>input from these large organisations. More harmonisation of the agendas of work between the ICBs and UNCTAD and FAO (and ITC and perhaps others) must be accomplished, for example by annual meetings of their chief officers.</p> <p>(ii) considering withdrawing from ICBs with low relevance, continuous poor performance or very small size</p> <p>No consideration of EC withdrawing from ICBs noticed in IDC study. Otherwise, the study provides some information and assessment related to ICBs' size.</p> <p>The ICBs' human resources, totalling 212 persons, range from 7 to 45 persons per ICB, with IOOC being the largest, followed by ITTO and ICO with 33 persons. IRSG is the smallest in number of staff.</p> <p>IGG secretariats are very small, often less than 2 persons, but embedded in the Commodities and Trade Division of the FAO. A few ICBs (IRSG, ISO and IGC) finance a part (14%) of their expenses from their own income, other ICB completely rely on the member contributions. IGGs receive a budget from the FAO.</p> <p>Looking at what can be done by the ICBs in terms of statistics, market information, studies, meetings and projects, a typical ICB should have a staff of 10-15 members.</p> <p>Those with smaller numbers of staff leave some of these activities undone; those with greater numbers of staff generally serve large numbers of member countries and either have a wider domain and many projects (ITTO), much technical advisory work (IOOC) or more general service provision to the public (ICO).</p> <p>Overall output per person appears to fall with the size of the ICB however. The IGG secretariats are much smaller than the average ICB. The statistics and market information output for some of them is, nevertheless, at a good level. Their project activity level is high. Studies are small. In terms of meetings and involvement of the private sector, the score is low. Their value-for-money ratio would certainly be the highest, however.</p> <p><i>Source: IDC study</i></p> <p>(iii) proposing to merge ICBs covering related commodities No explicit evidence in received documents</p>
<b>ALL ICBs</b>	<p>The role of the Commission has been evolving over the past 10 years as it has increasingly acted on behalf of its MS. Community competence on behalf of all MS exists for the International Jute Study Group, on matters regarding the operation of the International Coffee Agreement (from October 2002). Similar arrangements have been proposed for other commodities, including cocoa, in future. Where the legal basis for sole competency has been established, the European Commission assumes lead responsibility for negotiations, based on a Community Position agreed in advance by the Member States, and in accordance with the so-called Helsinki Principles<sup>[1]</sup>. Important administrative arrangements (e.g. payment of subscriptions to the ICBs) are also transferred to the Commission. The Working Party on Commodities (PROBA from Produits de Base) serves as the principal forum for negotiation of the Community Position. It produces the views that are then defended by the Commission in other fora (UNCTAD, CDC, FAO etc) whenever there is a policy statement made by organisations of which the Commission and/or MS are members.</p> <p><i>Sources: <a href="http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file9819.pdf">http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file9819.pdf</a>; MN 912</i></p> <p>[1] The Helsinki principles follow on from the observation in the late 1990s that the EU's collective involvement in the ICBs required more cohesion and that despite significant interests (reflected in voting rights and subscriptions to the ICBs), the EU wasn't getting much out of the ICBs. A meeting of the MS</p>

	<p>in Helsinki in October 1999 considered future guidelines for a coherent EU commodity policy and agreed on a set of principles commonly referred to as the Helsinki Principles, which cover some of the institutional aspects of the ICBs with a focus on increased efficiency and private sector participation. It was a first step in identifying the common issues that needed to be pursued in order to ensure a more effective participation in the ICBs. The Helsinki principles:</p> <p>The Commission and the Member States have agreed that the following principles should be reflected in the strategy for future commodity co-operation and in the specific mandates for future commodity negotiations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• direct market intervention mechanisms should be avoided;</li> <li>• the positive experience of the international study groups should be reflected in the future cooperation;</li> <li>• however, future forms of co-operation should be decided on a case by case basis;</li> <li>• there should be a minimum share of production and consumption represented to guarantee the effectiveness of the intergovernmental co-operation;</li> <li>• the private sector should be given a more important role within the framework of cooperation;</li> <li>• the structures and decision making procedures (including excessive administrative practices and requirements) should be streamlined.</li> </ul>
<b>ALL ICBs</b>	<p>(i) Depuis 2001 (accord international sur le café faisant jurisprudence), la Commission européenne est sensée représenter la Communauté européenne dans les ICBs. (pour y parler d'une seule voix). NB. Les cotisations de participation aux ICBs sont payées par la Commission pour la Communauté européenne (EM et Commission européenne).</p> <p>Il reste néanmoins un devoir de consultation avec le Conseil. Certains Etats-Membres préfèrent encore une approche nationale que via la Commission européenne (exemple : le coton). Par ailleurs, chaque accord international sur les produits de base a ses caractéristiques propres. De ce fait, le Conseil doit se prononcer au cas par cas pour le positionnement de la Communauté européenne par rapport à l'accord en préparation. Cependant, la tendance (ex. pour le coton/ICAC) va vers une représentation de la Communauté européenne par la Commission dans tous les ICBs. Cela n'empêche pas une participation active d'Etats membre (fonction des intérêts pour le produit de base et des la motivation des représentants), mais c'est la Commission qui s'y exprime officiellement. Cette évolution lente tranche quand même avec le passé, où la situation était plus chaotique avec chaque Etat membre qui y allait de sa voix.</p> <p>(iii) Le retrait de la Commission de certains ICBs n'apparaît pas être à l'ordre du jour. Au contraire, il est question qu'elle entre dans ceux où elle n'est pas encore présente : coton/ICAC, où des Etats membres y sont, et bambou-rotin/.INBAR. Cela n'exclut pas la volonté de la commission de réformes progressives(ex. où une participation de la Commission a été conditionnée au changement de certaines règles de fonctionnement de l'INBAR) et de fusion d'entre certains ICBs.(voir (iii))</p> <p>(iii) Malgré des efforts et des discussions en cours (ex. café (ICO)-cacao (ICCO) pour lesquels une dynamique de fusion existe, groupe intergouvernemental des fibres dures/FAO – Jute (IJSG)), il n'y a pas encore eu de fusion entre ICBs concernant les produits agricoles. Il y a un exemple de fusion réussie pour les métaux non-ferreux. C'est plus difficile à réaliser pour les produits agricoles, vu les spécificités de ces produits.</p> <p>Source : MN689</p>
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Madagascar
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Uganda
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the SFA evaluation or on the Intergovernmental Group on Bananas and Tropical Fruits website.

<b>I.3.3.3</b>	The reforms of the ICBs objectives, functions, justification, membership, governance and secretariats have been implemented; the Commission monitored their effectiveness and the ICBs work
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the SFA evaluation or on the Intergovernmental Group on Bananas and Tropical Fruits website.
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Madagascar
<b>Overall BF</b>	<p>Une fois un accord produit (ICB) négocié, il est valable pour une période donnée (10 ans en général, de plus en plus 15/16 ans) et ne peut être modifié. Cet état de fait expliquerait au moins en partie que c'est plutôt une lenteur des réformes qu'un manque de volonté de réforme qui est en cause.</p> <p>Notons que les liens entre le PROBA et la Commission se sont récemment redynamisés ; il y a une volonté de travailler ensemble.</p> <p>Source : MN689</p>
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Uganda
<b>I.3.3.4</b>	The ICBs individual commodity strategies have been strengthened as a result of the reforms adopted
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Madagascar
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Uganda
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the SFA evaluation or on the Intergovernmental Group on Bananas and Tropical Fruits website.
<b>I.3.3.5</b>	The strengthened ICBs have drawn on and influenced other international actors working on cross-cutting commodity chain initiatives so that they incorporate a commodity chain perspective in their strategies
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Madagascar
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence regarding ICBs in Uganda
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the SFA evaluation or on the Intergovernmental Group on Bananas and Tropical Fruits website.

### EQ 4 on the Commission's support in terms of competitiveness of agricultural commodity chains in CDDCs

To what extent has the Commission's support helped to improve the competitiveness of agricultural commodity chains in commodity dependent recipient countries?	
<b>J.4.1</b>	<i>The Commission's cooperation programme has stimulated the creation of an environment conducive to increased competitiveness of agricultural commodity chains</i>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Il y a peu d'évidences au Burkina Faso que la Commission a supporté l'environnement global burkinabé directement en lien avec les produits de base agricoles. L'accessibilité à la terre reste un enjeu. Le secteur privé sera prochainement appuyé par la Commission européenne.</p> <p>Le helpdesk (tarifs/ règles d'origine) mis en place par la Commission européenne est connu des autorités publiques (Ministère du Commerce) mais n'a été que très peu utile en ce qui concerne l'exportation des produits agricoles de base.</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Several EC interventions aim at stimulating the competitiveness, not only of agricultural commodities, but of the country as a whole. A temporary EPA agreement has ensured preferential access to the EU market which has been very important for bananas and processed coffee and cocoa products (the EPA has however not had any effects on Cameroon's import taxes yet). The PASAPE project supports Cameroon in the EPA negotiations and in the upgrading of its private sector (compliance with quality standards, etc.). This support is, among others, directed towards agro-entreprises. The banana budget line has also helped that specific sector in complying with international market requirements. Furthermore, trunk and feeder roads have been funded, respectively through Stabex and EDF funds. The Government has also changed its tax policy in favour of the cocoa, coffee and banana sectors (although the link with EU interventions is not clear). However, major constraints remain and are currently not addressed, such as land ownership.</p> <p>Overall, it seems that efforts are made to ensure coordination among donors, but aid modalities still differ and contradictions exist.</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>In Ghana, the EC's main contribution to create an environment conducive to increased competitiveness of agricultural commodity chains was through the cocoa sector support and feeder roads programmes. Besides that, much of the focus was on private sector development in general. However, repercussions on agriculture do exist. The EC is not part of the Agricultural Sector Working Group (and does therefore not participate in the dialogue on the policy). Its support to private sector development (through budget support) did include targets that were relevant for agricultural commodities (e.g. share of non-traditional exports in total; time to export...), but the results were disappointing. The programme's follow-up "TRAQUE" (yet to be started) is a trade-related assistance for issues of quality and standards. The programme will thus aim at improving the competitiveness of firms in the international market and should influence the agricultural commodity sector as well. Indeed, non-tariff barriers remain an important obstacle to access the international markets. A temporary EPA agreement was made in 2007 between Ghana and the EU for it to preserve its interests and access to the EU market (since it cannot benefit from the Everything But Arms scheme because it is not one of the Least Developed Countries). However, several issues remain (no binding commitment from the EU to provide the EPA-Development Package; and problems of regional integration and South-South cooperation in case no regional EPA is signed). The more direct EC contribution was through the EDF-funded Feeder Roads Improvement Programme (FRIP) in the Eastern Region (which did not only focus on agriculture), as well as the Stabex-funded feeder roads programmes for cocoa growing regions, all contributed to reduce transport costs for agricultural commodity exports and thus increased competitiveness (1675 km of roads altogether). The Cocoa Sector Support Programme (phase II) also had an action on helping farmers comply with SPS regulations, through rational pesticide use. These interventions were generally designed with full knowledge of what else was being done by other donors in the sector.</p>

<b>MG</b>	Les projets Stabex, qui étaient initialement concentrés sur la production, se sont progressivement étendus au volet commercialisation des filières d'exportation. Ils ont contribué localement à une organisation des marchés favorisant la valorisation de la qualité et la transparence des transactions sur les produits agricoles d'exportation. Mais ces avancées locales n'ont pas été étendues à d'autres zones et seul le projet AIM est parvenu à impliquer les autorités locales dans l'organisation des marchés.
<b>TZ</b>	The core of the Commission's support to essential related areas to agricultural commodities was devoted to roads, and especially feeder roads. It is also interesting to note that law related to agriculture, including agricultural commodities, has been changing during the period. But the Commission did not support specifically that evolution. There is still a lack of capacities to implement with success the decentralisation process and the basket fund needs to tackle this issue to improve the global environment related to the agricultural development in Tanzania. There is no issue in terms of land availability, especially in the tea sector. As far as EPA is concerned, the Commission supported trade negotiations, but there is no information on the nature of this support.
<b>UG</b>	Of the 7 areas of the PMA, only two, research and extension, both supported by the EC, have been effectively implemented. The five other components (rural finance, agro-processing and marketing, agricultural education, sustainable natural resources management, physical infrastructure) lagged behind. The EC provided trade related technical assistance (notably in relation with SPS).
<b>VU</b>	Durant la période 2000-2010, la Commission n'a pas supporté l'environnement global du Vanuatu directement en lien avec les produits de base agricoles. Un projet de support au secteur privé à travers un renforcement des capacités de trois Ministères du Gouvernement du Vanuatu a été programmé (mais n'a pas encore débuté). L'accès à la terre reste un problème fondamental (culturel) au Vanuatu, et limite les possibilités de crédit au secteur rural. La fiscalité reste défavorable: il y a des taxes sur les exportations des produits agricoles. Le helpdesk est connu des parties prenantes au Vanuatu et est le plus souvent utile au secteur privé, notamment agricole. Au Vanuatu, il n'y a pas eu d'avancées concrètes en termes d'APes et d'accès à l'OMC (en débat); les capacités du Gouvernement restent très faibles. Par ailleurs, il n'y a pas de dialogue politique entre la CE et le Gouvernement du Vanuatu en matière de soutien à la compétitivité des filières agricoles.
<b>I.4.1.1</b>	Evidence that the Government-Commission policy dialogue included specific measures in favour of agricultural business development and agricultural commodity exports based on identified needs and challenges
<b>BAN</b>	The SFA was established based on the need – identified by the EU and ACP banana exporters – to improve ACP banana exporters' competitiveness (or to diversify when sustainable competitiveness wasn't possible). The projects were elaborated by the concerned countries based on strategies elaborated with the Commission to address the country's needs. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 4, htsp, 2008.</i>
<b>CI</b>	Dans le cadre du PIN 10ème FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CI</b>	La consolidation des différentes propositions du DSP revues a été faite au cours d'un atelier organisé par la Cellule de Coopération et de Coordination Cote d'Ivoire - Union européenne en 2006 sous la présidence de la Primature. ( <i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.69</i> ). L'importance de l'agriculture dans l'économie ivoirienne, notamment l'emploi et les revenus qu'elle génère pour un très grand nombre, les risques encourus par l'économie et la population du fait des fluctuations

	<p>des cours des matières premières, les effets de la crise sociopolitique en particulier pour le financement des filières, le vieillissement des plantations de cultures pérennes, la pression foncière, la faiblesse des OPA, la gestion chaotique de certaines filières, les difficultés d'adaptation aux exigences SPS sur les marchés d'exportation et, d'une manière générale, la mondialisation des échanges exigent de nouvelles impulsions et des politiques adaptées permettant de relever ces défis vitaux pour l'avenir de l'agriculture ivoirienne et la lutte contre la pauvreté.</p> <p>A cette fin, les interventions s'orienteront notamment sur l'appui et l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles (secteur hors concentration) au travers de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion et d'atténuation des variations de prix dans le cadre des secteurs hors concentration, le renforcement des outils d'aide à la décision, l'appui à la structuration institutionnelle du secteur agricole, l'amélioration de l'accès aux marchés extérieurs en renforçant aux niveaux public et privé, la promotion de la qualité et le respect des standards sanitaires, sociaux et environnementaux en vigueur sur les marchés d'exportation, notamment celui de l'Union européenne. Les filières fruitières continueront d'être soutenues par la ligne budgétaire banane tandis que l'amélioration de la compétitivité de la filière sucre le sera au travers de la ligne budgétaire sucre. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In the PASAPE programme taking place in the framework of EPA negotiations, the EC is supporting Cameroon in building institutional capacity for negotiations, as well as upgrading the country's private sector (including agro-enterprises). However, according to stakeholders, the choice of sectors and implementers of the programme was not so much a choice of the Government. It was rather imposed by the EC. <i>Source : MN 971</i></p>
<b>CR rum</b>	<p>With respect to trade related issues, the Commission has attempted to initiate a number of regional programmes that would contribute to mitigating the impact of the changes on the global environment and assist the Caribbean in its integration efforts both regionally and globally. These projects have included, among others CULP (Caribbean University Level Programme), in particular the international business and agricultural diversification projects and CARTF (Caribbean Agribusiness Research and Training Fund). However, there seems to have been limited dialogue between the various parties as to whether these were the appropriate solutions in the final form in which the programmes were drawn up. The programmes appear to have been "one off" solutions to deal with a pending problem (gradual exposure of the sugar and banana industries to global market forces) or an immediate problem (e.g. support to the rum industry). It is quite apparent that these pending problems were in evidence long before these programmes were initiated. A more constructive dialogue with CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market) at early stage may have resulted in more strategically viable and gradual solutions for restructuring rather than "shock solutions" that will inevitably have limited impact and have created resentment within the regional Caribbean community. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The principle of an EC support to Caribbean rum producers resulted of negotiations between the EC and ACP Caribbean countries in the framework of negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement. However there is no evidence that Caribbean governments committed themselves to take any measure aimed at improving the competitiveness of the rum sector. The TAPs of the programme read (p.9): "CARIFORUM governments are committed to pursue the necessary steps to put in place an enabling environment for entrepreneurial activity and business infrastructure (...) and providing the necessary political support needed to voice the industry's concerns in world trade discussions.</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>The strategic focus of the Joint Response Strategy is to support the Government in achieving decisive progress in reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Achieving development results is a mutual commitment of the Government and the donor community. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.42</i>).</p> <p>While the share of agriculture in GDP has fallen below 50%, about 85% of Ethiopia's people still live in rural areas where they remain largely dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. In addition, close to 10 million people are chronically food insecure reflecting vulnerability of the rural population to climate shock and environmental adversity. Achievement of sustainable income growth and reduction in vulnerability in Ethiopia's rural areas will therefore have to start with addressing food security through</p>

	<p>productive safety net programmes as well as with reversing environmental degradation. The CSP includes strong provisions for this purpose. These programmes will definitely have to be supplemented by relieving production constraints in the agricultural sector. The CSP proposes to do this in various ways, inter alia through providing support for roads development, improving the functioning of agricultural markets and supporting the livestock sector which offers potential for export development in the Region. Reduction in rural non-monetary poverty remains a key priority of the Government and the CSP proposes to address this by means of support for the Protection of Services Programme or through general budget support, as the case may be. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.43</i>).</p> <p>Recommendation: Ensure effective phasing out of interventions in sectors that no longer constitute the strategic focus. This concerns mainly the water sector and export crop sector from the 7th EDF programme and the education sector from the 8th EDF. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p vi</i>).</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The EC doesn't participate in the policy dialogue on agriculture (it does not participate in the Agricultural Sector Working Group). However, under its support to PSD (PSTEP I), it used a SBS support which used some triggers relevant for agricultural commodities exports: the share of non traditional exports in total exports, the time to export, the time to import and the time to register a new business. On the whole however the implementation of the PSDP which the EC supported through its PSTEP didn't really produce the expected results, the progress towards establishing a conducive environment for PSD was very limited and the indicators followed by the EU were not all achieved; in any case they were also influenced by too many other factors so that any results that were achieved could not be attributable to the sole initiatives and efforts of the MoTI or to the EC support. <i>Source: ROM894048, ROM 894045, MN181, FA PSTEP</i></p> <p>The EC funded Feeder Roads Improvement Programme focused on regions that produce cocoa and other agricultural products. The objective of the programme was to improve market access (not only for agriculture) to reverse the poverty trend. It did not only focus on agricultural commodities, but they were part of the intended beneficiaries of the project. Prior to the FRIP, there were Stabex-funded feeder roads programmes for cocoa growing regions. <i>Source: MN 952</i></p> <p>There is reference to EC and Ghanaian government planning on which regions of the country could potentially develop their agricultural sector with the feeder roads projects and which regions would most benefit from the micro-project programme, etc. <i>Source: Ghana CSP/NIP 2002-2007, pages 19 &amp; 20.</i></p> <p>According to the country evaluation report, the Ghana cocoa sector support programme was based on the fact that cocoa plantations needed to be modernised in order to avoid a decline of the cocoa sector. <i>Source: Ghana Country evaluation report, Annex page 70</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>MG</b>	<p>Peu d'infos sur l'identification des besoins et des challenges des filières agricoles dans le dialogue CE-Gouvernement. La stratégie de coopération entre la République de Madagascar et la Commission européenne découle d'un ensemble de considérations dont la réduction de la pauvreté des populations notamment enclavées qui prend en compte les causes structurelles et endogènes qui sont d'ordre alimentaire et endogène (plus de détail dans le CSP notamment concernant les capacités de production agricole) (<i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.15-16</i>).</p> <p>Dans le cadre du secteur de concentration 2 développement rural et sécurité alimentaire, l'amélioration des cultures de rente et des filières d'exportation a porté sur la diversification horticole, la normalisation agricole, la promotion des cultures de rente et la surveillance des pêches. Les programmes de structuration du monde rural ont permis de renforcer l'environnement productif du monde paysan (micro finances et services agricoles) et ont facilité l'émergence de leaders dans le milieu rural. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.19</i>)</p> <p>L'objectif de la stratégie nationale d'adaptation du secteur sucrier (SNASS) adoptée en 2006 est de relancer la production nationale pour atteindre l'autosuffisance nationale à l'horizon 2012-2015. Cet objectif passe par la privatisation du secteur et l'amélioration de la productivité des sites existants, pour améliorer la compétitivité de la production nationale face à aux importations, dont les droits d'entrée ont été fortement abaissés à partir de 2006. Au niveau institutionnel, le CIF (Comité Interministériel de la Filière Sucre) n'a</p>



	<p>pas réussi à jouer le rôle de pilotage et de coordination attendu. Il demeure un organe faible, qui manque de leadership et dont les membres sont peu impliqués en dehors de ses sessions. Le besoin de réviser la SNASS a été perçu dès 2009 mais est resté sans suite. Faute d'un dispositif formalisé de suivi du secteur, sa connaissance du secteur est lacunaire et ne lui permet pas de mesurer l'efficacité des actions conduites et de décider rapidement des éventuelles actions correctives à prendre. <i>Source : Mesures d'accompagnement en faveur des pays signataires du protocole sucre (AMSP), Programme Indicatif Pluriannuel 2001-2013 pour Madagascar</i></p>
<b>MG rice</b>	<p>La stratégie de développement agricole du gouvernement est actuellement fortement centrée sur les cultures vivrières (riz et manioc). Le développement des cultures d'exportation n'est pas la priorité (Source : MN 805).</p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The project is a response to identified needs and challenges in the region and is exclusively geared to improve the competitiveness of Pacific products. <i>Source: Intervention fiche</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>The EC supported the GoU agricultural strategy in 2001 (PMA-plan for Modernization of Agriculture), which benefited among others crops to agricultural commodities, of which coffee.</p> <p>The PMA aimed at “transforming subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture”. This objective was not achieved. Self-subsistence remains the main objective of the vast majority of Ugandan farmers. Both government and donors draw from this situation the conclusion that support to the development of a market-oriented agriculture should from now on be targeted on well-off farmers rather than on the poorest as was the PMA. The EC support to PMA focussed on research and extension with a view of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector (Source: MN 301).</p> <p>The PMA also included a component on marketing and agro-processing. A sub-committee on agricultural marketing and processing was established. But this component of the PMA remained under-developed. (Source: MN 302).</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Au Vanuatu, il n'y a pas de dialogue politique en agriculture, excepté au niveau des projets agricoles en cours (à l'époque le POPACA ; aujourd'hui en ce qui concerne l'intervention <i>Primary Sector Growth Programme Phase 1</i>, qui inclut une composante de renforcement des capacités pour le Ministère de l'Agriculture). Par ailleurs, il y a des réunions hebdomadaires entre le bureau du Premier Ministre et le Chef de Délégation de l'UE au Vanuatu (mais non spécifique à l'agriculture).</p> <p>Le dialogue politique est qualifié de faible depuis quatre ans. Le Gouvernement du Vanuatu connaît des problèmes de stabilité : dans les 9 derniers mois, 9 premiers Ministres se sont succédé.</p> <p>La Délégation organise des réunions avec le Gouvernement du Vanuatu et les autres bailleurs, pour discuter de l'aide au développement (par exemple : concernant appui budgétaire pour le Vanuatu), mais les représentants du Gouvernement ne viennent pas aux réunions.</p> <p>Néanmoins, les relations entre le Gouvernement du Vanuatu et la Délégation peuvent être qualifiées de bonnes. S'il y a un problème, il y a une communication entre les parties pour le résoudre. Il y a des réunions hebdomadaires entre le bureau du Premier Ministre et le Chef de Délégation de l'UE au Vanuatu. <i>Source : MN 1067, MN 1023 and MN 1059</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Selon le RSP/RIP de 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, des mesures favorisant le développement des entreprises agricoles (par la facilitation du commerce, l'organisation du marché et des filières, la structuration professionnelle, etc.) devront être comprises dans les « Programmes APE pour le Développement » et dans la mobilisation des ressources pour l'aide au commerce. Les besoins et défis menant à cette déclaration ne sont pas explicités, ils découlent selon le RSP/RIP d'une conférence ministérielle de la CEDEAO en 2008. <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, page 49</i></p>
<b>I.4.1.2</b>	<p>Evidence that essential related areas (private sector development, fiscal/tax policies, competition policy, land titling/ownership policies, judicial system, etc.) were supported by the Commission in complementarity to Government or other donors support</p>

<b>BF</b>	<p>The other sectors of support of the EU do not concern private sector development, fiscal, land, judicial or competition policies. Areas of work of the EU are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Infrastructure and transport: which can contribute indirectly to the competitiveness of the sector;</li> <li>▪ Water provision and sanitation;</li> <li>▪ Engery: which can also indirectly concern agriculture;</li> <li>▪ Macroeconomic framework support;</li> <li>▪ Regional integration;</li> <li>▪ Institutional support. <i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 45</i></li> </ul> <p>Le problème du foncier existe. Mais la nouvelle loi foncière, malgré qu'elle soit complexe, est intelligente, car elle inclut les aspects traditionnels (la chefferie traditionnelle). Il faut faciliter l'accessibilité aux terres. Il y a une mise en place de chartes foncières au niveau local. A partir de là on peut donner des titres fonciers aux producteurs. La loi foncière (de fin 2009) prévoit un domaine foncier privé. C'est une avancée intéressante. Le Burkina Faso s'est inspiré du code foncier défini au Niger. La CE n'a pas soutenu (financièrement/ appui) jusqu'à aujourd'hui la mise en place de la loi foncière au Burkina Faso. <i>Source : MN 504.</i></p> <p>L'appui de la CE dans le secteur privé (programme d'appui au développement du secteur privé) se fait avec le Ministère du Commerce. Tout ce qui est lié à la production agricole et aux filières n'est pas dans les attributions de ce ministère. Pour le coton, ce Ministère n'est donc pas impliqué.</p> <p>Le programme d'appui au développement du secteur privé comporte plusieurs volets (le programme devrait commencer début 2012) : renforcement du dispositif public-privé, facilité d'accès aux financements, composante qualité avec accompagnement pour l'accréditation. Ces volets pourraient être intéressants pour les filières agricoles. Il y a eu un diagnostic de l'ONAC (Office National du Commerce Extérieur). L'ONAC va évoluer en une agence de promotion des exportations des produits du Burkina Faso. La CE va appuyer la mutation de l'ONAC. <i>Source : MN 567.</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>In the region of Central Africa, the Commission has supported essential areas for facilitating intra-regional and world trade by supporting regional integration and transport. Nothing however points towards the importance of this for agricultural commodities; rather the accent is put on all other mineral and agricultural resources that are exported by the countries of the region (although cocoa for Cameroun is also mentioned but only in passing). <i>Sources: RSP 2002-2007 and 2008-2013.</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>La Commission européenne est le seul bailleur de taille présent ayant maintenu ses opérations durant les années de crise à partir de 2002, suite à l'arrêt de la coopération des trois autres partenaires traditionnels de taille, la France, la Banque mondiale et la BAD, dont les interventions étaient centrées sur les infrastructures, les transports, les secteurs sociaux et l'appui au secteur privé. La Commission européenne est, par conséquent, le partenaire avec une expérience de première importance dans la coopération avec la Cote d'Ivoire. La période couverte par le 10<sup>ème</sup> FED devrait voir le retour de la plupart des bailleurs historiques de la Cote d'Ivoire, les interventions européennes s'inscrivant donc dans une logique d'harmonisation et de complémentarité avec ces partenaires au développement. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p28</i>).</p> <p>Au niveau européen, l'action est coordonnée par des réunions régulières et fréquentes entre la Délégation de la Commission européenne et les Etats membres. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p 28</i>). Les Etats Membres présents sont l'Allemagne, la Belgique, l'Espagne, la France et l'Italie (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.24 25</i>). Les possibilités de coopération avec les Etats membres paraissent limitées, en raison du manque de ressources humaines spécialisées dans les questions de développement de la plupart de leurs représentations diplomatiques. (<i>Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.63</i>).</p> <p>Dans le cadre de la stratégie de réponse, le premier secteur de concentration sera la « Consolidation de la paix et bonne gouvernance » pour asseoir les bases d'une croissance économique accélérée et durable, l'amélioration de la gestion économique et des affaires publiques en général demeure un défi majeur à relever. En effet, le diagnostic en matière de gouvernance laisse entrevoir de nombreux dysfonctionnements en matière de justice, de sécurité, des institutions politiques, des ressources publiques</p>

	<p>et de participation de la société civile aux différents niveaux de décisions. Focus sur processus de décentralisation, système judiciaire et sécuritaire, finances publiques, énergie, foncier rural, réforme institutionnelles (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.28).</p> <p>L'appui aux acteurs non étatiques (secteur hors concentration) est indispensable dans le cadre de la coopération avec la Commission européenne. La coopération visera à aider le secteur privé, les organisations non gouvernementales nationales et la société civile au sens large à promouvoir l'appropriation locale à tous les niveaux du processus de développement afin d'assurer une exécution adéquate, rapide et efficace des projets et programmes. Ce qui permettra notamment d'améliorer de manière significative la capacité d'analyse, de prévision, de formulation et l' impact des services publics dans les domaines économique, social et environnemental (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.29).</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui pour le foncier et l'éducation qui sont des secteurs d'interventions du programme Stabex et dont le choix s'avère être parfaitement justifié selon l'évaluation se répartissent comme suit :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Secteur éducation : 27%</li> <li>▪ Filière café/cacao : 3,7%</li> <li>▪ Secteur coton : 57 %</li> <li>▪ Filière ananas/banane : 1,8 %</li> <li>▪ Filière riz : 1,8 %</li> <li>▪ Sécurité sanitaire des produits alimentaires d'exportation : 0,6%</li> <li>▪ Secteur Foncier rural : 3,9 %</li> <li>▪ Appuis institutionnels : 1,4%</li> </ul> <p>Les projets, de divers niveaux financiers, ciblent plusieurs secteurs : Education, huit (8) filières (coton, café, cacao, riz, ananas, bananes, palmier et hévéa), Organisations professionnelles Agricoles (transversal et sectoriel), Foncier Rural, Sécurité sanitaire (Autorité compétente et OTA), Infrastructures rurales et appuis institutionnels. A noter également que des opérations sectorielles ont été conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>Le programme Stabex 1999 s'est choisi comme partenaire principal, le Ministère de l'Agriculture et est contributif de la politique sectorielle de la Cote d'Ivoire. D'une manière globale, le programme Stabex 1999 est en parfaite compatibilité avec le cadre politique du Gouvernement. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>La CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée : la complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds n'est avérée que lorsque ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007.</p> <p>Même si les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale, ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission en dépit de l'absence de rapport annuel de coordination du programme Stabex qui induit le fait que l'information détaillée stratégique ou d'avancement n'est que partiellement diffusée au niveau des Etats membres (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>Soutien au secteur privé dans les filières bananes et ananas sous Stabex : ont notamment financé la mise en place d'organismes fédérateurs et l'installation d'une chambre frigorifique au port d'Abidjan. <i>Source : MN 819</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, the EU support has also been directed to infrastructure, including roads. However these roads were transnational ones, rather than feeder roads which would be more directly aimed at improving market access for farmers. Transnational roads have been funded as focal sector under the 9th EDF. In addition, Stabex funds supported feeder roads in coffee and cocoa production areas. <i>Source : MN 913</i></p> <p>The PASAPE programme funded by the EU includes two private sector development components (one on the business environment and the other on support to human capital investments) which are implemented by the UNIDO. The programme is underway and few results can be measured so far. <i>Source : MN 938, MN 971</i></p>

	<p>Beyond EU support, the Gvt also took several actions (tax policy on agricultural products (banana, cocoa, coffee) elimination of export tax, reduction of tax on imports of inputs (fertiliser), special regime for packaging (banana) (<i>source: MN 993</i>)</p> <p>However, the lack of clarity regarding land ownership and land titling is a major constraint for any agricultural development. Indeed, officially the Gvt owns all land. But there are also the customary laws to be taken into consideration. And more recently, people (especially high ranking officials) may get land titles, if they use the land. (<i>Source: MN-407</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The Commission supported essential related areas (PSD, public finance and justice), in particular under the second CSP/NIP.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, the Commission supported two focal areas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ infrastructure</li> <li>○ macroeconomic support (in support to the implementation of the PRSP, in particular support to public finance, health and environment)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Non-focal sectors covered good governance, environment and the strengthening of institutional capacities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, the Commission supports two focal areas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Governance (justice, public finance, forests)</li> <li>○ Trade and regional integration (support to competitiveness and to infrastructure)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Non-focal areas cover rural development, non-state actors, support to NAO.</p> <p>There is no evidence that the support for PSD and justice is implemented in complementary with other donors though the CSP overall mentions that coordination and synergies with other donors will be systematically sought and presents the other donors active in public finance (WB, France) and PSD (EC, WB). For public finance, the support of the Commission will be coordinated to the one of other donors through the public finance platform.</p> <p><i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>me</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 17-18</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p><u>RSP 2003-2007</u></p> <p>Focal sector: Intensification of integration. The support aimed at expanding the Caribbean regional economic base and integration process and to contribute to the successful implementation of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). The following sub-elements for each of the three priorities aimed at building a comprehensive environment:</p> <p><u>Regional economic integration</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Liberalisation of trade in goods and services</li> <li>▪ Co-ordination of macro-economic policy (harmonisation of fiscal policies, etc.)</li> </ul> <p><u>Integration into the world economy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support for participation in trade negotiations</li> </ul> <p><u>Economic repositioning:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improved business environment</li> </ul> <p><u>RSP 2008-2013</u></p> <p>Focal area: Regional economic integration / Cooperation and EPA. The support aims at increasing regional competitiveness in the production of and trade in goods and services and at regional economic integration with the CSME.</p> <p>The support provided is explicitly related to CARIFORUM's economic development objectives.</p> <p>There is no evidence of complementarity of this support with the one provided by other donors in Commission's strategy documents. <i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p>

	<p>No more information than in CSP except for the coordination between donors :</p> <p>In general, Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.45</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>The Commission's cooperation strategy evolved over successive EDFs to develop gradually into a strategy aiming at the construction of a regional integrated space in the CARIFORUM area. It included two major objectives: regional integration and cooperation, and building of regional capacity. Four specific objectives have been pursued with varying intensity over time: (i°) regional infrastructure network; (ii°) trade and productive sector development; (iii°) institutional capacity building; (iv) human resources capacity building (tertiary education, health and environment). Finally, a series of interventions in the area of drugs, money laundering and similar issues were conducted to contribute to the eradication of major obstacles to regional capacity building.</p> <p>Coordination and complementarity with other donors is limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>According to the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, private sector development is one of the region's focal sectors of support. This support includes undertaking fiscal, judicial, legal and financial-sector reforms. It isn't mentioned whether this intervention is complementary to Government or other donors support. The development of a competition policy is supported by the DFID.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 57 &amp; 86.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>The European Commission's contribution to the Joint Response Strategy is to support the Government's efforts to achieve decisive progress towards the MDGs through faster and sustained economic development, stressing regional integration and strengthening the democratic process. It is built around three focal sectors: (i) Transport and Regional Integration; (ii) Rural Development and Food Security, and; (iii) Macro-Economic Support and Governance. It is also proposed to include in the Non-Focal Sector a pioneering programme for the restoration and conservation of Ethiopia's cultural, biological and environmental heritage. In general terms, the proposed interventions have been designed to contribute to reducing regional income inequalities within Ethiopia, as well as to the achievement and maintenance of economic prosperity, food security, peace and political stability in the Horn of Africa, and are consistent with the approaches and measures included in the EC-ESA Regional Strategy Paper (RSP). The three focal sectors and the non-focal sector are closely interlinked. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.43</i>).</p> <p>In the framework of the "Focal sector I: Transport and regional integration », the "private sector development trade" is a sub-sector sustained. Indeed, PASDEP explicitly recognises the private sector as the engine of economic growth. Its strong focus on more business/market-oriented agriculture and export development will benefit from a comprehensive intervention to further build the capacity of private sector intermediary organizations and public service bodies set up to help reduce transaction costs for the private sector and the development of markets (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.49</i>).</p> <p>A key issue in agriculture relates to the issue of land tenure. This is recognised in PASDEP which aims to provide "improved land tenure security with more flexible and transferable rights". Over the last 2 years Government has moved forward with the provision of land certificates which are intended to confirm user rights to promote greater tenure security. Over 2 million certificates have so far been issued, mainly</p>

	<p>in Tigray and Amhara. The Government's long-term objective is to have cadastral surveys and user title deeds. It is unclear to which extent these certificates increase tenure security, being only for user rights, are of a temporary nature and cannot be used as collateral in the formal banking system. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.28</i>).</p> <p>The others essential related areas such as competition policy and judicial system are taken into account in the "Focal sector III: Macro-economic support and governance ». Indeed, the EC resources allocated to Ethiopia will be based on an evaluation of the Government's performance in economic management and governance, against commitments made by the Government in the PASDEP policy matrix. The EC's conclusions regarding performance in the governance area will have direct impact on the release of resources to Ethiopia from the Incentive Tranche. The thrust of this focal sector will be directed to two components: (i) strengthening socio-economic governance, and (ii) strengthening democratic governance. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.52</i>).</p> <p>The Commission is seen by both donors and the government as a prominent player in coordination efforts, having effectively and successfully taken the lead in many co-ordination groups and being very supportive of the co-ordinated budget support around the SDPRP. The Commission is chairing or co-chairing coordination groups on food security, education, trade facilitation, public finance management and private sector development. Until 2001 the Commission was also very actively involved in coordination of support to the road sector. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 51</i>).</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>In the 2008-2013, there is the following evidence: The EU supported public finance management policies along with France, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, the UN &amp; the World Bank. Private sector development &amp; trade projects were also supported by the EU with Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, the USA, the IFAD, the UN &amp; the World Bank. Natural resource management (including land &amp; forestry) projects were supported by the EU as well as Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, the IFAD, the UN &amp; the World Bank. Public sector reforms were also supported by the EU with Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, the UN &amp; the World Bank. <i>Source: Ghana CSP/NIP 2008-2013, Annex 3, page 114.</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>PSD has been an important non focal area for EC support under CSP 9 and again CSP 10. Under the more The PSTEP (€5m) has focused on improving the public sector environment, positioning the public sector for a more competitive Ghana, whilst its follow-up programme (TRAQUE) is focused on the competitiveness at firm level, focusing on standards and quality.</p> <p>The GOG's efforts on PSD are on addressing the issues of financing for SMEs: making finance work for them. Then also linking SMEs with growth through linking them with large enterprises (outsourcing). The third area of action is export diversification (value addition). This is also why the national quality infrastructure is important. Then finally improving the business enabling environment. According to interviews, the EC interventions in Ghana have covered technical assistance for trade (in relation with EPA negotiations). The EU interventions are not coordinated with other donor interventions. Other donors such as the World Bank are much more active e.g. in land tenure programmes. <i>Source: MN 923, ROM PSTEP, MN 134</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>A large part of the EC support to Kenya under the 9th EDF (€115 million) was a general budget support, which allowed a good dialogue and achievements on macroeconomic and public financial management reforms and governance. Continued support to macro-economic policy implementation was proposed under the 10th EDF with general budget support (€126.8 M) featuring in the CSP 2008-2013; support to Trade and private sector development (€16.8 M) were also included recently as non focal sectors of support. <i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 22</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>L'appui budgétaire (prévu à 30% environ de l'aide de l'UE à Madagascar) visera entre autres à améliorer le système fiscal national/local. L'appui à la bonne gouvernance prévoit un appui à la transformation du système judiciaire (réforme 6) (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.28, 29</i>)</p> <p>L'intégration régionale est un objectif transversal à poursuivre dans chacun des secteurs de transformation à poursuivre dans chacun des secteurs de concentration et Madagascar s'efforcera de développer une</p>

	politique visant à renforcer son intégration à travers l'augmentation des échanges et des investissements notamment par le développement du secteur privé (sur le plan de l'intégration régionale et des APE) (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.30)
<b>MG</b>	La CE ne finance pas directement le secteur privé (Source : MN 804) mais finance un centre technique (CTHT-Centre technique horticole de Tamatave) dont les opérateurs privés devraient pouvoir bénéficier des activités qui y sont menées. Certains projets essaient également d'impliquer le secteur privé (notamment les collecteurs) à travers des actions sur l'organisation des marchés comme le projet AIM dans l'Est de Madagascar mais cela s'avère être extrêmement complexe notamment dû à la forte réticence des petits collecteurs à intégrer l'organisation de marchés (Source : MN 806). Concernant le foncier (question très complexe à Madagascar), la seule information recueillie concerne le programme national foncier qui a bénéficié d'un appui bailleur assez bien coordonné (Source: MN 817). Aucune information sur les autres domaines cités au niveau de l'indicateur n'a été recueillie (système juridique, etc.). Concernant la complémentarité sur ces questions entre bailleurs, il a été souligné qu'il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB) mais très peu ou rien en matière de coordination de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 801).
<b>ML</b>	According to the Donor Complementarity Matrix of Mali's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the European commission also supports private sector development. Other donors for private sector support are Germany, France, the Netherlands, the World Bank, Switzerland and the USA. Their presence in the "Donor Complementarity Matrix" does not however guarantee that the interventions are really complementary. Support to land management is also provided by the EU to the "Office du Niger" zone to improve the use of the Niger river water. Measures include a plan of land attribution in the region. It is mentioned that the interventions will be complementary with those of the Netherlands, France, Germany, the World Bank and the USA. The Government of Mali has also made commitments to improve the judicial system so as to promote private sector development. There is however no evidence that the EU supports the project. <i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 41, 89 &amp; 132.</i>
<b>PAC</b>	The RIP also supports the private sector development, and competitiveness policies. There is no evidence of EC support to fiscal/tax policies, land titling/ownership policies or judicial system. <i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 68, 70, 71, 136</i>
<b>SADC</b>	The EC supports transport and communications, including building of roads, for an indicative amount of €41m. <i>Source: Addendum to the EDF 9 - Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP</i>
<b>TZ</b>	In Tanzania, the main EC support has been going to roads, which certainly is an essential element of competitiveness for agricultural commodities. The feeder roads were also strongly supported under the Stabex programmes. In addition, law has been changed for a large amount of products (coffee, cashew nuts, tobacco, tea, sisal, tobacco, sugar, and pyrethrum) so that the boards were no longer funded through forced savings. The Commission did not support that law modifications. To change the law, there were a series of participatory meetings to build confidence with producers. A new legislation came after amendments coming from participatory approach. Meetings to develop the strategy with stakeholders to obtain set levels of quality and quantity for the crops (then monitor through the year). This leads to a big change in the sector while emphasizing on a better environment for the private sectors (small-scale producers, companies, exporters, etc.). They made sure that everybody of the value chain met together to discuss quality target. This is written in the law to organise such meetings to invite all the parties to discuss the value chain issue at stake. After these meetings, strategies have been decided. Now they meet to discuss the implementation. Process of the decentralisation has been difficult due to a lack of capacities. This is one of the reasons to fund the basket fund, which targets on capacity building of decentralized entities. A lot of money was provided to cars/ administrative part. Time is needed to start properly with the basket fund due to the lack of capacities of decentralized entities. Perspectives of the basket fund are little bit different today.

	<p>There are success stories. Phase I of the ASDP is almost done. Also found that the ASDP was too narrow: need to have a global look on the agricultural sector, through CAADP approach. Evaluation of the ASDP is available. Need to have a look. Overall one year was not enough to judge the results and since then M&amp;E have shown some successes and great discrepancies in effectiveness between regions. In the tea sector, privatised companies, majority shares to investors and little shares to smallholders. In Uganda a new campaign to attract investors is launched. Why not in Tanzania? Land is very much available in Tanzania to grow tea. They want to see what is happening in Tanzania.</p> <p><i>Source: CSPs 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, MN156, MN 602, MN 600 and MN 662</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The sector matrices reflect well-developed structures for dialogue between donors and the Government. Policy dialogue takes place in nearly all the sectors (working groups, ad-hoc basis).</p> <p>The EC has not played an active role in the private sector development and in the field of trade and regional integration in Tanzania, but have to consider a new approach under the Cotonou Convention. Transport infrastructure (roads, including feeder roads) is the main focal sector of the EC cooperation to Tanzania for the period 2001-2007. This choice aims at an improved road network while expecting to contribute to reduced transport costs and travel time, which in turn would facilitate economic growth, trade investment, and social integration and inter- and intra regional co-operation in Tanzania. <i>Sources: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 15, 18 &amp; 20</i></p> <p>EDF and STABEX funds were used for the improvement and periodic maintenance of gravel standard roads of the national roads network in 9 regions in the North (Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Mara), North-West (Mwanza, Kagera and Kigoma) and South-West (Ruvuma, Iringa and Mbeya) of the country.</p> <p>The specific objective of the trade and regional integration focal sector will be achieved firstly through a concentration on those key commodities based on the analysis of their supply chain. This will indicatively involve quality enhancement through agricultural research (notably for coffee, tea, cotton, and potentially innovative crops such as bio-energy plants). In addition, there will be support to measures which can enhance trade, for example price risk management systems. The interventions will build on lessons learnt from previous investments, including STABEX funds. For these interventions a mix between co-financing, basket arrangements and project support is envisaged.</p> <p>A second priority will be the facilitation of market access to smallholders, supporting producer organizations in their work to link small farmers (especially women) to local and regional markets.</p> <p>A third priority will be to build capacities for companies and farmers or fishers organisations on food safety issues. In that field, the Commission recognizes the importance of meeting demanding sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards imposed at EU and global level, including by non-state actors such as EUREPGAP. In addition, efforts will be made to ensure coherence both with regional support on trade-related SPS (under the ESA-IOC and SADC programmes) and with a number of relevant all-ACP programmes dealing with SPS challenges. <i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 61,73 &amp; 74</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, support to private sector development and economic reconstruction was provided by the EIB (€ 110 million). Problems of land access are supposed to be addressed by the Karamoja peace and development intervention. The conflict resolution support is accompanied by efforts to solve problems in natural resource management such as land for pastoral societies. Although the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP stresses the importance of improving the judicial system to prevent conflicts, the EU support is not aimed at that (the issue is probably addressed by other donors of the Uganda Joint Assistance Unit). <i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 12, 37 66 &amp; 77.</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Regarding the private sector development, EC is considering the implementation of an equity fund, which would invest in SMEs active in the processing and marketing of agricultural products. Moreover, Danida (Danish cooperation) has established a trust fund whose revenues shall be used to support the development of agri-businesses (e.g. Through the provision of guarantees to bank loans) (Source: MN 309 and 313). No information has been collected regarding the fiscal/tax policies, competition policy, land titling/ownership policies, judicial system, etc.</p> <p>Regarding the donors' coordination, stakeholders highlight that there is a strong coordination of donors</p>



	<p>(including MS) through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Agriculture Sector Working Group chaired by the government</li> <li>▪ The Agriculture Donors Group</li> </ul> <p>Indeed, donors report on their activity in the framework of the donors working group. Lessons learned and diffusion between donors: gaps are shared at the project level and also at the strategic level: all levels of coordination are covered. Besides the multi-donor support to the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture), donor coordination results in some sort of task and geographical sharing between donors by regions and by nature of intervention. (Sources : MN 301, 309 and 313).</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>La Commission n'a pas supporté les différents domaines reliés au développement des filières agricoles (telles la fiscalité, le système judiciaire, la propriété terrienne, etc.) pendant la période 2000-2010, à l'exception de la construction de routes rurales (dans les régions de production du café et du cacao) et d'un projet de support au secteur privé (<i>Primary Sector Growth Support Programme – Phase I</i>). Ce projet a toutefois pris du retard et n'a pas encore démarré. Les activités principales de ce projet est le renforcement des capacités de trois Ministères du Vanuatu, dont le Ministère de l'Agriculture.</p> <p>En termes fiscal, le Gouvernement taxe chaque kilo de copra pour la vente et l'exportation. Cela freine le développement de la filière.</p> <p>L'accès à la terre est un sujet très sensible au Vanuatu. La terre appartient à celui ou celle qui y est né. A la naissance, le placenta est enterré sur la terre où le bébé est né et appartient à ce nouveau-né. A l'acception de Port-Vila et de Lougainville, aucun titre de propriété n'est délivré. Une réforme terrienne s'impose mais ce serait la révolution si elle était organisée. C'est un problème culturel. La CE n'a ainsi pas supporté ce type de réforme au Vanuatu. L'accès à la terre reste un problème pour le développement agricole dans le pays.</p> <p>Le problème de l'accès à la terre est problématique pour l'accès au crédit par les producteurs agricoles. Comme la terre ne peut être donnée en garantie, il n'est pas possible d'octroyer de crédit facilement aux producteurs agricoles.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 1067</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>The EC supports the private sector development strategies which are the primary objective of Vanuatu's Priority Action Agenda. The EC has discussed and negotiated coordination and synergies with France in the sector of agriculture and food security (under the economic growth and job creation strategy). There is no information concerning EU support to reform land titling/ownership policies, the judicial system or the competition policy. <i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 32 &amp; 35</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Le RIP de l'Afrique de l'Ouest de 2008-2013 vise comme premier secteur de concentration l'approfondissement de l'intégration régionale, l'amélioration de la compétitivité et les APE. Ce soutien est censé améliorer les conditions pour le développement du secteur privé. Aucune référence à des réformes foncières ou judiciaires n'est faite dans les documents. <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, page 58</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France). <i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>This intervention directly supported private sector development. It aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the economy and at facilitating its insertion into the regional and world economy through the implementation of the EU-Central Africa EPA. It should be noted that the various activities do not explicitly target agricultural commodities.</p> <p>The mid-term evaluation notes that the programme has not achieved any of the expected results so far (implementation lasts until 2012). It could however deliver the following activities: training, conduct of studies on the diagnostic of the national competitiveness and on the elaboration of a national</p>

	<p>competitiveness strategy, improvements of the web site of the Comité National de Suivi et de Coordination des Négociations de l'APE (CNSCN APE). <i>Sources: Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p> <p><i>Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Le rapport ROM indique que le PARFC se base sur le "Cadre stratégique du Développement du Secteur Coton", (CSDSC) (CF annexe 2) de l'Etat malien, assorti du plan d'action "Chronogramme Révisé de Reforme du Secteur Coton" (CRPRSC, CF annexe 1) dont la mise en œuvre est confiée à la "Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton" (MRSC). Cette feuille de route de la privatisation et de la libéralisation de la filière coton constitue le document de référence unique tant pour le gouvernement que pour les partenaires techniques et financiers" (BCS, §1.1; Monitoring report, p2)</p> <p>Le rapport ROM relève des contradictions. En effet, d'une part l'Etat s'est proclamé prêt à faire sortir le Mali de l'impasse de l'implication étatique dans une filière pour que celle-ci puisse devenir compétitive dans le contexte du marché mondial du coton. Cependant, les multiples acteurs concernés par l'action, notamment ceux de l'environnement CMDT, se voient menacés dans leur existence et résistent au changement. Ces acteurs ont exprimé de sérieuses réserves envers la libéralisation de la filière coton et se caractérisent plutôt comme des adeptes d'une attitude interventionniste (BCS, §1.3) D'après le ROM, cela expliquerait la lenteur de la mise en œuvre des mesures de privatisation et de libéralisation de la filière coton qui serait due, en grande partie, au fait que la communication de l'état financier catastrophique de la CMDT par les autorités maliennes laisse à désirer (BCS, § 5.2). <i>Source: ROM/BCS, CF</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>EDF funds supported other related areas such as improving the private sector's performances. No reference is made however to the Commission supporting changes in the fiscal policy, ownership policy, competition policy or in the judicial system. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 18, htsp, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.4.1.3</b>	<p>Evidence that EPA and WTO negotiations related to agricultural commodities have progressed and that results have been obtained for commodity dependent ACP countries</p>
<b>Overall</b>	<p>The process towards signing and applying iEPAs has effectively taken much longer than anticipated, in part because of EU internal procedures. During this period, negotiations were continuing in all regions with a view to reaching comprehensive regional EPAs, i.e. broaden the subject coverage (SPS, TBT, services, investment, etc) and foster further regional integration, where possible. In this process, upon request of ACP countries and subsequent to initialling the iEPA, the EU revisited certain provisions already contained in the iEPAs (such as export taxes, infant industry, standstill, etc.) in order to include revisions in the comprehensive regional EPA. Requests multiplied as, issues specific to an area in one negotiation were often taken up by a neighbouring configuration. In many cases, the texts are now agreed upon formally between negotiators (SADC, ESA,EAC). As negotiations advanced and issues were addressed and mostly resolved, it became increasingly difficult for countries and regions to sign the iEPAs previously initialled, since they do not include these new provisions. On the other hand, from the EU's perspective, advanced provisional application of the iEPAs, made possible through Regulation 1528/2007, was predicated upon the iEPA that was initialled being signed and applied.</p>

Status	Agreement	Comments
<i>Signed agreements approved by the EP</i>	Cariforum	Signed on 15 October 2008 and approved by the EP on 25 March 2009. Provisionally applied.
	Côte d'Ivoire	Signed on 26 November 2008 and approved by the EP on 25 March 2009.
<i>Signed agreements</i>	Cameroon	Signed on 15 January 2009.
	SADC	Signed by the EU and by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland on 4 June 2009. Mozambique signed the agreement on 15 June 2009. <u>Namibia</u> has indicated it is not ready to sign.
	Pacific	Signed by the EU and Papua New Guinea on 30 July and by Fiji on 11 December. PNG applies provisionally.
	ESA	Signed by the EU and by Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Zimbabwe on 29 August 2009. Seychelles have ratified. <u>Comoros</u> and <u>Zambia</u> have not yet signed.
<i>Signature pending</i>	Ghana	<u>Ghana</u> and European Community signature arrangements are pending.
<i>Signature put on hold</i>	EAC	<u>EAC</u> has indicated it is not ready to sign the iEPA

Negotiations towards more comprehensive and inclusive EPAs have continued in parallel to the process towards signature of the interim agreements. The EU approach is based on the Cotonou Agreement and the negotiation directives of 12 June 2002. These foresee comprehensive, regional arrangements that include trade in goods, trade in services and investment as well as a range of trade related rules such as competition policies, trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, protection of intellectual property rights, trade and environment and labour standards. Development cooperation clauses are also discussed. The state of play of the negotiations in each region is as follows:

- West Africa : Parties continue to engage on a regular basis. The latest WA market access offer presented in March 2010 covers near to 70% of tariff lines and trade volume. The EU adopted Council Conclusions in May to demonstrate its support to the EPA development package (PAPED). Both parties are committed to finalize an inclusive trade and development agreement including trade in goods, development cooperation and certain trade related issues as soon as possible. Success will depend on progress on outstanding issues (Most-favoured Nation clause –MFN–, regional levies, non-execution clause, market access offer and Rules of Origin). Services negotiations should, in principle, have started since January 2010 and other rules would be negotiated immediately after signature of the agreement.
- Central Africa : Discussions on the draft EPA were well advanced. However, no progress was made since a last meeting in February 2009. Difficulties remain on financing of accompanying measures, MFN, regional taxes, non-execution and market access. A Central African Trade Ministers meeting in February 2010 decided to re-engage in negotiations with EU; however, they issued new orientations effectively hardening the CA position and backtracking from the 2008 CA market access offer. There have only been informal contacts since then.
- East African Community (EAC) : Regular discussions on a comprehensive EPA are underway at all levels. A Ministerial meeting was held in Dar Es Salaam on 9 June 2010. A roadmap for discussing and concluding by the end of 2010 on all remaining issues including services, investment, IPR, government procurement and competition was agreed in February. It is essential to make progress towards a mutually acceptable EAC development co- operation matrix. Other outstanding issues in the talks are the "MFN clause" and export taxes.

- Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA): After the signature of interim agreement with four partners, negotiations to reach a more comprehensive and inclusive agreement, possibly including variable geometry, are to continue. ESA Ministers had a first contact with the new Trade Commissioner in April followed up by an exchange of letters confirming the principles of their engagement - need for flexibility and mutual trust - on the way forward to conclusion. The main outstanding issues are the degree of liberalisation and transition periods, development assistance, export taxes, agriculture safeguards, MFN and rules of origin.
- Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA group : After the signature of the interim agreement by 4 SADC partners, the region agreed to work towards a broad and inclusive trade and development agreement, including chapters on services and trade- related aspect. This would address all outstanding issues for which a number of provisions (such as export taxes, infant industries or safeguards) have already been agreed. To help SACU implement its CET, the Commission proposed to align the iEPA with the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement applicable to South Africa. In February 2010, the five SACU members informed that they did neither intend to provisionally apply nor - in the case of Namibia - to sign the iEPA. Rather they propose to focus on reaching an "inclusive" and comprehensive agreement with the whole group.
- Pacific : The last meeting took place in September 2009. Issues to be resolved in the regional negotiations towards a comprehensive agreement are Rules of Origin applying to fishery products and a fisheries chapter, the MFN clause, export taxes, provisions to protect infant industries and the non execution clause. Services would be covered by a rendezvous clause. Given the specificities of the region and slow progress, prospects for a comprehensive regional EPA are currently unclear. Nevertheless regional negotiations will continue for the time being if our partners so wish. Alternatively one could build on the existing iEPA in a flexible way by bringing in more countries and gradually expanding the scope, an option increasingly favoured by some in the region.

The CARIFORUM EPA was signed on the 15th October 2008 by the EU and all CARIFORUM States and entered into provisional application on 29 December 2008. Haiti signed the agreement on 10 December 2009, after having agreed with the EU on adjusting some of its commitments on tariffs. The Bahamas signed a services and investment deal with the EU on 27 January 2010. The EPA Council, held on 17 May 2010, adopted the rules of procedure and started exchanges on implementation. The Trade and Development committee is foreseen to meet some time in the summer of 2010. The challenge now is implementation. Apart from Haiti which is currently unable to ratify the agreement in the aftermath of the earthquake, the CARIFORUM side needs to successfully overcome their difficulties – between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic – to co-operate.

The Interim agreement with Côte d'Ivoire was signed on 26<sup>th</sup> November 2008 and was formally notified to the WTO. The agreement is not yet provisionally applied. Indeed, implementing iEPA commitments would be problematic for ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) still to be agreed and the existing UEMOA CET; but provisional application of the iEPA would allow us to formally agree a solution and manage jointly an alignment with the prospective regional integration agenda.

The Interim agreement with Cameroon was signed on 15th January 2009. The agreement was formally notified to the WTO, but is not yet provisionally applied. According to the Cameroonian constitution, iEPA must be ratified by the parliament before any implementation. However, Government has still not put the agreement on the agenda of the Parliament for ratification.

The Interim agreement with the Pacific was signed by Papua New Guinea on 31 July 2009 and by Fiji on 11 December 2009. Papua New Guinea has started to provisionally apply since 20 December 2010, and Fiji said it will follow in due course.

The Interim agreement with ESA, EAC and SADC countries cannot be implemented before they have been signed by all partners who have initialled them.

*Source: EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: State of Play at June 2010, 15 June 2010, pages 1 to 6*

<b>BF</b>	En ce qui concerne le Burkina Faso, le Ministère du commerce est engagé dans le processus APE. Au niveau régional, c'est la CEDEAO qui est pilote. Chaque année, le Ministère du Commerce propose des sujets de discussions: par exemple, demande d'un atelier sur l'agriculture (6-8 juillet) ; le 8 juillet a été retenue pour le thème coton. Les experts viennent de l'OMC pour animer les débats sur les négociations et leur préparation en ce qui concerne les aspects coton. Une cellule de suivi et de coordination au sein de l'administration du BKF (regroupant le secteur privé, les syndicats, les responsables de l'administration, les interprofessions) est en place. L'expertise est fournie par l'OMC et l'Etat burkinabé finance les ateliers et activités. La CE n'intervient pas à travers des interventions d'appui direct au Burkina Faso dans le cadre des accords de l'OMC et dans le cadre des négociations des APEs. Mais l'UE appuie la CEDEAO pour améliorer les capacités pour les négociations internationales. <i>Source : MN 501</i>
<b>CI</b>	Les appuis sont mises en œuvre par le biais de Devis-Programmes et de contrats d'assistance technique, au bénéfice direct du Ministère de l'Agriculture, a notamment visé à améliorer le cadre institutionnel et l'efficacité des interventions du MinAgri. Quatre types d'actions sont proposées dont un appui au point focal APE/OMC, qui selon l'évaluation, s'inscrit avec d'autres actions, dans l'esprit de clarification des rôles et de renforcement des capacités cibles (en particulier l'Etat) des acteurs autour de filières stratégiques (riz, coton, ananas, ...) et est tout a fait pertinent (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	« L'UE et le Cameroun ont signé un accord de partenariat économique (APE) « d'étape » en 2009, paraphé en 2007 le premier du genre à être conclu entre l'UE et un partenaire commercial de l'Afrique centrale. Louis Paul Motazé, le ministre de l'Économie, de la planification et de l'aménagement du territoire du Cameroun, et Peter Thompson, directeur de la direction « Développement et APE » à la direction générale TRADE de la Commission européenne, ont signé l'accord dans la capitale camerounaise Yaoundé. Cet instrument combine les avantages d'un accord commercial avec une aide au développement visant à accélérer la croissance et l'essor du Cameroun. L'objectif final reste la conclusion d'un APE complet avec l'ensemble des membres de la région de l'Afrique centrale, lequel assurera la promotion de la compétitivité, de la croissance et des investissements, tout en accélérant l'intégration régionale. L'APE d'étape ou « intérimaire » confère au Cameroun un accès au marché de l'UE en franchise de droits et sans contingents, en ne lui imposant qu'une ouverture asymétrique et progressive de sa propre économie. Le Cameroun a exclu de la libéralisation un certain nombre de produits agricoles ou transformés et libéralisera 80 % de ses importations en provenance de l'UE sur une période de 15 ans ». (source rapport AT-Ban) La ténacité du ministre du commerce a tout fait pour que l'accord soit signé (paraphé) par l'Etat : nous avons reçu les félicitations du principal transformateur de cacao au Cameroun. C'était un soulagement pour la filière cacao. Si on n'avait pas signé, le régime aurait changé (source : MN 405).
<b>CM</b>	According to an interviewee, the EPA negotiations do not have any real repercussions for the moment, as Cameroon has signed a temporary agreement to protect its interests. Their goal is to support the regional EPA, with better conditions for Central African countries. The temporary agreement signed by Cameroon mostly ensures that the country won't lose its preferential access to EU markets for products such as bananas. <i>Source : MN 993</i> The EU also provides support to the adjustment to EPA agreements in Cameroon through the PASAPE programme (through support to the business environment, to human capital investments in the private sector and to negotiation capacity). <i>Source : MN 938</i>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH</b>	Ghana initialled (not signed) an interim agreement on December 13 2007 because otherwise trade would have been disrupted after December 31 2007. The regional negotiating group includes 13 Least DCs and only 3 Less DCs (Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana): total of ECOWAS + Mauritania. So all the 13 Least DCs are benefiting from the Everything But Arms but the 3 less developing countries would have had problems after December 31. So Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, signed interim agreements. Not Nigeria because they're more oil-based whereas we are horticultural-based. Nigeria went to the normalised GSP

	<p>scale. If Ghana had done so, only 72% of products would have entered the EU duty-free (canned tuna would have faced 25% tariffs, bananas, pineapples, processed cocoa products, etc.). So on that basis, it was important to have an agreement ensuring trade continued. The interim agreement has only been initialled rather than signed because Ghana disagrees with the MFN clause prohibiting having preferential agreements with emerging economies whereas this is part of their South-South cooperation. It also disagrees with the abolition of the ECOWAS levies on imports entering the region because these are the only source of revenue for ECOWAS which is our regional integration. The EPAs are supposed to drive the regional integration processes but would take away the only financing we have available for that. Initialling rather than signing enables Ghana to get back to the table and discuss. This is not the EC's view which argues that initialling or signing is just the same legally. Ghana submitted a policy statement with the initialling which underlines that their commitment is to the regional agreement, not the interim bilateral agreement. The negotiations at regional level have been stalled for a long time (unlike the 3 Less DCs, the 13 Least DC have not much incentive to see the process ended). The remaining stumbling block is the market access (Art 24 of the GATT dictating FTAs: progressively liberalising all trade within a "reasonable time" which is considered to be 10 years or more if you can justify. But there's no quantification of "all the trade". Ghana agreed with other African nations to liberalise maximum 70%. The EU would like 80% minimum. Another problem is the EPA-DP (Development Plan): a package of supports in different areas that are supposed to help upgrade countries' competitiveness in the programmes, for the sectors that will be hit the most. But the EU has not made any binding commitments (whether funding or legal) to provide this. The heads of state have insisted that without the DP, there will be no EPA. At bilateral level, another challenge was a "standstill provision" which provides for no increase at all on any tariffs, including of the items on the 20% exclusion list (which are not to be liberalised). Ghana disagrees with the EU on this (Ghana says the 20% should not be concerned by the standstill position) once the EPA is signed. <i>Source: MN134, MN964</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>There is no evidence in the 2003-2007 CSP/NIP that EPA and WTO negotiations related to agricultural commodities have progressed and that results have been obtained for Kenya. However, this CSP mentions that EPA is a major challenge facing Kenya in her trade relations with the EU. The EPA will replace the current trade arrangements from 2008. The EPA negotiations will address the gradual establishment of an FTA with a high degree of asymmetry and flexibility, and will include arrangements in the area of services and in trade related areas, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical regulations and standards, competition and investment. EPA negotiations started on an all-ACP level in September 2002. <i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 18.</i></p> <p>There is no evidence in the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP that EPA and WTO negotiations related to agricultural commodities have progressed and that results have been obtained for Kenya. However, this CSP mentions that following elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In the field of development of trade and horticultural exports, the EC has been active in joint consultations with the government, private sector and the media. In 2005 the EC financed two workshops for stakeholders to discuss pertinent issues on EU food safety regulations. The EC also designed a programme to support Kenya Plan Health Inspectorate Service to strengthen sanitary and phytosanitary measures and requirements for horticultural products for the export market.</li> <li>▪ The EC is working closely with Kenyan counterparts towards concluding the negotiations on EPAs by the end of 2007. Implementation of the EPAs will be supported by development cooperation, in particular by reinforcing supply-side capacity and competitiveness. The EC will actively follow the national joint discussions on Aid for Trade.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 24 &amp; 27</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La concurrence des produits européens touchera sans doute principalement les produits agricoles et alimentaires (viandes, huiles, farine, biscuiterie). Des produits industriels comme la savonnerie ou les plastiques pourraient être également touchés. A partir de 2008, si les frontières s'ouvrent aux produits agricoles européens, cette agriculture peu aidée faisant face à des contraintes fortes en matière</p>

d'infrastructures, d'accès au crédit, d'accès aux intrants, de sécurisation foncière, d'organisation... sera confrontée à une agriculture européenne fortement aidée à la production et à l'exportation et bénéficiant d'un environnement très favorable (infrastructures, accès au crédit, recherche agricole, organisation agricole...).

Compte tenu de la concurrence existante ou potentielle des produits agricoles et agroalimentaires pour les productions nationales et les échanges régionaux, et par ailleurs de l'importance économique et sociale de l'agriculture et du secteur de l'agro-alimentaire, enfin, de l'importance de l'agriculture en termes de sécurité alimentaire pour Madagascar, il faut négocier :

- l'exclusion des produits agricoles et alimentaires de la ZLE ;
- l'élaboration d'une clause de sauvegarde spéciale conforme aux règles de l'OMC, pouvant être mise en œuvre en cas de forte hausse des importations de produits européens ou de forte baisse des prix des produits importés et permettant l'augmentation de la protection, même au-delà des taux plafond définis dans le cadre de l'Accord agricole, pour les produits agricoles et alimentaires ;
- l'évaluation des effets de la PAC et des réformes envisagées (ex ante) sur les exportations de produits européens vers le marché malgache et la nécessité de mise en cohérence de la PAC avec la politique européenne de développement ;
- la poursuite du soutien de l'Union Européenne en matière de développement rural et de politique de sécurité alimentaire ;
- la poursuite du soutien de l'Union Européenne en matière d'infrastructures routières ;
- le développement de soutien en matière de mises aux normes et de traçabilité (Programmes PIP et Trade.Com) ;
- la mobilisation des lignes de financement de la BEI, concernant les investissements en particulier dans le secteur de la transformation de viande.

Pour l'ensemble des produits :

- l'élaboration de clauses de sauvegarde appropriées pour les produits non-agricoles ;
- la possibilité d'user des clauses de sauvegarde définies dans le cadre des Accords de l'OMC en cas de dégradation de la balance des paiements et pour protéger des industries naissantes ;
- le soutien de l'UE pour le contrôle des importations, notamment en ce qui concerne les normes sanitaires, pour éviter que Madagascar ne soit le débouché pour des produits dangereux pour la santé ou pour l'environnement ;
- la mise en place d'un suivi de l'ouverture du marché (système d'information fiable) et de ses effets sur l'ensemble des productions locales et sur les échanges régionaux ;
- sur la base des informations provenant du suivi, la possibilité d'exclure temporairement certains produits de la ZLE ;
- le financement de la réalisation d'études plus fines concernant la concurrence des produits européens sur le marché malgache et sur les marchés régionaux (COI et COMESA), notamment concernant les produits agricoles et alimentaires, en particulier pour l'huile, les pommes de terre et les oignons, mais aussi des produits non agricoles qui n'ont pas été abordés dans l'étude et qui peuvent avoir un intérêt économique et social important pour Madagascar (savonnerie, plastiques...).

*Source : Etude d'impact des APE pour Madagascar (2004)*

Non. Les négociations APE sont quasi bloquées.

APE : Madagascar a signé l'APE intérimaire avec négociations complétées sur trois domaines : accès au marché, pêche, coopération au développement. Restaient à négocier trois domaines dont l'agriculture qui avait l'objet d'un texte. Les négociations sont quasi bloquées. Les pays du COMESA demandent des fonds de développement supplémentaires. A noter que pour Madagascar les échanges régionaux restent marginaux (4%) (Source : MN 803).

	<p>De plus, dans le cadre des APE, les produits agricoles étant considérés comme les produits les plus exposés à la concurrence européenne pourraient conserver une certaine protection.</p> <p>A noter que la politique commerciale (OMC, etc.) est sous la responsabilité de l'UPDR (Unité de Politique de Développement Rural) conjointement avec le ministère du commerce. C'est une activité relativement récente pour UPDR. Un cadre de l'UPDR est spécialisé dans ce domaine. Un assistant technique a été fourni par l'AFD (Source : MN 805).</p> <p>Le Ministère du Commerce a continué à suivre les négociations APE et des représentants de Madagascar ont assisté aux réunions, lorsque le pays a été invité, comme cela a été le cas pour la réunion d'Harare des 13 -15 décembre 2010. Cependant, suite à l'arrêt des financements STABEX, le ministère du commerce n'organise plus régulièrement les réunions de restitution des négociations qui permettaient aux différentes parties prenantes (secteur privé, ministères concernés, société civile) d'être informés sur les derniers développements des négociations. Les moyens nécessaires étant limités (disponibilité d'une salle, envoi d'invitations et reproduction de documents), la contrainte n'est pas d'ordre financier. <i>Source : Rapport Stabex 2010</i></p>	
<b>PAC</b>	DATE	EVENT related to trade issues in the PACP region
	1994	Melanesian Spearhead Group formed (PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu. New Caledonia is observer).
	1995	Lomé IV bis signed in Mauritius. Trade provisions of Lomé IV remain in force to end 2007.
		WTO created. GATT ends.
	1996	WTO Singapore Ministerial Meeting raises issues of investment, competition, procurement and trade facilitation.
	1997	Integrated Framework (IF) introduced to promote incorporation of trade issues in policies and strategies of LDCs and in PRSPs.
	1999	Protestors disrupt WTO summit in Seattle.
	2000	June: Cotonou Agreement signed.
		Millennium Development Goals launched.
		Demonstrations in Washington over globalisation.
	2001	Doha Development Agenda established.
	2002	27 September: Launch of EPA negotiations, as scheduled in Cotonou Agreement.
		October: Pacific RSP/RIP signed.
		WB study of 'Globalisation, Growth and Poverty'.
		Oxfam launches 'Make Trade Fair' campaign.
	2003	ACP Council of Ministers and EC Commissioners for Trade, Development and Humanitarian Aid adopts Joint Declaration and a Joint Report as basis for regional negotiations.
		1 March: EC Trade Commissioner (Pascal Lamy) speaks in St Lucia on 'Small Economies in a Globalised World: A European Perspective'.
		April: PICTA (Pacific Islands Countries Trade Agreement) comes into force in Pacific. 10 countries have signed up to November 2005.
		PACER (Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations): 11 countries have ratified up to November 2005.
		WTO talks in Cancun collapse over farm subsidies.
	2004	10 September: Pacific EPA negotiations launched officially.
		Stage I: October 2004-December 2006: Substantive negotiations.
		June: Tuna Convention signed. EU admitted as member in December 2004.
		WTO rules against EU sugar subsidies.



	<p>Framework Agreement in Geneva on Doha Agenda. 3 ‘Singapore issues’ taken off the agenda.</p>
2005	<p>July: Negotiating session on Pacific EPAs. (Senior officials) (3 originally scheduled for year).</p> <p>March: Technical EPA meeting held in Port Moresby.</p> <p>Pacific Plan for Regional Cooperation and Integration adopted at Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) meeting.</p> <p>October: Melanesian Spearhead Group revised agreement, WTO compatible.</p> <p>WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong edges forward Doha Development Agenda.</p> <p>March: UK DTI and DFID indicate reservations about EPAs.</p>
2006	<p>March: Negotiating session on Pacific EPAs. (Senior officials)</p>
2007	<p>EPA Negotiations Stage II scheduled: January 2007-December 2007. Final negotiations to produce binding text.</p> <p>July: Failure in Geneva to reach agreement on advancing the Doha Development Agenda</p>
	<p><i>Source: EQ 5 – TABLE 5.12: CHRONOLOGY OF TRADE EVENTS 1994-2007, page 67, 68 of Annex 9 of the Evaluation of the Commission’s support to the ACP Pacific region, 2007</i></p> <p>The Pacific evaluation report (2007) states that regional economic integration has been strongly supported by the Commission through supporting the development of a regional institutional capacity, trade negotiations and trade-related technical assistance.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission’s support to the ACP Pacific region, 2007, page 33.</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>The SADC 2002-2007 RSP/RIP mentions that the EC response strategy includes support to Regional Integration and Trade, include preparation to the future EPA and WTO negotiations, as well as implementation of EPAs. Particular attention is paid to the development of the region’s supply capacity. No result in terms of progression in EPA and WTO is mentioned in the strategy paper, but it is underlined that the SADC region is accelerating work related to Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures within the region. <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, pages 19&amp;27</i></p> <p>SADC has produced and transmitted to the EC a framework document for the SADC EPA. However, the scope of what should be negotiated within an EPA has still not been established.</p> <p>The evaluation team has underlined from country visits that regional integration is not considered as a strategic factor in developing programmes at country level. It is mentioned that there is a mechanistic, bureaucratic approach taken to “trade” with little appreciation of national self-interest and the strategic trade-offs which the different negotiations will imply for the SADC Member States.</p> <p>Without capacity at the country level to absorb analysis, it is likely that if the EPA Support Programme only provides intelligence on the EPA at the regional level it will have no impact and not enhance decision making in the SADC Member States. The capacity of the decision making process has to be enhanced at the country level through country programme support. <i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to SADC, October 2007, page 31</i></p> <p>The SADC 2008-2013 RSP/RIP mentions that some advancements of the SADC region in EPA negotiations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In the case of sugar, the EC has tabled an action plan on accompanying measures for ACP countries covered by the Sugar Protocol (in the SADC region: Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe;</li> <li>▪ there is in principle a strong potential for synergy between EPA and the regional economic integration agenda and the opportunity for the RIP to support that synergy;</li> <li>▪ In 2008, 6 countries (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles) were</li> </ul>

	<p>negotiating the EPA within the Eastern and Southern Africa group (ESA), Tanzania within the Eastern African Community (EAC) and DRC with the Central Africa configuration.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ At the end of 2007, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and Mozambique initialled an Interim SADC EPA with the EC (negotiations are ongoing) with the aim to conclude a full EPA by the end of 2008.</li> </ul> <p>The EC has supported SADC EPA Facility (€6.5 m) in order to assist SADC countries in the preparation and conduct of the negotiations of an EPA with the EU.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, pages 21&amp;22 and Annex 6</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>As Tanzania is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and is part of the SADC EPA negotiations, it is benefiting and may benefit in the future from several EC-funded projects implemented at SADC level. Among the main ongoing actions are the SADC Trade in Services project (€1.09 million), the SADC EPA Facility (€7.5 million), the SADC SQAM Programme in the fields of quality and TBT (€14.2 million) and the SADC Customs modernisation programme (€18 million). Projects under preparation include the SADC Maximum residual level project (€7.5 million), the SADC capacity building programme (€10 million) and the Support to the implementation of the SADC Financial and Investment protocol.</p> <p>EC-supported technical assistance has driven forward institutional reform in the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, not least to ensure maximum participation of stakeholders (including non-state actors) in the development of policy towards the multilateral system and as part of the SADC EPA negotiations. However, there is still significant further progress to be made if Tanzania is to be able to address the many negotiating and programming challenges it faces within the Multilateral Trading System. The Commission seeks to learn from the lessons of programmes already undertaken elsewhere, such as KEPLOTRADE in Kenya, which provided a combination of training, research, communications support and long-term advisers on trade policy and project management. Special emphasis will be put in this support on trade-related issues, where several necessary regulatory reforms highlighted in the DTIS will become even more important to accompany the implementation of the expected EPA, e.g. in trade facilitation (customs reform). This is also the case for intellectual property rights, more particularly in the field of geographic indications. COSOTA, the Copyright Society of Tanzania, an agency under the Ministry of Trade, has indeed already requested EDF support for their fight against piracy. Dialogue on these issues and other trade-related measures in the governance commitments, will be an important priority.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 66 &amp; 74</i></p> <p>Even if there is limited human resource, the EC Delegation of Tanzania plays a proactive role in coordinating donors to the East African Community (EAC). It also helps the EAC Secretariat by building its capacity to meet the challenges of its ambitious mandate. An effective policy dialogue has also emerged over the past years and there is no discernible deceleration.</p> <p>In fact the EC has recently (2006) taken a proactive role in trade and regional integration in two main ways:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) developing the Government's capacity to design trade policies and to negotiate trade agreements, and initiating policy dialogue on these issues;</li> <li>2) encouraging donors to prepare an institutional diagnosis with a view to collecting contributions to basket fund support.</li> </ol> <p>While not being heavy, financial support within Tanzania has focused on technical assistance and capacity building, especially within the Ministry of Trade and Industries and dealing with EPA and WTO negotiations.</p> <p>The Government has made a significant effort in the last year to improve coordination of trade. The establishment of the National EPA Technical Team is crucial to that. <i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to the United Republic of Tanzania, April 2006, pages 40 41 and 56.</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	EDF funds have been used for trade negotiations including for those relating to export agricultural

	<p>commodities but no details were obtained except that support to EPA negotiations included capacity building and that some researches related to negotiations were conducted. Anything dealing with regional integration (training, etc.) was included in the support. <i>Source: MN601</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Negotiations started in 2002/03 in the framework of a very large geographic group. In 2005 Uganda (chair at that time) suggested negotiating within the narrower framework of the East African Community. Interim Agreement has been signed shortly before the deadline of end-2007. EU offered quota free tax free access to the European market except for some agricultural products (sugar and rice).</p> <p>Then three issues came up</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Export taxes: some ESA (Eastern and Southern African) countries requested that all export taxes should be removed from the agreement; EC did not agree because this would lead to a lack of predictability;</li> <li>▪ MFN (Most favored nation) clause: EU demands that if an ESA country enters into an agreement with a third country (e.g. China or India) offering better conditions, the EU is granted the same conditions;</li> <li>▪ Development cooperation: ESA countries request development aid; EC says that this is included in the EDF envelope.</li> </ul> <p>The last negotiation meeting took place in June 2010. The EC proposed a fast track approach with the view of signing the agreement in September 2010, but this attempt failed. Exclusion of agricultural products from the Agreement allows ESA countries to protect all their main commodities, and there is no restriction for them to exporting to the EU (provided SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) conditions are met). Currently the trade negotiations are frozen but it is not a contentious matter. It could become contentious if the agreement was not concluded in a reasonable time frame and if the EC retaliated through restrictions to access to the EU market. (Source : MN 302).</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Goods are exported under the Cotonou agreement. For Vanuatu there is market access for few commodities. Major exports for cocoa and copra are from Vanuatu to Asia. Because of distances, logistics and transport costs. However, there is good potential in Vanuatu to export more agricultural commodities. But Vanuatu faces issues in terms of SPS measures to export to the EU (e.g. for kava). There is also a good potential for coconut exports. There are main challenges in Vanuatu: the distance with the markets, including inside the islands, and the SPS requirements to export to the EU. The MTS programme should finance scientists to check quality of products to meet standards. The Vanuatu's Ambassador in Brussels is negotiating that support in Brussels at that moment. Vanuatu tries to get assistance to export kava to the EU. As far as EPA are concerned, a package is ready in Vanuatu to start the negotiations in Fiji with the Forum. However the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade does not agree on tariffs. The Ministry of Trade wants tariffs on imports from the EU in order to protect the Vanuatu's economy, notably in the fishery sector. The Ministry of Trade agrees however to stop taxing EU products that are not produced locally. No tariff on such goods is needed to facilitate access of the population to such products not produced in Vanuatu. The Ministry of Finance does not want to liberalize because it means that there will be large losses for the Government. WTO position of Vanuatu is still under discussion in the country. At the moment, Vanuatu is an observer at WTO. The Ministry of Trade mentions that they want to access to WTO. Commitments are OK. But the civil society and the private sector disagree to access to WTO. The Ministry of Trade explained the WTO package to the private sector. Vanuatu needs to comply with WTO rules. There is no other way to do. The private sector is still complaining about competition issues. They are protected for a long period and do not want to lose that protection. In Vanuatu duties are in average at 15%. UNCTAD helps Vanuatu to prepare itself to WTO negotiations. Training have been organised through the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). But training provided (one day only for Jimmy Rantes) is not sufficient to be prepared to negotiate WTO. This training dealt with the building of trade statistics database.</p> <p>In Vanuatu the company LAPITA café is assisted by the regional programme FACT. This company is a food-processing company (nuts, cassava, etc.). It is located in port Vila. Results obtained so far are progressing well. There is still a need to upgrade the facility work to get the certification to be able to</p>

export. There is an interesting link with small-scale farmers. The certification will be good for farmers in Vanuatu. *Source: MN 1011*

According to the Addendum to the Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2007 signed on 23 March 2006 by the European Commission and the Pacific ACP Region, € 6 million were added to the focal sector “Regional Economic Integration (allocation in December 2005 was € 9.2 million, and thus became € 15.2 million after the signed Addendum). This additional support under the Pacific Indicative Programme was broken down as follows:

- €2 million top up to component 2 of the Pacific Regional Economic Integration Programme (Capacity Building for EPA Negotiations);
- €4 million for an Agricultural Export Commodity Development programme to consolidate the results and build on the 8-9<sup>th</sup> EDF Plant Protection Programme.

*Source: Addendum to the Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2007, 23 March 2006*

The *Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS)* based in Suva is the Forum’s administrative arm. The Forum Secretariat implements projects and programmes of assistance (e.g. related to trade and economic integration), including those financed by the European Community. It is therefore the central body for regional coordination and cooperation. As far as the EU is concerned, it also assumes the function of Regional Authorising Officer for the Pacific Regional Indicative Programme and provides technical and logistic support to the Pacific ACP for EPA negotiations.

The Pacific Region’s comprehensive cooperation and integration goals from 2006 to 2015 have been set out in the *Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration*. This Plan sets out political commitments to stimulate economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security. Regional economic integration is identified as one of the means of achieving regional outcomes.

One of the Pacific Plan’s current economic cooperation and integration objectives is related to EPA: “Integrate trade in services, including the temporary movement of persons into the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) and the EPA”. It is important to note that the Pacific ACP states accept that integration into the world economy is their key collective strategy to achieve sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction.

There are five Pacific regional initiatives currently being implemented:

- 1) The Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA);
- 2) The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER);
- 3) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with EU;
- 4) World Trade Organisation (WTO); and
- 5) The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Agreement.

The EU opened the EPA negotiations with the 14 Pacific ACP countries in September 2004, which is the same year of the publication of both Communications (2004) 87 and (2004) 89. These negotiations target an ambitious and development-oriented arrangement to promote regional integration and economic development, policy reform and sustainable management of resources.

EPA negotiations entered a crucial phase during 2007 as the preferential access scheme contained in Cotonou expired at the end of 2007. At the time of 2008-2013 Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme was signed, results have been obtained for two Pacific countries. Papua New Guinea and Fiji. These two major non-LDC Pacific ACP countries currently exporting goods to the EU, initialled an interim EPA, where some of tariff concessions may exceed those made by these countries to one another under PICTA. In that way, these countries continue to benefit from improved market access and rules of origin, as was the case for canned tuna under the Cotonou Agreement ended in 2007.

In addition, both the Pacific ACP countries and the EC recognise that significant progress has been made in recent negotiation rounds in a number of areas such as principles, trade in goods, fisheries development cooperation and dispute settlement. Finally, the six Pacific LDC Pacific ACP states – including Vanuatu – could fall back on the “everything but arms” preferential access to the EU market, although this is a unilateral and not a contractual arrangement and does not contain improved EPA rules of origin. The remaining other eight non-LDC Pacific ACP states whose good exports to the EU are relatively limited at

	<p>present would be eligible for the EU's Generalised System of Preferences.  <i>Source: European Community-Pacific Region, 2008-2013 Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme, pages 31-36</i></p>
<b>ACP-IF</b>	<p>The MTS-IF project main objective is to help countries in the WO Negotiations (the Trade.com is more to do with providing support for EPA negotiations). The MTS component of the project has two objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Enhanced participation of ACPs in MTN and protection of their interest and concerns in WTO negotiations through: Contribute to inter-ACP meetings and participation to WTO meetings, prepare regional positions and analytical and legal work. Focal points and promoting ACP expertise through the use of a pool of ACP experts in trade related matters, assist ACP candidates to WTO membership in their accession process.</li> <li>▪ Better compliance of ACPs to their WTO commitments and stronger national and regional capacities to implement such commitments.</li> </ul> <p>In terms of the specific support to agricultural commodities related negotiations, the MTS-IR project (which started operating only in August 2009) has so far supported three specific agriculturally related negotiations:  one on cotton (by paying for ACP attendance to the negotiations), one in Dominican Republic to build capacity in the negotiations on trade in Agriculture and one in the Seychelles supporting work for Laws and Regulations dealing with SPS measures are brought in conformity with international standards and the regulatory bodies dealing with SPS strengthened.</p> <p>The results of the support to negotiations are not monitored by AidCo (it provides the funding and is involved in the management of the project) since this would be defeating the purpose (since on the other end of the negotiating table there will be the colleagues from DG Trade).  <i>Sources: 4<sup>th</sup> Quarterly report (Dec 2009-Feb 2010-11-14 5<sup>th</sup> Quarterly Report (March-May 2010), <a href="http://acp-mts-programme.org">http://acp-mts-programme.org</a> and MN 986</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA was implemented because of a modification in the banana trade regime, due to WTO negotiations (after WTO ruling in September 1997, a new banana trade regime was implemented in 1999). This new regime was however ruled incompatible with the EU's WTO obligations. In 2001, an agreement stated that the EU would establish a tariffs-only system by 2006, with a preferential tariff for ACP countries (and tariff-free access for ACPs until 2007, which was prolonged with the signing of the EPA agreements between the EU and ACP banana producers). The negotiations on the imposed tariff then lasted from 2005 until the end of 2009 when a comprehensive agreement was reached. <i>Source: <a href="http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pr591_e.htm">http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pr591_e.htm</a></i></p> <p>ACP banana-exporting countries have traditionally enjoyed preferential access to the EU market. This situation has been challenged by other countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and through the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism since the creation of the bananas CMO in 1993. Following several WTO disputes and subsequent reforms of its banana trade regime, the EC introduced a tariff-only regime on 1 January 2006 with an applied duty of €176 per tonne, combined with a duty-free tariff quota of 775,000 tonnes for ACP-origin bananas. However, this situation was not deemed satisfactory by MFN countries, and the WTO's Appellate Body ruled against the EC's CMO, most recently in December 2008. Thus, international trade negotiations and outstanding litigation at the WTO required the EU to rebind its MFN tariff below the current level of €176 per tonne of imported bananas. In December 2009, following long and complex negotiations, the EU initialled an agreement on bananas with Latin American banana-exporting countries, laying down a schedule for the reduction of the EU's MFN tariff on bananas.</p> <p>This agreement settles all pending disputes at the WTO and establishes that the MFN tariff will fall from the current €176 per tonne to €114 over a period of seven to nine years. ACP countries will continue to enjoy duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market, offered as part of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between ACP regions and the EU since January 2008. The change in the EU's tariff regime implies a reduction of the ACP preference margin. To assist</p>

	<p>ACP banana-supplying countries in their adjustment processes, the European Commission proposes to establish country-specific accompanying measures for the main ACP banana-exporting countries. The measures will build on the adaptation processes set in motion with the Special System of Assistance (SSA) and the Special Framework of Assistance (SFA) for traditional ACP suppliers of bananas. <i>Source : Communication from the Commission to the Council and the EU Parliament, Banana Accompanying Measures: Supporting the Sustainable Adjustment of the Main ACP Banana-Exporting Countries to New Trade Realities, Mars 2010, pages 2-3</i></p>
I.4.1.4	<p>The helpdesk launched by the Commission has facilitated CDDCs access to data on tariffs, rules of origin and trade statistics</p>
<b>Overall</b>	<p>The European Union is the world's largest single market and by far the most important trading partner for developing countries. The wide range of preferential trade agreements that the EU is offering partners in the developing world, allows them to benefit from as open access as possible to the EU market. This is a degree of openness unmatched by any other major economy and demonstrates the EU's commitment to putting trade at the service of development not only in theory, but in practice. The EU believes that its preferential trade arrangements help developing countries tie their economies more firmly to global trade links. Despite these efforts and even a largely tariff and quota free access for most developing countries, some technical and very specific requirements remain for exporters to fully benefit from the export opportunities provided. Most of these can be overcome when the information on how to access the EU market is more widely available. Building on these considerations, the Export Helpdesk was created in 2004 as a single point of access for online information about exporting to Europe. The Export Helpdesk provides the following services (source: <a href="http://exporthelp.europa.eu">http://exporthelp.europa.eu</a>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Requirements and taxes : requirements you must meet to import to and market goods in the EU, internal taxes applicable in every EU country, product-specific legal or market requirements ;</li> <li>▪ Import tariffs: import duties, preferential regime which applies to your country, preferential and non-preferential tariff quotas, import licences, anti-dumping measures</li> <li>▪ Preferential arrangements: EU's main trade agreements with developing countries, documents that must accompany your exports, rules of origin exporters must meet.</li> <li>▪ Trade statistics : trade flows between the EU and third countries by year and for any product (group) with a 2- to 8-digit code, imports and exports - expressed in value and/or quantity or supplementary quantity (litres, pieces, etc.).</li> <li>▪ Links: trade authorities (EU and national), international trade bodies, market places and business directories, voluntary and private standards.</li> </ul> <p>According to DG Trade (Personal communication, 2011), averages of number of daily unique visitors per ACP country and per region (including ACP region) are provided in tables below by year (2006 to 2010). The following assumptions need to be taken into consideration when interpreting data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The data monitoring takes into account the traffic on week days (Monday to Friday) only;</li> <li>▪ The data monitoring report counts the number of unique visitors based on cookie and IP address: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- if the same user connects multiple times on a given day, he is counted only once.</li> <li>- if a user makes multiple queries in various sections of the website, he/she is counted only once.</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ This report has an underestimating bias because multiple individuals connecting through the same IP address and not using cookies are counted as a single unique visitor. This situation can happen although not systematically in the case of colleagues working behind the same corporate IP address or in the case of unrelated organisations relying on the same internet service provider.</li> </ul>

Average number of DUV per country per year							
World regions	Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2006-2010
ACP	South Africa	13	11	10	10	11	11
ACP	Dominican Republic	3	8	7	7	7	6
ACP	Ghana	3	3	2	3	6	3
ACP	Mauritius	5	9	7	8	5	7
ACP	Kenya	4	5	5	4	4	4
ACP	Trinidad and Tobago	3	3	2	12	4	5
ACP	Grenada	1	1	0	1	3	1
ACP	Senegal	3	6	4	3	3	4
ACP	Bahamas	1	1	1	1	2	1
ACP	Barbados	2	3	2	2	2	2
ACP	Botswana	1	1	2	1	2	1
ACP	Dominica	1	2	2	0	2	1
ACP	Ethiopia	3	4	1	2	2	2
ACP	Guyana	2	1	2	2	2	2
ACP	Ivory Coast	1	6	2	1	2	2
ACP	Jamaica	4	3	4	2	2	3
ACP	Madagascar	3	2	3	3	2	3
ACP	Mozambique	2	1	1	1	2	1
ACP	St Vincent and the Grenadines	1	1	0	1	2	1
ACP	Sudan	0	1	1	0	2	1
ACP	Tanzania	2	2	2	2	2	2
ACP	Togo	0	1	2	1	2	1
ACP	Uganda	2	2	1	2	2	2
ACP	Angola	1	1	0	1	1	1
ACP	Antigua and Barbuda	2	1	0	1	1	1
ACP	Belize	1	2	1	1	1	1
ACP	Benin	2	1	1	2	1	1
ACP	Burkina Faso	2	2	2	2	1	2
ACP	Burundi	0	1	0	0	1	0
ACP	Cameroon	2	2	1	3	1	2
ACP	Central African Republic	0	1	1	0	1	1
ACP	Comoros (excluding Mayotte)	2	0	1	0	1	1
ACP	Cook Islands	0	0	0	1	1	0
ACP	Fiji	2	1	1	1	1	1
ACP	Gambia	2	2	0	1	1	1
ACP	Guinea	0	0	0	1	1	0
ACP	Haiti	1	2	2	0	1	1
ACP	Lesotho	2	2	3	2	1	2
ACP	Malawi	2	1	2	2	1	2
ACP	Namibia	1	2	1	1	1	1
ACP	Niger	1	1	0	0	1	1
ACP	Nigeria	1	2	2	1	1	1
ACP	Samoa	1	1	1	0	1	1
ACP	St Kitts and Nevis	1	0	0	1	1	1
ACP	St. Lucia	0	1	1	1	1	1
ACP	Surinam	1	2	1	2	1	1
ACP	Swaziland	0	1	1	1	1	1
ACP	Vanuatu	2	2	0	0	1	1
ACP	Zambia	2	2	1	1	1	1
ACP	Zimbabwe	1	2	1	1	1	1
ACP	Cape Verde	0	1	0	0	0	0
ACP	Chad	0	1	0	0	0	0
ACP	Congo (Republic of)	1	0	1	1	0	1
ACP	Djibouti	1	0	0	0	0	0
ACP	East Timor	0	2	1	0	0	1
ACP	Eritrea	1	0	3	0	0	1
ACP	Gabon	0	1	2	1	0	1
ACP	Guinea Bissau	0	0	0	1	0	0
ACP	Liberia	0	0	0	1	0	0
ACP	Maldives	1	1	0	0	0	0
ACP	Mali	4	2	2	1	0	2
ACP	Mauritania	1	1	2	1	0	1
ACP	Niue Island	0	1	0	0	0	0
ACP	Papua New Guinea	1	1	2	0	0	1
ACP	Rwanda	2	2	1	1	0	1
ACP	Solomon Islands	0	0	1	1	0	0
ACP	Tonga	0	1	0	2	0	1
<b>Total ACP</b>		<b>104</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>108</b>

Source: ADE calculations based on DG Trade, Personal communication, 2011

Average number of DUV per country per year							
No	Region	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2006-2010
1	European Union	1049	1261	1059	1154	1046	1114

<b>BF</b>	Le helpdesk est partiellement connu au sein du Ministère du Commerce du Burkina Faso. Les avantages du site web ont été exposés par une information spécifique de la Délégation à ce sujet. Mais le Ministère n'utilise pas cette facilité. La pertinence du site n'est pas mise en question mais les dossiers traités par le Ministère n'appellent pas le recours à ce site. Une seule fois, le Ministère a eu recours au site concernant l'exportation de miel vers l'UE. Les informations trouvées sur le site ont été utile pour ce cas ponctuel. <i>Source : MN 501</i>
<b>MG</b>	Les appuis à la filière litchi se sont achevés avec le suivi de la commercialisation du litchi en Europe durant la campagne 2009/2010. Celui-ci a noté l'effet sur les prix de la réduction volontaire des volumes décidée par la profession (19.750 tonnes de litchis exportées par Madagascar contre 23.950 tonnes pour la campagne précédente). Il a recommandé que cet effort soit poursuivi, ainsi que ceux visant à l'amélioration de la qualité, notamment au niveau du calibrage. Pour la campagne 2010/2011, la profession (importateurs européens et GEL, Groupement des Exportateurs de Litchi) a repris entièrement à sa charge le financement de ce service, qu'elle juge très utile. Malheureusement, les problèmes de maîtrise de la teneur en soufre ont abouti à la fermeture du marché allemand. Le report du produit sur les autres marchés a entraîné un effondrement des cours, annulant l'effort supplémentaire consenti par les opérateurs pour la maîtrise des volumes exportés (abaissés à 17.500 tonnes). Pour essayer de résoudre ce problème, le GEL a obtenu l'appui du programme tous-ACP Initiative Pesticides (PIP-2), mis en œuvre par le COLEACP. <i>Source : Rapport Stabex 2010</i>
<b>SADC</b>	There is no mention to the helpdesk in the 2008-2013 SADC RSP/RIP but this strategy paper mentions that the MTR of the Trade protocol (2007) underlines that the current rules of origin unnecessarily restrict trade in SADC. The MTR recommended two options to face these issues: 1) a general rule for goods and 2) product-specific improvements for selected products. There is an ongoing process of consultation in the SADC countries to discuss both propositions, but the various diverging interests among SADC Member States have so far impeded progress on more liberal rules of origin. <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 17&amp;18</i>
<b>UG</b>	Only evidence: in the framework of the EPA negotiations, there has been EC support to the ESA (Eastern and Southern African) secretariat to carry out the trade negotiations (study, training, etc.) (Source : MN 302).
<b>VU</b>	The helpdesk-website is known. The information about this website has been sent to all the private companies in Vanuatu. Even it is a useful tool, there is a need for more training and explanations to understand how to comply with EU requirements in order to able to export to the EU. Some enterprises are using the website, notable to learn about tariffs applicable in France or to export vanilla. There is however a need for more information, especially for cocoa and coconut exports. <i>Source: MN 101, MN 1098 and MN 1067</i>
<b>I.4.1.5</b>	Evidence that the Commission supported CDDCs' efforts to comply with existing tariff and non-tariff barriers (such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary) applicable to agricultural commodity imports into the EU
<b>CI</b>	Oui. La sécurité sanitaire des produits alimentaires d'exportation représente 0,6% des ressources Stabex. C'est la problématique du début du 21 <sup>ème</sup> siècle avec des risques induits très importants sur l'économie ivoirienne, compte tenu du poids du secteur agricole. Pourtant, le niveau de ressources affectées aux interventions, tant initial que révisé, est faible par rapport aux enjeux. Ce constat semble lié à la problématique d'autres financements (PIR 9 <sup>ème</sup> FED notamment). Toutefois, les hésitations et les mesures de « resserrement » prises en matière de financement (réduction de 58% du budget prévu, absence de visibilité sur les financements 10 <sup>ème</sup> FED et UEMOA PIR 9 <sup>ème</sup> FED) sont inquiétantes. Des mesures d'adaptation ont été prises (travailler sur 3 filières), mais le budget donne une impression de saupoudrage et d'absence de « profondeur ». (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	In Cameroon, the EU support to the banana sector has been used for investments to comply with GlobalGap standards and ISO certification. <i>Source : MN 994</i>



	Furthermore, the PASAPE programme supported by the EU includes a component (which is implemented by the UNIDO) to help businesses cope with quality and standard regulations on EU markets. Agro-industries are among the industries concerned by this support (but it does not concern commodities, rather transformed products). <i>Source : MN 938</i>
<b>CR</b>	Support to trade barriers and non-trade barriers is explicitly foreseen under the EPA (negotiations concluded in December 2007). <i>"In addition to market access in goods and services, the agreement covers a comprehensive set of provisions on trade rules and disciplines (e.g. Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Agriculture and Fisheries, Competition, Innovation and Intellectual Property, Public Procurement, Environment and Social Aspects)."</i> <i>Source: European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, page 23</i>
<b>CR</b>	Yes. The Commission's interventions (for instance those implemented through the trade development programmes) had positive results in terms of trade facilitation. In particular, it led to an increased awareness of local firms of the opportunities and benefits to be retrieved from intra and extra regional trade. They also contributed to improved knowledge of the regulatory framework surrounding intra regional trade, (for instance the consequences of the Common External Tariff of CARICOM) as well as to increasing sensitivity to international trade requirements in terms of quality and export promotion. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>GH</b>	Although Ghana received a lot of assistance, SPS remains a challenge. One of the interviewees stated that 'as a nation it is considered we usually have "access but no ability" because of all the non-tariff barriers and technical barriers to trade (e.g. SPS).' According to an interview, the "Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme – phase II" (CSSP2) included farm field schools which trained cocoa farmers to practice rational pesticide use, to help (among other things) to comply with Maximum Residue Limits for exports to the EU. <i>Source: MN 134</i> The EC supports a trade facilitation programme inter alia to "seek compliance with SPS/MLR and quality control requirements so as to facilitate the exploitation of non-traditional export markets identified (mainly in Europe) with a focus on fresh and processed agricultural markets". <i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 53</i>
<b>KE</b>	The 2003-2007 CSP/NIP mentions that respecting EC sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, notably on fish and horticultural exports, must be integrated into efforts to boost exports and appropriate assistance provided. In addition the CSP underlines that the Government of Kenya should take major accompanying measures, such as measures to improve the regulatory and tariff environment for the main export crops and domestic staples. <i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 28 &amp; 31</i>
<b>MG</b>	L'UE a eu une contribution importante dans le développement des normes et de la qualité (café, girofle, crevette, produits animaux) mais les producteurs n'ont pas été suffisamment impliqués et nécessitent d'être formés sur le long terme (travail de longue haleine). Il y a encore des obstacles à l'exportation du fait d'insuffisances dans le respect des normes sanitaires et phytosanitaires. Il y a eu des produits refoulés (café, huiles essentielles, légumineuses). Les services vétérinaires et de la protection des végétaux seront des cibles de l'UDPR (Unité de Politique de Développement Rural) pour des actions de formation. Il y également une nécessité de professionnaliser les secteurs exportateurs (lichis, girofle) pour répondre aux normes internationales. (Source : MN 805). Pour l'année 2007, l'UE a apporté son appui au Forum National de Développement et de Politique Commerciale et les autres acteurs tels que les organisations du secteur privé, de la société civile dans le cadre du processus de négociation des Accords de Partenariat Economique ainsi qu'à la mise en place et à l'opérationnalité d'un dispositif de normalisation/qualité des principaux produits d'exportation, offrant des garanties aux exigences du marché. <i>Source : Rapport annuel Stabex 2007</i> En 2009, la mission d'assistance technique au Ministère du Commerce et de l'Industrie (MECI) a été poursuivie pour l'appui à la finalisation de l'APE complet et à l'opérationnalisation du Système National de Normalisation et de Qualité (SNNQ). L'appui de l'UE a permis la signature de l'APE intérimaire. Cinq projets de normes ont été préparés pour le cacao, le poivre, le girofle, le café et le litchi et le service

	<p>"certification" du Bureau des Normes de Madagascar (BNM) est mis en place avec l'entrée en fonction de son Directeur début 2010.</p> <p>Toutefois, le programme s'est achevé avant que ce processus ne puisse être mené à terme et de grandes inquiétudes règnent quant à ses possibilités d'aboutissement. Les risques portent à la fois sur l'appropriation des appuis passés par le BNM et le portage politique du processus SNNQ. Le Conseil d'administration du BNM et le Conseil national de normalisation ne se sont toujours pas réunis. Les ressources du BNM et des services chargés de l'inspection ne sont pas à la hauteur des besoins.</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport Stabex 2009</i></p> <p>Le bilan de l'appui au Système National de Normalisation et de Qualité (SNNQ) sur la période juillet 2006 – janvier 2010 (9 missions d'appui ponctuelles) est assez mitigé. Les agents concernés ont été formés principes et standards des processus et pratiques de normalisation et inspection, et une démarche qualité, qui est transposable à d'autres produits, a été appliquée à 5 produits (litchi, café, girofle, poivre, cacao). Cependant, les démarches engagées n'ont pu être menées à terme. Des normes provisoires ont été définies mais ne sont pas appliquées faute d'être homologuées. La complémentarité des normes avec les règlements techniques n'a pas pu être abordée au delà de recommandations d'ordre général. La mise en œuvre s'est heurtée à un manque de ressources humaines et matérielles des services d'inspection et de certification ainsi qu'à un manque de volonté dans la mise en œuvre d'une véritable politique de qualité.</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport Stabex 2010</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>Regional economic integration in the Pacific has been initiated from and sustained within the region and the EC has played an important role in regional integration, inter alia, by supporting development of regional institutional capacity, trade negotiations and trade-related technical assistance. <i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission's support to the ACP Pacific region, 2007.</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>Trade facilitation through customs modernisation is now recognised as a key win for regional integration. It is widely supported by donors including the EC. The Customs Modernisation programme (9 ACP SAD, €18 million) though yet to be implemented will play to the comparative strength of SADC in performing a co-ordinating role to ensure assistance is well orchestrated and delivers results. <i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to SADC, October 2007, pages 30 &amp; 31</i></p> <p>The EC response strategy in the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP focus on Regional Economic Integration as first focal sector. One of the programme objectives in terms of Regional Economic Integration is to strengthen the development and implementation of regional trade arrangement in goods and services, EPAs and multilateral trade arrangements, specifically WTO. In addition, the response strategy will support further development of customs and other border procedures to facilitate free movement of goods and monitoring and removal of non tariff barriers (NTBs). <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 39</i></p>
<b>SN</b>	<p>Le programme régional du 9<sup>ème</sup> FED prévoit un appui institutionnel pour renforcer les capacités de négociation et le financement d'études d'impact sur les économies de la région, renforcé par des actions au niveau national. Dans le PIN on prévoit d'appuyer le commerce (avec des études, formations ou autres appuis spécifiques) dans la perspective des Accords de Partenariat Economique (APE) du fait : (i) de son importance dans le cadre de l'intégration régionale (le Sénégal est membre de l'UEMOA et de la CEDEAO) et aussi de l'intégration dans l'économie mondiale ; (ii) de la nécessité de préparer la sous-région à la perspective d'un APE avec l'UE ; (iii) de l'appartenance du Sénégal au groupe PMA, statut conditionnant l'éligibilité au Cadre Intégré, ayant pour but d'aider les PMA à mieux s'intégrer dans le système du commerce international. La CE propose de jouer le rôle de facilitateur parmi les bailleurs de fonds. <i>Source : CSP 2002-2007</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The third priority of the trade and regional integration focal sector of the 2008-2013 will be to build capacities for companies and farmers or fishers organisations on food safety issues. In that field, the Commission recognizes the importance of meeting demanding sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards imposed at EU and global level, including by non-state actors such as EUREPGAP. In addition, efforts will be made to ensure coherence both with regional support on trade-related SPS (under the ESA-IOC</p>

	and SADC programmes) and with a number of relevant all-ACP programmes dealing with SPS challenges. In the field of agriculture, the EC will continue its efforts to minimise the level of trade distortion related to its support measures to the agricultural sector. The EC will actively assist Tanzania in order to facilitate it meeting the Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) standards, so as to increase the exports of agricultural and fisheries products. <i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 74&amp;79</i>
<b>UG</b>	Mixed. According the MAAIF (Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries), Uganda needs support in SPS regulatory services. FAO provided technical support in 2002 in order to have quality products sent to the EU market (FAO provided capacity building and equipment at airport and border crossing points). There is a need of training in the EU regulatory mechanism (e.g. plant protection regulations). According the MAAIF, nothing has been done in that field for a very long time. (Source: MN 304). Nevertheless, EC provided trade related technical assistance notably in relation with SPS (Source: ppt debriefing) and through the implementation of warehouses (providing farmers with well equipped storage facilities which could not be installed at the farmers' household level to maintain the quality of the products, to sort them according to quality standards, to make packaging, etc. in order to improve transparence and efficiency) (Source: MN 302). Moreover, research and extension, supported by the EC trough the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture), contribute to a better response to market requirements but only if there is a demand from the farmers. (Source: MN 313).
<b>ACP-IF</b>	One of the projects funded with MTS-IF (through the MTS component) dealt with SPS: Seychelles: Laws and Regulations dealing with SPS measures are brought in conformity with international standards and the regulatory bodies dealing with SPS strengthened. <i>Source: Project intervention fiche</i>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) was designed to facilitate a more effective participation of African countries in the activities of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and the <i>Codex Alimentarius</i> Commission (CAC) during the formulation of international standards on food safety, animal and plant health. According to the programme's Financing Agreement, a more effective participation would result in a better compliance with international Sanitary and Phytosanitary regulations of African countries. This in turn would improve market access of African agricultural exports and contribute to agricultural development. <i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 15.</i>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	The project's FA and IF underline that this project has a specific focus on one of the constraints to export performance but that other projects are ongoing to tackle other constraints and namely that non-compliance with biosecurity issues (pests and diseases) and food quality standards are addressed in the region through a complementary EDF project (PACREIP- biosecurity) and PACER funded programme targeting the legal and operational reforms to national biosecurity agencies necessary to regulate sanitary and phytosanitary standards of exports. <i>Source: FA, page 3.</i>
<b>BAN</b>	According to the SFA evaluation report the EU supported the adaptation of banana production to comply with international and EC regulations. The competitiveness-oriented countries are now better in line with market requirements and the environmental standards of the EU. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 4 &amp; 30, htspe, 2008.</i>
<b>I.4.1.6</b>	Evidence that the Commission's support was coordinated with MS and other donors
<b>CI</b>	Oui mais la CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée : la complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds n'est avérée que lorsque ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007. Même si les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale, ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission en dépit de l'absence de rapport annuel de coordination du programme Stabex qui induit le fait que l'information détaillée stratégique ou

	d'avancement n'est que partiellement diffusée au niveau des Etats membres (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	D'une manière générale, il y a un échange d'information et des discussions entre la Commission et les autres bailleurs de fonds sur les questions d'interventions agricoles, les approches et la compétitivité. Il y a des tentatives de coordination, mais actuellement sur le terrain, les actions ne sont pas nécessairement coordonnées en l'absence de stratégie de développement du secteur agricole. Les modalités d'intervention sont différentes (MN-401, 411, 407, 403, 404)
<b>CM</b>	The EU support through the PASAPE programme is partly implemented by the UNIDO. Communication mechanisms are put in place and stakeholders seem more or less satisfied by the coordination. <i>Source : MN 938</i>
<b>CR</b>	The evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>GH</b>	All sectors of aid are coordinated among donors by the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS). <i>Source: Ghana CSP/NIP 2008-2013, page 114</i>
<b>GH</b>	The "Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme – phase II" (CSSP2) programme ex ante study included an inventory of all the other interventions that were done for the cocoa sector in the country. The programme was thus designed taking account of all the other interventions in the sector. Furthermore, a workshop was organised with many stakeholders and international donors (USAID, DFID, Cooperazione Italiana, CIRAD, FAO, beneficiaries, implementing agencies, farmer associations, India high commission, etc.) to discuss the project. <i>Source: CSSP 2 ex ante programme study, final report p 16-18; CSSP 2 List of invitees to the presentation workshop of the draft report of the formulation study of the CSSP2</i>
<b>KE</b>	The 2003-2007 CSP/ NIP underlines that 13 EU Member States are represented in Nairobi and coordination both within the EU and the wider donor community. In particular, the system of <i>lead donor</i> within specific sectors/themes is already being employed. For example, the EC is the lead donor in the roads sub-sector, UK for legal sector reforms, WB for disaster preparedness. <i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 28</i>
<b>MG</b>	Non. De manière générale, il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB) mais très peu ou rien en matière de coordination de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 801).
<b>TZ</b>	The sector matrices reflect well-developed structures for dialogue between donors and the Government. Policy dialogue takes place in nearly all the sectors (working groups, ad-hoc basis). In the sector of agriculture, the dialogue is lead by Denmark. <i>Sources: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 15</i>
<b>UG</b>	Yes. There is a strong coordination of donors (including MS) through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Agriculture Sector Working Group chaired by the government</li> <li>▪ The Agriculture Donors Group</li> </ul> Indeed, donors report on their activity in the framework of the donors working group. Lessons learned

and diffusion between donors: gaps are shared at the project level and also at the strategic level: all levels of coordination are covered. Besides the multi-donor support to the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture), donor coordination results in some sort of task and geographical sharing between donors by regions and by nature of intervention. (Sources: MN 301, 309 and 313).

EU funds to the Kaweri Farmers' Alliance project were supplemented from several sources including the Government, the private sector and the ASPS (Agricultural Sector Programme Support) and APEP (Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program)/LEAD (Livelihoods & Enterprises for Agricultural Development) projects, supported by Danida and USAID respectively. These development partners were represented on the Steering Committee which met biannually. Several other parties with experience in the sub-sector and in development more generally, including the UCDA, the Ministry of Finance and the Alliance, were also members. The Committee provided effective guidance to the management staff in their work to implement the project, as well as ensuring co-ordination and close collaboration between the different member organisations in their work to support the project. Unfortunately, participation in the meetings by many of those representing the public sector agencies was sporadic at best.

*Source: Evaluation of the Kaweri Farmers' Alliance Support Project*

The harmonisation of development assistance between the donor community, and between donors and the partner government is a key factor in aid effectiveness. The evaluation found that the management and administration of the Programme at the national level is a good example of effective cooperation and harmonisation of development assistance. However, the recent growing unease expressed by GoU on the agricultural service delivery mechanism, involving the private sector (rather than LG extension staff) is creating a sense of some uncertainty on the programme's future direction.

In terms of programme harmonisation at field level, NAADS has successfully coordinated its operations with another advisory services programme (AAMP) funded by ADB and IFAD, and there have been some moderate achievements in other areas including in the research field. However, not all programmes have been subject to formal harmonisation arrangements and some confusion and duplication of effort occurs. *Source: Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008*

EU and DANIDA are the biggest donors to agricultural research. Other donors: IFAD (25M\$ over 5 years), research Canadian Institute, Bill Gates Foundation, AGRA (alliance for green revolution in Africa), Rockefeller foundation, Ford Foundation and obviously ASARECA. Originally, donors gave directly money but they didn't know who was doing what: this led to duplications. NARO has a directorate that coordinates donors' funds and that keeps records of what has been done. Moreover, an agriculture donors group exists that allows improving the integrity of the organization. Each donor contribution gives rise to a MoU signed by the Director General of NARO. (Source: MN305)

Partners of the Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support project:

- European Union (EU). The European Union was the main funder. They provided a grant that funded the Project Management Unit and a large part of the field activities.
- Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA). The UCDA carried out a supervisory role on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture and chaired the steering committee. They also promoted the project by organizing a number of field visits for Government Officials. Through the Coffee Replanting Program they provided a large number of seedlings to project farmers.
- Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program (APEP) / USAID. APEP have been instrumental in the organizational development process, providing Producer Organization Trainers, introducing a methodology that has proven very successful and facilitating farmer groups with tools and equipment. Further to this they have contributed to the establishment of demonstration plots and have funded a number of consultants and experts.
- Agricultural Sector Programme Support (APEP) / DANIDA. Their contribution has been crucial in the establishment of coffee nurseries and mother gardens, in supporting the capacity building process of farmer organizations and in funding a number of consultants, experts and trainers.
- Kaweri Coffee Plantation (KPC). KPC provided technical expertise in the training of nursery operators and in the establishment of mother gardens. KCP has also made available high quality

	<p>planting material for the mother gardens and a large number of cuttings for rooting in the nurseries.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Livelihoods and Enterprises for Agricultural Development (LEAD) / USAID. Even though the LEAD program started during the final project year, very important support and expertise was provided for the establishment of Farmer Field Schools which have rapidly encouraged farmer to farmer learning. LEAD will become a more prominent partner in the rolling out process.</li> <li>▪ National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). NAADS have contributed to agricultural extension and have provided additional coffee seedlings to project farmers.</li> <li>▪ Ibero (Uganda) Ltd. Ibero has provided market information to farmer groups and a market for their coffee. They have signed MOUs with microfinance institutions and DC Companies in order for loans to be granted. They have also been promoting the project coffee internationally through their trading network.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Kaveri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report</i></p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>La proposition de financement du PASAPE (projet non ciblé sur les produits agricoles de base mais sur la compétitivité de l'économie camerounaise) note que la CE, la France, la Banque mondiale et la Coopération néerlandaise (SNV) sont les principaux partenaires intervenant en matière de compétitivité, de commerce et d'appui au secteur privé. Elle mentionne également que la coordination entre bailleurs sur le PASAPE aura lieu dans le cadre du sous-groupe Economie et commerce du Comité Multi-Bailleurs.</p> <p>L'évaluation à mi-parcours du PASAPE souligne que la coordination entre les bailleurs de fonds est « structurée autour du Comité Multi Bailleurs (CMB), initié en 2003 et qui réunit une vingtaine de partenaires techniques et financiers. Le CMB est organisé en en groupes sectoriels et thématiques. Un comité chargé des questions d'aide au commerce et développement du secteur privé (GEC pour groupe « économique et commerce ») a été mis en place début 2007 à l'initiative de la DUE qui en est maintenant le chef de file depuis le début de l'année 2009 ». Dans le domaine des produits de base, les programmes suivants des autres bailleurs sont mentionnés : « le Projet de compétitivité des filières de croissance (Banque Mondiale avec 3 composantes : filière transformation durable du bois, filière écotourisme, actions transversales visant à améliorer l'environnement des investissements et soutenir la compétitivité) ; le Programme d'appui à la compétitivité agricole (Banque Mondiale / IDA) ; le Programme d'amélioration de la compétitivité des exploitations agropastorales (France) ; »</p> <p>L'évaluation ne donne pas davantage d'informations sur d'éventuelles synergies entre programmes.</p> <p><i>Sources : Commission européenne, Proposition de financement n°9 ACP CM 18 ; Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	There is no such Evidence in the SFA impact evaluation report.
<b>J.4.2</b>	<b><i>Commission support has contributed to increase agricultural commodity production and decrease production and processing costs</i></b>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Malgré l'appui de la Commission à travers différentes interventions relatives aux produits agricoles de base (dont le secteur coton fut le plus grand bénéficiaire), il n'y a pas eu d'accroissement significatif et durable de la production de produits de base agricoles et il n'y a pas d'évidences que les coûts de production et de transformation des produits de base agricoles ont diminué.</p> <p>Quelques éléments positifs sont néanmoins relevés :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Programme PAOSA : accroissement de la production de riz de 5000 tonnes sur 2500 ha</li> <li>▪ Secteur cotonnier : baisse de la production suite à la crise financière de 2007, mais l'appui de la Commission a contribué à maintenir la viabilité financière de la filière (STABEX/ PAFFIC: études, apurement de dettes, infrastructures)</li> <li>▪ Projet anacarde-sésame (Rongead/ Inades) : pas d'augmentation de la production de l'anacarde en lien avec le support de la CE mais développement de la transformation à petite échelle</li> </ul>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Many EU interventions have contributed to lower costs.</p> <p>Production costs : Research projects on banana production constraints and diseases, technical and financial assistance (ATF) to the banana sector has been very important in facilitating investments, the</p>

	<p>PACICC has provided funds for buying small material for coffee and cocoa farmers (although the scale of the project is quite small), several Stabex programmes provided support for investments in material (drying cocoa) and seedling production ; and an upcoming project will also support seedling production for coffee and cocoa.</p> <p>Collecting and processing costs :ATF funds have been used to improve the transport conditions up to the shipping of bananas at the harbor of Douala ; EDF and Stabex funds have been widely used to support road construction and maintenance ; a Stabex-funded project also supported the improvement of cocoa drying ; and the PASAPE project is also supporting the upgrading of coffee roasting in the country.</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p><i>General comment on 'evidence': the M&amp;E systems in the Cocoa Sector Support Programmes (CSSP 1 and 2) are not functional; there is partial monitoring of outputs produced (by IITA) but no monitoring of results.</i> Yes, several components of the EU support have contributed to increasing production and lower average costs of the cocoa sector in Ghana. Both Cocoa Sector Support Programmes (CSSP) (phases 1 and 2) focused mainly on research and dissemination. The results of the CSSP1 were disappointing: they did not reach the expected results in terms of seedlings produced, and their impacts on yields were modest because they were often distributed to old farmers who did not tend to their crops. The CSSP2 programme has encountered problems in the research phase as well, but the farmer training and dissemination of virus-resistant and early-maturing seedlings component has provided encouraging results (yet quite local for now). Access to inputs is highly determined by Ghana's cocoa board (Cocobod), with highly subsidised seedlings and fertilisers, and taking care of 1 pesticide spraying per year. Although prices of inputs such as fertilizers are made affordable, the physical access to these inputs is difficult. The EU does not have any direct contribution to this issue. Infrastructure projects (feeder roads programmes) have led to improve collecting, reducing transport time and costs, which was an important issue for the sector (transport used to be 70% of marketing costs). There is however no quantification of the gains reached by the programme. Cocoa processing in Ghana actually lost from the improvements in production because beneficiaries can produce high quality beans all year long. Local manufacturers only process the lean season lower quality crop because they do not pay the premium for high quality (they cannot valorise the quality). Local manufacturers are now oversized for their market.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les projets Stabex ont eu un impact positif sur le niveau de production des produits agricoles d'exportation, leur qualité, leur transformation-valorisation mais ceci à un niveau local sans répliation dans d'autres zones. La Délégation considère que les résultats obtenus n'ont pas été à la hauteur des montants financiers engagés.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The bulk of the Commission support to agricultural commodities in Tanzania was devoted to sugar, tea and coffee. This support was especially devoted to research and infrastructures, but also capacity building. As a result, interventions supported by the Commission have allowed increasing agricultural commodity production in the coffee sector and in the tea sector and reducing production and processing costs in the coffee sector. In addition, interesting results have been obtained even if they are rarely sustainable.</p> <p><u>Coffee:</u> support to TACRI (research centre): infrastructures, equipment, development of varieties resistant to diseases, trained smallholders. New improved varieties delivering 30-50% cost savings and gross margins improved by up to 264%. However there still are huge challenges for smallholders in terms of access to seedlings and fertilizers, extension services, quality of the products due to poor quality processing, marketing.</p> <p><u>Tea:</u> support to TRIT (research centre): infrastructures, equipment, trained smallholders and extension services, development of varieties resistant to diseases. Tea yields of improved clonal varieties using recommended crop husbandry yield up to 6080kgs/ha of green leaf compared to old bushes under poor management which yield only 610kgs/ha. However there still are huge challenges for smallholders in terms of access to seedlings and fertilizers, extension services, collection of green leaves, quality of the green leaves. A big issue is the price mechanism. Need to scale up.</p> <p><u>Sugar:</u>(feeder) roads, bridges, crossings, etc. built, 8 block farms have been organised (comprised of about 30 to 40 farmers each); trained growers gathered in associations.</p>

	<p><u>Cotton</u>: research infrastructures built; laboratories equipments/ houses/ buildings, vehicles; seed multiplication; measurement of the cotton quality (cotton classification) at regional level (regional lab); trained farmers (with a new model to contract farmers).</p> <p>The Commission continues supporting tea research and coffee research through the Trade and Agricultural Support Programme (TASP, 2009).</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Through Stabex projects (e.g. Coffee Farmers Alliance support project) the EC supported the competitiveness of the whole coffee value chain from producers (higher yields, higher productivity, improved quality) to exporters (economies of scale in the coffee commercialization process)</p> <p>The EC support to the PMA implementation aimed at strengthening the link between research and extension and at reinforcing the extension system. However results didn't meet expectations.</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Suite à l'appui de la Commission, il n'y a pas eu d'accroissement significatif et durable de la production de produits de base agricoles et il n'y a pas d'évidences que les coûts de production et de transformation des produits de base agricoles ont diminué. A travers le projet POPACA/POP2 (fini en 2007): mise en place d'un revolving fund, organisation des producteurs, infrastructures, techniques de production; mais peu de durabilité des résultats obtenus. Sous le programme Tous ACP (FAO), il y a eu des résultats positifs, au niveau local, en termes de meilleures techniques de culture/ récolte/ transformation (exemple: vanille, fruits et légumes).</p>
<b>I.4.2.1</b>	<p>Commission support contributed to stimulate research (in the field of production factors and producer access to them, and labour productivity) and the dissemination of research results to producers/producer organisations</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Au Burkina, la recherche cotonnière est assurée au sein de l'Institut de l'Environnement et des Recherches Agricoles (INERA). Son financement est à 95% assuré par la filière cotonnière. <i>Source : Etude prospective sur la filière coton au BF, 2009</i></p> <p>Le programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière a établi en 2009 une contractualisation avec des structures de recherche pour mener les recherches suivant les axes suivants : (i) la mobilisation et la gestion de la matière organique au sein des exploitations ; (ii) l'approvisionnement en semences biologiques et (iii) l'efficacité des biopesticides locaux utilisées par les producteurs de coton biologique. <i>Source : Rapport narratif du programme, 2009</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Les mesures Stabex dans le secteur coton s'inscrivent dans la continuité des interventions menées par le MinAgri: soutien à la production (non aux prix), par un soutien à l'investissement sous forme subventionnée (intrants, équipements), à la recherche appliquée (production de matériel végétal, ... ) et au renforcement institutionnel (OPA, interprofession, fonctions de pilotage).</p> <p>Considérant les impacts économiques énormes pour l'économie ivoirienne induits par une réglementation restrictive du taux de contamination en OTA des lots de café et de cacao, l'UE a souhaité soutenir l'effort du Gouvernement à contrôler ce risque. Un programme de recherche, décliné en plusieurs étapes a donc été soutenu (1614 millions FCFA ont été mis en œuvre). Il s'est articulé autour de :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ missions préparatoires destinées à élaborer et à appuyer la mise en œuvre d'une stratégie de prévention;</li> <li>▪ programme de recherche, décliné en deux étapes, dont la seconde vise l'évaluation des points critiques dans différentes zones géographiques, installation d'un laboratoire de référence accrédité (LANADA), développement d'un programme de prévention.</li> <li>▪ La Convention de contribution ONUDI permettra l'équipement d'un laboratoire accrédité</li> </ul> <p>Une AT a appuyé la préparation du programme de recherche (Eurata - mai 2005) et celle d'une AT Directeur de recherche (AGRIFOR), la direction et la supervision des études, la mise en place du programme de vulgarisation et a assisté le MinAgri dans ses actions et plaidoyer.</p> <p>Selon l'évaluation, en ce qui concerne la problématique de l'OTA, les recherches et les travaux scientifiques ont été nécessaires. Les analyses montrent que le taux de rejet de lots de cacao, si la norme était appliquée, pourrait être compris entre 5 et 10% des exportations (60000 à 120000 tonnes), soit un ch</p>



	ffre d'affaire de 90 à 180 milliards FCFA. Les conséquences économiques possibles sont donc importantes. Cela impose effectivement des mesures de prévention et des actions de lobbying. <i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The EU is starting (the FA was signed in 2011) a seed multiplication project for coffee and cocoa in Cameroon, within its PAPA programme (Programme d'Amélioration de la Productivité Agricole). Furthermore, within the AAACP programme, the ONCC (Office National Café-Cacao) also does dissemination of good farming practices to improve coffee and cocoa productivity. ATF (Assistance Technique et Financière) support for Cameroon's banana sector and the Food Security Thematic Programme contributed to three research projects in collaboration with the CARBAP (Centre Africain de Recherche sur les Bananiers et Plantains) : on the black Sigatoka leaf disease, on nematodes and on the quality of wash water. These projects are led in collaboration with the private companies as well, since the projects are based on their demands. <i>Source : MN 913, MN 996</i></p> <p>The EC also supported (through Stabex funds) a programme that produced productive oil palm seedlings and disseminate them among farmers. The project lasted 5 years, from 1997 to 2002. <i>Source : Projet pilote pour la mise en place de pépinières villageoises privées de palmier à huile, rapport de fin d'exécution, mars 2003</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The second CSP (2008-2013) mentioned that support has been provided to research:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ "Le PIR a également apporté un soutien au centre africain de recherche sur bananiers et plantains (CARBAP) ;</li> <li>▪ "Le 6ème Programme Cadre de recherche (2002-2006) a mobilisé des équipes du Cameroun dans 50 propositions de recherche internationale. Dix ont obtenu des financements notamment dans les domaines de la santé et dans l'analyse des stratégies agricoles. La participation de ces équipes a été financée à hauteur d'environ 1,3 millions d'euros pour une valeur totale des projets d'environ 18,7 millions d'euros. En outre, la recherche forestière internationale à travers le réseau européen de recherche forestière tropicale (ETFRN) a été active dans la région et constitue une utile source de connaissance pour le Cameroun."</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED ; République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 16, 17</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Yes. With respect to trade related issues, the Commission has attempted to initiate a number of regional programmes that would contribute to mitigating the impact of the changes on the global environment and assist the Caribbean in its integration efforts both regionally and globally. These projects have included, among others CULP (Caribbean University Level Programme), in particular the international business and agricultural diversification projects and CARTF (Caribbean Agribusiness Research and Training Fund). No evidence regarding details of the CULP and CARTF and the dissemination of research results to producers/producer organisations in the evaluation report. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>According to the Evaluation of the Commission's support to the ESA-IO region, support has been brought by the EC (and other donors) to the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa. It seems however that this support was funded by the 8<sup>th</sup> EDF. <i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission's support to the ESA-IO region, DRN- ADE-ECO-NGC-ECORYS, page 56</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The research component of the CSSP I focused on cocoa pests and diseases as well as on re-establishment of cocoa in denuded lands. The component provided disappointing results: in terms of yields, quality and quantity, the research obtained some promising results, especially as regards the selection of progenies for future CSSVD and Black Pod breeding research, but the results achieved were not field tested and there was also some questioning of the geographical location of some of these plants. The final evaluation of CSSP I concluded that the support to the research had not been effective: no field trials were conducted, the research was undertaken on a very small scale so it needed major upscaling before being potentially able to contribute to the project purpose and research on integrated pest management (IPM) developed practices that could not be applied by farmers due to unavailability of seeds. Finally the evaluation also noted that Cocobod offered insufficient support in terms of spraying and certification for organic cocoa which could deliver premiums. The CSSP II offered a three pronged support: (i) to the CRIG for research</p>

	<p>on hybrid cocoa, for increased genetic fingerprinting capacity and follow-on cloning and applied research; (ii) support to SPU for multiplication of the seedlings/pods and (iii) support through the IITA/STC for farmers' training including participative strategy formulation and setting up of FOs. <i>Sources: Agrifor 2005, project documents</i></p> <p>According to interviews, the "Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme – phase II" stimulated research (it financed the multiplication phase of the research of new cocoa varieties) and the dissemination of its results (by financing the multiplication of seedlings of the new variety of cocoa and the dissemination of the results to farmer organisations that wanted to take part in the programme). <i>Source: MN 977</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs. According to the Evaluation of EC support to Kenya (June 2008), the overall strategy of EC interventions in agriculture has been poor with too much focus on agricultural research, and little or no attention to improving agricultural extension services, the legal and regulatory framework to revitalise the agricultural sector (including export), and food security by improving (basic) food crop production, including marketing and logistical systems. <i>Source: Evaluation of EC support to Kenya, June 2008, page 5</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui mais la recherche concerne maintenant essentiellement l'aval avec la volonté de la Commission d'étendre ses interventions de l'amont (production) vers l'aval (commercialisation et transformation) afin d'améliorer la qualité dans une optique de diversification et de compétitivité. (Source : MN 801).</p> <p>A titre d'illustration, PUE finance un centre technologique-CTHT (Centre technique horticole de Tamatave) avec lequel un protocole a été mis en place à partir de 2006 amenant à étendre le support à la transformation et au conditionnement dans une optique filière. CTHT a bénéficié des appuis Stabex et banane ; il y a un monopole de fait en matière de diversification mais il y a eu un problème de capacité d'absorption en raison du chevauchement des fonds et des difficultés de mise en œuvre qui y sont liées (Source : MN 801).</p> <p>Dans le cadre du programme d'intensification et de structuration des filières principales, le Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave (CTHT) continue à produire et à diffuser du matériel végétal de qualité aux opérateurs économiques et aux paysans. Pour ces derniers ceci est accompagné de formation sur les techniques de multiplication des plants, sur la conduite de plantation et la technique de traitement post récolte. Par ailleurs, le Centre continue d'améliorer la qualité des litchis exporté par Madagascar vers l'Europe en déterminant la date de l'ouverture de la campagne, en sensibilisant les paysans et les opérateurs aux exigences commerciales et réglementaires des marchés européens qui ne cessent d'évoluer et en évaluant la qualité commerciale et sanitaire des fruits pendant la période de chargement des bateaux conventionnels. En outre, les outils pédagogiques de formation pour la promotion des produits malgaches sont déjà disponibles au CTHT: DVD pour le litchi et les épices, CDROM pour le poivre, Posters sur les techniques culturales, et des manuels sur l'apiculture, ainsi que des fiches techniques sur la transformation et la conservation des produits. <i>Source : Rapport annuel Stabex 2006</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>The 2002-2007 SADC RSP/RIP does not mention that the EC support agricultural research. However, this strategy paper underlines that the SADC region has prepared a Consolidated Sub-regional Request, which includes both the needs of the region research networks and the needs of the National Agricultural research Institutes (NARIs). In annex 11, the strategy paper mentions that two projects/ programmes have been identified in the regions: Animal Health (PRINT) and maize/ wheat research. <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 11 and Annex 11</i></p> <p>The EC has supported SADC Member States in Implementation and Coordination of Agricultural Research and Training (€10.2 m + €3.7 m) in order to assist them in the development of the agricultural research sector. <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, Annex 6</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The EU support in Tanzania has addressed different links in the production chain in the sugar, tea and coffee sectors, but focusing mainly on research and infrastructure provision. The latter should have contributed most directly to production, transport and processing cost reduction in these sectors. However, no monitoring has been done within the sectors of any effects on price developments (costs and/or producer price and/or world price). In the sugar and tea industries, the costs of processing are</p>

‘secret’, they are not transparent so that one cannot calculate gross margins at factory level.

None of the interviewed persons indicated that farm gate prices were monitored (the tea industry through its board can only provide the minimum price, not the actual paid price at factory level) and no gross margins per crop are calculated by the MoA or the different crop boards. The discussions about prices are of a political, not a technical, nature. *Sources: MN625, MN673, MN656, MN623, MN666*

Facilities historically based in Karicho as a regional research centre until the east African Community collapsed and then TZ was left with very weak activity research. Decision was then made to launch this research centre (around 1999). It was supported by DFID (ODA). Fortunately when DFID stopped funding (2001) the EU came in to assist TRIT to develop.

Research (TRIT), which has been supported through Stabex funds, has not done so much against expectations (like Kenya). The limitations of TRIT are on the qualifications of manpower. At the initial stages, put more fellows to study more what we have to do. Kenya and India are faster than Tanzania to develop clones. TRIT started with less experience.

The impact of TRIT on small producers has been very low. No expansion. The TRIT project allowed establishing Public Private Partnerships. The tea industry is signing a MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) where private sector contributes to the funding of research (PPP agreement). Factories pay 8 tsh per kg of made tea (to Districts to repair the tea roads) and 5.5 tsh per kg of made tea (to research). Smallholders pay 8Tsh/kg/MT for contribution to the smallholder Association. Now are questioning what really the benefits to smallholders of stopping the cess were.

EC support to three areas to the tea sector: farmer training, smallholder nursery scheme and support to research. The EC support allowed developing new clones of varieties of tea, irrigation, water, etc. Extension methodologies at cost recovery basis. Currently ongoing discussions between stakeholders on agreement between producers and researchers to continue this research and fund it.

However, impact to producers is really questionable. In addition, there is still a lack in terms of extension services, even if there is one success story in Rungwe where there is a dedicated group of farmers. Extension services are not funded by EU but by farmers. Farmer associations must get impacts. EU should invest in farmer organisations as farmers are not organised. Need to mobilize farmers to organise themselves. Initiative of the Government in 2000 to encourage farmers to organise themselves. When they are organised, need to put provisions to allow farmers buying shares in factories. Need to train farmers and then they will grow.

On TRIT and nurseries: the impact of nurseries is not noticeable. We should have one large nursery then giving to farmers and then monitor what happens to these seedlings

Technology Transfer Programme (ITP): the issue is transferring technologies to all the tea producers. Irrigation helps tea producers to grow this production. Stabex has been also used to build laboratories for tea research.

The Trade and Agricultural Support Programme (TASP, 2009) is supported by the EC and focus on tea and coffee.

*Sources: MN 666, MN 673, MN 602, MN 138, MN 623 and MN 603*

The EC support TRIT, the Tanzanian Research Institute for Tea with Stabex funding since 2001 (TRIT started operations in 1998) to the amount of €6.5 million (with another €1,03 million for 2011/12 under TAP). Although the support has had positive results in its three areas of support (research facilities and housing, establishment of nurseries and training of farmers and extension workers), the smallholder benefits seem so far to be very limited. Excepting one region where the private sector has recruited TRIT to provide extensions services directly, the training of farmers is very limited. There is no follow-up on labour productivity, incomes, production and use of plants except for the one limited area where TRIT is contracted for private use. The dissemination of research results remains limited and the EU recognises this and has responded with an extension of support to TRIT from EDF 10 funds.

The sustainability issue looms large: the EU did not integrate an exit strategy into its support.

*Sources: MN697, MN625*

*“Tea yields of improved clonal varieties using recommended crop husbandry yield up to 6080kgs/ha of green leaf compared to old bushes under poor management which yield only 610kgs/ha.”*

*Source: EVALUATION OF ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY 1994/99 STABEX TRANSFERS, 2007*

The research in the coffee sector in Tanzania started in 1934. At that time a lot of research was done. Investments in coffee research declined a lot since the price fell down. There was a demoralisation in the coffee industry and everybody gave up. Major issues faced by the coffee production in Tanzania are coffee berry disease (CBD) and Coffee leaf rust (CLR) as far as Arabica is concerned, and coffee wilt disease (CWD) as far as Robusta is concerned. The cost of controlling disease equalled more than the half of the sell price. For this reason coffee producers gave up.

To face these issues, there were long negotiations around 2000. As result of these negotiations, the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TACRI) was founded in September 2001 and research started again. This institute is lead by a board of directors elected every 3 years. In this board there are representatives of growers, factories, Government of Tanzania. In addition, there are technical advisory services (including 5 people), which advise the Board on the research to carry out. Everything is clear in terms of governance.

Legally TACRI is a private company. However TACRI is working as a public-private partnership, in which the Government, growers, traders, processors, Coffee Board, exporters are involved.

Stabex financed facilities: 4 research substations, including one not completed due to problems with to lots of contracts. Remained STABEX funds should be used to finish these facilities.

In addition, the EU funded consulting services to prepare and write the 2003-2008 Strategic Action Plan of TACRI, including consultation with stakeholders and decision about research areas. These areas tackled diseases, productivity, quality and good agricultural practices to grow coffee plants. This Strategic Plan was evaluated in 2008 (supported by STABEX funds). Positive results were highlighted and developed coffee varieties were approved. Recommendations of the evaluation led to a revised Strategic Plan: a continuation of activities carried out before with minor amendments. In order to support this plan, additional resources have been brought by the EU through the Trade and Agriculture Support Programme (TASP): €2 M.

The Strategic action plan is being ended (end: 2013). The programme was successful. Research results obtained are:

- 10 Arabica varieties resistant to diseases have been developed
- 4 Robusta varieties resistant to coffee wilt disease have been developed

The challenge is still technology transfer (= dissemination of the resistant varieties/ seedling) to producers, including smallholders. Four methods are used to multiply coffee seedling in nurseries. Developing a tissue among producers is still a challenge to scale up the production of resistant varieties and disseminate them among producers.

Stabex was instrumental in these successes. Stakeholders agreed to 0.7 tsh/kg in order to fund the TACRI institution (or are 0.7% of the price per kg). This is evidence that producers believe in the TACRI research.

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In the coffee sector, the market is quite complex; it is not easy to define the final importers. Technoserv (NGO) has supported the coffee marketing. This is not the role in the EC as the market aspects have been already addressed by Technoserv. The EC doesn't feel it is appropriate for them to get involved in marketing, it is too much 'hands-on' and the EC thus leaves the support for linking the farmers to the markets to Technoserve.

Technology transfers have been supported by the EC. The EU added value deals with support to research and trade. So that is why the EC has supported tea and coffee researches in Tanzania and trade as part of the regional integration. The Trade and Agricultural Support Programme (TASP, 2009) is supported by the EC. Institutional memory on Stabex is difficult to find in the EU delegation.

The issue of extension services is important: there are lots of NGOs involved in this that could be used.

	<p><i>Source: MN 673, MN 677, MN 138, MN 625, MN 602</i></p> <p>EU support: First time, STABEX project which addressed issues with cotton research focused on building agricultural research institutes in Tanzania (Kiliguru, Morogoro). This allows to do research. It brought laboratories equipments/ houses/ buildings, vehicles, farming implements. It brought also water supply. It was a big project for the cotton sector. After that the same STABEX funded seed multiplication. Then funded regional project implemented by TBS (cooperating with the Cotton Board): cotton classification and measurement. TBS is a benchmark for the region and strengthens the regional labs. Labs in the region used the lab in Tanzania to confirm results. The same programme is there to help regional labs too (e.g. training). Easy to measure cotton there Tanzania and compare them to international standards. Cotton: not been able to set up an independent institution such as in tea and coffee. There are 2 institutions in 2 regions but they have been instrumental in developing agro practices, varieties, training extension workers and advice on trade issues. Development of new varieties, screen chemicals suitable for the environment. Institute important advising all the matters of trade for the cotton sector. Cotton board manage more efficiently. In 2002, it was realised that there were a lot of inefficiencies. Producers complained about Crop board services. EU and WB commissioned a crop board rationalisation study; it was carried out and made recommendations to be implemented (removal of taxation, decrease the regulatory power of the boards, increase participation of stakeholders, foster mechanisms for PPP). Need money to implement these recommendations. There were remaining funds from STABEX that have been used to that purpose. Issue on 1) making sure producers participate in the decision processes and 2) fostering a mechanism for building a PPP to provide benefits to private and public sectors. STABEX funds help that. <i>Source: MN 649, MN 602</i></p> <p>The support to the sugar industry of Tanzania has included as one of the four components the restructuring of research and training in terms of increasing accountability to stakeholders and increasing the outgrowers' capacity to deliver demand-driven services. This specifically includes the strengthening of the ability to conduct research and testing. Research in sugar cane has an important role to play because most varieties used in Tanzania are old (40-60), have lost vigour and are susceptible to diseases and there is thus a role for research to contribute to increased productivity through new variety introduction and selection, pest and disease control, and crop husbandry. In Tanzania, they have to shift from one poor variety to a better variety in terms in productivity; to produce more sugar. Research issues can be paid by the sector; at the moment Sugar Boards will use the EU funds to make research in varieties (more competitive, more productive). East Africa cane needs to be improved in terms of variety. CFC is working on this issue to get good varieties using varieties from several other countries. Example: mixing varieties which are pest resistant for example, to get a better variety. TZ is part of the East African Network for improvements: CFC finances TZ to test the different varieties and breed these (Varieties from all around the world). <i>Sources: MN173, Feasibility Study Report, June 2007 (Studies for EU Sugar Reform Accompanying Measures for Tanzania, Period 2007-2010); AMSP 2006 for Sugar Protocol Countries, Financing Agreement.</i></p>
UG	<p>Yes but results didn't meet expectations. The EC support to the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture) implementation aimed at reinforcing the research capacity and the extension system and at strengthening the link between research and extension. The EC support to PMA focussed on research (NARO-National Agricultural Research Organisation) and extension (NAADS-National Agricultural Advisory Services) with a view of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector. Of the 7 areas of the PMA, only two, research and extension, have been effectively implemented (lack of coordination between the ministries involved hampered a more homogeneous implementation of the PMA). (Source: MN 301) The EC has taken the decision to withdraw its support to NAADS because of a change in NAADS activities. NAADS core activity was to subsidise extension services provided on demand to the farmer groups by private service providers. It is evolving towards a provider of free-of-charge agricultural inputs; the ruling party is taking control of the farmer groups; extension services are delivered by government employees (Source: MN 301).</p> <p>The link between Technology Development Sites (TDS) and Adaptive Research, while recognised as an essential of agricultural transformation in Uganda, has not been fully exploited by either of the two parties</p>

	<p>(NAADS and the National Agricultural Research System, NARS). It is vital for the future success of the programme that closer and more systematic links are established.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008</i></p> <p>Thanks to EU funding, coffee varieties resistant to the Wilt Disease were created. EU has also supported research for oil seeds and tea. (source: MN305)</p> <p>EU support was fundamental from 2001 to 2006 for the establishment of the etiology and the epidemiology of Coffee Wilt Disease (CWD) and to generate over 1500 CWD Robusta resistant clones that continue to act as a selection pool. COREC has since established on-farm trials and mother gardens of CWD resistant clones. Seven CWD resistant clones partially released (consumer and yield acceptable). The quality of these coffees is checked by UCDA. (Source: MN310)</p> <p>EU and DANIDA are the biggest donors to agricultural research. Other donors: IFAD (25M\$ over 5 years), research Canadian Institute, Bill Gates Foundation, AGRA (alliance for green revolution in Africa), Rockefeller foundation, Ford Foundation and obviously ASARECA.</p> <p>Originally, donors gave directly money but they didn't know who was doing what: this led to duplications. NARO has a directorate that coordinates donors' funds and that keeps records of what has been done. Moreover, an agriculture donors group exists that allows improving the integrity of the organization. Each donor contribution gives rise to a MoU signed by the Director General of NARO.</p> <p>(Source: MN305)</p> <p>The EC has supported NARS/NARO (agricultural research) under project approaches since the beginning of the reference period at national and regional levels (using STABEX funds). During that time, a National Agricultural Research Policy was formulated in 2003, making research farmer-oriented and client-driven.</p> <p>Progress in implementation of these programmes has been made. The number of research outputs has increased; however, no evidence was found for the existence of a systematic relation between Private Service Providers (PSPs) and NARs institutions, nor is there proof that the transfer of research results is systematically undertaken. Nevertheless there is evidence that EC financing as well as technical assistance have considerably contributed to institutional development and technical achievements of NARO.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda Country Strategy Evaluation</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme supports interventions which stimulate research. For example, CFC is working in collaboration with the Caribbean Agricultural Research Institute (CARDI) and with producer groups on the production and distribution mechanisms of disease-free planting materials for roots and tuber crops.</p> <p><i>Source: Mid-term Review of the AAACP Programme, Final report, April 2009, page 34</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP final evaluation report states that the PIP implicated inter alia international research centres. The PIP also participated to international seminars and workshops in the field of EU regulations and fruit &amp; vegetable markets. Furthermore, the Regulations Component of the PIP implied carrying out field surveys and field experiments to determine which pesticides could be used in compliance with EU regulations. Finally, the PIP's Information/Communication component implied efforts to disseminate knowledge and know-how from the PIP to local operators. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 9, 36 &amp; 67.</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>La recherche agronomique et la transmission des connaissances sont prises en compte dans l'intervention. Au sein de la structure organisationnelle et l'équipe proposée, pour les ressources humaines INADES-Formation Burkina Faso, il y aura des stagiaires 'agronomie' et / ou 'agroalimentaire' pour les diagnostics agraires, analyses des pratiques de producteurs, travaux sur la qualité, les bonnes pratiques culturales, recherche sur l'agrobiologie et les itinéraires techniques (1 stagiaire /an) suivi restitutions des formations, enquêtes de terrain pour suivre évolution des IOV de l'objectif général, suivi de l'adoption des outils de gestion au sein des OP et opérateurs économiques. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 5</i>).</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés.</p>

<b>CI-ONG</b>	Selon la note d'informations, l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » en Côte d'Ivoire n'était pas ciblée sur les producteurs mais sur les unités de décorticage. Pour les unités de décorticage, des travaux ont été faits afin d'optimiser les processus de production et l'information a été diffusée par des formations ou guides pratiques. <i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Note d'informations pages 6 à 8</i>
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à la recherche agronomique mais qq références à la transmission des connaissances aux producteurs agricoles, notamment en ce qui concerne la formation et le conseil technique agronomique des pépiniéristes dans le cadre de l'activité « A.1.a.1 Hévéa et palmier » et la vulgarisation agricole pour les petits producteurs de coton dans le cadre de l'activité « A.1.b Autres cultures paysannes d'exportation». ( <i>Sources : Annexe II FA p.5-6, Rider FA p.6-7</i> )
<b>CM-ONG</b>	La recherche n'est pas abordée. Par contre, l'ensemble des activités concernent les organisations de producteurs.
<b>CM-PAS</b>	NA. This intervention has not targeted agricultural commodities. It aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the economy and at facilitating its insertion into the regional and world economy through the implementation of the EU-Central Africa EPA. The various activities do not explicitly target agricultural commodities. <i>Source: Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	The “Support to the competitiveness to the rice sector in the Caribbean” programme aimed at stimulating research. One of the components of the programme was directly targeting research and extension through the “establishment of a global regional fund for activities in seed production, multiplication and certification, as well as training of the farmers on improved production techniques”. The final evaluation of the programme noted that “in 2006 it was decided that the R&E component should be delivered via research grants to national institutions rather than regional ones.” It further stressed that this component mainly focused on (i) the production of basic, certified seeds out of good lines, (ii) the establishment of cooperatives to produce and label the seeds, (iii) the introduction of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) in fields and Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) in the mills and on (iv) the investigation of innovative products out of rice biomass. As a result, seed production has been developed and farmers benefited from a better access to seeds. However, due to time and budget limitations, the objective to achieve a sustainable seed industry was not fully realised. Additionally, the actual quantitative impact of increased use of quality seed on milling yields is unclear. Seed and paddy yields increased slightly but not as substantially as expected and possible. <i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009; pages 20-23</i>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	Research is not addressed by the Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	The activities (components) include extension, nurseries, research, conservation, and marketing ( <i>Source: FA p.2</i> ) and one of the activities is “improve the delivery of coffee research results” ( <i>Source: FA p.3</i> ). The main expectation with CIP IV was an improved use of coffee research results and that the latter would be practically transferred for appropriate use by DAs and farmers ( <i>Source: Completion report p.16</i> ). The technical approach to coffee research is consistent with those tried in other countries. The technology is both appropriate and known elsewhere in the world. ( <i>Source: FA p.5</i> ). The most important sub-component by far in research is that relating to landrace development concerning coffee quality. Annual Work Programmes will include the direction and content of each year's investments. This process will allow focus to be directed on the steps to ensure the successful implementation of the land race development programme including the provision of outside support. . The collection of genetic resources sub-components could be carried out by the Biodiversity Institute and funds re-directed there. The work on coffee by-product utilization is less significant than the others and

	<p>would be dropped entirely. The final sub-component relating to the collation and statistical assessment of past field results could not be attempted at all, but this is the least significant sub component. (<i>Source : FA Annexes A to D p.3</i>)</p> <p>The research has 5 sub-component : coffee quality, landrace development, collection of genetic resources, coffee by-product utilisation and statistical assessment field results (<i>Source : FA Annexes A to D p.13</i>). There is also a sub-component for the forest coffee research in the activity “conservation” (<i>Source: FA Annexes A to D p.13</i>).</p> <p>According to the MR, the research centre of Jimma, as well as the liquoring centre of Addis Ababa, are considered centres of excellence and their work is well appreciated by different stakeholders. Important research is focused on Coffee Berry Disease (CBD) resistant biological species. However, more than 60% of the small farmers’ total harvest is still wasted or non-marketable, because of parasites and/or diseases. This is an area where gains in productivity could still be very important. Therefore, research and dissemination of information should be strengthened. Private nurseries and seeds producers are self-sustainable and are increasing in number; however, public nurseries in the most promising and interesting areas should be kept active for testing high quality resistant species and seeds. (<i>Source : MR 2008 p.2-3</i>)</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Programme’s Financing Agreement states that the project is implemented inter alia through support to seed production and research by Ghana’s cocoa board (Cocobod). Although the new material has been developed and is available, the second monitoring report states that “<i>a medium to long term delay is to be envisaged for farmers to get use of those outputs</i>”. It states however that field visits have revealed that trained farmers have introduced the learned practices on their farms (e.g. weeding, pruning and disease control techniques). <i>Sources: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 02, Effectiveness to date sheet. Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Agreement, page 17.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>One of the activities of the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) is to “<i>compile research results and scientific information related to most relevant standards and produce briefings on each of them</i>”. According to the 2010 annual report, that activity is “on track” and its achievement is that “<i>websites and web pages have been consulted and are mentioned in the draft bulletin</i>”. <i>Sources: PAN-SPSO Annual Report, August 2010, page 15, PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 28.</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The EC intervention supports the establishment at district level of agricultural services centres (Centres de Services Agricoles – CSA) managed by NGOs. CSAs do not themselves provide services to farmers. They act as intermediaries between farmers and farmer organizations on the one hand, and providers of services (of which extension services) on the other hand.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Pas d’évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés</p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>The EC supports the ICART programme. This regional research programme of actions will enable National Agricultural Research System (NARS) in the 14 SADC countries to enhance their national efforts in order to improve incomes of small-scale farmers, processors, traders and other beneficiaries while maintaining the natural resource base. By addressing common regional researchable constraints and opportunities in agriculture, the programme will also improve the capacity of NARS to manage regional initiatives, thereby making a major contribution to the long-term sustainability of regional research as well making important inputs to the SADC rural development sector. <i>Source: IF</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>The project aims at promoting adoption by coffee growers in the Kamuli District of the “UTZ Code of Conduct”, which is an internationally recognized set of economic, social and environmental criteria for responsible coffee production. Implementing the UTZ Code of Conduct should lead to higher yields and being UTZ certified should allow coffee growers to be paid a higher price for their deliveries.</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>Supporting agricultural research and dissemination of its results by extension services is precisely the objective of the EC SBS in support of the PMA. The EC SBS supports the implementation of two components of the PMA:</p>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The development under coordination and supervision by NARS of a demand-driven smallholder oriented agricultural research system</li> <li>▪ A functional system of agricultural extension services provided by private operators with subsidies of NAADS.</li> </ul>
<b>VU-POP</b>	The Revolving Credit Fund (RCF) established by the project supported research as well as training, effective extension services, market support and market information. The RCF is considered to have played a central role for smallholders. However, interest in continuing the RCF beyond the programme seems low. <i>Source: Producers Organisation Project II Monitoring report 3, effectiveness and sustainability sheets.</i>
<b>BAN</b>	The only information on research that can be found in the SFA Impact Evaluation concerns 3 of the countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica and St Lucia. See detail below). No information is given on the dissemination of this research. In Côte d'Ivoire, 0.31% of SFA budget has been allocated to research. In Jamaica, the sector has been equipped with an adequate research and support infrastructure that should be able to serve as reference and monitoring centre for further development initiatives. In St Lucia, budget allocations show that research has been funded in 2000 & 2006. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 146, 281 &amp; 360, htspe, 2008.</i>
<b>I.4.2.2</b>	Commission support contributed to improve production factors and farmers access to them (e.g. extension services/agricultural techniques, water, fertilizers, seeds, energy)
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	As result 2 (access and use of markets, production factors and services) of the AAACP programme are concerned, the MTR assumes that effects will prove positive on the targeted beneficiaries based on experience of the International Organisations (FAO, WB, UNCTAD, CFC and ITC) and their comparative competence. <i>Source: Mid-term Review of the AAACP Programme, Final report, April 2009, page 70.</i>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	The PIP's objective was to adapt production methods to comply with EU regulations in terms of pesticide residues. The PIP therefore mainly provided or supported the development agricultural techniques and services to adapt fruit and vegetable production in ACP countries. The programme improved producer's access to regulations information, and access to environmentally-sounder techniques. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 3, 6, 8 &amp; 10.</i>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Divers appuis y contribuent :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Appuis STABEX : Appuis aux activités d'appui et d'encadrement des producteurs réalisées par l'UNPCB, accès aux intrants</li> <li>▪ Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière (production et utilisation de matière organique, mise au point et utilisation de nouvelles formulations de pesticides non chimiques (biologiques), mise en place d'une ferme semencière pour approvisionner les producteurs bio en semences certifiées bio.</li> <li>▪ Programme tous ACP, volet coton :GIPD/FAO : développement de techniques culturales dans le cadre d'une amélioration de la fertilisation des sols, production de semences.</li> </ul> <p>Cependant, l'impact de ces améliorations est difficile à évaluer/quantifier. Les interventions du STABEX, plus anciennes, semblent avoir été appréciées bien que leur portée soit considérée comme trop limitée par rapport aux besoins réels et qu'aucun rapport d'évaluation de ces interventions STABEX n'ait pu être obtenu. Les interventions du Programme tous ACP ont un impact potentiel plus important mais leur portée relative reste encore assez limitée que pour s'attendre à des impacts significatifs à grande échelle. De manière plus générale, mis à part pour le STABEX, les autres interventions sont aussi trop récentes que pour évaluer des impacts. Par ailleurs, il faut également noter que le financement direct des activités du Programme tous ACP se termine au plus tard fin décembre 2011. <i>Sources : Rapport FAO, 2<sup>nd</sup> semestre 2010, Focus group, MN 510 et 575, Rapport narratif 2009 du Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques</i></p> <p>Pour le projet anacarde/ sésame mis en œuvre par RONGEAD (ONG française) et INADES-B, les activités sont : accompagnement dans le temps, formation, analyse des résultats, renforcement des</p>

	<p>capacités, appui-conseil pour la transformation, actions d'équipement de transformation – surtout pour le volet anacarde. Il y a eu un accroissement conséquent du nombre d'unités de transformation d'anacardes. Mais finalement le volet équipement a été réduit du fait du boum dans l'équipement auprès des producteurs (L'INADES ne voulait pas financer de nouveaux équipements de transformation alors qu'il y avait déjà surcapacité de transformation) L'INADES s'est alors adapté et a donné plus d'appui, notamment avec le miel qui est en lien avec l'anacardier (expérimentation).</p> <p>L'appui à la formation pour la production cible l'augmentation de rendement. Pour les formations à la transformation, INADES travaille avec les producteurs sur les normes standards de qualité avec les exportateurs (commerçants en relation avec des Indiens, par exemple).</p> <p>A noter qu'il y a une surcapacité des unités de transformation de l'anacarde (suite notamment à l'achat direct par les Indiens). Les femmes parties prenantes de la filière n'ont pas assez de noix pour faire la transformation sur place. <i>Source : MN551</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Dans le cadre du PIN 10ème FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Les mesures Stabex dans le secteur coton s'inscrivent dans la continuité des interventions menées par le MinAgri : soutien à la production (non aux prix), par un soutien à l'investissement sous forme subventionné (intrants, équipements,... ), à la recherche appliquée (production de matériel végétal, ... ) et au renforcement institutionnel (OPA, interprofession, fonctions de pilotage, ... ) (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Au Cameroun, le programme PACICC (Programme d'Appui au Conseil Interprofessionnel Café-Cacao) avait une composante qui a mis du petit matériel à disposition des groupements de producteurs (tels des atomiseurs, débroussailleuses, balances, etc.). De plus, le soutien au secteur bananier du pays Cameroun a été largement utilisé pour investir dans les facteurs de production (irrigation par frondaison, électrification de l'irrigation, utilisation plus rationnelle des intrants, etc.). <i>Source : MN 913</i></p> <p>In Cameroon, the EC also supported (through Stabex funds) a programme that produced productive oil palm seedlings and disseminate them among farmers. The project lasted 5 years, from 1997 to 2002. The programme resulted in the production of over 200,000 seedlings and a well organised organisation ensuring the perennity of the programme. <i>Source : Projet pilote pour la mise en place de pépinières villageoises privées de palmier à huile, rapport de fin d'exécution, mars 2003</i></p> <p>The Logone-et-Chari rural development programme (which was funded through Stabex) rehabilitated rice 800 ha of rice fields, trained extension service workers, improved water management and organised farmer communities. <i>Source : Evaluation finale du programme de développement rural participatif dans le département du Logone-et-Chari, Rapport final, février 2007.</i> Other rural development programmes (programme péri-urbain, programme Semriz, etc.) also contributed to improve farmers access to irrigation, seedlings, etc. However, these programmes mainly took place before the 2000s. <i>Source : MN 409</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>As part of the implementation of the cocoa sector strategy (GCSDS) which had been approved by the Government in 1999 and which led the sector's development during the period under review, some major changes were brought into the sector including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cocobod's 517 extension staff was transferred to MOFA in September 2000; however, in 2011 a decision was taken that cocoa extension should be brought back under the responsibility of Cocobod and as a result Cocobod has been hiring some of these extension people back from MOFA</li> <li>- Significant reduction in export duty from cocoa revenues</li> <li>- The producer prices were raised from 65% of the fob price in 1999/2000 to 73% in 2003/2004 and are about 75% currently.</li> </ul>

	<p>- Since 2001, the Government decided to re-introduce the concept of spraying cocoa farms free of charge, under the Cocoa Diseases and Pests Control Programme (CODAPEC) with the view of increasing the yields of cocoa farmers. These costs are borne by Cocobod.</p> <p>The Commission indirectly supported these changes through its support to the cocoa sector with its CSSP I. One of the important shortcomings of CSSP I was the fact that it didn't integrate the need for extension services in programme design; it also didn't promote farmers' associations or mutual assistance programmes for coping with disease outbreak, weeding etc. The CSSPII works directly with about 4000 farmers, providing training (through farmer field schools and video viewing clubs), improved /hybrid seedlings for replanting (increase in plant population- ie intensification – rather than extension of area planted). Results of Year 1 and 2 have been exceeding targets. The MTE argues that the CSSP II, because it contributes to reduce unit costs by promoting on-farm practices ICPM/Q (Integrated Crop and Pest Management and Quality practices), is even more relevant in the current context of declining cocoa prices than in its design (strong cocoa prices). <i>Source: Agrifor 2005; MN131; CSSPII MTE, 2011</i></p> <p>According to interviews, the “Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme – phase II” provided seedlings and training (through farmer business schools) to farmer organisations. However, an interview with a farmer organisation highlighted that constraints such as access to spraying machines and fertilizers should still be addressed. Fertiliser prices are subsidised for 54%. <i>Source: MN 977, MN 943</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Concernant la filière café, le programme d'appui à cette filière, mis en œuvre par le Comité National de Commercialisation de Café (CNCC), est recentré sur l'appui à l'amélioration du potentiel de production et au renforcement des capacités des acteurs, pour l'amélioration de la qualité dans un contexte de production tournée vers le marché, notamment la valorisation du café de qualité issu d'un système de production et de commercialisation normalisé.</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport annuel Stabex 2006</i></p> <p>Le projet SOAVA, financé sur fonds Stabex et mis en œuvre par l'ONG Association Intercoopération Madagascar (AIM) couvrait 14 Communes du district de Mananara Nord et environ 16.200 petits agriculteurs familiaux pratiquant des cultures d'exportation (vanille girofle, café) en complément de cultures vivrières.</p> <p>Les résultats attendus du projet étaient les suivants :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Résultat 1 : La productivité des facteurs de production des ménages ruraux est augmentée de manière durable ;</li> <li>- Résultat 2 : Les produits répondent aux normes de qualité des marchés nationaux et internationaux ;</li> <li>- Résultat 3 : Les marchés intérieurs des produits d'exportation fonctionnent de manière concurrentielle et au bénéfice des producteurs ;</li> <li>- Résultat 4 : De nouveaux marchés de niche sont identifiés et exploités.</li> </ul> <p>AIM a adopté comme approche de mise en œuvre de ces deux projets la collaboration et l'interaction entre les trois pôles d'acteurs de ces filières d'exportation : (i) les producteurs à la base, (ii) les collecteurs locaux en contact direct avec les producteurs et (iii) les autorités locales responsables de la mise en place d'un cadre favorable.</p> <p>Selon l'évaluation finale du projet, les résultats suivants ont été obtenus :</p> <p>Résultat 1 : Productivité des facteurs de production</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Des intrants de qualité ont été mis à la disposition des producteurs (établissement de pépiniéristes, production de plants de girofliers)</li> <li>• Les techniques culturales ont été améliorées</li> <li>• Les terroirs communaux sont mieux exploités (plantations d'acacias et eucalyptus)</li> </ul> <p>Résultat 2 : Les produits répondant aux normes de qualité des marchés nationaux et internationaux</p>

- Regroupement des producteurs professionnels
- Application des techniques de post récolte
- Mise en place des alambics modernes
- Mise en fonctionnement de service de contrôle (poinçonnage des plants de vanille)

Résultat 3 : marchés intérieurs des produits d'exportation

- 13 marchés organisés ont été établis et sont fonctionnels. 20% de la production totale de vanille dans le District est écoulee sur ces marchés. Sur 88 collecteurs recensés, 29 ont participé à une formation sur la qualité des produits de rente et sont en possession de cartes professionnelles. Mais pour le girofle et le café, les pourcentages des produits vendus sur les marchés communaux par rapport aux productions totales sont très faibles et représentent respectivement 0,1% et 8%.
- Mise en œuvre d'un système d'information de marché (SIM) en collaboration avec PPRR (projet FIDA)
- Capitalisation des expériences (visite-échange avec un autre projet)
- Appui aux Communes sur la bonne Gouvernance

Résultat 4 : Marchés de niche

Les groupements producteurs d'huile essentielle de girofle sont entrés en relations commerciales avec l'entreprise suisse Givaudan, qui est engagée dans une démarche d'approvisionnement à la source, et de rémunération équitable des produits

*L'évaluation conclut que l'approche multi-acteurs : collaboration pratique entre producteurs, autorités locales et secteur privé pour développer les filières girofle et vanille, initiée et développée par AIM témoigne de l'efficacité du projet traduite par les premiers effets positifs constatés et ce, malgré le temps imparti très limité pour assurer la durabilité des acquis et des effets.*

*Source : Evaluation finale du projet SOAVA*

Les objectifs spécifiques du projet AFAKA, portant sur 7 communes du district de Mahanoro et 10 communes du district de Vatomaniry, consistaient dans la mise en place d'un modèle de commercialisation, des structures sociales et la mise à disposition des compétences techniques (éprouvés) permettant la relance de trois filières d'exportation : café, girofle, poivre.

