

***EVALUATION OF COMMISSION'S AID
DELIVERY THROUGH DEVELOPMENT
BANKS AND EIB***

Final Report

Volume IIa – Annexes 1 to 10

November 2008

Evaluation for the European Commission





Aide à la Décision
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This evaluation was commissioned by:

the Evaluation Unit common to:

EuropeAid Co-operation Office,
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The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission.

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
EuropeAid Co-operation Office

Evaluation

I:\1. Evaluations - ON-GOING\World Bank and regional development banks\2. TOR\TOR - development banks - 6 September 2006.doc

**Evaluation of EC aid delivery
through development banks and EIB**

TERMS OF REFERENCE

September 2006

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1. Mandate and objective

Systematic and timely evaluation of its expenditure programmes is a priority of the European Commission (EC), as a means of accounting for the management of the allocated funds and of promoting a lesson-learning culture throughout the organisation. It has for many years been the main tool the Commission uses to assess the extent to which EC interventions reach the set policy objectives and how the EC can improve performance of these interventions in the future.

On the basis of the multi-annual evaluation programme 2002-2006, as approved by External Relations Commissioners, the evaluation of the EC aid delivery through development banks and EIB was included in the 2006 work programme of the Evaluation Unit.

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

- to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EC and the wider public with an overall independent and accountable assessment of the Commission's past and current co-operation with partner countries implemented through the development banks and EIB;
- to identify key lessons from the Commission's past overall co-operation, and thus provide the Commission's policy-makers and managers with a valuable aid to evidence-based decision-making, and for planning, designing and implementing EU policies.

2. Background

Development is a global effort and donors can deliver aid much more effectively if they work together. The European Commission attributes significant importance to the good relations between the Commission, international development banks and EIB. Collaboration between EC and international financial institutions has developed considerably during the recent years. An important incentive, which gave to this co-operation even higher priority, was the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (signed in March 2005), based on five key principles: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability.

The **World Bank** and **European Investment Bank** are important partners in EC development efforts. Co-operation is also ongoing on regional level with several **regional development banks**.

EC closely co-operates with the development banks and EIB both on policy level as well as through direct financial contributions to various Trust Funds, Programmes and Projects. Such a co-operation is regulated by the agreements and memoranda of understanding signed between the EC and the respective financial institutions.

The most important EC partner among development banks is the World Bank. Trust Funds and Co-financing Framework Agreement signed between the European Commission and the World Bank Group's entities on 8 November 2001 and modified on 17 March 2003 made it possible to significantly increase EC co-operation with the World Bank in recent years. With increasing amounts spent through the World Bank, more and more attention is being paid to EC visibility. As stated in the EC-WB (additional) agreement on visibility, signed on 2nd June 2006, where the European Commission contributes more than 20% of a

Trust Fund, it will expect to have a significant role in the governance of the Trust Fund, including, where appropriate, co-chairing any steering committee for the Trust Fund.

The WB currently manages more than 700 Trust Funds of which more than 30 are being supported by the Community. Out of the overall EC contributions to WB activities, 1/3 in number and amount concerns specific projects in individual countries, whilst the remaining 2/3 concern public goods (health, environment, tropical agricultural research) and reconstruction post conflicts and post natural disasters (East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Tsunami). Of a total 2517,82 million USD paid in period 1997-2005 about 1/5 (463,5 million USD) was for reconstruction whilst more than half was for the following three global initiatives:

- Debt cancellation (HIPC)	827,22 million USD
- Fight with AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	511,59 million USD
- Agricultural research (CGIAR)	121,36 million USD

With respect to the Commission's effective working relations with the different IFIs (notably, the IMF/WB, the EBRD and several regional multilateral development banks), the existing situation is diverse for both institutional and practical reasons.

In operational terms, working relations with the World Bank prove rather complex because of the global character of the institution - both in terms of geographical coverage (worldwide) and the nature (project and policy related) of its interventions – and the absence of Community's representation in the governing bodies of the Bank.

These relations are nevertheless long-standing and intense, notably in support of the developing countries but also in most of our other partner countries in Central, East and South-East Europe and the Mediterranean region together with Asia and Latin America. This co-operation ranges from parallel financing initiatives and Trust funds to international donor co-ordination, notably in support of the Western Balkans, for which the World Bank and the Commission co-chair a Steering Group meeting at different levels.

The co-operation also includes concerted policy recommendations, notably for candidate countries in the context of the pre-accession preparation, and horizontal thematic issues (anti-corruption, environment, health, etc.). During the last years, the World Bank has sought to enhance its co-operation with the Commission. Consistent with this strategic choice, the Bank has ensured internal co-ordination of its relations with the Commission, has set up a representation office in Brussels, and has developed close contacts with Commission staff at all levels, including on the ground through its delegations.

However, the experience, so far, tends to demonstrate that the Commission's leverage could be maximized in the context of a network of well-devised and diversified relations with the main IFI's. It seems essential in this respect for the Commission to develop a proactive monitoring of the architecture of these relations, which requires not only bottom-up development of joint initiatives with the IFI's, but also top-down strategic thinking within the Commission.

3. Scope of the evaluation

The scope of the evaluation is the overall EC co-operation with development banks and EIB, since these institutions are becoming more and more important channel for delivery of EC external assistance.

The evaluation will focus on the EC co-operation with the World Bank (WB) Group and with three main regional development banks (Inter-American Development Bank, African development Bank, Asian Development Bank) with a similar mandate to that of WB. The evaluation will also cover the EC co-operation with European Investment Bank (EIB) and with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Other international financial institutions, funds and banks (even though they might be one way or another connected with the work of the European Community), will become subject of this evaluation only for the mapping of the (eventual) EC contributions, since their mandate and/or geographical focus is different from that of the above mentioned institutions. This relates mainly to the Caribbean Development Bank, Central American bank for Economic Integration, East African Development Bank, West African Development bank, Nordic Investment Bank, Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, Council of Europe Development Bank, The Black Sea Trade & Development Bank and few other institutions.

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess to what extent the Commission interventions through the development banks and EIB have been relevant, efficient and effective and visible and what is their impact on sustainable development of the partner countries.

The evaluation shall lead to a set of conclusions (based on objective, credible, reliable and valid findings) and related lessons and recommendations. It should come to a general overall judgement on the Commission's co-operation with development banks and EIB. This judgement should be based upon well-founded conclusions regarding the fundamental aspects of the Commission's approach. The final report should contain conclusions and recommendations expressed clearly enough to be translatable into operational terms by the Commission.

The evaluation should be **forward looking**, providing lessons and recommendations for the continued support to the partnership with development banks and EIB.

The consultants should assess the thematic, legal (regulations, agreements, etc.) and geographic aspect of the co-operation. The **time period to be covered** by the evaluation is **1999 – 2006**.

Thematic focus of the evaluation

The international development banks and EIB are becoming more and more important channel of aid delivery for EC external assistance. The European Commission would therefore like to have a comprehensive picture on the way international development banks and EIB manage programmes on its behalf and on the overall impacts of these activities. This implies also focusing on main reasons for channelling aid via development banks and EIB; on guiding criteria based on which those decisions are made; on implementation modalities used; on EC programming mechanisms (relevant to the given financial flows) and their coordination with those of development banks; and on the relation between programming and implementation.

Based on the purpose of the evaluation to identify relevant lessons and to produce recommendations for the current and future relations with the development banks and EIB, the evaluation will cover the following principal fields of interest of EC services:

- **Mapping all the EC financial flows** (commitments and disbursements) to regional development banks, the World Bank and EIB during 1999-2006; and it will come with **typology** of the respective payments; Mapping will focus on the RELEX family (Directorates-General RELEX, Development and AIDCO), but will take into consideration also payments from other Directorates General;
- Overall **results and impacts** of the EC aid delivery through development banks and EIB will be examined;
- **Efficiency** of EC interventions through the channel of development banks;
- Identifying what is the **added value** of EC cooperation with development banks and EIB and what are the main factors influencing the dramatic increase of EC contributions to development bank's Trust Funds and Programmes;
- **Visibility** of EC aid provided through development banks and EIB.

Legal aspects

The complete cooperation framework with the development banks and EIB should be taken into consideration encompassing the main agreements signed between EC and development banks and other official commitments.

Geographical scope

All regions where the EC cooperation with partner countries is implemented through the development banks or EIB are included in the scope of this evaluation with the exception of the regions and countries under the mandate of the DG Enlargement and with exception of all the OECD member countries

4. Methodology and Approach

It is to be noted that while the Evaluation Unit has been dealing with various types of evaluations, both regional and thematic, this will be the first time when a channel of assistance is going to be evaluated (represented by International Development Banks and EIB). This new subject therefore requires to carefully define the appropriate evaluation methods and tools and also to explore experience of other donors (for the reference to some relevant evaluation studies, please see Annex 1). The overall methodology guidance is available on the web page of the evaluation unit under the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/evaluation/methodology2/index_en.htm

The evaluation basic approach will consist of **5 phases** in the course of which **several methodological stages** will be developed (the phases with consultant's involvement are marked in grey).

<i>Five Main Phases of Development:</i>	<i>Methodological Stages¹:</i>
1. Preparation Phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reference group constitution ▪ ToR's drafting (Evaluation Unit)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Launch Note (consultants)
2. Desk Phase 3. Field Phase 4. Synthesis phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Structuring of the evaluation ▪ Data Collection², verification of hypotheses ▪ Analysis ▪ Judgements on findings
5. Feedback and Dissemination	Dissemination Seminar
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quality Grid ▪ Board summary ▪ Evinfo (summary for OECD and Commission databases) ▪ <i>Fiche contradictoire</i> (a statement of key recommendations followed by the Commission's response)

4.1. Preparation Phase

The evaluation manager, within the Evaluation Unit, identifies the Commission services to be invited to the Reference group, which will assure that the Commission expertise is fully utilised, that all the relevant information is provided and the EC points of view dully considered in the evaluation.

The Reference Group will act as the main professional interface between the Evaluation Team and the Commission Services. The Group's principal functions will be:

- to discuss and comment on the Terms of Reference drawn up by the Evaluation Unit;
- to validate the Evaluation Questions;
- to ensure that the consultants have access to and consult all information sources and documentation on activities undertaken;
- to discuss the launch note and inception note, and all subsequent reports produced by the consultants, as well as to give an opinion on the quality of the final report. Comments by individual members of the Reference Group will be compiled by the Evaluation Unit and subsequently transmitted to the consultants;

¹ These components are not entirely sequential.

² The study will draw on the contents of (i) all relevant documentation supplied by the Commission Services, and (ii) documentation from other sources which the evaluators find relevant and useful.

- to facilitate and assist in feedback of the findings and recommendations from the evaluation.

Proposed Reference Group meetings with the evaluation team are indicated below in a time schedule under the item 8 of this TOR.

The evaluation manager prepares the Terms of References for the evaluation and he/she sends it to contractor.

Then, the contractor will present a *Launch Note* which should contain: (i) the contractor's understanding of the Terms of Reference, (ii) the proposed composition of the core evaluation team with CVs and (iii) the proposed workplan and budget for evaluation. The Launch Note will be provided to the Reference Group for comments.

4.2. Desk phase

Inception report

Once the Launch note is approved by the Evaluation Unit, work will proceed to the Structuring Stage, which shall lead to the production of an Inception Report. The Inception report will be divided into two parts. The first part will be devoted exclusively to the results of the fact finding and will contain the complete overview (mapping) of the financial flows (commitments and disbursements). A note on the inventory will be prepared at the end of this first phase, subject for discussion and validation by the Evaluation Unit and by the Reference Group.

Based on the results of the mapping phase, the second part of the inception report will consist of the analysis of all relevant key documents, including the relevant policy, programming documents and agreements also taking into account key documentation produced by other donors and agencies. On the basis of the information collected the evaluation team will:

- (1) Reconstruct the intervention logic of EC aid to partner countries through development banks and EIB. Given the complex policy framework, it may be difficult to develop a proper impact diagram relevant for the evaluated period. However, it is important that the evaluation team **reviews the key objectives**. The result of this exercise should be presented in a structured way in a diagram(s) or similarly with an accompanying explanatory text.
- (2) Specify how the evaluation team would treat the themes presented in the chapter 3. Since the **methods and tools refer to a channel** (development banks) and not to a direct intervention of the European Commission, this could imply also the **identification of specific methods** to apply in this context
- (3) Present a preliminary set of **evaluation questions**.
- (4) Present the approach to ensure **quality assurance** throughout the different phases of the evaluation.
- (5) The detailed **work plan**, specifying the organisation and time schedule for the evaluation process.

Based on the above, the evaluation team will present the **Inception Report**. The evaluation will not continue before the proposed approach and methodology have been

approved by the Evaluation Unit, and the final Inception Report has been formally accepted.

Desk phase report

The Desk Phase and the Inception Phase partly overlap, but they have different purposes. The Desk Phase is part of the actual evaluation exercise and ensures that relevant information in HQ, which is accessible from the desk, is gathered and taken into account.

Upon approval of the Inception Report, the team of consultants will proceed to the final stage of the Desk Phase of the evaluation.

In this stage, consultants are asked to:

- (6) Present a set of **evaluation questions**; appropriate **judgement criteria** for each evaluation question; and relevant quantitative and qualitative **indicators** for each criteria (this in turn will determine the scope and methods of data collection).
- (7) **Present** suitable methods of **data and information collection** both for the Desk and the Field Phases - literature reviews, interviews both structured and unstructured, questionnaires, seminars and workshops, case studies, etc. - indicating any limitations and describing how the data should be cross-checked to validate the analysis. The consultants will also propose a list of activities/projects/programmes that could be retained for in depth analysis. Since **methods and tools refer to a channel** (development banks and EIB) and not to a direct intervention of the European Commission, this could imply also the **identification of specific methods** to apply in this context.
- (8) Appropriate **methods of analysis** of the information and data collected, indicating any limitations. The methods of analysis should also be **adapted to the specificity of the EC interventions through a channel** and to the policy framework which characterize the relation of the EC with the development banks and EIB.
- (9) On the basis of the identification of appropriate methods and the right mix of tools, the evaluation Team should **identify** institutions/countries chosen as **case studies to be visited during the field phase**. The choice of the countries/institutions for the case studies should cover as far as possible all the regions where the Commission interventions through development banks are carried out. The indicative number of countries to be visited should be five.
- (10) Present the basis to be used for making the **judgements**, which should be directly related to the Judgement Criteria but adaptable should the field findings require to do so.
- (11) The preliminary findings and the first hypotheses to be tested in the field based on the specific methods identified in the Inception report.

During the Desk phase, it may be necessary to undertake missions to World Bank or other development banks HQ – but this would be subject to formal approval by the evaluation unit and the Reference Group.

At the conclusion of this work, the evaluation team will present a **Desk Phase Report**³ setting out the results of this first phase of the evaluation including all the above listed tasks (the major part of the Inception report will be put as an annex of the desk phase report). The field missions shall not start before the proposed approach and methodology have been approved by the evaluation manager.

4.3. Field phase

Following acceptance of the Desk Phase Report, and following the identification of specific case studies in relevant countries, the Evaluation Team will proceed to undertake the field missions.

The fieldwork, the duration of which shall be cleared with the Evaluation Unit and with the Reference Group, shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the previous Reports and agreed with the Evaluation Unit and the Reference Group. If during the course of the field phase any significant deviations from the agreed methodology or schedule are perceived as being necessary, these should be explained to, and agreed by, the Evaluation Unit and the Reference Group.

At the conclusion of each of the field missions the team should give a detailed *on-the-spot de-briefing to the Delegation of the European Commission* to validate the data and information gathered.

At the conclusion of each field mission the team will proceed to prepare **Case study notes** (depending on the character of the evaluated intervention), for each of the case studies, for delivery to the Evaluation Unit no later than ten working days after returning from the field (see Annex 2 for an outline structure of the notes). These notes (which will appear in annex to the final report) should be written in the predominant working language of the Delegation in the country concerned.

4.4. Final report-writing phase

The evaluators will submit the *Draft Final Report*, using the structure set out in Annex 3, taking due account comments received during de-briefings and previous RG meetings. Apart from answering the evaluation questions, the final report should include a section synthesising the main overall conclusions of the evaluation.

If the evaluation manager considers the report of sufficient quality (on the basis of the grid in Annex 4), he will circulate it for comments to the Reference Group, which will convene to discuss it in the presence of the Evaluation Team.

On the basis of the comments expressed by the Reference Group (which includes the EC Delegation in Washington and the evaluation manager), the Team will make appropriate amendments and prepare the *Final Report*. The evaluators may either accept or reject the comments made by the Reference Group, the EC Delegation, EC services or relevant stakeholders, but in case of rejection they shall motivate and explain their reasons in writing.

³ See annex 3 for the draft outline structure of the report.

The final report must be of high quality (*the judgement will be done on the basis of the evaluation grid in Annex 4*). The final report should clearly account for the observations and evidences on which findings are made so as to support the reliability and validity of the evaluation. The report should reflect a rigorous, methodical and thoughtful approach. Conclusions and recommendations should be based on the findings. The findings, analysis, conclusions and recommendations should be thorough.

The recommendations should be concrete and realistic and presented in a logical structure following on their importance and level of details.

The Final Report shall be presented in a way that enables publication without any further editing. The Final Report shall be written in English

4.5. Dissemination and follow-up

After approval of the final report, the manager of the evaluation will proceed with the dissemination of the results (conclusions and recommendations) of the evaluation: (i) make a formal judgement on the evaluation using a standard quality assessment grid (see Annex 4); (ii) prepare an Evaluation Summary following the standard DAC format (EvInfo); (iii) prepare and circulate a three-column *Fiche Contradictoire* (FC). The FC is prepared by the Evaluation Unit in order to ensure feedback from the evaluation and an active response from the Commission services. All three documents will be published on the Web alongside with the Final Report.

5. Identification of the Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will be based on a set of key questions. These questions are intended to give a more precise and accessible form to the evaluation criteria and to articulate the key issues of concern to EC services, thus optimising the focus and utility of the evaluation.

Consultants will identify the evaluation questions on the basis of the field of interest specified under the scope of the evaluation in chapter 3. After initial discussions with the Evaluation Unit, the evaluation questions will be discussed with the Reference Group, which will validate an agreed set of Evaluation Questions. These evaluation questions will be annexed to the TOR.

The assessment will be based on five OECD-DAC key evaluation criteria: impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Other criteria to be considered are EC added value and "3Cs" (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence) aspects of the co-operation. The criteria will be given different weight according to the precise evaluation question.

6. Management and supervision of the evaluation

The responsibility for the management and monitoring of the evaluation will rest with the Relex Evaluation Unit at the EuropeAid Cooperation Office with the assistance of the Reference Group consisting of members of the Relex Family Services as well as other relevant Directorate Generals and concerned Delegations under the chairmanship of the Evaluation Unit.

7. Evaluation team

This evaluation is to be carried out by a team with advanced knowledge, and experience in at least the following fields:

- Strong professional experience in development evaluation. Ability to draw out lessons and implications for country and sector policies. Sound and proven experience in evaluation methods and techniques in external co-operation, including at the programme and policy level plus relevant field experience. Ability to assess and communicate best practices.
- State of the art knowledge of economic dimensions of international development, including access to specific expertise related to activities of development banks and EIB.
- Ability to understand and analyse links between overarching goal of poverty reduction and various development policies of the banks vis-à-vis the EC Development Policy.
- In-depth understanding of EC development policies and practices. Appropriate experience across the range of instruments, programmes and types of external co-operation, and access to knowledge of the main geographical regions covered by the European Commission's external co-operation.

The team should comprise a reasonable mix of consultants familiar with the different regions. The team must be prepared to work in English, and possess excellent drafting skills. Knowledge of French, Spanish and Portuguese in particular for the field phase, is required.

The team-leader shall have considerable experience of managing evaluations of a similar size and character. The team leader shall also be experienced in the international debates on development issues and be aware of the different approaches.

The Team composition should be agreed as indicated but may be subsequently adjusted if necessary in the light of the final Evaluation Questions once they have been validated by the Reference Group.

It is recommended that the team should include national consultants where possible for the case studies with in-depth knowledge of key areas.

In accordance with the rules of the framework contract a declaration of absence of conflict of interest should be signed by each consultant and annexed to the launch note.

8. Timing and budget

The evaluation will start in September 2006 with completion of the Final Report scheduled for September 2007. The following is the *indicative* schedule⁴:

<i>Evaluation Phases and Stages</i>	<i>Notes and Reports</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Meetings</i>	<i>Dates</i> <i>(to be specified)</i>
Terms of Reference		September 2006		
Starting Stage	Launch Note	Mid September		
Desk Phase		Starts in September 2006		
Structuring Stage	Inception Note	End of October	RG Meeting	
Desk Study	Desk Report	Mid-December	RG Meeting	
Field Phase		From February to March 2007 ⁵		
	Presentation	By mid April 2007	RG Meeting	
Final Report-Writing Phase		From May to June		
	Draft Final Report	By the end of May	RG Meeting	
	Final Report	June 2007		
Dissemination Seminar		September 2007		

The overall cost of the evaluation should not exceed 295 000 €. This amount includes a provision (reimbursable costs) for the organisation of an international feed-back seminar in Brussels (or where appropriate). The budget for the seminar (fees, per diems and travel) will be presented separately in the launch note.

The payment modalities shall be as follows: 30% at acceptance of the Final Inception Report; 50% at acceptance of Draft Final Report; 20% at acceptance of Final Report (final version). The invoices shall be sent to the Commission only after the Evaluation Unit confirms in writing the acceptance of the reports.

⁴ The dates mentioned in the above table may only be changed in view of optimising the evaluation performance, and with the agreement of all concerned.

⁵ Subject to agreement by the EC Delegations concerned

Annex 1 - Relevant Documentation (not exhaustive)

- Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation, report prepared for the European Commission by Charles Vellutini (team leader) and Laure Delcour, April 2005
- Overview of implementation by International Organisations, AIDCO study, May 2006
- Reports on the Joint IMF/World Bank Development Committee meeting + the respective positions/statements of the EC
- Minutes of the meetings between senior representatives of EC and Development Banks
- The World Bank Group 2005 Trust Funds Annual Report (year ended June 30, 2005)
- Trust Funds and Co-financing Framework Agreement between the EC and WB, signed on 8th November 2001 and renewed in 2003.
- The Multilateral Development Bank Common Performance Assessment System, 2005 report on <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/COMPAS/2005-COMPAS.pdf>
- Managing for development results in the multilateral development banks, Progress Report, February 2004 on <http://www.mfdr.org/documents/MDBProgressReportonMfDR.pdf>
- DIRECTIVE 2000/12/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, available for example on http://www.fese.be/statistics/european_directives/dir_2000_12.pdf
- Commission Directive 2004/69/EC of 27 April 2004 amending Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition of "multilateral development banks" (Text with EEA relevance)

The evaluation reports of bilateral as well as multilateral donor should also serve as a useful reference. For example the evaluation reports:

- Evaluation des donations de la France au Fonds africain de développement et a la Banque africaine de développement, 1999-2003
- Co-financing between the Netherlands and the World Bank, 1975-1991" and other sources.

Annex 2. Guidance on the country notes for the country case studies

Length: The country note should be maximum 20 pages (excluding annexes).

This evaluation is partly based on a number of country case studies. These case studies allow the evaluation team to gather information on the EC support (to the sector/theme of the evaluation) at the country level, which together with the desk phase findings should feed the global assessment reported in the synthesis report. This reporting is needed for transparency reasons, i.e. to clearly account for the basis of the evaluation, and also to be able to have a factual check with the concerned EC Delegations and other stakeholders.

This reporting should be seen as building blocks for the evaluation and as documents to be circulated with the Reference Group and the Delegations involved. In the end of the evaluation the country notes will be published as part of the overall evaluation exercise in annexes to the synthesis report (so editing is required). These notes should be prepared after the missions, they should respect the agreed structure and they should go further than the oral presentations conducted at the end of the missions. Furthermore, the evaluation questions are formulated to be answered on the global level using the sum of the information collected from the different case studies and the desk study, and should hence not be answered at the country case study level.

Indicative structure:

1. Introduction:
 - The purpose of the evaluation;
 - The purpose of the note;
 - The reasons for selecting this country as a case study country.
2. Data collection methods used (its limits and possible constraints)
3. Short description of the sector in the country
4. Findings on the sector (focused on facts and not going into analysis)
5. Conclusions at two levels: (1) covering the main issues on this sector in the context of the country and (2) covering the elements confirming or not confirming the desk phase hypothesis.

Annexes:

- The list of people interviewed;
- The list of documents consulted;
- The list of the projects and programmes specifically considered;
- All project assessment fiches;
- All questionnaires;
- Acronyms and abbreviation.

Annex 3. Outline Structure of the Final Evaluation Report

The final report should not be longer than approximately 50/60 pages. Additional information on overall context, programme or aspects of methodology and analysis should be confined to annexes.

The detailed report structure will be agreed during the evaluation process, taking into account the lessons learnt and the specificity of the present evaluation.

1. Executive summary (5 pages maximum)
2. Evaluation framework: brief background to the evaluation, the purpose of the evaluation, evaluation questions and evaluation methodology.
3. Context (including Commission objectives, overall relations between EC and development banks, considering respective agreements etc.)
4. Findings: they should be presented through answers to the evaluation questions. The analysis leading to findings must be clearly visible in the report.
5. Conclusions: they will be organised by clusters (not necessarily following the order of the evaluation questions). Each conclusion should both include a synthesis of the related findings and express a judgement on the aspect of the EC support considered. This part will also include an overall assessment on the EC aid delivery through development banks and EIB.
6. Recommendations: they should be clearly linked to the conclusions and prioritised, options should be presented)

All conclusions should be cross-referenced back to the appropriate findings, lessons or conclusions. Recommendations must be presented in a logical order with the overriding and fundamental recommendations first followed by the more detailed recommendations. The recommendations should also be ranked and presented in the order of importance.

Annexes should include:

- logical diagrams of EC strategies;
- judgement criteria forms;
- list of the projects and programmes specifically considered;
- project assessment fiches;
- list of people met;
- list of documentation;
- TOR;
- any other info (also in the form of tables) which contains factual basis used in the evaluation;
- etc.

Annex 4 - Quality assessment grid

Concerning these criteria, the evaluation report is:	Unacceptable	Poor	Good	Very good	Excellent
1. Meeting needs: Does the evaluation adequately address the information needs of the commissioning body and fit the terms of reference?					
2. Relevant scope: Is the rationale of the policy examined and its set of outputs, results and outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both intended and unexpected policy interactions and consequences?					
3. Defensible design: Is the evaluation design appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of findings, along with methodological limitations, is made accessible for answering the main evaluation questions?					
4. Reliable data: To what extent are the primary and secondary data selected adequate. Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use?					
5. Sound analysis: Is quantitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way?					
6. Credible findings: Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale?					
7. Validity of the conclusions: Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible results?					
8. Usefulness of the recommendations: Are recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel or shareholders' views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable?					
9. Clearly reported: Does the report clearly describe the policy being evaluated, including its context and purpose, together with the procedures and findings of the evaluation, so that information provided can easily be understood?					
Taking into account the contextual constraints on the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the report is considered.					

Annex 1b – Launch Note



Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB

Launch Note

October 2006

ADE s.a.
Rue de Clairvaux, 40
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
Belgium
Tel.: +32 10 45 45 10
Fax: +32 10 45 40 99
E-mail: ade@ade.be
Web: www.ade.be

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1. Introduction

The European Commission has made systematic and timely evaluation of its expenditure programme a priority. It has therefore drawn up a multi-annual evaluation programme for 2002-2006, which foresees for the year 2006 the launch of the evaluation of the Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB (hereafter called "Channels").

In September 2006, the Evaluation Unit of the RELEX family ("Evaluation Unit") has issued the Terms of Reference (ToRs) of this evaluation. The present launch note answers to these ToRs and is structured in three main parts:

- Our understanding of the ToRs
- The proposed approach for the evaluation, including the calendar
- The proposed team and budget.

It is important to underline that evaluating the delivery of the Commission aid through external channels is a new evaluative issue that is in many ways different from thematic evaluations that concern direct interventions of the Commission.

The present launch note highlights the main features of the proposed methodology, according to the understanding the team has at this stage of the task to be undertaken.

2. Understanding of the ToRs

2.1 Objectives and Purpose

The ToRs specify the following main objectives for the evaluation:

- to provide an overall **independent and accountable assessment** of the Commission's past and current co-operation with partner countries implemented through the development banks and EIB;
- to identify **key lessons** from the Commission's past overall co-operation, and thus provide the Commission policy-makers and managers with a valuable aid to evidence-based decision-making, and for planning, designing and implementing European Union policies.

These main objectives specify that the purpose of the evaluation is "to assess to what extent the Commission's interventions have been relevant, efficient, effective and visible and what their impact is on the sustainable development".

The ToRs specify as well that the evaluation should be forward looking, leading to a set of sound conclusions and related lessons and recommendations, translatable into operational terms by the Commission. The evaluation should also provide an overall judgement on the Commission's co-operation with development banks and EIB.

2.2 Scope

We define in this section our understanding of the elements under section "3. Scope of the evaluation" of the ToRs. They concern the thematic scope (institutions, funds, period and criteria), the legal aspects and the geographical scope.

These definitions are preliminary and may be refined after the validation of the Inventory by the Reference Group (RG) (see below).

2.2.1 Thematic Focus

Institutions

The ToRs specify that the evaluation will focus on the co-operation of the Commission with the World Bank Group and with three main Regional Development Banks with a mandate similar to that of the World Bank, namely the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), African Development Bank (AfDB), and Asian Development Bank (AsDB); they also mention that the Commission co-operation with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for an inventory part of the evaluation will be covered.

The ToRs also specify that co-operation with other international financial institutions, funds and banks also falls within this evaluation, but *only* for the inventory exercise on (potential) Commission contributions, and that this relates mainly to the Caribbean Development Bank, Central American Bank for Economic Integration, East African Development Bank, West African Development Bank, Nordic Investment Bank, Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, Council of Europe Development Bank, The Black Sea Trade & Development Bank and a few other institutions.

Funds

The ToRs specify that the inventory of channelled Commission's funds will cover all Commission's financial flows ("commitments and disbursements"¹) to the World Bank, Regional Development Banks and EIB and that the focus will be on the RELEX family (DG RELEX, DG Development, AIDCO), although disbursements by other Directorates-General will also be taken into consideration.

It is essential that the evaluation should be able to mirror the Commission's funds *committed* and *disbursed* with the funds *received* and *used* by the Channels.

Period

The ToRs state that the time period to be covered by the evaluation is **1999 – 2006**. The evaluation team understands by this that the evaluation will address the commitments and disbursements realised during the 1999-2006 period.

Criteria

As explained above, the ToRs specify that "the purpose of the evaluation is to assess to what extent Commission's interventions through the Channels have been relevant, efficient and effective and visible and what is their impact on sustainable development".

The assessment will therefore be based on five OECD-DAC key evaluation criteria: impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.

As requested in the ToRs, it will be based as well on the criteria of visibility and of added value.

Given the nature of this evaluation, the specific understanding of these criteria will be defined after the inventory, i.e. based on fuller knowledge of the channelled Commission's funds.

¹ The present evaluation is not intended to evaluate the instruments provided through the Channels (e.g. technical assistance, risk capital, interest subsidies).

The ToRs also specify that the Commission would like to have a comprehensive picture on the way the Channels manage programmes on its behalf and on the overall impact of these activities, which implies to focus also on the main reasons for channelling aid via the Channels, on guiding criteria based on which those decisions are made, on implementation modalities used, on EC programming mechanisms relevant to the given financial flows and their coordination with those of the Channels, and on the relation between programming and implementation.

Note: it is important to specify that the measurement of the impact and sustainability of the Channels' activities, as well as the efficiency of the use of the Commission's funds by the Channels, depends on the information to be provided by the Channels.

2.2.2 Legal Aspects

The complete co-operation framework with the Development Banks and EIB should be taken into consideration, encompassing the main agreements signed between the Commission and the Development Banks and other official commitments.

2.2.3 Geographical scope

The geographical scope includes all regions where the Commission's co-operation is implemented through the Channels. However, regions and countries within the mandate of DG Enlargement or OECD member countries do not fall within the intended scope.

2.3 Challenges & limits

The evaluation may face a number of methodological and logistical challenges that it is difficult to foresee, given the innovative approach required for evaluating aid delivered through external channels.

To that end a close cooperation and understanding with the Evaluation Unit and RG will be essential, and particularly on the following points:

1° Availability and accuracy of data and resources for data collection

- The availability and accuracy of data, both at the side of the Commission and within the Channels, will be key to this evaluation, in particular at the stage of the Inventory.
- It is critical to have sufficient resources for the Inventory stage, in terms of time, budget and personnel, as one of the main challenges of this evaluation is to acquire a full understanding of the channelled Commission's funds so as to be able to determine a specific methodological approach to its evaluation.

2° Support for data collection

- The evaluation team is dependent for its data collection and analysis work on the availability and quality of the data and information. Therefore, the support of the

Evaluation Unit will be essential to ensure that existing data is made available to the team at short notice and that key people with the best understanding of the required information can be met, again at short notice. This will be important within the different Commission Directorates-General and agencies, as well as within the Channels at their headquarters, liaison offices and delegations. It is key both for the Inventory stage as for the subsequent stages of the evaluation.

- It is particularly important to have access to detailed data and key people at the World Bank in respect of funds received by the Commission and their use by the World Bank, as the Bank appears to figure prominently in Commission's aid to development banks.
- The evaluation team considers that identification of key people and first contacts by the Evaluation Unit or possibly by a member of the Reference Group would be the most effective way of facilitating data collection.

3° *Calendar*

- In order to avoid delays, it is important that all the different parties involved with the evaluation make sure that the different milestones of the calendar are respected. As validation of notes/reports is requested at different stages, it is suggested that clear deadlines are set for the communication to the evaluation team of comments on reports produced.

4° *Budget*

- It should be noted that the budget for the evaluation as stated in the ToRs is tight, particularly given, first, the ambition of evaluating all Commission's aid delivered through the Channels, which requires a prior inventory of related financial flows, and, second, the complexity of the subject of the evaluation, which requires devotion of significant time to developing an innovative methodological approach. The approach as laid out in the present Launch Note has been determined in an attempt to comply with the budget specified in the ToRs.

5° *Analysis in the field (beneficiary level)*

- With a view to keep the budget as close as possible to the indication of budget in the ToRs, five field visits are proposed as indicated in the ToRs: one visit to the World Bank, and four visits to countries where the Channels have interventions involving Commission's aid which consist of 10 days on average, including travel. This means that the field visits will focus on strategic issues, while nevertheless devoting time to project visits.
- They should be conducted from the perspective of capturing what have been the benefits (or their absence) for the beneficiary of interventions of other institutions using Commission's funds. As few field visits will be possible, they should therefore be very careful to permit such analysis and to provide valuable example from where to draw lessons.

3. General approach

This section describes the method and approach proposed by the evaluation team for conducting the evaluation. It presents the various stages and intermediate steps required.

As a preliminary remark, as evaluating the delivery of the Commission aid through external channels is a new evaluative issue, it is in many ways different from thematic evaluations that concern direct interventions of the Commission. This might have important implications in terms of methodology, as also acknowledged by the ToRs and by the Evaluation Unit. Due to the more indirect impact, a combination of classical evaluation tools and new and innovative approaches, methods and tools are required.

Prior to structuring the evaluation, a first and essential stage will be to provide a mapping of the Commission's funds delivered through external channels. It will bring together a comprehensive and full picture of the funding provided by the Commission through the Channels. This will consist in an inventory and typology, of the Commission's financial flows delivered through the numerous UN agencies, funds, and programmes, their magnitude, the types of funds (grants, credits, guarantees...), the types of collaboration (ad hoc, project-based, systematic, programmatic...), the modalities of the agreements and payment methods, and the variety of interventions funded.

The inventory and typology will be used as solid foundation for the later stages of the evaluation. It is a prerequisite to fine-tune the methodological approach to the specificity and complexity of the present evaluation. It will moreover enable to determine the focus and scope for the later stages, in particular the desk study and the field missions.

This may require a more iterative approach than usual with questions of scope being addressed to the reference group as they emerge. The inventory will consequently be submitted for approval to the RG. Assistance of the RG will be indispensable for this exercise and it is proposed that it is conducted in close liaison with and validated by the Evaluation Unit and the RG. The inventory should also permit to agree on a selection of the banks on which the further stages of the evaluation will focus. On the basis of the approved inventory the team will then structure the evaluation and refine its methodology.

3.1 Kick-Off Meeting

It is suggested to have a kick-off meeting with the RG short after approval of the Launch Note by the Evaluation Unit, with the aim of presenting and explaining the Launch Note, clarifying the inventory approach, and providing insights into the specificities of this evaluation compared to evaluation of direct interventions, as well as identifying contact points for data collection at the start of the Inventory stage. It could also be appropriate for a first discussion on the methodological approach and the scope of the evaluation.

If it is not possible however to have the kick-off meeting with the RG short after approval of the Launch Note, the evaluation team proposes to have a briefing with the Evaluation Unit, and eventually key people regarding data collection, short after the approval of the Launch Note, in order to introduce the evaluation team and to identify key contacts and sources for starting the data collection. In that case, the evaluation team would still appreciate a kick-off meeting with the RG in the early stage of the work on the inventory.

3.2 Desk Phase

The desk phase will be divided in three stages. At the end of each stage the evaluation team will provide a report to be validated by the RG, prior to launching the work of the next stage. These stages are the following:

- an Inventory stage devoted to the mapping of the channelling of funds through development banks and the EIB;
- a Structuring stage, aimed at providing the methodological framework of the evaluation;
- a Desk study stage, aimed at collecting information on the basis of a document study.

3.2.1 Inventory stage

On approval of the Launch Note by the Evaluation Unit, and after the kick-off meeting with the Evaluation Unit and the RG, work will proceed to the Inventory stage, which shall lead to the production of an Inventory Note.

As described above, making an inventory and mapping of the channelled Commission's funds is key to serve as a basis for this evaluation.

It is therefore critical to have sufficient resources of time and budget. The evaluation team estimates that a period of three months will need to be devoted exclusively to the Inventory stage.

It is also essential to have sufficient access to the information needed to ensure the comprehensiveness of the inventory. It is indeed essential to gain a precise overview of the type and volume of Commission funds transferred through the Channels. Support of the RG and the Evaluation Unit in terms of access of information and availability and accuracy of data and people to be interviewed will be essential to enable the evaluation team to provide an accurate inventory of the financial data, in particular regarding the origins of the Commission's aid delivered to the Channels and their final destination, as well as to build a typology. A certain degree of reconciliation may thus be necessary between the records of the Commission and the recipient institution.

It should be noted, however, that the work we undertake is an evaluation and not a financial audit, and therefore we will rely primarily on datasets from the Commission. We will seek confirmation of these figures through deskwork or exchange of correspondence for some Channels, or at Channels' liaison offices where possible. Visits to Channel

headquarters are not considered at this stage due to budget constraints (with the exception of a visit to the EIB in Luxembourg).

A typology of the various financial instruments used to transfer funds to the institutions will be developed, in addition to the breakdown of the Commission's funds by Channel, a process which will be refined during the course of the Inventory stage.

Once clarity is gained regarding the details of the Commission's aid routed through the Channels, it will be decided on which Channel(s) the following evaluation steps should focus. It should be noted that, according to our current understanding, the EIB and EBRD are to be covered by this evaluation merely at the Inventory stage.

The main output of the Inventory stage will be the **Inventory Note**, which will present an overview of Commission's aid channelled through partner institutions. It will be submitted to the Evaluation Unit for distribution to and discussion with the RG and subsequent approval by the Evaluation Unit.

3.2.2 Structuring stage

On approval of the Inventory Note and according to its results, the evaluation team will detail and potentially refine the methodology of the evaluation. The Structuring stage is based on the analysis of relevant key documents.

The evaluation team will reconstruct the intervention logic of the Commission's aid channelled through the Channels and review the key objectives. This will be based on relevant key documents and on the inventory. As stated in the ToRs, it may be difficult to develop a proper impact diagram relevant to the evaluated period given the complex policy framework.

The evaluation team will propose a specific understanding for the evaluation criteria², given the context of this evaluation.

As described above, refinements may be made during the Structuring stage on the approach, methodology, definitions and so forth laid out in the present Launch Note, based on fuller knowledge of channelled Commission's aid gained through the inventory.

The evaluation team will also define a set of Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria for each Evaluation Question, and quantitative and qualitative Indicators for each criterion. The choice of Judgement Criteria and Indicators might further evolve in the next stages of the evaluation.

Methods of data and information collection for the Desk stage will be specified at this stage. In addition, a detailed work plan will be drawn up for the evaluation process.

Based on the above, the evaluation team will present the **Inception Report**.

² The comments received on the first version of the Launch Note in this respect will be covered here.

3.2.3 Desk study stage

On approval of the Inception Report, the team of consultants will proceed to the Desk Study stage, the final stage of the Desk Phase of the evaluation.

The Desk study stage aims at collecting relevant information accessible from the desk and at preparing the field phase.

The team will proceed with collecting data from available documents. If a visit to bank headquarters is deemed necessary during the Desk study stage, these would be subject to formal approval by the Evaluation Unit and the RG.

On the basis of the data and information collected, the evaluation team will formulate preliminary findings³ and identify the first hypotheses to be tested and the gaps that should be filled during the Field Phase in respect of validation and collection of information.

Subsequently, the evaluation team will identify and propose the institutions and countries chosen for the Field Phase (see details below), including the activities, projects and programmes to be studied.

The team will specify the methods to be used for data and information collection in the field as well as the methods of analysis of information and data collected, indicating possible limitations in this respect. In this stage, the evaluation team may also fine-tune the preliminary set of Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria and Indicators as determined in the Structuring stage.

A **Desk Phase Report** will set out the results of the Desk Study stage and firm up key elements of the Inception Report. As stated in the ToRs, the major part of the Inception Report will be placed as an annex to the Desk Phase report, which will be submitted to the Evaluation Unit for distribution and discussion with the RG and subsequent approval by the Evaluation Unit.

3.3 Field Phase

On approval of the Desk Phase Report, including the proposed case studies, the evaluation team will proceed to the Field Phase.

As stated in the ToRs, the fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the previous Reports and agreed with the Evaluation Unit and the RG. As the ToRs require budget specifications, it is however necessary to define a preliminary approach. It should be stressed that this preliminary approach could, in agreement with the Evaluation Unit, be refined or modified on the basis of the knowledge gained through the inventory stage and the desk study. This might imply adjustments in the expense categories of the budget (travel, per diems, expert fees...), to be agreed by the Evaluation Unit.

³ At this stage, it is suggested to focus on preliminary finding and not on, even provisory, answers to the question.

The proposed preliminary approach is based on requirements of the ToRs and consists in case studies realised through visits to a Channel and to countries within regions where the Commission intervenes through the Channels. Accordingly a total of five visits will be undertaken:

- one visit to the World Bank in Washington, which should provide insight and information at decisional and institutional level regarding the evaluation questions;
- four visits to countries where the Channels have interventions involving Commission's aid, consisting of ten days on average (including travel), which should provide insight and information at local and intervention level regarding the evaluation questions .

Each visit to a selected intervention country will conclude with a **debriefing presentation to the local Commission Delegation** to present the data and information gathered. It will be in PowerPoint format and be written in English. While the Delegation will not be required to validate the findings, the presentation will provide an opportunity for rectifying any factual errors that come to light.

At the end of the Field Phase, the evaluation team will present a comprehensive **debriefing presentation to the RG**, in PowerPoint format. This presentation and the individual country debriefing presentations will constitute the country case studies and be included in the final report. They will focus on findings gathered during the field visits.

3.4 Synthesis Phase

Following the debriefing presentation to the RG of the field work, the evaluation team will proceed to the Synthesis Phase.

The evaluation team will analyse all the information collected so far and synthesise it so as to answer the Evaluation Questions, provide main overall conclusions and recommendations, and reach an overall judgement on the Commission's aid routed through the Channels.

This will result in a **Draft Final Report**. Once the Evaluation Unit considers the report of sufficient quality, it will be circulated to the RG for comment. The Evaluation Unit will organise a meeting with the RG to discuss the Draft Final Report in the presence of the evaluation team.

On the basis of comments received from the Evaluation Unit and the RG, the evaluation team will make any final amendments needed and submit the **Final Report** to the Evaluation Unit. If the evaluation team is not in line with the comments made by the Evaluation Unit or the RG, they will explain their reasons in writing.

3.5 Dissemination Phase

On approval of the Final Report, the evaluation team will participate in an international feedback seminar organised by the Commission, to be held in Brussels. The evaluation team will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Commission's Services and the main stakeholders.

The budget for the participation of two experts of the evaluation team in the seminar (fees, per diems and travel) is presented below. It should be noted it is included in the overall budget.

Note: Although the TOR state that the dissemination seminar might be held in Brussels "or elsewhere", the present launch note and budget is based on a seminar organised in Brussels. A seminar organised in another country would indeed have a substantial impact on the cost for this evaluation (additional time, travel and per diems).

3.6 Quality control

ADE will apply strict quality control to the present evaluation, as follows:

- ADE will ensure that the evaluation is properly directed by a team leader who is a permanent senior staff member of the company. The core team includes other permanent staff members of ADE as well and one external senior expert. In addition, the team selected for each visit to a country of intervention will include at least one member of the core team.
- A senior staff member of the company is being appointed as methodological advisor and quality control manager. He will ensure that the quality of the evaluation is in accordance with the nine criteria defined by the Evaluation Unit. This involves following up the different stages of the evaluation, being accessible for discussion at all times, and re-reading all reports prior to submission to the Evaluation Unit. He will also be part of the team of the United Nations evaluations and make sure that the methodological insights are channelled from one evaluation to the other.
- All reports shall be read and edited by a native English speaker with experience in evaluation and Commission standards.
- ADE has a certificate in accordance with the quality system ISO 9001 for all its activities.

Annex 1c – Approach for an Extended Desk Phase

Evaluation of the EC aid delivery through Development Banks and the EIB

Approach for the next phases (revised)

December 2007

The present document concerns the ongoing *Evaluation of the EC aid delivery through Developments Banks and the EIB*.

Further to the submission of the Desk Report for this evaluation on 23 July 2007 and its discussion by the Reference Group on 26 July, the evaluation team received a number of consolidated comments and requests with respect to this report on 14 September 2007.

The current document proposes an approach that allows dealing with these different comments and requests. It is a revised version of the proposal submitted on 2 October and commented by the Joint Evaluation Unit on 5 October. It is divided in four sections:

- A presentation of the evaluation team's understanding of the comments and requests and of the challenges involved ;
- The approach proposed;
- A section dedicated to the budget amendments required (without an increase of the budget);
- The proposed calendar.

1. Understanding of the comments and requests and challenges involved

To our understanding the comments and requests transmitted to the evaluation team on 12 September 2007 can be "classified" in five categories:

- 1) A number of specific remarks on factual elements contained in the desk report;
- 2) A specific request to devote a special chapter to the EC contributions to the HIPC trust fund;
- 3) A specific request to conduct an analysis on the small World Bank (WB) Trust funds (TFs);¹
- 4) The request to undertake a deeper specific desk work with, if necessary, additional visits to WB and EIB headquarters in Washington D.C. and Luxemburg;
- 5) More generally the suggestion to conduct a "non classical" field mission phase, as a lot of secondary data exist and, eventually, to decide to conduct less field visits than foreseen.

The evaluation team acknowledges these different points and considers that there are arguments for the comments and requests formulated. The specific requests with respect to the small WB Trust Funds would indeed add an additional dimension to the evaluation, and allow gathering better insights on the issues related to these TFs. Conduct a deeper specific desk work should allow fine-tuning the approach for the "field" phase to the needs of this specific evaluation.

¹ The expression "small WB TFs" should be understood here as WB TFs to which the European Commission has made a relatively small contribution. The threshold under which one can talk about small WB TFs can be discussed, but as the approach proposed to tackle this issues suggest to tackle all WB TFs identified in the inventory note, no decision on the threshold to use needs to be taken at this stage.

Dealing with these different requests involves a number of challenges, of which the principal are related to timing and budget.

In terms of timing, it is important to underline that answering to several of the requests made will require an “incompressible” amount of time. This is the case especially for the request regarding the small WB Trust Funds. Indeed, as mentioned in a mail to the Joint Evaluation Unit on 10 August 2007, working on the small WB Trust Funds will be resources and time consuming. The timing issue also applies, although to a lesser extent, to the specific chapter to be devoted to the HIPC TF (point 3 above) and to the more general request to deepen the desk work (point 4 above).

In terms of budget, the team would like to underline, as mentioned on several occasions, that the budget for this complex (given the amounts involved and variety of interventions to be covered) and sensitive evaluation is very tight and has already led the team to an important over-consumption of days, notably during the inventory phase, as mentioned in a mail sent to the Evaluation Unit on 6/4/2007.

