

Evaluation of Visibility of EU external action

Final Report
Volume 8 – Thematic Report on
Climate Change and Energy

June 2012

Evaluation for the European Commission





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**Evaluation of Visibility of
EU external action**

Final Report

**Volume 8 – Thematic Report on
Climate Change and Energy**

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ACRONYMS

CBD	CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
CC	CLIMATE CHANGE
CCCA	CAMBODIA CLIMATE CHANGE ALLIANCE
CCE	CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY
CCD	DEPARTMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
CDKN	CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT KNOWLEDGE NETWORK
CEP	COUNTRY ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILES
COP	CONFERENCE OF PARTIES
CSP	COUNTRY AND REGIONAL STRATEGY PAPERS (CSP/ RSP) AND INDICATIVE PROGRAMMES (NIP/RIP)
EEAS	EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTIONS SERVICE
ENRTP	ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
EUD	EU DELEGATION
EU ETS	EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM
FFI	FAUNA & FLORA INTERNATIONAL
GCCA	GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ALLIANCE
GOC	GOVT OF CAMBODIA
IDS	INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, UNIV OF SUSSEX, UK
IASG	IMPACT AND ADAPTATION STEERING GROUP
MEA	MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENT AGREEMENT
MOE	CAMBODIA'S MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT
MWH	MONTGOMERY WATSON HARZA ENGINEERING COMPANY
NCCC	NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE
NIP	NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME
MAFF	MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND FORESTS
NAMA	NATIONALLY APPROPRIATE MITIGATION ACTION
PPCR	PILOT PROGRAMME FOR CLIMATE RESILIENCE
REDD	REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION
RECOFTC	CENTER FOR PEOPLE AND FORESTS
UNFCCC	UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

1. INTRODUCTION

Collectively, the European Commission and individual member states provide more than half of development aid in the world. It is important to make sure that this support and the results are widely known, inside and outside Europe. “Visibility” is a key issue for EU external action and is of increasing importance. It is defined as: “*The extent to which the target public is aware of a communication activity*”, and is linked to “effectiveness” as an evaluation criterion. Visibility interacts closely with coherence/effectiveness of policies and of aid cooperation programmes.

In 2006 the European Commission issued a communication on “*Europe in the world – some practical proposals for greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility*”. One of the axes of this document was setting the objective of strengthening “*...democratic accountability and visibility of EU policies and actions, increasing their public acceptance*”. Evidence points to varying levels of visibility, so it is essential to understand the reasons for good or poor visibility. The EC intends to better understand the public awareness of EU external relations and of its actions.

Taking one specific theme, climate change and energy, the aim of this evaluation is to:

- Clarify the definition of visibility in EU central and Delegation actions; and address the rationale and aims of efforts to make EU actions visible.
- To understand how visibility is affected by type of aid modality; and by types of activity - such as policy dialogues and cooperation programmes.
- Analyse how visibility serves as a factor for democratic accountability in the EU, as well as with partner countries
- Examine how visibility can contribute to increased coordination and coherence with national partners and aid partners
- To find out “if”, “how” and “when” visibility works in the specific thematic areas supported by EC DEVCO and EU bodies including EC Delegations, considering different target audiences and contexts.

The study is interested not just in the publicity created simply by communication activities on climate change and energy, but in the visibility created by the EU’s external actions themselves, and the effects of that visibility. It accounts for the EU’s visibility as compared with other donors, notably EU member states. The evaluation tries to provide credible findings to give the EC a set of operational and useful recommendations, serving policy decision-making and management purposes. The main users will be DEVCO and the EU Delegations, but as well will generate results of interest to broader audiences such as EU tax payers and governments; partner countries, and other donors (Member States, the multilaterals and others).

Therefore the aims of this report are:

- (i) to provide an overview of the actions undertaken by EU institutions to support developing economies tackle climate change, and grow their economies by following low carbon pathways;
- (ii) to show how these actions were perceived by relevant stakeholders.

These objectives are reached by reporting the key findings of a study that has been conducted in two phases. During the first phase, a desk analysis was carried out on the measures adopted by the EU for helping developing countries deal with climate change and meet their energy needs. The aim of that desk review was to clarify what should be visible, and what messages the European Union (EU) intended to convey to internal and external stakeholders on this theme.

During the desk phase, the analysis of visibility for the climate change (CC) and energy theme (CCE) focused on (i) definition of a sensible scope for the theme and the assessment of the EU policy framework; (ii) the identification of relevant EU actions according to geographical area, and the analysis of their visibility implications; (iii) an initial assessment of communication strategies and

actions and identify the target groups and concerned stakeholders; (iv) the choice of countries to visit and review of options for what cases to study in these countries.

In the second phase of the study, a field mission was conducted in Cambodia as a beneficiary country receiving EU support. The aim of this mission was to analyse the visibility of a selected EU external action, the Global Climate Change Alliance, and to assess the effectiveness of the Delegation's visibility approach at country level.

This thematic report summarises the findings of the desk and field phases; and provides evidence for replying to the evaluation questions that were formulated for the overall study.

The Desk Report establishes that the current and likely future impacts of climate change are understood by all concerned to be highly significant for developing countries. Given that these impacts, such as extreme weather events, are not “the fault” of developing countries but are effectively an additional burden on them, the ethical case is very strong that the EC, as a development cooperation actor, should mitigate the adverse effects that the oncoming and increasing crisis that “climate chaos” is inflicting on the developing world.

Subjects that concern the overall study are therefore:

(i) **Adaptation** is the major development concern that developing countries impacted by climate change want to see addressed and about which the EU wants to project an image as responding fully to this major activity area. Then support to ‘*climate compatible or resilient development*¹’ covers Climate Change Adaptation with actions focussed on capacities to understand and resources to manage the impacts of climate change (such as GCCA and EUroCLIMA); as well as the actions to mainstream measures and policies into relevant sectors² by improving programming and project development tools and processes.

(ii) Those **mitigation concerns** of the developing countries that benefit from EU external action (such as those beginning to be defined in NAMAs³) that are relevant to developing countries, in particular low-emissions energy systems and development paths. Note however, that REDD is covered in a separate thematic study, so are only mentioned here when relevant.

(iii) EU-fostered support and **financing mechanisms** that respond to international concern about meeting the needs of developing countries for financial flows, to support both adaptation actions and low-carbon development growth, such as the EU's Global Climate Change Alliance.

Within this framing, the study highlights some of the EU positions on climate change as a global challenge; and attempts to show how the EU response to these challenges is planned and implemented.

Note that, in contrast with some of the other themes that originate in a specific time period (i.e. the financial and food crises over the last few years) this theme has much in common with “the environment” and “gender”, as a long-time theme meriting serious attention across vulnerable

¹ According to CDKN, a UK government initiative: *Climate compatible development* is ‘development that minimises the harm caused by climate impacts, while maximising the many human development opportunities presented by a low emissions, more resilient, future’ [by negotiating] a new development landscape to nurture .. economic growth and social development in the face of threats and uncertainties, while also keeping emissions low. .. climate compatible development moves beyond the traditional separation of adaptation, mitigation and development strategies. It emphasises climate strategies that embrace development goals; and development strategies that integrate the threats and opportunities of a changing climate. .. it safeguards development from climate impacts (climate resilient development) and keeps emissions low, without compromising development goals (low emissions development)...it.. asks policy makers to consider ‘triple win’ strategies that result in low emissions, build resilience and promote development simultaneously”. Source: <http://www.cdkn.org/resource/defining-climate-compatible-development>

² See: Integrating Climate Adaptation into Development Co-operation: Policy Guidance http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3746,en_2649_37429_44096282_1_1_1_37429,00.html
³http://www.ecofys.com/com/publications/brochures_newsletters/documents/Report_Ecofys_NAMA_overview_ENG_04_2010.pdf

sectors, and has the potential to considerably alter socio-economic dynamics and development paradigms.

We choose here not to see this as a "crisis", which would suggest it is happening suddenly. Instead, we regard this as a strategic theme of an ongoing, chronic nature, requiring integration of decision-makers' attention to altering climates, disaster management and to low-carbon growth, as a combined set of issues.

Sector by sector, and for exposed regions, the risk and vulnerability elements require tackling the inter-related issues of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacities of units at all scales, establishing an ambitious agenda of development policy reform and actions in a suite of ambits towards "climate smart" development.

The report is structured as follows. **Section 2** analyses the key policy documents produced by the European Union that guide the EU response to CCE, and provides an overview of the programmes and measures introduced by the European Union to support developing countries in responding to climate change.

Section 3 presents the EU's major global and regional programmes that address climate change and energy issues, drawing largely on the findings reported in the Desk Study. **Section 4** sets out the rationale for choice of case and country to be visited, providing the criteria through which the case and the country for the field mission were identified.

Section 5 reports the hypotheses that were tested during the field mission and related evaluation questions, while **Section 6** describes the data collection process and methodological issues.

Section 7 presents the main findings of the field mission distinguishing between evidence obtained through interviews across different actors (i.e. government officials; non-state actors; and journalists in Cambodia; and EU Delegation staff) and evidence from the media coverage analysis.

Section 8 discusses the main findings in relation to selected evaluation questions. **Section 9** concludes and provides some recommendations.

2. EU POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

Climate change is known to amplify the need to focus on the key vulnerable sectors, and on the best type of development assistance. A notable overall finding of the Desk and Field phases is that the EU as a whole (Parliament, Council, Commission, MS) has been considering what to do to properly address "climate change and energy" for more than 15 years; has found resources; created structures; generated capacities; and has then ensured reasonable visibility of these efforts.

The Desk Report's policy analysis highlighted the growing importance and integration of climate change (alongside the environment) in EU external action, especially over the last decade. This global strategic approach was translated to:

- Internally applying the EC's resources within the EU to make reductions in the MS carbon emissions, for example through the individual MS' actions and the European Emissions Trading System. The progress of these programmes means that the EU, within the limitations of its own MS' policies, can appear to external stakeholders as a responsible and leading actor on the global stage making a real contribution to mitigate climate change. An ambitious programme steered by DG CLIMA has resulted.
- Through establishment of DG CLIMA, enhanced participation and contribution of the EU to responsibly resolve the EU's own carbon emissions issues; support climate financing; and respond robustly to international negotiations processes.
- Establishing a series of policies and resolutions (mainly by the EU's Council) that mandate and organise responses to CCE, such as requiring the EC to pay attention to climate change, both as a mitigation and adaptation issue in development approaches. This translates into a long-term EC

commitment to make climate change a cross-cutting initiative that is mainstreamed (with “the environment”) into development cooperation.

- Building on the CDM, these policies and resolutions provide frameworks for targeted support to developing countries to encourage them to follow a low-carbon emissions growth pathway.
- Attention paid to CC and CCE as policy coherence issues, requiring efforts by all participants in the EU’s external actions, to reduce any policy clashes that may be occurring in the approaches to CCE taken by MS and by the EU’s own bodies. This enables improvement of stakeholder perceptions, in the measure that policy dissonances are reduced.
- In consultation with UNFCCC, the EU (led by Parliament and the Council) have defined programmes and financing frameworks (such as GCCA) that apply resources to make effective the EU’s contribution to developing countries’ prioritised climate change actions.
- Support for policy dialogue with developing country partners and MS policies to implement programmes and agreements in partner countries for direct benefits on the ground, such as improvement of developing countries own internal adaptation knowledge and networks; and negotiating capacities in the UNFCCC processes.
- Promotion, harmonisation and implementation of EU thematic programmes through diversified and adapted funding instruments, such as ENRTP that supplies the vehicle for GCCA; or regional programmes like EUroCLIMA.
- Support for development of scientific capacities through engaging European researchers and institutes with developing country partners to improve the quality and flow of relevant climate risk information.
- The Commission set up a framework for implementation of the EU approach to integrate climate change into development cooperation alongside “the environment”. Climate change “external actions” were integrated and “mainstreamed” into the Commission’s development work alongside “the environment”, and disaster management;
- Actions would need to be coherent with those of Member States, with EC and MS ensuring coherence and coordination and good quality visibility through communication strategies.

2.1. Policy setting

Table 1: Selected Commission proposals, Parliament responses and Council conclusions on selected climate change actions

MAJOR EU POLICIES AND COMMUNICATIONS
<p>Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Climate change in the context of development cooperation [COM(2003) 85 final - Official Journal C/2004/76].</p>
<p>Action Plan on Climate Change and Development - 2004 ⁴ In the early 2000s DG Development and AIDCO favoured prioritising climate change within development policy, due to the logical need to undertake this work as an expressed priority of vulnerable developing countries. This led to the 2004 Action Plan on ‘Climate Change and Development’, setting down how EU development support would address climate change, focused on mainstreaming CC concerns in actions, and on policy dialogue with partner countries.</p>

⁴ EC (2004) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation.

The **external dimension of EU Energy Policy** was laid out in the External Energy Policy Paper of 2006⁵ and the overall EU energy policy was set out in the Commission's 2006 Green Paper "*A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*"⁶. This identified sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply as the 3 main objectives.

Europe 2020 Strategy promotes growth inside the EU, and contains renewable energy targets that have external implications. The relevant EU flagship initiatives proposed by the Commission are the a 'Low-carbon, resource efficient Europe' and 'Clean and efficient energy'. For a resource-efficient Europe, the policy supports reduction in GHG emissions by at least 20% compared to 1990 levels or by 30% if the conditions are right; and the increased share of renewable energy in final energy consumption to 20%; and achievement of a 20% increase in energy efficiency. The European Council adopted the Europe 2020 strategy in June 2010, stating that it would "help Europe recover from the crisis and come out stronger, both internally and at the international level by boosting competitiveness, productivity, growth potential, social cohesion and economic convergence"⁷. However, the biofuels targets does imply feedstock production levels for which there may not be enough agricultural land in the EU, and it seems that this has led to high levels of land use conversion in countries such as Brazil and Indonesia.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/115346.pdf

Global Climate Change Alliance. European Commission proposed in 2007⁷ to create a Global Climate Change Alliance as a key response of the EU towards the integration into development of climate change⁸. The GCCA was suggested as an overall instrument to coordinate EU and MS climate finance; and to bring together then-existing and future platforms, dialogues and alliances⁹. In 2008 the Parliament resolved¹⁰ to call for MS funding for the alliance. The European Council asked the EC in 2008 **to propose how to operate the GCCA**, and DG DEV performed a study on this, managed by UK IDS staff on the design of the Alliance¹¹ while a further study¹² looked at options for GCCA funding. These established that GCCA should take as an objective providing support to those LDCs most vulnerable to CC impacts, built around two pillars of (i) 'effective dialogue' between the EU and partners and (ii) 'effective cooperation' through technical and financial support. GCCA ended up with five priority task areas: (i) supporting adaptation; (ii) reducing emissions from deforestation; (iii) enhancing participation in the CDM; (iv) promoting DRR; and (v) integrating CC into poverty reduction. The **GCCA Staff Working Document of 15/7/08**¹³ established how the GCCA would be implemented.

Climate Change and Development: Joint Paper of Presidency/Commission of 20/10/09¹⁴ provides guidance on how the EU can best respond to challenges of adaptation and mitigation in developing countries and improve its development cooperation approaches and practices.

EC Communication: Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen ¹⁵

⁵ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/90082.pdf

⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006_03_08_gp_document_en.pdf

⁷ EC 2007 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Building a Global Climate Change Alliance between the EU and poor development countries most vulnerable to climate change.

⁸ EC 2008 Commission Staff Working Document: Implementation Framework of the Global Climate Change Alliance.

⁹ Note that this section on GCCA draws substantially on - Colebourn, Elizabeth 2011. A study on the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) <http://internationaldevelopmenteu.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/edcsp-study-on-gcca-march-2011.pdf> European Development Cooperation Strengthening Programme (EDCSP), Overseas Development Institute, London.

¹⁰ European Parliament 2008. Resolution of 21 October 2008 on building a Global Climate Change Alliance between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change.

¹¹ <http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/idsproject/support-study-for-the-establishment-of-the-global-climate-change-alliance>

¹² McKenzie Hedger. M 2008, Support Study for Establishment of GCCA: Potential Role, Scope and Activities. IDS, Sussex, UK

¹³ <http://www.donorplatform.org/load/645>

¹⁴ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14967.en09.pdf>

<p>addresses three challenges: targets and actions; financing; and the global carbon market. It responds to the request made by the European Council in June 2008 to present a comprehensive strategy for scaling up finance and investment flows for both emission reduction and adaptation.</p>
<p>The 2008 European Parliament's Resolution on the GCCA¹⁶ welcomes the Commission's initiative to launch a GCCA, which represents an important recognition of the effects of climate change on development.</p>
<p>Commission issued a Communication on Stepping up international climate finance: A European blueprint for the Copenhagen deal to help developing countries combat climate change¹⁷ agreeing to 'fast-start' funding of € 2.4 billion annually for 2010–2012</p>
<p>In 2009¹⁸ following the April 2009 European Commission's presentation of a WHITE PAPER ON ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE, the European Council and the Commission established an Impact and Adaptation Steering Group (IASG)</p>
<p>EU's Foreign Affairs Council¹⁹ underlined the possible international security implications of climate change. It noted that adaptation to climate change, sound policies on displacement, migration and conflict prevention, are effective ways of dealing with the international security implications of climate change, in partnerships.</p>
<p>Supporting a climate for change: The EU and developing countries working together²⁰ highlights through practical examples key areas of intervention by the European Union and its partner countries to face the climate change challenge. While this is not a policy document like a Communication or Staff Working Document that goes through a full Interservice Consultation, this brochure has contributed to visibility (even if it cannot be used as reference for the policy line).</p>
<p>Lisbon Treaty TITLE XX - ENVIRONMENT: Article 191 and TITLE XXI – ENERGY Article 194 is also the first EU Treaty to make specific reference to Energy, and aims to ensure: (i) a robust and well-functioning energy market; enhanced security of supply; (iii) promotion of energy efficiency and energy saving; (iv) promotion and development of new and renewable forms of energy; (v) promote of interconnected energy networks.</p>
<p>Document <i>External Dimension of European Union Energy Policy: a brief summary of international fora in which the EU is participating</i>²¹, the European Council sets out the history and roles of large number of international fora in which the EU participates.</p>

2.2. Institutional setting

Mandates, responsibilities and competences on climate change-related issues are shared between different institutions working within the EU family. Their visibility impacts on external action at political, strategic and operational levels.

Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2010, and the 2011 reform of EU external action services to create DEVCO, the responsibilities of EU external action in the climate change and

¹⁵ *Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen*. (2009). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, Council, European Commission.

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0039:FIN:EN:PDF>

¹⁶<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2008-0491&language=EN>

¹⁷ European Commission (2009). "Stepping Up International Climate Finance: A European Blueprint for the Copenhagen Deal." Commission Staff Working Document, September 2009.

¹⁸ http://www.europa.eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8822_en.htm

¹⁹ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/99387.pdf

²⁰ Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/162a_en.pdf

²¹ <http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/171260/ec04.02.2011-external-dimension-factsheetfinal.en.pdf>

energy thematic areas were shared between different Directorates-Generals and services. External relations DGs (DEV, RELEX and EuropeAid) had a similar organisational structure with geographic and thematic divisions and Units; and the devolution of tasks to EU delegations throughout the programme cycle.