Les résultats attendus étaient :

Résultat 1 : Un système de production de jeunes plants, de diffusion de technique de production

Résultat 2 : Une démarche de planification de l'extension de surfaces plantées en culture de rente

Résultat 3 : Un processus d'amélioration de la qualité des produits mis sur le marché

Résultat 4 : Un modèle d'organisation de marché assurant la concurrence, la transparence et l'équité

L'évaluation conclut que la durée de vie de 29 mois du projet ne lui permettait pas d'atteindre ces résultats. Par contre, le projet a pu mettre en place une base solide pour une future augmentation de la production de girofle, café, poivre notamment en termes de quantité et qualité :

- L'existence d'un système de fournitures de matériels végétal, à travers les pépinières privées villageois qui est tirés par la présence d'une demande des jeunes plants par les autres producteurs
- L'existence d'un système de vulgarisation « Paysan à Paysan » à travers des Paysans Leaders motivés disposant de connaissances nécessaires en matière de techniques culturales et techniques d'encadrement.
- La structuration des producteurs en OPC en matière de commercialisation mais qui se trouve encore au stade de démarrage
- La gouvernance des 3 filières par les communes en matière de plan d'extension des futures plantations de café, de girofle et de poivre.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Les marchés organisés permettant la réalisation de transactions commerciales transparente mais qui ne traitent qu'une très faible fraction de la production totale de la zone couverte par le projet.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : Projet AFAKA Mahanoro-Vatomandry, Mission d'évaluation finale</i></p> <p>L'essentiel du prix de revient du girofle est lié à la rémunération de récolte. Avec ses bas niveaux de rémunération du travail, Madagascar possède un avantage comparatif indéniable sur le marché mondial.</p> <p>La hausse poursuivie des prix depuis 2003 semble indiquer une certaine fermeté de la demande mondiale face à une offre qui tendrait à la baisse dans les principaux pays producteurs, où la plupart des plantations sont âgées de plusieurs décennies.</p> <p>Cette tendance devrait inciter les producteurs à renouveler ou étendre leurs plantations mais les nouveaux peuplements n'entreront cependant en production que dans 7 à 8 ans. Vu les longs délais de production, il est primordial que ces plantations soient réalisées avec un matériel végétal performant. Dans ce but, l'UE appuie le Centre Technique et Horticole de Tamatave (CTHT) dans la mise au point de techniques de multiplication végétative mais une grande attention devra être apportée à la sélection des pieds-mères à partir desquels seront réalisées les futures plantations (choisis en fonction de la régularité et le niveau de leur production, de leur résistance au vent, etc).</p> <p>L'autre enjeu pour Madagascar est de consolider ses parts de marchés sur les marchés européen et américain en adoptant des normes commerciales qui répondent au mieux aux besoins des utilisateurs et en améliorant la fiabilité des documents délivrés par les autorités.</p> <p><i>Source : Délégation de l'UE à Madagascar, Note filière girofle</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui avec la création des CSA - Centres de Services Agricoles- qui prônent une "approche par la demande", c'est-à-dire identifier les prestataires de services qui peuvent répondre aux besoins exprimés par les producteurs agricoles. Les CSA ont donc un rôle de facilitation : trouver qui peut répondre aux besoins des producteurs agricoles. (Source : MN 804).</p> <p>5 services pour lesquels CSA interviennent en intermédiaires : Appui à la production (conseil, intrants, etc.) ; structuration et renforcement des organisations professionnelles ; Infrastructures et équipements ; Recherche ; Extension du réseau de micro-finance. Un 6ème service va être introduit : renforcement de la qualité des prestataires.</p> <p>Création des CSA : Le Programme d'Action pour la Sécurité Alimentaire a débouché sur le PASAM et la création des CSA et des Fonds de Développement Régionaux Agricoles (FRDA) dans 6 régions. Prévu pour 3 ans, le PASAM n'a duré qu'un an. Les CSA pilotes sont financés par d'autres bailleurs. Les CSA continuent d'être financés par le budget de l'Etat alors que CE a suspendu son appui budgétaire. L'appui de la CE aux Fonds de Développement Agricole s'arrête cette année. D'autres bailleurs (WB, FIDA, AFD, Suisse) ont financé les CSA et appuient les Fonds de Développement ou en créent de nouveaux. (Source : MN 804).</p> <p>CSA vs appel à propositions : les lignes budgétaires avec appel à propositions en fonction de la situation du moment (d'une région à l'autre selon les situations de crise ou approches filières) ont conduit à multiplier des interventions de faible amplitude, non coordonnées entre elles. L'approche CSA permet de faire appel à des structures locales de type ONG dans un cadre national cohérent. (Source : MN 804).</p> <p>Les fonds Stabex ont financé entre fin 2008 et fin 2010, pour un budget total de €4,7 millions, onze projets mis en œuvre par cinq organisations.</p> <p>Chacun des onze projets poursuivait les mêmes objectifs d'accroissement du revenu des producteurs par l'augmentation et l'amélioration de l'offre de cinq produits agricoles d'exportation (cacao, café, girofle, poivre, vanille) et par une meilleure valorisation au moment de l'échange.</p> <p>L'augmentation de l'offre des produits devait être le résultat de l'augmentation de la production — résultant elle-même de l'extension des surfaces consacrées à ces cultures et de l'amélioration de la productivité des exploitations.</p> <p>Parallèlement, à ces actions d'augmentation de l'offre les actions d'amélioration de la qualité des produits</p>

	<p>mis en vente avaient également pour objet d'assurer une meilleure rémunération des producteurs. L'amélioration de la valorisation devait être le résultat d'une mise en adéquation de la demande exprimée par les acheteurs et de l'offre résultant des actions du programme.</p> <p>Un nouveau mécanisme de mise en vente —la vente publique sur les marchés communaux, lors de la première transaction de la chaîne des échanges — devait être celui par lequel les exigences des acheteurs seraient communiquées aux producteurs.</p> <p><i>Source : Assistance Technique à la mise en œuvre du programme d'intensification et de structuration des principales filières d'exportation de produits agricoles à Madagascar, Rapport final</i></p>
TZ	<p>Yields of major cash crops in Tanzania are well below those of the world or even of the region. The PER notes that: (i) fertiliser use in Tanzania is well below par: Tanzanian farmers use an average of 9kg/Ha or fertiliser compared to an average of 16kg/Ha for SADC and 27kg/Ha for Malawi. In Vietnam use is of 365kg/Ha (China 279kg/Ha). This is despite wide availability (in fact oversupply) of fertilisers in the country; (ii) improved seeds are not sufficiently used because there is a shortage of supply in improved seeds (demand for 120,000 Tons compared to supply of 12,000 Tons).</p> <p><i>Source: PER 2010</i></p> <p>The EC has supported the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TACRI). TACRI has devoted a part of its activities to train extension services from TACRI and from the Government (at district level) on agricultural techniques in the coffee sector (Arabica and Robusta).</p> <p>In the District of Moshi, there are 27 officers who work with coffee cooperatives and coffee producers. These officers have been trained by TACRI about agricultural techniques. Training has been provided in group. Farmers are also trained by TACRI. To be cost-efficient training are provided in TACRI's building or within cooperatives. Poor smallholders link to existing cooperatives in order to organise the follow-up of their crops. To launch their nurseries TACRI may provide coffee seedlings free to smallholders.</p> <p>Extension services assist producers in managing nurseries. In this nursery there are 6 workers dealing with seedlings. Sometimes TACRI purchase material to build nurseries, sometimes cooperatives purchase themselves. In this last case, extension services may advice cooperatives about the right material to buy.</p> <p>In the Moshi district, the Agriculture Support Development Programme, which is supported through a basket fund that the EC left recently, finance extension services of the district to advice producers to grow coffee? District extension services and extension services of TACRI are working together on the field. TACRI has trained 65 groups, of which 10 groups hired by the ASDP and 55 from TACRI extension services and producers.</p> <p>However, huge challenges remain in the Tanzanian coffee sector, especially for smallholders:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Buy and use inorganic fertilizer. 100 g of ammonium sulphate per seedling is required when planting. This fertilizer is expensive (around 40 YSD/ 50 kg) and a lot of producers can not afford it. Another 75 g of calcium ammonium nitrate is required two times while coffee plant is growing. Three applications of inorganic fertilizers are recommended in total.</li> <li>▪ Productivity issue: 2 kg to 3 kg per tree is a good productivity. Around 5 kg of berries allows getting 1 kg coffee ready to sell on the market (Moshi's auction).</li> <li>▪ Quality improvement (Premium standard)</li> </ul> <p>In the coffee sector, there is a huge challenge in terms of training extension services and producers and attached them to TACRI, notably to support TACRI activities in the future. TACRI decided to train trainers, which will train themselves producers and other extension services. So far, 846 groups of trainers (of around 25-30 participants) through the whole country have been trained about breeding, cutting, processing, etc. This training is providing throughout the year. There are 21 TACRI trainers for the whole country. To scale up training TACRI work also closely to NGOs through partnerships.</p> <p>Within the Trade and Agriculture Support Programme (TASP) funded by the EU (€2M), different activities are foreseen:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Research;</li> <li>▪ Breeding programme to develop varieties;</li> <li>▪ Continuation of the development of Arabica</li> </ul>

- Releasing varieties
- Scaling up to growers: a budget has been devoted to operational activities (transport, training, and subsistence of participants to trainings).
- Developing building and facilities
- To pay casual salaries (the rest is paid by TACRI)
- Research programme to address climate change (drought)
- Capacity building (participations to conferences, travels, etc.)

*Source: MN 677, MN 690, MN 673*

The most important challenge in the tea sector and for research in particular is the dissemination of research results to farmers: in Rungwe tea sector stakeholders (estate, smallholder growers and factory) have contracted TRIT to provide extension services (10-15 people are employed by TRIT and placed in Rungwe). The experience is very positive and it would be good to push TRIT to do this with more factories.

However, on the whole the support to research has had very limited impact:

- OK in training extension agents technically but nothing on how to approach the farmers and how to get them to adopt the technologies. So not enough efforts are made to pass the knowledge on to farmers.
- TRIT getting some results on cloning
- Lots of research effort on irrigation but irrigation hasn't really been used
- Nursery: many plants are developed but how many have actually been planted? Should have seen an increase in area planted but nothing there to show that it has served to increase number of tea bushes and how these are managed. There has been no monitoring of the nursery programme (follow-up with farmers benefiting).

On the whole the effectiveness of support was limited due to the research institute not considering the links between research, farmers and private sector.

One of the tea growing associations near the research centre benefited from the supply of 300,000 tea seedlings; the nursery shed was built by the farmers association.

The quality of the green leaves is difficult to obtain due to the difficult access to fertilizers, an ineffective collection system and the limited factory capacities. The price of fertilizers is very prohibitive to smallholders.

There is no irrigation and yields and quality go down when there is not enough rain.

The issue is that we do not have enough volume and we can not answer demand for green leaves. Expansion of estates is not going to happen because of the costs of infrastructure (housing for staff).

Long attempts (three-six months) to assist growing extension staff. The trainees sometimes abandoned the training and decide to produce other crops. Need to support the farmers. TRIT did not make it and there is very little impact in that sense. Training has had very little impact on farmers and government staff has to deal with many other crops.

The challenge is to focus on extension services. Need to train trainees/ specialists to help farmers to grow properly tea green leaves. How finance it? This is the problem. They have addressed demand to the Chai Project.

TSHTDA, created in 1997 (operational in 2000), is a government organisation dealing with promotion of tea producers by small farmers. The aim is to facilitate extension services to smallholders, to facilitate tea production in new areas, and to facilitate position of smallholders to factories. Created after the wave of liberalisation.

Tea Board designed for Regulation issues and TSHTDA designed for Promotion issues.

Until after the independence, smallholders were not allowed to produce tea. After independence, smallholders have been introduced to tea production. 50% of the area (12,000 Ha) under production by 30,000 small holders but their productivity is very low. Additional production from smallholders to production of estates.

During the 1970s and 1980s the WB extended loans for the construction of 6 factories and to plant

	<p>11,000 Ha. Then in the 1990s the sector was liberalised and smallholders got some minority shares in factories. The future of tea industry in Tanzania is based on smallholders' shoulders. The rate of expanding tea production amongst smallholders is quite low at the moment.</p> <p>It is very interesting to note in the WB's appraisal report for its project in 1990 that according to the WB three main constraints need to be addressed in the smallholder tea sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increased green leaves production in order to have higher factory use</li> <li>▪ Maintenance of adequate price levels for green leaves from smallholders and access to inputs and support services</li> <li>▪ Adequate maintenance of feeder roads</li> </ul> <p><i>'Smallholder production increases should be achieved if GL prices remain attractive to growers and if input supplies will be made available, supported by stronger extension services'</i> In estates the main constraint is labour shortage (NB: exactly the same can be said now, 20 years later and after sustained support from the EU to one element of the value chain)</p> <p>Organisation of farmers and extension services:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In 2000, they created association to organise of farmers. The association has been useful notably to negotiate prices. There currently are 14 associations.</li> <li>▪ Five zone offices with tea extension specialists; extension staff provided by the government. But extension is still a problem: 1) shortage of extension staff; 2) general extension staff, not working fully on tea (knowledge of tea is limited to a very minimum) and not answerable to TTA. The set-up of the extension services is not really good.</li> </ul> <p>Major problem is not extension, it is the access to inputs (no financial institutions to help farmers obtain financing). Farmers are not paid enough and fairly for their production. To fix one price at the beginning of the year is not fair. Tea is produced all along the year. In Kenya, smallholders own the processing industries. This is a different picture in the tea sector in Tanzania. It is difficult to convince young farmers to grow tea. Need to create the value chain in the tea sector by and for smallholders. The Government does not take care about the price things. On tea the major inputs are green leaves but they are not paid at the fair price. If the EU assists in that area things can be changed. Farmers need to get involved in processing and marketing. Not having shares in the factories is a big problem.</p> <p>Need to use fertilizer. They (Tea Board) are negotiating with the Chai project to provide money to define a loan system to make farmers able to buy fertilizers and with the GoT for fertiliser subsidies. Currently the planting material is already subsidised so would provide subsidised fertilizer in the same package. The price of fertilizers is really high and currently smallholders do not use fertiliser on tea.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN623, MN 697, MN 662, MN 666, MN 673, MN 164, World Bank report</i></p> <p>The AMSP supports research and training. The expected result 3 of the 2007 feasibility study states that: <i>'Farmers will therefore be organised in small groups, where synchronised farming will be promoted and they will benefit from different types of training such as Farmers Field School and farm management training. It is envisaged that 50 village extension officers will be assigned to the project, so that they can organise the groups and deliver the different types of training.'</i></p> <p>To date 8 block farms have been organised (comprised of about 30 to 40 farmers each). Capacity building of the programme: training of growers gathered in associations. Courses are: good governance, financial management, business management. Farmers from 0.6 ha to 30 ha. People understand better after training. There is a dissemination system. Some are trained by the project and come back home to disseminate. District extension workers are also trained by the Sugar Board.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN 673; Feasibility Study Report, June 2007 (Studies for EU Sugar Reform Accompanying Measures for Tanzania, Period 2007-2010); AMSP 2006 for Sugar Protocol Countries, Financing Agreement.</i></p> <p>Current EC projects have impacted on farmers' income through various channels, mainly: increased productivity, better access to credit, better management capacity, and improved access to buyers (e.g. EC support to the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute). <i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to the United Republic of Tanzania, April 2006, pages 37 and 38.</i></p>
UG	Yes, EC supported extension services through the the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture)



implementation that aimed at strengthening the link between research and extension and at reinforcing the extension system. The EC has taken the decision to withdraw its support to NAADS because of a change in NAADS activities. NAADS core activity was to subsidise extension services provided on demand to the farmer groups by private service providers. It is evolving towards a provider of free-of-charge agricultural inputs; the ruling party is taking control of the farmer groups; extension services are delivered by government employees... (Source: MN 301).

Integrated Support to Farmer Groups (ISFG): The ISFG is essentially a revolving fund for members of farmer groups to obtain inputs. As such it partly responds to the demands of farmers for a material inputs and micro-finance facility to complement the advice and training being provided. While still limited in scope, it has proved highly popular and is an essential feature of the advisory services. It is, however, relatively new and the ability of farmer groups to set up and establish effective revolving funds has not been fully tested. The current scale of operations means that ISFG benefits only a minority of farmers (the majority of farmers, many of whom are the poorer members, will have to wait many years to benefit from the revolving fund process). *Source: Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008*

Although NAADS providers generally received favorable ratings from farmers for the availability, quality and timeliness of their services, and farmer participation in NAADS farmer group activities was generally high, some important constraints facing farmer groups by survey respondents. A shortage of capital and credit facilities was often cited as a critical constraint. Other constraints commonly cited include the scarcity of agricultural inputs, lack of adequate farmland, unfavorable weather patterns and problems of pests and diseases. These responses emphasize that the quality of advisory services is not the only important factor influencing technology adoption and productivity, and the need for complementary progress with respect to the other pillars of the PMA that address many of these constraints, especially development of the rural financial system. *Source: Quantifying the impact of NAADS in the Uganda livelihoods (2005).*

An efficient extension system has been put in place by the Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support project to improve the coffee husbandry of the project's farmers. A number of good agricultural practices were promoted, including the use of high-quality planting material and fertilisers, water and soil nutrient conservation, de-suckering and weeding. To this end, some 1,248 coffee demonstration plots on farmers' fields were established, the yields of which increased significantly over time. Sample surveys show impressive levels of adoption of these practices by the farmers.

The project also supported the establishment of six farmer-owned/operated coffee nurseries and associated mother gardens which has meant that the chronic shortage of good planting material which had been a feature of the districts, is now history. Old plantings have been rehabilitated and more than 2.50 million good-quality coffee plantlets distributed to/purchased by, the project farmers.

*Source: Evaluation of the Kaweri Farmers' Alliance Support Project*

Availability of agricultural inputs has improved considerably in the project area. 14 out of 24 DC Companies have set up input supply schemes. Private stockists have also reported higher sales;

*Source: Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report*

In order to train and encourage the farmers to employ better coffee husbandry practices, an extension system was set up. Project Field Officers, DC Extensionists and Lead Farmers at PO level created the link through which training would reach the farmers and information would flow in both directions. By the end of the project a total of 24 DC Extensionists and 443 Lead Farmers were involved in the extension system. A total of 1,288 demo plots were established; 328 large demo plots and 960 small demo plots of 110 and 25 coffee trees respectively.

With the cooperation with the LEAD project and through their specific focus on Farmer Field Schools, this concept was prominently introduced half way through the 5th and final project year. The introduction of FFS transformed the extension system; ownership was passed on to the farmer groups and as such it changed to a bottom up approach and to a more participatory approach. In total 447 FFSs have been established and 72 FFS Facilitators have been trained at DC level, each one responsible for approx. 6

FFSs.

The various tools that have been employed in the extension system have resulted in a significant improvement in the adoption of good agricultural practices. This has, however, been a gradual and fairly slow process. A monitoring exercise that began in 2007 shows the improvement over the years. Approximately 60% of the farmers are now adopting improved agricultural practices.

*Source: Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report*

The extent to which farmers depend on middlemen for credit and loans has been hugely underestimated. One of the main reasons why DC Companies are currently only accessing about 30% of the members' coffee is because most of it is tied up with middlemen in repayment of loans. This constraint should have been addressed sooner by focusing on savings, for example through the development of Village Savings and Loans Associations. It would have also been important to have focused sooner on creating links between DC Companies and financial institutions.

*Source: Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report*

The Luwero coffee project is founded on the experiences from the Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support project, but, in addition, will also be incorporating the following components to further complement the concept of the project:

- Access to credit shall be substantially improved. In addition to short term funds for commercial operations, also financing for the crop cycle is planned.
- Farmers and their organizations shall be trained in financial literacy and business planning in order to better assess production costs, improve farm management and to plan the economic development of the organizational structures.
- Commercial partnerships between farmer organizations and their downstream supply chain partners shall be strengthened.
- A focus will be put on farm households, strengthening the potential to evolve as a whole (women, men and children). This includes enabling household members to better develop their potential, as well as looking at possibilities to raise income through diversification while reducing risk.
- A comprehensive mainstreaming gender approach will be designed and implemented as cross cutting through the entire project.

*Source: Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report*

Approximately 14,600 smallholder farmers were registered with the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support project and grouped into 443 Producer Organisations (PO) that were subsequently transformed into Farmer Field Schools. These were, in turn, organised into 24 farmer organisations know as Depot Committees (DC) which, over the last two years of the project, were transformed into legally-registered companies. They were established to facilitate the provision of agricultural services to their members, to add value to their coffee and to access more-remunerative markets.

The project provided intensive and wide-ranging training to those involved in the operations and management of both the companies and their constituent POs. Training was also provided to stockists providing fertilisers and other inputs/tarpaulins to the Alliance farmers throughout the project area.

*Source: Evaluation of the Kaweri Farmers' Alliance Support Project*

PMA contributed to the setting up of institutions and a coordinating activity in the MoF. People started to take loans, but the microfinance sector suffered from competition by free money distributed in the framework of the Prosperity for All strategy. Now people have become aware that there is nothing like free money. (Source: MN306)

Based on observed differences across selected NAADS and non-NAADS sub-counties, it appears that the NAADS program is having substantial positive impacts on the availability and quality of advisory services provided to farmers, promoting adoption of new crop and livestock enterprises as well improving adoption and use of modern agricultural production technologies and practices. Although current rates of adoption and intensity of use among households are still low, the increase in rates of adoption between

	<p>2000 and 2004 in NAADS sub-counties was very dramatic in many cases.</p> <p><i>Source: Quantifying the impact of NAADS in the Uganda livelihoods (2005)</i></p> <p>There exists evidence for increase of coverage of extension services and intensification of agricultural research were significant and NAADS objectives have been achieved; however the extension services reach only part of the farmers at district or sub-county level; no evidence of significant improvement of land tenure situation and water management is available. The EC has supported Ugandan extension services since 2001 under a project approach, and since 2004 under a sector-wide approach. Thus it is reasonable to assume that observed changes have been partly achieved thanks to EC's support and EC's permanent participation in sector working groups and policy dialogue.</p> <p>Extension services have significantly increased in coverage and agricultural research has been intensified during the reference period. NAADSs structures are based at district and sub-national levels and deliver demand-driven extension services (mainly) through Private Service Providers (PSPs); some 39.600 farmers' groups were progressively established under NAADS (about 715.000 farmers).</p> <p>There is evidence that the quality of service providers is variable and that good quality PSPs are not available in all districts. The challenges the programme now faces relate to high level of group fall-out and dissatisfaction of group members with NAADS quality and quantity of services such as training, technological development sites, access to credit and delivery of material inputs.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda Country Strategy Evaluation</i></p>
<p><b>VU POP2</b></p>	<p><u>POPACA/POP2 project</u>: Several stakeholders have declared that this project was designed through a top-down approach. Farmers were not involved from the beginning. Under this project, infrastructures were built. But today these infrastructures are no more working and trees are covering them as there is no budget for maintenance. There is a clear sustainability problem.</p> <p>The Government does not support agricultural value chains (cocoa for example). The problem of the POPACA project was that it was supporting too many value chains at the same time. The money was spread to too many value chains. No study has been done before launching the project to select key value chains to be supported. There was too much spreading. However, there is one success linked to that project; this concerns the coffee sector in Tana. A lot of support was brought to the coffee sector. But there was no impact in terms of increased coffee exports for Vanuatu. There is still small processing and packaging in Vanuatu. Coffee of Tana is protected by a tariff against imported coffee (25% taxes to be paid to import coffee in Vanuatu). In the cocoa sector there is still a lack of resources to grow more cocoa and process it. <i>Sources: MN 1011 and MN 1098</i></p> <p>La CE a appuyé la transformation des produits agricoles à travers le projet POP2/ POPACA, notamment pour le cacao, le café et le copra. Cela a permis d'organiser le séchage des récoltes. Par exemple, des subventions ont été données pour acheter du matériel comme des buses pour construire les cheminées des fours pour sécher les productions agricoles. Le projet POPACA (terminé en 2007) a eu quelques résultats positifs en termes d'organisation des producteurs en coopératives. Mais, il n'y a pas eu de durabilité des résultats acquis. Par ailleurs, il y a eu du retard dans l'exécution du projet (il a duré de 2001 à 2007) et il a été difficile de dépenser tous les fonds disponibles. Il y a ainsi eu un grave problème d'absorption des fonds car le Gouvernement est incapable de gérer et de définir des politiques et des stratégies.</p> <p>Dans le secteur de la vanille, de nouvelles techniques de production ont été apprises grâce au projet POP2/POPACA. Les avancées ont cependant été faites à petite échelle. La qualité des produits, comme la vanille, s'est améliorée grâce au projet POPACA/POP2.</p> <p><i>Sources : MN 1067 and MN 1098</i></p>
<p><b>VU ACP-ACP</b></p>	<p>Under the FAO project <i>farmer-buyer linkage in the fruit and vegetables sector</i>, implemented under the All ACP programme, the Farm Support Association (FSA) has benefitted from capacity building relating to production techniques (e.g. nurseries) and result-oriented research (implemented in Montmartre by FSA). This represents a small amount of money, tranche by tranche (two agreements have been signed and being implemented). However it has an interesting impact for farmers who can learn new techniques. Producers are well satisfied of this project as we have produced better quality seeds and we can use better</p>

	production techniques (see monitoring reports and financial agreement). <i>Source: MN 1098</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	Sugar mills exert a strong leadership on the whole production chain. They decide which varieties should be planted and when they should be planted, how much fertiliser should be brought and when it should be brought, when the cane should be harvested. They supply plants, fertilisers, labour force for the harvest, trucks for transportation of the cane. Small growers do not do much more than making their piece of land available to the mill.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Peu de référence aux facteurs de production dans les documents consultés même si il est précisé que « La pauvreté est synonyme de difficultés pour l'accès aux facteurs de production (intrants, crédit et équipement) et à la faible couverture des services de base. L'action a donc pour objet le soutien effectif à des Organisations Paysannes de base » ( <i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 5</i> ). Le MR précise également les recommandations suivantes « v) Améliorer la disponibilité des intrants pour les transformateurs et trouver un moyen d'assurer cette disponibilité dans le futur » et « viii) Pour les transformateurs de cajou, considérer un mécanisme facilitant l'accès aux intrants, par le crédit ou un partenariat renforcé avec les producteurs locaux » ( <i>Source : MR p. 3</i> ).
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Selon la note d'informations, l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » en Côte d'Ivoire n'était pas ciblée sur les producteurs mais sur les unités de décorticage. Pour les unités de décorticage, des travaux ont été faits afin d'optimiser les processus de production et l'information a été diffusée par des formations ou guides pratiques. <i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Note d'informations pages 6 à 8</i>
<b>CI-REH</b>	Les activités « A.1.a.1 Hévéa et palmier » avec la mise à disposition de packages agronomiques : matériel végétal, intrants, petit équipement et « A.1.b Autres cultures paysannes d'exportation » avec la fourniture de matériel végétal amélioré pour le coton et les cultures de diversification contribuent à l'amélioration des facteurs de production et à leur accès ( <i>Sources : Annexe II FA p.5-6, Rider FA p.6-7</i> )
<b>CM-ONG</b>	L'ensemble des activités concernent les organisations de producteurs : Former des animateurs pour l'accompagnement des GIC ; créer une bibliothèque ; réaliser des manuels didactiques, créer un stock de moyens de production, créer des magasins de stockage ; accompagner des groupes informels de paysans à l'organisation en GIC ; suivre les GIC dans la constitution d'une Fédération ; former les paysans des GIC à l'organisation et à la gestion; aux techniques culturelles, à la création de micro-projets productifs, aux stratégies de commercialisation ; réaliser des actions de soutien à l'activité productive des GIC ; réaliser un Cahier avec les conclusions de l'évaluation finale du projet. ( <i>Source : Annexe I p.3</i> ).
<b>CR-RIC</b>	The "Support to the competitiveness to the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme aimed, among others, at improving (i) farmers access to seeds through the research and extension component, (ii) water supply and addressing water management problems, and (iii) the provision of working capital to private sector operators through a financial facility. The final evaluation notes the following results: (i) increase in the production and use of improved seed. "In Guyana, the total national usage of improved seed has gone up from 12% to 40%. But the actual impact of increased used of quality seed on milling yields is not clear. (...) In Suriname, the focus has been on quality seed for the small and middle sized farmers (because larger famers produce their own quality seed). While the paddy yields were slightly higher, there is no evidence whether the milling yields improved went up due to better quality seed and better quality paddy. Moreover, it is clear that after the end of the subsidies, no new farmers started seed production." (ii) In Guyana: construction of sluices and rehabilitation of the Dawa Pump; improvement of water management but no development of a drainage and irrigation policy. In Suriname: budget limitations prevented the realisation of most planned activities; better water management in selected areas but no proper regular maintenance. (iii) lack of a comprehensive approach to this component : it should have encompassed, beyond more affordable interest rates, other de facto subsidies to farmers' costs as well as more cost-effective

	<p>marketing. Banks were not attracted to participate in the scheme. In Guyana the results have been limited while in Suriname the participating bank responded more positively. <i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009; pages 20-28</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>The activities (components) include extension, nurseries, research, conservation, and marketing (<i>Source: FA p.2</i>) and one of the activities is “improve the delivery of coffee research results” (<i>Source: FA p.3</i>). The main expectation with CIP IV was an improved use of coffee research results and that the latter would be practically transferred for appropriate use by DAs and farmers (<i>Source: Completion report p.16</i>). The essence of coffee extension support lies in the increased number of development agents that the main coffee producing regions intend to recruit, train and equip. (<i>Source: FA p.4</i>). The main sustainability issues under the Project include the strengthening of the extension services associated with their reorganisation at the Regional levels as an action, which the Federal Government has required the Regions to carry out. Failure to make the required changes as evidenced in Annual Work Programmes will result in funds not being released under the Project. (<i>Source : FA Annexes A to D p.5</i>). Main achievements have been registered in the field of Extension, Nursery and Research. Under “Extension component” and as far as the training of Development agents is concerned, the initial objective had been fulfilled as from 3rd Programme Estimate. Besides training the coffee extension service was made more effective thanks to the provision of vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles and pruning tools. (<i>Source: Completion report p.5</i>). For instance, SNNP Region reported to have prepared and published manuals on “How to cultivate coffee with associated crops” in 12 regional languages (37,500 copies). (<i>Source: Completion report p.16</i>).</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>Although the new material has been developed and is available, the second monitoring report states that “a medium to long term delay is to be envisaged for farmers to get use of those outputs”. It states however that field visits have revealed that trained farmers have introduced the learned practices on their farms (e.g. weeding, pruning and disease control techniques). The Programme also set up “Farmer’s Field Schools” (FFS) in certain areas and the second monitoring report states that farmers continue to use the services of their FFS facilitators when needed. <i>Sources: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 02, Effectiveness to date sheet. Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Agreement, page 17.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) does not provide services or input facilitation for producers. The programme doesn’t focus on the individual producer level but on the laboratory or institutional levels. The specific objective of the intervention (facilitating more effective participation of African countries in the activities of International Standard Setting Organisations) should in term improve farmers’ access to or use of inputs such as pesticides. <i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 15.</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The EC intervention supports the establishment at district level of agricultural services centres (Centres de Services Agricoles – CSA) managed by NGOs. CSAs do not themselves provide services to farmers. They act as intermediaries between farmers and farmer organizations on the one hand, and providers of services (credit, extension services, etc.) on the other hand.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Pas d’évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés. Il faut remarquer que, dans le contexte de la sécurité alimentaire du Mali, toujours précaire, le rapport ROM comprend mal que c'est à la filière coton qu'il incombe la fonction d'apporter les intrants de campagne aux agriculteurs. Dans le contexte national, ceci effectivement exclut les producteurs qui ne s'engagent pas dans la culture de coton et ceux opérant dans les zones non-cotonnières de toute agriculture moderne (BCS, §4.2). Le rapport ROM note que les producteurs performants sont ceux qui ont les premiers quitté la filière coton. La raison principale invoquée est le fait qu'ils se sont trouvés en "caution solidaire" pour le remboursement des crédits de campagne coton envers les banques opérant avec la CMDT, c'est à dire ont été tenus garants des prêts des agriculteurs non performants non capables de rembourser les crédits de</p>

	campagne. Pour pallier à cet effet inverse, le principe de caution a été changé au profit d'un système volontaire, dans lequel les agriculteurs choisissent eux-mêmes les partenaires de caution, installant ainsi un système d'autocontrôle efficace (BCS, §5.3). <i>Source: Intervention Fiche, ROM/BCS</i>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	Indirectly the project contributes to this as it advises the processors whom in turn advice the farmers on the best production and marketing practices. <i>Source: FACT project sheet.</i>
<b>SADC</b>	The EC has supported: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ SADC Member States in Standardization, Quality Insurance, Accreditation and metrology (€14.2 m) in order to enhance the protection of the consumers and to improve the competitiveness of suppliers of products and services ;</li> <li>▪ Food safety – capacity building on residue control (€ 7.5 m) in order to assist SADC Member States to comply with Sanitary and Phytosanitary requirements.</li> </ul> <i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, Annex 6</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>SN-ONG</b>	Pour l'anacarde, deux centres de conditionnement ont été installés. Pour la fertilité, un nombre limité de compostières (5 sur Velingara, aucune à Sedhiou), sont entrées en fonctionnement. Des formations en culture attelée ont été dispensées et certains producteurs vont pouvoir accéder aux crédits d'équipement. Le processus de certification AB et CE a été mis en place, l'appui à l'accès aux marchés correspondants a été fourni, ainsi que la mise en place d'infrastructures (2 unités de transformation d'anacardes); Programme d'optimisation de la fertilité (stabulation); crédit d'équipement; renforcement des organisations. <i>Source: MR (ROM)</i>
<b>UG-COF</b>	Through training and extension the project promotes the UTZ Code of Conduct for coffee growing, which implies implementation of Good Agricultural & Business practices: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ monitoring business processes</li> <li>▪ record-keeping of fertilizers &amp; agro-chemicals</li> <li>▪ good housekeeping practices</li> <li>▪ workers trained properly</li> <li>▪ implementation of accident and emergency procedures</li> <li>▪ implementation of hygiene rules and practices</li> <li>▪ traceability of coffee</li> </ul> annual internal inspections
<b>UG-SBS</b>	“The EC has supported Ugandan extension services since 2001 under a project approach, and since 2004 under a sector-wide approach. Thus it is reasonable to assume that observed changes have been partly achieved thanks to EC’s support and EC’s permanent participation in sector working groups and policy dialogue. Extension services have significantly increased in coverage and agricultural research has been intensified during the reference period. NAADS structures are based at district and sub-national levels and deliver demand-driven extension services (mainly) through Private Service Providers (PSPs); some 39.600 farmers’ groups were progressively established under NAADS (about 715.000 farmers). There is evidence that the quality of service providers is variable and that good quality PSPs are not available in all districts.” <i>Source: Uganda Country Strategy Evaluation (2009), p.50</i>
<b>VU-POP</b>	The Revolving Credit Fund (RCF) established by the project supported research as well as training, effective extension services, market support and market information. The RCF is considered to have played a central role for smallholders. However, interest in continuing the RCF beyond the programme seems low. <i>Source: Producers Organisation Project II Monitoring report 3, effectiveness and sustainability sheets.</i>
<b>BAN</b>	In Dominica, the SFA contributed to the West Coast Water Supply project, but this project is aimed at developing tourism rather than giving access to irrigation. Baseline studies for drainage and irrigation systems, reimbursements for irrigation works, and land preparations have also been (co-) funded by the

	SFA. Projects have also been financed for irrigation equipment, fungicides, nematode control, etc. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 22, htsp, 2008.</i>
<b>I.4.2.3</b>	Commission support contributed to increase agricultural commodities crop yields, crop quality and quantity
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Under the All ACP programme, the CFC has supported different activities for the cotton sector.</p> <p><i>For the Cotton Instrument Testing project - 0.ACP.F01:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A "Guideline for Commercial Standardized Instrument Testing of Cotton" is currently being developed in cooperation between FIBRE, CIRAD and the USDA-AMS, with six additional contributing organizations, replacing the ITMF and the USDA guidelines and adding significant information e.g. from project findings. The full text will be presented for approval during the ICAC Plenary Meeting in September 2011.</li> <li>▪ The 16th Round Trial has finished and for 2011 110 labs from all continents are registered. From Africa, 14 laboratories from 10 countries (Burkina Faso, Egypt, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) registered for 2011.</li> <li>▪ Two Regional Technical Centres in Mali and Tanzania are fully operational. Support and trainings for the RTC's are ongoing with 4 trainings in 2011 so far. The RTC's are performing most of their regular work: trainings were given to laboratories and additionally to the stakeholders in each region, including trainings supported by the instrument manufacturers.</li> <li>▪ Most emphasis is given on developing a viable structure for the future work of the RTC's after the end of this project. For RTC East/Southern Africa, a Memorandum of Association (MoA) and an according Business Plan were prepared.</li> <li>▪ The Government of Tanzania has extended its support to Tanzania Board of Standards to include RTC activities, forming a bridge function until reaching financial sustainability. The RTC will be within the TBS organisational structure, but will maintain the Regional status through a Regional Steering Committee composed of the Chief Executives from the Cotton Organizations of Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Kenya, Malawi and Sudan.</li> </ul> <p><i>For the project on Improved Cotton Production Efficiency - 2.ESA.F01:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The key findings of the baseline survey and the status of the ongoing project activities in Kenya were presented during the Fibre Crops Agricultural Product Value Chains (APVC) Analysis Workshop held between 26th and 28th April 2011, at Egerton University Njoro, Kenya. In Mozambique, the results of the baseline survey were presented during the Cotton Stakeholder's Meeting on Seed Cotton Minimum Price Negotiations in Nampula, 8th – 9th April 2011, chaired by the Minister for Agriculture.</li> <li>▪ Comparative analysis of production practices and post-harvest handling of cotton by smallholder farmers in Kenya and Mozambique is in progress and is expected to be ready for presentation during the World Cotton Research Conference in India (7th -11th November, 2011);</li> <li>▪ In Kenya, 15 new FFSs groups with a total of 554 members (&gt;30% female farmers) were established (February/March 2011) in Baringo North, Lamu West and Tana delta districts. Cotton was planted in the PTD trials in April/May 2011, based on the onset of the rains, and agro-ecosystem analysis (AESA) at these FFS sites is ongoing. For the 15 FFSs that were established in October/November 2010 in the eastern region (Kathonzweni, Tharaka South and Kitui Central districts) harvesting of cotton (normally end in August) is ongoing and the FFSs members have already conducted 5-10 AESA sessions.</li> <li>▪ At each FFS site, both traditional and ICM practices (including strip cropping) are being evaluated on 0.5ha plots. On the ICM plots, improved seeds of cotton acquired from the Cotton Seed Multiplication and Research Center in Namialo (CIMSAN/IIAM) were introduced for the first time along with strip intercropping (cotton and maize; Cotton and soya beans), and decision on the pest management strategy is based on the results of the AESAs.</li> </ul>

	<p><i>Project on Prevention of Seed Cotton Contamination - 2.WST.F02</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 9,043 producers belonging to 1,539 cooperatives are participating in the programme, 18,000 other producers belonging to 785 cooperatives have been identified in Banfora (Burkina Faso), Korhogo (Cote d'Ivoire) and in Sikasso (Mali). 88 extension agents, 120 transporters and 361 staff of the gins were trained by the project</li> <li>▪ 63,000 bags and 27,000 cotton bale cover sheets were distributed in the project area, 868 sheds were constructed. Results obtained indicate that the contamination problem was reduced in the project zone compared to non-project areas.</li> <li>▪ During the first year of production 24,953 MT of seed cotton or 10,121 MT of fibre cotton was produced, 9120 of samples have been collected during ginning. In June CERFITEX signed a contract with the PEA to determine the contamination in the collected samples.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Common Fund For Commodities (CFC), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 27 July 2011</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>According to the PIP evaluation report, the PIP had a positive impact on the crop quality (since ACP share in EU fruit and vegetable imports have been maintained with an improvement of compliance with EU regulations). Exports to the EU even grew in absolute terms. The PIP also mentions that “<i>it is very likely that the PIP has induced an important effect on the quality of the sanitary security of the products that are not farmed for export to Europe</i>”. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 4, 33, 34 &amp; 85</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>In the five SP countries of South Eastern Africa (Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe), which are low cost producers of sugar by international standards and are net exporters of sugar, the AMSP programme contributes to increasing the surface devoted to sugarcane production, and hence sugar production.</p> <p>In Mauritius, implementation of the National Adaptation Strategy (NAS) supported by the AMSP programme seemed likely to induce a significant reduction of sugar production costs, and hence to maintaining competitiveness of sugar exports.</p> <p>In the 3 other SP countries (Belize, Fiji and Guyana), where sustainability of the sugar sector is threatened by the reduction of the price paid for sugar exports to Europe, and in the five countries (the Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, and Tanzania), which are net importers of sugar, there was no evidence, when the study of the programme was carried out (in 2009), that the NAS and the AMSP programme would allow the development of a profitable sugar sector.</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Le Programme PAOSA a permis d'aménager des bas-fonds pour la production de riz, à moindre coût. La production de riz s'est accrue de 5000 tonnes sur les 2500 hectares qui ont été aménagés. <i>Source : Evaluation du PAOSA, Contrat spécifique 2007/137997, Rapport Final, 2007.</i></p> <p>Plusieurs interventions financées par la Commission sont orientées vers l'augmentation des rendements et de la production, avec un souci marqué de durabilité liée à la préservation/amélioration de la fertilité des sols, le niveau de production et la qualité du coton :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière (NB. Bien qu'elle se soit sensiblement développée depuis 2006, la production de coton biologique(-équitable) ne représente toujours que quelques pourcents (2-3%) de la production totale de coton du BF (production de « niche »).</li> <li>▪ Programme tous ACP :GIPD/BPA/FAO</li> </ul> <p>Un suivi des rendements et des productions est assuré dans chacune des interventions. Les résultats sont encourageants (exemple GIPD/FAO : une évaluation fin 2010 a conclu le rendement moyen du coton produit par BPA/GIPD est d'environ 40 % supérieur à celui obtenu avec le coton conventionnel (parcelles témoin). C'était aussi le cas pour le maïs (+ 54%). <i>Source : Rapport narratif 2009 du Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques ; FAO, 6 monthly progress report : 1July-31 December 2010.</i></p> <p>Cependant, on ne peut pas présumer d'un impact significatif à relativement large échelle en termes</p>



d'augmentation des rendements et des productions, vu le caractère encore trop récent des interventions et de leur nature expérimentales (ex. Ce qui est obtenu sur un champ école de producteurs (CEP) ne signifie pas encore une « adoption/diffusion à large échelle dans les exploitations familiales cotonnières. Par ailleurs, il faut également noter que le financement direct des activités du Programme tous ACP se termine au plus tard fin décembre 2011 et que, malgré un impact potentiel plus important, leur portée relative reste encore assez limitée pour obtenir des impacts significatifs à grande échelle. Cela semble aussi être le cas pour le Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière.

Plusieurs interventions financées par la Commission sont orientées vers l'augmentation de la qualité du coton graine et de la fibre :

- Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière. Il s'agit de produire un coton d'une qualité telle que définie par le cahier des charges de la production bio.
- Programme tous ACP :
  - CFC, en collaboration avec Banque mondiale (SDN) : Projet de prévention de la contamination de coton graine en Afrique de l'Ouest
  - Standardisation commerciale des techniques instrumentales pour les tests de qualité du coton.

La lutte contre la contamination du coton graine semble être un projet très pertinent d'autant qu'il est en cohérence avec la politique/stratégie qualité de l'UEMOA et de l'Association Cotonnière Africaine (ACA). Le défi reste d'arriver à généraliser et viabiliser la pratique à une échelle suffisante pour avoir de l'impact. Le coût et le financement des kits de récolte constitueront un élément important de la viabilité de la pratique, de même que la mesure de la non contamination. Il sera tout aussi important d'arriver à valoriser le coton non contaminé pour qu'il puisse générer une prime dont la répartition entre producteurs et égreneurs sera clairement établie et qui justifiera les efforts entrepris pour lutter contre la contamination.

La standardisation commerciale des techniques instrumentales s'inscrit dans un processus de plus en plus développé au niveau international d'objectiver la mesure de la qualité du coton par mesures instrumentales (par rapport à une mesure/classification visuelle/manuelle de la qualité). Pour l'AOC, le Centre Technique Régional (CTR) installé au Mali, CERFITEX de Ségou concerne indirectement le BF, à travers son laboratoire national de classification de la fibre (SOFITEX) et la SOFITEX qui est partenaire du projet pour des aspects liés à l'expertise et à la formation.

Malgré une exécution technique correcte du projet, des problèmes importants restent à résoudre pour espérer un impact significatif sur la qualité du coton : (i) une viabilisation institutionnelle du CTR de Ségou, ce qui implique un statut juridique clair et une contractualisation effective entre les partenaires (NB. le partenariat avec la SOFITEX ne fonctionne pas pour le moment, cette dernière estimant plutôt être considérée comme un client que comme un partenaire) ; (ii) une viabilisation économique du CTR. Cela implique de répondre à diverses conditions dont les principales sont que :

- Le CTR puisse travailler en réseau avec les laboratoires nationaux de classification des principaux pays cotonniers de la sous-région (il reste à ce niveau un gros travail de mise aux normes de ces labos que le projet ne pourra pas assumer seul. NB. D'après la SOFITEX, la mise aux normes des laboratoires nationaux aurait dû être un préalable à l'établissement du CTR)
- Que le rapport coût/avantage de ces investissements soit bien établi et démontré aux interprofessions cotonnières nationales et aux associations cotonnières régionales (ACA, AProCA) afin que les filières cotonnières comprennent l'intérêt du réseau CTR-laboratoire nationaux et contribuent à son financement.

*Source : Rapport narratif 2009 du Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques ; CFC, 6 monthly progress report : 1 July-31 December 2010 ; Commercial Standardization of Instrument Testing of cotton for the Cotton Producing Developing Countries in Africa. Mid Term- Evaluation, 2010 ; Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2011. MN 575*

Le programme de Lutte contre la contamination du coton/ coton PPCC financé sous le programme Tous

	<p>ACP et appuyé par le CFC est un programme élaboré au niveau de pays africains de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Burkina, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali). Il est mis en œuvre par le Centre international pour la Fertilité des sols et le Développement agricole (IFDC). Au niveau local, il y a une mesure de la qualité pour 150 kg de fibres (100kg venant du projet, 50kg hors projet). On attend les analyses de CERFITEX (basé à Ségou au Mali). C'est une première démarche de qualité, et qui reste à pérenniser. La SOFITEX est chargé de suivre ce dossier et d'avoir le feedback des filatures.</p> <p>Le défi est de partager les gains en termes de contamination au producteur (qui reçoit aujourd'hui le kit). Le but est de décrocher une prime. Il y a eu des échanges sur une rémunération.</p> <p>A noter que la viabilité de la mesure de la qualité de la fibre de coton est loin d'être assurée ; il reste à valoriser la qualité auprès du producteur. Le kit d'analyse est donné au producteur (gratuit). Mais après ? Et puis comment valoriser la qualité par un meilleur prix (la prime) ? Le kit est à 755 FCFA en 2011. Mais le prix de cette année est plus élevé. Un kit peut faire deux campagnes. Il y a 30% de dégradation sur le kit actuel après une campagne. <i>Source : MN 526</i></p> <p>En 2004, il y a eu un financement de GTZ, DANIDA et CE en lien avec le Comité interprofessionnel des filières céréales et niébé du Burkina (CICB). GTZ était chargé de la mise en place du programme. GTZ a recruté un bureau local pour la mise en œuvre. Les fonds CE étaient à part, et n'ont pas été donné au bureau local choisi. Les fonds CE ne faisaient pas partie de l'enveloppe de GTZ. Le plan d'action a duré pendant 2,5 ans. Une évaluation devait avoir lieu pour tirer des leçons. Mais l'Etat n'avait pas prévu cela et il n'y a pas eu de suivi et d'évaluation. Après 2,5 ans, les PTFs ont arrêté le financement. Les fonds de la CE n'ont pas été totalement dépensés. Le programme a demandé d'utiliser l'argent pour acheter le matériel pour faciliter la post-récolte et transformation. Il y a eu achat de bascules et de moulins pour améliorer la qualité des produits céréaliers (environ 300 millions FCFA sur les 800 millions de FCFA prévus au départ ; 500 millions environ n'ont pas été dépensés).</p> <p>A travers le programme FAO, supporté par le Programme Tous ACP, des consultants de la FAO ont mis en œuvre des tables rondes sur un certain nombre de filières (maïs, niébé, sésame, riz). Les consultants ont sollicité le CICB pour identifier les participants dans les organisations (cela a commencé en 2009). Après la table ronde, les expériences de l'interprofession ont été présentées. Comme la FAO travaillait sur le warrantage, elle a été intéressée d'aider le CICB. Des ateliers ont été mis en œuvre pour définir les activités à mener avec la FAO, au Sénégal un atelier sur le financement des interprofessions (présentation des expériences du CICB). Deux activités FAO retenues avec le CICB : 1) warrantage 2) cartographie des risques dans la filière maïs. Fin juin 2011, l'atelier sur le warrantage aura lieu. Mais il y a beaucoup de retard dans les activités menées par la FAO. <i>Source : MN 550.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Selon l'évaluation de la Stratégie pays au Burkina Faso, la CE a soutenu la filière rizicole du Burkina Faso par l'Appui à la Filière Riz (AFR). Ce programme, lancé au cours du 8<sup>ème</sup> FED, a duré jusqu'en 2007. Il a effectué un appui direct à la production, aux opérateurs de la filière, à lister le potentiel de terres aménageables, et à appuyer un cadre national de référence. L'impact direct du programme sur les rendements serait limité (+4.4%). L'UE finance également un projet pour améliorer la fertilité des sols dans les exploitations bio de la zone cotonnière du Burkina Faso, depuis janvier 2008. Les impacts attendus sont une augmentation des rendements de 30% et une augmentation de la valeur ajoutée. <i>Source : Evaluation de la stratégie pays au Burkina Faso, 2010, pages 70 &amp; 74</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Dans le cadre du PIN 10<sup>ème</sup> FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>La composante "appui rural décentralisé participative" du PACICC a appuyé diverses formations dont sur la thématique de la production. Elle a également fourni l'acquisition de petit équipement agricole qui</p>

	<p>permet de contrôler la qualité (humidimètre). Mais ces interventions liées à la production et à la qualité sont mineures à côté de celles sur la structuration et la commercialisation. The EU support to the banana sector has helped it improve its yields (to be similar to those in Latin American countries), crop quality (compliance with GlobalGap certification, MRLs...) and crop quantity (banana production has increased (from 238,303 tonnes in 2000 to 255,507 tonnes in 2009). It also helped the sector recover after a tornado in 2004-2005. <i>Source : MN 913, 994</i></p> <p>In Cameroon, the EC also supported (through Stabex funds) a programme that produced productive oil palm seedlings and disseminate them among farmers. The project lasted 5 years, from 1997 to 2002. The impacts of the programme were naturally of long term nature and no further information is available. <i>Source : Projet pilote pour la mise en place de pépinières villageoises privées de palmier à huile, rapport de fin d'exécution, mars 2003</i></p> <p>The Logone-et-Chari rural development programme (which was funded through Stabex) rehabilitated rice 800 ha of rice fields, trained extension service workers, improved water management and organised farmer communities. The impact on production was implicit but not specifically measured. <i>Source : Evaluation finale du programme de développement rural participatif dans le département du Logone-et-Chari, Rapport final, février 2007</i></p> <p>Dans le cadre du volet "développement agricole" du programme Mungo-Nkam 14% du budget total d'environ (8,7M€) soit environ 1,2M€ un appui a été fourni à 150 organisations de producteurs (après un processus sérieux d'identification de réels OP, identifiés selon l'approche participative).</p> <p>Les activités suivantes ont été mises en place : 1) installation de pépinières de café (70000 boutures à 10 OP), cacao (6600 cabosses à 40 OP) et palmier à huile (34000 semences à 32 OP) avec le petit matériel pour le fonctionnement des pépinières ; 2) diversification de la production agricoles avec 110000 boutures de manioc à 18 OP, 320000 rejets de bananes plantain à 19 OP et 1t de semences de maïs à 16 OP ; 3) transformation (manioc et palmier à huile). Toutefois, le matériel végétal amélioré (café, cacao, palmier) n'était pas disponible en quantité suffisante auprès des institutions sectorielles de l'Etat, seules habilités à fournir du matériel amélioré (source : évaluation à mi-parcours du programme de développement rural du Moungo Nkam HTSPE, 2009).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Yes regarding the quality. No evidence for the crop yields and quantity. In the agricultural sector, the CARTF project has contributed significantly to capacity development in the areas of diversification and quality improvements with the ultimate aim of developing alternative export opportunities in this sector. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>According to interviews, the "Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme – phase II" contributed to increase yields (through the dissemination of new hybrid varieties of cocoa) and the time required for the cocoa trees to achieve maturity stage (from 6-7 years to 3 years). According to an interview with a farming community, their yields increased more than twofold thanks to the new varieties and techniques which were brought to them in the programme. <i>Source: MN 977, MN 943</i></p> <p>An important activity of the CSSP I (2000-2005) programme was the compensation of farmers to uproot diseased plants and replace them with good seedlings and the use of adequate husbandry practices. The component (CSSVDPC) achieved the compensation of 17,444 farmers who uprooted about 30 million diseased cocoa plants; however, only about 15,000 plants were replanted. The final evaluation of the programme notes that the replanting of new, non diseased seedlings, did not necessarily lead to increased production and increased yields (as was expected) because many of the beneficiaries were old farmers who did not take up the good husbandry practices and did/could not look after their crop. The research component of the CSSP I also provided disappointing results: in terms of yields, quality and quantity, the research did develop new strands but the results achieved were not field tested and there was also some questioning of the geographical location of some of these plants. The seed multiplication component of CSSP I was not successful: the irrigated plots that were supposed to be set up did not come off the ground and the multiplication of seedlings by private sector farmers did not take off whilst the Seed Production Unit itself was unable to provide the 25 million seedlings required (it could do no more than 8 million seedlings). Overall the results of the CSSP I on yields and production levels will have been very localised and limited.</p>

	<p>CSSP II is but one of the programmes that support the cocoa sector in Ghana. In particular the CSSP II is addressed to about 4000 farmers (there are 800,000 smaller famers in the sector); it is hoped that demonstration effects will stimulate the other farmers to adopt the same husbandry practices.</p> <p>In terms of the effect of the EC CSSP II, this is too early to judge (the programme is in its second year). One notes that cocoa output has increased from 395,000 metric tonnes in 2000 to over 650,000 tonnes in 2009. Also, the share of cocoa in GDP rose from 4.9% in 2000-2004 to 8.1% in 2005/2006 and cocoa accounts for 28.5% of agricultural GDP. The CSSP's MTE claims that over the last three years cocoa has contributed substantially to agricultural sector growth. (page 18, MTE, 2011). <i>Source: CSSP II MTE 2011.</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>According to the Ghana Country Strategy Evaluation Report, there has been an increase in cocoa production but the impact of the Stabex and CSSP interventions to this increase is not measurable, given the lack of baseline data. No new enterprises have been created. The income increase has occurred because of the world price increase and the increase of the producer's share in the export price. The increase in the producer's share of the export price was a prior condition to the sector's support so it can be considered that it indirectly did improve producer income. <i>Source: Ghana Country Strategy Evaluation report 2005, page 57</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Le programme Stabex a constitué un des rares et importants efforts significatifs d'investissement publics à Madagascar pour la relance des secteurs des cultures de rente en collaboration directe avec les producteurs et exportateurs. Le concept « filière » a été développé avec succès pour la vanille, le café et le litchi. Il a permis l'émergence ou le renforcement des organisations professionnelles, le développement et la diffusion de techniques pour débloquer les principaux goulots d'étranglement relatifs à la production, à la transformation et à la mise en marché, et/ou lorsque le potentiel existait, la standardisation des produits et le contrôle de la qualité, la promotion du label d'origine Madagascar, et si nécessaire des appuis pour des révisions réglementaires ou légales à Madagascar et dans l'UE. <i>Source : Cadre d'Obligations Mutuelles 1996-1999</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les fonds Stabex ont financé entre fin 2008 et fin 2010, pour un budget total de €4,7 millions, onze projets mis en œuvre par cinq organisations. Chacun des onze projets poursuivait les mêmes objectifs d'accroissement du revenu des producteurs par l'augmentation et l'amélioration de l'offre de cinq produits agricoles d'exportation (cacao, café, girofle, poivre, vanille) et par une meilleure valorisation au moment de l'échange.</p> <p>L'augmentation de l'offre des produits devait être le résultat de l'augmentation de la production — résultant elle-même de l'extension des surfaces consacrées à ces cultures et de l'amélioration de la productivité des exploitations.</p> <p>Parallèlement, à ces actions d'augmentation de l'offre les actions d'amélioration de la qualité des produits mis en vente avaient également pour objet d'assurer une meilleure rémunération des producteurs. L'amélioration de la valorisation devait être le résultat d'une mise en adéquation de la demande exprimée par les acheteurs et de l'offre résultant des actions du programme.</p> <p>Un nouveau mécanisme de mise en vente — la vente publique sur les marchés communaux, lors de la première transaction de la chaîne des échanges — devait être celui par lequel les exigences des acheteurs seraient communiquées aux producteurs.</p> <p><i>Source : Assistance Technique à la mise en œuvre du programme d'intensification et de structuration des principales filières d'exportation de produits agricoles à Madagascar, Rapport final</i></p> <p>S'inscrivant dans la continuité des précédentes interventions, les appuis à l'accroissement de la production ont pu, malgré la courte durée du programme (28 mois), être rapidement menés à une large échelle. Ainsi, plus de 1 millions de plants ont été produits. Dotée d'un bon potentiel de développement bien que peu touchée par les précédents appuis, la filière girofle a bénéficié de 37% de cette production (constituée à 48% de caféiers et 1% seulement de plants de vanille). Des manuels et guides techniques à l'intention des producteurs ont été rédigés en langue locale et largement diffusés, via notamment les paysans-relais formés à cet effet. Ces réalisations n'ont cependant pas d'effet immédiat sur la production (il faut 7 années avant qu'un giroflier entre en production) et, lorsque cela sera, elles ne devraient que partiellement</p>

compenser la baisse liée à l'âge déjà avancé de la plupart des plantations. Face à des besoins très importants, les opérateurs ont surtout contribué au développement des compétences, au niveau notamment de 250 pépinières villageoises et privées et de 200 paysans relais ou leaders.

*Source : Rapport Stabex 2010*

Le projet SOAVA, financé sur fonds Stabex et mis en œuvre par l'ONG Association Intercoopération Madagascar (AIM) couvrait 14 Communes du district de Mananara Nord et environ 16.200 petits agriculteurs familiaux pratiquant des cultures d'exportation (vanille girofle, café) en complément de cultures vivrières.

Les résultats attendus du projet étaient les suivants :

- Résultat 1 : La productivité des facteurs de production des ménages ruraux est augmentée de manière durable ;
- Résultat 2 : Les produits répondent aux normes de qualité des marchés nationaux et internationaux ;
- Résultat 3 : Les marchés intérieurs des produits d'exportation fonctionnent de manière concurrentielle et au bénéfice des producteurs ;
- Résultat 4 : De nouveaux marchés de niche sont identifiés et exploités.

AIM a adopté comme approche de mise en œuvre de ces deux projets la collaboration et l'interaction entre les trois pôles d'acteurs de ces filières d'exportation : (i) les producteurs à la base, (ii) les collecteurs locaux en contact direct avec les producteurs et (iii) les autorités locales responsables de la mise en place d'un cadre favorable.

Selon l'évaluation finale du projet, les résultats suivants ont été obtenus :

Résultat 1 : Productivité des facteurs de production

- Des intrants de qualité ont été mis à la disposition des producteurs (établissement de pépiniéristes, production de plants de girofliers)
- Les techniques culturales ont été améliorées
- Les terroirs communaux sont mieux exploités (plantations d'acacias et eucalyptus)

Résultat 2 : Les produits répondant aux normes de qualité des marchés nationaux et internationaux

- Regroupement des producteurs professionnels
- Application des techniques de post récolte
- Mise en place des alambics modernes
- Mise en fonctionnement de service de contrôle (poinçonnage des plants de vanille)

Résultat 3 : marchés intérieurs des produits d'exportation

- 13 marchés organisés ont été établis et sont fonctionnels. 20% de la production totale de vanille dans le District est écoulee sur ces marchés. Sur 88 collecteurs recensés, 29 ont participé à une formation sur la qualité des produits de rente et sont en possession de cartes professionnelles. Mais pour le girofle et le café, les pourcentages des produits vendus sur les marchés communaux par rapport aux productions totales sont très faibles et représentent respectivement 0,1% et 8%.
- Mise en œuvre d'un système d'information de marché (SIM) en collaboration avec PPRR (projet FIDA)
- Capitalisation des expériences (visite-échange avec un autre projet)
- Appui aux Communes sur la bonne Gouvernance

Résultat 4 : Marchés de niche

Les groupements producteurs d'huile essentielle de girofle sont entrés en relations commerciales avec l'entreprise suisse Givaudan, qui est engagée dans une démarche d'approvisionnement à la source, et de rémunération équitable des produits

*L'évaluation conclut que l'approche multi-acteurs : collaboration pratique entre producteurs, autorités locales et secteur privé pour développer les filières girofle et vanille, initiée et développée par AIM témoigne de l'efficacité du projet traduite par les premiers effets positifs constatés et ce, malgré le temps imparti très limité pour assurer la durabilité des acquis et des effets.*

*Source : Evaluation finale du projet SOAVA*

Les objectifs spécifiques du projet AFAKA, portant sur 7 communes du district de Mahanoro et 10 communes du district de Vatomandry, consistaient dans la mise en place d'un modèle de commercialisation, des structures sociales et la mise à disposition des compétences techniques (éprouvés) permettant la relance de trois filières d'exportation : café, girofle, poivre.

Les résultats attendus étaient :

Résultat 1 : Un système de production de jeunes plants, de diffusion de technique de production

Résultat 2 : Une démarche de planification de l'extension de surfaces plantées en culture de rente

Résultat 3 : Un processus d'amélioration de la qualité des produits mis sur le marché

Résultat 4 : Un modèle d'organisation de marché assurant la concurrence, la transparence et l'équité

L'évaluation conclut que la durée de vie de 29 mois du projet ne lui permettait pas d'atteindre ces résultats.

Par contre, le projet a pu mettre en place une base solide pour une future augmentation de la production de girofle, café, poivre notamment en termes de quantité et qualité :

- L'existence d'un système de fournitures de matériels végétal, à travers les pépinières privées villageois qui est tirés par la présence d'une demande des jeunes plants par les autres producteurs
- L'existence d'un système de vulgarisation « Paysan à Paysan » à travers des Paysans Leaders motivés disposant de connaissances nécessaires en matière de techniques culturales et techniques d'encadrement.
- La structuration des producteurs en OPC en matière de commercialisation mais qui se trouve encore au stade de démarrage
- La gouvernance des 3 filières par les communes en matière de plan d'extension des futures plantations de café, de girofle et de poivre.
- Les marchés organisés permettant la réalisation de transactions commerciales transparente mais qui ne traitent qu'une très faible fraction de la production totale de la zone couverte par le projet.

*Source : Projet AFAKA Mahanoro-Vatomandry, Mission d'évaluation finale*

La stratégie du projet d'Antalaha a été construite autour d'enjeux qui conditionnement la relance de la filière vanille et l'amélioration des capacités productives et économiques des exploitations familiales qui produisent la vanille. Trois axes ont été développés :

- Le renforcement des capacités productives
- L'amélioration de la qualité des produits de manière à mieux coller aux exigences des marchés
- L'organisation des filières et des marchés

Le projet a établi différentes collaborations avec des acteurs présents dans la zone, principalement les producteurs et leurs organisations et les autorités locales.

Les producteurs restent très réticentes à prendre en charge et à faire vivre les organisations qu'ils ont mises en place et appliquent parcimonieusement les techniques qui leur ont été transmises. Très réactive au facteur prix, qui n'est pas intéressant pour la vanille actuellement, la main d'œuvre familiale s'oriente davantage sur des spéculations plus sécurisantes, en particulier la sécurité alimentaire est ciblée. De même, face à l'insuffisance de trésorerie, les producteurs préfèrent vendre rapidement la vanille verte plutôt que de la traiter.

La mise en œuvre du projet a été affectée par de nombreuses difficultés dues au contexte d'intervention (prix bas et prix administrés, désintéressement des acteurs par rapport à la qualité, faiblesse des organisations de producteurs, contexte politique, ...), au fonctionnement du dispositif d'intervention (partenariat difficile et dénoncé, difficulté à trouver des cadres de niveau approprié, difficulté à motiver les agents, éloignement des décideurs finaux) et à la durée des projets. Ces difficultés ont imposé un recentrage des activités sur 3 communes au lieu de 10 pour atteindre des résultats concrets.

*Source : Evaluation du projet d'appui à l'amélioration de la qualité et à la commercialisation de la vanille dans le district d'Antalaha*

L'objectif de la stratégie nationale d'adaptation du secteur sucrier (SNASS) adoptée en 2006 est de relancer la production nationale pour atteindre l'autosuffisance nationale à l'horizon 2012-2015. Cet objectif passe par la privatisation du secteur et l'amélioration de la productivité des sites existants, pour améliorer la

	<p>compétitivité de la production nationale face à aux importations, dont les droits d'entrée ont été fortement abaissés à partir de 2006.</p> <p>La stratégie d'accompagnement de l'UE a pour objectif de faciliter les investissements privés et appuyer le renforcement de la compétitivité de la filière, à travers la réalisation d'études (diagnostics industriels, possibilités de diversification, etc) et l'appui à la relance et à l'amélioration de la production paysanne.</p> <p>Durant la période couverte par le PIP 2007-2010, les appuis apportés par la CE à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale ont consisté en :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ La mobilisation d'expertises pour évaluer les possibles impacts environnementaux de la stratégie, préciser son coût, identifier les investissements et réhabilitations prioritaires à réaliser et appuyer les réformes à adopter</li> <li>▪ Le renforcement des capacités d'intervention du Centre Malgache de la Canne et du Sucre(CMCS) et la reprise de son programme d'amélioration variétale (introduction de nouvelles variétés, production de vitro-plants et quarantaine, installation de pré-pépinières)</li> <li>▪ La réalisation d'une première tranche de travaux de réhabilitation des infrastructures d'irrigation du site d'Ambilobe, pour environ 25% du montant total estimé des travaux prioritaires à réaliser</li> <li>▪ La mise en place d'essais variétaux sur Ambilobe et de 240 ha de pépinières pour la fourniture de boutures aux planteurs indépendants.</li> </ul> <p>La mise en œuvre du PIP 2007-2010 a rencontré de sérieuses difficultés. La crise politique prévalant à Madagascar a engendré la perte des allocations 2008 à 2010 (soit 6,9 M€ et 82% de l'allocation prévue pour le programme 2007-2010) et bloqué les avancées attendues au niveau institutionnel pour faciliter les investissements dans le secteur.</p> <p>Le bilan de la première phase de mise en œuvre de la SNASS est mitigé.</p> <p>Les ressources nationales affectées au développement secteur sont insuffisantes. Elles proviennent essentiellement des loyers perçus par la SIRAMA, prioritairement affectés au remboursement des impayés accumulés.</p> <p>Au niveau institutionnel, le CIF (Comité Interministériel de la Filière Sucre) n'a pas réussi à jouer le rôle de pilotage et de coordination attendu. Il demeure un organe faible, qui manque de leadership et dont les membres sont peu impliqués en dehors de ses sessions. Le besoin de réviser la SNASS a été perçu dès 2009 mais est resté sans suite. Faute d'un dispositif formalisé de suivi du secteur, sa connaissance du secteur est lacunaire et ne lui permet pas de mesurer l'efficacité des actions conduites et de décider rapidement des éventuelles actions correctives à prendre.</p> <p>Son action est limitée par la faible implication à son niveau des décideurs politiques, et de fait ses propositions sont rarement traduites en décisions. En outre, plusieurs dossiers d'importance sont gérés directement au niveau politique et sans grande transparence, tels la négociation des contrats de location de Namakia et Ambilobe, la recherche d'investisseurs pour Nosy Be et Brickaville, la négociation de nouveaux projets ou l'utilisation des ressources de la SIRAMA.</p> <p>La viabilité des investissements dans le secteur n'est pas encore clairement évaluée. Les analyses effectuées dans le cadre du PIP 2007-2010 situent le prix de revient du sucre à Madagascar entre 420 et 460 \$ par tonne de sucre brut et estiment que de tels projets ne sont rentables qu'en développant la cogénération ou en protégeant le marché intérieur<sup>30</sup>. Aucune mise en perspective régionale n'a été faite.</p> <p><i>Source : Mesures d'accompagnement en faveur des pays signataires du protocole sucre (AMSP), Programme Indicatif Pluriannuel 2001-2013 pour Madagascar</i></p> <p>Les appuis à l'amélioration de la qualité ont constitué en la mise au point et distribution de matériel de traitement post-récolte adapté (en particulier pour le séchage du café et du girofle, dont la récolte se réalise en saison humide), la recherche de procédés alternatifs (préparation du café par voie humide), la formation de préparateurs de la vanille et du cacao, la réalisation de vastes campagnes de sensibilisation sur la qualité</p>
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<sup>30</sup> Italtrend, rapport de mission I, 2006.

	<p>et de formation aux bonnes pratiques. En dehors d'initiatives menées dans le cadre d'opérations contractualisées avec un opérateur privé, les résultats sont cependant demeurés limités car l'organisation des circuits de commercialisation ne favorise pas une rémunération de l'effort de qualité. <i>Source : Rapport Stabex 2010</i></p> <p>Oui mais la CE a étendu à partir de 2008 ses appuis vers l'aval. Avant 2008, les appuis concernaient essentiellement la production (recépages, plantations, etc. afin d'améliorer les rendements, la productivité et la qualité). A partir de 2008, les appuis ont également été centrés sur l'organisation du marché et la commercialisation 11 projets ont été sélectionnés sur appel à propositions (café, vanille, girofle, poivre, cacao) avec un volet appui à la production (CTHT, CNCC,...), un volet qualité (formation, sensibilisation, petit matériel) et un volet organisation des marchés au niveau des communes (ce qui a le moins bien marché car ce volet est très complexe à mettre en œuvre étant donné le contexte institutionnel et la concurrence des acheteurs itinérants). (Source : MN 802).</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Current EC projects have impacted on farmers' income through various channels, among them: increased quality and selling prices (e.g. EC support to the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute). <i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to the United Republic of Tanzania, April 2006, pages 37 and 38.</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>EU supported the funding of a cotton research lab that is operated under the Tanzanian Bureau of Standards and caters for regional testing. Support to TBS testing lab: directly benefiting the private sector through the marketing. Indeed historically Tanzania produced high quality cotton but with the liberalisation in the mid 1990's the crop marketing systems broke down and private buyers didn't distinguish cotton grades so everything was lumped together. Without a premium for quality, the quality went down. In order to restore international confidence in the quality of the TZ cotton testing facilities are required. Ginners buy seed cotton and then produce lint that is bought for export. But this lint needs to be tested. Currently 3 ways to get it tested: one private company, the TBS lab and the Tanzanian Cotton Board. At the moment farmers are not rewarded for the quality of their cotton. At the point of entry into the ginning process, the cotton seed is just graded either 'high' or normal. The buyer of the cotton lint tests for fiber quality and when he sells it gets tested and if there is a premium it should get back to the farmers (but doesn't currently). <i>Source: MN 101</i></p> <p>One of the tea growing associations near the research centre benefited from the supply of 300,000 tea seedlings; it expanded the number of seedlings to 1.3 million. This started smallholder tea production on a much larger scale:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increase the number of association members who produce tea in the region (from initial 174 to 590 now)</li> <li>- Increase the tea production (from 856,829 to over 2,1 million in 2010)</li> <li>- Increase the productivity</li> </ul> <p>Tea production and productivity are increasing. Areas under tea are increasing, mainly because they have no other opportunities (except in few regions where they can grow bananas). For farmers, tea is food as tea provides money to get food. Tea is the core business for these farmers</p> <p>Roads are not very good to transport tea to factories. Factories go to get leaves to the farmers. This is reflected in the tea factory production costs, which may explain the low price of green leaves.</p> <p>In some regions smallholders have been really benefited from TRIT interventions. In some areas where TRIT did not intervene, there is no impact (e.g. Kagera). All the smallholders have not benefited from TRIT interventions (just some of them).</p> <p>New clones have not yet been developed. It is only in the process. It takes twenty years to get your own clones. TRIT has 15 years of experience.</p> <p>EU funding of TRIT has done something to farmers to the long run. You can see all the benefits know (e.g. soil fertility analysis, etc.). Benefits will be seen in the near future. When the price issue is sorted out the benefits will be better to smallholder farmers. If the tea price issue is not solved to farmers, benefits will be very small, even close to zero. For example, it will be better to grow tomatoes, because will be paid directly. They will switch out from the tea sector. Need to collect leaves in time and pay farmers in time.</p>



	<p>The issue of quality is tackled with Maximum Residue Level standards for fertilizers. Tea Act with farmers to use properly fertilizers (to avoid fertilizers they received is used and not sold by farmers). Try to get ISO2720 and obey safety regulations and maximum residue level standards -&gt; all international standards. Also try to ensure fair play where factories have provided inputs to smallholders: contract farming is included in the Tea Act.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 623, MN 666, MN 164, MN 662</i></p> <p><i>“Tea yields of improved clonal varieties using recommended crop husbandry yield up to 6080kgs/ha of green leaf compared to old bushes under poor management which yield only 610kgs/ha.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: EVALUATION OF ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY 1994/99 STABEX TRANSFERS, 2007</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Yes, strong evidence with the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project supported by Stabex with activities regarding the improvement of productivity, quality and efficiency of the coffee value chain (improvement of coffee production and better overall farm management, improvement of quality, nursery implementation and organizational development).</p> <p>Indeed, among the main achievements, farmer organizations have implemented a <u>quality control system</u> to ensure that only good quality coffee will be marketed through the organizations and <u>yield achievements increase</u> in the average farmers’ production from about 600 Kg green coffee per Ha to about 1.3 T/ha (average production on demo plots has reached about 2.7 T/ha). (Source: MN 308).</p> <p>It is too early for any significant increase in coffee production arising from the Kaweri Coffee Farmers’ Alliance Support project’s activities to be recorded, as the new plantings/rehabilitated areas have not yet reached full production; this can be expected in the coming 1-2 years. Nevertheless, it has been calculated that as a result of selling their Kiboko through their companies, Alliance farmers have experienced significant increases in the returns from their coffee enterprises – averaging US\$ 246,000 (24%).</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the Kaweri Farmers’ Alliance Support Project</i></p> <p>Despite positive effects of NAADS on adoption of improved production technologies and practices, we did not find significant differences in yield growth between NAADS and non-NAADS sub-counties for most crops, reflecting the still low levels of adoption of these technologies even in NAADS sub-counties, as well as other factors affecting productivity.</p> <p><i>Source: Quantifying the impact of NAADS in the Uganda livelihoods (2005)</i></p>
<b>VU POP2</b>	<p>Il y a des évidences que la qualité des produits s’est améliorée, notamment dans le secteur de la vanille. Mais cette amélioration reste localisée à petite échelle. Les productions soutenues par le projet POPACA n’ont pas crû de manière significative. <i>Source : MN 1098</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Pas de référence aux rendements dans les docs consultés mais aspects « qualité » et « quantité » sont traités. L’objectif global (3) est « Favoriser la création locale de valeur ajoutée par la promotion de la qualité et des traitements post-récolte » (<i>Source : CL</i>). Selon le MR, la qualité des produits est bonne. En effet, les bénéficiaires récitent avec exactitude les nouveaux procédés. Le contrôle de leur application est à ses débuts dans le sésame mais déjà bien développé sur l’anacarde. (<i>Source : MR p. 2</i>).</p> <p>Le CL définit le résultat (R1) « Des opérateurs paysans professionnels ayant augmenté leur revenu grâce à une amélioration de la qualité de leur production et à une meilleure capacité de négociation lors de la commercialisation ». 1.2.4. Appui à la contractualisation entre OP et exportateurs, les volumes de sésame commercialisés par les OP sont triplés. Le CL définit également le résultat (R. 2.2.) « Des volumes de produits agricoles semi-transformés commercialisés en augmentation améliorent l’économie rurale (débouchés locaux et internationaux) ». (<i>Source : CL</i>).</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Selon le cadre logique d’intervention, l’intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » en Côte d’Ivoire n’était pas ciblée sur les producteurs mais sur les unités de décorticage. Pour les unités de décorticage, des travaux ont été faits afin d’améliorer la qualité et l’hygiène de la production.</p> <p><i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d’Ivoire. Note d’informations page 2</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Les rendements sont évoqués à travers le résultat « R1 : La productivité et la compétitivité des cultures</p>

	<p>paysannes d'exportation sont améliorées » (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>). Le MR présente les impacts attendus :</p> <p>I) Hévéa. Après un an de projet, l'impact sur le développement socio-économique et la réduction de la pauvreté est déjà perceptible grâce à la création d'emplois rentables chez les jeunes démunis. D'autres impacts sont également fortement probables : i) génération de revenus des petits planteurs grâce à l'accès aux plants subventionnée ; ii) chiffre d'affaire prévu de 12 500 000 FCFA par ha de pépinière ; iii) augmentation des surfaces plantées (5000 ha prévus pour 2010-2011) ; iv) développement de nouveaux fronts de culture, jusqu'alors non exploités car enclavés ; v) augmentation de production des industries de transformation (SOGB, CHC, SAPH) ; vi) augmentation progressive de l'offre de plants de qualité ; vii) amélioration de la qualité du caoutchouc (clones performants) et de la rentabilité des plantations. (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>)</p> <p>II) Palmier. Aucun impact n'est actuellement perceptible. Les impacts probables dans le Bas-Sassandra sont les mêmes que l'hévéa, avec un CA par an et par ha de pépinière estimée à 11 200 000 FCA. Par contre, les plants n'étant pas subventionnés par l'AIPH pour l'instant, il est peu probable que l'impact sur le développement économique des petits planteurs soit visible. L'impact dans le Moyen Cavally risque d'être assez limité du fait de l'insuffisance de débouchés en termes de capacité de transformation sur place pour absorber 1 500 nouveaux ha en année 1, avec une augmentation annuelle. (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>Résultats escomptés (<i>Source : Annexe I p.26</i>): L'introduction d'une correcte diversification des cultures, leur rotation, une bonne gestion de la fertilisation du terrain – à travers différents cours de formation, comme la formation aux techniques culturelles ou la formation à la création de microprojets - pourront amener à un rendement de plus en plus grand en termes aussi bien qualitatifs que quantitatifs. Dans son ensemble, l'action vise à renforcer, entre autres, l'autonomie économique des GIC bénéficiaires, à travers des stratégies et des activités qui amèneront un rendement et une productivité plus importants de leurs activités et, donc, une augmentation de leurs revenus et de leur capacité de pourvoir à l'entretien de leur famille mais aussi de s'autofinancer. (<i>Source : Annexe I p.29</i>)</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The "Support to the competitiveness to the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme aimed, among others, at improving yields. Two specific objectives of the programme were directly related to the improvement of yields:</p> <p>"Average rice yields reaches 4.5t/ha by 2007" and "Rice milling yield reaches 65/50 in 2007". The final evaluation pointed out that the impact of the programme in terms of improved yields is unclear in both countries. "In Guyana, the total national usage of improved seed has gone up from 12% to 40%. But the actual impact of increased used of quality seed on milling yields is not clear. (...) In Suriname, the focus has been on quality seed for the small and middle sized farmers (because larger famers produce their own quality seed). While the paddy yields were slightly higher, there is no evidence whether the milling yields improved went up due to better quality seed and better quality paddy. Moreover, it is clear that after the end of the subsidies, no new farmers started seed production."</p> <p>Regarding the two specific objectives, the evaluation noted:</p> <p>For "Average rice yields reaches 4.5t/ha by 2007":</p> <p>"Both Guyana and Suriname have recorded the average rice yields of 4.6 tonnes / ha as of the end of 2007. Suriname was able to consistently improve its yields from 3.7 tonnes / ha in 2003 to an average of 4.6 tonnes / ha by the end of 2007 and Guyana has sown a average yield of 4.2 tonne per hectare in 2003/4 which was further increased to 4.6 tonnes / ha in 2006. The yields are expected to further increase with the expected improvement in water management and the implementation of the other components of TA and R&amp;E coming on stream."</p> <p>For "Rice milling yield reaches 65/50 in 2007":</p> <p>"Updated figures were not available to verify progress in milling yields. PMU data shows that milling yield in Guyana has been recorded consistently above 65 per cent whilst in Suriname this figure has shown a gradual increase from 53 per cent in 2003 to 58 per cent for 2006. However, there is scope for further improvement with regard to head rice yields. In Guyana, the head rice yield percentage has gradually improved from 45 per cent in 2003 to 48 per cent in 2006 and in Suriname the head rice yield has increased from a value of 38 per cent in 2003 to 45 per cent in 2006. As result the status in 2006 is 68/48 for Guyana and 58/45 for Suriname as compared to the targeted 65/50."</p> <p>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003,</p>

	<i>SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, pages 13-14, 20-23</i>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	The overall objective was to improve standards of living in the growing areas thus reducing widespread poverty. Coffee yields and quality were identified as the main factors to meet this objective. The expected results are “to increase the proportion of local varieties of high quality coffees” and “to increase yields of smallholders coffee farmers” ( <i>Source: FA p.3</i> )
<b>GH-COC</b>	There are no statements on results in terms of yields, quality and quantity. The second monitoring report states that trainings have already produced a positive impact and that productivity increases <b>will be</b> achieved during the following cropping season. These improvements should follow a multiplying effect and reinforcements in terms of yield improvements should be observed through the newly created farmers associations focusing on buying fertilizers this upcoming year. <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 02, Effectiveness to date sheet.</i> According to the Ghana Country Strategy Evaluation Report, there has been an increase in cocoa production but the impact of the Stabex and CSSP interventions to this increase is not measurable, given the lack of baseline data. No new enterprises have been created. The income increase has occurred because of the world price increase and the increase of the producer’s share in the export price. The increase in the producer’s share of the export price was a prior condition to the sector’s support so it can be considered that it indirectly did improve producer income. <i>Source: Ghana Country Strategy Evaluation report 2005, page 57</i>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Anyway, the programme doesn’t focus on such objectives.
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The mid-term evaluation of the programme does not provide any information on its outcomes.
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d’évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés. Le rapport ROM note plutôt que les producteurs performants sont ceux qui ont les premiers quitté la filière coton. La raison principale invoquée est le fait qu'ils se sont trouvés en "caution solidaire" pour le remboursement des crédits de campagne coton envers les banques opérant avec la CMDT, c'est à dire ont été tenus garants des prêts des agriculteurs non performants non capables de rembourser les crédits de campagne. Pour pallier à cet effet inverse, le principe de caution a été changé au profit d'un système volontaire, dans lequel les agriculteurs choisissent eux-mêmes les partenaires de caution, installant ainsi un système d'autocontrôle efficace (BCS, §5.3). <i>Source: Intervention Fiche, ROM/BCS</i>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	The project certainly contributed to increased crop quality and quantity as it stimulated the intake of crops at the processing plants. By increasing marketing outlets and making them more reliable, farmers have turned to increased production. <i>Source: FACT Brochure August 2010</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>SN-ONG</b>	Au bout de la 2ème année de mise en œuvre, les quantités pour la commercialisation et l’exportation étaient en deçà des espérances, suite à une défection partielle de nombreux producteurs (vente directe) et de mauvais rendement. <i>Source : MR</i>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG-COF</b>	Growing coffee in compliance with the UTZ Code of Conduct should lead to higher yields.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	“The data available for the analysis of the agricultural/rural sector in Uganda are poor and not updated; the national statistical data available shows no strong evidence that the GoU’s targets (production, productivity, food security, income and employment) have been achieved. However, the Impact Evaluation of the NAADS Programme indicates that a high percentage of farmers participating in the

	<p>survey confirmed that they have improved their economic situation or are on track towards improving it.” Uganda Country Strategy Evaluation (2009), p.50</p> <p>Assessment of NAADS impact between 2000 and 2004 (prior the EC SBS implementation) reads: “Despite positive effects of NAADS on adoption of improved production technologies and practices, no significant differences were found in yield growth between NAADS and non-NAADS sub-counties for most crops, reflecting the still low levels of adoption of these technologies even in NAADS sub-counties, as well as other factors affecting productivity.” IFPRI, Assessing NAADS impact, 2007, p. 43</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The programme’s third monitoring report refers to an expansion in production (but no mention of yields can be found). It also states that the quality of certain productions also increased (e.g. cocoa, coffee). <i>Source: Producers Organisation Project II Monitoring report 3, impact sheet.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>Support provided by the EU contributed to increase yields and reduce costs in Belize (from 472 boxes/acre in 2001 to 760 boxes/acre in 2004), Côte d’Ivoire (from 39.6 tonnes/ha in 1999 to 41.7 tonnes/ha in 2004), Cameroon (13.9% yield increase between 1994-98 and 2002-2004) and Suriname (yield increase from 14.5 tonnes/ha in 2001 to 34.8 tonnes/ha in 2005). Fruit quality has also been improved in most cases. In Belize and Suriname, the improvement of yields was linked to the recovery of production after a hurricane. Yet, according to the SFA impact evaluation, the results may have less to do with the SFA efficiency than presumed. The competitiveness actions were often dictated at a pace dictated by the market. The diversification actions which weren’t as linked to markets were much slower to implement and provide results. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 23 &amp; 25, htspc, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.4.2.4</b>	<p>Commission support contributed to improve infrastructures (e.g. feeder roads) related to agricultural commodity production, collection and processing</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Les appuis ayant contribué à l’amélioration d’infrastructures ont été réalisés dans le cadre du: STABEX :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Construction de magasins de stockage des intrants (estimés à environ 60) au niveau de groupements de producteurs de coton (GPC). Appuis passés, appréciés, mais jugés nettement insuffisants en fonction des besoins (ex. en 2007, il existait plus de 12000 GPC).</li> <li>▪ Idem pour la construction/réfection de pistes cotonnières dont l’importance des réalisations ne peut être bien estimée.</li> </ul> <p>Cependant, l’impact de ces améliorations est difficile à évaluer/quantifier (aucun rapport d’évaluation n’a pu être trouvé), hormis dans une certaine mesure, pour les magasins de stockage et tenant du fait qu’elles ont été appréciées (UNPCB, SOFITEX) bien qu’en précisant qu’elles sont loin de suffire pas par rapport aux besoins réels. <i>Source : MN 510, 575 ; Diagnostic de la filière coton et identification d’axes stratégiques. Rapport final, 2007.</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Les projets, de divers niveaux financiers, ciblent plusieurs secteurs dont les infrastructures rurales: Education, huit (8) filières (coton, café, cacao, riz, ananas, bananes, palmier et hévéa), Organisations professionnelles Agricoles (transversal et sectoriel), Foncier Rural, Sécurité sanitaire (Autorité compétente et OTA), Infrastructures rurales et appuis institutionnels. A titre d’illustration, la restructuration sectorielle (dont les pistes rurales) représente 24% des dépenses Stabex avec notamment un programme de réhabilitation des pistes rurales cotonnières dont les résultats sont néanmoins négatifs suite à de nombreux dysfonctionnements en termes de gestion. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, the EU support has also been directed to infrastructure, including roads. However these roads were transnational ones, rather than feeder roads which would be more directly aimed at improving market access for farmers. Furthermore, stakeholders stressed the urgent need for improvement of infrastructures in order to make the sectors of coffee and cocoa more competitive. Important shares of Stabex funds were used in the past to fund feeder roads. The EU support to the banana sector of Cameroon was partly used to improve the collecting and transport up to shipping of bananas in the port of Douala. The strategy for the future (with BAM funding) is to set up refrigerated storage in the harbor, to reduce fret costs (so that the boats do not have to wait in the harbor to be filled up). <i>Source : MN 913,</i></p>

	<p><i>MN 994</i></p> <p>Les pistes rurales et routes de collecte de café et de cacao ont été largement financées par les fonds Stabex depuis 1990 jusque 2004 environ. Les routes étaient l'un des deux secteurs de concentration du 9<sup>ème</sup> FED (avec environ 50% du budget) et elles sont toujours concernées par le 10<sup>ème</sup> FED sous le domaine « commerce et intégration régionale » <i>source : Country note Cameroun</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH</b>	<p>Ghana received funds for feeder roads programmes in cocoa-growing regions through three different Stabex programmes. The country's feeder roads department also benefitted from support through the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF to fund projects in regions of the country where it could serve for agriculture (but not only for cocoa). <i>Source: MN 952.</i></p> <p>Ghana received funds for feeder roads programmes in cocoa-growing regions through three different Stabex programmes. The country's feeder roads department also benefitted from support through the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF to fund projects in regions of the country where it could serve for agriculture (but not only for cocoa). <i>Source: MN 952</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	Investments have been made in feeder roads through EDF funding. The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that 23% of the 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF framework is destined to "Decentralisation framework and implementation" which includes feeder roads, water and sanitation, etc. The 2002-2007 CSP/NIP also mentions feeder roads as an important support project. <i>Sources: Ghana 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 27 ; Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 41</i>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>Feeder roads have been built with Stabex funds in three phases. No institutional memory on Phases I (1997) and II (2003-2005) but 1100 km of roads were rehabilitated in cocoa producing areas. Phase III (2005-2007) did about 390 km of roads in the cocoa growing areas: spot improvement and rehabilitation. In the CSSP II there are no longer any supports to feeder roads or other infrastructure.</p> <p>The MTE of the FRIP (Phase III) noted: <i>'At the stage of this mid term evaluation, only one road link has been achieved (lot 33 in maintenance period since April 2008); nevertheless during the site visit august 20<sup>th</sup> 2008, it appeared evident that the first benefits of the project are delivered to the beneficiaries; induced traffic, and commercial exchanges were noted. The traffic is now visible, and goods are transported from the production areas to the centres of commercial exchange; in the same way, access to health and social services is now possible for the populations of this food farming area.'</i> (page 43, MTE FRIP). It should be underlined that the benefits that accrue from the rehabilitation of the feeder roads are assumed, not measured: neither the project nor the district provides monitoring data on the results (increased production, marketing, agricultural service delivery etc.). <i>Source: MN159, MN156, MTE FRIP 2008</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	Les fonds Stabex 1991-1999 ont financé pour un montant de €28,1 million (41,1% de la dotation Stabex totale) des travaux de désenclavement, en particulier au bénéfice des régions productrices de produits agricoles d'exportation. <i>Source : Délégation de l'UE à Madagascar</i>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>An important element of the support to the coffee sector in TZ has been on roads. Out of a total of €46 million provided under FMO 94-99 for Coffee, €11.3 million concerned the rehabilitation of priority rural roads in coffee producing areas.</p> <p>A feasibility study was done before the building of roads in the regions which benefitted from the STABEX funds to that purpose but there is no information ex post on the increase of traded agricultural products and revenue of farmers due to the building of the roads.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN629, Annual Report Stabex Programmes 2010.</i></p> <p>The support to sugar included infrastructure for outgrowers such as roads and bridges, drains, crossings etc.. The EU funded 45.6km and 16km of farm tracks and access. Currently the Sugar Board is realising an aquifer study for irrigation.</p> <p>A study was also realised to look into irrigation and the EU decided not to fund this.</p> <p><i>Source: MN629, MN625</i></p> <p>EDF funds have been used for setting up cross border markets and One-stop border post but no details were</p>

	<p>made available on exactly what this entailed.</p> <p>Apart from supporting the rehabilitation/construction of feeder roads in the tea and coffee producing areas, the EC has also contributed to the funding of other roads: four regions are most expected to produce food and agricultural products. Programme implemented between 2003 and 2006. Another project is ongoing: focusing on the road between Dar Es Salaam to Morogoro for trade vehicles. Morogoro-Dodoma: 215 kilometres. It is not specifically to agriculture but of course the agricultural sector also benefits from these roads. EU supports the central corridor (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, etc.).</p> <p><i>Sources: MN 629 and MN 601</i></p>
<b>TZ Tea</b>	<p>The EC did not support collection and processing of tea green leaves.</p> <p>Farmers were denied when privatising the tea sector in Tanzania. The best would have been to privatise and push and help farmers to manage private factories.</p> <p>21 tea factories, including 16 ones owned by multinationals and with estates. Multinationals have always been there in the country. 5 factories are under the Tanzania Tea Authority and have outgrowers schemes with small-scale farmers.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 666</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Infrastructure was one of the seven components of the PMA. But this component was not really implemented. What MinAgri expects from donors is infrastructure: agricultural infrastructure (e.g. development of post-harvest like washed coffee and storage capacities). We produce 2 million tons coffee; all of it comes on the market at the same time pushing the price down. Storage would allow farmers to negotiate the price of their coffee deliveries and the consumer would get maize at a good price.</p> <p>(Source: MN304)</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Sous le 9<sup>i</sup>è FED, la Commission a contribué à l'amélioration de certaines routes rurales dans les régions de production du café et du cacao. <i>Source : MN 1067</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP evaluation report mentions that the programme could not supply support in the necessary infrastructures to meet the needs of the smallest companies. The evaluation even advises to invest more in infrastructure for small producers in the future. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 51 &amp; 92</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>In the five SP countries of South Eastern Africa (Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe), expansion of the sugarcane cultivated surface implies the development of infrastructure (feeder roads, irrigation schemes), which the AMSP programme contributes to finance.</p> <p>In Belize, the Government and sugar mills regretted that funds of the AMSP programme were utilised to finance roads rather than to support actions more directly targeted on sugar production.</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Selon le cadre logique d'intervention, l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » en Côte d'Ivoire a contribué à améliorer l'infrastructure des unités de transformation des noix de cajou brutes en amandes, notamment du point de vue énergétique (amélioration du four, du foyer et du chauffe-eau solaire). Le soutien a également contribué au développement d'installations (broyeur et presse) permettant la fabrication de briquettes de combustion. <i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique commenté</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Le résultat R3 est « Les pistes rurales sont durablement réhabilitées » : par souci d'efficacité autant que d'efficience, il est main tenant propose de concentrer le financement de ce volet sur des segments de pistes ayant un intérêt stratégique essentiel pour relier les zones de production agricoles aux grands centres urbains et pour renforcer l'intégration économique sous régionale. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.6</i>)</p>
<b>CR_RIC</b>	<p>The "Support to the competitiveness to the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme aimed, among others, at improving water supply and water management (which is one of the four components of the programme). The final evaluation noted overall that this component scored strongly on relevance and effectiveness in Guyana while the position was less satisfactory in Suriname mainly due to engineering design flaws in relation to the amounts available.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In Guyana: construction of sluices and rehabilitation of the Dawa Pump; improvement of water management but no development of a drainage and irrigation policy.</li> <li>▪ In Suriname: budget limitations prevented the realisation of most planned activities; better water management in selected areas but no proper regular maintenance.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, pages 6, 23-28</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Anyway, the programme doesn't focus on such objectives.
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The programme is not intended to finance infrastructure investments.
<b>ML-COT</b>	L'objectif spécifique n° 3 de l'intervention est de Procéder à la réhabilitation/ reconstruction d'environ 350 à 400 km de pistes dans les zones où les perspectives de développement de la production sont importantes et dont l'enclavement compromet sérieusement la sortie à temps et dans de bonnes conditions de la production récoltée» (Synthèse de Projet, p.1). Le rapport ROM relève que la réhabilitation des routes a été achevée et la totalité des fonds prévus a été perçue dans les délais programmés (BCS, §2.1). Il mentionne que la réhabilitation des pistes est la seule activité à produire des résultats "tangibles" (BCS, §2.2). Il précise également qu'une vraie viabilité du volet pistes cotonnières nécessitera une rétraction sur les zones cotonnières les plus productives et ayant des fonctions autres que l'évacuation du coton. Il constate qu'une étude basée purement sur des données économiques n'a pas été faite (BCS, §5.1). <i>Source: ROM/BCS</i>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	Very small scale: FACT provides equipment/facilities to processing plants in 7 islands. <i>Source: FACT project sheet.</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>SN-ONG</b>	Un dispositif de collecte des productions de sésame a été mis en place. Source : MR
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	The SRM project supports <i>inter alia</i> the building of two new rural markets (Mkata and Ingagala markets). These markets have been opened since July 2008. <i>Sources: Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, Appendix 2</i>
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project foresees provision to coffee growers of logistical support, of which warehouse facilities.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	The SBS was not intended to finance infrastructure investments.
<b>VU-POP</b>	No reference to infrastructure improvements can be found.
<b>BAN</b>	Road and infrastructure projects have been supported by the SAF in countries such as Suriname and Belize. Funding from EDF also has gone to such projects. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 18, htspe, 2008.</i>
<b>I.4.2.5</b>	Commission support contributed to improve the collection and processing of agricultural commodities
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	Under the All ACP Programme, the World Bank has supported the production/ processing of coffee through the following activity: "2.CEN.D01 - Support to specialty coffee production and marketing in Cameroon". \$ 120,000 of out \$ 399,000 has been disbursed to date (30 June 2011). The overall objective is to introduce the fully-washed process to the coffee industry in Cameroun (particularly for robusta coffee, which is a novelty in Cameroun whose coffee production is over 90% robusta), through the piloting of the compact eco-pulping technology (Colombia-made Penagos machines) in both arabica and robusta coffee areas. Four sites have been earmarked for the tests, at Belo

	<p>and Bandjoun for arabica coffee, Chede and Angossas for robusta coffee. It is recalled that these activities are being conducted in close cooperation with ITC which is ensuring training activities aimed at reaching the quality level required to qualify for 'specialty' coffee niche markets.</p> <p>Outputs: The first coffee crop (2010-11) at the four sites where the compact wet milling equipment has been installed. Due to the procurement delays, particularly in the contracting for the construction of sheds to house the CPU machines, the installed eco-pulping machines could only be partially used in this first coffee season, resulting in the production of modest tonnages of fully washed coffee. A commercial quantity was only produced at Chede (robusta area), 1800kg cherry coffee was processed into 800 kg clean coffee. Samples of this washed robusta coffee were well received at the EAFCA coffee fair, which augurs well for the next season when commercial quantities should be produced at the four sites. The technical hitches that appeared during the running in of the equipment in season 2010/11 have been fixed thanks to after sale visits by the Penagos representative, and sufficient water supply at Belo and Angossas is now ensured.</p> <p>The first Steering Committee of the fully washed coffee project was finally held on June 8th, which gave CABI, the implementing agency recruited by WB-SD, an opportunity to present the 2010/11 complete coffee season report. The report was discussed at length by SC members and discussions held to plan the way forward with the next season. The CABI report is annexed to the present six-monthly report.</p> <p>Under the All ACP Programme, the World Bank has supported the cassava processing through the following activity: "2.CEN.D03 - Promotion of cassava processing in Cameroun". \$171,739.96 out of \$360,500 has been disbursed to date (30 June 2011).</p> <p>The objective of this activity is to test improved cassava processing equipment to produce cassava starch and cassava chips, as well as to conduct marketing tests on the end products.</p> <p>Outputs: First a consortium of consultancy firms led by Horus of France was recruited to take charge of the implementation of this activity. The retained arrangements, similar to those of the coffee activity, provide for close cooperation with the Bank-funded PACA program in Cameroun, which is procuring the processing equipment to be tested within the premises of two pre-selected entities: Coop. SOCAMAK and GIC-UTRAM have been identified as most adequate beneficiaries to receive and operate the equipment. The equipment to be piloted will include a 'flash dryer', imported from Nigeria and adapted by a Cameroonian engineering firm to suit the market prospects (in terms of expected volume) for cassava starch identified by GIC-UTRAM.</p> <p>An inception mission took place in June together with a Horus representative, which allowed finalizing the technical details to complete the procurement files. The mission discussed implementation arrangements with PACA and visited the two recipient firms to negotiate counterpart contributions. The mission also worked on drafting the MoUs (conventions) that will be signed between the three parties (PACA, HORUS, SOCAMAK) for the pilot on cassava chips; between PACA, HORUS, UTRAM for the pilot on cassava starch.</p> <p>These tripartite MoUs will clearly spell out the terms, conditions and calendar for the transfer of ownership of the supplied equipment from PACA to the beneficiaries.</p> <p><i>Source: WB-Sustainable Development Network (WB-SDN), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 28 July 2011</i></p>
<p><b>BF</b> <b>coton</b></p>	<p>Diverses interventions ont contribué à améliorer la collecte et la transformation primaire (égrenage) du coton</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Le STABEX : contribution à l'amélioration de la collecte à travers la construction/réfection de pistes cotonnières, de magasins de stockage pour la collecte-entrepasage du coton graine</li> <li>▪ Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière. La technique de récolte, de tri, de séchage et stockage du coton biologique fait partie des formations dispensées par le programme.</li> <li>▪ Programme tous ACP : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- GIPD/BPA/FAO : également, des formations analogues sont dispensées</li> <li>- Projet de prévention de la contamination de coton graine en Afrique de l'Ouest : sensibilisation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



	<p>et formation à la lutte contre la contamination au niveau de la récolte (avec des kits de récolte adaptés) mais aussi du stockage, transport et de l'égrenage.</p> <p>Cependant, l'impact de ces améliorations est difficile à évaluer/quantifier. Aucun rapport d'évaluation des interventions du STABEX n'a pu être obtenu. Les interventions du Programme tous ACP ont un impact potentiel plus important mais leur portée relative reste encore assez limitée que pour avoir des impacts significatifs à grande échelle. D'une manière générale, les interventions sont trop récentes pour évaluer des impacts. Par ailleurs, il faut également noter que le financement direct des activités du Programme tous ACP se termine au plus tard fin décembre 2011. Cela devrait également être le cas pour le Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière.</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport narratif 2009 du Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques ; CFC et FAO, 6 monthly progress report : 1 July-31 December 2010 ;</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Dans le cadre du PIN 10ème FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, the EU support has also been directed to infrastructure, including roads. However these roads were transnational ones, rather than feeder roads which would be more directly aimed at improving market access for farmers. Furthermore, stakeholders stressed the urgent need for improvement of infrastructures in order to make the sectors of coffee and cocoa more competitive (although roads have received significant funds in the past through Stabex). The EU support to the banana sector of Cameroon was partly used to improve the collecting and transport up to shipping of bananas in the port of Douala. The strategy for the future (with BAM funding) is to set up refrigerated storage in the harbor, to reduce fret costs (so that the boats do not have to wait in the harbor to be filled up). <i>Source : MN 913, MN 994</i></p> <p>Within the PASAPE programme, the EC also supports agro-industries such as coffee roasting factories. The programme aims to support the upgrading of the country's industries in the framework of the EPA negotiations. <i>Source : MN 971</i></p> <p>The Stabex-funded Mungo Nkam project (1997-2005) funded the construction of cocoa dryers in the region in order to improve the processing of the cocoa beans. (<i>Source : Mungo-Nkam mid-term evaluation report</i>)</p> <p>Le PACICC dans sa composante « information des opérateurs sur les prix et les marchés » a agit sur le regroupement de l'offre et la mise en contact avec les acheteurs. (<i>source : CF PACICC</i>)</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The EC's support to improve network conditions (by upgrading feeder roads, trunk roads, etc.) did have a positive effect but the targets have been achieved more slowly than expected. <i>Source: Ghana CSP/NIP 2008-2013, page 31</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The support to research and dissemination of new high yielding disease resistant varieties is actually not working in favour of the local processing industry. Local processing is based on light crop bean, the second harvest which yields lower quality and is thus sold at 15% less than the price on world market, and at a 20% discount on the internal market. There is excess processing capacity at 500 000 tonnes, with only 40 000 tonnes of light crop beans produced. Now with better, high yielding varieties that produce all year round, there are less 'light' second crops and the quality produced is found too expensive by local processors. <i>Source: MN123</i></p> <p>Following from earlier Stabex support to Cocobod (the state run monopolistic cocoa marketing agency) restructuring, the Commission continued to support the sector through the early 2000's, together with the WB, with the objective of strengthening Cocobod's efficiency and opening the sector to private sector internal marketing. As a result of Cocobod's increased efficiency and lower operating costs, the producer price for cocoa increased dramatically as a share of the world price (from 40% in 1994 to 50% in 1994/95</p>

	<p>and then gradually to 73% in 2010). This result is the most easily verifiable of the targets pursued by the FMO 1992-93 which included (i) reduced marketing costs through the improvement of rural feeder roads, (iii) improved productivity and income of smallholder cocoa producers. <i>Source: FMO 1992-1993</i></p> <p>The Commission's support to the rehabilitation of feeder roads was very important. A total of 1675 km was rehabilitated through the Feeder Roads programme Phases I to III. In the late 1990s when the FMO was designed, it was estimated that transport costs represented up to 70% of the marketing costs. Reducing these costs thus enabled Cocobod to offer higher prices to the producers. <i>Source: MN123, FMO 1992-1993</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Le programme Stabex a constitué un des rares et importants efforts significatifs d'investissement publics à Madagascar pour la relance des secteurs des cultures de rente en collaboration directe avec les producteurs et exportateurs. Le concept « filière » a été développé avec succès pour la vanille, le café et le litchi. Il a permis l'émergence ou le renforcement des organisations professionnelles, le développement et la diffusion de techniques pour débloquer les principaux goulots d'étranglement relatifs à la production, à la transformation et à la mise en marché, et/ou lorsque le potentiel existait, la standardisation des produits et le contrôle de la qualité, la promotion du label d'origine Madagascar, et si nécessaire des appuis pour des révisions réglementaires ou légales à Madagascar et dans l'UE</p> <p>Source : Cadre d'Obligations Mutuelles 1996-1999</p> <p>Les fonds Stabex ont financé entre fin 2008 et fin 2010, pour un budget total de €4,7 millions, onze projets mis en œuvre par cinq organisations.</p> <p>Chacun des onze projets poursuivait les mêmes objectifs d'accroissement du revenu des producteurs par l'augmentation et l'amélioration de l'offre de cinq produits agricoles d'exportation (cacao, café, girofle, poivre, vanille) et par une meilleure valorisation au moment de l'échange.</p> <p>L'augmentation de l'offre des produits devait être le résultat de l'augmentation de la production — résultant elle-même de l'extension des surfaces consacrées à ces cultures et de l'amélioration de la productivité des exploitations.</p> <p>Parallèlement, à ces actions d'augmentation de l'offre les actions d'amélioration de la qualité des produits mis en vente avaient également pour objet d'assurer une meilleure rémunération des producteurs. L'amélioration de la valorisation devait être le résultat d'une mise en adéquation de la demande exprimée par les acheteurs et de l'offre résultant des actions du programme.</p> <p>Un nouveau mécanisme de mise en vente — la vente publique sur les marchés communaux, lors de la première transaction de la chaîne des échanges — devait être celui par lequel les exigences des acheteurs seraient communiquées aux producteurs.</p> <p><i>Source : Assistance Technique à la mise en œuvre du programme d'intensification et de structuration des principales filières d'exportation de produits agricoles à Madagascar, Rapport final</i></p> <p>L'organisation de marchés publics pour la vente des produits agricoles a pu être testée au niveau de 40 communes. Lors des travaux préparatoires, toutes les catégories d'acteurs avaient confirmé leur adhésion de principe à cette nouvelle forme d'organisation pouvant permettre une meilleure mise en concurrence des acteurs, une réduction du nombre des intermédiaires et du risque de dénaturation du produit le long de la chaîne, un meilleur contrôle des acteurs et des pratiques, un meilleur suivi des volumes échangés... Toutefois, les implications très fortes, pour tous les acteurs, en termes de changement de comportement n'ont pas permis à l'expérience de produire des effets significatifs sur un délai aussi court. Les circuits habituels sont restés prédominant tandis que l'affluence et les volumes apportés sur les marchés demeuraient limités (600 tonnes, tous produits confondus, pour l'ensemble des marchés organisés et sur toute la durée du programme). <i>Source : Rapport Stabex 2010</i></p> <p>Le Comité de Suivi STABEX a pris la décision d'orienter les financements du programme d'intensification et de structuration des filières vers l'appui aux initiatives des collectivités locales pour l'organisation de marchés intérieurs publics. En régulant l'adéquation entre l'offre intérieure et la demande extérieure en produits d'exportation, ceux-ci devraient permettre de conduire à un accroissement de l'offre de produits de qualité et contribuer ainsi à l'augmentation des revenus des producteurs. A cet effet, un appel à propositions ouvert a été lancé en 2008 et 11 projets approuvés pour un montant total de 4 681 431 €. A</p>

	<p>travers ces projets, 12 districts sont visés et cinq filières agricoles d'exportation, à savoir vanille, café, girofle, cacao et poivre. En parallèle, une assistance technique a été mise en place pour identifier les exigences des traders et clients finaux en matière de qualité, animer l'échange d'expérience, évaluer l'efficacité des mesures prises et capitaliser l'expérience ainsi acquise.</p> <p>Près de 400 groupements paysans de base, localisés dans 120 communes, ont bénéficié de l'appui de ce programme, articulés autour de trois volets, visant respectivement à l'accroissement de la production, l'amélioration de la qualité des produits et l'amélioration des conditions de mise en marché.</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport Stabex 2010</i></p> <p>L'évaluation du programme d'intensification des principales filières d'exportation (TRANSTEC, analyse ECOFIN, 2007), mis en œuvre par des organisations professionnelles (le Groupement des Entrepreneurs de la Sava – GES/SAVA – le Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave – CTHT – et le Comité National de Commercialisation du Café - CNCC), a montré un bilan relativement mitigé des actions entreprises, dont l'efficacité et l'efficacités seraient compromises par l'organisation défaillante de la commercialisation des produits. Celle-ci ne permet pas de promouvoir la qualité ni la mise en conformité avec la réglementation sanitaire du commerce international.</p> <p>A la suite de ce constat, les fonds Stabex encore disponibles ont été alloués au financement d'un programme dont l'objectif est de proposer des modalités pratiques d'organisation des marchés des principaux produits d'exportation, prenant en compte les exigences sanitaires et commerciales des clients finaux.</p> <p><i>Source : Projet d'appui aux filières d'exportation dans le district de Soaniera Ivongo, Synthèse de Projet</i></p> <p>Depuis 2008, la Délégation a étendu ses appuis vers l'aval (commercialisation et transformation) afin d'améliorer la qualité dans une optique de diversification et de compétitivité (Source : MN 801). Les appuis sont donc également centrés sur l'organisation du marché et la commercialisation. 11 projets ont été sélectionnés sur appel à propositions (café, vanille, girofle, poivre, cacao) avec en outre un <u>volet appui à la production</u> (CTHT, CNCC,...) et un <u>volet qualité</u> (formation, sensibilisation, petit matériel) mais également un <u>volet organisation des marchés au niveau des communes</u> (ce qui a le moins bien marché car ce volet est très complexe à mettre en œuvre étant donné le contexte institutionnel et la concurrence des acheteurs itinérants). (Source : MN 802).</p>
UG	<p>Yes, both with EDF and Stabex Funds. The EC supported through EDF the GoU agricultural strategy in 2001 (PMA-plan for Modernization of Agriculture), which benefited among others crops to agricultural commodities, of which coffee. The EC support to PMA focussed on research and extension with a view of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector (Source: MN 301). The PMA also included a component on marketing and agro-processing. A sub-committee on agricultural marketing and processing was established, but this component of the PMA was hardly implemented (Source: MN 302). Through the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project the EC supported by Stabex, farmer organizations which enhanced the capacity of the coffee sector to meet the market requirements in terms of quality and quantity were established at village, parish and national levels. Indeed, 24 Depot Committees (parish level) have been registered as Companies and carry out primary processing and deliver hulled green coffee directly to exporters in Kampala (Source: MN 308).</p> <p>NAADS appears to have promoted greater use of post-harvest technologies and commercial marketing of commodities, consistent with its mission to promote more commercially oriented agriculture.</p> <p><i>Source: Quantifying the impact of NAADS in the Uganda livelihoods (2005)</i></p> <p>A significant amount of effort was also expended by the Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support project on working with farmers to improve the quality of their coffee, including the use of tarpaulins for coffee drying and hand-hullers at each DC. An improvement in the quality of the FAQ (Fair Average Quality) has been reported throughout the project area, with traders willing to pay a premium for "Kaweri" coffee.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the Kaweri Farmers' Alliance Support Project</i></p>
VU	<p>La collecte et le transport sont des freins importants au développement des marchés agricoles au Vanuatu, vu les distances importantes entre les îles et les vendeurs/acheteurs. Les coûts de transport sont</p>

	importants. La CE n'a pas supporté ces aspects des filières agricoles. <i>Source: MN 1015</i>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no such evidence from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	No reference to product collection is mentioned in the evaluation reports of the PIP. The PIP final evaluation report states that processed products were excluded from the scope of the PIP's activity. Although it isn't "product processing", we can note that PIP final evaluation states that assistance was brought to accredit laboratories so that their certification processes can be recognized internationally. Only two of the eight supported labs obtained accreditation. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 18 &amp; 19</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	Except for large sugarcane farms, harvest and transportation of sugarcane are carried out by the sugar mills which are excluded from the (direct) benefit of the AMSP programme.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	L'objectif global (3) est « Favoriser la création locale de valeur ajoutée par la promotion de la qualité et des traitements post-récolte » ( <i>Source: CL</i> ). Le CL détaille le résultat (R.2.1): « Une maîtrise technique renforcée des acteurs de la transformation agro-alimentaire primaire » ( <i>Source: CL</i> ).
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés.
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Selon le cadre logique d'intervention, l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » en Côte d'Ivoire a contribué à améliorer l'efficacité de transformation des noix de cajou brutes en amandes, notamment du point de vue énergétique. Le soutien a également contribué au développement de la valorisation des coproduits (coques d'anacarde) par la fabrication de briquettes de combustion. Une plus grande quantité de noix de cajou est transformée en Côte d'Ivoire et le rendement de la transformation s'est amélioré dans les unités développées par le projet. <i>Source: Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique commenté</i>
<b>CI-REH</b>	Outre ce qui est cité à l'indicateur I.4.2.4 concernant le résultat R3 « Les pistes rurales sont durablement réhabilitées » ( <i>Source: Rider FA p.6</i> ), aucune référence n'est faite sur la collecte et les traitements post-récoltes.
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Une des activités concerne cet indicateur : créer des magasins de stockage. ( <i>Source: Annexe I p.3</i> ) : Pour encourager l'utilisation des magasins de stockage et pour aider les plus indigents, des fonds permettront d'anticiper une somme d'argent (inférieure à la valeur du marché) à ceux qui déposent des sacs de vivres. Pour retirer les sacs, les propriétaires devront verser la somme qui leur sera anticipée, plus une petite majoration pour le service. Cela permettra à beaucoup de familles de disposer d'argent liquide dans les périodes où les prix seront inférieurs et de pouvoir vendre sur le marché dans les périodes plus favorables. Chaque magasin aura son fonds et le Comité de Gestion sera chargé de le gérer. Dans les magasins, on rédigera un cahier de caisse et un autre de stock. On prévoit au moins 100 sacs de vivres déposés par magasin et par an. Les fonds commenceront à fonctionner à partir de la 2ème année avec les magasins. Toute l'action de création des fonds et de fonctionnement des magasins sera suivie, en particulier, par le coordinateur général du projet expatrié. ( <i>Source: Annexe I p13</i> )
<b>ET-CIP</b>	Along with intensive training and procurement of pruning tools, the procurement of equipment and materials needed for the diffusion of improved post harvest processing techniques (semi-washing, drying) to 15,000 farmers was budgeted under two successive Programme Estimates. As previously reported a first tender launched under PE No 4 had to be re-tendered under PE No 5 due to the invalidation of the previous tender but finally the delivery of the different material and equipment could not be executed in time. ( <i>Source: Completion report p.16</i> ).
<b>GH-COC</b>	The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II does not focus on collection and processing and no references are made to those activities in the documents.
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Anyway, the programme doesn't

	focus on such objectives.
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The mid-term evaluation of the programme does not provide any information on its outcomes.
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	On a very small scale (17 enterprises are concerned), the FACT has provided advice and equipment to improve supply chains of various products, post harvest handling, and food safety standards by means of fair trade and organic farming practices. <i>Source: FACT brochure August 2010</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>SN-ONG</b>	Un dispositif de collecte des productions de sésame a été mis en place, des prospections commerciales ont été menées et certains contrats de vente ont été passés. Mais les quantités en jeu sont restées très en deçà des espérances, suite à une défection partielle de nombreux producteurs (vente directe) et de mauvais rendement. <i>Source : MR</i>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project foresees provision to coffee growers of logistical support (warehouse facilities, transport services, etc.).
<b>UG-SBS</b>	The SBS was concentrating on agricultural research and extension and was not intended to support the marketing component of the PMA. However, assessment of NAADS (extension) impact between 2000 and 2004 (prior the SBS implementation) reads: “The proportion of households recently becoming aware of drying technologies, storage facilities, grading practices, information on prices and markets, and collective marketing practices was significantly higher in trailblazing NAADS sub-counties, ranging from 8% to 22% of households. In late NAADS and non-NAADS sub-counties, the respective ranges were 0–12% and 0–15%. The proportion of those aware that actually adopted post-harvest handling practices was also significantly greater in trailblazing NAADS than in late NAADS or non-NAADS sub-counties. As Table 19 shows, the share of marketed output was slightly higher among households in NAADS sub-counties (28–33%) compared to their counterparts in non-NAADS sub-counties (24%). Table 19 also shows that the percentage of households reporting an increase since 2000 in the share of marketed output was about two times greater in NAADS (about 25%) than in non-NAADS sub-counties (14%). These results suggest the market orientation of the NAADS program is having the desired impact.” IFPRI, Assessing NAADS impact, 2007, p. 31
<b>BAN</b>	There have been studies on food processing as well as support to projects (e.g. in Jamaica) but no significant developments. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 28, htspe, 2008.</i>
<b>J.4.3</b>	<b><i>Commission support has contributed to improve the capacity of producers to respond to commodity market requirements</i></b>
<b>BF</b>	L'appui de la Commission dans le cadre du programme AAACP a contribué à améliorer la capacité des producteurs à répondre aux demandes du marché, dans le secteur du coton (par exemple: prévention contamination coton (CFC/ IFDC)). Au niveau de l'anacarde (RONGEAD/ INADES-B), l'intervention soutenue par la Commission contribue à coordonner les organisations de producteurs au niveau national (et prochainement au niveau régional).
<b>CM</b>	The PACICC programme helped producers in the coffee and cocoa sectors through price information, grouping production and contacts with buyers/collectors. Banana technical and financial assistance (ATF) had a leverage effect on investments (both foreign and domestic) in the sector. Regarding certification, the banana ATF and the PASAPE programme (supporting the country in the framework of EPA negotiations) have helped sectors in complying with ISO and Globalgap standards. It seems that coordination among donors is difficult and donors tend to follow different approaches (e.g. between AFD and EU). The sustainability of projects beyond EU support has been good in the case of the Logone-et-

	Chari programme in the North, whereas EU support is still needed for the banana sector and sustainability of support is questioned for the PACICC (coffee-cocoa).
<b>GH</b>	In Ghana, marketing of cocoa is State-owned (the State controls external marketing through the Cocobod and the internal marketing is tightly controlled). Commission support has therefore not intervened in market information services. Label certification is under development in Ghana's cocoa sector, although the EC does not provide support to it. The EC's intervention helped regroup farmers at community level (in 56 communities throughout cocoa growing regions of the country). However, little achievements have been made regarding vertical integration at national level, and none at regional level. No evidence was found on the EC support encouraging FDI and public-private partnerships in the country. The EC's support to the competitiveness of the cocoa sector took place in the 1990s within the structural adjustment plans financed by the World Bank. At present, few other donors are aware of EC support in the sector and the EC is not a member of the agricultural sector donor working group. One of the implementing agencies of the EC supported project however, receives funds from other donors (and ensures coherence of projects internally). Several issues on the sustainability of projects (capacity to outlast EC support) have been raised. Results were quite poor for the 2000-2005 project, notably due to poor design. Sustainability of the current project seems good for those who benefitted from the current project, but its scope was quite small (targeted about 0.5% of cocoa farmers). Continued support would be necessary to extend impact. Furthermore, the programme is not likely to reach its full expectations due to problems encountered in implementation procedures.
<b>MG</b>	L'organisation des marchés des produits agricoles d'exportation mise en place par des projets Stabex a permis d'assurer aux exportateurs un approvisionnement de volume significatif en produits de qualité contrôlée, mais à un niveau strictement local et sans réplication dans d'autres zones.
<b>TZ</b>	The interventions financed by the Commission have contributed to improve the quality of agricultural products, especially in the cotton sector where the measurement of the quality of cotton has been launched at regional level. Price mechanisms and information about the price to smallholders are still major issues at stake in the tea sector, while for the coffee sector there is a system to communicate market information from the Moshi auction. There is no evidence that the EC support has contributed to increase the number of producers' organisation, except in the tea sector. In that sector, it is reported that the number of association members, which produce tea in the surroundings of the tea research institute, has grown from 174 to 590. A lot of questions are raised about the issue of sustainability in all the sectors supported by the EC. For example, there is still a need to continue to support the research centres and extension services. In addition, a lot of constraints are met in all the sectors (access to inputs, quality of the products, how to finance the production, etc.).
<b>UG</b>	Through the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project the EC supported the establishment at village, parish and national level of farmer organizations which enhanced the capacity of the coffee sector to meet the market requirements in terms of quality and quantity. Research and extension, supported by the EC, only contribute to a better response to market requirements if there is a demand from the farmers. There are such examples for bananas and cassava.
<b>VU</b>	L'appui de la Commission a contribué à améliorer la capacité des producteurs à répondre aux demandes du marché (POPACA/Programme Tous ACP). Les services de vulgarisation agricole ont vu leurs capacités améliorées (vanille). Les résultats ont été obtenus à un niveau local (petite échelle).
<b>I.4.3.1</b>	Commission support contributed to improve availability and use of market information and advisory services to producer organisations/producers (e.g. agricultural commodity prices, quality standards, packaging, timely delivery, etc.) at national and regional level
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<i>Specific to Burkina Faso</i> : L'appui de la Commission dans le cadre du programme AAACP a contribué à

améliorer la capacité des producteurs à répondre aux demandes du marché, dans le secteur du coton (par exemple: prévention contamination coton (CFC/ IFDC)). Au niveau de l'anacarde (RONGEAD/ INADES-B), l'intervention soutenue par la Commission contribue à coordonner les organisations de producteurs au niveau national (et prochainement au niveau régional).

*Overall :*

In the framework of the All ACP programme, UNCTAD has contributed to the development of regional market information about agricultural commodities in the Pacific region, through the activity: "2.PAC.C01 - Regionalisation of the Pacific Market Information System – Infoshare" (December 2008 - December 2011).

- The objective of this activity is the creation of a regional market information system hosted by a regional institution for enhanced access to market information and intelligence effectively meeting the needs of national and regional commodity chain stakeholders.
- The INFOSHARE system was substantially updated and tailored to the needs of countries of the Pacific region, based also on the outcomes of the workshop on the establishment of the sub-regional Market information system (MIS) in the Caribbean, held in February 2011 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad & Tobago.
- The issue of the integration of the existing national MISs (namely AgTrade in Fiji) into a sub-regional system was successfully solved. The methodology for the export of AgTrade data to INFOSHARE was developed; this methodology can be applied to export data from any other national sources across the region.
- In order to meet the beneficiaries' demands for access to market information over mobile phones (i.e. SMS) in addition to online platforms, UNCTAD -- in collaboration with ITC – has designed a method to expand INFOSHARE using the "Trade-in-hand" methodology developed by ITC.
- The outputs are: A methodology to integrate INFOSHARE with mobile telephone market information systems; a methodology to export data from national systems for the use by INFOSHARE.
- The workshop on the Establishment of a sub-regional Agricultural Market Intelligence System in the Pacific is scheduled for 17-19 August 2011 in Nadi, Republic of Fiji.

In the framework of the All ACP programme, UNCTAD has contributed to the development of price information and Market Intelligence through the activity: "1.CAR.C02 - Information on Prices and Market Intelligence (December 2008 - December 2011).

- The objective of this activity is the creation of a pilot sub-regional system on prices and market intelligence, focused on fruits and vegetables, possibly also roots and tubers as well as other agricultural commodities.
- The test version of the Caribbean sub-regional Agricultural Market Information Systems (AMIS), presented at the Market Information Organization of the Americas (MIOA) Executive Committee Meeting and Regular Meeting (1-2 December 2010 in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago), was revised during the period December 2010 to mid-February 2011 according to participants' recommendations.
- A new version of INFOSHARE system for the Caribbean region was developed and presented during a workshop on AMIS in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad & Tobago in February 2011.
- Data on prices were directly imported from the national MIS of Trinidad and Tobago (NAMIS-NADEVCO) and Guyana (NewGMC) into INFOSHARE.
- A new module for the direct import of data from other national MIS was developed.

In addition, UNCTAD has strengthened the Caribbean Sub-Regional Marketing Information Service through the activity: "2.CAR.C01 - Strengthening of the Caribbean Sub-Regional Marketing Information Service" (December 2008 - December 2011 – budget: 150,000 EUR).

- The objective of this activity is the creation of a sub-regional system, main focus on fruits and vegetables, possibly roots and tubers and others.
- A workshop on the Establishment of a regional Agricultural Market Intelligence system took place in Port-of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 15-17 February 2011 in combination with the SCP launch.
- The workshop, organized in close co-operation with the CARICOM Secretariat and CARDI outlined the future work of the Caribbean Community on the creation of the sub-regional AMIS and recommended INFOSHARE as one of the possible options for such a system, both at sub-regional and national levels.
- UNCTAD provided relevant officials in Barbados with the basic information on INFOSHARE and the possibility of its use as a national MIS.
- The activity is completed. The CARICOM Secretariat would have to formulate a further strategy in the area and contact UNCTAD for a possible future technical cooperation project.

In Central African region, UNCTAD completed or has implemented the following activity.

- « 2.CEN.C01 - Information systems on Prices and Market Intelligence » (30,000 EUR):
  - The objective of the activity is: Access to and use of markets, production factors and services is improved through market information systems in the coffee and cocoa sector in Cameroun.
  - Two database administrators (DBA) from Cameroun were trained in Geneva in February 2011. This training covered all planned activities under this sub-project.
  - The approach of the activity was based on strengthening local capacities, in particular through a strong partnership with the National Coffee and Cocoa Office (ONCC).

UNCTAD also support the consolidation of Sustainability Claims Portal (SCP) consolidation in ACP countries. Due to delays encountered throughout the project and the regional SCP launches, the proposed consolidation of the portal has had to be postponed. Information collected from participants at the Caribbean and Francophone launches have contributed to the development of the portal. Objectives are:

- Improved market information and transparency, reduction of asymmetry of information, enhanced access to market information and analysis, and thus improvement of market efficiency.
- Stakeholders have easy access to strategic, accurate, up-dated, specific and structured information.

*Source: UNCTAD, Draft 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011, 22 July 2011*

Under the All ACP programme, the World Bank supported the prevention of seed cotton contamination in West Africa (2.WST.D01 - Prevention of seed cotton contamination in West Africa). Budget: \$109,770.74 out of \$505,400 has been disbursed to date (30 June 2011)

This activity, conducted jointly with CFC, aims at tackling the issue of (seed) cotton contamination through the development of improved harvesting techniques and other value chain improvements. WB-SDN has opted to concentrate on the institutional issues that the introduction of a differentiated 'clean' cotton stream will pose namely: (i) incorporate a 'non contamination' element in the specifications contractually describing seed cotton both at national and regional (WAEMU) levels; (ii) sensitize the ginners of the emergence of a 'clean' cotton stream and obtain their cooperation in marketing it separately, in order to obtain a premium to be shared fairly between growers and ginners.

It should be recalled that WB-SDN opted for a two pronged approach to implement activities (i) recruitment of an international consultant to take the overall charge of this activity and in particular oversee the technical work to be performed by the African Cotton Association (ACA), and (ii) recruit ACA to conduct needed technical work within its specialized commissions, in particular the 'Quality and Metrology' Commission. In the period under review, two major meetings were organized by the African Cotton Association and funded by AAACP:

On February 1-2 a 25 people meeting was organized in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) to discuss methodological and strategic issues to achieve the above objectives, and take a formal stance on the



relevance of devising a ‘quality charter’ to be used by cotton producer organizations and ginners throughout the Region. The idea is that this ‘Quality Charter’ would describe the various steps to be taken at various levels of the value chain to ensure that the better quality of seed cotton resulting from improved harvesting techniques (aiming at collecting contamination-free seed cotton at village level) is maintained throughout the supply chain to the ginneries. The plan is that this Quality Charter would be first discussed at national level (ACA bringing together members from the various WAEMU cotton producing countries), and then become adopted both at national level and at WAEMU level. This meeting brought together representatives of both ACA and AProCA (Association des Producteurs de Coton Africain) and formally constituted the ‘Regional Committee to fight Cotton Seed Contamination’. UEMOA representatives in charge of the cotton subsector also participated in the meeting.

On April 14-16, 2011, took place in Abomey Calavi (Benin) the first meeting of this newly constituted Regional Committee which brought together eight key members from three of ACA’s technical commissions: ‘production’, ‘marketing’ and ‘quality-metrology’. This meeting devised the work program that the eight members would achieve in the period until the next Regional Committee meeting scheduled for August. A detailed report on the workshop proceedings is available.

The World Bank also completed the activity “2.WST.D03 - Continuation of fruit fly control campaign (Regional)”. *Pour memoire*, it is recalled that the WB-SDN part of this activity was completed in September 2010, and that the WTO-STDF-financed part of it then kicked in seamlessly to ensure continuation of the program till the end of March 2011 as planned. This latest exercise also takes into account citrus productions in a series of pilot orchards in the main citrus growing agro-ecological zones in the region. A final report on WAFFI III implementation and achievements was issued upon completion of the contract, in April 2011.

*Source: WB-Sustainable Development Network (WB-SDN), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 28 July 2011*

FAO has supported the market linkage between buyers and farmers under the All ACP programme. Details are provided below:

*1.PAC.A11 - Consultation, preparation and finalization of action plans that improve farmer-buyer linkages for the fruit and vegetable sector in Vanuatu, Samoa and Fiji.*

Objective of the activity: Identify activities that will improve the market linkage between producers and buyers in the fruit and vegetable sector in Vanuatu, Samoa and Fiji.

From consultation mission that took place in the region in 2008, the following stakeholders and service providers were identified to partner with FAO on the implementation of activities under 1.PAC.12; the Samoan Farmers Association (SFA) in Samoa and Nature’s Way Cooperative (NWC) in Fiji. Following a review of the activities and the outcome of the MTR, Farm Support Association (FSA) in Vanuatu and Kastom Gaden Association (KGA) in the Solomon Islands have been invited to participate. The Melanesian Farmers First Network has been approached to partner in the regional coordination.

*1.PAC.A12 - Implementation of action plans and activities that improve farmer-buyer linkages for the fruit and vegetables sector in Vanuatu, Samoa and Fiji.*

Objective of the activity:

To improve farmer-buyer linkages for the fruit and vegetables sector in Vanuatu, Samoa, Fiji and the Solomon Islands

To enable the participation of fruit and vegetable dependent smallholders to participate in sector strategies and engage more profitably in national and export markets, FAO has been working in the target countries with the Farmer Organizations and Cooperatives named in PAC.11. An Inclusive Business Model approach has been developed to enable FO’s to appraise how they are doing or not doing business,

interact with buyers and agro-processors, and identify upgrading strategies to improve market linkages. To-date all of the partners named have developed descriptions of their business model and developed upgrading strategies which are being currently implemented under the AAACP.

In Samoa, activities implemented are a direct response to priorities highlighted in the ITC Fruit and Vegetable Sector Strategy, (result are 3 points 7 to 11) which will be continued under Activity 2.PAC.A01. Fiji was the first country to begin implementation using this approach under the AAACP, however, due to political problems, it was not possible to follow-up on activities.

Outputs, results and main lessons: All reports and training materials were submitted to FAO, Contracts were developed to support the implementation of activities.

FAO has supported the capacity building of producers' organisations with regard to marketing aspects; through:

1.CAR.A03 - Workshop to strengthen the capacity of producer organisations

Objective of the activity: To strengthen the capacity of Farmers' Organisations to coordinate marketing activities and improve the supply of roots and tubers to national and export markets.

- In collaboration with CTA, CaFAN conducted a members' survey to obtain more information on key crops grown and marketed, profiles of members and key challenges.
- A project proposal was developed to strengthen CaFAN's capacity to coordinate production and marketing activities.
- Resources were leveraged to implement a second marketing and production coordination workshop.
- On-going field testing of farm data by CaFAN and ECTAD, St Vincent before circulating to members.
- Regular training sessions on record keeping, farm database management and marketing for CaFAN staff.
- Newsletter prepared and distributed to members and regional stakeholders.
- Preparations for the final lesson leaning workshop September 2011

2.CAR.A01 - Support to Caribbean farmers and farmer organisations in R&T VC

Objective of the activity

To strengthen the capacity of CaFAN member organisation in agribusiness and provision of professional market oriented support services to its members.

This activity is closely related to 1.CAR.A03 and ensures that activities started in support of strengthening the agribusiness capacities of farmers' organisations and the coordination of supply of roots and tubers to market continues under Phase 2 of the EU AAACP. The work is being coordinated through the Caribbean Farmers Network (CaFAN) and includes support to the coordination and implementation of national level activities, representing members at regional events and facilitation work to access new markets.

1.CEN.A03 - Regional workshops for capacity strengthening of producer organisations

Objective of the activity: To strengthen the capacity of farmer organizations to respond to trends in agriculture markets.

1.WST.A07 - Support farmer groups on production and marketing of sustainable horticulture produce (Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal)

Objective of the activity: Increase smallholder farmers' income and market access by supporting production and promotion of safe and sustainably-produced vegetables in local and regional markets.

Based on a study on market opportunities for vegetables produced according to IPPM, a strategy and action plan were developed in 2009 in the 3 countries. Pilot zones were selected for support. A Farmer Training Toolbox was developed in 2009 on marketing, safety and quality of horticulture production. Trainers from Farmer organisations and technical support institutions were trained. Training of farmers

	<p>took place during the horticulture growing seasons 2009-2010 and 2010-2011. At the regional training of trainers held in October 2010 in Thiès, Senegal, the master facilitators for the 2010-2011 season were trained.</p> <p><i>1.ESA.A04 - Regional workshops for capacity strengthening of producer organisations</i> Objective of the activity: To strengthen the capacity of producer organizations to respond to trends in agricultural markets.</p> <p><i>1.ESA.A12 - Facilitate market linkages between organic cotton producers and the fashion industry (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda)</i> Objective of the activity: In collaboration with UNCTAD, FAO will facilitate market linkages between organic cotton producers and the fashion industry on the basis of existing experiences and stakeholder inputs. Hereby greater awareness of organic cotton as a diversification and as a value added crop will be created, with the objective that this concludes in an increase of the market share of organic cotton in the region.</p> <p><i>Source: FAO, 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, July 2011</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP's final evaluation report states that one of the PIP's components was the "Information and Communication Component", set up to "enable ACP (and EU) firms to be informed of demands of the European market in terms of quality, and the efforts made by the ACP producers and exporters". It also provided the information on means to comply with these market requirements. According to the evaluation survey, more than 80% of the beneficiaries (who answered the survey) considered the information tools of the PIP to be useful and satisfactory. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 21, 35 &amp; 81.</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>Sugar mills and their professional organisations are well informed on market developments.</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Quelques interventions ont contribué à améliorer les informations sur les marchés et les conseils aux organisations de producteurs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière. Des opportunités de marché ont été étudiées conduisant à retenir le sésame, le soja et l'Hibiscus comme cultures à intégrer avec le coton dans le système de rotation. Une information et formation régulières sont également données aux producteurs sur des aspects liés aux prix des productions bio et à leur qualité requise par le marché.</li> <li>▪ Programme tous ACP : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CCI/ITC- développement de la chaîne de valeur orientée vers le marché (meilleure connaissance des marchés d'exportations et de la demande finale à travers des missions d'échange-formation privilégiant la coopération Sud-Sud (ex. Thaïlande, Chine, Inde, Turquie... ) dont certaines ont inclus des représentants de la filière cotonnière du BF.</li> <li>- CFC-Projet de prévention de la contamination de coton graine en Afrique de l'Ouest : Une visite au BF de filateurs du Vietnam et du Bangladesh a été organisée en 2011 pour échanger avec des représentants des producteurs et sociétés cotonnières du BF sur les demandes de la filature en termes de non contamination.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Cependant, l'impact de ces améliorations est difficile à évaluer/quantifier, notamment en termes d'augmentation de ventes de coton (quantité, prix). Les interventions du Programme tous ACP ont un impact potentiel plus important bien que leur portée relative reste assez limitée que pour avoir des impacts significatifs à grande échelle. De plus, les interventions sont trop récentes pour évaluer des impacts. Par ailleurs, il faut également noter que le financement direct des activités du Programme tous ACP se termine au plus tard fin décembre 2011, de même, en principe que pour le Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière.</p>

	<i>Source : Rapport narratif 2009 du Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques ; CFC et CCI/ITC, 6 monthly progress report : 1july-31 December 2010.</i>
<b>BF</b>	Selon l'évaluation de la stratégie pays de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, la CE a financé le Plan d'Action pour l'Organisation du Secteur Agricole (PAOSA). Cette intervention a cependant été lancée en 1999, mais a duré jusqu'en 2007. Ses résultats sont mitigés. <i>Source : Evaluation de la stratégie pays de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, 2010, page 69</i>
<b>CI</b>	Oui. Dans le cadre du PIN 10ème FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. Les projets, de divers niveaux financiers, ciblent plusieurs secteurs : Education, huit (8) filières (coton, café, cacao, riz, ananas, bananes, palmier et hévéa), Organisations professionnelles Agricoles (transversal et sectoriel), Foncier Rural, Sécurité sanitaire (Autorité compétente et OTA), Infrastructures rurales et appuis institutionnels. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	In Cameroon, the PACCIC programme (Programme d'Appui au Conseil Interprofessionnel Café-Cacao) had an activity on improving market information, by providing daily market prices in different regions of Cameroon for producers. The information is sent to them by text message on cellular phones. The same programme also provided information to have grouped supply and to inform buyers. The AAACP is building on this experience to study the possibility of developing the market information system to other commodities and provide more information, both qualitative (standards, list of exporters, list of warehouses, agencies for credit...) and quantitative (price, costs, interest rates...) information. <i>Source : MN 913 ; AAACP action fiches</i> Projets séchoirs cacao (1997-2005) Mounjo Nkam – installation de 2500 séchoirs de cacao (couvrant 20% de la production régionale) pour remédier au goût fumé des fèves et lever la contrainte de cette décote du produits camerounais.
<b>CR</b>	Yes, under the 8th EDF support was provided for both broadening and consolidating the regional initiatives under the 7th EDF and included, among others, a major programme to enhance the competitiveness of the rum sector by making it export-oriented in the segment of branded products. The components include: (1) institutional capacity building to WISPA, (2) marketing and distribution strategies; and (3) plant modernisation and meeting of environmental needs. In general, the Commission's strategy has promoted integration in supporting the export capacity and the institutional settings in charge of increasing competitiveness and market access, in developing infrastructure of regional interest and in supporting human resource development to strengthen the regional institutional capacity, cohesion and identity. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>GH</b>	Normally the IITA, which is executing agency for one of the components of CSSP II, would have looked at these marketing aspects but in Ghana the internal marketing is tightly controlled and the external market is done by Cocobod, a state monopoly. There is thus no scope to investigate these issues further. 'In Ghana, we don't work with marketing innovations since the State owns it. There is no fool-proof method, but so far, no other system has the same quality and resilience as the Ghana nationalised cocoa system.' This has been confirmed by several stakeholders: the state monopoly is the best system working in Africa. <i>Source: MN131, MN 911, MN 140</i>
<b>MG</b>	Le programme Stabex a constitué un des rares et importants efforts significatifs d'investissement publics à Madagascar pour la relance des secteurs des cultures de rente en collaboration directe avec les producteurs et exportateurs. Le concept « filière » a été développé avec succès pour la vanille, le café et le litchi. Il a permis l'émergence ou le renforcement des organisations professionnelles, le développement et la diffusion de techniques pour débloquer les principaux goulots d'étranglement relatifs à la production, à la

transformation et à la mise en marché, et/ou lorsque le potentiel existait, la standardisation des produits et le contrôle de la qualité, la promotion du label d'origine Madagascar, et si nécessaire des appuis pour des révisions réglementaires ou légales à Madagascar et dans l'UE. Source : Cadre d'Obligations Mutuelles 1996-1999

Les différentes industries — du cacao, du café, du girofle, du poivre et de la vanille — à Madagascar, ne sont que très faiblement structurées. Une 'appropriation' des objectifs et résultats du programme STABEX, ou des recommandations de l'assistance technique d'appui, ne peut donc être le fait que de structures fugaces, comme les projets, ou de structures qui ne sont pas directement concernées—i.e., directement 'intéressées'—par les améliorations recherchées: celles de l'Etat malgache.

*Source : Assistance Technique à la mise en œuvre du programme d'intensification et de structuration des principales filières d'exportation de produits agricoles à Madagascar, Rapport final*

La Commission a financé sur fonds Stabex une étude dont l'objectif global était de proposer les modalités pratiques d'organisation à l'échelle régionale de marchés (bourses) pour les principaux produits agricoles d'exportation prenant en compte notamment les normes sanitaires, réglementaires, voire commerciales exigées par les clients finaux.

L'objectif spécifique de l'étude était de préparer les lignes directrices d'un appel à propositions pour les organisations à but non lucratif éligibles (ONG, organisations professionnelles, collectivités locales) afin d'appuyer les producteurs et organisations de producteurs dans l'organisation de leurs filières.

*Source : Commission Européenne, Organisation des marchés (bourses) de produits agricoles des principales filières d'exportation à Madagascar, rapport final, juin 2009*

De 2001 à 2005, Le Groupement des Exportateurs de la Sava (GES) puis le CTHT avaient mis en place un dispositif de suivi de la floraison capable de fournir des estimations sur le potentiel de récolte de l'année suivante mais ce dispositif n'a pu être pérennisé. Depuis, la diffusion de prévisions par des acteurs fortement impliqués dans les échanges peut être un moyen de chercher à influencer sur le marché.

*Source : Délégation de l'UE à Madagascar, Note filière Vanille*

Les objectifs spécifiques du projet AFAKA, portant sur 7 communes du district de Mahanoro et 10 communes du district de Vatomaniry, consistaient dans la mise en place d'un modèle de commercialisation, des structures sociales et la mise à disposition des compétences techniques (éprouvés) permettant la relance de trois filières d'exportation : café, girofle, poivre.

Les résultats attendus étaient :

Résultat 1 : Un système de production de jeunes plants, de diffusion de technique de production

Résultat 2 : Une démarche de planification de l'extension de surfaces plantées en culture de rente

Résultat 3 : Un processus d'amélioration de la qualité des produits mis sur le marché

Résultat 4 : Un modèle d'organisation de marché assurant la concurrence, la transparence et l'équité

L'évaluation conclut que la durée de vie de 29 mois du projet ne lui permettait pas d'atteindre ces résultats.

Par contre, le projet a pu mettre en place une base solide pour une future augmentation de la production de girofle, café, poivre notamment en termes de quantité et qualité :

- L'existence d'un système de fournitures de matériels végétal, à travers les pépinières privées villageois qui est tirés par la présence d'une demande des jeunes plants par les autres producteurs
- L'existence d'un système de vulgarisation « Paysan à Paysan » à travers des Paysans Leaders motivés disposant de connaissances nécessaires en matière de techniques culturales et techniques d'encadrement.
- La structuration des producteurs en OPC en matière de commercialisation mais qui se trouve encore au stade de démarrage
- La gouvernance des 3 filières par les communes en matière de plan d'extension des futures plantations de café, de girofle et de poivre.
- Les marchés organisés permettant la réalisation de transactions commerciales transparente mais qui ne traitent qu'une très faible fraction de la production totale de la zone couverte par le projet.

*Source : Projet AFAKA Mahanoro-Vatomaniry, Mission d'évaluation finale*

Le projet SOAVA, financé sur fonds Stabex et mis en œuvre par l'ONG Association Intercoopération Madagascar (AIM) couvrait 14 Communes du district de Mananara Nord et environ 16.200 petits

agriculteurs familiaux pratiquant des cultures d'exportation (vanille girofle, café) en complément de cultures vivrières.

Les résultats attendus du projet étaient les suivants :

- Résultat 1 : La productivité des facteurs de production des ménages ruraux est augmentée de manière durable ;
- Résultat 2 : Les produits répondent aux normes de qualité des marchés nationaux et internationaux ;
- Résultat 3 : Les marchés intérieurs des produits d'exportation fonctionnent de manière concurrentielle et au bénéfice des producteurs ;
- Résultat 4 : De nouveaux marchés de niche sont identifiés et exploités.

AIM a adopté comme approche de mise en œuvre de ces deux projets la collaboration et l'interaction entre les trois pôles d'acteurs de ces filières d'exportation : (i) les producteurs à la base, (ii) les collecteurs locaux en contact direct avec les producteurs et (iii) les autorités locales responsables de la mise en place d'un cadre favorable.