2. The proposed approach

In order to deal with the above mentioned comments and requests, while take into account the challenges in terms of time and budget, the team would like to suggest an approach in three steps that remains within the current budget of the evaluation².

The three steps proposed are the following:

- Amending the present desk report to take into account factual elements mentioned by the Reference Group and Joint Evaluation Unit and to explain the further approach (this would cover point 1) mentioned above;
- Tackle the points 2, 3, and 4 (except for the visits to WB and/or EIB Headquarters) mentioned above in a separate “Extended desk report”³;
- Leave open the nature of the work to be undertaken further to that extended desk report, while nevertheless specifying at this stage what budget would be available for undertaking that work.

Each of these three stages is further commented below.

2.1 Amending the present desk report

As answering to some of the above mentioned requests will be time consuming, it is proposed to submit for approval an amended desk report that takes into account a number of factual elements mentioned by the Reference Group and the Joint Evaluation Unit. This will allow “closing” this stage and allow for all parties involved (Reference Group, WB and EIB and the evaluation team) to have a clear idea of where the exercise stands, what progress has been made and what can be expected for the next steps. Annex 1 contains the

² Provided that no additional demands are made in a later stage.

³ This expression is not totally accurate as this report will also be based on field work, notably the data collection done during the visit to Washington (see section 2.2 on this point).

consolidated comments addressed to the team and highlights in yellow those which will be tackled (i.e. accepted or explained why they are not accepted) at the moment of the amended desk report). The comments not highlighted will be tackled at a later stage, i.e. for the extended desk and/or the “field” phase.

It is also suggested to add to this amended report the questionnaire (see point 2.2 below) that the team would suggest to use for tackling the issue of the small WB TFs. This would indeed provide the RG members with the opportunity to react on the questionnaire before launching the exercise, so as to ensure that the right questions have been posed.

Finally the amended desk report will also explain the approach for the next phases and notably the change in approach, and be submitted for approval.

2.2 Extended desk report

In order to tackle most of the requests mentioned above it is suggested to draft an extended desk report.

This extended desk report will take as a basis the approved desk report and include the following additional elements:

- A specific chapter on the EC contributions to the HIPC TF ;
- The results of the work on the small WB TFs;
- A deepening of the overall analysis, notably on the basis of:
 - The information collected during the visit to the WB Headquarters and the additional documents received further to this visit;
 - Additional documents received after the submission of the first desk report;
- On the basis of the work undertaken, a proposal for the « field » phase.

For the work on the EC contributions to the HIPC TF, it is proposed to conduct a maximum of four additional face-to-face or telephone interviews with EC representatives, to be identified in collaboration with the Joint Evaluation Unit. A senior expert will be in charge of this task (with punctual assistance of a junior expert).

A specific approach is proposed for the small WB TFs. The overall idea is:

- To address a questionnaire to managers (within Headquarters and/or within Delegations) in charge of these TFs. We would suggest to address the questionnaire to all the TFs and not only the small ones as the difference in price between both exercises would be marginal and as this will allow to better identify the impact of the size of the contribution. The support of the Joint Evaluation Unit will be crucial to help identifying the right contact persons, and to provide an accompanying letter to be sent to addressees. The request for responses will be re-launched twice, with a response window of one week. It will not be possible to take into account questionnaires received after the deadline;
- Once the responses are collected, to ensure a follow-up with a number of additional (maximum 6) telephone interviews with these managers;
- To include the results of this data collection in the main report in the same manner as for the other TFs.

2.3 The « field » phase

The work undertaken for the extended desk report will allow proposing an adequate approach for the “field” phase. The nature of the work to be undertaken at that stage will be determined at the end of the extended desk study exercise. This approach will have to be in line with the budget identified for this purpose. This budget allow several possibilities for the field phase⁴, such as additional visits to the WB and EIB Headquarters, or a limited number of short country visits, or other activities such as focus groups within the Commission. In other words, in addition to the additional desk work, it would thus still be possible to do country visits. Given the duration foreseen, such country visits would be dedicated to focussed interviews with key interlocutors in one city. Project visits would not be possible in this time frame.

3. The calendar

A calendar is proposed in table 3 below and based on the hypothesis that the present proposal is accepted by 18/10/07. As shown in this calendar, the following dates concern the key steps of the further work:

- **Desk report revised by 26/10/07.** This would include the drafting of the questionnaire on the small WB TFs. In order to be able to stay in line with the calendar and launch the questionnaire on 8 November, it is important that the amended desk report (including the questionnaire) is approved on 5 November at the latest;
- **Delivery of the extended desk report by 12/12/07**, provided that the desk report and small WB TF questionnaire are approved by 02/11/07. This delay appears to be a minimum to be able to collect the results on the small WB TF questionnaire. More in particular the following steps are important:
 - Sending questionnaire: 8/11/07;
 - First re-launch 19/11/07;
 - Second re-launch 26/11/07;
 - Deadlines all responses 3/12/07;
 - Submission extended desk report: 12/12/07;
 - Given the nature of the report a Reference Group meeting is not foreseen. It will however be important to receive comments from the RG on the extended desk report before Christmas. These comments could focus on the additional information contained in the extended desk report and on the approach proposed for the “field phase”.
- **Launch of field phase on 07/01/2008**, provided that the extended desk report is approved. The duration of the field phase will depend on the type of activities to be implemented during that phase, but as shown in the calendar it may be expected that under this proposal it will be shorter than the period of time mentioned previously.

⁴ Whatever the option taken, it would need to be compatible with the remaining budget.

Table 3 – Proposed planning

		2008													
Phasing	Main Activities	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January	February	March	April	May
Preparation phase															
	ToRs														
	Launch Note														
	Kick-Off Meeting														
Desk Phase															
	Inventory Stage														
	Structuring Stage														
	Reconstruct intervention logic														
	Complement data collection														
	Analyse institutional agreements														
	Determine EQ-JC-Indicators														
	Write Inventory Report														
	Deliver Inventory Report														
	RG Meeting and Validation														
	Desk Study Stage														
	Collect and analyse desk documents														
	Determine preliminary findings and hypotheses														
	Determine information gaps														
	Prepare field visits														
	Prepare data collection tools														
	Write Desk Phase Report														
	Deliver Desk Phase Report														
	RG Meeting and Validation														
	Reception of consolidated comments														
	Proposal of alternative approach														
	Approval of alternative approach														
	Drafting and delivery amended desk report														
	Extended "desk" study														
	Launching questionnaire on small WB TFs														
	First relaunch questionnaire														
	Second relaunch questionnaire														
	Deadlines all responses on question (3/12/07)														
	Finalisation drafting extended desk report														
	Submission extended desk report														
	Approval extend desk report														
	Field Phase														
	Implementation of activities field phase														
	Synthesis Phase														
	Write Draft Final Report														
	Deliver Draft Final Report														
	Present Draft Final Report to RG														
	Amend Draft Final Report														
	Deliver Final Report														
	Approval of Final Report														
	Dissemination Phase														
	Participate to Dissemination Seminar														DS

Annex 2 – The Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria, Indicators and sources of information

EQ1 EQ1-GC To what extent are decisions to channel aid explicitly motivated and based on formal guidance criteria (guidelines, policies, Communications...)? Do these formal guidance criteria provide the rationale for the observed evolution of channelled aid? <i>EQ 1 on Guiding Criteria</i> Coverage of the question: The question investigates whether the rationale behind specific decisions to channel funds corresponds explicitly with the rationale underlying the intervention logic and whether mechanisms have been put into place to ensure that decisions to channel funds have been appropriately justified. The justification for its formulation is that the significant scaling-up of channelled aid over recent years is a key issue which is susceptible to analysis. It therefore seeks to reveal the explanatory factors behind this trend, and in particular to assess whether those factors are strategic or more <i>ad hoc</i> . Evaluation Criterion and link with intervention logic: The question addresses the relevance of the decisions to channel funds. It therefore addresses the 'inputs' level of the intervention logic but within the perspective of the entire IL. In other words it questions the relevance of the choices in the context of the objectives to be achieved. The question also relates to the 3Cs insofar as coordination and complementarity with other donors are justifying elements.		Approach to collect the information required for the indicators													
		Level of indicators			Desk					Field (case studies)					Focus Group
		Global	Cluster of interventions	Intervention specific	Doc. study	Interviews		Inventory	Other tools	Interviews			Beneficiaries		
						EC HQ	IFI HQ			DCE	IFI local	Partner Countries		Other donors	
Sources of information															
JC 1.1 Prior to the decision, a comprehensive and documented analysis of the intervention's objectives and functioning has taken place															
I-1.1.1	Existence of documents, preceding the decision, which justify the decision	Programming and/or other official documents			1	1									
I-1.1.2	Inclusion in the above mentioned documents of an analysis of the objectives and functioning of the intervention	Programming and/or other official documents			1	1									
I-1.1.3	Views of involved stakeholders on the existence and quality of ex ante justification for the intervention	EC programming officers at HQ and in Delegations		1	1		1	1							
JC 1.2 Prior to the decision, a documented analysis of alternative ways of intervening was conducted															
I-1.2.1	Explanation in the preparatory/programming documents of why the channelling of funds was preferred to other alternatives (such as direct intervention, no intervention, intervention through another channel)	Preparatory/programming documents		1	1	1									
I-1.2.2	The justification of the choice referred to in I-1.2.1 was considered reasonable in other programming phase documents and/or by Commission representatives	Other documents and EC representatives at HQ and in Delegations		1	1		1	1							
JC 1.3 Decisions to channel aid are explicitly motivated and rest on formal guidance criteria															
I-1.3.1	Existence of formal guidance criteria relating to the intervention at the time the decision was made.	Regulations, guide lines, strategic documents, official recommendations; political commitments;		1		1	1								
I-1.3.2	These criteria are referred to in the programming documents	Programming documents			1	1									
I-1.3.3	These criteria are considered by the Commission as useful and as providing an adequate basis for channelling interventions	EC programming officers at HQ and in Delegations		1	1		1								
JC 1.4 The formal guidance criteria provide the rationale for the observed evolution of channelled aid															
I-1.4.1	Observed parallel between the evolution of channelled funds and the development of guidance criteria	Inventory note; programming documents; regulations; guidelines, etc.		1		1		1							
I-1.4.2	Existence of other factors that explain the evolution of channelled funds	Programming documents, EC programming officers at HQ and at Delegations?		1		1	1		1						

Sources of information			Approach to collect the information required for the indicators													
			Level of indicators			Desk				Field (case studies)					Focus Group	
			Global	Cluster of interventions	Intervention specific	Doc. study	Interviews		Invent-ory	Other tools	Interviews		Partner Countries	Other donors		Benefic-iaries
			EC HQ	IFI HQ			DCE	IFI local								
JC 2.1 <i>The absorption capacity of the interventions has facilitated the disbursement of EC funds</i>																
I-2.1.1	Evolution from 1999-2006 of the EC funds channelled over the total payments EC external aid.	<i>Inventory, Annual reports</i>	1			1			1							
I-2.1.2	Testimonies that the absorption capacity of the interventions has facilitated the disbursement of EC funds	<i>Opinions of EC officials in HQ and on the field, of IFIs, and/or beneficiaries and partner countries</i>		1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1		1	
JC 2.2 <i>The presence of the EC has attracted/mobilised more resources</i>																
I-2.2.1	Testimonies that the presence of the Commission has encouraged other donors to contribute	<i>Opinion of other donors and IFIs, and of EC officials in HQ and in the field</i>		1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	
I-2.2.2	Testimonies that the Commission's grants have permitted the mobilisation of other types of funding (e.g. loans, interest rate subsidies...)	<i>Opinion of other donors and IFIs, and of EC officials in HQ and in the field</i>		1		1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	
JC 2.3 <i>EC contributions facilitated attainment of the critical mass necessary for the interventions</i>																
I-2.3.1	Testimonies that the Commission funding made a difference	<i>Opinions of EC, IFIs, other donors</i>		1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1		
I-2.3.2	Testimonies that the critical mass necessary for the interventions would not have been reached without the EC contributions	<i>Opinions of EC, IFIs, other donors</i>		1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1		
JC 2.4 <i>ODA has been scaled up since the channeling took place.</i>																
I-2.4.1	Increase in global ODA worldwide	<i>OECD-DAC figures</i>	1			1										
I-2.4.2	Increase in Commission's ODA worldwide	<i>Annual reports</i>	1			1										
I-2.4.3	Evolution of Commission channeling to development banks and EIB.	<i>Inventory</i>	1			1										
I-2.4.4	Evidence that channelling through IFIs has increased ODA in the country	<i>Opinions of EC, IFIs, partner country, other donors, beneficiary</i>			1	1					1	1	1	1	1	

		<i>Level of indicators</i>			<i>Approach to collect the information required for the indicators</i>											
					<i>Desk</i>					<i>Field (case studies)</i>					<i>Focus Group</i>	
					<i>Doc. study</i>	<i>Interviews</i>		<i>Inven-tory</i>	<i>Other tools</i>	<i>Interviews</i>		<i>Partner Countries</i>	<i>Other donors</i>	<i>Beneficiaries</i>		
<i>Global</i>	<i>Cluster of interventions</i>	<i>Intervention specific</i>	<i>EC HQ</i>	<i>IFI HQ</i>			<i>DCE</i>	<i>IFI local</i>								
EQ3 <i>EQ3-RI</i>		To what extent did channelling through IFIs contribute to achieving sustainably the intervention objectives the EC targeted when channelling its funds?														
		<p><i>Coverage of the question:</i></p> <p>The question aims at verifying whether the intended results and impacts from the interventions supported with channelled funds have materialised and, moreover, whether they have done so in a sustainable manner. More specifically the question aims at verifying whether the intervention generated in a sustainable manner the results and impacts the Commission expected when contributing to the intervention. The question is of the utmost importance for the evaluation since the extent of the results and impacts at beneficiary level is the ultimate justification for channelling aid. It is also an extremely difficult question to answer and it will be addressed stepwise through the various judgement criteria. These will verify:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the existence of clearly-identified expected results and their coherence with those of the channelling instrument; - the capacity of the Commission Services that channel the funds to follow up their use, and effective follow-up by the Commission Services of the use made of the funds by the partners; - the existence of information on the results achieved; - the adequacy of the observed results in relation to expectations; - the coherence between the objectives of the intervention (for instance a trust fund) and the Commission's overall policies. <p>The question is fundamentally one of effectiveness and impact but cannot avoid an analysis of the process since the existence of information on materialisation of results depends substantially on the process.</p> <p>Evaluation Criterion and link with intervention logic:</p> <p>The question concerns mainly effectiveness, impact and sustainability and deals with the two highest layers of the intervention logic diagram. It is also highly relevant with respect to the 3Cs insofar as it tackles the issue of coherence between, on the one hand, the objectives of the intervention to which the Commission is contributing, and on the other its overall policies.</p> <p>In addition the question aims at providing insights on efficiency (notably in terms of monitoring of the channelled funds) and on value added for both the Commission and the beneficiaries through the achievement of results and impacts.</p>														
		<i>Sources of information</i>														
JC 3.1		<i>The objectives the Commission aimed to achieve via a specific intervention were explicit and coherent with those of the channelling instrument selected.</i>														
I-3.1.1	Evidence that the Commission subscribes to the overall objectives of the intervention	<i>Programming documents, binding agreements.</i>			1	1										
I-3.1.2	Justification in the preparatory documents and agreements.	<i>Programming documents, binding agreements.</i>			1	1										
I-3.1.3	Amount of funds earmarked and impact on channelling instruments' objectives.	<i>Programming documents, binding agreements, evaluation</i>			1	1	1	1		1	1					
I-3.1.4	Evidence of provisions (e.g. earmarking/preferences, from the Commission or the channelling instrument) that hamper/enhance the reaching of the objectives of the global intervention	<i>Programming documents, binding agreements, evaluation, interviews with Commission representatives</i>			1	1	1			1	1					
JC 3.2		<i>The Commission Services which channel the funds have the capacity, resources and information needed to follow up their use.</i>														
I-3.2.1	Resources in manpower and time allocated to these functions.	<i>Human resources services of the Commission (including in Delegations) and staff in charge of these functions.</i>		1	1		1	1			1	1				
I-3.2.2	Effective transmission by the managers of the channelling instruments of the agreed monitoring documents.	<i>Monitoring documents received by the Commission services</i>		1	1	1	1			1	1					

			Level of indicators			Desk					Field (case studies)					Focus Group
			Global	Cluster of interventions	Intervention specific	Doc. study	Interviews		Invent-ory	Other tools	Interviews		Partner Countries	Other donors	Benefic-iaries	
Sources of information							EC HQ	IFI HQ			DCE	IFI local				
JC 3.3 <i>The Commission Services who channel the funds effectively follow-up the uses of the funds by the managers of the channelling instruments and interact with these managers.</i>																
I-3.3.1	Existence of internal follow up reports in the relevant Commission Services	<i>Follow reports produced by the Commission Services.</i>		1	1	1	1				1					
I-3.3.2	Evidence of interactions (notes, meetings, etc..) with the managers of the channelling instruments on the evolution of the activities funded.	<i>Commission Services and IFIs</i>			1	1	1				1	1				
I-3.3.3	Actions taken by the Commission Services to ensure conformity with the intended objectives, or, if impossible, to interrupt or stop activity.	<i>Commission Services and IFIs</i>			1	1	1				1	1				
JC 3.4 <i>Information on the results achieved is available at the Commission</i>																
I-3.4.1	Evaluations are conducted and their results communicated to the Commission Services	<i>Commission Services and IFIs</i>		1	1	1	1	1			1	1				
I-3.4.2	The evaluations inform on the results achieved and not only on the process.	<i>Evaluation reports</i>		1	1	1	1	1			1	1				
JC 3.5 <i>The Commission's objectives for the intervention have been sustainably achieved</i>																
I-3.5.1	Documentary evidence on degree of sustainable achievement of the Commission's objectives	<i>Project reports, evaluation & monitoring reports</i>			1	1										
I-3.5.2	Views of stakeholders (project managers, beneficiaries, other donors, partner countries)	<i>Managers of channelled instruments, EC Services, contractors and implementing agencies</i>			1		1	1			1	1	1	1	1	
I-3.5.3	Evidence of overall positive impact on beneficiaries	<i>Beneficiaries</i>			1									1		
JC 3.6 <i>The overall set of objectives of the intervention (on paper and in reality) are in line with the Commission's policies</i>																
I-3.6.1	Number and importance of questions raised on alignment of interventions with Country and Regional Strategy Papers	<i>Commission Services</i>		1	1	1	1				1		1		1	
I-3.6.2	Number and importance of questions raised on overall objectives of the intervention vis-à-vis Commission's overall policies	<i>Commission Services</i>		1	1	1	1				1					

<p>EQ4 To what extent did channelling through IFIs enable the Commission to offer a broader range of expertise and instruments to the beneficiaries? EQ4-EXP Coverage of the question: The question aims at verifying the extent to which the channelling of funds has allowed the Commission to gain access to specific expertise or instruments so as to better respond to the needs of beneficiaries. Indeed, it is expected that channelling allows the Commission to contribute to offering expertise (such as logistics and staff to deal with emergency situations) which would not be readily available in-house. This also applies to the capacity of channelling to provide, for instance through a combination of grants and loans, a mix of the specific expertise of different donors that could not be achieved otherwise.</p> <p>Evaluation Criterion and link with intervention logic: The question relates to three evaluation criteria: relevance (responding better to beneficiaries' needs); the 3Cs (the channelling as a means of combining the comparative advantages of donors) and added value, both for the Commission (as it is expected to widen the range of what it can offer) and for the beneficiaries (as the intervention should allow a better response to their needs).</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Approach to collect the information required for the indicators</i></p>															
Sources of information			Desk								Field (case studies)				
			Doc. study	Interviews		Inventory	Other tools	Interviews					Focus Group		
Global	Cluster of interventions	Intervention specific		EC HQ	IFI HQ			DCE	IFI local	Partner Countries	Other donors	Beneficiaries			
JC 4.1 Channelling through IFIs enables the Commission to provide leading expertise and experience to beneficiaries															
I-4.1.1	Testimonies of general recognition of partner's technical/sector leadership in area of intervention	Documents, interviews with Commission representatives		1		1	1	1	1			1		1	
JC 4.2 Channelling through IFIs enables the Commission to have access to readily available know-how required to intervene in situations of emergency															
I-4.2.1	Partner's years of presence in the country and/or expertise in the field	Documents, interviews with Commission and IFI representatives		1		1	1	1			1	1			
I-4.2.2	Commission's years of presence in the country and/or expertise in the field	Documents, interviews with Commission representatives		1		1	1				1				
JC 4.3 Channelling through IFIs enables the Commission and the partner to provide more flexible and comprehensive (financing) instruments															
I-4.3.1	Number of financial instruments that the Commission alone can provide	Documents, interviews with Commission and IFI representatives	1			1	1	1	1		1	1			
I-4.3.2	Number of financial instruments that the IFI alone can provide	Documents, interviews with Commission and IFI representatives	1			1	1	1	1		1	1			
I-4.3.3	Number of financial instruments that the Commission and IFI can provide together	Documents, interviews with Commission and IFI representatives	1			1	1	1	1		1	1			

EQ5 To what extent did the Commission's channelling of funds contribute to swifter implementation and lower transaction costs? EQ5-CRI EQ 5 on Cost Reduction & Implementation Coverage of the question: The question verifies whether channelling through IFIs is an effective and efficient alternative to the Commission's own direct interventions, in terms of "time to market" and cost reduction. Evaluation Criterion and link with intervention logic: The question relates to effectiveness and efficiency in implementation of projects and programmes, and to efficiency in terms of reducing transaction costs. Through these two aspects it also addresses value added, notably for the beneficiary but also for the Commission.		Approach to collect the information required for the indicators														
		Level of indicators			Desk					Field (case studies)						Focus Group
		Global	Cluster of interventions	Intervention specific	Doc. study	Interviews			Inventory	Other tools	Interviews					
						EC HQ	IFI HQ				DCE	IFI local	Partner Countries	Other donors	Beneficiaries	
Sources of information																
JC 5.1 Time needed between project identification and project implementation																
I-5.1.1	Time from first identification study of the project to the proposal decision	Testimonies of Commission and IFI staff, partner countries, and programming documents			1	1	1				1	1				
I-5.1.2	Time from proposal decision to signature of Contribution Agreement EC-IFI	Testimonies of Commission and IFI staff and programming documents			1	1	1				1	1				
I-5.1.3	Time from signature of Contribution Agreement to signature of contract for implementation	Testimonies of Commission and IFI staff and programming documents			1	1	1				1	1	1		1	
JC 5.2 Transaction costs are reduced for the Commission and the beneficiaries																
I-5.2.1	Comparison of management costs for the Commission between similar interventions involving channelling through MDB vis-à-vis direct interventions	Commission staff and project documentation on similar projects with and without IFI involvement		1	1	1	1				1					
I-5.2.2	Single set of procedures and single interlocutor for the beneficiaries	Commission staff, IFIs, other donors, beneficiaries, and project documents		1	1	1	1				1	1	1	1	1	
JC 5.3 The channelling entity uses procedures that are in line with the Commission's expectations																
I-5.3.1	Existence of appropriate rules and procedures throughout the project cycle to deliver aid through the channelling entities (e.g. framework and administration agreements)	Agreements, Commission and IFI staff, evaluation & monitoring reports		1	1	1	1				1	1				
I-5.3.2	The terms of the framework and administration agreements are respected	Commission and IFI staff, evaluation & monitoring reports		1	1	1	1				1	1				
JC 5.4 The intervention has been implemented at a reasonable cost																
I-5.4.1	Assessment of efficiency of the interventions in monitoring and evaluation reports	Monitoring reports and evaluations		1	1	1										

EQ6 To what extent did EC channelling contribute to the visibility of the EC support vis-à-vis its taxpayers, the beneficiaries, the partner countries, its MS and the international community? To what extent did it enhance its ability to promote EU policies and priorities?		Approach to collect the information required for the indicators													
		Level of indicators			Desk				Field (case studies)						Focus Group
		Global	Cluster of interventions	Intervention specific	Doc. study	Interviews EC HQ	Interviews IFI HQ	Inventory	Other tools	Interviews DCE	Interviews IFI local	Partner Countries	Other donors	Beneficiaries	
Sources of information															
JC 6.1 Visibility clauses exist and are respected															
I-6.1.1	Existence of visibility rules/clauses on the Commission's side and at the level of the interventions or channelling entity	Agreements, programming documents	1	1	1	1	1	1			1	1			
I-6.1.2	Degree of compliance with the agreed visibility rules (e.g. Logos on reports, etc.)	Commission and IFI staff, incl. EC officials in charge of corporate visibility, evaluation & monitoring		1	1	1	1	1			1	1			
JC 6.2 Beneficiaries, partner countries and the international community are aware of the magnitude and the intervention locations of the Commission's channelled development aid															
I-6.2.1	Degree of awareness of beneficiaries, partner country officials, and the international community.	Interviews and documents		1	1	1							1	1	1
I-6.2.2	Reference of EC interventions in other donors' documentation	Documents	1	1		1								1	
JC 6.3 Tax payers and MS are aware of Commission's channelling of aid															
I-6.3.1	Specific initiatives are taken to raise awareness (folders, joint campaigns, press conference...)	EuropeAid Communication & Information Unit representative	1					1							
I-6.3.2	Information is provided in general communication tools	Annual reports	1						1						
I-6.3.3	Evidence of awareness of tax payers	E.g. Parliamentary questions, number of hits on information sites,	1						1						
JC 6.4 The Commission has an influence on the decision making process with respect to the interventions															
I-6.4.1	Testimonies of the Commission's influence from design to implementation & reporting	Opinions of EC officials and IFI bodies		1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	
I-6.4.2	Number of steering groups in which the EC is an active member	Programming documents			1	1				1					
JC 6.5 Channelling through IFIs allows the Commission to better promote its own policies and priorities															
I-6.5.1	Testimonies of Commission's increased influence on policy dialogue with the country of intervention	Opinions of EC officials, IFI bodies, and partner countries		1	1		1	1			1	1	1	1	
I-6.5.2	Testimonies of Commission's increased ability to influence the dialogue between the IFI and the country of intervention	Opinions of EC officials, IFI bodies, and partner countries		1	1		1	1			1	1	1	1	
I-6.5.3	Testimonies of increased EU voice within the IFI due to the Commission's channelling of funds	Opinions of EC officials, IFI bodies, and partner countries		1	1		1	1			1	1	1	1	

EQ7 EQ7-CC To what extent did aid channelling improve coordination between the Commission and EU MS and complementarity between the Commission and other donors? <i>EQ 7 on Coordination & Complementarity</i> Coverage of the question: The question assesses whether channelling facilitates coordination and complementarity by analysing the following aspects: 1° how far decisions on channelling involving the Commission have been preceded by consultation between the Commission and the MS or rather were taken by each of these actors without particular consideration of what the others were doing; 2° how far activities financed through multi-donor funding have been prepared on the basis of a dialogue with the beneficiaries, conducted either collectively with the participants in the co-funding intervention, or with one of them (for instance the channelling institution) with the approval of the others; 3° the extent to which channelling permits better coverage of the needs of the beneficiaries. Note. Channelling funds via a third institution is in itself a form of coordination and complementarity. The present question therefore does not address all aspects of coordination and complementarity. Other questions discuss harmonisation of procedures, alignment, etc; this question rather focuses on whether channelling is explicitly used as an instrument for improving coordination, and is not simply being used because the facility happens to be available. Evaluation Criterion and link with intervention logic: The question covers two aspects of the 3Cs: coordination with the MS and complementarity with other donors. It is also a question of efficiency insofar as coordination and complementarity are conducive to greater efficiency in programming and implementing activities. In addition, it is ultimately a contributory factor to impact in the intervention logic of the Commission's aid channelling, since greater efficiency and effectiveness of aid are key objectives of channelling. <th colspan="13">Approach to collect the information required for the indicators</th>		Approach to collect the information required for the indicators													
		Level of indicators			Desk					Field (case studies)					Focus Group
		Global	Cluster of interventions	Intervention specific	Doc. study	Interviews EC HQ	Interviews IFI HQ	Inventories	Other tools	Interviews DCE	Interviews IFI local	Partner Countries	Other donors	Beneficiaries	
		Sources of information													
JC 7.1 Channelling funds to an IFI is preceded by consultation with the MS															
I-7.1.1	Evidence of consultation between the Commission and the MS prior to channelling funds via an IFI-	Preparatory documents; Commission, MS and IFIs' services.	1	1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	
I-7.1.2	Absence of a situation where an intervention is funded directly by one or several MS and/or the Commission whereas another of these actors supports the same intervention through an IFI- Existence of appropriate justification in such a situation is observed	Preparatory documents; Commission, MS and IFI Services.	1	1		1	1	1			1	1	1	1	
JC 7.2 The policy dialogue accompanying the preparation and implementation of multidonor interventions channelled via IFIs is conducted with the beneficiary either through a coordinating donor group organised to this end or by a single donor explicitly mandated by the others.															
I-7.2.1	Existence and nature of coordination mechanisms between the beneficiary and the participants in the intervention funded via an IFI (it may involve delegation of power to one donor).	EC representatives/stakeholders involved in activities funded through channels: beneficiaries, implementation agencies and contractors, channelling institutions, Commission and MS Services and representatives		1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	
I-7.2.2	Evidence of improved control and command of the beneficiary over activities channelled via an IFI vis-à-vis activities funded separately by several donors.	EC representatives/stakeholders involved in activities funded through channels: beneficiaries, implementation agencies and contractors, channelling institutions, Commission and MS Services and representatives			1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	
JC 7.3 Channelling via a single intervention grouping together the resources of several donors allows for more comprehensive and strategic coverage of the needs of the beneficiary.															
I-7.3.1	Existence of studies analysing the needs of the beneficiary and identifying the required responses (in the form of priority action matrices, road maps, etc.) elaborated with the beneficiary and serving as a framework for channelling interventions via an IFI	EC representatives/stakeholders involved in activities funded through channels: beneficiaries, implementation agencies and contractors, channelling institutions, Commission and MS Services and representatives		1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	

Annex 3 – Description Fiches for the selection of interventions

Selection of interventions	Recipient institution	Funding resources	Amounts of EC contribution	Co-financing modality	Geographic level	Region	Theme
ARTF	WBG	Budget	€142m	MDTF	Country	ALA	Post-conf.
PFMR (W-B & Gaza)	WBG	Budget	€80m	MDTF	Country	MEDA	Post-conf.
TFET (Timor Leste)	WBG	Budget	€55m	MDTF	Country	ALA / ACP	Post-conf.
WB Iraq TF	WBG	Budget	€120m	MDTF	Country	Iraq	Post-conf.
MDF (post tsunami)	WBG	Budget	€203m	MDTF	Country	ALA	Post-crisis
CGIAR	WBG	Budget EDF	€114m	MDTF	Global	ACP- ALA MEDA	Env. & sust. Agri.
GFATM	WBG	Budget EDF	€443m	MDTF	Global	All	Health
HIPC TF	WBG	EDF (Budget)	€934m	MDTF	Global	ACP- ALA	Debt
AFLEG	WBG	Budget	€0.5m	MDTF	Regional	ACP	Forestry
PSNP	WBG	EDF (Budget)	€98m	MDTF	Country	ACP	Food Sec.
PRSC	WBG	Budget	€52m	SDTF	Country	ALA	Poverty Red.
PFM	WBG	Budget	€1.5m	MDTF	Country	ALA	Public Fin.
HEMA	WBG	Budget	€11m	SDTF	Country	ALA	Health
TFF/VCF	WBG	Budget	€2.8m	SDTF	Country	ALA	Forestry
FEMIP Support Fund	EIB	Budget	€105m	Up-stream TA preparation / TF	Regional	MEDA	Economic dev.
Interest rate subsidies MEDA	EIB	Budget	€155m	Interest rate subsidy	Regional	MEDA	Economic dev.
Risk capital Lomé IV	EIB	EDF	€534m	Risk capital operation	Regional	ACP	Economic dev.

See Inventory Note for details and sources

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)

Full Title	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
Channel	WB
Ref.	TF050576
Country/Region	Afghanistan (ALA)
TF Start date	2002
TF End date	2010
TF Budget and type (indicative)	US\$ 1.7B pledged by 24 donors of which US\$ 1.4B received by WB of which US\$ 1.2B disbursed to beneficiaries (as of 22 Sept. 2006)
EC Start date	2002 (at start)
EC Contribution and type	€142m commitments to the ARTF for 2002-2006 + €30m contracted by Commission with WB in 2006 In addition, €135.5m to the LOTFA. for 2002-2006 (<i>source: MEMO/07/34</i>) Note. The total Commission's aid to Afghanistan for 2002-2006 (incl. ARTF among others) amounts to €1,025m commitments. (<i>source: MEMO/07/34</i>). ARTF + LOTFA represent thus 27% of the total Commission's aid to Afghanistan over the period.
TF Objectives	The objective of the Trust Fund is "to provide a vehicle for Donors to pool resources and coordinate their support to the programme of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the reconstruction of Afghanistan". (<i>source: Adm. Agreement 2002</i>) The ARTF is designed to: (i) promote transparency and accountability of reconstruction assistance; (ii) help reinforce the national budget as the vehicle for promoting alignment of the reconstruction program with national objectives; (iii) reduce the burden on limited government capacity for the first few years of re-engagement, while promoting capacity building over time; (iv) help fund the essential recurrent budgetary expenditures required for the government to function effectively; and (v) provide a convenient mechanism for donors to fund priority investments. (<i>Source: Review of Post-Crisis MDTFs, February 2007</i>)
Programme Background & History	The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund is one of the two multi-donor trust funds supported by the donor-community in Afghanistan, the other being the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund (AIAF). The AIAF ¹ (administered by UNDP from end 2001 till June 2002) has actually preceded the ARTF (administered by the WB from March 2002 to the present). In addition, there has been a special "window" under the ARTF that can be considered a third fund, namely the Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan, LOTFA (managed by the UNDP but funded via the WB-managed ARTF) ² . The ARTF was approved by the WB Board on 27 March 2002. The Grant Agreement was signed in May, and the Fund began operating in late May 2002. A single trust fund has been established. The WB is entrusted with the administration of the proposed fund ; decisions about allocation of expenditures will be the responsibility of the WB, UNDP, ADB, and Islamic Development Bank in close co-operation with the government of Afghanistan and in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

¹ The AIAF was set up and run by the UNDP at very short notice, operated under the difficult circumstances of the immediate post-Taliban period, and then shut down again within six month, as foreseen.

² The reason for this is that the WB, by its mandate, cannot be directly involved in financing security sector organizations. LOTFA was thus set up as a sub-fund under the ARTF, where donors could provide the funding to the WB, which would then pass the funds straight on to UNDP.

	<p>The ARTF was set up with the intention of providing support only for the initial years, during which the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA) would establish the capacity to mobilize revenue to cover its recurrent budget. The ARTF closing date was first established for two years after the election of a permanent government or June 30, 2006, whichever came first. In June 2004, however, donors agreed to extend the closing date of the ARTF from June 2006 to June 2010.</p> <p>The ARTF Program thus contains two components or "windows":</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funding for recurrent costs of the budget (salaries of civil servants plus operations and maintenance, O&M): "Recurrent Window" • Development Projects: "Investment Window". <p>The ARTF has two components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The "Recurrent window": funding for recurrent costs of the Government's budget - The "Investment window": funding for development projects - Note. The LOTFA (law & order, <i>see above</i>) could be considered as a third window <p>The Commission funds all three components.</p>
Structure and Governance	<p>Informants indicate that the most important governance body is the Donor meeting, held once a year, which includes the Afghan Government and the Commission. Directions are discussed and agreed there.</p> <p>(Source: Meeting notes 29)</p>

PFMR WB&GS

Full Title	West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund (PFMR)
Channel	WB
Commission Ref.	MED/2004/16765
WB Ref.	TF053218
Country/Region	West Bank & Gaza Strip (MEDA)
TF Start date	2004
TF End date	July 2006 (completion date in the Administration Agreement was foreseen on 31 December 2005)
TF Budget and type (indicative)	(as of February 2005) \$151m of contribution (from 9 donors) and \$123m disbursed.
EC Start date	2004
EC Contribution and type	\$80M (contribution) and \$55.8m (disbursed in February 2005)
TF Objectives	<p>The objective of the Trust Fund are to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mobilize Donor resources in support of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) budget; - harmonize Donor assistance to the PA under a commonly agreed reform programme; - assist in the simplification of the PA disbursement procedures.
Beneficiary	The PA, Ministry of finance and indirectly the Palestinians
Programme Background & History	<p>Following the second Intifada, the PA did not receive anymore money from Israel → The Commission decides to intervene by providing budget support to the PA: €10M per month → reaction of Israel saying that the Commission is financing terrorists. → Investigation from OLAF and from the EC parliament setting up of a working group on that issue → enormous political pressure from Israel and the EC parliament on the Commission to stop the disbursement of the €10M per month. → Creation of a Financial Facility for the financing of the Ministry of Finance in order to help him clear his arrears. (similar to budget support but in another acceptable form). → Conclusion of the working group: the Commission should coordinate its interventions in Palestine with IFI and not go alone. → the Commission ask the WB to create a TF to support the PA → Creation of the PFMR TF on the basis of the functioning of the Commission's Financial Facility, and for which the Commission is the biggest contributor.</p>

Governance	The TF is administered by the WB (which contributes also in the TF as a donor) and “guided” by a Guidance Committee . The Commission is part of the Guidance Committee with other donors and the USA (which is not a donor but still part of the Committee for political reason). The decision to disburse to the PA is taken by the WB but following the decisions of the Guidance Committee. The Guidance Committee meets at least once a year in a meeting and is prepared by the WB. The conclusion of the meeting is sent to all the donors.
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TFET


Full Title	Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET)
Channel	WB
Commission Ref.	IDN/B7-3040/IB/2000/2001
Country/Region	East Timor (Timor-Leste) (ALA/ACP)
TF Start date	2000
TF End date	2002
TF Budget and type (indicative)	\$178.6m
EC Start date	2000
EC End date	2002
EC Contribution and type	€55.28m (€18.9m in 2000 + €27.38m in 2001 + €9m in 2002)
TF Objectives	To finance the emergency reconstruction and recovery programme in East Timor over a three year period including supporting agricultural recovery, rehabilitation of utilities and restoration of public health and education services.
Beneficiary	Civil society and the Timorese Government of transition.
Programme Background & History	<p>In 1999, civil war in East Timor for its independence vis à vis Indonesia. The UN intervene and create a special mission to East Timor UNTAET in order to govern the country until the setting up of a national government.</p> <p>The TFET was established as a result of the Donor conference on Timor-Leste, held in Tokyo in December 1999. Previous experience in post conflict and crisis situation prompted donors to opt for the establishment of trust funds which would be administered by the WB.</p> <p>The TFET provides the capital investments needed in the main sectors identified in the Joint Donors Assessment carried out in November 1999. Since its inception, 24 projects, targeting different sectors and aspects of the rehabilitation and development of Timor-Leste are funded through the TFET representing a total support for rehabilitation of \$177.89m. Most of the projects are implemented through the corresponding units/ministries in the Government of Timor-Leste. Capacity building and institutional strengthening and national policy development are important elements in the process of project implementation. The support through the TFET was initially planned for a period of 3 years. Despite initial delays most reconstruction projects under TFET will be completed by mid 2007.</p> <p>Beside the TFET, other projects/programmes and trust funds were created by the UN, NGO and bilateral donors, to which the Commission has also contributed. See table below:</p>

<u>Contributions in € million</u>	
<i>Programmable Aid</i>	
UNAMET Trust Fund [1999]	5.00
UNTAET Trust Fund [2000]	8.63
Trust Fund for East Timor (WB TFET)	55.28
▪ €18.9 million in 2000	
▪ €27.38 million in 2001	
▪ €9 million in 2002	
Capacity Building [2002]	2.50
Health 2002	16.50
Rural Development 2003	25.50
Health 2004	8.00
Rural Development 2005	9.00
Food Security 2005	6.00
<i>Non-Programmable Aid</i>	
ECHO	44.43
EC-UN Agencies	16.44
NGOs	6.54
TOTAL EC CONTRIBUTION	203.82
<i>Source: European Commission. Donor Profile, Timor-Leste (2005)</i>	
TF Structure and Governance	The TFET has a Donor's council of which the Commission is a member. This Council meets at least semi-annually and analysis the work programmes indicating projects and programmes proposed to be funded from the TFET, the amount of TFET funding proposed for each such projects and programmes, the identity of the proposed recipient of the TFET funding and the identity of the implementing agency proposed to be responsible for such project and programme. The TFET Donor's Council approves or not the work programmes proposed and decision are, if possible, made by consensus. The Commission, as larger contributor, has an important impact on the decision of the Donor's Council.

WB Iraq TF

Full Title	World Bank Iraq Trust Fund (WB ITF) within the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)
Channel	WB
Commission Ref.	MED/2004/082-205/1 (+ one other administration agreement signed in 2005, but we do not have it)
World Bank Ref.	TF053167
Country/Region	Iraq
TF Start date	07 May 2004
TF End date	31 December 2007
TF Budget and type (indicative)	US\$ 462.4m
EC Start date	05 July 2004
EC Contribution and type	€120M contracted (€80M + €40M contracted, see other administration agreement that we do not have) From the General Commission's Budget
TF Objectives	Ensure, in complement to other existing options such as bilateral aid, coordinated, flexible and swift donor response for financing priority expenditures, including reconstruction activities,

	sector wide programmes, investment projects, technical assistance and other development activities.
Beneficiary	Iraqi Government and civil society
Programme Background & History	<p>In 2003, in parallel with the Iraq Needs Assessment mission carried out by the WB and the UN, the WB and UNDG (UN Development Group) designed the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), which aims to help donors channel their resources and coordinate their support for reconstruction and development activities in Iraq, in line with the priority areas emerging from the Needs Assessment and validated by the Iraqi authorities.</p> <p>Within this framework, two trust funds have been created: the WB Iraq Trust Fund, administered by the WB; and the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund, to be administered by UNDP on behalf of itself and Participation UN Organisation. Each trust fund has its own particularities and are described in the IRFFI's ToR.</p> <p>The objective of the IRFFI is to ensure coordinated, flexible and swift donor response for financing priority expenditures, including reconstruction activities, sector-wide programmes, investment projects, technical assistance and other development activities.</p> <p>The donor coordination is explained in the picture below with the Iraqi Entities at the centre of the all process of reconstruction.</p> <p>Before explaining the two trust funds, to which the Commission has contributed a total amount of €479m up to 31 May 2007, one should be aware of the fact that the Commission had already contributed to the reconstruction of Iraq in 2003, through a different modality. Indeed, the Commission contributed in 2003 to the UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. It also supported the electoral process through IOM and provided technical expert, on a bilateral initiative.</p> <p>The WB ITF operates on three tracks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - capacity building of Iraqi counterparts - sectoral programmes - start-up operations for sectoral and structural policy reforms and larger scale development projects. <p>Cross-cutting themes identified in the Needs Assessment (i.e. human rights, gender and the environment) have also a particular emphasis on areas where the WB has comparative advantage.</p> <p>The UNDG ITF help finance the implementation of the activities entrusted to the UN system in Iraq by its executive bodies, particularly during the transition phase. It places emphasis on all of the sectors in which the UN has carried out needs assessments and focuses on funding quick-impact projects and transition activities which need to be implemented in a rapid and flexible way. It covers technical assistance and capacity building across the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - capacity and institution building for human development and social justice; - the delivery of essential social services, in the area of health in particular; - the empowerment of civil society and local communities; - water resources and food security; - infrastructure rehabilitation, building in particular on expertise gained under the Oil for Food Programme; - the protection and reintegration of vulnerable groups; - the promotion of human rights and the rule of law; - private sector development and employment generation, with due regards to cross-sectoral issues such as gender equality and environmental protection and management.



MDF - Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (Post-Tsunami)

Full Title	Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (MDF)
Channel	WB, the administrator of the TF, as trustee
Ref.	TF054838
Country/Region	Indonesia (ALA funds)
TF Start date	2005
TF End date	2010
TF Budget and type (indicative)	<p>€520M in grants (85% from Commission and Member States), of which €385 million (74% of total) has been launched for projects and €171m (33%) disbursed, as of December 2006. There are 15 bilateral and multi-lateral donors, including the WB, the ADB, Canada, US, New-Zealand, besides the EU.</p> <p><i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p2)</i></p>
EC Start date	2005
EC Contribution and type	<p>According to the indicative program 2005-2006, "the EC's commitment to the MDF is 100% of ALA budget resources made available to Indonesia for the rehabilitation and reconstruction programme. The envisaged contribution is up to €200 million".</p> <p><i>Source: C(2005)1490 – Tsunami Indicative Programme (2005 – 2006) - Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, 2005 (p23)</i></p> <p>According to later information, the Commission contribution to the MDF is €203.5m (pledged in 2005, corresponding to 39% of the TF contributions). As of December 2006, 99.6% of the</p>

	<p>pledged funds were committed, and 50% disbursed (€98.7m). <i>(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/indonesia/assistance_to_aceh/index.htm, 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p26)</i></p> <p>In the Aceh province, besides reconstruction aid through the MDF of €203.5m, the Commission is funding €53m for humanitarian aid and €40M as support to the peace process. <i>(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/indonesia/assistance_to_aceh/index.htm)</i></p> <p>Regarding the response to the tsunami in the whole region, the EU played a leading role in the overall international response, and pledged and deployed funds and resources quickly: €560M for humanitarian assistance and €1.5B for medium and long-term reconstruction. The Commission alone has committed €123m in humanitarian aid and €350M in rehabilitation and reconstruction (including the €203.5m for the MDF)³. <i>(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/indonesia/assistance_to_aceh/index.htm)</i></p>
TF Objectives	Support a post-earthquake and post-tsunami emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Indonesia
Beneficiary	MDF funding is for projects, implemented by different agencies, such as government agencies (e.g. BRR), the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs, UNDP, ILO, WFP, private foundations and NGOs (e.g. Leuser International Foundation, Muslim Aid)
Programme Background & History	<p>Following the tsunami on 26 December 2004 along the coastal areas of the Aceh province on Sumatra (Indonesia), and further damage due to an earthquake three months later, the Government of Indonesia responded by immediately organizing both overview and relief efforts to ensure as rational and coordinated response as possible.</p> <p>The international response to the devastation in the region was overwhelming. The Government asked the WB to coordinate the reconstruction assistance. The WB suggested a multi-donor trust fund as the most appropriate instrument, which the Government accepted. The WB began mobilizing support among the donors for a "Multi-donor Trust Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra" (MDTFANS), later simplified to "Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias" (MDF). The WB Board on 30 March 2005 formally established what was then the MDTFANS.</p>
TF structure & Governance	<p>The Commission as the largest donor is co-chairing the Steering Committee of the MDF, together with BRR⁴ as the representative of the Government of Indonesia, and the WB as trustee. The Commission has as particular responsibility: to engage with other members of the Steering Committee, especially all other contributors, to ensure that a consensual and constructive spirit is maintained, and facilitating the Steering Committee's policy dialogue with the Government on special issues as tasked by the Steering Committee - such as the Aceh Peace Process. <i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p5)</i></p> <p>The MDF Steering Committee consists of representatives from provincial and central governments, 15 of the largest bilateral and multi-lateral donors in Aceh and Nias, an international NGO representative, the United Nations and members of the Aceh Civil Society. <i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p11)</i></p>

³ In addition the EIB is making available specific loan financing to the affected countries

⁴ The "Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) is the Aceh-based government agency responsible for the overall coordination and planning of the reconstruction:

CGIAR

Full Title	The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
Channel	World Bank
Ref.	CGIAR
Country/Region	Global
TF Start date	1971
TF End date	-
TF Budget and type (indicative)	US \$450 million in 2005
EC Start date	1977; through the WB since 2001
EC Contribution and type	€114m (of which 92% from the Commission budget)
TF Objectives	<p>The CGIAR aims at contributing to food security and poverty eradication in developing countries through strategic agricultural research, research partnerships, capacity building and policy advice. The main objectives specified in the CGIAR Resolution of 1971 can be summarized as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - on the basis of a review of existing national, regional and international research activities, to examine the needs of developing countries for special effort in agricultural research at the international and regional levels; - to attempt to ensure maximum complementarity of international and regional efforts with national efforts in financing and undertaking agricultural research in the future and to encourage full exchange of information among national, regional and international agricultural research centers; - to review the financial and other requirements of those international and regional research activities which the Group considers of high priority, and to consider the provision of finance for those activities, taking into account the need to ensure continuity of research over a substantial period; - to undertake a continuing review of priorities and research networks related to the needs of developing countries, to enable the Group to adjust its support policies to changing needs, and to achieve economy of effort; and - to suggest feasibility studies of specific proposals to reach mutual agreement on how these studies should be undertaken and financed, and to exchange information on the results. <p>It has five areas of focus: sustainable production, enhancing National Agricultural Research Systems NARS, Germplasm Improvement, Germplasm Collection, Policy .</p>
TF Structure and Governance	<p>The <u>CGIAR System</u> is a regularly interacting and interdependent network of independent institutions that form a complex whole, and are committed to a common cause. The primary institutions in the System are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR/the Group); - an independent Science Council; and - 15 international agricultural research Centers. <p>The three components of the CGIAR System are interdependent. They are supported by the Executive Council (ExCo) of the System, a broad range of partners, various standing committees, and the System Office, a "virtual" combination of service units.</p> <p>The Chair of the CGIAR, usually a Vice President of IBRD is nominated by the President of the World Bank to lead the CGIAR, when endorsed by the CGIAR.</p> <p>The Director of the CGIAR, selected through an international search process, who functions as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the CGIAR. He/she heads the CGIAR Secretariat.</p> <p>The "Charter of the CGIAR System" (short form: The Charter) sets down the roles, responsibilities and functions of the main organs of the CGIAR.</p>

	<p>The <u>Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research</u> (CGIAR) created in 1971, is an informal association of sixty-four independent public and private sector Members, from South and North, with the World Bank, FAO, IFAD and UNDP as Cosponsors. The CGIAR fulfils its mission primarily by formulating a research agenda to be carried out through a network of 15 international agricultural research centers.. The CGIAR provides the Centers with strategic guidance, as well as financial support - \$450 million in 2005, all in outright grants. The CGIAR is hosted in the WB at Washington DC. The CGIAR partnership includes 25 developing and 22 industrialized countries, 4 private foundations and 13 regional and international organizations. Today, more than 8,500 CGIAR scientists and staff are working in 100 countries. Thirteen of the Centres are headquartered in developing countries.</p>
Beneficiary	The direct beneficiaries are the 15 research centres.
Programme Background & History	<p>The CGIAR grew out of the initial international response to widespread concern in the 1950s, 60s, and early years of the '70s that many developing countries would succumb to famine. Such grim predictions were proved wrong by a combination of connected trends: reorientation of domestic policies in developing countries that were considered particularly vulnerable, sharply focused research by developing country scientists, a great effort by developing country farmers, and the impact of international agricultural research on tropical agriculture.</p> <p>Predictions of "gloom and doom" began to recede and were replaced by hope and optimism that the scope of agricultural transformation could be extended worldwide. In an effort to make this happen, a series of high-level consultations were held in Bellagio, Italy and elsewhere. The purpose of these meetings was to explore how best the international community could:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consolidate and spread the benefits of agricultural research and agricultural transformation globally; - Respond to the urging of the "Pearson Commission on International Development" for an "intensive international effort" to support "research specializing in food supplies and tropical agriculture;" - Protect and strengthen the four international agricultural research centers established with the support of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and their partners. <p>Participants in these meetings invited the World Bank, which had already created a "consultative groups" to coordinate and support development in individual countries, to set up a consultative group for international agricultural research. The World Bank accepted the challenge, and led the effort to create the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). FAO and UNDP worked with the World Bank as cosponsors. IFAD has since joined the group of cosponsors. (UNEP joined the group of cosponsors in 1995 but subsequently withdrew. It remains a member of the CGIAR.) The inaugural meeting of the CGIAR was held on May 19, 1971 at the World Bank.</p>

GFATM

Full Title	The Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis, Malaria
Channel	WB
Ref.	TF n°050676 and latter n°069001
Country/Region	world wide
TF Start date	2001
TF End date	-
TF Budget and type (indicative)	\$9.7B pledged \$5.3B disbursed as December 2006 ⁵ About half from EDF and half from Commission's budget with a growing share of EDF funds.
EC Start date	2003
EC Contribution and type	€443m

⁵ GFATM Partners in Impact Results report 2006

TF Objectives	The purpose of the Fund is to attract, manage and disburse additional resources through a new public-private partnership that will make a sustainable and significant contribution to the reduction of infections, illness and death, thereby mitigating the impact caused by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in countries in need, and contributing to poverty reduction as part of the Millennium Development Goals. ⁶
Beneficiary	People infected and directly affected by the three diseases.
Programme Background & History	GFATM was identified following very high level initiatives such as the G8 Summit in July 2000 in Okinawa and Kofi Anan UN Secretary General appeal in early 2001. The Commission has been a founding member of the GFATM. It actively participated in the setting up of the Fund through the Transitional Working Group [as the Director general of AIDCO was seating at this Transitional Group], established in Brussels in 2001, as well as in the definition of the governance of GFATM through the Board, where it seats. The GFATM Board had its first meeting in January 2002 where it adopted the GFATM "Framework document". Less than one year later, the GFATM made its first disbursement.
TF structure & Governance	The Board meets at least twice annually for grant approval. It is composed of representatives of donors and recipients. The Commission is a voting member, and also represents Belgium, Portugal and Finland. The Technical Review Panel (TRP) composed of independent experts, assesses the applications made to the GFATM. At country level, the Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) composed of representatives of public, private and civil society organisations is responsible for the project identification and proposal to the TRP.