- **DG-DEV** was responsible for programming cooperation strategies with partner countries and regions through the preparation and negotiation of country and regional strategy papers (CSP/RSP) and indicative programmes (NIP/RIP). Programming was a joint task of geographic and thematic services.
- **DG-RELEX** was in charge of EU external action in non-ACP countries and regions with the exception of the Enlargement region (EU pre-accession countries) with responsibilities mainly focused on political and policy dialogue as well as on the programming phase of development and economic cooperation.
- **EuropeAid** was created in January 2001 via reform of EU external assistance policy and management. EuropeAid became responsible for the management of the project cycle, from identification of projects; monitoring their implementation; and evaluation.
- **DG CLIMA**: The Directorate-General for Climate Action was established in February 2010²², climate change being previously included in the remit of DG Environment of the European Commission. Climate Action DG was created from the relevant activities in DG Environment, the activities in the External Relations DG related to international negotiations on climate change and the activities in the Enterprise and Industry DG related to climate change. DG CLIMA currently employs around 160 EC officials and external staff²³. It leads international negotiations on climate, helps the EU to deal with the consequences of climate change and to meet its targets for 2020, as well as develops and implements the EU Emissions Trading System. CLIMA's specific roles are to:
 - (i) Develop and implement international and domestic climate action policies and strategies;
 - (ii) Leads international negotiation on climate, above all in UNFCCC processes;
 - (iii) Coordinate bi-lateral and multi-lateral partnerships on climate change and energy with third countries;
 - (iv) Implement the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS);
 - (v) Monitors the implementation of Member States' emission reduction targets in the sectors outside the EU ETS;
 - (vi) Promotes low carbon and adaptation technologies;
 - (vii) CLIMA is responsible for the EU's adaptation policies and giving support to the UNFCCC's Nairobi Work Programme on Adaptation;
 - (viii) Provide the content of the EU's Communications to the UNFCCC.

CLIMA has not been established in order to deal closely with LDC and other developing country development, rather this DG's focus is on larger developing countries with significant carbon emissions (China, Brazil, Indonesia); on climate finance; deforestation and REDD and on supporting EU's negotiating positions in various international fora.

In the upcoming 2013-2020 CSP programming round, CLIMA has a major role in reviewing the arguments made for focal sector selection and for ensuring that CEPs are formulated to high standards with the correct level of emphasis on climate risk management. It also has a role in identifying global priorities and actions that may be best tackled through programmes such as ENRTP, and not through traditional geographically-limited country or regional assistance.

²² http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_9503_en.htm

²³ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/clima/chart/index_en.htm

With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the RELEX family DGs have been merged into a single DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO). External assistance reform has been launched and a re-organisation of the EC external action services is now largely completed, involving major changes such as the formation of EEAS and DEVCO. The main changes in 2011 can be summarised as follows:

- ECPDM has reported²⁴ on the new DEVCO structure, noting that there are now two thematic directorates – **sustainable growth and development** and **human and society development**. *“Sectors and thematic issues relevant for development, which the EC emphasises, are included in these. The growth and development directorate includes rural development; food security; climate change and environment; financial instruments, including the blending instruments the EC want to promote to attract private investors as a partner in development. Thematic directorate officials will develop state of the art sectoral policies and follow implement of individual EU sectoral policies (climate change, trade, migration, environment, etc) and ensure they enjoy policy coherence. The DG supports delegations and geographical directorates in terms of programming. Directorate A, which deals with development policy, covers policy formulation and includes a unit on economic analysis, public finance and budget support. Officials based here will ensure that colleagues in sectoral directorates promote beneficial policies. It will reflect on aid effectiveness and cooperation between the EC and EU Member States”.*
- **EAAS**²⁵: With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union reformed its external relations system (previously the RELEX Family) and created the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS, which has its Headquarters in Brussels, is an autonomous body separate from the Council and from the Commission. The EEAS is headed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also Vice-President of the Commission. In addition to the central administration, the EEAS is made up of the Union Delegations and Representations in international organisations.

The EEAS replaces the DG External Relations (RELEX) and has annexed part of the geographical Directorates and Units of DG Development (DEV). Note that there is potential confusion of roles for authorising of expenditures, whereby the Head of Delegation as EU Ambassador will be EAAS staff, and operational staff will be DEVCO. This is under resolution in the structuring of the EU’s array of Delegations.

- **Directorate General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO)**. The merger of the former RELEX family Directorates (DEV, RELEX and EuropeAid) into a single DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) is detailed in an organisation chart dated September 2011²⁶. Heads of Operations within Delegations become DEVCO staff. The creation of EEAS reinforces the shift towards DEVCO becoming an policy and operational service that steers the EU’s aid programme, by separating out diplomatic services. *DEVCO is aimed at designing state-of-the-art development policy for all developing countries, and enhance policy coherence for development, while further improving implementation and delivery mechanisms, through a set of financial instruments, implementing programmes and projects around the world, by means of grants and EuropeAid tenders. DEVCO will be the single interlocutor for the European External Action Service (EEAS), where part of the staff of the former DG Development (DG DEV) has been integrated..... DG DEVCO will be one single interlocutor for all sectoral Directorates General, and will play a leading role in the international debate for development involving donors, international institutions, developing and emerging countries and non State actors*²⁷.
- The organisational chart creates a Unit number C2 titled ‘Climate Change, Environment, Natural Resources, Water’. This unit will be responsible for implementing funding from the thematic programmes on these issues. This Unit’s tasks²⁸ are:

²⁴ <http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/983/>

²⁵ http://eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm

²⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/documents/organigramme-devco_en.pdf

²⁷ <http://euroalert.net/en/news.aspx?idn=11395>

²⁸ http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/18/07/2011_-_1246/cc_and_water_gcca_brussels_30_june_rev_3.ppt

- (i) coordination of GCCA’s policies and strategies;
 - (ii) provision of support to DG CLIMA for negotiations and processes under bodies such as UNFCCC and MEAs, including adaptation financing, technology transfer, REDD and deforestation control;
 - (iii) support to the Africa-EU Partnership²⁹, such as the Great Green Wall of the Sahara and CLIMDEV³⁰;
 - (iv) ensuring wide policy coherence by MS and across the EC.
- DEVCO technical Unit C2 mainly relates with CLIMA on the subject of climate negotiations, for example on adaptation financing, where technical advice is needed in a specific event for higher-level segments or in support of the European Council.

Synergies with DG-ENV and with DG-CLIMA have been strengthened, in particular when acting on international fora such as the UN³¹. The main Units now are:

DG-DEVCO	DG-CLIMA
DEVCO A: EU Development Policy	Dir. A International & Climate Strategy A2. Climate Finance and Deforestation
DEVCO C: Sustainable Growth & Dev. C2. Climate Change, Environment, Natural Resources, Water	Directorate C Mainstreaming Adaptation & Low Carbon Technology
DEVCO C: Sustainable Growth & Dev. C5. Energy	A1. International and Inter-Institutional Relations

2.3. Communication and Information

Based on documentary review and consultations with EC staffs, a diverse range of communications are carried out at different levels that contribute to the visibility of EU external action in climate change. The EC has a communication strategy towards external stakeholders (EU member states, EU citizen, partners) implemented through the mobilization of appropriate resources and the organization of specific events. The following can be mentioned:

EU Internet home pages: Through www.europa.eu and related web addresses, a wide range of information is made available including policies, thematic and geographic initiatives, awareness campaigns, interactive tools (i.e. euro barometer), business and funding opportunities, etc.

Climate Actions webpage: on [HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/EUROPEAID/CLIMATE-CHANGE-ACTIONS](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/climate-change-actions) provides an excellent example of good visibility which specifically shows where climate change related projects are located geographically (perhaps at the cost of being open to the accusation that “now all projects are climate change related”).

²⁹ <http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/partnership-on-climate-change-and-environment.pdf>

³⁰ http://www.uneca.org/eca_programmes/sdd/events/climate/

³¹ Source: http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/home/index_en.htm

EU network of Information relays: The EU has launched in the 80's the decentralized information network (called Europe Direct³²). This network can provide EU citizen direct access to the nearest of the 486 Europe Direct Information Centres, 402 European documentation centres and 398 EU expert speakers (team Europe) in every EU member country.

InfoPoint Stand: An important visibility initiative has been the development of the **InfoPoint Stand** located at one of the EC's Brussels offices, which has to hand a suite of information materials, mostly available in several languages, which cover many dimensions of the EU's development policy and achievements.

EU Development Days: gives opportunities for EU DGs, Delegations to communicate about current hot topics, and about country/regional cooperation strategies and programmes. EDDs emphasise networks, partners and platforms. Debates are held in plenary sessions or in bilateral meetings, in workshops or in the framework of parallel events.

3. MAJOR GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROGRAMMES

Prior to the Cancun 2010 UNFCCC COP, a key publication that expresses the EU's actions in favour of developing countries on climate change was published, titled: *Supporting a climate for change: The EU and developing countries working together – 2010*³³. While this is not a policy document like a Communication or Staff Working Document that goes through a full Interservice Consultation process, the publication systematically covers the range of EU actions under the following section headings:

1 Bringing about change: EU cooperation with developing countries: (i) Climate change a global issue: international engagement & political dialogue with partners; (ii) Translating political dialogue into action

2 Adapting to climate change: supporting our partners in meeting the challenge: (i) Supporting adaptation in the field; (ii) Making the link: climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction

3 The path to low emissions growth: (i) Stimulating clean development through emissions trading; (ii) Promoting the transfer of low carbon technologies; (iii) The role of clean energy

4 Pursuing multiple goals: mitigating while helping to adapt: (i) Strengthening the knowledge base: assisting developing countries through climate research; (ii) Promoting sustainable forestry; (iii) Agriculture and rural development in the context of climate change.

A key step towards an increased role of the EU as a global actor on climate change follows the adoption in 2006 of the *Thematic Programme for the Environment and the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources including Energy (ENRTP)* that replaced the former budget lines addressing the environment-related areas. ENRTP became the EU leading strategic and financial instrument applicable at global level and aimed at complementing the measures implemented under national and regional cooperation programmes. With an allocation of funds of nearly 550 millions Euro in the period 2007-2010, ENRTP finances diversified initiatives of global and regional importance such as the Global Climate Change Alliance, reaching a wide range of beneficiaries and involving multiple partners, thus enhancing the EU visibility. In this thematic study, ENRTP has therefore represented key criteria for the selection of case studies and countries for in-depth visibility assessment.

The measures proposed by the Commission in response to the crisis may be classified into five categories: (i) *aid initiatives and cooperation initiatives*; (ii) *high-level meetings and international fora*; and (iii) *research initiatives*.

Table 2 summarizes the key actions and initiatives adopted under each category.

³² Address: http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm

³³ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/162a_en.pdf

Table 2: EU Measures in response to Climate Change and Energy

AID AND COOPERATION INITIATIVES
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Mainstreaming of climate into development aid programming via:<ul style="list-style-type: none">(i) Environment Integration Handbook (2009) is a web-based set of guidelines for preparation of Country Environmental Profiles, SEAs and Environmental Impact Assessments, in support of CC adaptation into programming and project preparation.(ii) Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) (upstream assessments of potential impact of activities in a sector)(iii) Climate sector scripts as Guidance for exposed and sensitive sector introduced by the Commission Integration Advisory Services in 2009(iv) “Pilot Study of Climate Change Screening of the EC's Development Cooperation Portfolio”³⁴(v) Guidelines on the Integration of Environment and Climate Change in Development Cooperation in a 2010 version³⁵• EC strategic partnership with Latin America³⁶ and EUroCLIMA• Global Climate Change Alliance³⁷• ACP-EU Water Facility• Africa EU Energy Partnership• ACP-EU Energy Facility³⁸• EU-Africa partnership under ACP³⁹• EU-India Clean Development and Climate Change Initiative• EU-China Partnership on Climate Change

³⁴ 2009 Final Report: Pilot Study of Climate Change Screening of the EC's Development Cooperation Portfolio. AIDCO E6 Project No. 2008/172609

³⁵ <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/c4d-lib/document/climate-en-web>

³⁶ Source: COM(2005) 636 Final – A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America

³⁷ The Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) was launched in 2007 by the European Commission to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on climate change between the European Union and developing countries most vulnerable to climate change, in particular the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The GCCA acts as a platform for dialogue and exchange of experiences between the EU and developing countries on climate policy and on practical approaches to integrate climate change into development policies and budgets. The results of the dialogue and exchange feed into the discussions on the post-2012 climate agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and in the technical and financial cooperation supported by the GCCA. GCCA provides technical and financial support to developing countries to integrate climate change into their development policies and budgets and to implement adaptation and mitigation interventions. The technical and financial cooperation in turn informs the policy dialogue and exchange of experiences between the EU and developing countries.

³⁸ <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/energy>

³⁹ Climate change has been specifically addressed via the Africa-EU Climate Change Partnership. This was launched during the 2nd Africa-EU Summit in 2007 in Portugal, where the First Action Plan (2008-2010) was adopted. This provides a platform for dialogue, co-operation and exchange for measures to respond to climate change; establish close links to the Global Climate Change Alliance and to the ClimDev Africa Programme; and represent a framework for Africa-EU co-operation on climate change. The 2nd Action Plan 2011-2013 What is the Africa-EU Climate Change Partnership has several priority actions. Parties commit to raising the profile of climate change in development cooperation, and to support ACP efforts in mitigating and adapting. Under the €20 million EC Multilateral Environment Agreements programme with the ACP, €3.3 million is earmarked for implementation of international agreements on climate change, biodiversity, desertification and chemicals. Joint work on the implementation of EU Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategy for Developing Countries and African DRR Plan of Action. AUC and EC prepared follow-up action with support from FAO for which €1.4 million was earmarked from ENRTP to assist countries for the second implementation phase of the Action Plan.

- SWITCH-Asia Programme⁴⁰
- Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund⁴¹ (GEEREF)⁴²
- Infrastructure Trust Fund⁴³ supporting energy projects relating to climate change, renewable energy and energy security
- EU-UNDP Climate Change Capacity Building Programme⁴⁴:
- Support to the World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness⁴⁵
- Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP)⁴⁶
- REDD+⁴⁷: EU REDD Facility launched to scale up cooperation with Congo, DRC, Guyana, Indonesia, Vietnam (Euro Forest Institute)

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS / INTERNATIONAL FORA*

Under the "dialogue pillar" of the GCCA several conferences and declarations on CC have been undertaken by GCCA, seeking to work regionally through partnerships, forums and alliances. For example different GCCA side events were organised since the Bali COP⁴⁸:

- Declaration with the Asian LDCs
- ACP- EU Joint Resolution on climate change of 25/6/2010
- 5th EU-LAC Summit "Lima Summit" of May 2008⁴⁹ between the European Union and Latin America -Caribbean region
- CARIFORUM-EU Declaration on Climate Change and Energy⁵⁰

⁴⁰ <http://www.switch-asia.eu>.

⁴¹ <http://geeref.com/pages/home>.

⁴² GEEREF was set up by the European Commission (Europe Aid - AIDCO) to provide clean energy to developing countries and economies in transition, particularly focussed on serving the ACP developing countries. GEEREF is producing tangible results in actual renewable energy projects with a budget of E45,000,000

⁴³ <http://www.eu-africa-infrastructure-tf.net/about/>

⁴⁴ The programme is funded by the European Commission (€ 8 million) and Germany (€5 million). The objectives of the programme are to strengthen the capacity of developing countries to monitor, report and verify GHG emissions; to identify opportunities for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs); and to support the design of low-emission development strategies (LEDS) and to facilitate the uptake of mitigation actions, with the participation of the private sector, as appropriate, taking into account national priorities and circumstances and national economic plans. Consultations for these public sector activities are currently taking place with Chile, Colombia, DRC, Ecuador, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Uganda, and Zambia. The programme also includes activities to build private sector capacity to uptake mitigation actions, for which Brazil, China, Egypt, Mexico and South Africa are currently being consulted.

⁴⁵ The Partnership for Market Readiness initiative is to reduce GHG emissions globally in a cost effective manner by scaling up of the use of carbon market mechanisms. Objective is to improve capacity of developing countries to develop and implement cost effective mitigation policies through new carbon market mechanisms. The Commission contributes in 2010 with €5 million.

⁴⁶ The objective of the RECP is to stimulate sustainable economic and social development in Africa through an increased use of renewable energy. The purpose of Commission support to the start-up phase (€5 million) is to establish a 10 year Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (including inputs to preparation and mobilizing stronger EU Member States involvement).

⁴⁷ A total of €7 million are committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. Funding will partly be allocated to the support the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility; as well as to the creation of the EU REDD Facility, aimed at building developing country capacities for REDD.

⁴⁸ EC 2008: "Commission Staff Working Document: Implementation Framework of the Global Climate Change Alliance", pg 7-9.

⁴⁹ Declaración de Lima: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperation/eurosocial/documents/declaration_lima_es.pdf

⁵⁰ <http://www.gcca.eu/usr/doc/Caribbean%20EU%20joint%20declaration%20on%20climate%20change.pdf>

- Pacific Islands meeting with the Ministerial Troika of EU and the Pacific Islands Forum ⁵¹
- 11th Ministerial Meeting of the African and EU Troikas in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 2008 - Africa EU Declaration on Climate Change⁵²
- 2009 meeting of the Joint ACP-EC Council of Ministers in Brussels - Joint ACP-EU Declaration on Climate Change and Development⁵³
- Vienna High Level meeting⁵⁴

RESEARCH INITIATIVES

A range of science-based actions in the area of carbon budgeting and climate risk management:

- CarboAfrica project;
- QWeCI (Quantifying Weather and Climate Impacts on Health in Developing Countries) project;
- CLIMAFRICA (Climate change predictions in Sub-Saharan Africa: impacts and adaptations);
- URGENCHE (Urban Reduction of GHG Emissions in China and Europe) project;
- POEM (Policy Options to Engage Asian economies in a post-Kyoto regime);
- CLARIS Europe-South America climate research network and CLARIS-LPB;
- CENSOR (Climate variability and El Niño Southern Oscillation) project
- Study called "Climate Change in Latin America"⁵⁵
- EUrocLIMA socio-economic component (implemented UN-ECLAC); scientific component (implemented by Joint Research Centre Ispra)
- EURO-SOLAR⁵⁶

Figure 2: EU “external action” measures including climate risk in development programmes that respond to climate change impacts from the Unit 2 presentation⁵⁷

⁵¹ <http://www.gcca.eu/usr/doc/Pacific%20EU%20joint%20declaration%20on%20climate%20change.pdf>

⁵² <http://www.gcca.eu/usr/Africa%20EU%20joint%20declaration%20on%20climate%20change.pdf>

⁵³ <http://www.gcca.eu/usr/doc/ACP%20EU%20joint%20declaration%20on%20climate%20change.pdf>


⁵⁴ <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/focus/high-level-meeting-energy-14-15-september>

⁵⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperation/documents/climate_change_in_latin_america_en.pdf

⁵⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperation/euro-solar/index_en.htm

⁵⁷ http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/18/07/2011_-_1246/cc_and_water_gcca_brussels_30_june_rev_3.ppt

Tools and methodologies for integrating environment and climate change in development assistance



4. RATIONALE FOR CHOICE OF CASE AND COUNTRY

This section recovers the choice of countries to visit made in the Inception Report and reviews of options for what cases to study in these countries. A list of criteria is outlined, which are designed to ensure good coverage of:

- Strategic priorities of EU external action
- Strategic partnerships according to EU agreements with third countries and political priorities from the main Communications
- Visibility/communication priorities
- Balanced coverage of the EU's regions of intervention
- Scale of financial contribution of EC cooperation
- Importance of budget dedicated to visibility and communication
- Levels of income of country – a range of different levels to be covered

4.1 Case selection

GCCA was selected under the following arguments. A major concern of developing country partners, and EU stakeholders such as the international NGO community, is that specific climate change finance must be delivering effective operations on the ground, and at a scale that really does meet the challenge of reduction and management of climate change impacts, as was noted by ODI's release of an analysis of GCCA⁵⁸.