Selon l'évaluation finale du projet, les résultats suivants ont été obtenus :

Résultat 1 : Productivité des facteurs de production

- Des intrants de qualité ont été mis à la disposition des producteurs (établissement de pépiniéristes, production de plants de girofliers)
- Les techniques culturales ont été améliorées
- Les terroirs communaux sont mieux exploités (plantations d'acacias et eucalyptus)

Résultat 2 : Les produits répondant aux normes de qualité des marchés nationaux et internationaux

- Regroupement des producteurs professionnels
- Application des techniques de post récolte
- Mise en place des alambics modernes
- Mise en fonctionnement de service de contrôle (poinçonnage des plants de vanille)

Résultat 3 : marchés intérieurs des produits d'exportation

- 13 marchés organisés ont été établis et sont fonctionnels. 20% de la production totale de vanille dans le District est écoulée sur ces marchés. Sur 88 collecteurs recensés, 29 ont participé à une formation sur la qualité des produits de rente et sont en possession de cartes professionnelles. Mais pour le girofle et le café, les pourcentages des produits vendus sur les marchés communaux par rapport aux productions totales sont très faibles et représentent respectivement 0,1% et 8%.
- Mise en œuvre d'un système d'information de marché (SIM) en collaboration avec PPRR (projet FIDA)
- Capitalisation des expériences (visite-échange avec un autre projet)
- Appui aux Communes sur la bonne Gouvernance

Résultat 4 : Marchés de niche

Les groupements producteurs d'huile essentielle de girofle sont entrés en relations commerciales avec l'entreprise suisse Givaudan, qui est engagée dans une démarche d'approvisionnement à la source, et de rémunération équitable des produits

*L'évaluation conclut que l'approche multi-acteurs : collaboration pratique entre producteurs, autorités locales et secteur privé pour développer les filières girofle et vanille, initiée et développée par AIM témoigne de l'efficacité du projet traduite par les premiers effets positifs constatés et ce, malgré le temps imparti très limité pour assurer la durabilité des acquis et des effets.*

*Source : Evaluation finale du projet SOAVA*

Au terme des 15 premiers mois de mise en œuvre du programme Stabex en appui à l'intensification de la production et la structuration des filières (sur une durée totale de 27 mois), une trentaine de marchés physiques ont pu être mis en place et ont offert des services de contrôle de l'humidité, certification, pesée,.... Toutefois, les volumes des produits transitant ces marchés sont encore faibles : 193 tonnes de café, 29 tonnes de girofle et 3,4 tonnes de vanille, pour la campagne 2009/2010, avec des prix fixés en fonction de la qualité ou de la catégorie de produit. Aucun marché de la vanille préparée n'a pu être organisé dans les districts d'Antalaha et Sambava car la fixation d'un prix plancher par l'Etat a eu l'effet contraire à celui attendu (perte de compétitivité des exportations malgaches par rapport aux pays

	<p>concurrents et démotivation des producteurs face à la mévente de la vanille). A cela s'ajoute, dans certaines communes, la non implication des responsables communaux, notamment pour l'adoption des réglementations concernant la commercialisation des produits sur les marchés créés compte tenu du contexte sociopolitique. <i>Source : Rapport Stabex 2009</i></p> <p>Pour l'année 2007, l'UE a apporté son appui au Forum National de Développement et de Politique Commerciale et les autres acteurs tels que les organisations du secteur privé, de la société civile dans le cadre du processus de négociation des Accords de Partenariat Economique ainsi qu'à la mise en place et à l'opérationnalité d'un dispositif de normalisation/qualité des principaux produits d'exportation, offrant des garanties aux exigences du marché. <i>Source : Rapport annuel Stabex 2007</i></p> <p>Concernant la filière café, le programme d'appui à cette filière, mis en œuvre par le Comité National de Commercialisation de Café (CNCC), est recentré sur l'appui à l'amélioration du potentiel de production et au renforcement des capacités des acteurs, pour l'amélioration de la qualité dans un contexte de production tournée vers le marché, notamment la valorisation du café de qualité issu d'un système de production et de commercialisation normalisé. <i>Source : Rapport annuel Stabex 2006</i></p> <p>Dans le cadre du programme d'intensification et de structuration des filières principales, le Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave (CTHT) continue à produire et à diffuser du matériel végétal de qualité aux opérateurs économiques et aux paysans. (...) Par ailleurs, le Centre continue d'améliorer la qualité des litchis exporté par Madagascar vers l'Europe en déterminant la date de l'ouverture de la campagne, en sensibilisant les paysans et les opérateurs aux exigences commerciales et réglementaires des marchés européens qui ne cessent d'évoluer et en évaluant la qualité commerciale et sanitaire des fruits pendant la période de chargement des bateaux conventionnels. En outre, les outils pédagogiques de formation pour la promotion des produits malgaches sont déjà disponibles au CTHT: DVD pour le litchi et les épices, CDRom pour le poivre, Posters sur les techniques culturales, et des manuels sur l'apiculture, ainsi que des fiches techniques sur la transformation et la conservation des produits. <i>Source : Rapport annuel Stabex 2006</i></p> <p>Ces dimensions ont été prises en compte à travers l'organisation de marché (avec pour objectif d'assurer aux exportateurs un approvisionnement de volumes significatifs en produits de qualité contrôlée) dans certaines interventions au niveau local dont celles d'AIM (Association Intercoopération Madagascar) financé sous Stabex avec 4 résultats : augmenter la production / améliorer la qualité des produits (en partant des semences) / organiser le marché local / développer la vanille bio. Les objectifs étaient les mêmes pour la vanille, le girofle et le café dans deux districts, l'un principalement vanille et l'autre girofle. Le café intéresse beaucoup moins les paysans de la région. (Source : MN 806).</p> <p>Néanmoins, ce projet AIM est une « exception » (qui par ailleurs est strictement locale et n'est pas répliquée dans d'autres zones) étant donné que la durabilité de tels projets est généralement « nulle » après l'arrêt des financements (Source : MN 802).</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The EC did not support Tanzania Coffee Board. However this Board plays key role in the filed of coffee quality and marketing. In fact, the Board carries out different activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Dealing with market regulation</li> <li>▪ Promoting the production</li> <li>▪ Promoting the coffee quality</li> </ul> <p>The Board is charged to advise the Government about what to do in terms of support. The marketing role is to set rules to advice marketing systems to benefit producers (win-win situation). The Board supervised coffee trade and observe and monitor the value chain (obstructions? What is happening?)</p> <p>The Board also deliver licences to traders and provide the platform to sell-buy coffee: it is the Moshi's auction. The Board verifies if Tanzanian coffee respect quality standards and the preparation of stocks to be traded on the international market. The Board monitor prices (cf. its website) on basis of the international markets (London). World market price is provided on Wednesday's and the Moshi's auction is held on Thursday's. The Board provide market information to producers through email and phone cells to allow them to decide to sell or not their production on the market. The Board make quality analysis of the coffee production samples and provide certificate for storage. There is a very strong demand for</p>

	<p>coffee but Tanzania can not address this demand. The coffee quality has increased since the last 10 years, notably due to the support of exporters. Around 15% of the products which pass through the auction has been certified (organic, UTZ, coffee practices, 4C certification, etc.). <i>Source: MN 658</i></p> <p>In Tanzania, the All ACP Programme through the CFC funded a cotton testing laboratory located under the Tanzania Bureau of Standards. This has been set up over the past four years, starting with training of staff, then acquisition of equipment and functional since 2010. The cotton testing laboratory is to serve Eastern and Southern African countries. The aim is to disseminate instrumental classification of cotton's strength, colours/ brightness, maturity, and length. The TBS has been trained and are now training people from other regions since knowledge about cotton quality is very poor and there is a need to see if cotton answers worldwide market requirements before being sold and for producers to know the quality of their cotton so they can get the price corresponding to the quality offered. Competences of trained staff within TBS are thus also transferred to other laboratories in East and West Africa: 2 trainings every year provided by TBS to each involved country (to lab technicians and lab managers); they have to send one lab assistant to be trained before coming back home. They can also go and train a group in country if need be. The TBS works in close partnership with the Cotton Board. Persons working in the laboratories are part of the Cotton Board. The TBS has not yet managed to make cotton testing mandatory at regional level but is considering an advertisement campaign to raise awareness about the necessity and benefits of testing. Samples of cotton are sent to the TBS by courier for rapid treatment before sale.</p> <p>CosCotton: Work with the ITC (International Trade Centre) to increase Tanzanian direct cotton exports (instead of through agents). Since 2006 there is a lot of training visits in India, Thailand, Taiwan, Senegal, etc. To visit the Ministers to expand the business. For the industry we are exposed to other countries (like India). Training helped to shape activities in Tanzania. After training, we have defined a new model to contract farming (between ginners and farmers) to support the farmers. It has been pilot tested and will now be extended. TZ cotton is discounted because of quality but now with contract farming the quality is improving and prices rise. <i>Source: MN656 and MN 649</i></p> <p>The availability of market information about tea prices and more specifically the costs entailed in the processing of tea is one of the major stumbling blocks for smallholder farmers who have to accept the low prices offered by tea factories and have no (or very little) say in the matter of pricing. The EU support has not taken this angle into account at all in its support so that there is an inherent contradiction in supporting research and training for a crop which price is not attractive to smallholders.</p> <p>Another failure of the support to the tea sector is the links with extension workers whereby the research does not translate well into technology transfer (seedlings are provided but there is no systematic follow-up in terms of extension work). <i>Sources: MN164, MN697, MN662, MN673</i></p>
UG	<p>EC project in support of the Uganda Commodity Exchange (UGE) and Warehouse receipt system. The purpose of the project was 'to improve the efficiency of the marketing of agricultural commodities for the benefit of Ugandan producers, traders, processors and end-users'. The project's two 'results' were intended to be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ An efficient, effective and properly regulated Warehouse Receipts System in place, based on a network of certified and well managed commercial warehouses;</li> <li>▪ Agricultural commodities are being traded through the Uganda Commodity Exchange at commercially sustainable volumes and values.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Final evaluation of EU support to the Uganda Commodities Exchange and Warehouse receipt system</i></p>
UG	<p>EC supported extension services through the the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture) implementation that aimed at strengthening the link between research and extension and at reinforcing the extension system. There is a price monitoring system called "Infofoodtrade" to disseminate information on markets by e-mail but this is not a EC project although EC delegation is encouraged by DEVCO to develop information systems on food prices (Source: MN 301).</p>
VU PACT-FACT	<p>The Farm Support Association (FSA) got some support from the FACT to strengthen capacities of extension services which helps farmers to grow vanilla. It allows strengthen capacities of field extension</p>



	<p>services at the level: 1) one session on production techniques and 2) one session on curing techniques. The trainings have been organised by the FSA. After receiving training field staff got back on the field to show techniques to farmers. As a result the quality and the quantity of the production have improved (cf. reports on FACT support to FSA). <i>Source: MN1098</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Le CL définit le résultat (R1) « Des opérateurs paysans professionnels ayant augmenté leur revenu grâce à une amélioration de la qualité de leur production et à une meilleure capacité de négociation lors de la commercialisation ». (R1.2.) Une commercialisation maîtrisée, des partenariats satisfaisants et durables 1.2.2. « Les OP possèdent une meilleure connaissance du mécanisme de fixation des prix et sont capables de mener des analyses simplifiées des chaînes de valeur » (<i>Source : CL</i>). Le CL définit également le résultat (R3) « Des micro-entreprises de conseil agricole pour dynamiser les filières anacarde et sésame » (<i>Source : CL</i>).</p> <p>R 3.1. Des agents de conseil spécialisés sur les filières anacarde et sésame R 3.2. Un conseil orienté vers les besoins des paysans et financé par les OP</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Selon le quatrième rapport annuel, l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » ne concerne pas les producteurs mais les unités de transformation des noix brutes en amandes. De ce point de vue, l'intervention a soutenu l'accès au label biologique et la conformité avec les normes de qualité européennes. Des formations ont été faites et des guides pratiques ont été élaborés pour faciliter le transfert de savoir, ainsi que des systèmes de contrôle interne. <i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Draft rapport année 4</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Outre ce qui est indiqué à l'indicateur I.4.2.1 concernant les conseils techniques et agricoles, peu de références sont faites à cet indicateur malgré que le « renforcement des organisations professionnelles agricoles » soit évoqué, notamment dans le secteur coton dans le cadre de l'activité « A.1.b Autres cultures paysannes d'exportation » (<i>Source : Rider FA p.7</i>)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>Une des activités concerne cet indicateur : réaliser des manuels didactiques qui a une thématique concernant les stratégies de commercialisation (<i>Source : Annexe I p13</i>)</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>L'un des résultats attendus du PASAPE concerne l'amélioration de la diffusion de l'information sur les principes de gestion de la qualité et les normes ISO 9000. « <i>Les opérateurs économiques et les consommateurs sont sensibilisés et l'information mise à leur disposition (séminaires de sensibilisation et diffusion de supports médiatiques)</i> ». Les ministères concernés sont ceux en charge de l'industrie, de l'élevage et de l'agriculture. Ce volet du projet est mis en œuvre par l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour le Développement Industriel (ONUDI). Il n'y a aucune information disponible à ce jour sur les résultats (pas de rapportage de l'ONUDI).</p> <p><i>Sources : Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007 ; Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010</i></p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The “Support to the competitiveness to the rice sector in the Caribbean” programme included a marketing component at regional level which aimed at (i) supporting market promotion and expansion (mainly in the Caribbean and in South America) by developing promotion campaigns and by organising and attending meetings, trade fairs, etc. and at (ii) disseminating rice marketing intelligence.</p> <p>The final evaluation noted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A design flaw in the sense that OVIs reflected marketing success (number of export contracts signed / exporters receiving information) qualified as unrealistic whereas the emphasis should have been put more on carrying out market and marketing studies;</li> <li>▪ Limited but useful impact in terms of awareness raising of the industry throughout the region.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, pages 15-16</i></p>

<b>CR-RUM</b>	An objective of the Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector was to strengthen the West Indies Rum and Spirit Producers Association (WIRSPA), and in particular to enhance its capacity to provide to its members market intelligence services.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>No explicit evidence for the information transmission to producer organizations/producers in consulted documents. Moreover, the MR 2008 underlined that associations and cooperatives of small producers and traders should be supported, if coffee is still to be used as an instrument for poverty reduction (<i>Source: MR 2008 p.3</i>): Nevertheless, three marketing functions had been decided to be supported by the Project (<i>Source: Completion report p.22</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The provision of computers and software for statistical work on coffee markets and coffee sales,</li> <li>▪ The supply of Ochratoxin analysis equipment,</li> <li>▪ The international promotion of Ethiopia's coffee.</li> </ul> <p>Following the Mid Term Review, the marketing subcommittee identified three major activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Domestic market improvement which included training on domestic marketing system;</li> <li>▪ Coffee quality, grading, certification and inspection, which included training of liquorers, purchase of OTA equipment and moisture testers.</li> <li>▪ Diversification in and intensification of the international market promotion of coffee including not only participation in exhibition and conferences, but financing coffee cupping competition, financing of coffee property right registration, establish national coffee websites etc.</li> </ul>
<b>GH-COC</b>	The Cocoa Sector Support Programme II does not aim at improving market information and no information on the subject can be found in the programme documents. According to the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financial Proposal, one of the activities of the programme is to strengthen service provision capacity of producer's organisations. But these services aim at providing input and credit services, not to give access to market information. <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Agreement, page 13.</i>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) does not provide services or input facilitation for producers. The programme doesn't focus on the individual producer level but on the laboratory or institutional levels. The specific objective of the intervention (facilitating more effective participation of African countries in the activities of International Standard Setting Organisations) should in term improve knowledge of market regulations in terms of Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards. <i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 15.</i>
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	No information retrieved. But it is important to remember that MG-FOOD is not commodity-oriented but food security-oriented.
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>This is one of the aims of the project of which activities 8, 9 and 10 cover:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) Facilitate development of post harvest quality assurance, processing and packaging and operators skills to increase SPS compliance, market access, shelf life and reduce bulk, increase durability and add value to increase the competitiveness of export products</li> <li>ii) In collaboration with government agencies, PITIC and trade gents, facilitate exports and support promotions of Pacific products</li> <li>iii) Provide ICT and training support in quality standards, post harvest processing, packaging, marketing, market access and compliance with SPS and Codex standards.</li> </ol> <p>The MR states: "The project delivered a significant amount of survey and analysis prior to the identification of the strategic needs of individual AGFOR enterprises and started delivering certain outputs to some of the enterprises it works with. These include economic and systems analysis of production, export and marketing requirements and design as well as the development of business plans for some of the enterprises and the provision of technical support as well as improvements to a smaller group. Outputs are judged to be responding directly to the needs of the enterprises.</p>

	<p>Improvements being implemented include improved silviculture and germplasma for a balsa wood exporter, equipment and technical advice for an exporter of organic spices, the provision of an axis press for more efficient production of virgin coconut oil, advice on post-harvest and processing improvements, etc. Other project outputs include providing various of the enterprises with information on Good Manufacturing Practices, help in developing Quality Assurance Management Systems, value chain and market studies, training in HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) practices in order to help the exporters become HACCP certified, etc. These outputs respond directly to needs of the enterprises, are highly appreciated by these and are very likely to contribute to the intended results.' <i>Source: FA, MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>According to the MTR (October 2008), main achievements of the programme were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ many researches have already been participating in formal and informal research networks, while the ICART programme has not yet established research networks according to research priorities for the SADC region;</li> <li>▪ all competitive research grant funds have been allocated to seven projects and regional research cooperation has been successfully promoted as all projects include several SADC Member States;</li> <li>▪ research projects did not demonstrate improved effectiveness and research is still more descriptive than analytical. So, these projects will bring a modest contribution to economic development of the region and its Member States;</li> <li>▪ much time has been devoted to design a strategy for the development of the information system, but this strategy is still only at a draft stage;</li> <li>▪ there were serious delays in the MSc programmes due to administrative problems of the participating universities but they are now working.</li> </ul> <p>To conclude, it seems very unlikely that any impact will be made neither during the life-time of the ICART programme, nor after the end of the programme at the end of 2010. As programme ownership is not strongly developed, the outlook to reach sustainability is bleak. Neither the SADC Secretariat nor the National Agricultural Research Institutes (NARS) will be able and willing to sustain the programme activities and results. The "new" original initiative MAPP did not show a strong interest in the results of the programme. <i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, page 10</i></p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Le projet, a réussi le processus de certification AB et CE, appui à l'accès aux marchés correspondants, mise en place d'infrastructures (2 unités de transformation d'anacardes); Programme d'optimisation de la fertilité (stabulation); crédit d'équipement; renforcement des organisations. <i>Source: MR</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>As underlined by the Final External Evaluation, the SRM project was the continuation of the Rural Markets Development Project (RMDP) used as a model for supporting rural marketing through construction of market centres with various services and a marketing unit that facilitates the dissemination of Market Information System (MIS). The overall objectives of the Support project to strengthen commercial capacities of agricultural producers in Tanzania (SRM project) are to improve the marketing conditions of agricultural products in Tanzania and thereby to increase and secure farmers income.</p> <p>The SRM project supports the rural markets development, the development of management skills for four market boards which should ultimately lead to them being autonomous, construction of two new half bulk rural markets (Mkata and Ingagala markets), building up of strong farmers' groups and develop sustainable marketing links, the creation of a market information centre and promotion of Tanzanian agricultural products.</p> <p>The Final External Evaluation noted that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The project successfully achieved the establishment of the two new rural markets and consolidated activities of the previous project in that field (RMDP) in supporting markets;</li> <li>▪ Services offered by the project and the supported markets to farmers were not comprehensive enough to address the marketing conditions;</li> <li>▪ Some critical services were lacking: financial services, productivity related services, market focus production, market linkages, transportation, packaging and added value;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Capacities of most marketing boards and executives are still weak and require substantial additional support. The advisory committee structure and composition is still ineffective and its mandate and added value needs deeper conceptualisation.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: Project &amp; Monitoring reports, 2006 and Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, Appendix 2</i></p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	The ultimate objective of the project is conclusion of a buying arrangement between the UTZ certified coffee growers and a coffee company (Ibero Uganda). Being UTZ certified should allow the farmers to be paid a higher price for their coffee deliveries.
<b>VU-POP</b>	The Revolving Credit Fund (RCF) established by the project supported research as well as training, effective extension services, market support and market information. The RCF is considered to have played a central role for smallholders. However, interest in continuing the RCF beyond the programme seems low. <i>Source: Producers Organisation Project II Monitoring report 3, effectiveness and sustainability sheets.</i>
<b>BAN</b>	There are references among the objectives to increase services and market information for producers, but there are no details of proof of such results in the SFA impact evaluation. Yet the SFA impact evaluation report states that in the competitiveness-oriented countries, the SFA helped the banana sector align to market requirements and EU environmental standards and policies, as well as compliance to label requirements. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 31 &amp; 36, htspe, 2008.</i> <i>Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country Reports, page 414, htspe, 2008.</i>
<b>I.4.3.2</b>	Commission supported interventions contributed to an increased number of producers/ producer organisations having direct contracts with supermarket chains and/or are certified with a label
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Under the All ACP Programme, the World Bank has supported label certification process in Rwanda and in Burundi for horticultural products, through the activity: “2.ESA.D01 - Support to horticulture industry in Rwanda and Burundi”. Budget: \$45,511 out of \$226,100 has been disbursed to date (30 June 2011).</p> <p>It is recalled that, in close consultation with the National Agriculture Export Board, NAEB (which absorbed the activities of former RHODA as of June 1, 2011), it was decided to use the AAACP allocation to finance GlobalGap certification of up to 30 horticulture producer groups in Rwanda. Due to the limited funding available and uncertainties concerning the situation in Burundi, it was decided to concentrate this activity on the Rwandese horticulture sub-sector.</p> <p>As per previous report, a new tender was held that led to the competitive selection of the Kenyan certification company Africert Ltd. An inception video-conference bringing together RHODA Africert and WB-SDN was held on February 22 to kick start the activity. In the month of March, Africert conducted a preliminary visit to Rwanda which revealed that RHODA-designated farmer groups were in fact not ready for certification, and that more training was required before Africert could move forward with the certification procedure. In June, a mission to Rwanda, together with Africert’s managing Director helped better understand the issues at stake and the difficulties faced by RHODA/NAEB. Africert agreed to support the Rwandans with technical advice to define training needs faced by selected farmer groups. Additional training will be contracted by NAEB before Africert returns to Rwanda to effect the GlobalGap certification of those farmer groups that will be deemed ready for it. It is hoped that certification can begin in the last quarter of 2011, and completed in the first quarter of 2012.</p> <p><i>Source: WB-Sustainable Development Network (WB-SDN), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 28 July 2011</i></p> <p>Under the All ACP programme, the CFC has supported the label certification in the coffee sector (2.ESA.F02):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Training of master trainers completed in May 2011. A total of thirty-nine (39) master trainers from nine (9) countries were trained. The training manual posted on the EAFCA website under the CFC/ICO web page (<a href="http://www.eafca.org">www.eafca.org</a>).</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ MoUs have been signed with the responsible coffee development institutions in all 9 participating countries, and activities are now implemented in all countries with full Government endorsement and support;</li> <li>▪ The project baseline surveys have been concluded in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Uganda and Burundi. Surveys are on-going in the rest of the participating countries: Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda;</li> <li>▪ Project activities were presented at the 8th African Fine Coffee Conference and Exhibition (8th AFCC&amp;E) held in Arusha, Tanzania, from 17th to 19th February. Other promotional activities were undertaken at the ISEAL2011 Conference in Zurich, Switzerland and at the Specialty Coffee Association of Europe (SCAE) held in Maastricht, Netherlands from 22nd to 24th June 2011. The project activities will also be showcased at the Speciality Coffee Association of Japan (SCAJ) in September 2011. The participation at these events is tailored to provide significant visibility to the activities of the project. The information on the project is reported regularly on the website of EAFCA.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Common Fund For Commodities (CFC), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 27 July 2011</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Les interventions (PAFFIC, Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols et celles du Programme tous ACP) ont débuté à partir de 2008, et pour certaines 2010- début 2011. Elles ont pris place dans un contexte de crise financière très profonde que la filière cotonnière du BF a vécu de 2005 et 2009. Ainsi, entre 2006 et 2010, la production de coton a chuté de plus de 50% s'accompagnant d'une diminution importante (au moins 25-30%) du nombre de producteurs</p> <p>Ce contexte a certainement favorisé l'engouement relatif pour le coton bio-équitable qui proposait un prix au producteur jugé attractif car le différentiel avec le prix du coton conventionnel était substantiel. Ainsi, 2 ans après le début de ses activités, le programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnières comptait près de 8000 producteurs. En termes de marché, ce type de production est basé sur des contacts plus directs entre demandeurs finaux (firmes/marques du textile/habillement) et producteurs. Cependant, favorisé par la crise financière et économique mondiale qui a débuté en 2008, le coton bio-équitable du BF a été confronté à une contraction de la demande telle qu'elle a conduit à une mévente d'une partie de la production de 2009/10.</p> <p>Les appuis du Programme tous ACP :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ CCI/ITC- développement de la chaîne de valeur orientée vers le marché favorise des contacts directs entre acheteurs et vendeurs.</li> <li>▪ CFC-Projet de prévention de la contamination de coton graine en Afrique de l'Ouest : Une visite au BF de filateurs du Vietnam et du Bangladesh a été organisée en 2011 pour échanger avec des représentants des producteurs et sociétés cotonnières du BF sur les demandes de la filature en termes de non contamination.</li> </ul> <p>D'une manière générale, les interventions sont trop récentes pour évaluer des impacts en termes d'accroissement du nombre de producteurs/organisations ayant des contacts directs avec des utilisateurs/consommateurs des principaux marchés du sud. Par ailleurs, il faut également noter, d'une part, la portée relative assez limitée des appuis que pour avoir des impacts significatifs à ce sujet et, d'autre part, que le financement direct des activités du Programme tous ACP se termine au plus tard fin décembre 2011. <i>Source : Rapport narratif 2009 du Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques ; CCI/ITC et CFC, 6 monthly progress report : 1july-31 December 2010 ; Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2011. MN 510</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Il semblerait que ce soit le cas sur base documentaire notamment en termes de mise en marché des produits et de création d'un environnement propice tout en renforçant la capacité des OPA. Dans le cadre du PIN 10ème FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise</p>

	<p>en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>It is part of the future strategy for Cameroon's banana sector to access labelling for the country's production. Although organic production is considered to be impossible, the country might aim for a national or fairtrade or other label in the future. <i>Source : MN 995</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>There are no groups as yet which have certification or labellisation. The MTE notes that <i>'Driven by social, environmental, and health consciousness in OECD countries, fair trade, social support, and traceability are being increasingly promoted by some of Ghana's major cocoa sector stakeholders. The farmer-owned cocoa buying organisation, Kuapa Kokoo, was Fairtrade-certified in 1995 and now sells 27% of its purchases from 50,000 farmers under the FT label. In April 2009 Rainforest Alliance (RA) and Mars launched their RA certification programme. In December 2009, Cocoa Abrabopa became UTZ-certified. In August 2010, the Cadbury Cocoa Partnership (CCP) announced that 10 farmer organisations are being targeted for FT certification.'</i> (page 14, MTE 2011).</p> <p>It continues to recommend that FOs which were promoted under the CSSP II should move towards labellisation and certification with a view to sustain the FOs in the longer term. <i>'Continued strengthening of FOs beyond the LOP would be best assured by migrating the CSSP II -fostered FOs as candidates for inclusion in certification programmes. The reason: the primary motivating factor which holds a FO together and justifies its value to members is receipt of price and social premiums for "best practice" behaviour. Such systems give integrated supply chain product protocols market-led legitimacy. They become FO raison d'être and engender longer-term commitment to consistency and traceability by individuals and groups. IITA, through the SCTP-2 NSC, should establish contact with certification organisers such as the Rainforest Alliance (RA)/Mars initiative, Kuapa Kokoo, Cocoa Abrabopa and the Cadbury Cocoa Partnership (CCP), to explore assimilation prospects and options for CSSP II-assisted communities.'</i> The objective would be to align the 56 communities with an interested certification agent like Kuapa Kokoo and to bring them into the Certification fold. <i>Source: Mid Term Evaluation CSSPII, 2011.</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui dans un cas (projet AIM-Stabex): une partie des activités du projet initié par Stabex et l'animateur local continuent sur financement d'une entreprise suisse d'huiles essentielles (Givaudan). (Source : MN 814). La labellisation n'est pas encore possible dans le cas du projet Stabex compte tenu du niveau technique des producteurs mais l'entreprise suisse (Givaudan) offre un prix supérieur pour les huiles essentielles. (Source : MN 806). Néanmoins, ce projet AIM est une « exception » (qui par ailleurs est strictement locale et n'est pas répliquée dans d'autres zones) étant donné que la durabilité de tels projets est généralement « nulle » après l'arrêt des financements (Source : MN 802).</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>There is no evidence that the EC support has contributed to increase the number of producers' organisation. However, you need to have a minimum volume/ quantity to sell your coffee through the Moshi's auction. That is why producers are organised in cooperatives. The majority of the producers are organised in cooperatives. <i>Source: MN 677</i></p> <p>There is no evidence that the EC support has contributed to increase the number of producers' organisation. However, one success story to tea small farmers through TRIT assistance: Rungwe. Also in Mufindi, Mkongwe block farm where the smallholders have transformed into a commercial entity. Also in terms of transport of tea: small farmers can bring their tea production to factories. <i>Source: MN 623</i></p> <p>In the smallholder tea growers association near the research centre which benefited from an initial endowment of 300,000 tea seedlings to set up a nursery, the association's members claim that there has been:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increase the number of association members who produce tea in the region (from initial 174 to 590 now)</li> <li>▪ Increase the tea production (from 856,829 to over 2,1 million in 2010)</li> <li>▪ Increase the productivity</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: MN 164</i></p>

<b>UG</b>	Through the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project the EC supported by Stabex, farmer organizations which enhanced the capacity of the coffee sector to meet the market requirements in terms of quality and quantity were established at village, parish and national levels. Indeed, 24 Depot Committees (parish level) have been registered as Companies and carry out primary processing and deliver hulled green coffee directly to exporters in Kampala (Source: MN 308). Nevertheless, there is no evidence regarding direct contracts with supermarket chains and/or are certified with a label.
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	There is no evidence in the evaluation reports of an increased amount of label certification or contracts with supermarket chains among beneficiaries of the PIP. At first, the PIP favoured national quality controls, leading to national quality labels, but this approach did not correspond to regulations or to market requirements and was quickly abandoned. <i>Source: Mid-Term Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 25</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	Finding outlets for their production is a responsibility of sugar mills, which do not need any assistance in this respect. Some of them managed to get a “fair trade” premium for their sugar deliveries to the European market.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés. Le CL précise néanmoins les résultats suivants : ( <i>Source : CL</i> ) 2.2.1. Les marchés internationaux favorables aux petits producteurs sont identifiés et caractérisés (bio, équitable, réseau PME) 2.2.2. Les groupements sont capables de définir une stratégie de développement long terme, sont engagés dans des démarches de certifications et ont accès à des crédits et à de nouveaux marchés, notamment internationaux 2.2.3. La qualité maîtrisée des produits semi- finis (amandes de cajou, huile de sésame) est conforme aux exigences du marché visé La forte promotion de démarches de productions certifiées permettra la promotion des normes, codes de conduites et méthodes de productions contrôlées. ( <i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 29</i> ).
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Selon le cadre logique d'intervention de la « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde », 3 unités de production ont la double certification Flo-Bio et ont développé un partenariat avec <i>Ethiquable</i> pour l'exportation. <i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'intervention commenté</i>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	Deux des résultats attendus du PASAPE concernent le soutien à la certification et à la normalisation mais le secteur /type d'entreprises visé n'est pas précisé : « <i>Les entreprises camerounaises sont accompagnées à la certification (formations, séminaires, appui à la mise en place de système de management et de la qualité pour 13 entreprises) et « Les systèmes de normalisation, la réglementation et la métrologie légale sont développés</i> ». Ce volet du projet est mis en œuvre par l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour le Développement Industriel (ONUDI). Il n'y a aucune information disponible à ce jour sur les résultats (pas de rapportage de l'ONUDI). <i>Sources : Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007 ; Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010</i>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	The “Support to the competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean” aimed at integrating producers into associations. One of its expected results is: “Producers, millers and exporters integrated into effective and sustainable associations aiming the general benefit of rice operators.” The final evaluation noted that there is “little evidence of any success in organising producers and exporters into effective and sustainable associations. On the contrary, the one functioning millers' association in Guyana (GRMEDA, established in 1992) has effectively ceased to function in recent years. Although the PMU reports appear to suggest that the establishment of water users' associations (WUAs) in Guyana was somehow the result of Programme activity, support for the establishment of these was in fact the result of the IDB-funded Guyana Drainage and Irrigation Systems Rehabilitation Project. However, WUAs were legally established in Suriname as a result of the efforts of the Programme and have been able to deliver some useful support for the irrigation authorities,

	<p><i>although they are a long way from being operationally sustainable.”</i></p> <p><i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, page 18</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	A key objective of the Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector was to assist Caribbean rum producers in formulating and implementing a marketing strategy relying on the design and promotion of a <i>Marque</i> (Authentic Caribbean Rum)
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No explicit evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents. The MR 2008 underlined that the market position of small farmers is weak, and they have little negotiating capacity and power. Associations and cooperatives of small producers and traders should be supported, if coffee is still to be used as an instrument for poverty reduction ( <i>Source: MR 2008 p.3</i> ). Nevertheless, the Sub-component 6.3: International Coffee Promotion had an activity addressed to the certification: in a bid to create a national organic certification, a short mission by an Expert from ECOCERT had taken place from 27/10 to 6/11/2004 but probably due to a lack of concerted involvement the matter did not make progress and it was not until June 2007 that concrete interventions were decided in the specific field of certification. In particular to call together the coffee certifying agencies operating in Ethiopia in a round table so that farmers and cooperatives would be aware of objectives and benefits of certification.
<b>GH-COC</b>	The Cocoa Sector Support Programme II first monitoring report mentions that activities have been launched to set up producers' organisations. But no reference to contacts between producers/producers' organisations and supermarkets or reference to labels can be found in the programme documents. <i>Sources: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 01, Effectiveness to date sheet.</i>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Anyway, the programme doesn't focus on such objectives.
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	No information retrieved. But it is important to remember that MG-FOOD is not commodity-oriented but food security-oriented.
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés. Cependant, le rapport ROM relève que le projet, par son volet "alphabétisation", avait prévu de contribuer à mettre les producteurs en mesure à savoir négocier leur partenariat individuel avec les nouvelles sociétés d'égrenage et de commercialisation issues de la privatisation. Il note qu'une simple alphabétisation des producteurs ne permettra pas nécessairement à ceux-ci de pouvoir négocier des contrats commerciaux avec des commerçants/égreneurs. Il recommande de préciser la nature des enseignements (volet alphabétisation) à fournir par l'ADF pour être sûr que l'alphabétisation des producteurs leur permettra véritablement de devenir des associés dans des structures assez complexes, et si un volet "calculs commerciaux" ne serait pas préférable, ou du moins à inclure dans le curriculum. Relevons qu'un élément critique formulé par l'identification portait déjà sur la pertinence de l'alphabétisation fonctionnelle qu'elle considère comme étant un besoin structurel de long terme qui ne trouvera pas de solution par un appui ponctuel sur un ou deux ans. En matière de structuration des OP dans la zone cotonnière, l'identification suggère plutôt que d'autres objectifs plus directement liés à la Réforme de la Filière, soient soutenus (ex. participation aux mécanismes de gestion pour en améliorer la transparence et l'efficacité) (Checklist, Identification phase, p2). <i>Source: ROM/BCS, Intervention Fiche</i>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	The project provides firms with information on Good Manufacturing Practices, help in developing Quality Assurance Management Systems, value chain and market studies, training in HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) practices in order to help the exporters become HACCP certified, etc. Example of one of the 17 firms concerned: <i>Through the project, Origins Pacific will be assisted in its efforts to promote the nutritional benefits of VCO, and in the process acquire HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points – a process ensuring that food is processed safely) and organic certification, which would open exports into Europe.</i>



	<i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009), FACT Brochure August 2010</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>SN-ONG</b>	Le projet cherche à renforcer les capacités d'organisations paysannes professionnelles par une insertion favorable sur les marchés de qualité (Commerce équitable et biologique) du sésame et des noix de cajou, notamment : en 2010 la certification AB est un acquis, mais devra être renouvelée régulièrement. Par contre, le MR note qu'en même temps il reste des problèmes : procédures de gestion perfectibles, non prise en compte d'exigence techniques agro-alimentaire « Bio »: « marche en avant », séparations des flux, stockage produits finis, traçabilité. La chaîne de contrôle qualité est encore imparfaitement définie et maîtrisée. <i>Source : MR</i>
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project aims at making 3,500 coffee growers in the Kamuli District of Uganda to be UTZ certified and hence to get a higher price for their coffee deliveries.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	“The percentage of households reporting an increase since 2000 in the share of marketed output was about two times greater in NAADS (about 25%) than in non-NAADS sub-counties (14%). These results suggest the market orientation of the NAADS program is having the desired impact.” IFPRI, Assessing NAADS impact, 2007, p. 31
<b>VU-POP</b>	No mentions of contracts with supermarkets can be found. The project included an increased amount of organically certified production as goals in the financing agreement. The second monitoring report mentions that the POP2 initiated product research and certification for fair-trade and organic production at the Vanuatu Virgin Oil Company. The third monitoring report does not refer to certification or organic production however. <i>Source: Producers Organisation Project II Monitoring report 2, page 2. Producers Organisation Project II Financing Agreement, page 14</i>
<b>BAN</b>	The SFA impact evaluation notes that competitiveness policies have contributed to an increase in the number of Fair Trade Label beneficiaries in ACP countries, particularly in the Windward islands. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country Reports, page 414, bispe, 2008.</i>
<b>I.4.3.3</b>	Commission supported interventions contributed to an increased number of producers/ producer organisations being coordinated at national and regional levels
<b>BF</b>	Les interventions (PAFFIC, Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols et celles du Programme tous ACP) ont débuté à partir de 2008, et pour certaines en 2010- début 2011. Elles ont pris place dans un contexte de crise financière très profonde que la filière cotonnière du BF a vécu de 2005 et 2009. Ainsi, entre 2006 et 2010, la production de coton a chuté de plus de 50% s'accompagnant d'une diminution importante (au moins 25-30%) du nombre de producteurs. Ce contexte a certainement favorisé l'engouement relatif pour le coton bio-équitable qui proposait un prix au producteur jugé attractif car le différentiel avec le prix du coton conventionnel était substantiel. Ainsi, 2 ans après le début de ses activités, le programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnières comptait près de 8000 producteurs alors que le nombre total de producteurs, regroupés à la quasi-totalité sous l'UNPCB, était en nette baisse. En effet, le poids relatif du coton bio dans la production nationale restant très faible, l'augmentation des producteurs de coton bio (équitable) ne peut inverser la tendance à la baisse du nombre de producteurs de coton conventionnel (NB. Au Burkina, depuis 2010, il faut entendre par coton conventionnel, le coton Bt). Toutefois, on peut estimer que l'intervention PAFFIC (participation au financement des producteurs UNPCB) dans l'augmentation de capital des sociétés cotonnières, rendue obligatoire suite à la crise financière, a permis de ne pas davantage aggraver la tendance. <i>Source : Rapport narratif 2009 du Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques; Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2011 ;MN 510</i> Pour le projet anacarde-sésame mis en œuvre par l'INADES, des activités ont été menées pour organiser les producteurs. Au niveau régional, l'INADES appuie la mise en place d'Unions de producteurs. La

	<p>prochaine étape est d'avoir une union régionale des producteurs, avec un cadre de concertation. Ce projet est accompagné pour l'anacarde, d'un projet CE d'appui à la décentralisation, dans la région des Hauts Bassins. Pour le sésame, le travail est effectué avec l'Union des groupements de producteurs. La gouvernance n'est pas bonne pour les groupements de sésame et INADES-B travaille sur ce point avec eux. <i>Source : MN 551.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Selon l'évaluation de la stratégie pays de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, la CE a financé le Plan d'Action pour l'Organisation du Secteur Agricole (PAOSA). Cette intervention a cependant été lancée en 1999, mais a duré jusqu'en 2007. Ses résultats sont mitigés. La composante « Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles » de ce plan d'action a permis de mettre en place 45 Comités Provinciaux de Coordination et d'Echange. De plus, le programme d'appui à la filière coton mis en place après la révision à mi-parcours du 9<sup>ème</sup> FED a permis la prise en charge partielle de la participation des producteurs de coton à l'augmentation de capital des trois sociétés cotonnières du Burkina Faso. <i>Source : Evaluation de la stratégie pays de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, 2010, pages 69, 72 &amp; 73</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>La restructuration et la professionnalisation des OPA (Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles) est une des actions financées par le Stabex, notamment dans le secteur cotonnier. En effet, au sein de la filière coton, la restructuration des faitières vise une meilleure représentativité des producteurs et une plus grande légitimité des organisations avec une implication des producteurs aux débats portant sur la filière. La restructuration du mouvement coopératif vise à assurer une qualité de service aux producteurs, et la participation responsable de ceux-ci aux décisions stratégiques (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, the PACICC programme (Programme d'Appui au Conseil Interprofessionnel Café-Cacao) which benefitted from EU funding allowed to regroup all coffee and cocoa producers (estimated to be 600,000) in one organisation. <i>Source : MN 913</i></p> <p>The Logone-et-Chari rural development programme (funded under Stabex) organised and structured about 500 rural organisations (much smaller than the national level) in rice-growing regions. <i>Source : Evaluation finale du programme de développement rural participatif dans le département du Logone-et-Chari, Rapport final, février 2007</i></p> <p>Le programme comportait des composantes importantes de structuration via le volet « information des producteurs et autres acteurs concernés par la filière » et le volet « communication » et « renforcement des capacités du CICC » (<i>source : documents de programme PACICC</i>). Le programme de développement rural du Mounjo Nkam était basé sur une approche participative avec une sélection détaillée et approfondie de 150 OP. C'est le tout premier maillon de l'organisation (OP qui a été appuyé par le programme en étant l'interlocuteur principal) (<i>source : évaluation à mi-parcours et brochure PDRBA</i>).</p>
<b>GH-Cocoa</b>	<p>According to an interview in a cocoa-producing community, the “Cocoa Sector Support Programme – phase II” led them to found a farmers organisation at the community level. On a national or regional level however, the programme has not had time yet to deliver such results. <i>Source: MN 943</i></p> <p><i>‘With regard to Result 2 (improved cocoa governance) targets, 33 VVC communities were to be mobilised to initiate set up of farmer organisation by the end of Year 1 , increasing to 50 by the end of programme implementation in Year 3. By the end of Year 2, 56 communities had formed farmer groups of which about a third were well-organised; all 56 had received continued exposure to good governance practices during the first half of Year 3 (July to December 2010). It should be noted however that progress was intensively induced by CSSIP II use of the specialist consultancy group, PDA, and supported by independent consultants thereafter. One reason for such concentrated effort was that IITA expected to train 16 Community Development Officers (CDOs) to support farmer organisation development but only 8 had been deployed by the Department of Community Development (DCD) in the eight districts in two regions covered by CSSIP II. This reduced the level of co-opted support and triggered the need for greater infusions of short term technical assistance. (MTE page 23)</i></p> <p>The MTE notes that good governance of the FO has not yet yielded good results. This would entail: community groups function democratically; are set up efficiently; recruit competent staff; are being managed transparently; and are providing members with agreed services cost-effectively and efficiently. According to a study cited in the MTE, out of the 56 CSSIP II-assisted Farmer Organisations (FOs)</p>

	<p>initially set up, 16 (28.6%) have demonstrated strong or good leadership and high levels of commitment of FO members. <i>'In these groups there is consistent attendance at meetings, payment of dues, mobilisation of resources, regular meetings without prompting, development of own work plans, and registration at District - level and Registrar General (business) levels. But 2/3 of the groups are not fully ready to move to the next steps in the governance process – developing the capacity to provide members with agreed services on time, efficiently, and at costs that are lower than they would have incurred on their own. (...) As a rule of thumb, specialist Cooperative Society development service providers like SOCODEVI estimate that it takes 5 – 7 years before fledgling entities are in strong positions to contribute to governance issues on a national basis.'</i> Source: CSSP MTE 2011</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui mais de manière assez modérée. A titre d'illustration le projet STABEX-AIM (un des projets ayant le mieux fonctionné et qui est une exception) impliquait au départ une centaine de groupements. Il n'en restait que 43 à la fin dont 34 vraiment actifs, soit une efficacité de 34%. Certains groupements ont été déçus parce qu'ils espéraient que le projet leur donnerait directement de l'argent (Source : MN 814).</p> <p>Selon l'Afdi (Agriculteurs français et Développement International) dont les actions s'effectuent selon trois priorités fortement axées sur les OP (appui aux organisations paysannes dans le cadre de leurs interventions sur les questions de politique agricole /appui à la mise en place de services aux agriculteurs /appui au renforcement des capacités stratégiques des organisations paysannes), la représentativité des OP est très forte dans les périmètres irrigués mais faible ailleurs et est globalement de 10% à 20% (Source : MN 816).</p>
<b>TZ Sugar</b>	<p>The support to the Tanzania Sugar industry, by supporting the formation of block farming, contributed to increase the number of sugar cane growers being organised in blocks; however as sugar is produced for the domestic market, this did not call for regional level of organisation. Source: MN173</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Farmer Institutional Development (FID): The programme achieved its aim of setting up the necessary farmer institutions, i.e. Farmer Groups, Farmer Fora, Parish Coordinating Committees and Procurement Committees. Some 39,600 Farmer Groups were established, with a range of farmer types. NAADS has achieved some positive results in terms of Farmer Group strengthening, though older (pre-NAADS) groups have proved more resilient with greater cohesion compared to those formed under NAADS.</p> <p>The Value Chain, Market Linkages and Public Private Partnerships: NAADS has now begun to address and enhance these aspects of the value chain although this element of the programme is relatively undeveloped. With the focus on farm level production during Phase I, the programme will need to put greater emphasis on capacity building of Higher Level Farm Organisations (HLFOs). In the longer term the pillar for rural infrastructure will need to be implemented as envisaged in the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA). Source: <i>Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008</i></p> <p>Yes. Through the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project the EC supported by Stabex, farmer organizations which enhanced the capacity of the coffee sector to meet the market requirements in terms of quality and quantity were established at village, parish and national levels.</p> <p>Approximately 14,600 smallholder farmers were registered with the project and grouped into 443 Producer Organisations (PO) that were subsequently transformed into Farmer Field Schools. These were, in turn, organised into 24 farmer organisations know as Depot Committees (DC) which, over the last two years of the project, were transformed into legally-registered companies. They were established to facilitate the provision of agricultural services to their members, to add value to their coffee and to access more-remunerative markets. The costs of running the companies were originally met by the project but were increasingly transferred to the companies, such that they are all now virtually self-financing from a levy on the coffee they handle. The project provided intensive and wide-ranging training to those involved in the operations and management of both the companies and their constituent POs. Training was also provided to stockists providing fertilisers and other inputs/tarpaulins to the Alliance farmers throughout the project area. In May 2010, an apex body, the Uganda Coffee Farmers Alliance, was registered as a company to work on behalf of its 24 member companies to seek out remunerative markets, to negotiate realistic transport rates and to lobby on behalf of its members. Source: <i>Evaluation of the Kaweri Farmers' Alliance Support Project</i>. The Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support project also sought to add value to the</p>

	<p>Kiboko sold by Alliance farmers through processing and improved marketing – it was collected by the Depot Committees (DCs), bulked and then stored prior to processing at nearby coffee factories. By the end of the project, the companies were collaborating to rationalise both the collection of Kiboko and the transportation of the FAQ (Fair Average Quality) to the exporter. Training in support of these activities was provided by the project. In spite of these efforts, a significant volume of Kiboko is still sold for cash through the “informal” market at the farm-gate, due to the need of many for immediate cash. Nevertheless, a significant increase in the proportion of farmers’ coffee being sold through the Alliance is projected. <i>Source: Evaluation of the Kaweri Farmers’ Alliance Support Project</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme supports the <i>Cos-Coton</i>, which is the joint EU-ACP Steering Group set up after agreement on the EU-Africa Cotton Action Plan (2004). Members of the <i>Cos Coton</i> are notable producer organisations from different ACP countries which have interest in developing the cotton sector. <i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2 and <a href="http://www.cotton-ACP.org">www.cotton-ACP.org</a></i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>According to the PIP final evaluation report, the programme’s centralised management did not encourage coordination with local projects. The evaluation therefore recommended that a part of the support management be decentralised to ensure a better coordination with other projects. In some cases the task forces set up by the PIP in beneficiary countries included producers organisations, public authorities, laboratories, etc. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 58 &amp; 73.</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>Sugarcane growers are organised/coordinated by the sugar mills. As for sugar mills, they either are in a monopolistic situation, or have at national level professional organisations to promote their collective interests.</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Le CL définit le résultat « (R4) Une politique régionale de valorisation de l’anacarde et du sésame, en collaboration avec des partenaires internationaux est définie »</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Les autorités régionales décentralisées participent à l’accompagnement stratégique des producteurs d’anacarde et sésame</li> <li>▪ La coopération décentralisée entre les régions visées permet l’établissement de relations commerciales durables entre OP et entreprises des régions partenaires</li> <li>▪ Un cadre de concertation est favorisé afin d’intégrer les OP dans les processus de définition des politiques agricoles (<i>Source : CL</i>).</li> </ul>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Pas d’évidence directe dans les documents consultés, bien qu’on pourrait s’attendre à des effets indirects positifs en terme de coordination des producteurs par le fait que le PAFFIC a permis de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. <i>Source : Allocation signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Selon le cadre logique d’intervention de la « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde », deux des leaders du projet sont maintenant membres du conseil d’administration d’Intercajou, l’organisation des producteurs au niveau national. L’intervention n’a donc pas augmenté le nombre de producteurs coordonnés au niveau national mais a inclus davantage de transformateurs. <i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d’Ivoire. Cadre logique d’intervention commenté</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Peu de références sont faites à cet indicateur malgré que le « renforcement des organisations professionnelles agricoles » soit évoqué, notamment dans le secteur coton dans le cadre de l’activité « A.1.b Autres cultures paysannes d’exportation » (<i>Source : Rider FA p.7</i>)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>L’objectif spécifique est « Renforcer l’autonomie opérationnelle et économique, la représentativité et la capacité d’auto-promotion et de plaidoyer des organisations paysannes des communes de Garoua Rurale et de Gashiga » (<i>Source : Annexe I p1</i>). Plus particulièrement, une activité s’intitule : « Suivre les GIC dans la constitution d’une Fédération ». (<i>Source : Annexe I p9</i>). A la fin de la 2ème année, les membres de tous les GIC seront invités à se réunir en assemblée pour discuter et décider de la constitution d’une Fédération de tous les GIC des communes de Garoua Rurale et de Gashiga. L’assemblée de tous les membres des GIC sera préparée par les délégués des GIC, soutenus par les animateurs et par le coordinateur du projet. La</p>

	<p>Fédération qui sera constitué et légalisé selon la loi n°92/006 du 14 Août 1992 relative aux Sociétés Coopératives et aux Groupes d'Initiative Commune représentera tous les GIC qui en feront partie auprès des institutions et des autorités nationales et internationales. Elle promouvra une organisation, une discipline de l'activité productive des GIC selon des stratégies opérationnelles communes à travers des rencontres périodiques de tous les membres; elle offrira un service d'assistance pour tous les GIC et elle jouera un rôle important dans la défense des intérêts des organisations paysannes. La fédération, en effet, augmentera l'autonomie, la représentativité, la légitimation des organisations paysannes (GIC) sur le territoire des communes de Garoua Rurale et de Gashiga, et même leur conscience et leur capacité de dialogue institutionnel. La Fédération aura un Président, un Secrétaire, un Trésorier et un Conseil d'Administration élus par l'assemblée des GIC. Dans l'élection des organes de direction on encouragera la candidature des femmes en mettant en évidence l'importance que la fédération soit vraiment représentative de toute la réalité des GIC, de tous ses problèmes, ses nécessités, ses intérêts. Le siège du bureau de la Fédération sera choisi par le conseil d'administration en accord avec les chefs des villages intéressés par les projets qui mettront à disposition de possibles locaux. La fédération commencera déjà à fonctionner la 3ème année, soutenue par les animateurs diocésains et par le coordinateur expatrié, en prenant en charge la gestion du fonds crédits pour les microprojets et les activités de sensibilisation des nouveaux groupes de paysans soutenue par le personnel du projet.</p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>During the programme implementation the West Indies Rum and Spirit Producers Association (WIRSPA) gained 6 new members and represents 13 of the 15 Caribbean ACP countries.</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Cocoa Sector Support Programme II first monitoring report mentions that activities have been launched to set up producers' organisations. No statement on the coordination of the organisations can be found. However, the project synopsis states that one of the expected results of the programme is the vertical integration of farmer's organisations. The second monitoring report states that the creation of associations and interest groups is to come. <i>Sources: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 01, Effectiveness to date sheet. Monitoring report 2: Potential sustainability sheet. Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring Project Synopsis</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Anyway, the programme doesn't focus on such objectives.</p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>No information retrieved. But it is important to remember that MG-FOOD is not commodity-oriented but food security-oriented.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés. Le rapport ROM note plutôt que les producteurs performants sont ceux qui ont les premiers quitté la filière coton. La raison principale invoquée est le fait qu'ils se sont trouvés en "caution solidaire" pour le remboursement des crédits de campagne coton envers les banques opérant avec la CMDT, c'est à dire ont été tenus garants des prêts des agriculteurs non performants non capables de rembourser les crédits de campagne. Pour pallier à cet effet inverse, le principe de caution a été changé au profit d'un système volontaire, dans lequel les agriculteurs choisissent eux-mêmes les partenaires de caution, installant ainsi un système d'autocontrôle efficace (BCS, §5.3). <i>Source: ROM/BCS</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>As unplanned positive effects of the project, the MR states that some firms supported by the project are linking up and doing business with each other. <i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.</p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>L'action propose également de renforcer les organisations faitières, depuis leurs groupements de base, en termes de capacités de gestion administrative, financière, technique et commerciale, comme moteur du développement local sur le long terme (résultat 3). Acteurs économiques reconnus, les organisations faitières professionnelles gagneront alors plus facilement une légitimité auprès des autorités locales et</p>

	<p>nationales. Les capacités de défense des intérêts des petits producteurs et de l'agriculture familiale, seront renforcées. Les organisations paysannes, fortes de leur expérience commerciale pourront contribuer activement aux débats concernant les enjeux à court et moyen terme dans le processus de libéralisation des marchés et du retrait de l'Etat dans le secteur agricole. Au delà de ces aspects plus gestionnaires, le projet prévoit aussi de renforcer la capacité des OF de défendre les intérêts de ses membres et pour ceci le projet offre de 'L'appui à la mise en réseaux / mise en relation des OP faitières entre elles et avec d'autres organisations au niveau local (ex : ASSOLUCER &amp; FADECBA sur le sésame), national (FENPROSE, CNCR...) et international (ex : COPABO en Cote d'Ivoire) afin d'élaborer des stratégies de défenses communes des intérêts des producteurs. Cette action sera matérialisée par l'organisation d'au moins un atelier ou d'une manifestation portant sur une thématique large comme par exemple la place des OP dans le développement économique des filières agricoles.' La recherche de synergies ou d'alliances avec des groupements de paysans en Gambie est également mentionnée. <i>Source: Description Action</i></p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>The project is implemented at district level. It aims at organising the coffee growers into groups with a "key farmer" for 25 coffee growers. Key farmers are trained by the project so as to disseminate among their fellow farmers the practices involved in the UTZ Code of Conduct for coffee growing.</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>"NAADSs structures are based at district and sub-national levels and deliver demand-driven extension services (mainly) through Private Service Providers (PSPs); some 39.600 farmers' groups were progressively established under NAADS (about 715.000 farmers)." Uganda Country Strategy Evaluation (2009), p.50</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The project synopsis of the Producers Organisation Project II refers to strengthening producer organisations, but at a micro level (no mention of national coordination can be found in the documents). The monitoring reports never provide such evidence either. <i>Source: Producers Organisation Project II Project Synopsis 1, page 1.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA impact evaluation mentions that the SFA had an appreciable impact on the organisation of the sector, which was already favourable. No further details are available though. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 10, btspe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.4.3.4</b>	<p>Commission support contributed to increased foreign direct investments in the commodity chains, including public-private partnerships, and promotion of sustainable development through social and environmental codes of conduct</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Il est prématuré de pouvoir estimer/mesurer un accroissement des investissements étrangers dans la filière coton. On peut constater que l'intervention portant sur le programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière fait la promotion du développement durable en sensibilisant/formant aux respect des codes/standards de production qui sont ceux définis et pris en compte dans la certification biologique et équitable.</p> <p>Programme tous ACP : CCI/ITC- développement de la chaîne de valeur orientée vers le marché (meilleure connaissance des marchés d'exportations et de la demande finale à travers des missions d'échange-formation). Les effets positifs de cette démarche (passation de nouveaux marchés...) sont attendus pour le BF mais pas encore difficile à mesurer. Par ailleurs, il faut également noter la portée relative assez limitée de l'appui, d'autant que le financement direct des activités du Programme tous ACP se termine au plus tard fin décembre 2011.</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport narratif 2009 du Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques; Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2011.CCI/ITC, 6 monthly progress report : 1july-31 December 2010.</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture.</p>

	<p>En outre, l'évaluation indique que le programme Stabex participe également à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté notamment concernant l'axe 3 « Création d'emploi et de richesses par le soutien au monde rural et promotion du secteur privé comme moteur de la croissance » qui vise à renforcer les secteurs productifs afin, notamment, de diversifier l'économie et d'augmenter la transformation des produits agricoles, minéraliers et énergétiques sur place. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>Toutefois, l'évaluation souligne que bien que la participation effective de toutes les parties prenantes et des groupes cible, notamment celle du secteur privé, a été recherchée, elle n'est assurée que dans le secteur du coton bien que le programme a su détecter les bons partenaires et bénéficiaires. Le programme Stabex 1999, certainement en raison du contexte particulier de la Cote d'Ivoire, ne dégage pas, à l'instar d'autres pays, un « état d'esprit Stabex », spécifique à ce type de programme associant le secteur public au secteur privé pour trouver, au mieux des solutions aux problèmes quotidiens de gestion, liés à des enjeux économiques. Le programme reste très marqué par l'empreinte d'un relationnel traditionnel entre le bailleur de fonds et les bénéficiaires, dans lequel le dialogue est très hiérarchisé. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>Aucune évidence concernant les codes de conduites environnementaux et sociaux bien que la Stabex ait financé de lourdes interventions dans le secteur social de l'Éducation et le secteur socio-économique du coton (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CM</b>	It is estimated that the leverage effect of EU support to investments (both foreign and domestic) in Cameroon's banana sector were of about 20%. Furthermore, the support was partly used to adopt social measures and respect environmental codes of conduct. <i>Source : MN 993, 994, 995</i>
<b>CR</b>	No. A weakness of the whole organisational process supporting the management and implementation of the Commission's interventions has been often raised by the representative of private sector institutions: it is ill-adapted to consulting and working with the private sector. Identification of needs has largely taken place under a dialogue conducted by civil servants or representatives of public institutions on both sides without sufficient incorporation of the views of the private sector. It resulted in a strong emphasis on strengthening and supporting institutions rather than addressing the needs of the final beneficiaries in the productive sectors. As a result the private sector representatives are generally disappointed with the progress of regional integration whereas they originally had high expectations in that regard. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	FDI and PP partnership have not been addressed by the Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector. The programme subsidised investments in the field of waste management.
<b>MG</b>	Seule évidence: AIM a avec Givaudan (entreprise suisse huiles essentielles qui a financé une partie des activités initiées par STABEX-AIM) un mandat d'accompagnement des producteurs sur le plan du respect de l'environnement (Source : MN 806).
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	FACT certainly promotes sustainable development but no information regarding PPP with foreign companies.
<b>TZ</b>	In the Tanzanian tea industry the estate sector (mostly owned by multinational companies) owns the processing factories. There is as yet only one single instance where smallholder producers have a stake in a processing factory. By and large there is thus no PPP as yet although this is seen as one of the main constraints to the extension of tea production by smallholders (not having a stake in the factory means that smallholders cannot bargain for the price at which they sell their green leaf, they don't know what the factory's production costs are and are thus at the receiving end of the price chain).
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence has been reported. Nevertheless, regarding the <u>private sector development</u> , EC is considering the implementation of an equity fund, which would invest in SMEs active in the processing and marketing of agricultural products. Moreover, Danida (Danish cooperation) has established a trust fund whose revenues shall be used to support the development of agri-businesses (e.g. Through the provision of guarantees to bank loans) (Source: MN 309 and 313).

<b>I.4.3.5</b>	Evidence that Commission supported activities towards improved competitiveness were coordinated with and complementary to the activities of other donors in the same areas
<b>BF</b>	Les interventions de la Commission : appuis STABEX, PAFFIC, programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols, Programme tous ACP (GIPD/BPA), lutte contre la contamination, etc. sont en majorité orientées vers l'amélioration de la compétitivité de la filière. Il n'y a pas ou peu d'évidence d'une coordination directe entre PTFs. Cependant, il faut signaler que toutes les interventions des PTFs qui passent par l'UNPCB sont coordonnées par elle. En effet, cette organisation est amenée à coordonner un nombre croissant d'interventions financées par divers bailleurs (DCE, AFD, BAD,...) portant sur l'amélioration de l'exploitation cotonnière. Ainsi, l'UNPCB a élaboré un plan stratégique quinquennal en 2007 pour mieux conduire les appuis de manière coordonnée. Ces appuis sont intégrés dans le plan stratégique. Pour l'UNPCB, peu importe le bailleur et l'instrument de financement, ce qui importe c'est que les appuis s'intègrent de manière complémentaire dans leur plan stratégique. <i>Source : Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2011. MN 510.</i>
<b>CI</b>	Oui même si la CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée. La complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds est avérée, des lors que ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007. Les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale mais ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	According to interviewees from private sector of the coffee and cocoa chains in Cameroon, the coordination among donors is a real problem. <i>Source : MN 913</i> The support the Cameroon's agro-industry within the framework of the PASAPE programme (programme supporting the country in the EPA negotiations) is implemented by the UNIDO. According to stakeholders, coordination is ensured, but their knowledge on what is done by the other side is limited. <i>Source : MN 938, 971</i> UE- AFD : les programmes interviennent en partie dans les mêmes régions et sur les mêmes produits, mais l'AFD s'est délibérément inscrite dans une approche globale du système de production et pas dans une approche filière. Elle propose des services de conseil aux agriculteurs via leurs OP. Ces conseils peuvent concerner les filières d'exportation mais également toutes les autres productions. (MN-401)
<b>CR</b>	The evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme. Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH</b>	All sectors of aid (agriculture, transportation & trade included) are coordinated among donors by the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS). <i>Source: Ghana CSP/NIP 2008-2013, page 114</i>
<b>GH</b>	The activities of the Commission's support through the 1990s and early 2000s were geared to support the sector's restructuring in which the WB was also heavily involved. The reforms were supported by the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (1987) which was co-financed by other donors as well as the WB and by the



	<p>Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme (1992) funded by the WB. The Commission, by using its funds to accompany and facilitate this restructuring (payment of interest on Cocobod's cocoa bills, payment and/or retraining of some 10,000 Cocobod retrenched workers, etc.) is likely to have coordinated closely with other donors although there is no evidence of this in consulted documents.</p> <p>Currently, and although there are many other donors and stakeholders in the cocoa sector, the fact that the EC is funding a programme in support of cocoa is not widely known. This finding was also corroborated by the findings from the CSSP II MTE (2011). However, part of the CSSP II was executed by the IITA-STCP which was initially set up by USAID and has also different funding arrangements with different donors. By using the IITA-STCP to execute the farmers' training and FO component, the project thus is coordinated and complementary to other efforts in the same field. <i>Sources: MN181, MN131, CSSPII MTE (2011)</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>MG</b>	<p>Si il y a complémentarité, c'est une complémentarité de fait car les bailleurs observent une répartition selon des critères géographiques ("chacun son aire d'intervention") et/ou en fonction du montant de l'aide (Source: MN 804, 812, 817). En effet, de manière générale, il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB) mais très peu ou rien en matière de coordination de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 801).</p> <p>Un exemple de complémentarité de fait est l'utilisation par le projet SOAVA (sur financement Stabex) du système d'information de marché développé par le projet PPR (financé par le FIDA).</p> <p><i>Source : Evaluation finale du projet SOAVA</i></p> <p>Mais les deux projets, qui opéraient dans les mêmes régions et avec des objectifs très semblables ont été formulés et mis en œuvre indépendamment l'un de l'autre.</p> <p>La coordination et la complémentarité entre les bailleurs de fond et leurs interventions dans le domaine des cultures d'exportation ne sont pas satisfaisantes. La première insuffisance est l'absence de coordination du programme STABEX et de ses 11 contrats de subvention. Certains de ces contrats couvrent des filières communes (ou avec des spécificités similaires) et sont mis en œuvre dans une même région, autant de conditions pour créer des synergies et partager bonnes pratiques et leçons apprises.</p> <p><i>Source : Appui à l'amélioration de la qualité et à la commercialisation du girofle dans le District de Fénérive, Rapport de Monitoring</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>The SADC donor matrix of the 2002-2007 SADC RSP/RIP mentions France and USA as countries which support the agricultural research in the SADC region (technical assistance and small grain research).</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, Annex 12</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	There are no other donors supporting Tea in Tanzania.
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. There is a strong coordination of donors (including MS) through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Agriculture Sector Working Group chaired by the government</li> <li>▪ The Agriculture Donors Group</li> </ul> <p>Indeed, donors report on their activity in the framework of the <u>donors working group</u>. Lessons learned and dissemination of information between donors: coordination and complementation needs are identified at the project level and also at the strategic level: <u>all levels of coordination are covered</u>. Besides the multi-donor support to the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture), donor coordination results in some sort of task and geographical sharing between donors by regions and by nature of intervention. (Sources: MN 301, 309 and 313).</p> <p>The harmonisation of development assistance between the donor community, and between donors and the partner government is a key factor in aid effectiveness. The evaluation found that the management and administration of the Programme at the national level is a good example of effective cooperation and harmonisation of development assistance. However, the recent growing unease expressed by GoU on the</p>

	<p>agricultural service delivery mechanism, involving the private sector (rather than LG extension staff) is creating a sense of some uncertainty on the programme's future direction.</p> <p>In terms of programme harmonisation at field level, NAADS has successfully coordinated its operations with another advisory services programme (AAMP) funded by ADB and IFAD, and there have been some moderate achievements in other areas including in the research field. However, not all programmes have been subject to formal harmonisation arrangements and some confusion and duplication of effort occurs. <i>Source: Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008</i></p> <p>EU funds to the Kaweri Farmers' Alliance Support Project were supplemented from several sources including the Government, the private sector and the ASPS and APEP/LEAD development projects, supported by Danida and USAID respectively. These development partners were represented on the Steering Committee which met biannually. Several other parties with experience in the sub-sector and in development more generally, including the UCDA, the Ministry of Finance and the Alliance, were also members. The Committee provided effective guidance to the management staff in their work to implement the project, as well as ensuring co-ordination and close collaboration between the different member organisations in their work to support the project. Unfortunately, participation in the meetings by many of those representing the public sector agencies was sporadic at best.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the Kaweri Farmers' Alliance Support Project</i></p> <p>Partners of the Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ European Union (EU). The European Union was the main funder. They provided a grant that funded the PMU and a large part of the field activities.</li> <li>▪ Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA). The UCDA carried out a supervisory role on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture and chaired the steering committee. They also promoted the project by organizing a number of field visits for Government Officials. Through the Coffee Replanting Program they provided a large number of seedlings to project farmers.</li> <li>▪ Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program (APEP) / USAID. APEP have been instrumental in the organizational development process, providing Producer Organization Trainers, introducing a methodology that has proven very successful and facilitating farmer groups with tools and equipment. Further to this they have contributed to the establishment of demonstration plots and have funded a number of consultants and experts.</li> <li>▪ Agricultural Sector Programme Support (APEP) / DANIDA. Their contribution has been crucial in the establishment of coffee nurseries and mother gardens, in supporting the capacity building process of farmer organizations and in funding a number of consultants, experts and trainers.</li> <li>▪ Kaweri Coffee Plantation (KPC). KPC provided technical expertise in the training of nursery operators and in the establishment of mother gardens. KCP has also made available high quality planting material for the mother gardens and a large number of cuttings for rooting in the nurseries.</li> <li>▪ Livelihoods and Enterprises for Agricultural Development (LEAD) / USAID. Even though the LEAD program started during the final project year, very important support and expertise was provided for the establishment of Farmer Field Schools which have rapidly encouraged farmer to farmer learning. LEAD will become a more prominent partner in the rolling out process.</li> <li>▪ National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). NAADS have contributed to agricultural extension and have provided additional coffee seedlings to project farmers.</li> <li>▪ Ibero (Uganda) Ltd. Ibero has provided market information to farmer groups and a market for their coffee. They have signed MOUs with microfinance institutions and DC Companies in order for loans to be granted. They have also been promoting the project coffee internationally through their trading network.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>The Financing agreement mentions that several other donors are supporting SADC agricultural research activities and will continue to do so during the programme (USAID, GTZ, and AfDB) either to support Research Networks or Research Programme. The financial support of the SADC member States for the agricultural research and training programme will also continue through financial and technical supports</p>

from the SADC-FANR directorate. *Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2*  
 Most of the agricultural research in the SADC region is carried out by national or regional projects financed by international funding. Most of the SADC Member States do not increase their own budgets for agricultural research. Universities and research centre do, however, pay salaries and maintain a minimal infrastructure. Consequently many ICART activities and results are rather stand alone initiatives without substantiation complementary input from SADC Member States. There have been any reports regarding significant SADC MS government commitments to ICART activities. The table hereafter shows the SADC grant projects approved between 2003-2008.

Table 4: SADC grant projects approved between 2003-2008

Donors	Area of interest	Amount of the grant
French Cooperation	Performance improvement of Small scale farmer	€ 1.6 million Competitive funds for research
	Institutional Support to SADC-research coordination unit	
African Development Bank group AfDB	Support to regional Agricultural Research, ,	US\$ 0.2 million
	Support to Bean research network (SABRN	US\$ 0.2 million
GTZ	Groundnut and Legume Programme (GLIP),	US \$ 0.6 (2003-2007)
E.U.	SADC Land & Water Management Training and Research Programme	€ 4.8 million (2003-2007)
Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden...)	SADC Plant Genetic Resources Centre (SPGRC)	US \$ 10 million
Bio net International	SAFRINET Plant Protection Institute of ARC, South Africa	US \$ 10 million (2006)

*Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, pages 20, 22 & 23*

#### PAC-FACT

To the extent that the project is aligned to the regional (and thus the national) priorities and that it is a component of the regionally endorsed and multi donor supported (NZ, AU and SPC) LRD programme, the project would be complementary to activities undertaken by other donors to implement the LRD strategic plan. *Source: IF*

‘Co-ordination with other similar interventions in order to encourage synergies and avoid overlaps has been designed into the project more or less from the beginning, and is made easier by the fact that SPC (and LRD) co-operate closely with several donors in projects funded by those donors and implemented by SPC. These include the Biosecurity and Trade component of the PACREIP project funded by the EC, managed by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and implemented by SPC, forestry projects funded by GTZ and AusAID Forestry, ACIAR/NZAID/AusAID support for plant genetic resources conservation and use, and SPC programme support for LRD.’

In addition the physical location of the project enhances donor cooperation. ‘For instance the ACIAR (Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research) Pacific crops coordinator sits in the SPC office,

	next door to the FACT office. This has had a good impact on the project, as has, more generally, the location of the project within SPC.' <i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	Le MR de 2010 note que 'le projet est attentif aux synergies possibles :i) en interne AVSF, avec les autres actions menées dans la zone ; ii) avec les organisations paysannes partenaires (en premier lieu l'AAJAC et l'ADPS (association départementale des producteurs de sésame de Vélingara) et groupements de base; ii) avec les autorités régionales et départementales, et les ministères compétents.' <i>Source: MR</i>
<b>BAN</b>	In Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire, the SFA doesn't have any linkage with other programmes. No information on the subject is available in St Vincent and the Grenadines either. In Dominica, there are no structural linkages between SFA and other programmes, apart from the FAO agricultural review process. In Jamaica, the banana SFA has little linkages with other donor's activities. Jamaica also benefits from the EU Accompanying Measures to Sugar Protocol Countries and areas of synergy are being explored, particularly in the formulation of Area Development Plants. The EU is the only supporter of the banana industry but other donor-funded programmes act upon the rural areas as a whole (USAid, IDB, CARICOM-CARIFORUM, etc.) The program is also seeking synergies with the completed IDB Land Titling Project and the IDB Policy-based programme. In St Lucia, there is evidence of coordination with other donors in agricultural development (partnership agreement with the FAO) and in social development (close coordination with the World Bank). In economic diversification, there is no evidence of systematic coordination with other donors although focus has been brought on the OSPR (Office of Private Sector Relations of St Lucia). In Surinam, the SFA banana support forms an integral part of the Strategic Plan for the Agricultural Sector. Other donors (the Netherlands, IDB, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture) also intervene in different sectors influencing directly or indirectly the banana export chain. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country reports, pages 78, 150, 215, 286, 366, 435 &amp; 548 htspe, 2008.</i>
<b>I.4.3.6</b>	Evidence that obtained results in terms of increased agricultural production and producers' capacity to respond to commodity market requirements outlast Commission support
<b>BF</b>	Pas d'évidence à ce sujet, d'autant que les interventions : programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols, interventions du volet coton du Programme tous ACPsont relativement courtes dans leur mise en œuvre (compte tenu aussi de certains retards). Les résultats obtenus en termes d'augmentation de production et de capacité à mieux répondre aux besoins du marché risquent de ne pas être suffisamment consolidés et viabilisés d'autant plus que le financement direct des activités du Programme tous ACP se termine au plus tard fin décembre 2011.
<b>CI</b>	Secteur café-cacao : La viabilité des opérations se rattache à une organisation professionnelle de la filière efficace, complémentaire d'une action de l'Etat qui assure son rôle de régulation et de contrôle. Une démarche de qualité est la synthèse d'un choix du marché et de normes à respecter. Les paysans prendront en compte l'exigence de qualité et le travail que cela impose uniquement s'ils trouvent une réponse dans le prix qui leur est proposé. Secteur coton : Dans le secteur du coton, la viabilité des opérations conduites dépendra de la capacité de l'Etat à imposer un prix aux producteurs, pour autant qu'il soit en mesure de soutenir le différentiel entre le prix économique et le prix social du produit mais surtout d'en assumer et assurer lui-même le paiement. <i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>
<b>CM</b>	The Logone-et-Chari programme in Northern Cameroon provided results which, according to the final evaluation report, will outlast EC support (e.g. the producers organisations that were set up). <i>Source : Evaluation finale du programme de développement rural participatif dans le département du Logone-et-Chari, Rapport final, février 2007</i> In the banana sector however, EU support is still considered mandatory to help the sector survive, given the new market circumstances. <i>Source : MN 993, 994, 995</i> The PACICC programme supporting the coffee and cocoa sectors suffered from delays due to heavy procedures. According to an interviewee, this might hamper the sustainability of the effects of the



	programme. <i>Source : MN 988</i>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005. Nevertheless, the evaluation report highlight that for interventions in support of the productive sectors sustainability needs to be assessed in terms of its viability after support has ended; in other words, whether the agriculture, bananas, sugar, rice, rum, tourism and other supported sectors are capable of undertaking sustainable and profitable engagement in domestic production and international trade. For all these sectors long-term sustainability requires either a fundamental restructuring, the need for which was long predictable, or repositioning according to comparative advantage. A general weakness of the approach to these sectors is that neither global restructuring, nor reorientation of resources in the context of global repositioning, have been effectively addressed, although these are stated objectives. <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>GH</b>	The EC has been supporting Feeder Roads rehabilitation for over 15 years with STabex funds and with EDF funds. However, maintenance of feeder roads is a real problem in Ghana. <i>Source: MN136, Ghana Audit Report</i>
<b>GH</b>	The first phase of the CSSP (2000-2005) focused mainly on uprooting and replanting and the evaluation concludes that the sustainability raised several concerns: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The disease is still not under control at the end of the programme and the programme failed to prevent CSSVD to spread westwards;</li> <li>▪ Some farmers are still awaiting compensation and this undermines confidence in staff</li> <li>▪ there is no monitoring system in place for replanted trees</li> <li>▪ the capacity of farmers for farm maintenance was not factored into the programme so sustainability is at risk</li> </ul> <i>Source: Agrifor 2005</i>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	The MTE raises several points about the sustainability of the CSSP II results: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ At district level, MoFA could replicate if it had the money but is also constrained by the fact that they didn't really benefit much from the project because of insufficient capacity (page 20, MTE 2011). In addition it should be noted that the extension officers that had been trained by the project belong to MOFA whereas in the meantime responsibility for cocoa farmers extension services has moved back from MOFA to Cocobod. The extent to which the officers trained have been recruited by Cocobod is not ascertained.</li> <li>▪ through the STCP-2 National Steering Committee, the CSSP II outcomes should be integrated into a broader national strategy and action plan but according to the MTE there is limited evidence that CSSP II assimilation is being addressed.</li> <li>▪ IITA has proposed the creation of a community based Extension Fund</li> <li>▪ The formation of 56 community associations and the use of ICPM/Q will be maintained if the profits are seen to be positive. Survival of the FOs beyond the period when direct benefits accrue to farmers from the project depends on the income increase which they experience - but this also depends on lots of external factors (world price) – and the access to inputs and support services.</li> </ul> Corroborated by the team's own gathering of information which pointed towards the need for supplementary funds if the initiative is to be extended beyond the limited number of farmers benefiting from the project. The programme is targeting only 4,125 against 800,000 small cocoa farmers and at the moment there is no strategy to ensure that farmers will continue applying the ICPM/Q practices or that there will be alternative sources of funding available to consolidate and/or extend the initiative. The training activities (Farm Field Schools) undertaken by IITA-STCP could be funded by other donors but the format of FFS does not suit Cocobod's organisation/infrastructure where training is centred around more traditional (but expensive) training centres/training hostels. <i>Source: FMO 1992-1993, CSSP II MTE, 2011, MN123.</i>
<b>MG</b>	Non. Selon la Délégation et à quelques exceptions près (par exemple le projet AIM-SOAVA et dans une certain mesure grâce au soutien d'une entreprise privée - Givaudan -aux activités initiées dans le cadre du

	<p>projet), la durabilité des projets et des interventions est généralement « nulle » après l'arrêt des financements (Source : MN 802)</p>
<p><b>TZ</b></p>	<p>The AMSP evaluation raises several questions about the issue of sustainability of the sugar sector's performance. Firstly it explains that the crop is mostly for domestic consumption and the sector is thus not necessarily geared up to be competitive in the EU markets. However, it notes that even at regional level, the sector could only export if the regional markets are somehow protected from international competition of other sugar producing countries with lower costs of production: 'the NAS assumes that the sugar industry will be effectively protected on its domestic and regional markets against the competition by low cost producers. But no evidence is provided that this assumption is realistic.' (ASMP Evaluation, page 26). In illustration of this, as of 2011 the Tanzanian Sugar Board still has the control over domestic imports of sugar (import permits are required to import sugar into Tanzania).</p> <p>In addition the AMPS Evaluation notes that one of the requirements for sustainable sugarcane farming is the putting in place of a financing mechanism of the periodic replanting of sugarcane field; this is not foreseen in the Tanzanian NAS.</p> <p>One notes that the Sugar Board does have independent income in the form of rents from buildings it owns in DSM: the sustainability of the institution is thus not immediately at risk (salaries are paid). <i>Source: AMSP Evaluation, MN 673.</i></p> <p>There is an issue in terms of sustainability as far as Stabex funds are concerned. This concerns TACRI. The Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TACRI) pays salaries of its staff, including TACRI trainers. Coffee producers make a contribution to TACRI: 0.75% of their production sold on the market. In 2010 this was equivalent to around 1 billion TSH (about 455,000 EUR). This seems to be sufficient now to cover operational costs. TACRI has also received additional sources.</p> <p>In 2011, TACRI has been funded through the support of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Stakeholders: around 15%</li> <li>▪ The Government of Tanzania: around 5%</li> <li>▪ EU: around 75%</li> </ul> <p>TACRI launched the TACRI Endowment Fund to try to sustain the institution. STABEX contributes to launch this fund (€6 M). Financial managers manage this fund. UK charity is involved.</p> <p>The issue of sustainability is still very important. The Tanzania Coffee Association is analysing options to sustain TACRI and try to define options:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ TACRI counts on the TACRI Endowment Fund to be part of the sustainability strategy of the coffee research in Tanzania.</li> <li>▪ Coffee growers should agree to increase their contribution to sustain coffee research through TACRI.</li> <li>▪ Own resources (e.g. breeding products and short bank term deposits) may serve to sustain the institute</li> <li>▪ The Government should contribute too</li> <li>▪ The challenge is also to show results to be able to attract funds among the private sector</li> </ul> <p>Challenges of the Tanzanian coffee sector:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Productivity. Problems met: moistures, lack of fertilizers. 90% of the coffee production comes from smallholders. They have no means to invest in fertilizers, chemicals, plants, equipment, etc.</li> <li>(2) Pest and diseases</li> <li>(3) Quality improvement. Need to educate farmers and support farmers to invest in equipment to clean berries (water cleaning). Producers do not use clean water to prepare coffee before selling them. They do not have the material due to a lack of resources to buy it. Arabica coffee is a Premium quality coffee (as Colombian coffee) but producers can not sell it with Premium quality because they do not clean coffee properly.</li> <li>(4) Market instability/ volatility of prices. It is difficult to decide to invest as the price is very volatile.</li> </ol> <p><i>Sources: MN 658, MN 677 and MN 138</i></p> <p>There is an issue in terms of sustainability as far as Stabex funds are concerned. This concerns TRIT. Major constraints of the tea sector: sustainable inputs for smallholders. Processing factors for smallholders</p>


	<p>are a challenge also. Thirdly, the area of tea plantations will need irrigation due to climate change. Then the price to smallholders.</p> <p>Major constraints for small-scale tea farmers: 1) production and sell price -&gt; cost of production; 2) shortage of extension staff; 3) expensive inputs (farmers can not afford inputs).</p> <p>The Government is financing TRIT beyond of farmers. It is paying about 600 millions tsh to TRIT for salaries and other activities. The private sector (TAT) pays 200 millions tsh. TAT owns TRIT: TRIT is private sector. The issue of sustainability of TRIT is really in question. Smallholders feel paying TRIT to the Government contribution. GoT should have a say in what TRIT does since it pays the salaries. The future is very bleak actually. TAT owns TRIT. TRIT is a private company. In 2000, the Government abolished assistance to research. The Tanzania tea industry is young. Coffee is bigger than tea; coffee can afford research costs, but not tea production. That is why the Government put money in tea research through TRIT. The Government is under the process to define what to do in the tea sector. Into the field there is not that much to help smallholders. Farmers are represented in TRIT through the TSHTDA which sit on the TRIT Board but that are not powerful. They are a minority.</p> <p>Challenges: low productivity and low price of green leaves tea and made tea because of low quality of tea. Technology: needs for more tea clones as they are more productive and of better quality. Clones are produced now by TRIT to fill gaps in Tanzania. The Government decides to give funds to tea small farmers to produce clones (2007-2008). <i>Sources: MN 623, MN 666, MN 673, MN 138, MN 662</i></p> <p>Main constraints of the cotton sector in Tanzania:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ low productivity. Here we get on average 250 kg of lint/Ha and in the rest of the world the average would be around 700-750 kg/Ha. We encourage farmers to increase this productivity;</li> <li>▪ the quality of cotton but it is going to change;</li> <li>▪ low application of mechanisation. In some areas we need to pay more attention. Land planting is really important. Need to rain when planting/ seeding. There is a cotton development fund (contributions are made by growers and ginners; it funds research, extension services and subsidies for mechanisation) which can be used for facilitating investments into mechanisation. Ox-weeding is important it can be done in 2 hours instead of 7 days and enables early planting so you can benefit from the rains (otherwise cotton is being planted after all the other food crops and that is very late)</li> <li>▪ We still have the capacity building issues. The institutions/ industries: need a strong private sector and need strong associations (through ITC there has recently been a study on strengthening stakeholders associations). They can reinforce each other in the process.</li> <li>▪ Value addition is important in the cotton sector: inadequate funding of research. Need to think about how to finance cotton research. Adequate extension services to farmers are still also a problem.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: MN 649</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Yes but not only with the increase of agricultural production and producers' capacity to respond to commodity market requirements. All the components of the coffee value chain must be taken into account in the framework of the project in order to ensure sustainability of the project results.</p> <p>Indeed, the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project supported by Stabex has activities dealing with the improvement of productivity and quality but also efficiency of the coffee value chain (improvement of coffee production and better overall farm management, improvement of quality, nursery implementation and <u>organizational development</u>). The biggest challenge: get farmers together and to increase their trust to the project and the creation of farmers' organization: require a long-term work to reach a big mass. (Source: MN 308).</p> <p>The EC highlights that the project approach is very costly and difficult to replicate in other regions. If farmers can support themselves the project, it will mean that the project is sustainable (Source MN 313).</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Le projet POPACA avait pour but d'organiser les filières de produits agricoles (café, cacao, kava, copra, etc.) et organiser les producteurs en coopératives. Le but était également de mettre en place un système de suivi des prix agricoles, pour en informer les producteurs. Depuis l'arrêt du projet en 2007, peu de coopératives sont encore en place; il y a clairement un problème de viabilité. Le projet POPACA a</p>

	également mis en place un <i>revolving fund</i> pour permettre aux producteurs organisés en coopératives d'être payés dès la vente de leurs produits agricoles. <i>Source : MN 1067</i>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	Sustainability of the programme achievements is a key issue to address in the following stage of the evaluation.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	Neither the SADC Secretariat nor the National Agricultural Research Institutes (NARS) will be able and willing to sustain the ICART programme activities and results. The "new" original initiative MAPP did not show a strong interest in the results of the programme. <i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, page 10</i>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	The project produces information, advice and some equipment to selected firms. The MR rightly points out that these outputs for beneficiary firms are being or have already been incorporated into their productive practices, with benefits that will last for as long as the firms remain in production. The equipment in question is generally simple and easy to maintain or replace by the beneficiaries, who have a direct interest in that equipment functioning well. In addition the MR points out that this project (a pilot) will be continued by the SPC even without EC funding but it would have to find alternative funding (as these regional organisations depend on donor funding). <i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>La viabilité potentielle du projet et de ses acquis est fortement remis en question par le MR. Plusieurs arguments sont avancés ;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ comme le projet n'a fait aucune étude préalable de viabilité financière et économique des activités, on questionne le bien fondé de certains investissements (tels qu'un camion pour transporter le sésame alors même qu'on ne sait pas si les niveaux de production seront suffisants pour le justifier et le rentabiliser)</li> <li>▪ les perspectives d'autonomisation des agents supposés reprendre/continuer les activités ne sont pas planifiées (bien qu'il y ait des mesures envisagées pour la dévolution des installations et fonds de roulement)</li> <li>▪ la filière sésame avait déjà bénéficié d'un soutien projet, arrêté pour cause d'absence de viabilité financière, d'investissements surdimensionnées et de filière non raccordée au marché réel.</li> </ul> <p>Par contre le projet est pleinement inscrit dans la logique de la cogestion avec les populations et les organisations paysannes avec des renforcements de capacités permettant d'augurer une bonne perspective de viabilité. <i>Source : MR 2010</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	The Final External Evaluation noted that the supported markets are essentially viewed by local authorities as a source of income and not as a tool that contribute to the local development. This has affected the continuity of markets' activities. The lack of strategic linkages with other initiatives, i.e. synergy with other national based market information initiatives, will limit the functioning of the Market Information System (MIS) after the support of the project. <i>Sources: Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, Appendix 2</i>
<b>BAN</b>	Four of the eight countries targeted have implemented exit strategies and are more likely to have the best transitions from the SFA. There is however no further evidence on the financial sustainability of the SFA tools. The SFA impact evaluation report stated that the strategies followed by the ACP countries oriented towards competitiveness would ensure the sustainability of their banana production over the short to medium term. However, this statement was made before the WTO settlement of 2009. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global report, pages 15 &amp; 30, hispe, 2008.</i>
<b>J.4.4</b>	<b><i>Incomes of producers, sector and countries have improved as a result of Commission's support to the implementation of commodity chain strategies</i></b>
<b>BF</b>	Dans certains cas (anacarde, sésame) et à l'échelle locale, l'intervention soutenue par la Commission a contribué à améliorer les revenus des producteurs. Au niveau des producteurs de coton, les revenus des producteurs et du secteur du coton ne se sont pas améliorés du fait de l'appui de la Commission, mais l'appui de la Commission a contribué à maintenir la filière coton en place.



<p><b>CM</b></p>	<p>The export trends of Cameroon can be seen below. The data was collected from FAOStat as it was not possible to find official statistics in the country. In value (\$1000) :</p>  <p>In tonnes :</p>  <p>There have not been any significant increases in export quantities from 2000 to 2008 (except for cocoa beans in the first four years). From 2006 to 2008 however, the value of exports highly increased for bananas and cocoa beans, due to a rise in world prices. <i>Source : FAO TradeStat</i></p>
<p><b>GH</b></p>	<p>No monitoring of the Commission's impact on incomes was done. Direct beneficiaries of the current EC project say their incomes have improved. On a whole, the value of sales and the quantities of cocoa produced and exported by Ghana have increased significantly. Non-traditional agricultural commodity sales have also increased (in value and in tonnes). However, the Commission's support's contribution to this improvement is quite marginal because the scope of the EC's interventions is narrow and their impact is more likely to be perceived on the long term.</p>
<p><b>MG</b></p>	<p>Les effets positifs des projets Stabex sur les rendements et la qualité et sur l'efficacité des marchés ont eu des effets positifs sur le revenu des producteurs mais ces effets ont été très localisés et restent fortement dépendants de la conjoncture internationale des produits exportés</p>
<p><b>TZ</b></p>	<p>Globally incomes of producers are not assessed in the framework of interventions supported by the</p>

	Commission. However, some information related to incomes has been noticed in the Stabex evaluation report (2007) for the coffee sector: gross margins improved by up to 264%.
<b>UG</b>	Farmers participating in the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project enjoyed a large increase of their in cash income (multiplied by 2.9 and potentially by 6) thanks to higher yields, better quality and higher selling prices. The benefits of the project extend beyond direct beneficiaries. Rural communities also benefit of it through jobs creation, development of the finance sector, development of the building sector, improvement of the education level, etc. But the limited size of the project (35,000 coffee farmers out of 1.3 million) did not allow for an impact at the national level.
<b>VU</b>	Pas d'accroissement des exportations en lien avec les interventions de la Commission; pas de mesure de l'impact sur les revenus.
<b>I.4.4.1</b>	Evidence of increased exports (volume and value) of agricultural commodities to regional and international markets, of which in particular the EU
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence à ce sujet, malgré quelques résultats encourageants mais encore trop partiels enregistrés par la programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologique : la marge brute des producteurs, calculée et suivie depuis 3 ans, serait passée en moyenne de 140 000 à 170 000 FCFA/ha dans le système d'exploitation « coton bio-équitable » et est estimée, en moyenne, supérieure de 25 000 FCFA/ha par rapport à celle obtenue dans le système d'exploitation du « coton conventionnel »</p> <p>D'une part, les appuis sont trop récents et de portée relative assez limitée que pour avoir des impacts significatifs à ce sujet. Par ailleurs, le financement direct des activités du Programme tous ACP se termine au plus tard fin décembre 2011.</p> <p>D'autre part, le contexte de crise financière profonde dans lequel est plongé la filière coton entre 2005 et 2009 a conduit à une tendance lourde nettement baissière des revenus tirés du coton par les producteurs pris en tenaille entre des bas prix d'achat de leur coton graine et des coûts des intrants orientés à la hausse (bien que cette hausse ait été atténué par des subventions apportées par l'Etat et, en partie, par les sociétés cotonnières).</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport narratif 2009 du Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2011. MN 510. Diagnostic de la filière coton et identification d'axes stratégiques, 2007.</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Seule évidence : « Dans un contexte de filières d'exportation, la notion d'impact du programme Stabex est fortement dépendante du facteur marché international qui n'est pas très favorable (à l'exception de celui du cacao) » (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>Le secteur coton, principal bénéficiaire des interventions, ne bénéficie pas d'une bonne conjoncture pour « accompagner » les efforts du programme. Cela ne justifie pas d'abandonner ce secteur plus social qu'économique, dans un tel contexte international et surtout dans le contexte national récent de partition. Le secteur Ananas est en voie de trouver une solution « interne » par le biais de ses importateurs qui souhaitent sécuriser leurs sources d'approvisionnement, suite au retour à la paix chez un partenaire historique. La position de veille dans le secteur café cacao a certainement contribué à alimenter le débat autour de la gouvernance de la filière et plus largement de la gouvernance sectorielle de l'Etat. Les impacts sur ce sujet ne sont pas encore concrétisés mais la coordination des bailleurs de fonds autorise de bons espoirs ». (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>GH</b>	According to the Ghana Living Standards Surveys, the value of sales (in constant Cedis) of cocoa has increased by 172% between 1998 and 2008. Ghana's exports in tonnes between 2000 and 2010 are represented on the figure below (Source: COCOBOD Statistics):



Overall, trade with the EU however has been declining from 2000 to 2010 (see table below):


*Direction of trade in % of total: importance of European Union*

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Exports	54	52.8	53.6	52.2	48.9	27	30.4	31.6	35.2	40.4	32.6
Imports	45.2	34.8	36.5	32	33.1	36.8	23.6	20.9	10.8	24	28.1

*Source: Ghana Living Standards Surveys, eds. 4 (1999) and 5 (2008); COCOBOD Statistics*

**GH**

The following graph shows the value and volumes of cocoa exports (cocoa beans and cocoa products): it shows an increasing trend on both counts and an even faster increase in non traditional exports.



*Source: Bank of Ghana Statistical bulletin several issues.*

**GH Cocoa**

The CSSPII did not realise its baseline data and did not monitor result indicators retained for M&E in the FA.

**GHA**

Apart from increases in non-traditional exports (e.g. pineapples), the export increase over the past years has been considered unsatisfactory. The table below figures in Ghana's 2002-2007 CSP/NIP:

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>IMPORTS in 1000 €</b>									
agricultural products	160,9	194,5	168,8	275,3	296,6	399,1	430,3	517,2	453,6
total imports	717,2	572,1	513,6	778,6	839,2	876,7	940,0	1.217,8	1.164,8
<b>% of total imports</b>									
agricultural products	22%	34%	33%	35%	35%	46%	46%	42%	39%
<b>index 1990 = 100</b>									
agricultural products	82	99	99	141	152	204	220	264	232
total imports	98	78	70	107	115	120	129	167	160
<b>EXPORTS in 1000 €</b>									
agricultural products	72,5	80,3	83,3	63,1	70,2	74,6	85,0	123,0	128,2
total exports	540,1	544,4	631,0	658,0	744,3	984,9	1.109,5	1.148,4	1.099,5
<b>% of total exports</b>									
agricultural products	13%	15%	13%	10%	9%	8%	8%	11%	17%
<b>index 1990 = 100</b>									
agricultural products	121	135	135	106	118	125	142	206	215
total exports	108	109	109	132	149	197	222	230	220
<b>BALANCE in mio euro</b>									
total trade balance	(177,1)	(27,8)	117,4	(120,6)	(94,9)	108,2	169,5	(69,5)	(65,3)
Exports/Imports ratio	75%	95%	123%	85%	89%	112%	118%	94%	94%

Source: Eurostat

Sources: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 46  
Ghana 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 55

**MG** vanilla  
coffee cocoa

Non pour les deux produits ciblés (vanille et café) (Source : Rapport sur les exportations du secteur agriculture – élevage - pêche en 2009, EU Delegation of Madagascar).

« A Madagascar, les exportations du secteur agriculture-élevage-pêche occupent la seconde place, avec 30% du total. Elles ont généré 290 millions USD de recettes en 2009 contre 351 millions USD l'année précédente (-17%). Les exportations de produits animaux (hors pêche) comptent pour moins de 5% du total et sont principalement constituées de cuirs et peaux. Huit (8) produits ou catégories de produits représentent à eux seuls 85% de la valeur des exportations du secteur. Leur performance en 2009 dépend plus de facteurs structurels internes ou de l'état des marchés internationaux, que de l'effet de la crise politique qui a marqué le pays depuis le début de l'année.

Les exportations de crevettes et de vanille, les deux principaux produits, ont connu de sérieuses difficultés en 2009, qui se traduisent par une perte de 77 millions USD de recettes (-47%) par rapport à la moyenne 2006-2008. Les exportations de girofle ont atteint un niveau qui n'a été dépassé qu'en 2001, avec près de 58,6 millions USD pour clous et essence. Depuis 2007, le cacao s'est hissé au 4<sup>ème</sup> rang des exportations du secteur. Sa production est en nette augmentation mais le cacao malgache a perdu la surcote dont il bénéficiait en 2006-2007 pour ses qualités aromatiques. Les produits de la mer (hors crevettes) accusent

	<p>depuis deux ans une baisse significative (-16% en 2008 et -22% en 2009), principalement due à la baisse des exportations de langouste dont la ressource montre des signes d'épuisement. Pour le litchi, le réajustement des volumes à la taille du marché a permis une légère amélioration du prix moyen et ainsi le maintien de la valeur exportée au niveau de 2006 et 2008, dans la fourchette de 12 à 14 millions USD.</p> <p>Les exportations de café ont atteint leur plus bas niveau historique avec moins de 3 millions USD. Les produits des industries alimentaires occupent depuis quelques années une place croissante dans les exportations malgaches. En 2009, la valeur des exportations s'est maintenue au niveau atteint depuis 2006 (entre 55 et 60 millions USD). Toutefois, la bonne performance des industries sucrières (+170%) et exportatrices de conserves de fruits et légumes (+52%) masque d'importantes difficultés pour les autres industries (-16% en 2008 et -31% en 2009). »</p>																																																																								
<b>PAC</b>	<p>No conclusive evidence is given in the evaluation about trade flows. It is however underlined that the Commission interventions in regional integration and trade have contributed to increasing the trade-related capacities of regional bodies as well as to their cohesion on trade-related matters but at the same time limited contribution was made to the development of private sector capacity, despite a lack of capacity for business innovation to take advantage of new opportunities arising from trade liberalisation.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission's support to the ACP Pacific region, 2007, page 2.</i></p>																																																																								
<b>UG</b>	<p>No. Although the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project supported by Stabex is successful (notably in terms of quantity and quality), it reaches only 35,000 farmers out of 1.3 million of coffee "producers". Although the sector is transformed at the regional level when a pool of 35,000 framers are involved (Source: MN 313) the Ugandan coffee production hasn't moved since 50 years according the UCTF (Uganda Coffee Trade Federation): it was estimated at 2.7 million bags in 1964 and it is currently estimated at 2.6 million bags. The latest changes regarding the Ugandan coffee sector are the shift to Arabica production (higher prices than Robusta) and the slow increase of domestic consumption (Source: MN 311).</p>																																																																								
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP final evaluation report notes that ACP fruit &amp; vegetable exports to the EU increased in absolute terms between 2001 &amp; 2006, as shown in table below.</p> <p><b>Table 1: annual progression of the export flows of fruit and vegetables towards Europe between 2001 and 2006</b></p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Rate of progression between 2001 and 2006</th> <th>vegetables</th> <th>bananas</th> <th>citrus fruit</th> <th>pineapples</th> <th>other tropical fruit *</th> <th>other fruit</th> <th>total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Value (1000 Euros)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>ACP export towards EUR 15 (excluding South Africa)</td> <td>16%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>0%</td> <td>-5%</td> <td>8%</td> <td>7%</td> <td>5%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>European imports (EUR 15)</td> <td>17%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>-13%</td> <td>-5%</td> <td>0%</td> <td>42%</td> <td>5%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>European imports (EUR 15)</td> <td>6%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>14%</td> <td>-3%</td> <td>9%</td> <td>7%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Volume (metric tons)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>ACP export towards EUR 15 (excluding South Africa)</td> <td>18%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>-7%</td> <td>12%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>European imports (EUR 15)</td> <td>15%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>-10%</td> <td>-7%</td> <td>8%</td> <td>46%</td> <td>3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>European imports (EUR 15)</td> <td>6%</td> <td>5%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>16%</td> <td>3%</td> <td>7%</td> <td>6%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>* avocados, mangos, guavas, lychee, tamarind, coconut, pawpaw</p> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 22</i></p>	Rate of progression between 2001 and 2006	vegetables	bananas	citrus fruit	pineapples	other tropical fruit *	other fruit	total	Value (1000 Euros)								ACP export towards EUR 15 (excluding South Africa)	16%	4%	0%	-5%	8%	7%	5%	European imports (EUR 15)	17%	4%	-13%	-5%	0%	42%	5%	European imports (EUR 15)	6%	5%	5%	14%	-3%	9%	7%	Volume (metric tons)								ACP export towards EUR 15 (excluding South Africa)	18%	4%	1%	-7%	12%	5%	3%	European imports (EUR 15)	15%	4%	-10%	-7%	8%	46%	3%	European imports (EUR 15)	6%	5%	4%	16%	3%	7%	6%
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<b>AMSP</b>	<p>As noted above (Cf. I.4.2.3) the five SP countries of South Eastern Africa are likely to increase their production and exports of sugar. For the other SP countries, the objective, supported by the AMSP programme, is to maintain their export capacity (Belize, Fiji, Guyana and Mauritius), to supply a larger share of their domestic market (Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, and Tanzania) or to switch to other economic activities (St Kitts &amp; Nevis, Barbados).</p>																																																																								
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Le CL précise l'OG (4) Faciliter l'intégration de populations vulnérables à l'économie mondiale avec pour IOV « Accès aux marchés d'export pour des produits semi-finis répondant aux exigences de qualité de l'UE » et « Accès sécurisé à des marchés d'export sur le sésame de qualité, hausse des volumes commercialisés ». (Source : CL). Le CL définit le résultat (R. 2.2.) « Des volumes de produits agricoles semi-transformés commercialisés en augmentation améliorent l'économie rurale (débouchés locaux et</p>																																																																								

	internationaux) et permet d'insérer des producteurs défavorisés sur des marchés d'export rémunérateurs » (Source : CL).
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Selon le cadre d'intervention de la « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde », les unités de transformation permettent d'augmenter la valeur des produits exportés : l'achat de noix brutes revient 1000 FCFA/kg d'amande, les coûts de transformation 700FCFA/kg d'amande et le produit final est vendu à 2000 FCFA/kg d'amande. La valeur ajoutée brute est donc doublée et la marge brute dégagée par l'activité est de 300FCFA/kg d'amande. Sur le marché équitable, cette marge brute est augmentée à 500FCFA/kg d'amande. En termes de quantités, le projet a abouti à un total d'environ 350 T de noix brutes transformées (estimation en novembre 2010). Source : <i>Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'intervention commenté</i>
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à une hausse des exportations dans les documents consultés en dépit du fait que l'intervention vise à améliorer la productivité des petites exploitations paysannes ou la compétitivité des filières agricoles paysannes d'exportation.
<b>CM-PAS</b>	NA. This intervention has not targeted agricultural commodities. It aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the economy and at facilitating its insertion into the regional and world economy through the implementation of the EU-Central Africa EPA. The various activities do not explicitly target agricultural commodities. Source: <i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The “Support to the competitiveness to the rice sector in the Caribbean” programme aimed at increasing rice exports. Two overall objectives of the programme were directly related to the increased exports: (i) “Rice trade increases by 30% in the Cariforum countries by 2009” and (ii) “Rice trade out of the Caribbean region increases by 20% by 2009”, and one specific objective : “Rice exports above 250,000t/year”. The final evaluation reported the following evidence of sector performance while it stressed that <i>“the impact of the programme on the industry’s performance is inevitably hard to determine given its limited scale, the existence of other support and the effects of changes in market conditions”</i>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “Rice trade increases by 30% in the Cariforum countries by 2009”: <i>“In 2003, which is being used as the base period, 81,682 tonnes were exported to the region from both countries. Since then the overall exports to CARIFORUM countries have fluctuated based on the volume available for export and the price on the market. This indicator is achieved in 2007 with exports of 33,450 tonnes. The increase in the overall percentage of exports to the CARICOM market by the Caribbean rice industry was triggered by the increase in the applications for waiver of the CET because of claims that Guyana and Suriname are unable to satisfy the requests from importing countries like Jamaica. The rice importing countries of the region have indicated their commitment to purchase rice as first preference intra-regionally, providing there is some guarantee of supply on time and quality of product at a competitive price. The CARIFORUM countries have the potential to absorb all the rice being exported from Guyana and Suriname and any increase in production that may be envisaged.”</i></li> <li>▪ “Rice trade out of the Caribbean region increases by 20% by 2009”: <i>In 2003 160,699 metric tonnes were exported outside of the region. However, there have been significant decreases since then, showing a reduction of 10 per cent in 2004, 23 per cent in 2005 and 22 per cent in 2006. Increased prices on the world market have induced greater exports to Europe and this is expressed through an increase in volume of 11 per cent exported in 2007 to 178,839 tonnes. The European market is still considered to be a major market for which approximately 50 per cent of the rice exported from the region is destined. Since the regional market is underserved it is expected that there will be an increase in the volume of exports within the region and an accompanying decrease in exports to Europe over the long-term.”</i></li> <li>▪ “Rice exports above 250,000t/year”: <i>“Total rice exports from Guyana and Suriname in 2003 was 242,381 tonnes. This increased to 294,922 tonnes in 2004, to drop to 218,052 tonnes in 2005 and increase again to 236,393 in 2006. Exports for 2007 were 312,289, which show a significant increase of 28 per cent compared to 2003. This is far above the minimum standard of 250,000 tonnes. However, the fact that the volume of exports fell back to below this level again in 2008 demonstrates the difficulty of claiming such a gain as “permanent”.”</i></li> </ul>

	<i>Sources: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003; SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, pages 12-14</i>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	Between 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 Caribbean rum exports to the EU increased by nearly 70%. This development is however entirely due to an extremely strong increase (172.0%) of rum exports from Trinidad and Tobago. Excluding T&T Caribbean rum exports to the EU have remained stable.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	International coffee buyer's confidence in Ethiopia coffee maintained in all other respect: enough is to mention that from 126,000 tons (\$70 million in value) in 2002-2003 the Ethiopian coffee exports raised to some 171,000 tons (\$425 million in value) in 2006-2007. ( <i>Source: Completion report p.25</i> ).
<b>GH-COC</b>	No such evidence can be found in the monitoring reports of the Cocoa Sector Support Programme II. The second monitoring report states that since it is a medium to long term programme, it is difficult to see results this early in the programme. <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 02, Impact prospects &amp; Effectiveness to date sheet.</i>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Effects due to the PAN-SPSO programme would rather be on the longer term.
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The intervention objective is not the development of agricultural exports but improvement of the food security situation.
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	The FA announces that project indicators include trade revenue, economic returns on traded products, export revenue from internationally competitive AGFOR products supported by the project and data obtained from the 14 PACPS. <i>Source: FA, page 4 and Annex 1.</i> The MR also points out that although at project level there is definitely an impact of facilitating the export activity of the firms with which it works, the impact of this pilot project (even if/when replicated on a larger scale) wouldn't really be felt at the regional level where trade will always be affected by many other factors. Growth in trade is currently affected by the global financial crisis by constraining the resources that certain industries could invest in connection with the project, and more generally by lowering the willingness of exporters to invest as well as by the price of fuel by increasing the costs of shipping from and between island countries. <i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>SN-ONG</b>	Le projet devait contribuer à accroître la production d'anacarde et sésame pour l'exportation mais le dernier RM disponible rapporte que les quantités en jeu sont restées très en deçà des espérances, suite à une défection partielle de nombreux producteurs (vente directe) et de mauvais rendements. La masse critique (masse "critique" : 1 à 2 containers de 15 tonnes) pour réaliser des exportations n'est pas atteinte, mais les perspectives pour la campagne 2010 sont favorables. <i>Source : MR</i>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	No information found. The research and extension components of the PMA supported by the EC SBS programme aimed at increasing agricultural production and the share of this production delivered to the market, but they do not specifically targeted export crops.
<b>VU-POP</b>	The project's third monitoring report states that appreciable export growth in quantities has been observed between 2002 and 2004 but that the 2004 cyclone implied a decline afterwards. <i>Source: Producer Organisation Project II Monitoring Report 03, impact sheet.</i>
<b>TZ Sugar</b>	The sugar industry in Tanzania was supported by the EU but the production is only for the (protected) domestic market. <i>Sources: MN 673, AMSP Evaluation.</i>
<b>BAN</b>	According to the SFA impact evaluation, ACP banana exports to the EU have increased both in absolute

and in market share terms. However, all ACP Caribbean countries (with the exception of Belize) have lost substantial market share over the 1990 to 2007 period. The main African ACP countries (Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire) have increased their market share but at a much slower rate than their Central American competitors. See table below:

#### Evolution of EU banana market shares

Year	EU	ACP countries	Others
1999	15.8 %	17.4 %	63.8 %
2000	16.9 %	16.5 %	66.6 %
2001	17.1 %	16.5 %	66.4 %
2002	17.4 %	16.0 %	66.6 %
2003	16.3 %	17.0 %	66.8 %
2004	16.4 %	17.0 %	66.6 %
2005	14.8 %	17.5 %	67.7 %
2006	13.3 %	18.5 %	68.2 %

*Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 6, htspe, 2008.*

There has been a decline in the share of traditional Caribbean suppliers among ACP banana exports to the EU (from 52.3% in 1992 to 13.7% in 2005). This decrease has been balanced by an increase in African exports (37.4% of ACP total in 1992 to 57.5% in 2005) and of exports from the Dominican Republic and Belize (from 9.8% in 1992 to 28.8% in 2005). *Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 7, htspe, 2008.*

<b>I.4.4.2</b>	Evidence that foreign exchange earnings at country level have stabilised and increased due to improved performance of agricultural commodity related products in regional and international markets
<b>BF Coton</b>	Pas d'évidence à ce sujet. D'une part, les appuis sont trop récents et de portée relative assez limitée que pour avoir des impacts significatifs à ce sujet. D'autre part, le contexte de crise financière profonde dans lequel est plongé la filière coton entre 2005 et 2009 a conduit à une tendance lourde nette ment baissière chute du volume de production de coton de plus de 50% avec des prix (surtout ramenés en FCFA) n'évoluant en moyenne que légèrement à la hausse (du moins jusqu'en mars 2009). <i>Source : Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2011. MN 510.</i>
<b>CI</b>	Seule évidence : « Dans un contexte de filières d'exportation, la notion d'impact du programme Stabex est fortement dépendante du facteur marché international qui n'est pas très favorable (à l'exception de celui du cacao) » (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	According to an interview with stakeholders of the coffee and cocoa value chains in Cameroon, impacts on the incomes of producers are mostly due to price variations. The programmes undergone in the recent years are very small and would not have influenced the country. <i>Source : MN 913</i> According to the Ministry of Trade, foreign exchange earnings are of major importance from cocoa and coffee. These have increased in recent years, due to high prices on the world market. This high price level is at the bases of the recovery of coffee and cocoa subsector. The recovery plan and its various projects accompanying this trend should lead to improved performance in the future. In addition, coffee and



	cocoa are the two only commodities for which a legal frame exists for marketing. This legal frame is published every year and includes various quality requirements. International standards are included. <i>Source: MN 405</i>
<b>GH</b>	In Ghana there has been a remarkable increase in the value and volume of cocoa exports over the past 10 years.
<b>MG</b>	Non pour les deux produits ciblés.
<b>SADC</b>	In SADC, the perception of the openness of Member States to trade has remained static between 2000 and 2007. This would suggest that while the region has liberalised and reduced tariffs through e.g. the SADC Trade Protocol, barriers to trade may be changing shape rather than falling away. Agriculture is a particularly sensitive area and subject to non tariff restrictions that are due to removed in 2008. The removal of non tariff barriers is likely to benefit those exporters and traders on lowest income relatively more than the larger companies that are better able to cover the fixed costs of NTBs through economies of scale. Trade barriers are being reduced, but at slow pace. The legal framework in Member States is also slow in being harmonised with the SADC protocols, which would otherwise speed up the process of reducing the trade barriers. <i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to SADC, October 2007, pages 30 &amp; 31 &amp; 57</i>
<b>UG coffee</b>	No such evidence as a result of EC support (see I.4.4.1) but the international prices of coffee has substantially increased over the last years and the foreign exchange earnings have probably increased as a consequence. Indeed, the production value is increasing because of higher prices but the volume is going down (diseases...) (Source: MN 301)
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	The PIP final evaluation report mentions that the programme contributed to stabilise ACP market shares among EU fruit & vegetable imports. There is however no evidence of that sort of stability at country levels. According to interviews, there are significant differences at between countries. In African Anglophone countries (e.g. Kenya, Uganda...), trading standards imposed by retailers in the UK had already made the exporters adopt a proactive methodology. They were the first to come ask the PIP for support. In Francophone countries, where the constraints came later, the pace was slower. Other factors include which sectors were being exported to. Constraints were stronger for the retail sector than for the wholesale sector and much stronger than for the ethnic sector. In countries aiming mainly at the ethnic sector (e.g. Dominican Republic), response was slower. Furthermore, countries with a year-long production such as Kenya presented a more organised chain than seasonal production countries (e.g. Senegal) for which it has been more of a challenge. The war in Côte d'Ivoire made things change drastically for that country. Pineapple exports dropped severely. However mango exports increased during that period, so there must have been other factors than the war that influenced the situation. Finally, the situation also depends on public support service providers. Generally, the national capacity building was proportionate to the dynamism of the sector. Kenya has a well organised, financed and infrastructure-fledged sector. The situation was mixed in Ghana, where the market requirements changed for pineapples and the country had to change its whole production system. Exports therefore declined but are now re-increasing. The PIP usually has a standard approach which becomes customised depending on the particularities of each country. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 79; MN 958</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	Foreign exchange earnings of SP countries have diminished because of the 36% reduction of the sugar price in the EU. Only the most competitive ones (the five low cost sugar producers of South Eastern Africa) may hope to compensate this price loss by an increase of their export volume.
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune preuve des documents de l'intervention de la « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » ne permettent de tirer de telles conclusions.
<b>CR-RUM</b>	The Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector should allow Caribbean producers to export branded rum sold at a higher price than the standard rum they used to export. However ComExt statistics do not reveal any significant increase of the average price of rum exports to

	the EU between 2000-2002 and 2007-2009.
<b>GH-COC</b>	No such evidence can be found in the monitoring reports of the Cocoa Sector Support Programme II. The second monitoring report states that since it is a medium to long term programme, it is difficult to see results this early in the programme. <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 02, Impact prospects &amp; Effectiveness to date sheet.</i>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Effects due to the PAN-SPSO programme would rather be on the longer term.
<b>UG-COF</b>	No data found yet. But we know that coffee growers involved in the project have been UTZ certified in 2007. This should allow them to sell their coffee at a higher price.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	No information found. The research and extension components of the PMA supported by the EC SBS programme aimed at increasing agricultural production and the share of this production delivered to the market, but they do not specifically targeted export crops.
<b>BAN</b>	Not much evidence appears in the SFA impact evaluation, although an increase in export earnings is often mentioned as goal in the report. Comments appear about the decrease of banana export earnings in absolute or relative terms (e.g. in Windward Islands, Jamaica). Export earnings from bananas increased slightly in Belize (7.2% increase in export quantity between 2002 and 2004 mostly balanced by price decrease). <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country Reports, pages 16, 266 &amp; 340 bispe, 2008.</i>
<b>I.4.4.3</b>	Evidence that income levels at producer level and within the agricultural sector as a whole have stabilised and increased through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The increased competitiveness of the agricultural commodity production</li> <li>▪ A diversification of the sources of income of the agricultural sector through expansion of agricultural commodity value added</li> <li>▪ Higher export earnings</li> </ul>
<b>BF</b>	Pas d'évidence à ce sujet. D'une part, les appuis sont trop récents et de portée relative assez limitée que pour avoir des impacts significatifs. Par ailleurs, le financement direct des activités du Programme tous ACP se termine au plus tard fin décembre 2011. D'autre part, le contexte de crise financière profonde dans lequel est plongé la filière coton entre 2005 et 2009 a conduit à une tendance lourde nettement baissière des revenus tirés du coton par les producteurs pris en tenaille entre des bas prix d'achat de leur coton graine et des coûts des intrants orientés à la hausse (bien que cette hausse ait été atténué par des subventions apportées par l'Etat et, en partie, par les sociétés cotonnières). <i>Source : Mise à jour relative au partenariat Union européenne – Afrique sur le coton, mai 2011.</i> Pour le projet anacarde-sésame mis en œuvre par l'INADES-B, en termes de mesure des impacts et de l'augmentation des revenus, l'INADES-B a mis en place des plans de suivi. L'information collectée dans le cadre des projets permet de tracer les résultats obtenus. Mais il ya un besoin d'affiner l'analyse pour voir si INADES-B est la source de l'amélioration des revenus des producteurs. Il y a d'autres partenaires dans la zone : financement Bill et Melinda Gates (ICA), Ministère Environnement (soutenu par la coopération luxembourgeoise). Pour le sésame, l'INADES-B est le seul à intervenir. C'est très parlant en termes de revenus. Par exemple: les semenciers ont été formés et commencent à vendre les semences de sésame, ce qui a permis d'améliorer les revenus. Par ailleurs, l'action INADES-B a permis aux producteurs de faire des ventes groupées, parfois supérieures au prix du marché. <i>Source : MN551</i>
<b>CI</b>	Non (de manière générale). Secteur coton : Bien que l'objectif spécifique initial est l'augmentation du revenu des exploitations agricoles par l'amélioration du fonctionnement des filières d'exportation ou de substitution aux importations, le Stabex a contribué au sauvetage du secteur coton et des petits opérateurs bénéficiaires mais sans accroissement significatif des revenus des exploitations agricoles, par une prise en charge de la dette des opérateurs défaillants. L'incidence de la pauvreté rurale a significativement progressé

	<p>dans les zones de production cotonnières depuis 2001. Cela se traduit, autant sur le revenu des producteurs que sur leurs conditions de vie (dégradation ou disparition des services sociaux et économiques). Secteur café/cacao : L'étude sur les revenus et les investissements des producteurs de café et de cacao, confirment l'appauvrissement progressif et continu des ménages (lié au partage déséquilibré de la marge produite sur le produit, au vieillissement des vergers, et à la dégradation des services de productivité). <i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>According to an interview with stakeholders of the coffee and cocoa value chains in Cameroon, impacts on the incomes of producers are mostly due to price variations.</p> <p>Diversification of production is a natural phenomenon for those crops. The producers tend to them if the price is interesting. <i>Source : MN 913</i></p> <p>L'installation de séchoirs à cacao par le Mungo Nkam et leur location auraient généré d'importantes sources de revenu, au point d'avoir fait l'objet d'une taxe des municipalités annulée par la suite par le MINADER. <i>Source : Evaluation du PDR Mungo-Nkam</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The final evaluation of CSSP I as well as the final evaluation of CSSP II or the current evaluation mission met the same twofold problem:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The absence of any provision in the project design for monitoring farm level yields from newly planted trees and farm level income generated thereby. Any assessment has thus to rely on the farmers perception of how they have benefited from the different phases of the project to what extent such benefits have improved the quality of their living.</li> <li>▪ The absence of centrally gathered data by GoG.</li> </ul> <p>The Agrifor 2005 evaluation of CSSP I actually relied on interviewing farmers having benefitted from the first phase (1994-1998) of the project since reaping full benefits from new tree planting only occurs after 8 to 10 years (the time is shorter now). They found that the increase in production was highly dependent upon the type of farmer: the young ones who had adopted the correct husbandry practices could get as much as 3 to 4 times higher yield. The others up to 2 times. <i>'The medium and big farm owners of younger age seems to be the one who have benefited most from the programme phase 1. There has been spectacular change in their living standards, which started to have a demonstration effect on other younger farmers.'</i></p> <p>One of the EU interventions in Ghana is a sectoral budget support programme aiming at improving trade conditions for the country in the framework of the EPA negotiations. One of the targets to be reached by the budget supported programme was to increase the share of the country's non-traditional exports (including cocoa paste, tuna, cocoa butter, shea nuts, pineapples, bananas, etc.). This share increased from 25% in 2006 to 27.7% in 2007.</p> <p>Furthermore, according to the Ghana Living Standards Surveys, the value of sales (in constant Cedis) of cocoa has increased by 172% between 1998 and 2008. The mean household income in the rural forest region of Ghana rose by 77%, while the one of Ghana as a whole rose by 115%. The household agricultural income in the whole country increased by 54% (same rate as other sectors).</p> <p>Overall, Ghana's non-traditional exports (in US \$) increased by 40% between 2007 and 2010. The exports of cocoa processed products increased by 279% during those same years, mainly through the increase of cocoa paste exports. <i>Source: MN 964; Ghana Living Standards Surveys, eds. 4 (1999) and 5 (2008)</i></p> <p>According to interviews, the incomes of cocoa farmers who participated in the "Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme – phase II" increased thanks to increased yields and training on good farming practices and accounting. <i>Source: MN 943</i></p> <p>The MTE states that: <i>'In major cocoa growing areas, income generation has been the major contributor to poverty reduction reducing poverty levels from 60% in 1992 to 24% in 2006 – in fact, reducing poverty in those areas at a faster rate than for the overall population, which fell from 52% to 29% over the same period. Cocoa has played a key role in Ghana's recent achievement of middle income status.</i></p> <p><i>It is projected to continue to grow at about 6% annually and should remain the most important agricultural commodity, accounting for about 60% of agricultural exports by 2015'. (MTE page 18). Source: CSSP II MTE 2011</i></p> <p>In 1997/98 the cocoa sector is composed of 426,000 cocoa farmers on 534,000 farms on 1.45 million Ha. Average yields are between 240 Kg/Ha to 250 Kg/Ha. <i>Source: Agrisystems, 1999.</i></p>

<b>MG</b>	Très peu d'évidences à ce sujet. Selon notre appréciation personnelle, les revenus des producteurs malgaches restent très bas. Seule évidence citée par des bénéficiaires du projet AIM-SOAVA (exception): la diversification des cultures de rente permet de mieux étaler les revenus monétaires tout au long de l'année même si les bas prix internationaux (vanille) grèvent les prix de vente et que l'amélioration de la qualité ne semble pas avoir d'impact direct sur les prix (Source: MN 814)
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs. Current EC projects have impacted on farmers' income through various channels, mainly: increased productivity, increased quality and selling prices, better access to credit, better management capacity, and improved access to buyers. Both in-depth studies in the agricultural sector show very significant impacts on beneficiary farmers and some positive indirect effects (e.g. EC support to the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute). The evaluation underlines that benefits would have been even higher if the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute project had been part of a local development approach also dealing with rural roads and access to credit. <i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to the United Republic of Tanzania, April 2006, pages 37 and 38.</i>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Tea nurseries have been developed. Farmers have been able to do money savings. In other words, farmers' income has been increased. This has enabled the construction of the offices for the association's board, the construction of a dispensary and houses for doctor and nurses and set up a lending scheme. Farmers mentioned also that 27 children have been sent to university due to incomes' increase related to tea production. Revenues from the sales of tea leaves have also allow purchasing a truck to transport green leave. They are currently embarking on a GL weighing center in association with the Tea Board and the district. <i>Source: MN164</i></p> <p>Incomes from coffee are quite high. Cooperatives however diversify their crops. Producers try to improve the quality of the crops to increase their revenue. In the Fair Trade system, extra coffee revenue paid to the cooperatives may be used to pay children's schools. This up to the decision of every cooperative. <i>Source: MN 690</i></p> <p>TACRI has conducted economic studies about the use of new varieties against traditional varieties. This has assessed the return on research investment. Lessons learnt show that new varieties mean profit for producers. A total of four socioeconomic studies were carried out during the 2007-2008 period in four principal Arabica coffee farming districts (Arumeru, Mbinga, Hai and Moshi). These studies have provided lessons learnt about the challenges of smallholder coffee productivity, quality and profitability as far as the economic return of new varieties is concerned, the studies have shown that the gross margin for improved varieties equals in average 1,530,234 TSH against 523,296 TSH for traditional varieties. <i>Source: MN 677</i></p> <p>Cotton Board monitors cotton revenue to farmers. Farmers received 60% of the final price. The problem seems to be the productivity but not the price. Input supply and extension services constraint cotton productivity. <i>Source: MN 649</i></p> <p>None of the institutions interviewed (whether crop boards, ministries or research centres) collects and analyses farmers income data. The National bureau of statistics: collects on income every 5 years but there is no specific analysis of farmers incomes. The MoAFSC does not follow-up on the evolution of incomes of farmers. There are no impact studies. Now they are doing something on follow-up of coffee producers. The MoA's marketing department has been transferred to the Trade &amp; Industry Ministry 4 years ago.</p> <p>None of the interventions that have been supported by the EU over the past 10 years in agriculture have been the subject of an ex-post evaluation including the effect of the interventions upon farmers' incomes. <i>Source: MN604</i></p> <p>“Significant improvement in yields and savings in cost of production have been demonstrated with new improved varieties delivering 30-50% cost savings and gross margins improved by up to 264%.” <i>Source: EVALUATION OF ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY 1994/99 STABEX TRANSFERS, 2007.</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	Incomes from activities in rural areas have slightly increased. There is evidence that the rural population needs to increase off-farm and non-farm income. An increasing number of subsistence farmers are gradually switching to commercial farming but there is not any convincing evidence that a significant part

	<p>of the rural population has benefited from an increase in agricultural income. The selling-off of small agricultural surpluses and income-generating activities beyond the farm gate has apparently contributed to a decrease in poverty. Information available shows that increases in household income are lower than expected. Numerous interventions financed by EC under project approach (Stabex funds, micro-projects etc) have contributed to increase locally income of rural population. According to a recent impact evaluation, farmers who have benefited from NAADS support have shown slight improvements in their productivity, in form of increased yields and production, but many districts have benefited from NAADS services only during the last years, and not all farmers are covered (or are yet to be covered) and therefore do not receive services; only farmers organised in farmers group benefit from services, and quality of services is variable. <i>Source: Uganda Country Strategy Evaluation</i></p> <p>Yes, through Stabex projects. For instance, the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project, with activities regarding the improvement of productivity, quality and efficiency of the coffee value chain (improvement of coffee production and better overall farm management, improvement of quality, nursery implementation and organizational development), had an objective to improve the farmers' income. Indeed, farmers enjoyed a large increase of their in cash income (multiplied by 2.9 and potentially by 6) thanks to higher yields, better quality and higher selling prices. Nevertheless, the major risk for these farmers and the project sustainability remains the decline and the variability coffee prices although some experts forecast that they will remain at a high level because of growing domestic consumption in coffee exporting countries (Source: MN 308).</p> <p>Yes, through Stabex projects. For instance, the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project, with activities regarding the improvement of productivity, quality and efficiency of the coffee value chain (improvement of coffee production and better overall farm management, improvement of quality, nursery implementation and organizational development), had an objective to improve the farmers' income. Indeed, farmers enjoyed a large increase of their in cash income (multiplied by 2.9 and potentially by 6) thanks to higher yields, better quality and higher selling prices. Nevertheless, the major risk for these farmers and the project sustainability remains the decline and the variability coffee prices although some experts forecast that they will remain at a high level because of growing domestic consumption in coffee exporting countries (Source: MN 308).</p> <p>Before the project, total annual coffee income (computed using 09/10 main crop prices) generated by the 15,000 project farmers would have been approximately USD 1.8M. However, with the current production levels, if all the project farmers sold all their coffee through their DC Companies, the total annual income generated would reach USD 5.6M; this would mean an additional flow of income of USD 3.8M per annum into the project area to further drive the local economy. It also has to be considered that the above computations do not take into account the additional production from new planting, as on average, every farmer has planted an additional 168 coffee trees. Upon maturity, these new trees will significantly further boost overall production and incomes, i.e. an additional annual 3,000 MT of FAQ coffee with an approximately value of USD 3.1M. <i>Source: Kaweri Coffee Farmers' Alliance Support Project, End of Project Report</i></p> <p>Land productivity remains very low across all the enterprises (crops and livestock raising) analysed. This is so for a diversity of reasons but partial adoption appears to be one of them since most farmers are not using the entire technology package recommended by NARO. <i>Source: Impact assessment of NAO (2009)</i></p> <p>NAADS appears to have helped farmers to avoid the large declines in farm income that affected most farmers between 2000 and 2004, especially in the pilot NAADS districts. Given the generally limited and mixed impacts observed of NAADS on yields of different crops, this beneficial impact probably was due more to encouraging farmers to diversify into profitable new farming enterprises than to increases in productivity caused by NAADS. <i>Source: Quantifying the impact of NAADS in the Uganda livelihoods (2005)</i></p>
VU	<p>Pour les interventions de la CE dans le domaine agricole, il n'y a eu aucune mesure de l'impact des interventions en termes de revenus pour les producteurs ou le secteur agricole (par exemple, cacao). <i>Source : MN 1067</i></p>

<b>ACP-ACP</b>	L'impact en matière d'amélioration des revenus des producteurs est considéré plutôt anecdotique à ce stade du programme. A un niveau micro, il y a quelques exemples de revenus de producteurs qui ont augmenté ou de réduction des coûts de production. Aux Caraïbes, on ne note pas une amélioration de la compétitivité. Dans la partie du programme AAACP relative au soutien de la production des racines, il y eu augmentation des revenus des producteurs mais pas vraiment de la compétitivité en soi de la filière. L'impact est surtout au niveau micro. L'amélioration de la productivité se situe au niveau du producteur, ce qui entraîne une de facto amélioration des conditions de vie des producteurs. Aux Samoa, il est nécessaire au niveau des unités de transformation de faire des progrès pour arriver à exporter car il faut répondre à un cahier des charges, notamment en ce qui concerne les normes phytosanitaires, pour aller sur des marchés comme l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. <i>Source : Meeting note reference number MN 641</i>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	The PIP final evaluation report states that the growth in absolute terms of fruit & vegetable from ACP countries to the EU has increased the income distributed to rural areas, by increasing jobs within exporting companies or by increasing income of independent producers. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 11</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	In the five low cost sugar producing countries of South Eastern Africa, extension of the sugarcane surface resulted in higher incomes for former subsistence farmers. In the other SP countries, sugarcane growers, which are paid a percentage of the net revenue derived from sugar sales, suffered from the price reduction of sugar exports.
<b>CI-REH</b>	I) Hévéa. Après un an de projet, l'impact sur le développement socio-économique et la réduction de la pauvreté est déjà perceptible grâce à la création d'emplois rentables chez les jeunes démunis. D'autres impacts sont également fortement probables : i) génération de revenus des petits planteurs grâce à l'accès aux plants subventionnée ; ii) chiffre d'affaire prévu de 12 500 000 FCFA par ha de pépinière ; iii) augmentation des surfaces plantées (5000 ha prévus pour 2010-2011) ; iv) développement de nouveaux fronts de culture, jusqu'alors non exploités car enclavés ; v) augmentation de production des industries de transformation (SOGB, CHC, SAPH) ; vi) augmentation progressive de l'offre de plants de qualité ; vii) amélioration de la qualité du caoutchouc (clones performants) et de la rentabilité des plantations. ( <i>Source : MR p.3</i> ) II) Palmier. Aucun impact n'est actuellement perceptible. Les impacts probables dans le Bas-Sassandra sont les mêmes que l'hévéa, avec un CA par an et par ha de pépinière estimée à 11 200 000 FCA. Par contre, les plants n'étant pas subventionnés par l'AIPH pour l'instant, il est peu probable que l'impact sur le développement économique des petits planteurs soit visible. L'impact dans le Moyen Cavally risque d'être assez limité du fait de l'insuffisance de débouchés en termes de capacité de transformation sur place pour absorber 1 500 nouveaux ha en année 1, avec une augmentation annuelle. ( <i>Source : MR p.3</i> )
<b>ET-CIP</b>	Marketing actions aiming at increasing the value for small farmers are still missing. The small farmers' revenues are still very low; their annual income from coffee being € 500 in the very best instances, with the average being € 200-300, as described above. The market position of small farmers is weak, and they have little negotiating capacity and power. The highest quality of washed coffee is sold at less than € 1/Kg by the farmers in Yirgachefee; while at the shops in Addis Ababa the price has already increased fourfold. ( <i>Source: MR 2008 p.3</i> ).
<b>GH-COC</b>	No such evidence can be found in the monitoring reports of the Cocoa Sector Support Programme II. The second monitoring report states that since it is a medium to long term programme, it is difficult to see results this early in the programme. <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 02, Impact prospects &amp; Effectiveness to date sheet.</i> According to the Ghana Country Strategy Evaluation Report, Ghana doesn't have any comparative advantage in terms of locating cocoa processing industries because of : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Important economies of scale in the cocoa industry which imply a small number of large production plants</li> <li>▪ The requirement of the use of cocoa beans from several different origins.</li> </ul>

	<p>The report states that for these reasons, the tariffs imposed by the EU on manufactured cocoa products don't impede the development of a cocoa industry which would anyway not be viable.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Country Strategy Evaluation report 2005, page 94</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Effects due to the PAN-SPSO programme would rather be on the longer term, but would not concern diversification.</p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The intervention objective is not the development of agricultural exports but improvement of the food security situation.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Le rapport ROM constate par contre que le projet, dans sa totalité et mis à part le volet "coton biologique", n'envisage qu'insuffisamment les alternatives à la filière coton, qui au niveau macroéconomique est génératrice de pertes. Il estime, à l'exemple du volet "coton biologique", que la bonne voie est de s'intéresser à d'autres cultures complémentaires, voyant ainsi la production agricole dans son intégralité en évitant de considérer le coton comme activité isolé des autres composantes d'une exploitation agricole". Il estime également que c'est seulement par cette approche qu'une différenciation de la production agricole, qui résultera dans une spécialisation des agriculteurs selon leurs aptitudes et en fonction de leurs équipements et disponibilités de terres aptes à la culture de coton, peut être entamée (BCS, § 4.2). Plus globalement, le rapport ROM estime que l'impact de la filière sur la pauvreté ne peut être décrit que comme négatif, c'est à dire qu'elle constitue une trappe de pauvreté pour les paysans vulnérables, insuffisamment équipés pour affronter les complexités de la culture du coton. La pratique de sa culture a tendance à endetter les producteurs qui ne se trouvent pas en mesure de produire des quantités suffisantes (de 1.500 kg de coton graine selon AFD). Cet aspect n'est pas suffisamment pris en compte par le projet, qui souffre du fait de ne pas accepter que la culture du coton s'adresse aux producteurs les plus performants. Sans une mise à l'écart des producteurs faibles, l'appui à la filière coton risque d'accroître la pauvreté des campagnes par endettement (BCS, §7.3). <i>Source: ROM/BCS</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The FA announces that project indicators include trade revenue, economic returns on traded products, export revenue from internationally competitive AGFOR products supported by the project and data obtained from the 14 PACPS. <i>Source: FA, page 4 and Annex 1.</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.</p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Le projet prévoyait que pour 2500 familles concernées par le projet, il y aurait une incidence positive suivante :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Pour le sésame, en partant de données moyennes de 1,25 ha par familles avec un rendement avoisinant les 400 kg/ha et en estimant que l'appui du projet permettra d'augmenter ce rendement de 25% et permettra de commercialiser un minimum de 20% de cette production avec le prix minimum FLO (soit 500 Fcfa/kg contre 200 Fcfa en conventionnel), le revenu moyen tiré du sésame devrait passer de 100 000 Fcfa à 160 000 Fcfa par familles et par an (soit env. 91 euros d'augmentation). Cette situation devant concerner 2 000 familles paysannes (1500 dans le département de Sédhiou et 500 à Vélingara), les revenus totaux générés s'élèveraient à 120 millions de Fcfa/an (180 000 euros/an) soit 90 millions Fcfa (165 000 euros) pour le département de Sédhiou et 30 millions Fcfa (55 000 euros) pour le département de Vélingara)</li> <li>▪ Concernant l'anacarde, en estimant également qu'au minimum 25% de la production sera commercialisée au prix minimum FLO de 600 Fcfa/kg équivalent noix brute (contre 125 Fcfa actuellement) et en partant d'une moyenne de production d'environ 250 kg de noix brute/familles, le revenu moyen par famille issu de la commercialisation de l'anacarde devrait passer d'environ 30 000 Fcfa à 60 000 Fcfa par famille et par an (soit 45 euros d'augmentation). Considérant le nombre de bénéficiaires visés par l'action les revenus totaux générés s'élèveraient à env. 23 000 euros/an pour le Vélingara.</li> </ul> <p>Le MR note que le projet n'a démarré qu'en 2008 et qu'il est donc trop tôt pour s'attendre à voir des</p>

	<p>effets/impacts sur les revenus ; il note par ailleurs que les rendements ont été moins élevés que prévus. Le dernier MR note que : 'Les produits du projet n'ont pas encore produit les effets escomptés. Donc, les impacts restent lointains, au stade de perspectives. Les impacts les plus probables concernent : i) l'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations qui auront su pleinement entrer dans la logique du projet ; ii) la dynamisation et l'autonomisation des OP partenaires, et leur capacité à poursuivre les initiatives pour une adaptation à l'évolution de la situation.' A part le caractère récent des résultats obtenus les impacts sont aussi difficiles à estimer à cause de la faible intensité réelle des actions menées, les différentes activités étant souvent présentées plus comme des expérimentations (ou tests) que comme des activités définies de façon volontariste avec des objectifs quantifiés et une ambition suffisante pour "marquer" le paysage et la société cible. <i>Source: MR, Descriptif Action.</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>The Final External Evaluation noted that services offered by the project and the supported markets to farmers were not comprehensive enough to address the marketing conditions and increased incomes. However, in some cases, supported farmers have increased quite considerably their farmlands (e.g. by almost 200% in Kibaigwa) and small towns have emerged that offer services (shops, kiosks, etc.) closer to farmers. <i>Sources: Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, Appendix 2</i></p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>"Roughly one fourth to one third of the households perceived that their farm income had increased between 2000 and 2004 (either moderately or significantly) (Table 23), a quarter of the farmers perceived that their farm incomes decreased, while the remaining felt no significant change in their income. The non-NAADS sub-counties reported the largest share of households that felt their farm income either did not change or decreased, while the trailblazing NAADS sub-counties reported the largest share of households that felt their farm income increased." <i>IFPRI, Assessing NAADS impact, 2007, p. 38</i></p> <p>However these results are not directly related to commodity production since NAADS provides demand-driven extension services with no specific focus on agricultural commodities.</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The project aimed inter alia at increasing farm gate income by 20%. The monitoring report stated that goal as unrealistic. There is no evidence in the reports of an income increase. <i>Source: Producer Organisation Project II Monitoring Report 03, impact sheet.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>According to the SFA impact evaluation report, income effects are likely to be low or negligible for diversification programmes, whereas economic growth programmes probably gave better results. But since income effects have not been monitored by the country programmes, the assessment teams were unable to estimate them. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 28 bispe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.4.4.4</b>	<p>Producer/ farmer organisations and producers views on the effectiveness of increased competitiveness as an income increasing and stabilising tool and on the benefits from improved access to regional and international markets</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Le Groupement de producteurs de coton Kopena est bénéficiaire d'un champ-école mis en place par la FAO dans le cadre du Programme Tous ACP. Le champ-école a été installé il y a deux ans et les producteurs du groupement ont reçu une formation sur les bonnes pratiques agricoles en coton. Ils sont satisfaits de ces formations. Avant l'arrivée du champ-école, les producteurs rencontrés cultivaient le coton de manière extensive, large étendue avec peu de rendement. Depuis que le champ école est installé, les producteurs produisent du coton de manière plus intensive.</p> <p>Grâce au changement de pratiques agricoles, le rendement de coton s'est accru : 805 kg/ ha avec les pratiques agricoles paysannes traditionnelles à 1675 kg/ ha avec les bonnes pratiques agricoles enseignées dans le champ-école. Alors que les producteurs n'ont pas témoigné formellement d'une augmentation de leurs revenus, l'accroissement de la productivité est notable. <i>Source : MN 500 Focus Group</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>According to interviewees, the intervention of the EU in the cocoa and coffee sectors in Cameroon are useful (e.g. better access to information). However several important constraints remain and hamper the competitiveness of the sector : plantations are widely spread out and small, and the infrastructure is highly</p>



	deficient (roads, electricity...). According to interviewees, the EU support to the competitiveness of the banana sector of Cameroon has been very important for the survival of the country's companies throughout the past years. <i>Source : MN 913, MN 993</i>
<b>GH-Cocoa</b>	According to an interview with a farmer organisation, the "Cocoa Sector Support Programme – phase II" has led to improving the farmers' income through an improvement of farming and management techniques. <i>Source: MN 943</i>
<b>MG</b>	Seule évidence citée par des bénéficiaires du projet AIM-SOAVA (exception): la diversification des cultures de rente permet de mieux étaler les revenus monétaires tout au long de l'année même si les bas prix internationaux (vanille) grèvent les prix de vente et que l'amélioration de la qualité ne semble pas avoir d'impact direct sur les prix (Source: MN 814) La vision des producteurs agricoles reste de manière générale portée sur le (très) court-terme.
<b>TZ</b>	Producers are satisfied with TACRI support to coffee in the region of Moshi. This can be seen through the following elements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ There is a strong demand for seedlings that can not be afforded by TACRI;</li> <li>▪ They appreciate to learn about techniques to grow coffee;</li> <li>▪ Small groups are more and more interested by nurseries.</li> </ul> <i>Source: MN 690</i> Competitiveness of the tea industry in Tanzania: sometimes we are more competitive (e.g. against Malawi). Tea is volume, exchange rate and quality. <i>Source: MN 673</i>
<b>UG</b>	Through the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project the EC supported by Stabex, farmer organizations which enhanced the capacity of the coffee sector to meet the market requirements in terms of quality and quantity were established at village, parish and national levels. 24 Depot Committees (parish level) have been registered as Companies and carry out primary processing and deliver hulled green coffee directly to exporters in Kampala (Source: MN 308). The farmers are very satisfied of the support to activities related to the improvement of productivity, quality and efficiency of the coffee value chain (improvement of coffee production and better overall farm management, improvement of quality, nursery implementation and organizational development). The benefits of the project extend beyond direct beneficiaries. Rural communities also benefit of it through jobs creation, development of the finance sector, development of the building sector, improvement of the education level, etc. (Source: MN 308). Although the sector is transformed at the regional level with a total number of 35,000 farmers being involved (Source: MN 313), the limited size of the project (35,000 coffee farmers out of 1.3 million) did not allow for an impact at the national level (Source: MN 313).
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	The PIP final evaluation report mentions that interviews performed during the evaluation survey show that beneficiaries generally considered that the information system set up by the PIP was of very high quality. There is no information however on the producers' views in terms of increasing and stabilising incomes. <i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 67.</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	In SP countries sugarcane growers and sugar mills regret the situation that prevailed before the reform of the EU sugar market and the termination of the Sugar Protocol, which allowed them to sell sugar at the high EU domestic price. They consider the AMSP Programme as a compensation for their income loss
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	The MR notes that the project outputs respond directly to needs of the enterprises, are highly appreciated by these and are very likely to contribute to the intended results. <i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i> The Project's brochure cites various very positive reactions to the support provide by the project: farmers and producers interviewed are happy with additional outlet opportunities for their production, employment opportunities in the new/extended transformation plants and the extra income this has provided to them and the community at large. Interviewees include:

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ a farmer who from subsistence farming moved to commercial farming of cassava because of a reliable market having been set up by an exporter (it enabled him to send his wife for medical treatment and support their children's education, buy equipment and employ 5 people);</li> <li>▪ the cassava processing plant's manager benefiting from the project's advice in organising the supply chain (from many different villages) and on food safety, especially focussing on achieving HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points – a process ensuring that food is processed safely) certification for the factory.</li> <li>▪ A young girl employed in a company manufacturing coconut oil and the manager of this mill. <i>'The mill has impacted lives of many people – workers, coconut suppliers, the Vuna village shop owner – and the village as a whole. (...) For one thing, villagers could now afford to pay the weekly diesel levy that provided electricity in their homes every night. The village shop was also well stocked because people were buying in cash and not on credit. Mr Drodrolagi said the 17 school children of the workers were in school full time and their parents were able to pay their school fees.'</i> <i>Source: FACT brochure, FACT project completes its second year, August 2010</i></li> </ul>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	Le MR cite que les populations bénéficiaires ont noté deux impacts positifs non attendus : une prise de confiance des OP et la montée du sentiment de maîtrise de son propre sort et le rôle des femmes reconnu comme moteur de l'économie et de l'évolution positive de la société.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	No information found. The research and extension components of the PMA supported by the EC SBS programme aimed at increasing agricultural production and the share of this production delivered to the market, but they do not specifically targeted export crops.

## EQ 5 on the Commission's support to risk management

To what extent has the Commission's support contributed to protect agricultural commodity producers from income variability through risk management and/or social safety nets?	
<b>J.5.1</b>	<i>Commission support has contributed to the development and implementation of risk management and compensatory tools</i>
<b>BF</b>	<p>L'appui de la Commission a contribué au développement et à la mise en œuvre de mécanismes de compensation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– STABEX: coton, gomme arabique et oléagineux. Cependant il n'y a pas d'évidence d'un suivi/évaluation de l'utilisation du STABEX</li> <li>– FLEX: appui budgétaire</li> </ul> <p>Le Programme Tous ACP (Banque mondiale/ARMG) a initié récemment le développement d'un système de gestion des risques pour la filière coton (assurances, climat, etc.)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission support through Stabex was very important in Cameroon until the 1990s and Stabex funds have continued to be used for projects (on themes ranging from diversification to rural development and competitiveness) until 2010. Currently, no risk management tools are supported by the EC. Cameroon did not mobilise the Flex. The Commission did however support price information transparency, in order to help producers deal with price fluctuations as well as possible. Through the All-ACP programme, the EC financed several studies on risk management and access to credit, mainly for the coffee sector.</p> <p>The World Bank is also active in the sector (it implemented the AAACP risk management study) and the AFD as well. The AFD is working on a different project (but not contradictory) on price fluctuation management at a macro level especially for the cotton sector. In other sectors, price risk management is limited to good farming practices and quality; it seems quite unrealistic to have other price management tools especially on the "marchés à termes" for the moment.</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>In Ghana, the EC has not been involved in risk management tools over the recent years. Other donors (UNDP, World Bank) have been working on pilot projects of warehousing receipt systems and commodity exchanges through the AAACP.</p> <p>Stabex CMOs from 1990 to 1993 led to projects being funded until the beginning of the 2000s: the Cocoa Sector Support Programme (phase 1, which focused on developing new virus-resistant varieties – thus reducing disease risk) and two feeder roads rehabilitation programmes.</p> <p>Access to credit is indirectly addressed by the EU-funded CSSP2 (cocoa sector support strategy – phase 2) as it encourages farmers to regroup in organisations, which facilitates their access to credit.</p> <p>For cocoa producers, the price is guaranteed by the Cocobod (the national cocoa board) so price risk management at the producer level is not an issue. The Cocobod itself sells the majority of cocoa on the international futures markets, which allows it to deal with price risk as well.</p>
<b>MG</b>	Les fonds Stabex constituaient en principe un mécanisme de protection des revenus du

	pays bénéficiaire contre les baisses de prix des produits agricoles d'exportation. Mais leur efficacité à cet égard a souffert des très longs délais entre la perte de revenu subie par le pays et la mobilisation des fonds.
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The Commission did not support the development of and access to shock management tools and risk reducing tools in Tanzania. It focussed most of its support on research in coffee, tea and cotton which can be considered as very indirect support to reducing risks (of pests, diseases, drought). The Commission did also support the Warehousing Receipt System in the cashew nut sector through its support to CFC (before the All ACP Project was launched). This is considered as a success even though the gains made by farmers in terms of increased income have been eroded by inflation on food stuffs and agricultural inputs.</p> <p>Other initiatives (not supported by the EU) include the development of commodity exchange systems and some form of price stabilisation through the use of a two-stage payment system for some of the export crops (excluding tea).</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>The EC (together with the WFP for the investment costs) supported the establishment of warehouses combined with a system of tradable delivery receipts and a Commodity Exchange Board. Currently, five warehouses are operational. MAAIF is not committed to develop this system but the Ministry of Trade would be more interested.</p> <p>An attempt was made to put in place a risk management system in the cotton sector, which however did not materialise because of divergences between the Government and the private sector.</p>
<b>VAN</b>	<p>L'appui de la Commission a contribué au développement et à la mise en œuvre d'un mécanisme de compensation : la STABEX. L'appui du Stabex (cacao, 1998) a permis de réhabiliter la Big Bay Road à Santo (157,090 €, plus intérêts).</p> <p>Le POPACA/ POP2 a mis en place un revolving fund, mais il y a eu peu d'intérêts à le poursuivre à la fin du projet.</p> <p>Il n'y a pas de système de protection sociale soutenu par la CE au Vanuatu</p> <p>Il n'y pas d'évidence que les interventions STABEX ont permis de réduire la variabilité des revenus et la vulnérabilité des producteurs, des secteurs agricoles ou du pays</p>
<b>I.5.1.1</b>	Evidence that the Commission supported the development of and access to shock management tools at macro-economic level
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>One of the key activities of the AAACP programme is addressing commodity risk management in ACP countries. It is expected that the programme supports further work on country-and commodity-specific development and application of market-based instruments, raise awareness and build capacity among potential users of these instruments (producer organisations, inter-professional associations, traders, processors, financiers and governments). Moreover, the strengthening of supportive "infrastructure" – both "soft" (e.g. organisations and legislation) and "hard" infrastructure (e.g. weather stations) that forms a prerequisite for the application of the instruments – is part of the set of activities funded by the AAACP programme.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-GIIF</b>	<p>The GIIF project is providing financial contribution to a shock management tool that has been designed to function both as a risk insurance at Government and at farmer level. It is based on an index insurance approach and insures against weather risks.</p> <p>The ACP-GIIF supports also Commodity Risk Management Group of the WB in their</p>

	<p>work on innovative risk management techniques and applications, including piloting innovative index insurance techniques in the context of the All ACP agricultural commodities programme.</p> <p>Interest has also been expressed to participate in the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), a WB initiative, using index insurance to cover immediate Government funding needs after a catastrophic event.</p> <p>The GIIF is not addressed to individual farmers but either to groupings of farmers or farmers associations or through other intermediaries.</p> <p><i>Source: IF, MN 934 and MN912</i></p> <p>The ways that the Commission supports insurance/shock management tools:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the GIIF project</li> <li>▪ via the All ACP programme, contributions to the WB's CRMG which develops and tests different tools.</li> <li>▪ Projects under the food thematic line where the Commission supports IFAP (International Federation of Agricultural Producers) looking at different risk management tools and participative research</li> </ul> <p>Overall weather insurance is easier to deal with than price insurance; for the latter it seems limited to some initiative in Burkina Faso in cotton with the fonds de lissage.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN934 and MN912</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés même si l'éventuel effondrement des cours des 2 spéculations est pris en compte dans l'analyse de la durabilité et figure comme hypothèse de mise en oeuvre. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 27</i>).</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France).</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>En outre, concernant la filière riz, un projet de soutien à <u>l'amélioration des bases de la sécurité alimentaire</u> par l'appui aux organisations paysannes agricoles et le renforcement des capacités de production des agriculteurs au niveau des périmètres irrigués du Centre de la Côte d'Ivoire a été initié avec la FAO comme partenaire technique (Convention de contribution à 100% pour un montant 600 millions FCFA dont 7% pour frais administratifs). Toutefois, l'évaluation note que le projet d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire</p>

	et sanitaire est à mettre au titre des mauvaises expériences. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CI-REH</b>	Les reformes dans le secteur coton ne sont pas encore achevées. Pour les orienter, un document de stratégie sectorielle et un plan d'action ont été élaborés par le ministère de l'Agriculture et deux études (sur fonds STABEX) sont en cours pour examiner la réorganisation du financement des intrants et les <b>modalités de gestion du risque sur les prix</b> . (Source : Rider FA p.4)
<b>GH</b>	In Ghana there are some crops for which warehousing receipt systems are being used/developed. Also there is currently some talk about developing commodity exchanges (spearheaded by the Ministry of Trade and Industry) with some UNDP support for study of the legislative context. The EC has no involvement in these initiatives.  <i>Source: MN 134, MN 911</i>
<b>GH</b>	According to interviews, the EC doesn't do anything in terms of risk management in Ghana. Other donors (such as the World Bank) are active in developing risk management programmes in the country. The All-ACP programme (which receives EU funding) is however developing a rain index-based risk management programme. The programme is being pilot-tested. Funds provided by the EU are managed by a trust fund through the World Bank.  <i>Source: MN 923, MN 911</i>
<b>KEN</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>MG</b>	La réponse est positive dans la mesure où les fonds Stabex peuvent être considérés comme des outils de gestion du risque. Le total des fonds Stabex relatifs aux années 1991 à 1999 s'est élevé à €68,4 millions. Il faut toutefois noter que l'engagement et la consommation de ces fonds a été très lente et donc très retardée par rapports aux chocs macroéconomiques qui les justifiait. Les derniers décaissements de fonds Stabex ont eu lieu en 2010. Source : Délégation à Madagascar
<b>ML-COT</b>	L'objectif spécifique n°1 du PARFC « Mener à terme le processus de réforme engagé: conclusion du processus de filialisation et de la privatisation de la CMDT, mise en place des organes de régulation de la filière » prévoit la mise en place d'un dispositif opérationnel permettant une réduction des effets de la volatilité des cours de la fibre sur le revenu du producteur par une contribution à un Fonds de Soutien (CF, annexe 5) et un appui à la conception d'un fonds de lissage (soutien intra-annuel puis inter-annuel des cours de coton) (BCS, §1.2; Monitoring report, p2) Le niveau d'intervention semble donc davantage se situer à un niveau « méso » que « macro » ou « micro ».  <i>Source: ROM/BCS, CF</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	The Commission did not support the development of and access to shock management tools at macro-economic level in Tanzania.
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.

<b>UG coffee</b>	Yes. The EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds were mainly used to support specific commodity chains in particular coffee. Uganda didn't benefit from the banana and sugar support programmes which aimed at alleviating the impact on producing countries of changes in the EU policy concerning these products.
<b>I.5.1.2</b>	Evidence that the Commission developed and eased the access to compensatory tools (such as Stabex, FLEX)
<b>general</b>	<p>STABEX has been used to invest. The issue now is still the price volatility. There was a support of the EU to the Common Fund for Commodities to develop risk management tools in the sector of cashew nuts: not mentioned by the DEL and thought the warehousing receipt system was probably not very successful. The World Bank has supported the development of the warehouse system. Does the Government want this system for coffee or tea? No answer so far.</p> <p>STABEX: tool used by the EU for a very long time, notably in Tanzania. Thing not to find in the papers: from other donors in the late 80s and 90s very little was directed as support to agricultural development. There were no crises. In the mid 2000s, people came back to agriculture, notably based on the paper of the World Bank and with the food crisis. They came back then to agriculture, technical side. E.g. GTZ left agriculture in the 90s for the social services (health, education) and infrastructures.</p> <p>STABEX was available in the late 80s and 90s with the value chain approach to agricultural commodities even though it was not fashionable at the time. In Tanzania they were especially supporting cotton, coffee and tea. It helped to establish research and public-private partnerships.</p> <p>STABEX activities are finished. Audits are ongoing. STABEX successes are "evaluated". In the coffee sector some results were not achieved (e.g. quality issues and problems with contractors regarding the coffee research.). The rest of the money will be used to improve the obtained results. There is one evaluation of the STABEX activities (done in 2007). During the evaluation of Stabex (2007), they focus on certain parts. The recommendations were to get out the basket fund devoted to ASDP. It was critical on cotton and the process of decentralisation which was not going well (absence of district agricultural plans). Then focus on coffee, tea to enabling trade.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 600, MN 602, MN138</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Le programme AAACP ne développe pas d'interventions en lien direct avec des financements FLEX. Peut-être, il devrait le faire. Le mandat du programme AAACP était d'innover, de sensibiliser les ACP aux instruments comme les bourses de marché, les <i>warehouse receipt systems</i>, les <i>discounting</i>, etc. (par exemple aux Caraïbes). Rien n'est fait en lien avec des reliquats du Stabex.</p> <p><i>Source : Meeting note reference number MN 641</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence appears in the SFA impact evaluation report
<b>BF</b>	<p>Au Burkina Faso, les fonds <b>STABEX</b>, et plus récemment le <b>FLEX</b>, ont été utilisés par la Commission européenne pour soutenir, en partie, le secteur agricole et rural et plus spécifiquement dans la filière coton.</p> <p>Les informations sur <b>l'utilisation des fonds STABEX</b>, qui ont pu être collectées auprès de la Délégation de l'Union européenne et de l'Etat burkinabé (Direction de la</p>

coopération), sont données ci-dessous. Il est important de noter que **l'information obtenue sur les fonds Stabex** telle qu'obtenues par la Délégation de l'Union européenne au Burkina Faso **n'est que partielle**. Toutes les informations relatives au fonds Stabex n'ont pas pu être obtenues faute de problèmes d'archivage et de méconnaissance des dossiers Stabex par le staff actuellement en place au niveau de la Délégation.

**Année 1999 (montant temporaire, en cours) :**

Convention de transfert Stabex Haricots – transfert/2/99/BK : 677 914 EUR. **Il n'y a aucune indication que ces fonds ont été dépensés pour soutenir la filière haricots fin des années 90/ début des années 2000.**

**Etat des transactions effectuées sur le STABEX - Année 2006 :**

- 1) Bénéficiaire : **Union Nationale des Producteurs de coton (UNPCB)/ Société de fibres et textiles (SOFITEX)**; nature de l'intervention : Construction d'infrastructures (**coton**); montant au 6 avril 2006 : 157 M FCFA
- 2) Bénéficiaire : CNCA/ Société de fibres et textiles (SOFITEX); nature de l'intervention : **apurement de dettes des groupements de producteurs de coton** au 6 avril 2006 : 325 M FCFA
- 3) Bénéficiaire : Société de fibres et textiles (SOFITEX); nature de l'intervention : **formation des correspondants coton** : montant au 15/12/2006 : 50,4 M FCFA

**Liste des actions non clôturées au 31/07/2011**

- 1) **SOFITEX/ UNPCB** : Construction d'infrastructures de stockage et d'intérêt collectif pour les groupements et les Unions de producteurs de **coton** – engagement : 750 M FCFA (clôturé)
- 2) CNRST/INERA/FARAKOBA : production de **semences de base d'oléagineux** – engagement 12 M FCFA
- 3) CIDR : Phase d'autonomisation du réseau des Caisses villageoises d'épargne et de crédit de la Sisssili et du Ziro – engagement : 243 709 000 FCFA (clôturé)
- 4) **SOFITEX** : formation des correspondants **coton** de la SOFITEX et typologie des exploitations agricoles en zone cotonnière – engagement 200 M FCFA (en apurement)
- 5) BOA/ APEGA: mise en place d'un **fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations de gomme arabique** – engagement : 10 M FCFA (clôturé)
- 6) BOA/ **Conseils des oléagineux** : mise en place d'un **fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations de gomme arabique** – engagement : 125 M FCFA (non clôturé)
- 7) **Promotion gomme arabique** : projet de promotion de la gomme arabique – paiement : 35 M FCFA (clôturé)
- 8) **CNCA/ SOFITEX** : Apurement partiel des dettes des groupements villageois (**filière coton**) – paiement : 325 M FCFA (clôturé)
- 9) **HORUS** : Etudes **secteur coton** : 6 M FCFA (clôturé)
- 10) URCP SO : entre la Fédération des caisses populaires du Burkina Faso et le MEF sur le redressement de l'URCP SO – pas de paiement car le rapport d'audit manque
- 11) Audit financier des fonds STABEX des 7<sup>ie</sup> et 8<sup>ie</sup> FED : paiement de 53.4 M FCFA (clôturé)
- 12) Mission d'appui pour l'utilisation financière des fonds STABEX au Burkina Faso (7<sup>ie</sup> et 8<sup>ie</sup> FED) : engagement : 28,2 M FCFA (situation finale non disponible, à fournir par DG COOP).

Au 31 juillet 2007, sur un montant total engagé de 2 milliards FCFA engagés (soit environ 3 M EUR), 1,7 milliards FCFA ont été dépensés (soit environ 2,6 M EUR).



	<p>Selon le bilan arrêté à fin 2007, les fonds STABEX dépensés dans le secteur agricole ont été :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ d'environ 1.3 milliards FCFA (environ 1.8 M EUR) pour le secteur du coton (principalement pour : infrastructures de stockage et d'intérêt collectif, formation, apurement de dettes, études) ;</li> <li>▪ d'environ 45 M FCFA (environ 65 000 EUR) pour le secteur de la gomme arabique (mise en place d'un fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations et promotion de la gomme arabique) ;</li> <li>▪ d'environ 14 M FCFA (environ 21 000 EUR) pour le secteur des oléagineux (mise en place d'un fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations et production de semences de base).</li> </ul> <p>Par ailleurs, il apparaît que sur la période 2008-2010 des ordonnancements dans le cadre des cadres d'obligations mutuelles STABEX été programmés au niveau de la DG Coopération du Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 2008 : un montant de 1,4 milliards FCFA ;</li> <li>▪ 2009 : un montant de 179 M FCFA ;</li> <li>▪ 2010 : un montant de 600 M FCFA.</li> </ul> <p>En ce qui concerne le <b>FLEX</b>, le montant alloué (9,42 millions €), établi à partir des exportations de 2007-2008, a été versé <b>sous forme d'appui budgétaire</b> à l'Etat burkinabé.</p> <p><i>Sources : Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, Direction de la Coopération et Délégation de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, 2011 ; Etat des transactions effectuées sur le Stabex, année 2006; COM STABEX 1994-1995, Liste des actions non clôturées au 31/07/2007 ; AIDCO-C7-Comptabilité administrative Stabex Haricots 1999, 2000</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Par le passé, la CE a largement participé au développement de la filière coton dans le cadre du mécanisme de stabilisation des exportations "STABEX", à travers des appuis directs à la SOFITEX et à l'UNPCB ainsi qu'aux groupements de producteurs de coton. La construction d'infrastructures villageoises et la réhabilitation des routes nationales RN1 et RN4 utilisées pour le transport du coton, en sont des exemples</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CI cotton cocoa palm oil</b>	<p>Stabex a été utilisé (in)directement pour compenser les faibles prix payés aux producteurs, essentiellement les producteurs de coton : fourniture d'intrants (même si les paysans utilisent la moitié des intrants fournis pour les cultures alimentaires telles que le maïs), dons de bœufs (environ 2.000) et règlements des dettes des producteurs vis-à-vis des égreneurs (le chef de Délégation est allé 5 sur le terrain ans auparavant pour cette action qui a coûté environ 1 milliard FCFA).</p> <p>Toutefois, ces actions sont sporadiques ne résolvent pas les problèmes de fond qui sont identiques depuis 30 ans (de même que les solutions : dons de bœufs). La Délégation souhaiterait soutenir ou mettre en place des mécanismes plus durables de soutien des prix bord de champs car les paysans cotonniers sont ne sont toujours pas rentables.</p>

	<p>La production de coton a d'ailleurs chuté de 400.000 tonnes graines /an (année ?) à actuellement 90 tonnes graines / an. Les paysans abandonnent le coton pour l'huile de palme ou le cacao pour lesquels les revenus sont plus élevés et stables</p> <p>Il y a 4 zones coton en Côte d'Ivoire et 4 usines d'égrenage (1 par zone). Sur ces 4 usines, 1 seule est rentable. A travers le soutien des prix aux paysans, la CE a soutenu indirectement les égreneurs et les compagnies internationales. De plus, seuls les égreneurs non rentables ont profité de ces aides indirectes alors que l'usine rentable n'a pas bénéficié du soutien de ses producteurs (« concurrence déloyale »).</p> <p>Il serait souhaitable de supprimer cette dépendance et ce lien entre les producteurs et les égreneurs.</p> <p>Source : MN 819</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Malgré que les allocations Stabex soient terminées depuis 2000 (dernier COM Stabex au Cameroun date de 1998), les fonds sont toujours disponibles au cours de la période 2000-2010. Ils ont été utilisés aux routes de desserte, à divers projets de développement rural dont plus accessoirement les filières café cacao ainsi que des actions plus sociales et conditions de vie (voir liste protocoles Stabex). Globalement environ 60 M€ sur la période.</p>
<b>CM</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cameroon has benefitted since 1990 of STABEX funds (€250m in total; the outstanding amounts from the “Cadres d'Obligations Mutuelles” 1998 have been implemented until 2010) and of the Banana EC budget line (B7-8710). The latter aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the sector on international markets with a view to prepare the liberalisation of the banana sector in 2006.</li> <li>▪ Cameroon has not benefited from the FLEX mechanism. Commission's interviewees reported that since 2006 price fluctuations have not been sufficiently important to trigger the mechanism. Moreover, the government of Cameroon submitted proposals that have been refused by the Commission: Cameroon being a low-middle income country having important gas revenues, there is some reluctance in supporting it.</li> </ul> <p>Sources :</p> <p><i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, page 17</i></p> <p><i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 16-17</i></p> <p>MN 701</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>The 2003-2007 RSP evidences that the Commission used <b>STABEX and the Special Assistance Framework (SFA) in the banana sector</b> to increase productivity, to promote diversification and to mitigate social dislocation (“current financing stocks amount to €90m”).</p> <p>It further presents <b>data over the period 1975-2001</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Stabilisation of export earnings: (Stabex and Sysmin): €252m</li> <li>▪ SFA bananas: €132m</li> </ul> <p>The 2008-2013 RSP further specifies that the Caribbean Region benefitted from the <b>SFA for the banana sector</b>: “<i>To enhance competitiveness and support the diversification of the banana sector, a Special Framework of Assistance (SFA) was established in 1999. By 2008, when the SFA will have run its course, the Caribbean will have received a total allocation of</i></p>

	<p><b>around €270 million</b>, which is more than 73% of the total value of the SFA.</p> <p>Sources:  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, page 12</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, page 33</i></p> <p>Annex 8 describes the general framework and principles of the Commission's co-operation in the Caribbean and the application of the different instruments available (RIPs, NIPs, All ACP project, specific facilities (STABEX, SYSMIN), EIB credits, Commission's own budget lines) and reconstructs the theoretical logframes underlying the regional strategies of the successive EDFs starting from the 7<sup>th</sup>. (Source: <i>CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.6</i>).</p>																																					
<b>ET</b>	<p>The Commission support to Ethiopia during the period 1996-2001 was financed on several budget lines apart from the EDF, of which the following were the most important: the food aid/food security (B7-2000), the NGO co-financing (B7-6000) and the human rights (B7-7020) budget lines (Sources of EC-Ethiopia co-operation: food security (B7-2000), NGO co-financing (B7-6000), human rights (B7-7020), environment (B7-6200), tropical forests (B7-6201), child victim of war (B7-612), rehabilitation (B7-6410), research/ INCO-DC (DG XII), ECHO. And within the EDF: the NIP, the RIP, SAF, <b>Stabex</b> and refuge assistance.) (Source: <i>ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 72</i>).</p>																																					
<b>GH</b>	<p>Stabex tools were used in Ghana on three different occasions over the past years, to deal with export decline due to diseases, bush fires and low yields.</p> <p>Source: <i>MN 952</i></p>																																					
<b>GH cocoa</b>	<p>Ghana benefitted from almost €60 million of Stabex payments through the early 1990s: decline of export revenues was triggered by crop disease (1990-1991) and price collapse (1992-1993). Transfers were made as follows:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Year of Stabex</th> <th>in Euro m</th> <th>Agreement</th> <th>Use of transfers</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1990</td> <td>6,9</td> <td>FMO 1990</td> <td>Cocobod redundancy payments</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1991</td> <td>16,4</td> <td>FMO 1991</td> <td>Cocoa sector restructuring (1)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1992</td> <td>4,9</td> <td rowspan="2">FMO 1992-1993 (signed 1996)</td> <td>CSSP (€11,2 m)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1993</td> <td>16,4</td> <td>Feeder Roads Phases I and II (€14 m)</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">interests and balances</td> <td></td> <td>Feeder Roads Phase III (€11,8 m)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total</b></td> <td><b>59,7</b></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>(1) Included Cocobod redundancy payments €8 m), interests on cocoa bills €4 m), retraining programme (€0.8 m), disease control (€3.5 m), and M&amp;E (€0.1 m).</p> <p>During the period 2000-2010 disbursements made under Stabex amounted to €37m :</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Euros</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Interest accrued and balances previous Stabex</td> <td>15,965,406</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Stabex 1992 transfer</td> <td>4,883,722</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Stabex 1993 Transfer</td> <td>16,381,086</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total Stabex transfers used during 2000-2010</b></td> <td><b>37,230,214</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Year of Stabex	in Euro m	Agreement	Use of transfers	1990	6,9	FMO 1990	Cocobod redundancy payments	1991	16,4	FMO 1991	Cocoa sector restructuring (1)	1992	4,9	FMO 1992-1993 (signed 1996)	CSSP (€11,2 m)	1993	16,4	Feeder Roads Phases I and II (€14 m)	interests and balances			Feeder Roads Phase III (€11,8 m)	<b>Total</b>	<b>59,7</b>				Euros	Interest accrued and balances previous Stabex	15,965,406	Stabex 1992 transfer	4,883,722	Stabex 1993 Transfer	16,381,086	<b>Total Stabex transfers used during 2000-2010</b>	<b>37,230,214</b>
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	<p><i>Source: Delegation of the European Commission in Ghana, FMO 1992-1993, consultant's estimate</i></p> <p>The FMO 1992-1993 was implemented in different phases, with the CSSP and Feeder Roads II and III being implemented after 2000.</p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>The 2003-2007 CSP/NIP mentions that Kenya has qualified for a transfer under the STABEX system for loss of earnings in coffee and tea for the year of application 1999. The total amount of the transfer was € 47,841,888 (plus interest). These funds were utilised in targeted budget support benefiting areas where export losses were originated. Previous Stabex transfers have been allocated for the development of key foreign exchange earning-productive agricultural sub-sectors, diversification and improvement of the general economic environment. Existing balances not yet allocated will be used in line with the general objectives of Stabex and according to the priorities defined in the CSP.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 25</i></p> <p>Stabex funds have been used in Kenya to :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To provide support for democratic governance, institutional capacity-building, including in the NAO's office, decentralisation of health services, tourism, preservation of cultural heritage and institutional capacity related to the EPA-trade negotiations (along with the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF)</li> <li>To support the Roads 2000 phase II (€5m) and the Central Kenya Rural Roads Programme (€1.25m);</li> <li>To support rural development and agriculture: horticulture (€2.4m), coffee-sector reform (€5m) and support for the ASCU/Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (€2m);</li> <li>To advanced budget support in the period 2003-2004 (€51m).</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 22, 23 &amp; 25</i></p> <p>According to the Evaluation of EC support to Kenya (June 2008), Stabex funds have been made available in Kenya to compensate the losses of export earnings, mainly in the coffee sector, but also in tea. These funds were spent in the period 1990-1999 in the coffee sector, roads, education, tourism and local governance. In 1999, Stabex funds were spent as advance budget support and earmarked for specific sectors. On the other hand, these funds have been also utilised to bridge finance gaps (e.g. for community development) or to finance sectors that were not foreseen in the CSP (e.g. tourism and trade). In other words, Stabex funds have been used as a mechanism to make adjustments to the CSP.</p> <p>For the period 2001-2005, the total amount of committed Stabex funds was about € 105 million.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of EC support to Kenya, June 2008, page 27</i></p>
<b>Kenya</b>	<p>Stabex funds were used to support the coffee sector reform in Kenya (€5m).</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 27</i></p> <p>According to the Evaluation of EC support to Kenya (June 2008), Stabex funds have been made available in Kenya to compensate the losses of export earnings, mainly in the</p>

	<p>coffee sector, but also in tea. These funds were spent in the period 1990-1999 in the coffee sector, roads, education, tourism and local governance.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of EC support to Kenya, June 2008, page 27</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1<sup>er</sup> COM STABEX: 1991-1993</li> <li>• 2<sup>nd</sup> COM STABEX 1996-1999</li> </ul>
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	<p>EDF and STABEX funds were used for the improvement and periodic maintenance of gravel standard roads of the national roads network in 9 regions in the North (Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Mara), North-West (Mwanza, Kagera and Kigoma) and South-West (Ruvuma, Iringa and Mbeya) of the country.</p> <p>An amount of €44 million was available from STABEX funds (€ 38 million transfers and € 6 million generated interest) and covered by a Framework of Mutual Obligation (FMO) which was signed in February 2003 and amended by a rider in 2005. Support is given to the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TaCRI), the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), and a programme for the rehabilitation of priority regional roads in coffee-growing areas. There have been significant achievements in the area of private research. The contribution to the Agriculture Sector development programme (ASDP) has been integrated into the ASDP basket fund which supports the sector budget at Ministry level.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 61 &amp; 65</i></p> <p>Stabex funds were made available as a measure to stabilize the economy affected by coffee and tea export losses. Up to 1993, Tanzania received 51 million Euros of Stabex allocations. In 2003, it received 38 million Euros to stabilize export losses between 1994 and 1999.</p> <p>Stabex funds, which were previously used in the form of direct aids to farmers, are now channeled through projects. Stabex interventions are managed at the level of specific products, namely coffee and tea, and to a lesser extent, cotton. In addition, support was also provided to carry out key studies on the reform of Crop Boards, the Agricultural Census and the development of the strategic action plan to implement the Land Acts. All of these interventions have taken place in the wider reform of the sector.</p> <p>Given the importance that the EC has attached to supporting policy reforms and strategies, the allocation of Stabex funds has been targeted to a strategic tool to support the Agricultural Sector Support Programme (ASDP) and the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) priorities. Around 40 million Euros (from 1994-1999 Coffee transfers plus the remaining balance from earlier funds) will be allocated to these priorities. Part of the Stabex funds will also support the development of rural roads.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to the United Republic of Tanzania, April 2006, page 37</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.

<b>VU</b>	<p>Vanuatu benefitted from Stabex funds as result of a downward trend of cocoa beans for the application year 1998. In fact, Vanuatu faced difficulties in the cocoa sector in 1998:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Marketed production of cocoa beans were equivalent to 1,501 millions VATU (against 1,757 millions VATU in 1997)</li> <li>▪ Exports of cocoa beans to the EC: 20 millions VATU and 142 tonnes (against 234.1 millions VATU and 1,536 tonnes in 1997).</li> </ul> <p>Stabex funds amounted to €157,090. These funds would be utilised to supplement the funding of the reconstruction of bridges and river crossings which was subject to the FMO relating to application years 1995 and 1996 and the balance of the funds from transfers up to 1994 (signed on 6 August 1999). Activities foreseen for the use of the Stabex funds were: studies and supervision, and works contract.</p> <p>However the STABEX funds deposited in the bank accounts have produced interest of about 6 millions VATU. To finance activities related to the rehabilitation of the Big Bay Road in Santo the following amounts were available: 129 525 Millions VATU. The amount of 21.3 Millions VATU was already disbursed to contracts passed for Technical assistance studies and supervision. Two offers to implement rehabilitation activities have been received on 19 December 2000. The lowest offer was in the range of 155.2 Millions VATU. This meant that a gap of 25.675 millions VATU existed (around €206,550). To allow these works, the gap should be paid through the Public Works Department's own budget for reparation of damages caused by cyclone Dani.</p> <p><i>Sources: Letter of 21 March 2000, Stabex in Vanuatu – Application year 1999 – collection of statistical data; Framework of Mutual Obligations for the use of STABEX funds for the application year 2008 between the Government of Vanuatu and the European Commission, May 2001; Letter of 5 January 2001, Vanuatu Stabex Report for 2000.</i></p>
<b>I.5.1.3</b>	Evidence that the shock management and/or compensatory tools developed by the Commission added value compared to already existing tools
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Instruments such as Stabex (EDF 7 and 8) and Flex (EDF 9) putting in place to buffer ACP countries/ producers against the worst effects of price and revenue volatility have been undermined by their speed of disbursement. However, these instruments have provided and continue to provide important resources to producing countries.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-GIF</b>	<p>The Commission does not develop its own shock management tools, it contributes to the financing of efforts deployed by others to do so (and primarily the WB's CRMG, the IFAP).</p> <p>According to the project identification and formulation documents, the GIIF by providing index insurance to Governments and farmers adds to the products available: Compared to traditional indemnity-based insurance, index insurance avoids the moral hazard problem (taking more risks because of the incentive arrangement) and is less subject to fraud and can lead to fast payouts. It is also less expensive in terms of underwriting and claims handling costs.</p> <p><i>Source: See project intervention fiche.</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	Le PAFFIC contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la

	<p>recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France). La CE a ainsi apporté un appui indirect au FdL, outil novateur de gestion du risque prix.</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Pas d'infos recueillies même si le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>La mise en œuvre sous Stabex est plus simple et souple avec l'approche programme qu'avec les lignes budgétaires. Des tranches budgétaires sont définies par filière et au sein de chaque tranche, des contrats sont signés (approche programme qui fonctionne très bien). Des comités de pilotage contrôlent la réalisation des activités,...</p> <p>Source : MN 819</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Currently, there is no shock management or compensatory tool that has been developed, except historically Stabex funds. Cameroon has not mobilised the FLEX</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No although, in the framework of the Commission's co-operation in the Caribbean, there are different instruments available: RIPs, NIPs, All ACP project, specific facilities (STABEX, SYSMIN), EIB credits, Commission's own budget lines.</p> <p>The Commission has thus offered an important variety of instruments and programs to support the region. <u>However, these have not always been coordinated properly.</u> For example, the NIPs and RIPs are not designed to be mutually supportive. Each program and intervention has its own justifiable rationality but there is insufficient attempt to maximise the combined contribution of the various instruments to the strategic objective of the regional construction. The problem is particularly apparent in the multiplicity of instruments deployed in supporting the productive sectors. Because of the variety and the magnitude of the needs in this domain it has been relatively easy to avoid overlaps and duplications but it is difficult to demonstrate that the panel of instruments deployed have been designed and articulated so as to be complementary and mutually supportive of common strategic objectives. Although it has been observed that quasi all projects can justify a link with the objectives of the regional strategy, <u>there is no real linkage and coherence at the level of the instruments.</u> The selection of particular instruments may often result more from their availability than from a proper assessment of why they should be preferred.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The European Commission had not intervened in the agricultural sector per se over the 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. It did support rural development but rather in water and sanitation, micro-projects,</p> <p>The Stabex transfers of the early 1990s (€60 million over 4 years) enabled the Commission to support the agricultural sector at a time when it would not have done so through its programmable funds. The amount of the 1992 and 1993 transfers (€21,3 m) represented 5% of the total development assistance expected by Ghana during 1995 from all sources and it represented 20% of the 7<sup>th</sup> EDF programmable resources.</p>

	<i>Source: CSPs, FMO 1992-1993</i>
<b>MG</b>	Oui mais la Délégation estime que l'idéal serait d'avoir accès à Stabex, lignes budgétaires et FED car cela permet d'avoir un <u>mix d'outils</u> (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de <u>prendre en compte l'ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole malgache</u> (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (Source : MN 804 et débriefing Délégation).
<b>ML-COT</b>	L'objectif spécifique n°1 du PARFC « Mener à terme le processus de réforme engagé: conclusion du processus de filialisation et de la privatisation de la CMDT, mise en place des organes de régulation de la filière » prévoit la mise en place d'un dispositif opérationnel permettant une réduction des effets de la volatilité des cours de la fibre sur le revenu du producteur par une contribution à un Fonds de Soutien (CF, annexe 5) et un appui à la conception d'un fonds de lissage (soutien intra-annuel puis inter-annuel des cours de coton) (BCS, §1.2; Monitoring report, p2).  <i>Source: ROM/BCS, CF</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	Roles of the donors in the future? EU value added: Institutional support to R&D in agriculture and reducing costs of doing business (rationalize taxation), extension services, information/communication (Ward information centres). Local area resources farmers: place to network with us to address production, marketing areas. Commodity exchange will be also an interesting area to support. Legislation is in place. Need now to organise things together to create the commodity exchange market.  <i>Source: MN 602</i>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	Yes. The EC (and the WFP for the investment costs) <u>supported the implementation of warehouses combined with a system of tradable delivery receipts and a Commodity Exchange Board</u> . Currently, five warehouses are operational. Indeed, the idea was to establish warehouses providing farmers with storage facilities well equipped which cannot be installed at the household level to maintain the quality of the products, to sort them according to quality standards, to make packaging, etc. in order to improve transparency and efficiency (Source: MN 302).  MAAIF (Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries) is not committed to develop this system but the Ministry of Trade would be more interested (Source: MN 304).
<b>UG</b>	<u>EC project in support of the Uganda Commodity Exchange (UGE) and Warehouse receipt system</u> The purpose of the project was 'to improve the efficiency of the marketing of agricultural commodities for the benefit of Ugandan producers, traders, processors and end-users'. The project's two 'results' were intended to be: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● An efficient, effective and properly regulated Warehouse Receipts System in place, based on a network of certified and well managed commercial warehouses;</li><li>● Agricultural commodities are being traded through the Uganda Commodity</li></ul>



	<p>Exchange at commercially sustainable volumes and values.</p> <p>By the end of the project, in March 2010, progress on the first result could only be observed in the outputs of a limited (but successful) WRS pilot while there was still no trading on the exchange floor. Disappointing as this is, the project did still generate genuine achievements and the ‘intermediate’ outputs should not be underestimated. The project has certainly done a lot of work and contributed to a basis for further endeavour in this area: regulation, licensing, quality improvements in warehouses, training, publicity, institution and capacity building, and background studies to improve knowledge. Now, with banks starting to lend against warehouse receipts and the main buyer, the World Food Programme (WFP) preparing to make purchases on the trading floor, there is a clear case for follow up and follow on.</p> <p><i>Source: Final evaluation of EU support to the Uganda Commodities Exchange and Warehouse receipt system</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The warehouse receipt system deserves strong thinking. This seems reasonable, but MinAgri doesn’t like it. Profit margins are very small; farmers cannot afford to pay for the warehouse expenses.</p> <p>What MinAgri expects from donors is infrastructure: agricultural infrastructure (e.g. development of post-harvest like washed coffee and storage capacities). We produce 2 million tons coffee; all of it comes on the market at the same time pushing the price down. Storage would allow farmers to negotiate the price of their coffee deliveries and the consumer would get maize at a good price.</p> <p>(Source: MN304)</p>
<b>UG coffee cotton</b>	<p><u>Warehouses and risk management</u> for coffee and cotton were financed by the Common Fund for Commodities. Coffee is part of the Commodity Exchange Board. At trade level there is no major financing problems; therefore coffee is not an active player of the warehouse system. (Source: MN303)</p>
<b>UG coffee cotton rice</b>	<p>There are in Uganda a very large number of small farmers and a few big operators/exporters. Middlemen (significant number) are the link between farmers and big operators. Prices of agricultural goods vary very much during the year with their lowest level during the harvest season. The idea was to <b>establish warehouses</b> providing farmers with storage facilities well equipped which cannot be installed at the household level to maintain the quality of the products, to sort them according to quality standards, to make packaging, etc. in order to improve transparency and efficiency.</p> <p>In 2004, the EC financed a large feasibility study. A law regulating the system was adopted in 2005/06. In 2005, the EU adopted the recommendations of the feasibility study: <b>warehouses + commodity exchange</b>. The project should have its two components operational after 3 years. The EU committed €4 million: €1 million for international expertise (technical assistance) and €3 million to build 10 warehouses and support the establishment of the Uganda Commodity Exchange.</p> <p>To date (after 4 years): <b>4 fully operational warehouses</b> (against the planned number of 10). One bank is providing credit to farmers against guarantee by warehouse receipts. The World Food Programme buys from the warehouse. Sites identified for additional warehouses. Assumption: the private sector would invest in establishing warehouses.</p> <p><b>Commodity exchange</b> (transparent system): the receipts could be traded. But a precondition is that warehouses network is completed. It also implies a confidence building process. It is not currently fully operational.</p> <p><b>Interest rate of credit</b> against guarantee by warehouse receipts: 2% per month. It is a</p>

	<p>high level of interest but can be compensated by the inter-annual price fluctuations. To the interest rate one must add the warehouses charges. It is not sure that the operation is beneficial.</p> <p>Three main products are stored: maize, beans, paddy rice, which are staple foods grown throughout the country. Are also considered sorgho and millet, and possibly cotton and coffee.</p> <p>(Source: MN 302)</p>
<b>VAN</b>	No periodic evaluation of Stabex funds is available at the level of the EU Delegation in Vanuatu.
<b>I.5.1.4</b>	Evidence that agricultural commodity strategies supported by Commission interventions addressed risk management
<b>ACP-ACP Cocoa Coffee</b>	<p>The AAACP programme addresses risk management through its result 3 “Market-based risk management instruments”. In fact, it is foreseen that the AAACP programme supports further work on country-and commodity-specific development and application of market-based instruments, raise awareness and build capacity among potential users of these instruments (producer organisations, inter-professional associations, traders, processors, financiers and governments). Moreover, the programme will support the strengthening of supportive “infrastructure”, both “soft” (e.g. organisations and legislation) and “hard” infrastructure (e.g. weather stations) that forms a prerequisite for the application of the instruments.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p> <p>In the framework of the All ACP programme, UNCTAD has addressed risk management through the activity: “2.PAC.C02 - Commodity Supply Chain Finance: improving agricultural value chain finance by review of legal and regulatory framework” (December 2009-December 2011 – budget: 195,000 EUR).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The objective of this activity is: Regional/national legal regulatory frameworks relating to finance are reviewed, as a complement to FAO’s work on risk management</li> <li>▪ In the first half of April 2011, an UNCTAD mission visited Samoa and Fiji to meet with relevant stakeholders, regional bodies, financial institutions and development partners. The mission achieved the following results: (i) A preliminary analysis of the fruits &amp; vegetables sector in Samoa and Fiji, notably regarding the main financing constraints facing the value-chain stakeholders and the on-going donor initiatives in the region to improve agricultural finance; (ii) A refined scope of the project based on the expressed needs of stakeholders and the consultations with donor agencies and regional partners; (iii) Partnerships with different stakeholders for the implementation of the project.</li> <li>▪ Based on the discussions with stakeholders during UNCTAD’s mission in April 2011 to the Pacific, and in order to avoid duplication of the initiatives already conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the team decided to adjust the scope of this activity. UNCTAD is planning to focus on capacity building in agricultural finance, including collateral-based financing mechanisms. This activity will build on the work of ADB and seek to enhance the capacity of development banks and agricultural stakeholders in effectively using the new laws to develop innovative collaterals for lending and developing alternative financing instruments such as factoring, warehouse receipt systems and inventory-based finance.</li> <li>▪ Note: Support to the collateral reform framework for lending is one of the two</li> </ul>

	<p>major components of ADB's access to finance activities in the Pacific Region. During the past few years, ADB has made significant advances in secured transaction reform in the region. Secured transactions laws have been developed and registries established in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu; similar reform is underway in Tonga, Samoa, Papua New Guinea and Palau. The ADB secured transactions reform is conducted in the general framework of private sector development. Although the reform does not specifically target the access to credit for the agricultural sector, the issues on using farm products and farmers' future income/receivables/contracts as collaterals are already covered in the new laws (e.g. the Personal Property Securities Act 2010 of Tonga).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Based on the consultations with different stakeholders and development partners in Fiji and Samoa, UNCTAD will organize a Pacific regional capacity building workshop on improving access to finance for the agricultural sector, with a special focus on fruits &amp; vegetables. The overall objective of the workshop is to enhance the capacity of banks and the main agricultural value-chain stakeholders in agricultural finance. Good examples and successful financing techniques in and beyond the Pacific region will be shared with participants. Tentatively, the workshop will be organized in October 2011 in Nadi, Fiji, prior to the Pacific regional dissemination workshop scheduled on 24th and 25th of October. Based on the preliminary discussions, UNCTAD will organize this workshop jointly with FAO. UNCTAD will also work closely with regional organizations and development partners such as SPC, ADB, IFC and UNDP to ensure the success of the workshop.</li> </ul> <p>In the framework of the All ACP programme, UNCTAD has promoted commodity exchanges through the activity: “1.CAR.C04 - Commodity Exchanges: review and promotion of the Agricultural Commodity Exchanges (ACE)” (December 2008-December 2011 - budget: 70,000 EUR).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Objectives of this activity are: 1) Development of an Agricultural Commodity Exchange in the Caribbean Region as a tool for information and export development: potential creation of a regional electronic exchange, based on the Aruba experience; 2) Further development and upgrade of the Dominican Republic's Commodity Exchange performance (BOLSAGRO), and link to regional electronic exchange; 3) Review the potential for the creation of commodity exchanges in Jamaica; 4) Review the potential for the creation of commodity exchanges in Trinidad and Tobago.</li> <li>▪ While no field outputs have been delivered during the period between January 2011 and June 2011, UNCTAD provided legal advice on the recruitment of a consultant for the regulation of the COMEX-Bolsagro, upon the request of Bolsagro. Bolsagro submitted a proposal to UNCTAD for the provision of the electronic platform. This is being reviewed.</li> </ul> <p>In Central African region, UNCTAD completed or has implemented the following activities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “1.CEN.C03 - Commodity Supply Chain Finance- Coffee Cameroon” (completed): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The study of value chain finance for coffee and cocoa in Cameroon was carried out from June to August 2010. It assesses current conditions of coffee/cocoa sectors' development, identified gaps and bottlenecks in the coffee/cocoa sectors' financing, especially those related to access to credit by smallholders and cooperatives, and defined strategic activities aiming to improve coffee/cocoa financing in Cameroon and establish necessary</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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	<p>capacities for the sectors' development.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A capacity building workshop was held on 5-6 October 2010 in Kribi under the auspice of the Ministry of Commerce and in cooperation with the National Cocoa and Coffee Board (NCCB). Some 60 participants representing the government of Cameroon, cocoa and coffee stakeholders, financial institutions and development partners participated in the workshop. The meeting examined and validated the conclusions and recommendations of the study of value chain finance for coffee and cocoa in Cameroon and identified follow-up activities, such as the feasibility study for the creation of service centres/companies in coffee producing areas of Cameroon.</li> <li>- The report of the study of value chain finance for coffee and cocoa in Cameroon was finalized based on the comments and feedback received during the workshop.</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ “1.CEN.C04 – Agricultural commodity exchanges” (ongoing in 2011): the objective of the activity (81,400 EUR) is the pre-feasibility study and support to relevant stakeholders for the potential creation of a commodity exchange with special focus on cocoa and coffee in Cameroon with a view to a future regional development. Progress was made with the recruitment of a consultant to undertake the prefeasibility study.</li> </ul> <p>In Ghana, UNCTAD carried out with the CFC a support to and enhancement of the existing project of commodity exchange (status: completed; 30,000 EUR). The CFC has approved the grant for the creation of a repos system in Ghana to support the development of the Commodity Exchange. This private sector initiative will be held in conjunction with the initiative by the Government to develop the legal and institutional framework. UNCTAD is working together with the CFC on this initiative. The approach of the activity was to strengthen local capacities and raise awareness on the commodity exchange mechanism. CFCs new project should allow the momentum created to continue with UNCTAD’s collaboration.</p> <p>In COMESA, UNCTAD support to commodity exchanges (ongoing in 2011; 100,000 EUR). Objectives of this activity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Medium term use in the COMESA Region of Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ACE) as a tool for intra regional trade and export development. In order to contribute to this midterm objective, UNCTAD has the following immediate objectives:</li> <li>▪ Enhancement of five existing commodity exchanges - Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi and Uganda - through an in depth study, recommendations and experience sharing.</li> <li>▪ Support to the creation of a regional trade platform through a web linking these five existing national commodity exchanges (Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi and Uganda).</li> </ul> <p>In Tanzania, UNCTAD supported a commodity exchange in the cashew nuts sector (completed; 40,000 €). Objectives of this activity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Medium term use on the region of Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ACE) as a tool for information and export development</li> <li>▪ Feasibility study to look at the possibility to quote Tanzania cashew nut stocks on trading platform</li> </ul> <p>A Road Map to guide stakeholders on the creation of Tanzanian Commodity Exchange (TCX) was launched. The Road Map and stakeholder support provide the basis for</p>
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continued action for the establishment of a commodity exchange.

*Source: UNCTAD, Draft 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011, 22 July 2011*

Under the All ACP programme, the World Bank (risk management team) has implemented so far the following activities (update: 30 June 2011).