HIPC TF

Full Title	Highly Indebted Poor Country Trust Fund (HIPC TF)
Channel	WB
Ref.	-
Country/Region	Worldwide (mainly ACP countries)
TF Start date	1996
TF End date	-
TF Budget and type (indicative)	\$3.6B
EC Start date	1999
EC Contribution and type	€1.6B for the HIPC Initiative. This amount is the commitment from the Commission as a creditor (through the EIB: €680M) and the Commission as a donor (through the HIPC TF €934m)
TF Objectives	The HIPC TF was created by the WB and the IMF to gather the contribution of the multilateral, bilateral and commercial creditors/donors in order to purchase and cancel the external debt of the highly indebted poor countries.
Beneficiary	Government of the HIPCs and indirectly the local people
Programme Background & History	In-depth information on the EC contribution to the HIPC Initiative can be found in Annex 5. The HIPC TF is part of a broader international movement for the debt reduction of the poor countries called the HIPC Initiative. The diagram below explains the dynamic between institutions and HIPCountries:

⁶ GFATM Framework document, First Board Meeting January 2002

	<p>The HIPC Initiative started in 1996 and was enhanced in 1999. It is still in application in 2007. Another mechanism has been introduced in 2005, the MDRI (Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative), to cancel (and not only reduce) the debt of poor countries.</p> <p>The HIPC Trust Fund was created by the WB and the IMF to have an adequate financing of the HIPC Initiative. It is administered by the WB and gathers the contribution of the multilateral, bilateral and commercial creditors/donors on a voluntary basis. The Trust Fund either purchases and cancels the debt, or services it when repayment is due. The Commission is an important donor to the HIPC TF.</p> <p>One should not forget that the Commission contributes to the HIPC Initiative through the EIB in its role of creditor and not as a donor such as above for the HIPC Trust Fund. Within the HIPC Initiative framework, the Commission and the EIB work together on the basis of Conventions signed by both parties and technical administrative provisions for implementation. The Commission contributions through the EIB, as a creditor, are mainly to reduce ACP countries debt that they have vis-à-vis the Commission (in the form of EIB risk capital loans and special loans).</p>
TF structure and Governance	In order to receive funds from the HIPC Trust Fund, countries must complete several conditionality. These conditionality are discussed and decided at the joint WB and IMF Board and it takes the decision whether a countries can benefit from the HIPC TF funds or not. The Commission does not take part in this Board.

AFLEG

Full Title	Support to the Africa forest law enforcement and governance (AFLEG) process
Channel	WB
Ref.	TF 051872
Country/Region	Africa
TF Start date	14 April 2003
TF End date	31 July 2004
TF Budget and type (indicative)	€943,983 Contributions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WB: €179,118 - USDOS: €195,940 - GoG France: €68,578 - GoG UK: €150,000

	- Swiss: €24,492 - EC: €500,000
EC Start date	2003
EC Contribution and type	€0.5m– Grant (Budget resources: B7 6200 02/634)
TF Objectives	The general objective of the TF is to improve forest governance in Africa – in particular the enforcement of forest laws and combating illegal logging and associated trade-.
Beneficiary	Government: African Ministers responsible for forest management, producer African governments, consumer country governments, development organisations and donor programs, international and local environmental NGOs, responsible private sector organizations.
Programme Background & History	Forests are central to growth in many developing countries. However, mismanagement of these resources –and mainly illegal logging- entails huge losses for the governments. An AFLEG preparatory meeting was held in Brazzaville in 2002 where the participants expressed their commitments to the concept and process. It was agreed that a proposal for a Ministerial-level conference where the process would be launched and an AFLEG Declaration would be endorsed. This declaration will confirm governmental and other stakeholders' will and commitment to address illegal activities.
TF structure & Governance	-

PSNP in Ethiopia

Full Title	Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP)
Channel	WB
Ref.	9 ACP ET 12, 9 ACP ET 22 (following Amendment in 2007). WB reference TF 70327
Country/Region	Ethiopia
TF Start date	30/11/2004
TF End date	31/12/2010
TF Budget and type (indicative)	Annual budget of € 220 M The donors commitments for the TF, in \$ M: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CIDA: 123 (for 4 years) - DCI: 20 (first 3 years) - DFID: 82 (first 2 years) - EC: 79 (first 2 years) - USAID: 40 in-kind equivalent per year - WB: 70 (first 18 months) - WFP: 36 in-kind equivalent per year
EC Start date	25/10/2005
EC Contribution and type	€98m (€ 78 M from EDF (€ 60 M in 2005 + € 18 M in 2007) + €20 M from the Food Security Budget Line). The EC contribution's breakdown is as follow: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EC-WB Administrative Agreement for the SNP Trust Fund: € 97 200 000 - Audit : € 300 000 - Evaluation and related studies: € 500 000
TF Objectives	The TF objective is to support the GoE Safety Nets Programme (SNP) which is a reform programme for meeting the Poverty and Hunger MDG in Ethiopia. The TF aims at improving the food security of the chronically food insecure population and reducing the dependency of the country on Food Aid.

Beneficiary	<p>The final beneficiaries of the TF are the food insecure population of Ethiopia (4.83 million people during the first year of the programme implementation, 7.2 million after the second year of implementation).</p> <p>Indirect beneficiaries are the local government (woredas) and national ministries</p>
Programme Background & History	<p>The problem of food insecurity in Ethiopia has become worse in recent years and in 2004, the GoE has decided to tackle the needs of the chronically food insecure households via a productive safety net system financed through multi-year predictable resources rather than through a system of emergency food aid. On this basis, and within the framework of the national Food Security Programme, the GoE has developed a new Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) aiming at reducing food insecurity and shift the financing of food aid to development-oriented grants. The programme addresses not only immediate food insecurity, but also contribute to addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity. Through the provision of cash transfer rather than food, the programme enables smallholders to increase consumption and investment levels and stimulate the development of rural markets. This programme was developed by intensive collaboration between the GoE and the Joint Donor Group including the EC, WB, DCI, USAid, CIDA and DFID.</p> <p>Within this context, the EC has signed a Financing Agreement with the GoE which entered into force on October 2005 and specified a financial contribution of € 60 M (+ € 18 M following amendment in January 2007 + € 20M from Food Security Budget line) to be administrated by the WB through a multi donor trust fund. An EC-WB Administration Agreement for this multi donor trust fund was signed in 2005 (and a second for the additional contributions of the EC in 2007. The programme comprises three major components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - conditional transfers, labour intensive public works, which ensure that adequate and timely transfers are to the identified beneficiaries. - Unconditional transfers, direct support, which ensure that adequate and timely transfers are delivered to most vulnerable households who are labour-poor and are not in a position to participate in public works. - Institutional support – capacity building in order to strengthen institutional structures to deliver transfers effectively, to maximize productive aspects and to monitor adequately the progress.
TF structure & Governance	<p>The multi donor trust fund has been established by the WB for the purpose of channelling donor funds to the Safety Net Programme (SNP). The EC has signed an Administrative Agreement with the WB for the management of its contribution to the SNP trust fund and this fund is managed, monitored and audited in accordance with the Trust Fund and Cofinancing Framework Agreement between the EC and the WB signed on November 2001 and revised on March 2003. The financial contributions from the multi donor TF, from the GoE and from other donors preferring direct financing, are pooled in a common account managed by the GoE according to its rules and procedures. A MoU has been signed between the donors and the GoE and defines the common flow of funds mechanism and regulate the management of donor financial resources. The MoU also guides the common arrangements for coordination, reviews, monitoring and supervision of the SNP. A Joint Coordination Committee has been set up, comprising both Government and donors, in order to closely follow the implementation of the programme. They meet every six month.</p>

PRSC in Vietnam

Full Title	Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC3)																			
Channel	WB																			
Ref.	ASIE/2004/016-769																			
Country/Region	Vietnam																			
TF Start date	2001																			
TF End date	2011																			
TF Budget and type (indicative)	<p>The PRSC has started with 5 operations comprising the first PRSC cycle 1-5 (end in 2006). The second PRSC cycle 6-10 covers a five year period and runs until 2011.</p> <p>For the first 4 cycles the budget of commitments and disbursement is as follow:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Operation</th> <th>Committed (USD M)</th> <th>Disbursed (USD M)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>PRSC 1 (I)</td> <td>170</td> <td>150</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PRSC 1 (II)</td> <td>123</td> <td>122</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PRSC 2</td> <td>130</td> <td>123</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PRSC 3</td> <td>113</td> <td>106</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PRSC 4</td> <td>225</td> <td>218</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Source: World Bank (2006)</i></p>		Operation	Committed (USD M)	Disbursed (USD M)	PRSC 1 (I)	170	150	PRSC 1 (II)	123	122	PRSC 2	130	123	PRSC 3	113	106	PRSC 4	225	218
Operation	Committed (USD M)	Disbursed (USD M)																		
PRSC 1 (I)	170	150																		
PRSC 1 (II)	123	122																		
PRSC 2	130	123																		
PRSC 3	113	106																		
PRSC 4	225	218																		
EC Start date	The Commission started to finance the PRSC at the third cycle, in 2004 (PRSC 3)																			
EC Contribution and type	<p>The Commission is contributing through a SDTF administered by the WB for the following amounts:</p> <p>PRSC 3: € 15 M PRSC 4: € 8 M PRSC 5: € 9 M PRSC 6: € 20 M</p>																			
TF Objectives	<p>The overall objective of the project is reduced poverty and sustained growth in Vietnam through support for the implementation of reforms as envisaged in the Government's Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 2001 – 2010 (CPRGS). The purpose of the project is to foster the implementation of Vietnam 's Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) by providing budgetary support as well as technical assistance to improve public financial management and build capacity of strategic institutions.</p>																			
Beneficiary	<p>The Government of Vietnam and more specifically the State Bank of Vietnam , Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and Investment, State Audit of Vietnam</p>																			
Programme Background & History	<p>The World Bank started supporting the GoV reform programme explained in the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) since 2001 with a PRSC. This instrument is the only general budget support operation in Vietnam which was initially established in a five years cycle. The World Bank led the process with donors co-financing the operations by channelling their funds through a SDTF agreement with the WB. Policy actions are discussed by all donors participating over the preparatory phase and credit is given to the GoV for the reforms achieved during the previous year.</p> <p>A new cycle to support GoV's Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-2010 (SEDP) has started with the PRSC 6. After an assessment of the SEDP by the donors, they fully supported the GoV strategy and have stated their commitment to align their development assistance programmes with the SEDP's content and approach.</p>																			
TF structure & Governance	<p>The Commission has participated in this joint-donor mechanism as from 2004 by contributing to the PRSC 3, to provide its general untargeted budget support for the implementation of the Government's CPRGS. The instrument used the channel the Commission funds was through a SDTF administered by the WB. From 2008, the Commission has decided to support directly the GoV without channelling their funds through a WB SDTF. However, the approach and the joint coordinated approach between the donors will remain the same and still be led by the WB.</p>																			

PFM in Vietnam

Full Title	Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Support of Public Financial Management Modernisation in Vietnam (PFM)
Channel	WB
Ref.	TF n°50960
Country/Region	Vietnam
TF Start date	2003
TF End date	2006, extended to December 2007
TF Budget and type (indicative)	USD 4.3m (increased from the original amount of USD 1.7m with new participation of the Commission and SIDA in 2005) financed by 8 donors: Canada, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, the UK and EC
EC Start date	2005
EC Contribution and type	€1.5m
TF Objectives	The objective of the MDTF PFM is to support the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to improve and to enhance effectiveness of public financial management and implement the Public Financial Management Modernisation Programme.
Beneficiary	The Ministry of Finance of Vietnam
Programme Background & History	<p>The GoV has engaged a Public Administration Reform Master programme for 2001-2010 and one component of the reform is the Public Financial Management Reform Initiative. This initiative includes five main areas of reform in budget management, tax administration, debt management, fiscal risk management of the state owned enterprises and management of public assets.</p> <p>Within this reform, the GoV is supported since 2003 by a number of donors (listed here above) which have pooled their funds into a MDTF administered by the WB.</p>
TF structure & Governance	<p>The grants from the donors are pooled into a MDTF administered by the WB. These grants are used for the following activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - strengthening of the MoF's capacity in the carrying out and implementation of selected reforms under the PFM reform. - Strengthening of the MoF's capacity in planning, implementing and operation new policies and processes to reform management related to selected areas under the PFM reform. - Strengthening of the MoF's capacity in managing technical assistance programs in support of the PFM reform. <p>These activities are implemented through consultant's services, studies, surveys, workshops and in-country training; overseas training and study tours.</p>

HEMA in Vietnam

Full Title	Support to the Health Care Fund for the Poor under the Health Care Support to the Poor in the Northern Uplands and Central Highlands Project (HEMA)
Channel	WB
Ref.	ASIE/2006/123-578
Country/Region	Vietnam
TF Start date	5 July 2006
TF End date	December 2010
TF Budget and type (indicative)	€ 11 M SDTF administered by the WB
EC Start date	5 July 2006
EC Contribution and type	€ 11 M
TF Objectives	The TF objective is to assist the selected fund holders to purchase defined health packages to be delivered to the targeted population in the project provinces.
Beneficiary	The Ministry of Health, the Health Care Fund for the Poor and population of the Northern

	Uplands and Central Highlands
Programme Background & History	<p>The TF administered by the WB is one component of broader Commission project for Health Care Support to the Poor in the Northern Uplands and Central Highlands. The purpose of this Commission project is to ensure the provision of high quality preventive, curative and promotive care in the respective regions. This project support the effective implementation of the GoV's strategy for the provision of health care for the poor.</p> <p>This project was designed by the Commission to build up a sustained reform through temporary technical assistance (first component of the project directly financed by the Commission) and complementary financial support (second component of the project financed by the Commission but administered by the WB) through the support of the Health Care Fund for the Poor.</p> <p>A Financing Agreement was signed in 2006 between the GoV and the Commission encompassing both components. The AA was then signed between the Commission and the WB for the implementation of the second component.</p>
TF structure & Governance	<p>The SDTF administered by the WB is thus part of a Commission project and has to assist the selected fund holders to purchase the defined health package, in accordance with the approved Overall Work Plan and Annual Work Plans and Budgets prepared by the Commission TA.</p> <p>In the AA, the allocation of the funds through the TF is described as follow:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 60% of the grant will be allocated through contracting of health packages provided at the commune level - 20% of the grant will be allocated through contracting of health packages provided at the district level - 20 % of the grant will be allocated through contracting of health packages provided at a multi-sectoral level. <p>However, since the signing of the AA in 2006, no funds of yet been disbursed from the WB SDTF.</p>

TFF/VCF in Vietnam

Full Title	Support to the Vietnam Trust Fund for Forest (TFF) and Support to the Vietnam Conservation Fund (VCF)
Channel	WB
Ref.	TF N°054119 (including TF N°054120 and TF N°054122)
Country/Region	Vietnam
TF Start date	2005
TF End date	2009
TF Budget and type (indicative)	€ 2 850 000 of which € 2 000 000 for the Vietnam Conservation Fund (the recipient-executed part) and € 850 000 for the Vietnam Trust Fund for Forest (the Bank-executed part)
EC Start date	2005
EC Contribution and type	€ 2 850 000 divided between the recipient-executed TF and the Bank-executed TF, as mentioned here above.
TF Objectives	<p>The objectives of the Bank-executed TF are to support the WB work in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - carrying-out a Forest Sector Fiscal and Financial Analysis with the aim to create a platform for a sector-wide or programmatic approach to forest sector financing; and - carrying out diagnostic studies and capacity building on the issues of forest law enforcement and governance (FLEG) as part of the Forest Sector Support Program <p>The objectives of the Recipient-executed TF are to achieve effective management and conservation of Special Use Forests (SUFs) of international importance and to improve the conservation of biodiversity of these SUFs through funding support to the Vietnam Conservation Fund.</p>
Beneficiary	The Forest Conservation Department in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Vietnam (MARD); the Forest Sector Support Programme Coordinating Office
Programme Background &	The two TF financed by the Commission is part of an overall programme managed by the GoV. This programme is called the Forest Sector Support Programme (FSSP) and its overall objective

History	<p>is "the sustainable management of forests and the conservation of biodiversity to achieve: a) protection of the environment, b) improved livelihoods of people in forest dependant areas, and c) enhanced contribution of forestry to the national economy."</p> <p>The FSSP is a partnership between Government of Vietnam and 24 national and international organisations to support implementation of the Government's national forest development strategy and encourage harmonization of support to the forestry sector.</p> <p>A TF for Forest had been created by 4 donors (Dutch, Finnish, Swedish and Switzerland) and implemented by the GoV to support the FSSP. At the time the Commission was not contributing any funds but was a member of the donor partnership to support the forestry sector. In 2003, the Commission had € 3 M remaining fund from its rural development programme and started to investigate how to use it in order to support the forest sector. Three options were envisaged:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - provide the funds directly to the GoV - implement a traditional project approach - channel funds through the WB which was already supporting the forest conservation fund and institutional capacity building. <p>At the time, the Commission was not in favour of the traditional project approach but more favourable for budget support or SWAp. However, the Commission procedures did not allow the direct transfer of funds to the GoV and therefore the only option left was to channel the funds through the WB.</p>
TF structure & Governance	<p>The Commission signed in 2005 a Financing Agreement with the GoV encompassing the two components of the Commission project to support the Forest Sector Development, i.e. support to the Conservation Fund and support to the TF for Forest. The FA mentions that the funds will be channelled through to WB SDTF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Bank-executed TF where the grants shall be used for expenses for consultants' services, workshops and training. - The recipient-executed TF where the grants shall be used to fund sub-grants under the Special Use Forest component of the Forest Sector Development project.

FEMIP Support Fund

Full Title	The Support Fund for the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
Channel	EIB
Ref.	-
Country/Region	MEDA
Start date	2003
End date	Ongoing
TF Budget and type (indicative)	€105m for the period 2003-2006
EC Start date	2003
EC Contribution and type	€105m (Commission is only financer) - Grant
TF Objectives	<p>The purpose of the Fund is to accept and make use of grant funds provided by the Commission under the MEDA regulation in support of EIB's investment activities in Med Countries within the framework of FEMIP. Activities being financed under the Fund support beneficiaries in Med Countries during different stages of the project cycle that is, project identification, preparation, and implementation, excluding self-standing activities without any link to a potential Project. (Source, <i>Framework Agreement concerning the management of the FEMIP Support Fund, 2003</i>).</p>
Beneficiary	<p>The FEMIP Technical Assistance Support Fund provides technical assistance linked to EIB-loans for individual borrowers (for project identification, preparation, implementation / management and evaluation of projects) and for financial intermediaries (for improving procedures in the context of global loan operations, risk management, or setting up private equity funds).</p>
Programme Background & History	<p>The EIB has been active in the Mediterranean countries since the seventies, as part of the cooperation agreements between the EU and individual countries in the Mediterranean region. In 1995, the Barcelona process gave a new impulse to the EU-cooperation with the Mediterranean region. In 1997, the individual EIB mandates were replaced by a general mandate for the region,</p>

	<p>the EUROMED mandate, focussing on infrastructure and private sector development. The Barcelona European Council on March 15, 2002 stressed the need to stimulate private sector development in the Mediterranean partner countries, to help them achieve a higher level of economic growth. The Council decided to establish the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), to support private sector investments through increased lending to the private sector and support to the creation of an enabling environment. The FEMIP facility bundles all resources available to Mediterranean countries which are financed or managed by the EIB, such as EIB-loans (both with and without EU budget guarantee) and EU-budget resources for technical assistance, risk capital and interest rate subsidies for environmental projects. Furthermore, a dialogue structure (Policy Dialogue Coordination Committee - PDCC) was introduced, which included both Mediterranean partner countries and EU-member states.</p> <p>In September 2003, the <u>FEMIP Support Fund</u> has been created as the Technical Assistance Component (TA) of FEMIP. The component is managed by the EIB to support activities linked to potential or existing investment projects. (Sources: <i>Commission Staff working document. Assessment of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership and Future Options, 2006</i>, and <i>Mid-term Evaluation of the FEMIP Support Fund, 2007</i>).</p>
TF structure & Governance	<p>The activities of the FEMIP Support Fund are coordinated by a Technical Assistance Unit within the Mediterranean/FEMIP Department at the EIB. It is responsible inter alia for liaison activities with the European Commission on the Implementation of the Framework Agreement, the organisation of the tender process and the support of EIB staff during the whole cycle of TA operations on procedural, contractual and administrative matters.</p> <p>Each year, a request for a yearly Allocation needs to be submitted by the EIB to the Commission for approval. For each yearly Allocation, the Commission and EIB need to sign an Implementation Agreement. The eligibility of each Individual Activity needs to be submitted to the approval of the Commission (Sources: <i>Mid-term Evaluation of the FEMIP Support Fund, 2007</i> and <i>Framework Agreement concerning the management of the FEMIP Support Fund, 2003</i>).</p>

EIB Interest rate subsidies - MEDA

Full Title	EIB interest rate subsidies in MEDA countries
Channel	EIB
Ref.	
Country/Region	MEDA
Start date	1992
End date	-
Budget and type (indicative)	€155m were committed by the Commission and paid to the EIB during the evaluation period 1999-2006 ⁷
EC Start date	1992
EC Contribution and type	See above: €155m
Objectives	<p>Interest rate subsidies aim at reducing the cost of long-term investments in the environment sector, leading to increased EIB lending levels in the region's environmental sector. They also aim at offering the leverage to encourage gradual policy reform through increased potential for project conditionality.</p> <p>(Source: <i>Analysis of EIB operations under the External Lending Mandate 2000-2006, Annex 2, p19</i>)</p>
Beneficiary	Beneficiaries of loans for environmental projects
Programme Background & History	The Commission provides interest rate subsidies in support of EIB loans in the Mediterranean for more than two decades. In 1992, a Convention between the Commission and the EIB defined implementation and financial management rules, for the EIB to carry out these interest rate

⁷ This amount does not include operations which have been closed before December 31, 2006, although these are not expected to change significantly the picture. Source: *Evaluation team analysis on preliminary working data from EuropeAid, interview with Commission representatives.*

	<p>subsidies. In 1996, the MEDA Regulation (amended in 2000), the successor of the Financial Protocols, specified further rules. Since then, interest rate subsidies have been made available to all Mediterranean partners but are applied only to loans in the field of the environment. Each subsidy must be treated as an EC project financed on the bilateral cooperation envelope, programmed by RELEX and with an individual financing decision (on its own as in the past, or as part of the annual plan for a given country).</p> <p><i>(Source: Inventory Note)</i></p> <p>These subsidies are financed via the national indicative programs for individual countries (MEDA country allocations).</p> <p><i>(Source: Assessment of the FEMIP and Future Options - 2006, p12)</i></p> <p>Since MEDA II, the interest rate subsidy is equal to 50% of the market rate, but will not be superior to 3%.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p 11 and p viii)</i></p>
Structure & Governance	<p>The so-called "Article 14 Committee" is a committee consisting of the representatives of the MS, chaired by the representative of the MS currently holding the chair of the Board of Governors of the EIB. Its secretariat is provided by the EIB. A representative of the Commission shall take part to the proceedings. The EIB shall submit to the Article 14 Committee, for its opinion, proposals for subsidised loans in the field of environment (and for risk capital operations). The Commission representative shall convey to that committee the position of his institution on the project concerned, and in particular its conformity with the objectives of the MEDA regulation and with the general guidelines adopted by the Council. Discussions are held on individual projects, related to risk capital and interest subsidies. They are organized by the EIB around four times a year, and are held in Luxemburg.</p> <p><i>(Sources: Inventory Note, Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii)</i></p>

EIB Risk capital operations in ACP (Lomé IV Convention)

Full Title	EIB risk capital operations under the Lomé IV Convention
Channel	EIB
Ref.	-
Country/Region	ACP countries
Start date	1990
End date	2003
Budget and type (indicative)	The EDF funds managed by the EIB under the Lomé IV Convention amounted to €2.13B for the entire period 1990-2003 (first and second financial protocols). Note. In addition, the Lomé IV Convention foresaw an envelope of €2.86B EIB own resources.
EC Start date	1990 to 2003
EC Contribution and type	€0.52B payments by the Commission to the EIB on EDF funds during the evaluation period 1999-2006, consisting in €0.40B from the 8 th EDF and €0.12B from the 7 th EDF <i>(Source: OLAS)</i> .
Objectives	Risk capital operations financed by EU MS via EDF resources under the mandate of the Lomé IV Convention ⁸
Beneficiary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For individual and global loans: final beneficiaries ▪ For global loans: financial intermediaries
Programme Background & History	<p>The EIB has been called on over the years to finance projects outside the EU on the basis of mandates handed down by the European Council on a proposal from the Commission or by the MS (in the successive conventions with the ACP countries).</p> <p><i>(Source : EIB Group Activity Report 2005)</i></p> <p>The Lomé IV Convention covers a 10-year period with two financial protocols - A and B - covering 5 years each, to which correspond respectively the 7th and 8th EDF. The projects under the Lomé IV Convention could be financed through the EIB by risk capital from the EDF, or by</p>

⁸ Objective of the Lomé IV Convention: "to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States and to consolidate and diversify their relations in a spirit of solidarity and mutual interest".

	<p>loans from the EIB's own resources (OR) - or jointly by both of these financial instruments. In total, the EIB received a mandate to provide up to €4.98B of funds to the ACP countries, of which €2.13B from EDF resources for risk capital and the remainder from EIB's own resources. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV)</p> <p>The EIB financed under the Lomé IV Convention 410 projects, covering 536 operations, of which 397 from risk capital resources. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p13)</p> <p>Loans from risk capital (EDF funds) have to bear an interest rate below 3%. Concerning equity investments from risk capital, it is allowed to ask for a performance related remuneration that also considers risks and other commercial considerations. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p13, p27, EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV, p29)</p> <p>The EIB financing has represented between 7% and 47% of the individual loans' cost in the sample of projects evaluated in the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, the remainder coming from other banks or partners. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p13, p27)</p> <p>EIB informants specify that the MS are channelling 7th-8th EDF resources to the Commission to be transferred to the EIB. The Commission has hereby a role of "financial transfer". (Source: Meeting notes 28)</p>
Structure and Governance	-

Annex 4 – Data collection grid for the selection of interventions

The information provided in the data collection grid below was gathered at the level of the indicators and judgment criteria for the interventions or clusters of interventions analysed during the desk phase and country missions. It provides the facts used for answering to the Evaluation Questions which are presented in the main report. It is displayed in a basic, unprocessed form. As explained in the main report, it is important to note that the aim is to gather information that can serve as a basis for conducting a general evaluation of the Commission aid delivery through development banks and the EIB and not to conduct specific “evaluations” of each single intervention.

To facilitate the reading, a list of the abbreviations of the interventions and interventions clusters analysed in the desk phase and country missions is provided here.

Abbreviations used in the text	Name of the selection of interventions
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
PFMR	The Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund in West-Bank and Gaza
TFET	Trust Fund for East Timor
WB ITF	World Bank Iraq Trust Fund
MDF	Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (post-tsunami)
CGIAR	The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
GFATM	The Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis, Malaria
HIPC TF	Highly Indebted Poor Country World Bank Trust Fund
AFLEG	Support to the Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance process
PSNP (Ethiopia)	Productive Safety Nets Programme
PRSC (Vietnam)	Poverty Reduction Support Credits
PFM (Vietnam)	Public Financial Management Modernisation in Vietnam
HEMA (Vietnam)	Support to the Health Care Fund for the Poor under the Health Care Support to the Poor in the Northern Uplands and Central Highlands Project
TFF/VCF (Vietnam)	Support to the Vietnam Trust Fund for Forest and Support to the Vietnam Conservation Fund
FEMIP Support Fund	The Support Fund for the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
Interest rate subsidies MEDA	Interest rate subsidies in MEDA countries through the European Investment Bank
Risk capital Lomé IV	Risk capital operations under the Lomé IV Convention through the European Investment Bank

EQ1	To what extent are decisions to channel aid explicitly motivated and based on formal guidance criteria (guidelines, policies, Communications...)? Do these formal guidance criteria provide the rationale for the observed evolution of channelled aid?
	<i>EQ 1 on Guiding Criteria</i>
JC 1.1	<i>Prior to the decision, a comprehensive and documented analysis of the intervention's objectives and functioning has taken place</i>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>The EIB has been called on over the years to finance projects outside the EU on the basis of mandates handed down by the European Council on a proposal from the Commission or by the MS (in the successive conventions with the ACP countries).</p> <p><i>(Source : EIB Group Activity Report 2005)</i></p> <p>The Lomé IV Convention, signed in 1989 and amended in 1995, is an ACP-EC cooperation underpinned by a legally binding system. It covers a 10-year period with two financial protocols - A and B - covering 5 years each, to which correspond respectively the 7th and 8th EDF.</p> <p>The projects under the Lomé IV Convention could be financed through the EIB by risk capital from the EDF, or by loans from the EIB's own resources (OR) - or jointly by both of these financial instruments.</p> <p><i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV and EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV)</i></p>
HIPC TF	The HIPC Initiative is the outcome of a request of the G7 summit of 1996 to the Bretton Woods Institutions that they design a mechanism to tackle the indebtedness of poor countries. Such a mechanism was actually proposed in September 1996 by the IMF and the World Bank, then revised in 1999 as Enhanced HIPC Initiative.
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>For the Commission's contribution to the PRSC and to the PFM, no documented analysis has been carried out before the decision to channel. The Commission has joined later the initiatives launched by the WB and other donors in the case of the PRSC (Commission first contribution was for the PRSC 3 in 2004 whereas PRSC started in 2001) and the PFM (Commission contributed in 2005 whereas the MDTF was created in 2003). According to stakeholders met, the decision to channel funds to these two TF was justified by a more global context of budget support and international commitments such as the Paris Declaration.</p> <p>At the time, direct budget support to the GoV was not an option for the Commission. The Delegation was also encouraged by HQ to work with the WB. In the context of PRSC, the WB was the initiator of the programme and other donors rapidly followed. The WB had also other specific advantages such as its capacity to manage large TF, its expertise in public financial management, its fiduciary risk management and its major role in Vietnam (one of the largest donor with the ADB and Japan). For the Commission, it was an opportunity to join an existing structure for providing "indirect" budget support and intervene in the policy dialogue.</p> <p>For the TFF/VCF, a detailed identification fiche had been drafted by the Delegation before the decision describing the rationale for the financing of the project and detailing the options for the implementation. Three options were envisaged:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - provide the funds directly to the GoV - implement a traditional project approach - channel funds through the WB which was already supporting the forest conservation fund and institutional capacity building. <p>At the time, the Commission was not in favour of the traditional project approach but more favourable for budget support or SWAp. However, the Commission procedures did not allow the direct transfer of funds to the GoV and therefore the only option left was to channel the funds through the WB.</p> <p>For HEMA, no documented analysis has been carried out before the decision to channel the funds through the WB for one, out of two, specific component (support to the Health Care Funds to the poor) of a more broader Commission project. The Commission had design the project and contrary to the GoV will, the project included the channel of funds through the WB. According to stakeholders met, the reasons were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the fiduciary risk management offered by the WB - the expected absorptive capacity of the WB because without the TF mechanisms, the funds would not have been contracted in time (time pressure because of the D+3 rule) - Expected harmonisation (the Commission hoped that other donors would join the initiative) <p><i>Source: European Commission, Identification fiche for the « Support to the Forestry Sector in Vietnam », 2004</i> <i>Source: MN 70; MN 71; MN 72; MN 76; MN 89</i></p>

I-1.1.1	Existence of documents, preceding the decision, which justify the decision
ARTF	<p>EU support for Afghanistan is set firmly within the context of the December 2001 Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan. The December 2001, April-July-December 2002 General Affairs Councils agreed on a number of overall objectives for the EU and the Commission in Afghanistan. At the January 2002 Tokyo conference, the Commission pledged about €1B over five years in support of Afghanistan (including, among others, for the ARTF).</p> <p>A preliminary needs assessment has been prepared by the WB-UNDP-ADB. (Source: CSP 2003-2006)</p> <p>The then RELEX Commissioner Chris Patten pledged €1B EC aid for Afghanistan for 2002-2006 at the Tokyo Conference in 2002. Interviewees indicate that this decision to participate was taken by the RELEX Commissioner (and not the DCE), as it was done when AIDCO was still in an early stage, and at the start of the deconcentration process. (Source: MN 29)</p> <p>Interviewees indicate that there was neither a real documented analysis (such as feasibility studies, etc.) at the Commission nor formal justification for participating to the ARTF. It appeared at the time that having a sound public administration was a top priority (for the Commission as well as for other donors), and that the ARTF was the best option to ensure it. There have been some internal discussions within the Commission at the time to participate or not. An alternative was direct budget support to the Government, but this was not deemed appropriate by the Commission or by other donors.</p> <p>Formal acceptance was realised through the formal screening process through a DCE financing proposal. It is unusual to document such decision to participate. In addition, it is usually discussed in Kabul. (Source: MN 29)</p>
PFMR	<p>Prior to the decision of the Commission to contribute to the PFMR, the WB had drafted a document untitled: “West Bank and Gaza. Proposed Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund”. This document explains:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the fiscal crisis since 2001 of the PA following the intifada - the rationale for budget support in order to support the PA - the international response on the financial crisis the PA has to face - the rationale for the WB engagement - the proposed PFMR and its implementation and functioning <p>This document is based on the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) carried out by the WB and the IMF in 2003 in which they identified the recent areas of improvement of WB-GS and the areas requiring improvement for future international contributions to WB-GS.</p> <p>The outputs (which are stated in the proposed PFMR TF document) of the CFAA and of the WB expertise and work in WB-GS are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - budget support is the most efficient of all the emergency assistance instruments currently employed by donors, and that it has appreciable macroeconomic and welfare benefits. - the proposed PFMR TF builds on the successful budget support mechanisms of the European Commission (the Special Cash Facility and the Direct Budgetary assistance Programme). Lessons from this assistance form an integral part of the design of the PFMR TF, which would extend a similar mechanism to a wider set of donors. - <i>“the request by the PA, and its endorsement by donors, reflect the view that the WB has the capacity and global reach to lead an international effort in support of the PA’s budget”</i>. The WB justify that by stating that the <i>“WB has gained extensive experience in administering multi-donor trust funds. In the WB-GS the WB administered the Hols Fund from 1994 to 2001; this instrument served as the main conduit for PA budget support in its start-up years. This expertise would be brought to bear in the administration of the PFMR”</i>. <p>Source: WB, <i>“West Bank and Gaza. Proposed Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund”</i>.(2003)</p>
TFET	<p>In September 1999, a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to East Timor (called now Timor-Leste) was carried out by the WB, the UN, the European Commission, the ADB, the IMF and five other donor countries. The results of this JAM were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the identification of priority short-term reconstruction initiatives in eight sectors (economic management, civil service, community empowerment, justice system, agriculture, infrastructure, health and education)

- **the provision of estimation of external financing needs** (according to the JAM, a total of \$307M over three years was needed, (see p14 of the JAM report))
- **a proposition to create two trust funds**, one administered by the UN (to support the civil service and selected project-based capacity-building initiatives) and one administered by the WB (to cover project-based reconstruction activities in economic management, health, community empowerment, agriculture and infrastructure).

As explained in annex 1 of the *Report of the joint assessment mission to East Timor*: “Early deployment of the mission was driven by lessons of other post-conflict countries, where lack of coordination between relief and development planning has delayed the transition from emergency relief to more sustainable development support, and has caused inefficiencies and duplication in the use of external resources”. The document does not provide more details on why it has been decided to intervene through a TF rather than through other means.

In the same line, the WB working paper of November 2002 on *The East Timor Reconstruction Program: Successes, Problems and Tradeoffs* underlined that the JAM:

- Set clear priorities, costings, and a shared understanding on reconstruction priorities between the Timorese and institutions which were to finance reconstruction ;
- Identified clear roles and responsibilities for planning within each international institution;
- Allowed a clear joint approach in planning with both national counterparts and donors;
- Offered a unified presentation of humanitarian reconstruction.

During the **Donor's meetings for the reconstruction of Timor-Leste** (Tokyo in December 1999, Lisbon in June 2000 and Brussels in December 2000):

- **the donors pledged a total of \$523M** in assistance to Timor-Leste over three years. The Commission was the largest contributor (\$50.7M) followed by Portugal (\$50M), Japan (\$28M) Australia (\$12M), the UK and the WB (\$10M each).

Together, the EU (Commission plus Member States) accounted for 69% of contributions received by the TFET. (see p 9 of the Interim Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste)

- **the two trust funds for Timor-Leste were created** (after Tokyo's meeting)

According to the Commission's *Interim Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste* of October 2004 there are also two financing decisions that explain why intervening through the WB TF, but the team has not obtained these documents yet. As reported by the evaluation the main expected advantages for the EC to participate in TFET as specified in the financing proposals were:

- (i) better donor coordination;
- (ii) use of uniform procedures (particularly in administrative matters such as procurement and financing) and the resulting gains in efficiency;
- (iii) elimination of the administrative burden on the EC in a country where it does not have a large ground capacity;
- and (iv) to have a voice in the mechanism in which most donors participate.

Among the drawbacks, the following are mentioned:

- (i) lack of visibility, TFET being seen by all as a World Bank undertaking;
- (ii) assurance that resources will actually be allocated to the EC's priority sectors; and
- (iii) risk that EC funding would be used for procurement from countries normally not eligible for European financing.

In Tokyo, the Commission and the EU have committed themselves to support the reconstruction of Timor-Leste and in October 2000, a **Contribution Agreement** between the Commission and the WB was signed, of an amount of €18.2M to support the WB Trust Fund for East Timor. Four other contribution/administration agreements were signed in 2000, 2001 and 2002 for an additional amount of €36.35M. In total, the Commission has committed a total amount of €55.28M to the TFET. The contribution agreement does not specify why interventions take place through a TF rather than through other means.