Once GCCA's mechanisms has proven its worth within the EU and MS development community, NGOs, think-tanks and Parliaments, and once the development benefits are visible, there would be a higher likelihood of significant contributions from member states and other donors. With DEVCO's formation taken as an opportunity, the various contradictions and decision-making blockages that have affected it so far may be overcome. Its success, and visibility that flows from this, is an important consideration for the effort by the EC to appear as a responsible player on the world stage,


⁵⁸ <http://internationaldevelopmenteu.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/edcsp-study-on-gcca-march-2011.pdf>

applying its own specific, successful and visible initiative in support of significant action to address developing country concerns. Given that GCCA is the EC's flagship initiative, we proposed this as the most promising programme to study from a "visibility in climate change" perspective.

Global coverage of GCCA: Climate change, water and the EU development cooperation: Key issues prepared by DEVCO C2 – Climate Change, Environment, Natural Resources and Water ⁵⁹

4.2 Country selection

Basing ourselves on the compelling argument that GCCA is the key intervention to examine, the Desk Report examined the GCCA countries, to determine which of these would be good candidates,



because these already receiving EU climate support, and have already been rigorously selected by the EC as being vulnerable and meriting EU aid.

With regard to which geographical regions might be best to study for EU visibility on CC, Asia was selected due to the reasoning that Asia and the Pacific were amongst the first regions to be prioritized for GCCA assistance, with 2008 countries including Cambodia, Maldives and Vanuatu.

High levels of hazard and exposure, alongside vulnerable poor populations, are mitigated to some extent by variable, but sometimes high, adaptive capacity. Reasonable levels of capacity indicate that information may be collected effectively. Confidence is high that documents and informants will be quite readily accessible.

Cambodia was selected, as this country was amongst the first of the countries to get support, so we could expect that support to be yielding some benefits, so that actions in fact exist on the ground, to then be seen to be "visible". Cambodia is reported as being likely the most advanced of the 3 that are in progress since 2008, supposedly executing a large coastal zones management programme under GCCA.

⁵⁹http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/18/07/2011_-_1246/cc_and_water_gcca_brussels_30_june_rev_3.ppt

The database of *Climate Actions for a Better Development* identified by the EC on the platform <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/climate-change-actions> indicates some notable cases of development programmes/projects that the EU considers being climate relevant pointing to the National Wood Energy Policy Implementation project (<http://www.geres-cambodia.org>).

Examination of GCCA technically-supported country programmes, and the Policy Dialogue events held since 2008⁶⁰, also highlighted the opportunity to follow the impacts of the Declarations and Policy Dialogue Action Plans that were proposed. The visit would cover the visibility issues and benefits for Cambodian stakeholders of the 2010 GCCA Bangladesh conference and how the **Declaration on Climate Change between the EU – Bangladesh – Cambodia – Maldives** (and Action Plans made there) are being implemented.

5. HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED DURING THE FIELD MISSION

The hypotheses to be tested during the field mission were built with a two-fold objective:

1. Understanding how GCCA's country visibility actions and resources have been supported in terms of their adequacy and effectiveness by the EU Delegations;
2. Surveying local stakeholders (e.g. government officials, civil society organisations, etc.) and general public perceptions of the GCCA and the national CCCA programme.

Based on the desk phase analysis and findings, the field mission aimed at verifying these hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Actions and resources for GCCA and CCCA visibility are seen as adequate and effective by the EU Delegation and MS representations

Related evaluation question: EQ8 - How far are the resources mobilized by the EC adequate (human resources, budget) to carry out its visibility/communication strategy?

Adapted questions for the climate change thematic study:

- *Were the resources (human resources, budget) mobilized for visibility of CCCA adequate?*
- *Was the media coverage given to the CCCA's work programme and related events (the 2010 Dhaka GCCA Asian conference) effective in reaching the targeted audiences and intended objectives?*

Hypothesis 2: Local stakeholders and the general public were aware of EU funds disbursed through the CCCA and perceived the role of mechanism

Related evaluation question: EQ1 - How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action and to image the EU seeks to convey?

Adapted question:

- *Are you aware that your country received CCCA funds from the EU to counter the effects of climate change?*

Hypothesis 3: CCCA is perceived as potentially effective in supporting Cambodia to address climate change

Related evaluation question: EQ4 - How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?

Adapted question:

- *In your opinion, is there any tangible evidence that CCCA has helped Cambodia respond better to climate change impacts?*

Hypothesis 4: The added value of the European Commission's initiatives is understood by stakeholders compared to other donors such as Member States.

⁶⁰ http://www.gcca.eu/pages/22_2-Policy-Dialogues.html

Related evaluation question: (EQ5) To what extent is the EC's visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?

Adapted question:

- In your opinion, is there any tangible evidence that CCCA has helped Cambodia respond better to climate change impacts?

Hypothesis 5: Joint Management and partnerships with international agencies, reduces the opportunities for raising EU visibility, though it may be efficient in management terms.

Related evaluation question: EQ7 - How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora?

Adapted question:

- Is the EU in supporting CCCA an effective donor, ensuring coherence and complementarity between EU aid, and that of MS, and related international agencies and NGOs; as well as with the range of non-EU bodies involved in this development cooperation?

Hypothesis 6: GCCA's capacity-building efforts in international negotiation skills for LDCs have been focused via a series of international multi-country high-level meetings. Visibility communication around these processes has led to significant LDC capacity-building, which enables better participation in international negotiations and a convergence in visions between the EU and Cambodian decision-makers.

Related evaluation question: E4 - How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?

Adapted questions:

- Have the different activities under the policy pillar been organised to have a positive impact on the visibility of the EC's work on climate change?
- Is the EU seen to be 'on the Cambodian side' in terms of sympathetic support to enhance capacities to engage in climate change negotiations?

Hypothesis 7: The EU's image for this theme, and for the other critical themes, as perceived by national stakeholders, is as a positive, proactive, responsible player.

Related evaluation question: EQ1 - How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the objectives of this external action?

Adapted question:

- Is the EU seen as a reliable partner with civil society with Cambodian southern agencies?
- What is the overall image of the EU that you perceive through its development support to Cambodia and its visibility messaging?

6. FIELD MISSION METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND DATA COLLECTION

The field mission in Cambodia adopted a methodology that included:

a) Analysis of country context:

This was done before the mission by retrieving and assessing Cambodia sectoral documents to become familiarized with the country's political, economic, social and environmental context and challenges; as well as the EU MS's cooperation framework. This analysis completed that undertaken

during the desk phase when selecting Cambodia for the field visit. This enabled focus; as well as helping identify and then contact informants and prepare interview agendas.

b) Consultations with multiple stakeholders

Individual and group meetings were arranged with over 22 informants. These included the EU Delegation, the Departments and Ministries in charge of climate change and the environment; and other stakeholders directly involved in the agricultural, health and forestry sectors (research, academics, NGOs, community-based organisations, consultants etc.). International partners based in Cambodia were consulted, including those directly concerned with the theme (i.e. UNDP and World Bank); EU member states (Sweden and Denmark).

AGENCIES INTERVIEWED DURING THE CAMBODIA VISIT

- Department of Climate Change
- Staff of Cambodia Climate Change Alliance - TA
- Ministry of Environment
- Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
- Department of Wildlife and Biodiversity, Forestry Administration
- MPWT Admin. & Public Relations
- MAFF - Dept. Agricultural Land Management
- Department of Media Communication, Royal Phnom Penh University
- Group for the Environment, Renewable Energy and Solidarity
- CEDAC
- Welthungerhilfe Regional Office
- FFI Cambodia Country Program
- RECOFTC
- National Television of Cambodia
- Phnom Penh Post
- Cambodia Daily newspaper
- Raksmei Kampuchea Newspaper
- Integrated Sustainable Biomass Supply, GERES
- UNDP and UNESCO, Cambodia
- Forestry Administration
- Farmer and Nature Net FNN
- Royal Danish Embassy
- Embassy of Sweden, Development Co-operation Section in Cambodia
- Cambodia Development Research Institute

In the climate change and rural energy field, we covered specific questions about the impacts of climate change impacts facing Cambodia; the problem of rural energy access; the results and visibility of the EU's support to CCCA and of development actions to reduce the problem of fuelwood scarcity.

Note that the objective of investigating the GERES Fuelwood Programme could not be achieved, as only one short interview was possible with a GERES representative and no field visit was possible.

More generally with all interviewees, we tried to cover interviewees' perceptions of and insights about these issues:

- The overall visibility of the EU's external actions originating in Europe, such those of the European Commission and the European Council.
- The visibility of the Cambodia Delegation's actions and aid cooperation programmes, and other EU support provided to national stakeholders and partners. The effectiveness and visibility of policy dialogue actions, statements & declarations.
- The effectiveness of the Delegation's approach to visibility, and its use of different tools, channels and communication partners.
- How visibility is affected by the choice of the different aid modalities (projects or budget support) and by the involvement of international partners and Civil Society Organisations.
- The degree of coordination and complementarity of visibility efforts with EU Member States and with other donors, especially multilateral agencies.
- Perceptions of the Commission as a "change agent", as a "global actor"; recognition of the EC's "added-value"
- How visibility is positively or negatively affected by the degree of coherence between EU policies.
- Visibility in the short term (for example of one conference or media-assisted event) as differing from the visibility created by a long term presence or partnership.
- Identification of the obstacles to more effective visibility.

7. FINDINGS FROM THE FIELD MISSION

Some basic data on the case selected is that the GCCA's Cambodia **Contribution to the Cambodia Climate Change Alliance** (co-funded by Sweden and UNDP) seeks to improve NCCC coordination capacity and mainstream climate change, for a total value of E 2.5 mn, and an EC provision of E2.5 mn. The objective has been set as "*Climate Change activities in Cambodia are nationally owned, led and aligned with Cambodia's development priorities, and are effectively coordinated and implemented*". CCCA is a comprehensive and innovative approach to address climate change and disaster risks in Cambodia in support of the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). It aims to stimulate capacity development and institutional strengthening to prepare for climate change risks; and to directly help vulnerable communities by enhancing their resilience to climate change and other natural hazards. The CCCA Multi Donor Trust Fund launched in February 2010 amounts to US\$ 8.9 million.

7.1 Evidence from EU Delegation

The EUD uses the "standard approach" as outlined in the Visibility Manual to address visibility of all EU "external actions" in the country. The Delegation asserts that all projects and programmes have mainstreamed visibility as an integral part of the work. This includes proactive contacts to ensure coverage in the media (newspapers, radio & TV); and assignment of a Communications Officer to facilitate processes. A selection of the press releases prepared is located in Annex 3.

This communication approach allows for comprehensive communications ensuring coherent and harmonised messages towards diverse audiences. The budget for Delegation communications derives from central budget annual allocations for the EUD's communication activities.

The ongoing reform of EU external services is perceived as an important and very positive factor that favours a better-defined framework for the EUD's communication and visibility strategy, in particular establishing the opportunity for better HG-EUD communications flows. In this new structure, of course part of the EUD (the political section) works under the EEAS, while the development section responds to DG-DEVCO. The clear division favours the EUD's work by enabling staff to deal with EEAS for priorities oriented towards political issues, and then with DEVCO for issues focused on management of CSP and thematic EU programmes.

In its communication strategy with government and development partners, including EU member states, the EUD aims to enhance sectoral dialogue through thematic working groups on common interests such as disaster management (National Disaster Board); forests & fisheries; and climate change through the National CC Committee – NCCC.

An achievement of CCCA has been to contribute to the EUD's strategic objective under ECHO of making the National Disaster Coordination Committee more effective, and specifically to engage in assessment of the last decade's DRM support; and support in improving approaches for decentralisation of DRM to other tiers of government and to civil society.

CCCA has brought on board the World Bank's Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) and the ADB as observers in CCCA's steering structures (Programme Support Board), onto which the NCCC is also a leading actor. While the World Bank's PPCR is an observer in CCCA, this programme has not contributed to the basket of funds for CCCA's Trust Fund, and is going it alone with their programme of work. Even so, efforts have been made to avoid overlaps (for example by sharing work plans) and so ensuring as much harmonization as possible.

CCCA is amongst the first of the EU's large-scale multi-donor initiatives, indicating that transactions costs in direct management are shared, with UNDP having a significant role. The visibility of CCCA is likewise not directed at achieving an "EU supports this alone" objective, rather the visibility of the programme is directly aimed at enhancing the perception of the EU as a cooperative actor working in liaison with the UN and its own MS (Sweden and Denmark). This does however dilute the specific visibility of the EU's contributions.

As defined in GCCA's framework documents, promoting the visibility of CCCA in Cambodia is delegated to the Cambodia EUD by both the GCCA Support Facility and EU staff (ENRTP and by DEVCO task managers). This is the case for all GCCA-funded activities in beneficiary countries, once proposals have been approved and funding agreements signed with the interested parties in-country. This is part of the general approach to raising awareness of the origins of funding support and of other EU activities in Cambodia.

A specific communications strategy for CCCA is under development and due for completion in early 2012, in liaison with the NCCC. This is being designed to explicitly contribute to the wider development communications objective of CCCA, which is to enhance awareness of climate change risk across Cambodia's provinces and districts, and to mainstream climate risk management and adaptation measures in each of the most vulnerable sectors. The NCCC has established a National CC Technical Team that is charged with tacking the practical mainstreaming of climate change issues into all the vulnerable sectors.

The policy dialogue pillar of CCCA involves support to build the negotiating skills and international networks of staff from the Ministry of Environment's Climate Change Department (the chief executor of CCCA) and key staff from across government. This has been made effective in the UNFCCC process by inviting national stakeholders to hear and contribute to the GOC's negotiating position before each COP and then inviting press and stakeholders to hear feedback after each COP. These efforts are considerably enhancing GOC's profile in international fora, and this has then been

tackled by appropriate visibility actions by CCCA's TA, and the Delegation, to communicate the content of these events in the media, thus contributing to national policy dialogue.

The EUD argues that the "dialogue pillar" of the GCCA, as managed in CCCA, has led to significant communication processes, such as through the Dhaka EC-GCCA-Asia 2010 Conference⁶¹ and joint declaration, that have contributed to a convergence in visions between development partners and national CCCA stakeholders. However, evidence for policy convergence is hard to collect from either EUD and national stakeholders (such as the staff of CCD and NCCC members), as neither the EUD nor national partners have prepared any statement of objectives or joint strategy for policy convergence.

The EUD argued that the different activities under the dialogue pillar of the GCCA (conferences, policy dialogue sessions, joint declarations), all organised within that framework are now having a positive impact on the visibility of the EC work on climate change. Evidence is that the CCCA work programmes of 2009, 2010 and 2011 involved a large number of Cambodian decision-makers in various training and negotiation processes, who are now becoming more effective managers and interlocutors in climate-related policy dialogue processes.

However, while CCCA has made progress in some of its work programme, the overall national and institutional context is characterised by the EUD as being full of limitations, and with weak capacity of national partners emerging as a major – almost blocking - issue. This has been noted in the very poor progress of CCD to progress the production of the country's *Second National Communication on Climate Change* to be submitted to the UNFCCC.

This is also noted in the very poor progress in implementing the coastal resources management component of CCCA, due to quite substantial coordination and project management difficulties within UNDP and with UNEP, as CCCA partners and contributors.

Overall the EUD manifests satisfaction with their own efforts to increase CCCA's visibility, and more broadly it is felt that the EUD is following the Visibility Manual's guidance correctly. Evidence offered is that now media organisations proactively contact the EUD's communications staff to request information, reactions and viewpoints.

The role of the manual's guidance when implementing the funding sub-programme within CCCA (which will fund about 10 projects under competitive call for proposals) is understood to be limited, due to the fact of CCCA's overall basket funding has diluted what would have been full application of the Manual's protocols (in the case of sole EU funding, if CCCA were funded by the EU alone). Work on CCCA's visibility approach is rapidly evolving and the new methodology will be rolled out as the first tranche of CCCA projects is implemented.

The message has been received by the EUD that the MWH-managed GCCA Support Facility and the EU's HQ Quality Support Group process regard it as vital to raise the programme's visibility and knowledge sharing by the EUD in Cambodia, as in other GCCA beneficiary countries. EUDs are asked to include in their visibility action plan, lessons learnt, case studies, stories and testimonials from the field, to be disseminated in the country, in the region; and then across regions, through the GCCA. In preparing for the collection and delivery of these materials, the need for the EUDs to discuss this with their partners in-country has been stressed by the GCCA Support Facility so that this work is planned and resourced.

The EUD realises that Cambodia's specific profile on the EC's flagship website <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/climate-change-actions> is very limited, due to the fact that only the GERES Cambodia National Wood Energy Project is highlighted. This was designed to indicate the most important and notable cases of development programmes/projects that the EU considers being climate relevant, but for Cambodia only shows aid commitments up to 2008, thus not yet including CCCA. The EUD is working to prepare CCCA as a case study for inclusion in the database of EU actions.

⁶¹ http://www.gcca.eu/pages/34_2-The-Asia-Regional-Conference.html

7.2 Evidence from Government officials

During the discussions, there was a good understanding and appreciation of the multiple benefits of CCCA's support to the CCD, in particular how CCCA has enhanced skills and the country's negotiating capacities. This is seen as the main achievement of CCCA noted so far.

CCCA support is seen as opportune, as it is just now that the absorption capacity of external adaptation funds is rising, as the combined efforts of development partners (such as UNDP) helps the NCCC to make inroads into the mainstreaming of CC thinking into the vulnerable sectors. The support provided by CCCA to establish a National Climate Change Technical Team is valued, as a mechanism had been absent for practical ongoing technical work across sector Ministries.

Informants noted that realism is needed when seeking the widespread assimilation of new information, recalling that it took many years to mainstream major cross-sector issues such as gender equality, indigenous peoples and disaster risk reduction.

However, the real capacity to tackle climate change impacts is still low, as noted for example in rural areas where large areas that are drought-prone cannot access irrigation water; and central agencies such as the Ministry of Meteorology have very limited capacity to manage even their own data on historical climate, let alone carry out simulations and projections of climate change over coming decades. This is a major reason for the country's failure to complete the now-very-delayed Second National Communication to the UNFCCC.

Considerable support is now becoming effective to identify capacity needs through agencies such as UNEP, UNDP, CBD and PPCR. Government officials mention the very low salaries of staff as a major cause of institutional weakness due to the impacts of this on staff quality, motivation and corruption levels. This was a concern highlighted by all informants with relevant awareness of CCCA; that CCD staff was too over-stretched to cover their assigned tasks, and neither CCCA nor UNDP nor MS donors had been able to offer supplements to CCD's staff salaries to ensure their motivation and permanence.