<b>AAACP No</b>	<b>Title</b>
<b>PACIFIC REGION</b>	
1.PAC.E01	Risk management assessment for Fruit & Vegetable sector
<b>CARIBBEAN REGION</b>	
1.CAR.E01	Policy support on responses to food price volatility
1.CAR.E02	Pre-feasibility study for developing weather risk management strategy for agriculture
1.CAR.E03	Price risk management for the coffee sector as part of WB's promotion of coffee markets
1.CAR.E04	Pre-feasibility study for developing market based agr. risk management instr.
1.CAR.E05	Capacity Transfer to the region
<b>CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION</b>	
1.CEN.E01	Supply Chain Risk Assessment for cocoa & coffee
<b>WEST AFRICAN REGION</b>	
1.WST.E01	Supply Chain Risk Assessment
1.WST.E02	Weather Risk Management
1.WST.E04	Commodity Price Risk Management
1.WST.E07	Capacity Transfer to the Region
<b>EAST &amp; SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION</b>	
1.ESA.E01	Supply chain risk assessment
1.ESA.E02	Weather Risk Management
1.ESA.E04	Commodity Price Risk Management
1.ESA.E07	Capacity Transfer to the Region
<b>CROSS-REGIONAL</b>	
1.ACP.E01	Training and Education on Agricultural Risk management
1.ACP.E02	Cotton Market Research and Policy Dialogue

Available details of these activities are provided below.

Activity 1PAC.E01- Risk management assessment for Fruit & Vegetable sector.

The objective of this activity is to undertake a risk assessment and evaluation of options for use of risk management instruments within the supply chain for the fruits and vegetables (F&V) sector.

The activity is completed. However, ARMT continues exchanging comments and feedbacks with government and stakeholders to the findings of the report.

Activity 1.CAR.E01- Policy Support on responses to food price volatility

HAITI - The Objective of this activity is to provide technical guidance/policy support to the Government of Haiti on the 2008 implemented price subsidy and market based responses to food price volatility. Part of WB-ARMT activities consist of a short-term

<p>emergency plan being implemented in coordination with the World Bank's Emergency Response to Food Price Crisis for Haiti. This activity informed a US\$5 million Bank projects on agriculture approved in 2009. This activity has been completed.</p> <p><u>Activity1.CARE02- Prefeasibility study for developing weather risk management strategy for Jamaica agriculture.</u></p> <p>JAMAICA - WB-ARMT has been providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) of Jamaica in implementing a financial weather risk management strategy for agriculture (i.e. commodity cross-cutting). The objective of the activity is to contribute to the identification of a comprehensive weather risk management transfer strategy for the agricultural sector in Jamaica. The activities on agriculture risk management being developed in Jamaica are also serving as demonstrative model for other Caribbean countries.</p> <p>At the request of the Ministry of Agriculture, WB-ARMT has already delivered an agriculture weather risk mapping and an agriculture weather risk transfer strategy. Those deliverables have been well received and discussed in various workshops with participants from farmers associations, banks, insurance companies, public sector and donors' representatives.</p> <p>As part of this initiative, during the period under review, WB-ARMT continued having discussions with the MOA and the insurance industry for the various options for introducing risk management instruments to help around 43,000 small farmers in two pilot Parishes in Jamaica (St. Elizabeth and Portland) transfer their catastrophic weather risks. The final pre-feasibility study report has been finalized. MOA and the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) are in discussion with World Bank representative for introducing risk management in agriculture as a potential lending operation in FY13.</p> <p>In parallel, WB-ARMT is continuing to work with the coffee sector in accordance with the expressed priorities of the Government and the demand for weather insurance by the Coffee Industry Board (CIB). On-going activities are the development of a weather risk management transfer mechanism for protecting the high value coffee growing area of the Blue Mountain with over 9,000 small farmers exporting mainly to Japan. The final report is expected to be finalized in September 2011.</p> <p><u>Activity 1.CAR.E03 - Price risk management for the coffee sector as part of the WB and other IOs work on promotion of coffee markets.</u></p> <p>HAITI - The objective of this activity was to give commercial actors in the coffee supply chain the ability to improve profitability and increase the long term viability of their operations by managing price risk through physical trading and financial risk management activities. In addition, this activity transferred skills to the supply chain participants on the identification of risk (not only price), quantification of risk, and the implementation of risk management strategies. This activity has been completed</p> <p><u>Activity 1.CAR.E04 - Prefeasibility study for developing market based agricultural risk management instruments.</u></p> <p>GUYANA – The objective of this activity was to provide a basis for the public sector to assess and prioritize investments in agriculture risk management in Guyana. In particular, the Government is interested in exploring transfer instruments (agriculture insurance), and to undertake an in-depth assessment of risks in the rice supply chain. This activity has been completed.</p>
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<p>REGIONAL – This pre-feasibility study aims at identifying and assessing production risks at farm level for small farmers in Caribbean agriculture and designing ex-ante risk mitigation measures. The results of this study will be used as training material for small farmers in the Caribbean. Terms of Reference were developed and CARDI was contracted to conduct the analysis of production risks in typical Caribbean agricultural countries. The client for this analysis is the Caribbean Farmers Association (CAFAN). First draft of report was produced by end of June 2011.</p> <p><u>Activity 1.CAR.E05- Capacity transfer to the region</u></p> <p>REGIONAL – The primary objective will be to provide intensive training to selected institutions and organisations in the region to enable them to undertake provision of services and training of others in these risk management fields (to at least an intermediate level). The Technical Assistance to draft the “Caribbean Agricultural Risk Management Strategy and Plan of Action to Advance Regional Agricultural Insurance” has been completed and no further activity is foreseen for the strategy implementation, since its scope, timeline and funding goes beyond the mandate of the AAACP programme.</p> <p>A Weather Risk Management Training on Index Based Weather Risk Management has been postponed for September 2011 aiming at building capacity of Caribbean stakeholders in index insurance. Participants from insurance companies, financial institutions, national meteorological services and national insurance commissioners will be invited.</p> <p><u>Activity1CEN.E01 – Supply Chain Risk Assessment.</u></p> <p>Cameroon - The objective of this activity is to provide technical assistance to the Government of Cameroon to assess risks in the coffee supply chain. This activity is completed.</p> <p><u>Activity 1.ESA.E01 – Supply Chain Risk Assessments</u></p> <p>Provide stakeholders along supply chains with a comprehensive view of supply chain risks as critical to understanding the incentives for investment. The objective of this assessment is to establish a baseline for new risk management interventions.</p> <p>MOZAMBIQUE – Cotton Supply Chain Risk Assessment: This activity is completed.</p> <p>UGANDA – The objective of this activity is to provide technical assistance to the Government of Uganda to assess risks in agricultural supply chains. This activity is completed</p> <p><u>Activity 1.ESA.E02 - Weather Risk Management</u></p> <p>To apply, on a pilot basis, parametric based weather risk transfer products as a means to manage weather risks, expand the range of agricultural insurance solutions in developing markets. Develop financial solutions to reduce countries’ reliance on ex post donor funds and strengthen ability to plan efficient responses to catastrophic events through identifying, indexing and quantifying a country’s weather risk. Support efforts to improve early warning system to facilitate more informed Government decision making on issues such as food security and monitoring of natural disaster risks</p> <p>MOZAMBIQUE - The objective of this activity is to provide Mozambique agricultural sector and cotton supply chains in particular with a sector weather risk mapping, and sufficient and reliable weather data for risk analysis purposes</p> <p>Weather Risk Mapping - A firm has been hired and it is conducting the analysis for the weather risk mapping. This analysis will include: (i) Zoning agriculture in homogenous</p>
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<p>weather zones; (ii) Mapping crop suitability by drawing an exposure of crops to weather risks; and (iii) Finding crop vulnerability to weather risks. Delivery is planned for end of August 2011.</p> <p>Weather data digitization – A firm has been hired and it is in the process of transferring weather data kept in manuscript into digital form in compliance with WMO standards. This data can subsequently be used for weather risk analysis for various purposes, including weather insurance products. The firm already delivered 50% of contracted tasks and the remaining 50% will be delivered by mid-August 2011.</p> <p><b>MALAWI – Macro drought.</b> To assist the Government of Malawi (GoM) with the development and monitoring of a risk transfer product based on the Malawi Maize Index (MMI) to enable them to better manage the negative impacts of drought in so far as it affects their national maize production. With the support of AAACP funds a third transaction for the 2010–11 maize season was developed. During the reporting period, ARMT has updated the tools adopted in the Marking-to-Model process, monitored the data flow that began in October, and computed the level of the MMI from Dekad 1 (1-10th October) to Dekad 21 (21-30th April), the end of the derivative contract period. No payouts were triggered during this period.</p> <p><b>MALAWI – Weather Risk Management for Farmers and Agribusinesses.</b> The objective of this program is to support the Malawian insurance market in launching index insurance products and determining if there is a possibility to upscale the market in the country. The aim of this market expansion is to expand access to financial services for smallholders while managing risk for these producers. Technical support by ARMT was provided to the ongoing weather risk management program in Malawi. This program is ongoing. This year's program was supported by ARMT consultants and MicroEnsure (an NGO hired by ARMT). The program expanded to additional weather insurance contracts for maize and sorghum. This activity involves Opportunity International Bank of Malawi, Alliance One, and Limbe Leaf. In addition this year's program expanded to include the MicroLoan Foundation and the Clinton Hunter Foundation who wanted to offer their clients a weather insurance product. The product was developed in October/November and launched in November 2010. ARMT has monitored the transaction through the season.</p> <p><b>KENYA – Farmer Insurance Program.</b> The objective of this program is to develop index-based weather insurance projects for agriculture in Kenya. Project activities are carried out in partnership with the Financial Sector Deepening Trust of Kenya (FSD) and the Rockefeller Foundation. The partnership was formed in mid-2008 to test the use of index based weather risk management instruments in Kenya by assisting local insurance companies and credit institutions in the implementation of dedicated pilot programs. The program is on-going and is a continuation of pilot activities from September 2010, March 2010, and preparatory work that was carried out in 2009. Between January of 2011 and March of 2011 three different deficit rainfall products were launched in conjunction with Equity Bank, Agricultural Finance Corporation, and APA Insurance. WB-ARMT assisted in the development of these products through product design and strategic development activities. These products were sold to clients in March of 2011</p>
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and by June of 2011 the contracts had closed. The three products offered during the March 2011 season were rainfall index contracts for sorghum in Kibwezi, coffee in Ruiru, and wheat in Narok. Both of the first two contracts provided payouts, but the wheat contract in Narok failed to payout despite the occurrence of drought. ARMT discussed this issue with FSD and APA Insurance, the underwriter of the Narok contract, to support the company in determining potential compensation to be provided to wheat farmers in Narok based on technical adjustments that were identified for the contract. CIC insurance was also interested in a banana contract for the March season and a contract was designed but ultimately the product did not receive enough interest to be sold.

#### Activity 1.ESA.E04 – Commodity Policy & Price Risk Management

To provide technical support on a wide range of issues affecting commodity policy, market development, and competitiveness of the African commodity sectors. On the policy side, there has been demand from stakeholders for work on cereals markets, coffee, cocoa, and cotton. Technical assistance in this area focuses on the important role of market intermediaries and providing information about global markets and standard trading techniques used to assess, quantify, and monitor physical and financial exposures of the business in an ongoing way.

MALAWI – Technical advisory assistance has been provided to the Government of Malawi in the area of Commodity Policy risk management, particularly on the design of a risk management framework and the corresponding institutional settings for following up price trends for key agricultural commodities. The government has now appointed a manager for an agricultural risk management unit in the Ministry of Agriculture. This unit will receive financial support from the World Bank ADP-SP project to ensure recommendations from AAACP become operational.

REGIONAL - Cotton price risk management.

WB-ARMT working in partnership with the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) and the African Cotton Association (ACA) delivered training to over fifty attendees from the East African cotton sector at a three-day training event held in Mombasa, Kenya in June 2011. The training was directed at cotton traders and ginneries and aimed to provide them with insight into the risk of unmanaged price risk exposure, the means of monitoring such exposure, and the opportunities and techniques for mitigating such exposure through the use of physical contracts and financial instruments. The event was well attended primarily by people actively involved in the commercial cotton trade. Feedback received from the attendees was very positive with attendees appearing to learn greatly from the event and appearing to be eager to take the lessons learned back to their enterprises.

#### Activity 1.ESA.E07 – Capacity Transfer to the Region

The primary objective is to provide intensive training to selected institutions and organisations in the region to enable them to undertake provision of services and training of others in these risk management fields (to at least an intermediate level). Linked with this objective, the beneficiaries will also receive assistance in planning their activities in such a way as to enable their long term sustainability. The secondary objective is to create a practitioners network with other regions in the ACP to enable them to share experiences and knowledge in the future.

REGIONAL - Coffee price risk management.

WB-ARMT has continued its partnership with the Eastern African Fine Coffee Association (EAFCA). During the past year EAFCA was contracted to deliver training in five East African ACP countries: Kenya, Zambia, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania. The training in coffee price risk management is being delivered to coffee sector enterprises (small and medium sized traders and cooperatives), government coffee sector agencies, regulators, coffee sector NGOs and capacity building institutions. The goal had been to have all five events completed by end 2010 but due to delays in implementation so far four trainings have been delivered with the remaining event scheduled for August 2011. So far training has been delivered in Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Ethiopia. The Rwandan training was delivered in May 2011 and the Ethiopian training delivered in June 2011. Attendance was good, especially in Ethiopia, with EAFCA receiving additional requests for more training going forward. The final event is likely to be held in Uganda, rather than Zambia, as demand for training from Zambia has been lower than anticipated. In addition to the training delivered by EAFCA an additional event was held in Tanzania in Arusha in February 2011, following the EAFCA Annual Conference. The training was delivered jointly by EAFCA and ARMT to an audience of over forty people including fair-trade coffee producers and NGOs working with Eastern African sustainable sector coffee producers (primarily fair-trade, Utz, 4C and Rainforest Alliance certified producers). Feedback received was very positive and the NGOs trained are now aiming to integrate this material into their ongoing work.

#### REGIONAL – Weather-Based Index Insurance for Agriculture Training

WB-ARMT delivered a one-week training course in “Designing Index Based Weather Risk Management Programs” in January 2011 in Mombasa Kenya. The event was very well attended with over sixty attendees from the East African insurance sectors and meteorological agencies present. The training was a technical training based upon the World Bank training course developed under AAACP funding and was delivered by four subject experts. The goal of the training was to provide the attendees with a very strong understanding of what index insurance for agricultural is and how one may set about designing and implementing an index insurance program in an East African country. Feedback received from attendees was positive. In addition to the insurers and meteorological attendees, representatives from the College of Insurance (COI) were present to assess their interest in having their staff trained in the subject so that the college could subsequently offer the training on an ongoing basis throughout East Africa. Following the training COI confirmed their interest in receiving technical capacity building in the subject, with a view to offering the training on an ongoing basis as part of their existing program of training in the region.

Subsequently, in June 2011 WB-ARMT held a one-week intensive training course in Nairobi, Kenya for the academic staff of the College of Insurance. The goal of the training was to provide in-depth technical training to the COI academic staff to enable them to in future deliver the training to East African insurance companies and students. The training event went well and preparations are now underway for COI to hold a one-week long training event for East African insurers in August, with support from WB-ARMT.

#### 1.WST.E01 Supply Chain Risk Assessment

Provide stakeholders along supply chains with a comprehensive view of supply chain risks as critical to understanding the incentives for investment. The objective of this assessment is to establish a baseline for new risk management interventions. The

<p>objective of the risk assessment tool is to highlight these issues and identify where and when other supply chain constraints may hinder the effectiveness of individual approaches.</p> <p>Ghana – In May 2011, WB-ARMT fielded a technical mission in Ghana that undertook a risk assessment of the cocoa supply chain. This activity was coordinated with the regional World Bank Office. The counterpart for this activity was the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) who is the regulatory cocoa body within Ghana. Two senior officers from COCOBOD joined the mission team for the risk assessment. A final presentation to over 35 representatives of COCOBOD was made in Accra at the end of the mission. The findings highlighted the major risks to the Ghanaian cocoa supply chain which included Swollen shoot virus, black pod, capsids (pest, disease and insects), cross border smuggling, and cocoa price volatility. The WB-ARMT team suggested various measures to manage risks in relation to mitigation, transfer, and coping mechanisms</p> <p>1.WST.E02/E03 Weather Risk Management</p> <p>The objective of this activity is to develop financial solutions to reduce countries' reliance on ex post donor funds and strengthen ability to plan efficient responses to catastrophic events through identifying, indexing and quantifying a country's weather risk. Additionally, technical support in this area will provide support to efforts to improve early warning system to facilitate more informed Government decision making on issues such as food security and monitoring of natural disaster risks.</p> <p>BURKINA FASO – Weather Index Insurance Piloting</p> <p>The activities in the reporting period are related to the conduction of a Feasibility and Implementation Planning study of an insurance system, based on the outcomes agreed with stakeholders from the Workshop of December 2009. Agreement to move to the next phase of development of an insurance system was agreed with Government and stakeholders.</p> <p>A mission was planned for late April, during which the main technical work of the index analysis would be undertaken; and a cotton supply chain risk assessment and cotton price risk training would be carried out, all under the AAACP programme. Unfortunately, immediately before the mission an embargo was placed on all World Bank and UN missions as a result of civil and military unrest in the country, and the mission had to be postponed. The index technical mission was rescheduled and took place in late June/early July; and the price risk management training will take place in August.</p> <p>The technical mission in late June/early July allowed the detailed assessment of insurance options and dialogue with stakeholders in the cotton sector, with insurers and with the insurance regulator. Findings of the mission were that area-yield index insurance at the level of the département is likely to be technically feasible, and that the good organisational arrangements for cotton input supply, and single-channel marketing of raw cotton to cotton companies, provides a favourable framework within which area yield index insurance could be introduced. Weather index insurance is less suited to cotton crop insurance in Burkina due to complex mix of factors which contribute to crop losses, and the growth pattern of the cotton crop. Index insurance can be structured for delivery linked to the input packages provided by the cotton companies.</p> <p>GHANA - As part of an agreed Non-Lending Technical Assistance Program with the Ministry of Agriculture, WB-ARMT under the AAACP programme has started the delivery of technical assistance for weather risk management.</p>
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Weather Risk Mapping - A weather risk mapping for the agricultural sector has started. A specialized firm has been recruited that will undertake the study for the northern half of the country. This analysis will include: (i) Zoning agriculture in homogenous weather zones; (ii) Mapping crop suitability by drawing an exposure of crops to weather risks; and (iii) Finding crop vulnerability to weather risks. Delivery is planned for end of September 2011.

Weather data digitization – Terms of Reference have been prepared and a firm has been identified that will be transferring weather data kept in manuscript into digital form in compliance with WMO standards. This data can subsequently be used for weather risk analysis for various purposes, including weather insurance products. It is planned that the delivery will be in September 2011.

FAO has been waiting for the weather risk mapping and weather data digitization for in order to carry out a feasibility study for weather index insurance for cotton in Mozambique. Coordination between both IOs has been close.

#### Activity 1.WST.E04 Commodity Price Risk Management.

Ghana: In February 2011, WB-ARMT fielded a technical mission in Ghana that performed agriculture sector risk review. This sectoral risk review aimed at quantifying the risk exposure of the agricultural sector as a whole and was done in collaboration with Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA). This review analyzed nine major agricultural commodities that account for more than 60% of agriculture GDP. This risk review analyzed major production risks (drought, flood, pest and diseases, bushfire etc) and price risks to the major commodities. It attempted to highlight and prioritize main agricultural sectoral risks, as well as regional and commodity spread of these risks and related losses.

Background Paper on Cash Crop Early Warning Systems: In March 2011, WB-ARMT commissioned a background paper on cash crop early warning system in developing countries. Many West African countries are heavily reliant on the revenues from the sale of agricultural commodities (Ghana: Cocoa --8.1% of nations' GDP), Burkina Faso: cotton sector (60% export revenue), to support its national budget, manage balance of payment situation, and support the provision of basic services for its population. Lack of timely and accurate forecasting of these crops often has far reaching implications for these economies. This background document analyzed the current state-of-art of remote sensing applications for cash crop monitoring, yield estimates and early warning purpose and examined the current adoption of such systems by the public sector institutions and explained the determinants/factors which encourages and/or inhibits their adoption.

#### Activity 1.ACP.E01. Training and Education on Agricultural Risk Management

WB-ARMT has developed a capacity building strategy which 1) develops general and specialized training materials which can be delivered using web-based platforms and in person, 2) disseminates the materials through partnerships with the World Bank Institute and regional training organizations, 3) supports external organizations interested in making use of the materials for their own capacity building programs, 4) provides on-going, as-needed, technical support to clients related to risk assessment and development of risk management programs.

WB-ARMT has been pursuing its training strategy that was developed end FY2009.

The objective of this strategy and this activity - which is a component of multiple regional work plans - is to finalize, deliver and distribute modular risk management courses to ACP clients through both distance learning and face to face methods. This work has continued well during the past six months. The main courses (six of them) are now finalized. The online platform is also finalized and being used on a daily basis by interested parties wishing to access the materials, there are currently over 300 registered users and any interested party is able to join by self registering themselves online. This is a significant change as previously only invited parties could access the site, now anyone is free to access and use the site. CD ROMs have now been mass-produced for the six finalized courses and have been distributed at relevant locations and to relevant parties, and sent out based upon requests received. To date approximately 1,300 copies of the six finalized courses have been distributed to a variety of stakeholders ranging from coffee producers, to insurance companies, to sustainability programs, to academics, to UN organizations.

Work is continuing on finalization of four more courses, namely finalization of the cotton price risk management course, translation of the Weather Index Insurance course (from English to French), finalization of the Weather Index Insurance Spanish course and finalization of the cocoa price risk management course. The English language cotton price risk management course is now online and work is required to update it (following successful delivery of the first face to face delivery of this course in June 2011), format the course and transfer it to CD ROM. this will be undertaken over the next three months. The French language cotton price risk management course had been delayed due to delays in delivery of the face to face training in Burkina Faso. Following the delivery the course will be updated, finalized and put online. The Weather Index Insurance training course is currently being translated into French, a firm has been hired and is currently completing the work. Once the translation is completed the online course will be formatted and then transferred to CD ROM. The cocoa price risk management course (English version) is now being finalized after its first successful delivery in Nigeria in May. The course will be put online. The French version of the course that was planned will no longer proceed following the decision by the World Cocoa Foundation (our partner in delivering the courses in West Africa) to proceed with only English language training events. In addition to these three courses the Spanish Weather Index Insurance training course is having its theme / presentation updated and will also shortly be put onto CD ROM.

Details on the development of various courses is provided below in bullet point format:

- Price Risk Management Coffee Course (English and Spanish versions). Course finalized and CD ROMs widely distributed across East Africa and Latin America both directly and via partnership with the Eastern African Fine Coffee Association (EAFCA).and Fair Trade USA. Work is continuing on delivering the course in East Africa via the Eastern African Fine Coffee Association. Continued demand for coffee sector price risk management due to recent extreme volatility in coffee prices has made the coffee sector highly interested in this training. Face-to-face training events in Coffee Price Risk Management held in Tanzania, Rwanda and Ethiopia.
- Index Based Weather Risk Management Program Course and Automated Web-tool for Contract Design. Course finalized and CD ROMs widely distributed across East and West Africa and to NGOs and insurance practitioners. Two regional training events for insurers were held in January 2011 in West Africa (Accra) and East Africa. A partnership with Kenya's College of Insurance has commenced,

	<p>which shall result in them offering the course to students and insurers from across East Africa on an ongoing basis.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton Price Risk Management Course for W. Africa and Cotton Price Risk Management for E. Africa. The course was delivered to the East African cotton sector in June 2011 at a three-day event held in Kenya. This course will now be updated online and transferred to CD ROM once completed. The training event planned for West Africa (Burkina Faso) in 1H 2011 was delayed due to unrest in Burkina Faso and is now planned for August 2011. Following this training the French Cotton Price Risk Management course will be put online.</li> <li>▪ Cocoa Price Risk Management Course. Work on adapting the coffee price risk management course into a cocoa price risk management training course was completed and the course was delivered face-to-face in Nigeria in May 2011. The course was also planned to be delivered in June in Cameroon but due to logistical issues with our partner organization will now be delivered in October 2011. Work is now planned to put the course online and consider also transferring it to CD ROM.</li> </ul> <p><u>Activity 1.ACP.E02 – Cotton Market Research.</u></p> <p>In-country and regional level dissemination will be one of the main objectives of the third phase of the study. In parallel to sending the final report to the various country authorities, as well as to regional economic organizations (WAEMU, ECOWAS, SADC) and donor partners, in-country and sub-regional workshops will be organized to present and discuss the findings and stimulate exchanges on ongoing and future reform programs. The workshops will be organized around key themes of the report. This activity has been completed</p> <p><i>Source: WB- Agricultural Risk Management Team (WB-ARMT), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 25 July 2011</i></p> <p>The CFC is supporting the development of warehouse receipts (project 0.ESA.F02) under the All ACP Programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ project team is collaborating with WFP in promoting the use of WRS in grain markets, and intends to extend cooperation into Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Manyara, Dodoma, Singida, Tabora, Ruvuma, Kigoma, Iringa and Njolima regions;</li> <li>▪ Malawi is working to upgrade warehouses seeking certification, including warehouse facilities in Balaka, Ntendje, Ntchisi and Kufulu. All facilities will be completed by the end of 2011. The UNDP Millennium Village in Zomba will also be refurbished and certified to WRS standard using external funds;</li> <li>▪ work has started on the set-up of default protection mechanisms in Tanzania, including preparations by TWLB for building up an indemnity fund using storage lien paid by warehouse operators at the beginning of the season.</li> <li>▪ the delays with project startup in Ethiopia have been accommodated by reallocating CFC funds towards financing of activities in Ethiopia while using the Programme funds to expand activities in Malawi and on the regional level.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Common Fund For Commodities (CFC), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 27 July 2011</i></p>
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	<p>FAO has supported risk management under the All ACP programme. Details are provided below:</p> <p><i>1.PAC.A10 - Identification of requirements for supply chain finance and risk management instruments</i> Objective of the activity: To determine needs and to share and exchange ideas on products and mechanisms that can be used to improve the provision of credit, financial and risk management services.</p> <p>Based on the results of the questionnaire on risk management and finance that was administered in Fiji and Vanuatu, as well as in Grenada and Jamaica, a paper was prepared. Further activities under result 3 will be focused on Samoa. In Samoa, the piloting activities will involve fruit and vegetable stakeholders within the framework of the ITC sector strategy development.</p> <p>The survey undertaken by the Small Business Enterprise Centre of Samoa (SBEC) on farmers financing needs has been finalized. FAO in collaboration with SBEC has drafted a proposal about potential piloting activities in the area of finance and risk management that has been discussed and validated with the FVSS stakeholder committee in Samoa in October 2010.</p> <p>Outputs, results and main lessons Lessons from the SBEC survey were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Approaches are required to facilitate farmers collectively plan production and harvesting in line with market demands, as such there are frequent episodes of excess supply with resulting very low prices.</li> <li>▪ There are no formal agreements signed between farmers and buyers (restaurants, supermarkets, hotels)</li> <li>▪ Farming activities are regularly impeded due to liquidity problems and the ability of farmers to pay for purchased inputs, to build and maintain infrastructures (greenhouses, fences etc), to pay for pesticides and hired workers, transport costs</li> <li>▪ Lack of farmer financial management skills and knowledge on different financial services available to assist with their operations.</li> </ul> <p><i>1.CEN.A07 - Supply chain risk and finance assessment</i> Objective of the activity: Assessing existing formal and informal risk management mechanisms in view of fostering them through identifying alternative risk management tools including insurances products and facilitating access to finance and strengthening linkages along the value chain.</p> <p>As part of the supply chain strategy development the critical role of access to credit, finance and risk management always takes a central role. In Cameroon our focus in this area relates to work in staple crop value chains.</p> <p>Study on risk assessment for cassava (mentioned under 1.CEN.A01) and for rice and maize (mentioned under 1.CEN.A02) are also part of developing new opportunities for improving credit and finance opportunities for staple crops through improved risk management. These studies will be the basis for a training workshop bringing micro-finance agencies and value stakeholders on how to better control credit risks</p> <p><i>1.WST.A08 - Supply chain risk and finance assessment</i> Objective of the activity: To assess existing formal and informal risk management mechanisms along the value chain, the possibility of promoting them and of introducing alternative risk management tools.</p> <p>In follow-up to the round tables organised in Burkina Faso, Mali and the regional workshop in Senegal (see activity 1.WST.A01) a diagnosis of current and alternative finance and risk management needs in the three countries will be initiated. Activities will</p>
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also support the ITC led regional cotton strategy with the identification of tools for risk management and value chain finance, including the warrantage system.

During the reporting period, a maize value chain risk assessment was undertaken. In parallel a workshop on warrantage was organized (end of June 2011) by FAO and CIC-B raising the capacity for the staff of the cereal interprofession, 2 national trainers, 2 micro-finance agents, and 25 representatives of farm unions and federations in Burkina Faso. In Mali, a rice value chain risk assessment was carried out through CNOP-Mali by a national consultant.

*1.ESA.A16 - Supply chain risk and finance assessment*

Objective of the activity: Activities in the area of supply chain risk and finance assessment are concentrated in two countries, Zambia and Malawi, and relate to the cassava industry. Given the nature of this crop and its resistance to adverse climatic events, analysis and implementation activities have been concentrated on supply chain finance and an analysis of constraints/risks that may affect linkages and investment in the cassava value chain.

*1.ESA.A17 - Import and export risk management for cereals*

Objective of the activity: Evaluation and promote the introduction of risk mitigating tools targeted to public and private sector actors, including small businesses.

In light of the decision not to provide further funding for work on cereals under Tranche 2, it was decided (as explained under 1.ESA.A02) to align activities A02, A17 and A19 more closely with other donor funded activities currently being coordinated by EAGC to ensure maximum returns to the AAACP work in this area.

In discussion with EAGC, and based on the action plan developed with EAGC under activity A02 (see above), it was decided to develop a study at the regional level to assess the feasibility of formal and informal price risk management mechanisms, including improved policy interventions, working capital guarantees and export credit insurance, in the cereal sectors of ESA.

The stated purpose of most government operations in markets is to stabilize food prices and supplies. Governments pursue price stabilization objectives through two main routes: marketing board operations, and discretionary trade policy instruments, such as export bans and variable import tariff rates. The uncertainty that arises from these interventions is extremely detrimental to food market performance, and the periodic rise of food prices above import parity levels.

An appropriate review of policy is required to promote improved functioning of regional food markets, including investments in trade-facilitating infrastructure, regional integration, policy coordination, and introduction of market mechanisms such as commodity exchanges and warehouse receipt systems. The scope for adopting suitable market solutions assumes significance in this context from a policy perspective and also as a core initiative for market development in the region.

*1.ESA.A19 - Regional consultations on value chain risk management and finance*

Objective of the activity: To discuss the possibility of introducing formal and informal risk transfer mechanisms along the value chain capable of enhancing credit collateralization and facilitate access of chain actors to finance.

*Source: FAO, 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, July 2011*



<b>BF</b>	No such evidence can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Burkina Faso.
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Notons que, liée à l'intervention PAFFIC de la DUE, la stratégie commune de sortie de crise de la filière coton adoptée en 2008 comporte également un axe dédié au FdL. Cependant, l'appui du PAFFIC a été ponctuel (terminé en 2010) alors que le FdL soutenu par l'AFD est toujours en fonctionnement depuis sa création en 2007 et a fait l'objet d'une révision récente de son mécanisme suite à la spectaculaire envolée des cours du coton en 2010-début 2011.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 512, PAFFIC, Stratégie commune de sortie de crise de la filière coton, mars 2008.</i></p>
<b>BF ACP-ACP Coton</b>	<p>Le financement de l'UE à travers le programme Tous ACP a permis de lancer l'initiative de support de la Banque mondiale – ARMG à la gestion des risques climatiques. Au départ, les personnes impliquées étaient dubitatives, mais les ateliers faisant et les informations données ont fait évoluer les opinions. La phase pilote du projet de la gestion des risques se déroule au Burkina Faso. Elle a débuté par un atelier organisé à Ouagadougou fin 2009, qui a débouché sur un plan d'action.</p> <p>La gestion des risques dans le secteur du coton est une action de long terme. Le financement du programme tous ACP se termine fin 2011. Le plus important est que les acteurs du Burkina Faso (producteurs, sociétés d'assurance, etc.) ont compris l'importance de la question. L'étude de faisabilité en cours et les ateliers ont informé et ont permis de former des capacités locales en matière de gestion des risques. Mais il faudra une seconde phase de support pour tout fédérer et mettre la gestion des risques au cœur des activités. Il y aurait alors un soutien financier de la Banque mondiale pour poursuivre les efforts fournis à ce jour. La phase pilote devrait fournir les données de base pour lancer les activités. Mais il y a des facteurs externes qui jouent, comme les bons prix du coton actuellement.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 599</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>L'intervention contient analyse de risques détaillée et des éventuels plans d'urgence. Les <b>principaux risques identifiés sont les suivants</b> : Risques sociaux (activités 1 et 2), risques techniques (activité 2), risques économiques (activités 1, 2 et 3), risques particuliers liés au manque de réactivité dans la mise en œuvre du projet, risques liés à l'augmentation des coûts du carburant et risques politiques. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 27</i>).</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France). La CE a ainsi apporté un appui indirect au FdL, outil novateur de gestion du risque prix</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p> <p>La mise en place du FdL fait partie d'une des 4 conditions spécifiques de déboursement de la 1<sup>ère</sup> tranche fixe de l'ABS PAFFIC : « Adoption par le Gouvernement et par l'AICB de la stratégie de sortie de crise »</p> <p>En ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre du FdL, la situation d'avancement a été jugée satisfaisante dans le cadre du décaissement de la tranche 1. :</p> <p>1. <b>Formalisation des accords de financement.</b> La CF Etat – AFD concernant un prêt concessionnel de 15 M€ destinés à alimenter le FdL (NB. A ces 15 M€ sous forme de prêt très concessionnel contracyclique (PTCC) s'ajouteront 3 M€ financés sous forme</p>

	<p>de don par l'AFD au nom de l'UNPCB), l'accord de rétrocession entre l'Etat et le Fonds Burkinabé de Développement Economique et Social (FBDES), et l'accord de rétrocession entre le FBDES et l'AFdL ont été signés le 16 octobre 2008</p> <p><b>2. Mise en œuvre du dispositif opérationnel.</b> L'association du fonds de lissage (AFdL) a été créée le 4 avril 2008, et le règlement du FdL a été adopté le même jour par son AG constitutive. L'accord interprofessionnel a été amendé pour intégrer l'AFdL. L'AG, le CA et le bureau exécutif ont été établis.</p> <p>La banque de gestion du FdL a été sélectionnée et les dernières négociations ont été finalisées. Il s'agit de la Bank of Africa (BOA). Le contrat de gestion restait à être signé entre la BOA et l'AFdL.</p> <p>Le droit de tirage des sociétés cotonnières sur le FdL au titre de la campagne déficitaire 2006/07 a été arrêté au montant total de 8.948.272.000 FCFA (13.641.553 EUR). Pour la campagne 2007/08, un abondement du FdL par les sociétés cotonnières à hauteur d'environ 4 milliards FCFA (6.000.000 EUR) est espéré.</p> <p><i>Source : Note dossier CF-PAFFIC, 1<sup>ère</sup> tranche</i></p> <p>Le rapport FRPC6 (mars 2010) indique que l'AFdL a passé un contrat de mandat de gestion avec la BOA qui a notamment pour tâche, le calcul en début de campagne du prix de tendance FOB et du prix plancher ; d'établir en fin de campagne les résultats en dégageant le montant des soutiens ou marge brute dus et ainsi que le montant éventuel du prix d'achat complémentaire</p> <p>Après 3 années de fonctionnement (campagnes 2006/07, 07/08 et 08/09) le solde du FdL était de 1,815 milliards FCFA (2,77 millions €).</p> <p><i>Source : rapport FRPC6</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>No such evidence was found in the regional programming documents for the Central Africa region. In the 2008-2013 RSP price variations and the vulnerability of balance of payments to these are mentioned but nothing on ways to combat this.</p> <p><i>Sources: RSP 2002-2007, 2008-2013.</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Pas d'infos recueillies</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Les <b>interventions du secteur hors concentration « appui et amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles » s'orienteront sur la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion et d'atténuation des variations de prix, le renforcement des outils d'aide à la décision</b>, l'appui à la structuration institutionnelle du secteur agricole, l'amélioration de l'accès aux marchés extérieurs en renforçant aux niveaux public et privé la promotion de la qualité et le respect des standards sanitaires, sociaux et environnementaux en vigueur sur les marchés d'exportation, notamment celui de l'Union européenne. Les filières fruitières continueront d'être soutenues par la ligne budgétaire banane tandis que l'amélioration de la compétitivité de la filière sucre le sera au travers de la ligne budgétaire sucre. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Tout ACP: a study has been implemented entitled: Cameroon coffee supply chain risk management (WB AAACP, September 2010). The report identified the main risks (coffee price risk, volatility of fertilizer prices, crop substitution, policy regulations, default risk, pest and disease). These risks should be addressed through: improved access and affordability of farm inputs; training especially among young farmers about good coffee cultivation practices; on farm advisory services; coordination and transparency between producers and exporters. Specific interventions should be</p>

	implemented in the future ( <i>Source : document stratégique de développement de la filière café 2010-2015</i> ).
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's support supported the formulation of a national competitiveness strategy including agriculture in of its five pillars (See EQ2). There is no evidence in Commission's strategy documents that this strategy addresses commodity risk management.</p> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>No evidence in ECS</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>There are references to disaster risk management but not to financial risk management in the East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regional Strategy Paper.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 59.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>Support for the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in the « <b>Focal sector II: Rural development and food security</b> » precises that overtime, the joint donor group together with Government are expected to work towards refining the programme's design and improve the implementation modalities so as to allow the PSNP to become a more effective protection and <b>risk management mechanism</b>. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.50</i>).</p> <p>Support for agricultural markets and livestock development in the « Focal sector II: Rural development and food security » precises that support under the CSP will focus on policies and programmes that protect sources of livelihood while addressing sources of vulnerability. This will include: (i) provision of animal health services, inter alia to create disease free areas/corridors; (ii) better drought <b>risk management</b>/preparedness; (iii) conflict resolution mechanisms – mix of Government and traditional leaders; (iv) support for livestock marketing, and; (v) Support to achieve improved grazing methods. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.73</i>).</p> <p>Chapter IV.6. is devoted to <b>Risk assessment</b>. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.56</i>).</p> <p>The overriding objective of the Strategy for 1996-2001 was overcoming poverty through modernisation of the Ethiopian society and economy based on sustainable and regionally balanced growth. Food Security was seen as a key to such developments and was expected to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Increase food supplies through food production, internal inter-regional trade and</li> </ul>

	<p>liberalised import of food and inputs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Improved access to food through non-farm income</li> <li>· Develop the productive sector, especially agriculture</li> <li>· <b>Reinforce capacities for crisis prevention and management.</b></li> </ul> <p><i>(Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 11).</i></p> <p>The Strategy for 2002-2007 has as its overall objective the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, by removing structural constraints in sectors that are key to future development. Complementary to the overall objectives were specific objectives in the chosen focal sectors and notably Food Security</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Increased food supplies</li> <li>· Improved effective demand for food</li> <li>· <b>Improved crisis management and prevention</b></li> </ul> <p><i>(Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 12).</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The Cocobod controls indirectly the domestic purchase of cocoa (it licenses the buyers, sets the buyer's (farm gate) crop price and buys from the Licenced Buying Agents (LBAs)); the external trade is Cocobod's monopoly. For the farmer there is thus no risk on the price.</p> <p>Cocobod furthermore sells 70% of its production in future markets (3 months) so that is another source of risk management. It does require Cocobod to have lots of storage facility which may be a future problem if production expands even further.</p> <p><i>Source: MN131, MN123</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<b>Pas d'infos dans les CSP</b>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Non, il existe peu d'interventions structurées sur les produits agricoles concernant la gestion des risques sauf dans le domaine de la sécurité alimentaire avec des alertes précoces et le suivi des évolutions de prix. La Délégation souhaiterait aider à la mise en place d'outils pratiques sur la gestion des risques (assurances, etc.) sur base de ce qui se fait peut-être ailleurs. (Source : MN 801).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Mali even though cotton price volatility risk is mentioned as one of the key constraints weighing on the Malian economy.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 9.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>L'objectif spécifique n°1 du PARFC « Mener à terme le processus de réforme engagé: conclusion du processus de filialisation et de la privatisation de la CMDT, mise en place des organes de régulation de la filière » prévoit la mise en place d'un dispositif opérationnel permettant une réduction des effets de la volatilité des cours de la fibre sur le revenu du producteur par une contribution à un Fonds de Soutien (CF, annexe 5) et un appui à la conception d'un fonds de lissage (soutien intra-annuel puis inter-annuel des cours de coton) (BCS, §1.2; Monitoring report, p2)</p> <p>NB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ La Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton (MRSC) a commandité une étude sur la mise en place d'un fonds de soutien des prix du coton graine dont le rapport final a été fourni en 2006.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ La mise en place d'un mécanisme de détermination du prix du coton graine aux producteurs prenant en compte les cours sur le marché mondial et les prix pratiqués dans la sous région est une des importantes mesures prévues au plan d'action de la "Lettre de Politique de Développement du Secteur Coton" (LPDSC, 2001). En application de cette mesure, un mécanisme adopté en 2002 et a été appliqué pour les campagnes 2002/2003 à 2004/2005 (Etude fonds de soutien, annexe 1).</li> <li>■ les difficultés rencontrées dans la mise en œuvre de ce mécanisme ont conduit à son remplacement en 2005 par un Protocole d'Accord Etat CMD- Producteurs sur le mécanisme et qui est basé sur les trois principes suivants (Etude fonds de soutien, annexe 1): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- le prix d'achat du coton graine au producteur est déterminé de façon à favoriser un développement durable de la filière malienne qui respecte l'équilibre des différents acteurs, les incite à améliorer leurs performances respectives et limite les risques budgétaires.;</li> <li>- le prix final de campagne est calculé sur la base d'une répartition des revenus bruts de la filière entre les producteurs et la CMDT. Les nouveaux taux sont : 60% pour les producteurs et 40% pour la CMDT.</li> <li>- le Fonds de soutien est un instrument de flexibilité relative pour la fixation du prix initial et non pas une condition sine que non à l'application du mécanisme de prix. Ce dernier doit fonctionner que le Fonds de soutien soit abondé ou pas. (Etude fonds de soutien, annexe 1)</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ La CF (ANNEXE 5) note que : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- la réorientation des cotonculteurs les moins productifs vers une autre culture renforçant la rentabilité de la filière et réduirait la nécessité d'un FdS, bien qu'une telle réorientation immédiate soit jugée difficile.</li> <li>- Malgré les distorsions engendrées par les subventions sur le marché mondial, les cours tendent vers le niveau des coûts de production des producteurs les plus compétitifs qui sont inférieurs à 55 cents la livre, nettement inférieurs à la moyenne de 70 cents la livre des 30 dernières campagnes.</li> <li>- Le soutien s'avère donc indispensable pour atténuer l'amplitude des variations de revenus des producteurs à un niveau qui leur permette de poursuivre leur production dans des conditions ne remettant pas en cause sa durabilité écologique et sa productivité. Cependant, le soutien ne doit pas encourager une extension non économique ou incontrôlée de la production</li> <li>- L'atelier de Dakar de novembre 2005 sur la gestion du risque de marché appliqué aux filières cotonnières a mis en avant l'importance de la mise en oeuvre des différents outils de gestion de risque de marché de manière coordonnée et structurée dans le cadre d'un programme global 2006 de mise en oeuvre des mécanismes de gestion du risque appliqués aux filières coton.</li> <li>- La MRSC vient de prendre connaissance de l'existence de modèles de lissage associés à une boîte à outils de marchés faisant l'objet de réflexions dans le cadre d'une opération pilote financée par l'AFD qui serait menée au Burkina Faso et au Sénégal et à laquelle le Mali n'est pas encore associé.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>Source: ROM/BCS, CF, Etude Fonds de soutien</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The EC is involved in support to natural disaster risk management. But no reference to financial risk management linked to agricultural commodities can be found in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 58</i></p>

<b>SADC</b>	There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	In Tanzania the Commission did not support the development of agricultural commodity strategies. In the coffee sector a strategy is being developed: whether it addresses risk management is not known.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	No reference to financial risk management can be found in Uganda's CSP/NIPs.
<b>UG cotton</b>	Yes but not implemented. Indeed, besides the warehouses system (see I.5.1.3), an attempt was made to put in place a <u>risk management system in the cotton sector</u> , which however did not materialise because of divergences between the Government and the private sector.
<b>UG cotton</b>	Cotton is cultivated in the North East of Uganda. But it is not a focus for the government and the sector has declined over the last ten years. The EU had tried to do something in 2009/2010. It proposed a hedge fund to prevent volatility but gave up because there is not a common view between government and private sector. (source: MN 301)
<b>VU</b>	There was no specific project launched by the EC in Vanuatu due to price decline and variability, with the exception of Stabex Funds. These funds has been used to rehabilitate activities related to the rehabilitation of the Big Bay Road in Sant <i>Sources: Letter of 21 March 2000, Stabex in Vanuatu – Application year 1999 – collection of statistical data; Framework of Mutual Obligations for the use of STABEX funds for the application year 2008 between the Government of Vanuatu and the European Commission, May 2001; Letter of 5 January 2001, Vanuatu Stabex Report for 2000.</i>
<b>VU</b>	Vanuatu's CSP/NIP mentions that all EU activities mainstream and promote disaster risk reduction and disaster management among other issues.  But no reference to financial risk management is mentioned in the CSP/NIPs.  Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 36
<b>BAN</b>	There is no evidence of price risk management strategies developed with the help of the SFA.  The only information on risk management is the reduction of environmental or sanitary risks achieved on projects (co-)funded by the SFA.  Belize is the only country monitoring environmental risks. The evaluation also states that disease risks for workers have decreased due to the Eurepgap certification programme. SFA programmes helped improve banana industry of Côte d'Ivoire extend its reach to new countries and therefore improve its market risk management. Banana producers in Côte d'Ivoire have progressively widened their product base, which helps them cope with risk. Proper irrigation systems set up with SFA funding allowed reducing risks of run-off, degradation & erosion in Jamaica.

	<p>Sources: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 30, htspe, 2008.</p> <p>Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country Reports, pages 64, 289 htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>I.5.1.5</b>	Evidence that the Commission supported interventions with a view to improving producers' access to finance (credit)
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>In 2011, UNCTAD's organised:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>A workshop on the Establishment of a Regional Market Intelligence System &amp; the Development of a Sustainability Claims Portal for the Caribbean.</b> This event was held on 17 - 19 February 2011 in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. It was organized in collaboration with CARDI and CARICOM. Representatives of 11 countries presented experiences of local Market Information Systems and discussed ways to implement a regional information system to promote agricultural development. A total of approximately 45 participants attended from all across the region. The Sustainability Claims Portal was also officially launched during this workshop and participants were able to discuss the portal's functionalities and regional requirements.</li> <li>▪ <b>Regional Sustainability Claims Portal launch and capacity building Workshop for francophone West &amp; Central Africa.</b> This event was held on 24 - 25 May 2011 in Dakar, Senegal. Approximately 55 representatives from 11 West African countries participated in discussions on the opportunities and challenges of standards, labelling and certification initiatives in the region. The Sustainability Claims Portal was formally launched on the second day; participants made recommendations towards improving the online platform to suit the needs of the regional stakeholders.</li> <li>▪ <b>Workshop on Enhancing Access to Finance for the Nutmeg Sector in Grenada.</b> This event was held on 7 - 8 July 2011 in St. George's, Grenada. It was organized in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Coordinating Committee (NCC) of Grenada. The workshop brought together approximately 50 participants. Mr. Aaron Francois, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry &amp; Fisheries opened the meeting.</li> </ul> <p>The organization of five future workshops was initiated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The COMESA Cotton to Clothing strategy review Meeting. Scheduled for 27-29 July in Nairobi, Kenya.</li> <li>▪ The Regional Sustainability Claims Portal launch and capacity building workshop for East and Southern Africa. Scheduled for September 2011 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.</li> <li>▪ The workshop on the establishment of a sub-regional Agricultural Market Intelligence System in the Pacific. Scheduled for 17-19 August 2011 in Nadi, Republic of Fiji.</li> <li>▪ The Pacific regional capacity building workshop on agricultural finance. Tentatively scheduled for October 2011 in Nadi, Republic of Fiji.</li> <li>▪ The workshop on the establishment of an agricultural commodity exchange for cocoa and coffee in Cameroon. Tentatively scheduled for September or October in Cameroon.</li> </ul> <p>In terms of development of effective commodity strategies and implementation plan (result area 1 of the COM (2004)89), UNCTAD's developed one activity related to access to finance (reporting until 30 June 2011):</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the activity “1.CAR.C01b - Support for the financing of the nutmeg sector in Grenada” is completed. The objective of the study was to assess the financing gaps and bottlenecks of the nutmeg value chain, especially those related to access to credit for smallholders; identify activities aiming to improve nutmeg value chain finance and establish necessary capacities for the sector’s development. The draft report on Enhancing Access to Finance in the Nutmeg Sector in Grenada was completed. The draft report was sent to the Ministry of Agriculture of Grenada and the National Coordinating Committee (NCC) members for comments and suggestions. A workshop on Enhancing Access to Finance for the Nutmeg Sector in Grenada was organized on 7th and 8th July 2011 in St. George’s, Grenada in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture and the NCC. The workshop brought together approximately 50 participants representing the Government of Grenada, the main stakeholders of the nutmeg value chain, financial institutions, experts and other partners interested in nutmeg finance. The key conclusions and recommendations from the Study on enhancing access to finance in the nutmeg sector in Grenada were examined and validated, and concrete follow-up activities identified. Main lessons learnt of this activity are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The value-chain approach is effective for analyzing the main constraints in agricultural finance and proposing appropriate solutions.</li> <li>- Reinforcing the role of farmers’ organizations can facilitate access to finance by smallholder farmers.</li> <li>- Enhancing the cooperation with other IOs improved the efficiency of the activities and contributed to the success of the workshop. The draft report of the nutmeg finance study was shared with the FAO, ITC and World Bank for comments. In return, these IOs recommended experts or provided suggestions on the organizational aspects of the workshop.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>Source: UNCTAD, Draft 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011, 22 July 2011</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>It is foreseen that the AAACP programme raises awareness and builds capacity among potential users of market-based instruments (producer organisations, inter-professional associations, traders, processors, financiers and governments).</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>It is foreseen that the AAACP programme raises awareness and builds capacity among potential users of market-based instruments (producer organisations, inter-professional associations, traders, processors, financiers and governments).</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-GIIF</b>	<p>The project documents do not point this out but mention the fact that the provision of index insurance will have indirect positive effects upon the financial sector (banks, micro-finance institutions) as loans and credits are expected to increase when producers improve their risk coverage.</p> <p>Source: IF and FA</p>
<b>ACP-GIIF</b>	<p>Price variability is not really addressed by the Commission’s supported risk management tools which are weather/natural disaster based operations. The only one seems to be the Cotton fonds de lissage in Burkina Faso.</p>



	<i>Source: MN912</i>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP final evaluation report states that the programme financed training costs, technical assistance, tools developed by the programme and offered to companies and in some cases, costs of certification. There is no reference to increasing producers' access to credit.</p> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 5</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>There is no reference to price risk management in the PIP evaluation reports. The fact that the PIP does not focus on price risk management was confirmed in the interview.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 958</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>Putting in place a financing mechanism of the periodic replanting of sugarcane fields is in many SP countries a key condition for the sustainability of sugarcane farming. The EC AMSP strategy for Malawi proposes to address this issue through the establishment of two revolving funds: one to finance the acquisition of equipment by the farmers and another one for the replanting of cane fields; in Swaziland and Belize, the EC considered that conditions were not met for establishing such funds; in Zambia the Delegation says that EC funds cannot be used for that purpose; in most other SP countries the issue is not mentioned at all.</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>According to the SFA impact evaluation report, the credit access projects in Africa are mainly financed by the EIB.</p> <p>There is evidence of micro-credit projects funded by the SFA in St Lucia and Jamaica.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 23 &amp; 28 htspe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>There is no evidence of financial risk management projects in the SFA impact evaluation report.</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Burkina Faso.</p> <p>Selon l'évaluation de la stratégie pays de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, la CE a finance le Plan d'Action pour l'Organisation du Secteur Agricole (PAOSA). Cette intervention a cependant été lancée en 1999, mais a duré jusqu'en 2007. Ses résultats sont mitigés.</p> <p>Une de ses composantes était l'appui au financement du monde rural. Ce programme, en collaboration avec d'autres bailleurs de fonds, a contribué à l'augmentation du nombre d'institutions de micro-finance et de bénéficiaires.</p> <p><i>Source : Evaluation de la stratégie pays de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, 2010, pages 69 &amp; 70</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Sous le projet anacarde-sésame mis en œuvre par l'INADES, l'INADES-B essaie de développer un système de warrantage (dans le secteur du sésame uniquement). Le prix du sésame sur le marché burkinabé est de 400 kg/ ha en moyenne. Les producteurs encadrés par INADES-B sont eux à 200 kg/ ha. Cela dépend des variétés utilisées. Il faut s'adapter aux bonnes variétés en fonction des conditions pédoclimatiques (problème de la déhiscence).</p> <p><i>Source: MN 551</i></p>

<b>BF</b>	No such evidence can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Burkina Faso.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Le CL définit le résultat R 2.2.2. « Les <b>groupements</b> sont capables de définir une stratégie de développement long terme, sont engagés dans des démarches de certifications et <b>ont accès à des crédits</b> et à de nouveaux marchés, notamment internationaux » (<i>Source : CL</i>).</p> <p>L'intervention précise également que le projet pourra accompagner des opérations de micro-crédit afin d'aider les bénéficiaires à produire des dossiers bancables. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 16</i>).</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France).</p> <p>La CE a ainsi apporté un appui indirect au FdL, outil novateur de gestion du risque prix. L'appui se situe plutôt à un niveau « méso » (la filière coton) que micro.</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CI cotton</b>	Seule évidence dans le secteur cotonnier : sans un environnement « apaisé », une relance significative de la production devrait permettre d'aller progressivement vers une optimisation des capacités d'usinage et <u>d'atténuer les problèmes de recouvrement des crédits</u> . ( <i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i> ).
<b>CI cotton</b>	<p>En Côte d'Ivoire, il existe beaucoup moins de banques villageoises que dans d'autres pays de la même région. Très peu développé et contribue à la dépendance des paysans vis-à-vis des égreneurs.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 819</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Selon le 4ème rapport annuel, l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde » un des besoins identifiés était de développer des partenariats financiers entre les plateformes de commercialisation et un Institut de Micro-Finance pour faciliter l'accès au crédit. C'est donc un besoin identifié mais non réalisé. De plus, cet accès au crédit concerne les plateformes de commercialisation et non les producteurs individuels.</p> <p><i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Draft rapport année 4, page 3</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Selon le quatrième rapport annuel de l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde », un partenariat a été développé entre une des plateformes commerciales et un industriel (OLAM ivoire) qui fournit la matière première et garantit un prix d'achat fixe des amandes en fonction de la qualité. Ce partenariat réduit les risques de variabilité des prix. Rappelons que cette intervention cible les unités de transformation de noix brutes en amandes et non les producteurs de noix de cajou.</p>

	<i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Draft rapport année 4, page 14</i>
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>CI-REH</b>	Outre ce qui est indiqué pour <b>I.5.1.1</b> , pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, the AAACP programme funded a study on the improvement of the coffee value chain finance, in order to improve access to credit for producers, through warehouse receipt systems. Furthermore, the AAACP programme is funding a pre-feasibility study on the creation of a commodity exchange system for cocoa and coffee in Cameroon (possibly to be extended to the region).</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913; AAACP action fiches</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The second CSP/NIP evidenced that the Commission supported rural credit projects. It also foresees under the second focal area “trade and regional integration” a support programme to upgrade enterprises and reinforce the productive and export capacities of priority sectors for the economy. One intervention directly aims at supporting SMEs and includes the reinforcement of credit systems: « <i>Un appui aux PME pouvant prendre la forme d'un soutien aux organismes intermédiaires d'appui aux PME, à la formation professionnelle et à des interventions en faveur du renforcement des systèmes de crédit productif aux PME sera évalué et donnera lieu à des actions ciblées telles que le renforcement des capacités des intermédiaires financiers (sur le plan de l'analyse des risques, notamment) ou la mise en place de fonds de garantie pour les prêts aux PME, etc.</i> »</p> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 15, 33</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, the PACICC programme (Programme d'Appui au Conseil Interprofessionnel Café-Cacao) provides daily information to producers on the effective coffee prices. This allows producers to negotiate their sales price in a better way and deal with price fluctuations with a better level of knowledge of the situation. The AAACP is building on this experience to study the possibility of developing the market information system to other commodities and provide more information, both qualitative (standards, list of exporters, list of warehouses, agencies for credit...) and quantitative (price, costs, interest rates...) information.</p> <p>Tout ACP et la stratégie filière développée, il y a eu une étude sur la gestion du risque conduite par la Banque Mondiale. C'est au stade étude sans actions consécutives à ce stade.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913 ; AAACP action fiches</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p><u>Activités spécifiques de micro-finance</u> (<i>Source : Annexe I p12, 13</i>).</p> <p>Créer un fonds crédits de soutien aux GIC</p> <p>Afin d'aider matériellement les GIC dans la réalisation des micro-projets, on rendra disponible un fonds crédit de soutien qui affectera aux GIC des crédits pour la réalisation de leurs activités productives qu'ils s'engageront à restituer. Chaque GIC pourra demander une aide maximum de la valeur de 150 euros par micro-projet à</p>

	<p>réaliser, et le crédit sera donné sans intérêts. Les deux premières années du projet, le fonds sera géré par le coordinateur général du projet; la 3ème année, après la création de la Fédération des GIC des communes de Garoua rurale et de Gashiga, il sera géré par le Conseil d'Administration de la Fédération qui devra répondre de la gestion devant les membres et un contrôleur externe. Le support technique des animateurs et des ingénieurs agronomes dans la réalisation des micro-projets et, après, la gestion de la part de la Fédération sont une garantie pour la rentrée des prêts.</p> <p>Créer des fonds pour les magasins de stockage.</p> <p>Pour encourager l'utilisation des magasins de stockage et pour aider les plus indigents, des fonds permettront d'anticiper une somme d'argent (inférieure à la valeur du marché) à ceux qui déposent des sacs de vivres. Pour retirer les sacs, les propriétaires devront verser la somme qui leur sera anticipée, plus une petite majoration pour le service. Cela permettra à beaucoup de familles de disposer d'argent liquide dans les périodes où les prix seront inférieurs et de pouvoir vendre sur le marché dans les périodes plus favorables. Chaque magasin aura son fonds et le Comité de Gestion sera chargé de le gérer. Dans les magasins, on rédigera un cahier de caisse et un autre de stock. On prévoit au moins 100 sacs de vivres déposés par magasin et par an. Les fonds commenceront à fonctionner à partir de la 2ème année avec les magasins. Toute l'action de création des fonds et de fonctionnement des magasins sera suivie, en particulier, par le coordinateur général du projet expatrié.</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés.
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>NA. This intervention has not targeted agricultural commodities. It aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the economy and at facilitating its insertion into the regional and world economy through the implementation of the EU-Central Africa EPA. The various activities do not explicitly target agricultural commodities.</p> <p><i>Source: Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>No evidence in ECS</p>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p>

	No evidence in ECS
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The “Support to the competitiveness to the rice sector in the Caribbean” programme aimed at improving the provision of working capital to private sector operators in the rice sector through a financial facility. The FA specified as an activity that a credit study should be carried out as a precondition to decide on the system to facilitate working capital to the private sector.</p> <p>The final evaluation noted the following elements. The lack of access to short-term credit in both countries has been identified as a serious constraint to the expansion of the rice sector. The Investment/credit study undertaken during the start-up phase of the programme recommended a comprehensive approach to ensure the sustainability of the financial facility. But the component lacked such a comprehensive approach: it should have encompassed, beyond more affordable interest rates, other de facto subsidies to farmers’ costs as well as more cost-effective marketing. It has been a major constraint to attract banks to participate in the scheme. While the total amount of credit available under the financial facility has been fully disbursed in both countries -and revolved in Suriname into a second and third cycle- and has been largely repaid on time, it is also important to note that rice prices were abnormally high which contributed to greater ease of loan repayment. In Guyana the benefits have been limited: 100 out of 610 working capital loans have been received by farmers and the interest rate of 9% (compared to a 15% commercial rate) was not found very attractive. In Suriname, the participating bank responded more positively but the benefits have been confined to a quite small proportion of the target groups and were only provided for a limited period.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003,</i>  <i>SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, page 26-27</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector subsidised rum producers investments in four domains:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Modernisation and Capital Investment</li> <li>▪ Waste Treatment &amp; Environment. Protection</li> <li>▪ Distribution &amp; Marketing</li> </ul> <p>Business Development Services (business plans, feasibility studies, etc.)</p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	Not relevant. The price of rum exports to the EU is relatively stable over time.
<b>ESAIO</b>	No reference to interventions improving producers’ access to credit can be found in the East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP.
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>There are references to disaster risk management but not to financial risk management in the East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regional Strategy Paper.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 59.</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p><b>No explicit evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents.</b></p> <p>Moreover, the MR 2008 underlined that coffee production is carried out by small</p>

	farmers with little capital and at very low costs (family members are all involved in the process); as a consequence, price fluctuation affects them relatively marginally ( <i>Source: MR 2008 p.3</i> ).
<b>GH</b>	<p>The Commission is not active in programmes providing credit to farmers. The ministry of agriculture is currently on a project with several donors (including USAID and the World Bank, but not the EU) on warehouse receipt systems and commodity exchange.</p> <p>The EU funded “Cocoa Sector Support Programme – phase II” did, through the training and founding of farmer organisations, allow them indirectly to get better access to credit (since they regrouped, they can now access credit through their organisation).</p> <p><i>Source: MN 911, MN 943</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>Only to the extent that the CSSPII supported the formation of farmers associations and that this may lead to eased access to credit for farmers.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 943</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The CSSP II supports the CRIG, research institute for cocoa in Ghana, with the view to develop disease resistant varieties.</p> <p><i>Source: project Fiche, MN 131.</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>According to the 2<sup>nd</sup> monitoring report, the Cocoa Sector Support Programme II launched producer organisations projects. According to the Financing Proposal, these organisations are supposed to provide inter alia credit services to producers. No evidence can be found however on whether these particular organisations did actually provide an improvement in access to credit.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 01, Effectiveness to date sheet.</i>  <i>Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal, page 13</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>There is no evidence of interventions related to risk management at a micro-level. This information was confirmed during interviews.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 907.</i></p>
<b>I.5.1.6</b>	Evidence that the Commission supported interventions related to risk management at micro-level in order to better cope with agricultural commodity price variability
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>UNCTAD intervenes in four broad areas: market information services (MIS), Sustainability Claims Portal (SCP), commodity exchanges (COMEX), and supply-chain finance and warehouse receipt systems.</p> <p>UNCTAD is responsible for the implementation of 35 activities across five regions (Pacific, Caribbean, West Africa, Central Africa, and East and Southern Africa) as well as activities that are multi-regional or “cross-ACP.”</p> <p>A total of 21 activities are completed to date, of which 8 were newly listed as completed during the period between 1 January 2011 and 30 June 2011. 10 projects are on-going, 3 activities are cancelled and 1 activity was merged.</p> <p>The total EU contribution for the activities is 3,380,000 Euro. The amount of expenditures as of June 30, 2011 is 2,432,850 Euro. The disbursement rate is 80%.</p>

Three multi-stakeholder capacity building workshops were organised by UNCTAD in the framework of the All ACP programme during the period between 1 January 2011 to 30 June 2011:

- **Workshop on the Establishment of a Regional Market Intelligence System & the Development of a Sustainability Claims Portal for the Caribbean.** This event was held on 17 - 19 February 2011 in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. It was organized in collaboration with CARDI and CARICOM. Representatives of 11 countries presented experiences of local Market Information Systems and discussed ways to implement a regional information system to promote agricultural development. A total of approximately 45 participants attended from all across the region. The Sustainability Claims Portal was also officially launched during this workshop and participants were able to discuss the portal's functionalities and regional requirements.
- **Regional Sustainability Claims Portal launch and capacity building Workshop for francophone West & Central Africa.** This event was held on 24 - 25 May 2011 in Dakar, Senegal. Approximately 55 representatives from 11 West African countries participated in discussions on the opportunities and challenges of standards, labelling and certification initiatives in the region. The Sustainability Claims Portal was formally launched on the second day; participants made recommendations towards improving the online platform to suit the needs of the regional stakeholders.
- **Workshop on Enhancing Access to Finance for the Nutmeg Sector in Grenada.** This event was held on 7 - 8 July 2011 in St. George's, Grenada. It was organized in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Coordinating Committee (NCC) of Grenada. The workshop brought together approximately 50 participants. Mr. Aaron Francois, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries opened the meeting.

**Main results:**

UNCTAD's main contributions towards the objectives and expected results of the AAACP during this time period can be summarized as follows (by result):

*"R1. Commodity Chain Stakeholders in ACP countries/regions have the capacity to develop, adapt and implement effective and sustainable commodity strategies and action plans"*

- *Enhanced capacities for the implementation of commodity strategies:* The AAACP workshop on enhancing the access to finance for the nutmeg sector in Grenada (July 2011) directly supports the implementation of the AAACP supported sector strategy. UNCTAD's collaboration in the upcoming COMESA cotton strategy review workshop (July 2011) will also contribute to the achievement of this result.

*"R2. Access to as well as use of markets, production factors and support services are improved"*

- *Enhanced capacities in market intelligence skills and momentum created for Market Information Systems:* During this period sub-regional prototypes of INFOSHARE were developed for the Pacific and Caribbean region based on a methodology to integrate national systems: <http://infoshare.unctad.org>. Moreover, in order to meet the beneficiaries' demands for access to market information over mobile phones, a system was developed linking INFOSHARE with ITC's "Trade in Hand" methodology. Database managers from the Cameroon coffee and cocoa sector were also trained on the use of INFOSHARE. Finally, The transfer of INFOCOMM e-portal to a new web platform was completed and will be made available to the public in August: <http://www.unctad.info/en/Infocomm/>.

- *Enhanced capacities and momentum created for the establishment of commodity exchanges:* Thanks in part to the efforts of the AAACP, commodity exchanges have become the center of discussion of policy mechanisms at national and regional level.

	<p>During this period UNCTAD presented on the topic at the East African Grain Council / FAO meeting on alternative methods to policy intervention in the grains market (July 2011). UNCTAD also continued to support the integration of commodity exchanges in national policy frameworks in Ghana in collaboration with the CFC. A Road Map for the creation of a commodity exchange in Tanzania was drafted.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Enhanced capacities and momentum created for warehouse receipt systems and supply chain finance mechanisms:</i> During the UNCTAD AAACP workshop on the access to finance in Grenada (July 2011) concrete follow-up activities were identified. The activity also enhanced capacities of local financial institutions to develop appropriate financing instruments and mechanisms to meet the financing needs of key players in the agricultural value chain, particularly small-scale producers.</li> <li>▪ <i>Enhanced awareness of consumer- and market-driven food safety &amp; quality requirements:</i> During this period UNCTAD launched the Sustainability Claims Portal in the Caribbean (February 2011) and West &amp; Central Africa (June 2011) through two workshops. The need to establish regional standards was evoked by participants at both meetings. The online SCP is <a href="http://www.unctad.org/scp">http://www.unctad.org/scp</a> continues to be improved to meet the expectations of beneficiaries as voiced during the workshops.</li> </ul> <p>The organization of five future workshops was initiated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The COMESA Cotton to Clothing strategy review Meeting. Scheduled for 27-29 July in Nairobi, Kenya.</li> <li>▪ The Regional Sustainability Claims Portal launch and capacity building workshop for East and Southern Africa. Scheduled for September 2011 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.</li> <li>▪ The workshop on the establishment of a sub-regional Agricultural Market Intelligence System in the Pacific. Scheduled for 17-19 August 2011 in Nadi, Republic of Fiji.</li> <li>▪ The Pacific regional capacity building workshop on agricultural finance. Tentatively scheduled for October 2011 in Nadi, Republic of Fiji.</li> <li>▪ The workshop on the establishment of an agricultural commodity exchange for cocoa and coffee in Cameroon. Tentatively scheduled for September or October in Cameroon.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: UNCTAD, Draft 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011, 22 July 2011</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Anyway, the programme doesn't focus on such objectives.
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents. Anyway, the programme doesn't focus on such objectives.
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui, dans le cadre du projet AIM-Stabex, des associations de producteurs ont eu recours à des crédits (OTIV) pour notamment mettre en place un grenier villageois Les producteurs ont eu également une formation en gestion financière. (Source : MN 814). Néanmoins, ce projet AIM est une « exception » (qui par ailleurs est strictement locale et n'est pas répliquée dans d'autres zones) étant donné que la durabilité de tels projets est généralement « nulle » après l'arrêt des financements (Source : MN 802).</p> <p>A noter que les institutions de micro-finance pratiquent des taux d'intérêt très élevés (2,5% à 3% par mois) et ont une couverture géographique est très limitée (Source : MN</p>



	<p>804). En effet, dans les zones enclavées, il y a des problèmes de sécurité physique. De plus, le crédit n'entre pas dans les mœurs malgaches (peur de s'endetter et de perdre leurs garanties telles que leurs terres) et est peu orientée vers l'agriculture (Source : MN 806).</p> <p>Dans certains cas, les exportateurs offrent des garanties d'achat qui jouent le rôle de crédit pour les producteurs (effets pervers) (Source : MN 809).</p>
<b>MG vanilla</b>	<p>Non, il existe peu d'interventions structurées sur les produits agricoles concernant la gestion des risques sauf dans le domaine de la sécurité alimentaire avec des alertes précoces et le suivi des évolutions de prix. La Délégation souhaiterait aider à la mise en place d'outils pratiques sur la gestion des risques (assurances, etc.) sur base de ce qui se fait peut-être ailleurs. (Source : MN 801).</p> <p>En effet, AIM (Association Intercoopération Madagascar) souligne également qu'il n'y a pas de mécanisme d'atténuation du risque lié aux variations de prix. En organisant la profession en filière, ils espéraient amener les différentes parties prenantes à adopter une approche plus solidaire. Le stockage est techniquement possible mais financièrement difficile. (Source : MN 806). Seule évidence citée par des bénéficiaires du projet AIM-Stabex : la diversification des cultures de rente permet de mieux étaler les revenus monétaires tout au long de l'année même si les bas prix internationaux (vanille) grèvent les prix de vente et que l'amélioration de la qualité ne semble pas avoir d'impact direct sur les prix (Source: MN 814)</p> <p>OTIV (organisme de micro-crédit) a ce projet de micro-assurance dans ses cartons mais rien n'a été entrepris jusqu'à maintenant (Source : MN 813).</p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The EC intervention supports the establishment at district level of agricultural services centres (Centres de Services Agricoles – CSA) managed by NGOs. CSAs do not themselves provide services to farmers. They act as intermediaries between farmers and farmer organizations on the one hand, and providers of services (of which credit) on the other hand.</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Mali.</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Mali even though cotton price volatility risk is mentioned as one of the key constraints weighing on the Malian economy.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 9.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>L'objectif spécifique n°1 de l'intervention « Mener à terme le processus de réforme engagé: conclusion du processus de filialisation et de la privatisation de la CMDT, mise en place des organes de régulation de la filière » prévoit la mise en place d'un dispositif opérationnel permettant une réduction des effets de la volatilité des cours de la fibre sur le revenu du producteur par une contribution à un Fonds de Soutien (CF, annexe 5) et un appui à la conception d'un fonds de lissage (soutien intra-annuel puis inter-annuel des cours de coton) (BCS, §1.2; Monitoring report, p2)</p> <p>Le niveau d'intervention semble donc davantage se situer à un niveau « méso » que « macro » ou « micro ».</p> <p><i>Source: ROM/BCS, CF</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.</p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.</p>

<b>SADC</b>	There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.
<b>SADC</b>	There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>L'intervention n'a pas été uniquement appuyée pour mettre à disposition des micro-crédits mais ceci fait partie du projet tel que proposé. Le projet propose de mettre en place un fond de garantie de 60 000 euros auprès d'institutions locales de crédit afin de permettre aux paysans les plus vulnérables d'avoir accès aux moyens de production (culture attelée = achat de boeufs de trait, semoir, charue et charette). Les organisations faitières seront responsabilisées dans l'appui à la rédaction des demandes de crédit, leur examen d'un point de vu technique et le suivi des dossiers. Le projet fera appel aux compétences d'un prestataire spécialisé (étude des besoins solvables, élaboration et suivi d'un protocole avec une mutuelle de crédit, formation des dirigeants sur la gestion et le suivi des crédits octroyés)</p> <p>De plus le projet prévoit la mise en place d'un fond de roulement à hauteur de 45 000 euros afin d'appuyer les opérations d'exportations des organisations bénéficiaires. La répartition de ce fonds de roulement sera déterminée suite à l'élaboration du plan d'affaire de chaque organisation. En cas de nécessité, une partie de ce fonds sera utilisé comme garantie bancaire pour assurer l'augmentation des besoins de trésorerie suite à l'accroissement d'activités (recours aux prêts bancaires « bonifiés » d'institutions alternatives européennes spécialisées.)</p> <p><i>Source: Description de l'action.</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	No evidence was found: the Commission did not support access to finance.
<b>TZ</b>	<p><u>Cotton</u>: Price mechanisms: no. Nothing to stabilise. The Government intervened once in 2008 to pay producers due to the economic crisis. Because the price was so low the GoT also intervened in 2009 and set the price higher (360 TSh was market price, plus 80TSh subsidy so final price of Tsh440 giving a total subsidy of 20 M tsh. Normally the GoT, the Cotton Board, and the associations (TAT) sit down at the beginning of the season to set the price and then ginners compete so the price can be actually much higher fro producers. They look to the world market and cost production and define the price (600 tsh/ kg cotton seed). Maximum last year: 1100 tsh/ kg cotton seed. With contract farming, they do not fix the price at the moment of doing the contract but they have a continuous mechanism of price review during the year.</p> <p>Cotton price is not really an issue: TZ has been getting good prices; the problems are more with the tempering of the scales (buyers) which does not occur with contract farming.</p> <p>Marketing system goes through agents on the field. We want to change that way: farmers should be sellers; the agent is not needed. Need to link directly the farmer and the industry. If we change that, price will be better for farmers. The price for farmers is</p>

	<p>directly linked to the world price.</p> <p><u>Tea</u>: The price of green leaves needs to be discussed. Somewhere we will come to a solution to the price. The problem is the mechanism of the discussion of the price. The price setting is more political than business now. It is done in a general meeting but you need a technical meeting to do it.</p> <p>Tea Price: possible to 300 tsh/ kg. Need to have an independent study on prices and costs of the value chain. Nothing has been done so far to increase prices to farmers. The study should bring solutions: mechanisms to follow prices and regulate better. Also should be considered the possibility of having smallholders have a stake in the factory.</p> <p>Tea Prices are made indicative by Tea Board once year with consultation with stakeholders. Minimum price at the moment: 110 tsh/ kg of green leave. There is no basis to decide the minimum price. There are no pricing mechanisms. Then from this indicative price (which is really a minimum price), each factory negotiates separately with their producers.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 623, MN 673, MN 649</i></p>
<b>TZ cashew nuts</b>	<p>The Government of Tanzania introduced a Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) in 2007: it has 'played a catalytic role in terms of improved agricultural production and productivity, stability of producer prices, improve quality of crops, technological uptake, and improved marketing of agricultural crops in Tanzania. Other benefits from WRS include storage of crops and sell them when prices are attractive, thus improving incomes; offering guarantees which farmers use to access bank loans; and employment creation. It has been introduced in cashew nuts and paddy and operated in a few geographical areas. The system is about to be introduced to sesame and sunflower.</p> <p>The introduction of WRS also meant that standard measures and standard quality checking system are used for the crop.</p> <p>Another initiative under preparation is the commodity exchange system (not yet launched as of May 2011).</p> <p><i>Source: PER 2010, MN118</i></p>
<b>TZ Cotton</b>	<p>Price mechanisms: no. Nothing to stabilise. The Government intervened once in 2008 to pay producers due to the economic crisis. Because the price was so low the GoT also intervened in 2009 and set the price higher (360 TSh was market price, plus 80TSh subsidy so final price of Tsh440 giving a total subsidy of 20 M tsh. Normally the GoT, the Cotton Board, and the associations (TAT) sit down at the beginning of the season to set the price and then ginners compete so the price can be actually much higher for producers. They look to the world market and cost production and define the price (600 tsh/ kg cotton seed). Maximum last year: 1100 tsh/ kg cotton seed. With contract farming, they do not fix the price at the moment of doing the contract but they have a continuous mechanism of price review during the year.</p> <p>Cotton price is not really an issue: TZ has been getting good prices; the problems are more with the tempering of the scales (buyers) which does not occur with contract farming.</p> <p>Marketing system goes through agents on the field. We want to change that way:</p>

	<p>farmers should be sellers; the agent is not needed. Need to link directly the farmer and the industry. If we change that, price will be better for farmers. The price for farmers is directly linked to the world price.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 649</i></p>
<b>TZ Cotton</b>	<p>In 2009/10 the Government prepared a rescue package in response to the global financial crisis. This was meant to help exporters of agricultural produce who had borrowed funds from the banking system in order to purchase and market the farm produce. In this context, 35 firms engaged in the procurement and marketing of cotton requested assistance (TShs 28 billion) and the Government provided TShs 21 billion. In addition the Government used some of this rescue package to stabilise prices of cotton: Tz farmers received a top-up of TSHs80 per kg on the domestic market price.</p> <p><i>Source: PER2010</i></p>
<b>TZ Tea</b>	<p>The price of green leaves needs to be discussed. Somewhere we will come to a solution to the price. The problem is the mechanism of the discussion of the price. The price setting is more political than business now. It is done in a general meeting but you need a technical meeting to do it.</p> <p>Tea Price: possible to 300 tsh/ kg. Need to have an independent study on prices and costs of the value chain. Nothing has been done so far to increase prices to farmers. The study should bring solutions: mechanisms to follow prices and regulate better. Also should be considered the possibility of having smallholders have a stake in the factory. Tea Prices are made indicative by Tea Board once year with consultation with stakeholders. Minimum price at the moment: 110 tsh/ kg of green leave. There is no basis to decide the minimum price. There are no pricing mechanisms. Then from this indicative price (which is really a minimum price), each factory negotiates separately with their producers.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 623, MN673</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p><u>EC project in support of the Uganda Commodity Exchange (UGE) and Warehouse receipt system</u></p> <p>In spite of limited achievements the project did still generate genuine achievements and the ‘intermediate’ outputs should not be underestimated. The project has certainly done a lot of work and contributed to a basis for further endeavour in this area: regulation, licensing, quality improvements in warehouses, training, publicity, institution and capacity building, and background studies to improve knowledge. Bans are <u>starting to lend against warehouse receipts</u>.</p> <p><i>Source: Final evaluation of EU support to the Uganda Commodities Exchange and Warehouse receipt system</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>No reference to credit facilitation for producers can be found in Uganda’s CSP/NIPs.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. There are in Uganda a very large number of small farmers and a few big operators/exporters. Middlemen (significant number) are the link between farmers and big operators. <u>Prices of agricultural goods vary very much during the year with their lowest level during the harvest season</u>. The idea was to establish <u>warehouses</u> providing farmers with storage facilities well equipped which cannot be installed at the household level to maintain the quality of the products, to sort them according to quality standards,</p>

	<p>to make packaging, etc. in order to improve transparency and efficiency (Source: MN 302).</p> <p>The EC (and the WFP for the investment costs) supported the <u>implementation of warehouses combined with a system of tradable delivery receipts and a Commodity Exchange Board</u>. Currently, five warehouses are operational. (Source: MN 302).</p> <p>MAAIF (Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries) is not committed to develop this system but the Ministry of Trade would be more interested (Source: MN 304).</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Yes through Stabex projects and for instance, the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project. This project has activities related the improvement of productivity, quality and efficiency of the coffee value chain (improvement of coffee production and better overall farm management, improvement of quality, nursery implementation and organizational development). Through this project, farmer organizations which enhanced the capacity of the coffee sector to meet the market requirements in terms of quality and quantity were established at village, parish and national levels. 24 Depot Committees (parish level) have been registered as Companies and carry out primary processing and deliver hulled green coffee directly to exporters in Kampala (Source: MN 308).</p> <p>On the one hand DC Companies have access <u>to marketing loans from financial institutions</u> and a model for input finance is currently being tested (Source: MN 308).</p> <p>On the other hand, <u>farmers enjoyed a large increase of their in cash income</u> (multiplied by 2.9 and potentially by 6) thanks to higher yields, better quality and higher selling prices and are able to save money, to <u>open a bank account</u> and have the capacity to invest (seedlings and replanting, purchase of fertilizers in Kampala): something unique and it is a double safety (Source: MN 313).</p>
<b>UG</b>	No reference to financial risk management can be found in Uganda's CSP/NIPs.
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project does not include a credit component.
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project does not include any action related to risk management.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	Improving access to rural finance is a component of the PMA, but the EC SBS concentrates on the research and extension components.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	Risk management is not addressed in the PMA, which does not focus on commodities but on the overall agricultural production.
<b>VU POPACA/POP2</b>	<p>Le projet POPACA/POP 2 a permis de mettre en place un <i>revolving fund</i> pour appuyer les producteurs réunis en coopératives. Cet outil a été intéressant pour les producteurs. Mais ils ont témoigné peu d'intérêt à poursuivre l'utilisation de cet outil à la fin du projet (2007).</p> <p>Sources : MN 1067 and Evaluation of the POP 2 project, 2007</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>The EC co-funded the Producer's Organisation Programme to (among other things) facilitate access to credit.</p> <p>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 30</p>
<b>VU</b>	No reference to financial risk management is mentioned in the CSP/NIPs.

<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>One of the programme's achievements was the establishment of the Revolving Credit Funds (RCF) scheme which provided short term credit to producer organisations (at 1% interest rates over 12 months). The scheme proved to be largely successful. In 2006, it was converted to grants to the Cocoa Growers Association, the Coffee Organisation of Vanuatu and the Farm Support Organisation.</p> <p><i>Source: Producer's Organisation Project II Monitoring Report 3, Effectiveness sheet.</i></p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	No reference to price risk management can be found in the project's documents.
<b>I.5.1.7</b>	Evidence that the Commission's support was undertaken in coordination with that of other donors
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme is implemented through centralised management (for the service contract) and joint management (for the contribution agreements with the International organisations. Five International Organisations (FAO, ITC, WB, CFC, and ITC) implement the activities of the programme, according to a division of tasks which is based on an assessment of comparative advantages as relevant for the programmes. Especially, the bulk of the work in terms of risk management tools is led by the World Bank.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-GIIF</b>	<p>The project is complementary to the All ACP agricultural commodities programme of which it proposes to support the Commodity Risk Management Group of the WB in their work on innovative risk management techniques and applications, including piloting innovative index insurance techniques.</p> <p>Interest has also been expressed to participate in the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), a WB initiative, using index insurance to cover immediate Government funding needs after a catastrophic event.</p> <p>The project was designed after consultations with other donors, notably international discussions held at the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management led by the WB and involving also FAO and WFP and the private sector. NL and CH also support work of the CRMG and USAID and DK paid the premium for Ethiopia's food security index insurance pilot. Most technical work is done by the WB.</p> <p><i>Source: IF</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>No reference to other donors is made in the PIP evaluation reports. The fact that the PIP does not focus on price risk management was confirmed in the interview.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 958</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>The indicator isn't relevant given the fact that there wasn't any support to agricultural price risk management in Burkina Faso's CSP/NIPs.</p> <p>Selon l'évaluation de la stratégie pays de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, la CE a financé le Plan d'Action pour l'Organisation du Secteur Agricole (PAOSA). Cette intervention a cependant été lancée en 1999, mais a duré jusqu'en 2007. Ses résultats sont mitigés.</p> <p>Une de ses composantes était l'appui au financement du monde rural. Ce programme,</p>

	<p>en collaboration avec d'autres bailleurs de fonds, a contribué à l'augmentation du nombre d'institutions de micro-finance et de bénéficiaires.</p> <p><i>Source : Evaluation de la stratégie pays de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, 2010, pages 69 &amp; 70</i></p>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Le Secrétariat permanent de la filière coton libéralisée (SPCL) déplore que l'AFD soit restée seule pour soutenir le Fonds de lissage. D'après lui, si a DUE avait voulu fédérer ses efforts avec d'autres partenaires, elle aurait dû participer au Fonds de Lissage, vu l'importance qu'il revêt pour la filière et pour les producteurs. <i>Source : MN 523</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés concernant la coordination mis infos sur les synergies.</p> <p>Le <b>MR précise que</b> la logique du projet est clairement orientée vers le marché mais le projet présente de fortes synergies avec d'autres programmes, certains de grande envergure, notamment sur l'anacarde avec l'Initiative pour le Cajou Africain, financé par la Fondation Gates et la coopération allemande GTZ. (<i>Source : MR p. 2</i>).</p> <p>Dans le cadre d'un partenariat entre Inades Formation Burkina et Broederlijk Delen (organisation Belge de solidarité internationale), des actions de mise en place de caisses villageoises sont réalisées auprès des populations ciblées par le projet. C'est dans ce cadre que les bénéficiaires ont manifesté leur volonté d'investir des fonds dans la production de sésame. Ce <b>projet d'appui technique à la filière vient donc renforcer cette action et offre une synergie novatrice entre approche filière et mobilisation endogène des fonds.</b> (<i>Source : Rapport narratif intermédiaire p.8</i>).</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL). L'outil FdL ainsi que son premier abondement est sous la responsabilité de l'AFD (France).</p> <p>La CE a ainsi apporté un appui indirect au FdL, outil novateur de gestion du risque prix.</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui même si la CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée. Depuis 2004 et la chasse aux « français » ainsi qu'aux européens (slogan « à chaque ivoirien, son français »), tous les bailleurs de fonds sont partis à part l'UE et l'AFD (mais on ne sait pas ce qu'ils font !)</p> <p><u>La complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds est avérée</u>, des lors que ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007. Les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale mais ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission.</p> <p>(Sources : Eval Stabex 2009, MN 819).</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Selon le 4ème rapport annuel de l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde », le projet (qui n'est pas encore réalisé) de faciliter l'accès au crédit pour</p>

	<p>les unités de transformation de noix brutes en amandes, via la microfinance, se ferait en partenariat avec l'AFD. Des missions de diagnostic et d'analyse de faisabilité du projet sont déjà effectuées conjointement.</p> <p><i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Draft rapport année 4, page 4</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>La Commission européenne est le principal bailleur à avoir maintenu ses opérations durant les années de crise à partir de 2002. La coordination avec les autres donateurs se fait donc sur une base ad-hoc notamment avec les sections coopération des 3 États membres présents avec une telle section. Des contacts et échanges réguliers ont lieu avec les Institutions de Bretton Woods pour préparer et harmoniser leurs interventions futures.</p> <p>Depuis juin 2006, la Délégation copréside avec le PNUD un groupe de réflexion stratégique, composé de représentants des ambassades et des partenaires au développement sur place, qui formule des recommandations au Gouvernement sous la forme d'Aide-mémoires.</p> <p>De façon plus spécifique, en ce qui concerne les appuis aux secteurs du palmier et d'hévéa, la Délégation a engagé une concertation avec la Coopération technique allemande (GTZ) qui conduit différents projets de développement rural et de protection environnementale dans le sud-ouest du pays (Programme de développement économique en milieu rural et Programme de conservation du Parc National de Taï). Dans le cadre de ce projet, il est ici prévu d'établir un partenariat formalisé entre la CE et la GTZ. (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4</i>)</p> <p>En 2008, les institutions de Bretton Woods ont repris leur coopération avec la Côte d'Ivoire. Une collaboration régulière de la DCE a repris avec le FMI pour les questions relatives aux finances publiques et avec la Banque Mondiale pour ce qui concerne notamment les appuis aux secteurs des cultures pérennes et au Programme National de Sécurisation du Foncier Rural (<i>Source : Rider FA p.4</i>)</p> <p>Les interactions avec le projet LICUS (Hévéa, Banque Mondiale) sont très riches : i) retour d'expériences ; ii) approvisionnement en bois de greffe pour les PEPMV du PA4P (<i>Source : MR p.2</i>)</p> <p>Les cultures de diversification telles que l'anacarde offrent des opportunités majeures pour augmenter les revenus en milieu rural. Des réformes sont en cours pour améliorer la structuration de ces filières nouvelles, et reçoivent déjà des appuis d'autres bailleurs (Banque Mondiale, USAID, GTZ) mais, en réponse aux sollicitations des acteurs publics et privés, les fonds FLEX pourraient apporter une contribution complémentaire utile pour améliorer la compétitivité de ces secteurs et pour contribuer aux efforts visant à améliorer la productivité des planteurs. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, the support to a study on risk management for cocoa and coffee was supported through the AAACP programme, thus with EU financing but implementation by the World Bank. It can therefore be considered as a coordinated approach. There is no evidence of other risk management projects being funded by other donors for those sectors in the country. However, a project of the AFD is about to start on the subject, for cotton.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913; AAACP action fiches</i></p>



	<p>According to the WB, the Commission is leader in putting risk management at the agenda. However, the interviewees consider that price transparency is the only thing that can be done for the moment. Insurance is not realistic in the current environment (at national level and at the level of producer organisations that are not structured enough). Management of future markets is totally utopian in the current situation and the level of organisation. (MN 411)</p> <p>AFD is currently investigating about a mechanism to stabilise prices (fonds de lissage). It makes first experiences in Burkina Faso, with the intention to propose the same mechanism to Cameroon. Apparently, basic work on this approach has been undertaken under the recent French Presidency of the EU (source MN 401). The approach initiated by the French cooperation on “fonds de lissage” is also mentioned by the MINADER in relation with cotton and French support to this sector in North Cameroon. An agreement has been signed between cotton producers and the company SODECOTON. (MN 406)</p> <p>Au sein du tout-ACP, une étude de la stratégie de développement de la filière café a été réalisée dans le cadre de ce projet avec une approche chaîne de valeur. Dans ce contexte, une étude spécifique a été réalisée par la Banque Mondiale. Cette étude a abordé la gestion du risque de manière générale et pas uniquement lié au risque prix. Elle inclut la volatilité du prix des intrants, la substitution du café par d'autres cultures, le risque politique lié aux diverses réglementations en place, les maladies. Les résultats de cette étude sont pragmatiques mais non révolutionnaires ! Il n'y a pas de remède miracle au risque prix. Globalement, cela passe par la transparence sur l'information du prix auprès des producteurs (PACICC- café), l'amélioration de la productivité et une diminution des coûts de production.</p> <p><i>Source : AAACP action fiches</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>L'action s'inscrit dans le plus vaste programme de développement rural promu par le CODASC (Comité Diocésain des Activités Sociales et CARITAS), bureau de l'Archidiocèse de Garoua qui organise et gère les projets de développement de l'Archidiocèse. Dans son programme rural, le CODASC a adopté, parmi les stratégies opérationnelles, le renforcement des capacités des Groupes d'Initiative Commune présents dans le diocèse, en reconnaissant leur rôle de points de repère fondamentaux pour le développement du territoire. Afin d'éviter des doubles emplois et de maximiser les synergies avec d'autres initiatives diocésaines, les stratégies d'intervention de l'action ont été choisies en tenant compte des priorités stratégiques du programme du CODASC. En coordination avec ce programme, qui a parmi ses objectifs le renforcement des capacités diocésaines dans le développement local, les animateurs diocésains impliqués dans le projet seront invités à suivre un cours de recyclage organisé par le CODASC, avec tous les animateurs diocésains. (Source : Annexe I p.14).</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	NA. See I.5.1.5
<b>CR</b>	<p>The evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so <u>as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions</u>. However, <u>genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases</u>. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions.</p> <p>Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making</p>

	<p>centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p>Sources:  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>In general, Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.45</i>).</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>There is no strong evidence of coordination with other donors interventions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Financing Agreement refers to the operations carried out by other donors (Guyana: IDB supported the drainage and irrigation policy) and stresses that <i>"special care has been taken to ensure that this regional rice programme complements the efforts of other donor agencies"</i>. No further details or specific measures are provided in the FA.</li> <li>▪ The final evaluation does not mention specific coordination efforts undertaken during implementation and stakeholders interviewed confirmed that coordination with other donors has not been a specific area of attention under this programme.</li> </ul> <p>Sources:  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, pages 5, 10;</i>  <i>SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009;</i>  <i>MN 700</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>There has been no other donor intervention in the Caribbean rum sector.</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>There are references to disaster risk management but not to financial risk management in the East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regional Strategy Paper.</p> <p>Source: <i>Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 59.</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>In the case of Ethiopia the relationship and objectives are determined by the new Partnership Agreement between the 15 EU Member States and the ACP States that is characterized by non-reciprocal trade benefits for ACP States. A mutually agreed National Indicative Programme (NIP ), within an overall strategy is a part, sets development targets in focal sectors and contains a five year spending pledge by the EU</p>

	<p>tailored to meet the needs of the country (<i>Source : FP p.2</i>)</p> <p>Given the predominant role of the EC in the sub sector then the investments are complementary by the omission of others. The Swiss Government investments do not overlap the investments under the Project. It is doubtful that the other donors will become involved in the sub sector either during or after the Project. It is understood however that the World Bank is involved in discussions with the Government on macro-economic issues, which involve changes in coffee marketing. These are in line with the proposals set out in the Project document. (<i>Source : FP p.12</i>)</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The monitoring report refers to “other donors” without clarifying who they are. It mentions that there is “significant donor coordination, but no overlap in activities” since the CSSP II focuses on activities that no other donors do: training and replanting. The programme’s financing agreement states that donor coordination in Ghana is generally very strong, due to the joint elaboration by the government and donors of the “Harmonization and Alignment in Ghana for Aid Effectiveness: A Common Approach for Ghana and its Development Partners” and the “Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy”.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 01, Quality of Project Design sheet.</i> <i>Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal, page 4.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme doesn’t focus on risk management and compensatory tools.</p> <p>Furthermore, there is no evidence of coordination between the Commission’s support through the PAN-SPSO and that of other donors.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Non. De manière générale, il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-baïlleurs (SMB) mais <b>très peu ou rien en matière de coordination</b> de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l’application de la Déclaration de Paris (<i>Source : MN 801</i>).</p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The TAPs attached to the Financing Agreements of PASAM1 and PASAM2 indicate that a multi-donor secretariat coordinate donors interventions in the field of environment and that “la mise en place d’une telle coordination pour les interventions dans le développement rural dont le présent programme, le programme national foncier et le programme national d’amélioration des bassins versants seraient des composantes clés, est en cours”.</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>There is no evidence of such interventions in Mali and the indicator is therefore not relevant.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>L’objectif 1 du PARFC prévoit la mise en place d’un dispositif opérationnel permettant une réduction des effets de la volatilité des cours de la fibre sur le revenu du producteur par une contribution à un Fonds de Soutien (CF, annexe 5) et un appui à la conception d’un fonds de lissage. L’appui à la conception du fonds de lissage recherche une coordination avec une opération pilote sur la mise au point et le développement d’un fonds de lissage, financée par l’AFD, qui serait menée au Burkina Faso et au Sénégal et à laquelle le Mali n’était pas encore associé (CF, ANNEXE 5).</p> <p><i>Source: CF</i></p>

<b>PAC</b>	No such evidence can be found in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.
<b>SADC</b>	There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	n/a no support to price or other risk mechanisms.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. There is a strong coordination of donors (including MS) through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Agriculture Sector Working Group chaired by the government</li> <li>• The Agriculture Donors Group</li> </ul> <p>Indeed, donors report on their activity in the framework of the <u>donors working group</u>. Lessons learned and dissemination of information between donors: coordination and complementation needs are shared at the project level and also at the strategic level: <u>all levels of coordination are covered</u>. Besides the multi-donor support to the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture), donor coordination results in some sort of task and geographical sharing between donors by regions and by nature of intervention. (Sources: MN 301, 309 and 313).</p>
<b>UG</b>	No reference to financial risk management can be found in Uganda's CSP/NIPs.
<b>UG-COF</b>	According to the project description "there are a few (USAID financed) initiatives with more or less relevance" to the project. No reference is made to EU MS.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>Some 20 donors, the major ones being the European Union, Denmark, Ireland, IFAD, African Development Bank, United Kingdom and the World Bank support implementation of the PMA using various aid modalities such as general budget support, earmarked budget support, sector programme support and project aid.</p> <p>"During the last 3-4 years coordination amongst the development partners has matured, with the establishment and continued active operation of a PMA coordination group, as well as through the joint reviews and basket funding mechanisms that have been put in place".</p> <p>TAPs of the SBS</p> <p>It is likely (but to be checked) that some donors support the PMA component aimed at improving access of farmers to credit.</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	No reference to price risk management can be found in the project's documents.
<b>BAN</b>	There is no evidence of financial risk management projects in the SFA impact evaluation report.
<b>CI Palm oil</b>	De façon plus spécifique, en ce qui concerne les appuis aux secteurs du palmier et d'hévéa, la Délégation a engagé une concertation avec la Coopération technique allemande (GTZ) qui conduit différents projets de développement rural et de protection environnementale dans le sud-ouest du pays (Programme de développement économique en milieu rural et Programme de conservation du Parc National de Taï). Dans le cadre de ce projet, il est ici prévu d'établir un partenariat formalisé entre la CE et la GTZ. (Source : Annexe II FA p.4 <b>CI-REH</b> )
<b>CI Rubber</b>	De façon plus spécifique, en ce qui concerne les appuis aux secteurs du palmier et d'hévéa, la Délégation a engagé une concertation avec la Coopération technique

	<p>allemande (GTZ) qui conduit différents projets de développement rural et de protection environnementale dans le sud-ouest du pays (Programme de développement économique en milieu rural et Programme de conservation du Parc National de Taï). Dans le cadre de ce projet, il est ici prévu d'établir un partenariat formalisé entre la CE et la GTZ. (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4 CI-REH</i>)</p> <p>Les interactions avec le projet LICUS (Hévéa, Banque Mondiale) sont très riches : i) retour d'expériences ; ii) approvisionnement en bois de greffe pour les PEPMV du PA4P (<i>Source : MR p.2 CI-REH</i>)</p>
<b>I.5.1.8</b>	Evidence that the tools developed remain used and that their financial sustainability is ensured without further Commission support
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>As result 3 (market-based risk management instruments) of the AAACP programme is concerned, no activity was completed at the time of the MTR (April 2009). In addition, the MTR underlines that such activities, which have been implemented in the form of studies, training, technical assistance and advisory services, could not have an effect unless they are accompanied by the establishment or strengthening of both "soft" infrastructure (e.g. organisation, legislation, regulation, finance, insurance, judiciary) and "hard" infrastructure (e.g. weather stations, laboratories, warehouses, rural roads, electricity) that forms the prerequisite for the application of the instruments. Thus, the AAACP should articulate a broader and long-range strategy that gives a direction on how the market-based instruments (e.g. hedging, weather risk insurance) will be developed and applied to tackle the volatility of commodities prices in a long-term sustainable way.</p> <p><i>Source: Mid-term Review of the AAACP Programme, Final report, April 2009, Executive summary</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	Le FdL, mis au point par l'AFD et auquel la CE a indirectement collaboré, est sous la responsabilité de l'AICB et est toujours fonctionnel en 2010. La mission terrain devrait permettre une meilleure appréciation de la viabilité de l'outil FdL.
<b>CI</b>	<p>Non. Selon l'évaluation, la problématique de l'adéquation des budgets des différents projets du programme avec les buts, notamment les perspectives de retrait progressif, n'est pas réglée.</p> <p>Les lourdes interventions dans le secteur social de l'Education et le secteur socio-économique du coton ne peuvent à elles seules apporter une solution viable compte tenu de la situation budgétaire dans laquelle se trouve l'Etat. Les interventions dans le secteur de la sécurisation foncière sont pilotes et nécessitent de trouver diverses sources budgétaires pour poursuivre cette opération sur plusieurs décennies. Face aux enjeux économiques et à la faiblesse des ressources budgétaires de l'Etat, le budget mis en place pour l'Autorité compétente est manifestement très réduit, malgré une bonne budgétisation de la problématique OTA (maladie café). La viabilité financière et économique du programme, au stade actuel, ne peut être évaluée globalement sur la base d'opérations de type budgétaire. Dans le secteur du coton, la viabilité des opérations conduites dépendra de la capacité de l'Etat à imposer un prix aux producteurs, pour autant qu'il soit en mesure de soutenir le différentiel entre le prix économique et le prix social du produit mais surtout d'en assumer et assurer lui-même le paiement. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CI Rice Coffee Cocoa</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Riz : durabilité ok car il y a une forte demande sur le marché intérieur (la Côte d'Ivoire est même importateur de riz). FAO est en charge de l'appui technique sous financement UE.</li> </ul>

<b>Cotton</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ananas, café, cacao : durabilité n'est pas bonne : problèmes de prix (ananas : auparavant, la Côte d'Ivoire fournissait 90% des importations de la CE, aujourd'hui : 9%). De plus, il y a eu des détournements de fonds malgré l'importante batterie d'instruments pour empêcher cela.</li> <li>▪ Coton : oui car la durabilité dépend des sociétés cotonnières qui ont besoin d'un certain niveau de production pour pouvoir subsister.</li> </ul> <p>L'implication du secteur privé est un facteur déterminant pour assurer la durabilité des interventions.</p> <p>Source : MN 819</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, projects on risk that have been completed are only studies, not tools.</p> <p>Source : MN 913</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No. The evaluation concludes that <u>the sustainability of the institutions developed with the financial support of the Commission is generally not guaranteed</u>. Although several of these institutions are totally or partially not sustainable because they are by nature, or by default of alternatives, providers of public goods. The point is a source of concern in view of the dependency it creates and the difficult situations that develop when divergences of visions between these organisations and the Commission occur. For the institutions that could become partly or completely sustainable, sustainability has not been factored in the design and implementation of the interventions.</p> <p>In <u>the area of human resource development</u>, the Commission's assistance has achieved sustainable results in terms of strengthened regional identity and cohesion.</p> <p>Regarding <u>the interventions in the productive sector</u> more emphasis has been placed on the sustainability of the support mechanisms and institutions than on sustainable and profitable engagement into production and trade activities.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The "Support to the competitiveness to the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme aimed at improving the provision of working capital to private sector operators in the rice sector through a financial facility. The final evaluation notes the following regarding sustainability. This component was designed to provide financial support to producers for a short period of time (less than 2 years) and as such was not expected to have a durable impact on sector performance. As a result of the facility, interest rates offered by commercial banks have been lower but, considering risk factors associated with rice production, producers will probably continue to face difficulties in accessing affordable credit in the absence of a comprehensive package of support to the sector to reduce the risks involved.</p> <p>Sources:  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003,</i>  <i>SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, page 28</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Non. Seule évidence: la formation des producteurs en gestion financière réalisée dans le cadre du projet AIM-Stabex contribue à pérenniser l'accès et les recours au microcrédit (Source : MN 814) mais cela reste plus que limité à grande échelle. En effet, ce projet AIM est une « exception » (qui par ailleurs est strictement locale et n'est pas répliquée</p>

	<p>dans d'autres zones) étant donné que la durabilité de tels projets est généralement « nulle » après l'arrêt des financements (Source : MN 802).</p> <p>OTTIV (organisme de microcrédit) souligne que les paysans représentent 5% du total des encours de crédit et le secteur agricole reste donc marginal dans les recours aux microcrédits (Source : MN 813).</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	Only indirect tool is research for drought and pests resistant varieties (tea, coffee, cotton) and sustainability of this support is highly questionable.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	<p>Mixed. There is a significant risk on the sustainability of the Uganda Commodity Exchange and warehouses receipt system project. The "régime de croisière" envisaged by the feasibility study has not been reached.</p> <p>In 2004, the EC financed a large feasibility study for the implementation of warehouses combined with a system of tradable delivery receipts and a Commodity Exchange Board. A law regulating the system was adopted in 2005/06. The project should have its two components <u>operational after 3 years</u>. The EU committed €4 million: €1 million for international expertise (technical assistance) and €3 million to build 10 warehouses and support the implementation of the Uganda Commodity Exchange.</p> <p><u>To date (after 4 years): 4 fully operational warehouses (against the planned number of 10)</u>. One bank is providing credit to farmers against guarantee by warehouse receipts. The system as it currently works <u>is not adequate for small farmers</u> but the idea was to organize them into marketing groups and establish small intermediate warehouses. Note that the World Food Programme buys from the warehouse.</p> <p>Moreover, there is no new envelope on the EC side to finance further developments of the project (no more Stabex funds and the project was too short). The Government contributed 15% of the costs (mainly salaries). The <u>government did not compensate for the EC withdrawal and no other donor stepped in</u>. WFP will provide some equipment but not a comprehensive support (they serve their interest – have food easily available - rather than the initial project).</p> <p>Source: MN 302</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p><u>EC project in support of the Uganda Commodity Exchange (UGE) and Warehouse receipt system</u></p> <p>The basis for a roadmap to self-financing autonomy is already there and involves managerial independence, trading on the exchange floor, increased licensing, and increased volumes stored and traded. Unfortunately, till now, there has been no proper business planning or strategy to move away from donor dependence (despite it being an implicit objective during the project formulation phase, back in 2004-6). Self-financing was meant to be a driver of the whole project but there is still no consensus as to how Uganda Commodity Exchange (UCE) might become a genuine commercial entity driven by commercial imperatives and not another government agency depending on donors and unpredictable subventions from the parent ministry.</p>

	<i>Source: Final evaluation of EU support to the Uganda Commodities Exchange and Warehouse receipt system</i>
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence appears in the SFA impact evaluation report.
<b>J.5.2</b>	<b><i>Commission's support to agricultural commodities in CDDCs has included safety net issues in complement to commodity chain issues</i></b>
<b>BF</b>	Il n'y a pas de système de protection sociale soutenu par la CE au Burkina Faso
<b>CM</b>	No evidence on the subject was found during the field mission to Cameroon.
<b>MG</b>	Aucune information n'a été recueillie indiquant que des mécanismes de protection collective ont été mis en place au niveau local, régional ou national pour protéger les producteurs contre les risques de perte de revenu
<b>GH overall</b>	No such evidence was found in Ghana
<b>UG</b>	No attempt was made to establish a safety net.
<b>TZ</b>	Nothing like this was funded in Tanzania.
<b>I.5.2.1</b>	Evidence in strategy and programming documents that the support to specific agricultural commodities aimed at alleviating poverty
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no such evidence from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>BF</b>	No such evidence can be found in Burkina Faso's CSP/NIPs.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Un des objectifs globaux que l'action contribue à atteindre est de (1) "Réduire la pauvreté en milieu rural pour améliorer les conditions de vie de populations défavorisées" ( <i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 3</i> ).
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC vise à contribuer à la lutte contre la pauvreté en appuyant la filière coton, important vecteur de croissance économique en milieu rural.</p> <p>La poursuite satisfaisante de la mise en œuvre du CSLP et de son processus de suivi (SRP), est une des conditions générales de l'octroi de la 1<sup>ère</sup> tranche dans le cadre de l'ABS du PAFFIC.</p> <p>Par contre, la programmation du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED ne prévoit plus d'appui spécifique à la filière coton. Elle établit une stratégie de coopération focalisée sur l'appui budgétaire pour la croissance et la réduction de la pauvreté et deux secteurs de concentration : les infrastructures de base et la bonne gouvernance.</p> <p><i>Source : Allocation signature CF</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>No support to agricultural commodities was provided in the regional programmes for Central Africa region.</p> <p><i>Source: RSPs 2002-2007 and 2008-2013.</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	Oui. Globalement, le programme a contribué directement ou indirectement à la réalisation de l'objectif de lutte contre la pauvreté, tant au travers d'une consolidation de certaines filières, dans l'attente d'une éventuelle diversification, que de contributions budgétaires significatives et exceptionnelles à destination des producteurs. ( <i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i> ).
<b>CI</b>	Peu de référence dans le CSP 2008-2013 entre pauvreté et secteur agricole mais les facteurs ayant trait au concept de pauvreté en CI sont abordés. Par contre ce lien est



	<p>exposé dans le CSP 2004-2007.</p> <p>La Commission en prolongement des actions d'urgence sous <b>l'enveloppe B du 9ème FED</b> propose de contribuer à <b>contenir la pauvreté à travers deux secteurs de concentration : le développement rural durable (35%), par l'amélioration de l'accès a la terre (foncier rural), aux marchés (routes rurales), au développement social (hydraulique villageoise) et à la prise de décision (organisations professionnelles agricoles)</b> ainsi qu'à la bonne gouvernance (16%), par la restructuration du système judiciaire, le renforcement de la fonction de contrôle et le renforcement du secteur non étatique. (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.8).</p> <p>Sur le plan socio-économique, la <b>pauvreté concernait principalement les agriculteurs</b>. Le secteur rural concentrait en effet 60% de la population pauvre du pays. S'agissant des agriculteurs qui sont propriétaires de leurs terres, 50% des producteurs de cultures vivrières et 45% des producteurs de cultures d'exportation étaient pauvres. Chez les ouvriers agricoles, le taux de pauvreté était de 35%. Le niveau très élevé de prélèvements professionnels et étatiques sur le café et le cacao, dont le total dépasse en 2003 le plafond de 30%, revêt une responsabilité particulière dans le progrès de la pauvreté rurale. (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.19).</p> <p><b>S'agissant de la pauvreté rurale, l'action du 9ème FED sur les fondamentaux de l'agriculture ivoirienne ne peut cependant aboutir a l'élévation du niveau de vie du paysan</b> si la ponction des prélèvements sur les exportations de café et de cacao continue à réduire les bénéfices des petits producteurs à un niveau tel qu'ils arrivent à peine à couvrir les besoins essentiels de leurs familles sans laisser cette marge minimale qui devrait être réinvestie dans l'outil de production. (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.22).</p> <p>Avec 60% des pauvres du pays, c'est le monde rural qui concentre la pauvreté en Cote d'Ivoire. Au regard de l'importance de l'agriculture dans l'économie ivoirienne et plus particulièrement du nombre de personnes dont la survie dépend de ce secteur, une politique significative de <b>réduction de la pauvreté doit accorder la priorité au monde rural</b>. En effet, le <b>secteur agricole souffre aujourd'hui d'un certain nombre de déficits dont l'aggravation constante entraine une augmentation globale du niveau de pauvreté</b> (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.28 avec plus de détail).</p> <p>Exposition des déterminants de la pauvreté CSP 2004-2007 p.59.</p> <p><b>L'objectif de la politique de développement rural est de réduire la pauvreté en milieu rural en développant une agriculture compétitive, respectueuse des équilibres naturels et à l'écoute du marché, et en facilitant l'accès des populations rurales aux infrastructures de base</b>. Les résultats attendus sont à la fois l'amélioration de la compétitivité et de la productivité agricoles, l'autosuffisance et la sécurité alimentaire, l'augmentation du niveau de revenus des agriculteurs et la réduction des disparités régionales ou locales, ainsi que la rationalisation de la gestion des espaces agricoles ou forestiers et l'amélioration des infrastructures en milieu rural (Source : CSP 2004-2007 p.63).</p>
CI-REH	<p><b>Un des deux objectifs globaux est « Réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural »</b> (Source : Rider FA p.15 Cadre logique)</p> <p><b>D) Hévéa.</b> Après un an de projet, l'impact sur le développement socio-économique et la</p>

	<p><b>réduction de la pauvreté</b> est déjà perceptible grâce à la création d'emplois rentables chez les jeunes démunis. (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>)</p> <p><b>II) Palmier.</b> Aucun impact n'est actuellement perceptible. (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's strategy and programming documents for the period 2007-2013 explicitly referred to past Commission's interventions in the rural development area that focused on socio-economic infrastructure, rural credit, food security, etc. The second CSP also foresees support under the non-focal areas to rural development with a view to reduce rural poverty : « <i>Parallèlement à l'amélioration des capacités de production agricole et afin de réduire la pauvreté et d'améliorer les conditions de vie en milieu rural, des actions seront menées pour adapter le cadre socioéconomique (densification et réhabilitation des réseaux de pistes de collecte, construction et/ou aménagement de points d'eau potable, de maisons communautaires, de magasins de stockage et de marchés ruraux, sécurisation alimentaire).</i> »</p> <p>Sources :</p> <p><i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i></p> <p><i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, page 24</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>Objectif global : « Contribuer à la réduction de la pauvreté et au développement social, économique et humain dans les communes de Garoua Rurale et de Gashiga » (<i>Source : Annexe I p.2</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No. Whereas poverty alleviation may not be regarded as the dominant priority in the region, there are no studies on the impact of regional integration and trade policies on poverty issues.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents. Commission interviewees pointed out that the Commission has not developed social safety nets programmes.</p> <p>Sources:</p> <p><i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i></p> <p><i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p><i>MN 700</i></p> <p>No evidence in ECS that of the support to specific agricultural commodities aimed at alleviating poverty</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>There is no support specific to agricultural commodities in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP. The agricultural and food security support does not refer specifically to poverty reduction as a final goal.</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>Much of the decline in monetary poverty reflects the high overall GDP and <b>agricultural sector growth</b> that took place over the past 4 years. PASDEP attributes the decline in the proportion of rural people below the poverty level also to the wide-ranging and multi-faceted pro-poor programs that have been implemented in rural areas such as the <b>agricultural extension program</b>, the food security program and the recent Productive Safety Net Program. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.23</i>).</p> <p>It is clear that strong economic growth, especially the <b>recovery of food production</b>,</p>

	<p>has led to significant improvement in the poverty situation of many households since the 1990/2000 HICES. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.25</i>).</p> <p>The response strategy presented here can be considered "joint" in that it has been informed by a Joint Country Diagnostic Survey carried out with Member States and provides a framework for both their and the EC's planned cooperation initiatives in Ethiopia along with the linkages between them. <b>All of these initiatives have been designed to align with the priorities of the Government's national poverty reduction strategy, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).</b> Joint programming is by its nature a gradual process, as recognised in the 'European Consensus on Development'. This first Joint Response Strategy for Ethiopia takes an important first step in structuring EU cooperation and thus provides the potential and momentum for joint implementation and deeper joint programming in the future. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.41</i>).</p> <p>Among these initiatives, the EC proposes to support the « <b>Focal sector II: Rural development and food security</b> » in three concrete ways: (i) Support for the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP); (ii) Support to agricultural markets and livestock development, and; (iii) Management of natural resources, including restoration and preservation of degrading environmental conditions in rural Ethiopia. Linked to these proposed interventions is the support given by a number of EU Member States as regards rural-urban linkages, rural electrification as well as water and sanitation. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.50</i>).</p> <p>ADLI (Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation) has subsequently been incorporated into the SDPRP in 2002, where it now constitutes one element of the overall poverty reduction strategy. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 18</i>).</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	The overall objective was to improve standards of living in the growing areas <b>thus reducing widespread poverty</b> . Coffee yields and quality were identified as the main factors to meet this objective. ( <i>Source: FA p.3</i> )
<b>GH</b>	The EU support to rural development has mainly focused on reducing poverty. Yet there are no specific support to agricultural commodities mentioned in the CSP/NIPs  <i>Sources: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 33</i>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La réduction effective de la pauvreté devra continuer à s'appuyer sur le développement rural, qui intéresse la grande majorité de la population et aussi la plus pauvre. Le MAP se propose de doubler pour 2012 le taux de rendement agricole par le bais d'une « révolution verte durable » basée sur l'application des nouvelles techniques. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.7)</p> <p>Partie de stratégie de réponse : « Pour réduire la pauvreté qui continue à sévir fortement dans les zones rurales, l'objectif premier est de prendre en considération les causes structurelles et endogènes qui sont d'ordre alimentaire et monétaire. La lutte contre l'insécurité alimentaire s'attaquera à l'amélioration des structures et des capacités de production agricole afin d'accroître l'offre en produits, d'abord rizicole. En outre, elle cherchera à générer des revenus qui favoriseront, d'une part, la demande alimentaire et, d'autre part, une meilleure couverture des besoins non alimentaires. Enfin, cette stratégie ne peut réussir que si le problème de l'enclavement des régions est également pris en considération, puisqu'il représente un frein important au développement rural.</p>

	<p>La réhabilitation des routes d'intérêt national, provincial et communal ainsi que de pistes rurales situées dans des zones de production commercialisable est un facteur déterminant pour accroître les échanges et pour offrir des prix rémunérateurs aux paysans. Le désenclavement contribuera également à faciliter l'accès aux services sociaux et, d'une manière générale, à sortir de leur isolement les populations rurales afin de mieux les intégrer dans le processus de décentralisation qui les concerne directement. Ainsi, le développement rural, orienté à la fois vers une économie de marché dans les zones à fort potentiel agricole, ainsi que vers une moindre dépendance alimentaire, et une diversification des activités et des revenus dans les régions plus défavorisées; et redynamisé, par ailleurs, par l'existence de moyens de communication intégrés, sera en mesure d'améliorer le niveau et les conditions de vie des populations concernées » (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.16)</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>The EC support in Mali was embedded in the country's CSLP (Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté) between 2002 and 2006 and it is now embedded in the country's CSCRP (Cadre Stratégique de Croissance et Réduction de la Pauvreté) (2007-2011). We could therefore consider that the overall objective of the support is to reduce poverty. Furthermore, the first pillar objective of EU support is to reduce poverty.</p> <p>However, there is no evidence that support specific to agricultural commodities is aimed at alleviating poverty.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 10, 37, 38.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La CF indique que l'intervention concertée de la CE et de l'AFD vise à appuyer la restructuration du secteur coton et la mise en œuvre du Cadre Stratégique de Développement du Secteur Coton (CSDSC) afin de favoriser un développement économique durable et équitable dans les zones cotonnières. Cela passe par une amélioration des revenus des producteurs de la zone cotonnière, mais aussi par la sécurisation et la diversification de ces revenus (CF, annexe 2, p3).</p> <p>Cependant, plus globalement, le rapport ROM estime que l'impact de la filière sur la pauvreté ne peut être décrit que comme négatif, c'est à dire qu'elle constitue une trappe de pauvreté pour les paysans vulnérables, insuffisamment équipés pour affronter les complexités de la culture du coton. La pratique de sa culture a tendance à endetter les producteurs qui ne se trouvent pas en mesure de produire des quantités suffisantes (de 1.500 kg de coton graine selon AFD). Cet aspect n'est pas suffisamment pris en compte par le projet, qui souffre du fait de ne pas accepter que la culture du coton s'adresse aux producteurs les plus performants. Sans un écartement des producteurs faibles, l'appui à la filière coton risque d'accroître la pauvreté des campagnes par endettement (BCS, §7.3).</p> <p>Le rapport ROM souligne également le fait qu'avec le 10eme FED, la CE s'extrait de l'apport au secteur coton du Mali, ne laissant que l'AFD comme acteur européen de poids dans la filière coton. L'AFD prévoit de ne plus agir dans une logique principalement sociale, mais de centrer ses activités de support sur les producteurs performants dans une approche "secteur privé". (BCS, §5.1).</p> <p><i>Source: ROM/BCS, CF</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The Pacific 2008-2013 RIP/RSP states that poverty eradication was the primary objective of the EU development cooperation. There is however no evidence in the</p>

	RSPs of aiming poverty alleviation through agricultural commodities support. <i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 13</i>
<b>SADC</b>	There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	There is no support specific to agricultural commodities in Uganda's CSP/NIPs. Support to rural development in the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP and support to the Plan of Modernisation for Agriculture (PAM) in the 2002-2007 do aim, according to the documents, inter alia at alleviating poverty in rural areas.  Note that the programmes are imbedded in the national Poverty Eradication Action Plan.  <i>Source: Uganda 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 53</i> <i>Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 31.</i>
<b>VU</b>	There is no mention of support specific to agricultural commodities in the CSP/NIPs.  The EC's support to private sector development (its main focal sector of support) aims at reducing poverty and inequality.  Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 34
<b>WAF</b>	Tout d'abord, le soutien de la Commission en Afrique de l'Ouest s'inscrit dans leur « Stratégie Régionale de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté en Afrique de l'Ouest » et l'ensemble des interventions vise donc à terme la réduction de la pauvreté.  De plus, le Programme d'Investissement Agricole appuyé par le 10 <sup>ème</sup> FED est censé, selon le RSP/RIP 2008-2013, être d'une grande contribution à la réduction de la pauvreté rurale.  <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 25 &amp; 121</i>
<b>Palm oil</b>	<b>Un des deux objectifs globaux est « Réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural »</b> <i>(Source : Rider FA p.15 Cadre logique)</i>  <b>II) Palmier.</b> Aucun impact n'est actuellement perceptible. <i>(Source : MR p.3)</i>
<b>Rubber</b>	<b>Un des deux objectifs globaux est « Réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural »</b> <i>(Source : Rider FA p.15 Cadre logique)</i>  <b>I) Hévéa.</b> Après un an de projet, l'impact sur le développement socio-économique et la <b>réduction de la pauvreté</b> est déjà perceptible grâce à la création d'emplois rentables chez les jeunes démunis. <i>(Source : MR p.3)</i>
<b>I.5.2.2</b>	Existence of interventions designed to bring a safety net for vulnerable segments of a population depending upon a specific product
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no such evidence from programming documents and M&E reports of the

	AAACP programme.
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	No mentions of safety nets can be found in the PIP evaluation reports. The fact that the PIP does not focus on bringing safety nets for populations depending upon a specific product was confirmed in the interview.  <i>Source: MN 958</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	In order to benefit of the AMSP programme SP countries have had to produce national adaptation strategies (NAS) indicating how they would cope with the situation created by the price reduction of their sugar exports and the termination of the Sugar Protocol. These NAS should deal with three issues: (i) improvement of the sugar sector competitiveness; (ii) diversification; and (iii) mitigation of the broader impacts (notably the social impacts) of the strategy implementation. In Mauritius, where implementation of the NAS led to lay-offs of sugar industry workers, the Government made use of the AMSP funds to pay lay-off allowances. In the other SP countries this component of the NAS was not given much attention
<b>BF</b>	No such evidence can be found in Burkina Faso's CSP/NIPs.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Deux des objectifs globaux que l'action contribue à atteindre sont : <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Promouvoir la représentation des femmes dans les filières agricoles nationales et l'autonomisation économique des femmes</li> <li>(2) Faciliter l'intégration de populations vulnérables à l'économie mondiale</li> </ol> <i>(Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 3).</i>  Une des recommandations du MR est « ix) mieux intégrer les groupes vulnérables dans l'ensemble de la chaîne de production/transformation et favoriser leur accès à des positions d'encadrement, si possible. <i>(Source MR p.3)</i>
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune référence n'est faite à des filets de sécurité pour des populations dépendantes d'un certain produit dans les documents de l'intervention de « structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde ».
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés.
<b>CM-PAS</b>	NA. See I.5.1.5
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>CR-RUM</b>	Not relevant for the Caribbean rum programme, which targeted commercial companies.
<b>ESAIO</b>	There is a reference to an intervention aiming at providing a safety net, although it is for social sector development in food importing countries, not for segments of a population depending upon a specific product.  <i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 170.</i>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<b>No explicit evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents.</b>  Nevertheless, it is underlined that specific problems are the causes of <b>the sub optimal</b>

	<b>standard of living prevailing in the coffee areas</b> (around €1/day) and include (i) low coffee yields/unit area, (ii) erratic and generally low farmgate coffee prices; and (iii) loss of the distinctive quality characteristics associated with Ethiopia's position as the sole provider of <i>coffea arabica</i> . ( <i>Source: FP p.1</i> )
<b>GH</b>	The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that the Ghanaian government has committed to develop safety net programmes, but no specific mention of these programmes appears.  <i>Sources: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 88</i>
<b>GH-COC</b>	No reference to safety nets can be found in the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II.
<b>KE-PAN</b>	The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme doesn't focus safety nets for vulnerable segments of a population depending upon a specific product.
<b>MG</b>	Non, aucun interlocuteur n'a mentionné l'existence de « safety net ».
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The intervention is not product specific. It is basically a food security project.
<b>ML</b>	No such evidence can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Mali.
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>PAC</b>	No such evidence can be found in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.
<b>SADC</b>	There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	There is no safety net in Tanzania. <i>Source: MN 138</i>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG</b>	No, the EC has rejected the idea of establishing a safety net (Source: MN 313).
<b>UG</b>	The 2002-2007 CSP/NIP mentions that safety nets for the rural poor who don't have any assets will be provided by other programmes but there is no further explanation available. No specification of interventions to bring safety nets for segments of the population depending upon a specific product can be found.  <i>Source: Uganda 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, page 53</i>
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project does not foresee any action aimed at establishing a safety net.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	The PMA supported by the EC SBS aims at reducing rural poverty but does not specifically address agricultural commodities nor the impact of commodity price fluctuations on farmers' income.
<b>VU</b>	Il n'y pas de <i>safety net</i> financé par la CE au Vanuatu. <i>Source : MN 1067</i>
<b>VU</b>	No mention of safety nets can be found in Vanuatu's CSP/NIPs.
<b>VU-POP</b>	No reference to safety nets for the vulnerable population can be found in the Producer Organisation Project II documents.
<b>BAN</b>	There is evidence of SFA interventions to bring social safety nets to the vulnerable segments of the population (e.g. in St Lucia, but few of the projects were "substantially

	complete” at the time of the evaluation).  Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 23 & 28 htspe, 2008.
<b>I.5.2.3</b>	Evidence that these interventions offered a better living/created a safety net to the segments of the population targeted
<b>CI</b>	Pas d’infos recueillies
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	Non, aucun interlocuteur n’a mentionné l’existence de « safety net ».
<b>UG</b>	No, the EC has rejected the idea of establishing a safety net (Source: MN 313).
<b>SADC</b>	There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.
<b>projects</b>	None of the projects reviewed dealt with safety nets or included safety net components.
<b>I.5.2.4</b>	Views of stakeholders on : (i) the appropriateness of the support with respect to the creation of safety nets (ii) the results of the support with respect to the creation of safety nets
<b>AMSP</b>	In Mauritius, where the government brokered an agreement of all stakeholders on the NAS, social measures in favour of laid-off industry workers has been a condition for the trade union agreement with the NAS. As mentioned above (I.5.2.2) in the other SP countries little attention was given to social issues.
<b>J.5.3</b>	<b><i>Income variability and vulnerability to price fluctuations of producers, sector and countries has declined as a result of improved risk management</i></b>
<b>BF</b>	Il n’y a pas d’évidence que les interventions STABEX ont permis de réduire la variabilité des revenus et la vulnérabilité des producteurs, des secteurs agricoles ou du pays. Il est trop tôt d’envisager des éléments d’impact en ce qui concerne l’appui de gestion des risques à la filière coton (Banque Mondiale/ ARMG)
<b>CM</b>	Commission support through Stabex was very important in Cameroon until the 1990s and Stabex funds have continued to be used for projects (on themes ranging from diversification to rural development and competitiveness) in the end 2000s. It helped cope with consequences of price fluctuations in the past. Currently, no tools are set up for the moment to cope with price fluctuations. Price information systems seem to improve the situation for coffee producers. However, it isn’t « risk management » per se. The banana sector is quite vulnerable to the declining trade preference for ACP bananas that is beginning to operate. The banana accompanying measures (BAM) which are supposed to help in that context are stalling for the moment.
<b>GH overall</b>	No such evidence was found in Ghana
<b>MG</b>	Aucun mécanisme spécifique de gestion de risque n’a été mis en place. Mais la diversification des cultures d’exportation au niveau des exploitations agricoles diminue l’impact des fluctuations des prix internationaux sur les revenus des agriculteurs
<b>TZ</b>	It is interesting to note in Tanzania that there is no or hardly any monitoring of income levels, whether at sector level or country level. Similarly to the issue of crop prices which is not really discussed, the issue of farmers’ gross margins seems equally ‘secret’ and as a consequence the issue of farmers’ income is equally unknown. Some sources provide circumstantial evidence of improved incomes for those that



	<p>follow best practices and receive improved seeds and the example of cashew nut warehouse receipt system shows potentially higher and more stable incomes. There is no conclusive evidence that farmer incomes have increased in Tanzania as a result of issues surrounding crop prices.</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The in cash income of the farmers involved in the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project remains dependent on coffee price fluctuations, but has increased to the point where they are able to invest in their farm (seedlings, fertilisers, etc.) and make some savings. Their vulnerability to price fluctuations is thus reduced.</p> <p>As regards farmers' income and vulnerability, one should note that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Staple crops (e.g. maize) also cash crops; some part of the production is marketed</li> <li>• The revenue derived from cash crops contributes to reducing food insecurity (which is less a problem in Uganda than in other countries).</li> <li>• There is a minimum income level under which price decreases may lead to food insecurity. Above this minimum income level farmers can cope with price fluctuations. The main objective of the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project is to bring the farmers' income beyond this threshold.</li> </ul>
<b>I.5.3.1</b>	Evidence that the producer can better manage potential agricultural commodity price variability
<b>BAN</b>	<p>According to the SFA impact evaluation report, banana producers in Côte d'Ivoire have progressively widened their product base, which helps them cope with risk. No further evidence is available</p> <p>Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country Reports, pages 64, 289 htspe, 2008</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, the PACICC programme (Programme d'Appui au Conseil Interprofessionnel Café-Cacao) provides daily information to producers on the effective coffee prices. This allows producers to negotiate their sales price in a better way. The AAACP is building on this experience to study the possibility of developing the market information system to other commodities and provide more information, both qualitative (standards, list of exporters, list of warehouses, agencies for credit...) and quantitative (price, costs, interest rates...) information.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913 ; AAACP action fiches</i></p> <p>Séchoirs cacao zone province Sud Ouest et dpt du Moungo: les séchoirs couvrent environ 25% de la production locale. Ils sont une source de revenus, car les services se louent à des producteurs sans séchoir. En plus, ils sont moins coûteux à l'utilisation par une utilisation plus rationnelle de bois (ils brûlent pendant 3-4 mois 24h/24!) et un temps de séchage réduit. Ensuite il est recommandé de travailler sur les groupements de producteurs pour améliorer le revenu (<i>source : Rapport final pour l'évaluation à mi-parcours du projet séchoirs à Cacao dans la province du Sud-Ouest et dpt Moungo, février 2005 JMN Consultant</i>)</p> <p>Naguère prospère lorsque les cours du café robusta étaient favorables, le bassin agricole du Moungo Nkam a été frappé de plein fouet par l'effondrement du marché et les effets de la libéralisation de la filière (décennie 1990). La production a chuté fortement en volume (de 90.000 à 30.000 tonnes en l'espace d'une quinzaine d'années) et sa qualité s'est dégradée du fait du manque de moyens des planteurs</p>

	<p>et de leurs organisations. La baisse des revenus des planteurs a été responsable de l'extension de la pauvreté parmi la population. La diversification des productions (palmier à huile, manioc, élevage, cultures vivrières...), leur transformation, ou l'amélioration des revenus du café et du cacao par la commercialisation groupée constituent des solutions qui ont été explorées par le projet en s'appuyant sur des groupements de producteurs (<i>source : l'expérience du PDRBA- MN 409</i>)</p>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG vanilla</b>	<p>Seule évidence citée par des bénéficiaires du projet AIM-Stabex (exception) : la diversification des cultures de rente permet de mieux étaler les revenus monétaires tout au long de l'année même si les bas prix internationaux (vanille) grèvent les prix de vente et que l'amélioration de la qualité ne semble pas avoir d'impact direct sur les prix (Source: MN 814)</p>
<b>TZ cashew nuts</b>	<p>The Government of Tanzania introduced a Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) in 2007: it has 'played a catalytic role in terms of improved agricultural production and productivity, stability of producer prices, improve quality of crops, technological uptake, and improved marketing of agricultural crops in Tanzania. Other benefits from WRS include storage of crops and sell them when prices are attractive, thus improving incomes; offering guarantees which farmers use to access bank loans; and employment creation. It has been introduced in cashew nuts and paddy and operated in a few geographical areas. The system is about to be introduced to sesame and sunflower.</p> <p><i>Source: PER 2010.</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Answer with two different components.</p> <p>Mixed regarding the implementation of <u>warehouses combined with a system of tradable delivery receipts and a Commodity Exchange Board</u>. Indeed, the objective was to improve transparency and efficiency because the prices of agricultural goods vary very much during the year with their lowest level during the harvest season. Nevertheless, there is a significant risk on the sustainability of the project (see I.5.1.8) The "régime de croisière" envisaged by the feasibility study has not been reached. (Source: MN 302).</p> <p>Yes regarding <u>Stabex projects</u>, notably the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project. The cash income of the farmers involved in the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project remains dependent on coffee price fluctuations, but has increased to the point where they are able to invest in their farm (seedlings, fertilisers, etc.) and make some savings. <u>Their vulnerability to price fluctuations is thus reduced</u>. (Source : MN 308). As regards farmers' income and vulnerability, one should note that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Staple crops also cash crops; some part of the production is marketed</li> <li>• The revenue derived from cash crops contributes to reducing food insecurity (which is less a problem in Uganda than in other countries).</li> <li>• There is a minimum income level under which price decreases may lead to food insecurity. Above this minimum income level farmers can cope with price fluctuations. The main objective of the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project is to bring the farmers' income beyond this threshold. (Source: MN 313).</li> </ul>
<b>VU-POP</b>	No such information can be found in the programme documents.
<b>I.5.3.2</b>	Year-to-year and in-year variations of income levels within the agricultural sector as a

	whole have been reduced through the use of risk management and compensatory tools
<b>CI</b>	<p>Non bien que les constats ci-dessous portent sur le revenu de manière générale et non sur les variations annuelles :</p> <p><u>Secteur coton</u></p> <p>Bien que <u>l'objectif spécifique initial est l'augmentation du revenu des exploitations agricoles</u> par l'amélioration du fonctionnement des filières d'exportation ou de substitution aux importations, le Stabex a contribué au sauvetage du <u>secteur coton</u> et des petits opérateurs bénéficiaires mais sans accroissement significatif des revenus des exploitations agricoles, par une prise en charge de la dette des opérateurs défaillants. L'incidence de la pauvreté rurale a significativement progressé dans les zones de production cotonnières depuis 2001. Cela se traduit, autant sur le revenu des producteurs que sur leurs conditions de vie (dégradation ou disparition des services sociaux et économiques).</p> <p><u>Secteur café/cacao</u></p> <p>L'étude sur les revenus et les investissements des producteurs de café et de cacao, confirment l'appauvrissement progressif et continu des ménages (lié au partage déséquilibré de la marge produite sur le produit, au vieillissement des vergers, et à la dégradation des services de productivité).</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
<b>CI coffee cocoa</b>	<p>Non bien que les constats ci-dessous portent sur le revenu de manière générale et non sur les variations annuelles :</p> <p><u>Secteur café/cacao</u></p> <p>L'étude sur les revenus et les investissements des producteurs de café et de cacao, confirment l'appauvrissement progressif et continu des ménages (lié au partage déséquilibré de la marge produite sur le produit, au vieillissement des vergers, et à la dégradation des services de productivité).</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
<b>CI Cotton</b>	<p>Non bien que les constats ci-dessous portent sur le revenu de manière générale et non sur les variations annuelles :</p> <p><u>Secteur coton</u></p> <p>Bien que <u>l'objectif spécifique initial est l'augmentation du revenu des exploitations agricoles</u> par l'amélioration du fonctionnement des filières d'exportation ou de substitution aux importations, le Stabex a contribué au sauvetage du <u>secteur coton</u> et des petits opérateurs bénéficiaires mais sans accroissement significatif des revenus des exploitations agricoles, par une prise en charge de la dette des opérateurs défaillants. L'incidence de la pauvreté rurale a significativement progressé dans les zones de production cotonnières depuis 2001. Cela se traduit, autant sur le revenu des producteurs que sur leurs conditions de vie (dégradation ou disparition des services sociaux et économiques).</p>

	Source : Eval Stabex 2009
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG vanilla</b>	Non, il n'existe pas d'outils de gestion de risques. La diversification des cultures est par contre un moyen d'atténuer les variations annuelles des revenus. En effet, seule évidence citée par des bénéficiaires du projet AIM-Stabex : la diversification des cultures de rente permet de mieux étaler les revenus monétaires tout au long de l'année même si les bas prix internationaux (vanille) grèvent les prix de vente et que l'amélioration de la qualité ne semble pas avoir d'impact direct sur les prix (Source: MN 814)
<b>UG</b>	See I.5.3.1
<b>I.5.3.3</b>	Year-to-year and in-year variations in producers' revenues have been reduced through the implementation of safety nets for commodity producers
<b>CI</b>	Non, pas d'évidence sur l'existence de « safety net ».
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	Non, il n'existe pas de « safety net ». La diversification des cultures est par contre un moyen d'atténuer les variations annuelles des revenus (cf. I.5.3.2)
<b>UG</b>	No, the EC has rejected the idea of establishing a safety net (Source: MN 313).
<b>I.5.3.4</b>	Year-to-year variations of income levels at country level have been reduced
<b>CI</b>	Seule évidence : « Dans un contexte de filières d'exportation, la notion d'impact du programme Stabex est fortement dépendante du <u>facteur marché international qui n'est pas très favorable</u> (à l'exception de celui du cacao) » (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG vanilla coffee cocoa</b>	Non de manière générale (valeur des exportations agricoles ont chuté de 17% de 2008 à 2009) ainsi que pour les deux produits ciblés (vanille et café) (Source : Rapport sur les exportations du secteur agriculture – élevage - pêche en 2009, Délégation de l'UE à Madagascar)  A Madagascar, les exportations du secteur agriculture-élevage-pêche occupent la seconde place, avec 30% du total. Elles ont généré 290 millions USD de recettes en 2009 contre 351 millions USD l'année précédente (-17%). Les exportations de produits animaux (hors pêche) comptent pour moins de 5% du total et sont principalement constituées de cuirs et peaux  Huit (8) produits ou catégories de produits représentent à eux seuls 85% de la valeur des exportations du secteur. Leur performance en 2009 dépend plus de facteurs structurels internes ou de l'état des marchés internationaux, que de l'effet de la crise politique qui a marqué le pays depuis le début de l'année.  Les exportations de <u>crevettes et de vanille</u> , les deux principaux produits, ont connu de <u>sérieuses difficultés en 2009</u> , qui se traduisent par une perte de 77 millions USD de recettes (-47%) par rapport à la moyenne 2006-2008.  Les exportations de <u>girofle ont atteint un niveau qui n'a été dépassé qu'en 2001</u> , avec près de 58,6 millions USD pour clous et essence.  Depuis 2007, le <u>cacao s'est hissé au 4<sup>ème</sup> rang</u> des exportations du secteur. Sa production

	<p>est en nette augmentation mais le cacao malgache a perdu la surcote dont il bénéficiait en 2006-2007 pour ses qualités aromatiques.</p> <p>Les <u>produits de la mer (hors crevettes) accusent depuis deux ans une baisse significative</u> (-16% en 2008 et -22% en 2009), principalement due à la baisse des exportations de langouste dont la ressource montre des signes d'épuisement.</p> <p>Pour <u>le litchi, le réajustement des volumes à la taille du marché a permis une légère amélioration du prix moyen et ainsi le maintien de la valeur exportée</u> au niveau de 2006 et 2008, dans la fourchette de 12 à 14 millions USD.</p> <p>Les exportations <u>de café ont atteint leur plus bas niveau historique</u> avec moins de 3 millions USD.</p> <p>Les <u>produits des industries alimentaires occupent depuis quelques années une place croissante dans les exportations malgaches</u>. En 2009, la valeur des exportations s'est maintenue au niveau atteint depuis 2006 (entre 55 et 60 millions USD). Toutefois, la bonne performance des industries sucrières (+170%) et exportatrices de conserves de fruits et légumes (+52%) masque d'importantes difficultés pour les autres industries (-16% en 2008 et -31% en 2009). »</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>No such evidence. There are exports' increases but not as much as expected although statistics might be misleading for they do not capture most of the regional trade. However, the transformation of the sector is quite disappointing: agriculture was one of the less performing sectors over the last ten years despite the potential of the country (Source: MN 301).</p> <p>Moreover, there are only 4 fully operational warehouses (against the planned number of 10) to date after 4 years (Source: MN 302) and the limited size of the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project (35,000 coffee farmers out of 1.3 million) did not allow for an impact at the national level although the sector is transformed at the regional level when a pool of 35,000 framers are involved (Source: MN 313).</p>

**EQ 6 on the Commission's support to diversification**

<b>To what extent has Commission support helped producers, the agricultural sector and commodity dependent ACP countries to successfully diversify around traditional products?</b>	
<b>J.6.1</b>	<i>The Commission's support has facilitated the analysis of Government's policy choices aiming for diversification and growth</i>
<b>BF</b>	La Commission n'a pas promu la diversification des revenus hors produits de base agricoles au Burkina Faso
<b>CM</b>	The EC's support has not been oriented towards agriculture as a whole, including diversification until very recently (there have however been several interventions in rural development where the agricultural production was concerned with one or another crop targeted by the populations according the agroecological region). In 2010, technical assistance has been provided in the analysis of possibilities to diversify banana export destinations ; and in 2011 the Financing Agreement for a programme including a « diversification of the cotton producing region » project has been signed. The impacts of the EPA agreements on Cameroon are also being assessed, but not through quantitative analysis (only qualitative assessments).
<b>GH overall</b>	The EC did not “provide assistance in policy choices aiming for diversification and growth” per se. Diversification projects (out of cocoa) were planned by the Stabex FMOs of 1992-1993; and the diversification of exports was part of the targets to reach in a PSD sector budget support.
<b>MG vanilla coffee rice</b>	Comme noté plus haut (QE2), la stratégie nationale de développement agricole est centrée sur la production rizicole. La Facilité Sécurité Alimentaire a fourni un appui important au secteur rizicole (financement d'actions de structuration de la filière par des ONG, d'une assistance technique FIDA, mise en place d'un observatoire des prix). Les appuis Stabex aux cultures d'exportation (café, vanille, girofle, litchis) a contribué à diversifier les sources de revenu des paysans bénéficiaires mais ces appuis ne s'inscrivaient pas dans une stratégie explicite du gouvernement malgache (bien que les nombreux documents de stratégie produits par le gouvernement au fil des années – mais jamais mis en œuvre – fassent rituellement référence aux cultures d'exportation.
<b>TZ</b>	No evidence was found to corroborate the idea that the Commission might have supported the Government of Tanzania in investigating diversification issues, whether inside or outside the agricultural sector. This includes the NAS (which normally should have looked at diversification as an option to use AMSP funds).
<b>UG tea</b>	In the 2 <sup>nd</sup> half the 90s, EC made a major contribution to the rehabilitation of the tea sector. The EC with other donors supported the design by the government of its agricultural sector strategy (PMA) which aimed at promoting a zonal level enterprises well adapted to the agro-ecological conditions
<b>VAN</b>	La Commission n'a pas promu ni soutenu la diversification des revenus hors produits

	de base agricoles au Vanuatu
<b>I.6.1.1</b>	Evidence that Technical Assistance has been provided to the Government in the area of policy analysis relating to diversification and growth where necessary and in complementarity with that provided by other donors
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no such evidence from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	The PIP and the technical assistance it provided were never aimed at policy analysis with the Government. The programme did however collaborate with Governments of the concerned countries, particularly the Horticulture Departments of the Ministries of Agriculture to organise public-private stakeholder platforms concerning horticultural products and food safety. Assistance was also provided to public extension services in the Caribbean. Training is also provided to national and registration authorities and for regional harmonisation. The programme has focused a lot on facilitating cooperation between public and private actors. <i>Source: MN 958</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	In most SP countries the Commission hired consultants to assist the government in designing their National Adaptation Strategy to the new market conditions created by the reduction of the EU sugar price and the termination of the Sugar Protocol. These NAS should include a chapter on diversification.
<b>BAN</b>	There is evidence of technical assistance interventions in the areas of diversification and growth in Belize, Jamaica, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines. It is however not mentioned whether this assistance was complementary with that provided by other donors. <i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 10, 17, 19, 24, htsp, 2008.</i>
<b>BF</b>	No such evidence can be found in Burkina Faso's CSP/NIPs.
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Il s'agit d'un projet d'appui technique à la filière mais peu de référence à l'assistance technique dans l'analyse de politiques dans les documents consultés. Le MR précise que le Budget alloué pour AT est non applicable ( <i>Source : MR p.1</i> ) Le projet vise donc à favoriser la concertation entre l'Administration, les opérateurs privés, les investisseurs potentiels et les groupements de producteurs pour l'organisation et la régulation des filières sésame et anacarde afin de relever le défi de la compétitivité d'une transformation nationale des ressources agricoles. ( <i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 4</i> ). Le CL définit le résultat (R4) « Une politique régionale de valorisation de l'anacarde et du sésame, en collaboration avec des partenaires internationaux est définie ».
<b>CI</b>	Peu d'informations (sauf ligne budgétaire banane) sur assistance technique filières agricoles dans CSP. Concerne essentiellement PUR, encadrement juridique, négociations APE et OMC, appui à l'ON, ANE et coopération technique Compte tenu du fait que la mise en œuvre d'une grande partie des actions des PUR (programmes d'urgence de réhabilitations) a été confiée à des organisations de la famille

	<p>des Nations Unies et à des ONG internationales, un système de monitoring spécifique a été mise en place a travers une assistance technique à la Cellule de l'Ordonnateur National du FED. Finalement, une mission ROM en janvier 2007, qui s'est concentrée sur les PURs, a globalement conclu au bien-fondé des interventions. Les recommandations détaillées des moniteurs sont actuellement à l'étude par la Délégation (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.19</i>).</p> <p>Révision de l'encadrement juridique des structures: assistance technique dans la rédaction du Code des marchés publics et textes d'application, de la Loi organique créant la Cour des comptes et textes d'application, de la révision de la loi de 1998 sur le régime financier des EPN (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.21</i>).</p> <p>Appui à la préparation aux négociations de l'APE et de l'OMC: la Cote d'Ivoire bénéficie d'assistance technique financée sur des fonds « Intra ACP » et régionaux pour se préparer aux négociations APE et OMC. La Cote d'Ivoire est sensible aux obstacles techniques au commerce liés notamment aux nouvelles normes de contrôle sanitaire et phytosanitaire. Dans ce contexte, un diagnostic du système d'inspection et de contrôle sanitaire a été financé en vue d'un appui à la facilitation des échanges des exportations agricoles. En outre, la Cote d'Ivoire a bénéficié d'une étude d'impact de l'APE et d'une formation des formateurs en vue des négociations OMC (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.22</i>).</p> <p>La ligne budgétaire banane finance un programme d'Assistance technique et financière (ATF) qui s'inscrit dans les mesures d'accompagnements au processus de libéralisation du marché européen de la banane. En Cote d'Ivoire, le programme ATF bananes (1999-2008) s'élève à un montant global de €26,85 millions pour la période 1999 - 2006. Ce programme, initié en 2002, et à jusqu'à présent permis des investissements directs en plantation, la mise au point d'un système de traçabilité des stations de conditionnement au quai fruitier, des programmes de diversification pour les planteurs désirant quitter la filière, et l'identification d'un programme d'amélioration des conditions de vie des travailleurs. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25</i>).</p> <p>Le partenariat avec la CE en matière de stratégie de développement a renforcé dans le cadre de la nouvelle convention de financement « Appui à l'ON » qui prévoit le renforcement des ministères techniques et de la primature par de l'assistance technique en appui à la programmation, la mise en œuvre et à l'évaluation de l'aide communautaire. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.27</i>).</p> <p>L'appui aux acteurs non étatiques est indispensable dans le cadre de la coopération avec la Commission européenne. Une assistance financière et technique appropriée permettra à ces acteurs de soutenir la Cote d'Ivoire en tant que facteurs dynamiques de croissance et de développement. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.32</i>).</p> <p>Dans le cadre du secteur hors concentration « Appui à la coopération technique », l'objectif spécifique poursuivi sera de renforcer les capacités des administrations publiques. Les principales activités s'articuleront autour de la mobilisation d'expertises pour la réalisation d'études spécifiques, d'audit et d'assistance technique; l'appui aux services de l'Ordonnateur national pour la coordination de la coopération. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.40</i>).</p>
CI	<p>Oui pour l'assistance technique de la CE mais réponse mixte pour la complémentarité avec les autres bailleurs.</p> <p><u>Assistance technique</u></p> <p>Oui. Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des</p>



	<p>OPA, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. Les appuis institutionnels et <u>l'assistance technique</u> représentent 5 % des engagements COM 99/ 1 et 99/2 (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>). Exemples d'assistance technique :</p> <p><u>Secteur coton</u> : assistance technique directe (482,6 millions FCFA), mobilisée pour appuyer divers dossiers dont la stratégie de relance et le plan d'actions coton.</p> <p><u>Filière banane</u> : Un ensemble d'appuis a été financé dans le cadre du Stabex 99/1, pour un montant total de 443,7 millions FCFA. Ces appuis correspondent davantage à des mesures de soudure entre les différents ATF. Ils ont consisté principalement à mobiliser de l'assistance technique</p> <p><u>Politiques agricoles</u> : les appuis sont mis en œuvre par le biais de Devis-Programmes et de contrats d'assistance technique, au bénéfice direct du Ministère de l'Agriculture, pour un montant total de 790 millions FCFA. L'objectif de l'AT est d'apporter un appui technique et administratif au MinAgri., à l'ON du FED et à la DCE pour la conception, la coordination et le suivi des programmes de développement rural financés par l'UE en Côte d'Ivoire. Un assistant technique (BDPA) a été mis à disposition du Cabinet du MinAgri pour une durée initiale de 16 mois (mars 2005 - octobre 2006), prolongée de 12 mois jusqu'en octobre 2007. Les activités de l'AT ont concerné les principaux travaux et produits de la programmation Stabex 1999. Elles ont fait l'objet de rapports d'activités et de nombreux documents de programmation et de mise en œuvre.</p> <p><u>Coordination bailleurs</u></p> <p>Oui même si la CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée. La complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds est avérée, des lors que ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Côte d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007. Les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale mais ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune assistance technique n'a été fournie au gouvernement dans l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés. Il est simplement dit : « Depuis juin 2006, la Délégation coprésède avec le PNUD un groupe de réflexion stratégique, composé de représentants des ambassades et des partenaires au développement sur place, qui formule des recommandations au Gouvernement sous la forme d'Aide-mémoires ». ( <i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4</i> )
<b>CM</b>	<p>The CSP/NIP 2008-2013 foresees support under the second focal area (Trade and regional integration) to economic governance, to a regional single market and to economic diversification through increased competitiveness, both for industrial and agricultural products. The support will include institutional strengthening to service providers for enterprises and to intermediary structures of support to PSD (Agence nationale de l'investissement, chambre de commerce, etc.).</p> <p>The CSP further notes that the interest of the donor community for PSD and</p>

	<p>competitiveness is relatively recent. The Commission and the World Bank are reported to be the main players while the Netherlands and France (AfD) show an increasing interest. There is no evidence that the support will be provided in complementarity to the ones of other donors but overall the CSP stressed coordination with other donors will be ensured.</p> <p><i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i></p> <p><i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 17-18, 22, 33</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>According to interviews, nothing is done for diversification from the coffee and cocoa sectors in Cameroon. Projects rather aim at redeveloping the sectors.</p> <p>For bananas, technical and financial assistance has been provided to the sector. It has contributed to the design of the national banana strategy and analyses growth issues for the sector. More recently, the EU has supported a study on the diversification of export markets for Cameroon's bananas, which would be an element to cope with the new constraints of competitiveness on EU markets. No other donors are active in the banana sector in Cameroon.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913 ; MN 995 ; Etude sur la diversification des marchés d'exportation de la banane dans la sous-région cemac plus le Nigeria, rapport définitif Décembre 2010</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés.
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>NA. This intervention has not targeted agricultural commodities. It aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the economy and at facilitating its insertion into the regional and world economy through the implementation of the EU-Central Africa EPA. The various activities do not explicitly target agricultural commodities.</p> <p><i>Source: Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i></p> <p><i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>No evidence in ECS that that Technical Assistance has been provided in commodities sector</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>The Commission's cooperation strategy evolved over successive EDFs to develop gradually into a strategy aiming at the construction of a regional integrated space in the CARIFORUM (Forum of Caribbean States) area. It included two major objectives: regional integration and cooperation, and building of regional capacity. Four specific objectives have been pursued with varying intensity over time: (i°) regional infrastructure network; (ii°) trade and productive sector development; (iii°) institutional capacity building; (iv) human resources capacity building (tertiary education, health and environment). Finally, a series of interventions in the area of drugs, money laundering and similar issues were conducted to contribute to the eradication of major obstacles to</p>

	<p>regional capacity building.</p> <p><u>Institutional capacity building</u>: support regional integration by providing TA, support staff and other facilities and services for preparation, appraisal, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of regional programmes financed by the EDF.</p> <p>Regarding the complementarity with other donors, the evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions.</p> <p>Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	Diversification was not an objective of the Caribbean rum programme.
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP states that the EC “<i>established a budget for providing specific targeted technical assistance in the area of food safety and human, animal and plant health for developing countries, in response to commitments made under the Doha Development Agenda and the SPS Agreement. This will be in the order of €2 million for the year 2008</i>”. Yet there is no evidence that any technical assistance was provided to the Government in the area of policy analysis relating to diversification and growth where necessary.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 34.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>No information in CSP about technical assistance in commodities sector.</p> <p>Government has recently embarked – with the assistance of the IMF – on a review of Ethiopia's system of taxation. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.13</i>).</p> <p>In December 2006, the Government submitted its Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime to the WTO in line with due process requirements of WTO accession. The Government is planning to undertake, with World Bank assistance, an assessment of the effects of freeing entry into the financial and telecommunications sector. The latter could boost private sector investment and add to the efficient functioning of Ethiopia's modern economy. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.16</i>).</p> <p>The EC is an important donor in the Roads Sector, through investments in infrastructure, policy advice and technical assistance (<i>Source: CSP 2004-2008 p.15</i>).</p> <p>During the RSDP Mid-Term Review, it was noticed that the capacity of the Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA) is still insufficient for managing such a comprehensive and sizeable programme in the most efficient and effective way. Considerable capacity building interventions –such as training programmes and technical assistance- will still</p>

	<p>therefore be included in 9th EDF support to the sector (e.g. for contracts administration, design etc). (<i>Source: CSP 2004-2008 p.19</i>).</p> <p>Within the context of economic and regulatory reforms, the EC will continue its technical assistance in the areas of public finance management including tax policy reform. (<i>Source: CSP 2004-2008 p.21</i>).</p> <p>Technical assistance has worked best in areas where the Commission has its strategic focus, such as food security, roads and PRS related budget support. Problems have frequently been encountered in areas that go beyond the core strategic interests of the Commission and its staff expertise. It is important that the Delegation has the expertise to formulate appropriate terms of reference, identify suitable consultants and supervise/trouble-shoot implementation, as the supported government institutions typically will not possess those skills. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 58</i>).</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>The production of a coffee sector development strategy accepted by all stakeholders, as well as the determination of coordinated actions for the implementation of said strategy was expected from a short term mission organized within the framework of the Technical Assistance contract.</p> <p>From November 2007 to March 2008, a team integrated by an Expatriate Expert and two National Experts carried out an analysis of the coffee sector. On the basis of this analysis, a development strategy was drawn up, which wished to be a consensual development strategy accepted by the whole community, ensuring coordinated actions by the various actors and laying down clear objectives for all of them. (<i>Source : Completion report p.24</i>)</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The FMO 1992-1993 planned for the use of Stabex 1992 funds towards funding of a study leading towards the design of projects aimed at diversification of agricultural exports (out of cocoa) as well as the implementation of the ensuing recommendations.</p> <p><i>Source: FMO 1992-1993</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The EU is engaged in the private sector development strategy working group, which includes programmes to promote the productivity and diversification of agriculture and rural non-farm growth. Other donors in that sector include Denmark, Germany, Italy, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, the USA, the IFAD, the UN &amp; the World Bank. The working group also aims to avoid duplication and search for complementarities among donors.</p> <p><i>Sources: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 35 &amp; 97</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>No evidence can be found concerning technical assistance being provided to the Government.</p> <p>Yet, the first monitoring report states that the Farm Field Schools (FFS) or other training programmes are performed in presence of personnel from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA). The MoFA personnel will later be in charge of these same FFS and training programmes. It can therefore be considered that assistance is brought to Government agents.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Monitoring Report 01, Potential Sustainability sheet.</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>There is evidence that the Commission has brought technical assistance in the sugar sector. In fact, the <i>EC assistance under the accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol (AMSP)</i></p>

	<p>countries allowed Kenya to develop an elaborate strategy to revitalise the sugar sector for 2007. However, there are major issues that continue to affect the sector, including inadequate diversification at farm and factory levels, minimal privatisation, high inefficiencies and low productivity.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 21</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>Technical assistance provided by the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme is never directed at Governments. It doesn't concern diversification and growth either.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Pas d'informations sur une assistance technique aux filières agricoles dans le CSP. Concerne essentiellement appui institutionnel, réformes des douanes, justice,...</p> <p>A la demande du Ministère du Commerce, une assistance technique en appui au FNDPC (Forum National de Développement et de Politique Commerciale) et au Bureau des Normes de Madagascar a été mise en place par la CE en juillet 2006 (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.10).</p> <p>La coopération française à Madagascar dispose de plusieurs moyens d'intervention dont l'assistance technique qui compte aujourd'hui 70 postes (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.10).</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Programme sucre</p> <p>A Madagascar la Stratégie Nationale d'Adaptation du Secteur Sucrier développée par le gouvernement à la demande de la CE (l'élaboration d'une telle stratégie était la condition pour bénéficier des aides de la CE à l'adaptation du secteur) ne prévoit aucune mesure de diversification mais vise exclusivement à relancer le secteur. L'aide de la CE s'est alignée sur cet objectif.</p> <p><i>Source : Review of the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The intervention does not include the provision of TA.</p>
<b>MG rice</b>	<p><u>Assistance technique</u></p> <p>Dans le cadre de <u>Stabex</u> et de <u>l'instrument banane</u>, la Délégation a proposé une stratégie de diversification assez "simpliste" portant sur les épices, baie rose, palmier ornementaux et palmiers pour cœur de palmier, loni (plante médicinale utilisée dans les pays asiatiques) et sur les fruits (carambole, grenadelles,...). L'appropriation de cette stratégie par le gouvernement reste faible (<i>Source : MN 801</i>). En effet, la stratégie de développement agricole du gouvernement est actuellement fortement centrée sur les cultures vivrières (riz et manioc). Le développement des cultures d'exportation n'est pas la priorité (<i>Source : MN 805</i>).</p> <p><u>L'instrument banane</u> (spécifiquement consacré à la diversification) était prévu pour 1999-2008. Madagascar a seulement soumis une stratégie de diversification en 2001 avec un appui à partir de 2002. Les actions ont seulement démarré à partir de 2005 et ont été suspendues à partir de 2009. On comptabilise seulement 6 allocations annuelles au lieu de 10. (<i>Source : MN 801</i>).</p> <p>Le Plan d'Action pour le Développement Rural (PADR) initié en 1997 et mis à jour en 2008 a été très appuyé par l'UE à travers les programmes PASA. Il est encore opérationnel et guide la politique agricole aujourd'hui. Dans la première version l'accent était mis sur le développement rural au sens large incluant éducation, santé, infrastructures. La deuxième version (confirmée en 2008) exclut éducation et santé et retient 5 axes : environnement favorable ; productivité ; infrastructures ; valorisation des</p>

	<p>ressources naturelles ; accès au marché. (Source : MN 805).</p> <p>Le Ministère de l'Agriculture a également été associé à la formulation des appuis Stabex. (Source : MN 805).</p> <p><u>Coordination bailleurs</u></p> <p>De manière générale, il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB) mais très peu ou rien en matière de coordination de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 801).</p>
<b>ML</b>	There is no evidence of technical assistance to the government in the area of policy analysis relating to diversification and growth.
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Le Cadre Stratégique de Développement du Secteur Coton (CSDSC, CF annexe 2) prévoit le développement de filières de diversification de production agricole. Peu d'évidence sur cet aspect apparaît dans les documents consultés relatifs au PARFC, à part pour le « coton bio » (voir ci-après).</p> <p>La convention de financement (CF), dans son annexe II déclare: "pour le court et moyen terme, force est de constater qu'il n'existe pas d'alternative à la culture du coton: malgré son caractère peu rémunérateur. ...les producteurs la poursuivent car c'est la seule culture qui bénéficie d'un prix fixé à l'avance et qui garantisse l'accès au crédit agricole et donc aux intrants..". La mission ROM estime que ce constat est correct en identifiant la filière coton comme "peu rémunératrice", mais erroné en impliquant que seule la culture du coton peut permettre l'accès au crédit agricole et donc aux intrants (Monitoring Report, p2).</p> <p>Par ailleurs, elle estime que le projet a été rendu plus pertinent par l'inclusion d'un volet "coton bio" en 2009 (NB. Le soutien à la filière "coton bio" est une activité qui a été décidée pour réallouer les fonds initialement prévus pour la Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton (MRSC) et ne figure donc pas dans la CF initiale). (BCS, §1.3).</p> <p>Selon le ROM, le projet, dans sa totalité, n'envisage qu'insuffisamment les alternatives à la filière coton, qui au niveau macroéconomique est génératrice de pertes. Le volet "coton biologique", par son soutien au projet MOBIOM (Mouvement Biologique Malien), s'est engagé donne une ouverture à d'autres cultures complémentaires (notamment le sésame et le Karité), voyant ainsi la production agricole dans son intégralité en évitant de considérer le coton comme activité isolé des autres composantes d'une exploitation agricole". Le rapport ROM estime également que c'est seulement par cette approche qu'une différenciation de la production agricole, qui résultera dans une spécialisation des agriculteurs selon leurs aptitudes et en fonction de leurs équipements et disponibilités de terres aptes à la culture de coton, peut être entamée (BCS, § 4.2).</p> <p>Source: ROM/BCS, CF</p>
<b>PAC</b>	There is no evidence of technical assistance provided in such areas in the Pacific RSP/RIPs.
<b>SAR</b>	There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.