Source: “*Report of the Joint Assessment Mission to East Timor*” (1999)

Source: “*East Timor: Contribution Agreement between the European Community and International Development Association*” (2000)

Source: “*Interim Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste*” (2004)

<p>WB ITF</p>	<p>Prior to the decision of the Commission (in 2004) to contribute to the IRRFI and more specifically to the WB Iraq Trust Fund (ITF), the UN and the WB have carried out a Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, in October 2003. The Commission has participated to this joint needs assessment by providing technical experts. Other donors participated: IMF, Australia, Japan, and countries of the European Union.</p> <p>Conclusion of the Joint Iraq Needs Assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identification of 14 priority sectors with the immediate and medium-term priorities: education, health, employment creation, water and sanitation, transport and telecommunications, electricity, housing and land management, urban management, agriculture, water resources, and food security, finance, state-owned enterprises, investment climate, mine action, and government institutions. - Identification of 3 cross-cutting themes with the immediate and medium-term priorities: human rights, gender and the environment - Identification of development priorities for Iraq: Strengthening institutions of sovereign, transparent, and good government; restoring critical infrastructure and core human services destroyed and degraded by years of misrule and conflict; and supporting an economic and social transition that provides both growth and social protection. - Creation of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) in which two TF have been set up: the WB Iraq TF and the UNDG Iraq TF. <p>Following this Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, and the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution n°1511, which allows a multilateral force in Iraq for its reconstruction, a Donors' meeting was organised in Madrid (25th October 2003) to determine the financial commitments of each donors for the reconstruction of Iraq. The EU (Commission + MS) has committed €1.3B (on a total of \$33B committed by all the donors). This EU commitment was beforehand expressed in the Commission Communication COM(2003)575 (prepared on the 1st October 2003) on the Madrid Donor's meeting for the reconstruction of Iraq.</p> <p>Following that commitment, the Commission has drafted an Iraq Assistance Programme in 2004 (since then, two other Iraq assistance programme exist for 2005 and 2006) on the Commission strategy to intervene for the reconstruction of Iraq. It is stated in this document that: <i>"In order to demonstrate the EU's support for the multilateral framework for reconstruction and to contribute to increased aid efficiency, strong donor coordination and a decreased burden on the Iraqi administration, the Commission indicated in its Communication of 1 October 2003, that the majority of EC resources would be channelled through a multi-donor trust fund. This decision also reflected a realistic assessment of the Commission's own capacity to rapidly implement reconstruction assistance in the course of 2004."</i></p> <p><i>Source: United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment (2003)</i> <i>Source: Notes on the Madrid Donors Meeting (2003)</i> <i>Source: United Nations/World Bank. International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Terms of Reference. (2003)</i> <i>Source: European Commission, Iraq Assistance Programme, 2004. COM(2004)667</i> <i>Source: European Commission, Commission Communication on the Madrid Donor's meeting for the reconstruction of Iraq. COM(2003)575</i></p>
<p>MDF</p>	<p>Following the tsunami on 26 December 2004 along the coastal areas of the Aceh province on Sumatra (Indonesia), and further damage due to an earthquake three months later, the Government of Indonesia responded by immediately organizing both overview and relief efforts to ensure as rational and coordinated response as possible.</p> <p>A Damage and Loss Assessment was first produced within a few weeks and presented to the international community mid-January 2005 as the basis for mobilizing external resources. It was led by the Ministry of Planning and the WB on the international community side.</p> <p>The UN, under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, carried out a related assessment in January as background for its FLASH appeal.</p> <p>It is generally agreed that the DLA work was "best practice": international expertise from the UN system, the lending agencies, bilateral donors etc were quickly mobilized and brought into the different working groups. The collaboration between the different actors involved was also seen to be positive and constructive. The Government was recognized to be in charge of the process.</p> <p>The DLA was followed by a more detailed Master Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (MPRR), also led by the Government. The process behind the MPRR was consultative, with a wide range of local stakeholders and public offices being heard. The MPRR was presented on 26 March 2005.</p>

	<p>The international response to the devastation in the region was overwhelming. The Government asked the WB to coordinate the reconstruction assistance. The WB suggested a multi-donor trust fund as the most appropriate instrument, which the Government accepted. The WB began mobilizing support among the donors for a "Multi-donor Trust Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra" (MDTFANS), later simplified to "Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias, MDF". The WB Board on 30 March 2005 formally established what was then the MDTFANS. <i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p45-46)</i></p>
CGIAR	<p>The EC is participating to the CGIAR since 1977. Interviewees explained that till 2000, the EC intervened through individual centres, while as of 2000 it intervened through the WB administered global fund.</p> <p>Annex II of the 2003 Administration Agreement states that: <i>"The CGIAR, with its sixteen International Research Centres continues to be at the forefront of research in the field of food security and natural resources management, including genetic resources"</i>. It also explains that <i>"the Commission and EU Member States highly value the relevance and quality of the strategic research carried out by the CGIAR. They have a long-standing history of support to the system. The present programme proposal is based on the Commission's overall strategy for support to agricultural research, in which the CGIAR plays the key role for strategic and applied research"</i>.</p> <p>The Administration Agreement does not specify for what reasons the EC has decided to intervene through the WB.</p>
GFATM	<p>A joint declaration of the Commission and the Council welcomed the proposal of the UN Secretary General to established the GFATM on the 31 May 2001.</p> <p><i>"The EC and the international community are exploring innovative financing partnerships that may also induce the private sector to mobilise additional investment. This global partnership will co-operate with specialised UN agencies, such as WHO and UNAIDS, to back country based initiatives with demonstrated ability to increase access to, and make effective use of, key commodities and interventions, disseminate lessons learned, inspire others and catalyse more widespread and effective actions."</i></p> <p><i>Source: COM(2000)585, Accelerated action targeted at major communicable diseases within the context of poverty reduction, 20.09.2000</i></p> <p>In the Programme for Action, the section <i>"Identifying the instruments for action"</i> asserts the importance of developing countries' ownership and the need for a change in approach: <i>"To date the Commission has not been successful in developing efficient financial instruments for investing in global initiatives. The use of small-scale thematic budget lines has only partially allowed this gap to be addressed. Global mechanisms might well allow the Commission to increase development spending and lower transaction costs in co-operation with Member States' activities."</i></p> <p><i>Source: COM(2001) 96 - Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction, 21/2/2001</i></p> <p><i>"The Commission will seek to work in close co-operation with the UN, the G8 partners, the World Bank, civil society and EU Member States to, based on each partner's comparative advantage, promote the reform the international financial architecture to enable greater co-ordination, complementarity and efficiency of international funding."</i></p> <p><i>"The European Community will support new approaches to stimulate the development of global public goods targeting the three major communicable diseases."</i></p> <p><i>Source: COM(2001) 96 - Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction, 21/2/2001</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>In 1995, the G7 Summit in which four EU countries participate (France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom) had requested the IMF and the World Bank to design a multilateral approach to tackle the issue of poor countries indebtedness.</p> <p>The IMF and the World Bank responded to this request through the design of the HIPC Initiative, which was adopted by the boards of the two institutions in September 1996.</p> <p>In March 1997 the European Commission presented to the Council and the European Parliament a communication (COM(1997) 0129 Final) on the HIPC Initiative accompanied by a proposal for a Council Decision concerning exceptional assistance for the heavily indebted ACP countries. What was at stake in the</p>

	<p>Commission communication and in the proposal for a Council Decision was involvement in the Initiative of the European Community as a creditor holding claims on ACP countries eligible to the HIPC Initiative.</p> <p>In January 1998, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Commission Communication of March 1997. In this resolution, the Parliament “welcomes the Commission proposal” and “approves European Community participation in this measure [the HIPC Initiative].” The Parliament “strongly agrees with the use of the concept of debt sustainability as the target for the debt reduction initiative, but calls for human development and social indicators to be included in the definition of debt sustainability alongside macroeconomic indicators and the capacity to fulfil obligations punctually.” It “supports the Commission’s proposal for the establishment of a single fund for all instruments, and for this fund to be managed by the EIB in parallel with the HIPC Trust Fund managed by the IDA.”</p> <p>Eventually, the Council adopted on 6 July 1998 a Decision concerning exceptional assistance for the heavily indebted ACP countries, which states that “the European Community shall fully participate in the HIPC Initiative by assisting indebted countries which will qualify for this initiative, with a view to helping them reduce the net present value of their financial obligations towards the Community.” The scope of the Council Decision is clearly restricted to the participation of the Community as a creditor.</p> <p>In October 1998 the Commission presented to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee a new Communication on a Community participation in the debt relief initiative for highly indebted poor countries (COM(1999) 518 Final). This document proposed an enlarged participation of the Community in the HIPC Initiative. Beyond its role as a creditor, the Commission proposed that the Community also participates in the Initiative as a donor and as a major development stakeholder.</p> <p>Following this Communication the EU-ACP Council of Ministers took between 1999 and 2003 several Decisions to provide a large financial support by the EDF to the HIPC Initiative.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>The EIB-FEMIP 2006 Mid-term Evaluation explains that “FEMIP, the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment & Partnership, was launched in October 2002 with the aim to promote economic development and political and social stability in the Mediterranean countries. It is to strengthen the financial co-operation between the European Union and the Mediterranean partnership countries. In this context, a particular emphasis has been placed upon Private Sector Development and the modernisation of infrastructure affecting the quality of the overall living conditions. In September 2003, the FEMIP Support Fund has been created as the Technical Assistance Component (TA) of FEMIP. The component is managed by the EIB to support activities linked to potential or existing investment projects.” (Source, Mid-term Evaluation of the FEMIP Support Fund, 2007, p. 1).</p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>The Commission provides interest rate subsidies in support of EIB loans in the Mediterranean for more than two decades. In 1992, the Convention defined implementation and financial management rules, for the EIB to carry out these interest rate subsidies. In 1996, the MEDA Regulation (amended in 2000), the successor of the Financial Protocols, specified further rules. Since then, interest rate subsidies have been made available to all Mediterranean partners but are applied only to loans in the field of the environment. Each subsidy must be treated as an EC project financed on the bilateral cooperation envelope, programmed by RELEX and with an individual financing decision (on its own as in the past, or as part of the annual plan for a given country). (Source: Inventory Note)</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>See information at the level of JC 1.1</p>
PSNP	<p>No specific document justifying the decision to channel the funds to the WB for the PSNP has been found. However, within the Joint Donor Group (EC, WB, DCI, USAID, CIDA and DFID) for Food Security Strategy, the Commission had been very active at the time of the set-up of the TF. The Commission is one of the major donor for food security in Ethiopia since 1996. The TF had been set-up following a common approach between the Joint Donor Group and the GoE, following the principle of harmonisation and alignment. The Donors have used the GoE’s own documents as the principle guidelines for the programme implementation and have minimized the replication of appraisal documentation.</p> <p>The Financing Agreement between the Commission and the GoE, signed in 2005, mentions that the Commission contribution to the PSNP will be channelled through a multi-donor TF managed by the WB. Source: European Commission and GoE, Financing Agreement for the “Support to the Safety Nets Programme”, 2005; Source: MN 51</p>

WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC 1.1</i>																																																					
I-1.1.2	Inclusion in the above mentioned documents of an analysis of the objectives and functioning of the intervention																																																					
ARTF	The Commission has funded directly €106M for Economic Infrastructure (mainly roads) over 2002-2006. While the ARTF has an 'Investment' window, Interviewees indicate that the Commission did not discuss the possibility of doing (totally of part of) such investment through this window.																																																					
PFMR	<p>Yes, the objectives and the functioning of the PFMR TF are explained in the document mentioned in I-1.1.1. The objective of the PFMR is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to further improve the PA's financial management systems within a broader national reform agenda; - to provide budgetary and fiduciary assurance to donors sufficient to ensure their financial support during the 2004 and 2005 budget years. <p>The functioning is as follow:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the WB set up a single, multi-donor TF in order to mobilize additional donor resources, to harmonize donor assistance, and to simplify procedures for the PA - the WB sign a standard administration agreement with each contributing donors. - the WB sign a Grant Agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation for the benefit of the PA which would include the benchmarks for trance release. - Concerning the expenditure under the PFMR, there are of three types: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * budget support * programme supervision costs * annual audits - Concerning the governance structure: the WB, as TF administrator, is responsible for supervising the implementation of the agreed reform measures, monitoring and certifying compliance with the benchmarks, and making disbursement decisions accordingly. The WB is assisted by a local Guidance Committee which consist of the WB and the IMF and a limited number of other key TF donors (such as the European Commission, largest contributor to the TF). The Guidance Committee meet quarterly with the PA and review progress under the PFMR, the PA's progress reports and the findings of the WB quarterly technical supervision missions, offering recommendations to the PA and the Bank. - Audits have to be carried out regularly during the whole period of the PFMR and are undertaken by the WB - Monitoring, supervision and reporting: the PA prepare every quarter a progress report on the achievement of the benchmarks. The WB than lead technical and fiduciary supervision missions to revieux progress under the PFMR, compliance with agreed prior actions and benchmarks, budget implementation and general economic and social developments. <p><i>Source: WB, "West Bank and Gaza. Proposed Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund".(2003)</i></p>																																																					
TFET	<p>In the report of the Joint Assessment Mission to East Timor, to which the Commission has participated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the purpose of the external assistance to East Timor is explained. - the eight priority sectors are identified and detailed (identification of urgent priorities and short-term reconstruction priorities for each sector): Community empowerment, education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, economic management, civil service, judiciary. - the external financing requirements are also detailed for each sectors (p14) <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Sector</th> <th>2000</th> <th>2001</th> <th>2002</th> <th>TOTAL</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Community Empowerment</td> <td>9,195</td> <td>10,940</td> <td>9,840</td> <td>29,975</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Education</td> <td>14,821</td> <td>25,598</td> <td>17,363</td> <td>57,782</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Health</td> <td>7,541</td> <td>16,983</td> <td>15,679</td> <td>40,204</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Agriculture</td> <td>7,108</td> <td>14,336</td> <td>2,990</td> <td>24,434</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Infrastructure</td> <td>21,090</td> <td>49,306</td> <td>22,717</td> <td>93,111</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Economic management</td> <td>4,300</td> <td>6,500</td> <td>5,400</td> <td>16,200</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Civil service</td> <td>16,580</td> <td>16,622</td> <td>9,319</td> <td>42,521</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Judiciary</td> <td>1,145</td> <td>1,614</td> <td>176</td> <td>2,935</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TOTAL</td> <td>81,781</td> <td>141,898</td> <td>83,483</td> <td>307,160</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				Sector	2000	2001	2002	TOTAL	Community Empowerment	9,195	10,940	9,840	29,975	Education	14,821	25,598	17,363	57,782	Health	7,541	16,983	15,679	40,204	Agriculture	7,108	14,336	2,990	24,434	Infrastructure	21,090	49,306	22,717	93,111	Economic management	4,300	6,500	5,400	16,200	Civil service	16,580	16,622	9,319	42,521	Judiciary	1,145	1,614	176	2,935	TOTAL	81,781	141,898	83,483	307,160
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	<p>- a preliminary approach for the coordination of external assistance is proposed, i.e. creation of two trust funds, one administered by the UN (to support the civil service and selected project-based capacity-building initiatives) and one administered by the WB (to cover project-based reconstruction activities in economic management, health, community empowerment, agriculture and infrastructure). The differentiated use of the TFs is also specified.</p> <p>In the Contribution Agreement (2000) between the Commission and the WB for the TFET:</p> <p>- there are “Provisions applicable to the European Community Contribution to the Trust Fund for East Timor” (in attachment 4) which specify, inter alia, the purpose and objective of the TFET: <i>“The TEFT was created at the initiative of the IBRD and the IDA for the purpose of financing an emergency reconstruction and recovery program in East Timor over a three-year period including supporting agricultural recovery, rehabilitation of utilities and restoration of public health and education services”</i>.</p> <p>- the WBG rationales behind the TFET is explained in attachment 2 (Resolution establishing the trust fund for East Timor) and 3 (resolution amending the trust fund for East Timor): the WBG administers the trust fund for the benefit of the donors and provides emergency reconstruction and recovery assistance for East Timor consistent with the WBG purposes and in accordance with the provision applicable to each donor (objectives and purposes of each donors when contributing to the TFET). The remaining of this resolution establishing the TFET shapes the conditions and “rules” to be respected during and after the implementation of the TF.</p> <p><i>Source: “Report of the Joint Assessment Mission to East Timor” (1999)</i> <i>Source: “East Timor: Contribution Agreement between the European Community and International Development Association” (2000)</i></p>
WB ITF	<p>The ToR of the IRFFI state the purposes and principles, the description and functioning of the IRFFI and the coordination arrangements. It also presents the terms and conditions of the WB ITF and the UN ITF. This document is included in the annexes of the Administration Agreement signed between the Commission and the WBG for the WB ITF.</p> <p>- Purpose and principles of the IRFFI: <i>The objective of the Facility is to ensure coordinated, flexible and swift donor response for financing priorities expenditures.</i> The principles behind that are those applying to multi-donor trust funds in a post-conflict situation (see p.3)</p> <p>- The proposed Facility: The IRFFI is composed of two trust funds (one administered by the WB and the other one by UNDG) for donor participation. They work in close partnership with the Iraqi National Authorities</p> <p>- Coordination arrangements: Creation of three Committees within the IRFFI: The Donor Committee (donors coordination where the Commission is participating actively as one of the major donors); the UN/WB Facility Coordination Committee (takes the decision and inform the donor committee); and the Secretariat (administration matters).</p> <p><i>Source: United Nations/World Bank. International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Terms of Reference. (2003)</i> <i>Source: Administration Agreement. MED/2004/082-205/1. TF053167 (July 2004)</i></p>
CGIAR	<p>The Administration Agreement contains an analysis of the objectives and functioning of the CGIAR and details also the EC objectives in the intervention (see below).</p>
GFATM	<p>The Programme for Action sets clear objectives and explains the rationale. The Programme follows a High-Level Round Table (28 September 2000)¹ and a Council resolution of 10.11.2000,</p> <p>The expected outcome the Programme are :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - optimal impact from existing interventions, services and commodities targeted at the major communicable diseases affecting the poorest populations; - increased affordability of key pharmaceuticals through a comprehensive approach; - increased investment in research and development of specific global public goods. <p>The Program states that “Implementing the European Community Programme for Action will require coherent, collective and simultaneous action.” and that “The Commission will establish co-operative arrangements with WHO/UNAIDS, the World Bank and Member States to provide necessary technical and normative input to country programming and identification exercises.”</p>

¹ Organized with WHO and UNAIDS, Involving over 170 stakeholders, including 25 developing countries, notably ACP states, EU Member States, the European Parliament, international development agencies, civil society, researchers and leaders of major pharmaceutical companies.

	<i>Source: COM(2001) 96 final of 21.2.2001 giving a Programme for action on Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction</i> .
HIPC TF	<p>The Commission Communication of October 1998 is complemented by annexes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ a presentation of the main features of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, ▪ a document explaining the methodology used to calculate the Community's contribution to the Initiative ▪ a document presenting the principles governing the Community's contribution ▪ a paper on the link between the HIPC Initiative and poverty reduction. <p>These documents do not provide an in-depth analysis of the objectives pursued through the HIPC Initiative, do not demonstrate its consistency with the objectives of the EU development policy, nor present in some detail the implementation mechanism of the Initiative. Actually, the paper on the link between the Initiative and poverty reduction acknowledges that "it is not yet quite clear what the operational response of the Bretton Woods Institutions will be".</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	The 2003 <i>Framework Agreement concerning the management of the FEMIP Support Fund</i> , explains that the purpose of the Fund is to accept and make use of grant funds provided by the Commission under the MEDA regulation in support of EIB's investment activities in Med Countries within the framework of FEMIP. Activities being financed under the Fund support beneficiaries in Med Countries during different stages of the project cycle that is, project identification, preparation, and implementation, excluding self-standing activities without any link to a potential Project.
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<i>See information at the level of JC 1.1</i>
PSPN	<p>Annex 2 of the Financing Agreement between the Commission and the GoE explains in details the technical and administrative provisions for the implementation of the PSNP. It specifies the overall objectives of "improving food security of the chronically food insecure people by 2009 and to reduce the country dependency on food aid." It specifies also that the Commission contribution will be channelled to a MDTF managed by the World Bank and that the Commission will sign an Administration Agreement with the WB (this document was signed in 2005).</p> <p>It explains that the contributions of the WB, the GoE and all the other donors will be pooled in a common ETB (Ethiopian Birr) account managed by the GoE according to its own rules and procedures. Beside that a MoU will be signed between the donors and the GoE in order to regulate the management of the donors contribution and agree on the disbursement of the funds. It also establishes common arrangement for coordination, review, monitoring and supervision of the PSNP.</p> <p><i>Source: European Commission and GoE, Financing Agreement for the "Support to the Safety Nets Programme", 2005;</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC 1.1</i>
I-1.1.3	Views of involved stakeholders on the existence and quality of ex ante justification for the intervention
ARTF	The CSP 2003-2006 for Afghanistan mentions that all donors agree that the ARTF is the preferred multilateral mechanism for channelling budgetary support to the Government. <i>(Note. no further justification provided)</i>
TFET	<p>It has not been possible yet to verify with different stakeholder to what extent these expectations and concerns with regard to the contribution to a WB TF (see I.1.1.) as expressed in the financing decisions have been well identified, nor whether they have materialised. However, interviewees met so far consider that the conclusions of the JAM were adequate and that the right intervention strategy was chosen in the country.</p> <p>They also consider that intervening through the TFET was the only option:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Because there were no counterparts in the country, as infrastructure had been destroyed and many skilled people had left the country ; ▪ Because the EC had not (and still does have now) a cooperation structure in place. Indeed there was not EC Delegation in the country. The only structure in place as of 2000 was an office with an external consultant. ▪ So as to ensure a good coordination between donors; ▪ With a view to reach critical mass. <p>The WB was the appropriate candidate as trustee given its experience in emergency situations and because its experience in the country.</p>

CGIAR	<p>Interviewees met explained that the Commission is contributing to the CGIAR since 1977. Over time, this Commission intervention has evolved and has used three types of “channels”:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - From 1977 to 2000, the Commission intervened by contributing directly to the individual centres; - From 2000 to 2005, the Commission channelled its contributions through the WB; - As of 2007, the Commission will intervene through IFAD (also reported in a 2007 internal Commission note for the file). <p>According to interviewees, the main reasons for using the WB in 2000 were that the Commission considered that there was a kind of fragmentation of its intervention in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Management of the contributions; - Negotiation power; - Lack of clear lead in the Commission; - Capacity to influence the strategy of the fund: the Commission had a weak voice and the US and WB were driving the system. <p>Channelling the funds through the WB was considered as the appropriate manner to tackle these various issues. It was supposed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To facilitate the management of the contribution by having a single interlocutor, in this case the WB; - To enhance the negotiation power by reaching a greater critical mass <p>Relevancy of the EC co-financed projects : The EC co-financed projects contribute to themes that form the core of the centre’s research programmes in crop, tree, fish and livestock improvements, and are considered highly relevant. Genetic improvement technologies and the preservation of biodiversity are felt to be crucial for the centres’ current and future work in crop improvement, not only in terms of yield, but also in terms of disease resistance (a for ever ongoing battle) and tolerance to both drought and flooding. The projects also fit well the national, regional and global needs when it comes to improving regional coordination and regional research networks, improving genetic resource conservation, and by helping to set up regional and national policies for matters such as germplasm exchange, plant health standards, food markets, etc. Regarding the relevance of the newly adopted CGIAR research priorities in relation to the MDGs and in particular to MDG#1, a Science Council review in 2005 found that the CGIAR matched their over-arching goals (poverty alleviation, food security and nutrition and sustainable management of natural resources) with the MDGs, and in particular with MDG#1. Four of the five priority areas contribute directly to MDG#1.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i></p>
GFATM	<p>Key informant mentioned the EC policy framework as one of the reasons for joining the GFATM at that time and recalled the main criteria underlying the choice for a new funding mechanism (i.e. lower transaction costs, aligned with ownership, performance-based and public-private partnership).</p>
HIPC TF	<p>As pointed out above, the European Parliament had adopted in January 1998 a Resolution in which it welcomed the Commission proposal to support the HIPC Initiative, recommended that human development and social indicators are included in the definition of debt sustainability, and supported the Commission’s proposal for the establishment of a single fund for all instruments, and for this fund to be managed by the EIB in parallel with the HIPC Trust Fund managed by the World Bank IDA.</p> <p>The Economic and Social Committee of the European Union, which had been consulted on the issue of debt relief, delivered an opinion on 27 May 1999. In this document, the Committee, developing the European Parliament view on the need to link debt relief with the fight against poverty, recommended that “the extra finance saved by debtor governments should be allocated to social projects via clear plans for poverty reduction. Priority for these plans should be agreed with donors and with organised civil society”. It also proposed that the size of the debt relief initiative is increased so as to “reduce debt stock between the ranges of 100 to 150 percent of exports”. Actually the changes that took place in the debt relief mechanism in September 1999 (adoption of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative) met these recommendations of the Committee.</p> <p>As any other decision regarding the utilisation of EDF resources, contributions to the HIPC Initiative financed from the European Development Fund gave rise to Decisions by the EU-ACP Council. This implied that the governments of ACP countries agreed with the Initiative and with the provision of financial support from the EDF to its implementation.</p>
Interest Subsidies	<p>The mid-term evaluation of the MEDA II programme recommends that EIB interest rate subsidies proposals should be more closely scrutinised and appraised by the Commission in the context of the respective country</p>

in MEDA	programmes on the basis of tightly drawn guidelines. (Source: <i>Mid-term evaluation of the MEDA II programme, 2005</i>)
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<i>See information at the level of JC 1.1</i>
PSNP	<p>The different stakeholders states that at the time of the decision, there were enough evidence for the justification of channelling for the PSNP. This was part of a more global strategy on coordination and harmonisation of aid in Ethiopia. (Ethiopia is for the Commission a pilot country for aid effectiveness and donor coordination).</p> <p>Moreover, the GoE had chosen the WB to manage the contributions of the donors given its experience in coordination, food security. There were no other alternatives at the time and this was seen as an instrument for pool funding.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 51; MN 58</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC 1.1</i>
JC 1.2	<i>Prior to the decision, a documented analysis of alternative ways of intervening was conducted</i>
HIPC TF	Since the HIPC Initiative has been designed by the BWI on a mandate of the G7 countries, there was no room for the European Union to design and implement an alternative approach. Nevertheless the Commission proposed to channel the European Community contribution to the Initiative through two different channels: the EIB as regards the Community contribution as a creditor, and the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund as regards the Community contribution as a donor.
PSNP	<p>A documented analysis of alternatives ways of intervening was not conducted at the time the decision was taken to channel the funds through a WB TF but different stakeholders have expressed the rational behind the decision of channelling and notably through the WB:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have a harmonised approach among donors and coordinated with the GoE - Lower burden for a single donor - No other alternatives at the time of the decision (sensitive political situation in 2005 where donors were required to stop funding the GoE after the election) and the GoE had proposed the WB to manage the donors' contributions. <p>However, the WB TF are mainly used as an instrument among others within a strategy of pool funding, and other instruments could be used now. With the new Commission financing regulation under the DCI (Development cooperation Instrument), the Commission could transfer their funds to an EU MS or even the Delegation could pool funds from other donors (e.g. the Delegation in Ethiopia could envisaged that for the transport sector where they have a specific expertise)</p> <p><i>Source: MN 51, MN 52; MN 58</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>Alternative ways of intervening have been analysed in the four TFs analysed in Vietnam. However, only one analysis was documented (TFF/VCF, see JC 1.1).</p> <p>The WB is generally seen as one possibility among other such as the UN, the ADB or direct intervention. The new financial regulation of the Commission is now allowing more options for aid delivery, such as channelling funds through EU MS implementing agencies</p> <p><i>Source: European Commission, Identification fiche for the « Support to the Forestry Sector in Vietnam », 2004</i> <i>Source: MN 70; MN 71; MN 72; MN 76; MN 89</i></p>
I-1.2.1	Explanation in the preparatory/programming documents of why the channelling of funds was preferred to other alternatives (such as direct intervention, no intervention, intervention through another channel)
ARTF	<p>The "Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF" (February 2007) states that "the ARTF is the only coordination vehicle" for Afghanistan. In addition, it refers to Afghanistan's Minister of Finance who expressed on a number of occasions a clear desire for the donors to provide funding through the ARTF as the best means of supporting the GIRA budget.</p> <p><i>(Note. no further justification provided)</i></p> <p>The Commission supports Afghanistan with €1B, but only €0.28B of it were for the ARTF & LOTFA, the rest being realised through other means (mainly direct intervention but also e.g. funding of UN agencies). Interviewees indicate that a reason for intervening directly is that the Commission is able to operate in the field (vs. Iraq for instance).</p>

<p>PFMR</p>	<p><i>(Source: MN 29)</i></p> <p>According to the Commission (EuropeAid), it had no other choices to keep on financing the Ministry of Finance of the PA other than going through an IFI. Therefore, the Commission has proposed the WB to create a trust fund, the PFMR TF. This was thus for political reasons (see I-1.1.3).</p> <p>Beside that, other alternatives to support the PA and the Palestinian have been implemented by the Commission directly, through the UN (e.g. UNRWA) and through NGOs.</p> <p><i>Source: Meeting Notes</i> <i>Source: European Commission, RELEX, "The EU's relations with West Bank and Gaza Strip" (2004)</i></p>
<p>TFET</p>	<p>From the start of the external assistance for the reconstruction of Timor-Leste, the Commission has been one of the largest contributor and the EU is the major contributor for assistance to Timor-Leste people. The Commission has drafted a Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 2002-2006. The objectives of the EU co-operation with East-Timor are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to complete the rehabilitation programme in East Timor, ending new commitments in 2002 and 2003; - in parallel, to help launch a long term development programme, particularly for the health and rural sectors; - to maintain the Commission's position as a partner of substance for East Timor, ensuring the visibility of Community assistance; - help East Timor to develop a strategy for its external trade and economic relations. <p>Within this context, the Commission has used several mechanisms to support the reconstruction of Timor-Leste. In the Interim Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste, it is explained on p 5 that six different aid mechanisms were possible when the reconstruction work started in 2000:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the Consolidated Fund for Timor-Leste (CFET) administered by the UNTAET - the TFET administered by the WB and implemented by the WB and ADB - the assessed contribution budget of UNTAET financing salaries of UN staff - projects financed by UN agencies - assistance provided directly by bilateral donors - support and work done by or through NGOs - (the Transition Support Programme (TSP) which was added only in 2002 to help finance the government's current budget after Timor-Leste became independent.) <p>In its "Donor Profile", the Commission enumerates its main activities in Timor-Leste since June 1999. It has committed more than €200M to population of Timor-Leste and has supported the rehabilitation and development process in a wide range of sectors, through the WB TFET, through international agencies such as the UN bodies, the UN CFET, through international NGOs such as CARE, and through direct "solo" projects/programmes such as the Commission's Rural Development Programme in 2003 and 2005, the Health Sector Investment Programme in 2002 and 2004.</p> <p>The CSP and the NIP explain the rationale of the choices of the Commission to support Timor-Leste through all the mechanisms explained here above. (see section 5 p.20) The main priority task of the EU response strategy is to <i>"build a new national administration, and to rebuild physical infrastructure from the ground upwards, especially since the local technical, educational and institutional capacity to manage this are minimal."</i> The EU strategy is to work on a sectoral approach in order to build the capacity for East Timorese to begin to manage their own affairs.</p> <p>Although none of the above mentioned documents contains an explicit comparison of the comparative advantages of the different intervention modes, the above mentioned justifications for intervening through a WB TF are based on an implicit comparison with other modes of intervention. As an example, stating that the intervention through the WB TF is justified, among other things, because the Commission has no cooperation structure in place, is a manner of analysing alternative modes of intervention.</p> <p>In terms of alternative ways of intervention, it is also interesting to not that the Commission interim evaluation of 2004 examined possible alternatives of intervening through the TFET, more specifically (see p. 42 and 43):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bilateral financing, but this would have required, given the large size of its programme for Timor-Leste that the Commission developed a strong on-the-ground capacity, which in the present (2004) budgetary circumstances does not look like an attractive alternative;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A WB managed TF with the Commission as the only donor. This approach which was applied in the health and agricultural sector as of 2004, ensures visibility while limiting local capacity requirements. The evaluation however doubts that such an approach would have been feasible in 2000 when TFET was being set up because of the unwarranted increased complexity of the WB work at a time of emergency; ▪ Financing through UN agencies. The EC's Rural Development Programme in East Timor included five projects financed through various UN agencies, which allowed the EC to benefit from the comparative advantage of the various institutions. The amounts involved were however relatively small and the evaluation considers that it is unlikely that such an approach would credibly replace a WB-managed TF in terms of reconstruction impact; ▪ EC managed multi-donor TF. The evaluation considers that this might be envisaged in areas of strong EC influence such as Africa and the Middle East and in situations where a political approach may be preferred to the WB's technocratic approach. <p>For these reasons, the evaluation concludes that, <i>“among the alternatives discussed above, TFET appears to be the most adapted to the situation”</i>.</p> <p><i>Source: “Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2004”</i> <i>Source: “Interim Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste” (2004)</i></p>
WB ITF	<p>Prior to the decision to contribute to the IRFFI, the Commission has drawn up the Iraq Assistance Programme for 2004 (in March 2004), which states that the EU cooperation objectives in Iraq which are: <i>“the development of a prosperous and stable Iraq with a representative government and a thriving civil society with which it can develop mutually beneficial relations. (...) the EU's determination to play a significant role in the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq, within the framework of the relevant UNSC resolutions.</i></p> <p>The Commission response strategy and priorities for 2004 states (chapter 5, p.16) that the major part of the Commission contributions will be channelled through a multi-donor trust fund. The rationale behind that (chapter 5, p.16 and in the Commission Communication of October 2003 (COM(2003)575), is that: the EU wants to demonstrate its support to the multilateral framework for reconstruction and to contribute to increase aid efficiency, strong donor coordination and a decreased burden on the Iraqi administration.</p> <p>The implementation of the Commission Iraq Assistance Programme for 2004 will take the shape of channelling the majority of the Commission resources through the IRFFI and therefore be pursued via the UN and the WB trust funds.</p> <p>The Commission has thus decided to work within the multilateral framework, but has still its own priorities, namely addressing the immediate needs in cross cutting issues, inter alia, gender, human rights and the rule of law. The Commission allows itself, in its programming, to have alternative ways of supporting Iraq than the IRFFI. If the cross cutting issue are not addressed satisfactorily, the Commission could consider making use of certain bilateral instruments. These include the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and NGO co-financing budget lines as well as the Food Security/Food Aid line.</p> <p><i>Source: European Commission, Iraq Assistance Programme, 2004. COM(2004)667</i></p>
MDF	<p>There was no other option than considering the Indonesian Government for delivering aid, as there was no real decentralisation in Aceh. The new President developed a comprehensive approach (this was a test case for him). In addition, the need of materially delivering in a sustainably manner faced a huge challenge: to reconstruct in remote places, isolated by the guerrilla, with destructed harbours (no roads, no harbours, no technical capable people to reconstruct...)</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 26)</i></p> <p>All Commission & MS' funds for the post-tsunami for Indonesia go to the MDF (it is considered as an “EU operation”, as to interviewees).</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 26)</i></p>
CGIAR	<p>The documents available do not contain an explanation on why the channelling was preferred to other alternatives.</p>
GFATM	<p>Several reasons are mentioned mainly in the communications of the Commission:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enable greater co-ordination, complementarity and efficiency of international funding. The European Community will support new approaches to stimulate the development of global public goods targeting the three major communicable diseases. ▪ Additional reasons are the participation of private donors and the country ownership

	<p><i>Source: COM(2001) 96 - Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction, 21/2/2001</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mobilise, manage and disburse grant resources to enable developing countries to achieve more rapid progress in addressing the challenges created by HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and deliver better health outcomes in the context of poverty reduction. It is intended to achieve these objectives whilst lowering transaction costs for both donors and countries, maintaining high accountability for results, and building on existing development processes. <p><i>Source : Brussels, 23.10.2001, COM(2001) 612 final, 2001/0251 (COD) Concerning the European Community contribution to the "Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria"</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>Theoretically three different possibilities were open to the European Community to tackle the issue of HIPCs indebtedness:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ make money directly available to the debtor countries; ▪ make available to the multilateral development banks (MDBs), notably the AfDB, the funds needed to reimburse their claims on HIPCs; ▪ channel the Community contribution to the Initiative through a special fund managed by the World Bank or another bank. <p>The Community approach to debt reduction, as well as the decisions by the Council and the EU-ACP Council of Ministers, differentiate the Community contribution to the HIPC Initiative as a creditor and its contribution as a donor. But the documents produced by the Commission do not explain why it choose to channel its contribution as a donor through the World Bank-managed HIPC Trust Fund, nor why it made available to the EIB its contribution as a donor.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Following Council conclusions in 2001, the idea was launched to establish a special bank for Mediterranean countries (Euro-Med Bank), instead of providing EIB-loans to the Mediterranean. To facilitate the set-up of this Euro-Med bank and to keep costs down, the idea was that there would be a group of shareholders, but that the majority of the capital would come from the EIB ('subsidiary'). See document SEC (2002) 218. ▪ However, the Ecofin Council decided in March 2002 that it would be better to keep these activities within the EIB, by creating the FEMIP facility. This facility is a package of EIB-loans and EU-financed risk capital, technical assistance and interest rate subsidies. It was also decided to review FEMIP in 2003. ▪ In 2003 a review took place, which looked again at the option of a Euro-Med bank; see document Com (2003) 587 and the working paper attached to it. ▪ In 2006 another review took place, which included three scenario's (keeping FEMIP as it is, enhancing it or a Euro-Med bank) <p><i>Sources: SEC(2002)218, Com(2003)587, COM(2006)592, in ECFIN Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007)</i></p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>Following the extensive discussions held at that time throughout the world on the most effective ways of contributing to progress in the developing countries, the EIB retained both the financial instruments and the means of using them. They remained virtually identical under Lomé IV to those developed previously. All the new instruments (HIPC, assistance for structural adjustment, Sysmin) were therefore reserved for the Commission². <i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV Annex 1 – p6)</i></p> <p>Interviewees explained that the Commission tried in the past to manage risk capital operations itself, but failed. <i>(Source: MN 28)</i></p>
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC1.2</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC1.2</i>

² Article 1 of the Financial Protocol is quite clear: "The EIB shall administer the loans on its own resources, including interest subsidies, as well as risk capital. All other resources of the Convention shall be administered by the Commission". Note. The only minor exception was exchange risk, where intense pressure from the ACP countries, following numerous devaluations, led to the introduction of a mechanism covering such risk. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV).

I-1.2.2	The justification of the choice referred to in I.1.2.1 was considered reasonable in other programming phase documents and/or by Commission representatives
PFMR	<p>In its Communication to the Parliament and the Council, COM(2005)458 on the “EU-Palestinian cooperation beyond disengagement – towards a two-state solution”, the Commission states on p 14 that: “the Trust Fund (PFMR) was originally conceived as a temporary measure to overcome the fiscal deficit of the P.A. It will have to be succeeded by a more sustainable instrument.”</p> <p>Source: European Commission, COM(2005)458 on the “EU-Palestinian cooperation beyond disengagement – towards a two-state solution” (2005)</p>
CGIAR	<p>The information collected under I. 1.2.1 indicates that one of the main reasons to prefer the WB to other channels that could provide advantages in terms of better coordination and negotiation power was the fact that the Commission wanted to have more leverage on the institution that was driving the fund.</p> <p>Interviewees explain that future involvement will take place through IFAD. The main reason for this change is that the WB has announced that it will act in the future as a fiscal agent. In addition to the fiscal agent issue, another reason is that the Commission is closer to IFAD in terms of development objectives of the fund (see also below).</p> <p>This was also reported in a 2007 internal Commission note for the file.</p> <p>Other options such as direct interventions with several centres or direct interventions through one specific centre had also been envisaged. In addition to legal issues related to these options, IFAD had the comparative advantage of being experienced and of having key technical competence, also in comparison with other possible donors.</p>
GFATM	Commission representatives stated that an intense debate took place prior to deciding the participation to the Fund. Other channels might have been chosen as multilateral or bilateral interventions.
HIPC TF	<p>The choices made by the Commission to channel its contribution as a donor through the World Bank and its contribution as a creditor through the EIB were not challenged by the institutions that have had to examine the Commission’s proposals (European Council, European Parliament, EU-ACP Council of Ministers).</p> <p>On the contrary, the European Parliament, in its resolution of January 1998 states explicitly that it “supports the Commission’s proposal for the establishment of a single fund for all instruments, and for this fund to be managed by the EIB in parallel with the HIPC Trust Fund managed by the IDA.”</p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>It appears that the choice of providing interest rate subsidies to EIB loans exclusively is at present not considered reasonable anymore. EIB interviewees report that the Commission might cooperate with bilateral organisations in the future with the new mandate (as of January 2007) to widen the scope of financial intermediaries to all development banks, e.g. delivering interest rate subsidies through organisations such as the KfW and AFD. These bilateral organisations have budgetary funding from grants and provide interest rate subsidies. The EIB currently competes with them (and often offer less generous conditions as to these interviewees). However, there is a risk by doing so of re-bilateralisation of the Commission’s funds.</p> <p>Note. As to interviewees, interest rate subsidies would be paid under the new mandate directly by the Commission to the promoter as a grant. It is not yet clear how the link will be made with the EIB loan.</p>
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC1.2</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC1.2</i>
JC 1.3	Decisions to channel aid are explicitly motivated and rest on formal guidance criteria
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<i>Aid is channelled under the Lomé IV Convention - See JC 1.1</i>
HIPC TF	The HIPC Initiative designed by the BWI defines precisely which conditions have to be met by debtor countries to benefit of the debt relief mechanism and to what extent their external debt may be cancelled or reduced. The objective is to reduce the external debt of HIPCs to the point where it is sustainable, that is to the point where debtor countries can afford to settle the service of their debt.
PSNP	<p>No existence of formal guidance criteria for the channelling of aid but the rationale behind it is related to international commitments such as the Paris Declaration and the will to have a harmonised approach among donors and coordinated with the GoE. The WB plays this role when managing the TF, but it is not the only possibility.</p> <p>According to different stakeholders, guidelines on the decision to channel could provide useful indication but</p>

	should be short and operational. But it is essential to maintain flexibility to allow a case by case approach. <i>Source: MN 58; MN 66</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	No existence of formal guidance criteria for the channelling of aid but the rationale behind it is related to international commitments such as the Paris Declaration and the will to have a harmonised approach among donors and less transaction costs for the GoV. According to different stakeholders, guidelines on the decision to channel could provide useful indication. However, there is room for improvement of the FA and AA. A systematic need assessment of the WB, country by country and sector specific, should be done before the decision to channel the funds. <i>Source: MN 70; MN 76; MN 71; MN 89</i>
I-1.3.1	Existence of formal guidance criteria relating to the intervention at the time the decision was made.
TFET	No formal guidance criteria existed at the time of the signature of the first Contribution Agreement for the WB TFET (2000). Implicit commitments by the Commission had been made during the JAM and the Donor's meeting in Tokyo. However, for the period 2002-2006 the CSP for East Timor established the framework and the strategy for Commission's and EU's external assistance to East Timor. The NIP also established an indicative budget and the sectoral priorities. During that period, 3 additional Contribution Agreements have been signed for the WB TFET. <i>Source: "Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2004"</i> The Commission's interim evaluation of 2004, also contains recommendations with respect to future interventions in Timor-Leste. In this respect it explains that the EC is considering using SWAps (which could be done either with other donors or directly with the Timorese Government) for its continued assistance in the health and agriculture sectors. The evaluation considers that as a logical outcome of the TFET experience. The evaluators strongly support the use of these mechanisms as they incorporate the best features of TFET, i.e.,: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (i) good donor coordination; ▪ (ii) strong and continued policy and sector strategy discussions among all stakeholders; ▪ and (iii) use of unified project processing and implementation procedures. It also underlines that care must be taken to ensure that capacity building is built into these mechanisms. Information on the extent to which these recommendations have been taken on board is not available yet.
WB ITF	The Commission has written a Communication (COM(2003)575) for the preparation of the Madrid Conference on the Iraq reconstruction in October 2003. This Communication set the guidelines for the common approach of the EU for the Iraq reconstruction: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Necessity to strengthen the security conditions - Establishment of a sovereign Iraqi government - Establishment of a transparent and operational multilateral framework for the reconstruction - Participation of Iraq neighbour countries <i>Source: European Commission. Conférence de Madrid sur la reconstruction en Iraq, 24 octobre 2003. Com(2003)575</i>
MDF	The MDF is a very good example of the use of international best practice to identify quality criteria for projects that improve transparency and effectiveness of the recovery process. <i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p6)</i>
CGIAR	No formal guidance criteria have been identified.
GFATM	The Commission has developed a Programme for Action targeted at the three major communicable diseases over five years (2001 - 2006). In the programme presentation, several criteria are clearly mentioned: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - developing country ownership - lower transaction costs - improve effectiveness, provide rapid response - large scale - policy dialogue <i>Source: COM(2001) 96 - Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction, 21/2/2001</i>
HIPC TF	The IMF and the World Bank have defined precise rules for the provision of debt relief to debtor countries within the framework of the HIPC Initiative. These rules cover on the one hand the conditions that have to be met by

	<p>HIPCs to benefit of the Initiative and, on the other hand, the volume of financial assistance they may receive. Implementation of these rules extends on two periods, the first one leading to the Decision Point, where a country is recognized eligible to assistance and starts benefiting of still limited debt relief measures (notably from Paris Club creditors), and the Completion Point, where the HIPC benefits of the full extend of the Initiative.</p> <p>With the move from the HIPC Initiative to the Enhanced HIPC Initiative in 1999 greater attention was given to the allocation by the beneficiary countries of the resources freed in their budget by the reduction of their external debt. The development of a PRSP through a participative process became a condition for a HIPC to reach the Completion Point. This change had been strongly advocated by the European Community. It may be noted in this respect that the Contribution Agreement between the Commission and the World Bank relative to the EDF contribution to the HIPC Trust Fund devotes a paragraph to PRSPs. It states that “the development of PRSPs will be the mechanism by which individual country authorities will identify their future needs for assistance in program and investment financing and capacity building. (...) IDA will associate, as appropriate, the Commission, along with other donors to the HIPC Trust Fund, with discussion IDA has with those authorities on their PRSP, and would welcome the Commission’s comments prior to the presentation of the PRSPs to the World Bank board.”</p> <p>The European Community strictly applied the rules defined by the BWI including for the debt relief operations in which it intervened as a creditor and relied on the EIB rather than on the World Bank Trust Fund to channel its financial contribution.</p>
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC1.3</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC1.3</i>
I-1.3.2	These criteria are referred to in the programming documents
PFMR	No, the programming documents of the Commission do not refer to the criteria mentioned in the WB proposal for the creation of the PFMR
WB ITF	<p>Prior to the decision to contribute to the IRFFI, the Commission has drawn up the Iraq Assistance Programme for 2004 (in March 2004), which states that the EU cooperation objectives in Iraq which are: “<i>the development of a prosperous and stable Iraq with a representative government and a thriving civil society with which it can develop mutually beneficial relations. (...) the EU’s determination to play a significant role in the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq, within the framework of the relevant UNSC resolutions.</i>”</p> <p>The Commission response strategy and priorities for 2004 states (chapter 5, p.16) that the major part of the Commission contributions will be channelled through a multi-donor trust fund. The rationale behind that (chapter 5, p.16 and in the Commission Communication of October 2003 (COM(2003)575), is that: the EU wants to demonstrate its support to the multilateral framework for reconstruction and to contribute to increase aid efficiency, strong donor coordination and a decreased burden on the Iraqi administration.</p> <p>The implementation of the Commission Iraq Assistance Programme for 2004 will take the shape of channelling the majority of the Commission resources through the IRFFI and therefore be pursued via the UN and the WB trust funds.</p> <p>The Commission has thus decided to work within the multilateral framework, but has still its own priorities, namely addressing the immediate needs in cross cutting issues, inter alia. Gender, human rights and the rule of law. The Commission allows itself, in its programming, to have alternative ways of supporting Iraq than the IRFFI. If the cross cutting issues are not addressed satisfactorily, the Commission could consider making use of certain bilateral instruments. These include the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and NGO co-financing budget lines as well as the Food Security/Food Aid line.</p> <p><i>Source: European Commission, Iraq Assistance Programme, 2004. COM(2004)667</i></p>
CGIAR	The programming documents do not refer to formal guidance criteria.
GFATM	<p>The proposal for the Decision mentions “It is intended to achieve these objectives whilst lowering transaction costs for both donors and countries, maintaining high accountability for results, and building on existing development processes. Consensus has gradually emerged that a single fund, with an initial focus on these three diseases/conditions is the most appropriate model.”</p> <p><i>Source: COM(2001) 612, Proposal for the Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council</i></p>
HIPC TF	The Communication of the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social

	<p>Committee of October 1998 presents in its annexes the main features of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.</p> <p>The IMF and the World Bank released on their websites many documents presenting in detail the implementation mechanisms of the HIPC Initiative thus allowing to whoever was interested to access detailed information on the HIPC principles and implementation rules.</p>																		
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<i>N/A</i>																		
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC1.3</i>																		
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC1.3</i>																		
I-1.3.3	These criteria are considered by the Commission as useful and as providing an adequate basis for channelling interventions																		
CGIAR	<i>N/A</i>																		
GFATM	Key informant at the Commission stated these criteria are indeed the main reason for channeling the intervention through the GFATM. However the statement does not generalize the criteria to other channeling decisions.																		
HIPC TF	As pointed out above the criteria utilised by the BWI to decide if a country has reached the Decision Point are consistent with the European Community views. This applies in particular to the adoption by the government of a PRSP reflecting its commitment to allocate to pro-poor expenditures the resources freed in the budget by the reduction of the public external debt.																		
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<i>N/A</i>																		
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC1.3</i>																		
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC1.3</i>																		
JC 1.4	<i>The formal guidance criteria provide the rationale for the observed evolution of channeled aid</i>																		
HIPC TF	The European Community first involvement in the HIPC Initiative was restricted to its role as a creditor and was quite limited in volume terms. It increased very rapidly from 2000 onwards once the original Initiative was revised. The Enhanced HIPC Initiative met the European Community request for a focus on poverty alleviation and requested much larger financial resources.																		
I-1.4.1	Observed parallel between the evolution of channelled funds and the development of guidance criteria																		
TFET	<p>Between the years 2001 and 2005, the WB received the following payments related to the TFET:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 2001 : € 18 M ▪ 2002 : € 33 M ▪ 2003 : € 8.5 M ▪ 2004 : 0 ▪ 2005 € 3 M <p>This decrease goes in the opposite direction of a further development of “guidance criteria”. In fact, it seems that the decrease should not be linked to the development or not of guidance criteria, but, at least in the case of a post-conflict TF, to the changing situation in the beneficiary country. It appears that the TFET has been used for emergency work, while other interventions are considered as more appropriate for a more “developmental” approach.</p> <p>From September 1999 to September 2001, €109M of EC budget funds have been committed to East Timor, including emergency and humanitarian aid, food aid, contribution to the UN administration, elections observation and to the WB TFET.</p> <p>The indicative budget for 2002-2006 coming from budget line B7-300 and B7-304 is as follow:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="501 1765 1251 1966"> <thead> <tr> <th>Year of Commitment</th> <th>Budget (Million Euro) B7-300</th> <th>Budget (Million Euro) B7-304</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>2002</td> <td>-</td> <td>28</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2003</td> <td>10</td> <td>-</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2004</td> <td>8</td> <td>-</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2005</td> <td>5</td> <td>-</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2006</td> <td>4</td> <td>-</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Source: “Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2004”</i></p>	Year of Commitment	Budget (Million Euro) B7-300	Budget (Million Euro) B7-304	2002	-	28	2003	10	-	2004	8	-	2005	5	-	2006	4	-
Year of Commitment	Budget (Million Euro) B7-300	Budget (Million Euro) B7-304																	
2002	-	28																	
2003	10	-																	
2004	8	-																	
2005	5	-																	
2006	4	-																	

CGIAR	The channelling of funds to the CGIAR to the WB took place for the first time in 2001, at the time or shortly before the framework agreement was signed. The amounts of funds channelled over the years remained steady (around € 22 M).
GFATM	<p>The rationale for channeling aid through global funds has evolve since 2001. The provision of Global Public Goods is a central issue in the discussion with its link to the MDGs. Recommendations provided by the ITFGPG³ identified 6 global challenges. The distinctive benefit of using GFPs for the provision of GPGs is specialization and the associated economies of scale.</p> <p><i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation (p.32)</i></p> <p>The evaluation states that the “GFATM example confirms that the creation of some large GFPs appears to have been a response to the perceived limitations of existing development institutions”. These “could not be expected to channel alone the needed resources in the desired time span”. The limitations of the UN system, especially WHO and UNAIDS, are emphasized by the creation of GFATM.</p> <p><i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation (p.36)</i></p> <p>However, in comparison with MS involvement, the Commission has a relatively modest role in GFP funding, it is a smaller role in channeling European contribution to GFP than it has in channeling European ODA at large.⁴</p> <p><i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>The first Council Decision to involve the Community in the HIPC Initiative, taken in July 1998, was about a Euro 40 million grant to be disbursed through the EIB to alleviate the debt of HIPCs towards the Community. Today, the Community commitments to the Initiative, as a creditor and as a donor, reach Euro 1.6 billion.</p> <p>The changes made to the Initiative guiding principles in 1999, when the Enhanced HIPC Initiative replaced the original scheme, made possible a stronger support of the Community to the Initiative. The financial pledge of the Community to the Initiative jumped from Euro 40 million in 1998 to more than Euro 1 billion by end 1999. The original HIPC Initiative could have been interpreted as a rescue operation of multilateral banks designed for financing the reimbursement to these banks of loans to HIPCs which otherwise would have never been repaid. The Enhanced Initiative puts at the forefront a financing mechanism of the fight against poverty in poor countries while at the same it allows to remove bad assets from the MDBs balance sheets.</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	The EDF funds under Lomé IV are transferred to the EIB since the early 1990s. Since 2003, the Cotonou Agreement has officially replaced the Lomé IV Convention, and no more 7 th -8 th EDF funds are paid. This can be observed in the (declining) evolution of payments of 7 th -8 th EDF funds by the Commission, as captured in the OLAS database. (<i>see also Inventory Note</i>)
I-1.4.2	Existence of other factors that explain the evolution of channelled funds
HIPC TF	<p>The HIPC Initiative had originally been designed as a temporary operation with a two-year deadline left to potential beneficiary countries to meet the eligibility requirements of the Initiative. This so-called “sunset clause” was however removed four times (at the end of 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004), additional two-year periods being given to potential beneficiaries for complying with the eligibility criteria. By end-2006 the Executive Boards of the IMF and the World Bank decided that countries that had not yet met by that time the eligibility criteria of the Initiative might become eligible and reach the Decision Point at any time provided they have adopted the qualifying IMF- and IDA-supporting programmes.</p> <p>This extension of the Initiative made it easier to donors, notably to the European Community, to increase over time their financial support to the Initiative.</p> <p>Another reason that may explain the increase of the Community commitments to the HIPC Initiative is that the total cost of the operation, which had been initially evaluated by the World Bank at US\$ 12.5 billion in 1998 NPV terms, was revised sharply upwards to 27.4 billion following the adoption of the Enhanced Initiative and of its revised criteria.</p>
PSNP	The evolution of channelled funds can be explained by the need of donor harmonisation and the possibility to do that via the use of WB TFs.