CCCA support for national policy development through policy dialogue processes has not yet culminated in benchmark legislation such as a National Target Programme that mandates processes and time periods for vulnerable sectors to assess their climate risks, though the MOE and the CCD have programmed the finalisation of such frameworks for 2012. The priority assigned by CCCA to country ownership is highly valued, as this strengthens national institutions and capacities.

Concerns were raised about CCCA support to MoE and the hosting of CCD within MoE, as some informants argued that climate change by no means is truly an environmental issue, and instead is a cross-sector horizontal issue by itself. However, within CCCA (MoE, CCCA's external TA) the role of CCCA as an arm of NCCC (thus responding to all the relevant GoC Ministries) was very clearly expressed.

Some informants stated that the EU-sponsored policy dialogue is underperforming, with participants in negotiations, training and workshops frequently travelling without fully supplying their respective Ministries and colleagues across sectors with detailed information about their activities and results. These observations make it unclear how far participation in conferences and declarations is having impacts on the country's capacities, and then onto ability to deal with international climate change negotiations.

7.3 Evidence from civil society and development NGOs

A range of NGOs working on development issues were consulted about their impression of the EU. These bodies are working in areas such as forestry, rural development, sustainable agriculture, decentralisation, socio-economic development (i.e. gender, indigenous peoples) and biodiversity conservation. In sum, the NGOs interviewed seek to develop good governance practices accompanying the national decentralisation process, favouring the sustainable management of natural resources, and empowerment of local authorities and communities.

The work performed by civil society agencies has a major role in increasing public awareness and access to information on climate change risks. Their long-term continued support for rural development ensures an information flow about local issues (such as climate change and disasters) from rural societies into Phnom Penh's circles of decision-makers. For example, their local knowledge can be quite precise as to the local foci of poor and vulnerable families who are exposed and sensitive to weather-related disasters.

The NGOs interviewed were able to portray clearly that the state of awareness of climate change in rural Cambodia is quite low, despite increasing disasters (mainly more frequent floods), given the weak level of formal education and the immediacy of today's concerns in poor communities. Perceptions of major CC issues were: the variable onset of the rainy season out-of-season rains and prolonged droughts that all greatly reduce environmental predictability for crop management; more frequent storms with high winds and heavy rain; more frequent large scale flooding events; and increasing coastal erosion and storm surges. Many of these climate trends are widely held to have worsened impacts due to the high rates of deforestation, forest degradation and damaged watersheds.

Even so, given the lack of awareness raising and education, if asked about their immediate concerns, vulnerable groups would mention food and water insecurity far above in their scale of priorities compared with climate change.

Development NGOs made strong linkages with the EU's Food Facility and EU's MS natural resources management programmes, such as that run by DANIDA. Many have benefitted over the years from EU support and the perception is held very widely of the EU as a robust and steady development partner, supplying support that closely fits the needs of society by contributing to better governance (support to free elections); poverty alleviation; and responses to disasters. In urban Cambodia, awareness is high of the EU as a source of scholarships and of the support provided to the education sector.

Where developments NGOs have received EU funds directly, they manifest that they were made aware of EU visibility conditions, and have followed the stipulations. Visibility requirements are generally limited to the acknowledgement of the EU financial contribution; the endorsement of common aims and a strategic partnership is not targeted by the communication manual. On the other hand, many NGOs offer very good practice in following the guidelines beyond the letter of the Manual, with visibility focused beyond acknowledgement of the EC contribution, but also on project outputs, results and impact.

In general, the highest quality image of the EU that the EU's NGO development partners have been able to transmit to final beneficiaries is that of the EU as a responsible donor, giving access to EU taxpayer resources, through linkages with Cambodian partners, to benefit environmental sustainability and poverty alleviation. This contrasts with the more negative image of comparable international actors, such as the USA (seen as confrontational and bossy) and the World Bank, which are seen often as excessively pushing free markets and economic liberalisation.

However the baseline image of the EU in rural Cambodia is as an entity mainly related to the history of French involvement, and to current popular interest in football leagues and clubs. Even the EU currency of the Euro is little known outside urban areas.

The major issue of the GoC's excessive willingness to open Economic Land Concessions (which contribute to deforestation and convert prime land to commercial agriculture and palm and rubber plantations), was noted by several NGOs as a major development issue, on which the EUD has not offered any significant support to civil society, nor taken a position to question this policy against government. Some of the NGOs would like the EUD to adopt a clearer, value-based approach to tackle the continuing issue of human rights and freedom to act of civil society.

A visibility concern mentioned by NGOs were that EU monitors and evaluators, when interacting with final beneficiaries, would enquire in communities whether the families were aware where the funds derived from, and the responses would often be that the NGO's community participants could not state that they knew that the funds came from the EU. This might result in a low mark for that

programme on the visibility issue. However, the NGOs state that they can only promote the source of their funds so far, and that visibility information is hard to “make it stick” in rural contexts where villagers can barely identify Europe on a map, let alone grasp what the EU actually is.

On the climate change theme, the new facility offered by the CCCA Trust Fund to fund targeted projects has been well received by the NGO community. This builds on work that a small number of NGOs have undertaken in providing support to projects structured following the profiles set out in the NAPA exercise of some years ago.

Concerning the GERES national fuelwood policy and stoves programme that was internationally highlighted on the EU’s website <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/climate-change-actions>, some limited information became available during the field mission from GERES staff. This was to the effect that the EU project was able to decisively support Cambodian policy makers in building up a national fuelwood policy; and to trial and establish sustainable socio-economic mechanisms for ongoing production of fuel-efficient stoves. These are now widely adopted in rural and urban Cambodia. Considerable work was done on ensuring that the biomass and charcoal production supply chain becomes sustainable, by building up capacities in plantation establishment and woodland management, and marketing outlets were established for stoves and charcoal in urban and rural settings.

7.4 Evidence from MS and development partners

DANIDA, SIDA and UNDP make up the EU’s partners in implementing the CCCA. During formulation of the programme, under UNDP aegis, the MS’s were very clear in seeking for national mechanisms to be greatly strengthened, which led to the focus on policy development, negotiation capacities and awareness raising.

Based on DANIDA’s suite of earlier projects, the need to anchor the programme in a practical on-the-ground issue led to the inclusion of a component directed at integrated coastal zone management. However this is the area of work that has not worked well due to implementation issues with MOE and UNDP/UNEP, in which divisions in the past have erupted between the two UN agencies about a range of CCCA issues related to its priorities and management.

While development partners accept that progress will be irregular in the country context, and the Trust Fund’s support to a range of projects is welcome, MS agency informants identified a problem in multi-donor working, and the lack of strategic proposals and achievements. This reflects the lack of capacity which all partners have noted, in which basic science literacy is quite weak, even amongst CCD staff and NCCC representatives.

Even so, the focus on small achievable programmes such as those funded through the Trust Fund in 2011, needs to be shifted towards larger and higher scales of action. Examples are: capacity needs assessments and targeted institution building; and Sector Gap Analyses that support each vulnerable sector in assessing its vulnerabilities and adaptation options.

The major conflict between Cambodia’s very poor recent record of high levels of deforestation and the need to maintain forests for their micro-climatic, adaptation and hydrological buffering functions in areas prone to flooding was highlighted by all development partners involved in funding CCCA. Under the imperative of economic growth, the liberalised economic context has led to the development of many “land-grabbing” proposals that convert forests to other uses, such as oil palm and rubber plantations, meaning that land-use planning under precautionary principles is badly neglected. The rising influence of Chinese investors with extremely weak risk and impacts assessments is a major growing concern. The above are noted as issues beyond the scope of a programme such as CCCA, but that undermine long-term prospects for a shift to sustainable livelihoods and real reductions in rural vulnerabilities.

MS have noted the good effectiveness of ongoing efforts by the EUD to ensure the high visibility of EU actions. However, DANIDA informants noted that these have lacked subtlety as the image of the EU that has been projected through rigid adherence to stickers, signs and promotion of the EU’s

contribution in publications etc, has been to engender a sense that the EU is insecure and wants to “prove itself”, and be seen in high relief. An informant noted “the EU is seen to come in flying a flag more than giving practical support”. From the MS viewpoint this can undermine ownership and may fail to strengthen partnerships.

The recent step taken by the EUD of cancelling the annual Blue Book highlighting the EU’s contributions to Cambodia was seen as a positive change by MS as it was argued by MS technical staff (from DANIDA and SIDA) that it becomes easier to demonstrate MS’s partnerships with the EU and with their Cambodian partners without the Blue Book, rather than the EU excessively highlighting its “go-it-alone” achievements. The less exhaustive approach of short leaflets on the operation of the EU, and on each EU-funded initiative such as CCCA, is now seen by MS as much more focussed and productive.

The various development partners involved in CCCA note that the visibility challenge for MS and the EU is similar: to demonstrate an active partnership between the EU and its component MS; and to show to Cambodian stakeholder that these funds derive from people and organisation who have devoted their resources (from the European taxpayer) in solidarity with Cambodian beneficiaries. This would counter the impression of “infinite funding” which can easily induce negligent management of scarce funds, and engenders waste.

SIDA’s Advisor noted that due to the involvement of many partner agencies in CCCA’s basket funding, this effectively dilutes the visibility of each donor. The EU’s efforts are worthwhile, but of limited value due to this effect. The major concerns of both DANIDA and SIDA are the cumbersome nature of the EUD’s M & E of CCCA, which is seen as onerous and time consuming.

7.5 Evidence from journalists and from media coverage analysis

Newspaper media informants state that the EUD’s communication efforts have successfully transmitted an image of the EU via web page announcements and press releases, which clearly lay out the key messages so that the paper can simply copy and paste the information into the relevant edition. This effort is greatly appreciated. With CCCA major events were still recalled such as the launch of CCCA and major workshops. However, the absence of translations into Khmer, shortage of photo images, and the use of pdf documents are stated as hindrances.

The dominant strand of reporting on the EU relates to Cambodia-EU trading relations such as the opening and regulation of markets for Cambodia’s exports, leading to a widespread view (outside that of the development community) of the EU as “just an economic block” and a source of opportunities. The majority of stories that mention the EU cover the EU’s quotas, taxes, exoneration policies.

Secondly, coverage of the EU mentions the EU as a big donor that for example, aids sectoral development, free elections and good governance.

The image of the EU conveyed to newspaper readers is felt to fall short of reality, due to the very high level of basic unawareness (even amongst urban readers) of details of the EU’s MS composition, and internal structures. Informants held the view that key parts of the EU such as the Commission, Council and Parliament were largely unknown within Cambodia. The major value of the EU perceived by many Cambodians is that the EU is pro-democracy and in favour of education of the people.

So the EUD’s communications and visibility approach should not assume that the Cambodian public has a developed understanding of what the EU is, how it works and what its values are; a significant attempt to educate the public is needed to broaden the awareness of the EU beyond the dominant perception of it as a trading partner and giver of aid funds.

Media informants emphasised their own personal awareness of the strategic importance of Cambodia’s partnership with the EU, in which they recognise the EU as a global player in its geo-political dimension as representing 27 MS, and also for its influence in dialogue with other

governments, and with international partners. The neutrality of the EU is understood in relation to the open political agenda of similar blocks such as the USA.

An outreach programme managed by the EUD was proposed by several informants that would train and inform younger cohorts of journalists about EU structure, history and values.

The main challenge in conducting the media coverage analysis was represented by the scarce quantity of information available through local newspapers. The news culture in Cambodia is skewed towards radio and television rather than newspapers, with only the Phnom Penh Post and Cambodia Weekly having much in the way of serious coverage of issues. Media coverage online for the Phnom Penh Post was good, and this allowed online analysis across a large time span of 12 months since the Dhaka 2010 GCCA conference. Directly from the EUD we were able to collect a suite of EUD press releases and copies of newspaper reports.

Most of interviewed national stakeholders indicated the following sources of information on EU as the most consulted and accessible: National media (newspapers, TV), EU internet pages and newsletters. The topics of major interest for them are the EU-funded programmes, the examples of best practises, the partnership opportunities (for trade & investment), the education opportunities, and of course the funding opportunities.

CCCA was presented in 2010 at its launch by the EU, MS to national politicians and the press as an ambitious project that could convey information and support management of climate change at national level. CCCA expectations from the start were high especially given the capacity building work; and much has been achieved in linking Cambodian CC decision-makers with networks their improving policy influencing skills. However, the specific attribution of CCCA to the EU has not been effective.

Despite the increasing political visibility, the EU is generally perceived only as a donor and a partner of Cambodian Government in supporting national development, not as an ally of civil society and NGOs in an atmosphere that is somewhat tense in the relationship between development NGOs and government.

The Deputy Director General, National Television of Cambodia, noted that close working with the EUD was effective in enabling the transmission of 2 to 3 stories per month. These typically would be on trade and education issues, as well as occasional reports of EUD conferences, high level visits and news from projects, such as launches.

The media source consulted had the viewpoint that urban stakeholders in Phnom Penh are aware of CCCA and of its EU financing. This is because the media coverage of the general topic of climate change's impacts and disasters is good, and has provided reasonable urban awareness of the issue. However, among the general public in the country, CCCA is almost entirely unknown.

The Phnom Penh Post internet analysis shows NO coverage of CCCA; and no media outlets show any coverage at all of the 2010 GCCA Dhaka conference.

The press releases from EU Delegation are very well received and used; there is good coverage of other EU external actions. The EU's newsletters, reports, awareness events, and workshops all carry high quality visibility content, and effectively convey the EU role and transmit EU values.

8. FINDINGS IN RELATION TO SELECTED EVALUATION QUESTIONS

EQ1. THE IMAGE OF THE EU EXTERNAL ACTION

The evidence detailed above sustains the argument that the EU's transmission of a favourable image of itself to Cambodian stakeholders is proceeding as well as can be expected. The perceptions of stakeholders of this EU external action – CCCA - corresponds to the intended image. The media have given as good coverage of EU actions as can be expected. The main issue is that while the actions of CCCA are visibly discussed in the media and in development communications, the specific coverage of the EU's support is limited, due to this being a multi-donor intervention.

The EU Delegation's communication strategy has conveyed the message of a multi-purpose cooperation policy that contributes to global development objectives, with a participatory and adaptive approach that is in accordance with national and regional needs.

The images that are most widely perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the action's communication objectives, showing that the EU is an effective political actor, and a significant donor and good partner. The general perception amongst CCCA's beneficiaries of EU is positive.

The main features of EU's projected image are:

- As a **positive, proactive, responsible development partner**, providing high-quality development assistance that leads to durable low-emissions and climate-resilient growth within development partner countries.
- Seen as a reliable partner not just with Government's but also supporting **civil society development** for local benefits, even if not as a political actor.
- To be seen as an **ethical actor** in the face of the large costs imposed by EU past emissions, as these affect developing countries and limit opportunities to grow and develop sustainably.
- To be seen as an **effective donor, ensuring coherence and complementarity** between EU aid, and that of MS, and of supported international agencies and NGOs; as well as with the range of non-EU bodies involved in development cooperation.
- To be seen as 'putting its own house in order' by **mainstreaming climate change concerns** into all sectors of development cooperation.
- To be seen as an **effective manager and interlocutor** in climate-related policy dialogue processes, who is 'on the Cambodian side' in terms of sympathetic support that enhances the capacities of developing countries to engage in climate change negotiations.
- To be seen as a **capable agent** in deploying innovative financing instruments.
- To be seen to be ensuring that **climate change is systematically addressed** in the context of the EU's relations with international partners, at multilateral, regional and bilateral levels.

Of course the Cambodian media is not well developed to Western standards (in terms of freedom, newspaper circulation), with just a very limited number of print media outlets; radio and TV are much more popular ways in which the wider public obtains information, particularly at local and rural levels where lack of money and the education gap limits access to written media.

While the CCCA case study shows an appropriate and flexible approach, climate change is not yet a central felt concern across a large proportion of the Cambodian public, and so expectations from the EU for large-scale climate change actions are limited. National direct stakeholders recognise the initial benefits of the CCCA programme in terms of enhanced negotiating capacities, strengthening of national decision-making and enhanced awareness of climate change as a development issue.

More widely, the EU is seen as credible and reliable partner in development cooperation, especially in relation to education, human rights, trade partnerships and environment.

EQ2. VISIBILITY COMMUNICATION PRIORITIES

The EU Delegation has effectively adopted a comprehensive communication strategy that includes some corporate communications about the EU policies and statements on issues of national importance, as well as covering specific events and programmes related to its political, economic and development cooperation with the country. The implementation of the visibility strategy provides EU-programme stakeholders with some information on the policy framework (why); on the specific initiative (what) and the opportunities that may arise from them (how). For example, the potential interested parties who might wish to apply for funding from the CCCA Trust Fund were effectively briefed by CCCA and EUD on what the opportunity involves, and have successfully applied for these resources.

Beyond immediate and targeted receptors of visibility messages, the wider overall impression is that it is not yet widely clear why the EU carries out external actions such as CCCA. This is tied in with very limited conveyance of what really defines EU as an actor on the world stage; and poor transmission of the various methods used by the EU in terms of development instruments deployed around the world. There are very significant differences between the image of the EU internalised by EU-programme stakeholders; and the wider public outside the immediate circle of beneficiaries.

Even so, the stakeholders do not express a need for another formulation of external actions in order to make it more visible, as the problem relates to basic understandings about the EU's structures and composition, rather than a failure of visibility communication in relation to the climate change, the CSP portfolio, or any other of the critical themes.

The role of the EUD in steering and moderating sectoral working groups with other donors including the EU-MS is highly appreciated by partners and it favours the setting up of dialogue agenda with agreed priorities and the delivery of appropriate products (i.e. EU policy position papers) facilitating the bilateral negotiations on trade and investments in a harmonised manner.

On the other hand, the EUD is confronted with the different objectives of the EEAS (political issues) and those of the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DG-DEVCO) focused on the cooperation strategy, thus requiring harmonised and coherent communication priorities by both EU Headquarters and Delegations.

EQ3. IMPLEMENTING A SINGLE CLEARLY DEFINED VISIBILITY STRATEGY

The coherence of the Cambodia EUD's strategy for overall visibility is clear, but given the Cambodian context where climate change awareness is low, messages can become confused on specific issues. Still, it is relatively easy to understand the EUD's Cambodia strategy; and the clarity of the goals is reasonable.

In Cambodia, as in most partner countries, the EU cooperation strategy comprises economic, social and environmental objectives with increased cross-sectoral programmes.

The particular difficulties faced in achieving the action's visibility objectives have been related to the mixed funding of the action with DANIDA, SIDA and UNDP/UNEP involved, which has limited both the progress made in the various components, and diluted the attribution to any specific partner of the impacts so far.

On the wider issue of an overall GCCA visibility strategy, this is something that is recognised by the EC and GCCA's Support Facility, managed by MWH, as having been lacking to date. Much of the visibility effort has been focussed on meeting shorter term needs e.g. preparation of booklets / leaflets for particular events, and setting up of the GCCA website as the main means of communication and visibility about the GCCA. However, one of the Support Facility's priorities for the next 12 months of the GCCA is to implement an overall strategy for visibility and communication. This will be in partnership between the Support Facility and the EC.