<b>TZ</b>	<p>EC-supported technical assistance has driven forward institutional reform in the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, not least to ensure maximum participation of stakeholders (including non-state actors) in the development of policy towards the multilateral system and as part of the SADC EPA negotiations.</p> <p>In addition, the Technical Cooperation Facility (€5 million) support financed by the EC aims to maintain the capacity of the Government of Tanzania, implementing agencies and NSAs to implement EC assistance, covering diagnostics, technical studies, project formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 74</i></p>
<b>TZ Sugar</b>	<p>From the AMSP evaluation it is clear that the Tanzanian NAS did not investigate (or saw the need to look at) the possibilities of diversification within or outside the sugar sector. Indeed the evaluation notes that the production structure is not favourable to the development of a sugar sector competitive at international level. As the sugar industry only serves the domestic market, it does not pretend to compete with more effective sugar exporters on the EU market or on the world market. It might go for regional exports but only on the assumption regional markets would be protected from the competition of cheaper sugar imported from other producing countries.</p> <p>The NAS was elaborated in 2006; in 2011 it is still the Sugar Board that protects the local industry through the issuing of import permits. The sector is thus not yet sufficiently competitive in its own domestic market.</p> <p><i>Source: AMSP Evaluation, MN 673.</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>The input of Technical Assistance mission during the first year of the project (2007) was considered too early and the TOR was unclear.</p> <p><i>Source: Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, Appendix 2</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. The EC with other donors supported the design by the government of its agricultural sector strategy (PMA-plan for Modernization of Agriculture) adopted in 2001 which aimed at promoting a zonal level enterprises well adapted to the agro-ecological conditions (<i>Source: MN 313</i>).</p> <p>Note that, only two of the 7 areas of the PMA, research and extension, have been effectively implemented (lack of coordination between the ministries involved hampered a more homogeneous implementation of the PMA). (<i>Source: MN 301</i>)</p>
<b>UG tea</b>	<p>In the 2<sup>nd</sup> half the 90s, EC made a major contribution to the rehabilitation of the tea sector.</p> <p>The EC with other donors supported the design by the government of its agricultural sector strategy (PMA) which aimed at promoting a zonal level enterprises well adapted to the agro-ecological conditions</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in Uganda's CSP/NIPs.</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>The EC SBS programme supports the research and extension components of the GoU Programme of Modernisation of Agriculture adopted in 2000. It does not include TA to the Government.</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Il n'y a pas eu d'appui à la diversification au Vanuatu. <i>Source: MN 1067</i></p>

<b>VU</b>	No such evidence appears in the CSP/NIPs.
<b>VU-POP</b>	No such evidence can be found in the programme documents.
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Selon le RSP/RIP d'Afrique de l'Ouest de 2008-2013, de l'assistance technique a été apportée à l'UEMOA. Le RSP/RIP 2007-2013 cite également de l'assistance technique apportée à l'UEMOA et la CEDAO dans le cadre la coordination de ces deux institutions.</p> <p>Cependant aucune référence n'est faite à une assistance technique relative à l'analyse de politiques de diversification ou de croissance.</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, page 42</i>  <i>WAF RSP/RIP 2002-2007, page 48</i></p>
<b>I.6.1.2</b>	Evidence that specific tools have been developed and continue to be used for supporting strategic choices (e.g. competitiveness evaluations of specific commodity chains)
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Un atelier de concertation, organisé par RONGEAD et INADES-Formation Burkina Faso, qui s'est tenu en décembre 2007, a permis d'identifier les principaux problèmes rencontrés par les associations de planteurs et des opérateurs qui pratiquent le décorticage des noix de cajou dans le cadre d'une <b>analyse de la chaîne de valeur de la filière anacarde</b>. (Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 4-5)</p> <p>Une analyse récente de la filière intitulée « <b>Promotion des chaînes de valeur ajoutée de la filière sésame</b> », Programme de Développement Agricole, Coopération Burkina Faso, Coopération Allemande au Développement (Février 2008) a été réalisée et confirme les éléments diagnostiqués lors de l'analyse faite par RONGEAD et INADES FORMATION. (Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 5)</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence de ces aspects dans les rapports consultés
<b>CI Cotton</b>	<p>L'évaluation Stabex souligne que globalement l'analyse des problèmes relatifs aux filières a été de qualité voire même très fine, imposant des délais de rédaction des documents de mise en œuvre ou des outils, souvent longs. Un certain perfectionnisme a pris le pas sur l'opérationnel. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>A titre d'exemple, il existe une multitude d'études, de stratégies ou de projets concernant le secteur cotonnier ivoirien :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Projet de relance de la culture attelée dans le bassin cotonnier de CI</li> <li>▪ Adoption d'une nouvelle stratégie pour la relance du secteur coton</li> <li>▪ Plan d'action pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de relance de la filière coton</li> <li>▪ Elaboration d'une stratégie sectorielle coton : perspectives à moyen et long termes</li> <li>▪ Faisabilité d'une nouvelle organisation du financement de l'approvisionnement en intrants de la filière coton en Côte d'Ivoire</li> <li>▪ Diagnostic des prélèvements obligatoires sur la filière coton et révision du mécanisme de fixation du prix du coton graine</li> </ul>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pas de référence directe aux études chaînes de valeur mais de nombreuses ont été menées dans le secteur agricole :</p> <p>Dans la partie sud du pays, l'étude de l'amélioration du peuplement végétal des cultures</p>



	<p>pérennes paysannes (BDPA, 2006) a permis d'identifier les secteurs de l'hévéa et du palmier à huile, comme des secteurs où il est possible d'accompagner des dynamiques socio-économiques existantes. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.4</i>)</p> <p>L'étude d'une stratégie sectorielle coton (Italtrend 2006) a permis aux acteurs publics et privés de dégager des priorités et d'orienter l'utilisation des fonds européens. De plus, un document de stratégie sectorielle et un plan d'action ont été élaborés par le ministère de l'Agriculture et deux études (sur fonds STABEX) sont en cours pour examiner la réorganisation du financement des intrants et les modalités de gestion du risque sur les prix. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.4</i>)</p> <p>Des études sont également prévues pour l'intervention:</p> <p>Dans le cadre de l'activité A. 1.b. « Appui aux petits Planteurs d'autres cultures paysannes d'exportation » et pour le secteur café-cacao, il est envisagé d'intervenir qu'à travers des appuis institutionnels ponctuels (études ou renforcement des capacités) mais ayant une importance stratégique pour sa restructuration et pour la répartition des revenus en son sein.</p> <p>Pour les cultures de diversification, les appuis institutionnels (études ou renforcement des capacités) pourront être complétés par le renforcement des services apportés aux petits producteurs (vulgarisation agricole, fourniture de matériel végétal amélioré, etc.). (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>)</p>
<b>CI Palm oil Rubber</b>	<p>Pas de référence directe aux études chaînes de valeur mais de nombreuses ont été menées dans le secteur agricole : Dans la partie sud du pays, l'étude de l'amélioration du peuplement végétal des cultures pérennes paysannes (BDPA, 2006) a permis d'identifier les secteurs de l'hévéa et du palmier à huile, comme des secteurs où il est possible d'accompagner des dynamiques socio-économiques existantes. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.4 CI-REH</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Within the PASAPE programme supporting Cameroon in the EPA negotiations, the EC support has helped assess the EPA impacts on specific sectors and commodities (only qualitatively, not quantitatively).</p> <p>On the other hand, Cameroon's banana sector's strategy has been based on competitiveness evaluations which led to the strategic choice to invest in the sector.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 971, MN 938 ; Stratégie de la filière bananière camerounaise pour une amélioration de sa compétitivité, février 1999</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés.</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No because the evaluation highlight the importance to improve the Commission's capacity to measure progress in the area of trade, including reliable trade statistics at the level of CARIFORUM and regular institutional snapshots of progress in implementing the regional trade agreements.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>The production of a coffee sector development strategy accepted by all stakeholders, as well as the determination of coordinated actions for the implementation of said strategy was expected from a short term mission organized within the framework of the Technical Assistance contract.</p> <p>From November 2007 to March 2008, a team integrated by an Expatriate Expert and two National Experts carried out an analysis of the coffee sector. On the basis of this</p>

	<p>analysis, a development strategy was drawn up, which wished to be a consensual development strategy accepted by the whole community, ensuring coordinated actions by the various actors and laying down clear objectives for all of them. (<i>Source : Completion report p.24</i>)</p> <p>Nevertheless, three marketing functions had been decided to be supported by the Project including the provision of computers and software for statistical work on coffee markets and coffee sales and domestic market improvement which included training on domestic marketing system. (<i>Source: Completion report p.22</i>)</p>
<b>MG vanilla coffee cocoa</b>	<p>Seule évidence: des missions d'assistance technique (4) à la mise en œuvre du programme d'intensification et de structuration des principales filières d'exportation de produits agricoles à Madagascar ont été effectuées dans le cadre du programme STABEX (vanille, café, girofle, cacao et poivre)</p> <p><i>Source: Assistance technique à la mise en oeuvre du programme d'intensification et de structuration des principales filières d'exportation de produits agricoles à Madagascar</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence dans les documents consultés, alors que le rapport ROM préconise (i) de n'accorder de l'aide au secteur coton que si celui-ci se concentre sur des producteurs performants ; (2). Identifier et soutenir des voies de financements des intrants pour dynamiser les filières céréalières, notamment le riz ; (iii) sortir de la logique de gestion de la pénurie, se concentrer sur des cultures rentables telles que le riz, avec marchés internes et limitrophes preneurs et rémunérateurs (Monitoring Report, p3).</p> <p><i>Source: ROM/BCS</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>At commodity level, the lack of reliable statistical data is an impediment to an identification of the country's needs, problems and issues. However some donors (e.g. USDA) carry out reviews of value chains and the coffee organisation (UCDA) is producing monthly reports (Source: MN 313).</p>
<b>I.6.1.3</b>	<p>Evidence that a policy dialogue has been encouraged and supported by the Commission on diversification policies, strategies and measures and has involved potential diversifiers (producers, exporters, foreign investors)</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>One of the two axes of the SFA is to encourage diversification and the diversification programmes have been established by the concerned countries along with the EC. There is however no evidence in the SFA evaluation report that producers, exporters and foreign investors were involved in the strategy elaboration.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 4, htspe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA- Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The technical assistance to Cameroon's banana sector also led to discussions on potentially diversifying Cameroon's export markets : the country is considering investing in the development of banana exports to the regional market in Central and</p>

	<p>Western Africa.</p> <p>Le Gvt du Cameroun a présenté une série de programmes de développement rural ou récemment le PAPA. La diversification repose sur les potentialités locales en fonction des zones agro-écologiques. Les projets répondent à des demandes des populations pour l'une ou l'autre production.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913 ; MN 995 ; MN 993 ; Etude sur la diversification des marchés d'exportation de la banane dans la sous-région cemac plus le Nigeria, rapport définitif Décembre 2010</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Annex 8 of the 2008-2013 RSP presents a Joint Communiqué of the Cariforum-EU Troika Summit (held on 17 May 2008). The latter stresses that agricultural productivity and diversification have been discussed: "The Task Force would address immediate, medium and long term issues of climate change, energy and food security and agricultural productivity and diversification, with a view to ameliorate the problems in CARIFORUM states and to contribute to their sustainable development."</p> <p><i>Source: European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, annexes, page 37</i></p> <p>No evidence in ECS</p>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH</b>	<p>One of the EU interventions in Ghana is a programme aiming at improving trade conditions for the country in the framework of the EPA negotiations. One of the targets to be reached by the budget supported programme was to increase the share of the country's non-traditional exports (including cocoa paste, tuna, cocoa butter, shea nuts, pineapples, bananas, etc.).</p> <p>There is no information on whether or not the programme involved discussions with potential diversifiers.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 964</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The EU decentralisation programme supports inter alia civil society engagement in the national dialogue and decisions.</p> <p><i>Source : Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 45</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	Non, pas d'évidence que ces discussions aient impliqué des organisations de producteurs, exportateurs ou investisseurs étrangers.
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence has been reported
<b>I.6.1.4</b>	Stakeholders' views on the value added of the Commission's approach to diversification and of the Technical Assistance provided by the Commission
<b>CM</b>	<p>According to stakeholders from the coffee and cocoa sectors, diversification is not an issue for producers, as they are already diversified. No producer depends solely on these productions for income. They will only tend to these crops if the prices are good.</p> <p>In the banana sector, technical assistance provided by the EC has been considered very</p>

	<p>useful for the sector. However this technical assistance is not really oriented towards diversification ; it's rather on competitiveness of the sector (except recently with a study on the diversification of export destinations).</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913, 993, 995, 991 ; Etude sur la diversification des marchés d'exportation de la banane dans la sous-région cemar plus le Nigeria, rapport définitif Décembre 2010</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Only evidence: "In general the activities supported are used and appreciated by the beneficiaries and have produced significant outputs".</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Malgré quelques difficultés d'ordre administratif dans la gestion des financements Stabex, l'ensemble des intervenants se dit satisfait des approches développées par la CE (peu de commentaires critiques sur ce sujet ont été émis), à l'exception notable de la durée des contrats Stabex qui est trop courte pour assurer une durabilité après l'arrêt des financements.</p> <p>Dans l'instrument Stabex, il a eu des approches différentes: subventions et projets.</p> <p>CNCC souligne les discontinuités entre deux protocoles successifs ont nui à la durabilité et que le problème a persisté avec les appels à proposition. (Source : MN 807). En effet, AIM met en évidence le risque très sérieux sur la durabilité des résultats du projet du fait de la durée limitée de l'intervention. Il faut augmenter la durée de mise en œuvre (5 à 10 ans) pour espérer impacter sur les comportements (les connaissances techniques sont, elles, assez vite assimilées) (Source : MN 806).</p> <p>Toutefois, la Délégation précise qu'il est possible de négocier un nouveau protocole spécifique avec les mêmes agences d'exécution et une formulation légèrement changée. (Source : MN 801).</p> <p>Concernant l'approche, seule la Délégation semble remettre en question ses approches et réfléchit à la manière d'orienter ses soutiens (appuis sectoriels, approches filières, appui budgétaire) étant donné, de manière générale et à l'exception de quelques interventions, l'évaluation très négative des interventions passées en termes d'efficacité et de durabilité. (Source : <i>débriefing</i>)</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Most of the stakeholders seem to be (very much) satisfied with the EC approach and the technical assistance. Indeed, few negative comments have been received except regarding the EU procedures that are viewed as heavy (it takes up to 6 months before money is disbursed) (Source: MN 306). Indeed, other stakeholders highlight that the EC has to cope with a heavy bureaucracy but they are doing well (Source: MN 309).</p> <p>Generally speaking, the EC support seems to be appreciated. Some stakeholders highlight the fact that Uganda doesn't respect the Maputo declaration: (10% of GDP should be allocated to agricultural research). This is not respected by most African governments except Burkina Faso. Uganda is indeed far away (around 5%). In this context, these stakeholders are very thankful for EC support to research and extension commitments (Sources: MN 306 and 310).</p>
<b>J.6.2</b>	<p><b><i>The Commission has encouraged the diversification of sources of livelihoods of traditional agricultural commodity producers through the adoption and implementation of rural growth strategies</i></b></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>For countries that were not capable of sustainably increasing competitiveness of banana production for export, the SFA funded diversification programmes agreed by the</p>

	<p>concerned countries and the EC. These diversification programmes were implemented mainly in the Windward Islands</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 4, btspe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	Pas d'évidence trouvée à ce sujet au Burkina Faso
<b>CM</b>	<p>The EC has been very involved over the past twenty years. Stabex funds from the 1990s have been used until recently in rural development programmes which have led to diversification of production and of sources of livelihoods in coffee producing regions. More recently, the EC did not wish to support rural development, and support was brought through different channels. A recent study on the banana budget line considered the diversification of export destinations. A newly signed programme will support diversification in the cotton producing region.</p> <p>The causes of low food production are generally well known and are mostly due to several structural factors. Stakeholders believe that more support should be brought to cope with infrastructural issues which hamper diversification and growth (although support is already brought in this sector as well). As for everything else, coordination is ensured to a certain extent (through multi-donor working groups) but it remains an issue as each donor has a different approach.</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents do not explicitly provide support for diversification. However, they support competitiveness and diversification of goods and services.</p> <p><b>RSP 2003-2007</b></p> <p><u>Focal sector: Intensification of regional integration</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic repositioning: supports the regional business environment and competitive climate, the reinforcement of the capacity of private sector organisations and service providers, competitiveness and diversification.</li> </ul> <p><b>RSP 2008-2013</b></p> <p><u>Focal area: Regional economic integration / cooperation and EPA capacity building:</u> aims at promoting economic growth and increased international competitiveness. One of the expected results is "increased production, diversification and export of goods and services".</p> <p>The first RSP mentioned that the productivity and diversification of the banana sector has been provided through STABEX and the Special Framework of Assistance and that two 9<sup>th</sup> EDF programmes to support the agricultural commodity sectors were under preparation: Support for the Caribbean Rum Industry (€70m) and Support for the Caribbean Rice Industry (€24m). The second RSP highlights that "AMSP include actions to make the sugar industry more competitive, to bring about diversification and to mitigate the social effects of the changes in the trade regime.</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, page 12</i></p> <p><i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, page 33</i></p> <p>Commission's interviewees highlighted that the support to the agricultural commodity sector in the Caribbean has been articulated around support to diversification and competitiveness.</p> <p><b>Banana : 1999-2008:</b></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Easter Caribbean: have stopped to export bananas and try to diversify their economy. They are still active in the banana sector but on “marché de niche” : banana fair trade.</li> <li>▪ Jamaica: Support to diversification and to the banana sector</li> <li>▪ Belize and Suriname: reinforcement of the banana sector</li> </ul> <p><b>Sugar:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Trinidad: leaves the sugar sector</li> <li>▪ Guyana: aims at reinforcing the sector + mitigation support</li> </ul> <p><b>Assessment of results:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Results on the support to diversification are particularly difficult to assess because they depend on the evolution of the economic situation.</li> <li>▪ Rice: results are difficult to point out</li> <li>▪ Bananas: positive support to competitiveness in countries still continuing to produce bananas (Belize, Suriname)</li> <li>▪ Jamaica: approach centred on privatisation and it produced good results</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: MN 700</i></p>
<b>GH overall</b>	<p>No reference to rural growth strategies was found. The EC interventions through the Stabex FMOs of 92-93 provided retrenchment packages and training of laid-off personnel of the Ghana cocoa board (Cocobod). The programmes also looked into diversification out of cocoa.</p> <p>The current programme focuses on increasing competitiveness rather than diversifying.</p>
<b>MG rice</b>	<p>Les projets Stabex et l'initiative banane ont encouragé la diversification des cultures d'exportation comme source de revenu monétaire en appoint aux culture vivrières (riz, manioc).</p> <p>Cette diversification permet de lisser les effets des variations de prix sur un produit particulier et assure par ailleurs des rentrées d'argent réparties sur différentes périodes de l'année.</p> <p>Toutefois, ces résultats sont uniquement observés à un niveau local sans réplique dans d'autres zones. La Délégation considère que les résultats obtenus n'ont pas été à la hauteur des montants financiers engagés.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	Diversification has not been a focus of attention for the Commission in Tanzania.
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The Coffee Farmers Alliance support project has contributed to diversifying and improving the sources of farmers' income that mainly relied on staple crops through the improvement of the productivity, yields and competitiveness of coffee production</p> <p>There is evidence that in the pilot regions NAADS extension services, supported by the EC, led farmers to grow new crops. But this may have not taken place at national level after the roll-over of NAADS.</p>
<b>I.6.2.1</b>	The Commission has encouraged the inclusion of productive sector development strategies in the PRSPs and their discussion with relevant parties (Government, investors, donors)

<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Le programme Stabex 1999 est en parfaite compatibilité avec le cadre politique du Gouvernement puisqu'il participe aux objectifs de celui-ci, à savoir la réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural. Le programme participe à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté, notamment concernant l'axe 3 « Création d'emploi et de richesses par le soutien au monde rural et promotion du secteur privé comme moteur de la croissance » qui vise à renforcer les secteurs productifs afin, notamment, de diversifier l'économie et d'augmenter la transformation des produits agricoles, minéraliers et énergétiques sur place. <i>(Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</i></p> <p>La détermination d'une politique générale dans le DSRP ainsi que de politiques sectorielles (filières et sécurisation foncière) prouve la volonté de l'Etat de conduire une politique favorable aux secteurs agricoles, notamment d'exportation <i>(Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</i></p> <p>Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA- Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. <i>(Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Dans tout le processus de programmation, il y a eu une orientation forte de la CE. Elle a souhaité limiter les secteurs de concentration à 2 (ça au niveau général), elle n'a pas souhaité appuyer le secteur agricole (2000-2010) au niveau spécifique du Cameroun. Le secteur agricole, prioritaire parmi les priorités du Cameroun (à côté des routes et pistes) est entré par la petite porte. Le Commissaire de l'époque a imposé des orientations fortes. <i>Source : MN 402, MN 403</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No such evidence. Moreover, whereas poverty alleviation may not be regarded as the dominant priority in the region, there are no studies on the impact of regional integration and trade policies on poverty issues.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence sur ce sujet même si la Délégation a accompagné l'élaboration du DSRP à travers sa participation à des ateliers. <i>(Source : MN 801).</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La diversification des sources de revenu des agriculteurs était un des objectifs explicites du Plan d'Action Madagascar (MAP) 2007-2012 élaboré sous la présidence Ramalovana.</p> <p>Engagement 4 : Développement Rural</p> <p>Défi 5 : Diversifier les activités agricoles.</p> <p>« Réalité actuelle</p> <p>A Madagascar, la plupart des paysans s'appuient sur une seule culture pour leur subsistance. La faiblesse de la recherche et développement constitue une contrainte à l'expérimentation de la diversification de culture.</p> <p>Objectifs</p> <p>Les producteurs auront l'occasion d'améliorer leur revenu. Le développement des filières potentielles dans chaque région constituera le pilier de sa croissance.</p> <p>Stratégies</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mener des recherches sur les produits potentiels et les opportunités de marchés.</li> <li>2. Encourager la diversification des activités pour des revenus additionnels en vue de</li> </ol>

	<p>réduire la vulnérabilité causée par les fluctuations des prix mondiaux et des mauvaises conditions climatiques.</p> <p>3. Développer et mettre en œuvre une stratégie pour l'agriculture biologique.</p> <p>4. Identifier et développer des spécialisation-filières régionales.</p> <p>5. Promouvoir les activités secondaires : artisanat, écotourisme, etc. »</p> <p><i>Source : Plan d'Action Madagascar 2007-2012</i></p> <p>Mais ce plan, comme les précédents, est resté au stade des proclamations d'intention et le changement de régime a fait qu'il n'est plus même une référence.</p>
<b>MG coffee rice</b>	<p>Bien après les rois de l'Imerina, tous les chefs d'Etat qui se sont succédé au pouvoir à Madagascar ont utilisé le riz pour consolider celui-ci. Ceux qui ont essayé de mettre au second plan le riz ont risqué leur pouvoir car cette céréale divine reste un marqueur culturel. En voici deux exemples : (i) mécontentement de la population de la capitale quand, sous la Deuxième République, pendant les grandes crises de produits de première nécessité, le président Ratsiraka proposa le remplacement du riz par d'autres produits ; (ii) mécontentement aussi quand son prédécesseur le président Tsiranana, a favorisé les cultures d'exportation (dont le café) et introduit d'autres cultures (dont le soja) ; il se rattrapa en concentrant les aides techniques sur la région rizicole du Lac Alaotra.</p> <p><i>M.H.Dabat, Diagnostic du marché du riz à Madagascar en 2004 et début 2005</i></p>
<b>I.6.2.2</b>	<p>The Commission's rural development strategies and interventions have included considerations for diversification of producers' livelihoods and have addressed international marketing issues</p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>There is no information from programming documents and M&amp;E reports of the AAACP programme.</p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP final evaluation report states that the programme achievements are insufficient to address the problem of developing companies' capacities to maintain their small producers. The evaluation therefore recommends to “<i>support crop diversification of producers too small to maintain themselves on the market</i>”. This statement means that crop diversification support has not been brought by the PIP.</p> <p>The interviews confirmed that diversification issues are less relevant than for other productions (e.g. bananas) because smallholder don't devote their entire production to one crop, they usually have a diversified production base. Furthermore, the PIP2 has included support for domestic market access as well as international market access. In the case of certification costs being too high for accessing the international market, the PIP2 doesn't push the producers off the market. It gives them support for domestic production (in compliance with Codex regulations).</p> <p>In terms of addressing the international marketing issues, the PIP aims exactly at that. The programme aimed at adapting production to comply with market requirements in order to maintain ACP market shares. The evaluation does nevertheless note that although certification costs will probably be acceptable for the largest producers, there is a risk for small producers of being evicted from the horticulture export market.</p> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 11 &amp; 87.</i></p> <p><i>MN 958</i></p>



<b>AMSP</b>	<p>In SP countries which decided to continue sugar production, diversification measures consisted in the development of ethanol production or power generation using the by-products of sugarcane processing. At the time of the AMSP programme survey, in 2009, very few of these projects had materialised. In any case they would have implied investments by the sugar mills, which were not eligible to AMSP support.</p> <p>In Fiji, the AMSP programme insisted on diversification of agricultural production, but was not implemented (because of the military coup, which led the EC to suspend its assistance).</p> <p>In the SP countries where the Commission considered (sometimes in contradiction with the Government view) that sugar production could not be made profitable in the new market conditions, the AMSP support focused on the government activities aimed at diversifying the economy and at addressing the social and environmental impacts of phasing out sugarcane and sugar production.</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence dans les documents consultés qu'il y ait eu appui à la diversification.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>L'intervention précise les enjeux liés aux filières anacardes et sésame notamment en termes de diversification et de commerce international. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 4</i>) :</p> <p>Les populations rurales des régions productrices de coton, qui pratiquent également l'agriculture vivrière, sont à la recherche d'activités alternatives génératrices de revenus. Le développement de l'arboriculture paysanne et des cultures annuelles de rente (en pures ou en associations) sont des stratégies de diversification envisageables. Le Burkina Faso possède des zones agro-écologiques favorables à la production de l'anacarde et du sésame, sources de revenus complémentaires pour les populations vulnérables des zones rurales.</p> <p>Ces deux filières font face à des problèmes technico-commerciaux semblables : manque de maîtrise de la qualité, difficulté de commercialisation sur le marché international, manque de services adaptés à des filières peu encadrées, difficulté d'accès aux informations technico-économiques sur le marché.</p> <p>Le sésame présente un potentiel de développement important au Burkina Faso, s'agissant d'une plante peu exigeante, s'intégrant facilement dans les calendriers agricoles et valorisable à l'export. La demande du marché international est en croissance et certains contrats d'achat au Burkina Faso ne sont pas remplis. Toutefois, la méconnaissance des bonnes pratiques agricoles et le manque d'accès aux informations techniques et économiques pénalisent les organisations paysannes productrices de sésame (voir par exemple les contaminations du sésame biologique à la salmonelle en 2005 et les conséquences dramatiques pour la filière burkinabè).</p> <p>L'anacarde (noix de cajou) présente également un potentiel de diversification des revenus intéressant, bien que la production actuelle du Burkina Faso reste faible et peu structurée. Des plantations existent dans les régions cibles de l'action mais les exigences du marché international ne sont pas maîtrisées par les producteurs. L'anacardier est un arbre rustique valorisable économiquement, c'est pourquoi il est considéré comme un arbre adapté au développement économique de zones défavorisées et a été introduit dans les zones de savanes arborées de plusieurs pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest.</p>
<b>CM</b>	According to interviews, nothing is done for diversification from the coffee and cocoa sectors in Cameroon. Projects rather aim at redeveloping the sectors. According to stakeholders from the coffee and cocoa sectors, diversification is not an issue for producers, as they are already diversified. No producer depends solely on these

	<p>productions for income. They will only tend to these crops if the prices are good.</p> <p>The EU support to the banana sector also involves the analysis of possibilities in diversifying export markets (e.g. developing exports to the subregion) and international marketing issues (e.g. branding and labelling)</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913 ; MN 995 ; Etude sur la diversification des marchés d'exportation de la banane dans la sous-région cemas plus le Nigeria, rapport définitif Décembre 2010</i></p> <p>The EU also supported rural development programmes helping the diversification of peri-urban zones and coffee and cocoa producing regions. The programmes included hydraulic projects and plant nurseries.</p> <p>An upcoming programme (the Financing Agreement was signed in 2011) will support (among other projects) the diversification of the cotton-producing region in Northern Cameroon.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 409</i></p> <p>Déjà sur les reliquats des fonds Stabex, des programmes de développement rural ont été financés à travers le pays. Tout récemment, un nouveau programme (PAPA) a été élaboré avec début en 2011 – diversification de la production agricole en zone cotonnière.</p> <p>Le programme Moungo-Nkam était un PDR intégré basé sur une réelle approche participative : c'était une zone de production de café mais où la production a été en partie reconvertie avec la chute des prix. Ce qu'on y a fait est surtout devenu la diversification de production agricole (en plus d'appui au café/cacao). (MN 403).</p> <p><i>Source : MN 402 ; MN 403</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>La diversification des revenus des producteurs n'est pas ciblée par l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde. Selon le cadre logique cependant, l'intervention a visé le développement d'un autre maillon de la filière, la transformation des noix brutes en amandes (ce qui peut être considéré comme une forme de diversification). Les aspects de marketing international tels que la conformité avec les standards de qualité européens ou la certification biologique font partie de l'intervention.</p> <p><i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'intervention commenté</i></p>
<b>CI banana rice</b>	<p>Diversification : réponse mixte</p> <p>Globalement, le programme STABEX a contribué directement ou indirectement à la réalisation de l'objectif de lutte contre la pauvreté, tant à travers une consolidation de certaines filières, dans l'attente d'une éventuelle diversification, que de contributions budgétaires significatives et exceptionnelles à destination des producteurs. Le Stabex 1999 est contributif de la politique sectorielle de la Côte d'Ivoire. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p> <p>En effet, les seuls constats concernant la diversification concernent les filières ananas et rizicole. Pour l'ananas, l'intervention majeure consiste en un projet de diversification et régénération variétale, lié à un retournement de la demande aux conséquences désastreuses, en partenariat avec la profession. Concernant la filière rizicole, la culture de riz irriguée a été développée dans les Régions Centre et Centre Nord pour diversifier les revenus des agriculteurs (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p> <p>International marketing issues : oui</p> <p>Oui. Dans le cadre du PIN 10ème FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des</p>

	actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. ( <i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i> ).
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Dans le cadre du résultat « R1 : La productivité et la compétitivité des cultures paysannes d'exportation sont améliorées », il est dit « Les cultures de diversification telles que l'anacarde offrent des opportunités majeures pour augmenter les revenus en milieu rural » (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>)</p> <p>Dans le cadre de l'activité A.1.b « appui aux petits planteurs d'autres cultures paysannes d'exportation », il pourrait être envisagé d'appuyer d'autres cultures paysannes d'exportation qui contribuent à la diversification des sources de revenus, notamment l'anacarde dans le nord de la Côte d'Ivoire. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.7</i>)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	La diversification est brièvement abordée au niveau des impacts escomptés ( <i>Source : Annexe I p.26</i> ) : l'introduction d'une correcte diversification des cultures, leur rotation, une bonne gestion de la fertilisation du terrain – à travers différents cours de formation, comme la formation aux techniques culturelles ou la formation à la création de micro-projets - pourront amener à un rendement de plus en plus grand en termes aussi bien qualitatifs que quantitatifs.
<b>CR</b>	The Commission's support has had significant impact in a number of areas. In the agricultural sector, the CARTF project has contributed significantly to capacity development in the areas of <b>diversification</b> and quality improvements with the ultimate aim of developing alternative export opportunities in this sector. ( <i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.36</i> ).
<b>CR RUM</b>	<p>Yes, in the agricultural sector, the CARTF (Caribbean Agribusiness Research and Training Fund) project has contributed significantly to capacity development in the areas of diversification and quality improvements with the ultimate aim of developing alternative export opportunities in this sector.</p> <p>In general, the Commission's strategy has promoted integration in supporting the export capacity and the institutional settings in charge of increasing competitiveness and market access, in developing infrastructure of regional interest and in supporting human resource development to strengthen the regional institutional capacity, cohesion and identity.</p> <p>Under the 8th EDF support was provided for both broadening and consolidating the regional initiatives under the 7th EDF and included, among others, a major programme to enhance the competitiveness of the rum sector by making it export-oriented in the segment of branded products. The components include: (1) institutional capacity building to WISPA, (2) marketing and distribution strategies; and (3) plant modernisation and meeting of environmental needs.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	Diversification was not an objective of the Caribbean rum programme.

<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents (diversification is not an objective,...)
<b>GH</b>	Interventions of the Commission in Ghana include a programme aiming (among others) at developing the share of non-traditional exports. The programme was however a programme supporting trade; it did not focus on rural development. <i>Source: MN 964</i>
<b>GH-COC</b>	The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II does not include considerations for diversification of producers' livelihoods. Among the constraints to the cocoa sector identified in the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, the marketing issues are mentioned: The Government of Ghana doesn't allow external cocoa marketing by private companies. The Programme doesn't however aim at changing that situation, but to favour dialogue between the different stakeholders of the Ghana cocoa chain (among which the Government and the private sector). <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal, page 12.</i>
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>KE-PAN</b>	The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme aims precisely at addressing the international marketing issue of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regulations. It aims at facilitating a more effective participation of African countries in the activities of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and the <i>Codex Alimentarius</i> Commission (CAC) during the formulation of international standards on food safety, animal and plant health. The increased participation is supposed to improve compliance of African agricultural exports with international Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regulations. This improvement is, in turn, meant to improve the development of the agricultural sector and help reduce poverty and enhance food security in Africa. <i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 15.</i>
<b>MG</b>	Oui. A travers l'instrument banane et le Stabex, la CE a promu la diversification des revenus en favorisant la diversification des cultures de rente (notamment en renforçant les capacités des producteurs sur les plans productif et qualitatif : formation, matériel végétal,...) et ceci, en complément des cultures vivrières et non en remplacement de ces-dernières (Source : MN 801 et 814). La CE, outre l'amont, est également intervenue sur l'aval de la filière (transformation, commercialisation, organisation de marchés,...) vers laquelle elle a réorienté ses activités afin d'essayer de répondre aux exigences des marchés visés en termes de quantité et de qualité. (Source : MN 801, 814) Toutefois, ces constats sont à tempérer étant donné, de manière générale et à l'exception de quelques interventions, l'évaluation très négative que fait la Délégation des interventions passées en termes d'efficacité et de durabilité (Source : MN 802 et débriefing)
<b>MG</b>	<b>Programme Banane</b> L'appui de l'UE aux filières de diversification dans la région de Tamatave a fait l'objet

	<p>de conventions annuelles signées entre l'UE et le Gouvernement de Madagascar sur le financement de la ligne budgétaire B-21.03.18 « Cadre spécial d'assistance en faveur des Fournisseurs ACP traditionnels de Bananes ». Les ressources financières mises à disposition du Programme au cours des 6 allocations budgétaires ont été de 2.999.063 EUR.</p> <p>Objectif global : Développer les productions horticoles dans l'ancien bassin bananier par une diversification de l'offre en produits frais et transformés sur les marchés locaux et extérieurs.</p> <p>Objectif spécifique : Sécuriser et diversifier l'offre en produits frais et transformés pour fidéliser l'agriculture contractuelle et garantir ainsi un développement des productions horticoles tropicales en paysannat.</p> <p>Résultats attendus :</p> <p>R1 La production est diversifiée par le développement de cultures innovantes en paysannat pour répondre aux besoins des marchés locaux et des professionnels de la transformation.</p> <p>R2 La gamme des produits transformés est diversifiée par la mise au point de nouveaux process et la valorisation de nouveaux produits horticoles.</p> <p>R3 L'accessibilité aux bassins de productions est améliorée</p> <p>R4 Les quantités et la qualité des bananes commercialisées sur les marchés locaux sont améliorées.</p> <p>Effets observés :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Volet production. Des effets sont constatés sur l'accroissement des productions pour des filières de diversification horticole : noni, péjibaye, baie rose, papaye, ananas. Pour l'instant, ces effets réels sont limités car les plantations ne sont pas toutes au stade de production optimum</li> <li>- Volet réhabilitation piste/pont. Des effets marqués sont constatés sur l'accroissement de la circulation.</li> <li>- Volet transformation/conservation. Le volet a mis au point de très nombreux process qui ne produisent pas d'effet en l'absence d'investissement au niveau des opérateurs économiques. Seuls quelques effets très limités sont constatés au niveau du CTCP (expérimentation et prestations de services). Des effets importants sont perceptibles sur le comportement des opérateurs économiques qui s'engagent dans un processus pour l'amélioration de l'hygiène alimentaire et de la qualité.</li> <li>- Volet banane. Les effets du volet banane sur l'amélioration de l'offre de bananes pour les marchés locaux et nationaux sont très limités.</li> <li>- Formation/communication. Les très nombreuses formations ont des effets certains sur l'accroissement des capacités des acteurs.</li> </ul> <p>Enfin, l'exercice de la maîtrise d'œuvre du Programme par le CTHT a considérablement accru ses capacités d'intervention et développé ses domaines de compétence (en particulier en matière de formation, de transformation, d'analyse des produits,...).</p> <p><i>Source : Commission Européenne, Evaluation finale du programme de diversification horticole dans la région de Tamatave</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence dans les documents consultés, mis à part le soutien du PARFC à la filière « coton bio » mais qui résulte au départ d'une réallocation de fonds initialement prévus pour la Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton (MSRC).</p>

<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>TZ</b>	There was no diversification in Tanzania. <i>Source: MN 138</i>
<b>TZ Sugar</b>	<p>In the sugar sector in Tanzania the EU support has not included diversification and international marketing issues: there seems to have been no analysis of diversification within or outside the sugar sector and the production structure is not favourable to the development of a sugar sector competitive at international level. As the sugar industry only serves the domestic market, it does not pretend to compete with more effective sugar exporters on the EU market or on the world market. It might go for regional exports but only on the assumption regional markets would be protected from the competition of cheaper sugar imported from other producing countries.</p> <p>The NAS was elaborated in 2006; in 2011 it is still the Sugar Board that protects the local industry through the issuing of import permits. The sector is thus not yet sufficiently competitive in its own domestic market.</p> <p><i>Source: AMSP Evaluation, MN 673.</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>NAADS appears to have helped farmers to avoid the large declines in farm income that affected most farmers between 2000 and 2004, especially in the pilot NAADS districts. Given the generally limited and mixed impacts observed of NAADS on yields of different crops, this beneficial impact probably was due more to encouraging farmers to diversify into profitable new farming enterprises than to increases in productivity caused by NAADS.</p> <p><i>Source: Quantifying the impact of NAADS in the Uganda livelihoods (2005)</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>NAADS</p> <p>Enterprise Selection: The selection of appropriate crop and livestock enterprises by farmers is a fundamental, and highly important first step in the realisation of GoU's goal of transforming agriculture, as these enterprises define the subject matter of agricultural services, farmer training and marketing programmes which follow. While the NAADS initially offered support for six enterprises, this was reduced to a choice of three in each subcounty, (which raised issues of over-reliance on cash crops, higher risk and lack of sustainability). The programme has now responded to farmers' demands for a more flexible approach based on a 'menu' of options, which includes basic food crops and small-scale livestock and poultry enterprises.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008</i></p>
<b>UG Coffee</b>	<p>Regarding Stabex support, the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project has contributed to diversifying and improving the sources of farmers' income that mainly relied on staple crops through the improvement of the productivity, yields and competitiveness of coffee production (Source: MN 308 and 313).</p> <p>Regarding the EC support to the design by the government of its agricultural sector strategy (PMA-plan for Modernization of Agriculture) adopted in 2001, which aimed at promoting a zonal level enterprises well adapted to the agro-ecological conditions, there is evidence that in the pilot regions NAADS (NAADS-National Agricultural Advisory Services) extension services led farmers to grow new crops. But this may have not taken</p>

	<p>place at national level after the roll-over of NAADS.</p> <p>The EC recently took the decision to withdraw its support to NAADS because the GoU has undertaken to deeply change the nature of the extension service. NAADS is now used to provide farmers with free-of-charge fertilizers and other inputs. Farmers groups at local level are chaired by the head of the ruling party. Etc. (Source: MN 301).</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>The project focuses on coffee production and marketing and does not include any action aimed a diversification.</p> <p>Coffee growers who have obtained UTZ certification with the support of the project shall be able to sell their coffee at a higher price. The projects foresees the conclusion of a buying agreement between certified coffee producers and a coffee exporting company (Ibero Ltd) belonging to a German coffee wholesale trader (Neumann Kaffee Gruppe).</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>The impact assessment of NAAS between 2000 and 2004 notes: “More than 50% of households in NAADS sub-counties had adopted at least one new crop enterprise after 2000, compared to only 32% in of households in non-NAADS sub-counties (Table 13). The average number of new crop enterprises adopted was also significantly higher in the NAADS subcounties (an average of one per household) than in non-NAADS sub-counties (about one per every two households). (...) Income generation/diversification and increased food availability were the two main reasons cited by households for adopting a new enterprise.”</p> <p><i>IFPRI, Assessing NAADS impact, 2007, p. 22-23</i></p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The Producer Organisation Project II financing agreement includes as economic effects of the programme an “increase and diversification of exports of agricultural produce”. Yet no reference to diversification can be found in the monitoring reports of the project.</p> <p><i>Source: Producer Organisation Programme II, Financing Agreement, page 16</i></p>
<b>I.6.2.3</b>	<p>The Commission has commissioned studies of causes of low food production and their possible remedies for Governments to implement enabling environments</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui. Dans le cadre du PIN 10ème FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de renforcer la capacité d'offre et la compétitivité des produits agricoles pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs. Les principales interventions prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande. (Source : <i>Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The banana strategy (which has been supported by the EC) included studies on competitiveness and production conditions, providing reasons why banana production in Cameroon was less efficient than in Latin American countries.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913 ; Stratégie de la filière bananière camerounaise pour une amélioration de sa compétitivité 1999 ; Stratégie actualisée de la filière bananière camerounaise pour une amélioration de sa compétitivité , 2010</i></p> <p>Globalement la problématique est connue. Pas toutes les régions du Cameroun sont concernées par des productions et productivités faibles. Cela dépend en premier lieu des</p>

	zones agro-écologiques. Cette problématique se situe plus dans le Nord et l'extrême Nord. Là c'est lié au facteur climatique (sécheresses), humain (déplacement important de populations dans les années 50-60-) pour la production du coton. Ces populations nombreuses exercent aujourd'hui une pression importante sur l'environnement au sens large. Ailleurs, les faibles productions sont liées à l'absence ou la faible utilisation d'intrants. (MN-403)
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>KEN</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>MG vanilla coffee rice</b>	<p>La Délégation a produit différentes notes d'analyses (assez concises mais précises et qui abordent des éléments concernant le faible niveau de production) :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rapport sur les exportations du secteur agriculture – élevage - pêche en 2009</li> <li>▪ La filière café septembre 2008</li> <li>▪ Note filières, Girofle, juin 2010</li> <li>▪ Note filières, Vanille, juin 2010</li> </ul> <p>Toutefois, la stratégie de développement agricole du gouvernement est actuellement fortement centrée sur les cultures vivrières (riz et manioc). Le développement des cultures d'exportation n'est pas la priorité (Source : MN 805).</p>
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence has been reported.
<b>I.6.2.4</b>	Evidence that support to diversification has been provided in coordination with other donors efforts in this area
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no information from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP final evaluation report states that the programme achievements are insufficient to address the problem of developing companies' capacities to maintain their small producers. The evaluation therefore recommends to "<i>support crop diversification of producers too small to maintain themselves on the market</i>". This statement means that crop diversification support has not been brought by the PIP.</p> <p>The interviews confirmed that diversification issues are less relevant than for other productions (e.g. bananas) because smallholder don't devote their entire production to one crop, they usually have a diversified production base. Furthermore, the PIP2 has included support for domestic market access as well as international market access. In the case of certification costs being too high for accessing the international market, the PIP2 doesn't push the producers off the market. It gives them support for domestic production (in compliance with Codex regulations).</p> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 11.</i> MN 958</p>
<b>BAN</b>	The SFA impact evaluation report states that there has been a coordinated effort to promote Dominica as a tourist destination in Europe and to strengthen the capability of



	<p>rural communities.</p> <p>Beyond that point, the evaluation denotes a lack of coordination of diversification programmes impeding on their capacity to achieve results.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 24 &amp; 38, htspc, 2008.</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Pas de référence à la coordination dans les documents consultés même si des synergies existent :</p> <p>Le MR précise que la logique du projet est clairement orientée vers le marché mais le projet présente de fortes synergies avec d'autres programmes, certains de grande envergure, notamment sur l'anacarde avec l'Initiative pour le Cajou Africain, financé par la Fondation Gates et la coopération allemande GTZ. (<i>Source : MR p. 2</i>).</p> <p>Dans le cadre d'un partenariat entre Inades Formation Burkina et Broederlijk Delen (organisation Belge de solidarité internationale), des actions de mise en place de caisses villageoises sont réalisées auprès des populations ciblées par le projet. C'est dans ce cadre que les bénéficiaires ont manifesté leur volonté d'investir des fonds dans la production de sésame. Ce projet d'appui technique à la filière vient donc renforcer cette action et offre une synergie novatrice entre approche filière et mobilisation endogène des fonds. (<i>Source : Rapport narratif intermédiaire p.8</i>).</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence dans les documents consultés
<b>CI</b>	<p><u>Diversification</u> : peu d'évidence à l'exception des filières ananas et rizicoles (voir I.6.2.2).</p> <p><u>Coordination bailleurs</u></p> <p>Oui même si la CE a été le seul partenaire de la communauté internationale qui est resté quasi permanent durant cette période mouvementée. La complémentarité avec les différentes interventions des autres donateurs ou bailleurs de fonds est avérée, des lors que ces partenaires étaient présents (Foncier rural et Réhabilitation des pistes rurales). Jusqu'au retour des IBW en Avril 2008 la Commission européenne est restée le seul bailleur important toujours actif en Cote d'Ivoire avec des financements de plus de 400 M€ pendant la période 2002-2007. Les Etats membres ont réduit considérablement leur présence et leur aide bilatérale mais ils ont appuyé les initiatives de la Commission. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>La diversification des revenus des producteurs n'est pas ciblée par l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde. Selon le cadre logique cependant, l'intervention a visé le développement d'un autre maillon de la filière, la transformation des noix brutes en amandes (ce qui peut être considéré comme une forme de diversification).</p> <p>Concernant la coordination avec d'autres bailleurs de fonds, deux cas de synergie ont été notés dans le cadre logique d'action commenté de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Le PNUD a financé le développement d'activités de 2 des unités</li> <li>▪ Une étude a été réalisée avec l'AFD sur la mise en place d'un dispositif d'accès au crédit pour les unités</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'action commenté</i></p>

<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Les cultures de diversification telles que l'anacarde offrent des opportunités majeures pour augmenter les revenus en milieu rural. Des reformes sont en cours pour améliorer la structuration de ces filières nouvelles, et reçoivent déjà des appuis d'autres bailleurs (Banque Mondiale, USAID, GTZ) mais, en réponse aux sollicitations des acteurs publics et privés, les fonds FLEX pourraient apporter une contribution complémentaire utile pour améliorer la compétitivité de ces secteurs au pour contribuer aux efforts visant à améliorer la productivité des planteurs. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>)</p> <p>Les interactions avec le projet LICUS (Hévéa, Banque Mondiale) sont très riches : i) retour d'expériences ; ii) approvisionnement en bois de greffe pour les PEPMV du PA4P (<i>Source : MR p.2</i>)</p> <p>En ce qui concerne les appuis aux secteurs du palmier et d'hévéa, la Délégation a engagé une concertation avec la Coopération technique allemande (GTZ) qui conduit différents projets de développement rural et de protection environnementale dans le sud-ouest du pays (Programme de développement économique en milieu rural et Programme de conservation du Parc National de Tai). Dans le cadre de ce projet, il est ici prévu d'établir un partenariat formalisé entre la CE et la GTZ. (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4</i>)</p>
<b>CI Palm oil</b>	<p>En ce qui concerne les appuis aux secteurs du <b>palmier et d'hévéa</b>, la Délégation a engagé une concertation avec la Coopération technique allemande (GTZ) qui conduit différents projets de développement rural et de protection environnementale dans le sud-ouest du pays (Programme de développement économique en milieu rural et Programme de conservation du Parc National de Tai). Dans le cadre de ce projet, il est ici prévu d'établir un partenariat formalisé entre la CE et la GTZ. (<i>Source : Annexe II FA p.4 CI-REH</i>)</p>
<b>CI Rubber</b>	<p>Les interactions avec le projet LICUS (Hévéa, Banque Mondiale) sont très riches : i) retour d'expériences ; ii) approvisionnement en bois de greffe pour les PEPMV du PA4P (<i>Source : MR p.2 CI-REH</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Regarding diversification of Cameroon's banana sector (i.e. diversification of export destinations), the EC appears to be the only active donor.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913</i></p> <p>Comme déjà dit, il y a une concertation entre Bailleurs de Fonds, pas nécessairement une coordination en ce qui concerne l'agriculture et le développement rural – modes d'interventions différent aussi en ce qui concerne les appuis à la « diversification » (qui concerne en fait toutes les autres spéculations également appuyées par les Bailleurs de Fonds) (<i>MN – 411</i>)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés.</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>The evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member States) so as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions. However, genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions.</p> <p>Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was</p>

	<p>in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	Diversification was not an objective of the Caribbean rum programme.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents (diversification is not an objective,...)
<b>GH</b>	<p>The support to Cocobod under FMO 1992-1993 included assistance in the cocobod's retrenchment programme: the Commission funded retrenchment packages as well as retraining of workers laid-off (about 10,000 people; over the course of the restructuring of Cocobod staff dwindled from more than 100,000 in the 1980s to less than 5,000 in 1998). It also looked into diversification out of cocoa.</p> <p><i>Source: FMO 1992-1993</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II does not include considerations for diversification.
<b>KE-PAN</b>	The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) does not aim at diversifying production.
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>MG</b>	Non car si de manière générale, il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs, il a y eu très peu ou rien en matière de coordination de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris ( <i>Source : MN 805</i> ).
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	Diversification is not a stated objective of the programme.
<b>ML-COT</b>	Le rapport ROM indique que le programme de soutien à la filière "coton bio" a été sollicité en février 2009. Les travaux sont exécutés à travers l'ONG nationale Mouvement Biologique au Mali (MOBIOM). Le soutien à la filière "coton bio" a pu démarrer rapidement grâce à un préfinancement de l'ONG suisse HELVETAS (BCS, §2). <i>Source : ROM/BCS</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. The EC with other donors supported the design by the government of its agricultural sector strategy (PMA-plan for Modernization of Agriculture) adopted in 2001. (Source: MN 301)</p> <p>Moreover, there is a strong coordination of donors (including MS) through:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Agriculture Sector Working Group chaired by the government</li> <li>• The Agriculture Donors Group</li> </ul> <p>Indeed, donors report on their activity in the framework of the donors working group. Lessons learned and dissemination of information between donors: coordination and complementation needs are identified at the project level and also at the strategic level: all levels of coordination are covered. Besides the multi-donor support to the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture), donor coordination results in some sort of task and geographical sharing between donors by regions and by nature of intervention. (Sources: MN 301, 309 and 313).</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>NAADS</p> <p>Enterprise Selection: The selection of appropriate crop and livestock enterprises by farmers is a fundamental, and highly important first step in the realisation of GoU's goal of transforming agriculture, as these enterprises define the subject matter of agricultural services, farmer training and marketing programmes which follow. While the NAADS initially offered support for six enterprises, this was reduced to a choice of three in each subcounty, (which raised issues of over-reliance on cash crops, higher risk and lack of sustainability). The programme has now responded to farmers' demands for a more flexible approach based on a 'menu' of options, which includes basic food crops and small-scale livestock and poultry enterprises.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of NAADS, Final Report, 2008</i></p>
<b>UG cotton</b>	<p>In regard to the AAACP, below is the feedback</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The AAACP "Gap and IPPM for Ugandan Horticultural sector (1.ESA.A15)" was meant to provide a follow-up to the above activities that FAO supported in on GAP (Goog Agricultural Practices) in Uganda. However, after consideration of the institutional dynamics in the hortic sector in Uganda, the weak response from stakeholders to our solicitations, as well as funding pressure for other pressing activities under AAACP, it was decided to cancel this activity (which was very small, anyway). So no activity took place.</li> <li>• As for the second activity, "Facilitating market linkages between organic cotton producers and the fashion industry (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) 1.ESA.A12", we are yet to get any information on its implementation.</li> <li>• The third activity is an EAC regional level impact assessment study which is currently ongoing. The purpose of the mission was information collection, so no on the ground implementation activities. We expect a draft of the impact assessment next week and a final version that can be shared later in July.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: FAO response to a request for information on the AAACP programme</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The study established that there was generally a very low level of awareness about GAP among the stakeholders, especially the farmers. The level of infrastructure to support GAP both at the farmer and exporter level was still rudimentary. Despite efforts and trainings initiated towards GAP implementation at national level, there was no organized and coordinated effort within the public and private sectors to effect GAP implementation. It also revealed that the stakeholders were both pro-domestic and export market as far as the focus for a national GAP was concerned. The bigger percentage however, preferred a domestic market, arguing that the current absence of concrete initiatives addressing GAP and the low level of infrastructure development would make the industry unable to comply in the export market given strict</p>

	<p>requirements such as EurepGAP. However, those in favor of export market focus believed that the anticipated benefits from export market could be an incentive for the private sector to invest in GAP development.</p> <p>In the end, there was general agreement among stakeholders that development and implementation of GAP should initially target fruits and vegetables and should later expand to involve other produce, as experience is acquired and resources are made available. Areas such as flowers, fish and coffee will later be required to be integrated into the overall national GAP.</p> <p><i>Source: Development and Implementation of a National Good Agriculture Practice in Uganda (2007)</i></p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project focuses on coffee production and marketing and does not include any action aimed a diversification.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>Some 20 donors, the major ones being the European Union, Denmark, Ireland, IFAD, African Development Bank, United Kingdom and the World Bank support implementation of the PMA using various aid modalities such as general budget support, earmarked budget support, sector programme support and project aid.</p> <p>“During the last 3-4 years coordination amongst the development partners has matured, with the establishment and continued active operation of a PMA coordination group, as well as through the joint reviews and basket funding mechanisms that have been put in place”.</p> <p><i>TAPs of the SBS</i></p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The Producer Organisation Project II financing agreement includes as economic effects of the programme an “increase and diversification of exports of agricultural produce”. Yet no reference to diversification can be found in the monitoring reports of the project.</p> <p><i>Source: Producer Organisation Programme II, Financing Agreement, page 16</i></p>
<b>I.6.2.5</b>	Stakeholders' views on implication of the Commission in diversification and growth initiatives
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>La diversification a été mise de côté dans le programme AAACP avec la mise en œuvre de la phase 2 (suite au MTR) puisque le programme s’est recentré davantage sur les secteurs agricoles d’exportation de base.</p> <p>Par ailleurs, quand diversification il y a, on est plutôt dans une diversification des risques qu’une diversification pour réduire la dépendance aux produits agricoles de base.</p> <p><i>Source : Meeting note reference number MN 641</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	Since the PIP did not aim at stimulating growth nor diversification but rather at maintaining ACP market shares in EU fruit & vegetable imports, there is no relevant information for this indicator.
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>In Barbados, where the Government intended to maintain sugar production as a subsidised sector, and in Jamaica, where the Government’s strategy was to privatise the sugar mills, governments regretted the EC decision to exclude support to the sugar sector from the AMSP programme.</p> <p>In St Kitts &amp; Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago, focus of the AMSP programme on</p>

	diversification outside sugar was consistent with the Government strategy.
<b>BAN</b>	There are no stakeholders' views expressed in the SFA impact evaluation report.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés
<b>CM</b>	According to interviewees, diversification is not an issue for coffee and cocoa producers in Cameroon as their farms are already diversified. Farmers will tend to their crops or not depending on the prices. Their view on growth initiatives for these sectors are favourable, but they believe that other issues need to be addressed as well (such as feeder roads, electrification...) in order to benefit fully from the gains in agriculture. <i>Source : MN 913</i>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	Diversification was not an objective of the Caribbean rum programme.
<b>CR</b>	Only evidence: "In general the activities supported are used and appreciated by the beneficiaries and have produced significant outputs". <i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents
<b>GH-Cocoa</b>	According to an interview with a farmer organisation, the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme – Phase II focused on increasing cocoa production, not on diversifying. However, the new plantations set up through the programme also include other crops (cassava, plantains), which ensure a diversity of production throughout the first years. The question of diversification will have to be analysed in the upcoming years, once the cocoa trees have outgrown the other crops. <i>Source: MN 943</i>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) does not aim at diversifying production. There are no views available in the programme documents on the implication of the Commission in growth initiatives.
<b>MG</b>	Voir I.6.1.4
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	Diversification is not a stated objective of the programme.
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.

<b>UG</b>	See I.6.1.4
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project focuses on coffee production and marketing and does not include any action aimed a diversification.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	No information found. But it must be reminded that the EC SBS supported the research and extension components of the PMA, and not directly diversification or growth.
<b>VU-POP</b>	No such views can be found in the project's documents.
<b>J.6.3</b>	<i>The Commission has facilitated knowledge of and access to support instruments for private sector development</i>
<b>BF</b>	Pas d'éléments trouvés à ce sujet au Burkina Faso
<b>CM</b>	The EC facilitates PSD instruments in Cameroon through several channels : the PASAPE programme aims at upgrading the country's private sector in the framework of EPA negotiations ; the EIB, CDE and ProInvest are active in the country (including for agro-industries and infrastructure). However few stakeholders knew of their activities. No evidence was found on the EC value added and on the effects outlasting EC support.
<b>GH overall</b>	The EC is involved in Ghana's private sector working group. It is available to provide information on support instruments, but nothing is specifically set up to facilitate it.
<b>MG</b>	Le Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave (CTHT) avait vocation à susciter des investissements privés dans la transformation-valorisation des produits d'exportation. Ces investissements ne se sont pas concrétisés du fait de la situation (crise politique) et/ou parce que le CTHT lui-même était en concurrence avec les investisseurs privés potentiels.  L'activité de collecte des produits agricoles d'exportation a été professionnalisée avec l'organisation des marchés promue par les projets Stabex. Mais cela s'est fait à un niveau local et cet acquis reste fragile s'il n'y a pas implication des autorités locales.
<b>TZ</b>	No evidence was found that the Commission participated in PSD initiatives or policy discussions. No support is given in this area and the GBS does not include indicators in PSD. This is the more remarkable that the cash crop sectors (and in particular sugar, tea and to some extend coffee) are dominated by the private sector and that the crop boards are very much private sector oriented, with Government support only now coming in at the end of Stabex in tea and coffee to pay for the research institutes' staff's salaries.
<b>UG</b>	EC is considering the establishment of an equity fund, which would invest in SMEs active in the processing and marketing of agricultural products.  Danida has established a trust fund whose revenues shall be used to support the development of agri-businesses (e.g. Though the provision of guarantees to bank loans)
<b>I.6.3.1</b>	Evidence of Commission support to private sector development in CDDCs,

	including via its participation in PSD policy discussion groups
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Even if this support is not part of a diversification around traditional commodities, it is interesting to note that the World Bank, under the All ACP programme, has supported the horticulture private sector (industry) in Ghana through the following activity “1.WST.D02 - Ghana Horticulture Strategic Profile, Phase 1&amp; 2”.</p> <p>The overall objective of the proposed study was to provide the Ghanaian stakeholders in the industry with a common strategic vision for the horticulture cluster development over a 10 year period.</p> <p>The study in itself had been completed back in the first half of 2010, but the editing of this substantial piece of work in order to publish it took longer than expected.</p> <p>The editing was completed by consultant and author Peter Jaeger early in the period under review, but additional delays were incurred due to the initial printer selected by the Bank going bankrupt. A new printer had to be selected and briefed about this contract before work could resume. The printing of the book has now started and should be completed by the end of July.</p> <p><i>Source: WB-Sustainable Development Network (WB-SDN), 6 Monthly progress report of the All ACP programme for the period from January to June 2011 and Programme operational activity report, 28 July 2011</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	Private Sector Development was not an issue for the AMSP programme. Sugarcane is either produced by the sugar mills themselves on large estates, or by smallholders closely dependent on the sugar mills to which they deliver sugarcane. There is no room for the development of private operators.
<b>BF</b>	<p>The EC doesn't intervene in the private sector development of Burkina Faso. The 2001-2007 CSP/NIP mentioned that private sector development could be retrieved from the EC's intervention sectors because it didn't have any comparative advantage for private sector development and that other major donors also supported the private sector (e.g. the World Bank and France).</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 71 &amp; 72</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	L'action proposée vise l'appui aux initiatives privées de valorisation des ressources agricoles (transformation primaire, conditionnement) et de micro-entreprises de formation et conseil en milieu rural. ( <i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 4.</i> )
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL).</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Réponse mixte</p> <p>Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture.</p>



	<p>En outre, l'évaluation indique que le programme Stabex participe également à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté notamment concernant l'axe 3 « Création d'emploi et de richesses par le soutien au monde rural et promotion du secteur privé comme moteur de la croissance » qui vise à renforcer les secteurs productifs afin, notamment, de diversifier l'économie et d'augmenter la transformation des produits agricoles, minéraliers et énergétiques sur place. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p> <p>Toutefois, l'évaluation souligne que bien que la participation effective de toutes les parties prenantes et des groupes cible, notamment celle du secteur privé, a été recherchée, elle n'est assurée que dans le secteur du coton bien que le programme ait su détecter les bons partenaires et bénéficiaires. Le programme Stabex 1999, certainement en raison du contexte particulier de la Côte d'Ivoire, ne dégage pas, à l'instar d'autres pays, un « état d'esprit Stabex », spécifique à ce type de programme associant le secteur public au secteur privé pour trouver, au mieux des solutions aux problèmes quotidiens de gestion, liés à des enjeux économiques. Le programme reste très marqué par l'empreinte d'un relationnel traditionnel entre le bailleur de fonds et les bénéficiaires, dans lequel le dialogue est très hiérarchisé. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<p><b>CI</b></p>	<p>Peu d'informations sur secteur privé dans secteur agricole dans les CSP.</p> <p>Les projets régionaux PARI-II et PARI secteur Privé. Le bilan de la mise en œuvre du PARI secteur Privé est satisfaisant. Les activités ont consisté en la formation d'agents compétents, l'équipement et l'accompagnement à l'accréditation de laboratoires, la mise en place d'un système de qualité au sein des entreprises et des laboratoires sélectionnés, la proposition d'un système national de certification, et un projet d'élaboration d'une loi cadre sur la protection des consommateurs. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.22</i>).</p> <p>Les interventions du secteur hors concentration « appui et amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles » s'orienteront sur la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion et d'atténuation des variations de prix, le renforcement des outils d'aide à la décision, l'appui à la structuration institutionnelle du secteur agricole, l'amélioration de l'accès aux marchés extérieurs en renforçant aux niveaux public et privé la promotion de la qualité et le respect des standards sanitaires, sociaux et environnementaux en vigueur sur les marchés d'exportation, notamment celui de l'Union européenne. Les filières fruitières continueront d'être soutenues par la ligne budgétaire banane tandis que l'amélioration de la compétitivité de la filière sucre le sera au travers de la ligne budgétaire sucre. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31</i>).</p> <p>L'appui aux acteurs non étatiques est indispensable dans le cadre de la coopération avec la Commission européenne. Une assistance financière et technique appropriée permettra à ces acteurs de soutenir la Côte d'Ivoire en tant que facteurs dynamiques de croissance et de développement. La coopération visera à aider le secteur privé, les organisations non gouvernementales nationales et la société civile au sens large à promouvoir l'appropriation locale à tous les niveaux du processus de développement afin d'assurer une exécution adéquate, rapide et efficace des projets et programmes. Ce qui permettra notamment d'améliorer de manière significative la capacité d'analyse, de prévision, de formulation et l'impact des services publics dans les domaines économique, social et environnemental. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.32</i>).</p> <p>Appui à l'intégration régionale et à l'APE. Les objectifs spécifiques poursuivis doivent concourir au développement du secteur privé par une zone de libre échange et une union douanière effective, un approfondissement du marché commun, la création d'un environnement des affaires favorable, capable d'attirer les</p>

	investissements productifs et de stimuler l'emploi. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.39).
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pas de référence directe au soutien du secteur privé dans les documents consultés</p> <p>Il est succinctement indiqué que dans le cadre de l'activité A.1.b « appui aux petits planteurs d'autres cultures paysannes d'exportation », il s'agira de répondre aux initiatives des acteurs publics et privés visant à améliorer la productivité des petites exploitations paysannes ou la compétitivité des filières agricoles paysannes d'exportation (Source : Rider FA p.7)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The EC support in Cameroon through the PASAPE programme (helping the country in the framework of the EPAs) aims among others at upgrading the capacities of the country's private sector (by improving the business environment and facilitating material and non-material investments).</p> <p>Source : MN 938</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The second CSP foresees support under the second focal area (Trade and regional integration) to competitiveness through the reinforcement of productive and export capacities. The support aims at increasing economic governance, consolidating the regional single market and supporting economic diversification through increased competitiveness, both for industrial and agricultural products. This will include PSD support, in particular: upgrading of enterprises and strengthening of productive and export capacities (mainly agricultural ones), promotion of quality aspects to increase productivity, promotion of a more favourable business environment, and support to trade facilitation.</p> <p>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED. République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 22-23</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés.
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>This intervention directly supported private sector development. It aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the economy and at facilitating its insertion into the regional and world economy through the implementation of the EU-Central Africa EPA. It should be noted that the various activities do not explicitly target agricultural commodities.</p> <p>The mid-term evaluation notes that the programme has not achieved any of the expected results so far (implementation lasts until 2012). It could however deliver the following activities: training, conduct of studies on the diagnostic of the national competitiveness and on the elaboration of a national competitiveness strategy, improvements of the web site of the Comité National de Suivi et de Coordination des Négociations de l'APE (CNSCN APE).</p> <p>In terms of coordination, the financing proposal notes that the trade and economic group will be the framework of reference for donor coordination on the PASAPAE. The mid-term evaluation also notes the existence of this group, set up in 2007 at the request of the EUD, and from which the EUD is chef de file since 2009. "La coordination entre les bailleurs de fonds est structurée autour du Comité Multi Bailleurs (CMB), initié en 2003 et qui réunit une vingtaine de partenaires techniques et financiers. Le CMB est organisé en en groupes sectoriels et thématiques. Un comité chargé des questions d'aide au commerce et développement du secteur privé (GEC</p>

	<p>pour groupe « économique et commerce ») a été mis en place début 2007 à l'initiative de la DUE qui en est maintenant le chef de file depuis le début de l'année 2009 ».</p> <p><i>Sources: Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p> <p><i>Commission européenne, Proposition de financement n°9 ACP CM 18</i></p> <p><i>Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Commission strategy documents for the Caribbean region aimed at reinforcing regional integration and supported PSD.</p> <p><b>RSP 2003-2007</b></p> <p><u>Focal sector: Intensification of regional integration</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic repositioning: supports the regional business environment and competitive climate, the reinforcement of the capacity of private sector organisations and service providers, competitiveness and diversification.</li> </ul> <p><b>RSP 2008-2013</b></p> <p><u>Focal area: Regional economic integration / cooperation and EPA capacity building:</u> aims at promoting economic growth and increased international competitiveness.</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i></p> <p><i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>The support for the programming unit of the CARIFORUM secretariat has created a technical capacity and permitted development of regional mechanisms for consultation and programming. But important weaknesses have been observed in local capacities for consulting and dealing with the private sector. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. viii</i>).</p> <p>It is recommended that more systematic and continuous consultations be organised between the Commission Services and CARIFORUM, on the one hand, and the private sector on the other. One possible approach could be the development, under the newly unified CARICOM/ CARIFORUM secretariat, of a special function of interface with private sector operators; the function could be conducted jointly with the CNRM, where the interests of the private sector also need to be well articulated and identified. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. ix</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No. A weakness of the whole organisational process supporting the management and implementation of the Commission's interventions has been often raised by the representative of private sector institutions: it is ill-adapted to consulting and working with the private sector. Identification of needs has largely taken place under a dialogue conducted by civil servants or representatives of public institutions on both sides without sufficient incorporation of the views of the private sector. It resulted in a strong emphasis on strengthening and supporting institutions rather than addressing the needs of the final beneficiaries in the productive sectors. As a result the private sector representatives are generally disappointed with the progress of regional integration whereas they originally had high expectations in that regard.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>

<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The TAPs of the Rum Programme indicated that other EU-ACP schemes such as the European Business Assistance Scheme (EBAS) and the Centre pour le Développement de l'Entreprise (CDE) could be called upon.</p> <p>The programme evaluation report does not make any reference to these potential developments.</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>According to the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, private sector development is one of the EC's focal sectors of support in the region. There are however no references to PSD discussion groups.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 57 &amp; 86.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>Efforts and policies of Government to raise private sector investment and growth are described on <i>CSP 2008-2013</i> p. 10, 11, 12.</p> <p>An important element of the Government's strategy is to increase and diversify private sector based exports to finance imports needed for sustaining high economic growth rates and for maintaining macro-economic stability. The CSP proposes to discuss relevant policy matters in a dialogue with Government as part of the substantial provision of DBS or PBS financial support. The Strategy also proposes direct support for private sector development as well for the preservation of Ethiopia's cultural and biological heritage, both of key importance for employment creation, foreign exchange generation and economic growth. Further trade development is essential, and success in the Government's strategy is very much predicated by reducing the costs of exports and imports. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.43</i>).</p> <p>Support in the focal sector I « Transport and regional integration » will consist of two concrete intervention areas: (i) Infrastructure development aimed at strengthening both intra-regional as well as interconnection with the regional market of the Horn of Africa; and (ii) Capacity building for Private Sector Development and Trade in the context of the EC-ESA Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) currently under negotiation and Ethiopia's WTO accession process. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.47</i>).</p> <p>Key components of the EPRDF's Programme included encouragement of the private sector in agriculture, transport and exports with support through land, training, technical advice and credit, as well as the provision of economic and social infrastructure such as schools, health posts, roads and clean water supply. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 6</i>).</p> <p>Private sector development has also been dealt with as a separate issue and not properly integrated into focal sector interventions. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p iii</i>).</p> <p>Recommendation : Change the strategy for promotion of private sector development, using means such as (i) strengthen the use of DBS outcome indicators related to an enabling environment for private sector operations, (ii) capacity building for trade negotiations, (iii) incorporating private sector development as specific elements in focal sector interventions, and (iv) strengthen co-ordination of support from other EU institutions supporting private sector. The separate EDF project support to the private sector could consequently be phased out. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p vi</i>).</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>Project design was many times criticized by the different evaluation/monitoring missions, in particular for not making clear the role of the public intervention in the private sector and not pointing out the division of tasks between the public and</p>

	<p>private sector, and what was expected from private companies.</p> <p>For some observers coffee production, conservation and trading might be managed more and more by private investors and that the public sector should re-define its role and priorities. (<i>Source : Completion report p.29</i>)</p> <p>Indeed, the MR 2008 underlined that no specific links between the project and the private sector representatives were established (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>)</p>
<b>GH</b>	The delegation in Ghana participates in the PSDTWG.
<b>GH</b>	<p>The EU is engaged in Ghana's private sector development strategy, which includes programmes to improve quality and timeliness of PSD-related public services, to improve the legal and regulatory framework for business and enterprises, promote the productivity and diversification of agriculture and rural non-farm growth, etc.</p> <p>The donors engaged in the private sector development strategy are organised in a working group which aims inter alia to avoid duplication and search for complementarities among donors.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 93 &amp; 97</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>MG</b>	<p>Non, aucune évidence concernant l'implication du secteur privé dans des groupes de discussion. De plus, la Délégation souligne qu'une des limites /échecs du programme banane concerne la non éligibilité du secteur privé à l'aide de la CE et que la Délégation s'interroge sur la manière de l'impliquer dans le cadre des approches sectorielles (<i>Source : MN 802</i>).</p> <p>A noter également que le secteur privé n'était pas retenu dans les priorités du 9ème FED mais qu'il était prévu dans le 10ème FED au titre de la préparation de l'APE, avec un focus sur le secteur agro-alimentaire. (<i>Source : MN 802</i>).</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La CE a financé un centre technique (CTHT-Centre technique horticole de Tamatave) dont un des objectifs était de développer/tester des procédés de transformation de produits agricoles avec l'idée que ces procédés seraient repris par des investisseurs privés (<i>Source : MN 804</i>). Mais les investissements privés n'ont pas eu lieu. Raisons : le CTHT semble finalement entrer en concurrence avec le secteur privé (<i>Source : débriefing</i>) ou contexte de la crise politique à Madagascar et de la crise économique mondiale pas favorable à des investissements privés (<i>Source : MN 809</i>).</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La mobilisation du secteur privé et l'internalisation des objectifs d'intégration régionale par l'ensemble des acteurs sont considérées comme prioritaires dans le cadre du MAP, et se trouvent également au coeur du partenariat ACP-UE. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.30</i>).</p> <p>Dans le cadre de la préparation du DSP (Document de Stratégie Pays) 10è FED, lancé en mars 2006, plusieurs consultations sectorielles ont été organisées dont la consultation du secteur privé dans le cadre de l'Atelier National sur la Vanille (septembre 06). (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.65</i>).</p> <p>Le MAP constitue un programme innovant sur une période de cinq ans de 2007 à 2012, articulé autour de huit engagements clés dont « Economie à forte croissance » avec la promotion d'un secteur privé fort et diversifié prospérant dans l'investissement et le commerce nationaux, régionaux et internationaux. (<i>Source : CSP</i></p>

	<p>2008-2013 p.73).</p> <p>Les appuis de la Commission européenne, viseront, en premier lieu, à améliorer les conditions de vie des populations rurales, seront complétés par les interventions financées par la Banque européenne d'investissement en vue d'aider à la promotion de la croissance du secteur privé (<i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.2</i>).</p> <p>Les infrastructures routières et le développement rural ont toujours constitué les deux axes principaux de l'aide européenne à Madagascar, auxquels se sont souvent ajoutés des appuis à la santé, l'éducation, le secteur privé et l'ajustement structurel (<i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.12</i>).</p> <p>Ainsi, afin de contribuer à la viabilité de la politique de développement du secteur rural à Madagascar à travers le PADR, le prochain partenariat interviendra de manière soutenue à trois niveaux dont l'appui au secteur privé agricole, selon deux axes complémentaires (<i>Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.19</i>).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>According to the Donor Complementarity Matrix of the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Mali, EU support is brought to the country in the field of private sector development. There are other donors listed in interventions for private sector development in the matrix (Germany, France, the Netherlands, the World Bank, Switzerland and the USA. There is however no evidence of coordination of the aid (no leader in the area is mentioned in the matrix).</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 89.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>“Le PARFC se base sur le "Cadre stratégique du Développement du Secteur Coton", (CSDSC), (CF annexe 2) de l'Etat malien, assorti du plan d'action "Chronogramme Révisé de Reforme du Secteur Coton" (CRPRSC) (CF annexe 1) dont la mise en oeuvre est confié à la "Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton" (MRSC). Cette feuille de route de la privatisation et de la libéralisation de la filière coton constitue le document de référence unique tant pour le gouvernement que pour les partenaires techniques et financiers”(BCS, §1.1; Monitoring report, p2)</p> <p><i>Sources: ROM/BCS, CF</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The EC is involved in private sector development through the Centre for Development of Enterprises, but its contributions to private sector development were considered limited by evaluations.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 54</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	No such information appears in the CSPs/NIPs
<b>UG</b>	<p>No evidence regarding the inclusion of private sector in PSD policy discussion groups although EC is considering the implementation of an equity fund, which would invest in SMEs active in the processing and marketing of agricultural products. Moreover, Danida (Danish cooperation) has established a trust fund whose revenues shall be used to support the development of agri-businesses (e.g. Through the provision of guarantees to bank loans) (<i>Source: MN 309 and 313</i>).</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>One year ago Danida established a Trust Fund for support to small and medium enterprises in the agriculture and food sector. The Fund is capitalized through several donors: EC, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, The Netherland... It started with USD60 million and should reach USD100 million. The Trust Fund board is Ugandan.</p>

	<p>Resources of the fund are invested in Treasury bonds. The Trust Fund focuses on a limited number of value-chains: maize, coffee, oil seeds, aquaculture and pulses. The Trust Fund has signed partnership agreements with industries and has overtaken a loan guarantee institution.</p> <p>A major hindrance to the development of the agri-business sector is lack of access to finance. The level of interest is very high and banks consider agriculture as a risky business. They prefer to put their money in the real estate sector. Objective of the Trust Fund is to make finance to the agricultural sector attractive to banks. This will allow the Fund to have a leverage effect.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 309)</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>There is no evidence of the Commission participating in PSD policy discussion groups. According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, support to private sector development and economic reconstruction was provided by the EIB (€ 110 million).</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 66</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Private sector development is Vanuatu's Prioritised Action Agenda's first priority. The EC's support through the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF programme is aimed at supporting "economic growth and employment, including human resources development (vocational training and capacity building)" and the second specific objective is to "Assist in the development of an environment conducive to economic growth through improved delivery of and access to services and means of production for key productive sectors".</p> <p>So, although the EC's support is not embedded in the private sector's development policy, the expected result of the EC's aid is to increase private sector growth and employment and therefore reduce poverty and inequality.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 34</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Selon le RSP/RIP de 2008-2013, le premier secteur de soutien de la Commission en Afrique de l'Ouest est l'intégration régionale, qui vise entre autres le développement du secteur privé, par la création d'un environnement attractif et mieux organisé.</p> <p><i>Source : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 58</i></p>
<b>I.6.3.2</b>	Existence of EIB operations in the CDDCs
<b>BAN</b>	<p>According to the SFA impact evaluation report, the EIB's credit programmes have had a complementary activity in African countries.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 19, htspe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Burkina Faso mentions that as of 2005, the EIB counted 10 ongoing loans for a total of 70 million euros. The EIB loans concerned projects in the financial sector, water, electricity, cotton and telecommunications.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 18</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>La situation politique et économique et la persistance d'arriérés de paiement ont conduit la Banque européenne d'investissements à suspendre ses activités en Cote d'Ivoire depuis trois ans. La reprise des activités de la banque en faveur du secteur public ne pourra intervenir qu'après la résorption des arriérés de paiement. En cas de stabilisation de la situation politique, la banque sera disposée à considérer des</p>

	<p>investissements dans le secteur privé. La BEI peut contribuer à la mise en œuvre du présent document de stratégie pays par des opérations financées sur la facilité d'investissement et/ou sur ses ressources propres, conformément aux paragraphes 2. c et 3 de l'annexe Ib de l'accord de partenariat «ACP-CE» portant sur le cadre financier pluriannuel du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED pour la période 2008-2013.</p> <p><i>(Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.33).</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Oui, divers prêts et lignes de crédit sont ouvertes au Cameroun</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2003 : Développement du secteur privé PG II A et B 3 et 25M€ (44 opérations) ;</li> <li>- 2006 : 2 prêts SONEC (électricité) total 66M€</li> <li>- 2007 : Pro PME II prêt de 4M€ (financement PME et AT : 30 opérations)</li> <li>- 2008 prêt de 1<sup>er</sup> rang SPM (Société des Plantations Mbanga) 4,1M€ ;</li> <li>- 2010 : Prêt global pro PME III – ligne de crédit 5M€ ; prêt PHP (source site BEI et rapport)</li> </ul> <p>La CDE est également présente avec un projet dans le coton équitable depuis janvier 2004.</p> <p>Proinvest a également une programme de partenariat UE-ACP de 110 M€ sur 7 ans (2002-2011) dont la mise en œuvre a été confiée au CDE. Son but est de promouvoir les flux d'investissement et de technologies en faveur des entreprises des secteurs clé des ACP.</p> <p>Avec « PROMOTE » en 2008, Proinvest a organisé et financé trois ateliers thématiques à Yaoundé au Cameroun (transports, TIC, accès des PME aux financements) en partenariat avec le CEMAC.</p> <p><i>Source : site CDE et rapport d'activité 2008 (dernier disponible)</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The first CSP (2001-2007) referred to the following EIB operations:</p> <p>« Les interventions de la BEI dans le cadre de la Convention de Lomé IV avaient pour but ces objectifs : le financement partiel de la participation du Cameroun dans un des plus importants projets privés en énergie dans la sous-région, l'oléoduc Tchad-Cameroun, et l'appui à trois sociétés privées dans le domaine de l'agro-industrie (SBM-Bananes, CAMSUCO) et l'industrie (SCIMPOS). Un premier soutien au secteur financier a été aussi donné par l'octroi d'un prêt global à trois banques locales pour le financement des PME privées. »</p> <p>The second CSP (2008-2013) precisely describes the EIB portfolio in Cameroon :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ « Le portefeuille de projets actifs (en cours de remboursement) de la BEI comprend, à ce jour, huit prêts et une prise de participation pour un montant total de 63,2 Mio EUR. De plus, quatre Fonds d'investissements dont la BEI est actionnaire couvrent le Cameroun. Avec un encours de 41,1 Mio EUR à fin 2006, les projets d'infrastructures publiques occupent une place importante et concernent les secteurs de l'énergie et des transports ferroviaires. Au delà de projets terminés comme la modernisation et la réhabilitation du matériel roulant de CAMRAIL (prêt de 12 Mio EUR) ou la construction du pipeline Tchad-Cameroun (prêt de 35,7 Mio EUR), il convient de citer deux nouvelles opérations d'envergure: un appui à AES SONEC pour accroître la production et le transport de l'énergie (participation de la BEI: 65 Mio EUR) et une contribution à la modernisation et à l'extension de l'alimentation en eau potable des centres</li> </ul>



	<p>urbains et péri-urbains du Cameroun pour un montant de 40 Mio EUR.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Le second volet principal des interventions de la BEI concerne l'appui à la réalisation de projets d'investissement du secteur privé, soit directement en faveur d'investissements promus par des sociétés, soit indirectement à travers certaines institutions financières locales pour la réalisation de projets réalisés par les PME (prêts globaux). L'agro-industrie a été le secteur économique auquel la banque a le plus contribué, notamment la production de sucre, les plantations de bananes, de palmiers à huile et d'hévéas. Au titre des prêts globaux, une opération de 3 Mio EUR a été conclue avec PRO-PME Financement SA en faveur d'investissements privés promus par des très petites et petites entreprises camerounaises (mésfinance). L'infrastructure hôtelière (construction d'un hôtel à Douala), l'industrie (accroissement des capacités de production d'ALUCAM) et le secteur financier (prise de participation dans un groupe bancaire camerounais) sont les secteurs qui pourraient bénéficier à court terme de l'appui de la banque.</li> <li>▪ Le Cameroun bénéficie également du programme COOPENER qui soutient les initiatives portant sur la promotion des énergies renouvelables et l'efficacité énergétique dans les pays en développement, notamment dans le cadre de la coopération entre la Communauté et des pays en développement d'Afrique, d'Asie, d'Amérique latine et du Pacifique.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources : Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, page 18</i></p> <p><i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 16-17</i></p>									
<b>CR</b>	<p>The Commission's support to the Caribbean takes the form of a very large portfolio of diverse interventions and instruments: the regional indicative programme, the national indicative programmes, the credit lines, the EIB investment facilities, and so on.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>									
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The TAPs of the Rum Programme noted that the EIB had expressed willingness to consider financing proposals.</p> <p>The programme evaluation report does make any reference to EIB loans.</p>									
<b>CR</b>	<p>The EIB is present in the Caribbean.</p> <p>The 2003-2007 RS underlines that over the period 1975-2001, European Investment Bank operations [Risk capital (from EDF resources) and EIB own resources] amounted to €854m. It further mentions "The European Investment Bank (EIB) has aimed at promoting regional integration through global loans to financial institutions, air traffic development, OECS waste management, venture capital funds and micro finance:"</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="379 1727 1364 1989"> <thead> <tr> <th><i>Loan</i></th> <th><i>Amount</i></th> <th><i>Description</i></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><i>CFSC Global loan II</i></td> <td><i>3 M€</i></td> <td><i>Conditional global loan from risk capital resources (1993), for equity and quasi-equity investments in small- and medium-scale enterprises of the OECS region.</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td><i>Carib Express</i></td> <td><i>4 M€</i></td> <td><i>Conditional loan to Trident Ltd from risk capital resources</i></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<i>Loan</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>CFSC Global loan II</i>	<i>3 M€</i>	<i>Conditional global loan from risk capital resources (1993), for equity and quasi-equity investments in small- and medium-scale enterprises of the OECS region.</i>	<i>Carib Express</i>	<i>4 M€</i>	<i>Conditional loan to Trident Ltd from risk capital resources</i>
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		<i>(1994), for the purpose of creating a regional airline, Carib Express Inc.</i>
<i>Caribbean Development Bank GL II</i>	<i>20 M€</i>	<i>Subsidised loan from own resources and 5 M€ conditional loan from risk capital resources for onlending to and quasi-)investments in small- and medium-scale enterprises in the Caribbean region (1996).</i>
<i>Tiona Fund</i>	<i>2 M€</i>	<i>Contribution to a closed-end venture capital fund of 15 to 20m USD for equity and quasi-equity investments in small- and medium-sized enterprises in the productive sectors of the English-speaking Caribbean (1999). The Fund was promoted and sponsored by the British Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC).</i>
<i>Caribbean Investment Fund (CIF)</i>	<i>up to 10 M€</i>	<i>Limited partnership interest in CIF of up to 10 M€ or 20% of total commitments from risk capital resources (2000). The CIF is a regional venture capital fund, promoted by Caricom for the purpose of promoting private sector enterprises in the Caribbean region by means of equity and quasi-equity investments.</i>
<i>Caribbean Microfinance Ltd (CML):</i>	<i>5 M€</i>	<i>Subordinated, participating loan from risk capital, to strengthen the capital base of Caribbean Microfinance Ltd. (CML), a specialist micro finance subsidiary of Development Finance Ltd (DFL, Trinidad, and thus indirectly support micro enterprises in the southern and eastern Caribbean region.</i>
<p>The 2008-2013 RSP underlines: The EIB's mandate is for project financing, principally through long term lending. Over time, and through the various EU/ACP Conventions the Bank has contributed significantly to the interconnectivity of the Caribbean region through national projects both public and private sector that also have had a significant regional impact. In the present portfolio of the Bank there are around EUR 140 million worth of lending and investments signed which have significant regional integration and regional inter-connectivity attributes including airports, air traffic control, transborder energy transmission, port developments and mobile telecommunications (for details please see annex). In the financial sector, where the Bank has been requested to work towards broadening and deepening of the markets, EIB projects have made a contribution to providing funds on a regional or sub-regional basis - in regional venture capital and investment capital, in microfinance and in global loans to support small and medium sized enterprises. Under the Second Financial Protocol of Cotonou the EIB has developed a pipeline of projects that should ensure continued financing of regional infrastructure and private sector capacities to contribute to the interconnectivity and integration of the region. Significant multiplier benefits would be achieved if this could be aligned with Commission grant funding. The Bank's move towards a regional approach to venture capital, global loan and micro-finance will also continue to be pursued and will be supported by the recently opened Regional Office in Martinique.”</p> <p><i>Sources: CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, page 15</i></p>		

	<p><i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013, page 30</i></p> <p>No more information than in CSP</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP mentions that funds can be allocated via the EDF or the EIB, inter alia for food security and for the sugar accompanying measures.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 55.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>Since 1982 the European Investment Bank has granted 18 loans from EDF resources to Ethiopia in an amount of € 245 million. As a result of the implementation of the debt relief program under the HIPC initiative, the Bank's exposure is currently €152.4 million of which € 87.6 million remain to be disbursed. More recently EIB activity was focused on the implementation of new projects in three basic public infrastructure sectors: power, water and sanitation as well as small and medium enterprises. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.31, 32</i>).</p> <p>The European Investment Bank will continue to operate in all sectors of Ethiopia's economy, notably by promoting the development of key infrastructure projects and supporting investments undertaken by private small and medium-sized enterprises through its partnership with the local banking sector. The EIB aims to play a catalytic role by mobilizing local and foreign resources, and in addition to complementarities with the European Commission grant aid, will seek synergies with the operations and instruments of the EU Member States' bilateral institutions and of multilateral institutions operating in Ethiopia. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.47</i>).</p> <p>The EIB is financing commercial projects including public utilities and other economic infrastructure (other than roads). Emphasis in the SP 1996 and NIP 1997 was on credit lines for Small and Medium sized Enterprises and on major agro-industrial projects as well as mining. It also included power supply, and either air traffic control (SP) or telecommunications (NIP). The CSP 2002 show a slight shift with tourism replacing mining and utilities covering telecommunications, power supply and water supply.</p> <p>EIB funding of utilities infrastructure supplements the NIP and RIP funding quite well and creates complementarity in support for the productive sectors and indirectly private sector development. The same can be said about credit lines. Of the more specific sectors focused on, however, mining and tourism are largely outside the general scope of the Commission strategies and NIPs and do not benefit from any identifiable synergies between the EDF and EIB programmes. The interventions in telecommunications and air traffic control may also help directly in forging integration of the regions within Ethiopia as well as regional integration at the international level. Though complementary to the development strategy implemented through EDF programme, the EIB programme does not in general feature significant links to the remaining strategy with the consequent loss of potential synergies between interventions.</p> <p><i>(Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p17).</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>There is evidence of EIB financing in the energy sector until 2006. The EDF is also mentioned as potential financier in the 2007-2013 financial framework (but the CSP/NIP mentions that this financing depends on availability of funds).</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 42 &amp; 110</i></p>

<b>KE</b>	<p>The 2001-2007 CSP mentions that during the Lome IV period, the EIB has provided €133 million in own resource loans and €83 million in risk capital operations. The major part of this financing has been made within the framework of the Global Private Enterprise (GPE) scheme whereby the EIB makes funds available to the Central Bank of Kenya which are then tapped on a competitive basis by commercial banks and financing institutions to finance small and medium-scale investments in the agro-industrial, horticultural, manufacturing sectors, tourism and associated services (about 250 firms have been supported in this manner, with unit amounts of between €10.000 and €1.5 M.</p> <p>The tea, horticulture and flower-growing sectors are amongst the most dynamic in the Kenyan economy and have long been major areas for EIB activity and almost certainly will continue so.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 23 and Annex 7</i></p> <p>The EIB financing operations in Kenya are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Providing foreign currency loans directly to two large industrial companies, including a soda ash producer, financing capacity expansion and product diversification;</li> <li>▪ Contribution to the capital of a private equity fund operating from Nairobi with a regional scope in order to support the burgeoning investment fund industry in Kenya ;</li> <li>▪ Assisting SME development by way of “global loans” – lines of credit under which commercial and development banks – devoted to investment projects in a wide range of industry and services sectors. The breakdown of allocations for the most recent global loan shows commercial agriculture and horticulture as the largest beneficiary (27 % of projects financed), followed by the food processing industry (13 %), manufacturing (11 %) and tourism (11 %). A significant portion of the funds had been taken up in EUR by companies exporting to Europe, in particular flower producers.</li> <li>▪ Addressing the absence of long-term funds in the Kenyan financial markets resulting from investors’ liquidity preference in an environment of high interest rate volatility and limited financial market depth.</li> <li>▪ Providing two loan agreements (signed in 2005) in the power sector.</li> </ul> <p>The EIB strategy in Kenya will pursue support in favour of the development of private enterprises and infrastructures sectors. Especially, the EIB will include <i>inter alia</i> the commercial agriculture sector in order to foster rural development and food industry and microfinance institutions.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 163-164</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui mais peu d’infos ont été récoltées sur ce sujet. D’autres bailleurs interviennent également sur le secteur privé : AFD, FIDA, BAD (Source: MN 804)</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>A la fin de l’année 2005, le portefeuille de projets actifs (non remboursés) de la BEI comprend 16 prêts et une prise de participation pour un montant total de EUR 117.5m ; de plus trois fonds d’investissement dans lesquels la BEI est actionnaire concernent Madagascar.</p> <p>Les projets d’infrastructures publiques occupent une place importante et concernent les secteurs de l’énergie, de l’eau et des chemins de fer. Au-delà des projets terminés</p>

	<p>tel que la réhabilitation de centrales hydrauliques et l'extension des réseaux d'électricité d'Antananarivo et d'Antsirabe (prêt de 25M€) ainsi que le projet d'eau potable de ces deux villes (prêt de 4M€), il convient de citer le grand projet d'adduction d'eau potable d'Antananarivo, adopté en 2006, dont le coût de 47M€ sera financé à parts égales par un prêt BEI et un don (géré par la BEI) à partir de la Facilité Eau de la Commission européenne.</p> <p>Le deuxième volet principal des interventions de la BEI concerne l'appui à la réalisation de projets d'investissement du secteur privé, soit directement comme dans le domaine de l'aquaculture, soit indirectement à travers les institutions financières locales pour la réalisation d'investissements de PME dans divers secteurs de l'économie malgache, soit enfin via des fonds d'investissement. Au cours des quinze dernières années, le secteur de l'aquaculture est devenu une source de devises et de création d'emplois de plus en plus importante.</p> <p>Il est aussi à mentionner un allègement de la dette sur les prêts gérés par la BEI pour un montant de 10.97 M€. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.73</i>).</p> <p>Egalement des infos dans CSP 2002-2007 p. 14 mais infos redondantes.</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, by the end of 2005, the EIB counted 9 active loans for a signed total of € 38.5 M in sectors such as cotton, electricity, the industry and the financial sector.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 33.</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP mentions that specific activities in the Pacific may be supported by the EIB.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 67</i></p>
<b>SAR</b>	<p>The 2002-2007 RSP/RIP mentions the EIB has a major programme of financing infrastructure in the SADC region, with a current portfolio amounting to € 1.25 m and annual inflows into the region of some € 200 m.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 23</i></p> <p>During the 2000-2008 period the EIB committed a total of € 2,466 m into investments in the SADC region, half of which in South Africa. The contribution was devoted to the development of the productive sector and economic infrastructure.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 35</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The 9<sup>th</sup> EDF includes the "Investment Facility" as financing instrument managed by the EIB, but not part of the Indicative Programme. The EIB identified inter alia the development of agricultural and agro-industrial activities and all the related services and activities, combining both export oriented and import substitution operations, as a specific focus for the Investment Facility.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 61</i></p> <p>The 2008-2013 CSP notes that the EIB has not financed any new investment project in Tanzania under the 9th EDF, although it has continued disbursing under two major 8th EDF projects: the Dar es Salaam Water and Sanitation project and the Songo-Songo gas development. For the future, EIB is looking at bankable investment projects, mainly in the industrial and infrastructure sectors, including energy, water and telecommunications. In addition, EIB will explore ways to support and deepen the local financial services sector and capital markets.</p>

	<p>Within the general development strategy for Tanzania, interventions by the EIB will remain demand-driven. The focus will continue to be the provision of long-term financial resources for sound and productive investments in revenue generating sectors, which will promote private sector development and economic growth. Projects can be promoted by both private and public entities. The EIB could mobilise a wide range of financial instruments from the various risk capital instruments from the Investment Facility or senior loans from its own resources. Detailed appraisal will be carried out in compliance with the rules and procedures of the EIB. Considering the specificities of Tanzania's economic situation as well as the EIB's past experience in the country, the following areas of possible intervention for the EIB have been identified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ provision of direct loans or global loans to local financial intermediaries for on lending to domestic companies, mainly SMEs;</li> <li>▪ support to local financial intermediaries in the form of quasi-equity or guarantees to strengthen and deepen the domestic financial sector and capital market;</li> <li>▪ financing infrastructure projects in the water, telecommunication, power and transport sectors, where the emphasis will be to help increase the efficiency of public utilities and to encourage private sector participation if appropriate;</li> <li>▪ direct funding of large industrial projects, where the EIB can contribute value added in the technical and/or financial structuring of the investment</li> </ul> <p>The EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure aims to support and initiate programmes that facilitate interconnectivity at continental level in transport, communication services, energy, water and sanitation. This grant and loan facility will be implemented through a Trust Fund administered by the EC and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The facility is in its start-up phase after which national allocations will be decided.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 65, 77 &amp; 78</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	No information regarding EIB operations has been collected
<b>UG</b>	<p>According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, support to private sector development and economic reconstruction was provided by the EIB (€ 110 million).</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 66</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>The CSP/NIP mentions the possibility of specific activities funding by the EIB. The EIB also provided a €5 million loan to finance the Bauerfield Airport in Port Vila.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 31 &amp; 63.</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Selon le RSP/RIP de 2008-2013, la BEI a notamment contribué à des prêts au Fonds de Coopération, de Compensation et de Développement de la CEDEAO. Elle a également financé des projets dans des secteurs tels que l'agro-industrie, l'industrie, le tourisme, le transport, les télécommunications et la finance.</p> <p><i>Source : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 109</i></p>
<b>I.6.3.3</b>	Stakeholders views on Commission efforts to communicate the possibilities of funding of private sector development initiatives through EIB and other direct access horizontal instruments of the Commission and EU MS

<b>CM</b>	Stakeholders from the banana industry were satisfied with the way their projects with the EIB were going. They said that the 14 year investment plan they have with the EIB has changed a lot since it started. <i>Source : MN 994</i>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH</b>	The Delegation in Ghana would make the Government (or other parties) aware of the existence of the EIB and other budget lines as a response to specific requests for funding. <i>Source: MN156</i>
<b>MG</b>	La Délégation est peu informée des activités de la BEI et sa capacité à communiquer sur ce sujet est donc très limitée (Source: MN 804).
<b>UG</b>	No information regarding EIB operations has been collected
<b>I.6.3.4</b>	Stakeholders views on Commission efforts to involve the EIB and other direct access horizontal instruments in developing the private sector in country
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	La Délégation est peu informée des activités de la BEI et sa capacité à communiquer sur ce sujet est donc très limitée (Source: MN 804).
<b>UG</b>	No information regarding EIB operations has been collected
<b>I.6.3.5</b>	Stakeholders views on value added of Commission efforts in developing the private sector in CDDCs
<b>CI</b>	<p>Outre ce qui est indiqué à l'I.6.3.1 (voir ci-dessous) qui est tiré de l'évaluation Stabex, aucune autre info n'a été recueillie</p> <p>Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle (stratégie sectorielle) que technique (veille sanitaire OTA) et des opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le Ministère de l'Agriculture.</p> <p>En outre, l'évaluation indique que le programme Stabex participe également à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté notamment concernant l'axe 3 « Création d'emploi et de richesses par le soutien au monde rural et promotion du secteur privé comme moteur de la croissance » qui vise à renforcer les secteurs productifs afin, notamment, de diversifier l'économie et d'augmenter la transformation des produits agricoles, minéraliers et énergétiques sur place. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p> <p>Toutefois, l'évaluation souligne que bien que la participation effective de toutes les parties prenantes et des groupes cible, notamment celle du secteur privé, a été recherchée, elle n'est assurée que dans le secteur du coton bien que le programme ait su détecter les bons partenaires et bénéficiaires. Le programme Stabex 1999, certainement en raison du contexte particulier de la Côte d'Ivoire, ne dégage pas, à l'instar d'autres pays, un « état d'esprit Stabex », spécifique à ce type de programme</p>

	<p>associant le secteur public au secteur privé pour trouver, au mieux des solutions aux problèmes quotidiens de gestion, liés à des enjeux économiques. Le programme reste très marqué par l'empreinte d'un relationnel traditionnel entre le bailleur de fonds et les bénéficiaires, dans lequel le dialogue est très hiérarchisé. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	<p>Si l'implication du secteur privé comme garantie de durabilité après l'arrêt des financements semble être une opinion partagée par l'ensemble des intervenants (<i>Source : MN 806, 814</i>), certaines des initiatives tentant de l'impliquer malgré sa non éligibilité à l'aide de la CE (programme banane) semble engendrer des résultats assez mitigés.</p> <p>A titre d'exemple, la CE finance un centre technique (CTHT-Centre technique horticole de Tamatave) dont les opérateurs privés devraient pouvoir bénéficier des activités qui y sont menées (<i>Source : MN 804</i>) mais cela n'est actuellement pas le cas. Raisons : le CTHT semble finalement entrer en concurrence avec le secteur privé (<i>Source : débriefing</i>) ou contexte de la crise politique pas favorable à des investissements privés (<i>Source : MN 809</i>).</p> <p>Certains projets essaient également d'impliquer le secteur privé (notamment les collecteurs à travers l'organisation des marchés) comme le projet AIM dans l'Est de Madagascar mais cela s'avère être extrêmement complexe notamment dû à la forte réticence des petits collecteurs à intégrer l'organisation de marchés (<i>Source : MN 806</i>). En outre, ce projet AIM est une « exception » (qui par ailleurs est strictement locale et n'est pas répliquée dans d'autres zones) étant donné que la durabilité de tels projets est généralement « nulle » après l'arrêt des financements (<i>Source : MN 802</i>).</p>
<b>UG</b>	No such information is already available because the support to the private sector is not yet implemented. Indeed, EC is considering the implementation of an equity fund, which would invest in SMEs active in the processing and marketing of agricultural products. Moreover, Danida (Danish cooperation) has established a trust fund whose revenues shall be used to support the development of agri-businesses (e.g. Through the provision of guarantees to bank loans) ( <i>Source: MN 309 and 313</i> ).
<b>I.6.3.6</b>	Evidence that achievements in terms of facilitation of support instruments for private sector development outlast Commission support
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no information from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>In terms of services to producers, the PIP final evaluation report estimates that the Programme formed a sufficient number of service providers to ensure adequate external training sessions. However, these sessions still should be organised to be able to offer group sessions for several companies. The evaluation states that a continuation of support is still necessary to ensure that systems can be set up in companies in a sustainable way.</p> <p>The certification system appears to be viable for large companies. In the case of small producers however, the certification costs seem to be too large and create a risk of eviction of the small producers.</p> <p>The expertise services appear to be sustainable in the short run. With market evolutions in the long run, the expertise services should be linked to universities and research centres to ensure a sufficient flexibility.</p>



	<i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 86 &amp; 87.</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	See above I.6.3.1
<b>BAN</b>	No such evidence appears in the SFA impact evaluation report.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence à ce sujet dans les rapports consultés.
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Pour l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde, il n'y a pas de preuve que les projets seront durables à long terme hormis le fait que des guides d'aide à la transformation sont élaborés pour permettre une diffusion de l'information au-delà du soutien de la Commission.</p> <p><i>Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Rapport année 4, page 4</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les documents consultés
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents (private sector support is not an objective,...)
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II monitoring report states that support to producers through training is supposed to outlast Commission support. This statement is based on the assumption that farmers will be able to self-organize and provide continuous training among them.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring report 01, Potential sustainability sheet.</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	A key output of the intervention is the establishment at district level of "Centres de Service Agricoles", managed by NGOs and acting as intermediaries between farmers and private providers of services (credit, extension, etc.). The documents available to date (Financing Agreements and their annexes, Mid-Term evaluation) do not indicate how these centres will be financed once the EC support is over.
<b>MG</b>	Oui, dans un cas (projet AIM-Stabex) qui est une exception: une partie des activités du projet initié par Stabex et l'animateur local continuent sur financement d'une entreprise suisse d'huiles essentielles (Givaudan), ce qui contribue donc à pérenniser ces activités qui sans cela seraient probablement mises en péril. ( <i>Source : MN 806, 814</i> ).
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence à ce sujet dans les rapports consultés. Notons que le rapport ROM souligne le fait qu'avec le 10eme FED, la CE s'extrait de l'apport au secteur coton du Mali, ne laissant que l'AFD comme acteur européen de poids dans la filière coton. L'AFD prévoit de ne plus agir dans une logique principalement sociale, mais de centrer ses activités de support sur les producteurs performants dans une approche

	"secteur privé". (BCS, §5.1). <i>Source: ROM/BCS</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project does not foresee any action aimed at private sector development. Collection, processing and marketing of coffee will be carried out by an established subsidiary ((Ibero Ltd) of a German coffee wholesale trading company.
<b>UG</b>	As noted above EC support to private sector development in the agri-business sector is on the agenda (equity fund) but has not been provided yet. More generally stakeholders point out that the limited duration of Stabex projects puts at risk the sustainability of EC projects. Fortunately the Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project benefited of other donors support once the EC funding was over.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	The NAAS supported by the EC SBS relies on the provision by private providers of subsidised extension services. According to the TAPs of the SBS programme, the EC financial contribution represented 80% of the total costs involved in this activity (government: 15%; local governments: 4%; farmers: 1%). Financing of these costs once the EC support has come to its end is far from being secured.
<b>VU-POP</b>	On the contrary, it seems that several of the support instruments and projects established by the Commission have proven unsustainable. The Revolving Credit Fund (RCF) established by the project supported research as well as training, effective extension services, market support and market information. The RCF is considered to have played a central role for smallholders. However, interest in continuing the RCF beyond the project duration seems low. Some Producer Organisations have survived but many have disappeared and with them, the access for farmers to facilitating instruments (such as the RCF). <i>Source: Producers Organisation Project II Monitoring report 3, effectiveness and sustainability sheets.</i>
<b>J.6.4</b>	<b><i>The income vulnerability of producers, sector and countries has declined as a result of the implementation of diversification strategies</i></b>
<b>BF Coton</b>	On peut noter qu'il y a recherche de diversification des revenus agricoles au sein des exploitations (diversification des spéculations agricoles) à travers les interventions suivantes : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Programme Tous ACP/ FAO: Bonnes pratiques agricoles/ GIPD</li> <li>– ICCO/Helvetas/UNPCB: Programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques qui concerne le développement de la filière coton biologique et équitable.</li> </ul> Si les bénéficiaires relatent des effets positifs de ces appuis sur leurs revenus, il n'est pas possible de les quantifier précisément et de les apprécier sur une durée suffisamment longue.
<b>CM</b>	Difficulties to obtain statistics were encountered in Cameroon : no income statistics could be obtained. Cameroon already has a relatively diversified economy and is one of the rare countries of the region not to be an LDC. There is evidence that some

	regions diversified over the past years (e.g. Moungo Nkam and the coast) where EU support has been significant. Some crops have been declining (coffee and cotton mostly ; although programmes are being launched to revive the coffee sector). At producer level, coffee and cocoa producers are « naturally » diversified and will simply tend (or not) to their crops depending on the price.												
<b>GH overall</b>	Ghana's non-traditional exports have been increasing very significantly over the past 4 years. The incomes have increased in the whole country (including in cocoa producing regions). There is no indication of a reduction of the income vulnerability though; and no link can be established with diversification strategies co-funded by the EU.												
<b>MG vanilla coffee rice</b>	Le développement des cultures d'exportation (café, vanille, girofle, litchi) soutenu localement par les projets Stabex en complément des cultures vivrières (riz, manioc) apporte aux paysans un revenu monétaire qui leur permet si nécessaire d'acheter du riz pendant la période de soudure. Par ailleurs, pratiquer plusieurs cultures d'exportation permet de lisser les effets des variations de prix sur un produit particulier et assure par ailleurs des rentrées d'argent réparties sur différentes périodes de l'année.												
<b>UG coffee</b>	The Coffee Farmers Alliance support project has contributed to diversifying and improving the sources of farmers' income that mainly relied on staple crops through the improvement of the productivity, yields and competitiveness of coffee production. Their vulnerability is thus reduced.  But this positive development is limited to 35,000 farmers out of a total of 1.3 million coffee growers.												
<b>TZ</b>	Not applicable.												
<b>I.6.4.1</b>	CDDCs economies have diversified around traditional commodities (GDP, employment, investment)												
<b>CDDCs</b>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Country</th> <th>Main Agricultural commodity exports in 2001-2003 in % of total exports</th> <th>Main Agricultural commodity exports in 2008-2010 in % of total exports</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Benin</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 57.9%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 2,7%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 6.0%</li> <li>▪ Total: 66.6%</li> </ul> </td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 27,3%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 1,0%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 14.5%</li> <li>▪ Total: 42.8%</li> </ul> </td> </tr> <tr> <td>Burkina</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 66.9%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 5.0%</li> <li>▪ Total: 71.9%</li> </ul> </td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 58.4%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 15.2%</li> <li>▪ Total: 73.6%</li> </ul> </td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cameroon</td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Wood: 15.7%</li> <li>▪ Cocoa: 10.8%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 2.8%</li> <li>▪ Rubber: 1.3%</li> <li>▪ Cotton: 5.3%</li> <li>▪ Coffee: 3.4%</li> <li>▪ Total: 39.3%</li> </ul> </td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Wood: 15.5%</li> <li>▪ Cocoa: 14.9%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 7.5%</li> <li>▪ Rubber: 3.1%</li> <li>▪ Cotton: 1.8%</li> <li>▪ Coffee: 1.7%</li> <li>▪ Total: 44.5%</li> </ul> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Country	Main Agricultural commodity exports in 2001-2003 in % of total exports	Main Agricultural commodity exports in 2008-2010 in % of total exports	Benin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 57.9%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 2,7%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 6.0%</li> <li>▪ Total: 66.6%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 27,3%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 1,0%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 14.5%</li> <li>▪ Total: 42.8%</li> </ul>	Burkina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 66.9%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 5.0%</li> <li>▪ Total: 71.9%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 58.4%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 15.2%</li> <li>▪ Total: 73.6%</li> </ul>	Cameroon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Wood: 15.7%</li> <li>▪ Cocoa: 10.8%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 2.8%</li> <li>▪ Rubber: 1.3%</li> <li>▪ Cotton: 5.3%</li> <li>▪ Coffee: 3.4%</li> <li>▪ Total: 39.3%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Wood: 15.5%</li> <li>▪ Cocoa: 14.9%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 7.5%</li> <li>▪ Rubber: 3.1%</li> <li>▪ Cotton: 1.8%</li> <li>▪ Coffee: 1.7%</li> <li>▪ Total: 44.5%</li> </ul>
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Côte d'Ivoire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cocoa: 39.7%</li> <li>▪ Rubber: 2.1%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 3.8%</li> <li>▪ Wood and articles of wood: 6.0%</li> <li>▪ Total: 51.2%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cocoa: 39.3%</li> <li>▪ Rubber: 5.6%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 3.6%</li> <li>▪ Wood and articles of wood: 2.9%</li> <li>▪ Total: 51.4%</li> </ul>
Ethiopia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Coffee &amp; Tea : 38.1%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed : 10,6%</li> <li>▪ Edible vegetable: 6.9%</li> <li>▪ Live trees, plants, bulbs, roots, cut flowers etc.: 0,1%</li> <li>▪ Total: 55,7%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Coffee &amp; Tea: 30.4%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 17,7%</li> <li>▪ Edible vegetable: 16.7%</li> <li>▪ Live trees, plants, bulbs, roots, cut flowers etc.: 7,9%</li> <li>▪ Total: 72,7%</li> </ul>
Gambia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Fish, crustaceans, molluscs: 15.9%</li> <li>▪ Animal, vegetable fats &amp; oils: 22.4%</li> <li>▪ Oil seeds: 12.2%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 0.9%</li> <li>▪ Total: 51.4%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Fish, crustaceans, molluscs: 14.6%</li> <li>▪ Animal, vegetable fats &amp; oils: 13.1%</li> <li>▪ Oil seeds: 6.7%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 6.3%</li> <li>▪ Total: 40.7%</li> </ul>
Ghana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cocoa: 36.1%</li> <li>▪ Wood and articles of wood: 7.7%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 1.9%</li> <li>▪ Total: 45.7%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cocoa: 51.6%</li> <li>▪ Wood and articles of wood: 5.7%</li> <li>▪ Edible fruits: 4.0%</li> <li>▪ Total: 61.3%</li> </ul>
Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Coffee: 23.8%</li> <li>▪ Cut flowers: 9.1%</li> <li>▪ Edible vegetables: 6.1%</li> <li>▪ Tobacco: 2.3%</li> <li>▪ Total: 41.3%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Coffee: 24.4%</li> <li>▪ Cut flowers: 10.3%</li> <li>▪ Edible vegetables 5.3%</li> <li>▪ Tobacco: 2.8%</li> <li>▪ Total: 42.8%</li> </ul>
Madagascar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Coffee: 27.1%</li> <li>▪ Fish, crustaceans, molluscs: 14.9%</li> <li>▪ Total: 42.0%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Coffee: 8.2%</li> <li>▪ Fish, crustaceans, molluscs: 8.0%</li> <li>▪ Total: 16.2%</li> </ul>
Malawi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Tobacco: 55.7%</li> <li>▪ Coffee: 9.3%</li> <li>▪ Sugar: 15.6%</li> <li>▪ Total: 80.6%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Tobacco: 61.7%</li> <li>▪ Coffee: 6.8%</li> <li>▪ Sugar: 6.2%</li> <li>▪ Total: 74.7%</li> </ul>
Mali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 66.1%</li> <li>▪ Live animals: 15.5%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 0.4%</li> <li>▪ Total: 82.0%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cotton: 42.9%</li> <li>▪ Live animals: 11.9%</li> <li>▪ Oil seed: 4.6%</li> <li>▪ Total: 59.4%</li> </ul>
Sao Tome	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cocoa: 91%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cocoa: 49.1%</li> </ul>
Solomon Islands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Wood and articles of wood: 64.1%</li> <li>▪ Fish, crustaceans, molluscs: 17.8%</li> <li>▪ Animal, vegetable fats &amp; oils: 0.5%</li> <li>▪ Total: 82.4%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Wood and articles of wood: 73.9%</li> <li>▪ Fish, crustaceans, molluscs: 6.9%</li> <li>▪ Animal, vegetable fats &amp; oils: 6.2%</li> <li>▪ Total: 87.0%</li> </ul>

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<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA impact evaluation report states that the Windward Islands have now embedded the prerequisites for diversifications. Yet impacts are yet to be quantified as only half of SFA diversification funding had been disbursed at the time of the evaluation.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 34, htspe, 2008.</i></p>									
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui dans une certaine mesure car Stabex contribue aux objectifs du DSRP. En effet, l'évaluation Stabex indique que le programme Stabex participe à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté notamment concernant l'axe 3 « Création d'emploi et de richesses par le soutien au monde rural et promotion du secteur privé comme moteur de la croissance » qui vise à renforcer les secteurs productifs afin, notamment, de <u>diversifier l'économie et d'augmenter la transformation des produits agricoles</u>, minéraliers et énergétiques sur place. (<i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i>).</p>									
<b>CM</b>	<p>Le Cameroun a déjà au départ une économie relativement diversifiée (taux de dépendance autour de 30%) et ce n'est pas un PMA. Par contre, la production de café qui constituait autrefois des exportations importantes (140000t) a très largement régressé avec la libéralisation de la filière et le déclin des prix. Actuellement, les acteurs de l'interprofession et le Gvt se sont engagés dans un programme de relance de cette culture, ainsi que du cacao. Globalement les divers rapports font état d'une pauvreté croissante en milieu rural à partir de 1985 – milieu années 1990. Au cours de cette période le PIB a chuté de plus de 6%, et il y a eu la chute des cours des produits agricoles de base dont le café et le cacao. (<i>sources : divers rapports</i>)</p> <p>Over 2000-2008, the shares of the main agricultural commodities in agricultural exports have followed different trends. The share of cocoa exports increased at first, to stabilize afterwards. Cotton export share mainly decreased. The share of banana exports dropped till 2002, stagnated until 2006 and went up afterwards. Coffee clearly declined. Rubber has been slowly rising, and the last ones did not undergo major changes.</p>									

	<i>Source : FAOStat</i>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Only evidence: in the agricultural sector, the CARTF (Caribbean Agribusiness Research and Training Fund) project has contributed significantly to capacity development in the areas of diversification and quality improvements <u>with the ultimate aim of developing alternative export opportunities in this sector.</u></p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>Overall, Ghana's non-traditional exports (in US \$) increased by 40% between 2007 and 2010. The exports of cocoa processed products increased by 279% during those same years, mainly through the increase of cocoa paste exports.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Export Promotion Council Database</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Non, l'ensemble des indicateurs économiques semblent s'enfoncer dans le rouge (à vérifier sur base documentaire), ce que confirme la Délégation qui fait également état de l'évaluation très négative des interventions passées en termes d'efficacité et de durabilité, à l'exception de quelques interventions (Source : MN 802 et débriefing)</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>No such evidence. There are exports' increases but not as much as expected although statistics might be misleading for they do not capture most of the regional trade. However, the transformation of the sector is quite disappointing: agriculture was one of the less performing sectors over the last ten years despite the potential of the country (Source: MN 301).</p>
<b>I.6.4.2</b>	Evidence that income levels of producers have stabilised and increased in geographical zones where diversification strategies have been implemented
<b>CI</b>	<p><u>Diversification</u> : peu d'évidence de mise en œuvre de stratégies de diversification à l'exception des filières ananas et rizicoles (voir I.6.2.2).</p> <p><u>Augmentation revenus</u> : non (de manière générale).</p> <p><u>Secteur coton</u></p> <p>Bien que l'objectif spécifique initial est l'augmentation du revenu des exploitations agricoles par l'amélioration du fonctionnement des filières d'exportation ou de substitution aux importations, le Stabex a contribué au sauvetage du <u>secteur coton</u> et des petits opérateurs bénéficiaires mais sans accroissement significatif des revenus des exploitations agricoles, par une prise en charge de la dette des opérateurs défaillants. L'incidence de la</p>

	<p>pauvreté rurale a significativement progressé dans les zones de production cotonnières depuis 2001. Cela se traduit, autant sur le revenu des producteurs que sur leurs conditions de vie (dégradation ou disparition des services sociaux et économiques).</p> <p><u>Secteur café/cacao</u></p> <p>L'étude sur les revenus et les investissements des producteurs de café et de cacao, confirment l'appauvrissement progressif et continu des ménages (lié au partage déséquilibré de la marge produite sur le produit, au vieillissement des vergers, et à la dégradation des services de productivité).</p> <p><i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Des statistiques sur les niveaux de vie des producteurs n'ont pas pu être trouvées.</p> <p>Les producteurs ont diversifié leurs productions tout seul particulièrement dans les régions où des alternatives étaient possibles ; ils ont abandonné le café, le cacao, pour les remplacer par d'autres cultures – différentes selon leur localisation. Certains ont planté de l'hévéa ou du palmier à huile. D'autres ont développé des productions maraîchères surtout ceux situés proches de grandes agglomérations ou de bonnes routes (<i>source : l'expérience du PDRBA- MN Cameroun, coopération Cameroun UE ; document de programmation Moungo Nkam</i>)</p>
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG vanilla</b>	<p>Non, les revenus des producteurs malgaches restent très bas. Seule évidence citée par des bénéficiaires du projet AIM-Stabex : la diversification des cultures de rente permet de mieux étaler les revenus monétaires tout au long de l'année même si les bas prix internationaux (vanille) grèvent les prix de vente et que l'amélioration de la qualité ne semble pas avoir d'impact direct sur les prix (<i>Source: MN 814</i>).</p> <p>Toutefois, le succès et la durabilité de cette intervention est une exception dans l'ensemble des interventions passés de la CE (<i>Source : MN 802 et débriefing</i>)</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Yes, through Stabex projects. For instance, the Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project, with activities regarding the improvement of productivity, quality and efficiency of the coffee value chain (improvement of coffee production and better overall farm management, improvement of quality, nursery implementation and organizational development), had an objective to improve the farmers' income. Indeed, farmers enjoyed a large increase of their in cash income (multiplied by 2.9 and potentially by 6) thanks to higher yields, better quality and higher selling prices.</p> <p>Nevertheless, the cash income of the farmers involved in the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project remains dependent on coffee price fluctuations, but has increased to the point where they are able to invest in their farm (seedlings, fertilisers, etc.) and make some savings. Their vulnerability to price fluctuations is thus reduced. (<i>Source : MN 308</i>).</p> <p>As regards farmers' income and vulnerability, one should note that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Staple crops also cash crops; some part of the production is marketed</li> <li>• The revenue derived from cash crops contributes to reducing food insecurity (which is less a problem in Uganda than in other countries).</li> <li>• There is a minimum income level under which price decreases may lead to food insecurity. Above this minimum income level farmers can cope with price</li> </ul>

	<p>fluctuations. The main objective of the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project is to bring the farmers' income beyond this threshold.</p> <p>(Source: MN 313).</p>
<b>I.6.4.3</b>	Evidence that income levels within the agricultural sector as a whole have stabilised and increased through the implementation of vertical and horizontal diversification
<b>BAN</b>	The SFA impact evaluation report states that income effects have not been monitored by the country programmes and they were therefore unable to be estimated.
<b>CI</b>	Seule évidence : « Dans un contexte de filières d'exportation, la notion d'impact du programme Stabex est fortement dépendante du <u>facteur marché international qui n'est pas très favorable</u> (à l'exception de celui du cacao) » (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	Des statistiques sur les niveaux de vie des producteurs n'ont pas pu être trouvées.
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG vanilla coffee cocoa</b>	<p>Non de manière générale (valeur des exportations agricoles ont chuté de 17% de 2008 à 2009) ainsi que pour les deux produits ciblés (vanille et café) (Source : Rapport sur les exportations du secteur agriculture – élevage - pêche en 2009, Délégation à Madagascar)</p> <p>« A Madagascar, les exportations du secteur agriculture-élevage-pêche occupent la seconde place, avec 30% du total. Elles ont généré 290 millions USD de recettes en 2009 contre 351 millions USD l'année précédente (-17%). Les exportations de produits animaux (hors pêche) comptent pour moins de 5% du total et sont principalement constituées de cuirs et peaux</p> <p>Huit (8) produits ou catégories de produits représentent à eux seuls 85% de la valeur des exportations du secteur. Leur performance en 2009 dépend plus de facteurs structurels internes ou de l'état des marchés internationaux, que de l'effet de la crise politique qui a marqué le pays depuis le début de l'année.</p> <p>Les exportations de crevettes et de vanille, les deux principaux produits, ont connu de sérieuses difficultés en 2009, qui se traduisent par une perte de 77 millions USD de recettes (-47%) par rapport à la moyenne 2006-2008.</p> <p>Les exportations de girofle ont atteint un niveau qui n'a été dépassé qu'en 2001, avec près de 58,6 millions USD pour clous et essence.</p> <p>Depuis 2007, le cacao s'est hissé au 4<sup>ème</sup> rang des exportations du secteur. Sa production est en nette augmentation mais le cacao malgache a perdu la surcote dont il bénéficiait en 2006-2007 pour ses qualités aromatiques.</p> <p>Les produits de la mer (hors crevettes) accusent depuis deux ans une baisse significative (-16% en 2008 et -22% en 2009), principalement due à la baisse des exportations de langouste dont la ressource montre des signes d'épuisement.</p> <p>Pour le litchi, le réajustement des volumes à la taille du marché a permis une légère amélioration du prix moyen et ainsi le maintien de la valeur exportée au niveau de 2006 et 2008, dans la fourchette de 12 à 14 millions USD.</p> <p>Les exportations de café ont atteint leur plus bas niveau historique avec moins de 3 millions USD.</p> <p>Les produits des industries alimentaires occupent depuis quelques années une place croissante dans les exportations malgaches. En 2009, la valeur des exportations s'est maintenue au niveau atteint depuis 2006 (entre 55 et 60 millions USD). Toutefois, la</p>



	bonne performance des industries sucrières (+170%) et exportatrices de conserves de fruits et légumes (+52%) masque d'importantes difficultés pour les autres industries (-16% en 2008 et -31% en 2009). »
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence. There are exports' increases but not as much as expected although statistics might be misleading for they do not capture most of the regional trade. However, the transformation of the sector is quite disappointing: agriculture was one of the less performing sectors over the last ten years despite the potential of the country ( <i>Source: MN 301</i> ).
<b>I.6.4.4</b>	Evidence that income levels at country level have stabilised and increased with the reduction of dependency upon traditional agricultural commodities
<b>BAN</b>	The SFA impact evaluation report states that income effects have not been monitored by the country programmes and they were therefore unable to be estimated.
<b>CI</b>	Seule évidence : « Dans un contexte de filières d'exportation, la notion d'impact du programme Stabex est fortement dépendante du facteur marché international qui n'est pas très favorable (à l'exception de celui du cacao) » (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	Des statistiques sur les niveaux de vie au Cameroun n'ont pas pu être trouvées.
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH</b>	Income levels have increased all over the country over the past 10 years (household agricultural income increased by 101% and the country's annual income increased by 102% between 1999 and 2008). <i>Source: Ghana Living Standards Surveys, 1999 &amp; 2008</i>
<b>MG</b>	Voir I.6.4.3
<b>UG</b>	See I.6.4.3
<b>I.6.4.5</b>	Producers views on the effectiveness of diversification as an income stabilising and improvement tool
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Pour l'UNPCB, les appuis de la Commission à la diversification sont perçus assez positivement. Il s'agit des appuis suivant qui restent dans le domaine de la diversification agricole :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Le programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière (2008-2011): des résultats intéressants repris dans des rapports de monitoring du projet mettent en évidence (i) une diversification des productions bio :en plus du coton, sésame, arachide, hibiscus ; (ii) une amélioration sensible de la teneur en matière organique des sols par l'adoption/amélioration de pratiques culturales; (iii) la marge brute des producteurs est calculée et suivie depuis 3 ans : elle est passée en moyenne de 140 000 à 170 000 FCFA/ha dans le système d'exploitation « coton bio-équitable » et est estimée, en moyenne, supérieure de 25 000 FCFA/ha par rapport à celle obtenue dans le système d'exploitation du « coton conventionnel ». Il faut cependant souligner que le calcul des marges dans le système « coton bio-équitable ne tient pas compte de certains coûts cachés, en particulier les coûts liés</li> </ul>

	<p>aux certifications bio + équitables (ces coûts sont progressivement pris en charge par les producteurs) et à l'encadrement.</p> <p><i>NB. En termes de diversification agricole sur l'exploitation, un rapport de projet mentionne également : la culture de mucuna (en association avec des céréales : maïs, mil, sorgho) dans le cadre de la rotation des cultures ; la plantation de légumineuses pérennes dans des zones test</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Les bonnes pratiques agricoles (GIPD, champs-écoles..), appuis du volet coton du Programme tous ACP/FAO. Les champs écoles des producteurs (CEP) (1 groupement de 25 producteurs pour un CEP animé par un facilitateur formé parmi les producteurs) semblent bien appréciés par les producteurs en termes (i) d'introduction de nouvelles variétés dans la rotation (ex. mucuna), (ii) d'effets sur les rendements et les revenus, (iii) de renforcement de la capacité de décision économique des producteurs participant au CEP.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : MN 510, Rapport narratif du programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols dans les exploitations biologiques de la zone cotonnière, année 2009</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	Les systèmes de productions des exploitations familiales au Cameroun sont « naturellement » diversifiés; les producteurs réagissent aux évolutions de prix en favorisant l'une ou l'autre culture. ( <i>sources : divers rapports</i> )
<b>CR</b>	No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH-Cocoa</b>	According to the producers that were met, diversification is not much of an issue for the moment, and their objective is rather to intensify cocoa production. <i>Source: MN 943</i>
<b>MG</b>	Voir I.6.4.2
<b>UG</b>	See I.6.4.2

## EQ 7 on Commission support in the wider context of EC policies

To what extent did the implementation of other relevant European Community policies strengthen or weaken the pursuit of the COM's objectives ?	
<b>J.7.1</b>	<i>European Community policies in fields potentially relevant to cooperation in the area of agricultural commodities in CDDCs (such as trade or agriculture) have been designed and implemented taking account of their potential impact upon agricultural commodities</i>
<b>BF</b>	Pas d'évidence trouvée à ce sujet lors de la mission de terrain au Burkina Faso
<b>CM</b>	<p>Il y a des incohérences entre la DG Trade – DG Dev sur la banane et la négociation des accords. En effet, malgré un cadre négocié de démantèlement progressif à l'horizon 2020, des accords de tarifs douaniers préférentiels privilégiés ont été accordés à 2 pays de la banane \$ (75€/t au lieu de 114€/t) (en 2010/2011).</p> <p>Le Cameroun a été chaudement invité à ratifier un « APE transitoire ou d'étape » alors qu'il y a une incohérence de fonds en termes d'intégration régionale vis-à-vis de la CEMAC.</p>
<b>GH</b>	Two issues can be mentioned here. First the Commission supports the development of a banana sector strategy for Ghana in the context of the ending of the banana protocol but it can't go much further in direct support as the sector is totally private sector led. Secondly, the EPA negotiations are still ongoing with Ghana having only initialed an interim bilateral agreement (the regional has not yet been agreed): because Ghana doesn't benefit from the EBA (it is not a least developed country), only 72% of their products could enter the EU duty free without a signed agreement. The issue is still outstanding with differences between the EU and Ghana on questions relating to the support package offered (the EPA-DP (Development Plan) to help upgrade countries' competitiveness in the sectors that will be hit the most) and to the interpretation to be given to the exclusion list and the "standstill provision".
<b>MG</b>	<p>A travers l'initiative banane et le programme sucre la Commission s'est efforcée d'atténuer les impacts sur l'économie malgache de décisions relatives à la politique agricole commune dans ces deux secteurs.</p> <p>L'APE, qui pourrait avoir des incidences sur les exportations agricoles malgaches, est encore en cours de négociation. La Commission a fourni une assistance technique à la négociation.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Uganda didn't benefit from the banana and sugar support programmes which aimed at alleviating the impact on producing countries of changes in the EU policy concerning these products.</p> <p>There is no evidence of EU policies having a negative impact of the Ugandan agricultural sector.</p>
<b>I.7.1.1</b>	The implications of trade and domestic agricultural support policies upon CDDCs export performance have been monitored on a regular basis

<b>ACP-IF</b>	<p>Fair trade: “9 November 2010 (Brussels) - The European Commission (EC) issued a Communication “Trade, Growth and World Affairs” today<sup>31</sup>. Despite the clear support to ethical considerations in trade by European Union citizens, the European Commission has failed to translate the EU citizens’ views into the EU trade agenda.</p> <p>On 16 March 2010, Commissioner for Trade Mr. Karel De Gucht stated “<i>I see trade policy for developing countries as one of my key objectives for the years to come....We can and have to help developing countries make the most of the market access on offer, develop their capacity to expand their trade and best use trade to reduce poverty</i>”.</p> <p>Six months after the encouraging statement by Commissioner De Gucht, the Fair Trade movement is disappointed to see that the new EU trade agenda presented today by Commissioner De Gucht is merely “business as usual” from the former EU Global Europe trade strategy. The new EU trade agenda continues to focus almost exclusively on opening markets for European companies; including measures to ensure European companies have undeterred access to raw materials and public procurement markets from third countries. While it mentions sustainable development, it focuses on its environmental pillar, ignoring that sustainable development is based on economic, environmental and social pillars.”</p> <p><i>Source: <a href="http://www.fairtrade-advocacy.org">http://www.fairtrade-advocacy.org</a></i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA for traditional ACP banana suppliers was designed because of the change in banana market organisation and trade policy. In the SFA impact evaluation report, reference is made to the influence of a drop in EU tariffs on third country bananas: “<i>If the tariff is dropped from its present level of €176/tonne to close to €116 as was proposed by the EU in the July Doha round, then there is general agreement that means the end of a banana export industry for Dominica and for the other two Windward Island countries as well</i>”.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 31, htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>There is no evidence of regular monitoring of the impacts of EU trade and domestic policies in Burkina Faso’s CSP/NIPs.</p> <p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP does however mention that the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU has an impact on the export performances of Burkina Faso. Although the impact is very limited, the presence of European subsidies to its cotton sector is badly regarded in the country. Certain EU exports also represent serious competition for Burkinabe exports to coastal countries.</p> <p>Furthermore, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations of the EU constitute barriers for Burkinabe exports, especially for animal products.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 20</i></p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIPs.</p>

<sup>31</sup> EU Communication Trade, Growth and World Affairs. Trade Policy as a core component of the EU’s 2020 strategy. COM (2010) 612/4: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-growth-and-jobs/>

<b>GH</b>	There is no such information in the CSP/NIPs
<b>KE</b>	<p>There is no evidence in the CSPs that the implications of trade and domestic agricultural support policies upon export performance have been monitored on a regular basis in Kenya. However, EC has taken measures to minimise any distortion in trade and agriculture as it is aware that non-aid policies can have an impact on developing countries, especially in agriculture.</p> <p>In addition, it should be noted that generally monitoring of the results and evaluations of the impact of individual activities (programmes, projects and sectors) under the 2008-2013 CSP will be undertaken in line with the Technical and Administrative Provisions attached to each individual Financial Agreement concluded to implement the CSP.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 26 and 34</i></p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>There is no evidence of regular monitoring of the implication of EU domestic and trade policies on Mali in the CSP/NIPs. The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that the European Common Agricultural Policy (and particularly its support to cotton producers) doesn't have a significant effect on world prices affecting Malian producers. It is however badly regarded in the country as Malian cotton exporters are affected by the cotton market distortions.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 35 &amp; 36.</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the Pacific's RSP/RIPs.</p> <p>The effect of the change in CAP on Fiji's exports is commented upon in the 2007 evaluation report as follows: 'It must be noted that reforms of the CAP involved reductions in prices paid for sugar quotas from Fiji to the EU. The support provided to Fiji under the Sugar Protocol has been very significant for the sugar industry and the Fiji economy as a whole, and the Commission is assisting in the restructuring of the sugar industry to meet the new conditions. This cannot of course significantly affect the main trends which imply a considerable fall in the value of Fiji's exports to the EU. This is an unavoidable but adverse consequence for Fiji of changes in agricultural trade arrangements.'</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission's support to the ACP Pacific region, 2007, page 34.</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The 2001-2007 CSP mentions that coherence between development policy and other EC policies (notably fisheries and trade but also agriculture, environment, etc.) will be permanently assessed during project or programme identification and appraisal.</p> <p>In addition, The EC will support through the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF efforts done by Government departments and Non State Actors to prepare the EPA and on WTO, and assistance for capacity-building for carrying out negotiations in a regional and multilateral context and in implementing the accompanying trade policy and structural reforms, including fiscal reform.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 25</i></p>

	<p>Duty-free quota free access to EU markets under the Everything But Arms initiative was an important trade preference, but one which Tanzania and other LDCs have yet to exploit fully, not least due to supply-side constraints and non-tariff barriers.</p> <p>In the field of agriculture, the EC will continue its efforts to minimise the level of trade distortion related to its support measures to the agricultural sector. The EC will actively assist Tanzania in order to facilitate it meeting the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards, so as to increase the exports of agricultural and fisheries products.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 67 &amp; 79</i></p>
<b>I.7.1.2</b>	<p>There has been no occurrence of positive or negative effects of the implementation of other European Community policies in the countries and sub-sectors (products) benefiting from Commission agricultural commodities support</p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP was designed because of the potential negative impacts of the modification of Europe's pesticide Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs). The new stricter regulation could have implied a progressive loss of ACP's EU fruit &amp; vegetable market share, due to lack of compliance.</p> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 2</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>There has been occurrence of negative effects of the implementation of other EC policies in the banana sector. It is the reason why the SFA for traditional ACP banana suppliers was established.</p> <p>The implementation of the CMO bananas reform has occurred and had a depressing effect on export prices for ACP countries and increased competition with third countries.</p> <p>An efficiency challenge was also imposed by the EC's new financial regulations, with which the SFAs of 2002 were not compliant at the time. This led to changes in implementation frameworks that caused significant delays in input deliveries.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 1 &amp; 22, htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU has an impact on the export performances of Burkina Faso. Although the impact is very limited, the presence of European subsidies to its cotton sector is badly regarded in the country.</p> <p>Furthermore, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations of the EU constitute barriers for Burkinabe exports, especially for animal products.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 20</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Il est largement reconnu que la seule politique de développement ne permettra pas aux pays en développement de progresser. <b>Les politiques autres que la politique d'aide sont au moins aussi importantes, dans la mesure où elles sont susceptibles d'influencer ou de contribuer à l'objectif du pays dans la poursuite des objectifs du millénaire pour le développement.</b> Il est important</p>

d'analyser et de prendre en compte la cohérence des politiques communautaires notamment dans les domaines suivants: les **migrations, la politique agricole et la politique de la pêche**. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25).

Dans le domaine **de l'étude et de la gestion des migrations**, il existe un dialogue politique institutionnalisé entre l'Union européenne et la région dans le cadre de l'initiative de Rabat. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25).

En ce qui concerne les **infrastructures**, le récent partenariat UE-Afrique sur les infrastructures se situe au cœur de la stratégie de l'UE pour l'Afrique et a été développé conjointement avec les partenaires africains, Etats et organisations régionales. Un montant de base de €5,6 milliards en provenance du 10e FED est alloué à ce partenariat. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25).

La **ligne budgétaire banane** finance un programme d'Assistance technique et financière (ATF) qui s'inscrit dans les mesures d'accompagnements au processus de libéralisation du marché européen de la banane. En Côte d'Ivoire, le programme ATF bananes (1999-2008) s'élève à un montant global de €26,85 millions pour la période 1999 - 2006. Ce programme, initié en 2002, et à jusqu'à présent permis des investissements directs en plantation, la mise au point d'un système de traçabilité des stations de conditionnement au quai fruitier, des programmes de diversification pour les planteurs désirant quitter la filière, et l'identification d'un programme d'amélioration des conditions de vie des travailleurs. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25).

**Ligne budgétaire sucre:** l'accès préférentiel au marché du sucre de l'UE fournissait des avantages (prix très supérieurs à ceux pratiqués sur le marché mondial) aux pays ACP signataires du Protocole sur le sucre (accord de Cotonou) et, notamment, à la Côte d'Ivoire qui a bénéficié d'un quota annuel d'exportation de 10186 tonnes. Cependant, la baisse du prix du sucre dans l'UE est envisagée dans la réforme de l'Organisation commune de marché de l'Union européenne relative au sucre (OCM - Sucre) qui va entraîner une baisse de revenu pour l'ensemble des pays bénéficiaires du protocole. Afin de définir les actions sur lesquelles se concentreront les financements de la ligne budgétaire en Côte d'Ivoire, une étude de stratégie est en cours de finalisation sous l'égide du ministère de l'Agriculture. Cette étude a déjà identifié que la filière sucre ne pourra survivre en Côte d'Ivoire à moins d'un engagement réel de l'Etat à protéger effectivement son marché intérieur, notamment en luttant contre la fraude et en mettant fin aux importations exonérées. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.26).

En matière de pêches, La Commission européenne a signé des accords bilatéraux avec les pays côtiers pour l'obtention de licences d'exploitation en fonction de contreparties financières. Le Conseil de l'UE souligne l'importance de la **cohérence entre les accords de pêche et les objectifs de développement**. Afin d'assurer l'intégration des accords pêche à la politique de développement, la présente stratégie devra appuyer les actions permettant une meilleure connaissance de la ressource, et un renforcement des capacités de formulation, de suivi d'une politique régionale de pêche (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.26).

La **cohérence entre la stratégie régionale et la politique commerciale de l'Union européenne est assurée à travers la mise en place des APE** qui, conformément à l'accord de Cotonou, constituent un élément essentiel de la politique commerciale et de développement de l'UE. D'autre part, le lien entre

	<p>commerce et développement est également l'objectif central des négociations multilatérales de l'OMC. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.26).</p> <p>Dans le domaine de la Politique extérieure et de sécurité commune (PESC), il existe un dialogue politique institutionnalisé avec la région sous forme de Troïkas ministérielles UE-CEDEAO et UE-IUA. L'UE suit avec attention et de manière permanente l'évolution de la situation politique dans la région et a adopté une série de positions communes sur des situations et pays politiquement sensibles. Le dialogue permanent avec les pays dans le cas de l'intégration permet également d'échanger des expériences et idées sur ses effets positifs sur la stabilisation politique et sur l'instauration des processus de démocratisation dans la région. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.26).</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>L'évaluation à mi-parcours du PASAPE note que la <i>“cohérence du PASAPE est bonne entre tous les outils de la politique de développement de la Commission européenne au Cameroun unique le projet vise à consolider l'économie camerounaise et son développement en cohérence avec le Document de Stratégie pour la Croissance et pour l'Emploi.”</i></p> <p><i>Source:</i> Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010, page 9</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents did not refer to positive or negative occurrences linked to the implementation of other EC policies. The second CSP clearly reports that more efforts should be devoted to ensure synergies between EC policies and development interventions:</p> <p><i>« En ce qui concerne l'articulation avec les autres politiques de la CE importantes pour le développement, comme le commerce, l'environnement, les changements climatiques, la sécurité, la politique agricole commune, la pêche, les migrations, la société de l'information, le transport et l'énergie, les actions menées le sont le plus souvent sur la base d'initiatives sectorielles et ponctuelles et ne répondent pas à une vraie dynamique de partenariat. Des efforts doivent être faits pour développer des synergies et permettre une intégration des enjeux de ces politiques dans les objectifs et les interventions de développement.”</i></p> <p><i>Sources :</i> Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, page 18</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>La DG Trade n'agit pas et ne négocie pas en cohérence avec la DG DEV. La DG Trade a accordé des tarifs préférentiels d'accès à la banane \$ à la Colombie et au Pérou (75€/t dès 2010/2011) alors que le tarif a déjà été réduit de 176 à 114 €/t. environ. Cette dérogation prématurée à deux pays d'Amérique Latine constitue un préjudice pour les bananes ACP et est contraire aux négociations prises pour la banane. (MN-993, 994, 995 MN 402, 403).</p> <p>Globalement, les interlocuteurs estiment que les négociations à l'OMC constituent une réelle menace pour l'Afrique et les industries émergentes.</p> <p>According to banana producers, several elements of the EC policies have made the situation difficult for them :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The reform of the banana sector eroding preferences for ACP bananas</li> <li>- The strength of the € EU compared to the dollar, affecting exports from ACP countries of the CFA Franc zone (since their currency is pegged to the</li> </ul>



	<p>Euro). However this is not only due to the EU monetary policy.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certification and environmental requirements such as MRLs have also caused a need to invest to comply.</li> <li>- Free Trade Agreements between the EU and Colombia and Peru (two important dollar banana exporters) make competition more difficult for ACP countries.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : MN 994</i></p> <p>The EPA temporary agreement between the EU and Cameroon could imply important changes for Cameroon's private sector. However, the agreement has so far not been the source of much change for Cameroon. The country hopes not to have to open its barriers to the EU before a regional agreement between Central African countries and the EU is concluded.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 938</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The origins of the Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector lie in the unilateral decision of the EU to liberalise access to the EU rum market under an EU/US agreement concluded in 1996. Under this agreement, the trade preferences for traditional African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) rum (duty free export quotas) were <i>de facto</i> eroded. Being aware of the challenges this unilateral action would give rise to, Caribbean governments gave voice to the concerns of rum producers and opened the dialogue with the EU in order to find an appropriate policy response. With the start of the negotiations on a successor agreement to the Lomé convention, the Caribbean rum industry intensified its lobbying efforts for the inclusion of specific provisions aimed at supporting the rum sector. This resulted in December 1999 in the joint ACP-EU declaration on rum, which included the EU commitment to finance 'an integrated sector specific programme for the development of ACP exporters of rum'.</p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p><u>Some EU policies had a significant impact on the Commission's strategy for the Caribbean.</u> The Common Agricultural and Trade Policies indeed deeply affected segments of the region's productive sector which necessitated a response of the Commission regional strategy. However, potential impact of EU policies on regional outcomes are not systematically analysed in Commission programming documents. As a consequence, the response to EU policies-generated shocks has been rather <i>ad hoc</i> in spite of the fact that these shocks were anticipated and likely to adversely affect some key sectors of the Caribbean economy.</p> <p>Indeed, EU internal policies (Common Agricultural Policies, Trade policy, etc.) have consequences for the development of productive sectors in the Caribbean that are not analysed in the programming documents or have not always been anticipated. Changes in these policies, either for internal reasons or to comply with the rules of the MTS (Multilateral Trading System), transmit shocks to the Caribbean economies which generate <i>ad hoc</i> responses. This has been the case for important Caribbean sectors such as <u>bananas, sugar and rum</u>.</p> <p>The <u>case of rum</u> offers an interesting example. The Common Agricultural Policy and associated external tariffs protected the European producers against competition from third countries. This was likely to harm the rum producers in the</p>

	<p>Caribbean region and thus create a contradiction with the goals of the Lomé Agreements. The rum protocol of the Lomé Agreement was an <i>ad hoc</i> arrangement aimed at protecting the Caribbean producers from harm. When the Commission negotiated with the US, in the context of compliance with the WTO rules, an agreement to liberalise the bilateral trade in spirits, the protection offered by the quota was completely eroded, and to mitigate the consequences the Commission offered a €70 million assistance project to the Caribbean rum industry. Although it can be advocated that the rum programme has been designed and is implemented not simply with a view to limit damage but also as an effort to restructure the industry, this succession of <i>ad hoc</i> measures reveals a lack of strategic vision and has not contributed to the joint strategic objectives of the region or of the Commission. There was insufficient perception of the fact that the protocol tended to lock the Caribbean rum producers into the export of low-value-added bulk products; there had been no anticipation of the inescapable liberalisation of the sector, and when it happened the response was inevitably biased towards damage limitation rather than a fundamental restructuring of the sector across the region.</p> <p>The <u>banana industry</u> is a similar case, with the offer of Special Framework Assistance. Again, the adaptation of the price of <u>sugar</u> under the European Common Agricultural Policy is having similarly devastating consequences on the Caribbean producers which will create pressure for an <i>ad hoc</i> response where a long term strategy should be put in place.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Some EU policies had a significant impact on the Commission's strategy for the Caribbean. The Common Agricultural and Trade Policies indeed deeply affected segments of the region's productive sector which necessitated a response of the Commission regional strategy. However, potential impact of EU policies on regional outcomes are not systematically analysed in Commission programming documents. As a consequence, the response to EU policies-generated shocks has been rather <i>ad hoc</i> in spite of the fact that these shocks were anticipated and likely to adversely affect some key sectors of the Caribbean economy. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. 45</i>).</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>According to the 2008-2013 East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP, the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2002 established “<i>a genuine partnership for the development of sustainable and responsible fisheries</i>”, which is supposed to have had a positive impact (but no impact on agriculture).</p> <p>According to the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU has had impacts on the sugar sector in sugar producing countries of the ESAIO region.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 42 &amp; 43</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>As regards other donors the EC is currently only one of two donors in the coffee sub sector. The other is the Government of Switzerland STABEX funds which provides (i) support to farmers for the provision of inputs for their coffee farms, and also to rehabilitate co-operative washing stations destroyed in the 1991 disturbances and (ii) a new project which involves support to organic coffee in Ethiopia through the establishment of an inspection and certification system and</p>

	assistance in marketing. ( <i>Source : FP p.7</i> )
<b>ET</b>	<p><b>The coherence with other EC/EU policies is described on p 38 and 39 of CSP 2008-2013 but there is not explicit reference to commodities sector.</b></p> <p>The Joint Response Strategy reflects the EU Coherence for Development Commitments, in particular those relating to trade, environment, security, <b>agriculture</b>, food aid, migration and transport. Its design is also consistent with the EU Regional Political Partnership for Peace, Security and Development in the Horn of Africa<sup>25</sup>, which aims to promote peace, stability and development in the Region (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.38, 39</i>).</p> <p>Coherence calls upon the EU to make a better use of and create synergies between its different instruments (particularly aid, political co-operation and trade) with a view of increasing the overall impact of its co-operation with a given developing country. Internal co-ordination has been a major problem for the Commission both at country level (within the Delegation) and at Headquarters (between various DGs and Aidco units) and is partly a consequence of systems for such co-ordination not being well developed. This has particularly affected the areas of institution building for democracy, human rights, governance and conflict prevention, but also the development of inter-sectoral links within the Commission programmes (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p50</i>).</p> <p>The implementation of the EC's strategies and programmes has, overall, suffered from lack of effective internal co-ordination systems and from staffing problems. These problems combined with the perception of the CSP as one-off exercise, rather than a document for recurring guidance, has left major gaps in the strategy unfilled, while different sector programmes are being identified and implemented without exploiting potential links and synergies. Due to the disjointed evolution of the Commission strategies and programmes the overall cohesiveness is difficult to overview and strategy implementation monitoring has been hampered. A team spirit around a jointly shared strategy is seriously missing. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p51</i>).</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that the implication other policies on development policies are generally not discussed.</p> <p>However, the CSP/NIP mentions that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Trade policies have allowed 90% of Ghanaian exports to Europe to enter duty-free;</li> <li>▪ Ghana has not benefitted from the EU fisheries agreement (which results in the unsustainable exploitation of Ghanaian marine resources);</li> <li>▪ The EU (and USA) migration policy has acted as a “brain drain” for health and skilled workers.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 34</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The European Union's trade policy, and specifically the end of the banana protocol is felt to be particularly detrimental to Ghana. Indeed the Commission's BAM has to be used for the Government but here the 2 banana operators are private sector. The private sector firms are the ones suffering from the opening up of the European banana market to other non ACP banana producers but they can't be</p>

	<p>targeted with the BAM. Here in Ghana one way out of it might be to look at areas of common interest (public/private) such as the on-plantation social facilities (services to the communities such as clinics, housing, schools etc).</p> <p><i>Source: MN156</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>Several other EC interventions benefitting the sector are mentioned in the Financing Agreement of the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Pesticides Initiative Programme supports ACP countries in addressing Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) issues;</li> <li>▪ The Strengthening Fishery Products Health Conditions in ACP/OCT Countries programme also addresses SPS issues, but not for agricultural products;</li> <li>▪ The EC PARI II supports work on industry standards in West Africa to reinforce SPS capacities, mainly through laboratory support;</li> <li>▪ The EC supports the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) representation in Africa to “prepare national veterinary services to fulfil international SPS requirements for Rinderpest and declaration of other diseases constraining trade of animals”;</li> <li>▪ The DG TRADE supports African countries (among others) through the “Participation Trust Fund” which provides funding to the International Standard-setting Organisations (ISSOs) for SPS expert missions to and from developing countries;</li> <li>▪ The DG RESEARCH supports research programmes in the field of “Food Quality and Safety”, which provides vital information for standard-setting meetings.</li> </ul> <p>The documents do not refer to negative consequences of EU policies</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 18.</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les instruments visant également le secteur agricole à Madagascar issus de la <b>PAC</b> sont l’initiative banane et le programme sucre par lesquels la Commission s’est efforcée d’atténuer les impacts sur l’économie malgache de décisions relatives à la politique agricole commune dans ces deux secteurs.</p> <p><u>Réponse assez positive.</u> La Délégation estime que l’idéal serait de continuer Stabex, lignes budgétaires (banane, sucre) et FED car cela permet d’avoir un <u>mix d’outils complémentaires</u> (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de <u>prendre en compte l’ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole</u> malgache (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (Source : MN 804 et débriefing Délégation).</p> <p>Toutefois, la Délégation signale qu’il y a eu un <u>problème de capacité d’absorption en raison du chevauchement des fonds</u> (ligne budgétaire banane et Stabex portant tous deux sur la diversification) et des difficultés de mise en œuvre ont été rencontrées, notamment concernant le financement du centre technologique-CTHT (Centre technique horticole de Tamatave) avec lequel un protocole a été mis en place à partir de 2006 amenant à étendre le support à la <u>transformation et au conditionnement</u> dans une optique filière (Source : MN 801).</p> <p>Concernant les <u>négociations APE</u>, elles sont quasi bloquées. Madagascar a signé l’APE intérimaire avec négociations complétées sur trois domaines : accès au marché, pêche, coopération au développement. Restaient à négocier trois domaines dont l’agriculture qui avait l’objet d’un texte. Les négociations sont quasi bloquées.</p>

	<p>Les pays du COMESA demandent des fonds de développement supplémentaires. A noter que pour Madagascar les échanges régionaux restent marginaux (4%) (Source : MN 803).</p> <p>De plus, dans le cadre des APE, les produits agricoles sont classés dans les produits sensibles et les APE ne devraient pas avoir d'impact sur les exportations agricoles.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Programme sucre</b></p> <p>Madagascar faisait partie des pays dits du Protocole Sucrier à qui étaient alloués des quotas d'exportation de sucre vers l'UE au prix intérieur européen. La dénonciation unilatérale du Protocole Sucrier par l'UE et la diminution du prix du sucre dans l'UE étaient susceptibles d'affecter Madagascar. Mais en pratique, lorsque ces mesures ont été prises, le secteur sucrier malgache était à l'état de ruine au point que Madagascar devait satisfaire 90% de sa demande intérieure de sucre par des importations.</p> <p>Madagascar a néanmoins bénéficié du programme de l'UE d'aide à l'adaptation de son secteur sucrier.</p> <p><i>Source : Review of the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Autres politiques de la CE : pas d'infos dans les CSP sur les effets négatifs ou positifs sauf dernier paragraphe qui aborde succinctement les synergies dans le cadre de l'Accord de Partenariat dans le domaine des Pêches.</b></p> <p>En matière de politique commerciale, l'<b>Initiative « Tous Sauf les Armes »</b> lancée en 2001 a eu un faible impact sur le commerce extérieur de Madagascar compte tenu, d'un côté, de l'accès déjà préférentiel au marché européen des produits malgaches et, de l'autre, de la difficulté de satisfaire aux normes SPS et de contrôle de qualité sur certains produits. Les autorités et le secteur privé malgache poursuivent leurs efforts de renforcement dans ce sens, notamment pour les produits frais agricoles et halieutiques.</p> <p>Prenant en compte les résultats des inspections de l'Office Alimentaire et Vétérinaire à Madagascar, la <b>DG-SANCO</b> classe Madagascar parmi les pays prioritaires pour son programme de formation ; les actions de coopération dans le domaine des normes SPS sont déterminées en concertation avec la DG SANCO.</p> <p>L'accord de partenariat conclu en juin 2006 dans le cadre de la nouvelle politique de la <b>DG FISH</b> renforce les liens déjà existants entre l'UE et Madagascar dans le secteur de la pêche. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.23-24).</p> <p><b>L'Accord de Pêche entre Madagascar et les Communautés Européennes</b> date de 1986 et concerne exclusivement la pêche thonière. Le nouvel accord de partenariat de pêche, paraphé en juin 2006, prévoit une contribution financière annuelle de 1.197.000€, dont 80% seront affectés à l'appui de la politique sectorielle de la pêche. Cet accord d'une durée de 6 ans (1.1.2007-31.12.2012) permettra à la CE et à Madagascar de s'accorder sur un programme annuel et multiannuel qui fixera les orientations et les objectifs à atteindre pour l'instauration d'une politique des pêches durable et responsable. De plus, la DG Pêche a lancé un Plan régional de surveillance des pêches dans le sud ouest de l'Océan indien, concrétisé par la signature d'une convention cadre de partenariat entre la CE et la Commission de l'Océan indien. Cette convention cadre de partenariat durera 3 ans (2007- 2010) pour un montant total de 7 M€. La première convention spécifique a été signée le 14 août 2007 ce qui a permis le démarrage des premières activités du Plan régional (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.22).</p>

	<p>Dans le <b>domaine des pêches</b>, l'<b>Accord de Partenariat</b> conclu avec Madagascar prévoit que 80% des paiements de licence viennent en appui à la politique sous-sectorielle correspondante du MAEP, <b>en synergie avec les interventions qui seront financées sur le PIN et/ou sur le PIR de la région ESA/OI</b> (contrôle et surveillance, contrôle sanitaire des produits exportés, monitoring de la ressource exploitée). La convergence entre environnement et développement rural sera soutenue dans ce programme sectoriel, qui sera complété par des interventions du PIR ESA-IO dans le domaine des écosystèmes marins et côtiers. Les appels à propositions des nouveaux Programmes Thématiques liés à l'environnement encourageront les opérateurs à proposer des actions supplémentaires (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.27-28).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that the European Common Agricultural Policy (and particularly its support to cotton producers) doesn't have a significant effect on world prices affecting Malian producers. It is however badly regarded in the country as Malian cotton exporters are affected by the cotton market distortions.</p> <p>European sanitary standards also represent an important obstacle for Mali's cattle exports.</p> <p>Other plant or animal productions of Mali are in competition with EU products. The EPA negotiations have brought the subject into spotlight.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 35 &amp; 36.</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy and in particular of the sugar sector have implications on certain countries such as Fiji.</p> <p>The EU's strong support of the Kyoto protocol has been appreciated by PACPs, since Pacific Islands are among the most vulnerable areas to climate change.</p> <p>The EPA negotiations also will have implications on trade of agricultural commodities in the Pacific region.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 57-58</i></p>
<b>SN</b>	<p>Le Sénégal et la CE ont un accord de pêche (protocole de 4 ans allant du 1er juillet 2002 au 30 juin 2006) qui a introduit des éléments nouveaux en faveur d'une pêche durable dans un souci de renforcer la cohérence entre la politique commune de la pêche et d'autres politiques de l'Union. La compensation financière est prévue à €16 millions/an, dont € 3m seront consacrés à des mesures de partenariat visant à soutenir la conservation des stocks halieutiques, la recherche et la surveillance de la pêche.</p>
<b>SUG</b>	<p>The AMSP programme is an attempt to assist Sugar Protocol countries to the situation created by the EU decision to reduce by 36% the EU domestic price of sugar, and then to terminate the Sugar Protocol which granted SP countries preferential access to the EU market for their sugar exports.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>There is no evidence of EU policies having a negative impact of the Ugandan agricultural sector.</p>

	<p><u>Banana and sugar support programmes</u>: no because Uganda didn't benefit from the banana and sugar support programmes which aimed at alleviating the impact on producing countries of changes in the EU policy concerning these products.</p> <p><u>EPA negotiations</u>: no because there is an <u>exclusion of agricultural products from the Agreement that allows ESA (Eastern and Southern African) countries to protect all their main commodities, and there is no restriction for them to exporting to the EU</u> (provided SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) conditions are met). <u>Currently the trade negotiations are frozen but it is not a contentious matter</u>. It could become contentious if the agreement was not concluded in a reasonable time frame and if the EC retaliated through restrictions to access to the EU market. (Source : MN 302).</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>The EPA agreements have impacts on commodity trade. Synergies between the EPAs and CSPs and RSPs need to be maximised, according to the 2008-2013 CSP.</p> <p>EU and OECD standards in terms of good governance require more compliance efforts on behalf of the Government of Vanuatu.</p> <p>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 33</p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Selon le RSP/RIP de l'Afrique de l'Ouest de 2008-2013, la stratégie régionale de développement est en cohérence avec la politique commerciale de l'UE à travers la mise en place des APE et du soutien dans les négociations à l'OMC.</p> <p>Concernant l'agriculture, le RSP/RIP mentionne simplement que « <i>la cohérence entre les politiques agricoles et les politiques de développement doit être assurée. Dans ce contexte, une attention particulière devra être portée sur les politiques agricoles durant les négociations multilatérales de l'OMC et celles de l'APE.</i> »</p> <p>Source : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 45 &amp; 46</p>
<b>I.7.1.3</b>	<p>Specific measures have been taken by the Commission to mitigate any potential negative consequences upon agricultural commodities in CDDCs of other policies in related areas (trade, agriculture, environment ...)</p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP was designed because of the potential negative impacts of the modification of Europe's pesticide Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs). The new stricter regulation could have implied a progressive loss of ACP's EU fruit &amp; vegetable market share, due to lack of compliance.</p> <p>The PIP was launched by the Commission in the end of the 1990s to ensure the stability of ACP fruit &amp; vegetable market share in the EU, by supporting the adaptation of production means to EU regulations.</p> <p>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 2</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA for traditional ACP banana suppliers is the specific measure to mitigate the negative consequences of the CMO bananas reform. It foresees measures to increase competitiveness of ACP banana exporters or diversify the economies of those countries where sustainable competitive banana production was not possible.</p> <p>In the competitiveness-oriented countries, the SFA helped the banana sector align</p>

	<p>to market requirements and EU environmental standards and policies.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 31 &amp; 36, htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The banana sector of Cameroon has benefited from the banana budget line funds in order to comply with market requirements and changes.</p> <p>The BAM (Banana Accompanying Measures) are planned to help ACP banana producers cope with the erosion of preferences to the EU market. However, due to difficulties on agreements between the EU Parliament and Commission, beneficiaries have still not been able to benefit from funding, while the tariff preference erosion has already started.</p> <p>The ATF (Assistance Technique et Financière) projects on bananas in Cameroon were also designed to help the country deal with reforms of the trade regime of the EU banana market ; and with changes of market requirements (e.g. MRLs, GlobalGap certification...)</p> <p>Interviewees from the banana sector insisted however on the fact that the accompanying measures were generally smaller and much slower than the adverse effects of the EU trade reforms.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 994</i></p> <p>To help Cameroon cope with the changes created by the temporary EPA agreement (although no implications of the agreement have occurred so far), the EC has provided support to the PASAPE project in Cameroon, which focuses on developing the private sector (helping it to reach international standards of quality and capacity requirements) and help in EPA negotiations themselves.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 971, MN 938</i></p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>Le PASAPE s'inscrit dans une volonté de renforcement de l'économie camerounaise et de facilitation de son insertion dans l'économie régionale et mondiale, à travers la mise en œuvre viable de l'Accord de Partenariat Economique Union Européenne-Afrique Centrale (APE UE-AC). Il répond à une volonté du gouvernement camerounais et de la Commission européenne d'amplifier les efforts concernant la préparation de l'économie nationale à l'arrivée de l'APE. En particulier, une étude sur l'impact de l'APE au Cameroun réalisée en 2005 mentionnée dans la fiche d'identification a mis en exergue que « la réciprocité des échanges entre l'UE et les 8 pays négociateurs auraient des effets différents selon les catégories d'acteurs et les niveaux de libéralisation, les secteurs primaire et manufacturier étant particulièrement concernés. Ces Etats, conscients des bouleversements consécutifs à la suppression des barrières douanières et la réciprocité des échanges avec l'UE ont perçu l'importance du renforcement de l'intégration régionale, en particulier dans le domaine du renforcement des capacités et de mise à niveau des économies et des entreprises. »</p> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>



	<i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006, page 4</i>
<b>CR</b>	<p><b>Commission's strategy documents explicitly referred to mitigating measures in response to changes brought by the EC Trade and Agricultural policies.</b></p> <p><i>"The EC Trade policy, which seeks to improve trade and economic growth in developing countries, is an important tool for supporting regional integration. The comprehensive EPA (where the EC signed up to duty-free-quota-free market access, with the exception of rice and sugar where transition periods have been foreseen) will complement regional efforts to strengthen governance of regional integration and cooperation and the consolidation of regional markets. (...) In the EPA context, account has been taken of the sensitivity of the agricultural sector: long <b>transition periods or even exclusion of liberalisation have been provided for a number of agricultural products originating in Cariforum.</b> The limited transition period foreseen for imports of rice and that for sugar (until 2015) have been designed to take into account the Common Agricultural Policy reform process. In the case of sugar in particular, the full liberalisation of sugar imports will occur on 1st October 2015 to allow the sector to get adapted to the new price conditions and carry out restructuring. Bananas, which are a key commodity for some Caribbean countries, can now be exported to the EC without any duty nor quota. In addition, in order to facilitate the adaptation to changing global (and EU market conditions), the EC has supported the transition in key commodities sectors in the Caribbean: To enhance competitiveness and support the diversification of the banana sector, a Special Framework of Assistance (SFA) was established in 1999. By 2008, when the SFA will have run its course, the Caribbean will have received a total allocation of around €270 million, which is more than 73% of the total value of the SFA. The "Accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries" (AMSP) include actions to make the sugar industry more competitive, to bring about diversification and to mitigate the social effects of the changes in the trade regime, which entered into force on 28 February 2006 in six Caribbean countries (Jamaica, Belize, Barbados, Trinidad &amp; Tobago, St Kitts &amp; Nevis, and Guyana). (...) In addition, the EC has progressively made its Common Agricultural policy more development-friendly through successive reforms which have led to a drastic reduction of export subsidies and trade-distorting-domestic subsidies. By 2011, at which time the CAP reforms launched in 2003 and 2005 will be fully implemented, almost 90% of EU direct payments will be decoupled from production. In the context of the WTO negotiations, it needs to be recalled that the EU offered to eliminate all export subsidies by 2013 and to reduce trade-distorting-domestic support by 60% on average."</i></p> <p>See I.7.1.2</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>In recognition of the loss of trade preferences enjoyed by ACP rice exporters in the EU market due to result from liberation measures under the Cotonou Agreement, the EC issued a joint declaration on Rice (Art. 24 of the Cotonou Agreement) which states its "commitment to enhance the competitiveness and efficiency of the ACP rice sector in order to maintain a viable and sustainable rice industry". The Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean programme is directly enshrined in the spirit of this joint declaration.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector is actually intended to mitigate the impact on Caribbean rum producers of the liberalisation of the EU rum market. (See above I.7.1.2)</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>In the framework of sub-component 4.4: Coffee by-product utilization and regarding <b>environmental pollution</b>, as early as September 2002 JARC undertook</p>

	<p>an intensive investigation in 4 woredas and 17 rivers and streams around Jimma of the extent of pollution created. In early December 2004, at the request of the State Minister the TATL conducted an inspection and analysis of the washing stations operating in Sidamo and Gefe zone. The workshop below mentioned was the occasion for the presentation of a working paper based on a coffee processing waste water monitoring conducted in collaboration with Jimma University. A short term mission was conducted from 11/01 to 6/02/2009 and focused on “Improvement of effluents management and by-products utilization” (<i>Source : Completion report p.19</i>)</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>No mention of specific measures to mitigate potential negative consequences of other policies can be found in the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II can be found in the programme documents.</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP states that the sugar-producing countries of the ESAIO region will benefit from the “Action Plan on accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the reform of the EU sugar regime”.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 43.</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>In Ghana, the trade.com initiative was seen as very complementary to the interventions undertaken in Ghana in support of PSD&amp;T.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 156</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>On trade/EPA negotiations: Ghana initialled (not signed) an interim agreement on December 13 2007 because otherwise trade would have been disrupted after December 31 2007.</p> <p>The regional negotiating group includes 13 Least DCs and only 3 Less DCs (Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana): total of ECOWAS + Mauritania. So all the 13 Least DCs are benefiting from the Everything But Arms but the 3 less developing countries would have had problems after December 31. So Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, signed interim agreements. Not Nigeria because they’re more oil-based whereas we are horticultural-based. Nigeria went to the normalised GSP scale. If Ghana had done so, only 72% of products would have entered the EU duty-free (canned tuna would have faced 25% tariffs, bananas, pineapples, processed cocoa products, etc.). So on that basis, it was important to have an agreement ensuring trade continued.</p> <p>The interim agreement has only been initialled rather than signed because Ghana disagrees with the MFN clause prohibiting having preferential agreements with emerging economies whereas this is part of their South-South cooperation. It also disagrees with the abolition of the ECOWAS levies on imports entering the region because these are the only source of revenue for ECOWAS which is our regional integration. The EPAs are supposed to drive the regional integration processes but would take away the only financing we have available for that. Initialling rather than signing enables Ghana to get back to the table and discuss. This is not the EC’s view which argues that initialling or signing is just the same legally. Ghana submitted a policy statement with the initialling which underlines that their commitment is to the regional agreement, not the interim bilateral agreement.</p> <p>The negotiations at regional level have been stalled for a long time (unlike the 3 Less</p>

	<p>DCs, the 13 Least DC have not much incentive to see the process ended). The remaining stumbling block is the market access (Art 24 of the GATT dictating FTAs: progressively liberalising all trade within a “reasonable time” which is considered to be 10 years or more if you can justify. But there’s no quantification of “all the trade”. Ghana agreed with other African nations to liberalise maximum 70%. The EU would like 80% minimum.</p> <p>Another problem is the EPA-DP (Development Plan): a package of supports in different areas that are supposed to help upgrade countries’ competitiveness in the programmes, for the sectors that will be hit the most. But the EU has not made any binding commitments (whether funding or legal) to provide this. The heads of state have insisted that without the DP, there will be no EPA.</p> <p>At bilateral level, another challenge was a “standstill provision” which provides for no increase at all on any tariffs, including of the items on the 20% exclusion list (which are not to be liberalised). Ghana disagrees with the EU on this (Ghana says the 20% should not be concerned by the standstill position) once the EPA is signed.</p> <p><i>Source: MN134, MN964</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme was elaborated as a response, not to an EU policy, but to the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regulations.</p> <p>WTO regulations, based on the standards set by International Organisations such as the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and the <i>Codex Alimentarius</i> Commission (CAC), are poorly followed by African countries. The PAN-SPSO aims therefore at increasing the participation of African countries in those standard-setting organisations in order to increase their compliance with SPS regulations.</p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP underlines that is continuing its efforts to minimise the level of trade distortion by assisting Kenya to meet sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) in order further to increase exports of agricultural and fisheries products. Efforts are also made to ensure consistency with a number of relevant all-ACP programmes dealing with SPS challenges.</p> <p>In addition, the EC adopted the accompanying measures for the Sugar Protocol in 2005. In Kenya sugar reforms are being addressed by developing a response strategy for the “Adaptation Strategy to forthcoming changes in the EU sugar regime.” Kenya launched the strategy in 2007. The overall sugar strategy is expected to be implemented during the timeframe of the 2008-2013 CSP.</p> <p>In terms of trade, the CSP highlights that the EC recognises the dependence of ACP countries on a number of export commodities and is developing accompanying measures to help local producers and processors adapt to the higher hygiene and food safety standards required in international trade. The forthcoming EU policy on Aid for Trade, along with the ongoing EPA negotiations, will guide programming of future EU support in this field.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 26&amp;27</i></p>

<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Programme sucre</b></p> <p>L'objectif de la stratégie nationale d'adaptation du secteur sucrier (SNASS) adoptée en 2006 est de relancer la production nationale pour atteindre l'autosuffisance nationale à l'horizon 2012-2015. Cet objectif passe par la privatisation du secteur et l'amélioration de la productivité des sites existants, pour améliorer la compétitivité de la production nationale face à aux importations, dont les droits d'entrée ont été fortement abaissés à partir de 2006.</p> <p>La stratégie d'accompagnement de l'UE a pour objectif de faciliter les investissements privés et appuyer le renforcement de la compétitivité de la filière, à travers la réalisation d'études (diagnostics industriels, possibilités de diversification, etc) et l'appui à la relance et à l'amélioration de la production paysanne.</p> <p>Durant la période couverte par le PIP 2007-2010, les appuis apportés par la CE à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale ont consisté en :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• La mobilisation d'expertises pour évaluer les possibles impacts environnementaux de la stratégie, préciser son coût, identifier les investissements et réhabilitations prioritaires à réaliser et appuyer les réformes à adopter</li> <li>• Le renforcement des capacités d'intervention du Centre Malgache de la Canne et du Sucre(CMCS) et la reprise de son programme d'amélioration variétale (introduction de nouvelles variétés, production de vitro-plants et quarantaine, installation de pré-pépinières)</li> <li>• La réalisation d'une première tranche de travaux de réhabilitation des infrastructures d'irrigation du site d'Ambilobe, pour environ 25% du montant total estimé des travaux prioritaires à réaliser</li> <li>• La mise en place d'essais variétaux sur Ambilobe et de 240 ha de pépinières pour la fourniture de boutures aux planteurs indépendants.</li> </ul> <p>La mise en œuvre du PIP 2007-2010 a rencontré de sérieuses difficultés. La crise politique prévalant à Madagascar a engendré la perte des allocations 2008 à 2010 (soit 6,9 M€ et 82% de l'allocation prévue pour le programme 2007-2010) et bloqué les avancées attendues au niveau institutionnel pour faciliter les investissements dans le secteur.</p> <p><i>Source : Mesures d'accompagnement en faveur des pays signataires du protocole sucre (AMSP), Programme Indicatif Pluriannuel 2001-2013 pour Madagascar</i></p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>According to Mali's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the EU's regional support is supposed to help Mali deal with the competition issues and comply with sanitary regulations.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 36.</i></p>
<b>Overall</b>	<p>All modifications of EU policies are circulated for comments (and no-objection) and these inter service consultations give the opportunity to check the consistency of proposed changes with the cooperation policy objectives and the COM principles and objectives. If there are any inconsistencies, these are picked up and noted. In some cases, like the sugar or banana, specific steps will be taken to compensate the negative effects.</p> <p>But in fact the position of the Commission might not prevail as MS also have their own positions: compromises are thus reached in all cases.</p> <p><i>Source: MN912</i></p>

<b>PAC</b>	<p>Reforms of the sugar sector and its implications on Pacific countries are being addressed by a specific programme aiming at restructuring and diversifying.</p> <p>The EPA negotiations are taken in consideration in the elaboration of the Pacific RSP/RIP.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 57-58</i></p> <p>The evaluation notes that the Commission has made no contribution to the development of private sector capacity, despite a lack of capacity for business innovation to take advantage of new opportunities arising from trade liberalisation.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission's support to the ACP Pacific region, 2007, page 2.</i></p>
<b>SUG</b>	<p>The EC adopted the accompanying measures for the Sugar Protocol in 2005. In Kenya sugar reforms are being addressed by developing a response strategy for the "Adaptation Strategy to forthcoming changes in the EU sugar regime." Kenya launched the strategy in 2007. The overall sugar strategy is expected to be implemented during the timeframe of the 2008-2013 CSP.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 27</i></p>
<b>SUG</b>	<p>The AMSP programme supports the implementation by SP countries of National Adaptation Strategies (NAP) to the price reduction of their sugar exports to the EU and to the removal of preferential access to the EU market for their sugar exports. NAPs include (in varying proportion from one SP country to another one) measures aimed at (i) improving competitiveness of the sugar sector; (ii) diversification within or outside the sugar sector; (iii) addressing the broader impacts (social, environment) of the adaptation process.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Sugar Protocol comes from Brussels and the Sugar reform in the EU. With the SP support, a lot of infrastructures have been supported in Tanzania. There synergies with other sectors too: environment, child labour, corporate social responsibility (mainly at the level of sugar processing companies for workers), gender awareness.</p> <p><i>Source: MN138</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Efforts should normally be made to maximise synergies between the EPAs and the CSP</p> <p>The EU supports Vanuatu's efforts to comply with OECD good governance standards, in the area of exchange of information and transparency standards. This is however not in direct link with the agricultural commodities sector.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 33</i></p>
<b>J.7.2</b>	<p><b><i>Commission' support in other areas has achieved synergies with Commission support to agricultural commodities</i></b></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Particularly in the banana sector, the EU support has achieved synergies, through support to producers and to a research institute at the same time.</p> <p>Secondly, support has been provided to Cameroon in trade negotiations and dealing with the impacts of the EPA agreement (a temporary agreement was signed). This support also includes aid to agro-entreprises.</p>

<b>GH overall</b>	Strong synergies between the support to the cocoa sector and other supports have been found for feeder roads and trade (notably the use of pesticides for Maximum Residue Limits and standards) and between the cocoa support and the All ACP programme.
<b>MG</b>	Les fonds Stabex ont financé le renforcement des capacités des institutions en charge de la normalisation et du contrôle de la qualité et contribué à la constitution d'un noyau de négociateurs de l'APE.
<b>UG</b>	The EC provided technical assistance to help Uganda meeting the EU regulations related to the trade of agricultural commodities and fisheries products
<b>I.7.2.1</b>	Specific initiatives have been launched by the European Community in other related policy areas to support the objectives of the Communication related to agricultural commodities in CDDCs
<b>ACP-IF</b>	<p>The MTS-IF which provides support for all ACPs to integrate into the Multilateral Trading System (MTS), to mainstream trade into their national development strategies and to translate trade needs into PRSPs. The MTS-IF is typically a TRA funded from regional funds with a much wider scope than just agriculture. Over the period of project implementation, many activities undertaken would (if successful) directly contribute to ACP's insertion into the world economy and would indirectly contribute to improve the CDDC's negotiating capabilities in the trade rounds and their capacities to make the most of their agricultural commodities exports. Two projects stand out as being directly relevant to agricultural commodities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Dominican Republic: build capacity in the negotiations <b>on trade in Agriculture</b></li> <li>○ Seychelles: Laws and Regulations dealing with <b>SPS measures</b> are brought in conformity with international standards and the regulatory bodies dealing with SPS strengthened.</li> </ul> <p>In addition, the MTS-IF has funded participation of some country representatives to the <b>cotton negotiations</b> (in BF in 2010).</p> <p>The project complements the Trade.com project which supports the EPA negotiations.</p> <p><i>Source: Project intervention sheet, MN 986.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>There is no evidence of initiatives launched by the EC to support the objectives of the Communication.</p> <p>According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Burkina Faso, the country benefitted from proximity actions support from the EU general budget, for projects co-financed with NGOs for food security, environment, etc.</p> <p>Support to transport infrastructure is also meant to help de-isolate rural areas to facilitate agricultural commodity transport to and from rural areas. This is of particular importance for the cotton sector for which the competitiveness is highly dependent on transport costs to international harbours.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 24</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	Outre ce qui est indiqué à I.7.1.2, il n'ya pas de référence à cet indicateur.