³ International Task Force on Global Public Goods.

⁴ In 2003, EC's contribution to the GFPs amounts to 18% of the MS contribution, while it is 30% for ODA.

	<p>Moreover, after the election of 2005 in Ethiopia, the donors had to stop direct budget support to the GoE. The use of WB TF was therefore the appropriate instrument to continue aid delivery while maintaining a close control of the expenditure and providing additional accountability to the donors.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 55; MN 58</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>The increase in channelling can be explained by the willingness of complying with requirements of the Paris Declaration together with other factors such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the impossibility of doing direct budget support at the time - the pressure time due to internal Commission financial regulation - the HQ encouragement of working with the WB at the time. <p><i>Source: MN 71; MN 70; MN 72; MN 76; MN 89</i></p>

EQ2	Did the channelling contribute to scaling up of aid?																																								
	<i>EQ 2 on Scaling-Up</i>																																								
JC 2.1	The absorption capacity of the interventions has facilitated the disbursement of EC funds																																								
HIPC TF	Delays in the implementation of the HIPC Initiative are not related to a low absorption capacity of beneficiary countries but to the conditions for benefiting of the Initiative. The HIPC Initiative foresaw a three-year probation period before an eligible country reaches the Decision Point, then once again three-year between the Decision Point and the Completion Point. Furthermore many HIPCs met difficulties at fulfilling the conditions for reaching the Decision Point, then the Completion Point.																																								
PSNP	<p>The absorption capacity of the WB in Ethiopia has played a role in facilitating the disbursement of the Commission funds but it is not the reason for the decision of channelling funds.</p> <p>For PSNP, the WB plays a role of funds intermediary between the donors and the GoE. Indeed, as explained by the different stakeholders, the donors pool their funds into a WB account in their own currency which are then transferred by the WB to a special account in Birr at the National Bank of Ethiopia, which is managed by the MoFED (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development). Some problems occurred for disbursement of the funds to the Ethiopian account because of difficulties of absorption capacity on the GoE side. These problems are mainly due to the poor quality of financial and activity reporting from the GoE which have to be accepted by the donors before disbursing the next tranche.</p> <p>In specific context such as the case of Ethiopia where budget support was not an option at the time, the possibility to channel funds to the WB instead has allowed the Commission to disburse it's funds from the 9th EDF. Without this possibility, the funds would have not been disbursed and this would have cause an scaling down of aid. (e.g. this is related to the WB TF for Protection of Basic Services (PBS) to which the Commission is contributing since 2007)</p> <p><i>Source: MN 51; MN 58; MN 55</i> <i>Source: MoU between the GoE and the Funding partners supporting the PSNP, 2005</i></p>																																								
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>According to the survey for the four WB TFs in Vietnam, the absorption capacity was an important factor to decide whether to channel the funds through the WB, except in the case of the TFF/VCF. This was confirmed through interviews at Delegation level. In the case of HEMA, the decision to channel the funds was taken under time pressure because of the internal EC procedure of the D+3 rule. The funds had to be disbursed from the Commission's account 3 years after the signature of the Financing Agreement with the Government. No other solution were found than channelling it through the WB. Without this possibility, the funds would have been lost.</p> <p><i>Source: Survey; MN 71; MN 89</i></p>																																								
I-2.1.1	Evolution from 1999-2006 of the EC funds channelled over the total EC external aid.																																								
HIPC TF	<p>The table below summarises the development of the Community financial pledges to the Initiative (in million Euros)</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>1998</th> <th>1999</th> <th>2000</th> <th>2001</th> <th>2002</th> <th>2003</th> <th>Total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>As a creditor (main contribution)</td> <td>40</td> <td>320</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>125</td> <td>135</td> <td>620</td> </tr> <tr> <td>As a creditor (LDC Initiative)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>60</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>60</td> </tr> <tr> <td>As a donor</td> <td></td> <td>734</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>200</td> <td>934</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>40</td> <td>1054</td> <td>0</td> <td>60</td> <td>125</td> <td>335</td> <td>1,614</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>The Community contributions as a creditor have been channeled through the EIB; its contributions as a donor have been channeled through the World Bank-managed Trust Fund.</p> <p>Actual transfers to the EIB have been the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Prior to the inception of the EIB Trust Fund: € 11.03 for Guyana (€ 6.44) and Uganda (€ 4.59) ▪ December 2000: € 100,0 million ▪ December 2001: € 100,0 ▪ October 2003: € 149 million + € 60 million (LDC Initiative) <p>Actual transfers to the World Bank HIPC Fund have been the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ July 2000 : € 250 million ▪ December 2001: 250 million ▪ December 2002: 180 million 		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	Total	As a creditor (main contribution)	40	320			125	135	620	As a creditor (LDC Initiative)				60			60	As a donor		734				200	934	Total	40	1054	0	60	125	335	1,614
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 54 million (for Latin America and Asia) ▪ € 100 million <p>As of end-2006, of the total € 934 million pledged by the European Community € 100 million still had to be disbursed. They are planned for disbursement in 2008.</p> <p>The 2000 ACP-EC Cotonou Agreement states in its article 66, relating to support for debt relief, that “the use of resources which have not been committed in the framework of past indicative programmes shall be accelerated through the quick-disbursing instruments provided for in this Agreement”.</p>
PSNP	<i>N/A</i>
I-2.1.2	Testimonies that the absorption capacity of the interventions has facilitated the disbursement of EC funds
ARTF	<p>The Recurrent Cost window of the ARTF is almost like budget support (the contribution is recognised in the general budget of the country). Interviewees indicate that the Commission would have had difficulties to fund directly budget support with a direct contribution to the Afghan Government, due to its criteria for public administration (Note. Some others did, such as the Netherlands, if he is well informed).</p> <p><i>Source: MN 29</i></p>
TFET	<p>As noted by the Commission interim evaluation of 2004, TFET mobilised US\$ 169 M, which together with investment income of over US\$ 8 M brought the financing available for the reconstruction of Timor-Leste to over US\$ 177 M. According to the report, on a per capita basis, this is the highest amount of aid mobilized through a MDTF for reconstruction.</p> <p>The above mentioned WB 2002 working paper explains (p. 6) that the Tokyo Donors meeting in December 1999 resulted in US\$ 366 M in reconstruction pledges and US\$ 157 M in pledges for humanitarian aid, to cover the three-year period 2000-2002. This amount was surpassed during implementation, with at least US\$ 518 M already disbursed by June 2002.</p> <p>Interviewees met underline that TFET disbursement was fast, despite a slow start due to the complex nature of TF and the need to organise cooperation within such a TF.</p>
GFATM	<p>GFPs have allowed a quick redeployment of ODA towards emerging global concerns. The EC has channeled \$314M through the GFATM in only 2 years which is not possible to achieve with traditional ODA mechanisms.</p> <p><i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation</i></p> <p>“More effective aid management processes will speed up the disbursement of funds to improve health.”</p> <p>The ongoing process of European Commission’s reform is establishing more effective aid management processes and addressing bottlenecks to allow more rapid disbursement.</p> <p><i>Source: COM(2001) 96 - Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction, 21/2/2001</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>Delays are mentioned in the 2003 status report on the Commission participation in the HIPC Initiative. The report notes that “some concern has been expressed about the sluggish implementation of the initiative, as most of the nineteen countries in the interim period have failed to reach Completion Point by the date originally foreseen.”</p> <p>As of end-2006, ten years after the Initiative was launched, the situation was the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 40 countries had qualified or were considered eligible for the HIPC Initiative; ▪ Of these 40 countries, 30 had reached the Decision Point; ▪ Of the 30 countries having reached the Decision Point, 9 were in the transition period between Decision Point and Completion Point, and 21 had reached the Completion Point. <p>The Commission’s actual transfers to the HIPC Trust Fund and to the EIB were scheduled in accordance with the schedule of actual expenditures by the Trust Fund and the EIB. The EC Status Report of 2006 noted in this respect: “the Trust Fund has recently presented a new estimation of funding requirements, showing a total financing gap of USD 463. The EC’s outstanding € 100 million contribution to the Trust Fund could be disbursed if necessary to meet requirements”.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>At the end of 2005, more than 100 technical assistance operations were identified for an amount of EUR 105 million (including Turkey). Up to end of August 2006, 64 service contracts amounting to EUR 42 million have been concluded with consulting firms (Source: <i>Assessment of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) and Future Options</i>).</p>

	<p>Interviewees met specified that the amount of € 105 M for three years might be too high and that the need would rather be of about € 15 M/year.</p> <p>The main purpose of FEMIP TA is to stimulate the quality and effectiveness of EIB operations (e.g. better project design and implementation). A positive side-effect may be that it facilitates some loans to materialise at all. The quality aspect of TA was also confirmed in the questionnaires distributed among users of FEMIP resources (done for the FEMIP review, in early 2006): the recipients of TA believed that TA was a useful instrument, which contributed to a smooth implementation of the project, increased its sustainability and contributed to the performance of their organisation.</p> <p><i>Source: ECFIN Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007)</i></p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>Preliminary analysis of the evaluation team during the inventory phase based on EuropeAid working data indicated that, at 31 December 2006, almost all funds committed in 1999-2003 had been effectively transferred (paid or pre-financed) to the EIB, and around 60% had been effectively used by the EIB ("consumptions"). For funds committed in 2004-2005, less than 5% had been transferred by the Commission.</p> <p><i>Source: Inventory Note</i></p> <p>The report states that actual transfers to the EIB appear low for interest rate subsidies, compared to commitments. A reason could be that these subsidies are linked to long-maturity loans, and so only a small amount every year has to be paid to the EIB, for a number of years (while commitments have to be done at once, in the beginning). For example: for a 100m loan with 20 year maturity, a 3% interest rate subsidy would lead to payments of € 3m a year, but commitments (to be done at the start) are in the order of 60m.</p> <p>In that case, the time lag between commitments and disbursements is easily explained by the nature of the instrument. It should be checked whether this is the main cause, or if there were other reasons (such as projects not starting on time / not starting at all).</p> <p><i>Source: ECFIN Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007)</i></p>
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC2.1</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>No particular "catalytic" effect of the Commission on other donors was mentioned by people met during the country mission. The Commission is one donor among other and not on its own one of the major player. The Commission has joined the PRSC at phase 3, where other donors, including EU MS, were contributing since the beginning. The TFF/VCF is a SDTF but is also included in a larger multilateral programme for the forest sector development in Vietnam. This multilateral approach was initiated by the WB, the Netherlands and the GEF few years before the Commission joined in.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 69, MN 72, MN 73, MN 76, MN 81, MN 89</i></p>
JC 2.2	<i>The presence of the EC has attracted/mobilised more resources</i>
HIPC TF	EU member states have provided close to 50% of all bilateral resources channeled through the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund. This reflects the adherence of EU governments to the objectives of the HIPC Initiative.
I-2.2.1	Testimonies that the presence of the Commission has encouraged other donors to contribute
TFET	No information has been obtained yet on the impact of the Commission participation on the other donors willingness to participate.
CGIAR	<p>Interviewees met explained that when in 2005 the Commission was thinking of suspending its contributions to the WB, the MS decided to wait until they had a clear view on the Commission's position before taking decisions on their side.</p> <p>For all centres, a strong point of the EC co-financed projects is the focus on global public goods, policy reforms and research for development. Another strong point is the flexible nature of the EC funding that allows the centres to match these funds to the restricted contributions of other donors. There is also the possibility for the centres to leverage other funds with EC funding.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, October 2007)</i></p>
GFATM	<p>By contributing to GFPs, traditional donors also provide a signal on the quality of those GFPs to other potential donors. However it must be noted that in comparison with MS involvement, the EC has a relatively modest role in GFP funding, it is a smaller role in channeling European contribution to GFP than it has in channeling European ODA at large.⁵</p> <p><i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation</i></p>

⁵ In 2003, EC's contribution to the GFPs amounts to 18% of the MS contribution, while it is 30% for ODA.

HIPC TF	<p>The Status of Implementation Reports of the HIPC Initiative produced by the IMF and the World Bank provide information on donor pledges to the HIPC Trust Fund.</p> <p>EU member States indirectly participate in the financing of the HIPC Trust Fund through their contribution to EDF funding. But most of them also contributed on a bilateral basis to the financing of the World Bank-managed Trust Fund. The table below indicates what have been their bilateral pledges to the Trust Fund.</p>																																						
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This however cannot be attributed to a demonstration effect of the Commission's own support to the HIPC Initiative. It is more likely a reflection of the support given to the HIPC Initiative by the international community at large. Contributions to the HIPC Initiative were made on a voluntarily basis. EU member States decided each on its own to what extent they intended to participate in the Initiative through the reduction of their claims on HIPCs in the framework of the Club de Paris and through a financial contribution to the World Bank Trust Fund.																																							
FEMIP Support Fund	N/A																																						
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	The global leverage effect on external funds ⁶ is almost double and has been estimated at 1:11½ . (Source: <i>Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii</i>)																																						
Risk Capital Lomé IV	In several private sector individual loan projects evaluated by the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, the promoters mentioned that EIB financing in the project facilitated co-financing by other banks, as EIB involvement provided an implicit quality stamp to the project, which gave comfort to other financiers. (Source: <i>EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p27</i>)																																						
PSNP	The Commission is a major donor in Ethiopia and its presence in a TF such as PSNP is comforting for other donors which have small contribution. E.g. SIDA as joined the group of donors contributing to the PSNP in 2007. Before taking this decision, they have reviewed the Commission experience within the PSNP and have concluded that they would transfer their funds to the MDTF. According to Irish Aid, if the Commission is not contributing to a multi-donor programme, they would assess the reason why before deciding to contribute or not. Source: MN 64; MN 63																																						

⁶ All funds, including EIB resources but excluding government co-financing.

WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>No particular “catalytic” effect of the Commission on other donors was mentioned by people met during the country mission. The Commission is one donor among other and not on its own one of the major player. The Commission has joined the PRSC at phase 3, where other donors, including EU MS, were contributing since the beginning. The TFF/VCF is a SDTF but is also included in a larger multilateral programme for the forest sector development in Vietnam. This multilateral approach was initiated by the WB, the Netherlands and the GEF few years before the Commission joined in.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 69, MN 72, MN 73, MN 76, MN 81, MN 89</i></p>
I-2.2.2	Testimonies that the Commission's grants have permitted the mobilisation of other types of funding (e.g. loans, interest rate subsidies ...)
TFET	<p>The Commissions interim evaluation of 2004 notes (p. 79), that, “<i>the World Bank and the ADB were able to design projects the way they did in Timor-Leste with substantial technical assistance and consulting services (a large part of it foreign) because the funds entrusted to them were grants. With their normal resources, which are loans and credits albeit at low interest rates, it would not have been financially responsible to do so in a poor and non-creditworthy like Timor-Leste</i>”.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>Since the primary objective of the HIPC Initiative was to reduce the debt burden of HIPCs all contributions to the Initiative by all donors and through all channels have been provided in the form of grants.</p> <p>It may be noted in this respect that the mobilisation of donors in support of the HIPC Initiative did not succeed, as least as much as was expected, to persuade non-Paris and commercial creditors to cancel a significant volume of their claims on HIPCs.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>According to interviewees met, the TA has certainly a leverage effect in terms of quality. Because of the TA the project are better prepared, better designed, and better monitored. It would however be too strong to say that without this TA, lending would not have taken place.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 28, MN 90, MN 95, MN 95)</i></p> <p>However, in some cases, there might also be a leverage effect in terms of quantity and mobilisation of loans. Indeed, in some cases, the loan would most probably not have been provided without the TA. In Syria for instance, one of the water projects would not have been prepared without the TA. Similarly a Syrian SME credit facility would not have taken place without the consultancy provided. In Morocco, assistance in the health sector would not have taken place without the TA.</p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>The 2001 Evaluation reports that interest subsidies provided a financial leverage of about 1:6 on EIB resources: €470M of subsidies allowed the mobilisation of subsidised loans amounting to €2,900M. The global leverage effect on external funds is almost double and has been estimated at 1:11½ .</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii)</i></p> <p>As to EIB interviewees, the leverage effect of 1 :6 (€1 interest rate subsidies allows to have a loan of €6) reported in the Evaluation from 2001 should still be in the same range for the entire evaluation period 1999-2006.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 27)</i></p> <p>Interest subsidies and risk capital complement the mix of co-operation measures available, combining loans and grants and introducing a financial leverage effect on the EIB's own resources. ‘Leverage effect’ happens when a small force is multiplied, producing a force greater than the one applied. In this case, relatively small amounts of EU grants, in the form of interest subsidy, are able to mobilise large investments (financed by the EIB and other donors) by making them less expensive to the client, hence more attractive. The leverage ratio is the proportion between the value of the interest subsidies granted and the value of subsidised loans provided. A ratio of 1:6 means that every Euro of interest subsidies attract 6 Euro of subsidised loans. This notion of leverage does not necessarily imply additionality, and therefore it does not imply that these types of loans would not have been realised without the subsidies”.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii)</i></p> <p>Interviewees in Morocco acknowledge that interest rate subsidies in the MEDA region essentially aimed at softening lending conditions so as to facilitate activation of loans in a less productive sector, namely the environment. But different stakeholders interviewed (Commission, EIB, Government) mentioned that most of these EIB loans would probably still have been contracted without the interest rate subsidy. Stakeholders recognised the leverage effect at 1:6 on EIB loans mentioned in the above-mentioned 2001 evaluation.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 90, MN 92, MN 95, MN 97, MN 101)</i></p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	N/A

JC 2.3	<i>EC contributions allowed to reach the critical mass necessary for the interventions</i>																																																																								
HIPC TF	Taken together the European Development Fund, the EU member states and the Commission budget have contributed more than two-thirds to the funding of the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund.																																																																								
TFET	<p>As noted by the Commission interim evaluation of 2004 (p. 30) The largest contributors were the European Commission (US\$50.67 million), followed by Portugal (US\$50 million), Japan (US\$28 million), Australia (US\$12 million), the UK and the World Bank (each with about US\$10 million). Together, the European Union (the EC plus Member States) accounted for 69% of contributions received by TFET. Details are provided in the table below, extracted from the Interim evaluation.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Actual and Pending TFET Pledges and Contributions as of April 9, 2004 (US\$ million)</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: left;">Donor</th> <th style="text-align: right;">Pledges</th> <th style="text-align: right;">Contribution Agreement</th> <th style="text-align: right;">Cash Received or Promissory Notes Lodged</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Portugal ^(a)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">50.00</td> <td style="text-align: right;">50.00</td> <td style="text-align: right;">50.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>European Commission</td> <td style="text-align: right;">50.67</td> <td style="text-align: right;">50.67</td> <td style="text-align: right;">50.67</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Japan TFET</td> <td style="text-align: right;">28.00</td> <td style="text-align: right;">25.90</td> <td style="text-align: right;">25.90</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Japan (PHRD) ^(b)</td> <td style="text-align: center;">-</td> <td style="text-align: right;">2.00</td> <td style="text-align: right;">2.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Australia^(c)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">12.43</td> <td style="text-align: right;">12.43</td> <td style="text-align: right;">12.43</td> </tr> <tr> <td>United Kingdom</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10.18</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10.18</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10.18</td> </tr> <tr> <td>World Bank</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10.00</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10.00</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Finland</td> <td style="text-align: right;">3.72</td> <td style="text-align: right;">3.72</td> <td style="text-align: right;">3.72</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Norway</td> <td style="text-align: right;">2.39</td> <td style="text-align: right;">2.39</td> <td style="text-align: right;">2.39</td> </tr> <tr> <td>United States of America</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.50</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.50</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.50</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ireland</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.47</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.47</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.47</td> </tr> <tr> <td>IDA-PCF</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.38</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.38</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.38</td> </tr> <tr> <td>New Zealand</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.36</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.36</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.36</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Italy</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.21</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.21</td> <td style="text-align: right;">0.21</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total Commitment Authority</td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">169.23</td> <td style="text-align: right;">169.23</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Investment income^(d)</td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">8.34</td> <td style="text-align: right;">8.34</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Financing Available for Current Work Programme</td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">177.57</td> <td style="text-align: right;">177.57</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>^(a) Portugal has contributed US\$30 million in cash, with US\$20 million remaining against a promissory note.</p> <p>^(b) Japan's pledge was US\$28 million, of which US\$2 million was awarded from the Japanese-funded Policy and Human Resource Development (PHRD) Trust Fund prior to the establishment of TFET.</p> <p>^(c) Australia has also contributed US\$650,000 in cofinancing of the first TFET education programme.</p> <p>^(d) Actual income based on an estimated average monthly balance of US\$22.4 million and is as of March 31, 2004</p>	Donor	Pledges	Contribution Agreement	Cash Received or Promissory Notes Lodged	Portugal ^(a)	50.00	50.00	50.00	European Commission	50.67	50.67	50.67	Japan TFET	28.00	25.90	25.90	Japan (PHRD) ^(b)	-	2.00	2.00	Australia ^(c)	12.43	12.43	12.43	United Kingdom	10.18	10.18	10.18	World Bank	10.00	10.00	10.00	Finland	3.72	3.72	3.72	Norway	2.39	2.39	2.39	United States of America	0.50	0.50	0.50	Ireland	0.47	0.47	0.47	IDA-PCF	0.38	0.38	0.38	New Zealand	0.36	0.36	0.36	Italy	0.21	0.21	0.21	Total Commitment Authority		169.23	169.23	Investment income ^(d)		8.34	8.34	Financing Available for Current Work Programme		177.57	177.57
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I-2.3.1	Testimonies that the Commission funding made a difference																																																																								
ARTF	Commission contributions to the ARTF have been critical not only for small scale infrastructure projects through such as programmes in villages, but also for supporting the public services. <i>(Source: Commission's MEMO/07/34 on Afghanistan, 26/01/2007)</i>																																																																								
MDF	Commission's contribution to the MDF corresponds to 39% of the TF contributions. <i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p26)</i> The Commission's responded quickly and concretely to the tsunami. <i>(Source: Progress Report on the European Commission's Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26 December 2004 & Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in Third Countries, 18 November 2005)</i>																																																																								
HIPC TF	As of end-June 2007 total pledges to the World Bank-managed Trust Fund amount to USD 3.9 billion. Out of this total, € 934 million (USD 1.12 billion) have been provided by the European Community from resources of the EDF, and USD 1.4 billion have been bilaterally pledged by EU member States. In addition, € 54 million were transferred to the HIPC Trust Fund from the European Commission's budget. Altogether the EU contributed more than two-thirds to the financing of the HIPC Trust Fund.																																																																								

	Besides its financial contribution to the World Bank Trust Fund, the European Community supported the HIPC Initiative through € 680 million transferred to the EIB to reduce/cancel debts of HIPC and low income countries towards the Community.
FEMIP Support Fund	As mentioned above, interviewees and reports state that the funding made a difference in terms of quality. It seems however that in some cases, projects would not have taken place without the TA component.
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>As to interviewees, interest rate subsidies are to enable obtaining non-subsidised funds, as some projects need grants in addition to loans. Example in Morocco : It would have been difficult to repay a non-subsidised loan for a sewage project, as its profit is limited. (Source: MN 27)</p> <p>Interest rate subsidies were mainly provided to water treatment / sewerage and solid waste projects. The reason is that in this 'water' sector, it is difficult for beneficiaries to get other types of financing. (Source: MN 27)</p> <p><i>See financial leverage above (1-2.2.2)</i></p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>EIB financing was critical in four of the eleven individual loans projects evaluated by the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, in the sense that without the EIB the projects would have been reduced or delayed. In the other six cases, the promoter could have been financed without the EIB, but often at a significantly higher cost. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p27)</p> <p>Generally, the terms and conditions of the EIB's loans were significantly better than alternative finance at the time the projects were financed, when alternatives in similar terms existed, which were often difficult to obtain. As a result, in nine of the eleven cases evaluated by the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV the financial value added by the EIB was judged as either being high or significant. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p28)</p> <p>Risk capital finances activities with a higher risk than EIB own resources would allow. It made it also possible to lend in countries with a high risk. (Source: MN 28)</p> <p>The commitment rate of the financial envelope available is higher for risk capital operations with grant resources, allowing a higher risk, than with EIB own resources, which have the same appraisal criteria as within the EU. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV)</p> <p>Interviewees indicate that the EIB enables as well to have financing available at mid-to-long term (longer terms than most other donors). (Source: MN 28)</p>
PSNP	<p>The Commission is one of the major donor in Ethiopia and have a substantial contribution for food security programme (25-30%). They have a certain weight in the MDTF, being the 3 largest donors, which can be comforting for smaller EU MS contributors. For certain small donors, the follow-up of the TF is demanding and therefore they may rely to the Commission work. Source: European Commission and GoE, Financing Agreement for the "Support to the Safety Nets Programme", 2005; Source: MN 51; MN 63; MN 64</p>
I-2.3.2	Testimonies that the critical mass necessary for the interventions would not have been reached without the EC contributions
GFATM	<p>Between 2002 and 2006 the Commission represents the third biggest donor. The contribution of the EU (Commission and MS) is over 50% of the GFATM contribution. Source: Update on the progress of the GFATM in 2006, 26 January 2007</p> <p>Additionality is well observed at beneficiary country level, but not at global level in total ODA flows. Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation</p>

HIPC TF	There is no doubt that the HIPC Initiative would have failed if the European Community, which through the EDF and bilateral contributions of EU members States provided close to 65% of the total financing, had decided not to support it. But since the Initiative was launched as a response to a request of the G7 group of countries, of which four are the largest EU member states, there was no real risk that the Community refuses support to the Initiative.
FEMIP Support Fund	<i>N/A</i>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	As to interviewees, interest rate subsidies are to enable obtaining non-subsidised funds, as some projects need grants in addition to loans. Example in Morocco : It would have been difficult to repay a non-subsidised loan for a sewage project, as its profit is limited. <i>(Source: MN 27)</i> <i>See financial leverage above (1-2.2.2)</i>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	EIB financing was critical in four of the eleven individual loans projects evaluated by the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, in the sense that without the EIB the projects would have been reduced or delayed. In the other six cases, the promoter could have been financed without the EIB, but often at a significantly higher cost. <i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p27)</i>
PSNP	Without the Commission contributions, the PSNP and the PBS would still exist but would clearly have smaller amount of funds and less impact on the policy dialogue with the GoE. <i>Source: MN 52; MN 59</i>
JC 2.4	<i>ODA has been scaled up since the channelling took place.</i>
HIPC TF	Some observers feared that donor contributions to the HIPC Initiative are made at the expense of other donor activities. Actually there is evidence that HIPC contributions resulted in increased donor support to HIPCs. It might however be that aid to non-HIPC countries has diminished.
PSNP	The level of ODA in Ethiopia has strongly increased during the last few years. This is mainly linked to the specific context of the country which is one of the poorest countries in the world; it is also linked to the global international commitment of aid delivery (MDGs, Monterey). It cannot be linked to the channelling of funds <i>Source: MN 51; MN 58</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	In Vietnam, channelling has impacted the level of ODA through the absorptive capacity of the WB TFs. However, it is not clear whether the beneficiaries have been able to use these funds and this depends from the capacity of the beneficiaries to absorb the funds. <i>Source: MN 76; MN 89</i>
I-2.4.1	Increase in global ODA worldwide
GFATM	Defining global additionality as the degree to which total GFP resources add up to total existing ODA, we report no conclusive evidence of any global additionality. <i>- Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation</i>
HIPC TF	Additionality of debt relief is a key question. One could fear that debt relief is financed from resources that would have otherwise been allocated to other forms of aid rather than it represents an additional contribution by donors to the fight against poverty. The evaluation of the HIPC Initiative carried out in 2006 by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group tackles this issue. Their conclusion is that “in the aggregate, HIPC debt relief appears to have been significantly additional to other net resource transfers.” The evaluation points out in particular that non-debt relief transfers to HIPC countries has increased by 11% a year since the start of the Initiative. Net transfers to HIPC countries doubled from USD 8.8 billion in 1999 to USD 17.5 billion in 2004. Out of 17 African countries that reached the completion point, only 3 (Tanzania, Cameroon and Mauritania) showed a decreased inflow of ODA between 2003 and 2005. Other African countries enjoyed an increase of ODA inflows ranging from 10% to 80% during the same period. But the evaluation report also notes that the share of HIPCs in the total ODA transfers to developing countries has increased from 33% on average in the years 1990-1999 to 47% from 1999 to 2004. This suggests that while the Initiative has induced or at least permitted an increase of ODA to the benefit of HIPCs, this could have resulted in a reduction of aid to non-HIPC developing countries.
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC2.4</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC2.4</i>

I-2.4.2	Increase in Commission's ODA worldwide
GFATM	<p>"Despite the quick growth of contributions of DAC countries to major GFPs, GFPs share in total ODA remains modest (2.2% of total ODA). This is because of these contributions originate from the same budgetary pool than for ODA"</p> <p>- <i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>Except for € 54 million financed from the Commission budget, the € 934 million European Community contribution as a donor to the HIPC Initiative, as well as its € 680 million contribution as a creditor have been financed by the EDF. In a first stage, contributions were financed from unutilised resources and reserves of the EDF, then from the B envelope of the 9th EDF (Source: Decisions of the EU-ACP Council of Ministers). But there is no indication that EU member States have increased their contribution to the EDF in order to make resources available for the HIPC Initiative. Therefore, contributions of the European Community to the Initiative didn't result in an increase of the Community's overall ODA. Mobilizing idle resources is certainly a positive development, but it is not additionality in the strict meaning of that word.</p> <p>It has been pointed out above (I.2.2.1) that besides EDF contributions, the World Bank-managed HIPC Trust Fund has received USD 1.4 billion directly transferred by EU member States. If the HIPC Initiative has resulted in an increase of ODA by the European Community, it is through these bilateral transfers of EU member States.</p>
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC2.4</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC2.4</i>
I-2.4.3	Evolution of Commission channelling to development banks and EIB.
HIPC TF	Transfers from the EDF and from the Commission budget to the World Bank Trust Fund and to the EIB have been detailed above (Cf. I.2.1)
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC2.4</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC2.4</i>
I-2.4.4	Evidence that channelling through IFIs has increased ODA in the country
ARTF	The fact that the WB is administering the ARTF provides a fiduciary management service that enables more donors than otherwise to provide funding to the budget. (<i>source: Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF, February 2007</i>)
GFATM	<p>For beneficiary countries, a significant additionality to existing ODA is offered by GFPs</p> <p>- <i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>As seen before, the HIPC Initiative was accompanied by an increase of ODA to HIPCs.</p> <p>There is few doubts that such a programme involving all donors and some 40 beneficiary countries could have not been implemented if not, as it has been, under the guidance of the BWI and with a concentration of the resources provided by the donors in a limited number of funds.</p>
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC2.4</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC2.4</i>

EQ3	To what extent did channelling through IFIs contribute to achieving sustainably the intervention objectives the EC targeted when channelling its funds?
	<i>EQ 3 on Results/Impact</i>
JC 3.1	<i>The objectives the Commission aimed to achieve via a specific intervention were explicit and coherent with those of the channelling instrument selected.</i>
ARTF	<p>The CSP 2003-2006 states that the Commission office aims at taking a lead agency role in rural livelihoods and, with others, on public administration and health. This role through the Consultative Group is seen as crucial if the EC is to be able to implement the CSP. (note. this is not specific to the ARTF)</p> <p>The objective of the ARTF is the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and is more specifically designed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) promote transparency and accountability of reconstruction assistance; (ii) help reinforce the national budget as the vehicle for promoting alignment of the reconstruction program with national objectives; (iii) reduce the burden on limited government capacity for the first few years of re-engagement, while promoting capacity building over time; (iv) help fund the essential recurrent budgetary expenditures required for the government to function effectively; and (v) provide a convenient mechanism for donors to fund priority investments. <p>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis MDTFs, February 2007)</p>
HIPC TF	<p>The original HIPC Initiative aimed primarily at reducing the external debt which hinders the development of poor countries and secondarily at inducing HIPCs to implement sound macroeconomic and financial policies. The Enhanced Initiative complemented these objectives with a new one: that resources freed by debt reduction in the budget of HIPCs are mobilised for the fight against poverty. Complemented in this manner the HIPC Initiative is fully consistent with the objectives of the European Community development policy.</p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>The Commission subscribes to the common overall objectives of the PRSC and the PFM. The AA signed between the WB and the Commission indicates that both parties agree on the objectives of the TFs.</p> <p>For the TFF/VCF, the agreement between the WB and the Commission take the form of a Single Donor TF agreement. The reason is that the Commission funds allocated for the TFF/VCF have to be used for two components of a large multilateral initiative, managed by the WB, for the Forest Development Sector in Vietnam. The AA specify that the Commission's funds <i>shall be used exclusively for the following purposes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>co-financing of the Special Use Forest component of the Forest Sector Development Project through the financing of small grants for conservation activities to be made by the Vietnam Conservation Fund</i> - <i>to assist the Bank in providing support tot the Trust Fund for Forests administered by the Forest Sector Support Programme Coordination Office, through capacity building and financial analysis which are aimed at creating a platform for a sector-wide approach for forest sector financing; and supporting the policy dialogue among the partners of the Forest Sector Support Programme, carrying out of diagnostic studies and capacity-building, on the issues of forest law enforcement, governance and trade.</i> <p>For HEMA, the agreement between the WB and the Commission take the form of a Single Donor TF agreement. There was a lack of agreement on the objectives of the TF and the respective role of the WB and Commission before signing the AA. However, because of time pressure, the AA has been signed but problems on the objectives of the intervention remained.</p> <p><i>Source: Administration agreement concerning TF for the support of public financial management modernisation in Vietnam Administration agreement relating to the financing agreement "support to Vietnam's Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy – PRSC 4".</i></p> <p><i>Source: Administration Agreement to support the Vietnam Conservation Fund and to provide support to the Vietnam Trust Fund for Forest.</i></p> <p><i>Source: Administration Agreement to provide support to the Health Care Fund for the Poor under the Health Care support to the poor in the Northern Uplands and Central Highlands project; MN 71, MN 87</i></p>
I-3.1.1	Evidence that the Commission subscribes to the overall objectives of the intervention
TFET	<p>As explained under the indicators related to question 1, the Commissions has participated to the entire process that led to the set-up of the TFET. This process led from the JAM to the donors conference in Tokyo. Moreover, as explained under question 2, the Commission is the most important contributor to the TF in financial terms. Finally none of the preparation documents or agreements nor the interim evaluation question the objectives of the TF (see I. 3.1.2). These elements indicate that the Commission subscribed to the overall</p>

	<p>objectives of the TF.</p> <p>As explained under I.3.1.2, the Commission has nevertheless expressed preferences in terms of sectors of intervention and thus objectives for which it wanted its contribution to be used.</p> <p>It may however be that the Commission had a more nuanced approach to certain aspects of the TF. This should be verified through further interviews with Commission representatives. This would also help to understand whether there were certain expectations or demands from the Commission in terms of objectives that were finally not taken into account for the TF.</p>
MDF	<p>The C(2005)1490 – Tsunami Indicative Programme (2005 – 2006) - Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives provides (p19-20) explicit objectives for the Commission channelling to the MDF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General: The EC overarching objective is to support the Government of Indonesia (GoI) in implementing its post-tsunami strategy, including repair of damage and restarting of livelihoods, and to strengthen the long-term potential for peaceful development of Aceh and North Sumatra. • Specific: The EC objectives in Indonesia are two-fold: sustainable development (rehabilitation and reconstruction), and political stability, ensuring that development assistance contributes to a peaceful solution of the existing conflict in Aceh. Moreover, strengthening the capacity for local governments and civil society to play a positive role in the reconstruction process will enable them to exercise their prerogatives in the application of the Special Autonomy Law. <p>Commissioner RELEX Benita Ferrero-Waldner said: “The Commission was determined to accompany the whole reconstruction process – not just give a short term reaction to the initial catastrophe. The challenge has been to "build back better" in the affected parts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.”</p> <p>(Source: <i>Brief Tsunami</i>)</p>
CGIAR	<p>The CGIAR 2006 document <i>A partnership for Research and Development. European Commission and the CGIAR</i>, specifies that “the recently adopted EU Development Policy (the European Consensus on Development) and Strategy for Africa (The EU and Africa: towards a Strategic Partnership) both recognize the important role of global agricultural research.” It further specifies that in its policies promoting sustainable agriculture, foods security and rural development, the EU assigns high priority to a number of areas (8 areas are listed, such as promoting sustainable natural resource management or raising the competitiveness of agriculture), which are considered as thoroughly in line with the CGIAR’s research-for-development mandate. In this sense, one can consider that the Commission subscribes to the overall objectives of the CGIAR.</p> <p>Annex II of the 2003 Administration Agreement specifies the programme to which it will allocate its funds is in line with the Commission’s global objectives. This allocation concerned the programme in support of food security in sub-saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America and West Asia/ North Africa regions. “<i>This programme contributes to the EC development co-operation objectives as defined in the Treaty establishing the European Community. It is also consistent with the European Community’s Development Policy, in particular:</i> .</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The statement by the Council and the Commission dates November 2000, ▪ The EC Communication COM (97) 174 to Council and Parliament on Research, and ▪ Council Regulation (EC) N° 1292/96 of 27 June 1996 on food-aid policy and food-aid management and special operation in support of food security. <p>In other words, the Commission explicitly justifies its intervention in the CGIAR by referring to the fact that this intervention is in line with the Commission’s overall development objectives. .</p> <p>Nevertheless, a number of documents indicate a certain “tension” between the Commission’s views on the overall objectives of the CGIAR and those of the WB. Indeed, the OED <i>Précis I of 2003</i> (which summarizes the results of a large WB evaluation of the CGIAR conducted in 2003) specifies (p. 2) that “<i>The CGIAR is facing huge challenges, and it is less focused on enhancing agricultural productivity than it used to be. Its current mix of activities reflects neither its comparative advantage nor its core competence. The CGIAR’s expenditures on productivity-enhancing agricultural research – which is a global or regional public good ideally suited to a publicly funded global network such as the CGIAR – declines by 6.5 percent annually in real terms between 1992 and 2001</i>”. Several factors (for instance the failure of many governments of developing countries and their donors supporters to make the necessary investments in their national agricultural research systems that led CGIAR donors to runs to the Centers to fill the national and public goods gaps closer to the farmer) are invoked to explain this. Moreover, the report explains (p. 3) that two changes in the funding process of the CGIAR since the mid-1990s have also increased the influence of individual donors</p>

	<p>on the research expenditures of the CGIAR. One of these is that to create incentives for Centers to mobilize additional funding and to accommodate donors, the CGIAR expanded the definition of its “agreed research agenda” to include both the former “core” agenda (largely the high-return global and regional public goods research) and the “non-core” agenda (donor-funded, mostly downstream activities that the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) did not consider as high a priority.</p> <p>These elements and a number of other trends has seen a transformation of the CGIARs authorizing environment from being science-driven to being donor-driven, and a shift in the System from producing global and regional goods towards providing national and local services. Today, says the report, “<i>donor’s preferences are largely determining resource allocations independently of TAC’s medium and longer term priority setting</i>”. The report concludes in this respect that “<i>the sum of the interests of individual stakeholders in a global organization need not define a global public good.</i>”.</p> <p>Interviewees met explained (MN 24) that the CGIAR is intended to provide Global Public Goods in a continuum that leads from knowledge to development. In this perspective, there is, within the Commission, a will to make sure that the provision of Global Public Goods is more directly linked to development and poverty reduction, whereas the WB seems to emphasize more the scientific aspects of the research. The charter of the CGIAR is clear on development objectives, but the WB is pushing more in the direction of research. The EC wants to have a shift from a technology push to a demand driven approach. The EC would like to focus on Africa and Asia and on genetic resources and policy development.</p> <p>It is difficult to attribute the evolution in terms of objectives to one single element. Since 2000 there is a new EC policy on development. There is also more and more pressure from other donors: US and Canada are more in favor of the EC approach than the WB. Same is true for Japan.</p>
GFATM	<p>The Commission subscribe to the overall objectives of the intervention since the Commission is a founding member of the GFATM, and since, preceding the establishment of the fund, Commission’s documents quoted the 3 communicable diseases as a priority for the Commission : COM(2000) 585 final of 20.9.2000 on Accelerated action targeted at major communicable diseases within the context of poverty reduction ; or COM(2001) 96 final of 21.2.2001 giving a Programme for action on Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction”.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>The Council Decision of 6 July 1998, which is the starting point of the Community involvement in the HIPC Initiative states in its preamble that “the Community and its Member States are firmly committed to participating in the HIPC Initiative by providing exceptional assistance to the countries which implement economic reform programmes and qualify for this initiative”.</p> <p>Whereas the Decision of 1998 was strictly restricted to the Community involvement as a creditor, the Commission Communication of 26.10.1998 proposed that the Community is also involved in the Initiative as a donor. This position was approved by member states through subsequent Council decisions and by the EU-ACP Council of ministers as regards the mobilisation of EDF resources.</p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>Interviewees indicate that interest rate subsidies bring together the objectives of the Commission, the EIB, and the market.</p> <p>(Source: MN 27)</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>The Lomé IV Convention is the cooperation agreement between the European Community and the ACP countries under which EDF resources of the MS are provided by the Commission to the EIB for risk capital operations.</p> <p>The ACP mandate has always been a development mandate.</p> <p>(Source: MN 28)</p> <p>In accordance with the strategies and policies included in the Lomé IV Convention, the operational objectives for EIB lending in ACP not only take account of the EU development priorities, but also reflect market conditions as well as the priorities expressed by the governments, project promoters and other interested parties in the countries concerned.</p> <p>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV)</p>
PSNP	<p>In the Financing Agreement between the Commission and the GoE, the Commission subscribes clearly to the overall objective of the PSNP and to all the component of the intervention. The objectives have been agreed upon between all the donors and with the GoE through joint processes (Joint donors Groups, MoU between the GoE and the donors).</p> <p>Source: European Commission and GoE, Financing Agreement for the “Support to the Safety Nets Programme”, 2005 Source: MoU between the GoE and the Funding partners supporting the PSNP, 2005</p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>See information at the level of JC3.1</p>

I-3.1.2	Justification in the preparatory documents and agreements.
ARTF	No justification for participation is found in the Administration Agreement
PFMR	<p>The reason why the Commission contributed to the PFMR was political. (see I-1.1.3) The objective of the Commission was to keep on supporting the PA as it did since the second intifada. In the programming documents of the Commission, it is stated that it is a temporary mechanism that should be succeeded by another alternative in the future. (see COM(2005)458).</p> <p>The objective of the PFMR, as stated in the Administration Agreement, is to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mobilise Donor resources in support of the PA's budget; - harmonise Donor assistance to the PA under a commonly agreed reform programme; - assist in the simplification of the PA's disbursement procedures <p><i>Source: European Commission, COM(2005)458 on the "EU-Palestinian cooperation beyond disengagement – towards a two-state solution" (2005)</i></p> <p><i>Source: Administration agreement, "Standard Terms and conditions governing contribution to the West Bank and Gaza. Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund".</i></p>
TFET	<p>See I-1.3.2 for the objectives and the justifications of the Commission in intervening and financing the WB TFET, stated in the CSP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support health sector - Support rural development - Support infrastructure rehabilitation - Support the public institutional capacity building (as a cross-cutting theme) <p>In the Contribution Agreement signed between the Commission and the WB, attachment 4 mentions the "provisions applicable to the European Community contribution to the TFET". Purpose and objective of the TF are described as "(...) <i>financing an emergency reconstruction and recovery program in East Timor over a three-year period including supporting agricultural recovery, rehabilitation of utilities and restoration of public health and education services</i>".</p> <p>Retrieved preparatory documents and agreements do not explicitly tackle the issue of knowing to what extent the Commission subscribes to the objectives of the TF, but they do not mention a specific questioning of the objectives.</p> <p><i>Source: "East Timor: Contribution Agreement between the European Community and International Development Association" (2000)</i></p> <p><i>Source: "Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2004"</i></p>
WB ITF	<p>When channelling its funds to the WB ITF, the Commission's main objective is to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq. In its Iraq Assistance Programme 2004 it is stated that the Commission's intention is to use the multilateral framework provided by the IRFFI <i>as primary mechanism through which to channel resources to the Iraqi population in 2004</i>.</p> <p>Within this framework, the Commission has signed an Administration Agreement with the WBG to contribute to the WB ITF. In the annexes of this agreement, the WB's work programme for 2004 is described. Moreover, the programmes, expected results, indicators, conditionality and risks are presented and have been accepted by the Commission.</p> <p>Knowing that, the Commission expresses its priorities in its Assistance Programme 2004, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Restoring and strengthening the delivery of key public services - Livelihoods and poverty reduction - Strengthening governance, civil society and human rights. <p>In the terms and Conditions of the World Bank ITF, the WB expresses its objective: <i>the sustainable reconstruction and development of Iraq</i> (see page 10 of the IRFFI ToR); and its eligible expenditures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - investment and capital expenditures, including pre-feasibility studies, and incremental recurrent costs directly relating to the supported investment and capital expenditures; - technical assistance and training. <p>According to the administration agreement between the Commission and the WB for the WB ITF, the Commission agrees with the terms and conditions of the WB ITF and the rules governing its contributions. The</p>

	<p>Commission support the implementation of the WB Interim Strategic Work Programme for Iraq and make available a grant of € 80 M to the WB ITF, of which € 3M for Capacity Building; €40 M for Education; and € 37 M for Community Based Rural and Urban Infrastructure.</p> <p><i>Source: European Commission, Iraq Assistance Programme, 2004. COM(2004)667</i> <i>Source: United Nations/World Bank. International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Terms of Reference. (2003)</i> <i>Source: Administration Agreement. MED/2004/082-205/1. TF053167 (July 2004)</i></p>
CGIAR	<i>See information at the level of I 3.1.1</i>
GFATM	<p>The Decision of the European Parliament and the council “Concerning the European Community contribution to the GFATM” COM(2001)612 explain that the channeling has been preferred based on several limitations identified in past aid delivery and conducting to criteria for choosing new instruments.</p> <p>The Administration agreement does not offer any justification</p>
HIPC TF	<p>Neither the Commission Communication of October 1998 nor the preambles of the Council Decisions develop the policy reasons why the Community should participate in the HIPC Initiative. The Community involvement is basically derived from the adoption of the Initiative by the IMF and World Bank Boards following the request by the G7 group of countries that measures are implemented by the BWI to tackle the indebtedness of poor countries.</p> <p>For example, the Council Decision of 6 July 1998 states in its preamble: “Whereas a debt initiative for the heavily indebted poor countries was presented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank at their April 1996 meetings and subsequently endorsed in the autumn of 1996 by the Interim and Development Committees at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank;” Then “ Whereas the Community and its Member States are firmly committed to participating in the HIPC Initiative by providing exceptional assistance to the countries which implement economic reform programmes and qualify for this initiative”.</p> <p>It does not make any specific reference to the Community development policy.</p>
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of I 3.1.1</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC 3.1</i>
I-3.1.3	Amount of funds earmarked and impact on channelling instruments' objectives.
ARTF	Of the €30m committed in the Administration Agreement 2002, the preference was expressed to split it in €20m for the “recurrent & capital expenditures” window and €10m for the “Law and Order TF”.
TFET	<p>The Contribution agreement does not mention any earmarking or preferences. Nevertheless interviewees underline that the Commission expressed clearly its preferences for the use of its contribution in two sectors: infrastructure rehabilitation and health. This is also confirmed by the 2002-2006 CSP that underlines that these were the preferred sectors for the contribution to the TFET.</p> <p>It is not clear which amount or percentage of the funds were “earmarked” in this manner.</p>
WB ITF	<p>The Commission's funds are not earmarked. In the Terms and Conditions of the WB ITF, it is stated that donors can put forward some preferences in the allocation of their contribution but: <i>in the event that the Commission's preferences cannot be accommodated, the WB may allocate the contribution to other sectors with the previous written agreement of the Commission</i> (page 2 of the Administration Agreement).</p> <p><i>Source: United Nations/World Bank. International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Terms of Reference. (2003)</i> <i>Source: Administration Agreement. MED/2004/082-205/1. TF053167 (July 2004)</i></p>
MDF	<p>There is no earmarking/preferences. As to interviewees, it's a question of influence through the Steering Committee.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 26)</i></p> <p>Note. MDF funding is composed for 85% of Commission (39%) and MS resources. The Commission is co-chair of the MDF as it is the largest donor.</p> <p>Note. The MDF's Operational Manual specifies (p1) that “contributions may not be earmarked for any specific component, activity or program but a contributor may state a preference that disbursements from the fund be used to support one or more sectors and cross-cutting themes as defined in the Government of Indonesia's recovery master plan”.</p>