In late 2011 the GCCA support facility started serious work on this effort to redevelop the strategy, confirming the objectives, target groups, specific target group objectives, identification of

communication activities and tools, including what has been used to date and has proved successful or otherwise, and indicators of achievement, so that the success or otherwise of the implementation of the strategy can be measured and adapted as the implementation proceeds.

The Support Facility will provide materials to support implementation of the strategy, but in many respects it is likely that the EC and the EUDs will implement the strategy to a number of the target groups (for example, member states, beneficiary country populations and stakeholders, other international donor organisations). Activities that have already been identified in the GCCA Workplan around improving communications, including enhancements to the GCCA website, support to the EC on GCCA focussed side events at UNFCCC conferences and other international events, such as Rio+20.

Support is being provided to prepare a range of documents covering the GCCA and themes associated with implementation of GCCA initiatives, from newsletters, booklets to more substantial documents on budget support and climate change, the EU's Fast Start funding and a "lessons learnt" publication as part of GCCA's approach to knowledge management.

Among Cambodian stakeholders, the EU is perceived as a single institution, without differentiation between sectoral DGs.

The GCCA's Support Facility has not developed a specific strategy nor fully engaged yet with the specific visibility and communications needs of its country programmes, and this has been a limitation from the European end.

Within the EC, there has been some management confusion and difficulty in reaching decisions, which has led to some negligence of GCCA's overall, and specific needs of countries with regard to visibility issues, and this in turn has led to weak guidance of GCCA's Support Facility.

Some EU NGO observers have noted considerable lack of coordination and cases of poor communication between DEVCO and CLIMA in reaching decisions, such as the significant obstructions to quickly reaching a decision on the selection of countries for the 2011 GCCA country programme. Improving the ability of internal parties to reach convergent decisions is clearly a high priority. However, this is an issue of internal implementation effectiveness, and not so much of visibility strategy.

Additionally, it seems clear that the EUD is not able to be highly visible, as it is seen by only a certain part of government, but much less by wider government and stakeholders. The fact of UNDP leadership, the implementation difficulties suffered so far, and the preference of MS (such as DANIDA) for a low EU profile, limits the ability of CCCA to stand as a major example of EU support in the climate change arena.

We cannot therefore assert that the communication strategy at Brussels level (from EEAS & DEVCO) is as yet well defined and effectively transmitted to the EUD and on to CCCA.

Until CCCA and more widely GCCA have developed their particular communication strategies for their actions, visibility has followed standard EU protocols, with no particular need so far to "sound-proof" strategies with communication professionals.

EQ4. STAKEHOLDERS PERCEPTION OF THE BENEFITS OF EU EXTERNAL ACTION

As argued in the Desk Report, it is not EC visibility activities that alone generate stakeholders' views of the EU's external action; rather is more based on the results of the intervention.

The benefits of CCCA are not highly tangible to stakeholders, due to the recent start up of the programme, the poor availability of CCD staff for high quality management, the inability to implement the coastal resource management component, and the initial concentration on awareness raising and building negotiation capacities. CCCA's start-up phase was complex with many actors involved. It has largely been perceived as UNDP-led policy development and training programme,

but whoever appear to be leading, CCCA does not yet appear as an “agent on the ground” providing specific practical benefits.

It appears clear that joint Management and partnerships with international agencies such as the UN have reduced the opportunities for raising EU visibility, even though it may be efficient in management terms. However, a real need for high profile projection of the EU’s contribution to CCCA is not be shared, for example by the EU’s own MS who are involved as partners.

Even so, the multi-stakeholder dialogue implemented by CCCA and CCD/NCCC has certainly stimulated debate on appropriate linkages and synergies between climate change, rural development, governance reform disaster management and sustainable management of natural resources.

The communication strategy has been designed as to follow standard EU Delegation practices, as expected, and this has ensured a normal level of impact on stakeholders. As a specific CCCA’s communication strategy has not been developed, no monitoring or evaluation of impact, retention and credibility can be expected to be underway.

In some case, such as the policy dialogue event held in Dhaka in 2010 there was very limited coverage⁶² of the event in the Cambodian media, which severely reduced the retention of messages. Since then, in the series of COPs and training events held to build negotiating capacities, efforts have been made to make the activities visible, even if this has only been through press releases and consultation fora. Evidence was collected from several sources of concern about many and frequent outside trips of CCD/NCCC staff, but structured transmission is limited of their knowledge and of the lessons they have learned from their foreign affairs. The lack of clarity and poorly expressed impacts of socialisation activities around CCCA’s programme of building negotiating capacities has meant that perceptions are limited of CCCA’s tangible results in this component.

As well, the complexity of the benefits and the difficulty of attributing the capacities under development to the CCCA’s work programme, makes it hard to detect an “EU external action signal” associated with a related rise in Cambodia’s negotiating capacities and any policy convergence with regional Asian or EU positions.

So it therefore remains unclear how far (under the "dialogue pillar" of the GCCA) that the Joint EU-Asian LDCs Declaration has in fact contributed to the expected convergence in visions between the EU and Cambodian decision-makers. The hypothesis remains un-falsified that different activities under this pillar (conferences, policy dialogue sessions, joint declarations) have had a positive impact on the visibility of the EC’s work on climate change.

EQ5. COORDINATION AND COMPLEMENTARITY WITH EU MEMBER STATES AND EU INSTITUTIONS

Coordination to implement CCCA with EU-MS has been good; however, it has not been as good between EU, the MS involved and the UNDP. The EUD’s involvement in thematic/sectoral working groups in climate change and natural resource management favours donor coordination. Cooperation with MS is well developed at technical level and around specific issues and themes.

The prior presence of one of the MS influences the perception of the EU in this area, with DANIDA having been one of the largest donors in natural resource management and their coastal zones work.

Member States and EU policies and approaches are not perceived as very different by CCCA stakeholders. MS embassies and the EU Delegation see the EU acting approximately as a single entity, with little specific grasp of the various roles of the Council and Parliament, due to the fact that it is the European Commission that intermediates between these bodies and the MS.

⁶² The GCCA webpage provides a list of national newspaper coverage here http://www.gcca.eu/pages/49_2-In-the-press.html It is notable that no Cambodian outlet has covered the conference, and this was confirmed by the media analysis.

There is some limited evidence of an example of uncoordinated action on visibility conveying contradictory messages. This relates to the point made above about the Blue Book, which was an annual production that highlighted the EU's contributions in that year to Cambodian development. From the MS viewpoint, cancelling the Blue Book was a good idea, as they felt that this product projected a "go-it-alone" image of the EU; when, in a sensitive case such as CCCA basket-funding, a better outcome obtains when there is no high profile visibility objective for the EU. Keeping a lower profile is consistent with avoiding unrealistic expectations of what EU can do.

A significant question is if the EEAS will bring a clear and detailed political strategy to bear in Cambodia, from which a coherent Visibility strategy can follow, rather than a broad strategic orientation. There is an expectation (amongst the EU family) that the EEAS may bring greater strategy, coherence and "oversight", but some skepticism too.

More widely, it seems obvious that the EU intends to promote and highlight the fact that it is the largest aid donor to third countries. Clearly considerable influence derives from this and it is a significant "promotional point". The use made of this influence to generate appropriate global, regional and country policies is still lagging the EU's real position as a global player, and as a robust partner to third countries. Many proposals such as GCCA and Europe2020 seek to reassert the EU's benign influence within a very crowded world, as seen by the rise of China and other BASIC countries. The major task is to deploy instruments such as GCCA to really hit the mark.

The agility and effectiveness of GCCA in stepping outside the old definitions of partnerships and associated traditional roles of donor-recipient thus remains a significant challenge. To some extent the repositioning of the EU's aid portfolio with respect to that of the larger MS is important, as there is still a tendency for MS to want to communicate that it is they that are doing things, not so much the EU. This requires changes in the way MS view their external action, and whether or not is viewed as competing or not with the EU's.

EQ6. COHERENCE OF EU EXTERNAL ACTION WITH INTERNAL POLICY AREAS

There is no evidence of incoherence between internal policy areas and visibility/communication strategies. Stakeholders interviewed were not sophisticated enough in their understanding of the details of EU internal and external policy areas to pick up inconsistencies amongst them.

There are no particular cases of contradictions in messages conveyed by EU in press enquiries and requests for explanations. No specific were detected of significant negative perceptions of outsiders of incoherencies in the EU's policy, actions and messages conveyed by EU officials.

Repeating points expressed above, what can be stated is that between the MS and the EU there is some confusion as to what the "purpose" of EU visibility is – just to "show the flag" or for specific development communication objectives. The main value that both the EU and MS want to convey to Cambodian publics and stakeholders is of good partnership and of robust coherence in actions and policies. There is thus no particular reason, from the MS perspective, for a different relative impact of the visibility policies of the EUD versus those of Member States, which (it could be argued) do not need to be imaged and transmitted separately.

EU and CCCA's policy and practical coherence is highest with Sweden.

Ongoing reform of EU external services influences EUD communication and visibility strategies. Part of the EUD (political section) is working under EEAS, while the cooperation section responds to DG-DEVCO (managing EU programmes and funding). The EUD faces challenges dealing with priorities more oriented towards political issues, such as establishing clear policies on GoC NGO reform and human rights. It must be recalled that policy coherence is not something most people perceive, but on the other hand incoherencies can quickly be seen and exploited.

EQ7. PERCEPTION OF EU VALUE ADDED AS A GLOBAL PLAYER EMERGING CLEARLY FROM ITS COUNTRY PRESENCE?

As expressed above, the Cambodian wide public does not have a very clear basic perception of the EU's values, institutional organization and policies. The added value of the European Commission's initiatives is reasonably well understood by CCCA stakeholders, compared to other donors such as the UNDP or Member States, but its image does not excel compared to that of any other development partner taking part in supporting his programme.

The EC's role, as transmitted through the EUD's actions, as perceived by UNDP, is seen as adequate, even if differences have been acute in the recent past, with only the EC's cumbersome M & E requirements standing as an ongoing concern. The UNDP, UNEP and EU relationship is not yet highly strategic at country level, with a clear problem solving approach. The partnership should be based on the added value that each agency can bring to GoC's programme, such as UNDP's skills being applied to supporting the much delayed production of Cambodia's Second Communication to UNFCCC.

A reasonable degree of leadership (political and managerial) has been exercised by the EUD to manage visibility issues. However, beyond the Visibility Manual, no particular communication & visibility tools have been provided to the EUD to improve this leadership, or to increase the access by Cambodian stakeholders to information on EU policies.

The direct beneficiaries of the EUD's support to CCCA clearly perceive that the EU is collaborating in a joint programme with Cambodia. The wider messages about the actions of the EU MS and the EU's internal actions within Europe to tackle climate change, are not projected within Cambodia. Beyond the GoC and MoE, it is not clear that GCCA is a climate financing tool that responds to UNFCCC and international obligations.

For GCCA more widely, policy documents do not yet exist with clear communication and visibility objectives and implementation strategies, produced with contribution of DEVCO and CLIMA. With the recent consolidation of the EU's institutional architecture it can be expected that more coherent communication and visibility will become effective between DEVCO/CLIMA, the geographical Directorate, EEAS and the GCCA Support Facility.

It is clearly the case that if CCCA succeeds, this contributes to GCCA's success. The visibility that flows from this is a key consideration for the effort by the EC to appear as a responsible player on the world stage, applying its own specific, initiative in support of significant action to address developing country climate change concerns.

EQ8. ADEQUACY OF RESOURCES FOR VISIBILITY AND COMMUNICATION

The EU services rely on common visibility events at central level (Development Days, Info points, etc.), where coordination with other DGs is easier. It seems clear from the Cambodia case as an EU Delegation, that there are not clear rules on the volumes and mobilization of resources for visibility action. It seems that the capacity to allocate visibility and communication budgets and human resources differs from country to country.

No interviewees expressed the view that the resources allocated by the EUD to visibility were inadequate. The media coverage achieved of CCCA-related event was reasonably effective in reaching target audiences and intended objectives, apart from the failure to get coverage of the 2010 GCCA Asia conference. The budget for visibility in programmes seems adequate.

Visibility of EU support for CCCA is as high as can be expected; and as is appropriate.

The qualifications and skills of staff dealing with communication/visibility at the EUD who are involved in creating messages is good, as can be seen in a range of Press Releases set into Annex 4. However, only one full time Communications Officer is working on visibility-related topics in the Delegation.

The EUD communication strategy in Cambodia is built around the cooperation sectors of the CSP programmes, linked to specific projects. No specific financial amount dedicated by the Delegation staff was supplied in relation to visibility and communication. Neither could figures be obtained for the resources that are used for policy dialogue. Allocation for visibility is available in the budget of

each intervention. However, it would seem to be the case that the standard visibility strategy used so far correctly takes into consideration the available resources. Beyond the standard ROM, no EC resources are used to check visibility compliance for the CCCA programme.

EQ9. COMMUNICATION ACTIONS' COST-EFFECTIVENESS

Following the points made in prior paragraphs, the results of EUD's visibility actions, in terms of stakeholder perceptions do seem fully commensurate with the standard costs of conveying the messages. The resources have been adequate for visibility work and clearly are effectively deployed in a well organized manner, as specified in the Visibility Manual.

The tools used are largely traditional, in terms of press releases formatted for adoption wholesale by newspapers. Much more could be done to promote the image of the EU and detail given on the structure and policies of the EU, through the medium of radio, which is far more popular and easily reaches much larger audiences, quite cheaply.

EQ10. CONSISTENCY OF VISIBILITY ACTION PLANS WITH STRATEGY WITHIN EC

This question has been covered under previous EQs, especially in the points made about the intention of the GCCA's Support Facility to develop a well-structured Visibility approach in 2012. As noted, for GCCA policy documents do not yet exist with clear communication and visibility objectives and implementation strategies, produced with contribution of DEVCO and CLIMA. With the recent consolidation of the EU's institutional architecture it can be expected that more coherent communication and visibility will become effective between DEVCO/CLIMA, the geographical Directorate, EEAS and the GCCA Support Facility.

The communication strategy from HQ appears to be reasonably well-defined and transmitted to EUD, though this is expected to improve once CCCA and GCCA develop their specific approaches.

Beyond the GERES case study, returning messages to HQ about CCCA will contribute to the GCCA's global visibility. This is a priority given the need within the UNFCCC process to highlight the gains made in country programmes such as that in Cambodia.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- C1. Any programme can only legitimately be made visible once real results have been achieved, and once these have been combined to generate benefits that are 'worth talking about'.
- C2. As yet, until the new management of MWH's Support Facility roll out their new visibility strategy in 2012, little systematic attention was paid to the issue of GCCA's visibility. Effectiveness and impact of visibility actions are enhanced when combining corporate communication with result-oriented communications, which link specific programme outputs to strategic and global objectives. This is a good prospect now that CCCA and GCCA are working on the subject.
- C3. The EU is known internationally in the climate change field, not just as a supplier of finance, but also as a highly active player, pushing with considerable political will for a post-Kyoto agreement. Within Europe and internationally, the EU is known as an entity that takes environmental concerns and climate change seriously both by MS and in development cooperation, placing considerable emphasis on addressing climate change adaptation and mitigation, as well as energy efficiency and security.
- C4. Integrating communication resources in strategic planning effectively contributes to achievement of intended results, and favours participation of target groups.
- C5. The absence of clear political strategies in many cases is causing difficulties with visibility strategies. Involvement of delegations in ensuring coherence in the visibility of EC-UN partnerships is currently insufficient. Delegations are occupied with a great number of programmes and initiatives to implement, and often do not have specific experts assigned to

EC-UN cooperation. As shown by CCCA, a common approach for visibility with EC-UN cooperation across GCCA's programmes is lacking. Delegations need training about the contents and objectives of EC-UN cooperation and the messages to be transmitted.

- C6. The EU is one entity to most people in third countries, with an EU image that is largely positive. This should be built on by focussing on continued good work in development cooperation, but could be enhanced by using different communication modalities (i.e. radio) and developing messages that generate more sophisticated understandings of what the EU is and stands for.
- R1. Appropriate and tailored communication tools in accordance with stakeholders expectations and capacity is a key factor in determining perceptions and EU overall visibility. The medium of radio should be more significantly deployed when attempting to communicate on a mass scale, as the reach of radio stations and user-ship is far higher than for newspapers.
- R2. To enable education about what the EU is and what it does in Cambodia, the EUD could consider approaches such as support to a series of talk-back shows or similar radio format, to discuss what the EU is, what it is made up of, and how it is helping.
- R3. Coordination on communication priorities should be addressed as an integral component of strategy building (for country and regional cooperation) and be included as a cross-cutting issue in project design, implementation and monitoring.

The information provided here on issues raised by this study when evaluating CCCA should be transmitted to the GCCA's Support Facilities, both the one managed by MWH and the new ACP Support Facility due to begin work in 2012.

ANNEX 1: STANDARD FORMAT FOR EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO EQS (CAMBODIA)

EQ 1	“How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action and to the image the EU seeks to convey?”
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
JC.1.1. The EU has managed to disseminate the message to the relevant stakeholders in terms of content and reasons for its external action	Government officials and NGOs are aware of CCCA in terms of its reasons for and the objectives. Journalists are weakly aware of CCCA. All parties are conscious of the wider support provided by the EUD in support of Cambodian development. The proper definition of the EU’s external actions is unclear to all parties. The general public is very unclear of EU external actions, except when directly benefitting as primary beneficiaries of a given action in which case the standard visibility procedures usually appear effective.
<u>Indicator 1.1.1</u> The stakeholders know the definition of the external action of the EU	Government stakeholders are aware of the characteristics and scope of CCCA. Successively, NGOs are reasonably aware of CCCA, then the media.
<u>Indicator 1.1.2</u> The stakeholders know the content of the definition of the external action of the EU	The wider impacts and benefits of EUD’s portfolio are apparent to their respective specific stakeholders through the EUD’s application of the EC’s generic approach to visibility.
JC.1.2. The EU has managed to transmit an image to stakeholders that correspond to the image that was sought to be conveyed	In general, the EUD is successful in showing itself as a significant donor and partner in Cambodia’s development.
<u>Indicator 1.2.1</u> The images that are widely perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the communication objectives of the EU on its external action	Government officials, NGOs and media organizations clearly perceive that the EU provides appropriate and large scale support to the country. However, the EU poorly transmits messages on the benefits that achieved by CCCA due to the basket funding provided and the larger role of UNDP in steering the programme.
<p><u>Preliminary Finding:</u> Government officials, NGOs and some media organizations are aware of CCCA as a cooperative programme, managed in collaboration with other donors. Except for staff from the MoE and NGOs that are involved in the 2011 Trust Fund Call for Proposals, most people only are aware of CCCA in general terms and not detailed characteristics and scope. While the actions of CCCA are visibly discussed in the media and in development communications, the Cambodian media is not well developed to Western standards; and the specific coverage of the EU’s support is limited due to this being a multi-donor intervention. As well, climate change is not yet a central felt concern across a large proportion of the Cambodian public, and so expectations from the EU for large-scale climate change actions are limited.</p> <p>The situation is much better for the wider CSP and NIP programme, which is well established in people’s awareness, due to the long standing and significant support provided. The EU Delegation’s</p>	

communication strategy has conveyed the message of a multi-purpose cooperation policy that contributes to global development objectives, with a participatory and adaptive approach that is in accordance with national and regional needs. The EU is seen as credible and reliable partner in development cooperation, especially in relation to education, human rights, trade partnerships and environment.