	<p><b>Toutefois, les résultats de l'intervention concernent également d'autres secteurs que le secteur agricole bien qu'elles y soient fortement liées, à savoir : R2</b> « Le programme national de sécurisation du foncier rural (PNSFR) approfondit et étend ses activités dans les zones d'agriculture paysanne d'exportation » et <b>R3</b> « Les pistes rurales sont durablement réhabilitées » (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5-6</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The EC has supported agricultural commodities through the banana budget line (Assistance Technique et Financière bananes), from 1999 to 2006. Through its support to research (through the FSIP: Food Security Thematic Programme), the EC has supported the CARBAP (Centre Africain de Recherche sur les Bananiers et Plantains) which has undertaken research project on banana diseases, etc.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 993, 994, 995, 996</i></p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE is directly targeting other policy areas (the strengthening of the competitiveness of the economy and the facilitation of its insertion in the regional and world economy) and aims at one of the results of the COM(2004), in particular "Raised competitiveness of commodities and the economy." However, it should be noted that this intervention does not target agricultural commodities, or explicitly their competitiveness. The intervention focuses on a support to productive capacities, to the upgrading of enterprises and to the reinforcement of quality systems.</p> <p><i>Source: Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Financing Proposal of the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II mentions that the programme is complementary to the "All ACP Agricultural Commodities Programme". But the Financing Proposal mentions there are no other ongoing EC projects in the cocoa sector.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Proposal, page 3</i></p>
<b>SUG</b>	<p>There is no evidence of synergies between the AMSP programme and other EC initiatives. <b>On the contrary:</b> the Everything but Arms initiated eroded the preference which SP countries enjoyed for their sugar exports to the EU.</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>The EC SBS is not commodity specific. This being reminded, the programme TAPs note (i) that prior to this programme the EC had already provided support to NARS and NAADS through Stabex funds and (ii) that the EC is also involved in complementary interventions in rural infrastructure; rural credit; and marketing and agro-processing.</p>
<b>I.7.2.2</b>	<p>Evidence of initiatives in other policy areas that reinforced the success of agricultural commodity support interventions</p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP final evaluation report notes that programmes other than the PIP attained the PIP's objectives in certain countries where the PIP was not implemented (Madagascar, Mali &amp; the Dominican Republic). It is however not specified whether these other programmes were linked to the EU or not.</p> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 34</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>According to the SFA impact evaluation report, the EIB's credit programmes have</p>

	<p>had a complementary activity in African countries.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 19, htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Support to transport infrastructure is also meant to help de-isolate rural areas to facilitate agricultural commodity transport to and from rural areas. This is of particular importance for the cotton sector for which the competitiveness is highly dependent on transport costs to international harbours.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 24</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Outre ce qui est indiqué à I.7.1.2, il n’ya pas de référence à cet indicateur. Toutefois, les résultats de l’intervention concernent également d’autres secteurs que le secteur agricole bien qu’elles y soient fortement liées, à savoir : <b>R2</b> « Le programme national de sécurisation du foncier rural (PNSFR) approfondit et étend ses activités dans les zones d’agriculture paysanne d’exportation » et <b>R3</b> « Les pistes rurales sont durablement réhabilitées » (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5-6</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The EC support to banana research reinforced its interventions supporting the banana sector.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 993, 994, 995, 996</i></p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIPs. The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP agricultural objectives rather concern food security than commodity support and dependence.</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Financing Proposal of the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II mentions that the programme is complementary to the “All ACP Agricultural Commodities Programme”. But the Financing Proposal mentions there are no other ongoing EC projects in the cocoa sector.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Proposal, page 3</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>Since the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme has not yet achieved its objectives, since it recently began and is not yet over.</p> <p>According to the programme’s Financing Agreement, there is evidence of other EU initiatives which are complementary to the PAN-SPSO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Pesticides Initiative Programme supports ACP countries in addressing Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) issues;</li> <li>▪ The Strengthening Fishery Products Health Conditions in ACP/OCT Countries programme also addresses SPS issues, but not for agricultural products;</li> <li>▪ The EC PARI II supports work on industry standards in West Africa to reinforce SPS capacities, mainly through laboratory support;</li> <li>▪ The EC supports the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) representation in Africa to “prepare national veterinary services to fulfil international SPS requirements for Rinderpest and declaration of other diseases constraining trade of animals”;</li> <li>▪ The DG TRADE supports African countries (among others) through the “Participation Trust Fund” which provides funding to the International</li> </ul>



	<p>Standard-setting Organisations (ISSOs) for SPS expert missions to and from developing countries;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The DG RESEARCH supports research programmes in the field of “Food Quality and Safety”, which provides vital information for standard-setting meetings.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 17</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui. La Délégation estime que les différents instruments sont complémentaires. En effet, l'idéal serait de continuer Stabex, lignes budgétaires (banane, sucre et sécurité alimentaire) et FED car cela permet d'avoir un <u>mix d'outils</u> (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de <u>prendre en compte l'ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole</u> malgache (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (Source : MN 804 et débriefing Délégation).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>We can consider the EU's support in road infrastructure is supposed to increase the cotton exports competitiveness by reducing transport costs. The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that this support did have a positive effect but that progress still has to be made to avoid a rapid degradation of the new roads.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 29 &amp; 30</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Uganda didn't benefit from the banana and sugar support programmes which aimed at alleviating the impact on producing countries of changes in the EU policy concerning these products.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>According to Uganda's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the European Communities Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has helped local populations affected by the conflicts in the North and in Karamoja. Micro-projects managed by the local government were also supported in the Acholi and Karamoja programmes.</p> <p>Although these interventions are not directly linked to the commodity sector, it has helped to restore capacities in the rural areas devastated by the conflicts.</p> <p>EC support in the area of transport infrastructure has also improved the country's export potential.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 22</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>The 2002-2007 RSP/RIP mentions under its “Other EC Policies” section that SADC and the EC have a long-standing commercial links through the Sugar and Beef Commodity Protocols. This includes agreements allowing the SADC region to export meat to EC (beef and veal) with important reduction in import levies. The strategy paper highlights that the SADC have not yet benefited fully of these agreements.</p> <p>It is also underlined that SADC has expressed concerns about the coherence of the EU's agricultural and consumer health policies, notably related to sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may have a rather negative impact on the countries in the region.</p> <p>Finally, the EC's trade policy has encouraged the integration of SADC countries</p>

	<p>into the world economy through the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. So the EU has granted duty free market access for all products originating from the Least Developed Countries, with the only temporary exceptions being bananas, rice and sugar.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 24</i></p> <p>The 2008-2013 SADC RSP/RIP mentions that synergies between the RSPs/RIPs in the SADC Member States and EU trade policies and agreements (including EPA) need to be maximised. Agriculture and food security remain at the core agenda of the SADC's development agenda. The EU CAP reform is changing in order to be more market-oriented and less dependent on market support measures, in particular to be in line with the DDA process to phase out export subsidies by 2013. The Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative and the accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol also remain tools to facilitate SADC Member States' access to trade.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 37</i></p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project relies on the mechanism of Fair Trade faire trade certification, which is a private initiative.
<b>I.7.2.3</b>	Evidence that the Commission has contributed to alleviating negative impacts of changes in international trade rules (such as rules of origin)
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA impact evaluation report states that in the competitiveness-oriented countries, the SFA helped the banana sector align to market requirements and EU environmental standards and policies.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 31 &amp; 36, htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>CI</b>	Oui dans une certaine mesure. Dans le cadre du PIN 10ème FED, les partenaires sont convenus, au titre des actions « hors concentration » d'une inscription financière complémentaire pour les filières agricoles. L'objectif spécifique sera de <u>renforcer la capacité d'offre</u> et la compétitivité des produits agricoles <u>pour faciliter leur accès aux marchés extérieurs</u> . Les <u>principales interventions</u> prévues visent notamment la réduction des coûts de production et de mise en marché des produits, et la création d'un environnement favorisant une <u>meilleure prise en compte des risques en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité sanitaire des aliments mais aussi des évolutions de la demande</u> . (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).
<b>CM</b>	<p>The banana sector of Cameroon has benefited from the banana budget line funds in order to comply with market requirements and changes.</p> <p>The BAM (Banana Accompanying Measures) are planned to help ACP banana producers cope with the erosion of preferences to the EU market. However, due to difficulties on agreements between the EU Parliament and Commission, beneficiaries have still not been able to benefit from funding, while the tariff preference erosion has already started.</p> <p>The ATF (Assistance Technique et Financière) projects on bananas in Cameroon were also designed to help the country deal with reforms of the trade regime of the EU banana market. The funds were also used to comply with non-tariff changes of</p>

	<p>the EU market (certification requirements such as GlobalGap).</p> <p>Interviewees from the banana sector insisted however on the fact that the accompanying measures were generally smaller and much slower than the adverse effects of the EU trade reforms.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 994</i></p> <p>In the framework of the EPA negotiations and the temporary agreement that was signed between the EU and Cameroon, the EC began supporting Cameroon through the PASAPE programme. This programme is supposed to help the country cope with the effects of liberalisation on its industry and help it build capacity in trade negotiations.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 971</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The Integrated Development Programme for the Caribbean Rum Sector is actually intended to mitigate the impact on Caribbean rum producers of the liberalisation of the EU rum market. (See above I.7.1.2)</p>
<b>MG coffee</b>	<p>Oui. <u>L'UE a eu une contribution importante dans le développement des normes et de la qualité</u> (café, girofle) mais les producteurs n'ont pas été suffisamment impliqués et nécessitent d'être formés sur le long terme (travail de longue haleine). Il y a encore des obstacles à l'exportation du fait <u>d'insuffisances dans le respect des normes sanitaires et phytosanitaires</u>. Il y a eu des produits refoulés (café, huiles essentielles, légumineuses). Les services vétérinaires et de la protection des végétaux seront des cibles de l'UDPR (Unité de Politique de Développement Rural) pour des actions de formation. Il y également une nécessité de professionnaliser les secteurs exportateurs (litchis, girofle) pour répondre aux normes internationales. (Source : MN 805).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>A part from the fact that the EU provides support to help Mali (and other countries of the region) comply with sanitary measures, no evidence of EU measures alleviating negative impacts of rule changes can be found in Mali's CSP/NIPs.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 36.</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>There is evidence that the EC has relaxed the rules of origin for PACPs, but in the fisheries sector. No further details are available.</p> <p>There is also evidence that trade-related assistance provided by the EC's 8<sup>th</sup> EDF has helped PACPs undertake trade-related negotiations in the area of WTO-related rules</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 45 &amp; 54</i></p>
<b>SN</b>	<p>Dans le PIN 9<sup>ème</sup> FED on prévoir d'appuyer le commerce (avec des études, formations ou autres appuis spécifiques) dans la perspective des Accords de Partenariat Economique (APE).</p> <p>Source : CSP 2002-2007</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Mixed. According the MAAIF (Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and</p>

	<p>Fisheries), Uganda <u>needs support in SPS regulatory services</u>. FAO provided technical support in 2002 in order to have quality products sent to the EU market (FAO provided capacity building and equipment at airport and border crossing points). There is a need of training in the EU regulatory mechanism (e.g. plant protection regulations). According the MAAIF, <u>nothing has been done in that field for a very long time</u>. (Source: MN 304).</p> <p>Nevertheless, EC provided <u>trade related technical assistance</u> notably in relation with SPS to help Uganda meeting the EU regulations related to the trade of agricultural commodities and fisheries products (Source: ppt debriefing).</p>
<b>I.7.2.4</b>	Stakeholders' views on the Commission support given in the area of capacity building for trade negotiation
<b>GH</b>	<p>The EU support for trade negotiation: there is a unit in Brussels which supports trade negotiating capacities. We've seen them at least three times. The experience is very positive as they bring in experts from outside who offer different perspectives.</p> <p><i>Source: MN134</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>“Les Camerounais ont été poussé dans le dos” : on leur a chaudement demandé de signer un APE transitoire ou APE d'étape.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 408</i></p> <p>According to interviewees, the EC support to trade negotiations in Cameroon – which is done through the PASAPE programme – is mandatory to maintain the country up to date in EPA negotiations. The programme finances several studies to help decision making. However, procedural problems impede on the use that can be made of these studies, as several of them are blocked for the moment.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 971</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	L'ensemble des intervenants semblent satisfaits des approches développées par la CE (peu de commentaires critiques sur ce sujet ont été émis)
<b>J.7.3</b>	<b><i>Commission' support to agricultural commodities has taken into account Commission transversal policies regarding gender, environment, protection of human rights, corporate responsibility (including child labour and other social rights) and HIV/AIDS in CDDCs</i></b>
<b>BF Coton</b>	La prise en compte des questions genre/ environnement: est explicite dans le secteur coton biologique (environnement/ genre) à travers l'intervention ICCO/Helvetas/UNPCB, « Amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques ». Cette prise en compte n'apparaît pas dans les autres interventions.
<b>BF Cashew nuts</b>	La prise en compte des questions genre/ environnement: est réalisée dans l'appui de la Commission à la production et transformation d'anacarde et sésame (genre et environnement) à travers l'intervention RONGEAD/INADES-B
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Formation de 500 femmes pour la transformation artisanale de produits agricoles
<b>CM</b>	Des actions transversales ont été entreprises au Cameroun dans deux domaines : Bananes: certifications ISO14000 et Globalgap ont intégré les standards EU (environnement) – il y a une sensibilisation spécifique au SIDA sans qu'il y ait une

	<p>prévalence particulière dans les zones des plantations</p> <p>Opération séchoirs cacao: les séchoirs mis en place sous financement Stabex permettent une économie substantielle en bois de chauffe par rapport aux fours traditionnels</p>
<b>GH overall</b>	The projects looked at included transversal considerations such as protection of the environment (notably through intercropping and responsible pesticide use), training of farmers on issues including gender awareness, child labour, occupational safety and health.
<b>MG</b>	Les appels à proposition pour l'utilisation des fonds Stabex imposaient la prise en compte de dimensions transversales (genre, environnement). La Délégation a assuré de manière assez formelle un suivi de la mise en application de ces dimensions dans la mise en œuvre des projets.
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Gender and environment (climate change) are given an increasing attention in the implementation of the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project.</p> <p>According to some studies, the climate change is major threat on coffee production in Uganda. Farmers shall have to invest in irrigation systems if temperature raises and rain diminishes.</p>
<b>I.7.3.1</b>	Evidence of reference to these cross-cutting issues <b>in strategy and programming</b> documents
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Programming documents of the AAACP programme mention that gender, environment and good governance are cross-cutting themes to deal with activities that it will support.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP financing agreement mentions that the Programme will have a positive environmental impact, by reducing pesticide use and reducing use of the most dangerous types.</p> <p>It also mentions that the Programme will increase the incomes of women and young producers, who are much implicated in horticultural production or more receptive due to their higher level of education (in the case of young producers).</p> <p>No references are made to child labour or to HIV/AIDS.</p> <p><i>Source: PIP financing agreement, page 20.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>Certain cross-cutting issues have been taken into account in the SFA, as is shown in the results below:</p> <p>The SFA evaluation found no examples of systematic <b>environmental</b> impact assessment of banana production, despite high levels of agrochemical applications. According to the evaluators, there is a tacit assumption that they are “necessary evils” and a sine qua non of commercial agro-industry. Only one EC delegation assigned funds for environmental monitoring.</p> <p>However, improvements to production methods in line with agricultural and environmental practices required for certification have been operated in all countries</p>

	<p>(e.g. adhering to international phytosanitary regulations, reducing levels of agrochemical applications, etc.). These improvements were mostly funded by the industry with co-funding by the SFA.</p> <p>Although the improvement of <b>working conditions</b> were mainly driven by market quality and safety protocols, the SFA (co-)funding facilitated the necessary adaptations (packing sheds, improved observance of worker health and safety practices, etc.)</p> <p>Diversification funds have been used to support <b>social development</b> programs, developing <b>socioeconomic infrastructure</b> (water, sanitation, roads, etc.) and investing in <b>education</b> programmes.</p> <p>Except for the case of Cameroon, no information could be found in the SFA evaluation on <b>gender, HIV/AIDS</b> and <b>child labour</b> issues.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 29, htspe, 2008.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country Reports, page 76, htspe, 2008.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP doesn't include commodity chain support. But the 2001-2007 CSP/NIP mentions that gender, environment and institutional capacity development are systematically taken into account in all the interventions. It is however a "blanket paragraph" and further information cannot be found concerning transversal issues in agricultural support.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 7</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Deux des objectifs globaux que l'action contribue à atteindre sont :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Promouvoir la <b>représentation des femmes</b> dans les filières agricoles nationales et l'autonomisation économique des femmes</li> <li>(2) Favoriser la <b>préservation des ressources naturelles</b> par la promotion de pratiques culturelles agrobiologiques et la démonstration d'une reforestation rentable économiquement pour les populations</li> </ol> <p><i>(Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 2).</i></p> <p>Une des recommandations du MR est « vi) Adopter une approche genre, qui permette aux femmes de suivre les formations, pour élargir leurs compétences et les rendre plus autonomes ». <i>(Source : MR p. 3).</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Les documents de programmation de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde ne font pas référence aux questions d'environnement, des droits humains, de responsabilité d'entreprise ou de VIH/SIDA. Selon le cadre logique d'intervention, elle vise cependant à ce que le développement de la transformation de l'anacarde se fasse principalement par les femmes.</p> <p><i>Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Rapport année 4, page 4</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés <b>sauf concernant</b></p>

	<p><b>P'environnement dont la situation est décrite :</b></p> <p>La dégradation de l'environnement, déjà peu maîtrisée avant la crise dans certains domaines (pollution d'eau, déchets, déforestation), s'accélère suite à l'absence de mécanismes de contrôle dans plusieurs zones, à l'appauvrissement rapide de la population et à l'exploitation illicite de certaines ressources naturelles. Les questions environnementales n'occupent pas une place prioritaire dans les décisions politiques et stratégiques. La dégradation alarmante des conditions de vie, surtout des jeunes, présente un haut risque pour la stabilité sociopolitique future du pays. (Source : Rider FA p.8)</p>
CI	<p>La stratégie de <b>coopération dans ces secteurs sera soigneusement analysée en vue de déterminer si une analyse environnementale, et le cas échéant, de quel type, doit être entreprise</b>. La Commission s'assurera de leur mise en œuvre et veillera à ce que les conclusions de ces études soient intégrées dans les programmes analyses. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.37).</p> <p>Stratégie de développement de la Côte d'Ivoire : pour l'axe « <b>réduction de la pauvreté</b> », l'objectif poursuivi est de réduire l'incidence de la pauvreté, assurer de façon durable l'accès aux services sociaux de base et <b>réduire les inégalités et les disparités régionales</b>. Pour améliorer l'accessibilité équitable et assurer la qualité des services sociaux de base, les stratégies suivantes seront adoptées : poursuite de la politique de l'école obligatoire pour atteindre les pauvres, promotion d'un système de sécurité sociale efficace, permettant à tous d'accéder aux soins de santé, <b>prise en compte des dimensions genre et environnement dans les programmes de développement</b>, adoption de l'approche participative à travers la décentralisation et l'aménagement du territoire pour moderniser les infrastructures et réduire les inégalités et disparités régionales (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.17).</p> <p>Plus spécifiquement, en <b>matière de santé dans le cadre du 2<sup>ème</sup> secteur de concentration « Cohésion sociale et réhabilitations »</b>, l'objectif spécifique suivant sera poursuivi : une meilleure adéquation entre les besoins élémentaires des populations les plus vulnérables et l'offre des prestations sanitaires, en particulier pour les populations rurales défavorisées ou fragilisées et celles des zones urbaines et périurbaines, avec notamment la <b>lutte contre le VIH/SIDA</b>. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.17).</p>
CM-ONG	<p><u>Genre :</u></p> <p>A côté de l'approche participative on adoptera aussi une perspective de genre: la promotion de l'égalité de genre n'est pas assumée comme objectif indépendant mais comme perspective stratégique transversale à la réalisation de tout le projet. On connaît, en effet, la condition de marginalisation, de discrimination économique et sociale des femmes dans la zone d'intervention – même dans la réalité des GIC – et, d'autre part, l'importance de leur contribution pour atteindre les objectifs du projet. La discrimination de genre, en effet, en limitant les capacités et les potentialités des femmes, limite aussi l'apport fondamental qu'elles peuvent amener au développement économique et social.</p> <p>La <u>durabilité socioculturelle</u> est largement détaillée (Source : Annexe I p. 14).</p> <p><u>Peu de référence à l'environnement :</u></p>

	L'action aura un impact sur le contexte social et environnemental aussi bien à court terme qu'à long terme. (Source : Annexe I p. 26).
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not directly tackle agricultural commodities. The formulation documents of the PASAPE do not evidence the inclusion of specific measures targeting cross-cutting issues.</p> <p>Sources:</p> <p><i>Commission européenne, Proposition de financement n°9 ACP CM 18</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006</i>  <i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The first CSP did not envisage specific support to agricultural commodities. The second CSP foresees support to agricultural commodities and includes measures to target gender:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The support envisaged under the second focal area (Trade and regional integration) to competitiveness through the reinforcement of productive and export capacities includes reference to measures targeting gender: <i>“des activités pilotes de réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural par l'exportation, avec un accent particulier sur l'habilitation des groupements associatifs féminins. »</i></li> <li>▪ The support envisaged under the non-focal sector to rural development foresees that activities will be implemented according to a participatory approach (gender).</li> </ul> <p>Sources :</p> <p><i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The CSPs refer to the cross-cutting issues.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>CSP 2001-2007 : « En outre, comme stipulé dans l'Article 20 de l'Accord du Traité de la Communauté Européenne, en vue de leur intégration dans tous les domaines de la coopération, une prise en compte systématique des questions thématiques ou transversales suivantes sera assurée : les questions de genre, l'environnement, le développement institutionnel et le renforcement des capacités. »</i></li> <li>▪ <i>CSP 2008-2013 : « La Communauté adoptera une méthode plus rigoureuse pour intégrer les questions transversales suivantes: la démocratie, la bonne gouvernance, les droits de l'homme, les droits de l'enfant et des populations indigènes, l'égalité des sexes, la préservation de l'environnement à long terme et la lutte contre le VIH/SIDA. »</i></li> </ul> <p>Sources :</p> <p><i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, page 18</i></p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The FA of the Commission programme also noted that the project would also “directly address environmental issues, especially in the research of alternative practices to the excessive use of chemicals in agriculture and of the destination of industrial wastes.” Moreover, it stresses that the “programme will positively impact on rural incomes, rural employment and women”.</p>



	<p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The Caribbean Rum programme subsidised investment by rum companies in the area of waste management.  But the TAPs of the Financing Agreement do not make any reference to cross-cutting issues.</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No. The evaluation highlights that apart from the environment for which specific projects have been implemented (e.g. CULP Natural Resources Management) and EIA obligations for EIB projects, <u>cross-cutting issues have not been specifically addressed throughout all the EDFs</u> that fall under the scope of this evaluation. The evaluation has not found any evidence of base-line bench marking material for monitoring purposes, particularly in the case of gender. Whilst it is acknowledged that poverty alleviation may not be regarded as a priority area in the region, there are concerns that the combination of the specific climatic conditions of the region and increased globalisation are having a significant impact on poverty levels.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>Cross-cutting issues have not been specifically addressed throughout the regional programmes covered by this evaluation. There is no evidence of benchmarking material for monitoring gender issues, for example. Whereas poverty alleviation may not be regarded as the dominant priority in the region, there are no studies on the impact of regional integration and trade policies on poverty issues. Environment is a notable exception. Specific projects have been implemented and when non-environmental projects have probable environmental impact this dimension is usually taken into account. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. vii</i>).</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP makes reference to the human rights, social protection, environment and HIV/AIDs situation in the ESAIO region (with about one paragraph summarizing the situation for each of these cross-cutting issues, not just a blanket paragraph covering all the issues). The RIP also includes a € 4.5 million budget for the cross-cutting issues.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 17, 22, 23, 24 &amp; 82.</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p><b>For transversal issues, evidences in the consulted document are only related to gender et environment.</b></p> <p><b>Cross Sectoral Appraisals</b> (<i>Source : FP p.7</i>) : Gender review indicated the need for further study under the Project. Earlier environmental reviews indicated the need</p>

	for a material significant component and this has been included.
<b>ET</b>	<p>The mainstreaming approach will be strengthened for <b>four cross-cutting issues</b>: economic and democratic governance, gender equity; environmental sustainability; and the fight against HIV/AIDS (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.3</i>).</p> <p>For both the EC and the EU Member States, the Joint Response <b>will ensure that cross-cutting issues such as human rights, gender equality, the rights of children, environmental sustainability and HIV/AIDS are either addressed by direct interventions or mainstreamed into other programmes</b>. They may also be funded under the <b>EC's thematic and global programmes</b> which likewise provide funding for action on health, food security, water, energy, and trade and private-sector development. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.46</i>).</p> <p>Cross-cutting issues are not integrated into the main components of the Commission programme. Gender and conflict prevention have not been mainstreamed in the Commission programme. A few separate projects, addressing gender issues have been implemented successfully, but with low impact due to their limited scope. HIV/AIDS and environment appear better integrated into focal sector operations (food security and transport). (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p iii</i>).</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal refers to the following cross-cutting issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Environment: The programme aims at promoting the reconversion to intercropping with shading trees (or the maintaining of these trees, rather than practicing sunlight monocropping);</li> <li>▪ Gender: Women are generally under-represented in farmer organisations and the programme aims at studying more deeply gender aspects;</li> <li>▪ Child labour: Information on the subject is meant to be given in the extension trainings (e.g. the Farm Field Schools).</li> <li>▪ HIV/AIDS: Information on the subject is meant to be given in the extension trainings (e.g. the Farm Field Schools).</li> <li>▪ Governance: There is so far almost no room for cocoa producer organisations and the private sector in the decision making of the cocoa sector.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Proposal, page 16</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>There are references to the environment, child labour and trafficking, HIV/AIDS, human rights and gender issues in the CSP/NIP.</p> <p>There is a working group on AIDS in the donor programmes, although the EC is not part of it, considering there are already a sufficient number of donors in the group.</p> <p>The CSP/NIP mentions that the EC activities will, among other cross-cutting issues focus on decent working principles, notably regarding child labour.</p> <p>The EC is however member of the environment/natural resource working group, <i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 36, 54, 78, 79, 114 &amp; 138.</i></p>

	<p>There is evidence of the inclusion of these cross-cutting issues in the support strategies: all EC interventions include gender issues, the NIP includes an “environment” non-focal sector, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy includes a National Gender &amp; Children’s Policy.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 25 and 140</i></p> <p>There is evidence of the inclusion of these cross-cutting issues in the support strategies: all EC interventions include gender issues, the NIP includes an “environment” non-focal sector, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy includes a National Gender &amp; Children’s Policy.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 25 and 140</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The financing agreement states that since the PAN-SPSO is a training and capacity building intervention, it will pay attention to ensure an equal gender distribution among trainees.</p> <p>It also states that beneficiaries will be advised to take environmental impacts into account when elaborating their national SPS standards.</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, pages 37 &amp; 38.</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>The EC strategy to support the Agriculture and Rural development sector focal sector explicitly mentions that particular attention will be paid to crosscutting environmental/biodiversity issues, the role and position of women and, when appropriate, to trade related technical support.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 30</i></p> <p>The 2008-2013 CSP mentions that agriculture – among other sectors, faces a serious problem in the form of child labour and that the government of Kenya will work on mainstreaming child labour prevention into other national laws and policies. This needs to permeate into the Education Act, the Children’s Act, the Industry Act and policy documents like the orphans and vulnerable children policy.</p> <p>In addition, the EC response strategy of the 2008-2013 underlines that cross-cutting issues covered by EC development cooperation will include: (i) democracy, good governance and human rights; (ii) gender equality and equity; (iii) environmental sustainability; (iv) the fight against HIV/AIDS; and (v) conflict management and peace-building. A percentage of the overall financial envelope for each sector will be set aside specifically to ensure integration of cross-cutting issues.</p> <p>Finally, the Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA) that will be supported by the EC integrate the cross-cutting issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cross-cutting governance issues are addressed by support for demand-driven community-based projects and also by increasing the responsiveness and accountability of service delivery at local level.</li> <li>▪ Gender and conflict management will also be mainstreamed into the programming process.</li> <li>▪ The environment is an integral part of the SRA and will be specifically targeted</li> </ul>

	<p>in community-based projects and support for sound environmental management practices at national and local levels, by responsive research and extension, including compliance with environment-related regulations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Activities relating to HIV/AIDS should be integrated and budgeted in every project.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 16, 31 &amp; 37</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The TAPs attached to the Financing Agreements of PASAM1 and PASAM2 do not make reference to any cross-cutting issue.
<b>MG</b>	<p>La CE adoptera une méthode plus rigoureuse pour intégrer les <b>questions transversales suivantes</b> : la démocratie, la bonne gouvernance, les droits de l'homme, les droits des enfants et des populations indigènes, égalité des sexes, la préservation de l'environnement à long terme et la lutte contre le VIH/SIDA (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.3).</p> <p>Projets et programmes hors secteurs de concentration : la participation des Acteurs Non Etatiques s'est traduite par de nombreuses actions sur l'ensemble du pays représentant plus de 50 M€ entre 2002 et 2007 (au titre du FED et du budget des CE) en appui à la santé reproductive et la lutte contre le VIH/SIDA, la santé de la mère et de l'enfant, l'eau et l'assainissement, le développement local et urbain, la sécurité alimentaire, la préservation de l'environnement, la réinsertion socio-économique de groupes défavorisés, la promotion des droits justiciables, l'aide en milieu carcéral, le développement humain et l'éducation, les droits des enfants et la protection contre la maltraitance, l'accompagnement social et le genre. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.71).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>According to Mali's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the EC will adopt a rigorous methodology to deal with the following cross-cutting issues: good governance, human rights and rights of children and of indigenous populations, gender equality, long term environment preservation and HIV/AIDS.</p> <p>Many other references are made to the current situation or interventions concerning all of the above.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 12, 22, 40, 65, 70, 107, 144, etc.</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The FA and MR indicate that all SPC (implementing agency) activities are conducted in accordance with CROP (Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific) gender policy and promote the involvement of women in agricultural activities and that SPC activities give high emphasis to the sustainable management of natural resources.</p> <p><i>Source: FA, page 9, MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p> <p>With regards to the environment, the MR notes that the project contributes positively to this by placing strong emphasis on the sustainable management of natural resources and helping participating firms to improve their environmental practices; several first are exemplary from the environmental point of view, helping primary producers use sustainable methods of agroforestry, and even exporting products which will be used in ways that increase sustainability.</p>

	<p>The project has also played an important role in supporting the development of organic production and of Fair Trade in the Pacific region.</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP refers to the following cross-cutting issues (in a blanket paragraph):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Democracy, good governance, human rights, the rights of children and of indigenous people;</li> <li>▪ Gender equality;</li> <li>▪ Environmental sustainability;</li> <li>▪ Combating HIV/AIDS.</li> </ul> <p>In the non-focal areas of support, the EC allocates funds to non-state actor activities. The selection of beneficiaries is inter alia based on their provision of capacity building in the mentioned cross-cutting issues.</p> <p>There is also mention that “<i>attention will be paid to specific activities aimed at mainstreaming gender equality in both focal areas</i>”.</p> <p>Environmental sustainability is the second focal area of support of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 60 &amp; 72</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>The 2002-2007 SADC RSP/RIP makes reference to HIV/AIDS epidemic and gender policies in the SADC region. Activities are foreseen in the <i>indicative schedule of Activities 2002-2007</i> of the RIP for these issues (2004, 2007).</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 18&amp;19</i></p> <p>The EC strategy to SADC region for the period 2008-2013 stipulates that gender and HIV/AIDS will be mainstreamed through capacity development programme under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 41</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>The overall objectives of the ICART programme are in line with standards and guidelines defined with respect to gender, HIV, AIDS, Poverty and Environmental issues.</p> <p><i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, page 17</i></p>
<b>SUG</b>	<p>Most EC response strategies to the NASs foresee a Strategic Environment Assessment of the NAS. A SEA has actually been completed in Trinidad-and-Tobago and in Mauritius in 2007. In Côte d’Ivoire environmental assessments have been carried out on each of the four sugar estates. SEAs are on-going in some other SP countries, but others have been postponed. The main problem is however that most investments aimed at reducing pollution are under the responsibility of the sugar companies. These investments are not ranking high on their agenda (and are not eligible to EC support). As pointed out by the manager of a sugar company, these enterprises would pay more attention to the environment if exporting sugar to the EU was made conditional on the implementation of an environment-friendly production process.</p>

	<p>The AMSP study pointed out that sugarcane production involves an aggravation of the HIV/AIDS risk (because of large movements of seasonal workers for the cane harvest). This risk has not been addressed in the NAS, nor in the EC support strategies.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>There are references to the environment/ natural resources and gender cross-cutting issues in the CSPs/NIPs.</p> <p>The 2001-2007 CSP/NIP mentions that gender equality should be mainstreamed in all aspects of programming the response strategy with the ultimate aim of reaching equality between women and men. Likewise, sustainable management of the environment and natural resources is a cross-cutting issue to be incorporated into all areas of cooperation. Possibilities to involve the private sector as partner should be explored throughout.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 21</i></p> <p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that the mainstreaming approach will be strengthened for four cross-cutting issues: democracy, good governance, human rights, the rights of children and indigenous peoples; gender equality; environmental sustainability; and the fight against HIV/AIDS. This is related to the audits conducted by the European Court of Auditors which pointed out the need for better mainstreaming of environment in aid co-operation.</p> <p>Under the 9th EDF, a number of policies impacted on aid delivery in Tanzania. The EU's commitments in the Paris Declaration to scale up aid and to improve its impact and speed of delivery provided an important backdrop, aimed as they were at accelerating progress in order to meet the challenges of the MDGs by 2015.</p> <p>In August 2006, EC adopted a communication on Governance, with recommendations on Good Governance, and an assertion of the importance of regional organisations and the African Union.</p> <p>In January 2006 the EC published guidelines for gender equality which recognizes the importance of a balanced mix of men and women in the planning, decision making and implementation of our projects and programmes, as well as the promoting of women participation in service delivery.</p> <p>In June 2005, the EU adopted the 'Strategy for Africa', which focuses in particular on the best ways to achieve an effective scaling up of development assistance. In December 2005, the EU revised its Development Policy Statement, the "European Consensus", which outlines common strategic objectives as shared by the Member States.</p> <p>In 2006, the Commission adopted the Communication "Towards an EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child (COM (2006) 367)", which included as one of the first actions, the adoption of an "Action Plan on Children and Development." Consultations are ongoing, and the results will guide the Commission in developing a child-centred focus in Tanzania, based on a comprehensive approach to rights.</p>

	<p>Environmental sustainability is a key crosscutting issue, in line with the approach as outlined in the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). For projects, this will be addressed through environmental audit and impact assessment processes. However, the Commission also recognizes that budget support and sector policy support programmes (such as that proposed for transport) bring with them the duty and the opportunity to consolidate and develop effective national environmental management systems. In Tanzania, donors support the implementation of the recently passed Environmental Management Act which establishes standards and an enforcement function as well as mainstreaming the environment through key sector ministries and regional/local government. In addition, the area of environment will be supported through a component of the non-state actor programme.</p> <p>Measures to support energy and climate research (€8 million) are supported by the EC. Taking account of the recent and prolonged energy crisis, Government has requested that provision be made to investigate energy research and supply, taking account of regional supply issues, varying local conditions and needs. In addition, climate change (particularly increasingly erratic patterns of rainfall) has had a major impact on food and water security in Tanzania.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 59 &amp; 60, 67, 75 &amp; 76</i></p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>“The overall PMA design is responsive to gender and environmental issues. With women providing the bulk of agricultural labour force, increasing agricultural productivity for women means a greater return to their labour. (...) Both NAADS and NARS have natural resources management components built in their design, while the NAADS programme is seeking to operationalise its recently-published Poverty and Gender Strategy”.</p> <p>TAPs of the SBS</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Cross-sectoral issues (democracy, good governance, gender equality, environment, conflict sensitivity, human rights and HIV/AIDS) are considered to be “<i>mainstreamed throughout the programme</i>” but there is no further specification of how they are supposed to be.</p> <p>There is however a non-focal sector support programme for democratic governance and civil society. The rural development programme is also supposed to be complemented by a programme of conflict resolution and development assistance in Karamoja.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 9, 29, 37</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>The cross-cutting issues taken into account in the Vanuatu CSP/NIP are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Good governance, children’s rights and the rights of indigenous people;</li> <li>▪ Gender equality;</li> <li>▪ Environmental sustainability;</li> <li>▪ HIV/AIDS.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 68</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>As part of the “Strategic objectives of cooperation with the partner country”, the</p>

	<p>European Community concentrates its efforts on 9 areas, among which agriculture &amp; food security, rural development and territorial planning.</p> <p>The CSP then mentions that the mainstreaming approach will be strengthened for four crosscutting issues (Good governance, children's rights and the rights of indigenous people; Gender equality; Environmental sustainability; HIV/AIDS).</p> <p>There is however no mention of specific measures targeting these cross-cutting issues.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 11</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Les RSP/RIP 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest ne comportent pas de stratégies de filières pour les produits agricoles ni d'identification des besoins de ces filières. Il contient cependant des programmes de soutien en faveur de l'environnement (secteur non-focal d'intervention). Les questions de genre sont, selon le RSP/RIP 2008-2013 incluses en articulation avec toute la stratégie d'intervention (sans explication supplémentaire). Le respect et la promotion des droits humains sont également compris dans les documents. Le VIH/SIDA est aussi évoqué dans les documents de la stratégie régionale mais aucune preuve de soutien de la part de la Commission dans la lutte contre la maladie au niveau régional n'est apparente.</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 60, 61 &amp; 63</i></p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>UTZ certification implies respect for social and environmental criteria:</p> <p>Social Criteria</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ workers are protected by national laws and ILO conventions regarding age, working hours, pensions, working conditions, collective bargaining and safety</li> <li>▪ workers receive training in their own language about safe handling of chemicals</li> <li>▪ workers receive protective clothing for the use of chemicals</li> <li>▪ access to health care for the workers and their families</li> <li>▪ access to education for children</li> <li>▪ access to decent housing</li> <li>▪ access to clean drinking water</li> <li>▪ freedom of cultural expression</li> </ul> <p>Environmental Criteria</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ reduce and prevent soil erosion</li> <li>▪ responsible and minimal use of agrochemicals</li> <li>▪ implementation of Integrated Pest Management</li> <li>▪ minimize water usage and environmental pollution</li> <li>▪ minimize energy use</li> <li>▪ optimize use of sustainable energy sources</li> <li>▪ treatment of contaminated water</li> <li>▪ protecting water sources</li> <li>▪ no deforestation of primary forests</li> <li>▪ use of native tree species as <a href="#">coffee shade trees</a></li> </ul> <p>protecting endangered species</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The project's financial agreement states that it will respect the socio-cultural aspects of the Melanesian society and the agro-ecological environment (by promoting "organic" certified production). It also states that since women are key role players in production and marketing, the project will assure their presence in all the stages</p>



	<p>of the POP2 development and creation.</p> <p>No references to social rights, child labour or HIV/AIDS issues can be found in the programming documents.</p> <p><i>Sources: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Financing Agreement, page 14</i></p>
<b>I.7.3.2</b>	Evidence of inclusion of specific measures targeting these cross-cutting issues in interventions supporting agricultural commodities
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Specific measures to include cross-cutting issues in the AAACP programme supporting agricultural commodities will be as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Gender: women are generally the direct beneficiaries of the programme. The programme will pay specific attention to gender issues throughout, starting with the family/livelihoods analysis where gender issues will be documented, via capacity building for participation in strategy development which will promote gender balance, through to strategy implementation which will seek a gender balance in the distribution of benefits. The Coordination Unit will monitor this aspect;</li> <li>▪ Environment: Environmental issues will be considered throughout the programme activities, starting with the farming /livelihood systems analysis, and continuing in strategy development and implementation, including due attention to sustainable commodity farming practices and the use of ecological/fair trade market niches. The Coordination Unit will monitor this aspect ;</li> <li>▪ Governance: The programme will contribute to a range of matters of relevance to good governance. In particular, stakeholder participation and consensus building in national decision making is an essential aspect of the programme and will be actively encouraged. Similarly, transparency and accountability in the management of commodity chains will be promoted. In addition, the programme should contribute to the establishment of enabling environments for sustainable investments.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP does not include specific measures targeting environmental and gender issues. These issues are rather addressed as a logical consequence of the Programme to improve pesticide practices.</p> <p>The PIP financing agreement mentions that the Programme will have a positive environmental impact, by reducing pesticide use and reducing use of the most dangerous types.</p> <p>It also mentions that the Programme will increase the incomes of women and young producers, who are much implicated in horticultural production or more receptive due to their higher level of education (in the case of young producers).</p> <p>No references are made to child labour or to HIV/AIDS.</p> <p><i>Source: PIP financing agreement, page 20.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	The SFA evaluation found no examples of systematic <b>environmental</b> impact assessment of banana production, despite high levels of agrochemical applications.

	<p>According to the evaluators, there is a tacit assumption that they are “necessary evils” and a sine qua non of commercial agro-industry. Only one EC delegation assigned funds for environmental monitoring.</p> <p>However, improvements to production methods in line with agricultural and environmental practices required for certification have been operated in all countries (e.g. adhering to international phytosanitary regulations, reducing levels of agrochemical applications, etc.). These improvements were mostly funded by the industry with co-funding by the SFA.</p> <p>Although the improvement of <b>working conditions</b> were mainly driven by market quality and safety protocols, the SFA (co-)funding facilitated the necessary adaptations (packing sheds, improved observance of worker health and safety practices, etc.)</p> <p>Diversification funds have been used to support <b>social development</b> programs, developing <b>socioeconomic infrastructure</b> (water, sanitation, roads, etc.) and investing in <b>education</b> programmes.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 29, htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>BF coton</b>	<p>Le programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière (2008-2011, ligne FOOD) mis en œuvre par ICCO, en collaboration avec Helvetas et l'UNPCB, cible les femmes et les petits producteurs qui sont en dehors du système coton conventionnel. Il prend également en compte la durabilité environnementale à travers l'amélioration de la fertilité des sols, le recours à une fertilisation et une lutte phytosanitaire non chimiques ?</p> <p><i>Source : MN 510</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières, ce qui leur permet d'être impliqués dans la gestion des sociétés cotonnières.</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>

<p><b>BF</b> <b>Cashew nuts</b></p>	<p>Pour le projet anacarde-sésame mené par l'INADES, les thèmes transversaux ont été pris en compte comme suit:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Anacarde-genre: femmes dans la production et surtout la transformation. Les formations s'adressent aux femmes. Les paysans formateurs incluent des femmes, conseillères agricoles (5 femmes sur les 30). La récolte de noix est faite par les femmes et les enfants. L'homme vend les noix et les produits, il gère l'exploitation et habille les femmes. Au niveau de la production, c'est pour l'homme et la transformation c'est pour la femme. L'accès à la terre est donné à l'homme, par tradition.</li> <li>▪ Sésame-genre : chaque femme peut avoir son champ (0,5 – 1 ha). La production appartient à la femme. C'est le revenu de la femme. Environ 45% des bénéficiaires du projet sésame sont des femmes.</li> <li>▪ Anacarde-environnement : les formations n'encouragent pas l'utilisation de pesticides chimiques. Elles encouragent la fertilisation organique par les bonnes pratiques agricoles. Peu de producteurs utilisent des engrais chimiques et pesticides. INADES-B encourage la certification biologique. Dans une unité de transformation, INADES-B veut intégrer la certification biologique dans le projet. Rien comme résultat aujourd'hui. Rongead (ONG partenaire) est venu pour faire la formation sur la certification interne en biologique. C'est une expérience pilote en cours pour une unité de transformation. Pour voir les coûts. Si la structure bénéficiaire est d'accord, alors INADES-B encadrera le processus de certification biologique.</li> <li>▪ Sésame-environnement : utilisation de la fumure organique. Le sésame ne demande pas beaucoup d'engrais en plus, le sésame biologique est promu par INADES-B. Il n'y a pas de label biologique pas de certification). C'est dit biologique car il n'y a pas d'utilisation d'engrais chimique ou de pesticides.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : MN 551</i></p>
<p><b>BF-ANSE</b></p>	<p>Pour la transformation artisanale des produits agricoles, plus de <b>500 Femmes</b> sont visées par la formation directe. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 2</i>).</p> <p>Un <b>environnement protégé correspond à une augmentation des surfaces en arboriculture</b> dans des zones pédo-climatiques difficiles et l'adoption des pratiques agrobiologiques visant particulièrement le maintien de la fertilité des sols. . (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 3</i>). <b>Au sein de l'activité 1 : Formation technique de l'agrobiologie</b> et suivi terrain. Contenu des formations agrobiologie : technique de gestion de la fertilité des sols, rotations culturales, compostage, fosses à fumure, lutte biologique. Une série d'affiches produite sur l'agrobiologie (2 X 2 affiches, 500 exemplaires). (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 10</i>).</p>
<p><b>CI-ONG</b></p>	<p>Les documents de programmation de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde ne font pas référence aux questions d'environnement, des droits humains, de responsabilité d'entreprise ou de VIH/SIDA. Selon le cadre logique d'intervention, elle vise cependant à ce que le développement de la transformation de l'anacarde se fasse principalement par les femmes et engage donc 90% de femmes dans les unités de transformation.</p> <p><i>Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Rapport année 4, page 4</i></p>
<p><b>CI-REH</b></p>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés <b>sauf concernant</b></p>

	<p><b>l'environnement :</b></p> <p><u>Activité A. 3. Pistes rurales ; A.3.a Etudes préalables</u></p> <p>Les <b>études techniques</b> fourniront des APS et APD et une <b>étude d'impact environnemental</b> sera effectuée pour identifier des mesures de précaution au de correction à prévoir dans la conception et la conduite des travaux. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.8</i>)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>Le choix des animateurs (agents techniques d'agriculture et d'élevage) affectés à l'action, le choix des groupes cibles, les élections des organes directeurs des Unions et de la Fédération des GIC, toutes les activités de formation seront empreintes de la perspective de genre. (<i>Source : Annexe I p. 14</i>).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The ATF programmes for bananas in Cameroon (Assistance Technique et Financière) all included transversal issues of environment, workers rights, etc.</p> <p>The funds have been used for projects such as water recycling, hospital infrastructure, AIDS prevention (although there is not a specific occurrence of Aids due to the plantation), etc.</p> <p>L'environnement et les aspects sociaux (y compris la sensibilisation des populations à la problématique du SIDA – sont systématiquement traités concrètement dans les interventions. Les investissements et comportements « environnementaux » sont liés à l'adoption des certifications européennes (ISO 14000 Globalgap..) limitation utilisation d'intrants, ...abordées dans les CF des ATF dans les lignes budgétaires bananes (CF – ATF). A propos du SIDA, il convient de signaler qu'il n'y a pas de prévalence particulière dans les plantations. Mais les sociétés sensibilisent leurs ouvriers à cette problématique, aux moyens de lutte et distribuent régulièrement des préservatifs.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 994, MN 996</i></p> <p>Des projets de séchoirs à cacao réalisés sur fonds Stabex au Cameroun ont également permis de réaliser des économies importantes en bois de chauffe, tout en améliorant la qualité des produits.</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport COM Stabex Unifié</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>The gender study included in the Project involving the future role of women in coffee will provide insights into the present position and the way efforts can be directed for positive change. (<i>Source : FA Annexes A to D p.5</i>)</p> <p>Nevertheless, it must be noted that out of the four service tenders budgeted under PE No 5 the respective tenders dealing with the survey of further forest conservation areas and with <b>the survey of gender issues in coffee were cancelled</b> (<i>Source : Completion report p.14</i>) but in the framework of sub-component 5.7: Community development, it is said that a survey of gender issues in coffee was due to be outsourced to a local ONG (<i>Source : Completion report p.14</i>)</p> <p>In the framework of sub-component 4.4: Coffee by-product utilization and regarding <b>environmental pollution</b>, as early as September 2002 JARC undertook an intensive investigation in 4 woredas and 17 rivers and streams around Jimma of the extent of pollution created. In early December 2004, at the request of the State Minister the TATL conducted an inspection and analysis of the washing stations</p>

	<p>operating in Sidamo and Gefeo zone. The workshop below mentioned was the occasion for the presentation of a working paper based on a coffee processing waste water monitoring conducted in collaboration with Jimma University. A short term mission was conducted from 11/01 to 6/02/2009 and focused on “Improvement of effluents management and by-products utilization” (<i>Source : Completion report p.19</i>)</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II mentions that social issues such as child labour and HIV/AIDS are included in the subjects of extension services such as Farm Field Schools.</p> <p>Concerning environmental issues, the Financing Proposal mentions that the programme aims at promoting the reconversion to intercropping with shading trees (or the maintaining of these trees, rather than practicing sunlight monocropping). The monitoring report rather refers to the impact of promoting fertilization to reduce soil depletion of nutrients and discourage from using slash-and-burn techniques.</p> <p>The second monitoring report mentions that gender interests have been considered in the project strategy. The project aims at ensuring that at least 20% of the future trainers are women.</p> <p>Concerning human rights, the monitoring report states that the project, of technical nature, does not have a direct link to human rights, besides improving incomes of the rural poor.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Proposal, page 16</i> <i>Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring Report 02, Cross-cutting issues sheet.</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The programme’s environmental relevance is that productivity gains should slow down the process of further deforestation, partly because demand for new land should be tempered by better (cocoa) input/output performance on existing acreage. (page 18, MTE 2011)</p> <p>The IITA work plan included specific cross-cutting issues: the environment (deforestation), gender (female farmer participation), human rights (illegal child labour), and occupational safety and health (on-farm guidelines). These issues were addressed in Year 1 and 2 via VCC and FFS training and CSSP II community-targeted sensitisation. IITA also contracted Conservation Alliance in Ghana (CAG) to develop a bio-diversity strategy aimed at bridging forest corridors now separated by increased cocoa acreage and excessive timber logging. (page 20, MTE, 2011)</p> <p><i>Source: CSSP II MTE 2011</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found. The only information concerning the cross-cutting issues is the following:</p> <p>The financing agreement states that since the PAN-SPSO is a training and capacity building intervention, it will pay attention to ensure an equal gender distribution among trainees.</p> <p>It also states that beneficiaries will be advised to take environmental impacts into account when elaborating their national SPS standards.</p> <p>No further reference to these issues can be found in the annual reports.</p>

	<i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, pages 37 &amp; 38.</i>
<b>MG</b>	Selon AIM (Association Intercoopération Madagascar), les appels à propositions imposaient la prise en compte des dimensions transversales genre et environnement dont le suivi est en principe assuré par la Délégation en cours d'exécution (Source : MN 806). Toutefois, la Délégation fait part de ses difficultés à assurer le suivi de ces dimensions sur le terrain dont les effets ne sont pas très tangibles mais qui sont pris en compte au démarrage (Source : MN 801).
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La CF du PARFC (annexe II, § 2.10) indique que « le Mali est l'un des premiers et rares pays à avoir inscrit la qualité et la protection de la nature/environnement dans sa constitution (préambule et article 15). De façon plus spécifique la durabilité environnementale de la filière coton est une dimension importante du PASE/AFD et sera au centre du PASE II (cadre logique, CF, annexe 3b) instruit avec le soutien de l'AFD, parallèlement au programme de la CE. Ce programme implique des formations et activités concernant notamment la durabilité de la production et la préservation des sols».</p> <p>La CF (annexe II, §2.10) évoque également la durabilité institutionnelle : « L'aboutissement du processus de réforme en cours (filialisation / privatisation) permettra de préserver la filière du risque d'effondrement. L'alphabétisation fonctionnelle des membres des organisations de producteurs est un préalable pour le succès de la réforme, le rôle des producteurs dans le processus et le bon fonctionnement des structures faitières et de la gouvernance de la filière. Les formations sont mises en œuvre à la demande et assurées par des structures privées (associations de formateurs) ou par des ONG. Le montage institutionnel privilégiera dès lors l'adoption de partenariats et de modes d'interventions qui auront cours après le financement communautaire. Le comité de pilotage (dans lequel l'ON et la DCE sont représentés) sera garant de la bonne transition des actions d'alphabétisation vers les actions d'encadrement technique».</p> <p>La prise en compte de l'égalité du genre est évoquée dans la CF (annexe II, §2.10) Au niveau de la mise en œuvre de la composante alphabétisation où il est prévu qu'un nombre minimum de femmes devra bénéficier de la formation et des programmes d'alphabétisation NB. estimation : 17 % des membres des CPC (Coopératives de Production de Coton) sont des femmes.</p> <p>Le rapport ROM précise que les aspects du genre ne sont applicables qu'au volet alphabétisation, où il est prescrit qu'un nombre minimum de femmes soient incluses dans les formations. Les formations ont comme but final l'intégration des producteurs dans les structures d'autogestion (associations des producteurs coton) de la filière (BCS, §7.1).</p> <p>Au niveau des aspects environnementaux, le rapport ROM rappelle que, plus que toute autre fibre, le coton pose certains problèmes environnementaux (charge en pesticides et risque d'érosion en absence de techniques culturales pour pallier à ces effets). Il estime que l'impact en terme: de protection des producteurs lors de l'épandage des pesticides n'est pas garanti dans le contexte actuel de formation des agriculteurs. A ce titre le volet « coton biologique » semble être une bonne voie (BCS §1.3 et 4.2). En outre, il estime que la graine de coton, qui constitue l'oléagineux le plus important du Mali, pose des problèmes de contamination de</p>

	<p>l'huile de coton (huile comestible) avec des pesticides. En troisième lieu, il mentionne que les tourteaux des graines de coton, importante source d'aliment bétail, est elle aussi sujette à des contaminations avec pesticides, mal contrôlés à l'heure actuelle. Le rapport ROM recommande, dans toute activité future, l'aspect "contrôle de résidus" soit inclus dans les activités de soutien à la filière coton (BCS, §7.2).</p> <p>En matière de bonne gouvernance/droits de l'homme, le rapport ROM indique qu'au Mali, la filière coton, même dans son état actuel de transition, évolue dans une logique postcoloniale et paternaliste, hautement interventionniste. Le rapport ROM émet le souhait que la privatisation permette au monde paysan d'introduire plus de transparence dans les procédures d'administration (BCS, § 7.4).</p> <p><i>Source: ROM/BCS, CF</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The project targets commercial farmers and forest resource owners but its benefits are expected to reach also other stakeholders amongst whom principally the youth (through providing them with incentives to stay in the rural areas) and women (through main streaming of their participation for some products or parts of the supply chain). There is no mention of specific measures though.</p> <p><i>Source: IF</i></p> <p>From the MR: ' Given the nature of the intervention envisaged, planning the project on the basis of a gender-differentiated analysis of beneficiaries would not be especially useful or add value to the project. Nevertheless, all SPC activities are conducted in accordance with CROP (Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific) gender policy and promote the involvement of women in agricultural activities. This has led to the inclusion in the TAG of a representative from Women in Business Development Inc. Furthermore, one of the criteria of selection of the partner organizations with which FACT works was the impact of the cooperation on poverty and gender. Some of the organizations that have been selected by FACT for cooperation and support do lay considerable emphasis on community development and on fostering greater gender equality in and through their activities. Consequently, according to the OECD Gender Policy Marker, gender was a <b>significant policy objective</b> in this project. The value of the project gender marker score is therefore 1.'</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Le choix des bénéficiaires du projet montre la prise en compte de la problématique genre dans le projet : les transformatrices de noix de cajou. Le projet essaye de contribuer à améliorer l'égalité des genres pour essayer d'améliorer l'autonomisation des femmes et donc la réduction de leur dépendance économique. Selon les premières réactions des bénéficiaires, le projet aurait déjà eu un impact positif dans ce sens (accroissement de la reconnaissance de la place de la femme dans la société)</p> <p>L'environnement est également pris en compte explicitement selon une double approche : (i) amélioration de la fertilité par compostage et (ii) avoir accès au marché 'bio' (donc pas de produits chimiques de synthèse).</p>

	<i>Source : MR</i>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>The Final External Evaluation noted that the project caused negative impacts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Influx of traders from different social cultural backgrounds is reported to have increased the incidences of HIV/AIDS infection ;</li> <li>▪ There are incidences of youth/ school children drop puts (in Kibaigwa);</li> <li>▪ Improper waste management and disposal resulting in environmental pollution is observed in several markets.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, Appendix 2</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Gender and environment (climate change) are given an increasing attention in the implementation of the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project, a project supported through Stabex. Gender issues: women work a lot for coffee production but are not responsible for the sales. Climate change issues: according to some studies, the climate change is major threat on coffee production in Uganda. Farmers shall have to invest in irrigation systems. (Source: MN 308).</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>“Critical questions are to what extent the productivity gains can be captured by women and how to ensure that their views are represented in the farmers’ fora and other bodies that decide on research and extension services priorities. Both the NAADS and NARS programmes are well aware of these and other gender issues, and they are addressed – for instance by establishing composition criteria for decision-making bodies, and in their monitoring programmes, for instance by collecting gender-disaggregated data.</p> <p>TAPs of SBS</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>There are no “specific measures” mentioned targeting the cross-cutting issues.</p> <p>The project’s third monitoring report states that there was no gender discrimination in the process and that there was no real need for a gender focus in the project execution. The report also states that the project did respect the local socio-political structure, the prevailing cultural realities and religious beliefs. The good relations between the project beneficiaries and managers encouraged its sustainability.</p> <p><i>Sources: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 3, sustainability sheet</i></p>
<b>I.7.3.3</b>	<p>Evidence that <b>commodity chain strategies</b> have integrated corporate responsibility issues, including child labour and other social rights</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The only explicit evidence of such a strategy is in Cameroon, for which the SFA evaluation report states that “All EU projects in Cameroon will also address cross-cutting issues like gender, the environment, human rights (in particular the pygmy people) and the prevention of AIDS and malaria”.</p> <p>It seems however, that market-dictated production protocols have improved on-farm working conditions and improved the environmental impacts of banana production. SFA (co-)funding helped make the necessary adaptations such as improved observance of worker health, safety practices, packing sheds, etc.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country Reports, pages 29 &amp; 76, btspe, 2008.</i></p>



<b>BF coton</b>	<p>Le programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques en zone cotonnière (2008-2011, ligne FOOD) mis en œuvre par ICCO, en collaboration avec Helvetas et l'UNPCB est basé sur le coton bio et équitable qui s'accompagne d'un système de certification intégrant des critères de responsabilité sociale.</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport narratif du programme d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols dans les exploitations biologiques de la zone cotonnière, année 2009</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières, ce qui leur permet d'être impliqués dans la gestion des sociétés cotonnières.</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The banana value chain strategy integrates corporate responsibility issues such as the importance of maintaining/developing social rights of workers. It considers it to be a necessary condition for the development of the sector in the future, and wants to develop certification and recognition of the importance of the banana chain for social development.</p> <p><i>Source : Stratégie actualisée de la filière bananière camerounaise pour une amélioration de sa compétitivité (2010-2019), p. 84</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal refers to the following issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Child labour: Information on the subject is meant to be given in the extension trainings (e.g. the Farm Field Schools).</li> <li>▪ HIV/AIDS: Information on the subject is meant to be given in the extension trainings (e.g. the Farm Field Schools).</li> <li>▪ Governance: There is so far almost no room for cocoa producer organisations and the private sector in the decision making of the cocoa sector.</li> </ul> <p>But the second monitoring report states that the project is of technical nature and does therefore not address human rights aspects.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Proposal, page 16 Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Monitoring Report 02, Cross-cutting issues sheet.</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>There is no evidence in the CSPs that commodity chain strategies have integrated corporate responsibility issues, including child labour and other social rights. However, the 2008-2013 CSP mentions that agriculture – among other sectors, faces a serious problem in the form of child labour and that the government of Kenya will work on mainstreaming child labour prevention into other national laws and policies. This needs to permeate into the Education Act, the Children's Act, the Industry Act and policy documents like the orphans and vulnerable children policy.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 16</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Le volet «coton biologique» financé par le PARFC et évoqué dans le rapport ROM semble aller dans ce sens (BCS §1.3 et 4.2).</p>

	<i>Source: ROM/BCS, CF</i>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The purpose of FACT is to: “Sustainably increase quality and range of exports of agricultural and forestry (agfor) products by value adding with emphasis on supply chain improvement, post harvest handling, and food safety standards by means of <u>fair trade</u> and organic farming practices.”</p> <p>The project has played an important role in supporting the development of organic production and of Fair Trade in the Pacific region.</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SUG</b>	In several SP countries, sugar mills provide social services (housing, water, electricity; primary education) to their employees and to the smallholders cultivating sugarcane. In these countries, the National Adaptation Strategies (in the chapter dealing with broader impacts of the adaptation process) foresee that provision of these services will be transferred from the sugar mills to the government.
<b>VU-POP</b>	The Producers Organisation Project II is not literally a commodity chain strategy. The follow-up agricultural strategy of 2007 didn't really pursue the POP2's activities. No information can be found on whether or not the POP2 encouraged the inclusion of corporate responsibility issues in the agricultural strategy but it is highly unlikely since the POP2 itself didn't include such issues.
<b>I.7.3.4</b>	Evidence that the Commission has promoted the inclusion of these transversal issues in the strategies and interventions of MS and other international organisations active in the same areas
<b>CI</b>	<p><b>Pas d'information dans les CSP sur la prise en compte suite à l'impulsion de la CE des questions transversales dans les stratégies des EM et autres institutions</b></p> <p><b>Aucun autre donateur substantiel n'est présent en Cote d'Ivoire, à l'exception des Etats-Unis qui concentrent leur aide sur la lutte contre le sida (programme PEPFAR et Fonds mondial).</b> La Banque mondiale et la BAD ont suspendu leurs opérations suite à l'arrêt des remboursements de leurs prêts (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.25</i>). Toutefois, la période couverte par le 10<sup>ème</sup> FED devrait-elle voir le retour de la plupart des bailleurs historiques de la Cote d'Ivoire, les interventions européennes s'inscrivant donc dans une logique d'harmonisation et de complémentarité avec ces partenaires au développement. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.28</i>).</p> <p>Les interventions des EM concernent également parfois ces questions transversales et notamment l'Italie engagée dans la lutte contre le sida (€400 000 en 2006) (<b>Plus de détail dans CSP 2008-2013 p.24-25</b>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No. The evaluation highlights that <u>cross-cutting issues have not been specifically addressed throughout all the EDEs</u>. The evaluation has not found any evidence of base-line bench marking material for monitoring purposes, particularly in the case of gender.</p> <p>Regarding the other donors, the evaluation highlights that Commission programming documents refer to activities of other donors (including EU Member</p>

	<p>States) so <u>as to avoid duplication and overlapping of interventions</u>. However, <u>genuine coordination only takes place in a limited number of cases</u>. In fact, donor co-ordination seems to perform better where the ownership of the issue by the partner is high and there is a strong institutional capacity in identifying needs and implementing the related actions.</p> <p>Coordination and complementarity with other donors is thus limited and made difficult, at regional level, by the dispersion of the partners and of the donors' decision-making centres. Some large programmes have attracted contributions from many donors and developed heavy coordination structures. This proved effective where the partner was in a position clearly to articulate its need <i>and</i> to act as a real partner in the coordination process. When it was the case it also permitted to design complementary interventions of various donors in view of a comprehensive response to the needs. The mandate of Cariforum (Forum of Caribbean States) to deal exclusively with the Commission constrained the possibilities of donor complementarities within the regional programme.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP states that in the formulation of interventions under the regional programme, “<i>particular attention will be given to the cross-cutting issues of gender equality, equity and environment</i>”.</p> <p>Source: <i>Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 45.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>For both the EC and <b>the EU Member States</b>, the Joint Response will ensure that cross-cutting issues such as human rights, gender equality, the rights of children, environmental sustainability and HIV/AIDS are either addressed by direct interventions or mainstreamed into other programmes. They may also be funded under the EC's thematic and global programmes which likewise provide funding for action on health, food security, water, energy, and trade and private-sector development. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.46</i>).</p> <p><b>No evidence in CSP for other international organizations</b> but “the Commission has undertaken a leading role in sector and donor coordination in several Thmatic Working Groups of the DAG” (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.39</i>)</p> <p>No evidence in CSE</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Aucune évidence à ce sujet. De plus, s'il y a des échanges thématiques dans le cadre du secrétariat multi-bailleurs (SMB), il y a <b>très peu ou rien en matière de coordination</b> de la mise en œuvre. Cela apparaît clairement dans les évaluations de l'application de la Déclaration de Paris (Source : MN 801).</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Pas d'infos dans les CSP sur la prise en compte suite à l'impulsion de la CE des questions transversales dans les stratégies des MS et autres institutions, à l'exception de ce qui suit :</b></p> <p>Tant la partie européenne que malgache reconnaissent l'importance d'approfondir la <b>coordination entre les bailleurs de fonds</b> et l'harmonisation de leurs méthodes, dans la suite des engagements sur l'efficacité de l'aide pris à Paris et à Rome en 2005. La <b>Commission et les Etats membres</b> sont engagés en particulier à <b>coordonner étroitement leurs programmations respectives pour atteindre une</b></p>

	<p><b>complémentarité optimale.</b> La <b>Banque Mondiale</b>, qui a entamé son propre cycle de programmation pour l'IDA, a accepté de se joindre à cet effort de coordination. Une meilleure évaluation de l'impact des programmes passés et en cours sera nécessaire pour tous les secteurs et fera l'objet d'une attention particulière, tout au long de la mise en oeuvre du 10<sup>e</sup> FED. Dans ce cadre, les efforts de <b>prise en compte de la dimension environnementale et de genre</b>, compte tenu du lien étroit entre ces aspects et la pauvreté à Madagascar, feront l'objet d'un suivi attentif (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.30-31</i>).</p>
UG	<p>No such evidence although there is a strong coordination of donors (including MS) through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Agriculture Sector Working Group chaired by the government</li> <li>• The Agriculture Donors Group</li> </ul> <p>Indeed, donors report on their activity in the framework of the <u>donors working group</u>. Lessons learned and dissemination of information between donors: coordination and complementation needs are identified at the project level and also at the strategic level: <u>all levels of coordination are covered</u>. Besides the multi-donor support to the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agriculture), donor coordination results in some sort of task and geographical sharing between donors by regions and by nature of intervention. (Sources: MN 301, 309 and 313).</p>

## EQ 8 on the use made of different financing instruments in support of agricultural commodities

To what extent were different financing instruments and implementation modalities used in a cost effective and timely manner in order to facilitate attainment of the COM's objectives?

<i>J.8.1</i>	<i>The use of different financing instruments facilitated the development of synergies and complementarities between different interventions so as to facilitate achievement of the COM's objectives</i>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>La Commission européenne a mis différents instruments de financement en œuvre dans le cadre de son support aux produits de base agricole au Burkina Faso. Premièrement, les fonds Stabex ont soutenu le secteur cotonnier (financement d'études, d'infrastructures et d'équipement, apurement de dettes, formations). Par ailleurs, les 8<sup>ie</sup> et 9<sup>ie</sup> FED ont financé des études dans le secteur du coton et des programmes dans le domaine agricole (PAOSA et PAFFIC- spécifique au secteur cotonnier). Par ailleurs, le Burkina Faso bénéficie des activités du Programme Tous ACP. Sur le plan régional, la Commission européenne a appuyé l'Université du coton et l'UEMOA (secteur du coton entre autres). La Ligne ONG a appuyé un projet de développement de la filière anacarde-sésame (mis en œuvre par une ONG française, RONGEAD, et le centre de formation burkinabé INADES). Enfin, la ligne Food a appuyé un projet d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols pour le coton biologique.</p> <p>Bien que l'aide de la Commission, en particulier via les FED consécutifs, est appréciée, la plupart des parties prenantes rencontrées au Burkina Faso ne perçoivent pas la complémentarité entre le support de la Commission au niveau régional et au niveau national.</p> <p>Au Burkina Faso, l'appui aux produits de base agricoles a eu recours à une combinaison d'instruments de financement et de modalités de mise en œuvre: appui budgétaire général pour le FLEX, appui budgétaire sectoriel pour le coton, projets/ programme, etc. Au niveau du secteur coton, il y a eu un appui budgétaire sectoriel dans le cadre de la stratégie de sortie de crise (PAFFIC).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Quatre différents instruments financiers ont été mobilisés en relation avec les produits agricoles de base, à savoir :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Le Stabex: infrastructures routières, PDR (PPDR, Logone et Chari, périurbain Yaoundé, MoungoNkam) séchoirs cacao, eau potable, apurement de dettes, ..</li> <li>- La Ligne budgétaire bananes</li> <li>- FED: PACICC (9<sup>ième</sup> FED)</li> <li>- Ligne budgétaire FSTP: CARBAP ...</li> </ul> <p>Les fonds Stabex, la ligne budgétaire bananes, les fonds FED et d'autres lignes budgétaires ont été utilisés de manière complémentaire <b>mais cela ne forme pas un ensemble cohérent</b>: les programmations sont annuelles ou pluriannuelles, la gestion partagée avec le Gouvernement ou externe, .. ce « mélange » <b>ne permet pas une approche stratégique cohérente</b> à moyen terme.</p>
<b>GH overall</b>	<p>In Ghana, no complementarities between regional and bilateral programmes were noted even though regional programmes for cocoa exist (but are not supported by the Commission). The regional programmes are seen to be very slow. At bilateral level EDF programmable funds have been used to consolidate the achievements of interventions firstly supported through STABEX funds in the rural feeder roads and the cocoa sectors. More recently a PSD&amp;T programme is also indirectly relevant to the cocoa and other sectors in strengthening trade capacities.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les fonds Stabex et la ligne budgétaire Sécurité Alimentaire ont été employés complémentirement,</p>

	les premiers pour des appuis filière et la seconde pour la mise en place de structures d'appui au développement agricole et rural en général.
<b>TZ</b>	In Tanzania funds from different financing instruments have been used in complementarity especially towards the end of the period as STabex funds have been running out and have been 'replaced' by some bridging funds from the 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF to enable the two research institutes hitherto funded through Stabex to consolidate and develop an exit strategy for more sustainable funding. The use of these different financing instruments had no links to the COM's objectives
<b>UG coffee</b>	The EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds were mainly used to support specific commodity chains in particular coffee. But the main difference is the following: EDF is used to implement interventions; Stabex could be used to implement projects but also to identify and formulate interventions, support the design of policy documents, bridge the gap between two interventions, etc. These two instruments were clearly complementing each other. Currently the Delegation doesn't have available an instrument replacing the Stabex funds. Regional programmes devoted to agricultural research (e.g. Asareca) complemented the EC support to NARO.
<b>VAN</b>	LA CE a utilisé différents instruments de financement dans le cadre de son support aux produits de base agricole au Vanuatu: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FED-STABEX: infrastructures</li> <li>▪ FED: POPACA/ POP2, Renforcement des capacités APEs, Primary Sector Growth Support Programme – Phase 1, Programme Tous ACP</li> <li>▪ PIR-Pacifique: FACT</li> </ul> Il n'y a pas d'évidence que ces différents appuis au secteur agricole ont été mis en œuvre en complémentarité les uns des autres. Par ailleurs, les parties prenantes du Vanuatu sont quelque peu critiques à l'encontre de la Délégation de la CE qui a arrêté son appui (direct) au domaine agricole, à la fin de projet POPACA/POP2.
<b>I.8.1.1</b>	Evidence that a mix of different financing instruments (EDF, budget lines and emergency financing mechanisms) has been used in support of agricultural commodities in order to facilitate attainment of the COM's objectives
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	Le surcoût du programme par rapport aux 5 organisations internationales est l'Unité de Coordination du programme AAACP ; ce surcoût est d'environ 5 M€ sur 45 M€ (un 1/9 <sup>ième</sup> du budget global), incluant les coûts des kick-offs des ateliers (qui couvrent les billets d'avion des participants, le financement des réunions, les activités du Cos-Coton, etc.).  Le programme AAACP ne développe pas d'interventions en lien direct avec des financements FLEX. Peut-être, il devrait le faire. Le mandat du programme AAACP était d'innover, de sensibiliser les ACP aux instruments comme les bourses de marché, les <i>warehouse receipt systems</i> , les <i>discounting</i> , etc. (par exemple aux Caraïbes). Rien n'est fait en lien avec des reliquats du Stabex.  <i>Source : Meeting note reference number MN 641</i>
<b>BF</b>	According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Burkina Faso, the majority of interventions in the field of rural development and food security date back to the 8 <sup>th</sup> EDF and to the food security budget line. There is no mention of them aiming at attaining the COM's objectives.  <i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 14</i>

	<p>Selon l'évaluation pays du Burkina Faso, de l'aide a été apportée dans le pays au secteur cotonnier sous diverses formes : dans le cadre du Stabex, du FED, de l'appui budgétaire général, de l'appui régional à l'UEMOA pour l'appui à la qualité des fibres et au niveau inter-régional pour le programme AAACP.</p> <p><i>Source : Evaluation pays du Burkina Faso, Annexe pages 55-56</i></p>
BF	<p>Pour rappel, l'agriculture n'est pas un secteur focal au Burkina Faso pour la période 2007-2013. Pour la période 2002-2007, la sécurité alimentaire figurait parmi les secteurs focaux retenus mais avec un budget relativement faible (budget équivalent à 0.9 M €, soit 0,2% du budget total du Programme indicatif de Coopération). Dans ce contexte, <b>différents instruments financiers ont été mis en œuvre pour soutenir les produits agricoles de base. On retrouve principalement une approche programme/ projet.</b> En témoignent les instruments financiers utilisés suivant :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Sous le <b>FED, cadre national (DSP)</b>:       <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- le Programme <b>d'appui à l'organisation du secteur agricole</b> (PAOSA), en appui aux filières agricoles dont celle du <b>coton</b>, pour un montant global de 20.8 M€ (en date du 28 mars 2007);</li> <li>- Le Programme d'appui Financier à la <b>Filière Coton</b> (PAFFIC, 2007-2010). Appui à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières par la participation des producteurs, pour un montant global de 10 M EUR;</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Sous le <b>FED, cadre intra-ACP</b> :       <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Le <b>Programme Tous ACP</b>, incluant différentes activités menées par différentes organisations internationales :           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ FAO : 1) Bonnes pratiques agricoles (BPA) et gestion intégrée de la production et des déprédateurs (GIPD) dans le secteur du coton pour un montant de 430.000 € (2009-11 ; BF, Bénin, Mali, Sénégal) ; 2) Amélioration des revenus des producteurs et de la sécurité alimentaire pour les organisations de producteurs de riz et de maïs (pour un montant global de 0.38 M € pour l'Afrique de l'ouest, projet régional) ; 3) Projet pilote au BF pour améliorer les productions et la diversification des systèmes cotonniers (290 000 €, novembre 2007 à mai 2008) ; 4) Evaluation des risques et du financement de la filière maïs (BF, CICB ; 0,38 M € ; 2010-11).</li> <li>○ CFC en collaboration avec Banque mondiale (SDN): 1) projet de prévention de la contamination de coton graine en Afrique de l'Ouest (BF, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire), projet régional, pour un budget estimé de 2,9 M €). 2) Standardisation commerciale des techniques instrumentales pour les tests de qualité du coton : 2007-11, Mali (le BF est indirectement concerné avec d'autres pays d'AO), Tanzanie. Budget UE : 2,4 M € pour un budget total de 4 M €.</li> <li>○ Banque mondiale (SDN) : Etude comparative sur les réformes du secteur cotonnier en Afrique sub-sahélienne (2007-09 ; Budget UE : 430.000 €). 9 pays d'Afrique subsaharienne concernés, dont le BF.</li> <li>○ Banque mondiale (ARMT): 1/ Evaluation des risques de la filière coton au BF, pour un montant de 0,75 M €. (projet en cours). 2/ Gestion des risques climatiques (150.000 €, Afrique de l'Ouest, en cours). 3/ Définition de politiques et gestion des risques liés aux prix (37.500 €, Afrique de l'Ouest, en cours) ; 4/ Transferts de capacités à la région (200.000 €, Afrique de l'Ouest, en cours)</li> <li>○ CCI/ITC : 1) Elaboration d'une stratégie régionale coton pour l'UEMOA : stratégie révisée de mise en œuvre de l'agenda pour la compétitivité de la filière coton-textile (Budget : 187.000 € ; 2010-11)</li> <li>2) Mise en œuvre de la stratégie, notamment par des activités axées sur le développement de la chaîne de valeur orientée vers le marché (meilleure</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<p>connaissance des marchés d'exportations et de la demande finale à travers des missions d'échange-formation privilégiant la coopération Sud-Sud (ex. Thaïlande, Chine, Inde, Turquie...). dont certaines ont inclus des représentants de la filière cotonnière du BF Budget total : 411.000 €</p> <p>2) Stratégie de développement de la gomme arabique Burkina Faso et Mali), pour un montant de 0,12 M €.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Sous le <b>FED, cadre régional (PIR)</b> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Appui à Université du Coton (UdC). Subvention de 687.500 € à l'AProCA, via une convention UEMOA-AProCA (2010-2011)</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Sous <b>ligne budgétaire FOOD</b> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FOOD/2007/144-063 (1,05 M €, 2008-11). Amélioration de la fertilité des sols dans les exploitations biologiques de la zone cotonnière. Mise en œuvre par ICCO, en collaboration avec HELVETAS et l'UNPCB</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Sous <b>fonds STABEX</b> : Au 31 juillet 2007, sur un montant total engagé de 2 milliards FCFA engagés (soit environ 3 M EUR), 1,7 milliards FCFA ont été dépensés (soit environ 2,6 M EUR). Selon le bilan arrêté à fin 2007, les fonds STABEX dépensés dans le secteur agricole ont été : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- d'environ 1.3 milliards FCFA (environ 1.8 M EUR) pour le <b>secteur du coton</b> (principalement pour : infrastructures de stockage et d'intérêt collectif, formation, apurement de dettes, études) ;</li> <li>- d'environ 45 M FCFA (environ 65 000 EUR) pour le <b>secteur de la gomme arabique</b> (mise en place d'un fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations et promotion de la gomme arabique) ;</li> <li>- d'environ 14 M FCFA (environ 21 000 EUR) pour le <b>secteur des oléagineux</b> (mise en place d'un fonds de garantie pour faciliter les exportations et production de semences de base).</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Le <b>FLEX</b> a également été utilisé et l'aide a été versée à l'Etat burkinabé sous forme <b>d'appui budgétaire</b>.</p> <p><i>Source : DG Coopération, Dépenses 2000-2010 de la Commission européenne dans le secteur agricole au Burkina Faso, 2011 ; Programme Tous ACP, fiche d'identification ; Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, Direction de la Coopération et Délégation de l'Union Européenne au Burkina Faso, 2011 ; Etat des transactions effectuées sur le Stabex, année 2006; COM STABEX 1994-1995, Liste des actions non clôturées au 31/07/2007 ; AIDCO-C7-Comptabilité administrative Stabex Haricots 1999, 2000</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>On peut noter dans le RSP 2002-2007 que les ressources RSP se sont adjointes à des ressources NIP et de lignes budgétaires spécifiques (« Forêts tropicales » et « Environnement ») pour appuyer un programme de conservation et d'exploitation rationnelle des écosystèmes forestiers (ECOFAC). Mais il n'y a pas d'appuis aux produits agricoles de rente dans les programmes régionaux.</p> <p><i>Source RIP 2002-2007</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>La <u>cohérence du programme est relativement bonne entre tous les outils de la politique de développement de la Commission européenne en Cote d'Ivoire</u>. On notera tout de même que la problématique du « renforcement mutuel » au niveau de la coopération communautaire ne doit pas emporter en elle-même une restriction d'intervention ou conduire à une rigidité contraignante. Les ressources de type Stabex ou FLEX permettent et doivent répondre à des logiques d'intervention plus économiques que les instruments plus généraux.</p> <p>Le programme reprend ou développe des appuis dans des secteurs ou la coopération</p>



	<p>communautaire directe ou indirecte était historique et pour lesquels elle a pu engager des fonds du PIR 9eme FED (PUR), PIR 9emc FED et récemment FLEX 2006-2007 (sachant que ces derniers tendent à s'aligner sur la prolongation de certains projets du programme Stabex 1999).</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
CI	<p><u>Lignes budgétaires sucre (60 M€) et banane (40 M€)</u></p> <p><u>Sucre</u> : surtout utilisé pour la brasserie, l'houblonnerie et la production de cola. La production est mineure est cantonnée à deux zones. Objectifs des interventions sous ligne sucre : étendre les cultures pluviales de la canne à sucre car la culture irriguée est arrivée à un point de saturation.</p> <p>Ces lignes sont très lourdes à gérer avec l'approche projets : plus d'une centaine de dossiers à traiter. Avec cette approche projets, il y a peu de complémentarités avec Stabex. Etant donné la lourdeur administrative, la CE souhaite pouvoir effectuer de l'appui budgétaire.</p> <p><u>Approche Stabex</u></p> <p>La mise en œuvre sous Stabex est plus simple et souple avec l'approche programme qu'avec les lignes budgétaires. Des tranches budgétaires sont définies par filière et au sein de chaque tranche, des contrats sont signés (approche programme qui fonctionne très bien). Des comités de pilotage contrôlent la réalisation des activités,...</p> <p><u>Appui budgétaire</u></p> <p>La Côte d'Ivoire est devenue accessible à l'appui budgétaire (en-dessous d'un certain point de pauvreté). Volonté de la CE de réaliser ce type d'appui.</p> <p>Source : MN 819</p>
CM	<p>A mix of different financing instruments (EDF, Stabex, budget lines) has been used in support of agricultural commodities (EDF through various RDP including cocoa, coffee, palm oil (for local use), Stabex to coffee and cocoa, budget lines to bananas) <b>but not in order to facilitate attainment of the COM's objectives.</b> This mix of instruments is just a consequence of different policies towards different topics over time. <i>Source: MN 402, 403 + review of support to Cameroon</i></p>
CM	<p>A mix of different financing instruments has been used in Cameroon in support to rural development:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ STABEX</li> <li>▪ Banana Budget Line</li> <li>▪ EDF funded projects (8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>)</li> </ul> <p>There is no evidence in Commission's strategy documents that the mix has been used to facilitate the achievement of the COM's objectives. <i>Sources :</i> <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i> <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i></p>
CI	<p>Dans le cadre du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED et plus particulièrement du secteur hors concentration« appui et</p>

	<p><b>l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles », les interventions s'orienteront</b> la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion et d'atténuation des variations de prix dans le cadre des secteurs hors concentration, le renforcement des outils d'aide à la décision, l'appui à la structuration institutionnelle du secteur agricole, l'amélioration de l'accès aux marchés extérieurs en renforçant aux niveaux public et privé, la promotion de la qualité et le respect des standards sanitaires, sociaux et environnementaux en vigueur sur les marchés d'exportation, notamment celui de l'Union européenne. Les <b>filières</b> fruitières continueront d'être soutenues par la <b>ligne budgétaire banane</b> tandis que <b>l'amélioration de la compétitivité de la filière sucre le sera au travers de la ligne budgétaire sucre.</b> (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31).</p> <p>Du 1<sup>er</sup> au 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, la Cote d'Ivoire a bénéficié de €1 719,7 millions au total, au titre des divers financements communautaires (<b>PIN, STABEX, facilité d'ajustement structurel, etc.</b>). Cette coopération a, des l'origine, donne la <b>priorité au secteur de l'agriculture et du développement rural</b> retenus comme « secteur de concentration» par tous les FED successifs (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.18).</p> <p><b>Le détail des différents instruments financiers sont présentés de la page 21 à 24 du CSP 2008-2013 :</b> Stabex, coopération régionale, projets régionaux PAR-II et PARI secteur privé, appui à la préparation aux négociations de l'APE et de l'OMC, aide humanitaire, BEI, lignes budgétaires, accords de partenariat pêche, facilité ACP-UE pour l'eau, facilité ACP-UE pour l'énergie.</p> <p><b>Pas de référence aux COM dans les CSP.</b></p>
<b>Cotton</b>	<p>Selon l'évaluation pays du Burkina Faso, de l'aide a été apportée dans le pays au secteur cotonnier sous diverses formes : dans le cadre du Stabex, du FED, de l'appui budgétaire général, de l'appui régional à PUEMOA pour l'appui à la qualité des fibres et au niveau interrégional pour le programme AAACP.</p> <p><i>Source : Evaluation pays du Burkina Faso, Annexe pages 55-56</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>No explicit evidence that a mix of different financing instruments has been used in support of agricultural commodities <i>but</i> Annex 8 describes the general framework and principles of the Commission's co-operation in the Caribbean and the application of the different instruments available (RIPs, NIPs, All ACP project, specific facilities (STABEX, SYSMIN), EIB credits, Commission's own budget lines) and reconstructs the theoretical logframes underlying the regional strategies of the successive EDFs starting from the 7<sup>th</sup>. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.6</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Yes, in the framework of the Commission's co-operation in the Caribbean, there are different instruments available: RIPs, NIPs, All ACP project, specific facilities (STABEX, SYSMIN), EIB credits, Commission's own budget lines.</p> <p>No specific evidence regarding the agricultural commodities and no information about the COMs.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>Over the years, Ethiopia has been one of the larger beneficiaries of EC support among the ACP</p>

states. The assistance has taken several forms. The several European Development Funds have contributed most to this assistance (total EDF € 1.3 billion), both in the form of programmable resources and (NIPs) and non-programmable resources (mainly Stabex and Structural Adjustment Facility). Very substantial assistance has also been provided in the form of food security/food aid. (*Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.31*).

The implementation of the EC's cooperation strategy with the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia will be financed from several financial instruments. The following is an indication of their mobilisation as currently envisaged. (*Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.66, 67*) :

- 10th EDF (A –envelope) € 644 million: this envelope will cover long-term programmable development operations under the strategy, in particular:
  - Transport and regional integration, € 250 million,
  - **Rural development and food security, € 130 million,**
  - Macro-economic support and governance, € 244 million,
  - Other programmes, € 20 million,
- 10th EDF (B -envelope) € 30 million: this envelope will cover unforeseen needs, such as emergency assistance where such assistance which cannot be financed from the EU budget, contributions to internationally agreed debt relief initiatives and support to mitigate the adverse effects of instability in export earnings.
- Investment Facility: in addition to the above mentioned financial instruments, of which the A -envelope is the main programmable basis for the NIP, the 10th EDF also includes an Investment Facility, managed by the European Investment Bank. The Investment Facility is not part of the NIP. Some specific activities may be supported by the Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE) and the Centre for the Development of Agriculture (CDA).
- 10th EDF, Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), € XXX million : this allocation will cover long-term programmable development operations under the regional strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). The allocation is not part of the Indicative Programme but will have synergies with the NIP. The extent will depend on the participation by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in the programmes proposed under the regional framework.
- Other financial instruments : specific activities may be supported by external actions funded by the general budget of the European Community carried out under the financial framework for 2007-2013 subject to special procedure and availability of funds and out of the owns resources of the EIB.
- Monitoring and evaluation : monitoring of results and evaluations of impact of individual activities (programmes, projects, sectors) under this CSP will be undertaken in line with the Technical and Administrative Provisions that are attached to each individual Financial Agreement prepared to implement this CSP.

(*Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.66, 67*)

**No explicit reference in CSP to commodities sector and COM'S objectives.**

The Commission support to Ethiopia during the period 1996-2001 was financed on several budget lines apart from the EDF, of which the following were the most important: the food aid/food security (B7-2000), the NGO co-financing (B7-6000) and the human rights (B7-7020) budget lines (Sources of EC-Ethiopia co-operation: food security (B7-2000), NGO co-financing (B7-6000), human rights (B7-7020), environment (B7-6200), tropical forests (B7-6201), child victim of war (B7-612), rehabilitation (B7-6410), research/ INCO-DC (DG XII), ECHO. And within the EDF: the NIP, the RIP, SAF, **Stabex** and refuge assistance.) (*Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 72*).

	<b>No explicit reference in CSE to commodities sector.</b>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP mentions that the use of resources from the EIB or under thematic budget lines will be used inter alia for interventions concerning food security. The stability instrument and the instrument for humanitarian and emergency assistance are also mentioned.</p> <p>There is however no mention of the COM or of aiming at the COM's objectives.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 55.</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>In Ghana three projects have been funded from the Food Facility but they concerned the food production:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agra-UK : sustainable (northern ghana food security project)</li> <li>• Plan-Ireland : sustainable livelihoods programme</li> <li>• Care International UK : food &amp; agriculture recovery management</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: MN 136</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The EDF allocation includes an A envelope to support long term development objectives and a B envelope to cover unforeseen needs such as emergency assistance.</p> <p>Support is also provided by the EIB, the Centre for Development of Enterprise and the Centre for Development of Agriculture.</p> <p>Depending on the availability of the funds, other specific activities can also be supported by the EC's 2007-2013 financial framework and out of the EIB's own resources. Other financing possibilities come from special initiatives such as the Energy Facility (although it is not directly linked to the COM's objectives), the Water Facility, the EU-Africa partnership on infrastructure and the Global Funds.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 41 &amp; 42</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>Several instruments were foreseen to be used under the 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, especially related to agriculture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ EDF 9 - Envelope A (€170 M) to cover long-term development operations in the key sectors: focal sector <b>Agriculture and Rural Development, 25% - 35%</b></li> <li>▪ Balances of previous EDFs: approximately €45 million to be added to the 9th EDF funds earmarked for macroeconomic budget support. Furthermore, Stabex balances would be allocated along the lines and the priorities established in the NIP.</li> </ul> <p>In addition, one can note that the Kenya Rural Development Strategy (KRDS) proposes the establishment of a Kenya Rural Development Trust Fund along the lines of the EC's Community Development Trust Fund. The creation of this Trust Fund was highlighted in the 2002 budget speech of 13th June. The objective of the Fund will be to provide a mechanism and financial resources targeting rural sector programmes in order to achieve the stated strategy objectives.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 29 and Annex 5</i></p> <p>Several instruments were foreseen to be used under the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, especially in line or partially) with the objectives of the COM:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ EDF 10 - Envelope A (€ 383 M) to cover long-term development operations in the following sectors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Focal sector 2: Agriculture and Rural Development: €98.8 m</b> (26% of the total A envelope) Macro-economic support: €126.8 M (33% of the total A envelope), relating partially to EPA negotiations.</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Investment facility managed by the EIB (not part of the NIP) - some specific activities will be financed by this facility, including the <i>Centre for the Development of Agriculture</i> (CTA) whose budgets will also be drawn on outside the NIP.</li> <li>▪ EDF 10 East and Southern Africa Regional Indicative Programme (not part of the NIP allocation). This programme will focus <i>inter alia</i> on EPA accompanying measures.</li> <li>▪ <b>Accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries</b>, a total of <b>€6.23m</b> has been allocated to Kenya for the <b>period 2007-2010</b> to assist with the reform plan for production-dependent people and organizations.</li> </ul> <p>EC support to the Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA) will be provided to an emerging SWAP, preferably by sector budget support. This should be ready for the financial year 2007-2008. The feasibility of this intervention will be reassessed at the identification and formulation stage with reference to the overall budget support eligibility criteria and progress in the sectoral policy commitments made by the Government.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 33-34, &amp; 37</i></p> <p>According to the Evaluation of EC support to Kenya (June 2008), commitments of the EDF 9 to agriculture and rural development will probably remain at 7% (including pipeline) instead of 25-30%. Hence, it is questioned whether this sector is really considered as a focal sector. Two sub-sectors can be distinguished: 1) agriculture and livestock and 2) community development. The overall performance for community development is satisfactory while the overall performance for the agriculture and livestock sector is unsatisfactory.</p> <p>Stabex funds have been made available in Kenya to compensate the losses of export earnings, mainly in the coffee sector, but also in tea. These funds were spent in the period 1990-1999 in the coffee sector, roads, education, tourism and local governance. In 1999, Stabex funds were spent as advance budget support and earmarked for specific sectors. On the other hand, these funds have been also utilised to bridge finance gaps (e.g. for community development) or to finance sectors that were not foreseen in the CSP (e.g. tourism and trade). In other words, Stabex funds have been used as a mechanism to make adjustments to the CSP.</p> <p>For the period 2001-2005, the total amount of committed Stabex funds was about € 105 million.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of EC support to Kenya, June 2008, pages 5 &amp; 27</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>En raison du principe de concentration sectorielle et de la limitation des moyens disponibles tous les besoins identifiés dans le MAP ne pourront pas s'inscrire dans le futur Programme Indicatif National. Il est donc important d'avoir <b>recours aux instruments horizontaux du FED et aux fonds multi-bailleurs</b> dont les ressources sont accessibles (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.30)</p> <p>L'appui de la Commission aux politiques et stratégies de développement rural de l'Etat malgache (Madagascar Naturellement, MAP, PNDR) comblera plusieurs instruments financiers. Le PIN 10<sup>ème</sup> FED appuiera essentiellement le Programme National de Développement Rural et pourra</p>

		<p>inclure une composante d'appui budgétaire sectoriel aux composantes du Ministère de l'Agriculture de l'élevage et de la Pêche (MAEP). Les interventions structurelles de sécurité alimentaire prendront le cas échéant la relève des interventions d'urgence financées par ECHO. Les financements et les <b>lignes budgétaires « Bananes » et « Sucre » compléteront ce programme d'appui sectoriel pour les filières commerciales retenues</b> (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.30).</p> <p><b>Secteur de concentration 2 : Développement rural et Sécurité alimentaire</b>, incluant la Décentralisation et la gouvernance locale : entre 2003 et 2006, <b>près de 140 M€ ont été mobilisés au titre des PIN, des lignes budgétaires “sécurité alimentaire, bananes, forêts tropicales” (50 M€) et du Stabex (19 M€)</b> en vue de l'amélioration des cultures de rente et des filières d'exportation (18 M€), la structuration du monde rural (36 M€), le développement local (69 M€) et les réformes sectorielles (13 M€) (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.19).</p> <p><b>Pas de référence aux COM dans les documents.</b></p>
<b>MG</b>		<p>Oui. De plus, la Délégation estime que l'idéal serait de continuer à utiliser <u>Stabex, lignes budgétaires et FED</u> car cela permet d'avoir un mix d'outils complémentaires (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de prendre en compte l'ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole malgache (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (Source : MN 804 et débriefing Délégation).</p> <p>En effet, à titre d'illustration, les fonds Stabex et la ligne budgétaire Sécurité Alimentaire ont été employés complémentaires, les premiers pour des appuis filière et la seconde pour la mise en place de structures d'appui au développement agricole et rural en général.</p> <p>Concernant la <u>COM 2004(89)</u> (Madagascar n'est pas concernée par la seconde COM), l'ensemble des intervenant ne semble pas en avoir connaissance mais la Délégation souligne qu'il y a des convergences, que certains points sont pris en compte de manière ponctuelle et que certaines notions ont été intégrées dans la stratégie. La Délégation regrette néanmoins que les flux d'informations soient souvent à sens unique : Délégation vers siège central.(Source : MN 801 et débriefing Délégation).</p>
<b>MG coffee</b>	<b>vanilla</b>	<p>« Le programme Stabex a constitué un des rares et importants efforts significatifs d'investissement publics à Madagascar pour la relance des secteurs des cultures de rente en collaboration directe avec les producteurs et exportateurs. Le concept « filière » a été développé avec succès pour la vanille, le café et le litchi. Il a permis l'émergence ou le renforcement des organisations professionnelles, le développement et la diffusion de techniques pour débloquer les principaux goulots d'étranglement relatifs à la production, à la transformation et à la mise en marché, et/ou lorsque le potentiel existait, la standardisation des produits et le contrôle de la qualité, la promotion du label d'origine Madagascar, et si nécessaire des appuis pour des révisions réglementaires ou légales à Madagascar et dans l'UE. »</p> <p>Source : Cadre d'Obligations Mutuelles 1996-1999</p>
<b>MG coffee</b>	<b>vanilla</b>	<p>Les fonds Stabex pour les années 1991 à 1999 ont représenté un total de €68,4 millions. Ils ont été utilisés comme suit :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Désenclavement (en particulier au bénéfice des régions productrices de produits agricoles d'exportation) : €28,1 million (41,1%)</li> <li>2. Filières agricoles d'exportation (café, vanille, litchi, aquaculture) : 20,6 million (30.1%)</li> <li>3. Normalisation, contrôle qualité et promotion des produits agricoles : €6,6 million (9,6%)</li> <li>4. Surveillance des pêches : €7,9 million (11,5%)</li> <li>5. Appui institutionnel (notamment appui au bureau de l'ordonnateur national) : €5,1 million (7,5%)</li> </ol> <p>Ces crédits ont été épuisés fin 2010.</p> <p>Source : Délégation de l'UE à Madagascar</p>

<b>ML</b>	No reference to budget lines or emergency financing mechanisms can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Mali.
<b>PAC</b>	EDF budgets are the only ones directly linked to supporting agricultural commodities. Emergency financing mechanisms are used for natural disaster risk reduction and not directly for agricultural commodity risk.  <i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 58</i>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	The project's IF provides ample evidence of complementarity of this regional project with other regional initiatives but there is no detail about which financing instruments were financing these projects (PACREIP, PACER, PICTA). <i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission's Support to the ACP Pacific Region.</i>
<b>SADC</b>	According to the 2008-2013 SADC EC response strategy different financing tools are used to support the SADC region: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contribution Agreements in the following sectors: regional economic integration, trade liberalisation and the EPA, regional political cooperation and the Project Preparation and Development Facility (PPDF)</li> <li>▪ SADC development Fund</li> <li>▪ Technical cooperation Facility (TCF)</li> <li>▪ Support to Non State Actors</li> </ul> <p>There is no mention of the COM or of aiming at the COM's objectives.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 43 &amp; 44</i></p> <p>While agriculture was an important component under EDF8, it was not retained under EDF 9. However, the EC has supported trade/ economic liberalisation and development under EDF9. This includes the EPA.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to SADC, October 2007, page 3</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	The programme requires a budget of € 15 M for SADC over 5 years to fulfil its purpose in respect of regional research, capacity building and technology delivery. Over the 5 years period the budget will finance <b>long-term regional staff</b> (4) for the programme management, <b>local support staff</b> (3) for the regional coordinating unit for agricultural research and training, <b>SADC operation costs</b> to manage and coordinate the programme, partial support to regional positions for co-ordination of the Research Networks (10), <b>Competitive Fund System (CFS) for research projects</b> , specific activities in <b>information and communication technology and management (ICT-ICM)</b> , as well as a <b>contribution to the regional training programme</b> . No major physical infrastructure development is planned.

**Time table : Costs and financing plan (in 1000 € for a 5 years period)**

			<b>Detailed Budget in annex E</b>	
<b>Support areas</b>		<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>Total</b>	
<b>Area 1; Institutional funding. Support to the SADC</b>				
1.1.	Regionally recruited staff	1 100	<b>3 640</b>	
1.2.	Locally recruited staff	300		
1.3.	SADC office equipment	200		
1.4.	SADC office operation costs	1 290		
1.5.	Monitoring, Audit and Evaluation	750		
<b>Area 2: Research Implementation</b>				
2.1	Support to Research Networks	2 950	<b>8 550</b>	
2.2	Competitive fund to support regional research	5 600		
<b>Area 3: Specific funding to support information communication and training program</b>				
3.1.	Regional Information System	750	<b>2 310</b>	
3.2	Contribution to regional training prgm	1 560		
<b>Unforeseen expenses and Fluctuation in Change</b>			<b>500</b>	
<b>Grand Total</b>			<b>15 000</b>	

The duration of the programme is 5 years and the total budget is € 15 million funded by the RIP-EDF. Through the EPRD South Africa € 2 million could supplement the Competitive Funds.

*Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2*

**TZ**

During the period 2001-2007, the EDF allocation includes an A envelope (290 M€) to support long term development objectives and a B envelope to cover unforeseen needs (65 M€). Agriculture is not a focal sector in Tanzania for the period 2001-2007. However, the EC supported the transport infrastructure as a focal sector (116 M€) in order to improve access to local, regional and international markets and to services in Tanzania. In addition, the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF includes the "Investment Facility" as financing instrument managed by the EIB, but not part of the Indicative Programme. The EIB identified *inter alia* the development of agricultural and agro-industrial activities and all the related services and activities, combining both export oriented and import substitution operations, as a specific focus for the Investment Facility.

On average, 35% of the 4-6<sup>th</sup> EDF NIPs were allocated to agriculture, mainly to support coffee (major beneficiary) and feeder road maintenance programmes and the STABEX facility. Smaller transfers were carried out to cotton, tea, sisal and cloves. Since the 7<sup>th</sup> EDF support to agriculture has been limited to STABEX (76 M€ since the beginning of Lomé IV)

*Sources: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 18, 28 & 61; Addendum 2 to the CSP/NIP, page 2*

During the period 2008-2013, the indicative allocation of programmable resources is 555 M€ while the indicative value of the B envelope has been set at 10.1 M€. Agriculture is not a focal sector in Tanzania for the period 2008-2013 but the agricultural commodity sector will benefit from the programmable resources through the third focal area which is *Trade and Regional Integration*. In fact, the support will be devoted to *inter alia* the Agricultural Sector Development Programme.

The specific objective of the transport sector will be achieved firstly through a concentration on those key commodities based on the analysis of their supply chain. This will indicatively involve



quality enhancement through agricultural research (notably for coffee, tea, cotton, and potentially innovative crops such as bio-energy plants). In addition, there will be support to measures which can enhance trade, for example price risk management systems. The interventions will build on lessons learnt from previous investments, including STABEX funds. For these interventions a mix between co-financing, basket arrangements and project support is envisaged.

A second priority will be the facilitation of market access to smallholders, supporting producer organizations in their work to link small farmers (especially women) to local and regional markets. A third priority will be to build capacities for companies and farmers or fishers organisations on food safety issues. In that field, the Commission recognizes the importance of meeting demanding sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards imposed at EU and global level, including by non-state actors such as EUREPGAP. In addition, efforts will be made to ensure coherence both with regional support on trade-related SPS (under the ESA-IOC and SADC programmes) and with a number of relevant all-ACP programmes dealing with SPS challenges.

The CSP underlines that an amount of €44 million was available from STABEX funds (€ 38 million transfers and € 6 million generated interest) and covered by a Framework of Mutual Obligation (FMO) which was signed in February 2003 and amended by a rider in 2005. Support is given to the Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TaCRI), the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), and a programme for the rehabilitation of priority regional roads in coffee-growing areas. There have been significant achievements in the area of private research. The contribution to the Agriculture Sector development programme (ASDP) has been integrated into the ASDP basket fund which supports the sector budget at Ministry level.

In future, private commodity research in tea, coffee, sugar, and perhaps cotton are useful and efficient ways to support the delivery of improved technologies to producers. There should however be wider focus alongside the value added chain in the production process. Future support should combine the commodity support to private sector operators with other support in the area of trade, including the EPA related actions.

As a Sugar Protocol country Tanzania benefits from accompanying measures for the period 2007-2013. The actions envisaged in that context shall be complementary to the above financial instruments and 4 priority areas have been identified: Development of smallholder (outgrower) infrastructure, capacity building of outgrower associations, restructuring of research and training, and improved management of environmental issues. The amount allocated for 2007-2010 is €6 million.

*Sources: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 65, 69, 73-74,78*

Stabex funds were made available as a measure to stabilize the economy affected by coffee and tea export losses. Up to 1993, Tanzania received 51 million Euros of Stabex allocations. In 2003, it received 38 million Euros to stabilize export losses between 1994 and 1999.

Stabex funds, which were previously used in the form of direct aids to farmers, are now channeled through projects. Stabex interventions are managed at the level of specific products, namely coffee and tea, and to a lesser extent, cotton. In addition, support was also provided to carry out key studies on the reform of Crop Boards, the Agricultural Census and the development of the strategic action plan to implement the Land Acts. All of these interventions have taken place in the wider reform of the sector.

	<p>Given the importance that the EC has attached to supporting policy reforms and strategies, the allocation of Stabex funds has been targeted to a strategic tool to support the Agricultural Sector Support Programme (ASDP) and the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) priorities. Around 40 million Euros (from 1994-1999 Coffee transfers plus the remaining balance from earlier funds) will be allocated to these priorities. Part of the Stabex funds will also support the development of rural roads.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the EC support to the United Republic of Tanzania, April 2006, page 37</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>In TZ, important amounts of Stabex funds were still available at the time of 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> EDF programming (€ 38.44 million initially at signature of FMO 94-99 in 2003, increased to €46.35 million in December 2008 due to accumulated interests). In 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, some support for the institutions/sub-sectors previously benefiting from Stabex support (tea and coffee research institutes - €2m each) was set aside under a Trade and Agriculture Programme (TAP) to ensure the benefits of previous support would be consolidated, outreach to farmers and marketing. Exit strategies had not been determined for the 2 beneficiary institutions and the new programme extends the funding for 2 years whilst ideas for making the institutions self-financing (or other means to make their existence sustainable) are being discussed. The TAP does not provide an exit strategy.</p> <p>So EDF funds have been used as a follow-up from Stabex in an effort to increase the benefits of the Stabex funding (research efforts have been made but propagation to farmers and actual results in terms of planting and production have not yet occurred).</p> <p><i>Source: MN156</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Issues with coffee and tea: it was proposed under the EDF to use money to TACRI and TRIT. Because tea and coffee are very important commodities. The situation has changed little bit. The procedure to use EDF is long: financial agreement (2007), decision 20954 (2008): Trade and agriculture programme – phase I for 9.4 M€ from a budget of 55M€. Components: capacity building, trade component, support to regulatory initiatives, anti-dumping, legislative framework, EPA negotiations, etc. The programme started 6 months ago. We will receive the financing agreement.</p> <p>There was a mix of instrument used in Tanzania. The EU really paid attention to what fits exactly. Technical assistance has also been provided, where deemed necessary. TASP I is a direct continuation from Stabex (for TRIT and TACRI) but TASP II is a new programme.</p> <p><i>Source: MN138, MN 600</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>The Support project to strengthen commercial capacities of agricultural producers in Tanzania is a project-based approach including a day-to-day management with a French NGO (FERT), MVIWATA (network of farmer's groups in Tanzania) and local project stakeholders' representatives.</p> <p>The project management and MVIWATA complained about an inadequate coordination of activities (late responses, splitting of staff time between project and MVIWATA). The EC delegation input on monitoring was limited.</p> <p><i>Source: Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, Appendix 2</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Yes. The EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds were mainly used to support specific commodity</p>

	<p>chains in particular coffee. But the main difference is the following: EDF is used to implement interventions; Stabex could be used to implement projects but also to identify and formulate interventions, support the design of policy documents, bridge the gap between two interventions, etc.(Source: MN 301 and 313).</p> <p>Regarding the COMs, they were probably sent to delegations when they were produced but the EC delegation doesn't know them. However, EC delegation thinks to be in line with their priorities (Source: MN 301).</p>
UG	<p>There is evidence that EU support in Uganda has been provided by the EDF and community budget lines, as well as emergency assistance.</p> <p>However, although the EDF has been used for agricultural modernisation and rural development, the budget lines were directed at human rights and health. Emergency financing (from the B-envelope of the EDF) is aimed at aid to populations afflicted by the conflicts.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 3 &amp; 23</i> <i>Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 17</i></p>
VU	<p>According to the Addendum to the <b>Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2007</b> signed on 23 March 2006 by the European Commission and the Pacific ACP Region, € 6 million were added to the focal sector "Regional Economic Integration (allocation in December 2005 was € 9.2 million, and thus became € 15.2 million after the signed Addendum). This additional support under the <b>Pacific Indicative Programme</b> was broken down as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ €2 million top up to component 2 of the Pacific Regional Economic Integration Programme (Capacity Building for EPA Negotiations);</li> <li>▪ €4 million for an Agricultural Export Commodity Development programme to consolidate the results and build on the 8-9<sup>th</sup> EDF Plant Protection Programme.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Addendum to the Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2007, 23 March 2006</i></p> <p>Among other fields, agriculture remains an important sector of the Pacific (regional) economy. In this context, the second focal area of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF Regional Indicative Programme is the <b>Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and the Environment</b>. A total of €40 million out of €95 million (equalling to 42% of the RIP) is reserved for supporting activities in this area.</p> <p><i>Source: European Community-Pacific Region, 2008-2013 Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme, page 11</i></p> <p>At the time that STABEX came (1999-2000) a Board was established to manage funds from STABEX. This board is the Vanuatu Commodity Marketing Board (VCMB). Important missions of the Board were to analyse international prices tend for agricultural products such as copra, coffee and cocoa. The idea to create the VCMB was a good idea.</p> <p>At the time STABEX came, prices were good for coconut and then there was no need to use STABEX money to support the coconut value chain. But, when the funds were over, the coconut sector faced low prices and the help was needed at that time.</p> <p>Members of the VCMB were appointed by politicians/ Ministers. They were also politicians and not technicians or managers. The provisional Government has put a tax on each agricultural product. Farmers have to pay 2% of the revenue from agricultural products. The VCMB regulates this tax and collect it (for example, for cocoa, kava and coconut). This money is used to finance political parties. The VCMB also issues licences to exporters.</p> <p>No more audits have been done by the Government since 2005. The World Bank has recently</p>

	<p>done a review. The legislation was rebuilt in that context. There is a new framework. Still in progress for coconut, kava and cocoa. The framework is based on a Public Private Partnership (PPP) in order to facilitate the organisation of farmers (collection, processing, etc.) and to invest in agricultural commodities. Reports have been published in that matter. Ministers need to decide now. The Rebuild Act needs to be published.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 1011</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Different financing instruments (other than the EDF) are mentioned in Vanuatu's CSP/NIP: STABEX (final report sent in 2006), the Pacific Regional Fund, the Intra-ACP Cooperation, the EIB and the <i>B-6261 Tropical Forest</i> and <i>B7-6002 Decentralised Cooperation</i> Budget Lines.</p> <p>These different instruments were however never directly linked to support of agricultural commodities, but rather to infrastructure, energy or natural resource projects.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 31</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	Aucun autre instrument financier que le FED n'est évoqué dans les RSP/RIPs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.
<b>I.8.1.2</b>	Evidence that interventions at bilateral level in a given country are designed and implemented in the full knowledge of and in complementarity with regional interventions and vice versa
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>There is no evidence that interventions at bilateral level in a given country are designed and implemented in the full knowledge of and in complementarity with regional interventions and vice versa. However, it is expected that the AAACP programme will facilitate exchange of experiences across commodity sectors, and with other linked activities such as overall agriculture sector development support by supporting a coordination structure that includes the ACP countries, the Commission, EU Member States, relevant international organisations, as well as NGOs and private sector.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-IF</b>	<p>The MTS-IF project is designed and managed in such a way as to find/create synergies between the different interventions in different countries/ regions. When requests for assistance come to the PMU it will try to create synergies by identifying similar requests from other countries/regions and sharing the results and holding workshops to which they invite different countries so they can learn from each other.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 986</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>According to the PIP final evaluation, the Programme implemented measures on a national as well as on a regional level (e.g. setting up national health control systems, regional harmonisation of pesticide registration procedures).</p> <p>The report states however that there is a need for harmonisation of the PIP with other national and regional programmes (e.g. on attempting to improve the sector infrastructure and support services).</p> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 9 &amp; 14.</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>There is no evidence that National Adaptations Strategies and the EC responses have been designed with a view of developing synergies with regional programmes. The AMSP study pointed out that all NAS have been developed in isolation from one another although SP countries of South Eastern Africa and SP countries of the Caribbean region face similar situations.</p>

<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA interventions are considered complementary of the EDF Country Support strategies, where goals of “strengthening competitiveness” and “supporting diversification” are mentioned. Bananas are however never singled out in the strategy papers.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 16, htsp, 2008.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Burkina Faso mentions the presence of a Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), whose actions will have consequences on the national level. There is however no detail of the RIP.</p> <p>Furthermore, the CSP/NIP foresees € 11 million for regional integration and cooperation.</p> <p>There is however no information on what has been designed concerning agriculture and commodities.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 15 &amp; 45</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés même si le MR précise que la logique de l'intervention est clairement orientée vers le marché mais le projet présente de fortes synergies avec d'autres programmes, certains de grande envergure, notamment sur l'anacarde avec l'Initiative pour le Cajou Africain, financé par la Fondation Gates et la coopération allemande GTZ (<i>Source : MR p.2</i>).</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés</p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>No support to agricultural commodities in the regional programme.</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p><b>Peu d'informations sur la complémentarité avec les interventions régionales dans le secteur agricole mais intégration régionale au sens large est largement abordée.</b></p> <p>Pour pallier l'érosion des préférences commerciales, élargir son accès au marché régional, développer sa compétitivité et instaurer un environnement des affaires attractif, l'Etat de Cote d'Ivoire est engagé dans l'approfondissement de <b>l'intégration économique et commerciale sous régionale (UEMOA), régionale (CEDEAO), interrégionale (APE)</b> et multilatérale (OMC).</p> <p><i>(Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.10).</i></p> <p><b>Coopération régionale:</b> l'enveloppe globale au titre du 8e et 9<sup>ème</sup> FED (Enveloppe B) est de €16,3 millions. La coopération régionale porte, en Cote d'Ivoire, sur la poursuite de la mise en œuvre des programmes du PIR 8e FED. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.10</i>).</p> <p>Le secteur hors concentration « <b>appui à l'intégration régionale</b> » du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED est un point de passage obligé pour une intégration progressive et harmonieuse des économies dans l'économie mondiale, notamment par le biais de l'accord de partenariat économique. L'appui communautaire à l'intégration régionale sera essentiellement cible sur l'application des dispositions législatives et la mise à niveau du secteur productif induites par la mise en œuvre de l' APE. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.10</i>).</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>La cohérence du programme est relativement bonne entre tous les outils de la politique de développement de la Commission européenne en Cote d'Ivoire. On notera tout de même que la problématique du « renforcement mutuel » au niveau de la coopération communautaire ne doit pas emporter en elle-même une restriction d'intervention ou conduire à une rigidité contraignante. Les</p>

	<p>ressources de type Stabex ou FLEX permettent et doivent répondre à des logiques d'intervention plus économiques que les instruments plus généraux.</p> <p>Le programme reprend ou développe des appuis dans des secteurs où la coopération communautaire directe ou indirecte était historique et pour lesquels elle a pu engager des fonds du PIR 9<sup>ème</sup> FED (PUR), PIR 9<sup>ème</sup> FED et récemment FLEX 2006-2007 (sachant que ces derniers tendent à s'aligner sur la prolongation de certains projets du programme Stabex 1999).</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune référence aux interventions régionales n'est faite dans les documents de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents at bilateral level (CSP/NIP) referred to the Commission's support provided at regional level and to the need to ensure complementarities.</p> <p>Sources :</p> <p><i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, page 25-26</i></p> <p><i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 16-17</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés.
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not directly tackle agricultural commodities. The financing agreement of the PASAPE refers to the fact that the programme is coherent with the programmes implemented under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF Regional Strategy for which Regional Economic Integration and Support to Trade is the first focal area. The identification fiche further stresses that the 2005 Regional programme "Programme d'appui à l'intégration régionale en Afrique Centrale (PAIRAC) (€16m) foresees initiatives in the field of normalisation and quality and that the EU is the main donor in this field. The mid-term evaluation of the PASAPE also mentions that several programmes support the economy under the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP, but without mentioning the existence or not of synergies with the PASAPE.</p> <p>Sources:</p> <p><i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006</i></p> <p><i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p> <p><i>Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>On the one hand, the main line of the evolving Commission's strategy of support to the Caribbean Region has been the construction and the strengthening of a regional integrated space. The characteristics of the region and the potential gains in terms of economies of scale make this objective compelling. It is shared by the partners and supported by historical developments. The evaluation highlights that Commission's support has been coherent in its pursuit of the objective of constructing and strengthening a regional integrated space although the selection of interventions is insufficiently based on systematic review of the progress of regional integration.</p> <p>On the other hand, there is a general lack of <i>coherence</i> among the instruments used and the programmes which are generally not mutually supportive. This is particularly the case with the NIPs and the RIPs. Each programme and intervention has its own rationality and justification but</p>

	<p>with insufficient linkage to the Commission's strategic objective of construction of a regional integrated space. Although a large range of interventions and instruments have been deployed to support the productive sectors, overlaps and duplications have generally been avoided owing to the magnitude and diversity of the needs. Nearly all projects are linked to the objectives of the regional strategy but there is an absence of coherence at the level of the instruments.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The Caribbean Rum programme is a regional programme. There is no evidence of complementarities between this programme and EC interventions at bilateral level</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>According to the 2008-2013 East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP, there are clear complementarities with the National Indicative Programmes. For example, linkages exist between regional economic integration (part of the RSP/RIP) and national interventions such as addressing supply-side constraints in infrastructure. The national interventions are as much as possible integrated into the regional framework. According to the paper, Consistent complementarities between the NIP and the RIP also cover agricultural and rural development and food security (but no detailed explanation on why or how they are complementary can be found).</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 74</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents</p>
<b>ETHIOPIA</b>	<p>In general terms, the <b>proposed interventions</b> have been designed to contribute to reducing regional income inequalities within Ethiopia, as well as to the achievement and maintenance of economic prosperity, food security, peace and political stability in the Horn of Africa, and <b>are consistent with the approaches and measures included in the EC-ESA Regional Strategy Paper (RSP)</b>. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.43</i>)</p> <p>There is a high degree of coherence and complementarity between the Commission's country strategies for Ethiopia and the Regional Strategies and Indicative Programmes for the region covering Ethiopia, both in for 1996-2001 (RIP 1997) and the 2002-2007 period (RIP 2002). The focal sectors of the RIPs coincide very closely with the choice of focal sectors in Ethiopia and are consistent throughout the period. The RSP/RIP 2002 includes food security aspects under the sector 'Management of Natural Resources' and support to the private sector under the sector 'Economic Integration and Trade'. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 17</i>).</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>Regional interventions are not well coordinated with bilateral initiatives because the regional programmes are very slow to take off.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 964</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>There are regional support programmes to the cocoa sector (the Sustainable Tree Crops Programme of the IITA and the Platform in Scientific Partnership on improvement of cocoa-based agroforestry systems). These programmes are however not supported by the EU, although the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal mentions that collaboration and complementarity with these programmes will be assured.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal, pages 3 &amp; 4.</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>Ghana's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP states that "EC regional and national strategy links do not appear well identified and exploited". Yet there are no suggestions to improve that specific situation.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 30</i></p>

<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>Although the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme is mostly implemented at the level of an organisation located in Kenya (the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources or AU-IBAR), it is a regional intervention aimed at various African economic communities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);</li> <li>▪ The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD);</li> <li>▪ The South African Development Community (SADC);</li> <li>▪ The East African Community (EAC);</li> <li>▪ The East and South Africa Region (COMESA);</li> <li>▪ The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS);</li> <li>▪ The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD).</li> </ul> <p>These Regional Economic Communities (REC) also became role players in the implementation of the programme.</p> <p>As of complementarity with national interventions, the programme's Financing Agreement lists the different interventions (national and regional) which are considered complementary to the PAN-SPSO. These interventions are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Pesticides Initiative Programme supports ACP countries in addressing Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) issues;</li> <li>▪ The Strengthening Fishery Products Health Conditions in ACP/OCT Countries programme also addresses SPS issues, but not for agricultural products;</li> <li>▪ The EC PARI II supports work on industry standards in West Africa to reinforce SPS capacities, mainly through laboratory support;</li> <li>▪ The EC supports the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) representation in Africa to “prepare national veterinary services to fulfil international SPS requirements for Rinderpest and declaration of other diseases constraining trade of animals”;</li> <li>▪ The DG TRADE supports African countries (among others) through the “Participation Trust Fund” which provides funding to the International Standard-setting Organisations (ISSOs) for SPS expert missions to and from developing countries;</li> <li>▪ The DG RESEARCH supports research programmes in the field of “Food Quality and Safety”, which provides vital information for standard-setting meetings.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 17 PAN-SPSO Annual Report, August 2010, page 17</i></p>
<b>KEN</b>	There is no such evidence in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Peu d'informations sur la complémentarité avec les interventions régionales dans le secteur agricole. Par contre, quelques infos sur ces stratégies régionales dans les secteurs du transport maritime (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.27), pêche (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.46),...</b></p> <p>Dans le cadre de la <b>coopération Intra-ACP et régionale</b>, Madagascar a bénéficié de la « Facilité eau » depuis 2006 et d'un certain nombre de projets au titre des PIR 7ème et 8ème FED, mis en œuvre par la COI. La coopération régionale devra être renforcée dans le cadre du 10ème FED (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.21</i>).</p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The programme is addressing a country specific food security issue without any relation to regional projects.
<b>ML</b>	The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Mali makes reference to the 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF Regional Indicative Programme in West Africa in one of its chapters, but it doesn't explain which interventions will be funded by it.



	<p>It does however mention that EU support will be brought at a regional level in West Africa to help agricultural exports comply with sanitary regulations and to improve competitiveness of export sectors in the context of the EPA negotiations.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 36 &amp; 46.</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>There are no details on the complementarity but the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP mentions that Regional and National programmes are complementary, with the National ones addressing country-specific needs.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 64</i></p> <p>The 2007 Evaluation's summary report notes that 'the Commission, a small donor in relative terms in the Pacific Region, did not use the full potential of the coordination and complementarities of its regional and national strategies to maximise the impact of its assistance'. The evaluation report further notes that national programming is done through close dialogue with regional and national bodies, adopting regional priorities but that, at the same time the strategy documents at the two levels only refer superficially to each other and are not designed to be mutually supportive, and complementarity and that synergy effects have remained underexploited.</p> <p>The underlying logic is stated as: 'On the one hand, regional interventions are preferred wherever (i) regional dialogue has pre-existed, (ii) negotiations on a collective basis are needed, or (iii) regional expertise is available. On the other hand, support at national level gives high priority to rural or outer island development in the context of resolving internal weaknesses and inequalities.'</p> <p>Furthermore, in its Annex 9 (page 115) the evaluation reports the finding that 'agriculture development in PICs over the last decade has been strongly affected by the evolution of international trade agreements and by the influence of market integration in semisubsistence rural economies. The international market for agricultural commodities produced by PICs turned towards innovative and added-value processed products and/or towards "niche markets"' (the production of kava in Samoa for herbal medicine in Germany is given as an example). Also the physical, technical and financial constraints play in favour of the adoption of regional approaches and strategies with regard to international agricultural trade, agricultural research and information networks.</p> <p>Overall, the evaluation shows that the Commission has had good quality policy dialogue with regional institutions, that regional institutions have been much strengthened by Commission support and that they are very effective in undertaking their tasks and fulfilling their missions.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission's Support to the ACP Pacific Region, summary page 2, pages 60-61 and Annex 9 p 115, 2007</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The project is a regional one but it appears from available documentation (IF and Pacific Evaluation 2007) that there is a very tight coordination between the national and regional organisations in the Pacific, with notably a regional strategy for agricultural development and trade to which the national governments subscribe.</p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.</p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>The Financing agreement mentions that several other donors are supporting SADC agricultural research activities and will continue to do so during the programme (USAID, GTZ, and AfDB) either to support Research Networks or Research Programme. The financial support of the SADC</p>

	<p>member States for the agricultural research and training programme will also continue through financial and technical supports from the SADC-FANR directorate.</p> <p>In addition, SADC will establish a visible entity with a management capacity to regionally coordinate agricultural research and training. This visible entity will be integrated into the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) Directorate. According to the Maputo decision to officially create FARA, SADC is a funding member of FARA and as such will play the role of a Sub-Regional Organization for Southern Africa, as CORAF4 and ASARECA5. SADC will represent the research institutions of the region in the international research Fora and will participate in the necessary research coordination between the three sub-regions within FARA. SADC will mobilise the capacity of the other SADC directorates or services (Financial, IT, etc.) to manage the EDF and all the research activities to be implemented in the framework of this regional programme.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>TAN</b>	There is no such evidence in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>The lack of strategic linkages with other initiatives, i.e. synergy with other national based market information initiatives, will limit the functioning of the Market Information System (MIS) after the support of the project.</p> <p><i>Sources: Final Narrative report, period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009, June 2009, Appendix 2</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Yes. The new agricultural development strategy (DSIP) is <u>fully consistent with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)</u> of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development) (Source: MN 301).</p> <p>Regional programmes financed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization</li> <li>• PACE (on animal health)</li> <li>• Asareka (Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa) which complemented the EC support to NARO (source: MN301)</li> </ul>
<b>UG-COF</b>	There is no obvious relation between the project and interventions at regional level, but Solidaridad, the implementing NGO implements similar projects in other countries of Eastern Africa (and in Latin America).
<b>UG-SBS</b>	The only potential link between the EC SBS and EC interventions at regional level is with the EC support to agricultural research at regional/international level (for instance support to CGIAR). However the programme TAPs do not make any reference to such a link.
<b>UG</b>	<p>Complementarity of interventions in Uganda is supposed to be assured by the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) of which the EC, several member states and other donors are members.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 28</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	Il n'y a pas d'évidence que les activités du Programme Tous ACP (FAO) appliqué à un niveau régional (Pacifique) pour le Vanuatu et les activités du projet FACT (renforcement des capacités techniques des producteurs agricoles) aient été programmés et mis en œuvre en tenant compte des autres interventions de la CE dans le même domaine, notamment à travers le projet POPACA/POP2. Le seul point commun apparent est le fait que l'organisation de producteurs <i>Farm Support Association</i> a été le bénéficiaire des activités des trois interventions financées par la CE.

	<p>Le Programme tous ACP dont bénéficie le Vanuatu est géré à partir de Bruxelles et mis en œuvre par la FAO dans la région du Pacifique avec (très) peu d'information communiquée à la Délégation. <i>Source : MN 1098, MN 1067 and MN 1015</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>There is evidence that complementarity and synergies with France's interventions in Vanuatu have been discussed and negotiated.</p> <p>There is still a certain lack of coordination among donors in Vanuatu but the CSP mentions that they are “<i>intent to support the drafting of a road map at a national level, listing measures to be taken to enhance harmonisation between donor procedures, leading to a coordinated approach to development assistance to the beneficiary country, and aiming, eventually, at joint programming.</i>”</p> <p>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 32 &amp; 50.</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	No mention of regional interventions can be found in the Producer Organisation Project II documents.
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Les stratégies nationales et régionales élaborées avec la CE sont basées sur les stratégies nationales et régionales de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Selon le RSP/RIP de l'Afrique de l'Ouest de 2008-2013, ceci permettra normalement de tirer profit des synergies et complémentarités entre les deux programmes.</p> <p>De plus, la cohérence entre le programme régional et les programmes nationaux sera au cœur de la révision à mi-parcours prévue et des réunions de pilotage.</p> <p>Finaleme nt des synergies sont particulièrement recherchées dans le cadre de l'absorption de l'impact sur les recettes fiscales des APE et de la politique régionale d'interconnectivité.</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 51, 65 &amp; 66</i></p>
<b>I.8.1.3</b>	Evidence that interventions financed under non programmable funds in a given country have reinforced the achievements of interventions financed under programmable funds
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no such information from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PIP evaluation reports.
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>The AMSP programme is financed from a specific budget line as is therefore non programmable aid. It is implemented under the Development Cooperation Instrument.</p> <p>Relations between AMSP and interventions financed by the EDF NIP have not been investigated by the AMSP study.</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>There are multiple references to use of non programmable financing modalities used in the banana sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ STABEX projects have also been used to support the restructuring and diversification of the banana sector (e.g. in St Lucia);</li> <li>▪ EIB financing in Africa also complemented the support to the private sector development.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 16, htspe, 2008.</i></p> <p>Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country Reports, page 349, htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés

<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CI</b>	<p>La <u>cohérence du programme est relativement bonne entre tous les outils de la politique de développement de la Commission européenne en Cote d'Ivoire</u>. On notera tout de même que la problématique du « renforcement mutuel » au niveau de la coopération communautaire ne doit pas emporter en elle-même une restriction d'intervention ou conduire à une rigidité contraignante. Les ressources de type Stabex ou FLEX permettent et doivent répondre à des logiques d'intervention plus économiques que les instruments plus généraux.</p> <p>Le programme reprend ou développe des appuis dans des secteurs où la coopération communautaire directe ou indirecte était historique et pour lesquels elle a pu engager des fonds du PIR 9<sup>ème</sup> FED (PUR), PIR 9<sup>ème</sup> FED et récemment FLEX 2006-2007 (sachant que ces derniers tendent à s'aligner sur la prolongation de certains projets du programme Stabex 1999).</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune référence aux interventions régionales n'est faite dans les documents de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.
<b>CI-REH</b>	Les interventions financées par les fonds FLEX 2006 et FLEX 2007 complètent les efforts menés pour contribuer à la sortie de crise et à la stabilisation socio-économique, entrepris dans le cadre des différents Programmes d'Urgence de Réhabilitation ( <b>PUR I, II, III et IV</b> ) du 9 <sup>ème</sup> FED. Il s'intègre également au deuxième secteur d'intervention proposé par le 10 <sup>ème</sup> FED, « Cohésion sociale et la réhabilitation d'infrastructures sociales et économiques » et au secteur non focal « Appui à l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles ». (Source : Rider FA p.4)
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés.
<b>CR</b>	<p>No and the problem is particularly apparent in the multiplicity of instruments deployed in supporting the productive sectors. Because of the variety and the magnitude of the needs in this domain it has been relatively easy to avoid overlaps and duplications but it is difficult to demonstrate that the panel of instruments deployed have been designed and articulated so as to be complementary and mutually supportive of common strategic objectives. Although it has been observed that quasi all projects can justify a link with the objectives of the regional strategy, <u>there is no real linkage and coherence at the level of the instruments</u>. The selection of particular instruments may often result more from their availability than from a proper assessment of why they should be preferred.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	As regards other donors the EC is currently only one of two donors in the coffee sub sector. The other is the Government of Switzerland STABEX funds which provides (i) support to farmers for the provision of inputs for their coffee farms, and also to rehabilitate co-operative washing stations destroyed in the 1991 disturbances and (ii) a new project which involves support to organic coffee in Ethiopia through the establishment of an inspection and certification system and assistance in marketing. (Source : FP p.7)
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	In Ghana, the programmable funds have been used to consolidate the achievements of interventions supported through STABEX funds in the rural feeder roads and the cocoa sectors. The support to the Cocoa sector started in the 1990s with different elements supporting restructuring of the sector and the CSSVDCP (1994-1998) which aimed to stem the outbreak of the disease; it was followed by the use of Stabex funds (1992-93) for continuing the disease related activities (uprooting-replanting programme), adding research and extension and feeder roads rehabilitation. This was implemented over 2000-2005 after which the EDF funds were used to fund

	<p>a CSSP II (again research, extension, seed multiplication) and a feeder roads rehabilitation programme. More recently a PSD&amp;T programme is also indirectly relevant to the cocoa and other sectors in strengthening trade capacities.</p> <p><i>Source: Agrifor 2005, programme documents (CSSP I, CSSP II, FRIP, PSTEP).</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II mentions that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme I was financed through STABEX funds;</li> <li>▪ STABEX funds had also been allocated to the feeder roads programme, facilitating cocoa marketing;</li> <li>▪ STABEX funds also supported the Cocoa Swollen Shoot Projects to compensate producers for losses due to the swollen shoot virus.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal, page 3.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No references to non-programmable funds can be found in the programme documents.
<b>KEN</b>	There is no such evidence in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>MG</b>	<p>La coordination et la complémentarité entre les bailleurs de fond et leurs interventions dans le domaine des cultures d'exportation ne sont pas satisfaisantes. La première insuffisance est l'absence de coordination du programme STABEX et de ses 11 contrats de subvention. Certains de ces contrats couvrent des filières communes (ou avec des spécificités similaires) et sont mis en œuvre dans une même région, autant de conditions pour créer des synergies et partager bonnes pratiques et leçons apprises.</p> <p><i>Source : Appui à l'amélioration de la qualité et à la commercialisation du girofle dans le District de Fénévère, Rapport de Monitoring</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence concernant le renforcement des résultats. Toutefois, la Délégation estime que l'idéal serait d'avoir accès à <u>Stabex, lignes budgétaires et FED</u> car cela permet d'avoir un mix d'outils complémentaires (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de prendre en compte l'ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole malgache (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (Source : MN 804 et débriefing Délégation).</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Pendant la campagne 2010/11 les problèmes de maîtrise de la teneur en soufre ont abouti à la fermeture du marché allemand aux exportations malgaches de litchis. Pour essayer de résoudre ce problème, le Groupement des Exportateurs de Litchis (GEL) a obtenu l'appui du programme tous-ACP Initiative Pesticides (PIP-2), mis en œuvre par le COLEACP.</p> <p><i>Source : Rapport Stabex 2010</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The programme is a follow-up of the programme de sécurité alimentaire (PASA) financed from the budget line Food Security 1998, 1999, 2003/04, which already included actions aimed at improving agricultural production, structuring rural actors and reinforcing their capacities, reorganising the Ministry of Agriculture.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	There is mention of complementary projects, pursuing the same objective but no details are given as to their sources of financing (PACREIP, PACER, PICTA)
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, ROM reports and in the Mid Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	There is no such evidence in the CSPs/NIPs.
<b>TZ</b>	In TZ the situation is rather the reverse: programmable funding of 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF has included

	reinforcement of achievements of interventions funded under STABEX.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG coffee</b>	Yes. The EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds were mainly used to support specific commodity chains in particular coffee. But the main difference is the following: EDF is used to implement interventions; Stabex could be used to implement projects but also to identify and formulate interventions, support the design of policy documents, bridge the gap between two interventions, etc. <u>These two instruments were clearly complementing each other.</u> Currently the Delegation doesn't have available an instrument replacing the Stabex funds (Source: MN 301 and 313).
<b>UG-COF</b>	According to the project description "there are a few (USAID financed) initiatives with more or less relevance" to the project. No reference is made to EU MS.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	No evidence found.
<b>VU-POP</b>	No such evidence can be found in the Producer Organisation Project II documents.
<b>I.8.1.4</b>	Stakeholders' views on complementarities between interventions of a given country financed under: (i) bilateral and regional funds (ii) programmable and non programmable funds
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no such information from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	No such information can be found in the PIP evaluation reports.
<b>AMSP</b>	This issue has not been investigated by the AMSP study.
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>La plupart des parties prenantes interrogées à ce sujet (DUE, FAO, UEMOA...) perçoivent mal la complémentarité entre les interventions de la Commission à caractère bilatéral (PAFFIC, amélioration de la fertilité des sols des exploitations biologiques de la zone cotonnière) et celles à caractère régional (Université du coton, activités du volet coton du Programme tous ACP car ils ne voient déjà pas où et comment ces deux niveaux sont coordonnés entre eux.</p> <p>L'approche de l'UNPCB est plus pragmatique. Cette organisation a été amenée à coordonner un nombre croissant d'interventions financées par divers bailleurs (DCE, AFD, BAD,...) portant sur l'amélioration de l'exploitation cotonnière. Ainsi, l'UNPCB a élaboré un plan stratégique quinquennal en 2007 pour mieux conduire les appuis de manière coordonnée. Ces appuis sont intégrés dans le plan stratégique. Pour l'UNPCB, peu importe le bailleur et l'instrument de financement, ce qui importe c'est que les appuis s'intègrent de manière complémentaire dans leur plan stratégique.</p> <p>L'UNPCB distingue bien les appuis réalisés dans le cadre du STABEX et les autres appuis apportés dans le cadre du 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, lignes budgétaires FOOD....L'UNPCB a particulièrement apprécié les appuis réalisés dans le cadre du STABEX qui étaient nettement plus conséquents que les autres appuis et ont mieux répondu à leurs préoccupations (constructions de magasins de stockage d'intrants et du siège de l'UNPCB, financement d'équipement roulant pour l'UNPCB, appui au recrutement par l'UNPCB de personnel technique.... Les autres appuis sont jugés insuffisants pour répondre aux besoins.</p> <p>La SOFITEX, la plus grande des 3 sociétés cotonnières privatisées (= 85% de la production nationale de coton) a surtout apprécié les appuis apportés sur fonds STABEX car ils en voyaient concrètement les effets, notamment en matière, d'apurement de dettes envers les producteurs (bien que l'apurement n'a été que partiel, à hauteur de 800 millions de FCFA et surtout la construction de magasins de stockage des intrants au niveau de groupements de producteurs de coton (GPC). Environ 60 magasins de stockage ont pu être construits avec un financement : 1/3 STABEX, 1/3</p>

	<p>SOFITEX, 1/3 producteurs (main d'œuvre, apport de matériaux). D'après la SOFITEX, il faudrait que chaque GPC ait son magasin. Cela faciliterait beaucoup la gestion des intrants qui pose de gros problèmes à la filière. Par ailleurs, la SOFITEX déplore que l'utilisation initiale de fonds COM STABEX3 pour la construction/réfection de 900km de pistes rurales coton a finalement été détournée au profit de la construction d'une route à l'Est.</p> <p>La SOFITEX ne se sent pas concernée/associée par les autres types de financements CE.</p> <p><i>Sources : MN 510, MN 518, MN 567, MN 575, MN 581</i></p>
<b>BF ACP-ACP Coton</b>	<p>Pour la SOFITEX, ce qui importe c'est la pertinence et la cohérence des interventions qu'elle juge surtout selon son degré d'association dans les interventions.</p> <p>Ainsi, la SOFITEX n'est pas associée au programme GIPD du volet coton du Programme tous ACP, alors qu'elle promeut depuis longtemps des BPA (ex.semis précoce, traitement sur seuil, utilisation de la matière organique...). Pour la SOFITEX, la GIPD a montré ses limites et elle en a fait part à une mission FAO.</p> <p>Par contre la SOFITEX est associée au projet de lutte contre la contamination du Programme tous ACP qu'elle trouve car il permet de bien prendre conscience du problème des contaminants (alors qu'elle trouve moins pertinent le projet de standardisation de la mesure instrumentale du coton à des fins commerciales).</p> <p><i>Source : MN 575</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CI</b>	<p><u>La cohérence du programme est relativement bonne entre tous les outils de la politique de développement de la Commission européenne en Côte d'Ivoire.</u> On notera tout de même que la problématique du « renforcement mutuel » au niveau de la coopération communautaire ne doit pas emporter en elle-même une restriction d'intervention ou conduire à une rigidité contraignante. Les ressources de type Stabex ou FLEX permettent et doivent répondre à des logiques d'intervention plus économiques que les instruments plus généraux.</p> <p>Le programme reprend ou développe des appuis dans des secteurs où la coopération communautaire directe ou indirecte était historique et pour lesquels elle a pu engager des fonds du PIR 9eme FED (PUR), PIR 9emc FED et récemment FLEX 2006-2007 (sachant que ces derniers tendent à s'aligner sur la prolongation de certains projets du programme Stabex 1999).</p> <p><i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune référence aux interventions régionales n'est faite dans les documents de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés.
<b>CR</b>	No information has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents
<b>GH-COC</b>	No stakeholders' views can be found in the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II documents.
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No stakeholders' views on complementarities between bilateral and regional funds can be found in the programme documents.
<b>MG</b>	La Délégation estime que l'idéal serait de continuer à utiliser <u>Stabex, lignes budgétaires et FED</u> car

	<p>cela permet d'avoir un mix d'outils complémentaires (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de prendre en compte l'ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole malgache (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (Source : MN 804 et débriefing Délégation).</p> <p>En effet, à titre d'illustration, les fonds Stabex et la ligne budgétaire Sécurité Alimentaire ont été employés complémentaires, les premiers pour des appuis filière et la seconde pour la mise en place de structures d'appui au développement agricole et rural en général.</p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The programme is addressing a country specific food security issue without any relation to regional projects.</p> <p>On relations with non-programmable funds see above I.8.1.3</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>Overall</b>	<p>Trust funds are appreciated for regional operations but they potentially can be harmful for country operations: their use is not as predictable as national funding and sometimes they duplicate what is already done at national level. Infrastructure would typically be an area where trust funds can be used at international level. The Commission contributes to the CAADP, the IF and agricultural research programmes through Trust Funds.</p> <p><i>Source: MN912</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such information in the programming documents, ROM reports and in the Mid Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	<p>According to some stakeholders, the support that was given in the form of an EU contribution to the ASDP basket fund was better for them than project support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- More in line with the Paris declaration</li> <li>- Avoids duplication/overlapping of support</li> <li>- However, modalities for getting the funds may be longer</li> </ul> <p>No comment on the combined use of GBS, Basket Fund, regional funds.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 601</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Yes. The EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds were mainly used to support specific commodity chains in particular coffee. But the main difference is the following: EDF is used to implement interventions; Stabex could be used to implement projects but also to identify and formulate interventions, support the design of policy documents, bridge the gap between two interventions, etc.(Source: MN 301 and 313).</p> <p>Regarding the COMs, they were probably sent to delegations when they were produced but the EC delegation doesn't know them. However, EC delegation thinks to be in line with their priorities (Source: MN 301).</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	According to the project description "there are a few (USAID financed) initiatives with more or less relevance" to the project. No reference is made to EU MS.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	No information found.
<b>VU-POP</b>	No such evidence can be found in the Producer Organisation Project II documents.
<b>I.8.1.5</b>	Stakeholders' views on the appropriateness of the mix of instruments with regard to the COM objectives in a given country



<b>ACP-ACP</b>	There is no such information from programming documents and M&E reports of the AAACP programme.
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	No mention of the COMs can be found in the PIP evaluation reports, nor on stakeholder's views of the appropriateness of the mix of instruments.
<b>AMSP</b>	This issue has not been investigated by the AMSP study.
<b>BF</b>	<p>Le Burkina Faso a bénéficié de beaucoup d'instruments différents. De manière générale, la coopération avec l'UE se passe bien. Mais, au niveau opérationnel, il y a des difficultés. Cela est toutefois considéré normal car plus on descend, plus il y a des difficultés d'exécution. Sur le terrain on arrive quand même à trouver des solutions.</p> <p>Les FED (environ 30% des fonds d'aides apportés au Burkina Faso) sont très appréciées, en termes de décaissement. La presque totalité des fonds d'aide FED transite par la DG Coopération (Ordonnateur national). Sur le plan procédural, c'est très bien. Ce n'est pas toujours le cas d'autres partenaires qui exécutent directement les interventions dans le pays sans impliquer les services administratifs.</p> <p>Avec l'évolution des instruments, l'appui budgétaire est apprécié car il permet d'utiliser les ressources de l'aide en les alliant sur les priorités du Gouvernement. Mais, les résultats ne sont pas toujours probants. L'ordonnancement doit venir de la DG Coop pour la mise à disposition de fonds à l'extérieur. Cependant, il y a encore des décaissements en direct, du PTF vers le bénéficiaire. Un handicap majeur est que tous les bailleurs n'ont pas encore les mêmes procédures. Les divergences de procédures entre les 35 PTF freinent considérablement l'alignement de l'aide. Il faut harmoniser, le travail est en cours mais il n'y a pas d'avancées majeures à cet égard. L'objectif d'harmonisation ne peut pas être raté, vu que la Déclaration de Paris arrive à son terme.</p> <p>Un point à améliorer : pour l'agriculture, il n'y a pas encore d'harmonisation claire. Pour l'eau et la santé, cela s'organise doucement. Chaque partenaire y va de son intérêt et de sa propre approche.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 598</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CI</b>	<p><u>La cohérence du programme est relativement bonne entre tous les outils de la politique de développement de la Commission européenne en Côte d'Ivoire.</u> On notera tout de même que la problématique du « renforcement mutuel » au niveau de la coopération communautaire ne doit pas emporter en elle-même une restriction d'intervention ou conduire à une rigidité contraignante. Les ressources de type Stabex ou FLEX permettent et doivent répondre à des logiques d'intervention plus économiques que les instruments plus généraux.</p> <p>Le programme reprend ou développe des appuis dans des secteurs où la coopération communautaire directe ou indirecte était historique et pour lesquels elle a pu engager des fonds du PIR 9ème FED (PUR), PIR 9ème FED et récemment FLEX 2006-2007 (sachant que ces derniers tendent à s'aligner sur la prolongation de certains projets du programme Stabex 1999).</p> <p><i>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune référence aux interventions régionales n'est faite dans les documents de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés. L'appropriation concerne l'intervention.</p> <p>Le MR souligne qu'il existe des mécanismes d'appropriation par les bénéficiaires (contribution par remboursement de 40% de l'investissement à APROMAC (Association des Professionnels du</p>

	<p>Caoutchouc Naturel en Côte d'Ivoire). (<i>Source : Rider MR p.2</i>)</p> <p>Le MR cite simplement que « la période 2010-2011 sera déterminante pour la pérennisation des acquis de l'hévéa et le lancement des bases pour le palmier » (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>The Delegation does not consider this mix of instruments appropriate. It does not allow a coherent, medium term strategic approach. Indicative programming is a good thing. It is discussed with the Government. Sectors of concentration are chosen (<i>even under potential influence of Brussels (Commissioner) – Brussels should not ask why the agricultural sector or rural sector was absent over the 2000-2010 period- this is the consequence of evolution of aid delivery. Brussels wanted budget aid and if not limitation to 2 sectors of concentration. And a Commissioner did not want to see the agricultural sector, in contrary to the Gvt. Therefore in the end, the “rural” sector does not appear in the NIP. It has been timidly introduced were possible</i>). But there is a discussion and negotiation with the Gvt and at the end the NIP is signed by both parties. Under the EDF, there is double signature on all operations. This is a good thing. Stabex is heritage of the past. The basic idea was good. The whole approach for using Stabex (elaboration of FMO and their protocols) is not necessarily coordinated with other intervention. Cameroon is not concerned by Flex.</p> <p>For the budget lines, it is quite different. Programming cycle is different. Yearly approach for Budget lines! The implication of the Gvt in budget lines is very low! As an example, the Delegation has not even been visited by the all ACP programme managed in headquarters! This is a bit different for the budget line for bananas, where the Gvt was of course involved.</p> <p><i>Source: MN-402, 403</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés.
<b>CR</b>	No information has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents
<b>GH-COC</b>	No stakeholders' views can be found in the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II documents.
<b>KE-PAN</b>	No stakeholders' views on the appropriateness of instruments with regard to the COM objectives can be found in the programme documents
<b>MG</b>	<p>La Délégation estime que l'idéal serait d'avoir accès à <u>Stabex, lignes budgétaires et FED</u> car cela permet d'avoir un mix d'outils complémentaires (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de prendre en compte l'ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole malgache (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (<i>Source : MN 804 et débriefing Délégation</i>).</p> <p>Concernant la <u>COM 2004(89)</u> (Madagascar n'est pas concernée par la seconde COM), l'ensemble des intervenant ne semble pas en avoir connaissance mais la Délégation souligne qu'il y a des convergences, que certains points sont pris en compte de manière ponctuelle et que certaines notions ont été intégrées dans la stratégie. La Délégation regrette néanmoins que les flux d'informations soient souvent à sens unique : Délégation vers siège central. (<i>Source : MN 801 et débriefing Délégation</i>)</p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The intervention is not product specific. It is basically a food security project without any obvious relation with the COM.
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such information in the programming documents, ROM reports and in the Mid Term Evaluation report.

<b>TZ</b>	<p>Most Government officials interviewed regret the EU's withdrawal from the Agricultural Sector Programme's Basket Fund, claiming that it is a good mechanism to support the sector. The fact that the EU funds are flowing through the Ministry of Finance rather than going directly to fund the Ministries themselves is seen as an asset as this avoids overlapping and makes a coherent whole to the use of EC funding. Also the basket fund is the best tool to monitor support efficiently. If the money goes to GBS, it is not sure that the money will be brought to the agricultural sector. GBS and BF modalities are better than the project-based approach. However the process is very long to get the support.</p> <p><i>Source: MN601</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>On budget support.</p> <p>Who houses the PMA: MAAIF or Ministry of Finance? Line ministries did not get the budget allocations they would have needed to implement. If money is not properly targeted there is no implementation of the strategy. EU should support some specific areas rather than spreading their aid on the whole agricultural sector.</p> <p>Sector wide approaches do not work. Take a small issue and address it properly. MAAIF is in favor of a commodity approach.</p> <p>(Source: MN304)</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The mix of instruments is necessary because <u>they were clearly complementing each other</u>. Indeed, the EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds were mainly used to support specific commodity chains in particular coffee. But the main difference is the following: EDF is used to implement interventions; Stabex could be used to implement projects but also to identify and formulate interventions, support the design of policy documents, bridge the gap between two interventions, etc.. Currently the Delegation doesn't have available an instrument replacing the Stabex funds (Source: MN 301 and 313).</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>According to the project description "there are a few (USAID financed) initiatives with more or less relevance" to the project. No reference is made to EU MS.</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>The programme has been entirely financed by the NIP. Prior support to the NARS and NAAS had been financed from Stabex funds.</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p><u>Satisfaction with the instruments and modalities implemented by the EC in Vanuatu:</u> The EU needs to interpret the outcomes of the POPACA project in another way, not in the way of attaining the maximum impacts. Getting support from the other partners is not possible. We need a specific support to the agricultural sector based on an evaluation of the needs. We do not understand why the EC stopped supporting activities related to agricultural commodities (coffee, copra, cocoa, etc.). More studies are wanted by the EC, on evidence-based research. They need from us that we design a strategy in the agricultural sector. We need to prepare that strategy.</p> <p>The EU feels that the Government has no strategy for the productive sector.</p> <p>We need to be assisted for developing agricultural production and their quality (for example, in the kava sector, cocoa, coconut sector). We feel that the programme dealing with the private sector is a programme to prepare the global budget support to the Vanuatu's Government. After it will be the responsibilities of the Government.</p> <p><u>Satisfaction with the All ACP programme:</u> This programme is a joke: €45 m for all the CAP countries is nothing. A lot of experts came from FAO and UNCTAD to discuss and organise meetings. But at the end of the day nothing happens for Vanuatu. This programme is not really a participative approach in Vanuatu. They did not listen to problems and needs of Vanuatu.</p>

	<p>The idea of this programme is good, notably to link farmers in the fruit and vegetables sector in the Pacific region (with Samoa). But the budget is so small for the region that nothing concrete can happen. After meetings with FAO representatives, no feedback has been sent to the Ministry of Agriculture. There is a clear lack of communication.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 1059</i></p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	No such evidence can be found in the Producer Organisation Project II documents.
<b>J.8.2</b>	<b><i>At country level, the support to agricultural commodities used a mix of financing modalities and implementation mechanisms that offered timely and cost-effective responses to the challenges identified</i></b>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Au Burkina Faso, un nombre important d'interventions ont connu des retards dans la mise en œuvre, dont notamment :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ le projet d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols en coton biologique</li> <li>▪ le projet anacarde-sésame mis en œuvre par Rongead/ INADES-B : pour l'avance budgétaire en 2011 (sinon pas de perturbation)</li> <li>▪ le PAFFIC (appui budgétaire sectoriel)</li> <li>▪ Le Programme PAOSA: retards importants et prolongement de la durée du programme</li> <li>▪ Les activités du Programme Tout ACP : le projet de prévention de la contamination du coton graine</li> </ul>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>La Commission européenne a mis différents instruments de financement en œuvre dans le cadre de son support aux produits de base agricole au Burkina Faso. Premièrement, les fonds Stabex ont soutenu le secteur cotonnier (financement d'études, d'infrastructures et d'équipement, apurement de dettes, formations). Par ailleurs, les 8<sup>i</sup>e et 9<sup>i</sup>e FED ont financé des études dans le secteur du coton et des programmes dans le domaine agricole (PAOSA et PAFFIC- spécifique au secteur cotonnier). Par ailleurs, le Burkina Faso bénéficie des activités du Programme Tous ACP. Sur le plan régional, la Commission européenne a appuyé l'Université du coton et l'UEMOA (secteur du coton entre autres). La Ligne ONG a appuyé un projet de développement de la filière anacarde-sésame (mis en œuvre par une ONG française, RONGEAD, et le centre de formation burkinabé INADES). Enfin, la ligne Food a appuyé un projet d'amélioration de la fertilité des sols pour le coton biologique.</p> <p>Bien que l'aide de la Commission, en particulier via les FED consécutifs, est appréciée, la plupart des parties prenantes rencontrées au Burkina Faso ne perçoivent pas la complémentarité entre le support de la Commission au niveau régional et au niveau national.</p> <p>Au Burkina Faso, l'appui aux produits de base agricoles a eu recours à une combinaison d'instruments de financement et de modalités de mise en œuvre: appui budgétaire général pour le FLEX, appui budgétaire sectoriel pour le coton, projets/ programme, etc. Au niveau du secteur coton, il y a eu un appui budgétaire sectoriel dans le cadre de la stratégie de sortie de crise (PAFFIC).</p>
<b>CM</b>	Au Cameroun, les instruments ont été <b>utilisés de manière complémentaire</b> en vue d'une mobilisation de fonds vers le monde agricole, écarté du PIN. Progressivement, des activités productives ont été introduites dans les PDR via le Stabex ou sur fonds FED en réponse aux besoins identifiés.
<b>GH overall</b>	Many efficiency problems plagued the commission's support to the cocoa sector. In the beginning of the 2000s, the use of Stabex funds was put under a PMU but this was done in the midst of a reorganisation of the cocoa marketing board which may explain some of the initial delays in setting up and procurement. The final evaluation noted a lack of organisational efficiency and many components were affected. The second round of support, under the EDF funds, was also afflicted with some major managerial problems linked to the complexity of EDF procedures and the time

	<p>sensitivity of activities to be funded. Delays were important. Two issues of interest stand out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The question as to the necessity for strict application of complex EDF procurement and accounting/auditing procedures to entities which otherwise would have used national procedures which are found to be quite acceptable by the EU in other circumstances (more than half the EU's aid is given in the form of budget support)</li> <li>- The quality control process of project/programme design: the actual project is using implementation modalities which are quite different from those proposed in the formulation study and which warned of the problems likely to occur with using EDF procedures.</li> </ul>
<b>MG coffee</b>	<p><b>vanilla</b></p> <p>La complémentarité entre instruments s'est faite au niveau local et non au niveau pays. Dans les régions où sont pratiquées les cultures de vanille, girofle, café elle s'est faite à travers la complémentarité entre les FRDA et CSA et les initiatives soutenues par les projets Stabex. La coordination entre projets Stabex a laissé à désirer (par exemple entre le CTHT et le projet SOAVA qui opéraient dans la même région)</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>In Tanzania, a judicious mix of implementation mechanisms and funding channels has been used the choice of which has depended on the recipient's characteristics and the circumstances in the sector. There have been different modalities used even within the same programme to better adapt to the capacities of the recipients:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Basket funding/targeted budget support</li> <li>- TA</li> <li>- Programme estimates</li> <li>- Grant contracts (PEs for 3 years)</li> <li>- Direct contracts (for roads)</li> </ul> <p>One problem was noted in implementation on the construction for TACRI (coffee research institute) where the contractor didn't finish works to the agreed standard: the issue is being resolved in court.</p> <p>In terms of effectiveness, the Stabex funded programmes only monitored and reported on outputs, not on results.</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Stabex is viewed by the Delegation as a flexible instrument, which besides its utilisation in support of the coffee sector, was broadly used to finance studies, bridge the gap between two phases of a project, implement micro-projects, support microfinance, etc.</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Au Vanuatu, la CE a principalement eu recours à une approche projet/ programme (par exemple : POPACA/POP2) et un appui budgétaire général.</p> <p>Des retards de mise en œuvre ont été notés dans la plupart des interventions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ STABEX: infrastructures</li> <li>▪ POPACA/POP 2: problème de conception, cadre logique, approche « top down »</li> <li>▪ Primary Sector Growth Support Programme: pas encore signé après un an</li> </ul> <p>Diverses raisons pour les retards: manque de capacités du Gouvernement, instabilité politique (problème récent), procédures administratives de la CE compliquées (Vanuatu-PNG-Bruxelles), manque de personnel à la Délégation (une seule personne responsable de toutes les opérations)</p>
<b>I.8.2.1</b>	<p>Evidence of justification in the programming documents of the choice of financing modalities and implementation mechanisms, including in terms of timeliness of implementation and cost-effectiveness of interventions</p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>There is no such information from programming documents and M&amp;E reports of the AAACP programme.</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Burkina Faso mentions the presence of EDF and general budget</p>

	<p>support, as well as project support. There is however no justification of the choice of such financing mechanisms.</p> <p>However, it also states that for certain proximity interventions, it was chosen to use the EU general budget with co-financing by NGOs rather than Government</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 23 &amp; 30</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Il s'agit d'une approche projet ( <i>Source : MR p.1</i> )
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Par le passé, la CE a largement participé au développement de la filière coton dans le cadre du mécanisme de stabilisation des exportations "STABEX", à travers des appuis directs à la SOFITEX et à l'UNPCB ainsi qu'aux groupements de producteurs de coton. La construction d'infrastructures villageoises et la réhabilitation des routes nationales RN1 et RN4 utilisées pour le transport du coton, en sont des exemples</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p> <p>Le suivi du plan d'actions sectoriel de la stratégie de renforcement des finances publiques (2008) a donné un avis favorable à une démarche vers l'ABS.</p> <p><i>Source : Aide mémoire conjoint MEF/PTFs</i></p> <p>La modalité financière du PAFFIC est un ABS de 10M€ réparti en deux tranches fixes.</p> <p>Le décaissement de la 1ère tranche fixe (8M€) fixe est soumis :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Au respect des conditions générales relatives à tout appui budgétaire, en accord avec l'accord de partenariat de Cotonou et plus particulièrement : (i) à la mise en œuvre d'un mécanisme de suivi du cadre macroéconomique par le FMI (cadre macroéconomique), (ii) à la poursuite satisfaisante de la mise en œuvre du CSLP et de son processus de suivi (stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté), et (iii) à l'appréciation satisfaisante de la dynamique de réformes et d'amélioration des finances publiques par la Commission et les partenaires du CGAB-CSLP (gestion des finances publiques).</li> <li>▪ Au respect de conditions spécifiques : <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>L'adoption par le Gouvernement et par l'AICB de la stratégie de sortie de crise</i></li> <li>2. <i>L'inscription dans le budget de l'Etat (2007 ou loi rectificative) d'une contribution financière à la résolution de la crise financière de la filière</i></li> <li>3. <i>La décision des conseils d'administration des sociétés cotonnières sur la recapitalisation de leur société avec une quote-part dans ces recapitalisations de l'UNPCB à hauteur d'au moins 10 millions euros</i></li> <li>4. <i>La publication du rapport annuel 2006 reprenant les données consolidées de la filière</i></li> </ol> </li> </ul> <p>Le décaissement de la 2ème tranche fixe (2M€) fixe est soumis :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Le versement par l'Etat Burkinabé en 2007 pour le compte de l'UNPCB, sous forme de don, d'au moins 10 millions d'euros au titre de la participation des producteurs de coton à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières</i></li> <li>2. <i>La répartition de la totalité de ce financement entre les sociétés cotonnières qui auront décidé, au 31 décembre 2007, de procéder à leur recapitalisation. Cette répartition se fera au prorata de la moyenne du volume de coton graine réceptionné par chacune de ces sociétés cotonnières des 3 dernières campagnes</i></li> </ol> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF ; Note dossier CF-PAFFIC, 1ère tranche, Note dossier CF-PAFFIC, 2ème tranche</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	No support to agricultural commodities in the regional programme.
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pour chaque volet, la structure organisationnelle et le type de gestion (+ justifications) sont

	présentés ( <i>Source : Rider FA p.11-12</i> ). Deux types de gestion principaux sont renseignés pour les cinq volets : gestion centralisée indirecte et gestion décentralisée.
CM	<p>The choice for using the respective financing instrument cannot be identified in the programming documents and is not justified in these documents (As an example, why has the Rural development programme of the MoungoNkam been funded under Stabex and not with EDF? Why has the PACICC been funded by EDF and not by Stabex? Etc.). But discussions with stakeholders (CAON FED) provided explanations on the respective use and the logic behind.</p> <p><i>(Stabex funds were generated by cocoa and coffee; in 2005, the remaining Stabex funds were integrated in a "unique" Stabex which included operations to support coffee and cocoa development. At that time (2005) it was quite difficult to fund RDP (no sector of concentration, which of the Commission to go for budgetary support, no funding of the rural/agricultural sector. However, the rural development programme in the region of MoungoNkam included a small component towards agriculture namely cocoa, coffee and palm oil. It was thus introduced under the Stabex. At the time of PACICC (2007-2008) it was clear that Stabex disbursements came to an end. This small programme has thus been introduced under EDF. (source: MN 409))</i></p>
CM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The first CSP/NIP did not foresee specific support to agricultural commodities. It did not refer to the choice of financing modalities and implementation mechanisms.</li> <li>▪ The second CSP/NIP foresees support to rural development under: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Its second focal area "trade and regional integration" a support programme to upgrade enterprises and reinforce the productive and export capacities of priority sectors for the economy. It mentions that project aid will be used but without justifying this choice. Implementation mechanisms are not detailed.</li> <li>○ the non-focal sectors (rural development to reduce poverty): it does not mention financing modalities or implementation mechanisms.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 33-34, 36</i></p>
CM-ONG	<p>La <b>présente action se développe selon une approche méthodologique participative</b> qui voit la participation comme une fin; c'est-à-dire une approche méthodologique selon laquelle promouvoir la participation signifie viser à la responsabilisation, au renforcement du pouvoir des personnes bénéficiaires (empowerment) dans les processus décisionnels les concernant, au renforcement de leur capacité de mettre en œuvre, suivre avec autonomie et en tant que protagonistes les actions de développement dont ils peuvent se faire les promoteurs. Selon cette approche participative, les compétences, les capacités acquises et/ou renforcées, à travers tout le projet, par les GIC bénéficiaires et par la Fédération des GIC qui se constituera, stimuleront un rôle de plus en plus actif des organisations paysannes bénéficiaires qui va aussi au-delà de l'objectif spécifique du projet et qui peut engendrer des processus de transformation sociale de majeure portée.</p> <p>D'après cette optique participative, les rapports avec l'Archidiocèse de Garoua, partenaire local, seront aussi marqués par un esprit de réciprocité. Le COE mettra à la disposition du projet son expérience et ses connaissances de gestion développées pendant plus de 30 ans de travail dans les PVD dans des projets de promotion de l'auto-développement; l'Archidiocèse apportera une plus profonde connaissance du territoire et son expérience dans la formation et dans l'accompagnement des groupes de paysans. La confrontation et l'échange entre le personnel expatrié et l'équipe locale caractériseront tous les moments décisionnels du projet. (<i>Source : Annexe I p. 13</i>).</p>

	<p>La <b>durée et le plan de l'action</b> sont également présentés (<i>Source : Annexe I p. 17</i>) ainsi que la <b>durabilité</b> au point de vue des aspects financier, économique, institutionnel et socioculturel.</p> <p>(<i>Source : Annexe I p. 13</i>).</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not directly tackle agricultural commodities. The PASAPE is financed through a project approach. Various implementation mechanisms are foreseen, with the particularity that the project will be implemented both by the Commission and UNIDO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Component 1 and part of component 2 (TA, trainings, seminars, studies) are implemented under EDF procedures;</li> <li>▪ Part of component 2 and component 3 are implemented by the UNIDO according to its procedures.</li> </ul> <p>There is no justification of the financing modalities and implementation mechanisms chosen. However, it should be mentioned that part of the project is delegated to UNIDO due to its experience in terms of development and upgrading of enterprises and of support to quality control of manufactured and agro-industrial goods in MEDA and West African countries.</p> <p><i>Source: Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p><u>Financing modalities</u> : <b>pas de justification des modalités de financement dans CSP</b></p> <p>L'instrument principal de mise en œuvre de l'enveloppe A du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED sera <b>l'aide-projet</b>. (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.35, 37, 38</i>).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>No direct reference to commodities sector in ECS.</p> <p>EuropeAid Co-operation Office's mission is to implement the external aid instruments of the European Commission, which are funded by the European Community budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) both at national and regional levels. The Office is responsible for all phases of the project cycle (identification and appraisal of projects and programmes, preparation of financing decisions, implementation and monitoring, evaluation of projects and programmes) and ensures the achievement of the objectives of the programmes established by the Directorates-General for External Relations and Development and approved by the Commission. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.22</i>).</p> <p>Implementation of projects is decentralised, each project being assigned a Deputy Regional Authorising Officer (DRAO) in the country where the project is implemented. Consequently, the project is monitored for the Commission by the Delegation in the country in question. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.23</i>).</p> <p><b>Recommendation 6:</b> Review the organisational process and procedures governing the management of the regional programme so as to increase efficiency of implementation. When reviewing the organisational mechanisms and procedures some adaptation should be made to</p>



	<p>permit greater flexibility in the use of funds by private sector operators without losing control over their accountability. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.54-55</i>).</p> <p><b>Recommendation 11:</b> Sustainability needs to be built into the design and implementation of the interventions. A clear finding of this evaluation is that most institutions or mechanisms created or supported through the Commission's intervention are unsustainable after the Commission's funding is terminated. It also shows that the few exceptions occur in interventions where sustainability has been addressed in the design and the implementation of the projects. The recommendation therefore requires that implementing agencies or consultants in charge of an intervention explicitly factor sustainability into the operations and anticipate. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.57</i>).</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The FA of the "Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme presents the various financing modalities that will be used for the programme, in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Regional sub-programme: technical assistance and grant contracts;</li> <li>▪ Guyana sub-programme: technical assistance, training, equipment, financing facility; and</li> <li>▪ Suriname sub-programme: technical assistance, training, equipment and financing facility.</li> </ul> <p>But there is no justification upon the choice of these financing modalities. <i>Source: Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, pages 6-7</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The beneficiary of the Caribbean Rum project is CARIFORUM, which entrusted the West Indies Rum and Spirits Producers Association (WIRSPA) to implement the programme. The programme TAPs do not justify this set up, which is however logical since CARIFORUM is the EDF Regional Authorising Officer and WIRSPA the only organisation representing rum producers at regional level.</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>No justification of the financing modalities and implementation mechanisms can be found in the ESAIO RSP/RIPs.</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>The project implementation is very detailed in FP and FA (<i>Source : FP p.10,11,12 ; FA : p. 4,5</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Physical and non physical means</li> <li>▪ Organisational and implementation procedures</li> <li>▪ Appropriate technology</li> <li>▪ Timetable, costs and financing plan</li> <li>▪ Actions and accompanying measures to be taken by the government</li> <li>▪ Monitoring arrangements and follow up</li> <li>▪ Reviews, evaluations, audits : procedures and reports</li> </ul>
<b>ET</b>	<p><u>Financing modalities :</u></p> <p>Implementing the strategy in the most and effective manner will require a range of delivery mechanisms commensurate with the country-specific situation of Ethiopia. This will help to create a programme portfolio containing modalities that can easily be expanded into flexible and efficient joint instruments having a high impact <b>as well as bilateral programmes and projects</b> with a specific added-value. Aid delivery modalities to be adopted jointly in Ethiopia will be identified jointly in the context of a DAG/GoE review of Ethiopia's overall and sector external financing needs as indicated in PASDEP. They could include <b>budget support, sector-wide approach (SWAP), Multi-donor funds and bilateral programmes and projects</b>.</p> <p>(<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.55, 56 with more details</i>) More precisely, 10th EDF (A –envelope) € 644 million: this envelope will cover long-term</p>

	<p>programmable development operations under the strategy, in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transport and regional integration, € 250 million, be implemented in the form of a <b>combination of sector budget support and the project approach</b>.</li> <li>▪ Rural development and food security, € 130 million, to be implemented in the form of a <b>combination of sector budget support and the project approach</b>.</li> <li>▪ Macro-economic support and governance, € 244 million to be implemented in a <b>combination of modalities</b>.</li> <li>▪ Other programmes, € 20 million, be implemented in <b>the form of projects</b>,</li> </ul> <p><i>(Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.66, 67)</i></p> <p><u>Implementation mechanisms</u></p> <p>The European Commission's contribution to the Joint Response Strategy is to support the Government's efforts to achieve decisive progress towards the MDGs through faster and sustained economic development, stressing regional integration and strengthening the democratic process. It is built <b>around three focal sectors</b>: (i) Transport and Regional Integration; (ii) Rural Development and Food Security, and; (iii) Macro-Economic Support and Governance. It is also proposed to include in the Non-Focal Sector a pioneering programme for the restoration and conservation of Ethiopia's cultural, biological and environmental heritage. The three focal sectors and the non-focal sector are closely interlinked. <i>(Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.43)</i></p> <p>No more information than in CSP about this indicator in commodities sector. Nevertheless, CSE contains a description of the overall programme implementation (financial allocations and commitments + general factors affecting strategy implementation). <i>(Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 21-24).</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>Reportedly the choice of implementation modalities and financing modalities used in CSSP II came from the observations made in the evaluation report of CSSP I.</p> <p><i>Source: MN159</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The programme was reduced from an initial programming (at NIP stage) of €10 million to an actual €5million because funds were needed for something else (totally unrelated to cocoa).</p> <p><i>Source: MN 145</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in Ghana's CSP/NIP.</p>
<b>KEN</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the CSPs/NIPs.</p> <p>According to the Evaluation of EC support to Kenya (June 2008), the choice of the focal sector "Agriculture and rural development" is not debatable in itself as it represent a priority for Kenya. However, the justification for this choice in the CSP documents is relatively weak. The EC support strategy to agriculture should be better explained: organisation of the sector/ decentralization, stakeholders; specific strategies for commodities/ other crops.</p> <p>The intervention framework in the agriculture and rural development field (including agricultural commodities) is not very realistic. For this focal sector, a reduced role of of the state in agricultural production and marketing and increased food crop production were mentioned as a few of the expected results. However, the evaluation team has underlined that it is not at all clear how these results could be achieved with the programmes proposed, because these programmes did not focus</p>

	<p>on production and marketing. This reflects that a clear EC sector intervention strategy has been missing.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of EC support to Kenya, June 2008, pages 33 &amp; 34</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><u>Financing modalities</u> : <b>peu d'infos dans les CSP hormis quelques-unes très générales</b></p> <p>L'enveloppe A est destinée au soutien macroéconomique, aux politiques sectorielles, aux programmes et projets en appui aux domaines de concentration ou non de l'assistance communautaire. L'enveloppe B est destinée à couvrir des besoins imprévus, tels que l'aide d'urgence lorsqu'une telle aide ne peut être financée par le budget de l'UE, des contributions à des initiatives d'allègement de la dette convenues au niveau international ainsi qu'un soutien destiné à atténuer les effets néfastes de l'instabilité des recettes d'exportation. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.0).</p> <p>Le partenariat avec la République de Madagascar, ce, a <b>connu des adaptations au fil des Conventions passant des aides/projets au financement de programmes et enfin à l'appui à des politiques macro-économiques et sectorielles</b>. La diversité de son champ d'application a entraîné l'utilisation de tous les instruments prévus dans les Conventions de Lomé (Sysmin excepté), ainsi que de certaines lignes budgétaires, comme celle relative à la sécurité alimentaire. Ce <b>partenariat est passé d'une dispersion sectorielle assez marquée à une concentration sur un nombre réduit de domaines prioritaires</b>(Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.12).</p> <p><u>Implementation mechanisms</u></p> <p>Les infrastructures routières et le développement rural sont les <b>deux secteurs de concentration sectoriels</b> du 9<sup>e</sup> FED, auxquels s'ajoute l'appui à la consolidation du cadre macro-économique et à la bonne gouvernance (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.18).</p> <p>Plus particulièrement dans le cadre du secteur de concentration 2, les programmes financés sur le 9<sup>e</sup>me FED ont concentré leurs interventions sur les <b>deux provinces les plus pauvres</b> de Madagascar (Tuléar et Fianarantsoa). En revanche, la concentration géographique a affecté dans une moindre mesure les programmes financés sur STABEX et sur Lignes Budgétaires. Les interventions dans ce domaine combinent une <b>approche projet et/ou subvention à des Ministères, à des collectivités territoriales décentralisées et à des Acteurs Non Etatiques, avec un Appui budgétaire sectoriel au MAEP</b> (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.19).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>Financing modalities in Mali include mostly sectoral and budget support. According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the EU strategy takes into account synergies and lever effects of financing and aid modalities (e.g. it states that general budget support is a good way to make reforms progress).</p> <p>It also states that interventions in rural development require a proximity for which the EDF isn't well adapted. It therefore chooses to orient support to co-financing of NGO interventions.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 34, 37, 38 &amp; 45.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La modalité de financement retenue pour le PARFC est un mix d'appui budgétaire sectoriel en gestion décentralisée, pour le volet (Restructuration du Secteur Coton) et d'appui projet (volets alphabétisation et réhabilitation de pistes).</p> <p>Concernant l'appui budgétaire sectoriel, la phase d'identification propose de prévoir une tranche fixe en début de programme constituant une sorte de « ticket d'entrée », permettant le lancement effectif de la Réforme, les tranches variables étant assorties d'indicateurs pertinents, concernant les éléments clé de la réforme proprement dite (Check list Identification phase, p3).</p>

	<p>L'appui budgétaire retenu dans la CF est divisé en 2 tranches fixes et 1 tranche variable. NB. Le décaissement de la tranche variable (€ 5 M pour le Fonds de Soutien (aux prix coton)) et des tranches fixes (€ 3 M et € 0,7 M) est soumis à 4 conditionnalités générales: (1). poursuite du programme de réforme de la filière coton, (2) gestion satisfaisante des finances publiques, (3). mise en œuvre satisfaisante du CRPRSC, (4). comptes de la CMDT certifiés. ). En plus de ces conditionnalités générales, la convention prévoit des conditions particulières pour chaque tranche. (CF, annexe II, p.16 ; annexe 6). Ainsi, au moment de la mission ROM (février 2010), le financement de la 2<sup>ème</sup> tranche fixe (0,7 M €) était annulé pour non satisfaction à une conditionnalité de décaissement : non réalisation des travaux relatifs à l'ouverture du capital des filiales aux producteurs après la mise en œuvre de toutes les modalités de création des filiales (voir modalités de règlement des tranches d'appui budgétaire, CF, annexe II, p.16 ; annexe 6</p> <p><i>Sources : FIP, CF, ROM/BCS</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>No <b>justification</b> of the programming can be found in the RSP/RIPs.</p> <p>The Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP mentions that all implementation modalities will be considered. Financing agreements with the Regional Authorising Officer and contributions with International Organisations are privileged if positive results have been provided by an institutional assessment.</p> <p>No references to timeliness or cost-effectiveness are made.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 73</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The 2007 Evaluation of Commission support to the Pacific shows that the use of Contribution Agreements (such as used by the FACT for example) has been very efficient. When using this financing mechanism, the monitoring of the results has not been very good.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of the Commission's support to the ACP Pacific region, 2007, page 2.</i></p> <p>The IF and FA clearly justify the choice of the implementing modality by showing the track record of the implementing agency (the SPC) and pointing out its strong financial, organisational and managerial capacities. It specifies that there are 2 regional agencies engaged in trade facilitation (SPC and PITIC the overseas trade agencies of PIFS) but that the technical nature of the project makes it relevant for SPC.</p> <p>The project is implemented through a contribution agreement between the Regional Authorizing Officer and the SPC; it proposes to use TA for production and commercial issues, ST TA for specific studies (on demand) and trade facilitation assistants to be recruited in the countries concerned whilst administrative support would be provided by the relevant sections of SPC.</p> <p>The budget (€ 4 million) covers TA, equipment, operations and administration with additional resources provided by the SPC (institutional support), national government (in country supporting services) and private sector (complementary activities). The execution will use SPC procedures.</p> <p><i>Source: IF, page 4,6; FA p.9</i></p> <p>The MR assesses the coordination, management and financing arrangements to be clearly defined and, since SPC's procedures and arrangements are used, supporting both institutional strengthening and ownership by the organization. The timescale and range of activities in this pilot project are</p>

	<p>judged to be realistic with regard to the various stakeholders' capacities.</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	There is no such evidence in the SADC RSPs/RIPs.
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>The financing agreement explains the organisation of tasks and procedures to follow in order to properly implement the programme. The main organizational and implementation procedures will be as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A coordinating unit (within FANR Directorate) will be created to support the FANR Directorate and the SADC finance office for managing the overall implementation of the EC regional programme to support agricultural research.</li> <li>▪ SADC will create a Steering Committee (SC) for agricultural Research &amp; Training. This SC will be the common structure for all future competitive funds.</li> <li>▪ For the specific case of competitive fund management, the steering committee will mandate a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) to analyse and appraise the research projects submitted by research partners (consortia): consequently the TAC will propose to the SC the projects to be granted.</li> <li>▪ The Stakeholders Conference will be an advisory body.</li> <li>▪ The financial and technical management of the information and communication programme (ICM-ICT) as well the scholarship fund will be handled by SADC-Secretariat.</li> <li>▪ All long-term technical assistance including regional and local staff to strengthen SADC will be contracted through restricted invitation to tender.</li> <li>▪ All the Research Networks and competitively funded projects will prepare annual work plans and budgets for approval by SADC Steering Committee.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Evaluations of STABEX have shown that it has reached its objectives to lessen the ill effects of losses of commodity export earnings. Since Lomé IV, it has also been used to support policy reforms and restructuring in sub-sectors. It is noted that with the private sector there is a risk of counterproductive interventions by Government in the cash crop sectors and a return to bureaucratic management. The 2001-2007 CSP mentions that the significant level of amounts available from STABEX allocations (38 M€ from STABEX 1994/99 plus balances) will allow to continue EC support to the sector for at least the next three years (i.e. 2001 to 2003).</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 18</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The 10<sup>th</sup> EDF has chosen a mixture of financing mechanisms within the Trade and Agriculture Programme TAP (€45 m separated into 2 programmes so far: TAP1 of €9.4m and TAP2 for €15m). In TAP1 had:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ One FA for TRIT and TACRI (€2m each) use of grant contract</li> <li>▪ One support to MTI (€4m) transfer</li> <li>▪ One TA (1.5m) direct DEL</li> </ul> <p>In TAP2 of €15m have:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ study</li> <li>▪ PE</li> <li>▪ call for proposals</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: MN156</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.