CGIAR	<p>The Commission earmarks its contributions to the CGIAR. As specified in the 2003 Administration Agreements, the Commission's support is targeted towards two programme clusters:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Genetic resources (collection, conservation, management and improvement) ▪ International policies. <p>Furthermore it is specified that there has been a selection of the programmes most relevant to the EC strategy amongst the CGIAR portfolio, taking carefully into account the programmes supported the year before with a view to ensure continuity.</p> <p>Further there has been an allocation of resources according to Regions, Centers and programmes selected.</p> <p>This earmarking has been carried out in close collaboration between the relevant EC Directorates Generals (DG DEV, AIDCO, RTD) and the EU Member States through the European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development (EIARD).</p> <p>This concerns the total amount of € 22.2 M made available by the Food Aid and Food Security budget line (i.e. the total Commission grant).</p> <p>The resources are allocated to programmes to carry out research work in countries in development with clear priority to regions where poverty and food insecurity are most critical, i.e. Africa and Asia. The distribution of financial resources per region is as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ACP and Asia : each 35% ; ▪ Lat. Am., MEDA, CAC: each 10%. <p>A more detailed breakdown is provided in the annex of the Administration Agreement.</p> <p>A similar procedure has been applied for the 2005 allocation.</p>
GFATM	<p>The funds are not earmarked, and pooled with other donor funds e.g. <i>“an amount of the trust fund equal to the Grant funds will be fully utilised in accordance with the provisions of this Administration Agreement”</i>.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>As far as the major part of the Community contributions to the HIPC Initiative, be it through the EIB or the World Bank Trust Fund, were financed from the EDF, these contribution had to be earmarked for debt reduction measures benefiting to ACP countries.</p> <p>The Community contribution to the HIPC Initiative as a creditor has been channelled through the EIB, which manages Community loans to developing countries. This contribution, in a total amount of € 680 million, has been entirely financed from the EDF and earmarked for cancelling claims of the Community on ACP countries. But the EIB responsibility on this matter is limited to (a) the provision of information on the Community claims on HIPCs and (b) to the implementation of the debt relief measures decided by the Commission.</p> <p>The Agreement between the Commission and the EIB details precisely (article 9) what for these funds can be utilised during the transition period when a debtor country has reached the Decision Point but not yet the Completion Point, then after the country has reached the Completion Point. Practically, once a country has reached the Decision point or the Completion Point, the process is the following one:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (i) On the basis of information received from the EIB on the country liabilities towards the Community, the Commission decides which debt reduction measures will be implemented for the benefit of this country; (ii) the Commission decision is communicated for approval by the Commission itself to the beneficiary government; (iii) The Commission decision is eventually executed by the EIB in compliance with the instructions received from the Commission. <p>When making its decision the Commission is assumed to make sure that each debtor country having achieved the Decision Point or the Completion Point receives as much financial assistance, but not more, than it is entitled to on the basis of the rules defined by the BWI for countries benefiting of the HIPC Initiative.</p>

⁷ Administration Agreement for the European Community Grants to the Trust Fund for the Global Fund to Fight Aids Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2003

	<p>The Community contribution to the Initiative as a donor has been channelled to the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund. € 880 million have been financed from the EDF and earmarked for debt alleviation measures for the benefit of ACP countries; this mainly concerned debt of African countries towards the AfDB. The Commission indicated that its resources will be used to support up to 40% of the costs of each eligible country. The essential features of the AfDB proposed debt reduction modalities were: (i) delivery of debt relief through annual debt service reduction; (ii) release of up to 80% of annual debt service obligations as they come due until total relief is provided; (iii) interim relief up to 40% of total debt relief; (iv) debt service to be provided within 15 years time horizon.</p> <p>In addition € 54 million have been transferred from the Commission budget to the HIPC Trust Fund, these resources being earmarked for debt reduction measures for the benefit on non-ACP countries in Latin America (€ 45 million) and Asia (€ 9 million).</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	The funds need to be used for TA and consultancy services accompanying EIB loans in the MEDA region for individual borrowers and for financial intermediaries. .
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>Since the end of the financial protocols, interest rate subsidies have been made available to all Mediterranean partners but are applied only to loans in the field of the environment.</p> <p>They should also be part of national indicative programs. There are no fixed multi-annual amounts. Interviewees specify that there are no strict rules/definitions on the interpretation of what 'environment' consists of . (Source: MN 27)</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	There is no earmarking as such. Details are defined in the Lomé IV Convention.
PSNP	<p>No funds from the Commission are earmarked as such. However, within the PSNP, donors can provide their contribution in cash or in kind. WFP and USAID have chosen to provide only contribution in-kind. All the other donors, including the Commission, have chosen to contribute only in cash for the transfer of money to the beneficiaries. Source: MN 51, MN 66</p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	See information at the level of JC 3.1
I-3.1.4	Evidence of provisions (e.g. earmarking/preferences, from the Commission or the channelling instrument) that hamper/enhance the reaching of the objectives of the global intervention
ARTF	<p>Under the WB's policy for multi-donor TF, donor contributions may not be earmarked. This rule allows for optimal flexibility in managing funds and making allocation decisions in a timely manner. (source: Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF, February 2007)</p> <p>To facilitate Donor contribution and knowing that Donors may reasonably want to support investments that are important to their constituencies, the ARTF Management Committee has adopted a system of 'donor expression of preference' in which a Donor may request that a contribution be directed toward a Government priority program. Specifically, no more than 50% of a Donor's total contribution in a given Afghan Fiscal Year may be preferenced and the preference must be for a Government priority project or program, included in the development budget for which the Government will request funding and for which there is a financing gap. The preferenced project must be satisfactorily appraised by the WB and deemed eligible for ARTF funding. To date, this system has generally served the ARTF well. Up until mid-2006, all donor preferences for satisfactorily appraised projects had been met.</p> <p>To the extent that Donors finalize their pledges early in the Afghan fiscal year and subsequently, promptly pay their pledges, constraints on allocations and honouring preferences are mitigated. (source: Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF, February 2007)</p> <p>The Commission has expressed in the Administration Agreement (2002) the clear preference that its contribution is solely focused on two out of the three windows of the TF.</p> <p>Interviewees indicate that a long phase of negotiations was required to have the WB accepting the Commission's will to express a preference on the use of its funds, e.g. for the National Strategy Programme (NSP), managed by</p>

	<p>the Government (Minister of Rural Reconstruction & Development). (Source: MN 29)</p> <p>Interviewees indicate that these “preferences” are politically binding, although not legally. They are very strict, even though the WB will not commit firmly to it and it is not legally binding (Source: MN 29)</p>
TFET	<p>Neither the WBs 2002 working paper on <i>The East Timor Reconstruction Program: Successes, Problems and Tradeoffs</i>, nor the 2004 Commission’s interim evaluation mention anything on any provision of the Commission that has hampered the reaching of the TFET objectives. None of the other documents examined mention anything in this respect either.</p> <p>Interviewees met so far mentioned that the WB had some problems with the preferences expressed but that this had not caused any major problem.</p> <p>Among the other provisions disagreement between the WB and the Commission occurred on procedures but not on the content.</p> <p>The issue needs however to be further investigated as only few stakeholders have been met so far.</p>
MDF	<p>The Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds report that while donors were quick to pledge funds, getting all the agreements in place took time. A Standard Agreement was prepared by the WB Country Lawyer in Indonesia, and it was in principle agreed to by donors. However, once it came to signing agreements, several donors had special requests/clauses to meet their legislative requirements and policy decisions. These special requests had to be accepted by the WB’s country lawyer as well as other WB units that clear such agreements, especially the Trust Fund Accounting section (ACCTF).</p> <p>The MDF Secretariat spent significant time drafting these clauses, getting the country lawyer to review and approve them, negotiate with the donors and obtaining the required WB clearances. (Source: <i>Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p50</i>)</p>
CGIAR	<p>The OED <i>Précis</i> of 2003 mentions the earmarking as one of the elements that hampers reaching the objectives of the CGIAR. It is indeed stated that (p. 4): “Various interests in donor domestic constituencies have encouraged members to tie their contributions to specific regions of the world, Centres, and programs, and to their own national personnel or institutions. While broadening the CGLAR’s political support, this has created a chaotic marketplace for global public goods research and shifted the composition of the overall program from strategic research to development and dissemination activities tied to short-term donor agendas in which the CGLAR does not have a comparative advantage or core competencies”.</p> <p>The report also mentions the response of the WB management on this issue (p. 5): “Management agreed that restricted funding by some donors allocated to projects preferred by those donors has diverted some activities of the CGLAR Centres from their core research programs”. However, Management saw the report’s claim that “the CGLAR is less focused” as potentially too sweeping (...). Management does see a need to continue to focus on productivity research and to be alert to the risk that increasing the focus on natural resources may dilute the Centre’s contribution to global public goods if they become more heavily involved in local development activities”.</p> <p>The report also mentions (p. 6) the WB Executive Director’s Perspective in this respect: “The Bank should lead an international effort to reform the CGLAR and to encourage donors to provide less restricted funding for the System. However, the Committee made a distinction between “restricted funding” as defined by the CGLAR and certain donor “requirements” (such as a priority on Africa) that may be consistent with development needs”.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>Out of the 21 HIPCs which have reached the Completion Point all but three (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua) are ACP countries and all 9 HIPCs in the transition period between Decision Point and Completion Point are ACP countries. Furthermore all HIPCs and poor countries that have or had outstanding debts towards the Community are ACP countries. As a consequence there was very few risk that earmarking the Community contributions for ACP countries is a hindrance to an effective utilisation of these funds.</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>No indication of such provisions.</p>
PSNP	<p>The preference expressed by the Commission to provide its contribution only for the transfers in cash does not hamper the reaching of the objectives of the intervention. Source: MN 66</p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>See information at the level of JC 3.1</p>

JC 3.2	<i>The Commission Services which channel the funds have the capacity, resources and information needed to follow up their use.</i>
ARTF	<p>Interviewees indicate that the Commission lacks active means to be more active on policy level in the ARTF Donor meeting, i.e. capacity, understanding, and competence.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In Brussels: there are 3 people (2 RELEX + 1 AIDCO) (+1 ECHO for own programmes) working permanently on Afghanistan. As the ARTF represents only 14% of the funds for Afghanistan and the rest are direct Commission interventions, resources for the ARTF are quite limited. - In the DCE: 3-5 people are involved in the ARTF (but not full time), which is quite limited, especially compared with other donors (e.g. DFID). <p><i>(Source: MN 29)</i></p>
HIPC TF	The Commission devotes very limited human resources to the monitoring of the HIPC Initiative and the management of its contribution. It relies on information provided by an annual financial report of the Trust Fund managers and on the report released annually by the IMF and the World Bank on the implementation status of the Initiative.
I-3.2.1	Resources in manpower and time allocated to these functions.
TFET	<p>From 1999 to 2002, the Commission headquarters were in charge of programming and implementing. With the devolution, this task was done by Jakarta. In 2005-2006, Timor-Leste signed the Cotonou agreement and thus the Delegation of Jakarta had to apply rules it was not familiar with. Moreover, as East-Timor was a young country, it does not have so far a Delegation, only a small Commission office with an external consultant since 2000.</p> <p>Under these conditions and as mentioned under question 1, the Commission did not have enough manpower to implement programmes itself.</p> <p>Information on the extent to which manpower were considered sufficient for ensuring the follow-up of the TF activities are lacking, but first interviewees met indicated that little or no problems occurred in that respect. Evaluations examined do not mention any specific problems in this respect.</p>
MDF	<p>To enable the Commission to tackle the longer-term EU response to the tsunami, human resources were bolstered both at Headquarters and in the field. The EC Delegation in Jakarta has been reinforced through a 'Europe House' opened in Aceh to ensure a good, on-the-spot co-ordination of EU assistance in the area and raise the EU's profile on the ground.</p> <p><i>(Source: Progress Report on the European Commission's Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26 December 2004 & Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in Third Countries, 18 November 2005)</i></p> <p>Commission interviewees indicate that the co-chair of the MDF by the Commission requires lots of management time.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 31)</i></p> <p>The Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds considers that having several co-chair of a TF is useful if the co-chairs dedicate own staff time to the function and thus provide value-added. However, it considers that in the case of the MDF, the Commission should have been more pro-active in this regard.</p> <p><i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p67)</i></p>
CGIAR	<p>A Commission briefing note accompanying the 2005 administration agreement, specifies that the Commission monitors the programmes/projects that are being financed by the Food Security Budget Line. The Commission recurs to highly specialised independent experts to monitor some previously selected Centres and projects each year. The EC funding includes an annual provision (+/- € 300,000) for these services. The experts are presented to the EC by ECART (European Consortium for Agricultural Research in the Tropics, and NATURA (Network of European Agricultural Universities Related with Agricultural Development).</p> <p>Furthermore, the EC has also set out a technical Follow-up Committee (Task Force) of the CGIAR Programme composed by representatives from the EC AIDCO à/4, E/6, DEV B/4, and RTD/N2 and N3, and some EU MS of the European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development (EIARD). The Task Force selects the annual projects to be funded yearly, prepares the terms of reference of the monitoring, makes the final selection of candidates for the monitoring and proceed to the evaluation ex-post of the monitoring reports.</p> <p>Interviewees met so far noted however that there might be a need for clarification of the respective roles of DG Dev, who intervenes on policy, AIDCO who is in charge of the implementation and DG Research on the science aspects.</p>

HIPC TF	In the earlier stages of the Community contribution to the HIPC Initiative EuropeAid, DG Dev and DG Ecfm were involved in its preparation and management. Nowadays there is only one staff member of EuropeAid in charge on a part time basis of the monitoring of the Initiative and the management of the EC contribution. This expert receives some support from the EuropeAid unit for macroeconomics, from DG Dev, from DG Ecfm and, as regards the situation in HIPCs, from the EC Delegation in these countries.
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>With respect to the availability of resources from the side of the EIB, the 2006 mid-term review notes that (p. 55):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The capacity of the TA Unit with its small staff is rather limited ; ▪ Many of the Loan Officers and the PJ staff-members relevant for this Fund had only limited experience with TA; ▪ The preparation and development of TA measures have been considered very time-consuming and represent an add-on to the existing scope of recurrent tasks to be delivered by the staff of the Bank; ▪ The organizational culture of the Bank does not really seem to be conducive to a smooth implementation of the TA support fund; ▪ There is not much evidence that TA has become a significant priority for the management of the Bank. In terms of the financial magnitude it represents a negligible part. And there is no evidence that intangible assets (such as the complementary competence in TA) are sufficiently considered as important value drivers. <p>The evaluation states in this respect that there are indications (p. III) that <i>“the Bank does not dispose of the manpower to ensure professional quality assurance in an adequate way. This concerns the entire cycle of TA operations, from systematic needs analysis to ex-post evaluation linked with a lessons learned approach”</i>.</p>
PSNP	The Commission Delegation in Ethiopia has one local staff and one international staff following closely the implementation of the PSNP. However, according to the CSP 2007-2013, there is a capacity problem in terms of human resources within the Delegation in general. For the PSNP in particular, no full-time staff on the financial aspects of the intervention which hampers the follow-up of the financial reporting. <i>Source: MN 51</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	According to Commission staff in Delegation, human resources are lacking. <i>Source: MN 70; MN 76</i>
I-3.2.2	Effective transmission by the managers of the channelling instruments of the agreed monitoring documents.
ARTF	<p>The Administration Agreement (2002) states that the WB will provide each donor with quarterly reports on its quarterly ex-post evaluation of the activities undertaken by the Monitoring Agent including disbursements made out of the grant funds. The WB is to provide as well to the donors annually with a management assertion together with an attestation from the WB's external auditors on the satisfactory performance of the procedures and controls used by the WB in administering the grant funds. Moreover, a final progress report is to be handed out within six months of completion of the activities or of full disbursement of the grant funds.</p> <p>The WB faced problems during the first year of operations of the ARTF, however. It was, among other issues, not able to track funds use and report back to the donors as was required. (<i>source: Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF, February 2007</i>)</p>
PFMR	<p>In the agreement between the Commission and the WB, joint PFMR supervision missions to assess progress in implementations of scheduled reforms are foreseen. These supervision mission have been carried out and reports on the results of these mission have been transferred to the Donors. They are structured in sections as follow (example taken in the Joint supervision mission report of June-July 2004):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introduction -Economic developments - Reform Fund status -Compliance with previous benchmarks - Progress with mid-2004 benchmarks - Other issues - Mission and monitoring arrangements - Next steps <p>These reports outlines the findings and recommendations of the WB joint supervision mission on the progress of the PFMR. In June-July 2004, the Commission was part of the mission with other donor representatives.</p>

	<p>A completion Report to Donors have been transferred from the WB to the donors in March 2007 describing the achievements of the PFMR, its design, implementation and management, and summarises lessons learned.</p> <p><i>Source: Administration agreement, "Standard Terms and conditions governing contribution to the West Bank and Gaza. Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund".</i> <i>Source: PFMR Joint Supervision Mission Report (2004)</i> <i>Source: WB, "Completion Report to Donors. WB-GS PFMR"</i></p>
TFET	<p>The Commission's 2004 Interim evaluation notes however that they requested: "authorization to consult the World Bank and ADB's internal files on TFET, but did not receive approval to do so. However, the World Bank offered to provide specific internal information at the evaluators' request". It also specified that the team has thus asked the World Bank (and the ADB) to provide data on procurement by nationality of contractors and staff input by project compared with overall and regional averages in order to assess how effective was the system put into place to process TFET-financed projects. Procurement and some staff input data were then received from the World Bank. No access was given to WB documents relating to phases in the project cycle before appraisal.</p>
CGIAR	<p>The <i>CGLAR 2006 Stakeholders Perceptions Survey: Summary Report for Respondents</i>, of 2006 states (p. 13) that "The CGLAR is viewed as performing well on making information available about internal processes and being accountable for all actions and decisions."</p> <p>Interviewees met so far considered that required documents were easily made available.</p>
GFATM	<p>No evidence of direct report transmission between the manager of the channel and the Commission, but the GFATM website (www.theglobalfund.org) offers a broad range of reports : annual, progress report (bi annual or quarterly report) as well as monthly update.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>The managers of the HIPC Trust Fund deliver annually to the Commission an audited financial report of the utilisation by the Trust Fund of the financial resources provided by the European Community.</p> <p>The IMF and the World Bank jointly release on an annual basis reports on the implementation status of the HIPC Initiative.</p> <p>The Agreement between the Commission and the World Bank also foresaw an annual report on the activities of the Trust Fund. Such a report was never produced. It might have duplicated the implementation status report.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>On the basis of the information available it seems that the required monitoring documents are effectively transmitted.</p>
AFLEG	<p>Approved reports are available with each payment. However it appears that the balance (last 20%) had been paid before the implementation period was over. The Commission is still awaiting since over two years a final narrative report to be provided by the WBG.</p>
PSNP	<p>The WB team managing the TF send to all the donors, the agreed reports on the implementation progress of the intervention, i.e. financial reporting and activity reporting every quarter, verification mission reports, audit report every 6 month, joint review and implementation support mission reports. The WB plays its intermediary role between the GoE and the donors. The WB consolidates the comments from the donors and transfer them to the GoE.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 51</i> <i>Source: PSNP, Implementation report – July –December 2007</i> <i>Source: Joint review and implementation support mission – September – October 2007, Aide memoire</i> <i>Source: MoFED, Interim un audited financial report – October 2007 – January 2008</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>For the PRSC and PFM, the agreed monitoring report are transmitted to the Commission. Moreover, the Commission participates to monitoring exercises and steering committees.</p> <p>For the TFF/VCF, some delays have been experienced in the delivery of project documents.</p> <p>For HEMA, no documents have been transmitted to the Commission because the project as not started yet (after 2 years and half since the agreement has been signed)</p> <p><i>Source: MN 70, MN 71, MN 72, MN 87</i></p>

JC 3.3	<i>The Commission Services who channel the funds effectively follow-up the uses of the funds by the managers of the channelling instruments and interact with these managers.</i>
HIPC TF	Utilisation by the HIPC Trust Fund of the financial resources made available by the European Community must be authorised by the Commission on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly managers of the Trust Fund have to substantiate on a case-by-case basis their requests for expenditure authorisation. Before agreeing for a disbursement from the Trust Fund, the Commission may also ask the Delegation on the quality of cooperation with the beneficiary country.
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>The Commission staff in Delegation follow the activities of the TFs in close cooperation with the WB and the other donors for the PRSC and the PFM. They participate actively in coordination committees and steering group. Good coordination and interaction take place with the WB TF managers.</p> <p>For TFF/VCF and HEMA, the WB Team Leaders are based in Washington D.C, WB HQs which create several problems for the Commission as well as for other stakeholders. Communication is scarce and WB TLs in mission to Vietnam do not visit the Commission systematically. These WB TL are in charge of many TFs on top of their own project portfolio which create a lack if easy availability.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 69, 70, 71, 72, 76, 82, 88</i></p>
I-3.3.1	Existence of internal follow up reports in the relevant Commission Services
PFMR	<p>In the agreement between the Commission and the WB, joint PFMR supervision missions to asses progress in implementations of scheduled reforms are foreseen. These supervision mission have been carried out and reports on the results of these mission have been transferred to the Donors. They are structured in sections as follow (example taken in the Joint supervision mission report of June-July 2004):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introduction -Economic developments - Reform Fund status -Compliance with previous benchmarks - Progress with mid-2004 benchmarks - Other issues - Mission and monitoring arrangements - Next steps <p>These reports outlines the findings and recommendations of the WB joint supervision mission on the progress of the PFMR. In June-July 2004, the Commission was part of the mission with other donor representatives.</p> <p>A completion Report to Donors have been transferred from the WB to the donors in March 2007 describing the achievements of the PFMR, its design, implementation and management, and summarises lessons learned.</p> <p><i>Source: Administration agreement, "Standard Terms and conditions governing contribution to the West Bank and Gaza. Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund".</i> <i>Source: PFMR Joint Supervision Mission Report (2004)</i> <i>Source: WB, "Completion Report to Donors. WB-GS PFMR"</i></p>
TFET	<p>The Commission is part of the TFET Donor's Council. This Council meets at least semi-annually and analysis the work programmes indicating projects and programmes proposed to be funded from the TFET, the amount of TFET funding proposed for each such projects and programmes, the identity of the proposed recipient of the TFET funding and the identity of the implementing agency proposed to be responsible for such project and programme. The TFET Donor's Council approves or not the work programmes proposed and decision are, if possible, made by consensus. The Commission, as larger contributor, has an important impact on the decision of the Donor's Council.</p> <p>Each of the implementing agencies are responsible to the contributors for the use of TFET resources for the projects for which such implementing agency is responsible and provides progress reports to the contributors.</p> <p>The Commission has carried out an Interim Evaluation of the TFET in 2004 which assesses the TFET performance, the Commission performance, gives the main lessons learned and the future use of the TFET by the EC. (see I-3.4.2 for details)</p> <p><i>Source: "East Timor: Contribution Agreement between the European Community and International Development Association" (2000)</i> <i>Source: "Interim Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste" (2004)</i></p>

WB ITF	The Commission receives from the WB progress reports on the financial and operational progresses of the ITF. This is transmitted through the annual WB ITF Report to donors. <i>Source: WB ITF Report to Donors, 2005 and 2006.</i>
MDF	Progress reports specific for the Commission aid were issued in 2005 and 2006: the "Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme".
GFATM	An "Update on progress of the GFATM in 2006", of January 2007 was prepared by DG Dev Thematic issues : Human development, social cohesion and employment. It is a 6 pages note describing the results achieved, governance-related issues, EU contribution, and preparing the future.
HIPC TF	Since 2002 the European Commission releases annually in December a status report on the Commission Participation in the HIPC Initiative. This document deals relatively extensively with the utilisation of the resources made available by the Community to the EIB and to the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund. But it does not say anything of the Commission specific activity in relation with the Initiative.
FEMIP Support Fund	The Commission is closely involved with the TA, as it has to sign an annual implementation agreement and the eligibility of each individual activity is submitted for approval to the Commission. The 2006 Commission staff working document <i>Assessment of the Facility for FEMIP and Future Option</i> , is a clear example of a follow-up given to the Commission support to the FEMIP Support Fund. The document is organised in four parts of which the third part consists in an assessment of the FEMIP Facility (encompassing also the FEMIP Support Fund) – which refers also to the 2006 Mid-term Evaluation –, and a fourth part that provides some recommendations on FEMIP Future Orientations on that basis.
PSNP	The Delegation receive all the reports from the WB and are followed very closely by the Delegation. Because of lack of human resources, mainly in the finance and contracts section of the Delegation, the financial reports are not always fully examined. The Delegation sends their comments to the WB who consolidate all the comments from the donors and send them to the GoE. <i>Source: MN 51</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC 3.3</i>
I-3.3.2	Evidence of interactions (notes, meetings, etc...) with the managers of the channelling instruments on the evolution of the activities funded.
ARTF	The EC-WB cooperation in Kabul is excellent, as to the Commission <i>(Source: RELEX briefing for meeting with WB president, 14/11/2005)</i>
PFMR	See I-3.2.2 and the participation of the Commission to the Joint supervision missions
MDF	The Commission encourages the WB to maintain the valuable lines of communication between the relevant WB Country Offices and the Commission's Delegations in Jakarta. Close cooperation between the Commission and the WB must continue in line with the EC-WB Framework Agreement, to ensure the efficient and effective delivery of reconstruction assistance. <i>(Source: Note for a Meeting with the WB President, Brussels, 14 November 2005)</i>
CGIAR	According to the 2007 Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, the level of interaction between the centres and the EC delegations is very variable. In some cases the delegations are not even aware of the activities of the centres. This lack of contact means that the delegations are not able to take advantage of the centre's work for visibility purposes, nor can it use the centres to assist in the preparation of EC Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and National Indicative Programmes (NIP) for that matter. Similarly the local knowledge of the EC delegations is not used when the EC is developing its funding strategy for the CGIAR. <i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i>
GFATM	As the Commission is member of the Board, the Commission and the manager of the GFATM (meaning the Secretariat) meet regularly (between 2 and 3 times a year)
HIPC TF	The EuropeAid expert in charge of the monitoring and management of the EC involvement in the HIPC Initiative has at least once a year a meeting with the managers of the HIPC Trust Fund. For the programming of EDF expenditures the EuropeAid expert requests information from the Trust Fund managers on the progress of HIPCs towards the decision point and completion point. Since the utilisation by the Trust Fund of the resources made available by the Community must be authorised by the Commission on a case-by-case basis, the managers of the Trust Fund regularly issue such authorisation requests.

FEMIP Support Fund	The 2006 mid-term evaluation explains (p. 51) that the implementation of the TA Component has intensified the working relations between the Bank and the European Commission in the execution of initiatives on behalf of the Southern Mediterranean countries. <i>"The preparation, implementation and supervision of the TA operations created new interfaces between the staff-members of the two organisations and thereby entailed positive consequences for the recognition of the Bank in Brussels and for its integration in the policy dialogue about the overall contribution of the European Union in its Neighbourhood policy"</i>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	EIB interviewees indicate that the relationship between the EIB and the Commission works well regarding interest rate subsidies. (Source: MN 27) The 2001 Evaluation reports that at that time, the level of collaboration with the local EC delegations was generally poor, although this aspect had been addressed by the (then) new MEDA regulation (Article 4 on the spot coordination). Moreover, the potential of this instrument and its sustainability could be improved by improving the political dialogue, possibly through strengthened strategic co-operation with the EC, increasing the complementarity with EC activities in the region (Source: <i>Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p ix-x</i>)
Risk Capital Lomé IV	The EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV and EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV report that cooperation with the Commission – primarily DG DEV and occasionally DG RELEX or DG TREN – has, in general, been active, primarily in one operational and two institutional areas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>institutionally on a general level</u>, with discussions to finalise the Conventions, protocols and related annexes (Financial Regulation, Member State guarantee contracts, etc.); also with discussions on 'horizontal' topics such as debt or structural adjustment; • <u>institutionally, on a country-by-country basis</u>, during programming, with discussions on the economic situation, missions to the countries concerned, etc., or discussions on eligibility for facilities such as HIPC; • <u>operationally for projects</u>, in general on a low-intensity basis (Commission participation in the MS' Committee and the Board of Directors, EIB participation in the EDF Committee) or on a more intense basis for co-financed projects. Additionally, the 'Article 28' report on each project is sent as a matter of course to the Delegate, and to no one else in the country concerned. (Source: <i>EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV Annex 1 – p20, Evaluation EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV p27</i>)
PSNP	The Commission participate actively in the donor meeting group (every two weeks), the joint coordination committee meeting. Minutes of the meeting are drafted and sent to the participants. The interaction with the WB is considered satisfactory, but the decision power of the WB is in Washington which create some problems. Source: MN 51, MN 66 Source: <i>Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) Draft Minutes Joint Coordination Committee Meeting, 2008</i> Source: <i>PSNP, Implementation report – July –December 2007</i> Source: <i>Joint review and implementation support mission – September – October 2007, Aide memoire</i> Source: <i>MoFED, Interim un audited financial report – October 2007 – January 2008</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC 3.3</i>
I-3.3.3	Actions taken by the Commission Services to ensure conformity with the intended objectives, or, if impossible, to interrupt or stop activity.
ARTF	The ARTF and related issues have been a topic of discussion during several meetings between EC-WB up to the presidency-level.
TFET	The Interim Evaluation of the TFET suggested some future use of the TFET by the Commission in order to increase the "value added" of the use of Multi Donor TFs in post-conflict assistance by the EC: <i>"- Set clear conditions for participating</i> <i>- Enhance visibility</i> <i>- Monitor the work progress closely</i> <i>- Move towards united procurement</i> <i>- Move towards different types of mechanisms to continue the support to the Timorese Government"</i> (SWAps: Sectorwide approaches, also known as sector programmes or sector investment programmes. They are mechanisms by which development agencies collaborate to support sector reform programmes that are based on a country's long-term vision for its development. For further details see p 15 of the interim evaluation)

	<p><i>Source: "Interim Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste" (2004)</i></p> <p>No information is available at this stage on specific actions undertaken further to the recommendations of the interim evaluation.</p> <p>However, the evaluation also notes that (p. 79), "<i>after Independence when the major reconstruction works were completed, there should have been a reorientation of TFET work toward development, instead of continuing on the same reconstruction mode. Adjustments did take place to realign some projects to the NDP vision, but they were done at the project level. By and large, TFET continued its reconstruction business as usual. At least, there should have been a mid-term evaluation by the World Bank, the Trustee and Implementing Agency, of the achievements with a view to addressing emerging problems and, if warranted, moving TFET work toward longer-term development projects</i>⁸. The mechanics of the reorientation should have been agreed among donors at the time of the JAM."</p>
CGIAR	<p>The above mentioned monitoring is one way to ensure conformity with the intended objectives.</p> <p>No examples have been provided so far on interrupting or stopping activity for non conformity with the objectives of the intervention (not to be confounded with the fiscal agent issue).</p>
HIPC TF	<p>The Commission never considered that the managers of the HIPC Trust Fund were breaching the terms of the Commission-World Bank Agreement</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>For all individual EIB-operations, both regular loans and for activities financed by the EU-budget (interest subsidies, TA etc), the Commission receives a request from the EIB before the proposal is being sent to the decision-making bodies, and the Commission has the possibility to object.</p> <p>Furthermore, if the Commission believes that certain EIB-managed instruments are not functioning well (e.g. because they are not in conformity with EU priorities or don't fulfil the intended objectives), the Commission can decide not to continue these instruments, or to lower the amounts in the next programming period, or to give the instrument a different shape.</p> <p>When MEDA was replaced by ENPI, which was at the same time as the FEMIP review, the amounts available for risk capital and TA for Mediterranean countries were revised, also by using reflows on existing operations.</p> <p>Furthermore, a second instrument was proposed (the NIF), which would also cover eastern Neighbours and a wider range of eligible institutions. When the ENPI (2007-2013) expires and a new programme will be developed, the EU-contributions to risk capital and TA for MED countries will also be reconsidered.</p> <p><i>Source: ECFIN Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007)</i></p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>For all individual EIB-operations, both regular loans and for activities financed by the EU-budget (interest subsidies, TA etc), the Commission receives a request from the EIB before the proposal is being sent to the decision-making bodies, and the Commission has the possibility to object.</p> <p>Furthermore, if the Commission believes that certain EIB-managed instruments are not functioning well (e.g. because they are not in conformity with EU priorities or don't fulfil the intended objectives), the Commission can decide not to continue these instruments, or to lower the amounts in the next programming period, or to give the instrument a different shape.</p> <p>Interest rate subsidies for Mediterranean countries are decided on a case-by-case basis, as part of the individual country allocations, so these can easily be stopped. In the ENPI programme, the sector scope of this instrument has been widened and it is now made available for a wider range of institutions (not only the EIB). When the ENPI (2007-2013) expires and a new programme will be developed, this instrument will be reconsidered again too.</p> <p><i>Source: ECFIN Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007)</i></p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>For all individual EIB-operations, both regular loans and for activities financed by the EU-budget (interest subsidies, TA etc), the Commission receives a request from the EIB before the proposal is being sent to the decision-making bodies, and the Commission has the possibility to object.</p> <p>Furthermore, if the Commission believes that certain EIB-managed instruments are not functioning well (e.g. because they are not in conformity with EU priorities or don't fulfil the intended objectives), the Commission can decide not to continue these instruments, or to lower the amounts in the next programming period, or to give the instrument a different shape.</p> <p>When Lomé was followed by the Cotonou treaty, the Investment Facility for ACP countries (IF) was introduced. A second EDF-contribution to the IF is part of the decision on the next EDF, which will also be the case for following EDFs</p> <p><i>Source: ECFIN Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007)</i></p>
PSNP	<p>The first contributions of the Commission during the first year of implementation of the PSNP had not been</p>

⁸ It has been pointed out that this mid-term evaluation by the EC could have served the purpose, had it been carried out two years ago as planned. While this is true, it does not absolve the Trustee from making its own evaluation as its obligations would have required it to do so.

	<p>effected until the GoE had put in place a financial management system acceptable to the Commission. Moreover, in 2006, during the second year of implementation, the Commission's contribution had been stopped because of the weaknesses of the financial report of the first six month of implementation done by the GoE. The Commission had thus done some comments but the GoE delayed the revision of the report. The Commission's contribution, as well as other donors' contribution, was thus on hold.</p> <p><i>Source: European Commission, PSNP project summary</i> <i>Source: MN 51; MN 66</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC 3.3</i>
JC 3.4	Information on the results achieved is available at the Commission
HIPC TF	The World Bank and the EIB provide detailed information on the use of the funds made available to them by the Community in the framework of the HIPC Initiative. In addition, the World Bank evaluation unit carried out two evaluations of the Initiative and the Commission itself contracted a study on the utilisation by HIICPs of the resources freed by the Initiative.
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>For PRSC and PFM, progress reports are sent to the Commission informing on the results achieved. Mid term reviews have been produced and shared with the Commission Delegation.</p> <p>For the TFF/VCF, information on the progress of the activities have been sent to the Delegation but no final report nor evaluations have been carried out yet, as the project is in its finalisation process.</p> <p>For HEMA, no information on the results is available, as the project has not yet started.</p> <p>Moreover, information is shared between the different Delegations in Asia through a common network where Commissions staff from Delegation meet regularly to exchange experiences in general and also on WB TFs</p> <p><i>Source: Vietnam Public Finance. Management Diagnostic Study. Final report; Mid Term Review of the Multi Donor Trust Fund in support of the Public Financial Management Reform Initiative, Vietnam: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Annual progress report, Public Financial Management Modernization in Vietnam. Progress Report of the second six monthly implementation plan, Closing report of the MDTF Phase 1 Project for Public Financial Management Reform in Vietnam, Progress Report n°1: European Commission Vietnam Trust Fund for Forest. Forest Sector Support II</i> <i>Source: MN 89</i></p>
I-3.4.1	Evaluations are conducted and their results communicated to the Commission Services
ARTF	<p>An evaluation of the ARTF has been realised in 2005, commissioned by the WB. The objective was to assess the effectiveness and impact of ARTF operations over the first two and a half years (March 2002 – end 2004). <i>Source: (Assessment ARTF Final Report, 2005)</i></p> <p>The Commission can download quarterly Reports to Donors on the WB web site (in addition to interim reports), which provide an overview of contributions, and certifies that the use was in accordance with its objectives. <i>(Source: MN 29)</i></p> <p>According to interviewees, the WB is pretty good in reporting. <i>(Source: MN 29)</i></p>
PFMR	<p>Yes, an evaluation of the PFMR by the Palestinian National Authority has been carried out. An evaluation of the WB ESSP (Emergency Services Support Project) and the PFMR has been carried out by SIDA. The Completion Report to Donors made by the WB documents on the achievements, design, implementation and management, and summarises also the lessons learned. See I-3.4.2 for the results from these evaluations</p> <p><i>Source: "Evaluation of the Reform Fund by the Palestinian National Authority</i> <i>Source: WB, "Completion Report to Donors. WB-GS PFMR"</i> <i>Source: SIDA, "The World Bank Programs "Emergency Services Support Project" (ESSP) and "Reform Trust Fund" (2005)</i></p>
TFET	<p>Several evaluations or similar documents have been produced by both the WB and the Commission and were available in the Commission services. More specifically:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ WB, the East Timor Reconstruction Program : Successes, Problems and Tradeoffs, November 2002 ; ▪ European Commission, <i>Timor-Leste. Interim evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste</i>, October 2004., ▪ A study commissioned by the WB and several other donors: <i>Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds</i>, February 2007. This report has an annex dedicated to the TFET. <p>Interviewees met so far indicated that according to their knowledge, results of evaluations were communicated to the Commission services.</p>

	<p>It needs still to be verified to what extent there were clear agreements and a planning for conducting evaluations and transmitting results.</p>
MDF	<p>A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework will be established for the MDF to help ensure that the desired results and outcomes of the Government of Indonesia's recovery program are achieved. The M&E framework will help (i) Grant Executing Agencies, Partner Agencies, and the Steering Committee to monitor aid flows, project activities and achievement of results for MDTF funded activities and enable funding or activities to be adjusted as necessary (ii) to promote accountability for resource use and achievement of results by Grant Executing Agencies, Partner Agencies, and the Steering Committee (ensuring alignment of the MDTF financed activities with the goals of the GOI recovery program and proper and efficient application of funds) (iii) to document, provide feedback on, and disseminate results and lessons learned.</p> <p>A key component of the monitoring and evaluation framework should be the wide dissemination of performance reports. Where possible, these will be made available in real time through the use of information technology such as the E-Aceh web-site.</p> <p><i>Source: MDF Operational Manual, pp21-22</i></p> <p>The MDF issues Progress Reports every 6 months for all donors. These reports are communicated to and available at the Commission. There will be a joint donor mid-term review in 2008.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 26)</i></p> <p>In addition, progress reports specific for the Commission aid were issued in 2005 and 2006: the "Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme".</p> <p>The Commission has significantly contributed to improve the process of monitoring and evaluation in order to ensure that MDF projects are carried out with high standards of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. For this purpose, during the summer 2006, the EC launched an external evaluation mission to assess the MDF supervision, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in place. At present, the EC is working to ensure that the findings and recommendations provided by the evaluation mission, in particular to strengthen the regular project monitoring system, are taken into account and followed-up the Steering Committee level.</p> <p><i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p11)</i></p>
CGIAR	<p>The 2007 Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR reports that Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by several donors posed a problem. M&E is clearly important to the EC in order to guarantee the quality of the science and to ensure value for money, but the current process is costly and time consuming both for the EC and for the centres, and involves duplication of efforts as many other donors also carry out M&E missions. This burden affects the efficiency of the centres to carry out their work. It is recommended that the EC discusses with the Science Council a method of combining the M&E systems of the donors with that of the Science Council (EPMR and performance measurement) and the centres (CCERs) in order to avoid unnecessary duplication.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGLAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i></p> <p>Regarding the efficiency of monitoring and evaluation of the projects by the EC, there is much room for improvement as it affects project implementation efficiencies. The GIAR monitoring and evaluation system is found to be too time consuming, expensive (in terms of person months), and too frequent. In addition, many donors (including the EC) impose their own "brand" of review on the centres and there are numerous project specific reviews.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGLAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i></p>
GFATM	<p>The Technical Evaluation Reference Group (TERG) is an advisory body providing independent assessment and advice to the GFATM's Board. Evaluation that have been conducted, are available on the GFATM website.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>The World Bank Evaluation Group carried out two evaluations of the HIPC Initiative, the first one in 2003 and the second one in 2006. These evaluation reports have been made public.</p> <p>The European Commission mandated in 2003 a study on the utilisation in five African countries of the budget resources freed by the debt reduction measures.</p>

FEMIP Support Fund	<p>Monitoring reports are produced and a mid-term evaluation has been conducted in 2006.</p> <p>However, the Commission staff working paper on the Assessment of the FEMIP support fund states (p. 16) that <i>"the Bank's supervision and monitoring of technical assistance operations could be strengthened"</i> In the same line, the 2006 mid-term evaluation states that (p. III): <i>"While during the procurement process Bank staff play a primary role, their involvement during TA implementation seems rather limited. Due to budget and time constraints, their presence in the field seems to be rather sporadic and difficult to plan. At the same time, many promoters feel unable to effectively control and steer TA operations (...) As a consequence, there is a certain vacuum in the supervision process which entails the risk that the Bank might intervene too late when difficulties arise. A serious shortcoming of current monitoring practice is the absence of carefully defined indicators of achievement, which should be elaborated during the planning phase, together with an assessment of TA risks (...) The level of monitoring also depends to a large extent on the personal commitment of individual staff"</i>.</p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>An evaluation has been carried out in 2001 of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC. It has been carried out in accordance with such requirement in Article 15 of the MEDA I.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p 1)</i></p> <p>This 2001 evaluation was available at the Commission services.</p> <p>There has not been any evaluation addressing specifically interest rate subsidies since 2001.</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>Two final evaluations have been carried out in 2005-2006 by the Operations Evaluation of the EIB, consisting of the evaluation of EIB financing through individual loans and through global loans under the Lomé IV Convention during the period 1990-2003.</p>
PSNP	<p>An independent mid-term evaluation has been conducted in 2007 for the Commission's contribution to the PSNP. The report has been communicated to the Delegation and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the PSNP have been examined.</p> <p>Beside the mid-term evaluation, the Commission has also carried out monitoring missions on top of the WB and Joint mission on the field to assess the progress of the PSNP</p> <p><i>Source: Italtrend, "PSNP, Mid-term evaluation", 2007</i></p> <p><i>Source: Monitoring report 1620.01 – Support to the Safety nets programme.</i></p> <p><i>Source: Rapid Response Team, Field assessment report, 2008</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p><i>See information at the level of JC 3.4</i></p>
I-3.4.2	<p>The evaluations inform on the results achieved and not only on the process.</p>
ARTF	<p>The Assessment ARTF Final Report 2005 inform rather on the allocation of the funds than on the results achieved. The same observation is true for the quarterly Reports to Donor prepared by the WB.</p> <p>As the 2005 Assessment states it: "Reporting is seen as comprehensive, accessible (web-site), though donors would like more issues and results orientation".</p>

PFMR

According to the Completion Report to Donors of the WB, the first objective of the TF to mobilise additional donor resources for the PA's budget during a period of acute economic and fiscal crisis are deemed **satisfactory**. The PFMR provided a new avenue for donors to directly support the PA, and mobilise considerable donor resources for the PA's budget. See table below of the commitments and disbursement for the PFMR:

Table 1. West Bank and Gaza Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund

Million US\$

Donor	Commitments	Disbursements 2004		Disbursements 2005		Disbursements 2006
		Tranche 1 /1 Prior actions	Tranche 2/2 Mid-2004	Tranche 3/3 End 2004	Tranche 4/4 Mid 2005	Tranche 5/5 End 2005
		--- disbursed in 2004 ---		--- disbursed in 2005 ---		--- disbursed in 2006 ---
Australia	2.6		0.8	1.9		
Canada	7.2		7.2			
European Commission	164.6		55.8	25.0	42.9	20.8
France	7.0			3.3		3.6
Japan	40.0		10.0	30.0		
Korea	0.6		0.6			
Netherlands	6.0					6.0
New Zealand	0.4					0.4
Norway	32.8		12.0	5.0	16.0	
Spain	2.4					2.4
United Kingdom	30.8		6.0	6.3	9.0	8.8
Totals per tranche 6/			25.0	78.5	74.2	53.8
Total 7/	294.2		103.5		128.0	41.7

Notes: 1/ The first tranche covered the period April 22, 2004 to June 30, 2004. 2/ The second tranche covered the period July 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004. 3/ The third tranche covered the period from January 1, 2005 to May 31, 2005. 4/ The fourth tranche covered the period from June 1 to October 31, 2005. 5/ The fifth tranche covers the period from November 1, 2005 to May 31, 2006. 6/ Totals does not add up to individual donor disbursements as the latter includes contributions to Bank supervisions costs. 7/ Through June 2006, a total of US\$0.9 million accrued the Reform Fund as investment income. A total of US\$0.7 million was deducted by the Bank to cover administrative fees and supervision costs. The Reform Fund's remaining balance on its day of closing consisted of the undisbursed balance of the EC's contribution for the sixth tranche and was returned to the EC.

Outcomes in terms of the harmonisation of donor assistance in exchange for a commonly agreed Reform Programme and thus to support adequate progress in implementing the PA's public financial management reform programme are deemed **unsatisfactory**. Still according to the WB, *"while good progress was registered on several elements, the reform momentum eventually stalled and most importantly, the process to contain the PA's wage bill unravelled in the run-up to the legislative election in January 2006"*.

Finally, achievement of the third objective of simplifying procedures for the PA, it is deemed **satisfactory**.

Source: WB, "Completion Report to Donors. WB-GS PFMR"

TFET

The Commission interim evaluation of 2004 had a double mandate (see p. 24):

- *to assess the progress and achievements of TFET since its inception in fulfilling its mandate of social and economic reconstruction and bringing the benefits to the intended beneficiaries in a post-conflict context;*
- *and (ii) to draw lessons in relation to the strategies and coordination mechanisms of TFET, which can be applied in Timor-Leste, as well as in other countries in similar circumstances".*

The evaluation proposes an assessment in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the TFET activities;

In line with this mandate, the evaluation informed both on the results achieved and on the process. With the exception of a specific case study on the rural development sector which was a focus sector of EC assistance, the evaluation considered the TFET as a whole and not specifically those sectors in which the Commission intervened. Nevertheless the evaluation also draws, in line with its ToRs, lessons and makes recommendations with respect to the strategy, modalities and approaches of the EC's future assistance to Timor-Leste, including in terms of future assistance to the TF.