EQ 2	“How well do the Visibility communication priorities (Key Communication Messages from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, i.e.: why, what, how) ⁶³ achieve their objectives? ”
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
<p>JC 2.1: The priorities (why, what, how) have been well perceived and understood by the stakeholders</p>	<p>The implementation of the visibility strategy provides EU-programme stakeholders with some information on the policy framework (why); on the specific initiative (what) and the opportunities that may arise from them (how). For example, the potential interested parties who might wish to apply for funding from the CCCA Trust Fund were effectively briefed by CCCA and EUD on what the opportunity involves, and have successfully applied for these resources.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 2.1.1</u> The stakeholders perceive well why the EU does have an external action</p> <p><u>Indicator 2.1.2</u> The stakeholders perceive well what defines EU as an actor on the world stage</p> <p><u>Indicator 2.1.3</u> The stakeholders perceive well how the EU deploys its instruments around the world</p>	<p>There is very limited conveyance of what really defines EU as an actor on the world stage; and poor transmission of the various methods used by the EU in terms of development instruments deployed around the world.</p> <p>There are very significant differences between the image of the EU internalised by EU-programme stakeholders; and the wider public outside the immediate circle of beneficiaries.</p>
<p>JC 2.2.: The formulation of the priorities would have to be changed in order to gain an increased impact</p>	<p>No, rather EUD is confronted with the different objectives of the EEAS (political issues) and those of the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DG-DEVCO) focused on the cooperation strategy, thus requiring harmonised and coherent communication priorities by both EU Headquarters and Delegations.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 2.2.1</u> The stakeholders express the need for another formulation about the external action of the EU in order to make it more visible</p>	<p>Stakeholders do not express a need for another formulation of external actions in order to make it more visible, as the problem relates to basic understandings about the EU’s structures and composition, rather than a failure of visibility communication in relation to the climate change, the CSP portfolio, or any other of the critical themes.</p>

⁶³ Section 2.2 of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s Draft Communication to the Commission: 2 Feb 2006, “The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the EU’s External Policy 2006-2009”

Preliminary Finding: EU Delegation has effectively adopted a comprehensive communication strategy that includes some corporate communications about the EU policies and statements on issues of national importance, as well as covering specific events and programmes related to its political, economic and development cooperation with the country.

More widely, EU actions on CC and Energy are now large components of EU external action, and the EU is broadly seen as doing its fair share. EU climate finance seems to be beginning to contribute to paying the EU’s historical carbon damage and debt. The EU is seen clearly as an active player but in the changing world with increasing relevance of BASIC countries, the EU’s historical background is somewhat of a hindrance. The EU’s traditional approach to climate financing and development cooperation is less attractive, given the other options on the table, such as – in Cambodia’s case – support without “baggage” on offer from China. Following the post-Copenhagen decline in the outcomes of the UNFCCC process, EU traditional relationships have been tested in supporting policy dialogue and helping ensure the clear sense that the EU is an effective partner of the South, but now some EU civil society voices opine that now Southern countries feel a weakening in support from Europe.

EQ 3	To what extent does the EC view itself as implementing a single, clearly defined Visibility strategy to achieve an agreed public image for its external action?
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
JC 3.1 – The external actions services have one common visibility strategy	CCCA gets no particular special treatment relative to the rest of the EU’s country portfolio, with no particular attempt to follow a CCCA-specific logical chain of actions. EU cooperation strategy comprises economic, social and environmental objectives with increased cross-sectoral programmes. Among Cambodian stakeholders, the EU is perceived as a single institution, without differentiation between sectoral DGs.
<p><u>Indicator 3.1.1</u> The number of communication / visibility strategies in the EC external action services and the variations between them</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.1.2</u> The existence of functioning and respected coordination mechanisms between the responsible services</p>	Within the EC, there has been some management confusion and difficulty in reaching decisions, which has led to some negligence of GCCA’s overall, and specific needs of countries with regard to visibility issues, and this in turn has led to weak guidance of GCCA’s Support Facility. We cannot therefore assert that the communication strategy at Brussels level (from EEAS & DEVCO) is as yet well defined and effectively transmitted to the EUD and on to CCCA. Until CCCA and more widely GCCA have developed their particular communication strategies for their actions, visibility has followed standard EU protocols, with no particular need so far to “sound-proof” strategies with communication professionals.
JC 3.2 – Variations between the existing strategies are explained with valid reasons and an effort has been	No obvious variations have been detected.

made to ensure overall coherence	
<p><u>Indicator 3.2.1</u> The existence of valid reasons to explain any differences detected between the strategies</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.2.2</u> The overall coherence of the existing strategies is explained either in the documents or verbally in a consistent way by the officials responsible for them</p>	N/A
JC 3.3 – The overall strategy or strategies outline a clear and logical path to achieve the visibility goals of EU external action	
<p><u>Indicator 3.3.1</u> The strategy or strategies are easy to follow, specify a clear goal and outline a logical chain of actions.</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.3.2</u> The logic of the chain of actions in the strategy(ies) is robust</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.3.3</u> The communication strategies are sound-proofed by communication professionals</p>	See below.
JC 3.4 – Variations between the existing strategies do not cause problems in creating the right visibility	N/A
<p><u>Indicator 3.4.1</u> Evidence of difficulties of achieving the visibility objectives</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.4.2</u> Evidence of difficulties being ascribed to confusion on objectives or differences of points of view between the responsible services</p>	N/A
<p><u>Preliminary Finding:</u> The coherence of the Cambodia EUD’s strategy for overall visibility is clear, but given the Cambodian context where climate change awareness is low, messages can become confused on specific issues. Still, it is relatively easy to understand the EUD’s Cambodia strategy; and the clarity of the goals is reasonable.</p> <p>It seems clear that the EUD is not able to be highly visible, as it is seen by only a certain part of government, but much less by wider government and stakeholders. The fact of UNDP leadership, the implementation difficulties suffered so far, and the preference of MS (such as DANIDA) for a low EU profile, limits the ability of CCCA to stand as a major example of EU support in the climate change arena. Until CCCA and more widely GCCA have developed their particular communication</p>	

strategies for their actions, visibility has followed standard EU protocols, with no particular felt need so far to “sound-proof” strategies with communication professionals.

Some observers have noted considerable lack of coordination and cases of poor communication between DEVCO and CLIMA in reaching decisions, such as the significant obstructions to quickly reaching a decision on the selection of countries for the 2011 GCCA country programme. Improving the ability of internal parties to reach convergent decisions is clearly a high priority. However, this is an issue of internal implementation effectiveness, and not so much of visibility strategy.

EQ 4	“How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?”
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
JC 4.1. The stakeholders are sufficiently exposed to a communication from the EU on Visibility of its external action that is organised to improve impact, retention, credibility and buying intention	All stakeholders, except the general public (and rural public in particular) are quite exposed to visibility actions organized by CCCA, MoE and the EUD. Communications direct from the EUD reaches the media and government officials.
<p><u>Indicator 4.1.1</u> The communication strategies are designed to improve impact, retention, credibility and “adherence/agreement” at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.1.2</u> The communication strategies are implemented to improve impact, retention, credibility and buying intention at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.1.3</u> The communication strategies are monitored and evaluated on impact, retention, credibility and buying intention at the level of targeted stakeholders</p>	<p>The communication strategy has been designed as to follow standard EU Delegation practices, as expected, and this has ensured a normal level of impact on stakeholders.</p> <p>The EU tends to spread information on its CSP programmes mainly through press releases. This limits the EU communication impact since the news culture in Cambodia is skewed towards TV and radio rather than newspapers.</p> <p>As a specific CCCA’s communication strategy has not been developed, no monitoring or evaluation of impact, retention and credibility can be expected to be underway.</p>
JC 4.2. The stakeholders perceive and value the differences between the benefits of the EU external action and the results or the features/instruments	Most stakeholders are aware only on general aspects of the EU’s development support to Cambodia, but are less knowledgeable on the specific characteristics and concrete impacts of CCCA. They are aware that the EU is a big donor with significant programmes in education and health arenas, but are not aware of specifics of how this support benefits their daily life.
<p><u>Indicator 4.2.1</u> The communication strategies are designed to improve the perception of benefits at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.2.2</u> The communication</p>	The main benefit so far of CCCA is the work underway in the policy dialogue arena. Evidence was collected from several sources of concern about many and frequent outside trips of CCD/NCCC staff, but structured transmission is limited of their knowledge and of the lessons they have learned from their foreign

<p>strategies are implemented to improve the perception of benefits at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.1.3</u> The communication strategies are monitored and evaluated on the perception of benefits of targeted stakeholders</p>	<p>affairs. The lack of clarity and poorly expressed impacts of socialization activities around CCCA’s programme of building negotiating capacities has meant that perceptions are limited of CCCA’s tangible results in this component. The complexity of the benefits and the difficulty of attributing the capacities under development to the CCCA’s work programme, makes it hard to detect an “EU external action signal” associated with a related rise in Cambodia’s negotiating capacities and any policy convergence with regional Asian or EU positions.</p>
<p>Preliminary Finding: As argued in the Desk Report, it is not EC visibility activities that alone generate stakeholders’ views of the EU’s external action; rather is more based on the results of the intervention. Benefits of CCCA are not yet highly tangible to stakeholders, due to the recent start up of the programme, the poor availability of CCD staff for high quality management, the inability to implement the coastal resource management component, and the initial concentration on awareness raising and building negotiation capacities. CCCA has largely been perceived as UNDP-led policy development and training programme, but whoever appear to be leading, CCCA does not yet appear as an “agent on the ground” providing specific practical benefits. Even so, the multi-stakeholder dialogue implemented by CCCA and CCD/NCCC has certainly stimulated debate on appropriate linkages and synergies between climate change, rural development, governance reform disaster management and sustainable management of natural resources.</p> <p>Joint Management and partnerships with international agencies such as the UN have reduced the opportunities for raising EU visibility, even though it may be efficient in management terms. However, a real need for high profile projection of the EU’s contribution to CCCA is not be shared, for example by the EU’s own MS who are involved as partners.</p>	

<p>EQ 5</p>	<p>To what extent is the EC’s visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?</p>
<p>Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators</p>	<p>Evidence identified from ...</p>
<p>JC5.1 – The EC, MS and Council have a established coordination mechanism to discuss visibility issues</p>	<p>Not relevant to this case.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 5.1.1</u> Evidence of such a coordination mechanism (minutes of meetings held at regular intervals, agenda items on existing Council working groups, etc) being used regularly.</p> <p><u>Indicator 5.1.2</u> Evidence that points agreed on coordination and complementarity of visibility work are then followed up by actions by</p>	<p>Within Cambodia, coordination to implement CCCA with EU-MS has been good; however, it has not been as good between EU, the MS involved and the UNDP. The EUD’s involvement in thematic/sectoral working groups in climate change and natural resource management favours donor coordination. Cooperation with MS is well developed at technical level and around specific issues and themes.</p>

each of the three parties	
JC5.2 – Council, EP and MS representatives are aware that their actions have an impact on the visibility of the EU as a whole	
<p><u>Indicator 5.2.1</u> Evidence of discussions on the need to coordinate with the Commission on visibility</p> <p><u>Indicator 5.2.2</u> Evidence that these discussions on the need to coordinate with the Commission on visibility are then followed up by action</p>	<p>There is some limited evidence of an example of uncoordinated action on visibility conveying contradictory messages. This relates to the Blue Book, which was an annual production that highlighted the Eu’s contributions in that year to Cambodian development. From the MS viewpoint, cancelling the Blue Book was a good idea, as they felt that this product projected a “go-it-alone” image of the EU; when, in a sensitive case such as CCCA basket-funding, a better outcome obtains when there is no high profile visibility objective for the EU.</p>
JC5.3 – EC representatives take regular steps to liaise with MS, Council and EP on visibility issues in EU external action	
<p><u>Indicator 5.3.1</u> Evidence of discussions on the need to coordinate with the Member States, Council and EP on visibility</p> <p><u>Indicator 5.3.2</u> Evidence that these discussions on the need to coordinate with the Member States, Council and EP on visibility are then followed up by action</p>	<p>In Cambodia, MS embassies and the EU Delegation see the EU acting approximately as a single entity, with little specific grasp of the various roles of the Council and Parliament, due to the fact that it is the European Commission that intermediates between these bodies and the MS in-country.</p> <p>Some inconsistency can be found with climate finance issues: with each member state wants its own flag waving and own way of communicating it, delivering, accounting etc. There is no common approach to see if commitments were made or not. The EC cannot do that much as they only have a small amount in comparison, such as via GCCA.</p>
JC5.4 – Outside observers in a particular context (eg. In a partner country) see the EU (eg. MS embassies and EU Delegation) acting as a single entity rather than as a group of discordant actors	<p>All interviews showed that Member States and EU policies and approaches are not perceived as very different by CCCA stakeholders. The prior presence of one of the MS influences the perception of the EU in this area, with DANIDA having been one of the largest donors in natural resource management and their coastal zones work.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 5.4.1</u> No evidence emerges from interviewees or reports of examples of uncoordinated action on visibility or of MS actions conveying contradictory messages to the Commission</p>	<p>Correct – no evidence emerged of uncoordinated action by EUD or MS towards the EC HQ.</p>
<p><u>Preliminary Finding:</u> A significant question is if the EEAS will bring a clear and detailed political strategy to bear in Cambodia, from which a coherent Visibility strategy can follow, rather than a broad strategic orientation. There is an expectation (amongst the EU family) that the EEAS may</p>	

bring greater strategy, coherence and “oversight”, but some skepticism too.

It seems obvious that the EU intends to promote and highlight the fact that it is the largest aid donor to third countries. Clearly considerable influence derives from this and it is a significant “promotional point”. The use made of this influence to generate appropriate global, regional and country policies is still lagging the EU’s real position as a global player, and as a robust partner to third countries. Many proposals such as GCCA and Europe2020 seek to reassert the EU’s benign influence within a very crowded world, as seen by the rise of China and other BASIC countries. The major task is to deploy instruments such as GCCA to really hit the mark. The agility and effectiveness of GCCA in stepping outside the old definitions of partnerships and associated traditional roles of donor-recipient thus remains a significant challenge. To some extent the repositioning of the EU’s aid portfolio with respect to that of the larger MS is important, as there is still a tendency for MS to want to communicate that it is they that are doing things, not so much the EU. This requires changes in the way MS view their external action, and whether or not is viewed as competing or not with the EU’s.

EQ 6	Are the EC’s messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
JC6.1 – EU policy in other areas do not contradict EU external action	Correct – no evidence emerged of any contradictions between EU policies and EUD facilitation in Cambodia of a range of EU external actions.
<p><u>Indicator 6.1.1</u> Evidence of incoherence between formal policies</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.1.2</u> Awareness among outside observers of incoherence in the EU’s policy</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.1.3</u> Evidence from officials working in one EC policy sector that they have taken steps to improve policy coherence between their area of policy and other areas</p>	Not relevant – see above.
JC6.2 – Existence of contradictory messages being conveyed by different policy sectors	No contradictory messages were noted as being conveyed by different policy sectors in the Cambodia case.
<p><u>Indicator 6.2.1</u> Evidence of contradictions between the visibility and communication strategies of different EC departments responsible for different policy sectors</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.2.2</u> Evidence that EC officials have taken steps to coordinate the messages to be conveyed on different policies so as to iron out possible contradictions</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.2.3</u> Awareness among outside observers of apparent contradictions (lack of coherence) between the messages conveyed by EU officials</p>	Not relevant.

<p><u>Indicator 6.2.4</u> Existence of press enquiries and requests for explanations about seeming contradictions in messages conveyed by EU</p>	
<p>Preliminary Finding: There are no particular cases of contradictions in messages conveyed by EU in press enquiries and requests for explanations. No specific were detected of significant negative perceptions of outsiders of incoherencies in the EU’s policy, actions and messages conveyed by EU officials. EU and CCCA’s policy and practical coherence is highest with Sweden.</p>	

<p>EQ 7</p>	<p>“How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora? “</p>
<p>Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators</p>	<p>Evidence identified from ...</p>
<p>JC 7.1 The Commission has displayed political leadership in the implementation of its overall communication strategy and visibility activities, both internally and towards Council, MS ,EP and International Organisations</p>	<p>The EC’s role, as transmitted through the EUD’s actions, as perceived by UNDP, is seen as adequate, even if differences have been acute in the recent past, with only the EC’s cumbersome M & E requirements standing as an ongoing concern. The UNDP, UNEP and EU relationship is not yet highly strategic at country level, with a clear problem solving approach.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 7.1.1</u> The degree of leadership (political and managerial) exercised internally to produce policy documents and take decisions (HQ and DEL)</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.1.2</u> The degree of leadership (political) related to key events with Council, MS and EP</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.1.3</u> Policy document with clear communication and visibility objective + implementation strategy produced with contribution of all external family DGs</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.1.4</u> Communication/visibility tools provide improved access to information on EU policies</p>	<p>A reasonable degree of leadership (political and managerial) has been exercised by the EUD to manage visibility issues. However, beyond the Visibility Manual, no particular communication & visibility tools have been provided to the EUD to improve this leadership, or to increase the access by Cambodian stakeholders to information on EU policies.</p>
<p>JC 7.2 The Commission has actively supported the further consolidation of the overall EU institutional architecture enabling a more coherent and effective communication and visibility</p>	<p>Ongoing reform of EU external services influences EUD communication and visibility strategies. Part of the EUD (political section) is working under EEAS, while the cooperation section responds to DG-DEVCO (managing EU programmes and funding). The EUD faces challenges dealing with priorities more oriented towards political issues, such as establishing clear policies on GoC NGO reform and human rights.</p>

<p><u>Indicator 7.2.1</u> To what extent is the EU Institutional architecture conducive to ensuring responsive and coherent decisions have a strong visibility impact</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.2.2</u> To what extent EC has expressly push for reforms having a visibility impact</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p>JC.7.3 The EU Delegation contributed to strengthen the image of the EC in the third countries and the knowledge on the EU policies and activities</p>	<p>The Cambodian wide public does not have a very clear basic perception of the EU’s values, institutional organization and policies. The added value of the European Commission’s initiatives is reasonably well understood by CCCA stakeholders, compared to other donors such as the UNDP or Member States, but its image does not excel compared to that of any other development partner taking part in supporting his programme.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 7.3.1</u> How the presence of Delegation in third countries is perceived by local stakeholders, including MSs and International organizations</p> <p><u>Indicators 7.3.2</u> To what extent the stakeholder in the country knows the EC policy and actions</p>	<p>The direct beneficiaries of the EUD’s support to CCCA clearly perceive that the EU is collaborating in a joint programme with Cambodia. The wider messages about the actions of the EU MS and the EU’s internal actions within Europe to tackle climate change are not projected within Cambodia. Beyond the GoC and MoE, it is not clear that GCCA is a climate financing tool that responds to UNFCCC and international obligations.</p>
<p>JC 7. 4 If and how the EU has been able to demonstrate its specific added value in relation to the Presidency and MS and to influence the international organizations/bodies while making it visible externally</p>	<p>Interviews with EU civil society organizations noted that partner countries and organisations find it difficult to see the EU as donor in its own right and start talking about MS. People often do not see the role of the EU in spending MS money and MS are happy to keep it that way.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 7.4.1</u> Constant key role of the EC in reaching EU common positions to be presented in the ECOSOC, selected Trust Funds, UN HR Council.</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.4.2</u> How the EC role is perceived by selected International Organisations (HQ and field)</p> <p><u>Indicators 7.4.3</u> How the role of the EC in international fora is perceived by governments of third parties and OECD countries</p>	<p>For GCCA more widely, policy documents do not yet exist with clear communication and visibility objectives and implementation strategies, produced with contributions of DEVCO and CLIMA.</p> <p>With the recent consolidation of the EU’s institutional architecture it can be expected that more coherent communication and visibility will become effective between DEVCO/CLIMA, the geographical Directorate, EEAS and the GCCA Support Facility.</p>
<p>Preliminary Finding: It is clearly the case that if CCCA succeeds, this contributes to GCCA’s success. The visibility that flows from this is a key consideration for the effort by the EC to appear as a responsible player on the world stage, applying its own specific, initiative in support of significant action to address developing country climate change concerns. CCCA’s programme will make a</p>	

contribution to that objective.