<b>UG</b>	<p>Uganda's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that support to rural development will be done through sector budget support and project support. There is no justification of the financing modalities and mechanisms. However the programme considers different possibilities of interventions mechanisms in case of changes in the security environment.</p> <p>The CSP/NIP states that the support programme supposes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A successful conclusions of the peace talks;</li> <li>▪ Government commitment to peace and recovery in the North of the country;</li> <li>▪ A security situation allowing people to move out of the Internally Displaced Persons.</li> </ul> <p>The CSP/NIP then considers two different scenarios of security deterioration and the adaptation of the interventions that would result.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 36 &amp; 37</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	No such information is available in Vanuatu's CSP/NIPs.
<b>WAF</b>	Les mécanismes de financement et d'implémentation ne sont pas justifiés dans les RSP/RIPs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.
<b>I.8.2.2</b>	<p>Ex post evidence that this choice was justified in terms of effectiveness and efficiency with regard to the outputs produced and the results obtained within the allocated budget and the planned schedule:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ extent to which outputs were produced according to plan</li> <li>▪ extent to which results were achieved according to expectations</li> <li>▪ nature of any factors having influenced cost overruns, implementation delays, or shortfalls with regard to results achieved</li> </ul>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The period of execution and the period of implementation of the AAACP programme have been extended respectively to 31/12/2014 and 31/12/2012. The main reasons of this decision are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Delay of the actual launch of the programme (September 2007 instead of January 2007) ;</li> <li>▪ Time for preparation and consultation of ACP regions longer than expected (participatory process takes time);</li> <li>▪ Intensive participatory process to translate conclusions of the regional consultations into the phase I work plan of the programme;</li> <li>▪ Need to wait for the completion of scrotal strategy formulation by the International Organisations which only started in 2008;</li> <li>▪ Additional time to decentralise the <i>Cos-Coton</i> (recommendation of the MTR) to ACP regions.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : Official letter for the extension of time limit for implementation and execution, 6 July 2009</i></p> <p>The Mid Term review of the AAACP programme mentions that the first regional/International Orgnaisations' workplans were approved at the end of 2008 and in early 2009, so the output delivery was in its early stages at the time of the MTR. In addition, only 19 activities are recorded as completed (11% of the activities of the Workplan1 – WP1). Eight commodity strategies were expected to be completed by May 2009.</p> <p><i>Source: Mid-term Review of the AAACP Programme, Final report, April 2009, Executive summary and page 70</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	According to the PIP final evaluation report, the Programme was developed in the form of a grant to the Permanent Secretariat of ACP countries, which delegated the grant to the COLEACP. The COLEACP is a "private law association bringing together most of the ACP exporters in the supply chain as well

	<p>as European importers". The COLEACP worked in a centralized manner with a centralised management unit in Brussels. The evaluation considered this organisation relevant:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The centralised programme seemed effective and efficient;</li> <li>▪ The choice of COLEACP seemed the most appropriate and did not lead to conflicts of interest;</li> <li>▪ The funding in the form of a grant seemed to allow better flexibility and monitoring, which explains the good capacity of the Programme to adapt along the way.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages 4.</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>In SP countries where AMSP support is provided under project approach mobilisation of the AMSP resources has been slow. This is regrettable because SP countries have a very limited period of time to adjust to a EU sugar reform whose implementation had already started in 2006/07 with a first reduction by 5.1% of the price paid for sugar imports, and which is due to be completed by the 1/10/2009 with the last stage of the price reduction process and the removal of sugar quotas. But implementation of the AMSP programme is not slower than is the implementation in ACP countries of projects financed from other resources, for instance from EDF funds.</p> <p>As a consequence, at the time of the AMSP study (2009) the programme had delivered few tangible results.</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Le projet anacarde-sésame mené par l'INADES a connu un retard dans les décaissements en 2011. Pour le budget de l'année, il a été reçu en mai 2011. Sinon, il n'y a pas de soucis pour les autres années.</p> <p>Source : MN 551</p> <p>Dans le cadre du projet de lutte contre la contamination du coton/ coton PPCC (Programme Tous ACP sous la houlette du CFC), les retards de la signature du contrat sont liés aux aspects institutionnels. Beaucoup de temps a été nécessaire pour échanger. Les discussions ont eu lieu en mai 2010. Il a fallu 6 mois pour signer les contrats. En fait, des pertes de temps ont été observées au niveau des responsables des sociétés cotonnières qui n'étaient pas sur place. Par ailleurs, la commande régionale de matériel (kits de mesure de la qualité) faite au Mali a aussi entraîné des pertes de temps, notamment pour régler les frais de douanes et de transport.</p> <p>Source : MN 526</p> <p>Dans le cadre du projet de la FAO (sous Programme Tous ACP) avec le Comité interprofessionnel des filières céréales et niébé du Burkina, des retards ont été observés. Les financements tardent. Le projet a commencé avec les idées en 2009 et en juin 2011 le financement n'était pas encore parvenu. Il n'y a pas encore la totalité de l'argent pour financer l'atelier sur le warrantage. Seul 2 millions de FCFA a été versé et l'atelier coûte plus cher que ce montant. Il n'y a pas d'explication à donner sur le retard pris sur le projet., à l'exception d'un manque de disponibilité du représentant de la FAO une fois qu'il retourne au siège de Genève.</p> <p>Source : MN 550</p> <p>Selon un responsable de l'IFDC qui exécute pour le compte du CFC le projet de prévention de la contamination du coton graine pour le BF, le projet a connu un retard conséquent au démarrage qui n'a été effectif que fin 2010. D'après lui, la lenteur des échanges entre les institutions impliquées dans ce projet expliquent en partie ce retard. Des lenteurs rencontrées dans la finalisation de contrats avec les partenaires locaux, notamment la SOFITEX, ont également contribué à ce retard. De plus, la première rencontre avec la Banque mondiale (SDN) partenaire du CFC et qui s'occupe des aspects liés à la valorisation du coton non contaminé n'a eu lieu qu'en février 2011.</p> <p>Source : MN 526</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés

<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CI</b>	<p>Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des <u>appuis de nature institutionnelle</u> tant <u>conceptuelle</u> (stratégie sectorielle) que <u>technique</u> (veille sanitaire OTA) et des <u>opérations sectorielles</u> conduites en <u>partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA</u>, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le <u>Ministère de l'Agriculture</u>. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>Les <u>appuis individualisés sont de diverses natures</u> : actions structurantes, actions de type budgétaire, appuis institutionnels, etc. Ils <u>associent tous les outils du FED</u>: Devis-Programmes, convention de contribution ou de subvention et tous les types de marchés (fournitures, travaux, services).</p> <p>Le <u>programme Stabex a certainement répondu ses objectifs</u>, il a été adapté à la faveur des étapes d'individualisation et de formalisation des COM et des protocoles de mise en œuvre Stabex 99/1 et 99/2. En revanche, il <u>ne peut pas être caractérisé par sa flexibilité</u>. Les protocoles de mise en œuvre sont extrêmement détaillés et ne favorisent donc pas d'éventuelles flexibilités avec notamment les outils prévus pour la mise en œuvre des projets. Les devis-programmes et les conventions de contribution ou de subvention sont la simple traduction opérationnelle de ce qui est convenu dans le document de base. Les avenants avec des délais plus ou moins longs ont permis des adaptations judicieuses pour répondre à un problème technique (ananas), ou adapter les délais de réalisation qu'imposaient les soubresauts de la crise. L'échéance du 31 décembre 2008, fin de la période de contractualisation, prive, en dehors de changements mineurs, le programme de toute flexibilité pour intervenir dans un domaine d'urgence particulière.</p> <p>Selon l'évaluation Stabex, la <u>stratégie de mise en œuvre est parfaitement justifiée</u> mais elle constate une <u>dichotomie entre la qualité de la programmation et de la stratégie de mise en œuvre, et celle de l'opérationnalité de la mise en œuvre</u>. Les raisons premières sont les modalités de gestion (absence de maîtrise des outils de gestion et de reporting) et de coordination de la mise en œuvre (outils dévalués de coordination et absence de responsable / gestionnaire de programme). Mais on doit y rajouter l'absence d'intéressement versé aux fonctionnaires associés au programme dans un univers très procédurier et avec une charge de travail importante.</p> <p>Les problématiques d'<u>appropriation locale et de capacités d'absorption</u> sont étroitement liées aux <u>capacités de mise en œuvre</u> des projets. Des lors qu'une action emporte des réalisations et des avancées significatives, l'appropriation est immédiate. La question de capacités d'absorption dans un pays en crise politique, sociale et économique peut sembler incongrue. Des lors que l'on travaille sur des secteurs économiques avec des opérateurs professionnels (même au travers d'associations professionnelles), les capacités d'absorption sont réelles. On devrait associer à la problématique des capacités de mise en œuvre, celle de la capacité d'adéquation des procédures en vigueur. Le choix du programme est allé, au mieux et à raison, vers des associations professionnelles ou des organisations professionnelles pour contourner certaines difficultés. Mais ce choix s'est effectué en minorant la qualité des garanties (risques techniques et financiers) qu'ils pouvaient apporter.</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Aucun rapport évaluant l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde n'est disponible.</p> <p>Selon le cadre logique d'intervention commenté, certains résultats généraux visés n'ont pas été réalisés :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Augmentation de la production d'amandes de 20% par an : Ce seuil n'a pas été réalisé entre</li> </ul>



	<p>2009 et 2010, principalement à cause de la hausse brutale du prix des noix de cajou brutes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Le rendement de transformation est de 60% plutôt que les 70% visés. Les rendements sont limités par la difficulté d'approvisionnement en noix de bonne qualité et la faiblesse en équipements.</li> <li>▪ En 2009, une chute des ventes a été causée par la non-reconnaissance par les autorités allemandes de la certification biologique par ECOCERT.</li> </ul> <p>D'autres objectifs ont été réalisés :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Création de 500 emplois</li> <li>▪ Augmentation de la valeur ajoutée de 250 à 800 FCFA/kg de noix brutes dans le cas de la production certifiée biologique</li> <li>▪ Création de 10 unités de transformation</li> <li>▪ Des formations ont été données à plus de 900 personnes</li> <li>▪ Des acteurs des organisations mises sur pied sont parties prenantes de l'organisation de la filière</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul> <p><i>Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'intervention commenté</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Le MR détaille très précisément l'efficacité de mise en œuvre et l'efficacité de l'intervention, notamment en termes de réalisations, résultats et facteurs influençant les activités (<i>Source : MR p.2-3</i>).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>In Cameroon, support to the banana sector (through the ATFs and BAMs) suffered from important delays which affected the effectiveness of the aid :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- producers had to borrow to do the investments according to the schedule, which implied that they had to pay more due to interests, and EU funding did not cover the interests.</li> <li>- The changes of the banana market (and particularly now, the change of the trade regime) have immediate consequences, whereas the funding usually arrived several years after it was planned.</li> </ul> <p>Furthermore, procedures changed in the timeframe of the support (from decentralised to centralised procedures ; from support to the private sector to having to be to organisations) which, according to beneficiaries, created more delays and made the process more difficult.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 994</i></p> <p>Néanmoins, ces plaintes au sujet des procédures doivent être nuancées selon la CAON FED et la DCE. Les actions financées dans le cadre de lignes budgétaires s'inscrivent dans le cadre d'actions annuelles. Les acteurs (entreprises bananières) avaient été prévenus de l'obligation de réaliser les investissements prévus en une année. Cette obligation n'a presque jamais été tenue et on s'est engagé dans un long processus effectivement complexe d'avenants. Les torts sont partagés et commencent par ce non respect des délais du secteur privé.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 409, 410</i></p> <p>A priori, il y a un retour très positif des programmes (1) PACICC (programme d'appui au Conseil interprofessionnel du Cacao et du Café (2,182 M€, financé sur le 9<sup>ème</sup> FED - (clôturé en mai 2011) en termes d'atteinte des résultats sur base du dernier rapport d'activité disponible (<i>source : rapport d'activité PACICC du 1/02/2010 au 31/12/2010</i>) et du programme PDR Moungo Nkam (financé</p>

	sur Stabex avec une composante productive café, cacao) <i>Source : brochure de diffusion des résultats du programme (Pour une approche pragmatique et participative du développement rural, l'expérience du programme de développement rural du bassin agricole du Mounjo Nkam).</i>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Ces différents éléments (apports pour les bénéficiaires, résultats de l'évaluation, poursuite de l'action et des partenariats,...) sont présentés de manière assez succincte dans le rapport narratif final ( <i>Source : Rapport narratif final p.27 à 31</i> )
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>Le PASAPE ne vise pas directement les produits agricoles de base. Lors de la revue à mi-parcours, son efficacité est faible pour la composante 1. Pour les autres composantes (2 et 3), principalement mises en œuvre par l'ONUDI, il n'existe pas de rapportage et donc pas d'éléments sur l'efficacité. Cela contraint l'analyse sur l'ensemble du programme également.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ L'évaluation à mi-parcours note que le programme souffre globalement d'un faible taux d'exécution des activités (voir ci-dessous). Aucun résultat escompté n'est atteint au moment de l'évaluation à mi-parcours.</li> <li>▪ Quelques activités ont été réalisées dans le cadre du devis-programme 1 : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organisation d'un séminaire de formation</li> <li>- Conduite d'une étude locale sur le diagnostic de la compétitivité nationale</li> <li>- Conduite d'une étude d'appui à l'élaboration de la stratégie nationale de compétitivité</li> <li>- Amélioration du site web du CNSCN-APE</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ L'évaluation à mi-parcours note les difficultés suivantes: <p><u>Conception du programme:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Association dans un même programme d'objectifs et de résultats de natures très différentes (négociations APE / mise à niveau et normalisation) en introduisant une mixité du mode opératoire (CE/ONUDI) qui elle-même comporte des risques qui n'ont pas été maîtrisés ;</li> <li>- Ampleur des résultats escomptés, des activités du programme et des acteurs a instauré des attentes trop élevées et nécessite des moyens de coordination importants non disponibles ;</li> <li>- Le nombre d'entreprises visées par le programme est réducteur de son ambition ;</li> <li>- Ambiguïté dans le rôle de l'AT long terme : recrutement envisagé pour appuyer le CNSCN-APE dans les négociations du commerce international vs rôle de coordination du PASAPE et de suivi de l'avancement des activités.</li> </ul> <p><u>Organisation et exécution du projet :</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Un comité de pilotage (présidé par le MINEPAT) est venu se superposer au CNSCN-APE chargé de la maîtrise d'ouvrage + instauration d'un sous-comité technique en 2009 sur base des recommandations de l'ONUDI. Cela implique qu'environ 80 personnes sont mobilisées autour du PASAPE. Cela conduit à une dispersion de l'information</li> <li>- La mixité du mode opératoire : (i) volet FED pour la composante 1 et quelques autres activités de la composante 2, (ii) volet ONUDI pour les composantes 2 et 3 : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Double rapportage sans consolidation par la maîtrise d'œuvre et en l'absence de ressources humaines dédiées.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Faiblesse opérationnelle des rapports d'activités : rapportage sur la composante 1 mais pas de rapportage ONUDI</li> <li>- Absence d'un dispositif de suivi des indicateurs de résultats</li> <li>- Niveau d'exécution opérationnelle du programme est très faible en raison des nombreux retards dans la mobilisation des ressources humaines et logistiques : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Décaissement CE en faveur de l'ONUDI forfaitaire ; justification comptable qui intervient en fin de projet ;</li> <li>o Décaissements effectués en faveur de la régie correspondent à des coûts de</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<p>fonctionnement/d'investissement ;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Absence d'AT long-terme : procédures infructueuses et faisant l'objet de controverses entre la CE et les autorités camerounaises ; 3<sup>ème</sup> tentative de recrutement en cours.</li> <li>- Absence d'une stratégie de communication du PASAPE (en cours de formulation au moment de l'évaluation à mi-parcours)</li> <li>- Difficulté d'instaurer une large visibilité du programme (composante 1) dans un contexte de négociation politique</li> <li>- Quasi-exécution de 3 projets : PASAPE-FED et 2 projets ONUDI</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010</i></p>
CR	<p><u>Efficiency</u></p> <p>The Commission's support has been coherent in its pursuit of the objective of constructing and strengthening a regional integrated space. However, the selection of interventions is insufficiently based on systematic review of the progress of regional integration. It is difficult to demonstrate that the selected activities correspond to the real priorities. The strategy has shown good capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and environment, but has not been able to anticipate foreseeable changes.</p> <p>The management of regional programmes has suffered from the lack of clear delineation of roles and responsibilities as between the various actors on the Commission and Caribbean sides. The CARIFORUM (Forum of Caribbean States) Secretariat has been fully involved in the identification, programming and management of activities and this has enhanced ownership of the projects by the partners. However, the limited human resources and an excessive personalisation of the CARIFORUM Secretariat have limited its capacity to provide the required baseline material for appropriate institutional selection or to ensure that regional strategic objectives can be achieved.</p> <p><u>In conclusion</u>, overall the strategy has been able to respond to evolving needs but its efficiency has been limited by a lack of clear organisational framework and of responsibilities for managing the regional programme, and insufficient linkage between individual interventions and the strategic priorities. The support for the programming unit of the CARIFORUM secretariat has created a technical capacity and permitted development of regional mechanisms for consultation and programming. But important weaknesses have been observed in local capacities for consulting and dealing with the private sector. More use could have been made of analyses conducted by other donors.</p> <p><u>Effectiveness and impact</u></p> <p>The evaluation found ample evidence that the activities supported are used and appreciated by the beneficiaries and have produced reasonable outputs. Significant impact has been achieved in increasing human resource capacities, fostering regional cooperation and exploitation of economies of scale. This has induced more efficient use of national human resources at regional level and has positively influenced the emergence of a regional identity. The institutional capacity to implement the CSME (Caribbean Single Market and Economy), and in general to identify and implement policies to eradicate the main obstacles to effective regional integration, remains insufficient. In the case of trade statistical coverage remains imperfect but suggests a deepening of intra-regional trade. There is also evidence of an improvement in trade facilitation.</p> <p><u>In conclusion</u>, an impact has been achieved in terms of developing a regional identity across a</p>

	<p>broad range of sectors. But the inadequacy of the analysis underlying the selection of intervention has limited effectiveness and the benefits of several interventions have tended to be limited to the country of the implementation agency. When a constructive policy dialogue has taken place between a group of donors and the partner, with the full commitment of the latter, it has been a major contributing factor to effectiveness. The impact of the Commission's interventions on the evolution of regional trade flows and on the regional institutional setting is difficult to assess.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The final evaluation noted the following regarding efficiency. Overall the programme suffered from a 20 months delay during the start-up and beginning of the implementation of the programme. The overall record in delivering specified activities has been mixed. Parts of certain components were executed in full and on time while others were delivered only in part or not at all. Failures often resulted from defaults in the design of the programme or from misunderstandings on expected outputs.</p> <p>The final evaluation notes the following per component:</p> <p><u>TA:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Delays in inception phase compounded by backstopping deficiencies from the contractor and high level staff turnover in the programme;</li> <li>▪ Positive results achieved for technical aspects regarding rice production, processing and marketing but not meeting expectations for national strategy development and enhancement of producers' organisation and collaboration mostly due to a design flaw (<i>"lack of clear definition on the FA of the context in which national rice strategies were to be developed"</i>).</li> </ul> <p><u>Research and Extension:</u></p> <p>Guyana and Suriname partners experienced difficulties in matching the administrative requirements of being compliant with EDF 9 rules for procurement: funds have been restricted because of the 50-50 matching grant requirement. A time extension of 4-5 months has been granted.</p> <p><u>Water management:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Guyana: implementation in a timely and cost-effective manner</li> <li>▪ Suriname: only a few planned activities could be implemented with the available budget mainly owing to poor engineering design in relation to available funds.</li> </ul> <p><u>Financial facility:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Total amount of credit made available fully disbursed in both countries and revolved into a second and third cycle in Suriname, and largely repaid on time.</li> <li>▪ Satisfactory delivery in line with implementation modalities.</li> <li>▪ Signature of an addendum for a 3-year extension of duration to allow for repayments of the FF to CARIFORUM</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>According to the programme evaluation report (p.ii) "WIRPAS's management ability, particularly of the Cost Share Grant Scheme component of the programme, has uniformly received extremely positive judgment from beneficiaries".</p> <p>The evaluation report considers that the programme met the goals of the revised Logframe and facilitated industrial restructuring of the sector by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transforming WIRSPA into a more effective and relevant industry association (it gained 6 new members and represents 13 of the 15 Caribbean ACP countries)</li> <li>▪ Enhancing rum production capacity and efficiency to meet future demand (The Caribbean Rum Sector is composed of 32 companies of which 25 benefited from the programme and 21</li> </ul>

	<p>received assistance for investments in modernisation and new facilities)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reducing negative environmental impact directly and indirectly through improved waste treatment processes and energy-saving co-generation plants</li> <li>▪ Facilitating the transition from bulk commodity export to branded, value-added rums, including through the design and promotion of the Caribbean Rum <i>Marque</i>.</li> </ul> <p>However reimbursement procedures to be followed under EDF rules provoked delays in the implementation of the Cost Sharing Grant Scheme, and the <i>Marque</i> design was finalised in March 2008, 44 months behind schedule, leaving only two years for the marketing campaign.</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>The MR 2008 detailed the efficiency of implementation (<i>Source : MR 2008 p.2</i>)</p> <p>The difficulties and delays related to the dissolution of the Coffee and Tea Authority are clearly described in the precedent ROM report of February 2007. Since that, a new Project Management Unit (PMU) was set up, in fact only reaching full operational staffing levels during the week of this monitoring visit. The unit includes one local team leader (appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture), one international expert, two accounting experts, and four thematic local experts.</p> <p>After more than six years of implementation and only one year remaining, less than 50% of the available budget was spent. In order to speed up the process a series of tenders for supplies and constructions were launched at central level last year, but failed because of insufficient budget allocation. They are about to be re-launched with closer supervision from the finance and contract unit at the EC Delegation (ECDEL). In fact, the lack of expertise in contracts and procurement within the PMU had not been addressed. Only through the very recent selection of a local expert has this issue been tackled. However, the expert was unfortunately not hired in time for tender preparation.</p> <p>Difficulties in project financial monitoring and accounting are also visible, mainly at regional level. The final June 2008 prospect of expenditure is not completed, and the amount of funds available for the last year of implementation is not yet validated. During the visit to the Awada research centre, a big electric generator purchased by the programme in 2006 (estimated value US\$ 80,000) was found not to have been unpacked, and thus remains unused. At the same centre a series of laboratory tools were provided, but the laboratories were never fully equipped and are not in use. A better monitoring and follow up of activities is needed in order to minimise waste and ensure allocation of resources and funds in line with expressed needs and priorities.</p> <p>Partners' participation in developing project action plans is ensured by the setting-up of a bi-annual technical committee. The participatory approach is still not implemented, and given the availability of funds, the PMU should be more pro-active in collecting data on needs and priorities from different project actors. Most stakeholders did, in fact, lament a shortage of funds. At regional and district levels, a specific need for on-the-job training for development agents on the use of new varieties of seeds was observed, and the liquoring centre of Addis Ababa expressed the need for new laboratory machineries. The marketing unit of the Ministry of Agriculture is part of the Technical Committee (TC), but has taken part in its meetings only once, and is not giving any specific contribution to project steering and implementation</p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>According to the CSSP II MTE, the choice and quantity of inputs (financial, human and administrative resources) were aligned with the activities to be undertaken. On the side of the implementing agencies (IA) things didn't work out so well. On the one hand there was the IITA which was used to implementing similar projects. On the other were Cocobod's SPU and CRIG which have different (Cocobod-specific) agendas, time frames and capacity limitations and were not</p>

	<p>as “ready” as IITA was for intensive project implementation. Stakeholder involvement in programme design seems to have been uncertain and the MTE notes that there was no analysis of assumptions and risks. (page 20, MTE 2011)</p> <p>For the IITA-STCP, a grant contract was used. It is a three year arrangement whereby the implementation procedures are agreed between the executing agent and the EC. Under grant, they don’t have to use EDF procurement procedures.</p> <p>For the SPU and CRIG, annual PEs were used. These as well as the EDF procurement and accounting procedures have been major hindrances in project efficiency. The fact that tendering procedures were not strictly adhered to in PE1 has led to Cocobod having to reimburse the EC for that procurement. Other procurement is so much delayed that they are still currently in the process of procuring vehicles that should have been there under PE1. In addition there have been problems in getting advances replenished, with major delays occurring between the time the advance is requested and the time it arrives (due to accounting and auditing requirements: the account has to be closed before the next payment can be made). The delays in procurement and advances have had less negative impact upon effectiveness than could have been the case if Cocobod hadn’t put its own resources when EDF resources were not forthcoming. The problem is that the activities and procurement of SPU and CRIG are very time sensitive and if you miss then you have to wait for next year.</p> <p>The EU DEL provides regular training on EDF procedures and it shouldn’t be a problem. If it is a problem then possibly the beneficiary is not so committed to the project. Explanations of the problems that hit the implementation of the CSSPII include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- it would seem that SPU and CRIG are not that committed to CSSP II (they benefit from important funding elsewhere)</li> <li>- they have difficulties in working together under one umbrella (that of Cocobod): they see themselves as totally separate entities and do not easily work together (share procurement, share budget etc.).</li> <li>- they have administrative problems with their own structure (Cocobod)</li> <li>- the project’s steering committee is not reactive: it doesn’t see the problems.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: MN159, MN 136, MN 114, CSSP II MTE, 2011</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The CSSP I, implemented between 2000 and 2005, was designed as a three year programme but was implemented over 5 years. The final evaluation of CSSP I notes several problems with regards to the implementation arrangements where a PMU had been appointed to oversee the project’s activities.</p> <p>The research component’s effectiveness was undermined by lack of efficiency: <i>‘Achievement of intended results of the four research projects on pests and diseases were in most cases hampered by the general start-up delays of the programme, logistics and procurement problem’.</i> The delays were linked to the internal reorganisation of Cocobod.</p> <p>About the programme management: <i>‘As regards programme management, a PMU was created primarily to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of the CSSP. The decision for establishing a PMU was well justified in the preparatory documents. (...) programme planners wanted to avoid facing again the heavy bureaucracy of COCOBOD that hampered the smooth flow of funds to farmers in the previous programme. (...) the three</i></p>

	<p><i>implementing agencies of the programme (...) were all located within COCOBOD and in practice the latter played a prominent role in the management and coordination of programme's activities. This situation provided flexibility in the overall management of the programme and facilitated the internal coordination between the implementing agencies. On the other hand, the strong centralisation of the decision-making process through the COCOBOD generated a duplication of tasks and responsibilities at operational level between the COCOBOD and the PMU, and a useless and inefficient double reporting system for the implementers. It also limited the autonomy and efficiency of the agencies in the management of their projects.'</i> (Agrifor page 40)</p> <p>On the whole the PMU is judged to have worked efficiently but the main shortcomings have been the planning and timing of activities (lack of organisational efficiency) and overall for all components of the programme a lack of M&amp;E.</p> <p><i>Source: Agrifor 2005</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II is not yet finished and ex post evaluations are therefore not yet available.</p> <p>The monitoring reports also mention that the programme's impact are of medium/long term nature and therefore cannot be assessed yet.</p> <p>Delays have occurred in the launching of the programme because of delays in initial funds disbursements.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Monitoring report 01, Efficiency sheet Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Monitoring report 02, Impact prospects sheet</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>All the sectors are confronted with delays in implementation, and in the various sector assessments different examples are mentioned. All examples concern project support.</p> <p>In particular in agricultural research, the project faced several efficiency problems, amongst others the project's need for various riders and extensions during implementation, and that expected results had to be substantially reduced from seventeen to eight.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of EC support to Kenya, June 2008, page 67</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme is still underway. The end of the programme is planned for December 31<sup>st</sup> 2013.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>La Délégation réfléchit actuellement à la manière d'orienter ses soutiens (appuis sectoriels, approches filières, appui budgétaire) étant donné, de manière générale et à l'exception de quelques interventions, l'évaluation très négative des interventions passées en termes d'efficacité et de durabilité (Source : MN 802 et débriefing)</p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The intervention is basically a food security project without any obvious relation with the COM.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés</p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The MR states that: 'coordination, management and financing arrangements are very clear and simple, since the project is implemented by SPC through a Contribution Agreement. SPC uses its own methods and processes, which supports institutional strengthening and ownership. Furthermore, the project's OO and PP are well aligned with the objectives of SPC and LRD, which again strengthens ownership.'</p>

	<p>The efficiency rating of the MR is an 'a' which is very good. Some initial delays were experienced in hiring the TA. The flexibility of the project is praised. More difficult to judge would be the results as, due to the nature of the project being a pilot, they had not been very well defined during the design phase. Overall the MR assessment is positive with the project delivering a significant amount of survey and analysis prior to the identification of the strategic needs of individual AGFOR enterprises and starting to deliver certain outputs to some of the enterprises it works with. Outputs are judged to be responding directly to the needs of the enterprises.</p> <p>According to the MR, the organisational set up of the project ensures efficient project implementation with in particular the Technical Advisory Group or TAG playing a key role in ensuring the relevance and efficiency and effectiveness of the project. The implementing agency (SPC) also fulfils its role and communication between the project management, SPC and the EC delegation is excellent.</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>No considerations regarding cost-effectiveness analysis have been made within the Financing Agreement.</p> <p>It should be noted that there were administrative and procedural delays in starting the ICART programme due to some incompatibilities between the design of the programme, based on the 8<sup>th</sup> EDF conditions, and its implementation under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF regulations. Consequently, both the Regional Authorising Officer and the EC decided to revise the original programme concept of ICART 1 (signed at the end of 2003) slightly to extent the time for implementation of all programme activities. Corresponding changes have been integrated in the new ICART 2 financing agreement which was signed at the end of 2006.</p> <p>According to the MTR, it appears that the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Directorate of the SADC Secretariat (FANR) has not completely aware of its management role of the programme and tried to assign too many management responsibilities to the Technical Assistance and even to the Steering Committee.</p> <p>Few activities were carried out and little day to day management took place during the two first years of the programme (ICART 1). While the financing agreement was signed at the end of the 2003, the Situation Analysis of Agricultural Research was only published in July 2008.</p> <p>There have been communication issues. In fact, there was no evidence that regular meetings were held by the FANR project manager and the technical assistance (TA) team to discuss difficulties met by the programme. Focal points in the SADC Member States were not informed about the arrival of the new team leader of the coordination unit and the new TA team was not briefed by the FANR.</p> <p>Other issues have been met:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of cooperation and communication between the project manager and the Steering Committee</li> <li>▪ Monitoring issues: The SADC Secretariat did not ensure overall monitoring of the programme according to EDF rules, monitoring was not used as a tool, no sufficient monitoring visits to SADC Member States and NARS</li> <li>▪ The organisational set-up with FANR-R&amp;D was not adequate to manage a project with significantly different components and activities both at regional and Member State level. The absorption capacity of the FANR was also overestimated.</li> </ul>



	<p>However, budgets for the different components have been adequate, properly planned and managed.</p> <p><i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, pages 8 &amp; 9 and 17</i></p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>L'efficience de la mise en oeuvre et l'efficacité du projet sont notés C (existence de problèmes) dans le MR de 2010. L'efficience semble avoir été compromise par une lenteur au début du projet (mais sans justifications plus précises dans le MR). L'efficacité du projet semble avoir été notée C à cause du manque de cibles quantifiées dans le plan annuel du projet (ce qui ne permet pas de mesurer les progrès réalisés de façon claire) et du manque de calendrier de décaissement. Le MR conclut 'L'activité du projet et son efficience ont été bonnes : pour les trois composantes, les produits attendus ont été fournis selon le calendrier, mais le suivi des réalisations effectives, du budget et des délais est peu formel et peu documenté.'</p> <p><i>Source : MR</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Generally outputs were produced according to plan, except for building works for TACRI which were not completed to satisfaction (litigation currently ongoing). However the Stabex supports looked at outputs, not at results thus reflecting the way the programmes were designed and prepared. There has been no monitoring of the results of the support to research.</p> <p><i>Sources: Evaluation 2004, Evaluation 2007, MN697.</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p><u>EDF</u></p> <p>The EC supported the GoU agricultural strategy (PMA-plan for Modernization of Agriculture) in <b>2001</b>, which benefited among others crops to agricultural commodities, of which coffee. The EC support to PMA focussed on research (NARO-National Agricultural Research Organisation) and extension (NAADS-National Agricultural Advisory Services) with a view of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector. The support to PMA was a multi-donors support. The EC recently took the decision to withdraw its support to NAADS because the GoU has undertaken to deeply change the nature of the extension service. NAADS is now used to provide farmers for free with fertilizers and other inputs. Farmers groups at local level are chaired by the head of the ruling party. Etc. (Source: MN 301).</p> <p><u>Stabex</u></p> <p>The Kaweri Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project supported by Stabex is successful and achievements (35,000 farmers involved) are very positive: :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 24 Depot Committees have been registered as Companies.</li> <li>• DC Companies carry out primary processing and deliver hulled green coffee directly to exporters in Kampala</li> <li>• Through this new marketing opportunity farmers have achieved a 23% higher price for their coffee (net of processing and marketing costs).</li> <li>• DC Companies have access to marketing loans from financial institutions. A model for input finance is currently being tested.</li> <li>• Farmer organizations have implemented a quality control system to ensure that only good</li> </ul>

	<p>quality coffee will be marketed through the organizations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Yield achievements increase in the average farmers' production from about 600 Kg green coffee per Ha to about 1.3 T/ha (average production on demo plots has reached about 2.7 T/ha)</li> </ul> <p>(Source : MN 308).</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>The project results from a Call for Proposals launched by the Commission. Solidaridad, the Dutch NGO which proposed the project and implements it has a very large experience in the development of Fair Trade schemes. It was the founding father of the Max Havelaar label and is implementing Fair Trade supply chains for coffee, tea, cotton, etc. in a variety of developing countries.</p>
<b>VU POP2/POPACA</b>	<p>Projet POPACA : il y a eu nombreux retards. Notamment au début du projet, néanmoins l'assistant technique déjà sur place (du fait de la première phase du projet POP1) a commencé les études de filières malgré le retard dans la signature du contrat de financement par la CE. Le projet a également connu des problèmes de décaissements du fait de problèmes d'absorption. Une des explications est les faibles capacités du Gouvernement à définir des stratégies, à planifier et mettre en œuvre les activités.</p> <p>Projet secteur privé (<i>Primary Sector Growth Support Programme</i>): retard également. L'assistant technique a été recruté récemment devrait arriver bientôt.</p> <p>In Vanuatu there is an important need to increase capacities of people working in the Ministries. More should be also done to facilitate the activities of the private sector (e.g. small assistance for farmers). More money is needed to do so but the EC said that it was not possible.</p> <p>Sources : MN 1067, MN 1059 and MN 1098</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The project's third monitoring report states that the plan had to be modified (change of the overall objective, of the logical framework, of the implementing agency, longer project execution time, etc.) because the programme was encountering big difficulties due to poor design. The intervention logics differed between donors, that the projects had separate badly constructed Logical Frameworks and that there was a lack of coordination mechanisms between the two donors. The donors each dealt with separate local partners (the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) for the French and the Vanuatu Research and Technical Centre (VARTC) for the EU).</p> <p>The projects aimed at too many Producer Organisations, which proved that they didn't learn the lessons from the first POP (POP1).</p> <p>The institutional structures did not allow an efficient implementation of the programme. And since the French and EU interventions operated through different modalities (focus on commercialisation of cooperatives for the French and private sector support for the EU), it resulted in "double reporting".</p> <p>Contributions also lacked timeliness and delays in French funding had a domino-effect on the EU interventions.</p> <p>Later on, these problems were addressed by progressively adapting the Logical Framework (2005), establishing a monitoring and evaluation system for the overall programme (2006) and referring to only one implementation agency (the DARD) as it can be seen in the third project synopsis.</p> <p>According to the third monitoring report, the overall objective of the project was not attained because:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The targets were too ambitious</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The number of producer organisations was too large;</li> <li>▪ Insufficient attention was paid to socio-economic factors;</li> <li>▪ There was inadequate human resources in the implementation agency (the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, DARD);</li> <li>▪ Insufficient market information or marketing logistics were provided.</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 3, impact, efficiency and effectiveness sheets.</i>  <i>Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 1, page 1.</i>  <i>Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Project Synopsis 3.</i></p>
<b>I.8.2.3</b>	Views of Commission staff on the appropriateness of financing modalities and implementation mechanisms used for the different financing instruments
<b>Overall</b>	<p>There are no guidelines or even advice on the use of specific financing modalities and implementation mechanisms for specific purposes. DEV can only influence on the choices at mid-term reviews (not on the NIPs). It was also able to influence on choices when calls for proposals were used for the Food Facility (but the FF had more than 10 people working on it so there was manpower to do this).</p> <p>In terms of financing modalities, the contributions to regional and international organisations are the usual way for that level of support (contribution agreements) or trust funds (IF, infrastructure, CAADP, research programmes).</p> <p><i>Source: MN912</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p><u>Lignes budgétaires sucre (60 M€) et banane (40 M€)</u></p> <p><u>Sucre</u> : surtout utilisé pour la brasserie, l'houblonnerie et la production de cola. La production est mineure est cantonnée à deux zones.  Objectifs des interventions sous ligne sucre : étendre les cultures pluviales de la canne à sucre car la culture irriguée est arrivée à un point de saturation.</p> <p>Ces lignes sont très lourdes à gérer avec l'approche projets : plus d'une centaine de dossiers à traiter. Avec cette approche projets, il y a peu de complémentarités avec Stabex. Etant donné la lourdeur administrative, la CE souhaite pouvoir effectuer de l'appui budgétaire.</p> <p><u>Approche Stabex</u></p> <p>La mise en œuvre sous Stabex est plus simple et souple avec l'approche programme qu'avec les lignes budgétaires. Des tranches budgétaires sont définies par filière et au sein de chaque tranche, des contrats sont signés (approche programme qui fonctionne très bien). Des comités de pilotage contrôlent la réalisation des activités,...</p> <p><u>Appui budgétaire</u></p> <p>La Côte d'Ivoire est devenue accessible à l'appui budgétaire (en-dessous d'un certain point de pauvreté). Volonté de la CE de réaliser ce type d'appui.</p> <p>Source : MN 819</p>
<b>CM</b>	Although Commission staff at the Delegation does not consider this mix of instruments

	<p>appropriate nor coherent, as it does not allow a coherent, medium term strategic approach (see I 8.1.5), these various instruments have been used in the best and most pragmatic way by the Delegation. They allowed introducing some funding towards the agricultural sector that had been excluded from the National Indicative Programme.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 402, 403</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	No information has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>For CSSP II, the problems with using the PEs by Cocobod are linked also to the fact that they didn't understand how the programme would be managed, they had several changes of PM... they changed procedures again and again.</p> <p>If the quality of the project design was unsatisfactory (with regards for example to the CSSP II where the MTE claimed that the risks and assumptions of the project had not discussed the institutional arrangements) then the project quality control process at design stage might also be questioned.</p> <p>On the choice of financing instrument, it is not clear why small amounts of money under a project require such stringently adhered to procedures when Ghana is receiving massive amounts of budget support at the same time for which procedures are found to be acceptable.</p> <p><i>Source: MN159, MN156</i></p>
<b>MG coffee</b>	<p><b>vanilla</b> La Délégation estime que l'idéal serait d'avoir accès à <u>Stabex, lignes budgétaires et FED</u> car cela permet d'avoir un mix d'outils complémentaires (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de prendre en compte l'ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole malgache (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (Source : MN 804 et débriefing Délégation).</p> <p>En effet, dans les régions où sont pratiquées les cultures de vanille, girofle, café, une complémentarité a été observée entre d'une part les FRDA et CSA (structures d'appui au développement agricole) et d'autre part les initiatives soutenues par les projets Stabex. A noter que la complémentarité entre instruments s'est faite au niveau régional et non au niveau pays.</p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The choice of financing mechanisms is initiated by the Delegation.</p> <p>The main financing mechanisms used (not necessarily in agriculture) in the region are: projects, SWAP, budget support (Vanuatu first country eligible and only one for a long time, now 4 more have come up) and financial contributions (to regional organisations mainly). For the latter there is a 6 pillar assessment made of the institution receiving the funds before the Commission can use monies in this way. They thus have to satisfy a number of criteria. The Commission is also considering giving these regional institutions broader BS.</p> <p><i>Source: MN947</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Financing instruments/implementation mechanisms are chosen according to the context of the beneficiary and the kind of activities that are funded:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Programme Estimates (PE) mostly for operational and small equipment (including cars). PEs are budgets for one year of operation. The implementing agency receives an advance (60%) and initiates the expenditure, then submits a file of expenses to the NAO for replenishing the fund, this is also checked then endorsed by DEL and the Delegation pays the remainder. At the end the total expenses are audited and any deviations have to be reimbursed.</li> <li>▪ Direct contracts (for roads) with direct labour (NAO/DEL do everything)</li> <li>▪ Delegation of contracting (for roads again) to the Tanzanian Road Agency which is the</li> </ul>

	<p>contracting authority and NAO supervises</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ In both above cases, the NAO and DEL still involved in tendering and countersigning the contracts</li> <li>▪ Direct contracts by the DEL for TA</li> <li>▪ Contribution to basket fund: one single payment into Ministry of Agriculture's Agricultural Sector Development Programme Basket Fund (MOA's ASDP BF).</li> <li>▪ MoU just a simple transfer to a ministry (this was for MoLands)</li> <li>▪ Grant contracts (started in 2009/2010 for the TAP): this has been used under Trade and Agriculture Programme (TAP): essentially the same system as PE but on 3 year basis. Advance is of 40%.</li> </ul> <p>All the above except grant contracts have been used for the Stabex FMO 94-99. For EDF TAP, grant contract, TA, transfer.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Next TAP2 will also use call for proposals: this will be a first in TZ.</li> </ul> <p>The financing instruments are chosen to be appropriate to the beneficiaries</p> <p><i>Source: MN 156.</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	Brussels asked the Delegation to reduce the share of budget support in the NIP 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF. The Delegation's initial proposal was to provide more than half the total allocation as budget support. They were asked to reduce that figure under 50%. (Source: MN 301)
<b>UG coffee</b>	<u>EDF is used to implement interventions; Stabex could be used to implement projects</u> but also to identify and formulate interventions, support the design of policy documents, bridge the gap between two interventions, etc..Currently the Delegation doesn't have available an instrument replacing the Stabex fundsThe mix of instruments is necessary because they were clearly complementing each other. The EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds where mainly used to support specific commodity chains in particular coffee (Source: MN 301 and 313).
<b>VU</b>	<p>Il y a eu deux appuis budgétaires sous le 9<sup>ie</sup> FED. La dernière tranche (environ 3 M€ représentant environ un tiers du 9<sup>ie</sup> FED) n'a pas encore été payée. Le Gouvernement a du mal à rassembler l'information nécessaire et remplir les conditions du paiement pour cette tranche. Le Gouvernement du Vanuatu peine à répondre aux critères d'éligibilité pour obtenir un appui budgétaire général. La Délégation peine à recevoir les informations pertinentes pour vérifier ces critères d'éligibilité. Il n'est pas encore acquis que pour l'appui budgétaire prévu dans le 10<sup>ie</sup> FED le Vanuatu puisse répondre aux critères.</p> <p>Le Gouvernement ne répond pas aux exigences de l'appui budgétaire : pas de PEFA, plus d'audit des comptes/ dépenses depuis 2005, on ne sait pas comment la politique est réformée, il y a une <i>shopping list</i> d'activités mais aucune priorité n'a été donnée. Il n'y a pas d'indépendance dans l'audit des comptes en interne. Il y a des problèmes dans la mise en marché des contrats.</p> <p>Il y a une assistance technique (un français) qui était en place auprès du gouvernement. Mais cet AT ne connaissait pas bien l'anglais, alors que le Gouvernement ne travaille que presque exclusivement en anglais. Par ailleurs, il y a eu des soupçons de corruption entre le Gouvernement et l'AT. Cet AT a créé un bureau d'études au Vanuatu en plus d'un autre bureau en Ouganda). Il a écrit lui-même les termes de références de la mission d'AT auprès des finances publiques du pays. Puis il a eu le contrat. Il y a eu conflit d'intérêt. Il apparaît que l'AT est déjà connu des services de contrôle de la CE pour des faits similaires. Le Gouvernement ne voit pas où est le problème. L'OLAF examine depuis quelques temps ce problème. L'AT a quitté son poste. La situation est très compliquée. Un autre AT devrait arriver bientôt pour appuyer le Gouvernement dans la gestion de ses finances publiques.</p> <p>Il y a un manque de personnel à la Délégation de la CE au Vanuatu. Il y a une seule personne en</p>

	<p>charge du suivi de toutes les opérations (tout secteur confondu, appui budgétaire général inclus). Par ailleurs, chaque demande de financement et chaque modification au sein d'une intervention doit être signée dans la Délégation de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée. En fait, le centre décisionnel pour le Vanuatu se situe en Papouasie Nouvelle Guinée (PNG). Tous les dossiers doivent transiter vers la PNG, ce qui retarde très fortement le processus décisionnel. Par exemple sur le projet d'appui aux communautés villageoises - microprojets (<i>Reinforcing community based organisations</i>), un architecte avait été choisi pour réaliser les travaux. En attente de la signature en PNG (plus de 6 mois), l'architecte a quitté le Vanuatu, tout est à refaire. Par ailleurs, le chef de projet et la secrétaire attendent d'être payé depuis 6 mois (arriérés de salaire).</p> <p><i>Source : MN 1015 and MN 1067</i></p>
<b>I.8.2.4</b>	Views of the stakeholders on appropriateness of the financing modalities and implementation mechanisms used with regard to their cost effectiveness and timeliness vis-à-vis the objectives pursued
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CR</b>	No information has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The SPU and CRIG both underlined the complexity of EDF procedures. They both work with annual PEs. Their staff didn't understand the procedures to be followed for procurement and this has led to (i) Cocobod having to reimburse the CE for the first tender which was found not conform to procedures and (ii) major delays in procurement which are as yet unresolved, almost three years after the process was launched and with only a few months before project closure. In addition there have been problems in getting advances replenished, with major delays occurring between the time the advance is requested and the time it arrives (due to accounting and auditing requirements: the account has to be closed before the next payment can be made). Project staff have underlined the need for a special person to take care of the project procurement and accounting because for them it is an extra weight on their normal job. They would have wished for a PMU or secretariat to facilitate. The EU office (NAO and DEL) have helped them but they are themselves also sometimes confused and not aware of the latest rules to follow.</p> <p>Timeliness has been really bad: the moneys arrive too late and so the project cannot implement its activities on time whereas they are very much time-bound: if you miss the moment then you have to wait for a year before you can undertake what was required. Both the procurement poses a problem (major delay for example in getting the vehicles which have only just got out of the tender evaluation, a process which was started under PE1 two years previously) and the advances and replenishment of the advances which take about 3-4 months to do because the account has to be closed before you get the next instalment. Activities have been less affected than could have been the case because they ended up using Cocobod funds to undertake the essential activities and procure what they required.</p> <p>The staff doesn't understand why Cocobod procedures cannot be used: they are adapted to the time frame of operations. They have about 25 other external supports to Cocobod and none of them is anyway near as complex and difficult as the EC ones.</p> <p>In short their conclusion is: <u>the money is there but you cannot use it</u>. There are so many requirements that you're not sure how you can use it. Too complex and changing.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN 114, MN123.</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Dans l'instrument Stabex, il a eu des approches différentes: subventions et projets. Le CNCC souligne que les discontinuités entre deux protocoles successifs ont nui à la durabilité et</p>

	<p>que le problème a persisté avec les appels à proposition. (Source : MN 807). En effet, AIM met en évidence le risque très sérieux sur la durabilité des résultats du projet du fait de la durée limitée de l'intervention. Il faut augmenter la durée de mise en œuvre (5 à 10 ans) pour espérer impacter sur les comportements des producteurs (les connaissances techniques sont, elles, assez vite assimilées) (Source : MN 806).</p> <p>Toutefois, la Délégation précise qu'il est possible de négocier un nouveau protocole spécifique avec les mêmes agences d'exécution et une formulation légèrement changée. (Source : MN 801).</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Contribution to Ministry of Agriculture's Agricultural Sector Development Programme Basket Fund (MOA's ASDP BF) hasn't been continued (one single contribution under Stabex FMO 94-99). According to MoA and MoIT this is a very good funding mechanism. From DEL perspective possibly EU could have given the mechanism a longer time to prove it can work. Stabex evaluation was very negative about the system in terms of accountability, results and transparency.</p> <p>Basket funding was found to be maybe longer to get the monies but more effective in terms of coherence of support. Also the basket fund is the best tool to monitor support efficiently. If the money goes to GBS, it is not sure that the money will be brought to the agricultural sector.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN601, MN 156, MN602 and TZ Stabex FMO 94-99 Evaluation 2007</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Problems with EDF procedures and EU procedures (for Stabex funds):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ All EU procedures: délais etc, problems with understanding and applying the procedures although lots of training helps.</li> <li>▪ With PEs : have to constantly remind the implementing agencies of timing so that they don't overrun the expenditure time and submit the new PE in time to the NAO then fw to DEL.</li> <li>▪ PEs only work well if EU is the only donor otherwise there are too many different procedures for the implementing agency to apply.</li> <li>▪ With grant contracts: 3 years so there is less pressure on the timing of the disbursements/submissions. Can only do this when there is a local contribution of at least 10% of the other parties (in this case some comes from GoT, some from private sector through the crop levies).</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: MN 156.</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>Projects and budget support are both necessary: development requires the mix of these instruments. Budget support cannot be the only answer because the government doesn't have the technical expertise. (source: MN308)</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>See I.8.1.5 and I.8.2.3</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The Coffee Research Centre (COREC) is worried to hear that donors are orienting their support to the private sector, which does not have a long term view of the sector development needs. Rather than budget support they are in favour of a close targeting of donors' aid.</p> <p>The funding sources of the centre are very limited and erratic. The budget for 2009-2011 is less than US\$ 0,3 million but it requires at least US\$ 1.3 million. There are thus problems regarding the human staffing, the physical and financial infrastructures. All the realised works will be lost without additional funding.</p> <p>Currently, COREC is not able to go forward. For example, tissue culture multiplication is impossible with the current material (filters, autoclave...) and tests on the field need to be realized in order to be sure that the resistant varieties are suitable to other areas. (Source: MN 310)</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Les relations avec l'UE (la Délégation en place au Vanuatu) sont qualifiées de très bonnes. S'il y a un problème, il y a une communication entre les parties pour le résoudre. Il y a des réunions</p>

	<p>hebdomadaires entre le bureau du Premier Ministre et le Chef de Délégation de l'UE au Vanuatu. Mais, il n'y a pas de dialogue politique en agriculture, excepté au niveau des projets agricoles en cours (à l'époque le POPACA ; aujourd'hui en ce qui concerne l'intervention <i>Primary Sector Growth Programme Phase Phase 1</i>, qui inclut une composante de renforcement des capacités pour le Ministère de l'Agriculture).</p> <p>Les parties prenantes interrogées notent une très grande lenteur dans les procédures d'approbation de fonds et de support au Vanuatu. Deux causes à cela : 1) le manque de personnel à la Délégation du Vanuatu ; 2) le fait que chaque document de transfert de fonds et d'approbation d'interventions doit être ratifié par la Papouasie Nouvelle Guinée, puis Bruxelles avant de revenir en PNG puis vers la Délégation du Vanuatu. Il y a un réel problème d'efficacité au niveau de la Délégation de l'UE. Par exemple, cela fait un an que l'intervention <i>Primary Sector Growth Programme Phase Phase 1</i> devait démarrer et les documents ne sont pas encore signés.</p> <p>Il y a également un problème d'absorption des fonds reçus au niveau du Gouvernement. Il est difficile de s'approprier la gestion de l'aide et de programmer les activités.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 1023</i></p>
<b>J.8.3</b>	<b><i>At sector level, the interventions used financing modalities and implementation mechanisms that were adapted to the absorption and implementation capacities of implementation agencies, regional organisations and producer organisations</i></b>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Les avis sont positifs au sujet des agences d'exécution, tant pour les bananes qu'en ce qui concerne le cacao/café via les programmes PACICC et MoungoNkam.</p> <p>Les acteurs de la filière banane ont considéré que les délais de mise en œuvre des AFT ont limité l'efficacité des interventions – mais les responsabilités sont partagées</p> <p>Le PACICC a particulièrement renforcé les organisations de producteurs à s'organiser notamment en aval de la production (information sur les prix, regroupement de l'offre et contact avec les acheteurs, contrôle qualité...). Le PDR MoungoNkam semble avoir été efficace dans le domaine café/cacao/huile de palme, malgré une faible dotation financière du volet agricole.</p>
<b>GH overall</b>	<p>For the Commission's support to the cocoa sector there has been a misjudgement of the implementation capacities of the beneficiary institutions managing the project. The initial project identification assessed the issues and proposed an institutional set-up that was ignored in the actual project implementation.</p> <p>Financing modalities and implementation mechanisms have been differentiated according to the capacities of the agencies; hence in transport there has been concomitant use of direct labour and contracting through the Feeder Roads Agency; in cocoa there has been use of grant contracts (over 3 years) and yearly Programme Estimates (which have not worked well). Service contracts were also used in both sectors.</p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les CSA, financés par la ligne Sécurité Alimentaire, incitent et aident les producteurs à s'organiser en groupements de producteurs.</p> <p>Les projets Stabex s'appuient sur les groupements de producteurs pour le développement des filières d'exportation.</p> <p>Formation et renforcement des capacités ont été des priorités de l'appui de la Commission tant aux CSA qu'aux groupements de producteurs.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>On the whole the Stabex interventions used PE and grant contracts to fund operations of the research institutes: although cumbersome because the procedure requires passage through the Ministry of Finance, it seems to have worked to satisfaction and evaluations show that accounting has been transparent and funds used as programmed.</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The provision of budget support to the PMA implementation relied on the assumption that the</p>



	<p>government had the adequate implementation capacity. This assumption was not fully verified notably as regards inter-agencies cooperation. EC support to the PMA secretariat was meant to address this issue.</p> <p>A key component of the Coffee Farmers Alliance support project was the constitution of producer organisations at village, parish and national level.</p>
<b>VAN</b>	There is no specific instrument at sector level. The EC has mainly supported the agricultural sector in Vanuatu through a project/ programme approach.
<b>I.8.3.1</b>	Intervention formulation documents included a diagnostic of the institutional capacity of the implementing agency to undertake the required tasks
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Programming documents includes a diagnostic of the issues faced by ACP countries in terms of institutional capacity, notably in organising the agricultural commodity sectors and designing adapted regulatory frameworks.</p> <p>Indeed, the financial agreement stipulates that ACP commodity sectors have difficulties in adapting to increasingly harsh international competition and changes in the international and national market environment. At the national level, deregulation is often still in the process of being implemented while state extension and other support services have been reduced and not adequately replaced by the private sector. Largely, sectors are insufficiently organised and regulatory frameworks are not adequately developed and implemented. Markets at national and regional level often function poorly, with insufficient information, constraints posed by regulations and standards, and inadequate access to finance and risk management instruments.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The Financing Agreement stated that the COLEACP had built up sufficient human resources and management tools to implement the PIP.</p> <p>The financing agreement states that the COLEACP's management programme (definition of tasks, modalities, etc.) had to be approved by the Commission before implementation.</p> <p><i>Source: Pesticides Initiative Programme Financing Agreement, pages 15 &amp; 18.</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>The AMSP study did not find any EC AMSP strategy presenting a diagnostic of the institutional capacity of implementing agencies.</p> <p>The AMSP programme suffers a major contradiction: it finances the governments (and in some cases NGOs or sugarcane producer organisations), which have a minor role in the development of the sugar production chain, and not the sugar mills, which lead the sector development.</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA impact evaluation reports do not show explicit evidence that the intervention formulation documents included consideration of the institutional capacity.</p> <p>They do however note that SFA funds have been invested to develop institutional capacity (e.g. in the Windward Islands).</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 29, htsp, 2008.</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Le MR précise que les structures interinstitutionnelles gardent une certaine informalité, propice à un suivi efficace du projet (Source : MR p. 2)</p> <p>Dans le cadre de la filière anacarde, le projet s'intégrant dans une politique de développement</p>

	<p>régional des Hauts Bassins, chaque activité est discutée avec le Conseil Régional des Hauts Bassins. Cela permet un <b>ancrage territorial et institutionnel de l'action</b>. (Source : <i>Annexe VI Rapport narratif intermédiaire p.8</i>).</p> <p>Le projet est orienté vers le <b>renforcement des capacités des institutions locales</b>, particulièrement les institutions régionales décentralisées. L'intégration de ces acteurs dans les actions proposées permettra à terme l'appropriation du soutien à ces deux filières et l'intégration des résultats du projet dans les conventions de coopérations décentralisées signées par les acteurs. (Source : <i>Annexe I. description de l'action p. 29</i>).</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune référence aux capacités institutionnelles de l'agence d'implémentation n'est faite dans les documents disponibles sur l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pour chaque volet, la structure organisationnelle et le type de gestion (+ justifications) sont présentés (Source : <i>Rider FA p.11-12</i>)</p> <p>A titre d'exemple, pour le volet « palmier et hévéa », La Commission européenne délègue à la GTZ les tâches de contrôle, de contractualisation, de mise en œuvre, de paiement, de monitoring et de reporting. (Source : <i>Rider FA p.11</i>) et la justification de son éligibilité est présentée à l'annexe 8.4 (Source : <i>Rider FA p.7</i>).</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Pour le PACICC (Programme d'appui au Conseil interprofessionnel du Cacao et du Café (2,182 M€, financé sur le 9<sup>ème</sup> FED), la mise en œuvre a reposé sur l'organisation interprofessionnelle qui opère dans le secteur depuis sa libéralisation en 1995. Les activités développées par le programme font partie de la mission du CICC telles que définie dans ses statuts (apporter ses concours aux organisations de producteurs constituant ses divers collèges, accroître l'efficacité de l'ensemble de l'organisation professionnelle, gérer et produire l'information à caractère professionnel, enregistrer les contrats de vente à l'exportation, etc.).</p> <p>Source : <i>Convention de financement du PACICC et MN 913</i></p> <p>Pour le programme PDR Moungo Nkam (financé sur le COM Stabex 98 unifié 7,6M€ avec une composante productive café, cacao, palmier à huile (14% du total) novembre 2006- novembre 2010 la mise en œuvre a reposé sur une agence d'exécution en relation avec les communes (maires) les populations via leurs OP (GIC) et les délégations départementales du Ministère (MINADER). Le volet agricole a débuté avec plus de 6 mois de retard. Cependant, la brochure finale du programme présente des résultats finaux très positifs. Source : <i>brochure de diffusion des résultats du programme (Pour une approche pragmatique et participative du développement rural, l'expérience du programme de développement rural du bassin agricole du Moungo Nkam)</i>.</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>La durabilité de l'intervention au point de vue institutionnel est présentée (Source : <i>Annexe I p.29</i>) et le document précise que la durabilité institutionnelle sera garantie par (plus de détail dans le document) :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ la finalité même du projet qui est celle de renforcer l'autonomie opérationnelle et économique, la capacité d'autopromotion et de représentativité des GIC groupes cibles ;</li> <li>▪ l'empreinte méthodologique caractéristique du projet selon laquelle la participation des groupes cibles - entendue comme capacité des groupes cibles d'avoir le contrôle de leur existence et d'intervenir dans les processus décisionnels les concernant,</li> <li>▪ doit être sollicitée dans toutes les phases de l'action mais elle doit surtout représenter le but de l'action.</li> </ul>

<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not directly tackle agricultural commodities. Formulation documents of the PASAPE do not include a diagnostic (or aspects of analysis) of the institutional capacity of the implementing agency.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Proposition de financement n°9 ACP CM 18</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006</i>  <i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The "Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme identification (diagnostic and feasibility studies) and formulation documents (FA) do not include a diagnostic of the institutional capacity of the implementing agencies. Reference is made in the FA to the fact that the implementing agencies (Caribbean Rice Association and two Ministries of Agriculture in Guyana and Suriname) have established track records in delivering services to the industry. A more detailed description of the implementing agencies is provided in the feasibility study but there is no diagnostic of their institutional capacity.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Agrotec Spa, Feasibility study of the CARIFORUM rice industry, 2003</i>  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, page 10</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>Programming documents do not include any assessment of WIRSPA capacity to implement the programme. But there was no other choice since WIRSPA is the only organisation representing the rum industry at regional level. Furthermore WIRSPA was given institutional support and provided with technical assistance.</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p><b><u>Institutional and Management Capacity</u></b> (<i>Source : FA Annexes A to D p.6</i>)</p> <p>In principle, it has been concluded that each institution has the capacity to implement the sub components each is responsible for. Where there are weaknesses additional support would be provided as follows:</p> <p><u>Coffee Research</u> Past performance and present capacity for the difficult tasks involved have been taken into account in including locally and internationally recruited technical assistance.</p> <p><u>PMU/CTA</u> In CIP III outside TA was used successfully to assist in the co-ordination of the Project. It is concluded that this is appropriate for the current Project. Engineering support is strong through locally contracted staff, whilst procurement still has the benefit of the staff that implemented the last Project.</p> <p><u>Coffee Extension</u> The attainment of structural changes is proposed. This provides an impetus to change. It is understood that this has also been recognised by the Federal Government, which has requested the coffee growing Regions to implement changes in coffee extension structures so that there is better delivery</p> <p><u>Coffee Nurseries</u> The institutional capacity to operate the nurseries is evident. The defect has been the non-sustainability of the public nurseries because they have been consistently starved of funds after the closure of CIP III. The Project would correct this situation as a transitional measure before reaching financial autonomy of remaining "wholesale" nurseries relaying the research</p>

	<p>centers.</p> <p><u>Conservation</u> This is a new concept and hence a new organisational structure has had to be proposed, which includes the involvement of the Regional Governments, the Institute for Biodiversity Conservation and Research (IBCR) as co-ordinator, NGOs working in the areas of the forest in carrying out the community development programme, and use of an outside firm for monitoring progress.</p> <p><u>Marketing</u> Project involvement has been kept to a minimum, since it was seen that this is essentially the preserve of the private sector.</p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>According to the CSSP II MTE, there was no evidence of diagnostics of institutions having been done for IITA, SPU and CRIG. There was no evidence either of risks and assumptions having been looked at.</p> <p>The project preparation files showed that a similar set-up to the one used for CSSP I had been recommended for CSSP II but, for unknown reasons, this was changed at the time of actual implementation.</p> <p><i>Source: CSSP II MTE, 2011, Delegation files.</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II Financing Proposal mentions that the implementation agencies, the Cocobod and the IITA, have proven to be capable of the task.</p> <p>The Cocobod's agencies were restructured little before the beginning of the programme. Their capacity to implement specific components of the programme seemed good.</p> <p>The IITA was considered to have a good expertise and track-record in project and financing management.</p> <p>Yet, information has been transmitted from the delegation, providing some negative reactions from COCOBOD, where they found it quite difficult. Lots of delays were due to their staff not understanding about EDF procedures. The delegation themselves got a lot of negative reactions. Many problems occurred with EC regulations for access to money.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Proposal, page 15. MN 907</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) first steering committee report states that the technical, administrative and financial management capacity of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) was assessed by a consultant. However the consultancy assignment was cancelled due to incompetence of the consultant. Another assessment was then performed by the main implementing agencies.</p> <p>However, no evidence can be found concerning a diagnostic of the capacities of the main implementing agencies (AU-IBAR (African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources) and the AU-IAPSC (African Union Inter-African Phytosanitary Commission)).</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO 1<sup>st</sup> Steering Committee Report, page 16.</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The TAPs attached to the Financing Agreements of PASAM1 and PASAM2 do not include a diagnostic of the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture.</p> <p>An objective of the programme is a redistribution of the Ministry staff from the central unit to its antennas at regional level.</p>

<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La fiche d'identification (FIP, §10) évalue la capacité institutionnelle en mentionnant les aspects suivants :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ La Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton (MRSC), entité dépendant directement du Premier Ministre et mise en place pour accompagner le processus, doit être renforcée en ressources humaines (expertise insuffisante), en moyens financiers lui permettant de mener des études et des analyses sur fonds propres et en flexibilité afin d'attribuer des contrats dans des délais réduits.</li> <li>▪ Un organisme indépendant de classement (OCC, Office de Classement du Coton) doit être mis en place afin de garantir le classement du coton graine et du coton fibre et participer au renforcement du label « Coton Mali ».</li> <li>▪ Une société de bourse électronique au coton fibre, devra être mise en place afin de rendre transparentes les transactions, élargir le nombre d'acheteurs, renforcer l'information disponible sur le coton malien et accréditer vendeurs et acheteurs.</li> <li>▪ L'Interprofession Coton (IPC), représentant les grands métiers du coton, doit être mise en place par un acte constitutif intervenant début 2007. L'IPC assurera, outre la concertation de la filière, une partie des fonctions transversales actuellement assurées par la CMDT (intrants, recherche, conseil agricole, choix des variétés, entretien des pistes).</li> </ul> <p>D'après la FIP (§10), il résulte que l'IPC (Interprofession Coton), la bourse électronique au coton fibre et l'OCC (Office de Classement du Coton) sont des préalables à la privatisation car ils constituent le paysage institutionnel dans lequel la privatisation se déroulera et dont les soumissionnaires devront tenir compte.</p> <p>Par ailleurs, le document de synthèse du Projet mentionne que l'objectif n° 2 du programme vise à permettre aux producteurs d'acquérir une plus grande maîtrise de la filière, d'en assumer le rôle de catalyseur et de renforcer leur contrôle sur le processus de réforme. Il s'agit d'accroître la professionnalisation des producteurs et de leurs organisations notamment à travers l'alphabétisation (Synthèse de "Projet, p.1). Cependant l'identification a relevé que l'alphabétisation fonctionnelle est un besoin structurel de long terme qui ne trouvera pas de solution par un appui ponctuel sur un ou deux ans. En matière de structuration des OP dans la zone cotonnière, elle préconisait que d'autres objectifs plus directement liés à la Réforme de la Filière, puissent être soutenus (participation aux mécanismes de gestion pour en améliorer la transparence et l'efficacité, ou même participation effective au Conseil d'Administration des nouvelles instances (Checklist, Identification phase, p2).</p> <p><i>Source; FIP</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such evidence in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Le projet cherche à renforcer trois organisations faïtières auxquelles les producteurs bénéficiaires du projet sont affiliés : AAJAC COLUFIFA dans le département de Sédhiou, Fédération des producteurs d'anacarde et Fédération des producteurs de sésame dans le département de Vélingara. La description de l'action donne un aperçu de l'analyse des forces et faiblesses de ces trois organisations.</p> <p><i>Source: Description Action</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	In none of the FMO or Financing Agreements there was reference to initial institutional analysis.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.

<b>UG-COF</b>	The implementing NGO, Solidaridad, has a large expertise in the development of Fair Trade supply chains. At local level the project is implemented by a Ugandan NGO (Kulika Charity Trust) with experience in community-based development.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	The SBS TAPs read: “the NAADS secretariat is a highly professional organisation, to which technical assistance is being provided [likely provided by another donor. Consultant’s comment] for institutional capacity building. However, at lower local government levels and especially in farmers’ fora which provide the focus for the work of both components, capacity is weak. NAADS roll-out is actually delayed because of the larger-than-expected capacity effort required here.” The TAPs add: “In NARS, a critical aspect is the extent to which researchers are able to shift from their traditional “reductionist” approach to a genuine partnership with farmers and other clients. The EC has addressed this issue partly through the Decentralised Learning component of its current programme of support to NARO(National Agricultural Research Organisation). This activity will be sustained in the future through a recently-concluded agreement for collaboration between the International Centre for Development-Oriented Research in Agriculture, NARO and Makerere University”.
<b>VU-POP</b>	No such evidence can be found in the intervention formulation documents.
<b>I.8.3.2</b>	Evidence of mix of different financing modalities used within a sector and within programmes (MoU/FA) to adapt to needs and absorption capacities
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme is a project-based approach. The programme is implemented through five international organisations (FAO, CFC, UNCTAD, ITC and WB) which implement specific activities in the selected ACP countries.</p> <p>The AAACP programme will essentially make available a pool of key services and tools to ACP commodity chain sectors. Its objectives are those of both COM.</p> <p>The budget of the programme (€45 M) involves allocations for international organisations and results, based on the estimated costs of participation in the activities indicated in the logframe in a limited number of commodity dependent countries and chains. The proposed budget is shared as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contribution Agreements for a total amount of €36.5 M will be awarded to the following international organisations which are the implementing agencies of the programme: FAO, WB, ITC, CFC and UNCTAD;</li> <li>▪ €5.3 M is allocated to the coordination (coordination unit, support to COS-Coton, workshops and studies);</li> <li>▪ €2.7 M for contingencies;</li> <li>▪ €0.3 M for evaluation and €0.2 M for audit.</li> </ul> <p>It should be noted that one third of the total budget (€ 15 M) is specifically allocated to activities in support of the implementation of the EU-Africa Partnership on cotton including the support to the <i>COS-Coton</i>.</p> <p>The financial agreement mentions that the end of the period of execution is hereby set at 31/12/2012 while the end of the period of operational implementation is hereby set at 31/12/2010.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	According to the PIP final evaluation report all the financing of the PIP was given in the form of a grant to the COLEACP.

	<i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, page 3</i>
<b>AMSP</b>	Depending on the countries, the AMSP programme was delivered as GBS (Mauritius; St Kitts & Nevis), SBS (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Mozambique, Trinidad & Tobago) or project approach (all other 11 SP countries).
<b>BAN</b>	<p>There are multiple references to use of different financing modalities (other than the SFA) used in the banana sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The EDF fund has been used to develop the transport sector, benefiting indirectly banana marketing (e.g. in Suriname). Strengthening competitiveness and supporting diversification were embedded as generic needs in the country strategy papers of the EDF. However, bananas was not specifically singled out or emphasized as a Strategy Paper priority in most of the EDF country support strategies.</li> <li>▪ STABEX projects have also been used to support the restructuring and diversification of the banana sector (e.g. in St Lucia)</li> </ul> <p>Absorption capacities were never mentioned in the evaluation.</p> <p><i>Sources: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 16, htsp, 2008.</i>  <i>Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Country Reports, page 349, htsp, 2008.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>According to Burkina Faso's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, most of the support to the agricultural sector was provided through EDFs and budget lines.</p> <p>There is no evidence that the mix of modalities was aimed at adapting to needs and absorption capacities though.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 14</i></p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CAFR</b>	No support to agricultural commodities in the regional programme.
<b>CI</b>	Il n'y a pas d'infos dans les CSP concernant les modalités de financement dans un secteur ou au sein de programmes afin de les adapter aux besoins.
<b>CI</b>	<p>Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des <u>appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle</u> (stratégie sectorielle) que <u>technique</u> (veille sanitaire OTA) et des <u>opérations sectorielles</u> conduites en <u>partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA</u>, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le <u>Ministère de l'Agriculture</u>. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>Les <u>appuis individualisés sont de diverses natures</u> : actions structurantes, actions de type budgétaire, appuis institutionnels, etc. Ils <u>associent tous les outils du FED</u>: Devis-Programmes, convention de contribution ou de subvention et tous les types de marchés (fournitures, travaux, services).</p> <p>Selon l'évaluation Stabex, le choix du programme est allé, au mieux et à raison, vers des <u>associations professionnelles ou des organisations professionnelles</u> pour contourner certaines difficultés. Mais ce choix s'est effectué en minorant la qualité des garanties (risques techniques et financiers) qu'ils pouvaient apporter. Les <u>problématiques d'appropriation locale et de capacités d'absorption</u> sont étroitement liées aux <u>capacités de mise en œuvre</u> des projets. Des lors qu'une action emporte des</p>

	<p>réalisations et des avancées significatives, l'appropriation est immédiate. La question de capacités d'absorption dans un pays en crise politique, sociale et économique peut sembler incongrue. Des lors que l'on travaille sur des secteurs économiques avec des opérateurs professionnels (même au travers d'associations professionnelles), les capacités d'absorption sont réelles. On devrait associer à la problématique des capacités de mise en œuvre, celle de la capacité d'adéquation des procédures en vigueur.</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p><u>Lignes budgétaires sucre (60 M€) et banane (40 M€)</u></p> <p><u>Sucre</u> : surtout utilisé pour la brasserie, l'houblonnerie et la production de cola. La production est mineure est cantonnée à deux zones. Objectifs des interventions sous ligne sucre : étendre les cultures pluviales de la canne à sucre car la culture irriguée est arrivée à un point de saturation.</p> <p>Ces lignes sont très lourdes à gérer avec l'approche projets : plus d'une centaine de dossiers à traiter. Avec cette approche projets, il y a peu de complémentarités avec Stabex. Etant donné la lourdeur administrative, la CE souhaite pouvoir effectuer de l'appui budgétaire.</p> <p><u>Approche Stabex</u></p> <p>La mise en œuvre sous Stabex est plus simple et souple avec l'approche programme qu'avec les lignes budgétaires. Des tranches budgétaires sont définies par filière et au sein de chaque tranche, des contrats sont signés (approche programme qui fonctionne très bien). Des comités de pilotage contrôlent la réalisation des activités,...</p> <p><u>Appui budgétaire</u></p> <p>La Côte d'Ivoire est devenue accessible à l'appui budgétaire (en-dessous d'un certain point de pauvreté). Volonté de la CE de réaliser ce type d'appui.</p> <p>Source : MN 819</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Aucune information n'est donnée à ce sujet dans la documentation disponible sur l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.</p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pour chaque volet, la structure organisationnelle et le type de gestion (+ justifications) sont présentés (<i>Source : Rider FA p.11-12</i>). Deux types de gestion principaux sont renseignés pour les cinq volets : gestion centralisée indirecte et gestion décentralisée.</p> <p>Pas de référence autre concernant cet indicateur dans les docs consultés.</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents do not systematically mention the financing modalities chosen to deliver the support and, when they refer to them, there is no justification of the choices made, including in terms of adequacy to needs and absorption capacities.</p> <p><i>Sources :</i> <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i> <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 33-34, 36</i></p>



<b>CM</b>	Il existe un mix de modalités d'interventions qui repose plutôt sur une logique de présence d'instruments (pour des raisons historiques notamment) et d'opportunité d'utilisation (Stabex) que d'une adaptation aux besoins et capacités d'absorption. Sur le terrain au Cameroun, la DCE utilise au mieux cette combinaison d'outils dans une approche pragmatique. Les besoins du secteur agricole qui comprend les « commodities » ont pu être rencontrés, même de manière très marginale, par l'utilisation de ces différents outils (MN 402, 403).
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés.
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not directly tackle agricultural commodities. Formulation documents of the PASAPE do not evidence that different financing modalities have been used to adapt to needs and absorption capacities.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Proposition de financement n°9 ACP CM 18</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006</i>  <i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No information regarding financing modalities <u>used within a sector and programmes</u> has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005.</p> <p>Only evidence: Although a large range of interventions and instruments have been deployed to support the productive sectors, overlaps and duplications have generally been avoided owing to the magnitude and diversity of the needs. Nearly all projects are linked to the objectives of the regional strategy but there is an absence of coherence at the level of the instruments.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>See I.8.2.1</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The "Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme used a mix of different financing modalities. The constraints and needs have been identified in the diagnostic and feasibility studies. The various components of the three sub-programmes (FA) overall reflect the components proposed in the feasibility study. There is no explicit reference though on the extent to which the financing modalities have been chosen to adapt to needs; it is rather implicit. The feasibility study acknowledged the limited resources of implementing partners in terms of staff, funds and facilities and noted that this will have organisational implications for the intervention (supplementation of resources; staff orientation and capability building; technical assistance and consultancy services).</p> <p>Absorption capacities have not been analysed in detail in the feasibility study. Additionally, there is no explicit reference in the FA on the link between the chosen financing modalities and the absorption capacities.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Agrotec Spa, Feasibility study of the CARIFORUM rice industry, 2003</i></p>

	<i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003, page 10</i>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	All funds have been used in accordance with a service contract (between CARIFORUM and WIRSPA), with annual project budgets, as foreseen in the Commission's guide for decentralised project management.
<b>ET</b>	<p>Aid delivery modalities to be adopted jointly in Ethiopia will be identified jointly in the context of a DAG/GoE review of Ethiopia's overall and sector external financing needs as indicated in PASDEP. (<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.55, 56 with more details</i>)</p> <p>10th EDF (A –envelope) € 644 million: this envelope will cover long-term programmable development operations under the strategy, in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transport and regional integration, € 250 million, be implemented in the form of a <b>combination of sector budget support and the project approach</b>.</li> <li>▪ Rural development and food security, € 130 million, to be implemented in the form of a <b>combination of sector budget support and the project approach</b>.</li> <li>▪ Macro-economic support and governance, € 244 million to be implemented in a <b>combination of modalities</b>.</li> <li>▪ Other programmes, € 20 million, be implemented in <b>the form of projects</b>,</li> </ul> <p>(<i>Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.66, 67</i>)</p> <p>No more information than in CSP in commodities sector. Nevertheless, CSE contains a description of the overall programme implementation (financial allocations and commitments + general factors affecting strategy implementation). (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 21-24</i>).</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP mentions the use of different financing mechanisms (the sugar protocol accompanying measures, EDF, EIB, the stability instrument and the instrument for humanitarian and emergency assistance). There is however no justification of complementarities of the modalities or their adaptation to needs and absorption capacities.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 55.</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	Within the CSSP II there was use of both grant contract (for IITA-STCP) and PEs (for SPU and CRIG). No explanations of these choices were given to the consultants.
<b>GH-COC</b>	No information on different financing modalities can be found in the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II documents.
<b>GH</b>	<p>EU support is provided mainly through budget and project support. The CSP/NIP explains that budget support is preferred because of its alignment with the Paris Declaration principles. There is however no explanation on complementarities between the two chosen modalities.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 31</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The financing mechanisms include contracts and grants, as well as technical assistance for the facilitation of the project.</p> <p>There is no justification of the coicie of modalities to adapt to needs and absorption capacities though.</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 21.</i></p>

<b>MG</b>	Hormis ce qui est précisé en I.8.2.1, il n'y a pas d'infos dans les CSP concernant les modalités de financement dans un secteur ou au sein de programmes afin de les adapter aux besoins.
<b>MG</b>	<p>La Délégation estime que l'idéal serait d'avoir accès à <u>Stabex, lignes budgétaires et FED</u> car cela permet d'avoir un mix d'outils (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de prendre en compte l'ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole malgache (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (Source : MN 804 et débriefing Délégation).</p> <p>A titre d'illustration, les CSA (centres de services agricoles), financés par la <u>ligne Sécurité Alimentaire</u>, incitent et aident les producteurs à s'organiser en groupements de producteurs à travers la structuration et le renforcement des organisations professionnelles (Source : MN 805). <u>Les projets Stabex</u>, tels que le projet AIM (ONG suisse) s'appuient sur les groupements de producteurs existant pour le développement des filières d'exportation et contribue à les renforcer (Source : MN 806). La formation et le renforcement des capacités ont été des priorités de l'appui de la Commission tant aux CSA qu'aux groupements de producteurs (Sources : MN 801, 802 et 804).</p>
<b>MG rice</b>	<p>Parallèlement à un appui budgétaire et au financement de structures d'appui au développement agricole (CSA et FRDA), la ligne budgétaire Sécurité Alimentaire a financé des ONG pour des projets de renforcement des capacités des organisations paysannes. On peut notamment citer deux projets de ce type : le projet d'appui au développement des filières riz, manioc et légumes secs par le renforcement des capacités techniques, économiques et organisationnelles des organisations paysannes des régions Sud de Madagascar et le Projet d'Appui à la production rizicole et légumineuse dans le District de Vangaindrano.</p> <p><i>Source : Inventaire des interventions</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	Support to the reorganisation of the Ministry of Agriculture is provided as budget support. The establishment of "Centres de Services Agricoles" is financed through grants to NGOs.
<b>ML</b>	<p>Financing modalities in Mali include mostly sectoral and budget support. According to the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the EU strategy takes into account synergies and lever effects of financing and aid modalities (e.g. it states that general budget support is a good way to make reforms progress).</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 37, 38 &amp; 45.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Cette relation entre les modalités de financement et les besoins/capacités d'absorption n'est pas explicitement établie dans les documents consultés. Il faut cependant noter que la modalité de financement retenue est un mix d'appui budgétaire sectoriel (ABS) en gestion décentralisée et d'appui projet.</p> <p>L'ABS porte sur l'OS1 de l'intervention (mener à terme le processus de réforme engagé: filialisation et de privatisation de la CMDT, mise en place des organes de régulation de la filière) La phase d'identification proposait de prévoir une tranche fixe en début de programme constituant une sorte de « ticket d'entrée », permettant le lancement effectif de la Réforme, les tranches variables étant assorties d'indicateurs pertinents, concernant les éléments clé de la réforme proprement dite (Check list Identification phase, p3).</p> <p>L'appui budgétaire sectoriel retenu dans la CF est divisé en 2 tranches fixes et 1 tranche variable. NB. Le décaissement de la tranche variable (€ 5 M pour le Fonds de Soutien (aux prix coton)) et des tranches fixes (€ 3 M et € 0,7 M) est soumis à 4 conditionnalités générales: (1). poursuite du programme de réforme de la filière coton, (2) gestion satisfaisante des finances publiques, (3). mise en œuvre satisfaisante du CRPRSC, (4). comptes de la CMDT certifiés. ). En plus de ces conditionnalités générales, la convention prévoit des conditions particulières pour chaque tranche (CF, annexe 6).</p> <p>Les appuis projet concernent les OS2 et 3 de l'intervention (alphabétisation et réhabilitation de</p>

	<p>pistes).</p> <p><i>Source: Intervention fiche, CF, Check-list FIP</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP mentions the use of budget support and technical assistance (e.g. in the Pacific Anti-Money Laundering Project).</p> <p>There is however no mention of adapting to the needs and absorption capacities through the different modalities.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 59 &amp; 88.</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP mentions the use of different financing mechanisms (the sugar protocol accompanying measures, EDF, EIB, Technical cooperation Facility, etc.). There is however no justification of complementarities of the modalities or their adaptation to needs and absorption capacities.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 43 &amp; 44</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>A mix of different instruments has been used in the ICART programme. They are mainly:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Long-term technical assistance ;</li> <li>▪ Long-term regional staff and local support staff ;</li> <li>▪ Support to for co-ordination of the Research Networks;</li> <li>▪ Competitive Fund System (CFS) for research projects;</li> <li>▪ Specific activities in information and communication technology and management (ICT-ICM);</li> <li>▪ to the Regional training programme</li> </ul> <p>No major physical infrastructure development is planned.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p> <p>However it has been noted by the MTR (2008) that NARS in the SADC Member States do not constitute a clearly defined group of beneficiaries. There are neither membership rules, nor does a statute or regulation exist for NARS. Consequently, the absorption capacities of the NARS have to be considered as very limited and the ICART programme purpose had to be defined according to the requirements of EC PCM Handbook asking for a project purpose, being realistic, specific and measurable.</p> <p><i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, pages 17 &amp; 18</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	No such information is available in CSP/NIP.
<b>TZ</b>	The financing modalities were not stated within the FMOs but a mix of tools were used: PEs, direct contracts, TA, studies, basket fund contribution.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>Contrary to other donors, who supported the PMA implementation through contributions to a basket fund, the EC supported the PMA through a budget support programme. The reason for this is that the EC was not authorized at that time to contribute to a basket fund. The Financing Agreement of the budget support programme specified how much money was intended for agricultural research and how much for extension services.</p> <p>The coffee sector benefited from the PMA research and extensions services financed from the</p>

	EDF allocation (at zonal level research and extension were requested to focus on three enterprises well adapted to the agro-ecological conditions) as well as of Stabex projects (in particular the Coffee Farmers Alliance Support project)
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project is financed from a NGO budget line. It consists of a grant to a Dutch NGO (Solidaridad) selected on the basis of a Call for Proposals. Solidaridad is supposed to finance 28% of the project implementation costs.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>Prior to the SBS, NARS and NAADS have been supported through Stabex funded projects. The SBS financing proposals notes “The financing modality has also moved from project support towards the current sector programme approach, although the separate components are still identifiable. Experience has shown that a coordinated sector-funding approach for NARS can work.”</p> <p>As regards NAADS, the Financing Proposal notes: “NAADS’ resource requirements are beyond the capacity of the GoU, or of any single donor. Therefore, a MoU between all the stakeholders was developed to set up the rules of the game and to coordinate donor inputs, disbursement triggers and the joint M&amp;E procedures. The positive experiences with this system provide justification for the implementation modalities of this intervention.”</p> <p>The Financing proposal reads: “The chosen <i>financing</i> modality is direct non-targeted sector budget support. This choice is justified by the fact that both the EC and the GoU have clearly indicated their preference for general or sector budget support. In addition, the GoU has greatly improved its macro-economic management and public finance management systems during the last 10 years. Recent assessments by various Development Partners and the EC are positive, with in particular significant achievements in budget preparation, budget execution, reporting and monitoring, and internal and external auditing. Consequently, the conditions for sector budget support as outlined in article 61 of the Cotonou Agreement are met.”</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>There is evidence in Uganda’s 2008-2013 CSP/NIP that support is provided through project and budget support as well as technical assistance. The EIB also provides credit lines through the Bank of Uganda.</p> <p>There is no evidence however that the mix of financing modalities is adapted to needs and absorption capacities.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 32, 35, 36, 37 &amp; 66</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>EDF Financial modalities include general budget support (40% of the total) and project support (60% of the total). It is not mentioned that these different modalities are to adapt to needs and absorption capacities.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 62</i></p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The project’s financial agreement states that the Producers Organisation Programme II Global Work plan and successive cost estimates will be used for the disbursement allocated to infrastructure, studies, operating costs and contribution to a credit line. It also states that a consultancy contract will be concluded for technical assistance services.</p> <p>No further information on the financing modalities can be found in the programme documents. No information on their adaptation to needs and capacities is available.</p> <p><i>Source: Producer Organisation Programme II financing agreement, page 16</i></p>

<b>WAF</b>	<p>L'appui budgétaire est évoqué dans le RSP/RIP de 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Cependant aucune autre information concernant de l'appui sectoriel, des lignes budgétaires ou autres ne figurent (ni dans le RSP/RIP 2002-2007).</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, page 113</i></p>
<b>I.8.3.3</b>	Evidence of mix of different implementation mechanisms used within a sector and within programmes (MoU/FA) to adapt to implementation capacities
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme has been built with a mix of different implementation levels. It is implemented through centralised management (for the service contract) and joint management (for the contribution agreements with the International organisations. Indeed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Five International Organisations (FAO, ITC, WB, CFC, ITC) implement the activities of the programme, according to a division of tasks which is based on an assessment of comparative advantages as relevant for the programmes. The main contribution of each international organisation is the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ITC: participatory value chain based strategy formulation, including leading the programme (together with FAO) from the commodity diagnosis phase to the inception draft strategies and their incorporation in national development and actions plan;</li> <li>- FAO: diagnosis of existing farming and livelihood systems, including a specific attention to gender and environment;</li> <li>- WB: leading the work on commodity exchanges and warehouse receipt systems as well as the scaling up of market-based instruments to deal with price and weather risks;</li> <li>- UNCTAD: uptake of strategies' regional dimension and facilitation of the access to market information and systems;</li> <li>- CFC: support to interventions from ICBs or approved by the ICBs.</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ A Steering Committee (SC) chaired by one of the ACP representatives meets the Programme's specific needs of guidance ;</li> <li>▪ A coordination Unit is the focal point of the programme and facilitate its day-to-day successful implementation, including the regular Interagency Coordination.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p> <p>At field level, the MTR have noted that there was poor coordination. In addition, the collaboration among donors was compounded by the fact that International organisations (ITC, CFC, UNCTAD, WB and FAO) field offices were not properly informed about the AAACP programme activities implemented through their respective headquarters. For most of the Delegations with some exceptions, even if they were informed, did not feel really involved.</p> <p>The situation is actually counterproductive to the implementation of Paris Declaration since activities, not known and therefore not included in the national coordination, are managed and implemented from outside at a significant cost.</p> <p>It is underlined that the <i>Complementary aspects of and synergies between the international organisations, the EU and the ACP actors</i> (result 4 of the AAACP programme) should be viewed as a learning process which needs time to mature and materialize in effective collaboration.</p> <p><i>Source: Mid-term Review of the AAACP Programme, Final report, April 2009, Executive summary</i></p> <p>The MTR recommendations regarding the coordination issue are now tackled in the implementation of the AAACP programme. The follow-up of the MTR recommendations notes that:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ there is a lead evidenced in role played by the Programme Steering Committee in post-MTR decisions, including Tranche II allocations;</li> <li>▪ The concept of “Chef de File” is not formalized yet;</li> <li>▪ The Inter agency mechanism met five times since MTR workshop and continues to be a major instrument for inter-agency coordination</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Doc 52c - Follow up to main MTR recommendations, 20 September 2010, page 4</i></p>
<b>ACP-GIIF</b>	<p>Not really but the implementation mechanism used (provide the money through a Trust Fund) was justified in the FI on the grounds that it would provide other donors with the opportunity to also co-fund this initiative. In addition, the approach chosen was justified by the weaknesses identified in the insurance market: address the structural capacity constraints (awareness, legal and regulatory issues) of local insurance industry and use a market extension approach (enter into support arrangements with a public-private re-insurance company preferably operating on index re-insurance for emerging markets (Index Re).</p> <p>Complementarity to other EC projects is underlined: All ACP agricultural commodities programme (Commodity Risk Management Group of the WB support in their work on innovative risk management techniques and application: all ACP Disasters Facility of €12 million), the African Monitoring of Environment for Sustainable Development (AMESD) programme building capacities in meteorological services in African countries using satellite data (this is particularly important as data availability is essential to develop index insurance: ‘ for a good index to be designed, preferably a sound, long-term dataset is needed. If one has a limited amount of data (like crop yield data), fitting the statistical relationship between the index and that limited amount of data can be problematic. With improved modelling techniques datasets with deficiencies can still be used, while the use of satellite data provides increasingly good opportunities, but a minimum amount of sufficiently reliable data will remain a precondition for index insurance’). Lastly complementarity with the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF - WB) is mentioned as a potential.</p> <p><i>Source: FI, COM Annex p.6</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>According to the PIP Financing Agreement, the implementation modalities of the Programme include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Financing the functioning of the permanent staff of COLEACP working on the PIP;</li> <li>▪ Financing services responding to demands of private enterprises and professional organisations, which have been validated by the Programme;</li> <li>▪ Investing in equipment that could be useful for capacity building.</li> </ul> <p>There is no mention of “adapting to implementation capacities” though, except that it is meant for the operators to structure the chain themselves in a “bottom-up” process, starting at a national level.</p> <p><i>Source: Pesticides Initiative Programme Financing Agreement, page 18.</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>When delivered under project approach, the AMSP programme has been most frequently be implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, in some cases with support of a PMU. Implementation of components directly focussing on sugarcane farmers have been entrusted to sugarcane producer associations or NGOs.</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA impact evaluation report states different types of implementation tools used to reach SFA objectives: through use of technical and financial assistance tools, the SFA acted upon activities</p>

	<p>such as the establishment of microfinance institutions, training programmes, establishment of farmer associations, etc.</p> <p>However no link was made in the evaluation between these different implementation tools and the capacities of implementing agencies.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 5, htsp, 2008.</i></p>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Le FLEX a été utilisé et l'aide a été versée à l'Etat burkinabé sous forme d'appui budgétaire dans le secteur du coton. Mais il n'y a pas d'éléments qui justifient que cet appui budgétaire a été réalisé pour s'adapter aux capacités de mise en œuvre, notamment au niveau du Gouvernement. <i>Source : MN 567.</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>There isn't much information about implementation mechanisms of EU support to the agricultural sector. The only mention of it is the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, where it states that proximity actions of support to agricultural production, the EU oriented its support to co-funding with NGOs, in order to increase efficiency.</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés</p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>No support to agricultural commodities in the regional programme.</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Au delà de l'utilisation des projets, il n'y a pas d'infos dans les CSP concernant les mécanismes d'implémentation dans un secteur ou au sein de programmes afin de les adapter aux besoins.</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Le programme STABEX a pu associer, en temps opportuns, des <u>appuis de nature institutionnelle tant conceptuelle</u> (stratégie sectorielle) que <u>technique</u> (veille sanitaire OTA) et des <u>opérations sectorielles conduites en partenariat avec le secteur privé et des OPA</u>, sous pilotage d'un département de tutelle qui tend à retrouver ses capacités, le <u>Ministère de l'Agriculture</u>. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p> <p>Les <u>appuis individualisés sont de diverses natures</u> : actions structurantes, actions de type budgétaire, appuis institutionnels, etc. Ils <u>associent tous les outils du FED</u>: Devis-Programmes, convention de contribution ou de subvention et tous les types de marchés (fournitures, travaux, services).</p> <p>Selon l'évaluation Stabex, la <u>stratégie de mise en œuvre du programme Stabex est parfaitement justifiée</u> mais elle constate une <u>dichotomie entre la qualité de la programmation et de la stratégie de mise en œuvre, et celle de l'opérationnalité de la mise en œuvre</u>. Les raisons premières sont les modalités de gestion (absence de maîtrise des outils de gestion et de reporting) et de coordination de la mise en œuvre (outils dévalués de coordination et absence de responsable / gestionnaire de programme). Mais on doit y rajouter l'absence d'intéressement versé aux fonctionnaires associés au programme dans un univers très procédurier et avec une charge de travail importante.</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Les interventions de la CE sont réalisées via un approche filière mais des actions transversales ont également été financées : pistes rurales, réhabilitation de marchés, santé (actions minimales), sécurité alimentaire,...</p> <p>Source : MN 819</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Aucune information n'est donnée à ce sujet dans la documentation disponible sur l'intervention de</p>



	<p>structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde. Le seul mécanisme d'intervention utilisé est l'attribution du programme à une ONG.</p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pour chaque volet, la structure organisationnelle et le type de gestion (+ justifications) sont présentés (<i>Source : Rider FA p.11-12</i>). Deux types de gestion principaux sont renseignés pour les cinq volets : gestion centralisée indirecte et gestion décentralisée.</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents did not mention the implementation mechanisms chosen to deliver the support.</p> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés.</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not directly tackle agricultural commodities. Formulation documents of the PASAPE do not evidence that different implementation mechanisms have been used to adapt to implementation capacities.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Proposition de financement n°9 ACP CM 18</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006</i>  <i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Regarding the management and implementation of the programmed activities, the evaluation has found that the management of regional programmes has suffered from the lack of a clear definition of roles and distribution of responsibilities between the different Commission Services in Brussels and in the Caribbean countries. The situation has been further exacerbated by the limited human resources in the CARIFORUM (Forum of Caribbean States) Secretariat to provide the required baseline material for appropriate institutional selection and for monitoring purposes to ensure that regional strategic objectives can be achieved.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>Different implementation mechanisms have been foreseen for the Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean programme.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The overall management structure has been in the hands of the Regional Rice Steering Committee;</li> <li>▪ For the regional sub-programme, a regional coordination unit has been set-up in the Caribbean Rice Association;</li> <li>▪ For the national sub-programmes, Project Management Units (PMUs) composed of a TA, a national counterpart and auxiliary staff have been set up in the Ministries of Agriculture of Guyana and Suriname</li> </ul> <p>In the FA, there is no explicit mention that implementation mechanisms have been chosen with a view to adapt to implementation capacities. However, the feasibility study acknowledged the limited resources of implementing partners in terms of staff, funds and facilities and noted that this will have organisational implications for the intervention (supplementation of resources; staff orientation and capability building; technical assistance and consultancy services).</p>

	<p>The 2006 MR pointed out that the Regional Rice Steering Committee had very little decision-making power and could therefore not fulfilled the role assigned to it.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003</i>  <i>Agrotec Spa, Feasibility study of the CARIFORUM rice industry, 2003</i>  <i>European Commission, Monitoring Reports dated 02/11/2006</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	WIRSPA was entrusted to implement the programme.
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>Implementation mechanisms used in the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP include technical and humanitarian assistance, but there is no reference to adaptation to implementation capacities.</p> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 23.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	No evidence in CSE for this indicator in commodities sector.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents
<b>GH</b>	<p>Within a sector and within programmes, financial and technical assistance are provided.</p> <p>In the area of transportation, implementation mechanisms are infrastructure funding and studies and capacity building.</p> <p>In the area of governance, the EC supports the overall decentralisation policy framework and the implementation of district investment plans (including feeder roads, water and sanitation, etc.), support to the civil society and capacity building for non-executive governance institutions.</p> <p>There are no explanations on the complementarities of the different implementation mechanisms.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 39, 40 &amp; 143</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	The first CSSP (I) had a PMU for project implementation. There is no explanation as to the reasons for not providing this in CSSP II whilst the project is equally complex (with 3 implementing agencies involved).
<b>GH-COC</b>	Implementation mechanisms include grant agreements (for training, replanting support, governance and provision capacity strengthening, etc.), programme estimates (for improving farmers' access to planting material) and service contracts (for programme auditing and evaluation).
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>Implementation mechanisms include training, studies and specialist technical assistance. There is however no justification of the mix to adapt to implementation capacities.</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, page 21.</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	Hormis ce qui est précisé en I.8.2.1, il n'y a pas d'infos dans les CSP concernant les mécanismes d'implémentation dans un secteur ou au sein de programmes afin de les adapter aux besoins.
<b>MG</b>	La Délégation réfléchit actuellement à la manière d'orienter ses soutiens (appuis sectoriels, approches filières, appui budgétaire) étant donné, de manière générale et à l'exception de quelques interventions, l'évaluation très négative des interventions passées en termes d'efficacité et de durabilité (Source : MN 802 et débriefing)
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	Establishing "Centres de Services Agricoles" is entrusted to NGOs.

<b>ML</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP of Mali states that interventions in rural development require a proximity for which the EDF isn't well adapted. It therefore chooses to orient support to co-financing of NGO interventions.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 34.</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Cette relation entre les modalités de financement et les capacités de mise en œuvre n'est pas explicitement établie dans les documents consultés. Il faut cependant noter que la modalité de financement retenue est un mix d'appui budgétaire sectoriel (ABS) en gestion décentralisée et d'appui projet. En fait, on a un ABS et plusieurs approches projet : un contrat de services (convention avec l'AFD pour le volet alphabétisation) donc probablement de l'AT, deux contrats de travaux de construction/réhabilitation de routes), et un appel aux propositions ONG (pour la filière coton biologique) en appui aux associations de producteurs) Ce sont donc clairement 4 méthodes de mise en œuvre différentes et peut-être complémentaires (à vérifier sur le terrain, le choix des différentes méthodes n'étant argumenté/expliqué dans les documents (FiP et CF))</p> <p>L'ABS porte sur l'OS1 de l'intervention (mener à terme le processus de réforme engagé: filialisation et de privatisation de la CMDT, mise en place des organes de régulation de la filière) La phase d'identification proposait de prévoir une tranche fixe en début de programme constituant une sorte de « ticket d'entrée », permettant le lancement effectif de la Réforme, les tranches variables étant assorties d'indicateurs pertinents, concernant les éléments clé de la réforme proprement dite (Check list Identification phase, p3).</p> <p>L'appui budgétaire sectoriel retenu dans la CF est divisé en 2 tranches fixes et 1 tranche variable. NB.Le décaissement de la tranche variable (€ 5 M pour le Fonds de Soutien (aux prix coton)) et des tranches fixes (€ 3 M et € 0,7 M) est soumis à 4 conditionnalités générales: (1). poursuite du programme de reforme de la filière coton, (2) gestion satisfaisante des finances publiques, (3). mise en œuvre satisfaisante du CRPRSC, (4). comptes de la CMDT certifiés. ). En plus de ces conditionnalités générales, la convention prévoit des conditions particulières pour chaque tranche (CF, annexe 6).</p> <p>Les appuis projet concernent les OS2 et 3 de l'intervention (alphabétisation et réhabilitation de pistes).</p> <p><i>Sources : CF, Check-list FIP, CRIS</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 Pacific RSP/RIP mentions that all implementation modalities are considered, "<i>in particular financing agreements with the Regional Authorising Officer (RAO) and with international organisations, provided that an institutional assessment has been carried out and has given positive results</i>".</p> <p>There is evidence of provision of technical assistance and technical support to government agencies (e.g. to the RAO) and of support to Non-State actors' activities.</p> <p>No justification of complementarities between different implementation modalities can be found in the Pacific RSP/RIP.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 72, 73</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The MR notes that the project design w/r to organisation was adapted to make it more relevant:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Change from initial design of one office in each island country, to provide support locally, to centralizing project activities in Suva and providing services to the other countries from this central location: saves office running costs and avoids the excessive expectations which would be generated by the presence of project offices in those countries.</li> <li>▪ Project Steering Committee (PSC) was changed to be more operational (from Heads of</li> </ul>

	<p>Agriculture and Forestry Services (HOAFS) only to mix of technical advisory group (TAG) &amp; 5 HOAFS selected to achieve a certain regional and subject balance.</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>The programme is implemented through mix of different implementation mechanisms: technical assistance, steering group committee, the SADC Secretariat, a coordinating unit (within FANR Directorate) as well as a Technical Advisory Committee.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>No evidence was found in the MoU/FA but in effect the funding and implementation modalities were chosen according to the capacities of the beneficiaries. (eg roads were using both Ministry of Transport and DEL contracts).</p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>No evidence of the adaptation to implementation capacities can be found. However the programme considers different possibilities of interventions mechanisms in case of changes in the security environment.</p> <p>The CSP/NIP states that the support programme supposes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A successful conclusions of the peace talks;</li> <li>▪ Government commitment to peace and recovery in the North of the country;</li> <li>▪ A security situation allowing people to move out of the Internally Displaced Persons.</li> </ul> <p>The CSP/NIP then considers two different scenarios of security deterioration and the adaptation of the interventions that would result.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 36 &amp; 37</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds were mainly used to support specific commodity chains in particular coffee. But the main difference is the following: <u>EDF is used to implement interventions; Stabex could be used to implement projects</u> but also to identify and formulate interventions, support the design of policy documents, bridge the gap between two interventions, etc. <u>These two instruments were clearly complementing each other.</u> Currently the Delegation doesn't have available an instrument replacing the Stabex funds (Source: MN 301 and 313).</p> <p>The provision of budget support to the PMA <u>implementation relied on the assumption that the government had the adequate implementation capacity.</u> This assumption was not fully verified notably as regards inter-agencies cooperation. EC support to the PMA secretariat was meant to address this issue (Source: MN 301 and 313).</p> <p>A key component of the <u>Coffee Farmers Alliance support project was the constitution of producer organisations at village, parish and national level</u> through the Stabex support (Source: MN 308).</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>The EC also financed the agricultural research and extension components of the GoU Programme for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA). It is likely (but has to be checked) that in coffee growing areas research and extensions activities have addressed coffee production. However the project description drafted by Solidaridad does not make any reference to research and extension services.</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>The Financing Proposal reads: "The chosen <i>implementation</i> modality for this intervention is through GoU ministries or existing semi-autonomous GoU bodies. The co-ordinating body, the PMA secretariat and the secretariat charged with the roll-out of NAADS have a proven record of</p>

	<p>effective management and operations. Given the high investments required, the Participating Partners in NAADS agreed to a unified support system, including a coordinated funding arrangement to be managed by the GoU's own budget system, and a joint planning and review methodology involving all those agencies supporting it. The EC has been a major partner since the programme began, making substantial contributions to the overall NAADS programme, and financing technical assistance to the NAADS secretariat. The chosen modality has proven to work extremely well in the case of NAADS, and continuation of this system is imperative to maintain the momentum throughout the remaining three years of the current phase. Although for NARS the new structures are yet to prove their efficacy, the current design process is thorough, and likely to yield similar results as for NAADS.”</p>
<b>VU</b>	No listing of implementation mechanisms can be found in Vanuatu's CSP/NIPs
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>According to the project's financing agreement, the activities of the EU consisted in a three year technical assistance, comprising mostly marketing advice but also other short-term inputs. The technical assistance was to provide training and expertise, identifying potential markets and facilitating contacts between producers and buyers.</p> <p>As mentioned in the project's third monitoring report, the intervention was not adapted to the implementation agency's capacities.</p> <p><i>Source: Producer Organisation Programme II financing agreement, page 15</i>  <i>Sources: Producers Organisation Programme II (POP2) Monitoring report 3, efficiency sheet.</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	Les RSP/RIP de l'Afrique de l'Ouest n'expliquent pas les modalités de mise en œuvre du soutien, ni le fait que ces modalités puissent être adaptées aux capacités locales.
<b>I.8.3.4</b>	Mitigating actions and measures were contained in sector interventions to compensate for identified institutional capacity weaknesses
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>One of the key activities of the AAACP programme is the participatory approach engaging all the stakeholders of commodity chain in diagnosing the sector, identifying and analysing options, and developing responses.</p> <p>Moreover, it is expected that the situation of producers is at the centre of the analysis. Major efforts are placed on ensuring effective producer participation in the process. At the end of the strategy process, the programme should provide support to the integration of findings into national and regional development plans and thereby provide wider political backing and follow up to the strategies.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-GIIF</b>	<p>The project was designed with a certain approach to address the weaknesses identified in the insurance market: address the structural capacity constraints (awareness, legal and regulatory issues) of local insurance industry and use a market extension approach (enter into support arrangements with a public-private re-insurance company preferably operating on index re-insurance for emerging markets (Index Re).</p> <p><i>Source: FI</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	No such evidence can be found in the PIP's FA or evaluation reports
<b>AMSP</b>	In Zimbabwe, where EC cooperation with the Government is suspended, the AMSP programme is delivered as a grant awarded to a Trust created by all stakeholders of the sector (sugar mill, estates,

	cane grower associations, farmers unions).
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The report states that SFA funds have been used to develop institutional capacities, such as in the diversification programmes of the Windward Islands.</p> <p>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 29, htspe, 2008.</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Les deux filières font face à des problèmes technico-commerciaux semblables : manque de maîtrise de la qualité, difficulté de commercialisation sur le marché international, <b>manque de services adaptés à des filières peu encadrées</b>, difficulté d'accès aux informations technico-économiques sur le marché. (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 4</i>).</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CI</b>	<p>Oui, le programme Stabex 1999 s'est choisi comme partenaire principal, le Ministère de l'Agriculture. Des appuis ont été mis en place pour asseoir son rôle de maîtrise d'œuvre ainsi que pour la <u>conception de nouvelles stratégies agricoles</u>. L'appui institutionnel apporte au MinAgri pour l'élaboration aux politiques sectorielles a eu un impact sur la disponibilité de nombreuses stratégies sectorielles. (Source : Eval Stabex 2009).</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune information n'est donnée à ce sujet dans la documentation disponible sur l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p><b>L'appui institutionnel et les réformes institutionnelles sont pris en compte dans les activités de l'intervention.</b></p> <p>Le café et le cacao ont également fait l'objet d'appuis STABEX pour contribuer à la réflexion sur les <b>réformes institutionnelles</b>. Ces réformes ont une incidence majeure sur la compétitivité du secteur et sur les conditions de rémunération des producteurs, mais elles sont actuellement suspendues. Aussi, si le processus de réforme venait à redémarrer entre 2008 et 2010, il serait utile d'apporter de <b>nouveaux appuis institutionnels</b>. (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>)</p> <p><b>Dans le cadre de l'activité A. 1.b. « Appui aux petits Planteurs d'autres cultures paysannes d'exportation »</b> (<i>Source : Rider FA p.5</i>):</p> <p>Pour le coton, les financements concerneront le renforcement des services apportés aux petits producteurs (vulgarisation agricole, fourniture de matériel végétal amélioré etc.), les appuis à l'équipement, le renforcement des organisations professionnelles agricoles (y compris les organisations interprofessionnelles) mais aussi les <b>appuis aux réformes institutionnelles</b> ou aux restructurations sectorielles.</p> <p>Pour le secteur <b>café-cacao</b>, il est envisagé d'intervenir qu'a travers des <b>appuis institutionnels ponctuels</b> (études ou renforcement des capacités) mais ayant une importance stratégique pour sa restructuration et pour la répartition des revenus en son sein.</p> <p>Pour les <b>cultures de diversification</b>, les appuis institutionnels (études ou renforcement des capacités) pourront être complétés par le renforcement des services apportés aux petits producteurs (vulgarisation agricole, fourniture de matériel végétal amélioré, etc.).</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	La durabilité de l'intervention au point de vue institutionnel est présentée ( <i>Source : Annexe I p.29</i> ) et le document précise que la durabilité institutionnelle sera garantie (cf. <b>I.8.3.1</b> )
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not directly tackle agricultural commodities. Formulation documents of the PASAPE do not evidence the existence of institutional capacity weaknesses.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i> <i>Commission européenne, Proposition de financement n°9 ACP CM 18</i></p>

	<p><i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006</i></p> <p><i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Yes, the institutional capacity building, aimed at the development of institutions capable of playing a leading role in initiation of regional integration policies and in implementation of organisational and regulatory aspects, constitutes the third specific objective of the synthesis strategy. In the early EDFs the main effort was directed to CARIFORUM and the development of its capacity to identify and manage efficiently the Commission's assistance resources. <u>With successive EDFs, institutional capacity building has become central to supporting regional economic integration as well as the other major objective, the building of regional capacity.</u> The role of CARIFORUM in deepening the regional integration process and elaborating a Regional Integration and Development Strategy has been recently endorsed by the Council of Ministers of CARICOM. The institutional strengthening of CARIFORUM, together with that of the Court of Justice and the Regional Negotiation Machinery and other integrating bodies, occupies therefore a central position in the Commission's assistance strategy to the Caribbean and is a major contribution to regional capacity building.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>WIRSPA was given institutional support and provided with technical assistance.</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p><b><u>Institutional and Management Capacity</u></b> (Source : FA Annexes A to D p.6)</p> <p>In principle, it has been concluded that each institution has the capacity to implement the sub components each is responsible for. Where there are weaknesses additional support would be provided as follows:</p> <p><u>Coffee Research</u> Past performance and present capacity for the difficult tasks involved have been taken into account in including locally and internationally recruited technical assistance.</p> <p><u>PMU/CTA</u> In CIP III outside TA was used successfully to assist in the co-ordination of the Project. It is concluded that this is appropriate for the current Project. Engineering support is strong through locally contracted staff, whilst procurement still has the benefit of the staff that implemented the last Project.</p> <p><u>Coffee Extension</u> The attainment of structural changes is proposed. This provides an impetus to change. It is understood that this has also been recognised by the Federal Government, which has requested the coffee growing Regions to implement changes in coffee extension structures so that there is better delivery</p> <p><u>Coffee Nurseries</u> The institutional capacity to operate the nurseries is evident. The defect has been the non-sustainability of the public nurseries because they have been consistently starved of funds after the closure of CIP III. The Project would correct this situation as a transitional measure before reaching financial autonomy of remaining "wholesale" nurseries relaying the research centers.</p> <p><u>Conservation</u> This is a new concept and hence a new organisational structure has had to be proposed, which includes the involvement of the Regional Governments, the Institute for Biodiversity Conservation and Research (IBCR) as co-ordinator, NGOs working in the areas of the forest in carrying out the community development programme, and use of an outside firm for</p>

	<p>monitoring progress.</p> <p><u>Marketing</u> Project involvement has been kept to a minimum, since it was seen that this is essentially the preserve of the private sector.</p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>Some training and advice were given to the Project manager of SPU-CRIG in EDF procurement rules during the project life time.</p> <p><i>Source: MN114</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>Since the Programme identified a risk of preference of the Government of Ghana to maintain the status quo, the Programme set up cocoa policy workshops involving all stakeholders to unveil policy bottlenecks.</p> <p>So it isn't exactly measure containment but rather promotion to involve all the stakeholders.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Proposal, page 15.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme was designed to improve institutional capacities. It provides training and technical assistance to facilitate and effective participation of African countries in the SPSOs.</p> <p>There is no mention in the programming documents of risk assessment concerning the institutional weaknesses of the implementation agency or actions used to mitigate those risks.</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, pages 15 &amp; 37.</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Oui. Le renforcement des capacités a été une des priorités de l'appui de la Commission à travers la mise en place des CSA (Centres de Services Agricoles) via la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire (Sources : MN 804). Les CSA permettent entre autres allègent les tâches techniques des DRDR (Source : MN 810) et pallient ainsi à la faible capacité institutionnelle de l'administration malgache.</p> <p>A noter que les CSA ont initialement été conçus avec une certaine idée (ONG) mais ont évolué vers autre chose du fait du retrait de l'UE et de l'organisme d'appui : en d'autres mots, le statut du CSA est celui d'une ONG mais les salaires et les frais de fonctionnement sont payés par l'Etat (du fait de la suspension de l'aide de l'UE) (Source : MN 811).</p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>An objective of the programme is a redistribution of the Ministry staff from the central unit to its antennas at regional level.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La fiche d'identification indique que l'Interprofession Coton (IPC), la bourse électronique au coton fibre et l'Office de Classement du Coton (OCC) sont des préalables à la privatisation car ils constituent le paysage institutionnel dans lequel la privatisation se déroulera et dont les soumissionnaires devront tenir compte.</p> <p>Le document de synthèse du Projet mentionne que l'objectif n° 2 du programme vise à permettre aux producteurs d'acquérir une plus grande maîtrise de la filière, d'en assumer le rôle de catalyseur et de renforcer leur contrôle sur le processus de réforme. Il s'agit d'accroître la professionnalisation des producteurs et de leurs organisations notamment à travers l'alphabétisation (Synthèse de "Projet, p.1). Cependant l'identification a relevé que l'alphabétisation fonctionnelle est un besoin structurel de long terme qui ne trouvera pas de solution par un appui ponctuel sur un ou deux ans. En matière de structuration des OP dans la zone cotonnière, elle préconisait que d'autres objectifs plus directement liés à la Réforme de la Filière, puissent être soutenus (participation aux mécanismes de gestion pour en améliorer la transparence et l'efficacité, ou même participation</p>



	<p>effective au Conseil d'Administration des nouvelles instances (Checklist, Identification phase, p2).</p> <p><i>Sources : FIP, Check-list FIP</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>This isn't mentioned but on the other hand the MR states that the project contributed to the IS of the SPC: 'This organization, SPC, has been one of the main beneficiaries of the project in the sense that it has further developed its own already considerable HR and capacity, especially technical and managerial, in order to deliver the project's benefits.'</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>There is no such information in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.</p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Le projet est inscrit dans la logique de la cogestion avec les populations et les organisations paysannes avec des renforcements de capacités de celles-ci mais les méthodes de gestion sont jugées relativement faibles (en tous cas à parfaire).</p> <p>L'action propose également de renforcer les organisations faitières, depuis leurs groupements de base, en termes de capacités de gestion administrative, financière, technique et commerciale, comme moteur du développement local sur le long terme (résultat 3). Acteurs économiques reconnus, les organisations faitières professionnelles gagneront alors plus facilement une légitimité auprès des autorités locales et nationales. Les capacités de défense des intérêts des petits producteurs et de l'agriculture familiale, seront renforcées. Les organisations paysannes, fortes de leur expérience commerciale pourront contribuer activement aux débats concernant les enjeux à court et moyen terme dans le processus de libéralisation des marchés et du retrait de l'Etat dans le secteur agricole.</p> <p>L'action proposée s'inscrit largement dans une optique de renforcement des capacités des acteurs locaux organisé autour d'organisations professionnelles agricoles performantes et représentatives vouées à assurer l'amélioration des revenus des populations paysannes à la base par l'accès aux marchés porteurs, aux services de conseil et d'appui, aux moyens de productions.</p> <p><i>Source : MR, Description Action</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>No evidence was found for this.</p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>No such evidence because EC is not contributing directly to the capacity building but the donors' group pays a lot of attention to this area (Source: MN 301)</p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>Institutional capacity was not an issue for the implementation of the project. See above I.8.3.1</p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>The SBS TAPs read: "the NAADS secretariat is a highly professional organisation, to which technical assistance is being provided [likely provided by another donor. Consultant's comment] for institutional capacity building. However, at lower local government levels and especially in farmers' fora which provide the focus for the work of both components, capacity is weak. NAADS roll-out is actually delayed because of the larger-than-expected capacity effort required here."</p> <p>The TAPs add: "In NARS, a critical aspect is the extent to which researchers are able to shift from their traditional "reductionist" approach to a genuine partnership with farmers and other clients. The EC has addressed this issue partly through the Decentralised Learning component of its current programme of support to NARO (National Agricultural Research Organisation). This activity will be sustained in the future through a recently-concluded agreement for collaboration between the International Centre for Development-Oriented Research in Agriculture, NARO and Makerere University".</p>

<b>VU-POP</b>	No mention of mitigation or compensation for institutional weaknesses can be found in the project's documents.
<b>I.8.3.5</b>	Views of the stakeholders on appropriateness of implementation mechanisms with regard to the management of the project implementation, the organisational and managerial strength of the beneficiary agency and the objectives pursued
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Divers problèmes ont réduit l'efficacité du programme AAACP :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ au départ le programme devait se terminer le 31 décembre 2010. Puis il y a eu une extension. La raison du retard au démarrage initial du programme AAACP n'est pas connue de l'Unité de Coordination. Elle souligne que la passation de marché (à Emerging Markets - Cardno, bureau d'études qui coordonne le programme) a été très rapide. Ensuite, il y a eu retard dans la mise en œuvre des activités dû en partie au format de consultation régionale qui devait être suivi. Cette consultation a pris beaucoup de temps.</li> <li>▪ Cardno a gagné un appel d'offres avec un budget donné. Mais il doit appliquer la procédure de la CE pour organiser le travail. Les procédures sont lourdes et on perd du temps pour organiser les ateliers. C'est en ordre pour les audits mais les procédures retardent l'organisation des ateliers. Par exemple, si 10 000 EUR (seuil limite) doivent être engagés, il faut réaliser un appel d'offres. C'est laborieux.</li> <li>▪ Les factures des ateliers organisés par Cardno dans le cadre du projet AAACP sont payées avec beaucoup de retard. Cardno a difficile de trouver des contractants pour organiser les ateliers car Cardno ne peut pas les payer rapidement (il faut attendre un an !) car la CE ne paie pas Cardno en temps.</li> <li>▪ Les aspects « Communication et information du programme AAACP » (website, webmaster, etc.) n'a pas été bien pensé au départ, car il n'y avait pas de budget pour ce poste.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source : Meeting note reference number MN 641</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>According to the PIP, the grant provided by the EC to the PIP and the implementation approach have several advantages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The time to execute the project. The impact they have is due to being there for so long, although it wasn't planned at first. They do not know when the programme will finish.</li> <li>▪ The actions programmed are always accurate to the situation. They participate in the elaboration and the implementation of the programme. Efficiency is their only objective.</li> <li>▪ A grant contract is more flexible than a service contract. You're responsible for it. If you make mistakes, you pay for it. Rules have to be respected, but since you're responsible, you take initiatives, and you pay back if need. They are audited as well.</li> <li>▪ It's a demand-driven, cost sharing and participatory approach. They are committed to regulate the efficiency. If the company doesn't do what it has to, nothing will move. There is a natural selection of efficiency. All the PIP can lose is the time spent on analysis the case.</li> <li>▪ For food safety compliance, the operator is the one in charge. It has to go hand in hand with what the company wants. All the operations are set up on basis of economic sustainability.</li> <li>▪ The business has to pay for technical support of smallholders. The implementation has to be financed by the exporters. The exercise has its limits though. It creates a sort of feudal system. It is however completed by another way (with public services).</li> <li>▪ The top-down approach is slightly different from other development approaches. It isn't a development programme trying to develop new sectors, but one working with the existing supply chain.</li> <li>▪ The PIP's principles: sustainability, participation, collective actions, collaboration with other players. They work with many other actors to make better use of resources.</li> <li>▪ They are also more and more involved in lobbying and advocacy. It's become a very important</li> </ul>

	<p>aspect of the job. Given their extensive knowledge on the subject, they are in a strong position to inform the public deciders.</p> <p><b>Other stakeholders' views</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The PIP1 final evaluation gave a positive feedback and the Standards and Trade Development Facility as well.</li> <li>▪ The PIP received the UNIDO award for being “the best solution” at the “compliance with standards and conformity assessment” session.</li> <li>▪ The satisfaction survey we performed equally provided positive results.</li> <li>▪ The PIP received lots of individual (unsolicited) feedback by mail from beneficiaries acknowledging the impact of the PIP support.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: MN 958</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	This issue has not been investigated by the AMSP study.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune information n'est donnée à ce sujet dans la documentation disponible sur l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Peu de références à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés</p> <p>Le MR souligne qu'il existe des mécanismes d'appropriation par les bénéficiaires (contribution par remboursement de 40% de l'investissement à APROMAC (Association des Professionnels du Caoutchouc Naturel en Côte d'Ivoire). (<i>Source : MR p.2</i>)</p> <p>Le MR cite également que « la période 2010-2011 sera déterminante pour la pérennisation des acquis de l'hévéa et le lancement des bases pour le palmier » (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>)</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Regarding the implementation of EDF projects, there is still a very strong involvement from Brussels in spite of the Paris declaration and the devolution process. The QSG in Brussels is asking for a lot of explanations about the projects and influences their design without having all information available. A quality control is considered a good thing, but not getting involved in detailed activities in the field and reorienting programmes without the opinion of the Gvt</p> <p><i>Source: MN 402, 403.</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	Ces différents éléments (apports pour les bénéficiaires, résultats de l'évaluation, poursuite de l'action et des partenariats,...) sont présentés de manière assez succincte dans le rapport narratif final ( <i>Source : Rapport narratif final p.27 à 31</i> )
<b>CR</b>	No information has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>CR-RUM</b>	According to the programme evaluation report (p.ii) “WIRPAS's management ability, particularly of the Cost Share Grant Scheme component of the programme, has uniformly received extremely positive judgment from beneficiaries”.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>The MR 2008 detailed the efficiency of implementation (<i>Source : MR 2008 p.2</i>)</p> <p>See I.8.2.2.</p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	The CSSP II MTE notes: <i>‘the major issue affecting the Cocobod component is the inability of the two</i>

	<p><i>implementing units (SPU and CRIG) to complete the tendering process in accordance with EC guidelines. Some items, such as polythene bags, shade nets etc., could not be procured within the PE time frames. This has had some adverse effects on efficiency (conversion of inputs to outputs) in Year 1 and 2 although both entities claim to have met their annual targets. Steps are being taken to correct this deficiency via training and assignment of procurement responsibility to accounting personnel.</i></p> <p><i>Programme oversight and guidance is vested in the STCP Ghana - National Steering Committee (NSC) which is supposed to meet quarterly to review LA progress and highlight key issues of concern. But in fact meetings were not held as often as planned (50%) and implementation (at least for Cocobod components) met with difficulties that could thus not be addressed in a timely manner.</i></p> <p><i>(MTE page 25).</i></p> <p>The project managers themselves found the implementation mechanisms totally inappropriate: the procurement and funding rules cannot be used for time bound activities and they are so complex as to require a special unit to deal with procurement and project accounting. Indeed doing this on top of the normal job is too heavy.</p> <p><i>Source: CSSP II MTE 2011, MN114</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	There are no views on the appropriateness of the implementation mechanisms with regard to the management of the project implementation, the organisational managerial strength and the objectives pursued in the programme documents.
<b>MG</b>	<p>Dans l'instrument Stabex, il y a eu des approches différentes: subventions et projets. CNCC souligne les discontinuités entre deux protocoles successifs ont nuit à la durabilité et que le problème a persisté avec les appels à proposition. (Source : MN 807). En effet, AIM met en évidence le risque très sérieux sur la durabilité des résultats du projet du fait de la durée limitée de l'intervention. Il faut augmenter la durée de mise en œuvre (5 à 10 ans) pour espérer impacter sur les comportements des producteurs (les connaissances techniques sont, elles, assez vite assimilées) (Source : MN 806).</p> <p>Toutefois, la Délégation précise qu'il est possible de négocier un nouveau protocole spécifique avec les mêmes agences d'exécution et une formulation légèrement changée. (Source : MN 801).</p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such information in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>TZ</b>	The only comments made were on the slowness of the procedures to access EU funds.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such evidence in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG coffee</b>	The mix of instruments is necessary because <u>they were clearly complementing each other</u> . Indeed, the EDF supported the government overall agricultural development strategy (PMA), that has mainly a functional character, while Stabex funds were mainly used to support specific commodity chains in particular coffee. But the main difference is the following: EDF is used to implement interventions; Stabex could be used to implement projects but also to identify and formulate interventions, support the design of policy documents, bridge the gap between two interventions, etc.. Currently the Delegation doesn't have available an instrument replacing the Stabex funds (Source: MN 301 and 313).
<b>VU-POP</b>	The project's third monitoring report states that there was inadequate human resources in the implementation agency (the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, DARD);

## EQ 9 concluding on the relevance of the 2 COMs

<p>To what extent has the Commission's support to agricultural commodities been:</p> <p>(i) responsive to the needs, problems and issues of commodity dependent ACP countries,</p> <p>(ii) aligned to and supportive of the policy objectives and priorities of recipient commodity dependent ACP countries and regions, and</p> <p>(iii) consistent with and supportive of the objectives of the two communications COM(2004)89 and COM(2004)87<sup>1</sup>?</p> <p><sup>1</sup> COM(2004)89: 'Agricultural Commodity Chains, Dependence and Poverty – A proposal for an EU Action Plan'; COM(2004)87: 'Proposal for an EU-Africa partnership in support of cotton sector development' and its associated Action Plan (Action plan for the implementation of the EU-Africa Partnership for cotton)</p>	
<b>J.9.1</b>	<i>The interventions supported by the Commission in the field of agricultural commodities have been designed as a response to the country's needs, problems and issues</i>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Le plus souvent, les interventions de la Commission dans le domaine des produits de base agricoles ont été formulées en réponse aux besoins et problèmes du pays partenaire: secteur coton principalement. Des études diagnostics ont été menées dans le secteur du coton pour adapter l'aide aux besoins de ce secteur.</p> <p>Il est important de noter que la stratégie sectorielle de développement rural (PNSR) est en cours d'élaboration. Le premier « draft » est attendu courant 2011.</p> <p>Par ailleurs, il a été relevé que le manque de capacités du Ministère de l'Agriculture a mené la Commission européenne à ne pas davantage soutenir ce secteur au Burkina Faso.</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Les interventions de la Commission dans le domaine des produits agricoles de base ont été fortement limitées sur toute la période 2000-2010 hormis pour la banane. Un début de réponse aux besoins et problèmes n'apparaît qu'en fin de période (2008 – suite aux émeutes de la faim...) et le programme initié alors (PAPA) ne débutera que fin 2011. En outre, les COM (2004) n'évoquent pas certaines filières locales qui sont parmi les priorités du pays (plantain, maïs, manioc, et animales..).</p> <p>Le programme Tout ACP a mis récemment en place une stratégie de développement de la filière café (2009) avec la collaboration de tous les acteurs selon l'approche « chaîne de valeur ». Ce type d'approche semble également exister pour le coton mais qui ne bénéficie pas d'appui de la Commission au Cameroun.</p>
<b>GH overall</b>	The support of the Commission to the cocoa sector stemmed from the Stabex transfers and was thus not a reaction to the expression of prioritised needs of Ghana. These are discussed during the broader programming cycle with other donors in the context of the JAS. The support to the cocoa sector is more a localised and punctual response to a punctual need without necessarily linking into a much larger cocoa sector wide analysis of needs. This was the case for the first (Stabex funded) cocoa support and the second (EDF funded) followed on from there in the same vein (without necessarily prioritising the needs at the time in the wider frame of the sector).
<b>MG</b>	La création des FRDA-CSA vise à doter Madagascar d'un outil de développement agricole impliquant l'ensemble des parties prenantes (bailleurs, gouvernement,

	<p>agriculteurs, prestataires de services). La création des CSA était expressément prévue par le Plan National de Développement Agricole du gouvernement malgache.</p> <p>Les projets Stabex ont appuyé les principales filières de produits d'exportation. Ces deux approches sont potentiellement complémentaires.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>In Tanzania it would seem that interventions funded from Stabex did not systematically include prior diagnostic studies of the agricultural commodities sectors, or if they did, stakeholders were not involved in them. Indeed none of the stakeholders could recall such studies having been undertaken to justify the European Commission interventions. This is in contrast to the interventions funded under the AMPS (sugar) for which a diagnostic was undertaken but did not look at diversification opportunities or at the competitiveness of the sector.</p> <p>Documentation on the justification for the use of Stabex monies is lacking and it can be argued, ex post, that the supported sectors' problems and constraints (coffee, tea, cotton) were not addressed by the proposed supports. The issues of crop pricing, of the linkage between farmers and buyers (processors) and of extensions services (and the translation of research into knowledge sharing with farmers) have been ignored by the STabex interventions whilst they are central to the competitiveness of the sectors.</p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The PMA was considered by the EC and other donors as a well designed, although over-ambitious, strategy for the development of the agricultural sector. Joint evaluations of the PMA took place between 2002 and 2008.</p> <p>At commodity level, the lack of reliable statistical data is an impediment to an identification of the country's needs, problems and issues. However some donors (e.g. USDA) carry out reviews of value chains and the coffee organisation (UCDA) is producing monthly reports.</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Le Gouvernement n'ayant pas de stratégie agricole, il n'a pas été possible de s'aligner sur cette stratégie.</p>
<b>I.9.1.1</b>	<p>Country programming and project documents include an analysis of needs and challenges of the agricultural commodity sector or are based on existing diagnostics of the competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains (Domestic Resource Cost studies)</p>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Dans le cadre du 8<sup>ie</sup> FED, la Commission européenne a financé le « <b>Diagnostic de la filière coton et l'Identification d'axes stratégiques</b> » au <b>Burkina Faso</b>, dont le rapport final a été produit en août 2007.</p> <p>Cette étude est justifiée par le fait que la filière coton représente un enjeu économique et financier considérable pour le Burkina Faso. Elle a été réalisée suite à la crise financière majeure du secteur cotonnier dans le pays, qui s'est aggravé durant deux campagnes et qui a menacé l'existence même de la filière. Il convenait ainsi de s'interroger d'une part sur les contours de la crise elle-même et sur les mesures requises à court terme pour y mettre fin, et d'autre part sur la viabilité à moyen et à long terme de la filière cotonnière du pays.</p> <p>Le rapport, produit par une équipe de consultants externes commissionnés par la Commission européenne à travers le Fonds d'Observation Economique et sociale du monde rural, inclut une analyse de la filière coton sur les plans institutionnel, juridique et fonctionnel, ainsi que l'analyse économique et financière de la filière et la définition des orientations stratégiques pour le devenir de la filière à court, moyen et long terme.</p> <p>Les principales conclusions de cette étude indiquent que :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ la filière coton du Burkina Faso constitue depuis plusieurs années déjà un modèle</li> </ul>

	<p>de développement dans le secteur cotonnier d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre : 1) l'organisation de producteurs dans le secteur compte parmi les plus performantes en la matière dans la sous région africaine ; 2) le double processus de privatisation et de libéralisation de la filière coton du pays a été conduit de façon pragmatique sans jamais remettre en cause les principes organisationnels propres à sécuriser les producteurs, les sociétés cotonnières, les banques/ institutions financières impliquées dans la filière.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ En 2007, le modèle de la filière coton du Burkina Faso est partiellement remis en cause suite à trois évolutions majeures : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>La crise financière dans le secteur cotonnier du pays, ayant commencé lors de la campagne 2004-2005 et toujours présente en 2007, est de nature à compromettre la survie même de la filière avec une impossibilité de mobiliser les financements nécessaires pour l'acquisition d'intrants pour la production et de payer les producteurs en temps pour la récolte produite et vendues au sociétés cotonnières ;</li> <li>L'augmentation très conséquente de la production dissimule mal une stagnation voire une baisse des rendements qui pèse lourdement sur les revenus des producteurs de coton ;</li> <li>La question environnementale contribue à fragiliser la durabilité de la filière coton.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Afin de sortir de la crise, l'étude indique qu'il est primordial et urgent de recapitaliser la SOFITEX (société cotonnière la plus importante du pays représentant environ 80% de la production de coton burkinabé) et de mettre en place un Fonds de lissage. Par ailleurs, pour le moyen et le long terme, les principaux objectifs dégagés suite au diagnostic de la filière et indiquant les principaux axes stratégiques pour l'avenir de la filière sont :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ L'amélioration des performances institutionnelles de la filière en confortant le dispositif de gestion interprofessionnelle ;</li> <li>▪ L'amélioration des performances économiques de la filière en vue de prévenir de nouvelles crises et d'améliorer la compétitivité de la filière coton sur le plan international ;</li> <li>▪ L'amélioration de la durabilité environnementale de la filière ;</li> <li>▪ La diversification des revenus des producteurs</li> </ul> <p>Enfin, en matière de diversification, l'étude recommande le soutien des pouvoirs publics aux filières biocarburants et le développement de nouvelles cultures oléagineuses alors que les promoteurs de ces filières semblent avoir bien pris en compte les deux grandes problématiques de l'environnement et de la sécurité alimentaire.</p> <p><i>Source: Diagnostic de la filière coton et identification d'axes stratégiques, Projet 8 ACP BK O14 – Fonds d'observation Economique et Sociale du Monde Rural (FOESMR), Rapport final 2007</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>No diagnostics of the competitiveness can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Burkina Faso. The needs and challenges of the agricultural sector are identified in the 2001-2007 CSP/NIP but concern food security rather than commodity dependence.</p> <p><i>Source: Burkina Faso 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 56 &amp; 57</i></p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>The RSP for Central Africa region does not support agricultural commodities. It supports RI, transport and forestry.</p> <p><i>Source: RSP 2002-2007</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p><b>Les constats inhérents à l'agriculture ivoirienne sont exposés de manière assez générales</b> (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31</i>) et un diagnostic du milieu rural (comportant</p>

	<p>des éléments succincts d'analyse de filières) et de sécurité alimentaire sont présentés dans le cadre du diagnostic très détaillé de la CI (<i>Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.14 et 15</i>). Aucune étude n'est référencée pour étayer ces diagnostics mais ils font néanmoins état de constats précis.</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p><b>Commission's strategy documents did not include an analysis of the needs and challenges of the agricultural commodity sector and did not refer to diagnostics carried out by the Commission or other instances.</b></p> <p>They underline that one of the causes of poverty in Cameroon lies in the fact that the liberalization of the agricultural sector has not been accompanied by appropriate support measures. They also refer to the following elements of diagnosis in relation to agricultural commodities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ CSP 2001-2007: « <i>En termes structurels, le Cameroun demeure fortement tributaire des marchés des produits de base dont dépendent ses recettes de l'exportation, notamment celles du pétrole, du bois, du cacao, du café et des bananes. Mis à part l'évolution de ces marchés internationaux qui reste imprévisible, les filières des produits de base, notamment café et cacao, doivent aussi faire face aux problèmes internes dus au mauvais état du réseau routier d'écoulement, au manque de facilités dans l'approvisionnement des intrants, à l'incapacité d'assurer un contrôle de qualité efficace, ainsi qu'au manque de formation et de crédits pour les petits producteurs</i> ».</li> <li>▪ CSP 2008-2013 : « <i>De manière générale, le secteur agricole est caractérisé par une faible productivité qui grève la compétitivité des produits, notamment ceux exportés sur le marché international</i> ».</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED, page 12</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, pages 4</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Le CSP, le DSP et le PIN mentionnent la dépendance du Cameroun vis-à-vis des produits agricoles de base, ce depuis 2000, notamment sa dépendance du pétrole, du bois, du cacao, du café et des bananes pour ses recettes d'exportation. (CSP (2001-2007)), ainsi que la détérioration des termes de l'échange (CSP 2008-2013). Il existe par ailleurs une stratégie du secteur rural de 2005, mais qui ne fournit que des éléments généraux et qui est considérée comme non actuelle. D'autres études ont été appuyées par les bailleurs de fonds mais elles ne sont pas validées au niveau d'un des ministères techniques. Hormis le secteur de la banane, peu d'études approfondies sur la compétitivité de filières ont été identifiées. Les documents du Ministère parlent plutôt de politiques de relance mais sans nécessairement les appuyer avec des études de compétitivité.</p> <p>The EC provides technical and financial assistance to Cameroon's banana sector. Stakeholders are well informed of the competitiveness issues surrounding the banana sector (such as production cost differences between Cameroon and Latin American competitors).</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913, MN 995</i>  <i>Source : ATF Banane 1999-2008</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Commission's strategy documents briefly present in the regional diagnosis made elements related to agricultural commodities prices and market developments (see JC 1.1 and JC 1.2) but do not present an analysis of needs and challenges of the agricultural</p>



	<p>commodities sector. There is no evidence that they are based on specific diagnostics of the competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>The context and objectives of the cooperation strategy with the Caribbean include an overview and the main issues of the Caribbean region, a description of the regional integration, and selected examples of major challenges (banana, sugar and HIV) facing the Caribbean region (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. 6-13</i>).</p> <p>No evidence in ECS of specific diagnostics of the competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains.</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No. There is a <u>lack of analytical foundation for the rationale behind the identification of the focal sectors and areas of concentration in the indicative programmes</u>. Although there is an observable and evident improvement in the quantity and quality of preparatory work underlying the regional strategy conducted through successive EDFs, it remains difficult to understand the justification for the selection of the main areas of interventions and their evolution from one programme to the next. This lack of theoretical justification is also evident when it comes to justifying the continuation or abandonment of a particular intervention.</p> <p>No specific information regarding the agricultural commodity sector has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>No references to Domestic Resource Cost studies or to competitiveness studies of the agricultural commodity value chains can be found in the East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIPs</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p><b>There are information about Ethiopian agricultural sector features in CSP that refer to studies</b> (there are also other studies such as Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, 2003):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The decline in rural poverty is also documented by a study conducted by Addis Ababa University, in collaboration with Oxford University and IFPRI (p.23)</li> <li>▪ Dericon, S. D. Gilligan, J. Hoddinott and T. Woldehanna (2006) , The impact of roads and agricultural extension on crop income, consumption and poverty in fifteen Ethiopian villages, mimeo.(p.24)</li> </ul> <p>Within the context of Ethiopia's slow long-term expansion of its economy, the process of structural transformation of the Ethiopian economy made its beginning. Over the past forty years, the share of agriculture – while remaining dominant – fell by some 20 percentage points of GDP, from close to 70% of GDP in the sixties to 48% today. While this may have reduced volatility in Ethiopia's economic performance, low agricultural growth had a depressing effect on other sectors of the economy, notably in</p>

	<p>industry which virtually stagnated at about 13% of GDP. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.9).</p> <p>While agricultural performance appears to have been strong in recent years, helped by an expansion in land under cultivation, serious concerns remain about long-term prospects. Of great concern is that land productivity has remained low and that labour productivity has fallen. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.10).</p> <p>Of special interest is that the design of PASDEP has benefited from the results reflected in the Citizen's Report Card (CRC), which was conducted by the NGO Poverty Action Network of Ethiopia (PANE). The <b>CRC is a simple but powerful tool to provide public agencies with systematic feedback from the users of public services, to permit the latter to identify the strengths and weaknesses</b> of their work in health, education, water and sanitation <b>as well as in agriculture</b>. The findings generally reinforce the messages emerging from the Welfare Monitoring Surveys. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.24).</p> <p>Until a few years ago agricultural growth rates over the longer-term has been sluggish, economic growth being driven by services and trade. This has been so since agriculture was largely stuck in subsistence production of food grains, with limited market integration, while the service and trade sectors have been growing quickly, and are concentrated in urban areas where the first stages of renewed private activity and expenditure have taken place following liberalization. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.25, 26).</p> <p>A key issue in agriculture relates to the issue of land tenure. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.28).</p> <p>No evidence in CSE.</p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>Although the team did not see the programming files, the final evaluation of CSSP I states: <i>'The overall programme design was elaborated on the basis of very profound and comprehensive project planning documents. Most of the findings of these preparatory activities as well as the proposed Logframe were incorporated in the final core document of the programme.'</i> (Agrifor, Page 38)</p> <p>It is also quite obvious that the conclusions and recommendations from the final evaluation of CSSP I played an important role in shaping the design of CSSP II since one finds in the design of CSSP II several elements underlined in the evaluation such as the need to promote farmers associations, the production of seedlings, extension services etc.</p> <p><i>Source: Agrifor 2005.</i></p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The CSP/NIP includes a "country diagnosis" chapter, in which the needs of the political, economic, social and environmental situation are identified. EC support is in fact aligned with Ghana's Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS) based on an exhaustive evaluation the country's needs. The EC delegation was one of the G-JAS's initiators and leading partners</p> <p>It states that agriculture is constrained by low-tech farming practices, land tenure uncertainties, gender inequalities, limited access to inputs and poor roads.</p> <p>There is no reference to domestic resource cost studies.</p>

	<p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 9 to 24 &amp; 36</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>There is no reference in the 2003-2007 CSP to Domestic Resource Cost studies related to the competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains. However the CSP refers to the 2001 PRSP's assessment of the medium-term challenges of rural development, including agriculture. The 2001 PRSP identified a number of factors as being major constraints to rural development. Poor state rural infrastructure, poor marketing distribution systems, and quality and standards enforcement are among these constraints.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 12</i></p> <p>The 2008-2013 CSP includes a thematic analysis sheet dealing with agriculture and development sector. This sheet does not target directly specific needs and challenges of the agricultural commodity sector but general issues met in the sector.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 110-120</i></p> <p>According to the Evaluation of EC support to Kenya (June 2008), the choice of the focal sector "Agriculture and rural development" is not debatable in itself as it represent a priority for Kenya. However, the justification for this choice in the CSP documents is relatively weak. The EC support strategy to agriculture should be better explained: organisation of the sector/ decentralization, stakeholders; specific strategies for commodities/ other crops.</p> <p>The intervention framework in the agriculture and rural development field (including agricultural commodities) is not very realistic. For this focal sector, a reduced role of of the state in agricultural production and marketing and increased food crop production were mentioned as a few of the expected results. However, the evaluation team has underlined that it is not at all clear how these results could be achieved with the programmes proposed, because these programmes did not focus on production and marketing. This reflects that a clear EC sector intervention strategy has been missing.</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluation of EC support to Kenya, June 2008, pages 33 &amp; 34</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Pas de référence à ce type d'analyses dans les CSP hormis ceci qui est très léger :</b></p> <p>La production agricole de la République de Madagascar a connu une croissance inférieure à 1 % par an depuis 25 ans et n'a donc pas suivi la croissance démographique. Face à ce constat, le Gouvernement a défini un cadre sectoriel à travers le Plan d'Action pour le Développement Rural (PADR) (Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.10).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>There are no diagnostics of the competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains in Mali's CSP/NIPs.</p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP includes an analysis of the economic situation of the region in which a paragraph states the trends for the agricultural sector. The paragraph mentions that the sugar sector in Fiji will need to keep increasing productivity in order to compete on the increasingly liberalised EU market.</p> <p>The paper also mentions that the PACPs need to improve compliance with product</p>

	<p>safety and quality standards for their potential exports.</p> <p>No references are made to domestic resource cost studies however.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 19 &amp; 45</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	No references to Domestic Resource Cost studies or to competitiveness studies of the agricultural commodity value chains can be found in the SADC RSP/RIPs.
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The 2001-2007 CSP/NIP includes a “country diagnosis” chapter, in which the needs of the political, economic, social and environmental situation are identified. It states that the economy is heavily dependent on agriculture and efforts to modernise this sector have not yet yielded results. There is no reference to domestic resource cost studies.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, page 7</i></p> <p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP includes a “country diagnosis” chapter, in which the needs of the political, economic, social and environmental situation are identified. This diagnostic was carried jointly by donors and government: it is the Joint Country analysis of the Joint Assistance Strategy in Tanzania (JAST).</p> <p>There is no reference to domestic resource cost studies. However, the CSP mentions that donors and government have a broad agenda based upon the Integrated Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS). The DTIS addresses Tanzania’s trade needs from a range of perspectives including multilateral policy, regional integration, macroeconomic and supply-side</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 9-29 &amp; 73</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	At macro-economic and sector level, many studies and analytical reports are available. Many background studies on research, extension, farmer empowerment and organisations etc. were launched in preparation of the ASDP in 2004. The Government also undertakes regular agriculture sector and public expenditure reviews (2006, 2009, 2010) which provide good indications of the constraints and challenges of the sector; they also provide the main elements and priorities of the policy framework.
<b>UG</b>	No diagnostics of competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains can be found in Uganda’s CSP/NIPs.
<b>VU</b>	<p>L’agriculture n’est pas un secteur de concentration au Vanuatu (ni 2002-2007 ni 2008-2013). Il n’y a pas d’évidence que la Commission a encouragé une analyse des besoins des filières agricoles dans le cadre de la définition de stratégies de développement de ces filières.</p> <p>Cependant, de nombreuses études de filières (épices, noix, cacao, café, cocotier, cultures vivrières) ont été réalisées sous le projet POP2/POPACA, avec l’appui de l’assistant technique du projet et en collaboration avec le Ministère de l’Agriculture. Ces études ont été discutées lors d’ateliers avec les représentants des différentes filières concernées. Par ailleurs, de nombreuses études de marché ont été réalisées dans le cadre de l’intervention de la Commission au développement commercial des entreprises (CDE), en appui au secteur privé.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 1059 and MN 1098</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	The CSP doesn’t list needs and challenges of the agricultural commodity sector nor does it base statements on Domestic Resource Cost studies.

	<p>The CSP/NIP mentions however that agriculture has been undergoing an erratic growth throughout the past years due to natural disasters and political instability. It also mentions that the sector receives insufficient incentives to develop.</p> <p>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 17 &amp; 29.</p>				
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Aucune référence à des diagnostics de compétitivité de l'agriculture n'est faite dans les RSP/RIP de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Le soutien à la sécurité alimentaire du RSP/RIP de 2008-2013 est essentiellement basé sur les besoins et buts identifiés lors d'une réunion ministérielle en Afrique de l'Ouest pour répondre à la crise alimentaire en 2008 et en connexion avec les politiques agricoles communes de l'UEMOA (la PAU) et de la CEDEAO (l'ECOWAP).</p> <p>Sources : <i>WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, page 57</i></p>				
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Programming documents do not include an analysis of needs and challenges of the agricultural commodity sector or are based on existing diagnostics of the competitiveness of agricultural commodity value chains. However:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Financing agreement of the AAACP programme provides the background (strategic framework, lessons learnt, complementary actions and past donor coordination) and the global needs and challenges in ACP countries.</li> <li>▪ The AAACP programme supports itself – inter alia – the implementation of diagnostics of agricultural commodity sectors in ACP countries in order to prepare agricultural commodity strategies (e.g. Support to the International Trade Center – ITC – process of chain diagnosis and strategy formulation, implemented by FAO in Cameroon, March 2009).</li> </ul> <p>Source: <i>Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2 and www.euacpcommodities.eu</i></p>				
<b>ACP-IF</b>	<p>The needs assessment is the object of the IF component of the MTS-IF Project. The DTIS is a first stage in the IF process after which needs are identified and prioritised in a matrix.</p> <p>The DTIS assesses the competitiveness of the economy and of the sectors that are engaged in international trade or have such potential and as such it therefore does issue a judgment on the competence and capacity of countries and sectors to participate in the global market effectively.</p> <p>The DTIS generally provides a discussion of overall trade issues (macroeconomic environment, structure and pattern of trade and investment, trade policy and institutions, trade agreements and market access, WTO issues (accession or compliance, whatever may be applicable), trade and poverty); of cross-sectoral issues (business environment and institutional framework for trade and investment, trade facilitation, standards); and sectoral studies. Amongst the latter the agricultural commodities are covered. The quality of 'supply chain' analysis is however variable because <i>'the primary objective of the DTISs is trade-centric, focusing mostly on mainstreaming trade into national development plans rather than on developing a composite commodity development strategy with predictable supply, appropriate value addition, diversification and industrial development'</i> (Page 25 UNDP study).</p> <p>Countries and dates for which DTIS are available include (for the 12 selected countries):</p> <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <thead> <tr> <th>Country</th> <th>Year of DTIS</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Country	Year of DTIS		
Country	Year of DTIS				

	<table border="1" data-bbox="614 309 1080 575"> <tr> <td>Burkina Faso</td> <td>2007</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ethiopia</td> <td>2004</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Madagascar</td> <td>2003</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mali</td> <td>2004</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Senegal</td> <td>2003</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tanzania</td> <td>2004</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Uganda</td> <td>2004</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Vanuatu</td> <td>2007</td> </tr> </table> <p data-bbox="454 577 837 609"><i>Source: from Annex II, UNDP study</i></p> <p data-bbox="454 645 1471 712">Source: FA, <a href="http://www.integratedframework.org/">http://www.integratedframework.org/</a>, UNDP Commodity Development Strategies in the Integrated Framework, July 2009.</p>	Burkina Faso	2007	Ethiopia	2004	Madagascar	2003	Mali	2004	Senegal	2003	Tanzania	2004	Uganda	2004	Vanuatu	2007
Burkina Faso	2007																
Ethiopia	2004																
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Senegal	2003																
Tanzania	2004																
Uganda	2004																
Vanuatu	2007																
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p data-bbox="454 728 1471 795"><b>L'intervention précise les enjeux liés aux filières anacardes et sésame.</b> (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 4</i>) :</p> <p data-bbox="454 828 1471 958">Les populations rurales des zones sahéennes Burkinabè sont confrontées à des problèmes économiques et écologiques. Les difficultés écologiques sont liées au climat sahéen, à la déforestation et à la fragilité des sols. Les difficultés économiques sont principalement liées à la crise du coton et aux difficultés alimentaires.</p> <p data-bbox="454 974 1471 1171">Les populations rurales des régions productrices de coton, qui pratiquent également l'agriculture vivrière, sont à la recherche d'activités alternatives génératrices de revenus. Le développement de l'arboriculture paysanne et des cultures annuelles de rente (en pures ou en associations) sont des stratégies de diversification envisageables. Le Burkina Faso possède des zones agro-écologiques favorables à la production de l'anacarde et du sésame, sources de revenus complémentaires pour les populations vulnérables des zones rurales.</p> <p data-bbox="454 1187 1471 1317">Ces deux filières font face à des problèmes technico-commerciaux semblables : manque de maîtrise de la qualité, difficulté de commercialisation sur le marché international, manque de services adaptés à des filières peu encadrées, difficulté d'accès aux informations technico-économiques sur le marché.</p> <p data-bbox="454 1332 1471 1597">Le sésame présente un potentiel de développement important au Burkina Faso, s'agissant d'une plante peu exigeante, s'intégrant facilement dans les calendriers agricoles et valorisable à l'export. La demande du marché international est en croissance et certains contrats d'achat au Burkina Faso ne sont pas remplis. Toutefois, la méconnaissance des bonnes pratiques agricoles et le manque d'accès aux informations techniques et économiques pénalisent les organisations paysannes productrices de sésame (voir par exemple les contaminations du sésame biologique à la salmonelle en 2005 et les conséquences dramatiques pour la filière burkinabè).</p> <p data-bbox="454 1612 1471 1854">L'anacarde (noix de cajou) présente également un potentiel de diversification des revenus intéressant, bien que la production actuelle du Burkina Faso reste faible et peu structurée. Des plantations existent dans les régions cibles de l'action mais les exigences du marché international ne sont pas maîtrisées par les producteurs. L'anacardier est un arbre rustique valorisable économiquement, c'est pourquoi il est considéré comme un arbre adapté au développement économique de zones défavorisées et a été introduit dans les zones de savanes arborées de plusieurs pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest.</p> <p data-bbox="454 1870 1471 1937">Les besoins et contraintes de ces deux filières ont été identifiés en 2007 par RONGEAD et INADES Formation Burkina Faso.</p>																

	<p>Un atelier de concertation, organisé par RONGEAD et INADES-Formation Burkina Faso, qui s'est tenu en décembre 2007, a permis d'identifier les principaux problèmes rencontrés par les associations de planteurs et des opérateurs qui pratiquent le décorticage des noix de cajou dans le cadre d'une <b>analyse de la chaîne de valeur de la filière anacarde</b>. (Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 4-5)</p> <p>Une analyse récente de la filière intitulée « <b>Promotion des chaînes de valeur ajoutée de la filière sésame</b> », Programme de Développement Agricole, Coopération Burkina Faso, Coopération Allemande au Développement (Février 2008) a été réalisée et confirme les éléments diagnostiqués lors de l'analyse faite par RONGEAD et INADES FORMATION. (Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 5)</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Une étude diagnostic de la filière coton du Burkina Faso a été réalisée en 2007</p> <p>L'allocation de signature de la CF du PAFFIC, reprend certains éléments de ce diagnostic (ex. importance du coton burkinabé dans les recettes d'exportation, le PIB, nombre élevé de producteurs, processus de privatisation, crise financière profonde de la filière depuis 2004-2005....sans en faire référence explicitement. Par contre, une référence explicite à cette étude diagnostic est faite dans le document « Note de dossier PAFFIC, décaissement de la première tranche fixe, octobre 2008, page 6 : « Un diagnostic de la filière coton, une stratégie de sortie de crise et une stratégie à moyen et long terme pour la filière coton au Burkina Faso ont été élaborés de manière participative en 2007 (sur fonds 8<sup>ème</sup> FED)</p> <p>Sources : Allocation signature CF ; Note dossier CF-PAFFIC, 1<sup>ère</sup> tranche, page 6 ; Etude diagnostic de la filière coton du Burkina Faso, août 2007 ; Stratégies de développement durable de la filière coton au Burkina Faso, août 2007</p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Une analyse « contexte sectoriel » est présentée et détaille les enjeux du secteur agricole (Source : Rider FA p.3) et une analyse des enseignements tirés et complémentarités cite les études qui ont été entreprises notamment en termes de stratégie sectorielle (Source : Rider FA p.4).</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>L'identification des besoins et contraintes perçus dans le pays cible et en particulier dans la ou les régions concernées est présenté de manière détaillée et prend notamment en compte les problématiques agricoles (Source : Annexe I p.4, 5).</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The "Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme is based on a diagnostic study and on a feasibility study which analysed the needs and challenges of the rice sector. The diagnostic study analysed the rice industry in Guyana, Trinidad &amp; Tobago, Jamaica, Belize, Dominican Republic and Suriname (production, milling, trade, services, policy framework), highlighted the main constraints and proposed recommendations. The feasibility study (3 volumes) proposed three action plans: one for Guyana, one for Suriname and one for the region. It includes in each volume the trends of the rice industry, the assessment of the constraints, and a proposed action plan which includes details on the proposed intervention (objectives, components, budget, organisation).</p> <p>Sources: Agrotec Spa, "Diagnostic Study of the CARIFORUM rice industry", 2001 Agrotec Spa, Feasibility study of the CARIFORUM rice industry, 2003</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>A sectoral analysis (production base, sources and areas of production, importance of coffee in the national economy and links with agriculture) is presented in the FP (Source :</p>

	<p><i>FP p.2,3)</i></p> <p>A problem analysis (target groups, beneficiaries, stakeholders and specific problems) is presented in the FP (<i>Source : FP p.3,4)</i></p> <p>From November 2007 to March 2008, a team integrated by an Expatriate Expert and two National Experts carried out an <b>analysis of the coffee sector</b>. On the basis of this analysis, a development strategy was drawn up, which wished to be a consensual development strategy accepted by the whole community, ensuring coordinated actions by the various actors and laying down clear objectives for all of them. (<i>Source : Completion report p.24)</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Bien que la CF et la FIP évoquent des éléments de diagnostic (ex. importance du coton malien dans les recettes d'exportation, le PIB, nombre élevé de producteurs, processus de privatisation, fragilité du secteur coton, crise financière de la CMDT,...), il n'est pas fait référence dans les documents consultés à une étude diagnostic du secteur qui aurait été réalisée.</p> <p><i>Sources : CF, FIP,</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The project was identified after preliminary consultations which established the problems that had to be tackled to address the weak export performance of PACPS: lack of competitiveness of export products, limited market access due to non compliance with biosecurity specifications, poorly developed trade infrastructure and inadequate access to and understanding of production and marketing information. The project tackles the lack of competitiveness (other aspects being addressed elsewhere or in the longer term).</p> <p><i>Source: IF</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>According to the MTR (2008), the background and the justification of the ICART programme (first version) was based on the SADC sector strategy, NEPAD and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan ISDP (RISDP, 2003). However, it seems doubtful that a proper problem analysis was carried out before drafting the programme proposal.</p> <p>The problems of indirect beneficiaries (smallholders) are only partially addressed in the ICART programme design as poverty and smallholders' livelihood problems are not always due to a lack of agricultural research results.</p> <p><i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, page 17</i></p> <p>While it started at the end of 2003 (signature of the FA), the ICART programme carried out a Situation Analysis of the Agricultural research and Training the SADC region, the specific case of Tanzania (July 2008). This study is the third phase of a programmed approach to undertaking a situation analysis research and training in the SADC. The objective of this analysis is to determine the status of the National Agricultural research System (NARS) and the status of national and regional agricultural research and training networks. The study has been built on three themes: 1) Framework and coordination of the NARS, 2) Management of research and training programmes, 3) Networking for agricultural training, research and development.</p>



	<p>There is no evidence that similar analyses have been carried out for the other SADC Member States.</p> <p><i>Source: Situation Analysis of Agricultural Research and Training in the SADC – Tanzania, July 2008, page xiii</i></p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Le projet ne présente pas d'analyse préalable de l'intérêt et de la viabilité financière et économique des activités à promouvoir : absence de comptes d'exploitation prévisionnel par agent économique et de calcul de taux de rentabilité interne (TRI) ni financier ni économique. Des calculs partiels ("plans d'affaires") ont été produits pour la mission MR et se présentent comme des comptes d'exploitations sommaires, établis au niveau d'une seule campagne, débouchant sur de simples calculs de marges brutes (mais sans valorisation de la main d'œuvre).</p> <p><i>Source : MR</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>In the SFA impact evaluation report, there is no reference to domestic resource cost studies. However, funding was allocated based on competitiveness analyses and on the importance of banana production for the economy. No further detail on how competitiveness analyses were undertaken can be found in the evaluation report.</p> <p>The SFA allocated funds to improve competitiveness in countries for export and, where that wasn't possible anymore, to support diversification based on strategies agreed together with the EC.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 1, htspc, 2008.</i></p> <p>The context and objectives of the cooperation strategy with the Caribbean include an overview and the main issues of the Caribbean region, a description of the regional integration, and selected examples of major challenges (banana, sugar and HIV) facing the Caribbean region (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. 6-13</i>).</p>
<b>Sugar</b>	<p>The context and objectives of the cooperation strategy with the Caribbean include an overview and the main issues of the Caribbean region, a description of the regional integration, and selected examples of major challenges (banana, sugar and HIV) facing the Caribbean region (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. 6-13</i>).</p>
<b>I.9.1.2</b>	<p>Programming and formulation documents explicitly show which needs are intended to be responded to and how the proposed interventions will address these needs at macro-economic and commodity sector level</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>No evidence of how interventions are supposed to respond to which needs in Burkina Faso's CSP/NIPs.</p>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Suite au rapport de « Diagnostic de la filière coton et l'Identification d'axes stratégiques » au Burkina Faso (août 2007), la Commission européenne a soutenu sous le 8<sup>ie</sup> FED dans le cadre des interventions du Fonds d'Observation Economique et sociale du monde rural la définition des « <b>Stratégies de développement durable de la filière coton au Burkina Faso</b> ». Sous forme d'une approche participative, ces stratégies ont été définies avec la contribution de consultants internationaux, du Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (Direction Générale de la Coopération), du Ministère de</p>

L'Agriculture, de l'Hydraulique et des ressources halieutiques (Secrétariat permanent de la Coordination des Politiques sectorielles Agricoles), du Ministère du Commerce, de la Promotion de l'entreprise et de l'Artisanat (Secrétariat permanent du suivi de la filière coton libéralisée), ainsi que l'ensemble des partenaires de la filière coton (représentants des producteurs, représentants des sociétés cotonnières, représentants du secteur financier, etc.).