WB ITF	<p>A review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds have been undertaken in 2007 by independent evaluators and commissioned by the WB, Norad, CIDA and DFID. This review analyses, inter alia, the WB ITF.</p> <p>Concerning financial audit and control, it is stated in the Administration Agreement, Article 6 section 6.01 that <i>“financial transaction and financial statements with respect to the Grant shall be subject to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules and directives of the World Bank. A copy of the audited financial statements with respect to the funds provided by the European Community to the WB hereunder shall be submitted to the Commission by the IBRD, on behalf of the WB.”</i></p> <p>In addition, article 6 section 6.03 states that <i>“in conformity with its financial regulations, the European Community may undertake, including on-the-spot, checks related to the projects and activities financed by the trust fund.”</i> And section 6.04 state that <i>“the foregoing shall be applied in accordance with the agreement on verification missions between the parties as attached to the Framework Agreement (attachment 5)”</i>.</p> <p><i>Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, 2007</i> <i>Source: Administration Agreement. MED/2004/082-205/1. TF053167 (July 2004)</i></p>
MDF	<p>The MDF Operational Manual specifies (p23) that “grant proposals should have adequately defined arrangements for monitoring achievement of results before approval. These will include Precisely defined indicators and targets (...)”. The document further specifies that these indicators and targets should be limited in number, reflect elements that make a critical difference to the lives and welfare of people affected, measurable and monitored at reasonable cost, clearly defined, and achievable within the time frame indicated.</p> <p>The Progress Reports issued by the MDF for all donors provide detailed information on the results planned and their achievement to date for each of the different programs of the MDF.</p> <p>In addition, the progress reports specific for the Commission aid consist of 25-38 pages resuming and making explicit information of particular interest for the Commission, including on results.</p>
CGIAR	The available evaluations inform on the results achieved.
GFATM	<p>The evaluations conducted by the TERG are : Assessment of the Country Coordinating Mechanisms ; Assessment of the Proposal Development & Review Process ; 360° Stakeholder Assessment ; Global Fund Portfolio Review.</p> <p>They mainly tackled the process, contrary to the results/impact achieved.</p> <p>An evaluation on the five years of operation is planned and will include impact analysis.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>The World Bank evaluation assesses the results achieved by the HIPC initiative in the three areas that are the Initiative key objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ External debt sustainability; ▪ Fight against poverty; <p>Improvement of the macroeconomic and financial policy.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	The evaluations indeed inform on the results achieved.
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>The 2001 evaluation reports on the results achieved, at overall project level, zooming where necessary to information on specific projects.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May</i></p>
PSNP	<p>The mid-term evaluation states that the basic objectives of the PSNP has been reached but problems still remains:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the amount of the transfer covers only a part of the daily food ration - the targeting of the beneficiaries is not optimal - delays in the transfer of payments - high turnover of woreda specialised staff - the reporting system is insufficient and it is impossible to have a clear vision of what is going on <p><i>Source: Italtrend, “PSNP, Mid-term evaluation”, 2007</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC 3.4</i>

JC 3.5	<i>The Commission's intended results of the intervention have been sustainably achieved</i>
HIPC FT	<p>As regards the indebtedness of poor countries, the World Bank evaluation of the HIPC Initiative suggests that in many HIPC debt ratios have deteriorated again shortly after they had benefited from the Initiative. This is acknowledged by the Commission, which pointed out in its Communication COM(2005) 133 on "accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs" that "a consensus is emerging that the HIPC Initiative will not suffice to ensure sustainable debt levels for poor countries in the long run".</p> <p>As regards the fight against poverty, the World Bank evaluation of PRSPs implementation reveals that (i) HIPC are spending more public money in social sectors, but (ii) there is no clear evidence yet that these expenditures result in a reduction of poverty nor that a proper balance has been found between social expenditures and public expenditures in support of sustainable growth.</p>
PSNP	<p>According to the mid-term evaluation, the political and social impact of the PSNP is considerable. Indeed, the PSNP is the biggest government-donor programme which cover millions of beneficiaries and is part of a major global approach that aims at helping the poorest to get out of poverty and build their own autonomous livelihood. The PSNP cover more and more beneficiaries (from 5M in 2005 to 7.2 M in 2006).</p> <p>According to stakeholders, in the past three years, there has been a reduction of food insecure people among the safety net beneficiaries. Unlike non beneficiaries, safety net beneficiaries were not affected by the draught of 2008. The rural Community infrastructures have been built and are used. The contingency budget of 20% has not been entirely used for PSNP beneficiaries but for others. For all the stakeholders met, the results are globally good but the question on the capacity to trigger a self-sustaining development process remain. The process of "graduation" from the PSNP to a self-sustainable activity has not yet been measured. Concerns still remains for the need of assistance after 2009 (end of the programme).</p> <p><i>Source: Italtrend, "PSNP, Mid-term evaluation", 2007</i> <i>Source: MN 51, MN 54, MN 58; MN 59; MN 60: MN 63</i></p>
I-3.5.1	Documentary evidence on degree of sustainable achievement of the Commission's objectives
ARTF	<p>The "Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF" (February 2007) states that "the ARTF Recurrent Window must be seen as a success in terms of effectiveness".</p> <p>The 2005 Assessment of the ARTF by Scanteam as well states that "Both Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Recurrent Window are seen as very good, not least of all because funding is provided on-budget and thus contributing to improved Public Finance Management, transparency and accountability."</p> <p>The Commission questioned whether the hypothesis was realistic for Afghanistan to be self-sufficient in its recurrent budget by 2003. <i>(Source: RELEX briefing for meeting with WB president, 14/11/2005)</i></p>
TFET	<p>As explained above, the Commission's 2004 interim evaluation does not treat the Commission's intended results (i.e. the interventions in the agricultural and health sector) separately. Nevertheless the evaluation of the TFET as a whole states that the TFET was successful in reaching its objectives.</p> <p>More specifically in terms of effectiveness, the evaluation states that by 2004 (pp. 11-12): :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ With a few exceptions, most of the infrastructure rehabilitation needs identified by the JAM and the joint donor sector missions had been completed. Basic levels of service in health and education had also been restored. ▪ The economy responded to the inflows of external assistance, the high demand for goods and services brought about by the international workers, the improved infrastructure and the country's better prospects. GDP increased and by Independence in 2002 had reached pre-crisis levels. ▪ In addition to stabilizing the economy, the foreign assistance provided through TFET (and other channels) succeeded in re-establishing a functioning administration from a complete collapse of administrative structures in 1999. With the help of foreign assistance and funding of TA projects, the Government has been able to strengthen its fiscal policy and put into place: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a functioning treasury and payments office; - an administration which ensures basic services throughout the public sector, maintains adequate standards of financial control and compliance; - good coordination between the Government and donors and between TFET and CFET; - basic health and education services all over the country; and - modern procurement rules and practices. ▪ Finally, although TFET only represented about half the financing available for Timor-Leste's reconstruction, its efficient and effective donor coordination and good technical project design and preparation seem to have influenced the allocation of non-TFET resources toward meeting the

	<p>reconstruction needs identified by the JAM, which have thus been fully funded.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The pace of reconstruction was brisk, particularly during the first two years, so much that by Independence (May 2002), most of the emergency reconstruction work was completed. As in other post-conflict situations, this was achieved at the cost of slower capacity building. However, in the Timor-Leste case, this unavoidable trade-off between speed of reconstruction and capacity building was complicated by the fact that TFET did not have the mandate for capacity building, which was entrusted to UNTAET. <p>The evaluation considers that the TFET has been instrumental to the successful reconstruction of Timor-Leste and that its performance has been satisfactory.</p> <p>The evaluation is more critical in terms of sustainability. It indeed states that the above is “<i>The relative success because the mechanism did not significantly improve the country’s low institutional capacity and failed to develop Timorese ownership of the reconstruction programme</i>”. It is true that at the Tokyo meeting donors had entrusted UNTAET with the responsibility for capacity building and confirmed this at the Independence by financing . the UNMISSET Stability Posts Project and the UNDP Development Posts Project, two operations entirely dedicated to capacity building. Nevertheless, the evaluation considers that given the importance of the matter and the fact that capacity building is central to all World Bank and ADB interventions in member countries, the two implementing agencies should have discussed and agreed with UNTAET right at the start on a modus operandi and on a global strategy to jointly address the issue. In fact, with the exception of the health sector, capacity building was tackled in a piecemeal fashion by all the institutions involved, without a clear vision and expected results.</p> <p>These findings of the 2004 mid-term evaluation in terms of effectiveness and sustainability should be considered in the light of the 2006 events, as explained annex on Timor Leste of the 2007 <i>Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds</i>. Indeed, this report has been drafted after the new violence outbursts of April and May 2006. The report also refers to the Report of the UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste (2006), which concluded that Timor-Leste had experienced a break down of governance, both in its political and institutional dimensions and that the crisis resulted “<i>from the fragility of state institutions and the weaknesses of the rule of law</i>” and that “<i>Governance structures and existing chains of command broke down, roles and responsibilities became blurred and solutions were sought outside the legal framework</i>”.</p>
MDF	<p>As to a Commission brief on the post-tsunami, two years after the tsunami hit South East Asia, the EU and the international community have successfully made the transition from providing immediate humanitarian aid to reconstruction aid: helping local authorities and communities re-establish their lives within a longer term vision – re-building homes, livelihoods and infrastructure. 100% of the € 123 million humanitarian aid and 96% of the 350 million in medium and long-term reconstruction pledged by the European Commission has been contracted. The first concrete results are now being seen. (Source: <i>Brief Tsunami</i>)</p> <p>Eighteen months after the creation of the MDF, the MDF is fulfilling its objective of helping the people of Aceh and Nias to build back better. The MDF has already allocated €385 million (\$482 million) to finance critical projects of the BRR's reconstruction master plan for Aceh and Nias (2005-2009). Already €171 million (\$214 million) have been disbursed to materialize project activities in the field (44% of total grant amount). In addition, the BRR is contributing with approximately €185 million (\$231 million) for the co-financing of joint projects with the MDF, in particular in the infrastructures sector where the MDF has an advantage for leveraging large financing and to mobilize high-quality international expertise to work in tandem with local specialists. Building local capacity on the required technical needs and co-financing also implies that BRR benefits, in particular, from the strong anticorruption systems and quality control and assurance systems put in place by these partners. (Source: <i>2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p5</i>)</p> <p>Key achievements of the MDF include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Over one million m³ of tsunami waste cleared, almost 100,000 m³ of municipal waste collected and 620 hectares of rice fields cleared through the MDF's waste management project. This initiative has introduced or re-established municipal waste collection systems in 8 districts; – Establishment of a network of 13,000 facilitators for local community projects that reach all villages in Aceh and Nias. This network facilitated a democratic decision making process for communities to plan and prioritize need in their area. Through this process, communities have built over 1,900 km of roads, 740 bridges, 240 school buildings, 1,143 irrigation and drainage units, 570 water units and 632 sanitation units, 40 health posts

	<p>and have granted scholarships/apprenticeships to 7,082 people and micro-credits to 3,685 recipients. (Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p3)</p> <p>The MDF is a very good example of the use of international best practice to identify quality criteria for projects that improve transparency and effectiveness of the recovery process: Community participation, gender, conflict sensitive approach, anti-corruption and fiduciary oversight. (Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p6)</p> <p><u>Sustainability:</u> Interviewees indicate that it is interesting to see for the MDF how the issue of the governance of the TF with regard to sustainability develops. (Source: MN 31)</p> <p>The Aid Effectiveness Forum's overall conclusion that the close working relationship between the BRR and the MDF is the base of its success to date. The MDF pursued this close relationship from the outset when it integrated its operations within the structures of the Indonesian Government. There were two aspects of this integration. Firstly, the MDF preferred to finance programs that channel funds through the Government's budget (called "on-budget projects"). Secondly, the MDF implemented a policy of only considering projects that have already been screened and submitted by the BRR. The strong partnership was reinforced when the BRR decided to contribute almost \$300 million of its own funds to co-finance three projects with the MDF and to extend the MDF-financed Kecamatan Development Project until 2009. (Source: MDF Progress Report III, December 2006, p3)</p> <p>BRR has an exit strategy, which in itself is commendable. What still seems to be missing is how the institutional memory and organizational capacities created by BRR are to be handled once the BRR itself is dissolved. (Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p72)</p>
CGIAR	<p>According to the 2007 Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, projects were overall effective on outputs but less on producing real benefits for the poor. The EC co-financed projects have been effective when it comes to realizing planned project outputs. Most of the outputs have been realised. The majority of centres reported that overall no better results could have been expected, except when proper accompanying measures were taken by partner authorities such as adequate support to national research. This lack of support is also reflected when it comes to project results producing real benefits for the rural poor. Only a few centres were able to claim that project results have provided real benefits to the rural poor. Most centres stated 50% or less of realisation. Projects have however been particularly effective in stakeholder participation and the sharing of responsibilities, and in increasing training capacity within the centres. (Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGLAR, Ecorys, 2007)</p> <p>About impacts on food security and poverty alleviation: Most of the reported impacts of the EC co-financed projects have to do with progress made in genetic improvement, the preservation of biodiversity and the characterisation of genebank material; leading to increases in overall agricultural productivity. This has helped the centres to produce many improved genetic lines of crops, livestock and fish. These in turn have helped to increase productivity and quality, have stabilised yields in the face of increasing biotic and abiotic stresses and have helped to conserve the natural environment. Examples include diseased resistant cassava, Musa and wheat, higher yielding rice in Africa and Asia, and more drought tolerant pigeon pea, sorghum and millet. When it comes to actual agricultural growth, eventually leading to nationwide food security and poverty alleviation, the impact of improved genetic lines is much less evident as the uptake of project outputs by the beneficiaries has been much hampered by legal, political and institutional constraints; particularly in the Africa region⁸ and parts of Asia. Evidence of uptakes of centres' project outputs is much clearer when it comes to improvements in food policies and food market efficiencies, which also lead to improvements in food security and poverty alleviation. Reported improvements are in countries with generally strong policy coordination mechanisms and funding such as China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Brasil, South Africa, and to some degree Kenya and Uganda. (Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGLAR, Ecorys, October 2007)</p> <p>The failure of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia to adequately fund their national research and extension efforts, is leading to a steady erosion of the NARS capacity and capability to disseminate the activities and resources produced by the CGIAR centres' projects, dealing with food security and poverty alleviation; especially in the small countries. The main reason for this lack of support can be traced to setting political priorities, and hence national funding, away from agricultural development by many African countries and some Asian countries. (Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGLAR, Ecorys, October 2007)</p> <p>Sustainability with highs and lows: Technical sustainability of the EC co-financed projects is high as the projects are firmly embedded into the institutional structures of the organisation. It also has to do with the fact that the centres themselves propose the projects that are to be funded. Regarding financial sustainability, only half of the</p>

	<p>centres feel confident enough to continue the projects without external support. Staff turnover is not considered a serious problem for the centres, but there is much concern that erratic and excessively short-term funding can become a problem for staff recruitment and retention. Few senior scientists are willing to relocate in that case. Breeding programmes, especially, require stability of (senior) staff. Staff turnover is however a serious problem with the partner organisations. The high levels of staff turnover (particularly due to erratic funding at NARS, HIV/AIDS in SSA and the aspirations of good scientists to move on to greater opportunities elsewhere), causes severe problems for the continuity of partner collaboration in some projects.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, October 2007)</i></p> <p>An important lesson learnt by the centres is that they are in a very strong position to significantly contribute to food security and poverty alleviation, as “honest brokers”, having continued access to genetic diversity, and having established strong partnerships and alliances with beneficiary countries.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, October 2007)</i></p> <p>The OED 2003 <i>Précis</i> concludes that the CGIAR has had sizeable impacts on reducing poverty by increasing employment, raising incomes, lowering food prices and releasing land from cropping.</p> <p>In the same line, the 2004 study from the OED, <i>Addressing the Challenges of Globalization. An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Approach to Global Programs</i>, states that (p. XXVII) “Global public-goods programs (...) rate well in their impacts on reducing poverty or on focusing on the policy, institutional, infrastructural, or technological constraints developing countries face in achieving sustainable economic growth. Adding value on the ground in client countries is typically a joint product of global and country-level activities. For example, CGIAR (...) has demonstrated impressive poverty-reducing impacts in part because the Bank, donors, and some governments made complementary investments at the country level”.</p> <p>The CGIAR 2006 survey explains that stakeholders rate the CGIAR as performing particularly well on producing effective scientific research that has a purpose and serving global needs. Being responsive to the needs of stakeholders and serving local needs are also key strengths of the CGIAR.</p>
GFATM	<p>Since the evaluations conducted mainly tackled the process, and not the results/impact achieved, sustainability is hardly tackled.</p> <p>A 2004 DFID report on Global partnership explain that “sustainability has been identified as continuing problem”⁹. Indeed, as the “Added Value of Global Partnership and Global Funds to Development cooperation”, for the European Commission, April 2005 assesses, the sustainability of GFATM intervention can be questioned: “<i>We report [...] how the light-touch approach to implementation has limited the inclusion of the GFATM in a programmatic approach [and its insufficient engagement in horizontal cross-donor programmes at country level] and how this could in turn jeopardize the impact sustainability of its interventions</i>”. Thus, “GFATM [is] likely to increasingly deal with the implementation issues that governments in developing countries and more traditional donors are long been faced with: institutional capacity is central to sustain performance over time”, contrary to the light-touch administrative approach stressed by the GFATM.</p> <p>The 2005 report “Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development cooperation” mentions further the following: “<i>With respect to the GFATM, there is clearly a relationship between the light-touch administrative approach stressed by this GFP and its insufficient engagement in horizontal cross-donor programmes at country level. While the hand-offs, quick-delivery focus has been instrumental in quickly mobilising resources to attack HIV/AIDS, the limits of the approach are showing at country level. First, while claiming to be a financial-only organisation, the GFATM has in fact constructed complex institutions (the CCMs) that parallel, and create an additional burden on existing ones. In Ethiopia, this recently culminated in the formal rejection by the government of the principle of a CCM. Second, there is a sense that the lack of policy contribution, and more generally, the lack of inclusion into a sectoral, horizontal approach could ultimately jeopardise the early successes of the GFATM. Projects in HIV/AIDS, just in any other area, need to be prioritised – and the “demand-driven” principle used by the GFATM is not likely to a substitute for a sector-wide approach; policy and institutional inputs are likely to be strong complements to vertical interventions (for example, treatments) in the medium term; engagement in policy analysis and dialogue has proved to be an efficient learning mechanism for donors to improve the quality of their interventions and improve donor coordination overall.</i>”</p>
HIPC TF	<p>The conclusions of the comparative study of the management of HIPC Funds in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana and Tanzania, carried out for DG DEV, show that the link between the HIPC funds and the poverty-reduction strategies of these five countries is not direct and varies among the countries studied. Some countries have identified a subset of PRSP priorities/sectors to be financed with HIPC resources. In other countries, there is only a loose link between PRSP and HIPC sectors.</p>

⁹ “Added Value of Global Partnership and Global Funds to Development cooperation”, for the European Commission, April 2005.

	<p><i>Source: ECORYS-NEI, "The Management of HIPC Funds in Recipient Countries. A comparative study of five African countries. Synthesis Report" (2003).</i></p> <p>A study carried out for the European Commission, analyses several issues coming to light from the lessons learned on the HIPC Initiative from 1996 to 2004. One of this report findings is that there is "little correlation between debt relief and the level of poverty" and that "countries that are projected to mostly benefit from the Initiative are the countries with the worse policy environment, again seemingly contradicting the lessons on aid efficiency through country selectivity" and that "too few Completion Point countries seem to have durably secured a stable indebtedness ratio." However, the report says that the HIPC initiative has "encouraged policy and institutional reforms towards poverty reduction that has been translated into facts through the increase of poverty-reduction expenditures in recipient countries". Another finding on the impact on debtors' policy performance says that "the policy performance of the 8 Completion Point HIPCs has remained relatively strong since their respective Completion Points." However, this finding is questioned in the report by the fact that "these 8 HIPCs already had a (relative) strong policy performance prior to entering the Initiative".</p> <p><i>Source: Investment Development Consultancy, "Beyond the HIPC Initiative" (2004).</i></p> <p>The main conclusions of the World Bank evaluation of 2006 are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The HIPC Initiative has reduced debt ratios by half on average in 18 countries. But in 11 of 13 countries with available data, the key indicator of external debt sustainability has deteriorated since Completion Point. In eight of these countries, the ratios once again exceed HIPC threshold; ▪ Countries past Completion Point started out with higher scores on key policy ratings than other low-income countries and still score higher. Countries that are not yet at Completion Point have, on average, the lowest ratings of all low-income countries and face serious challenges in managing their economies; <p>The requirement to develop and implement a country-owned poverty reduction strategy has been an important and beneficial outcome of the HIPC Initiative. These strategies have tended to emphasise social sector spending rather than a more balanced approach to growth and poverty reduction.</p>
<p>FEMIP Support Fund</p>	<p>Referring to the 2006 mid-term evaluation, the Commission staff working paper on the Assessment of the FEMIP facility mentions with respect to the FEMIP support fund (pp. 16-17) that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ It is a key instrument for the Bank to become more developmental in MEDA countries ▪ It helped to develop new areas of intervention, such as small business lending, microfinance, privatization, public-private partnership and project upstream work (sector reviews, legal advice, training) <p>The 2006 Mid-term evaluation concludes that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Majority of TA operations are performing well ▪ The FEMIP support fund has the potential to improve considerably the quality of the EIB loan portfolio ▪ TA considerably improved the image of the Bank ▪ Positively received in all countries ▪ Co-operation with other donors seems good <p>An EIB representative stated that "at the end of 2008, more than 80% (EUR 80 m) of the FEMIP Support Fund will have been concluded with consulting firms".</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 102)</i></p> <p>Stakeholders met during the country mission to Morocco for the present evaluation mentioned positive results with regard to the TA operations on EIB loans.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 92, MN 95, MN 103)</i></p>
<p>Interest Subsidies in MEDA</p>	<p>Interest rate subsidies were mainly provided to water treatment / sewerage and solid waste projects.</p> <p><i>(Source: Assessment of the FEMIP and Future Options - 2006, p12)</i></p> <p>These sectors are identified as the greatest needs, as to an informant. The reason is that in this 'water' sector, it is difficult for beneficiaries to get other types of financing. At the contrary, other environmental sectors (e.g. wind energy) may benefit from access to grants (vs. loans).</p> <p>Nevertheless, there have been some EIB loans with interest rate subsidies in other (environmental) sectors such as air pollution in Algeria and industrial pollution in Tunisia.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 27)</i></p> <p>Confining the use of interest rate subsidies mainly to loans in the water sub-sector rather than loans covering the whole field of the environment, limits their relevance and their potential effects on the economy and the environment of the region.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii)</i></p> <p>The 2001 Evaluation reports that All the funds available for interest rate subsidies have been committed. However, sustainability appeared doubtful for interest rate subsidies loans.</p>

(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii)

ROM reports available for five EIB loans with interest rate subsidies in Morocco (see table below) indicate that most of these projects attained results, although with delays, confirming interviews in this sense. Impact and sustainability are also rated positively. Key achievements include water and sanitation in several city centres, improvements in the environmental conditions of water treatment units, and environmental enhancement of a power plant.

ADE Analysis of ROM for Interest Rate Subsidies on EIB loans in Morocco

N° Projet	Date de la Convention de Financement	N° ROM	Date ROM	Titre	1. Qualité de la conception du projet	2. Efficacité de mise en oeuvre à ce jour	3. Efficacité à ce jour	4. Perspectives d'impact	5. Viabilité potentielle	Engagement primaire CE (budget du projet)	Engagement secondaire CE (fonds contractés)	Fonds déboursés par la Commission	Dépenses encourues par le projet
3412	5/6/1995	MR-10321.01	5/26/2006	BEI - Assainissement villes marocaines Meknès - bonification d'intérêts.	a	b	b	a	b	5.95	5.95	5.95	N/Av
4576	12/26/2002	MR-10320.02	6/1/2007	Subvention BEI - Amélioration des conditions environnementales d'exploitation de 7 stations de traitement d'eau potable du Nord et du Centre du Maroc	a	b	a	b	a	4.79	4.79	0.67	N/Av
4714	8/17/2005	MR-10406.02	6/2/2008	BONIFICATION D'INTERET SUR PRETS DE LA BEI POUR L'ASSAINISSEMENT DES VILLES MAROCAINES	c	c	c	c	b	11	9	0	N/Av
4715	11/4/2004	MR-10409.01	6/1/2007	Subvention BEI: Dépollution de la Centrale Electrique de Mohammedia	b	b	b	b	a	7	7	1.17	N/Av
102174	5/23/2005	MR-10447.01	9/27/2007	Subvention BEI: Projet Assainissement villes marocaines (Oujda)	a	b	b	b	b	7	7	0.91	N/Av

Risk Capital Lomé IV

The EIB has adopted with the second financial protocol (Lomé IV B) a more flexible approach, with less formal and detailed involvement of the EIB. There was unfortunately a risk with this approach that objectives that would be more difficult to achieve (e.g. promote private sector development in less developed countries) were supported less than others (e.g. finance basic public sector infrastructure). It could also result in fewer and larger lending operations in order to gain economies of scale. This trend, which might not be politically desirable, can be observed in the increase of the average risk capital loan size from Lomé I to Lomé IV B.

(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV)

Analysis shows that "bankable" countries such as most Caribbean countries received far more funding for individual loans compared to less developed regions such as West Africa & Sahel.

(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p14)

However, the 2006 evaluation for individual loans indicates that the objectives of all the projects evaluated were consistent with the Lomé IV objectives, the decisions of the EIB government bodies, as well as the beneficiaries' requirements, countries needs, global priorities and partners' policies. The projects evaluated corresponded to the sectors of intervention and the entities and bodies eligible for financial support under the Convention.

(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p15)

Financial realisations: With a €2.125M mandate from EDF resources for risk capital under the Lomé IV Convention (A+B), loans were signed for €2.145M during the period 1990-2003. This corresponded to €1.939M net commitments (91% of mandate) of which €1.635M were disbursed by the EIB (84% of commitments and 77% of mandate). This may be compared with the loans on EIB's own resources, for which only 74% of the mandate was committed.

(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p14)

Interviewees indicate that the effectiveness of risk capital operations is globally satisfactory for larger operations. For smaller projects, the success rate is very variable (as these companies have less capacities, competences, etc. and require more follow-up). Global loans proved they could reach the SME they are targeting.

(Source: MN 28)

The assessment of the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV is that in most of cases the projects' objectives, as stated in the appraisal reports, have been achieved and thus were rated satisfactory or good in relation to their operational effectiveness. However, evidence suggests that the EIB's appraisal and follow up sometimes do not pay enough attention to operational/institutional issues (the focus is normally on the investment).

(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p21)

The assessment of the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV on project sustainability is that on eleven projects analysed, five projects were rated good in relation to the sustainability criterion, four satisfactory, one unsatisfactory and one poor. In most of the projects rated satisfactory or good, the key issue to ensure projects' sustainability is related to managerial ability.

	<p>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p25-26)</p> <p>The assessment of the EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV indicate that only 5 of the 9 global loans on risk capital were fully allocated and disbursed within the initial contractual period. This outcome was seen partly as a reflection of the ability of financial intermediaries to manage the global loans but also as the result of over-optimism on the part of the EIB, and possibly the financial intermediaries themselves, in determining the amount of the global loan in relation to potential demand at the time of appraisal. The ratings attributed to global loan performance in the EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV were: 3 were rated good, 8 were rated satisfactory, and 4 were considered unsatisfactory. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV, p2)</p> <p>Results of risk capital global loans targeting equity and quasi-equity investments produced very different results (one fully disbursed - the second only 20% disbursed). The difference can be explained by the experience of the two financial intermediaries with this type of instrument. Moreover, the regional facility, which had the specific objective of financing equity and quasi equity investments through development agencies of EU MS, failed to meet its objective of allocating most of the amounts to direct investments. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV, p16)</p>
I-3.5.2	Views of stakeholders (project manager, beneficiaries, other donors, partner countries)
TFET	Interviewees met so far consider that the Commission's contribution to the TF successfully achieved the expected results. They consider that the best way to intervene in the country was through the TFET.
MDF	<p>Ambassador Jean Breteche, Head of Delegation of the Commission: "The Commission is pleased that the MDF has achieved great results after 18 months of operations. We are however, also aware of the challenges ahead and the need to focus on quality implementation of projects in the field. A lot of work remains to be done and we are committed to continue working together with the BRR and the local governments to support the overall objective of 'building back better'". (Source: MDF Progress Report III, December 2006, p2)</p> <p>Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation, Mrs. Agnes van Ardenne: "The MDF has proven to be both efficient and effective." In general, the Minister's findings were that MDF is functioning well, and, in very difficult circumstances, manages to realize good results in the field. Furthermore, it has the support of the Indonesian government and local authorities. (Source: MDF Progress Report III, December 2006, p4)</p>
CGIAR	Interviewees met so far consider that overall the money is used and the objectives are reached and the money
HIPC TF	No information available
FEMIP Support Fund	The assessment of the Commission Staff Working Paper and of the mid-term evaluation is confirmed by interviewees met so far.
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	EIB interviewees report that interest rate subsidies work very well. They consider it as a sine qua non condition to be able to compete in certain sectors, with e.g. bilateral lenders such as the AFD, KfW, etc.
I-3.5.3	Evidence of overall impact on beneficiaries
ARTF	The Commission is concerned by the issues related to the opium economy (not tackled through the ARTF), which could undermine the entire reconstruction agenda. (Source: RELEX briefing for meeting with WB president, 14/11/2005)
TFET	<p>According to the Interim Evaluation, the TFET is a success story and has achieved major results to support the reconstruction of Timor-Leste and to improve the Timorese rehabilitation. However, the TFET "has failed to build up Timorese ownership of the reconstruction efforts". But it is further explained that this failure was relative, depending on the sectors. In agriculture for example, the TFET decision-making process was fully integrated into the Timorese administration.</p> <p>Source: "Interim Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste" (2004)</p>
MDF	The emergency response was quick, and focused action by international donors working with national and local authorities ensured that affected people benefited from access to food, improved sources of water, sanitation and health services. The general consensus for the first year was that emergency relief successfully met the immediate humanitarian needs of the affected people. (Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p2)
GFATM	Since the evaluations and monitoring conducted mainly tackled the process, and not the results achieved, impact is hardly tackled. When it is, it pass by general statistics and figures such as : "1.25 million lives had been saved

	<p>by December 2006” or “9.4M people reached with HIV counselling and testing, 23M malaria treatment delivered”¹⁰</p> <p>In the GFP approach a focus is set on performance monitoring and related output-based strategies. Based on periodic reviews the GFATM decides whether or not to continue funding individual programme. In January 2004, the GFATM stopped disbursement to a new Principal Recipient in Ukraine following an evaluation. But the “hands-off” approach affects GFATM performance for example the of prescription on CCM composition. <i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation (pp.39-41)</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>The overall impact of the HIPC Initiative is assessed in the World Bank evaluation studies mentioned above (See I.3.5.1).</p> <p>However more than the direct impact of the Initiative what is relevant from the point of view of the European Community development policy objectives is the impact on poverty alleviation, sustainable development and the integration of HIPCs in the world economy of the PRSPs that have been developed as an eligibility condition to the HIPC Initiative.</p> <p>In 2004 the World Bank released an evaluation of the PRSP process. The authors underline that their evaluation takes place at a very early stage of the PRSP process, and in fact too early to assess the impact of the HIPC Initiative on poverty. They rather point on significant strengths and weaknesses of the PRSP process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The process of gathering sector programmes under one strategic umbrella has helped policymakers better appreciate the links between sector strategies and poverty reduction, and sector expenditure plans are being channelled to meet poverty reduction criteria; ▪ PRSPs have generally provided a constructive framework for transparent policy dialogue among external partners and with government; ▪ Because the Initiative includes a uniform requirement – completion of an acceptable document – it has not been sufficiently tailored to match the full range of capabilities and public policy priorities found in low income countries; ▪ In many cases monitoring systems are designed to meet donor data requirements, even when these exceed the country’s needs or capacity; ▪ It remains poorly understood how development policies and programmes can best lead to poverty reduction. The PRSP formulation process has not been much help in reducing these knowledge gaps, because it has rarely entailed robust consideration of policy options, cost-effectiveness and trade-offs; <p>Most PRSPs focus largely on public expenditures, and within the realm of public expenditures they pay more attention to health, education and other social programmes than to the poverty reduction potential of spending in other areas such as infrastructure and rural development.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>The 2006 mid-term evaluation notes in this respect (p. 52):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The majority of the promoters visited by the evaluation team reported that learning and qualification effects emanating from the TA operations have been a primary benefit of the TA ; ▪ Not consistently, but frequently the staff of the Bank invited the local partners to participate in various stages of TA preparation and execution, such as the discussion of problem analysis, situation and conditions, the definition of possible operations, the development of ToR or the selection of tenderers. This clearly encompassed very positive consequences for the dialogue practiced by the Bank with the different stakeholders of its projects in the target countries; ▪ For the Bank, some of the TA measures facilitated the dialogue with the highest political level and thereby improved the conditions for integrating FEMIP in the national policy. <p>It also notes that the involvement of the beneficiaries only makes sense if the latter dispose of the qualification for participating in the relevant tasks. This frequently calls for important training efforts. For the time being, in most operations the improvement of staff qualification at the promoter is more a side-effect rather than a central purpose of the initiative. Various promoters complained that staff training does not find enough attention in the TA operations.</p> <p>More generally, the evaluation notes that the TA operations have engendered an important image effect for the Bank. With help of TA, FEMIP became more visible, and thereby the programme in particular and the Bank in general, have found a much higher recognition than before.</p>

¹⁰ Partners in Impact Results report 2006

Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>The 2001 Evaluation reports that potential impact was rated high for the interest rate subsidies related to environmental projects. (Source: <i>Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii</i>)</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>The individual loans financed were normally very relevant in terms of their contribution to the development of the respective ACP countries and in line with the EIB's first pillar of value added (Source: <i>EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p16</i>) The overall development impact of the global loans has been assessed as being of significance. (Source: <i>EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV, p22</i>)</p>
JC 3.6	<p><i>The overall set of objectives of the intervention (on paper and in reality) are in line with the Commission's policies</i></p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>Interest rate subsidies were mainly provided to water treatment / sewerage and solid waste projects. Confining the use of interest rate subsidies mainly to loans in the water sub-sector rather than loans covering the whole field of the environment, limits their relevance and their potential effects on the economy and the environment of the region. (Source: <i>Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii</i>)</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>Overall, out of 11 projects evaluated, 9 achieved their key operational objectives, which - as stated in the section related to project relevance - were consistent with important developmental priorities of the partner countries. (Source: <i>EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p23</i>) Objectives of all the individual loan projects evaluated in the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV were consistent with the Lomé IV objectives, the decisions of the EIB government bodies, as well as the beneficiaries' requirements, countries needs, global priorities and partners' policies. The projects evaluated corresponded to the sectors of intervention and the entities and bodies eligible for financial support under the Convention. (Source: <i>EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV</i>)</p> <p>The EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV assesses in p12 that the relevance of 14 out of 15 global loans evaluated was good.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>In the European Community's view reducing the external debt of HIPCs is not an end by itself but a means for allowing poor countries to allocate more public resources to the fight against poverty. To that extent elaboration of a PRSP by the countries eligible to the HIPC Initiative, then actual implementation of the poverty reduction strategy are the main direct results expected from the HIPC Initiative.</p>
PSNP	<p>The Commission subscribes fully with the objectives of the intervention and are in line with the Commission policy of moving from food aid to food security by transferring cash instead of food. Source: <i>European Commission and GoE, Financing Agreement for the "Support to the Safety Nets Programme", 2005</i> Source: <i>European Commission and GoE, Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for the period 2002-2007.</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>For the PRSC and PFM, the support to this intervention is in accordance with the Commission's policy expressed in the Country Strategy Paper for Vietnam. The financing of the PRSC through the WB is an alternative to direct Budget Support, which was not an option at the time the Commission decided to finance the Development strategy of Vietnam.</p> <p>For the TFF/VCF, the Commission policy was clearly expressed in the CSP and NIP where <i>the European Union places on the importance of coordinated forest sector support based around national forest programmes.</i></p> <p>For HEMA, the health sector is one of the focal sector for the Commission in its CSP 2007-2013. The objective of the intervention and the Commission's policy in the health sector are common.</p> <p>Source: <i>EC-Vietnam Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Vietnam – European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007 to 2013, Identification Fiche: Support to the Forestry Sector in Vietnam</i></p>

I-3.6.1	Number and importance of questions raised on alignment of interventions with Country and Regional Strategy Papers
PFMR	<p>Considering the situation of the WB-GS, no CSP exists. However, the WB-GS is part of the ENP since 2004 and Communication have been made by the Commission to the Parliament and the Council on the strategy of the Commission towards WB-GS. On the priority sector of the Commission towards WB-GS, as stated in its EU-PA Action Plan (2005) is the financial accountability and sound management of public finances. (p.7). But there is no mentioning of the PFMR nor the WB as channel to reach results in this area. Nor in other programming/strategic documents.</p> <p><i>Source: EU-PA Action Plan (2005).</i></p>
GFATM	<p>The intervention is aligned with the Commission's Strategy since the Commission is a founding member of the GFATM, and since, preceding the establishment of the fund, Commission's documents quoted the 3 communicable diseases as a priority for the Commission : COM(2000) 585 final of 20.9.2000 on Accelerated action targeted at major communicable diseases within the context of poverty reduction ; or COM(2001) 96 final of 21.2.2001 giving a Programme for action on Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction".</p>
HIPC TF	<p>Developing a PRSP through a participative process and starting to implement this strategy is a key condition for a HIPC to reach the Decision Point. Indeed the Initiative has been the main driver to the development of PRSPs. In all countries that have developed a PRSP, the Commission CSPs build on the government poverty reduction strategy. The support given by the European Community to the HIPC Initiative is therefore fully consistent with the Commission country strategies.</p>
I-3.6.2	Number and importance of questions raised on overall objectives of the intervention vis-à-vis Commission's overall policies
GFATM	<p>The intervention overall objectives are aligned with the Commission's overall policy since the Commission is a founding member of the GFATM, and since, preceding the establishment of the fund, Commission's documents quoted the 3 communicable diseases as a priority for the Commission : COM(2000) 585 final of 20.9.2000 on Accelerated action targeted at major communicable diseases within the context of poverty reduction ; or COM(2001) 96 final of 21.2.2001 giving a Programme for action on Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction".</p>
HIPC TF	<p>In the original version of the HIPC Initiative, objectives of the intervention were (i) to ensure external debt sustainability and (ii) to promote the design and implementation of the sound macroeconomic and financial policies compliant with IMF and World Bank programmes.</p> <p>From the beginning the European Community insisted that debt relief should not be considered as an end in itself but should contribute to poverty alleviation.</p> <p>The Enhanced HIPC Initiative satisfies the European Community request for a focus of the Initiative on poverty reduction. Designing a PRSP and starting to implement it has become a key condition for a HIPC to reach the Decision Point of the Initiative. This is expected to induce an allocation to pro-poor public expenditures of the budget resources freed by debt relief.</p>

Q4	To what extent did channelling through IFIs enable the Commission to offer a broader range of expertise and instrument to the beneficiaries?
	<i>EQ 4 on Expertise</i>
JC 4.1	<i>Channelling through IFIs enables the Commission to provide leading expertise and experience to beneficiaries</i>
PFMR	The PFMR is based on the Commission expertise in budget support that it provided to the PA since the second intifada.
HIPC TF	<p>Entrusting the BWI with the design and implementation of the HIPC Initiative has been a decision of the G7 countries.</p> <p>Indeed implementing the HIPC Initiative implied expertise in various areas, notably the capacity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To assess the debt situation of a country; ▪ To carry out debt sustainability assessments in order to determine how much debt relief is necessary for reducing the debt to the point where it becomes sustainable; ▪ To design policy programmes aimed at correcting macroeconomic imbalances. <p>The IMF and the World Bank, which have exerted a leadership in the design and implementation of structural adjustment programmes, have in these fields an undisputed expertise that no other institution would be able to provide at least on the scale implied by the HIPC Initiative.</p> <p>Even in its contribution as a creditor, for which the Community financial assistance is channelled through the EIB, the Community is relying on the IMF and World Bank expertise to assess whether a HIPC meets the condition for reaching the Decision Point, then the Completion Point, and how much debt relief it should be granted.</p>
I-4.1.1	Testimonies of general recognition of partner's technical/sector leadership in area of intervention
ARTF	<p>The WB is recognised as an experienced interlocutor for multi-donor funding as it has a long experience in managing funds this manner. <i>(source: Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF, February 2007)</i></p> <p>Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance expressed a preference for a WB-administered TF compared with a UN one. The reason was the experience with the UN system during the late Taliban period and transition phase, where Afghani officials felt the UN neglected local systems and aspirations and instead tended to continue with UN-managed activities directly. <i>(source: Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF, February 2007)</i></p> <p>The ARTF is seen to be in line with "best practice" principles for structuring and managing trust funds in post-conflict situations. It is also in accordance with the Paris Declaration's "good partnership principles" regarding Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization and Mutual Accountability for donor funding. <i>Source: 2005 Assessment of the ARTF, final report, Scanteam</i></p> <p>While adapted to Afghan realities, the design of the ARTF benefited from earlier experiences, and its coverage is the most comprehensive yet achieved in post-conflict situations, with virtually all major budget categories covered except for flagship investment projects (which by definition carry the flag of the donor concerned.) ARTF problems, mentioned later, do not arise from its design or early management. In large part, the superior design of the ARTF and its "selling" to other donors, were due to the direct involvement of WB staff who had been instrumental in earlier cases in devising the organizational and legal arrangements for MDTFs and aid management by the recipient government. <i>Source: Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-conflict Situations, Schiavo-Campo 2003</i></p> <p>An informant confirmed in an internal document that "the Commission was appreciating that the WB was managing the ARTF, which is a crucial instrument for the functioning of the Afghan public administration. It has certainly contributed to improve the coordination among donors, transparency of funding provided and also ownership of the Afghan government since they are deciding about the use of the ARTF. However and as highlighted in the ARTF donor meeting of last year, the Commission would appreciate if ARTF could be used more as an instrument to facilitate policy dialogue between donors and the ARTF in line with the Afghan Compact and the Afghan National Development Strategy (both adopted in London last year)." <i>(Source: Note for the file on Meeting with the World Bank - Brussels 11 April 2007)</i></p> <p>Despite the delay in Maldives and Sri Lanka, the Commission is broadly satisfied of the cooperation with the WB [in Asia]. In the last three years the annual EC commitments to programmes managed by WB has been</p>

	<p>around € 500 million. The WB proved to be competent in post-conflict/post-disaster reconstruction and in Global Public Goods (health, environment). (Source: Note for the file on Meeting with the World Bank Asia - Brussels 11 April 2007)</p>
TFET	<p>The Commission's 2004 Interim evaluation states (p. 14) that the evaluators "believe TFET was superior to the other alternatives (UN, NGOs and bilateral). Its staff had extensive experience of reconstruction/development financing, was highly competent and motivated and relied the most on Timorese inputs. According to Timorese decision-makers, the mechanism with its efficient donor coordination structure was the least bad instrument for Timor-Leste during this difficult transition period. For the EC, TFET was the best way to provide its assistance to the reconstruction of Timor-Leste."</p>
MDF	<p>As to interviewees, the WB offices are comprehensive (vs. different offices for UN agencies), with a resident officer with his team of experts. Their expertise is multisector, they have the best teams in the country and good project management. (Source: MN 26)</p> <p>The WB has a big program in Indonesia with almost 200 professional staff, they approve about a dozen new lending operations a year, and the Country Director is resident in-country. The ability to address the consequences of the tsunami was therefore considerable.</p> <p>In addition to in-country capacity, a lot of staff from Washington spent time in Jakarta and Aceh, working on the Damage and Loss Assessment, the subsequent assessment work, and in preparing the WB's response to the disaster. The feeling in the WB office was thus of a massive concentration on the tsunami, though some of the relevant skills were acquired by chance: the disaster management unit in the WB was not initially known to either the MDF secretariat or management.</p> <p>There has been clear and strong leadership and support for the MDF throughout, which is recognized both within the WB and by the other parties to the MDF. This strongly pro-active role has by some been seen as dominating the process and the instrument. The Government and most donors, however, appreciate this as having contributed heavily to the MDF's success.</p> <p>Perhaps most important was that the WB's long presence in-country meant the WB had strong relations with the Government. At critical points in the process, the Country Director was able to contact the President's Office, and together they were able to identify solutions to bottlenecks and ensure that problems were addressed. (Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p49-50)</p> <p>In response to the Government of Indonesia's (GOI) request, the World Bank and several donors and donor agencies agreed to establish a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) to support a post-earthquake and tsunami emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction program (Reconstruction Program) in Indonesia. At GOI's request, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group will also serve as Trustee for the MDTF. (Source: Multi-donor trust fund for Aceh and North Sumatra (MDTFANS), Operational Manual, p1)</p> <p>The EC proposes to channel all its ALA budget resources - €200 million – for Indonesia tsunami reconstruction through the MDF for three explicit reasons. One of them is the fact that "The MDF provides the most flexible instrument for support to the reconstruction." (Source: C(2005)1490 – Tsunami Indicative Programme (2005 – 2006) - Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, p19)</p>
CGIAR	<p>Interviewees met consider that the CGIAR has a clear comparative advantage, technically and in terms of reaching critical mass. Intervening in development related agricultural research, should take place through the CGIAR. Technically, there are no other options.</p>
GFATM	<p>The GFATM, as a new financial mechanism do not have any specific expertise in the health sector. It expertise rely on its capacity to raise funds.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>Subsidised development loans with conditionalities became still less in demand as the interest was falling. Moreover, the lending institutions were discouraged to provide loans to heavily indebted countries that were still in the middle of a reform process. (Source: Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007))</p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>Interviewees report that the financial added value of the EIB is limited. The interest rate subsidies on EIB loans often offer less generous conditions to beneficiaries than competing organisations for environmental loans such as the AFD and the KfW. The EIB indeed offers typically 20-25 years repayment period with interest rates of</p>

	<p>up to 3%, whereas . bilateral organisations offer 25-30 years repayment period with interest rate of around 1%. (Source: MN 27)</p> <p>As compared to other IFIs, the EIB operates its external lending mandates with fewer staff and is perceived by potential borrowers as a streamlined and efficient lending institution with a closely defined focus. The EIB's expertise and comparative advantage lie in particular in fields such as infrastructure, environment and SMEs, where it seeks to pass on to project promoters its technical and economic know-how. Furthermore, the EIB performs a rigorous appraisal of project conditionality, notably ensuring the application of EU environmental and procurement standards.</p> <p>The EIB's project conditions also cover other important issues such as pricing and tariff policies, improvements in management capacity, cessation of non-profitable activities, productivity targets and asset disposal, etc. Such conditions form part of the finance contracts and are monitored throughout project implementation. In case of non-compliance, disbursements of the loan may be withheld or suspended. It should be noted that, at an EU level, macro-economic assistance and conditionality are dealt with by the Commission.</p> <p>In addition to the above benefits, the EIB has passed on in full the financial advantages resulting from the Community guarantee and the attractive funding costs of the Bank to the final beneficiaries in the form of competitive interest rates. Moreover, the EIB has extended loans with very long maturities, which are generally not readily available in these countries. The EIB has also been developing its local currency fund raising and lending capacity in some countries, which has contributed to the development of local capital and financial markets.</p> <p>(Source: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council on operations conducted under the External Lending Mandate of the EIB and future outlook, June 2006, p9-10)</p>
<p>Risk Capital Lomé IV</p>	<p>Interviewees recognise the expertise of the EIB in terms of risk capital operations. They inform as well that the Commission tried in the past to manage such operations itself, but failed. (Source: MN 28)</p> <p>The EIB is recognised for its "PJ" (project management): engineers and project specialists with specific and very large expertise, also in the private sector, which enables cross-fertilisation. (Source: MN 28)</p> <p>In several individual loan projects, the EIB provided added value linked to its thorough technical-economic due diligence, through the scrutiny of the procurement process or through reviews of the environmental studies. In some cases, the Project Completion Reports produced by the EIB's experts claimed that the EIB's intervention lead to a cost reduction (better procurement) or environmental improvements. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p29)</p> <p>The EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV confirmed overall the view that the EIB has substantial non-financial value added to offer in less developed countries such as the ACP, by getting involved in projects at an early stage and helping, in particular public sector promoters, during project preparation and implementation. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p30)</p> <p>Interviewees indicate that the EIB enables as well to have financing available at mid-to-long term (longer terms than most other donors). (Source: MN 28)</p> <p>The financial value added of individual loans by the EIB is judged as either being high or significant in nine of the eleven cases evaluated by the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV. The terms and conditions of the EIB's loans were indeed significantly better than alternative finance at the time the projects were financed, when alternatives in similar terms existed, which were often difficult to obtain. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p28)</p> <p>Global loans provide financial value added as well. The flexibility of the risk capital instrument enables the EIB to lend in local currency and on-lending rates to be aligned to local market conditions to the extent that a long-term market exists. In many countries the EIB and other donors are effectively creating that market since long-term resources in local currency have not been available domestically. This provides financial value added in itself, but there is a risk of creating donor dependency especially among development banks. (Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV p22)</p> <p>The provision of financing in local currencies (on risk capital finance) was highly appreciated by clients, as exchange risk was considered high.</p>