More widely, there is a big gap between understanding EU as whole and individual MS role in development. Partner countries and organisations often find it difficult to see the EU as donor in its own right and start talking about the contribution of organizations such as UN or the MS.

EQ 8	“How far are the resources mobilized by the EC adequate (human resources, budget) to carry out its visibility/communication strategy?”
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
JC 8.1 The Commission has sufficient levels of capacity (at HQ and in Delegations) to manage the various dimensions of communication/visibility actions (strategy programming, support to implementation, M and E)	It seems clear from the Cambodia case as an EU Delegation, that there are not clear rules on the volumes and mobilization of resources for visibility action. It seems that the capacity to allocate visibility and communication budgets and human resources differs from country to country.
<p><u>Indicator 8.1.1</u> Qualification and tasks of staff dealing with communication/visibility in dedicated Unit and at DEL</p> <p><u>Indicator 8.1.2</u> Number of staff in HQ and Delegation compared with similar organisations (UN Agency and/or MS)</p>	The qualifications and task managed are good for a small Delegation. The skills of staff dealing with communication/visibility at the EUD who are involved in creating messages is good. However, only one full time Communications Officer is working on visibility-related topics in the Delegation.
JC.8.2 Financial amount of communication visibility budget and % of dedicated budget from projects, programmes, budget support and dialogues	Not clear.
<p><u>Indicator 8.2.1</u> Financial amount for staff and management services at HQ</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.2.2</u> Financial amount for staff and management services at Delegation</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.2.3</u> % or amount dedicated to visibility in financed projects/programme to CSOs, UN Agencies, Foundations, and Universities.</p> <p><u>Indicator 8.2.4</u> Availability of budget lines specifically related to visibility or other means to M &E visibility</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.2.5</u> EC Resources used to check visibility compliance____for projects/programme</p> <p><u>Indicator 8.2.6</u> Resources used for policy dialogue and new delivery methods</p>	<p>The EUD communication strategy in Cambodia is built around the cooperation sectors of the CSP programmes, linked to specific projects.</p> <p>Allocation for visibility is available in the budget of each intervention. However, it would seem to be the case that the standard visibility strategy used so far correctly takes into consideration the available resources. Beyond the standard ROM, no EC resources are used to check visibility compliance for the CCCA programme.</p>

JC.8.3 The financial amount available for implement the communication visibility strategy is known by the Commission and the strategy is designed accordingly	
<p><u>Indicator 8.3.1</u> To what extent the strategy is designed taking in consideration the available resources (staff/budget)</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.3.2</u> Involvement and training of external DGS and DEL personnel on visibility /communication not working in Communication Units</p>	Not clear.
<p>Preliminary Finding: No interviewees expressed the view that the resources allocated by the EUD to visibility were inadequate. The media coverage achieved of CCCA-related event was reasonably effective in reaching target audiences and intended objectives, apart from the failure to get coverage of the 2010 GCCA Asia conference. The budget for visibility in programmes seems adequate.</p>	

EQ 9	“To what extent are the results in terms of stakeholder perceptions commensurate with the cost of conveying the messages both in financial and organisational terms? “
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
JC 9.1 Are the stakeholders perception in selected policy areas and the thematics linked to specific messages conveyed by EC?	The direct beneficiaries of the EUD’s support to CCCA clearly perceive that the EU is collaborating in a joint programme with Cambodia. The wider messages about the actions of the EU MS and the EU’s internal actions within Europe to tackle climate change, are not projected within Cambodia. Beyond the GoC and MoE, it is not clear that GCCA is a climate financing tool that responds to UNFCCC and international obligations.
<p><u>Indicator 9.1.1</u> Measured results from attitudinal surveys of samples of particular stakeholder groups comparing perceptions of the EU and other comparable actors on EU external action and more specifically in the 6 thematic areas designated in the TOR</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.1.2</u> Measured results perceptions of informed actors from among the designated stakeholder groups</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.1.3</u> Measured results from comparison of main messages conveyed by the EU in specific communication efforts with the messages then retained by the</p>	<p>These are not available for the country analysis largely focussed on here.</p> <p>Little structured monitoring of the use made of press releases has been noted.</p>

<p>media in covering the event or NGOs following the issue</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.1.4</u> If available from Eurobarometer or other comparable sources: Measured results from public opinion polls of attitudes towards EU and EU external action</p>	
<p>JC 9.2 Are the resources used in the selected policy area able to create specific message including strategy design and coordination</p>	<p>Not noted.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 9.2.1</u> Number and qualification of personnel and Units +DEL involved in creating the message</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.2.2</u> Kind of tools (Internet, newsletter, declarations, press release, events, etc..) used to convey message in the different sectors</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.2.3</u> Cost of tools employed</p>	<p>The tools used are largely traditional, in terms of press releases formatted for adoption wholesale by newspapers. Much more could be done to promote the image of the EU and detail given on the structure and policies of the EU, through the medium of radio, which is far more popular and easily reaches much larger audiences, quite cheaply.</p>
<p>JC 9.3 The resources available for visibility work are effectively deployed in a well organized manner</p>	<p>The resources have been adequate for visibility work and clearly are effectively deployed in a well organized manner, as specified in the Visibility Manual.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 9.3.1</u> Clear and logical organisational chart for the staff working on visibility available</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.3.2</u> Budgets for visibility work are clearly linked to the action plans</p>	
<p>Preliminary Finding: The results of EUD’s visibility actions, in terms of stakeholder perceptions do seem fully commensurate with the standard costs of conveying the messages.</p>	
<p>EQ 10</p>	<p>How effectively do EC external action staff from different services translate the visibility strategy they are expected to implement into action plans that are consistent amongst each other?</p>
<p>Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators</p>	<p>Evidence identified from ...</p>
<p>JC10.1 – Commission staff coordinate with their colleagues in other departments on their visibility work</p>	<p>This is covered in previous EQs. The recent structuring of DEVCO and EEAS makes this very hard to evaluate.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 10.1.1</u> Evidence of coordination mechanisms (eg. minutes of meetings, correspondence on coordination, etc)</p> <p><u>Indicator 10.1.2</u> Evidence of changes in draft visibility action plans of different</p>	<p>N/A</p>

services as a result of having coordinated with colleagues in other services	
JC10.2 – Commission staff formulate action plans that are clearly based on their visibility strategy	The EC staff rely on the GCCA’s Support Facility to formulate action plans based on an agreed visibility strategy, which is a work in progress.
<u>Indicator 10.2.1</u> The links between the action plans and the visibility strategy they are based on are clear and logical	Not yet available.
JC10.3 – The visibility action plans produce expected results	Not yet available.
<u>Indicator 10.3.1</u> Evidence of results official expect and linked back to their own action plans <u>Indicator 10.3.2</u> The logical chain of the action plans to the results is solid	Not yet available.
Preliminary Finding: For GCCA policy documents do not yet exist with clear communication and visibility objectives and implementation strategies, produced with contribution of DEVCO and CLIMA. With the recent consolidation of the EU’s institutional architecture it can be expected that more coherent communication and visibility will become effective between DEVCO/CLIMA, the geographical Directorate, EEAS and the GCCA Support Facility.	

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PERSONS, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED

DATE	PERIOD	TIME	ACTIVITY	CONTACT ADDRESS
28 th Aug	Morning	10:20	Arrive at Phnom Penh	
	Afternoon		Structuring work with national counterpart	
Mon 29	Morning	08:30-09:30	Briefing in the EU Delegation Mr. Koen EVERAERT, Natural Resources Management-Climate Change Advisor	koen.everaert@ec.europa.eu Tel:+855 (0) 23 216 996 H/P: +88 (0) 12 958 245
			Ms. Puon Pok, Communication Officer, EU Delegation	Pok.POUN@ec.europa.eu Tel:+855 (0) 23 216 996
		11:00-12:00	Mr. Kim Than YI, Field Program Director, CEDAC	kimthan@cedac.org.kh Tel:+855 (0) 23 880 916 H/P: +855 (0) 12 998 655
	Afternoon	14:00-15:00	Mr. Jerry CHEN, Senior Project Manager, Fauna & Flora International	jerry.chen@fauna-flora.org Tel: +855 (0) 23 220 534 H/P: +855 (0) 77 368 100
		15:30-16:30	Mr. Tieng Sopheak Vichea, Director of Department of Media Communication and CCI, Royal Phnom Penh University	director@dmc-cci.edu.kh Tel: 855 (0) 23 884 408 H/P: 855 (0) 12 989 272
Tues 30	Morning	08:30-09:30	Mr. Chea Chanthou, Deputy Director, Department of Climate Change	chanthouchea@yahoo.com Tel: + 855 (0) 23 218 370 H/P:+855 (0) 11 750 758
		10:00-11:00	Mr. Jacob K. JEPSEN, Counsellor, Royal Danish Embassy	jajeps@um.dk Tel: +855 (0) 23 987 629 H/P: +855 (0) 12 996 515
	Afternoon	14:00-17:45	Participated in the Cambodia Haman Development Report Launching Ceremony, by UNDP and MOE	pidor.chhay@undp.org Tel:+855 (0) 23 216 167 H/P: +855 (0) 12 218 905
Wed 31	Morning	08:30-09:30	Mr. Sarakmony TEAV, Editor, Raksmei Kampuchea Daily	sarakmony05@yahoo.com H/P: +855 (0) 12 813 366 +855 (0) 97 781 336 6
		10:00-11:30	Mr. Hok Kim Thuon, Agriculture Program, MAFF	Tel: 855 (0) 23 211 351 H/P: 855 (0) 97 964 7 878
	Afternoon	14:00-15:00	Atitya KHVAY, Deputy Director General, National Television of Cambodia, Ministry of Information	atitya_kh@yahoo.vom H/P:+855 (0) 16 944 052 +855 (0) 12 683 968
			Dr. Edwin V. Payuan, Country Program	edwin@recoftc.org Tel: +855 (0) 23 998 784

DATE	PERIOD	TIME	ACTIVITY	CONTACT ADDRESS
		15:30-16:30	Coordinator (Cambodia, Lao PRD)	H/P: +855 (0) 77 901 995
			Mr. Heng Da, CF Partnerships Coordinator, Cambodia Country Program	da@recoftc.org Tel:+855 (0) 23 998 784 H/P:+855 (0) 12 659 425
			Met with Ms. Hou Kalyan, Training Coordinator, Cambodia Country Program	kalyan@recoftc.org Tel:+855 (0) 23 988 784 H/P: +855 (0) 12 839 955
		16:30-18:00	Dr. Omaliss KEO, Deputy Director Department of Wildlife and Biodiversity, Forestry Administration	omaliss@gmail.com H/P: +855 (0) 12 755 558
Thurs 1	Morning	08:00-09:00	Mr. Pan Sopheap, Director of Farmer Nature Net	pansopheap@gmail.com Tel: +855 (0) 23 636 9 990 H/P:+855 (0) 12 803 972
			Mr Uon Sophal, President of FNN	Tel: +855 (0) 23 636 9 990
		09:30-10:30	Mr. Lao Bun Rithy, Regional Impact Monitoring Officer, GAA	gaa.rithy@hmail.com Tel: +855 (0) 23 223 120 H/P: +855 (0) 12 925 799
			Mr. Thun Soriya, National Program Coordinator of GAA	gaa.soriya@gmail.com Tel" +855 (0) 23 223 120 H/P:+855 (0)16 888 185
			Ms. Christina Warning, Regional Director of GAA	christina.warning@welthungerhilfe.de Tel" +855 (0) 23 223 120
		11:00-12:00	Dr. Tin Ponlock, MOE Senior Officer, CCCA	etap@online.com.kh Tel:+855 (0) 23 218 370
	Afternoon	14:00-15:00	Dr. Mak Solieng, Independent Consultant	H/P:+855 (0) 12 902 029
		15:00-16:30	Mr. Iwan Boskoro, ICS Program Director and Technical Advisor.	i.baskoro@geres.eu Tel: +855 (0) 23 986 891 H/P: 016 852 369
			Mr. Mathieu Van Rijn, Program Director Integrated Sustainable Biomass Supply	m.vanrijn@geres.eu Tel: +855 (0) 23 986 891 H/P: +855 (0) 17 852 368
	Fri 2	Morning	09:00-10:00	Mr. Karl Anders Larsson, Consular, Economist, SIDA
Ms. Dor Soma, Programme Officer, SIDA				Soma.Dor@sida.se Tel: 855 (0) 23 212259 H/P:+855 (0) 16 544 244
10:30-11:30			Ms. Sophie Baranes, UNDP Deputy Country Director	Sophie.Baranes@undp.org Tel:+ 855 (0) 23 216 167 H/P:+855 (0) 812 723
11:30-12:30			Mrs. Anne LEMAISTRE UNESCO Senior Officer	a.lemaistre@unesco.org Tel:+(855 (0) 23 72 50 71/723 054 +

DATE	PERIOD	TIME	ACTIVITY	CONTACT ADDRESS
	Afternoon	14:00-15:00	Mr. Kay Kimsong, Editor-in-Chief (Khmer Post) Phnom Penh Post	kimsong.kay@phnompenhpost.com Tel: +855(0) 23 214 311 H/P: +855 (0) 12 921 053
			Dr. Koy Ra, Programme Coordinator, CDRI	ra@cdri.org.kh Tel:+855 (0) 23 881 701 h/P: +855 (0) 12 873 432
		15-16:15	Mr. KIM Sour, Research Associate, CDRI	sour@cdri.org.kh Tel:+855 (0) 23 881 701 h/P: +855 (0) 88 800 196 9
		16:15-17:00	Mr. Valdemar Holmgren, Chief Technical Advisor, CCCA, MOE	valdemar.holmgren@undp.org Tel:+855 (0) 23 218 370 H/P: +855 (0) 89 826 440
			Mr. Cedric Jancloes, Media 4 Development Expert, CCCA, MOE	cedricjancloes@gmail.com Tel:+855 (0) 23 218 370 H/P: +855 (0) 12803 670
Sat 3	Morning		Work preparing for Debriefing	
Mon 5	Morning	11:00 - 12:00	Delegation Debriefing	
		Leave: 17:00	Malaysia Flight	

ANNEX 3: SAMPLE OF EUD PRESS RELEASES

PRESS RELEASE (31 May 2010)

GCCA regional conference for Asia

Representatives of the EU and of developing countries in Asia have agreed to work together to mobilise international support for stronger action on climate change. Asia's regional conference of the Global Climate Change Alliance brought together representatives of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Maldives, Myanmar and Nepal as well as of the EU.

As smaller countries we usually, for the sake of a united position, accept what the larger developing countries suggest. But that may not be conducive to our national interests. Now the time has come for us to speak up loud. If we don't unite and make ourselves heard, the outcome might leave us as the worst victims of climate change.

Honourable Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh

I read in the press that the interest for climate change has dropped in many developed countries. That is a pity, as we have not yet solved the problem. And people expect it of us. Ask the women out in a Bangladeshi village, those who constantly need to seek shelter from cyclones. Ask the Bangladeshi farmer whose crops were washed away by floods. Ask anyone who sees the change and faces the consequences. We owe it to them to find a solution.

Honourable Ms. Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action

The regional conference (30-31 May in Dhaka, Bangladesh) took stock of the various challenges that climate change poses in Asia, looking at the vulnerable countries' specific problems and at what strategies and actions they have adopted in response. They considered in detail the existing financial mechanisms for support such strategies and actions, as well as the prospects for reaching an effective global agreement to bring climate change under control.

In addition the representatives of Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Maldives and the EU signed a Joint Declaration on 31st May to help the Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States in Asia adapt to climate change. The agreement foresees that the EU will provide financial support for national climate change strategies focusing on prevention, mitigation and preparedness.

Background:

The Global Climate Change Alliance is an initiative which was launched in 2007 by the European Commission. It intends to deepen dialogue and cooperation on climate change between the European Union and developing countries which are most vulnerable to climate change, in particular Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States. Such countries are hardest hit by the adverse effects of climate change as they have the least capacity to react and adapt to those climate impacts.

The GCCA aims mainly to deepen the policy dialogue between the European Union and developing countries on climate change, and to step up support to countries to implement priority adaptation and mitigation measures. The results of the dialogue and exchange feed into the discussions on the post-2012 climate agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. GCCA dialogues have already resulted in Joint Declarations between the European Union and regional groups such as Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Beyond the policy dialogue, the GCCA provides technical and financial support to targeted developing countries to help meet the new challenges that climate change poses to them. For the period 2008-10, the European Union is making available €100 million to the GCCA from the EU budget and bilateral contributions from Sweden and the Czech Republic, plus €40 million as part of the 10th European Development Fund to promote regional approaches in Africa, the Caribbean and

the Pacific. By the end of 2010, it is expected that GCCA-supported activities will be implemented in around 20 most vulnerable countries. Examples of actions which we expect the GCCA to support include:

- **Bangladesh:** Support to the implementation of Bangladesh's Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan aimed at building a climate resilient economy and society in Bangladesh through adaptation and mitigation to climate change (€8.5 million);
- **Cambodia:** Support the "Cambodia Climate Change Alliance" initiative to strengthen institutions and improve disaster risk management (€2.2 million);
- **Maldives:** Institutional support to the Government plus pilot projects in particular in waste management in different atolls and islands (€3.8 million);
- **Rwanda:** Support to sustainable management of natural resources through land registration (€4.5 million);
- **Vanuatu:** Capacity development, improved farming practices, scaling up successful water management practices and hazard risk mapping (€3.2 million).

Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Environment

Press Release

Integrated efforts crucial in helping Cambodia to respond to climate change

PHNOM PENH, 18 August 2010: The Royal Government of Cambodia and its development partners on Wednesday stressed on the need for integrated efforts under different climate change-related initiatives to ensure high efficiency in helping the country to respond to the impact of this global problem.