Deux stratégies (cadres logiques assortis de commentaires) ont ainsi été développées pour le secteur cotonnier du Burkina Faso :

- La stratégie de sortie de crise.
- La stratégie à moyen long terme.

Dans le cadre de la **stratégie de crise**, deux axes stratégiques ont été définis :

- L'assainissement de la situation financière des sociétés cotonnières, et plus particulièrement de la SOFITEX (pour 34 milliards de FCFA). La Commission européenne portera une partie de ce financement (10 millions EUR) sous forme d'un don dans le cadre d'une aide budgétaire. Un Fonds de lissage a été mis en place par l'AFD (pour garantir les nouveaux crédits auprès des banques).
- Le rétablissement de la confiance avec le système bancaire national et international. Cet axe comprend l'accès à l'information sur la filière et des échanges réguliers entre la filière coton du pays, l'Etat et les partenaires techniques et financiers.

La stratégie de crise proposée a débouché sur la **stratégie commune de sortie de crise** validée en mars 2008 par l'Etat et l'interprofession du coton (AICB). Elle constituait une des conditions spécifiques dans le cadre de l'ABS mis en œuvre à travers le PAFFIC.

La **stratégie à moyen-long terme** est axée sur l'amélioration de la compétitivité de la filière par une augmentation des rendements au champ, une maîtrise des coûts à tous les niveaux de la filière et une politique de reconquête de la qualité du coton graine et de la fibre. Cette stratégie sectorielle pour le coton s'inscrit dans le cadre plus général de la lutte contre la pauvreté. Son objectif général est de conforter la filière coton comme vecteur de la lutte contre la pauvreté en termes de croissance économique et plus spécifiquement de revenus et d'emplois dans le secteur rural et agricole. Elle met l'accent sur la durabilité de la filière à trois niveaux :

- **Durabilité financière et économique**, pour faire face à la faiblesse et la volatilité des cours et à la concurrence des pays plus compétitifs ;
- **Durabilité sociale**, pour accroître l'autonomie des producteurs et de leurs organisations ;
- **Durabilité environnementale**, pour tendre à limiter les impacts négatifs du coton sur la santé des personnes, des animaux et de l'environnement en général par un emploi raisonné des intrants chimiques le développement de nouvelles méthodes de traitement, le recours à des pratique agricoles plus respectueuses de la fertilité des sols.

La stratégie à moyen-long terme n'a pas fait l'objet d'une validation par l'Etat et les acteurs privés. Seule la stratégie commune de sortie de crise a été validée. Par la suite, un plan de soutien triennal (2009-2011) (demandé mais non fourni par le secrétariat permanent de la filière coton libéralisée) a été élaboré et mis en œuvre sur ressources propres (Etat et sociétés cotonnières). Les actions ont essentiellement porté sur l'assainissement financier de la filière coton. En 2010, sur fonds propre et sans l'appui de la DUE, une étude prospective a été menée afin de définir une vision et des axes stratégiques pour le développement futur de la filière coton. *Source: Stratégies de*

	<i>développement durable de la filière coton au Burkina Faso, Projet 8 ACP BK O14 – Fonds d'observation Economique et Sociale du Monde Rural (FOESMR), Rapport amendé, Août 2007 ; Stratégie commune de sortie de crise, mars 2008 ; MN 523</i>
<b>CAFR</b>	The RSP mentions that the focal sectors are totally in line with the regional priorities (but no agricultural commodities).  <i>Source: R.SP 2002-2007</i>
<b>CI</b>	Présentation en annexe du <b>cadre d'intervention et des indicateurs de performance</b> (logique d'intervention, indicateurs de performance, sources de vérification et hypothèses) pour les deux secteurs de concentration mais <b>pas pour le secteur hors concentration</b> « appui et l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles » (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.41-44).  Le cadre d'intervention du secteur « développement durable » qui reprend des composantes agricoles était présenté dans l'ancien CSP. ( <i>Source : CSP 2004-207 p.40-42</i> ).
<b>CM</b>	Commission's strategy and programming documents do not explain which needs are intended to be responded to and how the proposed interventions will address these needs. (NB: the first CSP does not foresee support to the agricultural commodity sector).  <i>Sources :</i> <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED,</i> <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i>
<b>CM</b>	Très peu de fonds ont été alloués au secteur agricole et aux produits agricoles de base hormis pour la banane (ligne budgétaire) et partiellement à partir des ressources du Stabex. Ces fonds sont non programmables.  In Cameroon, ATF (« Assistance Technique et Financière » for the banana sector) programme documents explain the need of Cameroon's banana sector (to increase competitiveness) and explain the actions that are undertaken to respond to that need.  <i>Source : ATF financing agreements, 1999-2008</i>
<b>CR</b>	Overall, Commission interventions are relevant to address particular needs of the Caribbean in view of constructing a regional economic integrated space. Projects/programmes are designed to cope with specific constraints affecting regional integration and aim at tackling several issues directly related with integration among Caribbean countries and/or their integration into the world economy. However, these interventions are not clearly integrated into a global strategy which in fact fails to be clearly identified. <u>This mainly stems from the absence of a comprehensive analysis of the Caribbean context that would be necessary to establish a prioritisation of needs and the selection of a set of interventions that would reflect genuine strategic choices based on a clear vision of the Caribbean integration process.</u> The elements incorporated in the strategies reviewed by this evaluation seem rather based on a pragmatic approach which takes into account the partner's requests, interventions of other donors and the Commission's comparative advantages.

	<p>No specific information regarding the agricultural commodity sector has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>No evidence in ECS</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>In the "Analysis of the Political, Economic, Social and Environmental Situation of the Region" section of the 2008-2013 East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIP, there is a paragraph on agriculture and food security. This paragraph states certain needs of the region and what should be done to respond to those needs. In the regional indicative programme however, there is no clear explanation on how the programme will address those needs.</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p>The intervention framework and performance indicators for each focal sector (Transport and regional integration, Rural development and food security as well as Macro-economic support and governance) are presented (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.81-84).</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The CSP/NIP includes an "EC response: choices and concentration" chapter wherein the areas that are chosen for EU support are detailed. The EU focuses on certain areas supposed to contribute to certain needs but not all (EC funding is coordinated with that of other donors). Areas of intervention are stated above an "objective" paragraph, wherein expected results are stated.</p> <p>There is also a Joint Assistance Strategy on which the EC strategy is aligned (the EC delegation was one of the initiators and leading partners of the JAS).</p> <p>There is no mention in the CSP about how each proposed intervention is supposed to contribute to address a need.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 37 to 39</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>The specific objective of EC intervention in the Agriculture and Rural development sector is to support the achievement of the PRSP sectoral growth target of 6% p.a. for Agriculture and Rural Development and thereby contribute to national growth and poverty reduction.</p> <p>The 2003-2007 CSP mentions that the response strategy to the Government of Kenya and EC takes into consideration:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ the analysis of the economic, social and political situation in Kenya and its prospects</li> <li>▪ the priorities identified during the 2001 PRSP consultation process and financing requirements</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ EC development policy priorities</li> <li>▪ lessons learnt from past/ongoing EC programmes and an assessment of comparative advantage -complementarity with EU Member States and other donors active in Kenya.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 26&amp; 30</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	Présentation en annexe du <b>cadre d'intervention et des indicateurs de performance</b> (logique d'intervention, indicateurs de performance, sources de vérification et hypothèses) notamment pour le second domaine de concentration « développement rural et aménagement du territoire, agriculture et sécurité alimentaire dans la perspective de l'intégration régionale » (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.85-86).
<b>ML</b>	There isn't much detail in the Malian CSP/NIPs on the interventions concerning agricultural commodities and there is therefore no explicit demonstration of which needs are intended to be responded and how the interventions will address these needs.
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The EU response strategy focuses on regional economic integration, natural resource management, governance and security. There is no reference on how the measures will address the needs of the commodity sector.</p> <p>The EU Aid for Trade funding is supposed to help PACPs deal with trade challenges but the RSP doesn't mention how the specific needs will be addressed.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 62 &amp; 65</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>In the "Analysis of the Political, Economic, and Social context" section of the 2002-2007 SADC RSP/RIP, there is a paragraph on the Food, Agriculture and Natural resources sectors. It is mentioned that the region has an integrated project called SADC Regional Early Warning System (REWS) which provide information on food security prospects in the region. In addition, problems of the sectors are analysed: transport bottlenecks (train), congestion of routes with competing demands on freight services and high transit costs.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2002-2007 RSP/RIP, page 18</i></p> <p>In the "Analysis of the Political, Economic, Social and Environmental situation of the region" section of the 2008-2013 SADC RSP/RIP, there is a short analysis of the issues met by the agricultural sector with negative impacts in terms of food security. It is underlined that SADC faces a lack of suitable framework for appropriate and coordinated agricultural research and limitations due to trade structural factors such as sanitary and phytosanitary issues.</p> <p><i>Source: Southern African Development Community 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 4&amp;9</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The 2001-2007 CSP/NIP includes a "Response strategy" chapter wherein the priorities of the EC cooperation are detailed. The EU focuses on certain areas supposed to contribute to certain needs but not all (EC funding is coordinated with that of other donors).</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 19-24</i></p> <p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP includes a "Specific Response strategy and Indicative</p>

	<p>Programme of the EC” chapter wherein the priorities of the EC cooperation are detailed. The EU focuses on certain areas supposed to contribute to certain needs but not all (EC funding is coordinated with that of other donors). There is one specific area – Trade and regional Integration – which specifically focus on agricultural key commodities (supply chain, quality, facilitation of market access to smallholders, sanitary and phytosanitary standards imposed at EU and global levels). However, there is no mention in the CSP about how each proposed intervention is supposed to contribute to address a need.</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 68-80</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The fact that support to agricultural commodities was funded exclusively from STABEX and AMSP funds which are non programmable, explains why the programming documents do not dwell on the agricultural sector and its needs and priorities.</p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>There is no explicit explanation of the needs of the agricultural and commodity sector or how the interventions will address these needs. Analysis of the document’s content reveals the following:</p> <p>Among the needs identified in the country’s situation analysis of the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP (increasing income of the rural poor by intensifying production and productivity, solving food insecurity problems in conflict regions, improving agricultural statistics and infrastructure for private sector development and preventing environmental degradation), the EU intervention aims mainly at addressing the first need (enhancing productivity to improve rural incomes).</p> <p>The intervention will focus on helping smallholders shift their production from subsistence to commercial agriculture and facilitating the return of the displaced communities to their places of origin in Northern Uganda.</p> <p>No reference to interventions on the macro-economic or commodity sector level can be found.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 31.</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>There is no mention of which needs are intended to be responded in the CSP/NIP. There isn’t any explanation on the proposed interventions at the commodity sector level either.</p> <p>However, in the Intervention Framework of the CSP/NIP, the objective of each intervention is stated as well as the expected results at a macro-economic level.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 72</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Le RSP/RIP d’Afrique de l’Ouest de 2008-2013 ne mentionne pas de besoins spécifiques que le soutien à la sécurité alimentaire est censé adresser. Il mentionne les objectifs globaux de l’appui au secteur :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>« - l’appui au processus de mise en oeuvre du Programme Régional d’Investissement Agricole;</li> <li>- la valorisation, la transformation et la gestion des ressources naturelles et agricoles,</li> <li>- la productivité et la compétitivité des filières agricoles ciblées;</li> <li>- le fonctionnement des cadres régionales de concertation des filières agricoles;</li> <li>- la facilitation du commerce intra-régionale des produits agricoles;</li> </ul>

	<p>- l'appui au dispositif pour la préparation et la conduite des négociations internationales agricoles; - la mise en place et le fonctionnement des systèmes d'information de marchés, y compris les statistiques agricoles, et d'aide à la décision. »</p> <p>Sources : W/AF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, page 57</p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The AAACP programme is a key aspect of implementing the two Action Plans on Commodities and Cotton. It addresses most of the key recommendations made by the Council and the EU-Africa Cotton Forum (2004), including the one concerning cooperation with international organisations.</p> <p>The overall objective of the AAACP programme is to improve incomes for producers from traditional or other agricultural commodities and reduce income vulnerability at both producer and macro level. The AAACP programme purpose is to strengthen the capacity to develop and implement sustainable commodity strategies that improve farmers' productivity and their rural livelihoods and reduce income vulnerability.</p> <p>The AAACP programme proposes four expected results in line with needs of macro-economic and commodity sector level. They are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Result 1: Commodity strategies and implementation plans</li> <li>▪ Result 2: Access and use of markets, production factors and services</li> <li>▪ Result 3: Market-based risk management instruments</li> <li>▪ Result 4: Complementary aspects of and synergies between the international organisations, the EU and the ACP actors</li> </ul> <p>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</p>
<b>ACP-IF</b>	<p>The FA for the MTS-IF project only very succinctly provides a contextual background to the project and the activities show how the EC proposes to address these needs. The needs arise from the recognition that ACPs participation in world trade has been disappointing and their share declining and 'integrating the ACP countries into the multilateral trading system and supporting them to reap benefits of market opening is key objective. There is no further explanation or reference to any established doctrine to show how trade is good for these ACPs or what benefits they are expected to reap. The FA then simply states that there is a need for enhanced negotiation capacity and implementing WTO agreements may require upfront costs while benefits will only occur later; that trade is not put at the height of the priority for the development agenda. There is no explanation about how this project is going to change all this and only a rather succinct logical framework is appended without further explanation (please note that the project is following on from a previous funding thus possibly not requiring a full blown explanation about how and why).</p> <p>The MTS-IF project is a demand driven project whereby countries and regions put in requests for assistance. The MTS component provides assistance to ACPs for their enhanced participation in MTN and for protection of their interest and concerns in WTO negotiations. The programme funds the participation of ACP representatives to inter-ACP meetings and WTO meetings, provides TA in preparing regional positions and analytical and legal work. They use a pool of ACP experts in trade related matters and assist ACP candidates to WTO membership in their accession process or assist them to improve compliance to their WTO commitments and increase national and regional capacities to implement such commitments. All this is done using a demand-</p>

	<p>driven approach so it should by definition correspond to needs.</p> <p>The IF is similarly based on a demand driven approach (three stages: 1<sup>st</sup> request from country to participate in IF process; 2<sup>nd</sup> diagnostic study - DTIS; 3<sup>rd</sup> elaboration of action plan (matrix) spelling out priority TA needs).</p> <p>The programming document (FA) underlines that the previous programme met problems linked to the fact that countries found it difficult to express/identify their bottlenecks and needs for assistance. As a result it was proposed to use the IF action matrix to identify prior activities to be funded through the WTO programme (thus enhancing complementarity between the WTO and EIF activities).</p> <p><i>Source: FA, <a href="http://www.integratedframework.org/">http://www.integratedframework.org/</a></i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC vise à contribuer à la lutte contre la pauvreté en appuyant la filière coton, important vecteur de croissance économique en milieu rural. Il permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL).</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The "Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme is based on the diagnostic and feasibility studies above mentioned. The FA does not detail how the intervention will address the needs at macro-economic and commodity sector level. However, the feasibility study precisely identified the needs to which the intervention is supposed to respond: e.g in Guyana: "(i) closing of the yield gap between the average and better farms and resolving the dilemma of the improvement of livelihoods for poor small farmers; (ii) rectifying of quality deficiencies and increased milling out-turns; and (iii) instigation of the cooperation and integration necessary for effective export competition." The various components proposed are then detailed: they aim at responding to identified constraints though it is not explicitly mentioned.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Agrotec Spa, "Diagnostic Study of the CARIFORUM rice industry", 2001</i>  <i>Agrotec Spa, Feasibility study of the CARIFORUM rice industry, 2003</i>  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La CF donne les leçons apprises au cours du long et difficile processus de réforme entamé par le Gouvernement malien depuis 2001<sub>2</sub> (CF, annexe 2, §2.6) :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Les difficultés rencontrées pour la mise en œuvre de la réforme ont mis en évidence la complexité de la filière ainsi que les enjeux politiques, économiques et sociaux. C'est ainsi que la nouvelle stratégie de réforme comporte de multiples volets qui doivent permettre de conduire le changement sans déstabiliser la filière.</li> <li>▪ La privatisation est insuffisante pour relever les grands défis auxquels la filière est confrontée - Les réformes en cours dans les filières de la sous-région montrent que si le double processus de privatisation et de libéralisation est indispensable pour affranchir les filières de la dépendance du budget de l'Etat et faire prévaloir une</li> </ul>



	<p>rationalité économique dans leur gestion, il ne permet pas à lui seul de relever les principaux défis auxquels la filière est confrontée à savoir, l'amélioration de sa compétitivité et la gestion de la volatilité des cours de la fibre.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Le processus de recentrage de la CMDT sur l'égrenage et la commercialisation de la graine et de la fibre a fait émerger de nouvelles difficultés. Ainsi, les producteurs ne disposent pas encore des supports institutionnels adaptés ni des savoirs faire ni des ressources pour assurer dans de bonnes conditions les fonctions qui leur incombent désormais (ex. exécution des programmes annuels de réhabilitation/entretien des pistes).</li> <li>▪ L'alphabétisation fonctionnelle est un préalable à toute réforme institutionnelle et à toute action de renforcement de la compétitivité - L'échec de certaines privatisations dans la sous-région montre que pour aboutir, les réformes structurelles doivent être soutenues par la mise en place d'un partenariat équilibré entre les sociétés cotonnières et les producteurs solidairement responsables des performances de la filière. La construction d'un tel partenariat adosse à des interprofessions exige des organisations de producteurs à caractère professionnel autonomes à la fois financièrement et techniquement. Or la mise sur pied d'un réseau performant d'organisations de producteurs reste un objectif irréaliste si elle ne s'appuie pas sur un nombre suffisant de personnes alphabétisées.</li> <li>▪ L'amélioration de la qualité du coton graine passe par l'amélioration des conditions de récolte et de stockage, mais l'évacuation du produit à temps et dans de bonnes conditions constitue une garantie de meilleure qualité pour laquelle la réhabilitation et l'entretien des pistes cotonnières est stratégique.</li> <li>▪ La mise en place d'un mécanisme de soutien s'avère nécessaire pour atténuer l'amplitude des variations des revenus des producteurs. En effet, le maintien du niveau des cours mondiaux à 59 cents/lb et une poursuite de la dépréciation du dollar par rapport au franc CFA ne permettront pas de respecter le prix de campagne tel que déterminé dans le cadre du protocole d'accord de janvier 2005.</li> <li>▪ Pour le court et le moyen terme, il n'existe pas d'alternative à la culture du coton: malgré son caractère peu rémunérateur dans certains cas, les producteurs la poursuivent car c'est la seule culture qui bénéficie d'un prix fixe à l'avance et qui garantit l'accès au crédit agricole et donc aux intrants. Il importe donc dans un premier temps de travailler à la consolidation de la filière coton et à l'amélioration de sa productivité, en prenant en compte les besoins d'une diversification qui ne pourra se faire que sur le moyen et long terme.</li> </ul> <p>L'objectif global finalement retenu par rapport à la nécessité de réformer la filière en vue de restaurer sa compétitivité et sa viabilité financière et institutionnelle, est de "Mener à terme le processus de réforme de la filière coton afin de rétablir la compétitivité et durabilité sur les marchés internationaux"(Synthèse de projet).</p> <p>L'objectif spécifique est d' « Améliorer les performances institutionnelles et économiques de la filière coton » qui est décliné en 3 objectifs :</p> <p>Objectif n° 1: Mener à terme le processus de réforme engagé: conclusion du processus de filialisation et de la privatisation de la CMDT, mise en place des organes de régulation de la filière, comprenant un mécanisme de fixation des prix aux producteurs et un fonds de soutien en cas de baisse des prix mondiaux en dessous d'un seuil pivot..</p> <p>Objectif n° 2: Permettre aux producteurs d'acquérir une plus grande maîtrise de la</p>
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	<p>filrière, d'en assumer le rôle de catalyseur et de renforcer leur contrôle sur le processus de réforme Objectif n° 3: Procéder à la réhabilitation/ reconstruction d'environ 350 à 400 km de pistes dans les zones où les perspectives de développement de la production sont importantes et dont l'enclavement compromet sérieusement la sortie à temps et dans de bonnes conditions de la production récoltée» ((Synthèse de projet et fiche d'identification, §5)).</p> <p><i>Sources : CF, FIP, PS</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The project is clearly focused on identified needs: Export performance is limited in the region by very high costs of shipping. As a result the focus on competitiveness must address the issues of 'increasing production efficiencies to reduce costs and increase margins, downstream processing, value adding and improved packaging to reduce the volume and maintain the quality of products in transit.'</p> <p><i>Source: IF</i></p> <p>Which needs: The MR assesses the OO And PP relevance to needs as excellent (grading a): '(...) This pilot project responds directly to the needs of the target groups, i.e. of regional producers of agriculture and forestry (AGFOR) products for export and of all those people who benefit directly or indirectly from the economic activity generated by these producers and exporters.'</p> <p>How: The project has a logframe which presents the logic of the intervention with OO, PP, results and activities addressing identified needs. According to the MR the activities, outputs and outcomes planned are appropriate to achieve the PP but the "results" indicated in the logframe are really outcomes) and the concrete outputs of the project are not all mentioned. "This can be explained by the fact that, this being a pilot project, the activities are described in relatively general terms, which only become defined more concretely and in greater detail once the needs of the firms with whom the project works have been clearly established.'</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>Programming and formulation documents do not explicitly show which needs are intended to be responded to and how the proposed interventions will address these needs at macro-economic and commodity sector level.</p> <p>However, the ICART regional programme's formulation is based on a lengthy interactive process. At the request of SADC members States, the first long term strategy for research priorities on food, agriculture and natural resources in the region was prepared by a team of consultants for SADC between 1993 and 1997. In 2000, The SADC coordinating Unit for research decided to embark upon a strategic planning process and a Five-Year Strategic Plan is the outcome of extensive consultations with experts and stakeholders.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p> <p>Taking into consideration comments from researchers during the MTR mission (2008), it seems that the objectives of the ICART programme have been designed without sufficient consultation with the agricultural researchers in the SADC region, even although the National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) were envisaged to be the</p>

	<p>principal stakeholders. One indication of this is the organisation of the first stakeholder workshop <u>after</u> the finalisation of the programming documents.</p> <p>The overall objectives of the ICART programme are in line with SADC/EC policies namely NEPAD and RISDP. The project purpose is formulated in an unspecific manner and cannot possibly be the result of a proper problem analysis based on felt needs of agricultural researchers in the region being the main target groups or beneficiaries.</p> <p><i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, pages 8 and 17</i></p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Le projet semble avoir été bien préparé, prenant en compte les besoins et les contraintes de la population mais 'Le bien fondé du projet repose sur une analyse fine du milieu et des besoins des populations. Il a déployé une activité importante, et recueille l'adhésion de tous mais on peut craindre une certaine dispersion.' En réalité c'est la soutenabilité à plus LT du projet qui semble être problématique et requérir un recentrement des préoccupations sur les thématiques principales du projet (certification bio, équitable)</p> <p><i>Source : MR</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.</p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA impact evaluation report concludes that needs of countries had been identified and interventions were proposed to address those needs.</p> <p>The country strategies for improving competitiveness were generally cognisant of changing market conditions and needs. However, the initial focus on improving competitiveness in Belize and the Windward Islands was not valid and projects were reoriented after a few years.</p> <p><i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 10, htsp, 2008.</i></p>
<b>I.9.1.3</b>	<p>Explicit reference in programming documents of Commission interventions to measures ensuring sustainability such as the participation of key stakeholders when designing programmes and projects</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Les programmes PACICC, le PDR MoungoNkam ainsi que les autres actions agricoles non nécessairement focalisées sur café/cacao reposent sur l'approche participative et l'implication des parties prenantes dès la conception des programmes.</p> <p>In Cameroon, ATF (Assistance Technique et Financière) programme documents for banana support include a chapter on sustainability, starting from the year 2002. Sustainability is considered in terms of economic viability, national policy, protection of the environment, institutional capacities and social issues.</p> <p><i>Source : ATF financing agreements, 1999-2008</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Programming documents mention that the first key activity area is the participatory strategy development. This activity area will be organised through a highly engaging all key stakeholders of a commodity chain (input providers, farmers, producer organisations, trade organisations, collectors, aggregators, transport and warehouse providers, wholesalers, processors, exporters, retailers, buying agents, and relevant parts</p>

	<p>of governmental authorities) in diagnosing the sector, identifying and analysing options, and developing responses. In addition, the situation of producers will be at the centre of the analysis, and major efforts will be placed on ensuring effective producer participation in the process.</p> <p><i>Source : Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-IF</b>	<p>There is no such reference in the FA. On the contrary, the evaluation of the previous programme actually pointed out the problem of sustainability: the project provides assistance in negotiations and MTS but it doesn't build capacities in ACPs to deal themselves with these issues. (this point was raised by the mid-term evaluation and by the final evaluation of trade.com: are ACP countries better able now to enter and successfully complete trade negotiations?)</p> <p><i>Source: Evaluations MTS and Trade.com</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The Financing Agreement of the PIP mentions that the fourth component of the programme is meant to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the PIP's activities. It also mentions that among the factors ensuring viability of the programme, the main stakeholders of the PIP are implicated in the programme, as they already were in the feasibility studies beforehand.</p> <p><i>Source: Pesticides Initiative Programme Financing Agreement, pages 17 &amp; 20.</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>At country level the EC AMSP strategy is a response of the EC to the National Adaptation Strategy (NAS) produced by the Government (most frequently with assistance of consultants provided by the EC). Governments were requested to prepare the NAS in close cooperation with all stakeholders.</p> <p>Implementation of the NAS, with support of the AMSP, should allow SP countries to sustainably adjust to the situation created by the price reduction of their sugar exports to the EU and to the loss of their preferential access to the EU market.</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p><b>L'intervention précise comment la durabilité sera assurée après l'action et peut inclure les aspects liés aux activités nécessaires de suivi, les stratégies d'intégration, l'appropriation, etc., s'il y a lieu</b> (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 28</i>) :</p> <p>Le principe de base du projet est de n'intervenir que sur les aspects formation et conseil en se limitant au financement des équipements et matériaux pédagogiques qui les accompagnent. L'objectif est de ne pas créer de distorsions de marché et de ne pas induire les opérateurs économiques dans des erreurs d'appréciation de la réalité économique, par l'octroi trop aisé de subventions ou d'équipements inadaptés aux besoins des acteurs. L'appui à la rédaction de business plan permettra le renforcement des capacités économiques des opérateurs locaux et l'accompagnement à la recherche de financement permettra d'orienter les porteurs de projets vers les institutions compétentes.</p> <p>La formation dispensée permettra une meilleure valorisation des populations. L'émancipation économique est visée grâce à la création d'activités génératrices de revenu. L'amélioration des compétences techniques, économiques et organisationnelles des acteurs se traduira par une augmentation générale des revenus, avec une création de valeur ajoutée par la transformation locale des produits. Les techniques améliorées de transformation agro-alimentaire, la performance accrue en termes de qualité et</p>

	<p>d'hygiène, le conditionnement selon les normes technico-sanitaires en vigueur permettront aux acteurs d'acquérir de nouveaux marchés. Les revenus et les emplois seront améliorés et développés dans ce secteur d'activité actuellement sous-exploité. L'organisation politique et économique des acteurs améliorera leur capacité de négociation à l'échelle locale et nationale, négociation politique et économique.</p> <p>Le potentiel de production du Burkina Faso est important. D'autres groupements ou opérateurs privés pourront bénéficier des améliorations apportées par le projet. Particulièrement : les femmes formées vont devenir formatrices. Les changements dans le process de transformation amélioreront la qualité et la diffusion des standards permettra à d'autres acteurs de s'investir dans la filière. Le transfert de technologie vers d'autres régions sera relativement facile à réaliser car le matériel utilisé sera produit sur place, suite à une action complémentaire visant la formation d'artisans locaux à la fabrication et à l'entretien des équipements.</p> <p><b>L'intervention précise également la durabilité financière</b> (Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 28-29) :</p> <p>Les études préalables réalisées montrent que l'activité de décortilage de la noix de cajou est socialement acceptable par les femmes. Bien que l'activité soit difficile (présence d'un baume corrosif dans la coque des noix), les groupements voient dans cette activité une opportunité économique et sociale. Des solutions sont imaginées par les groupements en fonction de leurs habitudes.</p> <p>L'intégration des groupements dans les circuits économiques certifiés permettra une viabilité économique du projet et favorisera l'autonomie des groupements lors de la phase-clé de la commercialisation des produits. L'accès à des marchés d'exportation, via les circuits d'économie sociale et solidaire, est une opportunité réelle pour les groupements. Les démarches certifiées exigent des compétences précises, ce projet vise à favoriser le transfert de ces compétences. De plus, les prix de vente des amandes sur les réseaux du commerce équitable assurent une rentabilité du décortilage (3,3 USD/lb) et les préfinancements obtenus couvrent les besoins de fonds de roulement.</p> <p>L'engagement auprès des OP d'acteurs internationaux (sociétés importatrices de produits du commerce équitable en Europe) ou l'obtention de contrats avec des exportateurs (ex OLAM) permettra aux OP de poursuivre la commercialisation de leurs produits dans des conditions maîtrisées.</p> <p>Le renforcement de la capacité de gestion des groupes, et de leurs capacités d'analyse économique doit permettre l'autonomie des groupements à la fin du projet.</p> <p>Les équipements qui seront retenus pour le kit de décortilage seront choisis sur des critères de reproductibilité. Ils pourront, pour la plupart d'entre eux, être fabriqués et réparés par des entreprises locales.</p> <p>On notera enfin que sur le plan énergétique, l'autonomie sera en grande partie assurée ; la démonstration est faite que pour l'opération qui consomme le plus d'énergie, à savoir la fragilisation des coques par chauffage, les coques des noix servent utilement de combustible en lieu et place du fuel (consommé par certaines unités industrielles).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No. Whereas institutional sustainability is an objective of the Commission's interventions, projects are not designed with a clear view of longer-term perspectives or of how support may be provided beyond project termination. Most institutions supported are therefore not sustainable, while sustainable involvement in profitable production and trade activities by the productive sectors benefiting from Commission</p>

	<p>assistance is generally not guaranteed.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Le PAFFIC permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FdL).</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Selon le cadre logique de l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde, les mesures assurant la durabilité de l'intervention relèvent plutôt de l'élaboration de guides d'information et de formations techniques et gestionnaires. Il n'y a aucune référence à la participation éventuelle de parties prenantes dans l'élaboration du projet.</p> <p><i>Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'intervention commenté</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>In the CSSP I the programme funding was 25% for the Commission and the rest from GoG. The evaluation of 2005 points out that this financing scheme was highly relevant to the sustainability of the programme.</p> <p><i>Source: Agrifor 2005</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Peu de références à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés</p> <p>Le MR souligne qu'il existe des mécanismes d'appropriation par les bénéficiaires (contribution par remboursement de 40% de l'investissement à APROMAC (Association des Professionnels du Caoutchouc Naturel en Côte d'Ivoire). (<i>Source : MR p.2</i>)</p> <p>Le MR cite également que « la période 2010-2011 sera déterminante pour la pérennisation des acquis de l'hévéa et le lancement des bases pour le palmier » (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>La <b>durabilité</b> de l'intervention au point de vue des aspects financier, économique, institutionnel et socioculturel est présentée. (<i>Source : Annexe I p. 14</i>).</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not directly tackle agricultural commodities. Formulation documents do not evidence that specific measures ensuring sustainability have been foreseen at design stage. However, the mid-term evaluation evidenced that the project has been designed in a participatory way with the implication of the public and private sectors as well as of the civil society. It also stressed that as of design stage, designers, operators and beneficiaries knew that all the resources needed to implement all the activities foreseen were not provided by the programme.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Proposition de financement n°9 ACP CM 18</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006</i>  <i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme</i></p>

	<p><i>d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p> <p><i>Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010</i></p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The identification of the programme “Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean” has been the object of a diagnostic study and of a feasibility study which proposed three action plans (Guyana, Suriname and Regional). For the diagnostic and feasibility studies, “<i>the consultants met with stakeholders of the rice industry (producers, millers, traders –both relating to the domestic or external market-), met with representatives of local authorities relating with the industry, of the banking community and of developmental organisations.</i>” The various monitoring reports also stressed that “<i>the diagnostic has been appraised by all stakeholders interviewed</i>”.</p> <p>The FA also devotes a specific section on “<i>factors ensuring sustainability</i>”: in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>“ownership of beneficiaries through a contribution of beneficiaries in all the phases of the project identification;</i></li> <li>▪ <i>institutional and management capacity : implementation of the programme in collaboration with the Caribbean Rice Association and two Ministries of Agriculture in Guyana and Suriname which have established track records in delivering services to the industry;</i></li> <li>▪ <i>economic and financial sustainability: after consolidating the industry in terms of agricultural yield, processing efficiency, quality management, the sector could be confident to face the competition of the global markets”.</i></li> </ul> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Agrotec Spa, “Diagnostic Study of the CARIFORUM rice industry”, 2001, pages 2-3</i>  <i>Agrotec Spa, “Feasibility study of the CARIFORUM rice industry”, 2003</i>  <i>European Commission, Monitoring Reports dated 05/12/2005, 02/11/2006 and 04/01/2008</i>  <i>FA, Pages 9-10</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The West Indies Rum and Spirit Producers Association (WIRSPA), which is the association representing Caribbean rum producers, was closely involved in the design of the Caribbean Rum programme and was entrusted with its implementation.</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>The measures ensuring sustainability are presented (<i>Source: FP p.10,11</i>) :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ownership by beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Cross sectoral sustainability</li> <li>▪ National policy measures</li> <li>▪ Institutional and Management capacity</li> <li>▪ Complementarity and sectoral coordination between donors</li> <li>▪ Economic and financial sustainability</li> </ul>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>One of the goals of the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II is to attain sustainable cocoa farming practices. The training sessions are supposed to give the farmers sufficient capacity to ensure sustainable production themselves.</p> <p>The programme also supports demand-driven research on cocoa farming systems.</p> <p>The programme’s Financing Proposal also mentions that the support will include participation of all stakeholders in the commodity chain to elaborate the strategy.</p>

	<i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Proposal, pages 2, 15 &amp; 18.</i>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme Financing Agreement includes an annex on “measures ensuring sustainability”. In the annex, it refers to several measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ownership by beneficiaries: The project includes many stakeholders, beneficiaries and target groups.</li> <li>▪ Cross-sectoral sustainability: The project is supposed to impact on poverty reduction and food safety enhancement. Measures are considered complementary to those established by other African Union bodies. The project will also ensure an equal gender distribution among beneficiaries.</li> <li>▪ National/Regional policy measures: The programme is considered to be in line with the strategic plan of the African Union Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (AU-DREA)</li> <li>▪ Complementarity and sectoral coordination between donors: The main implementing institutions have established synergies and close coordination with Regional Economic Communities and donors. The FA states that “<i>Coordination of donor activities related to the PAN-SPSO project is to be ensured through a Steering Committee (SC) that will be chaired by the AU Directorate of Rural Economy and Agriculture</i>”.</li> <li>▪ Economic and social situation: Although this point is mentioned in the “measures ensuring sustainability” annex, there is no link between the point and sustainability of the programme.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, pages 37 to 39.</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The issue of sustainability, which should have been raised as regards the “Centres de Services Agricoles” and the “Fonds Régionaux de Développement Agricole” is not addressed in the TAPs of PASAM1 and PASAM2.
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>La privatisation des filiales issues de la CMDT est assortie d’une participation des producteurs à leur capital. Cette participation fait partie de la conditionnalité de décaissement de la seconde tranche fixe (BCS, §2, Monitoring Report, p 2).</p> <p><i>Source :ROM/BCS, Monitoring report</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>‘Sustainability is part of the project design from three different but complementary points of view. First, the project tries to ensure that the enterprises chosen have immediate and clear succession strategies, to ensure continuity. Secondly, the fact that the project will work directly with producers and enterprises means that they will own the benefits associated with improvements made by the project to their efficiency, which will ensure the sustainability of those improvements. In this case the phase out / hand over strategy can easily be implemented (once the firms are considered to be ready), since it is in the direct interest of the beneficiaries to maintain the benefits that result from project improvements. Finally, the regional implementing agency, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and also PACP governments are committed to ensure the project delivers long-term benefits from the scaling up of its activities.’</p> <p>Key stakeholders are involved in the design of the specific project interventions rather than the overall project design. The sustainability strategy is clearly understood and strongly supported by the project partners, including both SPC and government agencies.</p>



	<i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>There is no such explicit reference in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report, except that the ICART regional programme's formulation is based on a lengthy interactive process.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p> <p>The EC Delegation and SADC were closely involved in the reformulation of ICART 1 but local stakeholders at SADC MS level had not been consulted on a larger scale; most of the NARS still have little knowledge about the ICART programme.</p> <p><i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, page 17</i></p>
<b>SN-ONG</b>	<p>Les besoins de la population ont été pris en compte mais la soutenabilité à plus LT du projet pose problème et requérir un recentrement des préoccupations sur les thématiques principales du projet (certification bio, équitable) car les activités du projet sont trop éparpillées. Le MR note la viabilité potentielle seulement B.</p> <p><i>Source : MR</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG-COF</b>	The project was identified and formulated by a Dutch NGO (Solidaridad) as a response to a Call for Proposals.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>“Stakeholder consultation lies at the heart of both components of this intervention. It was a key methodology employed in the development of both programmes and is also being closely adhered to during implementation. For example, under NAADS the capacity of farmers' groups and fora is developed by providing them with training in group dynamics, in participatory planning, in the administration of funds and in contracting services, with the intention of making them effective and articulate partners in both programmes.”</p> <p>SBS Financing Proposal</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The Producer Organisation Project II (POP2) financial agreement states that a participatory approach will be followed, taking due account of the specific socio-cultural aspects of the stakeholders.</p> <p>The financing agreement also states that, since the POP2 is a continuation of a pre-existing project (financed by the French ministry of foreign affairs), it could base itself on the lessons learnt to ensure sustainability of the project. However the project's third monitoring report states that some of the same mistakes of the POP1 were repeated in the POP2.</p> <p><i>Sources: Producer Organisation Project II, Financing Agreement, page 14. Producer Organisation Project II, Monitoring Report 3, sustainability sheet.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	The SFA impact evaluation report states that the actual stakeholder/beneficiary and country contribution were appropriate but modest at best compared to what was agreed in the Financing Agreements and Technical and Administrative Provisions. It is therefore a proof that stakeholders were involved in the design of the projects.

	<i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, page 21, htspc, 2008.</i>
<b>I.9.1.4</b>	Views of stakeholders on appropriateness of needs identified and on the priorities chosen with respect to the needs identified as well as on their ownership of Commission-funded activities
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>Le point de départ des activités du programme AAACP sont les ateliers régionaux de lancement (kick-off). Sur base de ces consultations, les agences d'implémentation (FAO, BM, CFC, ITC, UNCTAD) développent les activités. Il y a des allers-retours entre ces agences d'implémentation et les bénéficiaires. Cela rassure d'avoir l'aval des bénéficiaires. Le processus est bien huilé pour s'assurer que l'on répond aux besoins des bénéficiaires.</p> <p><i>Source : Meeting note reference number MN 641</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Globalement, le programme STABEX a contribué directement ou indirectement à la réalisation de l'objectif <u>de lutte contre la pauvreté</u>, tant au travers d'une consolidation de certaines filières, dans l'attente d'une éventuelle diversification, que de contributions budgétaires significatives et exceptionnelles à destination des producteurs. Le <u>Stabex 1999 est contributif de la politique sectorielle de la Côte d'Ivoire</u>. Selon l'évaluation Stabex, le choix des secteurs d'intervention se trouve parfaitement justifié, même si on peut apprécier diversement l'adaptation des budgets de certaines opérations.</p> <p>Source : Eval Stabex 2009</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>According to stakeholders from the coffee and cocoa sector, the EC support (and other donors support) is guided by their own priorities rather than the real needs of the sector.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 913</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	No information has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>No details could be found to assess the manner in which needs had been responded to in the programming and formulation documents of CSSP I. However the final evaluation of CSSP I notes that despite detailed analysis, the project failed to establish the wider links between the issue being supported (diseased trees) and the structural problems faced by the sector: <i>'the technical, economic and social problems that accompany the replanting of cocoa farms were not addressed in the CSSVD/DCP. In other words, the CSSVD/DCP was carried out like if the control of the CSSVD was a specific and separate issue, regardless of the others structural problems faced by the sector. The fact that the complexity and interactions between these different factors (ageing population, ageing cocoa tree stock, end of the "pioneer phase") were not sufficiently integrated within the programme has certainly hampered the achievement of its overall purpose of increased national production. This is even more regrettable that these structural problems were already well identified, analysed and stressed in the support documents to programme's planning.'</i> (Agrifor page 39)</p> <p>Apart from 'missing links' in the project to achieve higher cocoa output, the problem of lack of identification of potential higher producers was also underlined in the final evaluation: the project did not differentiate farmers by holding size or ability to pick up the new husbandry practices and those that had potential to raise productivity (as it is most of the programme's beneficiaries were old cocoa farmers who uprooted but has</p>

	<p>little interest in replanting).</p> <p>And in its conclusions: <i>‘The mission concludes that the EU/Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme was highly relevant to the national development policies and to the constraints faced by the sector and it is contributing to the overarching policy objectives of poverty reduction. The programme emphasis was on the control of the CSSVD, which one of the main structural problems faced by the cocoa sector in Ghana. The other specific objectives of the programme concerning the Seed Production Unit and the Cocoa Research Institute were all very relevant with Ghana cocoa policy objectives.</i></p> <p><i>However the programme should have allocated more resources to the problem of rehabilitation of old cocoa growing areas and/or replacement of old cocoa farms (less than 1% of total budget). It should also have better integrated the specific technical and socio-economic constraints caused by the end of the expansion phase of cocoa development in Ghana.’</i></p> <p><i>Source: Agrifor 2005.</i></p>
<p><b>MG</b> <b>coffee</b></p>	<p>vanilla</p> <p>D’une part, la <b>création des FRDA-CSA</b> vise à doter Madagascar d’un outil de développement agricole impliquant l’ensemble des parties prenantes (bailleurs, gouvernement, agriculteurs, prestataires de services) et d’autre part, les <b>projets Stabex</b> ont appuyé les principales filières de produits d’exportation. Ces deux approches sont potentiellement complémentaires et sont cohérentes vis-à-vis des besoins identifiés au niveau du secteur agricole.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Le Programme d’Action pour la Sécurité Alimentaire a débouché sur le PASAM et la création des <b>Centres de Services Agricoles (CSA)</b> et des <b>Fonds de Développement Régionaux Agricoles (FRDA)</b> dans 6 régions. Les CSA ont un rôle de facilitation : trouver qui peut répondre aux besoins des producteurs agricoles (Source : MN 804). L’ensemble des 36 districts ont un CSA. CSA est l’outil technique. FRDA sont l’outil financier. (Source : MN 805).</li> <li>• <b>Projets Stabex</b> : lorsque l’ensemble des problèmes et des besoins afférant au secteur agricole (production, qualité, transformation, commercialisation,...) sont pris en compte et que l’ensemble des intervenants sont impliqués (producteurs, collecteurs, exportateurs, autorités communales,...), l’appropriation des activités entreprises par une agence exécutive ont de plus grandes chances de perdurer dans le temps.</li> </ul> <p>En effet, ces dimensions ont été prises en compte de manière coordonnée dans certaines interventions <u>au niveau local</u> dont celles d’AIM (Association Intercoopération Madagascar) financé sous Stabex avec 4 résultats : augmenter la production / améliorer la qualité des produits (en partant des semences) / organiser le marché local / développer la vanille bio. Les objectifs étaient les mêmes pour la vanille, le girofle et le café dans deux districts, l’un principalement vanille et l’autre girofle. Le café intéresse beaucoup moins les paysans de la région. (Source : MN 806).</p> <p>Toutefois, comme indiqué ci-après (I.9.1.5), ce projet reste une exception (cela n’est pas le cas de la grande majorité des interventions).</p> <p>En outre, la Délégation estime que les différents instruments sont complémentaires. En effet, l’idéal serait de continuer Stabex, lignes budgétaires (banane, sucre et sécurité alimentaire) et FED car cela permet d’avoir un <u>mix d’outils</u> (appui budgétaire, interventions,...) qui permettent de <u>prendre en compte l’ensemble des problèmes affectant le secteur agricole</u> malgache (formation, production, qualité, organisation marché, secteur privé, foncier, infrastructures, décentralisation,...) (Source : MN 804 et debriefing Délégation).</p>

<b>TZ Tea</b>	<p>In the tea sector it appears that the EC has not identified the sector's constraints and needs. There is no institutional memory about the justification of the EU support to research. From the current perspective, there are two main problems which are linked: (i) the price of green leaf to smallholder growers and (ii) the link between factories and smallholder growers. The sector's dynamics (including institutional and policy frameworks) have not been properly assessed by the EU so that the focus has been put on research rather than on addressing the fundamental problem of price of green leaf and stake of shareholders in the processing which is stopping smallholder produce from increasing.</p> <p>Focus on research doesn't give farmers effective support. Constraints to the sector are (i) extension services are non-existent; (ii) the Tea Board is very weak and there is no effective regulation and most importantly (iii) the GL price has been set at very low levels. This has not been addressed by EU support.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN697</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p><u>Needs and priorities</u></p> <p>The PMA (plan for Modernization of Agriculture) was considered by the EC and other donors as a well designed, although over-ambitious, strategy for the development of the agricultural sector. Joint evaluations of the PMA took place between 2002 and 2008. The EC supported the GoU agricultural strategy (PMA) in 2001, which benefited among others crops to agricultural commodities, of which coffee. The EC support to PMA focussed on research (NARO-National Agricultural Research Organisation) and extension (NAADS-National Agricultural Advisory Services) with a view of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector. The support to PMA was a multi-donors support (Source: MN 301).</p> <p>At commodity level, the lack of reliable statistical data is an impediment to an identification of the country's needs, problems and issues. However some donors (e.g. USDA) carry out reviews of value chains and the coffee organisation (UCDA) is producing monthly reports. (Source : debriefing)</p> <p><u>Stakeholders' ownership</u></p> <p>Most of the stakeholders seem to be (very) satisfied with the EC approaches. Indeed, few negative comments have been received except regarding the EU procedures that are viewed as heavy (it takes up to 6 months before money is disbursed) (Source: MN 306). Indeed, other stakeholders highlight that the EC has to cope with a heavy bureaucracy but they are doing well (Source: MN 309).</p> <p>Generally speaking, the EC support seems to be appreciated. Some stakeholders highlight the fact that Uganda doesn't respect the Maputo declaration: (10% of GDP should be allocated to agricultural research). This is not respected by most African governments expect the Burkina Faso (???). Uganda is indeed far away (around 5%). In this context, these stakeholders are very thankful for EC support to research and extension commitments (Sources: MN 306 and 310).</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The various monitoring reports acknowledge local ownership for the four project components. The final evaluation however points out that one of the component (technical assistance and expertise) suffered from a lack of ownership which resulted in</p>

	<p>the failure to deliver expected results (e.g national sector policies and strategies for both countries have not been developed).</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>European Commission, Monitoring Reports dated 05/12/2005, 02/11/2006 and 04/01/2008</i>  <i>SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009</i></p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Le rapport ROM relève des contradictions. En effet, d'une part l'Etat s'est proclamé prêt à faire sortir le Mali de l'impasse de l'implication étatique dans une filière pour que celle-ci puisse devenir compétitive dans le contexte du marché mondial du coton. Cependant, les multiples acteurs concernés par l'action, notamment ceux de l'environnement CMDT, se voient menacés dans leur existence et résistent au changement. Ces acteurs ont exprimé de sérieuses réserves envers la libéralisation de la filière coton et se caractérisent plutôt comme des adeptes d'une attitude interventionniste (BCS, §1.3)</p> <p>On peut également noter que le rapport ROM mentionne que la communication entre la DELCE et les parties prenantes, notamment la MRSC n'est pas très étroite et caractérisée par un certain formalisme cauteux, qui va à l'encontre d'un échange d'idées. Ici, le rapport ROM souligne le rôle facilitateur de l'ordonnateur national du FED, qui à plusieurs reprises semble avoir pu débloquent des impasses de communication (BCS, §2.4).</p> <p><i>Source :ROM/BCS</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	There is no such information in the programming documents, the ROM report, monitoring reports and in the Mid-Term Evaluation report.
<b>I.9.1.5</b>	Views of Commission and other donors on the stakeholders' ownership
<b>BF</b>	<p>Depuis le 8<sup>ie</sup> et la 9<sup>ie</sup> FED, la tendance de la Commission européenne est de s'aligner sur les priorités du Gouvernement du Burkina Faso. Dans ce cadre, il est difficile d'influencer les décisions de support du Gouvernement sur base des visions stratégiques développées à partir de Bruxelles (CE, siège), dont notamment les Communications relatives aux produits de base agricoles.</p> <p>Les faiblesses relevées par l'évaluation du PAOSA (2007) en ce qui concerne les capacités du Gouvernement (plus précisément les services de l'agriculture) à améliorer la gestion institutionnelle ont influencé les orientations du CSP/PIN 2008-2013, qui n'ont pas inclus l'agriculture comme secteur de concentration. <i>Source : MN 572</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Selon l'évaluation Stabex, le choix du programme est allé, au mieux et à raison, vers des <u>associations professionnelles ou des organisations professionnelles</u> pour contourner certaines difficultés. Mais ce choix s'est effectué en minorant la qualité des garanties (risques techniques et financiers) qu'ils pouvaient apporter. Les problématiques d'<u>appropriation locale et de capacités d'absorption</u> sont étroitement liées aux <u>capacités de mise en œuvre</u> des projets. Des lors qu'une action emporte des réalisations et des avancées significatives, l'appropriation est immédiate. La question de capacités d'absorption dans un pays en crise politique, sociale et économique peut sembler incongrue. Des lors que l'on travaille sur des secteurs économiques avec des opérateurs professionnels (même au travers d'associations professionnelles), les capacités d'absorption sont réelles. On devrait associer à la problématique des capacités de mise en œuvre, celle de la capacité d'adéquation des procédures en vigueur.</p>

	Source : Eval Stabex 2009
<b>CR</b>	No information has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>MG</b>	La Délégation réfléchit actuellement à la manière d'orienter ses soutiens (appuis sectoriels, approches filières, appui budgétaire) étant donné, de manière générale et à l'exception de quelques interventions, l'évaluation très négative des interventions passées en termes d'efficacité et de durabilité qui sous-entendent des problèmes d'appropriation (Source : MN 802 et débriefing)
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p>The provision of budget support to the PMA (plan for Modernization of Agriculture) <u>implementation relied on the assumption that the government had the adequate implementation capacity</u>. This assumption was not fully verified notably as regards inter-agencies cooperation. EC support to the PMA secretariat was meant to address this issue (Source: MN 301 and 313).</p> <p>The EC recently took the decision to withdraw its support to NAADS because the GoU has undertaken to deeply change the nature of the extension service. NAADS is now used to provide farmers for free with fertilizers and other inputs. Farmers groups at local level are chaired by the head of the ruling party. Etc. (Source: MN 301).</p> <p>A key component of the <u>Coffee Farmers Alliance support project was the constitution of producer organisations at village, parish and national level</u> through the Stabex support (Source: MN 308).</p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Le premier PRSP du Vanuatu date de 2006. Avant la coopération se basait sur des plans. Il n'y avait pas de PRSP en 2004. La politique générale du Vanuatu (PAA) est une <i>shopping list</i> sans priorités. La Déclaration de Paris ne fonctionne pas pour le Vanuatu. Le gouvernement ne voulait plus d'assistance technique pour le 10<sup>i</sup>e FED. Alors, aucune assistance technique n'a été proposée. Rien ne se fait et l'argent n'est pas encore engagé. Le Gouvernement demande maintenant une assistance technique pour les appuyer.</p> <p>Source : MN 1015 &amp; MN 1067</p>
<b>J.9.2</b>	<b><i>The choice of interventions is aligned with the policy objectives and priorities of the beneficiary country's national strategy</i></b>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Le plus souvent, il y a eu alignement sur les objectifs et priorités du Gouvernement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Dans le secteur coton, la Commission européenne à travers le PAFFIC et les fonds STABEX: appui à la stratégie de sortie de crise</li> <li>▪ Le PAOSA s'est aligné sur le « Document de stratégie de Développement rural – A l'Horizon 2015 »</li> <li>▪ Alignement pour les interventions du Programme Tous ACP</li> </ul>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Les produits agricoles sont une priorité du Gouvernement (officiellement depuis 2004-2005 au moins), tout produit confondu, pas seulement les produits d'exportation. Par contre, l'absence du secteur agricole au niveau du PIN ne correspond pas au souhait du Gouvernement même si ce fait n'est pas écrit mais a seulement été mentionné à diverses reprises par différents interlocuteurs ministériels et autres nationaux. Par contre, le Cameroun peine à publier sa stratégie de développement du secteur agricole et de l'élevage, dont la formulation a été appuyée par la CE (et d'autres bailleurs de fonds) depuis 2008.</p> <p>Pour la banane, les AFT sont accordés avec la stratégie nationale de maintien de la filière</p>

<b>GH overall</b>	The main programming takes place within the context of the JAS and is aligned to the national strategy. Within agriculture, the choice of interventions was rather dictated by punctual issues (disease control) and the support given took insufficient account of the wider perspective (replanting); this was corrected in the EDF supported project that followed on from the Stabex funded support and increased the relevance of the project to the national priorities.
<b>MG</b>	Oui pour la mise en place des FRDA-CSA. La création des CSA était prévue par le Plan National de Développement Rural et le gouvernement en assure le financement après que la Commission ait suspendu son aide. Non pour l'appui aux produits d'exportation dans la mesure où il n'y a pas de stratégie nationale pour ces produits
<b>TZ Tea</b>	In the tea sector it appears that the EC has not identified the sector's constraints and needs. There is no institutional memory about the justification of the EU support to research. From the current perspective, there are two main problems which are linked: (i) the price of green leaf to smallholder growers and (ii) the link between factories and smallholder growers. The sector's dynamics (including institutional and policy frameworks) have not been properly assessed by the EU so that the focus has been put on research rather than on addressing the fundamental problem of price of green leaf and stake of shareholders in the processing which is stopping smallholder produce from increasing.  Focus on research doesn't give farmers effective support. Constraints to the sector are (i) extension services are non-existent; (ii) the Tea Board is very weak and there is no effective regulation and most importantly (iii) the GL price has been set at very low levels. This has not been addressed by EU support.  <i>Sources: MN697</i>
<b>UG coffee</b>	The EC programmable aid devoted to agriculture has been aligned with the government PMA strategy. EC support to the coffee sector did not rely on a national strategy for the sector. However coffee development was addressed by the PMA in the framework of the enterprise priorities defined at zonal level.
<b>VU</b>	Il n'y a pas de stratégie de support au domaine agricole au Vanuatu. Mais, le plus souvent, les interventions ont été décidées en consultation avec le Gouvernement et/ou les parties prenantes du secteur agricole. L'intervention POPACA/ POP 2 est le résultat d'une approche top-down. Elle a été financée sur demande de la France (qui avait déjà mis en œuvre une première phase du projet). En ce qui concerne le Programme Tous ACP (FAO) et le programme régional FACT, l'organisation de producteurs bénéficiaire ( <i>Farm Support Association</i> ) a été consultée avant de définir les activités.
<b>I.9.2.1</b>	Existence in the programming documents of explicit reference to the country's national and commodity sector policy objectives and priorities
<b>BF</b>	Burkina Faso's development strategy is summarized in the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP. The third axis of the development strategy concerns reducing the vulnerability of the agricultural sector, intensifying and diversifying agricultural production, diversifying rural incomes, de-isolating rural communities, support to producer organisations and collective infrastructures, improving the working conditions of women and promoting education.

	<i>Source: Burkina Faso 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 61 &amp; 62</i>
<b>CM</b>	<p>La convention de financement du PACICC (2007) fait référence à des documents très généraux, tels que le DSRP 2003 ou l'initiative PPTE. Mais il n'est pas fait référence à une politique nationale ou sectorielle pour le café ou le cacao. En effet, la stratégie de développement de la filière café au Cameroun n'a été définie qu'en 2009 dans le cadre du programme Tout ACP.</p> <p>The ATF (Assistance Technique et Financière) support for the banana sector programme documents systematically refer to the country's strategy for bananas. The only mentioned objective is to improve the competitiveness of Cameroon bananas.</p> <p><i>Source : Cameroon banana ATF Financing Agreements, 1999-2008</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Yes. The main line of the evolving Commission's strategy of support to the Caribbean Region has been the construction and the strengthening of a regional integrated space. The characteristics of the region and the potential gains in terms of economies of scale make this objective compelling. <u>It is shared by the partners</u> and supported by historical developments.</p> <p>The <u>Commission's support has been coherent in its pursuit of the objective of constructing and strengthening a regional integrated space</u>. However, the selection of interventions is insufficiently based on systematic review of the progress of regional integration. It is difficult to demonstrate that the selected activities correspond to the real priorities. The strategy has shown good capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and environment, but has not been able to anticipate foreseeable changes.</p> <p>However, there is no explicit evidence regarding the agricultural commodities sector in the evaluation.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CAFR</b>	No support to agricultural commodities in the regional programme.
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's strategy and programming documents do not refer to the priorities or sector policy objectives of Cameroon regarding agricultural commodities.</p> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p><b>Pas d'infos concernant le secteur agricole dans le CSP 2008-2013.</b></p> <p><b>L'intégration des priorités et objectifs a été prise en compte lors du processus d'élaboration du DSP et du Programme indicatif national.</b></p> <p>A la suite de la rencontre de haut niveau de Ouagadougou en mars 2006, entre le Premier ministre et le Commissaire européen pour le Développement et l'Aide Humanitaire, la Côte d'Ivoire s'est engagée dans le processus d'élaboration de son Document de Stratégie Pays (DSP) dans un environnement marqué par la mise en veille</p>



	<p>de son processus DSRP</p> <p>avec la Banque mondiale. Le processus de <b>rédaction du DSP a démarré par le recueil des propositions des Ministères concernés en rapport avec leurs domaines respectifs de compétence et avec les directives de la note de cadrage pays qui a sanctionné la rencontre rappelée ci haut.</b> La <b>consolidation de ces différentes propositions revues</b> a été faite au cours d'un atelier organisé par la <b>Cellule de Coopération et de Coordination Cote d'Ivoire - Union européenne</b> en 2006 sous la présidence de la Primature. Pendant ces assises, quatre groupes de travail ont été constitués pour produire une <b>première version du DSP et du Programme indicatif national</b> autour de <b>trois secteurs de concentration</b> qui auraient été pré-identifiés: (i) sortie de crise et bonne gouvernance, (ii) lutte contre la pauvreté - réhabilitation des secteurs sociaux, (iii) réhabilitation des infrastructures économiques et inter connectivité. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.69).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p><b>Annex 4 of the 2003-2007 RSP details the CARIFORUM regional integration and development strategy (RIDS).</b> The RIDS notes that in the field of PSD and competitiveness <i>“Cariforum responds to challenges facing the agriculture, livestock, fisheries and agri-business sector by pursuing strategies at increasing competitiveness and through diversification for export. This involves improving production efficiencies, seeking higher added value, product and market diversification and promotion of adherence to international standards. With respect to the regional banana industry, the region pursues strategies intended to maximise existing opportunities and prepare for adjustments. The same strategy is pursued in respect of the rice industry. As regards the rum industry, the region, with the assistance of the EU, is pursuing a strategy to make a transition from bulk to branded exports in attempts to maintain and increase market shares.”</i></p> <p>Sources:  CARIFORUM-European Community, <i>Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007, annex 4, page 9</i>  European Community- Caribbean region, <i>Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>No more information than in CSP</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	No such references can be found in the East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean RSP/RIPs.
<b>ET</b>	<p>The response strategy presented here can be considered "joint" in that it has been informed by a Joint Country Diagnostic Survey carried out with Member States and provides a framework for both their and the EC's planned cooperation initiatives in Ethiopia along with the linkages between them. <b>All of these initiatives have been designed to align with the priorities of the Government's national poverty reduction strategy, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).</b> (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.41).</p> <p>This Joint Response Strategy based on the comparative advantages of the EC and the EU Member States, will promote better donor complementarity by working towards joint multi-annual programming <b>based on Ethiopia's strategies and processes</b>, common implementation mechanisms, joint donor- wide missions, and the use of co-financing arrangements. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.41).</p>

	<p>The Ethiopian government's development policies and programmes are described (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 6-7</i>).</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>Ghana's national strategy (the country's second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy or GRPS II) is overviewed in the 2008-2013 CSP and assessed. The CSP mentions that the GPRS II includes an Agriculture Sector Development Programme, and summarizes the key elements of the programme.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 25</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>The 2003-2007 CSP the 2001 PRSP in which agriculture and rural development was identified as the highest sectoral priority. In addition, the CSP explicitly refers to the Kenya Rural Development Strategy (KRDS) which recognises the need to continue with the liberalisation of key agricultural sub-sectors and, in this context, identifies a wide-ranging programme of policy, legislative and institutional reforms to be undertaken. This reflects the policy of gradual government withdrawal from much of the trading/production or direct participation and regulatory responsibilities now devolved to the respective commodity boards e.g. Coffee and Sugar Boards.</p> <p>In the EC Response Strategy, the support to rural development significantly notes the roles played by the tea, coffee, horticulture and fisheries sectors. The tea, horticulture and flower-growing sectors are amongst the most dynamic in the Kenyan economy. Very important is their contribution to poverty alleviation objectives, especially via the linkages with smallholders, acting in group (as in the ownership of many tea factories) or as suppliers to larger companies. They will continue to need support in capacity-building, especially to ensure that smallholders are fully participant in maintaining and improving on quality-control and production standards required by the export markets.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, page 13 and Annex 7</i></p> <p>The 2008-2013 EC response strategy is designed to support the Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA), an integrated multi-sectoral framework to develop the capacity of poor rural households to raise their incomes. The SRA intends to address the major challenges facing a large and multi-faceted agricultural system, supplying domestic and international markets. Among the strategic objectives of the SRA, creating an environment enabling the private sector to be the driving force behind agricultural development, with the government divesting from productive or commercial functions, remains a challenge. The EC support will be directed towards implementation of the SRA, in line with its strategic objectives, notably those related to agricultural commodity support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ create an enabling environment for agricultural development by reviewing the current legal and policy framework;</li> <li>▪ promote market and product development by taking a value chain approach;</li> <li>▪ improve extension, advisory, support and other services;</li> <li>▪ improve access to quality inputs and affordable credit for producers.</li> </ul> <p>The main SRA instruments are expected to be ready for implementation and funding from the national budget in financial year 2007/2008. Support will be provided to the emerging SWAP, preferably by sector budget support.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 37</i></p>

<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Pas d'infos concernant le secteur agricole dans le CSP 2008-2013.</b></p> <p>Le MAP a été conçu pour prendre le relais du DSRP (2003-2006) qui avait comme objectif central le développement rapide et durable de Madagascar et la réduction de moitié de la pauvreté entre 2003 et 2015. Le MAP constitue ainsi un programme innovant sur une période de cinq ans de 2007 à 2012 articulé autour de huit engagements clés décrits en annexe et qui seront mis en œuvre à travers les processus de planification annuelle de la Politique Générale de l'Etat et du Budget. L'élaboration des Plans Régionaux de Développement (PRD) en articulation avec le MAP au niveau des 22 régions mises en place afin de fournir une approche de développement de proximité plus efficace (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.65).</p> <p>Dans le cadre de son <b>agenda politique, le Gouvernement malgache</b> a déterminé 3 axes dont un est « améliorer les performances économiques au bénéfice des plus pauvres » avec quatre types d'actions en vue de multiplier les opportunités pour les plus pauvres : amélioration des infrastructures (routes et pistes, marchés, greniers communautaires, réseaux de communication, énergie et eau potable), <b>accroissement de la productivité du secteur agricole</b>, notamment celle de l'agriculture à petite échelle, promotion du micro-crédit, des micro-entreprises et des activités complémentaires comme <b>l'élevage à cycle court</b> et l'artisanat et enfin, développement des travaux et filières de production à haute intensité de main d'œuvre (Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.12).</p> <p>Le Plan d'Action pour le Développement Rural (PADR) a été institutionnalisé en 1999 et propose cinq orientations principales dont « <b>accroître et promouvoir la production agricole avec une utilisation et une gestion optimales et durables des ressources et des infrastructures</b> » (Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.10).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>Besides mentioning that food security and rural development are part of Mali's development strategy axes, there is no explicit reference to the country's commodity sector policy objectives and priorities.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 26</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP refers to the Pacific Plan for Regional Cooperation and Integration, which sets out the region's goals, which are</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic growth;</li> <li>▪ Sustainable development;</li> <li>▪ Good governance;</li> <li>▪ Security.</li> </ul> <p>The economic growth objective includes measures to increase trade in goods and services through the creation of regional trade agreements.</p> <p>There is however no reference the commodity sector policy.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 33 &amp; 34.</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>No such references can be found in the RSP/RIPs.</p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The 2001-2007 CSP makes the review of Government Sector Policies. There is no reference to a national agricultural commodity strategy as such, but to the draft agricultural sector development strategy (ASDS) to be finalised in 2001.</p>

	<i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 7-13</i>
<b>UG</b>	No such reference can be found in Uganda's CSP/NIPs.
<b>VU</b>	Vanuatu's development strategy is summarized and its main objectives are listed in Vanuatu's CSP/NIP. Commodity sector policy objectives and priorities are not mentioned.  <i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 26</i>
<b>WAF</b>	Le RSP/RIP de 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest n'explique pas toutes les priorités régionales du secteur agricole. Il mentionne seulement les axes de ces politiques (la PAU pour l'UEMOA et l'ECOWAP pour la CEDEAO) qui sont soutenus par le RIP, à savoir :  « - l'appui au processus de mise en oeuvre du Programme Régional d'Investissement Agricole; - la valorisation, la transformation et la gestion des ressources naturelles et agricoles, - la productivité et la compétitivité des filières agricoles ciblées; - le fonctionnement des cadres régionaux de concertation des filières agricoles; - la facilitation du commerce intra-régional des produits agricoles; - l'appui au dispositif pour la préparation et la conduite des négociations internationales agricoles; - la mise en place et le fonctionnement des systèmes d'information de marchés, y compris les statistiques agricoles, et d'aide à la décision. »  <i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, page 57</i>
<b>I.9.2.2</b>	Programming documents explicitly show how the Commission's priorities are aligned on the national and sectoral objectives
<b>BF</b>	European support does not concern agriculture or the commodity sector in the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP. Furthermore, the 2001-2007 CSP/NIP does not state how the Commission's priorities are aligned on the national and sectoral objectives.
<b>CAFR</b>	The RSP show how the choice of focal sectors is aligned with regional priorities but no support to agricultural commodities.  <i>SOURCE: RSP 2002-2007 and 2008-2013</i>
<b>CM</b>	<b>Commission's strategy and programming documents do not explicitly show how the support to agricultural commodities is aligned to national and sectoral objectives.</b> However, the programme foreseen under the second focal area "trade and regional integration" of the 2008-2013 CSP aiming to upgrade enterprises and reinforce the productive and export capacities of priority sectors for the economy mentions that it will support the elaboration of the national competitiveness strategy and rely on the relevant sector strategies. (NB: the first CSP (2001-2007) does not foresee support to the agricultural commodity sector). Cameroon's ATF programme documents (Assistance Technique et Financière for bananas) systematically refer to the national strategy to develop the banana value chain.  <i>Sources :</i> <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i> <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif</i>

	<p><i>national pour la période 2008-2013, page 33</i>  <i>Cameroon banana ATF Financing Agreements, 1999-2008</i></p>
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>The CSSP I final evaluation concludes on relevance: <i>‘The mission concludes that the EU/Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme was highly relevant to the national development policies and to the constraints faced by the sector and it is contributing to the overarching policy objectives of poverty reduction. The programme emphasis was on the control of the CSSVD, which one of the main structural problems faced by the cocoa sector in Ghana. The other specific objectives of the programme concerning the Seed Production Unit and the Cocoa Research Institute were all very relevant with Ghana cocoa policy objectives.</i></p> <p><i>However the programme should have allocated more resources to the problem of rehabilitation of old cocoa growing areas and/or replacement of old cocoa farms (less than 1% of total budget). It should also have better integrated the specific technical and socio-economic constraints caused by the end of the expansion phase of cocoa development in Ghana.’</i></p> <p><i>Source: Agrifor 2005</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p>La feuille de route pour l’harmonisation (point 2. Alignement) précise les mesures pour que <b>le soutien des donateurs repose sur les stratégies nationales de développement</b> (Source : annexe 6 CSP 2008-2013 p.70-73).</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission’s strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>No evidence in ECS for commodities sector but :</p> <p>The Commission’s support has been coherent in its pursuit of the objective of constructing and strengthening a regional integrated space. However, the selection of interventions is insufficiently based on systematic review of the progress of regional integration. It is difficult to demonstrate that the selected activities correspond to the real priorities. The strategy has shown good capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and environment, but has not been able to anticipate foreseeable changes.</p> <p>The management of regional programmes has suffered from the lack of clear delineation of roles and responsibilities as between the various actors on the Commission and Caribbean sides. The CARIFORUM Secretariat has been fully involved in the identification, programming and management of activities and this has enhanced ownership of the projects by the partners. However, the limited human resources and an excessive personalisation of the CARIFORUM Secretariat have limited its capacity to provide the required baseline material for appropriate institutional selection or to ensure that regional strategic objectives can be achieved. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.vii</i>).</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The CSP mentions that the EC aligns its strategy to the national objectives:</p> <p><i>‘The EC Country Strategy Paper has been drafted in the Harmonisation and Aid Effectiveness</i></p>

	<p><i>framework and is mainly based on the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy II and the Programme of Action of the governance review carried out by the African Peer Review Mechanism. The EC Country Strategy Paper is fully aligned with the national plan and the activities of other donors as developed in the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy, signed by 16 donors including the EC in early 2007. Wherever possible, the EC Country Strategy and the National Indicative Programme provides budget support to strengthen government systems.”</i></p> <p>The CSP also states the strategic principles used to align support.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 25, 35</i></p>
ET	<p><b>The annex 5 is devoted to the process of developing and implementing the Country Strategy Paper (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.98) and notably what is following :</b></p> <p>The Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2008-2013 for Ethiopia was developed over a nine months’ period in 2006. It reflects the results of an extensive consultations’ and participation process within the Commission (Delegation and Brussels), as well as with Government, Member States, other official donors and Non State Actors (NSAs). To ensure the widest possible involvement of the latter, several consultations were held with the Cotonou Task Force.</p> <p>The preparation process was facilitated by the availability of the Government’s Draft Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 2007-2012 (PASDEP), and of its several sector analysis chapters. In addition, the process could build on and take further the collaborative process of the Joint Annual Review 2005 by the Commission and Government which also involved consultations with Member States and NSAs. (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.98).</p> <p>Since the mid 1990s the Government has based its national and agricultural development policy on ADLI (Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation), which is largely a supply-side development strategy for agriculture and industry. ADLI continued as an important component of the SDPRP. The Commission has expressed concern as to the adequacy of this strategy and advocated a stronger role for the domestic and export markets to determine the demand for production in various sectors and, thereby, the appropriate supply side response. The discussion of this difference of opinion was the core subject at a high level workshop with the Government on the CSP prior to its finalisation, without bringing the parties closer together.</p> <p>ADLI has subsequently been incorporated into the SDPRP in 2002, where it now constitutes one element of the overall poverty reduction strategy. However, the joint IMF/WB staff assessment of the SDPRP expresses concern over lack of policy specificity and measures in relation to liberalisation and private sector role in general, and in agriculture specifically. Implications of the differences of opinion between Government and the Commission would be difficulties in identifying and preparing Commission funded interventions and/or low Government ownership of such interventions. It may also be the reason why Government commitments in relation to food security are not defined in the CSP 2002 as for other intervention areas..(Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 18).</p>
KE	<p>The 2003-2007 CSP mentions that the specific objective of EC intervention in the Agriculture and Rural development sector is sector is to support the achievement of the</p>

	<p>PRSP sectoral growth target of 6% p.a. for Agriculture and Rural Development and thereby contribute to national growth and poverty reduction. Priority actions will be in support of the two main areas identified in the PRSP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ empowering rural communities in the local development process and providing the conditions for accelerated private sector economic activity</li> <li>▪ support to local service delivery and infrastructure provision through capacity building, policy and institutional reforms, and financial assistance to key public good/service providers/facilitators.</li> </ul> <p>EC is also committed to support the Kenya Rural Development Strategy (KRDS). This strategy aims <i>inter alia</i> at improving rural sector physical and social infrastructure to facilitate delivery of input to the farming community and exports to markets and trade.</p> <p>In addition the CSP underlines that the Government of Kenya should take major accompanying measures, such as measures to improve the regulatory and tariff environment for the main export crops and domestic staples.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2003-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 13, 26, 30 &amp; 31</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Pas d'infos dans les CSP sur la manière dont les priorités sont alignées hormis ce qui suit qui est néanmoins très général.</b></p> <p>La programmation du 10ème FED s'inscrit en appui à la stratégie et aux politiques définies par le gouvernement malgache telles qu'elles apparaissent notamment dans la vision du MAP et dans la Politique Générale de l'Etat approuvée annuellement. Du côté de l'UE, la programmation s'inscrit dans le respect de l'Accord de Cotonou et s'inspire du Consensus Européen pour le développement adopté en Novembre 2005 et de la nouvelle stratégie de l'UE pour l'Afrique. La lutte contre la pauvreté, la recherche d'une meilleure gouvernance et les ODM servent de grille de lecture pour analyser les besoins et déterminer les priorités du futur programme. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.26).</p> <p>Dans le cadre de la <b>définition des priorités par le Gouvernement malgache et la CE</b> et afin de contribuer à la <b>viabilité de la politique de développement du secteur rural</b> à Madagascar à travers le PADR, le prochain partenariat interviendra de manière soutenue à trois niveaux : les investissements publics, <b>l'appui au secteur privé agricole</b>, l'amélioration de services publics (Source : CSP 2002-2007 p.17-18).</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>According to Mali's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the EU priorities are embedded in Mali's strategies. Consultations with the EC delegation, the Government of Mali, other development partners and non-state actors have taken place and the alignment of the EC interventions on Mali's development strategy has been recognised.</p> <p>There is no explicit demonstration on <b>how</b> the priorities are aligned but since they are based on it and aim the same goals, it seems clear.</p> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 110</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The Pacific 2008-2013 RIP/RSP states that the EU's Response Strategy is entirely based on and aligned with the Pacific Plan.</p> <p>There are however no details on <b>how</b> they are aligned.</p>

	<i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 61</i>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The 2001-2007 CSP develops the National Development Agenda and the Poverty Reduction Strategy of Tanzania, including priorities to support Tanzanian sectors (basic education, primary health, water, roads, judiciary, agriculture and HIV/AIDS). The document shows how the EC support will be articulated to these documents, i.e. around three focal sectors (transport infrastructure – roads, basic education and macro support).</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2001-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 3-5 &amp; 21-23</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP states that it is embedded in the Poverty Eradication Action Plan, Uganda's national strategy. The main pillars are described in the document, among which is the “<i>Enhancing competitiveness, production and income</i>” pillar. It mentions that the “<i>Government will continue to target the commercialisation of agriculture</i>” which is the EC's rural development support objective.</p> <p>Support in other areas follows the same logic.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 21.</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>There is no explicit mention of <b>how</b> the Commission's priorities are aligned on the national and sectoral objectives.</p> <p>However, the CSP/NIP mentions that the overall objective of interventions is to support the government's objectives through support to the PAA implementation.</p> <p>It also describes the harmonisation road map (aiming at coordinating the aid approach), with a series of indicators on how donors are supposed to achieve aid harmonisation. Among the indicators, one of them aims to align aid flows on national priorities (it states that by 2010, the proportion of aid flows to government sector not reported on the government's budget should be halved).</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 35 &amp; 50</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Les documents de programmation expliquent que la stratégie de soutien de la commission est basée sur la stratégie régionale d'intégration économique de l'UEMOA et de la CEDEAO et que le soutien à la sécurité alimentaire est basé sur les politiques agricoles communes de l'UEMOA et de la CEDEAO.</p> <p>Le document n'explique cependant pas comment les priorités sont alignées en dehors du fait qu'elles le sont.</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 8 &amp; 57</i></p>
<b>I.9.2.3</b>	Existence in the intervention formulation documents of explicit reference to the policy objectives and priorities of the commodity sector in which interventions are proposed to take place and of explicit links to these objectives
<b>CM</b>	Le PACICC fait explicitement référence aux objectifs quantifiés d'augmentation de production qui sont mentionnés dans la stratégie de développement du secteur rural de 2005.



	<p>Cameroon's ATF programme documents (Assistance Technique et Financière for bananas) systematically refer to the national strategy to develop the banana value chain.</p> <p><i>Source : Cameroon banana ATF Financing Agreements, 1999-2008</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>The FACT IF explicitly situates the project in the context of regional and national priorities and objectives: the objectives of FACT align with PIC national strategic development goals both in terms of agriculture (as outlined in the SPC-Land Resource Division Strategic Plan 2005-2008) approved by Heads of Agriculture and Forestry Services) and trade (which is the first priority of the Pacific Plan). The IF also underlines that the expected results will contribute to the Small Islands Developing States Mauritius Programme of Action (2005) and to the MDGs (2000) in the Pacific.</p> <p><i>Source: Identification Fiche</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>The financing agreement clearly states that the AACP programme takes place in the context of the EU Action Plan on Agricultural Commodities, Dependence and Poverty (COM (2004) 89) as well as the EU-Africa Partnership for Cotton Sector Development of 2004 (COM (2004) 87). This programme fully acknowledges the link between production, value addition and trade in agricultural commodities and poverty reduction.</p> <p>In addition, there had been changes in the approaches to development cooperation with moves away from project type activities to broader sector approaches closely related to national strategic development frameworks such as PRSPs.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The PIP Financing Agreement makes reference to the global and specific objectives of the programme (respectively to contribute to a sustainable reinforcing of the private horticultural sector in the ACP, particularly in small and medium enterprises, and to improve the sanitary quality of ACP horticultural products to comply with consumer and importing country needs).</p> <p>There is no explicit reference to the "policy objectives". However, the programme links with such important topics as poverty alleviation and rural development, which are always in the main priorities of the country strategies.</p> <p><i>Source: Pesticides Initiative Programme Financing Agreement, page 16. MN 958</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>The AMSP programme objective is to assist SP countries to adjust to the situation created by the price reduction of their sugar exports to the EU and to the loss of their preferential access to the EU market.</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Le MR précise que ce projet répond bien aux problématiques burkinabés, notamment par sa volonté de contribuer à la diversification des revenus agricoles des communautés rurales et de professionnaliser certaines filières, ce qui <b>correspond à des problèmes identifiés par le gouvernement central</b>. Sa logique est clairement orientée vers le marché mais le projet présente de fortes synergies avec d'autres programmes, certains de grande envergure, notamment sur l'anacarde avec l'Initiative pour le Cajou Africain, financé par la Fondation Gates et la coopération allemande GTZ. (<i>Source : MR p.2</i>)</p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>L'Etat burkinabè, ses Partenaires, ainsi que tous les acteurs de la filière coton, sont</p>

	<p>conscients tant des potentialités de la filière pour le développement du pays, que des risques actuels qui pèsent sur elle.</p> <p>Avec le PAFFIC, l'UE veut contribuer de façon significative à la relance de la filière coton au Burkina Faso, conformément aux engagements pris suite au Forum de Paris de juillet 2004 dans le cadre du Partenariat Coton Europe-Afrique.</p> <p>Le PAFFIC vise à contribuer à la lutte contre la pauvreté en appuyant la filière coton, important vecteur de croissance économique en milieu rural. Il permet de financer la participation des producteurs à la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières. Il contribue à la stratégie de sortie de crise, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, qui veut redresser financièrement les sociétés cotonnières et ramener la confiance du système bancaire national et international, prévoyant notamment la recapitalisation des sociétés cotonnières accompagnée de la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion du risque prix, comme le Fonds de lissage (FDL).</p> <p><i>Source : Allocution signature CF</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Aucune information sur les objectifs politiques de la Côte d'Ivoire dans le secteur des produits agricoles de base <b>au moment de l'élaboration de l'intervention</b> ne peut être trouvée dans les documents disponibles sur l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.</p> <p>Cependant, selon le cadre logique d'intervention commenté, l'intervention a contribué à amener l'attention politique sur la transformation des produits agricoles de base. Le Document Stratégique de Réduction de la Pauvreté (DSRP) de la Côte d'Ivoire de 2009 en témoigne, vu qu'il a inclus le développement de la transformation dans les filières agricoles parmi ses objectifs.</p> <p><i>Source : Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire, Cadre logique de l'action commenté</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Une analyse des enseignements tirés et complémentarités détaille le contexte et les priorités dans lequel l'intervention prend place (<i>Source : Rider FA p.4</i>).</p> <p>Toutefois, le <b>MR précise que</b> l'interférence du projet avec les instances politiques est assez faible. Pour l'instant, aucun des 2 secteurs n'est soumis à une autorité de régulation. (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>)</p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>L'action s'inscrit dans le <b>plus vaste programme de développement rural promu par le CODASC</b> (Comité Diocésain des Activités Sociales et CARITAS), bureau de l'Archidiocèse de Garoua qui organise et gère les projets de développement de l'Archidiocèse. Dans son programme rural, le CODASC a adopté, parmi les stratégies opérationnelles, le renforcement des capacités des Groupes d'Initiative Commune présents dans le diocèse, en reconnaissant leur rôle de points de repère fondamentaux pour le développement du territoire. Afin d'éviter des doubles emplois et de maximiser les synergies avec d'autres initiatives diocésaines, les stratégies d'intervention de l'action ont été choisies en tenant compte des priorités stratégiques du programme du CODASC. En coordination avec ce programme, qui a parmi ses objectifs le renforcement des capacités diocésaines dans le développement local, les animateurs diocésains impliqués dans le projet seront invités à suivre un cours de recyclage organisé par le CODASC, avec tous les animateurs diocésains (<i>Source : Annexe I p. 13</i>).</p>

	<p>L'action, en plus, s'insère dans la <b>tendance de l'Etat camerounais, depuis la promulgation de la loi N°92/006 relative aux Sociétés Coopératives et aux Groupes d'Initiative Commune, à promouvoir les petits groupes de communauté, les organisations de paysans comme moteur de développement local.</b> Le DSRP (Document de Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté) aussi prévoit une stratégie intégrée de développement rural qui donne une attention particulière au rôle des communautés locales et de leurs organisations dans le développement des zones rurales. (<i>Source : Annexe I p. 13</i>).</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not target agricultural commodities. As such, there is no reference to the policy priorities and objectives of the commodity sector in the formulation documents of this programme.</p> <p>The PASAPE aims at reinforcing the competitiveness of the economy and at facilitating its insertion into the regional and world economy through the implementation of the EU-Central Africa EPA. The identification fiche (but not the FA) refers to the objectives of the national strategy with respect to business environment and competitiveness. It also refers to the fact that the programme is designed in the framework of the PRSP, and in particular of its two following objectives: "reinforcement of growth through economic diversification" and "strengthening of the private sector as an engine to growth." The strategic link between the intervention and the priorities of Cameroon is not explicit in the formulation documents.</p> <p>The mid-term evaluation further stressed the relevance of the programme which is inscribed in a context of preparation to the signature and implementation of a regional EPA.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006</i>  <i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i>  <i>Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010, page 6</i></p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The feasibility study of the "Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme presented in the section on the country background aspects related to legislation (Guyana: land administration and tenure, and drainage and irrigation; Suriname: lack of legislation on land tenure and D&amp;I) and stressed the weaknesses/lack of policies. The FA makes a minor reference to national policies in the section on "Factors ensuring sustainability" ("<i>The national policy frameworks of countries support the consolidation of the rice industry along sustainable lines</i>") and aimed at supporting governments in designing sector strategies. The final evaluation stressed that the programme failed to achieve this expected result.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003</i>  <i>Agrotec Spa, Feasibility study of the CARIFORUM rice industry, 2003</i>  <i>SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The Caribbean rum programme responded to a request of ACP Caribbean countries</p>

	<p>following the EU decision to remove duties on rum imports in the EU. The Joint ACP-EU Declaration on rum, agreed in the framework of the post-Lomé negotiations on the Cotonou Agreement, states that “rum is a value-added agro-industrial product capable, if appropriate efforts are undertaken, of competing in a global economy”. The Declaration committed the EC “to provide sufficient funds to finance (...) an integrated sector-specific programme for the development of ACP exporters of rum.”. The objective of the programme is thus to contribute to the policy objective of making the rum sector more competitive.</p> <p><i>Source: Intervention Fiche.</i></p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>Since the Project formulation has been approved by the concerned bodies of the GoE, and because of the previous and continued joint participation of the GoE and the EU, there were many links in the Programme to the Government policies and EU dialogue. The prime aim is to alleviate poverty in rural areas through the coffee sub-sector.</p> <p><i>(Source : Completion report p.8)</i></p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II (CSSP 2) Financing Agreement mentions that one of the main components of the national policy for rural development is “the promotion of agriculture with specific emphasis on export cash crops and import substitution cash crops”. The CSSP 2 aims exactly at improving sustainability of cocoa production, Ghana’s main export cash crop. As the link is quite logical, there are no further precisions on how the programme’s support responds to the national objective.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Agreement, page 16.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The Financing Agreement (FA) of the PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme refers to the Strategic Plan established by the African Union Commission, which defines policies and priorities to achieve a greater unity and solidarity among African countries. The strategic plan of the African Union Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (AU-DREA) is also referred to and its objectives are summarized. The FA states that the strategic plan of the AU-DREA includes as important area to “improve agricultural systems and productivity so as to attain food security, enhance nutritional quality and food safety, as well as expand export markets for agricultural (including livestock and fisheries) products”. The PAN-SPSO does explain how it is supposed to attain that objective: by facilitating effective participation of African countries in the SPSOs, African agricultural exports should find it easier to comply with international SPS regulations and the agricultural sector could therefore act as an effective lever for development, reducing hunger and poverty.</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, pages 15 and 37 to 39.</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The intervention is not product specific. It is basically a food security project without any obvious relation with the COM.</p>
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Le PARFC se base sur le "Cadre stratégique du Développement du Secteur Coton", (CSDSC, CF annexe 2) de l'Etat malien, assorti du plan d'action "Chronogramme Révisé de Reforme du Secteur Coton" (CRPRSC, CF annexe 1) dont la mise en oeuvre est confié à la "Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton" (MRSC). Cette feuille de route de la privatisation et de la libéralisation de la filière coton constitue le document de référence unique tant pour le gouvernement que pour les partenaires techniques et financiers”(BCS, §1.1; Monitoring report, p2).</p> <p>D’après la mission ROM, le cadre logique (CL) de l’intervention, reflète étroitement le</p>

	<p>"Chronogramme Révisé du Processus de Reforme du Secteur Coton" (CRPRSC) de 2005 et le "Plan d'action du CSDSC", qui définissent la politique de l'état malien en matière de libéralisation de la filière coton (BCS, §2.2).</p> <p><i>Source :ROM/BCS</i></p>
<p><b>PAC-FACT</b></p>	<p>The FA explicitly refers to the overall Pacific regional development framework (the Pacific plan) which includes the increase of sustainable trade and investment through improving competitiveness, addressing standards and expanding markets for trade, in its strategic objectives. The LRD (which the Commission supports by implementing inter alia the FACT project) includes in its priorities the facilitation of commodity pathways for food and trade, increasing food security and improving natural resources and environmental management and strengthening quarantine and bio-security related trade services.</p> <p><i>Source: FA, page 7</i></p> <p>The FACT IF explicitly situates the project in the context of regional and national priorities and objectives: the objectives of FACT align with PIC national strategic development goals both in terms of agriculture (as outlined in the SPC-Land Resource Division Strategic Plan 2005-2008) approved by Heads of Agriculture and Forestry Services) and trade (which is the first priority of the Pacific Plan). The IF also underlines that the expected results will contribute to the Small Islands Developing States Mauritius Programme of Action (2005) and to the MDGs (2000) in the Pacific.</p> <p><i>Source: Identification Fiche</i></p> <p>The overall objective and the project purpose complement efforts in the region to enhance regional cooperation and integration. They are consistent with and supportive of the Pacific Plan, national policies, bilateral aid programmes and international development strategies for the region, which envisage trade as a main motor of PACP economic development. One of the strategic objectives of the Pacific Plan is to increase sustainable trade and investment through improving competitiveness, addressing standards and expanding markets for trade.<sup>7</sup></p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<p><b>SAR-RES</b></p>	<p>The ICART programme is based on the research priorities identified in the Five-Year Strategic Plan and they are believed to be the most relevant to achieve the objectives of rural development as defined by NEPAD and SADC. Emphasis will be given to market orientation of agricultural research as a means to promote the small-scale farmers' production and also promote environmentally sound natural resources management practices that can sustain productivity in the long term.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p> <p>The MTR (2008) underlines that the programme purpose in the Financing Agreement of "enabling NARS to enhance its capacity to address common researchable constraints" appears to be very vague. In addition, there is a lack of activities and results directed to the strengthening of the NARS and also in respect to "addressing common regional research issues".</p>

	<p>The background and the justification of the ICART programme (first version) were based on the SADC sector strategy, NEPAD and the RISDP (2003).</p> <p><i>Source: ICART Mid-Term Evaluation report, October 2008, pages 8 &amp; 1</i></p> <p>The programme is the result of a wide consultation with regional experts and stakeholders. There is no explicit reference to the “policy objectives”. However, the programme links with the objectives of rural development as defined by NEPAD and SADC countries.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>Programming documents are not available. However, according to the ROM reports, the set of interventions designed under the project are likely to contribute to the realization of agricultural policy objectives in Tanzania, as it integrates rural based small-scale agricultural producers into national marketing channels.</p> <p><i>Source: MR-01912.01-22/12/2006, page 1</i></p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>No reference is made in the project description (drafted by Solidaridad) to Uganda’s policy relative to agricultural commodities. Only mention is made of the project contributing to poverty reduction but even this is not explicitly stated as a policy objective of GoU.</p> <p><i>Source: Grant document</i></p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>Reminder: the SBS does not focus on any particular agricultural commodity. The Financing Proposals shortly presents the GoU’s Programme of Modernisation of Agriculture and adds: “A number of policy reforms have been undertaken since the launch of the PMA, and will be further consolidated through this intervention’s focus on supporting demand-driven agricultural research and advisory services.”</p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The Producer Organisation Project had projects in multiple sectors: coffee, cocoa, copra, spices, beef, root crops and fisheries. Yet the financing agreement of the project does not refer to these sectors and there is no reference to policy objectives and priorities of the sectors either.</p> <p><i>Sources: Producer Organisation Project, Monitoring Report 3, Efficiency sheet.</i></p>
<b>BAN</b>	<p>The SFA impact evaluation report refers to the intervention formulation documents. The policy objectives mentioned are to improve competitiveness in ACP countries for banana export and, where that wasn’t possible anymore, to support diversification based on strategies agreed together with the EC.</p> <p>SFA programmes reflected the competitiveness goal through the following priorities: productivity, product quality, improving environmental friendliness, training, niche marketing, etc.</p> <p>The diversification goal did not explicit any guidelines and the SFA impact evaluation report noted that the lack thereof prevented the implementation of a hierarchical framework to achieve the diversification goal.</p>

	<i>Source: Impact Evaluation of the SFA for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas – Global Report, pages 1, 34 &amp; 35, htspc, 2008.</i>
<b>I.9.2.4</b>	Views of stakeholders on appropriateness of Commission's interventions with respect to national and country priorities
<b>BF</b>	<p>La FAO note que la DUE est impliquée avec les autres PTFs dans le processus d'élaboration du PNSR (Programme national du secteur rural), lancé en juillet 2010, dans le cadre des accords du NEPAD-PDDAA. Le PNSR est la fusion de 2 processus : (i) le Programme de développement rural productif (PROSDRp) entamé en 2006-2007 et (ii) le programme national d'investissement productif (PNIA, 2007). Un pacte pour l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre du PNSR, annexé d'une feuille de route financée par un fonds commun (Autriche, GIZ et DANIDA), a été signé par les PTFs en juillet 2010. Le PNSR est en cohérence avec le « document de stratégie de développement du secteur rural à l'horizon 2015 et a été mis en cohérence avec la SCADD (stratégie de croissance accélérée et de développement durable 2011-2015). Les PTFs, dont la DUE, sont en attente de la publication prochaine d'un « draft zéro » du PNSR afin de mieux se positionner. En effet, manquant de propositions concrètes, de nombreux PTFs sont actuellement quelque peu sceptiques. Un objectif central du processus PNSR est que l'aide des PTFs au développement rural (comprenant l'agriculture) s'aligne progressivement sur le PNSRn, chaque PTF devant définir et proposer les modalités de cet alignement.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 518 ; MN 548 ; MN 505 ; Note de cadrage pour l'élaboration du PNSR, 2010 ; Pacte pour l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre du PNSR, juillet 2010 ;</i></p>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Le ministère de l'agriculture n'a aucun contact avec la DUE concernant le coton. D'après lui, la DUE traite directement avec les acteurs de la filière. Il est précisé que, depuis la privatisation (2004), la production de coton relève des sociétés cotonnières dont la tutelle est sous le ministère du commerce, spécifiquement au niveau du secrétariat permanent de la filière coton libéralisée. Les rapports entre le ministère de l'agriculture et les sociétés cotonnières se limitent à des aspects liés à l'approvisionnement en intrants. <i>Source : MN 547</i></p>
<b>BF Coton</b>	<p>Le point de vue du Secrétariat permanent de la filière coton libéralisée (SPCL) est que le soutien de l'UE (et d'autres PTs) à la filière cotonnière dans le cadre de la stratégie de sortie de crise (mars 2008) a été assez efficace mais trop limité et ponctuel. Par ailleurs, le SPCL déplore les ressources trop limitées (15 millions€) allouées au volet coton du Programme Tous ACP au vu des besoins des filières cotonnières, conduisant à une dilution/saupoudrage des appuis et à des impacts trop limités. Il aurait fallu se limiter à un plus petit nombre de pays, les principaux producteurs de coton.</p> <p><i>Source : MN 523</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	Pas d'infos recueillies
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's interviewees pointed out that for the 2008-2013 CSP, national authorities would have liked that agriculture, being a national priority, received support under the focal areas. However, for political reasons, agriculture has not received the attention expected. It should be stressed that historically agriculture has never been a priority area of the Commission-Cameroon cooperation. Under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, agriculture has been the object of a specific support under the non-focal areas (support to rural development aiming at poverty reduction) and of a specific sub-programme to develop agricultural production under the second focal area "trade and regional integration" which foresees a programme aiming to upgrade enterprises and reinforce the productive and export capacities of priority sectors for the economy.</p>

	<i>Source: MN 701</i>
<b>CR</b>	No information has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH Cocoa</b>	<p>For the earlier support to cocoa (CSSP I 2000-2005) the final evaluation notes that there was a lack of coherence between the overall objectives of the cocoa sector strategy (increased production, increased quality) and the disease-control programme component (CSSVD) activities: the programme did well on the uprooting and the linked compensation of smallholder farmers but it did not do well on the replanting.</p> <p>The CSSP II MTE notes: <i>‘The objective of contributing to improved livelihoods through farmer adoption of sustainable cocoa production methods is consistent with and supportive of GoG’s policies and strategies, especially the GPRS II and its replacement, the GSDGA I. Specifically, it is consistent with the GPRS II private sector development pillar where agriculture is expected to lead to growth and structural transformation of the economy.</i></p> <p><i>CSSP II is in line with GPRS II intervention areas for modernising agriculture such as reform of land acquisition and property rights, enhancing access to credit and inputs for agriculture, promoting selective crop development, increasing access to extension services and restoration of degraded areas of the environment. It is also aligned with the GSDGA I (2010 – 2013)’s objective of accelerated technology-driven agriculture sector modernisation. CSSP II is allied with FASDEP II policy objectives, namely a) improved growth in incomes; b) increased competitiveness and enhanced integration into domestic and international markets; c) sustainable management of land and environment; science and technology in agriculture development and improved institutional coordination. However, while remaining committed to enhancing cocoa competitiveness, emphasis is also being placed on expanding cereals and other cash crop production for food security and export development reasons in line with GSDGA I’. (page 17, MTE, 2011)</i></p> <p><i>Source: MTE CSSP II, 2011</i></p>
<b>MG rice</b>	<p>La stratégie de développement agricole du gouvernement est actuellement fortement centrée sur les cultures vivrières (riz et manioc). Le <u>développement des cultures d’exportation n’est pas la priorité</u> (Source : MN 805). De plus, la crise politique a engendré une suspension plus ou moins complète des financements bailleurs et des relations officielles avec le gouvernement. Le Secrétariat multi-bailleurs sert de pont avec le gouvernement tant qu’il n’y a pas de relations institutionnelles entre eux (Source : MN 817).</p> <p>Par contre, le <u>gouvernement malgache s’est approprié la démarche « CSA »</u> initialement mis en place via la ligne budgétaire sécurité alimentaire (Sources : MN 804). Les CSA sont des structures semi-publiques et sont financées par le ministère depuis janvier 2009. Les finances du CSA subissent néanmoins les effets du blocage du budget suite à la suspension de l’aide accordée par la CE en conséquence de la crise politique). (Sources : MN 815). En effet, les CSA ont initialement été conçus avec une certaine idée (ONG) mais ont évolué vers un statut semi-public du fait du retrait de l’UE et de l’organisme d’appui : en d’autres mots, le statut du CSA est celui d’une ONG mais les salaires et les frais de fonctionnement sont payés par l’Etat (du fait de la suspension de l’aide de l’UE) (Source : MN 811).</p>
<b>TZ</b>	After a period of heavy state intervention during the 1970’s and 1980’s, Tanzania’s agricultural sector was liberalised in the mid 1980’s whilst at the same time Government and donor support was geared towards reduction of poverty through social sector expenditure. The agricultural sector development only regained importance in the latest national policy document, the MKUKUTA, where it is recognised as an essential engine



	<p>for growth. Agricultural sector growth is targeted at 6-8%/year with the focus being on smallholder agriculture and food crops. The agricultural sector development strategy (ASDS) emphasizes the importance of private sector led development of agriculture. The Agricultural sector Development Programme (ASDP 2005) is a SWAP (including a basket fund for donor funding), which, despite a difficult start, appears to benefit from increased Government funds.</p> <p>Government support is mainly focussed on food crops, with cash crops falling under crop boards which defend the interests of producers and processors. As such, cash crops can thus not be said to be prioritised in Government strategy.</p> <p>Government investment priorities in agriculture in the latest ASDS are: 1/rural infrastructure (feeder roads, markets, electrification, storage facilities) and agro-processing; 2/ irrigation, 3/ mechanisation; 4/ research and development; 5/ farm inputs and 6/ renewable natural resources. However, as far as cash crops are concerned, the investments are meant to come from the private sector.</p> <p>In terms of public expenditure, the lion's share is devoted to the provision of fertiliser subsidies (more than 50%) and the acquisition of grains for the national food reserve.</p> <p><i>Source; PER 2010</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>Complaining about decision made in Brussels without knowing problems on the field. But things are changing. The expertise of agriculture has left the donors after the 1980's when focus of 1st and 2nd generation PRSPs was on social sectors; it is only now that the 3rd generation of PRSPs are focusing again on the productive sectors which were before marginalised in the HR but also in investment and priorities. Now change with For example, CAADP, Maputo declaration etc.</p> <p>ASDP prepared in 2001 and implemented since 2006. We are in 2011. What happens? Two levels of support have been brought: Capacity building and research. Investing in people. Take time to provide results on the medium run or the long run (seven to ten years). E.g. grain crops productivity has been double in some years. Self-sufficiency in the country to provide food to people in Tanzania (from less than 100% to exporters of food now). Extension workers are missing today to farmers. Need to train young people to work in agriculture in 2007 less than 3500 extension officers on the ground against demand of 15,000 and even they had no means to do their job properly; since then training and have 7,000 on the ground. The use of fertilizers has been more than doubled and same for improved seeds.</p> <p>Basket fund: use to fund mainly the public sector. Not flexible and bureaucratic. Challenge itself the private companies want to get some funds to develop their activities. Need to become more flexible and innovate in new possibilities: new ASDP, Southern Agricultural Growth Corridors, Feed the future programme by USAID, etc.</p> <p>However, the donors need to give a degree of tolerance to the ASDP basket fund before it functions.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 602</i></p>
<b>UG coffee</b>	<p><u>The EC programmable aid devoted to agriculture has been aligned with the government PMA strategy.</u> The PMA (plan for Modernization of Agriculture) was considered by the EC and other donors as a well designed, although over-ambitious, strategy for the</p>

	<p>development of the agricultural sector. Joint evaluations of the PMA took place between 2002 and 2008. The EC supported the GoU agricultural strategy (PMA) in 2001, which benefited among others crops to agricultural commodities, of which coffee. The EC support to PMA focussed on research (NARO-National Agricultural Research Organisation) and extension (NAADS-National Agricultural Advisory Services) with a view of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector. The support to PMA was a multi-donors support (Source: MN 301).</p> <p><u>EC support to the coffee sector did not rely on a national strategy for the sector. However coffee development was addressed by the PMA which aimed at promoting a zonal level enterprises</u> well adapted to the agro-ecological conditions (Source: MN 313). Note that, only two of the 7 areas of the PMA, research and extension, have been effectively implemented (lack of coordination between the ministries involved hampered a more homogeneous implementation of the PMA). (Source: MN 301)</p>
VU	<p><u>No strategy in Vanuatu:</u> In the 1990s, the Ministry of Agriculture prepared Developments Plans for Agriculture in Vanuatu and a Comprehensive Reform Programme with the AdB assistance. A 5-year development plan defined priorities (PAA document).</p> <p>In 2010, a Planning was under construction. This plan is not yet finished. The agricultural policy needs to be completed. At the moment there is no agricultural strategy available at the level of the Vanuatu Government.</p> <p>During the period 2000-2010, there was no strategy at Government level to support agricultural commodities.</p> <p><u>Needs:</u> Each industry is different and needs are different. The major issue: the aid industry thinks that putting a lot of money will provide more tonnes of products. It is not true. There is a capacity building issue. The best in some cases is to increase the price of agricultural products. The industries are market-oriented. They respond to prices and diversify, if deemed necessary.</p> <p><u>FACT project:</u> The Farm Support association got some support from the FACT project to strengthen capacities of extension services which helps farmers to grow vanilla. It allowed strengthening capacities of field extension services at the level: 1) one session on production techniques and 2) one session on curing techniques. The trainings have been organised by the FSA. After receiving training field staff got back on the field to show techniques to farmers. As a result the quality and the quantity of the production have improved.</p> <p><u>POPACA/POP2 :</u> La CE et la France sont les deux seuls à s'intéresser au secteur rural et au développement agricole au Vanuatu. Ils ont mis en œuvre conjointement le projet POPACA/POP 2 (2001-2007). L'intervention de la CE a été décidée sur demande de la France qui avait déjà financé une première phase du projet (POP1).</p> <p><u>All ACP Programme:</u> Under the FAO project <i>farmer-buyer linkage in the fruit and vegetables sector</i>, implemented under the All ACP programme, the Farm Support Association (FSA) has benefitted from capacity building relating to production techniques (e.g. nurseries) and result-oriented research (implemented in Montmartre by FSA). Trainings have been decided with FAO based on needs identified with the FAS. This intervention has an interesting impact for farmers who can learn new techniques.</p> <p><i>Sources: MN1059, MN1005, MN 1067 and MN 1098</i></p>
J.9.3	<p><b><i>Over the period 2004-2009, the choice of interventions supported in the field of agricultural commodities is aligned to the objectives of the two Communications and has helped their achievement</i></b></p>

<b>BF Coton</b>	Sur la période 2004-2010, les interventions de la Commission dans le domaine des produits de base agricoles répondent aux objectifs des deux Communications et ont contribué à la réalisation de leurs objectifs, en particulier du Plan action secteur coton-Partenariat UE-Afrique. Cependant, la décision de réaliser ces interventions ne fait pas de référence directe et explicite aux Communications
<b>CM</b>	<p>Les communications ne seraient pas connues par la Délégation ni par les partenaires nationaux.</p> <p>La filière bananes est un peu particulière et sort en partie de la COM en raison de sa structure basée sur trois grandes entreprises agroindustrielles et des particularités de l'organisation du marché (un problème de compétitivité de la banane ACP face à la banane dollar sur le marché européen et pas de volatilité des prix).</p> <p>Les timides interventions de la CE dans les filières cacao /café ont touché certaines priorités de la COM plus que d'autres (approche chaîne de valeur, amélioration de la compétitivité, de la qualité, transparence sur les prix, groupement des producteurs et capacités organisationnelles..).L'approche « chaîne de valeur » n'est que toute récente et n'a été appliquée actuellement qu'à la filière café. Elle reste à mettre en place pour le cacao et à suivre globalement pour la filière café. Certains maillons faibles restent à renforcer (matériel végétal certifié, ..).</p>
<b>GH</b>	The project document mentioned the Communication and its alignment to it without giving further details. The Communication was not known by the Delegation staff and the MS interviewed. As the Ghanaian agricultural sector strategy has already adopted the value chain perspective there is alignment with the objectives of the Communication.
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les communications ne sont pas (ou ne sont plus) une référence pour la Délégation. Mais les activités de coopération dans le domaine des produits agricoles d'exportation sont en ligne avec certains des objectifs de la communication:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• importance donnée à ces produits dans les activités de la Commission</li> <li>• amélioration de la productivité et de la qualité comme réponse à la baisse tendancielle des prix</li> <li>• diversification y compris pour sa contribution à l'atténuation des risques</li> <li>• organisation des marchés locaux favorisant l'intégration dans les marchés internationaux</li> </ul>
<b>TZ</b>	The Stabex interventions were not designed against the background of the COM and they do not easily fit within the COM's framework: indeed the supports have been focusing on a very narrow part of the sector, ignoring the linkages and the value chain perspective that the COM promotes. Of course all elements supported by the STabex in Tanzania are also in the COM (research, rural roads etc) but they lack the overarching objective and thus fall short of attaining any kind of meaningful and sustainable result in terms of making the sectors more competitive and better able to integrate world markets.
<b>UG coffee tea</b>	<p>COM(2004) 89 is not currently a reference document for the Delegation. However, EC cooperation activities in the agriculture sector did not contradict the COM objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Importance given to exports commodities (tea, coffee)</li> <li>– Improvement of productivity and quality as a response to the declining price trend in the coffee sector</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Diversification of income sources of the farmers</li> <li>– Attempt to develop risk management instruments</li> <li>– Organization of the coffee marketing chain in order to better respond to international market requirements</li> </ul>
<b>VU</b>	Pas de connaissance des Communications (au niveau de la Délégation), mais cependant alignement implicite des interventions de la Commission dans le domaine des produits de base agricoles en réponse aux objectifs de la COM (2004) 89s.
<b>I.9.3.1</b>	EC stakeholders know the COM (2004) 89 and the COM (2004) 87 and have designed interventions taking into account the strategy defined in the COMs
<b>Overall</b>	<p>The responsibility for disseminating the COM and ensuring that it is known by EC staff and that it is being used doesn't lie with DEV but with Aidco. DEV develops the policy but the COM is not a set of guidelines; these need to be developed by Aidco. Aidco and DEV have split responsibilities in this and DEV is not entitled to follow up/follow through on the practical application of the policies it designs. DEV did launch a dedicated website to spread the COM after its elaboration but this has been closed down since; it also organised some outreach lunches.</p> <p>In-house there are no further guidelines developed by Aidco for applying the COM's principles to the design of CSPs, NIPs or interventions. Aidco has developed some information notes but not detailed guidelines on the COM or on the way to integrate the COM's 8 priorities in the country strategies and/or interventions. Rather than providing a methodology, the value added of the COM's is to get all partners around the same table.</p> <p>The DEV and Aidco have little clout in the re-orientation of CSPs and NIPs and therefore they have little influence over the application in practice of the COM's principles in county strategies and interventions. The design of interventions according to the principles of the COM is mainly crystallised in the intra-ACP projects of which the ALL-ACP project is the most important; it is expected that this will kick-start a number of other activities but it's only been 2-3 years as yet.</p> <p>Nevertheless, the application of the COM principles in new interventions is checked through the QSG meetings and inters service consultations. There is also a note guiding the Delegations if the agricultural or rural development sector is retained as a focal area.</p> <p>Apart from defending the importance of support to the agricultural commodities sectors (and applying the COM principles) in mid-term reviews and ensuring the COM's principles are adhered to in interventions designs (through inter service consultations and QSGs), DEV spreads the COM's principles at international fora; the COM represents the political statement of the Commission for agricultural commodities (how the Commission wants to address the agricultural commodities problems).</p> <p><i>Sources: MN 934 and MN 912</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	Les Communications ont été transmises et lues par la Délégation. Mais la Délégation ne se base pas sur ces communications pour définir l'appui au Burkina Faso. C'est une approche « top-down ». Par ailleurs, la Délégation n'a pas été chargée de suivre le Programme Tous ACP, qui découle des Communications. La Délégation a écrit à

	<p>Bruxelles pour se plaindre. Une décision a été prise que les Délégations soient plus impliquées sur le Programme Tous ACP. Mais rien ne s'est passé dans les faits. Il n'y a pas de cohérence globale. Pour le Programme Tous ACP, il y a eu une information générale au lancement du programme ACP (réunion au Sénégal/2008), mais plus rien après pour les Délégations. La Délégation n'a été que ponctuellement sollicitée. La Délégation n'a pas été acteur du Programme Tous ACP. Plein de missions ont dû être organisées avec la Délégation mais la Délégation n'a jamais été mise au courant des rapports de ces missions. <i>Source : MN 567</i></p>
<b>BF</b>	No reference to the COMs can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Burkina Faso.
<b>CAFR</b>	No support to agricultural commodities in the regional programme.
<b>CI</b>	<b>Pas de références aux COM dans les CSP.</b>
<b>CI</b>	<p>Prise en compte des aspects priorisés par la Communication 2004(89)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Dépendance vis-à-vis d'un nombre limité de produits agricole d'exportation</li> <li>✓ Intégration dans le système commercial international</li> <li>✓ Responsabilisation des entreprises et durabilité des investissements</li> </ul>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's interviewees had never heard about the two COM(2004). <i>Source: MN 701</i></p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>None of the interviewed stakeholders knew of the COM.</p> <p>Les timides interventions de la CE dans les filières cacao /café ont touché certaines priorités de la COM plus que d'autres (approche chaîne de valeur, amélioration de la compétitivité, de la qualité, transparence sur les prix, groupement des producteurs et capacités organisationnelles..).L'approche « chaîne de valeur » n'est que toute récente et n'a été appliquée actuellement qu'à la filière café. Elle reste à mettre en place pour le cacao et à suivre globalement pour la filière café. Certains maillons faibles restent à renforcer (matériel végétal certifié, ..).</p> <p>La filière bananes est un peu particulière et sort en partie de la COM en raison de sa structure basée sur trois grandes entreprises agroindustrielles et des particularités de l'organisation du marché (un problème de compétitivité de la banane ACP face à la banane dollar sur le marché européen et pas de volatilité des prix).</p> <p>Cameroon's ATF (Assistance Technique et Financière for bananas) programme documents always refer to the national strategy, to competitiveness and to corporate responsibility.</p> <p><i>Source : Cameroon banana ATF Financing Agreements, 1999-2008 ; MN 402, 988, 409</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>Commission's interviewees did not know the COM(2004). <i>Source: MN 700</i></p> <p>No evidence in ECS</p>
<b>CR</b>	No information has been reported in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>ESAIO</b>	There is no reference to the COMs in the East and Southern Africa RSP/RIPs.
<b>ET</b>	<b>No explicit reference to the COM in CSP.</b>

	No explicit reference to the COM in CSE.
<b>GH</b>	No mention of the COMs can be found in the CSP/NIPs.
<b>KE</b>	No mention of the COMs can be found in the CSP/NIPs.
<b>MG</b>	<p>Concernant la <u>COM 2004(89)</u> (Madagascar n'est pas concernée par la seconde COM), l'ensemble des intervenants ne semble pas en avoir connaissance mais la Délégation souligne qu'il y a des convergences, que certains points sont pris en compte de manière ponctuelle et que certaines notions ont été intégrées dans la stratégie. La Délégation regrette néanmoins que les flux d'informations soient souvent à sens unique : Délégation vers siège central. (Source : MN 801 et débriefing Délégation)</p> <p>Toutefois, les activités de coopération dans le domaine des produits agricoles de base sont en ligne avec certains des objectifs de la communication:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ importance donnée à ces produits dans les activités de la Commission</li> <li>✓ amélioration de la productivité et de la qualité comme réponse à la baisse tendancielle des prix</li> <li>✓ diversification y compris pour sa contribution à l'atténuation des risques</li> <li>✓ organisation des marchés locaux favorisant l'intégration dans les marchés internationaux</li> </ul>
<b>MG</b>	<b>Pas de références aux COM dans les CSP.</b>
<b>ML</b>	No reference to the COMs can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Mali.
<b>PAC</b>	No mention of the COMs can be found in the RSP/RIPs.
<b>SADC</b>	No such references can be found in the RSP/RIPs.
<b>TZ</b>	No mention of the COMs can be found in the CSP/NIPs.
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The task manager dealing with agricultural issues in Tanzania read the COM 2004 but was not inspired to define the EC support to agricultural commodities in Tanzania. However the COM confirmed things/ support that were developing in Tanzania. They do not do support divergent from guidelines provided in the COM. The driver of this strategy is EC staff in Brussels. They are very involved in Brussels while dealing with the strategy.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 600</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	No such evidence can be found in Uganda's CSP/NIPs.
<b>UG coffee tea</b>	<p>The COMs were probably sent to delegations when they were produced but the EC delegation doesn't know them. The COM(2004) 89 is thus not currently a reference document for the Delegation. However, EC delegation thinks to be in line with their priorities EC cooperation activities in the agriculture sector did not contradict the COM objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Importance given to exports commodities (tea, coffee)</li> <li>– Improvement of productivity and quality as a response to the declining price trend in the coffee sector</li> <li>– Diversification of income sources of the farmers</li> <li>– Attempt to develop risk management instruments</li> <li>– Organization of the coffee marketing chain in order to better respond to international market requirements</li> </ul>

	(Source: MN 301 and 313)
<b>VU</b>	Pas de connaissance des deux Communications par la Délégation et donc pas d'implémentation de ces deux Communications en tant que telles. Cependant, les interventions financées par la CE dans le domaine agricole, et plus spécifiquement en lien avec les filières agricoles à l'exportation, sont cohérentes avec les objectifs de la Communication (2004)89. <i>Sources : MN 1015 et MN 1067</i>
<b>VU</b>	There is no reference to the COMs in the CSP/NIPs.
<b>WAF</b>	Aucune référence aux COM n'est faite dans les RSP/RIP de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	The proposed AAACP programme takes place in the context of the EU Action Plan on Agricultural Commodities, Dependence and Poverty (COM (2004) 89) as well as the EU-Africa Partnership for Cotton Sector Development of 2004 (COM (2004) 87). This programme fully acknowledges the link between production, value addition and trade in agricultural commodities and poverty reduction. In addition, stakeholders met at the level of the Coordination Unit of the AAACP programme have confirmed that the programme takes into account the strategy defined in the COMs.  <i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2 and MN 641</i>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	There is no reference to the COMs in the PIP's Financial Agreement or evaluation reports.
<b>AMSP</b>	AMSP documents at overall level and at country level do not make any reference to the COM.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>BF-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>CI-ONG</b>	Aucune référence aux COMs ne peut être trouvée dans les documents disponibles sur l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde
<b>CI-REH</b>	Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés
<b>CR-RUM</b>	The Joint ACP-EU Declaration on rum was adopted in 1999 and the Caribbean rum programme was launched in 2002, whereas the COMs are dated 2004.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	No evidence for this indicator in the consulted documents
<b>GH-COC</b>	The Financing Agreement of the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II (CSSP2) refers to the COM (2004) 89 and its objectives. It mentions that the CSSP2 is aligned with the COM and its goals. There is however no further reference to it, or on whether other sector stakeholders know about it.  <i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Agreement, page 15.</i>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	The PAN-SPSO (Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organisations) programme documents never refer to the COMs.
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The intervention is not product specific. It is basically a food security project without any obvious relation with the COM.
<b>ML-COT</b>	Pas d'évidence sur base des documents consultés
<b>SAR-RES</b>	The ICART programming documents do not refer to the COM (2004) 89 and the COM

	(2004) 87.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	There is no such information in the ROM and final narrative reports.
<b>UG-COF</b>	No reference is made in the project description (drafted by Solidaridad) to the EC policy relative to agricultural commodities or to the COM.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	The SBS does not focus on any particular agricultural commodity nor makes any reference to the COM.
<b>VU-POP</b>	No such evidence can be found in the project's documents.
<b>I.9.3.2</b>	Evidence in country and regional programming documents that the intermediary objectives of the COM are explicitly stated
<b>BF</b>	No reference to the COMs or their objectives can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Burkina Faso.
<b>CR rum</b>	<p>Yes, in <u>the agricultural sector</u>, the CARTF (Caribbean Agribusiness Research and Training Fund) project has contributed significantly to capacity development in the <u>areas of diversification and quality improvements</u> with the ultimate aim of developing alternative export opportunities in this sector.</p> <p>In general, the Commission's strategy has promoted integration in supporting the export capacity and the institutional settings in charge of <u>increasing competitiveness and market access</u>, in developing infrastructure of regional interest and in supporting human resource development to strengthen the regional institutional capacity, cohesion and identity.</p> <p>Under the 8th EDF support was provided for both broadening and consolidating the regional initiatives under the 7th EDF and included, among others, a major programme to enhance <u>the competitiveness of the rum sector by making it export-oriented in the segment of branded products</u>. The components include: (1) institutional capacity building to WISPA, (2) marketing and distribution strategies; and (3) plant modernisation and meeting of environmental needs.</p> <p>Source: Evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CAFR</b>	No support to agricultural commodities in the regional programme.
<b>CM</b>	<p><b>Commission's strategy and programming documents for the 2008-2013 period mention the objectives of the COMs (without referring to the COMs), in particular diversification, the elaboration of national strategies and competitiveness.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The overall response strategy mentions the importance of the diversification of economic activities, in particular the promotion of agricultural commodity chains and of rural development activities.</li> <li>▪ The intervention foreseen under the second focal area "trade and regional integration" of the 2008-2013 CSP aims at supporting the elaboration and application of the national competitiveness strategy and at reinforcing the competitiveness of several productive sectors exposed to international competition and of sectors with a high export potential on both regional and international levels. One of its sub-programmes focuses on the development of the agricultural production.</li> </ul> <p>(NB: the first CSP (2001-2007) does not foresee support to the agricultural commodity</p>



	<p>sector).</p> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, page 20, 33</i></p>
<b>CI</b>	<p><b>Pas de références explicites aux COM dans les CSP.</b></p> <p><b>Néanmoins, un des objectifs intermédiaires « amélioration revenus » est cité</b> (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.9 et 31). L'objectif global concernant notamment la réduction de la pauvreté est régulièrement cité dans le CSP 2008-2013 et notamment p.17.</p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>To the extent that Commission strategy documents aim at increasing competitiveness through support to regional economic integration, specific intermediary objectives of the COM(2004) are stated. However, no explicit reference to the competitiveness of the agricultural commodity sector has been made.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>Despite the fact that “poverty alleviation may not be regarded as the dominant priority in the region, there are no studies on the impact of regional integration and trade policies on poverty issues” (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p. vii</i>), diversification and competitiveness to develop exportations are stated.</p> <p>Under the 8<sup>th</sup> EDF support was provided for both broadening and consolidating the regional initiatives under the 7<sup>th</sup> EDF and included, among others, a major programme to enhance the <b>competitiveness of the rum sector by making it export-oriented in the segment of branded products</b>. The components include: (1) institutional capacity building to WISPA, (2) marketing and distribution strategies; and (3) plant modernisation and meeting of environmental needs. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.20</i>).</p> <p>9<sup>th</sup> EDF support to the <b>Competitiveness</b> of the Rice Sector in the Caribbean (€ 24 million) (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.17</i>).</p> <p>The Commission's support has had significant impact in a number of areas. In the agricultural sector, the CARTF project has contributed significantly to capacity development in the areas of <b>diversification</b> and quality improvements with the ultimate aim of <b>developing alternative export opportunities</b> in this sector. (<i>Source: CR-ECS Volume I: Final Report p.36</i>).</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>The 2008-2013 ESAIO RSP/RIP refers to certain of the COMs' objectives, although never refers to the COMs themselves:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Diversification, through the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme);</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Integrating the international trading system, by complying with SPS standards</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 2008-2013 R.SP/RIP, pages 33 &amp; 39.</i></p>
<b>ET</b>	<p><b>No explicit reference to the COM in CSP.</b></p> <p>The global objective « poverty reduction » is a key concept both in Ethiopian strategy (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.25-27) and in EC response strategy (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.41). « Increasing incomes of vulnerable groups » is also cited in CSP (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.34).</p> <p>No explicit reference to the COM in CSE but :</p> <p>The overriding objective of the Strategy for 1996-2001 <b>was overcoming poverty</b> through modernisation of the Ethiopian society and economy based on sustainable and regionally balanced growth. Food Security was seen as a key to such developments. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 11</i>).</p> <p>The Strategy for 2002-2007 has as its overall objective <b>the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty</b>, by removing structural constraints in sectors that are key to future development. Complementary to the overall objectives were specific objectives in the chosen focal sectors and notably Food Security. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 12</i>).</p> <p>As agriculture is the backbone of Ethiopia's economy, it has received priority attention and much effort has been made to increase productivity in the sector. In 1993, ADLI (Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation) had been adopted as the core long-term development strategy of the country. Its main objective is to achieve productivity growth in the peasant agriculture sector and, thereby, bring about an <b>improvement in the standard of living of the rural population</b>. Key elements are: the provision of agricultural inputs (improved seeds, fertiliser), extension, credit to increase agricultural production, and the rehabilitation and construction of rural roads <b>in order to better integrate the smallholder sector in the economy</b>. Basically a supply side response to development.</p> <p>The <b>ADLI strategy has been supplemented with new policies for education, health and other important sectors, for which Sector Development Programmes (SDPs) have been developed or are being developed</b>. SDPs have been in place since the 1990s for Roads, Education, Health and Energy and more recently for Water. The SDPs are building blocks to achieve global development targets by 2015, like universal primary education and access to essential primary health care services. The SDPs for Roads, Education and Health were subject to Mid-Term Reviews in early 2001. (<i>Source: ET-ECS Volume I: Final Report p 7</i>).</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>The Ghana CSP/NIPs refer to the following objectives of the COM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Addressing supply side and competitiveness constraints (which can be considered as coping with the long term price decline);</li> <li>▪ Diversifying from cocoa to other cash crops for export markets</li> <li>▪ Facilitating trade through compliance with international regulations</li> </ul> <p><i>Sources: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 6 &amp; 53</i></p>

<b>KE</b>	<p>. There is no reference to the COMs in the CSPs of Kenya. However agriculture is one of the two focal sectors for the period 2007-2013. The EC specific objective is to support the achievement of the PRSP sectoral growth target of 6% p.a. for Agriculture and rural development, and thereby contribute to national growth and poverty reduction.</p> <p><i>Source: Kenya 2007-2013 CSP/NIP, page 30</i></p>
<b>MG</b>	<p><b>Pas de références explicites aux COM dans les CSP. Néanmoins, un des objectifs intermédiaires « amélioration revenus » est cité</b> (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.85-86). L'objectif global concernant notamment la réduction de la pauvreté est régulièrement cité dans le CSP 2008-2013 et notamment p.15.</p>
<b>ML</b>	<p>In Mali's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, there are multiple references concerning the need to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increase Mali's cotton sector competitiveness (which can be considered as coping with the long term price decline);</li> <li>▪ To diversify its economy (away from traditional commodities such as cotton)</li> <li>▪ To support Mali's compliance with trade rules (and therefore integrating it in the international trading system)</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 36 &amp; 38</i></p>
<b>PAC</b>	<p>The Pacific 2002-2007 RSP/RIP included support to a programme facilitating regional economic integration and trade.</p> <p>The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP stresses the need to improve agricultural practices to reduce negative environmental impacts (sustainable corporate practices). It also includes production diversification and increased competitiveness as goals of the RIP framework.</p> <p><i>Source: Pacific 2007-2013 RSP/RIP, pages 33, 109 &amp; 138</i> <i>Source: Pacific 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, page 75.</i></p>
<b>SADC</b>	<p>There is no reference to the COMs in the RSPs of SADC. However regional integration and trade is one of the two focal sectors for the period 2007-2013. The EC specific objective is to support the SADC countries/ region to increase economic growth and reduce poverty to higher levels of regional economic integration and to improve trade negotiating capacities at regional and multilateral levels (EPAs and WTO).</p> <p><i>Source: SADC 2007-2013 RSP/RIP, page 32</i></p>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>There is no evidence in the CSPs of Tanzania that intermediary objectives of the COM are explicitly stated. However, the objective of the focal sector "Infrastructure/ Communication and Transport" of the EC strategy for the period 2007-2013 is to enhanced regional integration and reduction of poverty in rural areas. In addition, the overall objective of the focal sector "Trade and Regional Integration" is to create conditions for sustainable pro-poor growth. These elements are linked to the global objective of the COM (progress achieved in terms of sustainable development, integration into the world economy and poverty reduction).</p> <p><i>Source: Tanzania 2007-2013 CSP, page 82</i></p>
<b>UG</b>	<p>The CSP/NIPs of Uganda mention the following objectives :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Stimulating rural development and the diversification of incomes;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Supporting productivity enhancement</li> <li>▪ Supporting sustainable natural resource management such as land for pastoral societies (sustainable corporate practices)</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Uganda 2002-2007 CSP/NIP, pages 46 &amp; 47</i> <i>Uganda 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 9, 12, 37, 66 &amp; 77</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>Vanuatu's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that EU activities promote disaster risk management (but no reference to price risk management can be found). The Producers Organisation Programme mentioned in the CSP/NIP is supposed to facilitate access to credit.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 30 &amp; 36</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Selon le RSP/RIP de 2008-2013 de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, la stratégie d'intégration régionale (un des secteurs de concentration) vise les objectifs suivants :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Réduction des coûts et augmentation de la compétitivité ;</li> <li>▪ Diversifier et accélérer la croissance.</li> </ul> <p>Il déclare aussi être en ligne avec les objectifs d'intégration dans l'économie mondiale, à travers la mise en place des APE et le soutien des négociations à l'OMC.</p> <p><i>Sources : WAF RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 10, 26, 34, 45, 46 &amp; 71.</i></p>
<b>I.9.3.3</b>	<p>Evidence in country and regional programming documents of the strategic contribution of interventions in the field of agricultural commodities to one or several intended results of the COM</p>
<b>BF</b>	<p>Dans le CSP/NIP 2008-2013 du Burkina Faso, la revue des résultats de la coopération passée dans le domaine de l'agriculture ne fait pas référence à l'atteinte de résultats. Les seuls faits mentionnés sont ceux des problèmes et retards rencontrés dans les programmes de soutien au coton.</p> <p><i>Source : CSP/NIP 2008-2013 du Burkina Faso, page 14</i></p>
<b>CR</b>	<p>No such evidence in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005</p>
<b>CAFR</b>	<p>No support to agricultural commodities in the regional programme.</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Commission's bilateral strategy documents for the period 2008-2013 foresee one intervention aiming at reinforcing the competitiveness of several productive sectors exposed to international competition and of sectors with a high export potential on both regional and international levels. However, the strategic contribution of this intervention to competitiveness is not clearly demonstrated (see quote hereunder).</p> <p>(NB: the first CSP (2001-2007) does not foresee support to the agricultural commodity sector).</p> <p><b><i>“Compétitivité et APE</i></b></p> <p><i>Action prévue: Mise à niveau des entreprises et renforcement des capacités de production et d'exportation pour les secteurs prioritaires de l'économie.</i> <i>L'objectif serait de renforcer la compétitivité de plusieurs secteurs productifs exposés à la concurrence internationale et des secteurs à haut potentiel d'exportation au niveau régional et international. Une</i></p>

	<p><i>attention particulière serait portée à l'insertion des produits stratégiques sur les marchés internationaux et régionaux. On prévoit notamment :</i></p> <p><i>1.1 Une éventuelle extension du soutien apporté au programme national de mise à niveau des entreprises. Ce programme, élaboré par la partie nationale en partenariat avec l'UE et l'ONUDI dans le cadre du 9e FED, vise à améliorer la performance compétitive du système productif par un appui aux acteurs institutionnels chargés du pilotage stratégique et de l'exécution du programme, à renforcer les capacités des prestataires de services aux entreprises et à créer des mécanismes permettant de faciliter le financement des plans de mise à niveau des entreprises des secteurs prioritaires. Dans ce cadre, l'appui communautaire pourrait se focaliser sur le renforcement des capacités en matière de gestion administrative et financière, de marketing, de comptabilité, d'analyse juridique, de préparation de plans d'affaires et de financement. D'autres interventions pourraient être envisagées, comme renforcer les capacités institutionnelles de mise à niveau et les structures intermédiaires d'appui au secteur privé (guichet unique de formalités pour les entreprises, Agence nationale de l'investissement, bourse de sous-traitance, chambre de commerce, etc.).</i></p> <p><i>1.2. Une intervention spécifique en faveur du développement de la production agricole en accord avec les orientations stratégiques de la plateforme agriculture-élevage développée par le MINADER et le MINEPLA. Une attention particulière sera accordée aux produits agricoles ayant un potentiel d'exportation, notamment dans le cadre de la sous-région. Dans ce contexte, le soutien du 10e FED visera, par exemple, la relance des filières cacao et café, le développement des productions horticoles et des exploitations cotonnières, la production vivrière et pastorale, ainsi que le renforcement des capacités de la chaîne locale de transformation des matières premières dérivées. Il y est également prévu un soutien au développement des circuits de commercialisation (magasins, marchés, centres de distribution, installations de conditionnement...) ainsi que d'éventuelles actions ciblées de densification et de réhabilitation des réseaux de pistes rurales en vue de désenclaver des zones à fort potentiel productif agricole.</i></p> <p><i>1.3. Un appui aux PME pouvant prendre la forme d'un soutien aux organismes intermédiaires d'appui aux PME, à la formation professionnelle et à des interventions en faveur du renforcement des systèmes de crédit productif aux PME sera évalué et donnera lieu à des actions ciblées telles que le renforcement des capacités des intermédiaires financiers (sur le plan de l'analyse des risques, notamment) ou la mise en place de fonds de garantie pour les prêts aux PME, etc."</i></p> <p><i>Sources :</i>  <i>Coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Cadre stratégique de la coopération Cameroun-Communauté européenne – 9<sup>ème</sup> FED</i>  <i>République du Cameroun-Communauté européenne, Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013, page 33</i></p>
CI	<p><b>Les interventions entreprises dans le cadre du 10<sup>ème</sup> FED et plus particulièrement du secteur hors concentration « appui et l'amélioration de la compétitivité des filières agricoles » contribueront sans doute à plusieurs résultats de la COM (2004)89.</b></p> <p><b>En effet,</b> ces interventions <b>s'orienteront</b> la mise en place de mécanismes de gestion et d'atténuation des variations de prix dans le cadre des secteurs hors concentration, le renforcement des outils d'aide à la décision, l'appui à la structuration institutionnelle du secteur agricole, l'amélioration de l'accès aux marchés extérieurs en renforçant aux niveaux public et privé, la promotion de la qualité et le respect des standards sanitaires, sociaux et environnementaux en vigueur sur les marchés d'exportation, notamment celui de l'Union européenne (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.31)</p>

<b>CR</b>	<p>There is no explicit evidence of support to agricultural commodities in the Commission's strategy documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>CARIFORUM-European Community, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2003-2007,</i>  <i>European Community- Caribbean region, Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013</i></p> <p>See I.9.3.2, notably for the <b>competitiveness of the rum sector</b>.</p>
<b>ESAIO</b>	<p>There is no reference to the COMs in the East and Southern Africa RSP/RIPs. The only potential contribution of the 2008-2013 Regional Indicative Programme would be the increase in competitiveness through its support to the CAADP, which does agricultural research, technology innovation and dissemination, etc.</p>
<b>ET</b>	<p><b>No or little evidence related to this indicator in CSP.</b></p> <p><b>Nevertheless, the intended results of the focal sector II are presented in the intervention framework and performance indicators</b> (Source: CSP 2008-2013 p.83):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Enhanced livelihoods and asset build-up of PSNP beneficiaries and communities leading to graduation</li> <li>▪ Agricultural markets function more efficiently due to proper policy provisions</li> <li>▪ Enhanced contribution of the livestock sector to sustainable food security</li> <li>▪ Improved participatory natural resource management in high potential resettlement areas</li> <li>▪ Biodiversity / Forestry potential of Ethiopia preserved and developed</li> </ul> <p>Highland water potential strengthened and developed</p> <p>No evidence for this indicator in the CSE.</p>
<b>GH</b>	<p>There is no explicit mention of strategic contributions of interventions to one of the intended results of the COM. The 2008-2013 CSP/NIP mentions that Interventions have however had a positive impact on the following elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reduction of the impact of the cocoa swollen shoot virus disease: and therefore a reduction of production costs</li> <li>▪ Provision of a water supply in small towns, and construction of schools and clinics: and therefore provision of services considered as prerequisites to diversify rural communities</li> <li>▪ Improvement of the transport sector: and therefore an increase in market access and an improvement of producer prices.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Ghana 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 30</i></p>
<b>KE</b>	<p>There is no reference of the strategic contribution of the CSPs/NIPs of Kenya to the expected results of the COMs. However, the 2007-2013 CSP mentions that the Government of Kenya under the first focal sector Agriculture and Rural Development will take steps to improve dissemination of research findings to small scale farmers, markets and marketing information as well as improved management of farmer and trade organisations. To some extent, these elements are linked to result 2 of the COM "Raised Competitiveness of commodities and the economy".</p>

	<i>Source: Kenya 2007-2013 CSP/NIP, page 30</i>
<b>MG</b>	Dans le cadre du « Secteur de concentration 2 : Développement rural et Sécurité alimentaire, incluant la Décentralisation et la gouvernance locale », une référence est faite à la diversification agricole qui permettra l'amélioration des cultures de rente et des filières d'exportation. (Source : CSP 2008-2013 p.19) qui peut éventuellement être assimilée à la priorité 4 ou au R4 de la COM (2004)89.
<b>ML</b>	No reference to the COMs can be found in the CSP/NIPs of Mali. Furthermore, besides the statement that interventions of the 8 <sup>th</sup> EDF in the rice sector have had positive impacts, there is no reference to interventions of the EU achieving results in the commodity sector.  <i>Source: Mali 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 31</i>
<b>PAC</b>	According to the overview of the interventions previous interventions in the 9th EDF, certain programmes have contributed to reaching COM objectives : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The Development of Sustainable Agriculture in the Pacific programme has contributed to increase production and better cope with the price peak of 2008;</li> <li>▪ The Plant Protection Programme has contributed to improve pest management practices, thus facilitating competitiveness, trade, and sustainable corporate practices;</li> <li>▪ The Facilitating Agricultural Commodity Trade programme contributes to increase diversification of export products and competitiveness.</li> </ul> <i>Source: Pacific RSP/RIP 2008-2013, pages 134-137</i>
<b>SADC</b>	Regional integration and trade is one of the two focal sectors for the period 2007-2013. The EC specific objective is to support the SADC countries/ region to increase economic growth and reduce poverty to higher levels of regional economic integration and to improve trade negotiating capacities at regional and multilateral levels (EPAs and WTO). These elements are clearly linked to expected results 2 and 5 of the COM (raised competitiveness of commodities and the economy, as well as opportunities in the multilateral trading system maximised for CDDCs).  <i>Source: SADC2007-2013 RSP/RIP, page 32</i>
<b>TZ</b>	The programme purpose of the focal sectors of the EC strategy for the period 2007-2013 are <i>the reduction of the transport cost component of goods traded nationally and improved all year round market access for the rural population as well as market access opportunities better exploited by small holders and businesses for key products and services</i> . Both these purposes are linked to the expected result 2 of the COM “Raised competitiveness of commodities and the economy”.  <i>Source: Tanzania 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, pages 82-83</i>
<b>UG</b>	There are no explicit references to achieving certain of the COM's objectives in the field of agricultural commodities in Uganda's CSP/NIPs. The main achievements mentioned in the 2008-2013 CSP/NIP are on the level of donor coordination.  There is reference to the fact that the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) has achieved positive results. Although the results are not detailed, the programme itself

	<p>deals with increasing competitiveness and diversification.</p> <p><i>Source: Uganda CSP/NIP 2008-2013, pages 23 &amp; 24</i></p>
<b>VU</b>	<p>According to Vanuatu's 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, the Producers Organisations Programme has contributed to facilitate access to credit and develop skills on market information.</p> <p><i>Source: Vanuatu 2008-2013 CSP/NIP, page 30</i></p>
<b>WAF</b>	<p>Les RSP/RIP de l'Afrique de l'Ouest ne font pas mention de la contribution des interventions régionales à un objectif mentionné dans la COM.</p>
<b>I.9.3.4</b>	<p>Explanation in intervention formulation documents of the link between the proposed intervention and its strategic contribution to one or several of the COM's intended results</p>
<b>CM</b>	<p>Cameroon's ATF (Assistance Technique et Financière for bananas) programme documents explain how the investments that will be made are supposed to improve the sector's competitiveness.</p> <p><i>Source : Cameroon banana ATF Financing Agreements, 1999-2008</i></p>
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>There is a clear link between the AACP programme and objectives of both COMs. Indeed, the overall objective of the AAACP programme is to improve incomes for producers from traditional or other agricultural commodities and reduce income vulnerability at both producer and macro level. The AAACP programme purpose is to strengthen the capacity to develop and implement sustainable commodity strategies that improve farmers' productivity and their rural livelihoods and reduce income vulnerability.</p> <p><i>Source: Financing agreement n°9571/REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The programming documents explain that the goal of the Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP) is to facilitate compliance with EC regulations in terms of pesticide maximum residue limits. This is meant to improve integration of ACP countries in the international trading system.</p> <p>The second PIP has also included support to favour environmentally-friendly practices and defend ACP country interests in international decisions concerning pesticides. These actions of support are intended to enhance sustainable corporate practices and maintain the integration of ACPs in the international trading system.</p> <p><i>Sources: Pesticides Initiative Programme, page 15 &amp; MN 958</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	<p>The AMSP programme is consistent with some COM expected results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ development of a competitive sugar production chain</li> <li>▪ development of sugar exports</li> <li>▪ diversification within the sugar sector (ethanol, electricity) and/or outside the sugar sector</li> </ul> <p>the importance given to each of these results varies from one SP country to another one</p>
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Cette relation n'est pas mentionnée de façon explicite dans le MR et le rapport narratif intermédiaire mais <b>les quatre résultats attendus de l'intervention contribueront aux</b></p>



	<p><b>R1, R2, R4 et R6 de la COM (2004)89.</b></p> <p>En effet, les <b>quatre résultats attendus de l'intervention</b> sont (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 7</i>) :</p> <p>(R1) Des opérateurs paysans professionnels ayant augmenté leur revenu grâce à une amélioration de la qualité de leur production et à une meilleure capacité de négociation lors de la commercialisation</p> <p>(R2) Des opérateurs investis dans la transformation agro-alimentaire, capables de gérer des unités artisanales de transformation et d'intégrer les caractéristiques technico-économiques du marché international.</p> <p>(R3) Des micro-entreprises de conseil agricole pour dynamiser les filières anacarde et sésame</p> <p>(R4) Une politique régionale de valorisation de l'anacarde et du sésame, en collaboration avec des partenaires internationaux est définie</p> <p><b>L'intervention contribuera également aux impacts intermédiaires et globaux de la COM (2004)89. En effet, l'intervention précise que</b> (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 3</i>):</p> <p>le projet contribue à atteindre les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement : lutte contre la pauvreté, préservation de l'environnement, promotion de la femme et plaidoyer pour l'accès aux marchés des pays de l'Union Européenne. Les objectifs proposés visent à appuyer les processus durables de développement social, humain, environnemental et économique. Le renforcement des capacités des structures locales de développement par des sessions de formation et de suivi des projets des populations permettra une meilleure valorisation des ressources locales.</p> <p>Les objectifs globaux que l'action contribue à atteindre sont :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Réduire la pauvreté en milieu rural pour améliorer les conditions de vie de populations défavorisées</li> <li>(2) Promouvoir la représentation des femmes dans les filières agricoles nationales et l'autonomisation économique des femmes</li> <li>(3) Favoriser la création locale de valeur ajoutée par la promotion de la qualité et des traitements post-récolte</li> <li>(4) Faciliter l'intégration de populations vulnérables à l'économie mondiale</li> <li>(5) Favoriser la préservation des ressources naturelles par la promotion de pratiques culturelles agrobiologiques et la démonstration d'une reforestation rentable économiquement pour les populations</li> </ol>
TZ	<p>Stabex not build in the framework of the COM; complex to make the link with the COM.</p> <p>In the future (2012) the EC will continue on coffee and tea again through the TAP targeting trade and research, mainly the link with farmers (before the support was provided to research mainly). Support will be devoted to quality and standards of cash (tea and coffee) crops. The cotton sector will be supported. Also support to the Tanzania Bureau of Standards, reinforcement of the Fishery component (Lake Victoria) and Horticulture sector, involving spices (done in the past under STABEX). The support to the basket fund will be ended as the large part of the support is already done</p>

	<p>through budget support and basket fund is very difficult in terms of procedures (the 5 pillar approach needs to be applied before one can go for a basket fund). The EU DEL prefers to work on the project-based approach for the rest of the support to agriculture. History of the EC support was on coffee and tea. They want to continue in that way. There are not a lot of donors assisting these sectors. The others focus on food crops, for example (opinion that the ASDP is mainly for food crops). The EU wants to favour partnerships between crop boards and private sector Another component will be devoted to non state actors and value chain.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 600</i></p> <p>STABEX: agreement to fund NAO (€3M) to continue activities in the near future (such as the support to the Crop reform)</p> <p><i>Source: MN 138</i></p>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Bien qu'aucune référence spécifique à la COM ne soit faite dans les documents consultés, le PAFFIC et son appui à la stratégie de sortie de crise de la filière coton, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, vont surtout dans le sens d'une contribution au R2 (amélioration de la compétitivité) de la COM, pour l'aspect recapitalisation, et R3 (gestion des risques) pour l'appui indirect au Fond de Lissage (FdL), outil novateur de gestion du risque prix.</p> <p><i>Sources : Allocution signature CF ;</i></p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Aucune référence aux COMs ne peut être trouvée dans les documents disponibles sur l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.</p> <p>Les objectifs cités rejoignent ceux de la COM en un certain sens (lutter contre la pauvreté, assurer le développement économique et social tout en préservant les ressources naturelles et contribuer à la création de valeur ajoutée par la transformation locale).</p> <p><i>Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'intervention commenté</i></p>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Pas de référence à cet indicateur dans les docs consultés</p> <p>Cette relation n'est pas mentionnée de façon explicite dans les docs consultés mais l'intervention contribuera sans doute au <b>R2 de la COM (2004)89</b>.</p> <p>En outre, l'intervention contribuera également aux <b>impacts intermédiaires et globaux de la COM (2004)89</b>. En effet, <b>un des deux objectifs globaux est « Réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural »</b> (<i>Source : Rider FA p.15 Cadre logique</i>)</p> <p>De plus le MR précise que : <b>I) Hévéa</b>. Après un an de projet, l'impact sur le développement socio-économique et la <b>réduction de la pauvreté</b> est déjà perceptible grâce à la création d'emplois rentables chez les jeunes démunis. (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>) <b>II) Palmier</b>. Aucun impact n'est actuellement perceptible. (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>).</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not explicitly target agricultural commodities. It aims at reinforcing the competitiveness of the economy and at facilitating its insertion into the regional and world economy through the implementation of the EU-Central Africa EPA. As such, it</p>

	<p>aims at contributing at one of the COM's intended results: "raised competitiveness of commodities and of the economy". The strategic contribution of the intervention to competitiveness is not clearly demonstrated in formulation documents.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Commission européenne, Fiche d'identification, 27 Juin 2006</i>  <i>Convention de financement entre la Commission européenne et la République du Cameroun, Programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique centrale (PASAPE), 9ème FED, 11 Octobre 2007</i></p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>The "Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean" programme directly aimed at two of the COM's intended results: enhancement of the competitiveness of the rice sector and development of rice sector strategies. The feasibility study and FA do not explain how the intervention will strategically contribute to these results.</p> <p><i>Sources:</i>  <i>Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Caribbean Forum of ACP States, Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, November 2003</i>  <i>Agrotec Spa, Feasibility study of the CARIFORUM rice industry, 2003</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>The Joint ACP-EU Declaration on rum was adopted in 1999 and the Caribbean rum programme was launched in 2002, whereas the COMs are dated 2004.</p>
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>This relation is not done in the consulted documents but the intervention overall objective was to improve standards of living in the growing areas <b>thus reducing widespread poverty</b> and coffee yields and quality were identified as the main factors to meet this objective. (<i>Source : FA p.3</i>) and the main activities are Improved delivery of coffee research results, Conservation of Ethiopia's and the world's coffee arabica genetic resource, Promote Ethiopia's coffee in the marketplace, Provision of an effective coffee extension service, Sustained increased supply of CBD resistant coffee seedlings with local landrace characteristics, Project management and co-ordination</p> <p>Indeed, the <b>prime aim is to alleviate poverty in rural areas through the coffee sub-sector</b>. (<i>Source : Completion report p.8</i>)</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>The Financing Agreement of the Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II (CSSP2) refers to the COM (2004) 89 and its objectives. It mentions that the CSSP2 is aligned with the COM and that the support is hinged on the development commodity strategy of the recipient country.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Financing Agreement, page 15.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	<p>The programming documents explain that the goal of the Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-Setting Organisations (PAN-SPSO) programme is to increase the participation of African Nations in SPSOs. This is, in turn, supposed to enhance the up-take of the standards into national Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and food safety systems. Therefore, the programme is supposed to facilitate integration of African countries in the international trading system.</p> <p><i>Source: PAN-SPSO Financing Agreement, August 2010, page 15.</i></p>
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	<p>The intervention is not product specific. It is basically a food security project without</p>

	any obvious relation with the COM.
<b>ML-COT</b>	<p>Bien qu'aucune référence spécifique à la COM ne soit faite dans les documents consultés, le PARFC apporte essentiellement une contribution liée au R2 (amélioration de la compétitivité) de la COM (appui à la privatisation/libéralisation de la filière coton, alphabétisation, réhabilitation de pistes).</p> <p><i>Sources : FIP ;</i></p>
<b>PAC-FACT</b>	<p>'The project's OO and PP also support the policy commitment of the EU in the Cotonou Agreement to facilitate the integration of the PACP countries into the regional and global economy, and the commitment in the Strategy on Aid for Trade to strengthen trade-related assistance and regional economic integration, as they are expressed in the Regional Strategy Paper for the Pacific, 2008-2013.'</p> <p><i>Source: MR124441.01 (09/2009)</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	The ICART programming documents do not refer to the COM (2004) 89 and the COM (2004) 87.
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>Programming documents are not available. However, according to ROM reports, the project has the same overall objective than the COMs, i.e. increase and secure the incomes of agricultural producers (with a view to reducing rural poverty). In terms of result, the project supports the marketing of agricultural products, which corresponds to result 2 "Raised competitiveness of commodities and the economy".</p> <p><i>Source: MR-01912.01-22/12/2006, page 1</i></p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>No reference is made in the project description (drafted by Solidaridad) to the EC policy relative to agricultural commodities or to the COM but the project fits entirely within the scope of the overall objective of raised competitiveness (R2) and more particularly would strongly contribute to attainment of R6 (fair trading and labelling, CSR).</p> <p><i>Source: grant document.</i></p>
<b>UG-SBS</b>	<p>The SBS does not focus on any particular agricultural commodity nor makes any reference to the COM but since its objective is to increase agricultural productivity and profitability in a sustainable manner, as a means to increase rural incomes and enhance rural livelihoods, it falls within the broad scope of the COM's objectives and more specifically to R2 (raised competitiveness).</p> <p><i>Source: FA</i></p>
<b>VU-POP</b>	<p>The Producers Organisations Programme II (POP2) financing agreement explains that through a support to creating new producers organisations and strengthening the existing ones, the programme is supposed to improve market knowledge for farmers, facilitate their access to credit (which was done by establishing the Revolving Credit Funds), and increasing farmer incomes by increasing their share of export price and their productivity. The sustainability of the credit access system is however considered doubtful by the programme's third monitoring report.</p> <p>It also states that the support is supposed to help diversify agricultural output but there are however no explanations on how that is supposed to be done and there is no such evidence in the monitoring reports.</p>

	<p><i>Source: Producer Organisation Programme II, Financing Agreement, pages 14 &amp; 16 Producers Organisation Project II Monitoring report 3, effectiveness and sustainability sheets.</i></p>
<b>I.9.3.5</b>	Evidence in project monitoring and evaluation reports that the interventions have contributed to the achievement of one or several of the COM's intended results
<b>ACP-ACP</b>	<p>At the time of the MTR (April 2009), only 19 activities are recorded as completed (11% of the activities of the Workplan1 – WP1) and thus are expected to deliver appropriate outcomes (direct effects on the beneficiaries). Main achievements of the programme by result are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Result 1:</b> 16 commodity strategies (prepared with AAACP funding) are either completed or under development out of which 8 are due to be completed by May-June 2009.</li> <li>▪ <b>Result 2:</b> out of the 101 activities implemented by IOs, only 17 are completed (mainly regional workshops to strengthen producer organizations, contributions to value chain analysis and commodity strategies, identification of business models as well as some specific activities like control of fruit fly).</li> <li>▪ <b>Result 3:</b> none of the 29 activities is completed and 12 are on-going. These activities, which have been implemented in the form of studies, training, technical assistance and advisory services, could not have an effect unless they are accompanied by the establishment or strengthening of both 'soft' infrastructure (e.g. organisation, legislation, regulation, finance, insurance, judiciary) and 'hard' infrastructure (e.g. weather stations, laboratories, warehouses, rural roads, electricity) that forms the prerequisite for the application of the instruments.</li> <li>▪ <b>Result 4:</b> on the one hand, there is a real coordination at IO headquarters level through the Inter Agencies Mechanism (IAM) meetings, on the other hand this collaboration has not yet addressed concepts and methodological issues like how to develop and implement a commodity strategy.</li> </ul> <p><i>Source: Mid-term Review of the AAACP Programme, Final report, April 2009, page 69 &amp; 70</i></p>
<b>ACP-PIP</b>	<p>The programme evaluations of the Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP) show that the share of ACP exports of fruit and vegetables to the EU markets have been maintained and the PIP has had a crucial contribution to maintain this share.</p> <p><i>Source: Final Evaluation Report of the Pesticides Initiative Programme, June 2008, pages i&amp; 95</i></p>
<b>AMSP</b>	At the time of the AMSP study (2009) the AMSP programme had delivered few tangible results but financed feasibility studies preparing investments.
<b>BF-ANSE</b>	<p>Cette relation n'est pas mentionnée de façon explicite dans le MR et le rapport narratif intermédiaire mais les <b>quatre résultats attendus de l'intervention contribueront aux R1, R2, R4 et R6 de la COM (2004)89</b>.</p> <p>En effet, les <b>quatre résultats attendus de l'intervention sont</b> (<i>Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 7</i>) :</p> <p>(R1) Des opérateurs paysans professionnels ayant augmenté leur revenu grâce à une amélioration de la qualité de leur production et à une meilleure capacité de négociation lors de la commercialisation</p> <p>(R2) Des opérateurs investis dans la transformation agro-alimentaire, capables de gérer des unités artisanales de transformation et d'intégrer les caractéristiques technico-</p>

	<p>économiques du marché international.</p> <p>(R3) Des micro-entreprises de conseil agricole pour dynamiser les filières anacarde et sésame</p> <p>(R4) Une politique régionale de valorisation de l'anacarde et du sésame, en collaboration avec des partenaires internationaux est définie</p> <p><b>L'intervention contribuera également aux impacts intermédiaires et globaux de la COM (2004)89. En effet, l'intervention précise que (Source : Annexe I. description de l'action p. 3):</b></p> <p>le projet contribue à atteindre les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement : lutte contre la pauvreté, préservation de l'environnement, promotion de la femme et plaidoyer pour l'accès aux marchés des pays de l'Union Européenne. Les objectifs proposés visent à appuyer les processus durables de développement social, humain, environnemental et économique. Le renforcement des capacités des structures locales de développement par des sessions de formation et de suivi des projets des populations permettra une meilleure valorisation des ressources locales.</p> <p>Les objectifs globaux que l'action contribue à atteindre sont :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(6) Réduire la pauvreté en milieu rural pour améliorer les conditions de vie de populations défavorisées</li> <li>(7) Promouvoir la représentation des femmes dans les filières agricoles nationales et l'autonomisation économique des femmes</li> <li>(8) Favoriser la création locale de valeur ajoutée par la promotion de la qualité et des traitements post-récolte</li> <li>(9) Faciliter l'intégration de populations vulnérables à l'économie mondiale</li> <li><b>(10)</b> Favoriser la préservation des ressources naturelles par la promotion de pratiques culturales agrobiologiques et la démonstration d'une reforestation rentable économiquement pour les populations</li> </ul>
<b>BF-COT</b>	<p>Bien qu'une référence spécifique à la COM ne soit pas faite dans les documents consultés, le PAFFIC et son appui à la stratégie de sortie de crise de la filière coton, adoptée par le Gouvernement et l'AICB, vont dans le sens d'une contribution au R2 de la COM (pour l'aspect recapitalisation) et R3 pour l'appui indirect au Fond de Lissage (FdL), outil novateur de gestion du risque prix.</p>
<b>CI-ONG</b>	<p>Il n'y a pas de rapport de monitoring ou d'évaluation disponible pour l'intervention de structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde.</p> <p>Les objectifs cités rejoignent ceux de la COM en un certain sens (lutter contre la pauvreté, assurer le développement économique et social tout en préservant les ressources naturelles et contribuer à la création de valeur ajoutée par la transformation locale).</p> <p>Ces objectifs ont été réalisés dans une certaine mesure :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Les 10 unités mises sur pied emploient chacune environ 50 personnes et contribuent à augmenter la valeur ajoutée de la production d'anacarde.</li> <li>▪ Les unités valorisent également les déchets de la transformation par la production de briquettes de combustibles à partir des coques d'anacardes.</li> <li>▪ Les unités ont été renforcées au niveau des performances énergétiques.</li> <li>▪ Certaines unités de production sont certifiées par le label biologique.</li> </ul>

	<i>Structuration professionnelle de la filière anacarde: une contribution durable pour la paix – Côte d'Ivoire. Cadre logique d'intervention commenté</i>
<b>CI-REH</b>	<p>Cette relation n'est pas mentionnée de façon explicite dans les docs consultés mais l'intervention contribuera sans doute au <b>R2 de la COM (2004)89</b>.</p> <p>En outre, l'intervention contribuera également aux <b>impacts intermédiaires et globaux de la COM (2004)89</b>. En effet, <b>un des deux objectifs globaux est « Réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural »</b> (<i>Source : Rider FA p.15 Cadre logique</i>)</p> <p>De plus le MR précise que : <b>I) Hévéa</b>. Après un an de projet, l'impact sur le développement socio-économique et la <b>réduction de la pauvreté</b> est déjà perceptible grâce à la création d'emplois rentables chez les jeunes démunis. (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>) <b>II) Palmier</b>. Aucun impact n'est actuellement perceptible. (<i>Source : MR p.3</i>).</p>
<b>CR-RIC</b>	<p>Achievements of the “Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean” programme with respect to COM's intended results have been modest. The final evaluation stressed that “<i>the programme was too small to impact on more than a small part of the industry and its impact could not in any case be distinguished from other influences such as price rises. Expected results related to national strategy development and export market expansion were not achieved. Those related to water management infrastructure were delivered in Guyana but partly in Suriname while institutional developments were limited in both countries. Miller's upgrading through TA has been achieved. Research and extension contributed to improved seed production. Financing facility funds were fully disbursed but few producers were able to benefit.</i>”</p> <p><i>Source: SOGES Spa, End of programme evaluation of the programme: Support to the Competitiveness of the rice sector in the Caribbean, Final Report, Draft, 11 November 2009, page 5</i></p>
<b>CM-ONG</b>	<p>Cette relation n'est pas mentionnée de façon explicite dans les docs consultés.</p> <p>L'intervention contribuera aux <b>impacts intermédiaires et globaux de la COM (2004)89</b>.</p> <p>En effet, son objectif global est : « Contribuer à la réduction de la pauvreté et au développement social, économique et humain dans les communes de Garoua Rurale et de Gashiga » (<i>Source : Annexe I p.2</i>).</p>
<b>CM-PAS</b>	<p>The PASAPE does not explicitly target agricultural commodities. The mid-term evaluation of the PASAPE evidenced that so far none of the expected results of the programme has been achieved. The programme, following an addendum in 2010, will be implemented until 2012. Some activities have however been implemented (in particular a diagnostic on the national competitiveness and the formulation of a national competitiveness strategy) but overall the programme suffers from a low execution rate. The production of the national competitiveness strategy should contribute to the achievement of the COM's objectives.</p> <p><i>Source:</i> <i>Transtec, Mission d'évaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui et de soutien à l'accord de partenariat économique (PASAPE) – 9 ACP CM 18, Juin 2010</i></p>
<b>CR-RUM</b>	<p>One may consider that the Caribbean rum programme contributed to two intended results of the COM, namely</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ integration in the international trading system (starting from a situation where Caribbean rum exports benefited of a preferential access to the EU market);</li> <li>▪ enhancement of sustainable corporate practices and investments.</li> </ul>

	According to the programme evaluation, the programme objectives have been achieved.
<b>ET-CIP</b>	<p>This relation is not done in the consulted documents but the intervention overall objective was to improve standards of living in the growing areas <b>thus reducing widespread poverty</b> and coffee yields and quality were identified as the main factors to meet this objective. (<i>Source : FA p.3</i>)</p> <p>Indeed, the <b>prime aim is to alleviate poverty in rural areas through the coffee sub-sector</b>. (<i>Source : Completion report p.8</i>)</p>
<b>GH-COC</b>	<p>No such evidence can be found in the programme's monitoring reports. They rather mention that the programme's impacts are rather on the medium/long term scale and that they can therefore not be assessed to this date.</p> <p><i>Source: Ghana Cocoa Sector Support Programme II, Monitoring report 02, Effectiveness to date sheet.</i></p>
<b>KE-PAN</b>	There are no references to the COM's results in the PAN-SPSO annual reports. Furthermore, since the programme results are of longer term nature and that the programme began recently, none of the COM's results could yet be apparent.
<b>MG-FOOD</b>	The intervention is not product specific. It is basically a food security project without any obvious relation with the COM
<b>ML-COT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cette relation n'est pas mentionnée de façon explicite dans le rapport ROM. Cependant, en relation avec les R2 et R3 des COM (NB.), la mission ROM relève une nette contradiction de principe entre "privatisation de la CMDT" (OS 1) et le résultat attendu de l'objectif 1 "...libéralisation de la filière et la mise en place des organes de régulation, mise en place d'un dispositif de soutien intra-annuel puis inter-annuel des cours de coton". Selon les consultants, ceci n'implique rien d'autre que de remplacer une entité quasi-étatique (CMDT) par une autre institution quasi-étatique avec mission de "lisser les prix", euphémisme pour une subvention des cours du coton (BCS, §1.2; Monitoring report, p2).</li> <li>▪ Sans en faire référence, mais en relation avec l'objectif global des COM, le rapport ROM estime que les aspects réduction de pauvreté (et sécurité alimentaire) sont complètement écartés (BCS, §1.3). Dans le contexte actuel, il estime que la filière coton ne rime pas avec l'objectif du millénaire "réduction de pauvreté (BCS, §7.4).</li> </ul> <p><i>Source :ROM/BCSné</i></p>
<b>SAR-RES</b>	<p>The ICART monitoring reports and the MTR do not refer to COM's intended results. However, the programme research activities should contribute to result 2 of the COM "Raised competitiveness of commodities and the economy".</p> <p><i>Source: Financing Agreement N° 9053/ REG, Annex 2</i></p>
<b>TZ-ONG</b>	<p>According to ROM reports, the project supports the marketing of agricultural products, which corresponds to result 2 of the COM "Raised competitiveness of commodities and the economy".</p> <p><i>Source: MR-01912.01-22/12/2006, page 1</i></p>
<b>UG-COF</b>	<p>If the project objectives have been achieved it should have contributed to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ maximise the benefits of trade for coffee producers of the Kamuli District</li> <li>▪ foster sustainable coffee production thanks to the environmental friendly practices</li> </ul>



	implied in UTZ certification.
<b>UG-SBS</b>	The SBS does not focus on any particular agricultural commodity nor makes any reference to the COM. No links between the support provided and the wider objectives have been found in documentation consulted.
<b>I.9.3.6</b>	Views of stakeholders about the alignment of Commission support in the field of agricultural commodities to the COM's objectives
<b>BF Coton</b>	Le Secrétariat permanent de la filière coton libéralisée (SPCL) estime que les appuis de la Délégation de l'UE se situent dans le cadre du Partenariat UE-Afrique, mais sans faire de référence explicite à la COM(2004)89. <i>Source : MN 523</i>
<b>BF Coton</b>	Sur la période 2004-2010, les interventions de la Commission dans le domaine des produits de base agricoles répondent aux objectifs des deux Communications et ont contribué à la réalisation de leurs objectifs, en particulier du Plan action secteur coton-Partenariat UE-Afrique. Cependant, la décision de réaliser ces interventions ne fait pas de référence directe et explicite aux Communications
<b>CM</b>	Interviewed stakeholders at national level (Ministries, other donors) did not know the COM. The position of the delegation is a bit more ambiguous, they say they do not know the COM, but also that they are overwhelmed with documentation and do not read everything they receive. They did not get any instructions to follow the COM. <i>Source: MN 407, 402, 403, 410.</i>
<b>CM</b>	Les communications ne seraient pas connues par la Délégation ni par les partenaires nationaux.  La filière bananes est un peu particulière et sort en partie de la COM en raison de sa structure basée sur trois grandes entreprises agroindustrielles et des particularités de l'organisation du marché (un problème de compétitivité de la banane ACP face à la banane dollar sur le marché européen et pas de volatilité des prix).  Les timides interventions de la CE dans les filières cacao /café ont touché certaines priorités de la COM plus que d'autres (approche chaîne de valeur, amélioration de la compétitivité, de la qualité, transparence sur les prix, groupement des producteurs et capacités organisationnelles..).L'approche « chaîne de valeur » n'est que toute récente et n'a été appliquée actuellement qu'à la filière café. Elle reste à mettre en place pour le cacao et à suivre globalement pour la filière café. Certains maillons faibles restent à renforcer (matériel végétal certifié, ..).
<b>CR</b>	No reference to the COMs in the evaluation of Caribbean RSP 2005
<b>GH</b>	The project document mentioned the Communication and its alignment to it without giving further details. The Communication was not known by the Delegation staff and the MS interviewed. As the Ghanaian agricultural sector strategy has already adopted the value chain perspective there is alignment with the objectives of the Communication.
<b>MG</b>	Concernant la <u>COM 2004(89)</u> (Madagascar n'est pas concernée par la seconde COM), l'ensemble des intervenants ne semble pas en avoir connaissance mais la Délégation souligne qu'il y a des convergences, que certains points sont pris en compte de manière ponctuelle et que certaines notions ont été intégrées dans la stratégie. La Délégation regrette néanmoins que les flux d'informations soient souvent à sens unique : Délégation vers siège central.(Source : MN 801 et débriefing Délégation) Toutefois, les activités de coopération dans le domaine des produits agricoles de base

	<p>sont en ligne avec certains des objectifs de la communication:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ importance donnée à ces produits dans les activités de la Commission</li> <li>✓ amélioration de la productivité et de la qualité comme réponse à la baisse tendancielle des prix</li> <li>✓ diversification y compris pour sa contribution à l'atténuation des risques</li> <li>✓ organisation des marchés locaux favorisant l'intégration dans les marchés internationaux</li> </ul>
<b>MG</b>	<p>Les communications ne sont pas (ou ne sont plus) une référence pour la Délégation. Mais les activités de coopération dans le domaine des produits agricoles d'exportation sont en ligne avec certains des objectifs de la communication:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• importance donnée à ces produits dans les activités de la Commission</li> <li>• amélioration de la productivité et de la qualité comme réponse à la baisse tendancielle des prix</li> <li>• diversification y compris pour sa contribution à l'atténuation des risques</li> <li>• organisation des marchés locaux favorisant l'intégration dans les marchés internationaux</li> </ul>
<b>TZ</b>	<p>The Stabex interventions were not designed against the background of the COM and they do not easily fit within the COM's framework: indeed the supports have been focusing on a very narrow part of the sector, ignoring the linkages and the value chain perspective that the COM promotes. Of course all elements supported by the STabex in Tanzania are also in the COM (research, rural roads etc) but they lack the overarching objective and thus fall short of attaining any kind of meaningful and sustainable result in terms of making the sectors more competitive and better able to integrate world markets.</p>
<b>UG coffee tea</b>	<p>COM(2004) 89 is not currently a reference document for the Delegation. However, EC cooperation activities in the agriculture sector did not contradict the COM objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Importance given to exports commodities (tea, coffee)</li> <li>– Improvement of productivity and quality as a response to the declining price trend in the coffee sector</li> <li>– Diversification of income sources of the farmers</li> <li>– Attempt to develop risk management instruments</li> <li>– Organization of the coffee marketing chain in order to better respond to international market requirements</li> </ul>
<b>UG coffee tea</b>	<p>The COMs were probably sent to delegations when they were produced but the EC delegation doesn't know them. The COM(2004) 89 is thus not currently a reference document for the Delegation. However, EC delegation thinks to be in line with their priorities EC cooperation activities in the agriculture sector did not contradict the COM objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Importance given to exports commodities (tea, coffee)</li> <li>– Improvement of productivity and quality as a response to the declining price trend in the coffee sector</li> <li>– Diversification of income sources of the farmers</li> <li>– Attempt to develop risk management instruments</li> <li>– Organization of the coffee marketing chain in order to better respond</li> </ul>

	to international market requirements (Source: MN 301 and 313)
<b>VU</b>	Pas de connaissance des Communications (au niveau de la Délégation), mais cependant alignement implicite des interventions de la Commission dans le domaine des produits de base agricoles en réponse aux objectifs de la COM (2004) 89s.