The message came during the inception workshop of the Cambodia Climate Change Alliance (CCCA) which was held today. The event marked the beginning of a new implementation phase of the CCCA following its launch on 25 February this year.

H.E. Dr. Mok Mareth, Senior Minister and Minister of Environment, Chairman of the National Climate Change Committee, opened the workshop by reiterating the high attention of the Royal Government of Cambodia is tackling impacts of climate change as a strategic priority for reducing poverty.

"We are undertaking this task at a time when climate change-related issues are becoming more and more serious, requiring the utmost attention in our national development agenda," the minister said in the occasion of opening session.

"Because climate change is a cross-sectoral issue directly concerning ministries and institutions that are charged with tasks of national development, the Royal Government of Cambodia has recognised the need to streamline climate change issues into the national policy and the socio-economic development plan at national and sub-national levels, as well as into other relevant sectors," he added.

Cambodia, where some 80 percent of the population live in the countryside and depend on agriculture for livelihoods, is deemed vulnerable to impacts of climate change events such as drought, erratic patterns of rain falls, and flooding. However, along with these challenges there are also opportunities for funding to least developed countries like Cambodia. But Cambodia needs to prepare and strengthen its institutional capacity to make use of those opportunities for sustainable socio-economic development.

The CCCA, a multi-donor funded initiative, was created for this objective. The CCCA will strengthen the key institutions – including the National Committee on Climate Change, the Climate Change Department, and key climate change functional units within sectors at national and sub-national

levels. The aim is to support the integration of climate change considerations into policy and planning processes to build a national adaptation system.

The CCCA initiative is supported by the Climate Change Trust Fund of US\$8.9 million – which covers the period 2010-2012 – from the European Union, UNDP, SIDA, and DANIDA, the representatives of which also attended the workshop on Wednesday.

For climate change impacts are too big for any single project, ministry or development partner to act alone, it is crucial to consolidate and harmonise different initiatives through the promotion of a National Programme for climate change, Rafael Dochao-Moreno, Chargé d’Affaires, European Union Delegation to Cambodia, said in his speech on behalf of all the CCCA donors.

“The CCCA is NOT a programme of the Ministry of Environment; it is a programme of the National Climate Change Committee and as such requires commitment and engagement from all ministries,” he said.

“We propose that a consolidated effort be made by all involved in climate change to support the establishment of a National Programme for climate change – to be established by the Government, with the support of development partners and civil society organizations – to align climate change initiatives and donor support with national strategies and priorities,” he said.

“A programmatic approach can reduce transactions costs, strengthen national ownership and leadership, and enhance efficiency and effectiveness in order to promote greater impacts,” he added. Following the launching of CCCA early this year a programme team was assembled to draw up plans for the next phase of the programme implementation.

The aim of the workshop was to assist the team to understand and take ownership of the objectives and the expected results of the programme. It will also include, among other issues, review of the progress made during the inception phase, discussion of grant guidelines, discussion of capacity development approach and harmonisation and expected results of the work of the CCCA initiative first year, 2010-2011.

For further information, please contact:

MoE/CCD: Mr. Sum Thy, Tel: 023-218370, CCEAP@ONLINE.COM.KH

EU Delegation: Mrs. Pok Poun: 090 335 888, POK.POUN@EC.EUROPA.EU

UNDP: Aimee Brown: 012 760 513, AIMEE.BROWN@UNDP.ORG



EUROPEAN UNION
DELEGATION TO CAMBODIA

PRESS RELEASE

EU MARKS WORLD DISASTER RISK REDUCTION DAY

Phnom Penh, 13 October 2010: To mark this year's World Disaster Risk Reduction Day on 13 October 2010, the European Union is supporting the organization of several events under the theme "Making Resilient Cities – My City is Getting Ready". The events aim to enhance community awareness about disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, and especially to integrate them into Cambodia's development agenda.

"Disaster preparedness saves lives" stated Michelle Labeeu, the Chargé d' Affaires a.i. of the European Union Delegation to Cambodia. "The European Union significantly contributes to global disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation efforts by supporting communities to better prepare themselves against natural disasters."

To enhance Disaster Risk Reduction measures in Cambodia, the European Union has this year signed contracts for projects worth over €2 million. The funding is being made available through the European Commission's 7th Action Plan for Disaster Preparedness, launched in February 2010 with €10 million available for South East Asia.


In addition, the European Union Delegation in partnership with two EU Member States (Sweden and Denmark) has supported the establishment of the Cambodia Climate Change Alliance (CCCA) which will valorise Disaster Risk Reduction good practices for climate change adaptation measures and provided some € 4 million to Cambodia.

As another commitment to the Disaster Risk Reduction agenda, the European Union's €2 million relief assistance provided to populations affected by the devastating 2009 Typhoon season included disaster preparedness activities.

Background: To support the Cambodian effort in reducing the natural disaster, the EU through its Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) has since 1998 contributed some €10 million to ten international partners and local NGOs to run 33 disaster preparedness projects. With the new funding signed in early this year will go to support the new projects implemented in nine provinces that will contribute to the capacity building of Disaster Management Committees and the Cambodian Red Cross at all levels. At the same time, the projects will focus on public information campaigns, continued testing of local early warning systems for drought and floods, integration of disaster risk reduction into the health, education and agricultural sectors, as well as into local planning. During this cycle, partners will join efforts for improved standardised approaches and training systems, coordination mechanisms at provincial level and impact assessment of previous work.

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EUROPEAN UNION

DELEGATION TO CAMBODIA

PRESS RELEASE

MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TO VISIT CAMBODIA

Phnom Penh, 12 March 2010 – The Delegation of the European Parliament for relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will visit Cambodia from 18 to 20 March 2010. The Delegation will include nine Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). They will meet with high-level representatives of the Royal Government of Cambodia and the Parliament, as well as with representatives of civil society and the private sector.


Through the visit, the Parliament Delegation aims to update its knowledge of recent political and economic developments in Cambodia. Specific themes of interest include the impact of the international financial and economic crisis and the bilateral trade issue; the state of affairs in human rights; the EU cooperation programme in Cambodia; and the commercial relations between the EU and Cambodia.

The delegation will be led by Chairman Dr Werner LANGEN. The other MEPs participating are Mr Ivo BELET (2nd Vice-Chair) Ms Christina GUTIÉRREZ-CORTINES, Ms Barbara WEILER, Mr Norbert NEUSER, Mr Csaba ÖRY, Mr Liem HOANG NGOC, Mr Francesco Enrico SPERONI, and Mr Adam BIELAN. The Members of the European Parliament represent respectively the Group of the European People's Party - Christian Democrats; the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament; the Greens/ European Free Alliance; the European Conservatives and Reformists Group; and the Europe of freedom and democracy Group. The CVs of all participating MEPs can be found at [HTTP://WWW.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/ACTIVITIES/DELEGATIONS/MEMBERSDEL.DO?LANGUAGE=EN&BODY=DASE](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/delegations/membersdel.do?language=en&body=dase)

During their three-day visit, the Delegation will have meetings with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation HE Mr HOR Namhong; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior HE Mr SAR Kheng; and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister in charge of the Council of Ministers HE Mr SOK An. The Delegation will further meet with the President of the Cambodian Senate Samdech CHEA Sim, the President of the National Assembly Samdech HENG Samrin, and members of the Cambodian Parliament. Other interlocutors include the political leaders of CPP, SRP, HRP, FUNCINPEC, and NP; and members of the international community.

The **European Parliament**, voice of the European Union's people, is elected every five years by the people of Europe. The main job of Parliament is to pass European laws on the basis of proposals presented by the European Commission. Parliament shares this responsibility with the Council of the European Union. Parliament and Council also share joint authority for approving the EU's €115 billion annual budget. [HTTP://WWW.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU](http://www.europarl.europa.eu)

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EUROPEAN UNION

DELEGATION TO CAMBODIA

PRESS RELEASE

EU ADDS €7 MLN TO KETSANA RELIEF FOR CAMBODIA, LAOS, VNM


Phnom Penh 21 January 2010: The European Commission is providing a further €7 million in humanitarian aid to help victims of Typhoons Ketsana and Mirinae in South East Asia. The new funds are for humanitarian assistance projects to assist the most affected populations in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. This support comes in addition to the €2 million in 'fast-track' funding that was provided by the Commission within 48 hours of Typhoon Ketsana hitting the central Vietnamese coast and subsequently Laos and Cambodia on 29 September 2009. For Cambodia the new funds are being allocated to humanitarian projects worth some €1.26 million, which will provide food, water, sanitation and education material to the most vulnerable victims of the typhoon in the provinces of Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Kratie, Siem Reap, Stung Teung and Ratanakiri. The projects will also support the rehabilitation of agricultural activities so that the affected communities can restore their livelihoods. The main implementing partners include the French Red Cross, Save the Children Alliance, Oxfam GB and Concern.

"More humanitarian assistance was needed to help the people most affected by the typhoon in addition to the first rapid response. The European Union is committed to help the victims cope with the dire situation and restore their living conditions as fast as is possible" said Rafael Dochao Moreno, Chargé d' Affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to Cambodia.

Tropical storm Ketsana left 21 people dead, forced more than 5,000 households to flee, destroyed 2,000 homes and left 10,000 families in need of urgent humanitarian relief. More than 28,900 hectares of crops were affected, with damage to infrastructure and livelihoods.

The European Commission regularly provides emergency support to victims of weather-related disasters in the region through non-governmental relief organisations, specialised UN agencies and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent movement. Cambodia together with Vietnam already received in late October €1.24 million in fast-track humanitarian aid to victims of Typhoon Ketsana for food aid and fundamental emergency needs of the people in the affected countries.

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EUROPEAN UNION

DELEGATION TO CAMBODIA

PRESS RELEASE

EU: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DECENTRALISED CAMBODIA

Battambang, 24 March 2010 – The EU Delegation to Cambodia today met with its funded partners in a seminar to discuss how Civil Society Organizations could contribute to the decentralization process in Cambodia. Some one hundred partners from different sectors including representatives from the Ministry of Interior have shared their different perspectives on this topic. This is one of a series of seminars organized by the EU Delegation to Cambodia twice a year for its funded partners to learn from each other to contribute to the development of Cambodia.

The workshop has underlined that the decentralization is not only a question of electing Council members, but involves devolving adequate powers, financial means, effective bureaucracy, economic development and, importantly, the rule of law at sub-national levels. It is also about the accountability of sub-national government.

In her opening remarks, Ms. Michelle Labeen, the Head of Operations of the EU Delegation to Cambodia stressed the important links between EU development cooperation with the government and the role of the civil society in the long-term development goals of Cambodia, " The EU has also long partnered with the government to advance democratic governance reforms, of which sub national democratic development is key. We have also long appreciated that Cambodia's civil society is often a vibrant and effective development actor. This workshop provides us an important opportunity to jointly examine achievements and challenges." added Ms. Labeen.

During the discussion forums, the participants had a great opportunity to exchange experiences and explore different and innovative approaches to decentralization and the sub-national democratic development reform process in order to build upon good practices and the cooperation between civil society organization and local authorities at different levels.

Background – Following the Government's adoption of the strategic framework for Decentralisation and De-concentration, the passing of the Organic Law in 2008 and the current efforts to finalise a 10 year National Programme for Sub-National Democratic Development, the EU has supported these efforts for this important reform. EU support includes € 10 Million joint EC-UNDP Democratic Decentralisation Local Governance (DDLG) project which began in 2005. Additionally, EU currently funds 12 ongoing projects with a total amount of € 5.25 million in different fields of work, through local calls for proposals under the Non-State Actors and Local Authorities which is one of the European Union's assistance programmes with the aim of strengthening the capacity of civil society organisations and local authorities to contribute to a more equitable, open and democratic society.

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PRESS RELEASE

EU PROVIDES \$ 25 MILLION TO BOOST AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION

Phnom Penh, 25 February 2010 – The European Union has awarded € 17.9 million (\$25 million) to five new projects designed to bridge the gap between emergency aid and medium to long-term development in Cambodia, the objective is to boost agricultural production and have a quick and lasting impact on food security. The “EU Food Facility” is supporting a range of projects whose objectives are to lessen the effect of volatile food prices on the rural poor. "I count on your continued commitment to make the EU Food Facility a success for all, not the least for the poor farmers and poor food insecure families in this country whose lives should improve due to our joint efforts," Mr. Rafael Dochao Moreno, Chargé d' Affaires a.i. of the EU Delegation to Cambodia said to the development actors.

In September 2009, the first of these five projects had been launched: €11 million (about \$15.4 million) had been provided by the European Union to assist the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in boosting agricultural production and supporting social safety measures to protect the most vulnerable with the technical support of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Mr. Ajay Markanday, Resident Representative of FAO to Cambodia, at the EU Food Facility Kick-Off meeting highlighted the need for coordination of the efforts of the various partners in development and for strong leadership by government. He said the FAO project supported by the EU Food Facility works in the nine provinces in order to help 50 000 farm families to increase their livelihood opportunities and to improve both food security and nutrition intake. “In an uncertain world, the global challenges of high and increasing food prices, combined with the effects of the economic crisis, a well coordinated and consistent approach is needed to find sustainable solutions for food security challenges in Cambodia. This requires not only investment to increase agriculture production but also ensuring that vulnerable populations have the means to access food,” added Mr. Markanday. Today is the launching of a second package of € 6.9 million (about \$ 10 million) awarded to three NGOs (Gret, ZOA, Helen Keller International) and a national development agency (GTZ):

- **Gret** will use the funds to improve the economic and nutritional situation of 15 000 family-scale farms and to increase the resilience of farming families to distress situations through safety net mechanisms (rice banks, health insurance) in ten provinces including Battambang, Kampot, Kampong Cham, Kampong Speu, Prey Veng, Siem Reap, Svay Rieng, Takeo, Kandal, Kampong Thom (EU contribution is over €1.9 million for one and a half year).
- **ZOA** will work to improve the access to irrigation and agricultural inputs of 3 500 families; in addition 10 rice seed stores will be built and 500 semi-urban land poor families will be encouraged to develop income-generation activities in Oddar Meanchey province (€ 1.25 million for one and a half year).
- **Helen Keller International** received a grant for improving food security and livelihoods of 6 000 vulnerable farming households in Prey Veng and Pursat provinces (more than € 1.7 million for nearly two years).
- **GTZ** will work to improve food security and access to essential services for poor households in rural areas of Cambodia by developing more efficient mechanisms for targeting poor households, in order to support the rapid implementation of poverty alleviation measures and the delivery of specific services and assistance (EU support of € 2 million for two years).



EUROPEAN UNION

DELEGATION TO CAMBODIA

PRESS RELEASE

EU FURTHER OPENS MARKET FOR CAMBODIA'S EXPORTS

Phnom Penh, 19 November 2010 – The European Commission yesterday adopted a regulation that will make it easier for Cambodian businesses to export their goods to the EU. Because of Cambodia's status as a Least-Developed Country, 75% of all its exports to the EU now already enter the European market without paying any import duties. The new regulation lowers the requirements on what the EU considers a Cambodian product, making more products eligible for preferential treatment. The new rules will apply from 1 January 2011.

The regulation revises the so-called 'rules of origin' for products imported under the EU's 'Everything but Arms' preferential trading scheme, of which Cambodia is a beneficiary. Rules of origin are used to determine whether imported goods really originate in countries covered by the EU's preferential trade arrangements. The current rules of origin have been criticised for being too complex, too stringent and out-of-date.

The Regulation considerably simplifies the rules of origin system, making it easier to understand and to comply with. For example, where in the current system certain types of garments need to be produced in Cambodia from yarn in order to qualify as Cambodian, the new rules allow production to start on step later in the value chain, i.e. from fabric. For other products, the currently applicable value-added criterion is lowered from 50% to 30%.

The regulation also puts forward a new procedure for demonstrating proof of origin, which places more responsibility on the operators. From 2017, the current system of certification of origin carried out by the third country authorities will be replaced by statements of origin made out directly by exporters registered via an electronic system.

'I believe our relaxation of the rules of origin is a very clear expression of the EU's commitment to open international trade and our belief in trade as a force for development,' said Ms. Michelle Labeuu, Chargé d' Affaires a.i. of the EU Delegation to Cambodia. "This should stimulate investment by encouraging further growth of the garment and shoes sectors that are so important in Cambodia's economy, as well as stimulate the much-needed diversification of Cambodia's economy," added Ms. Labeuu.


For further information please contact Mrs Pok POUN (023-216996, POK.POUN@EC.EUROPA.EU)

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[HTTP://EUROPA.EU/RAPID/PRESSRELEASES/ACTION.DO?REFERENCE=MEMO/10/588&FORMAT=HTML&AGED=0&LANGUAGE=EN&GUILANGUAGE=EN](http://EUROPA.EU/RAPID/PRESSRELEASES/ACTION.DO?REFERENCE=MEMO/10/588&FORMAT=HTML&AGED=0&LANGUAGE=EN&GUILANGUAGE=EN)

The regulation can be consulted here:

[HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/TAXATION_CUSTOMS/RESOURCES/DOCUMENTS/TAXATION/COM_2010_7868_EN.PDF](http://EC.EUROPA.EU/TAXATION_CUSTOMS/RESOURCES/DOCUMENTS/TAXATION/COM_2010_7868_EN.PDF)



EUROPEAN UNION

DELEGATION TO CAMBODIA

PRESS RELEASE

EU LAUNCHES COOPERATION REPORT WITH STUDENT DEBATE

Phnom Penh, 28 July 2010 – The Chargé d' Affaires a.i. of the European Union's Delegation to Cambodia, together with the Ambassadors and other representatives of EU Member States, will tomorrow lead a student debate on EU cooperation in Cambodia. The debate will touch on such questions as *'Is EU aid the solution to Cambodian poverty?'*, and *'What contributions can Cambodian youth make to eradicating poverty in Cambodia?'*

The debate will take place at the Royal University of Law and Economics (RULE) on 29 **July** 2010 **from 09:00 am**. The EU representatives will join representatives from the government, senators, members of the civil society and some 100 RULE students (***Journalists are invited***).

The debate marks the launch of the sixth edition of the EU 'Blue Book', the annual report detailing the EU's development cooperation activities in Cambodia. This year's report focuses on two highly important cooperation sectors: Human Rights and Good Governance on the one hand, and Climate Change on the other.

"Democratic governance and respect for human rights are an essential basis for political and economic stability. As the biggest donor in Cambodia, we want to explain how the EU cooperation can contribute to the sustainability of Cambodia's development," said Mr. Rafael Dochao Moreno, Chargé d' Affaires a.i. of the EU Delegation to Cambodia. "Climate change poses a real threat to countries around the world, especially least developed countries like Cambodia. This year's Blue Book sets out how the EU, one of the world leaders in combating climate change, is already doing now to help Cambodia in this area," added Mr. Dochao.

The EU Blue Book provides comprehensive information on EU support for all important sectors including agriculture and rural development; culture; education; environment; gender; health; infrastructure; public financial management and budget support; tourism; as well as trade and private sector development. The EU 'Blue Book' is part of the EU commitment to transparency, while helping to create awareness of the EU's comprehensive cooperation development programme. The sixth edition shows that the EU provided an estimated € 157 million (US\$ 212 million) of Official Development Assistance in 2009, making the combined EU the largest grant donor to Cambodia.

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