	<p><i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p28)</i></p> <p>However, in several cases, the financial value added of the EIB decreased significantly over time and the EIB interest rate turned out to be more expensive than alternative finance (own resources loans). This was the case for fixed rate loans in foreign currencies, as variable rates have decreased substantially since the loans were granted and local currencies have often been devaluated.</p> <p><i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p28)</i></p> <p>The EIB has a particular focus and recognition of its ability to support EC-ACP cooperation in two areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • financial products: lending operations, complex financial structures, in particular quasi-capital; • sectors: the Bank makes loans to industry and "viable infrastructure" – i.e. where direct revenues are received for services provided; these include electricity, telecommunications, railways and water supplies. The underlying principle is that investments financed by loans must generate the revenue needed to service the debt. <p><i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV Annex 1 – p5)</i></p> <p>A recent Commission report provides clear indications on the EIB expertise and experience:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EIB is perceived by potential borrowers as a streamlined and efficient lending institution with a closely defined focus. It operates with fewer staff as compared to other IFIs. ▪ Sectors: EIB's expertise and comparative advantage lie in particular in fields such as infrastructure, environment and SMEs, where it seeks to pass on to project promoters its technical and economic know-how. ▪ Rigorous appraisal of project conditionality, notably ensuring the application of EU environmental and procurement standards. EIB's project conditions also cover other important issues such as pricing and tariff policies, improvements in management capacity, cessation of non-profitable activities, productivity targets and asset disposal, etc. Such conditions form part of the finance contracts and are monitored throughout project implementation. In case of non-compliance, disbursements of the loan may be withheld or suspended. ▪ Financial instruments: Competitive interest rates, loans with very long maturities, which are generally not readily available in these countries, local currency fund raising and lending capacity in some countries, which has contributed to the development of local capital and financial markets. <p><i>(Source: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council on operations conducted under the External Lending Mandate of the EIB and future outlook, June 2006)</i></p>
PSNP	<p>According to stakeholders and the questionnaire sent to Commission task manager of the PSNP, the WB has been used for its capacity to manage large funds (use of its financial and reporting channels); for its experience of working in a multi-donor context for a coordinated and harmonised approach in supporting the GoE. The WB has not been called upon for its specific expertise in food security and the sector expertise could have been offered to beneficiaries through other channels.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 51, MN 58; MN 66</i></p> <p><i>Source: Questionnaire on the Commission's contributions to WB TF.</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>The WB is recognised by the donors to have a leading technical expertise in the sector where the Commission has channelled its funds, i.e. public finance (PRSC, PFM), forestry (TFF/VCF) and health (HEMA) in Vietnam.</p> <p><i>Source: Survey, MN 69, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 81, 88</i></p>
JC 4.2	<p><i>Channeling through IFIs enables the Commission to have access to readily available know-how required to intervene in situations of emergency</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>Implementing the HIPC Initiative was not really an emergency issue.</p> <p>This being said, the IMF, which carries out on an annual basis or even more frequently a survey of the macroeconomic and financial situation and of related policies in all countries of the world, either in the framework of article IV consultations or as a follow-up of an IMF programme, has a unique qualification for collecting and processing the information on macroeconomic and financial issues that is required to effectively implement the HIPC Initiative scheme, as well as to design macroeconomic recovery programmes.</p> <p>As far as the debt situation of HIPCs is concerned, the World Bank, which maintains a database on this issue, is also well qualified to provide the information required.</p> <p>The European Community contribution to the Initiative as a creditor requires detailed information on the loans granted by the Community to HIPCs. Since these loans had been channelled through the EIB, this institution was the best qualified to provide the information.</p>

WB TFs in Vietnam	The WB has also an expertise in managing large TFs (like the PRSC) and has an extensive experience in Vietnam. Their procedures and standards offer also a security (fiduciary comfort). The WB is one of the major donor in Vietnam, where as the Commission is a much smaller player in terms of funding. <i>Source: Survey, MN 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 81, 88</i>
I-4.2.1	Partner's years of presence in the country and/or expertise in the field
PFMR	The WB has the capacity and the global reach to lead an international effort in support of the PA's budget. Indeed, the WB has gained extensive experience in administering multi-donor trust funds, including in Timor-Lest, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and the greater Great Lakes region of Africa. In the West Bank and Gaza, the WB administered other trust funds (ESSP, Hols Fund) which served as the main conduit for PA budget supporting its start-up years. <i>Source: WB, "West Bank and Gaza. Proposed Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund".(2003)</i>
TFET	The WBG work in East Timor started in 1999 with the creation of the TFET. The WB is still active up to date. <i>Source: WB, "Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association to the executive Directors on a Transitional support strategy of the WBG for East Timor", (2000).</i>
MDF	Important was that the WB's long presence in-country meant the WB had strong relations with the Government. At critical points in the process, the Country Director was able to contact the President's Office, and together they were able to identify solutions to bottlenecks and ensure that problems were addressed. Some of the relevant skills were acquired by chance, though. <i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p50)</i>
CGIAR	The CGIAR is operational since 1971 and the Commission is contributing since 1977.
GFATM	Not present at country level, no expertise in the field
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	The EIB is a key player in the implementation of EU policies for economic development in the Mediterranean partner countries. This role goes back to the 1960s, when the EIB started its loan operations in that region, financed by its own resources. The Commission provides interest rate subsidies in support of EIB loans in the Mediterranean for more than two decades. <i>(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p 5)</i>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	The EIB is active in ACP countries since 1963. Based on about 40 years of lending activities in the ACP countries, the EIB has a well-established presence in the regions and has developed close relationships with the governments and other important public sector bodies in most ACP countries. Therefore, and even though programming exercises are not very detailed, EIB staff are usually well aware of the planned public sector capital investment programmes. <i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV p30)</i>
I-4.2.2	Commission's years of presence in the country and/or expertise in the field
ARTF	Interviewees report that the Commission did not have bilateral relations with Afghanistan before 2001 and that there was no delegations in the country. The Commission started bilateral relations with Afghanistan in early 2002, after the fall of the Taliban regime, with the set-up of a Delegation.
PFMR	The Commission has been involved in supporting the Palestinian since 1971 through the contribution to UNRWA. And since 2002, the Commission supported the PA through its general budgetary support programme in the form of a Reform Facility. <i>Source: European Commission, RELEX, "The EU's relations with West Bank and Gaza Strip" (2004)</i>
TFET	The Commission main assistance to East Timor started in 1999 with humanitarian aid and rehabilitation and development support. The Commission is still in the field and look at establishing a Commission Delegation. <i>Source: European Commission. Donor Profile, Timor-Leste (2005)</i> The Commission was however not strongly present in the country. It had no cooperation structure there and created therefore in 2000 a local "antenna" represented by one external consultant. The Delegation of Jakarta was in charge.
PSNP	The Commission has been provided development assistance to Ethiopia since 1975 <i>Source: Web site of the Delegation of the European Commission in Ethiopia</i>

JC 4.3	<i>Channeling through IFIs enables the Commission and the partner to provide more flexible and comprehensive (financing) instruments</i>
HIPC TF	This is not an issue for the HIPC Initiative. In order to guarantee that all HIPCs are treated on the same footing, the same financial instruments were utilized in all HIPCs and were utilized in accordance with the same principles and rules.
PSNP	The grants provided for the PSNP have not been used to mobilise other types of WB funding or other types of financing instruments such as loans. <i>Source MN 58; MN 66</i>
I-4.3.1	Number of financial instruments that the Commission alone can provide
CGIAR	<i>N/A</i>
GFATM	<i>N/A</i>
HIPC TF	According to this evaluation on the HIPC Initiative, debt reduction is on type of financial instrument to assist the HIPCs but it is <i>“not a sufficient instrument to affect the multiple drivers of debt sustainability. Sustained improvement in export diversification, fiscal management, the terms of new financing, and public debt management are also needed, measures that are outside the ambit of the HIPC Initiative.”</i> <i>Source: IEG, “Debt relief for the poorest. An evaluation update of the HIPC Initiative” (2006).</i>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	Interviewees reported the Commission could provide risk capital itself, but that it did it in the past with limited success.
I-4.3.2	Number of financial instruments that the IFI alone can provide
CGIAR	<i>N/A</i>
GFATM	<i>N/A</i>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	The EIB can offer risk capital operations, but is limited by its statute to a certain risk level on its own resources. The EIB cannot provide loans in local currency on own resources.
I-4.3.3	Number of financial instruments that the Commission and IFI can provide together
TFET	The Commission's 2004 Interim evaluation notes that the WB and the ADB were <i>“able to design projects the way they did in Timor-Leste with substantial technical assistance and consulting services (a large part of it foreign) because the funds entrusted to them were grants. With their normal resources, which are loans and credits albeit at preferential interest rates, it would have been financially irresponsible to do so in a poor and non-creditworthy country like Timor-Leste.”</i>
CGIAR	<i>N/A</i>
GFATM	<i>N/A</i>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	The EIB and the Commission, two sister institutions, are working together for offering/proposing a common financial package. <i>(Source: MN 27)</i> Interest subsidies and risk capital complement the mix of co-operation measures available, combining loans and grants and introducing a financial leverage effect on the EIB's own resources. These financial instruments are considered very relevant to the specific objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and to the needs of the recipient countries. <i>(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii)</i>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	The 7 th -8 th EDF funds used for risk capital could finance activities with a higher risk than own resources would allow. Interviewees indicate that these allowed to widen the use of some financial instruments such as quasi-equity loans, loans with conditionality level (often subordinated to project performance), equity stakes and participation in investment funds, as well as to offer loans in local currency, essentially in the “franc CFA” zone. The latter in particular would not have been possible on EIB own resources alone. <i>(Source: MN 28)</i> The EDF funds enabled to have financing available at mid-to-long term (even though at market conditions), which is difficult to obtain from other donors. <i>(Source: MN 28)</i> A number of global loans on risk capital resources had a provision that part of the credit could be used for equity and quasi equity investments but in only few cases was this used. The EIB Evaluation of its funding through global loans under Lomé IV states in p16 that this outcome suggests that, in future, RC operations with this specific objective should be channelled through specialised institutions or venture capital companies to be effective.

EQ5	To what extent did the Commission's channelling of funds contribute to swifter implementation and lower transaction costs?
	<i>EQ 5 on Cost Reduction & Implementation</i>
JC 5.1	Time needed between project identification and project implementation
ARTF	The "Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF" (February 2007) states that "the ARTF Recurrent Window must be seen as a success in terms of efficiency" and that "the funds appear to have been set up very quickly". The ARTF had the advantage of being able to piggyback on an initially established interim TF (the AIAF, see summary information on the ARTF), which was planned since the beginning for handing over functions and results to the subsequent ARTF. The ARTF thus had time to be set up. In addition, this made for a much stronger national counterpart for the ARTF, and hence a more credible partner for taking decisions and implementing them.
PFMR	This was very quick as the political situation of the WB-GS and the exigencies of the EU Parliament was rapidly formulated. A proposed PFMR TF by the WB was drafted in 2003, the signature of the administration agreement was signed in 2004 and the completion of the TF was in June 2006.
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	The FEMIP Support Fund has a clear impact on loans with interest rate subsidies as well, in that projects are improved as they are better prepared upfront, progress is followed, etc .
Risk Capital Lomé IV	Interviewees indicate that the Commission disburses the funds as soon as requested by the EIB. (Source: MN 28) Interviewees indicate that delays are inevitable in an ACP context. (Source: MN 28)
HIPC TF	Launched in September 1996, the HIPC Initiative gained momentum after its initial design was revised in September 1999 into the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Actual implementation of the Initiative was relatively slow because its design foresaw a probation period of three years before eligible countries reach the Decision Point, then once again three years before they reach the Completion Point. Furthermore many HIPCs faced difficulties to meet the conditions requested from them to reach the Decision Point, then the Completion Point.
PSNP	The identification of the programme was done jointly between the Joint donor group and the GoE. Each donor has signed an agreement with the GoE (for the Commission, the financing agreement with the GoE was signed in October 2005) and an agreement with the WB for the administration of their contribution under a MDTF (for the Commission the Administration Agreement with signed in August 2005). A MoU between the GoE and the funding partners supporting the PSNP has also been signed in November 2005. Following these agreements, the first Commission's disbursement for the PSNP had been delayed because of the non acceptable financial management system of the GoE. Delays of 3 to 4 months occurred also in the payments to beneficiaries because of low implementation capacity of the GoE. Source: European Commission and GoE, <i>Financing Agreement for the "Support to the Safety Nets Programme", 2005</i> Source: <i>Monitoring report 1620.01 – Support to the Safety nets programme.</i> Source: <i>MoU between the GoE and the Funding partners supporting the PSNP, 2005</i> Source: <i>European Commission and WB, Administration Agreement for the MDTF for Ethiopia – Productive safety net program, 2005</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	According to interviewees, delays have occurred for signing the AA between the Commission and the WB. For the TFF/VCF , difficulties to agree on one component of the TF. The Commission wanted to integrate a trade component in the FLEG programme, but the WB disagreed because it was not the purpose of the TF. It took at least 3 month to find a compromise and thus created delays before signing the AA. For HEMA , delays also occurred because of different interpretation of the AA. The Commission had planned a project with the Government and asked the WB to implement on component of this project. The WB did not agree on some component of the project as they had other project in the same field and neighbour regions. Delays occurred and the AA was finally signed in a rush (because of time pressur from the Commission D+3 rule). For the TFF/VCF , delays occurred also in the implementation of the activities and mainly in the recruitment of international TA by the WB. Source: MN 71, 72, 76, 82, 86

I-5.1.1	Time from first identification study of the project to the proposal decision
TFET	The Joint donor assessment mission was conducted in September 1999 and led to the decision at the Tokyo meeting in December 1999 to set-up a TF.
WB ITF	<p>The United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment was released in October 2003 and the Commission's Iraq Assistance Programme which proposed to contribute to the WB ITF was finalised in March 2004.</p> <p><i>Source: European Commission, Iraq Assistance Programme, 2004. COM(2004)667</i> <i>Source: United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment (2003)</i></p>
MDF	<p>The EU played a leading role in the overall international response, and pledged and deployed funds and resources quickly.</p> <p><i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p2)</i></p>
CGIAR	<p>A vital lesson learnt by the centres on the implementation of the EC co-financed project is the need for flexibility in the project design to immediately respond to external changes. This has not only to do with funding shortfalls but also to be able to capture opportunities, create synergies, and to respond to needs expressed by partner countries. Another lesson learnt is to have firm commitments from all partners already during the design stage, especially when dealing with multi donor projects.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i></p>
GFATM	<p>The date of the first identification study is hard to determine, as the Commission involvement in the sector preceded the GFATM creation, and as the direct identification of the intervention relies on the GFATM establishment. The communication issued on 20.9.2000 COM(2000) 585 explains the issue of communicable diseases and sets out a framework for targeted action which might be considered as the identification of the problems.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>The HIPC Initiative was launched in September 1996 by the WB and the IMF. The World Bank Trust Fund was established in November 1996.</p> <p>In March 1997, the European Commission presented to the Council and the Parliament a Communication in which it proposed that the EU provides exceptional assistance to heavily indebted countries.</p> <p>In July 1998, the EC Council decided that the European Community would participate in the initiative. This Decision was however restricted to the involvement of the Community as a creditor.</p> <p>In October 1998 the Commission presented a new communication in which it proposed a participation of the Community in the Initiative enlarged beyond its role as a creditor.</p> <p>A revised version of the HIPC Initiative – the Enhanced HIPC Initiative – was presented by the BWI in September 1999.</p> <p>On the 26 October 1999, the Commission communication was approved together with the draft of a Decision of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers.</p> <p>On the 8 December 1999, the EU-ACP Council of Ministers decided to allocate unused resources of the EDF to debt relief operations within the framework of the HIPC Initiative.</p> <p>These developments suggest that once the HIPC Initiative was revised with poverty alleviation becoming a key objective of the Initiative, the European Community reacted rapidly and positively.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>The Barcelona European Council on March 15, 2002 stressed the need to stimulate private sector development in the Mediterranean partner countries. The Council decided to establish the FEMIP Facility. As the FEMIP Support Fund as the TA Component of the FEMIP in 2003, this means that there were maximum 18 months between the “identification study of the project” and the “proposal decision”.</p>
I-5.1.2	Time from proposal decision to signature of Contribution Agreement EC-IFI
TFET	<p>The Commission's contribution agreement was signed in October 2000, i.e. 10 months after the proposal decisions. The WB working paper of 2002 considers that there had been few delays in the realization of pledges for either of the East Timorese TFs</p>
WB ITF	<p>The Commission's Iraq Assistance Programme which proposed to contribute to the WB ITF was finalised in March 2004 and the Administration Agreement signed between the WB and the Commission was signed in</p>

	<p>July 2004.</p> <p><i>Source: European Commission, Iraq Assistance Programme, 2004. COM(2004)667</i> <i>Source: Administration Agreement. MED/2004/082-205/1. TF053167 (July 2004)</i></p>
MDF	<p>The Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds report that while donors were quick to pledge funds, getting all the agreements in place took time. A Standard Agreement was prepared by the WB Country Lawyer in Indonesia, and it was in principle agreed to by donors. However, once it came to signing agreements, several donors had special requests/clauses to meet their legislative requirements and policy decisions. These special requests had to be accepted by the WB's country lawyer as well as other WB units that clear such agreements, especially the Trust Fund Accounting section (ACCTF).</p> <p>The MDF Secretariat spent significant time drafting these clauses, getting the country lawyer to review and approve them, negotiate with the donors and obtaining the required WB clearances.</p> <p><i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p50)</i></p>
CGIAR	<p>The strong and weak points of the EC co-financed projects: For all centres, a strong point of the EC co-financed projects is the focus on global public goods, policy reforms and research for development. Another strong point is the flexible nature of the EC funding that allows the centres to match these funds to the restricted contributions of other donors. There is also the possibility for the centres to leverage other funds with EC funding. Hence there is no issue about the type of EC project funding. The main issue has to do with the efficiency of the EC financial flows to the centres. Disbursement delays by the EC of sometimes of up to one year, the unpredictability (regional shift in EC funding) and an outright default of funding (2006), has had serious effects on the financial management of the centres and work planning, and hence project efficiencies and effectiveness.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, October 2007)</i></p>
GFATM	<p>Explanation of the issues: 20/9/2000 Proposal decision date : 23/10/2001 Signature of the Administration Agreement date : 08/12/2003</p>
HIPC TF	<p>For the implementation of the Community Contribution to the HIPC Initiative, the following documents were produced;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A Financing Agreement (N° 6300/REG) was signed between the European Commission in its capacity as manager of the EDF and the ACP-States on 7 July 2000, that is seven months after the Decision of the EU-ACP Council of Ministers; ▪ A Framework Agreement between the European Commission and the EIB was signed on the 30 November 2000. <p>A Contribution Agreement between the European Commission and the International Development Association was signed on the 10 July 2000. In this document this Commission committed itself to provide € 680 million to the HIPC Trust Fund. A second commitment of € 200 million was made on the 14 November 2011.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>The Framework agreement concerning the management of the FEMIP Support Fund was signed in May 2003. The Framework agreement is like a contribution agreement and covers the budget period 2003 - 2006. For each year, the EC and the EIB have signed an implementation agreement that specifies the amount of the yearly allocation.</p> <p><i>(Source: EIB, 2008-10-17)</i></p>
I-5.1.3	Time from signature of Contribution Agreement to signature of contract for implementation
TFET	<p>The WB 2002 working paper underlines (p. iii) that: “for IDA-financed project under the TFET, the Bank attempted to speed up delivery through the use of its emergency procedures. Project preparation time was cut from a Bank wide average of 15 months to 3.5 months while maintaining its quality standards”. It also notes in this respect that the Bank's Quality Assurance Group reviewed the quality at entry of the East Timor portfolio and found no significant deviation from the quality of its portfolio at large.</p> <p>Furthermore it is noted that rapid, visible impact on the ground address the political dimension of the speed of delivery. The paper also considers that lack of visible results might have led to increased dissatisfaction and jeopardized the reconstruction process.</p>
CGIAR	<p>The EC co-financed projects have been efficient in terms of management of staff and in maintaining good relationships with other stakeholders. Delays in project implementation have been relatively small.</p>

	<i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGLAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i>
GFATM	Note : Principal Recipient which receive the funds directly from the GFATM are not the implementation bodies. A further stage has to be considered between the Principal recipient reception of the funds and the disbursement of the funds to the sub-recipients. That is often a long process as the principal recipients are not supported by the GFATM ¹¹ .
HIPC TF	1) The Contribution Agreement with the WB was signed on the 10 July 2000 2) The first tranche of the Community contribution was received by the Trust Fund on 31 July 2000. 3) An agreement was reached in March 2001 on the individual country allocation following an implementation agreement between the WB and the AfDB.
FEMIP Support Fund	Interviewees in Morocco considered that the TA operations on EIB loans were generally running on time, despite the EIB's limited experience with managing TA prior to the creation of the FEMIP Support Fund. A large TA operation in the health sector was a notable exception: agreement on the approach required major efforts by both institutions and resulted in a delay of two years. This originated partly from the fact that the technical assistance was more at the level of a sector strategy than related to a typical EIB loan such as had been envisaged for FEMIP Support Fund operations. It was thus in the claimed expertise area of both the Commission and the EIB, both consequently claiming a say in the operation. But cooperation between the two institutions remained limited at the initial stages of the operation. <i>(Source: MN 90, MN 92, MN 95, MN 101)</i>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	Interviewees indicate that the relationship between the EIB and the local promoters is not always optimal. There are significant delays, due to different reasons, incl. too strict EIB conditionalities as well as political stagnation (e.g. in Lebanon). The weakness of institutions in the countries is an additional problem, especially regarding 'waste water'. <i>(Source: MN 27)</i> Stakeholders interviewed in Morocco agreed delays in loans with interest rate subsidies were frequent but inherent to the instrument. Different stakeholders interviewed confirm that delays were frequent (in about half of the cases) at project inception. The main reason is that Governments faced difficulties in meeting EIB conditionalities on loans. <i>(Source: MN 90, 92, 95, 100, 101)</i> Delays were said to have precluded the Commission from disbursing the funds in some cases in Morocco, as it was bound by the "D+3 rule". <i>(Source: MN 95)</i> ROM reports available on interest rate subsidies in Morocco indicate that most projects funded through EIB loans with reduced interest rates were rated positively on implementation efficiency (4 "good" and 1 "problem" ratings). Nevertheless, comments in those reports show that delays occurred repeatedly. <i>(Source: table provided above under I-3.5.1)</i>
JC 5.2	<i>Transaction costs are reduced for the Commission and the beneficiaries</i>
MDF	An issue was to rely on a new Government that was not proven and with no track-record of the Administration for the good use of money. (Note. members/governors of the former Government are now in jail due to corruption scandals). It was thus a risky exercise for the Commission. Money was therefore disbursed according to progress. <i>(Source: MN 26)</i>
HIPC TF	For the implementation of the HIPC Initiative the Commission relied on the EIB and the World Bank, that are both well qualified to assess the debt situation of beneficiary countries and deal with the multilateral banks that are their creditors.
PSNP	According to beneficiaries, channelling facilitates their work because they only deal with one interlocutor and have only one set of procedures they have to follow. For the Commission, the management cost paid to the WB are generally considered relatively low compared to other channel. However, it is difficult to compare it with the cost of a direct intervention of the Commission. It is also difficult to say to what extent it is good value for money if you take into account the responsibility issues of the WB regarding the donor's contributions. However, channelling reduces the number of human resources needed within the Delegation but it implies nevertheless some close follow-up and technical input from the Commission side, especially on the financial side.

¹¹ The Global Fund's principal recipients or neglected partners, The Lancet, Vol. 364, 27 November 2004

	<i>Source: MN 51, MN 54, MN 57, MN 58</i>
I-5.2.1	Comparison of management costs for the Commission between similar interventions involving channelling through MDB vis-à-vis direct interventions
ARTF	<p>The "Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF" (February 2007) states that "the ARTF Recurrent Window must be seen as a success in terms of efficiency" and that "the funds appear to have been set up very quickly". The ARTF had the advantage of being able to piggyback on an initially established interim TF (the AIAF, see summary information on the ARTF), which was planned since the beginning for handing over functions and results to the subsequent ARTF. The ARTF thus had time to be set up. In addition, this made for a much stronger national counterpart for the ARTF, and hence a more credible partner for taking decisions and implementing them.</p> <p>The normal Bank fee of 2% for administering trust funds was reduced in this case to 1.0-1.5% (on a sliding scale depending on ARTF size.)</p> <p><i>Source: Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-conflict Situations, Schiavo-Campo 2003</i></p>
TFET	Precise data have not been obtained yet, but interviewees met underline that the management costs of direct interventions would have been well above the cost of intervening through the TFET.
MDF	<p>The MDF Operational Manual specifies (p9) as Cost Recovery Arrangements that, "in order to assist in the defrayment of its administrative costs, IDA may deduct from the Contributions and transfer to itself an amount representing the actual costs of administration of the MDTF. IDA and designated partner agencies may also retain and transfer to themselves amounts representing the actual costs of appraisal, supervision, monitoring and evaluation, of those grant activities that they are administering".</p> <p>The WB promised the Government and the donors that it would only charge actual costs of running the fund, rather than a percentage fee, and that these costs would remain within a ceiling of 2% of the total value of the MDF. The thinking was that 1% would cover the administration and 1% project supervision and appraisal. The total budget was thus \$11.5M over the lifetime of the fund, while the WB estimates that the MDF will have an investment income of over \$12M from its cash balances. This fee is extremely low.</p> <p><i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p52)</i></p> <p>An interesting point on management costs is made in the Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds. An MDF Progress Report referred that "The target of keeping administration costs below 2% is unique, especially compared to trust funds managed by UN agencies that have costs of 5-12%" (p. 16).</p> <p>This comparison, however, is incorrect as reported in that Review, as it is comparing with project overhead and not what the UN charges as trust fund fees. In the latter case, the UN has basically the same policy as the WB – it will charge for actual costs, and not more. According to the UN, these costs compare favourably with those of the WB. When the UN takes on project implementation, it has a different cost structure, for example distinguishing National Execution (lower costs) with Direct Execution. When the evaluation team of the Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds has done reviews of UN overheads compared with other project execution modalities, the UN is seen to offer largely competitive rates, often with better fiduciary standards.</p> <p><i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p52)</i></p>
CGIAR	<p>Interviewees met explained that until 2004, the CGIAR secretariat, headed by the WB, did all the management, reporting etc., without charging any fee. Since sept. 2005 however, the WB has decided that it did not want to take these responsibilities anymore and wished to act as a fiscal agent only. As this was not in line with the framework agreement, no payment has been made in 2006. In the future, the Commission is said to contribute to the CGIAR through IFAD (who will take a 1% management fee and next year 2%).</p> <p>The cost effectiveness of the projects is considered high as EC co-financing often leverages larger (restricted/special) project support from other donors, resulting in a relatively high output from an otherwise relatively small EC investment (average of 24% of total project cost).</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i></p>
GFATM	<p>GFATM has been designed to minimize bureaucracy, limiting the Secretariat staff in Geneva to 80 with no field offices (reflecting the vision of a pure financial instrument), the direct administrative costs have remain low at 5% of grants in 2004. the funds managed per GFATM staff are 2.5 times those managed by the WB staff and 3.3 times those of DFID staff.</p> <p>However disbursement at country level suffers from weaker coordination resulting in longer time for disbursements (observed in Ethiopia and India). In Ethiopia the GFATM suffers as other donors from the weak capacities in the health sector resulting in a delay of one year in the implementation.</p>

	<i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation (pp.38, 41)</i>
HIPC TF	<p>In its donor role in the HIPC Initiative the Community could have theoretically chosen between three modalities for channeling funds to the beneficiaries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ make the money directly available to the debtor countries; ▪ make available to the multilateral development banks (MDBs), notably the AfDB, the funds intended to reimburse their claims on HIPCs; ▪ channel its contribution through the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund. <p>The modality would have implied for the Commission to put in place a monitoring mechanism in order to check whether each debtor country meets the conditions for benefiting of the Initiative and to ensure that the Community contribution is used to repay the country's outstanding debt towards MDBs.</p> <p>The second modality would have had similar implications for the Commission. There would have obviously been a conflict of interest if the MDBs had been left responsible to decide whether conditions were met for reimbursement of their claims.</p> <p>Both modalities would have therefore induced significant transactions costs for the Commission and would have duplicated the analytical work carried out by the World Bank.</p> <p>The third choice – that is the channeling of the EC contribution through the World Bank Trust Fund – was by far the most efficient solution.</p> <p>The same three options existed as regards the contribution of the Community as a creditor. In that case the Commission choose the second modality. In order to avoid the conflict of interest mentioned above, the decision to proceed with claim repayments are taken by the Commission and not by the EIB. This implies for the Commission to assess the debt situation of the beneficiary countries towards the Community and to monitor how far these countries comply with the conditions for debt release. The Commission did not explain why it choose this option rather than relying on the World Bank Trust Fund.</p> <p>EIB HIPC TF: Commission staff members involved in the management of the EU contribution to the HIPC Initiative considered that the operational performance of the EIB in managing the EU contribution as a creditor had been poor. <i>(Source: MN 106)</i></p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>The 2006 Mid-term evaluation underlines that (p. 53) <i>“in some cases, the collaboration with the local promoters is ensured via a Project Management Unit, to which the Bank assigns external consultants”</i>. The evaluation states that this is an expensive approach, which may encompass a number of risks.</p> <p>For the large TA operation in the health sector in Morocco, Commission staff were substantially involved according to interviewees in the country <i>(Source: MN 90, MN 92, MN 95, MN 101)</i></p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>Interviewees in both Commission and EIB agreed that the management fees charged by the EIB to the Commission were relatively low. The EIB charged for instance the Commission a fee lower than 1% for interest rate subsidies and 4% for administering and managing the FEMIP Support Fund, according to EIB representatives. <i>(Source: MN 95, 101, 102)</i></p> <p>Commission staff at both HQ and Delegation levels had indeed a limited role with regard to decision-making and follow-up in terms of individual operations and relied largely on the EIB's expertise and experience with the management of those financial instruments.. <i>(Source: MN 90, 95, 101)</i></p> <p>Beneficiaries met in Morocco did not mention difficulties in terms of transaction costs.</p>
PSNP	<i>See information at the level of IC 5.2</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>According to the survey results for the 4 TFs in Vietnam (PRSC, PFM, TFF/VCF, HEMA), the management costs (WB management fees + Commission costs for follow-up of the contribution) are lower compared to direct Commission interventions. This has also been confirmed by interviews in Delegation and other donors in Vietnam. However, for HEMA, their were no common understanding of management costs. <i>Source: Survey, MN 76, 81, 69, 77</i></p>

I-5.2.2	Single set of procedures and single interlocutor for the beneficiaries
ARTF	<p>Having the ARTF as a funding source has been extremely efficient for all parties, including for the Government of Afghanistan, as there is only one source of funding for the recurrent budget and thus only one actor with which to interact. It has ensured streamlining of donor conditionality linked with the disbursement of the financing. The alternative to the ARTF would have been donor-by-donor funding, largely through specific projects. This would have been much more costly, not least of all to the Government. (source: "Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF" (February 2007).</p> <p>Interviewees at the Commission recognise that ARTF is certainly a very valuable institution in Afghanistan, as it aligns donors with same procedures for all. It simplifies a constant dialogue. This is particularly appropriate for setting up a new public administration. (Source: MN 29).</p> <p>The ARTF does represent only a limited part of the total aid from the international community to Afghanistan. The Commission's contribution to the ARTF and the LOTFA (together €277M commitments over 2002-2006) represent for instance only 27% of its total aid to Afghanistan (€1,025M commitments over 2002-2006). (source: MEMO/07/34)</p>
PFMR	<p>Yes, this is one of the main achievements of the PFMR TF. According to the WB completion report, the beneficiary were satisfy to deal with only on institutions and that simplified the procedure and disbursements.</p> <p>Source: WB, "Completion Report to Donors. WB-GS PFMR"</p>
TFET	<p>According to the Interim evaluation of the TFET, the mechanism used uniform procedures for project processing and implementation.</p> <p>Source: "Interim Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Timor-Leste" (2004)</p> <p>It is not clear however to what extent one consider that this have simplified the work for the beneficiaries. Indeed, one should remember that six aid mechanisms were used when the reconstruction work started in 2000 (see Commission's interim evaluation 2004):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ (i) UNTAET-administered CFET mainly covering recurrent expenditures; ▪ (ii) TFET with two implementing agencies (the World Bank and the ADB) financing investments; ▪ (iii) UNTAET assessed contribution budget of financing salaries of UN staff and contractual employees; ▪ (iv) UN agencies projects; ▪ (v) bilateral donors aid and reconstruction programmes; ▪ and (vi) NGOs. During TFET implementation, a seventh financing mechanism was added in May 2002: TSP (Transition Support Programme) through which the World Bank and other donors helped finance the government's current budget (CFET) after Timor-Leste became independent. <p>In other words, although the beneficiaries could benefit from a single set of procedures in their collaboration with TFET, they still had to deal with other TFs and programmes. Most probably this implied dealing with other set of procedures in addition to dealing with many interlocutors. It may well be that the advantages of working with one interlocutor and one single set of procedures through the TFET has been lost by the fact that many other interventions with different procedures and interlocutors took place at the same time.</p> <p>The evaluation underlines indeed (p.24) that "his fragmentation of funding mechanisms rendered the overall coherence of reconstruction efforts difficult and made coordination crucial for the success of the undertaking"</p>
MDF	<p>Primary responsibility for coordinating donor support lies with the government agency BRR. The MDF, as channel for only ~10% of external funding, is to some extent a minor actor in this regard. However, it is the only permanent institutional arrangement that in a systematic way tries to strengthen dialogue across stakeholder groups. MDF-related activities are also organized to be as inclusive as possible. The Technical Review meetings are open, project supervision missions are organized on a planned basis with possibilities for all donors to participate, and various kinds of financial and performance reporting are publicly available. The use of Partner Agency agreements has also ensured harmonized and transparent standards for fiduciary management. The MDF has worked with the BRR to establish procedures and standards regarding anti-corruption measures, and has put in place its own stringent anti-corruption steps. The MDF has an ombudsman in Aceh to handle controversies and address problems, which also seems to be working well. The MDF serves as a meeting place for the Government officials and donors in particular but with possibilities for</p>

	<p>other actors also to join in. MDF project supervision missions have included a number of donors and thus provided an important venue for joint learning. The Lessons Learned workshop one year after the establishment of the MDF included a wide range of participants.</p> <p>The MDF has clearly been the most successful instrument for harmonization and coordination in an environment that has been criticized for lacking both, between donors as well as among the NGOs. To what extent MDF coordination has had any effect on donor funding outside the MDF itself is unclear, however. There is nothing this Review has seen to indicate that this has been the case. On the other hand, the MDF has no mandate to coordinate other resources than those made available to it directly – the larger coordination effort is a BRR task.</p> <p><i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p68-70)</i></p> <p>The MDF does represent only ~10% of the total international community post-tsunami aid (€520M out of €4.8B)¹². Funding is composed for 85% of Commission and MS resources. Other donors have relatively modest contributions, e.g. only 2.5% of \$400M from the US goes to the MDF, and all the \$588M mobilized by the UN goes to UN agencies for direct project implementation. Most other donors focus on specific aspects, due sometimes to requirements of tied aid. The US and Japan focus for instance respectively on roads and harbours.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 26 and Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p47)</i></p> <p>The Commission nevertheless considers participating to a multi-donor TF as a signal to the Government of how reconstruction should happen. Objective of the MDF is to have a best-case practice.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 26)</i></p>
CGIAR	<p>During the review period 2002-2005, the EC has contributed € 68.7 million to the 15 international research centres which are part of the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The entire funding came from the EC food security budget. During this period, the EC had co-financed a total of 140 research projects in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Central Asia and the Caucasus, and two Challenge Programmes: (1) the Generation Challenge Programme; and (2) the Sub-Saharan Africa Programme.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i></p> <p>An important issue is the lack of linkage between the EC's co-funded research agenda and other EC country level development programmes. Many useful research products have not been scaled up (Africa mainly) for lack of proper technology and agro-input delivery systems (e.g. extension services, private agro sector development, seed and fertilizer supply systems) and the weakness of the national partners. Areas that could be part of the EC's development portfolio at the country level but in many cases are not or hardly so.</p> <p><i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i></p>
GFATM	<p>According to the article "The Global Fund's principal recipients or neglected partners, The Lancet, Vol. 364, 27" from November 2004, if indeed there is a single set of procedure and a single interlocutor for the "principal receiver", this does not permit it to have decreasing transaction costs : the GFATM Secretariat do not support the principal receiver in the management of the funds, which often lead to important delays concerning the disbursement of the funds to the sub-receiver body.</p> <p>UNAIDS mentions an "implementation crisis" since a multitude of international organizations providing HIV/AIDS services have been converging on countries with limited institutional, administrative and managerial public health capacities</p> <p><i>Source: Global Fund – WB HIV/AIDS Programms comparative advantage study, 19 January 2006</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>A European Commission report (Beyond the HIPC Initiative) released in 2004, notes that "the HIPC process implies management costs which are reported to pose some difficulties to HIPC administrations, which have weak institutional capacity. The handling of the debt-reduction exercise itself, in its financial and accounting dimensions, is particularly skill- and time-demanding." These tasks have often overwhelmed the administrative capacity of HIPCs. The report also underlines that "the need to monitor the use of HIPC resources on poverty-related spending has also imposed a significant additional workload on HIPCs".</p> <p>The World Bank evaluation of 2006 also stresses the lack of capacity for debt management in HIPCs and regrets that no support was delivered by the Bank nor by other donors to develop this capacity.</p>

¹² MDF represents only ~7% of total reconstruction aid, if considering as well the aid from the Government of Indonesia *(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p47)*

PSNP	<i>See information at the level of JC 5.2</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	Beneficiaries recognise the positive aspects of dealing with one set of procedure and one actor when donors channel their funds through one actor, in this case the WB. <i>Source: MN 82, 83, 86</i>
JC 5.3	<i>The channelling entity uses procedures that are in line with the Commission's expectations</i>
HIPC TF	Conditions to be met by HIPC's to benefit of the Initiative have been defined by the BWI, which check case by case that these conditions are met. As for the share of a country external debt that is cancelled by the Initiative, it is derived from the BWI debt sustainability assessment. The Commission has had a role in the revision of the initial HIPC scheme into the Enhanced HIPC which allows for debt relief measures in the transition period between the Decision Point and the Completion Point, and significantly lowers the level of debt considered as sustainable. The procedures involved in the utilization of the Community contributions to the HIPC Initiative have been precisely defined in documents signed by the European Commission on the one hand, the EIB and the World Bank on the other hand.
WB TFs in Vietnam	There have been some difficulties in the negotiation of the AA (as mentioned in JC 5.1). However, solutions have always been found, but with delays. Stakeholders agree that difficulties are more linked to the fact that one needs to work with two "heavy systems", rather than to critical shortcomings in these respective systems. <i>Source: MN76, 88, 89</i>
I-5.3.1	Existence of appropriate rules and procedures throughout the project cycle to deliver aid through the channelling entities (e.g. framework and administration agreements)
TFET	The framework agreement did not exist at the time of the signature of the contribution agreement
WB ITF	Existence of terms and conditions of the WB ITF and ToR of the IRFFI explaining the rules and procedures of the TF. <i>Source: United Nations/World Bank. International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Terms of Reference. (2003)</i>
MDF	The Commission and the WB did sign an Administration Agreement regarding contributions to the MDF, as foreseen in the Commission-WB Framework Agreement. The WB initially wanted to use a Fiscal Agency Agreement. This is a simple contract that allows the WB to transfer the funds to the [Implementing] Agency, which then assumes full responsibility for financial and performance management. <u>But because the WB had contributed its own funds to the MDF, the WB's legal department proposed that a more careful Partner Agency agreement had to be put in place.</u> There were no suitable templates for Partner Agency arrangements that were available to use as the basis for the MDF case. A first draft of the Partner Agency Agreement was prepared by the country lawyer and the MDF Secretariat and circulated for internal comment in August 2005, though with very few comments forthcoming. <u>It took the Legal department three to four months, to draft an agreement that satisfied the WB's fiduciary responsibilities and was acceptable to the UN Agencies.</u> Negotiations with UNDP were time consuming and both head offices had to be involved, and where response times were slow. This all was done under the immense time pressures that the MDF was facing, where those involved felt that the critical issue was finding acceptable operational solutions as quickly as possible. In the end, formal Partner Agency agreements were not established with the UN agencies, but rather project-specific Grants Agreements. Once the agreements were signed, some issues arose though. <i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p59)</i>
CGIAR	Interviewees met underlined the problematic status of the CGIAR. Indeed, different actors intervene in the CGIAR system (International research centres, donors, Central Governments, the Science Council), but the CGIAR has no legal statues. The absence of such a legal status causes problems because it not possible for the Commission to contribute directly to the CGIAR. In the same line the OED 2003 <i>Précis</i> underlines that the informal status of the System poses a problem (p. 4). <i>"The lack of memoranda of understanding, constitution, legal status, or explicit bylaws at the System level has constrained the ability of the CGLAR to speak with a single voice, and to develop System-wide policies and long-term strategies"</i> .
GFATM	An Administrative Agreement has been signed in 2003 between the Commission, the IBRD and the Global Fund representative. It refers to the financial regulations, rules and directives of the IBRD in terms of audit and control.

HIPC TF	<p>The overall rules applied for implementing the HIPC Initiative, notably the conditions that debtor countries have to meet to reach the Decision Point then the Completion Point, and the volume of debt relief which they are entitled to receive, have been defined by the BWI. As noted above, these rules have been significantly changed when the Enhanced Initiative replaced the original one in 1999.</p> <p>As regards the contribution of the Community as a donor, the Community contributions to the HIPC Trust Fund are isolated within the Fund in a separate EC account. The mechanics linked to the management of the EC funds is based on two main accounts: the EC country Allocation account and the AfDB country Disbursement account. Decisions concerning transfers from the EC account to EC country Allocation accounts, are taken by the Commission services. Following signature of the grant agreement between the Trust Fund and AfDB, and formal authorisation by the European Commission, the money flows from the country Allocation account into the Disbursement account from where the AfDB can draw.</p> <p>The following documents were prepared and adopted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A Contribution Agreement between IDA (the administering body of the HIPC Trust Fund) and the European Commission. This agreement includes the usual administrative arrangements with respect to management costs, respective legal responsibilities and so on, as well as more specific ones ensuring that monitoring and control be possible in accordance with standard Commission practice. ▪ Agreements between AfDB and IDA; ▪ Agreements between AfDB and the beneficiary countries. <p>As regards the contribution of the Community as a creditor, the eligibility of individual countries to debt relief is assessed by BWI at the Decision and Completion Point as well as during the interim period. The relations between the Community/Commission, the EIB and the beneficiary countries are governed by two kinds of agreements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A framework agreement between the EIB and the European Commission dealing with management costs, respective responsibilities, accounting and monitoring requirements, etc. ; ▪ Agreements in the form of exchange of letters between the European Commission, the EIB and the beneficiary countries represented by the National Authorising Officer. <p>Decisions regarding transfers made from the EC-funded EIB Fund are taken by the Commission services.</p> <p>EIB comment on contributions to the EIB HIPC TF: <i>"(there are) comments made by the European Commission concerning the improvement of the operational performance of the EIB managing EU contribution since the entry into force of the new management agreement in November 2006 (cf. page 63, second § on HIPC + p.11) : "before the signature at the end of 2006 of the new HIPC management agreement between the Commission and the EIB, the Bank was not always able to deal with HIPC implementation in a timely manner. This was due to a lack of human resources, in line with the modest fee received by the Bank for that task. In addition, the implementation process was burdensome, often involving several iterations which the Commission was also ill-equipped to process, which often lead to significant delays"</i>. <i>Source: EIB, 2008-10-17</i></p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>A framework agreement exists, as well as an implementation agreements and a verification by the Commission of the eligibility of individual project.</p> <p>Commission Delegation staff in Morocco reported they would like to be involved earlier in the identification process of specific operations; this demand originated mainly with relation to the large TA operation in the health sector in Morocco. Delegation staff also reported that the whole decision and follow-up circuit for FEMIP Support Fund operations in their country was unclear at their level. They reported the same regarding risk capital operations. <i>(Source: MN 90, MN 95, MN 101)</i></p>
Interest rate subsidies in MEDA	<p>For interest rate subsidies in the Mediterranean countries, no specific difficulties were mentioned by Commission or EIB staff at HQs and in Morocco in relation to procedures.</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>The Lomé IV convention signed in 1989 and amended in 1995 is the legally binding agreement</p>
PSNP	<p>The FA and the AA are considered globally appropriate by both the Commission and the WB, but a revision</p>

	<p>on specific issues would be deemed useful, such as the article 6.3 separate budget for Commission audits, or the requirement of a special detailed budget for the Commission; or the Annex 4 on the “call of funds” which should be changed because the WB has recently reorganised their own procedures of all of fund through an automatic system. Therefore, the WB does not use the Commission template agreed upon in the AA. The Commission has thus to sign twice the call of funds.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 51; MN 55</i></p>
I-5.3.2	The terms of the framework and administration agreements are respected
TFET	Interviewees met consider that the terms of the contribution agreement have been respected
CGIAR	<p>Interviewees met explained that until 2004, the CGIAR secretariat, headed by the WB, did all the management, reporting etc., without charging any fee. Since sept. 2005 however, the WB has decided that it did not want to take these responsibilities anymore and wished to act as a fiscal agent only. As this was not in line with the framework agreement, no payment has been made in 2006.</p> <p>In the future, the Commission will contribute to the CGIAR through IFAD (who will take a 1% management fee and next year 2%), as explained by interviewees and mentioned in a 2007 internal Commission note. This will make no difference in the magnitude of the EC contribution. The reason for this change is the fiscal agent issue. The Fiscal Arrangement policy was indeed adopted by the WB a couple of years ago and in 2006 concerned about 40% of the \$ 5 billion annually trusted by the donor community to the Bank (33% in 2005 and 25% in 2004). Unfortunately the EC Financial Regulation allow AIDCO to deliver aid through international organisation only if these are fully liable. As a result, late 2006 AIDCO was obliged to deliver its annual contribution to Agricultural Research (CGIAR trust fund, at which EC annual contributions have been of about € 25 million during the last ten years) through another international organisation (IFAD).</p> <p><i>(Source: 2007 Commission note for the file)</i></p>
GFATM	No indications so far that it has not been respected.
HIPC TF	The European Commission says it is satisfied with the implementation of its agreements relative to the HIPC Initiative with the World Bank and the EIB.
FEMIP Support Fund	No indications have been found that the terms of the framework and administration agreement are not respected.
PSNP	<p>The signature of an AA sometimes required long negotiation and involved both HQ. Indeed, the Commission considers that the WB tries to include its own specific clauses, whereas the AA is a standard document. On the other side, the WB considers that it is pushed to re-negotiate issues that are already solved in the FA. They consider that the Commission has low awareness of the FA. Moreover, in the case of the PBS, the lack of clarity at field level led to confusion and delays in signing the AA. There is a tendency of going back and forth on elements that have already been agreed.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 55; MN 59</i></p>
JC 5.4	<i>The intervention has been implemented at a reasonable cost</i>
HIPC TF	The cost charged by the EIB to implement the HIPC Initiative concerning the Community as a creditor makes a very small percentage of the resources transferred to beneficiary countries.
I-5.4.1	Assessment of efficiency of the interventions in monitoring and evaluation reports
ARTF	<p>The “Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF” (February 2007) states that “the funds appear to have been set in a highly efficient manner”, “not least of all because funding is provided on-budget and thus contributing to improved public financial management, transparency and accountability”.</p> <p>In addition, an independent evaluation carried out early in 2005 found the ARTF to be aligned with best practice principles for structuring and managing trust funds in post-conflict settings and aligned with the Paris Declaration “good partnership principles” for donor funding.</p> <p>Interviewees indicate that disbursement rates (absorption capacity) were not a problem for the Recurrent Costs window, but that there were some problems with the Investment window, due to the limited capacity of the Government (which had to come pro-actively with proposals).</p>
TFET	According to the Commission’s 2004 Interim Evaluation, the TFET was insofar as it used uniform procedures for project processing and implementation, though they could have been more streamlined No significant simplification of procurement rules took place though

	<p>But, the TFET could have been more efficient in the utilisation of the substantial resources it succeeded in mobilising for Timor-Leste's reconstruction and development. Still according to the Interim evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the large number of PMUs handling the projects' implementation is a waste of resources and makes coordination of the overall TFET more difficult. - the high salary structure in the PMUs compared to that of the Timorese administration also prevent actual integration. - some functions of the PMUs such as procurement and financial management could have been centralised to save costs, make better use of scarce skills and simplify project management. <p>Furthermore the evaluation explains that roughly for every \$3 spent on Timor-Leste reconstruction, \$1 was for TA and consulting services. In some projects, for instance in health the ratio was even higher and close to 1/1. Data to benchmark these figures are not available</p>
MDF	<p>The representative of the Aceh Reconstruction Agency stated during the Aid Effectiveness Forum held in Manila, Philippines, in October 2006: "in the context of the Aceh reconstruction effort, we can identify the MDF as the fastest disbursing of recovery funds in their projects, the quality of the current projects is high and they are set-up in response to the needs of the people, with a strong focus on community-driven development projects". (Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p3)</p> <p>The Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds from February 2007 indicates that, while payments into the fund were slow, disbursements out of it were to begin with even slower. At the sixth SC meeting at the end of October 2005, it was noted that while project agreements for about USD 200 million had been signed, only USD 3 million had actually been disbursed. This was in large part due to the fact that the first four projects had been expected to be on-budget, which caused considerable delays and problems for the program. As of early 2006, disbursements to projects picked up considerably, and actual expenditures on the ground thus also took off. (Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p48)</p> <p>It appears there is a substantial lag between approvals in principle; activation of projects; disbursements; and spending. But as projects get underway, the WB's data show a disbursement and expenditure rate that is similar to that of the large NGOs and generally better than that of the bilateral and multilateral lending institutions. (Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p49)</p>
CGIAR	<p>Interviewees met so far stated that all donors consider that transaction costs are very high. The total of the transaction costs is the equivalent of the support to 1 medium centre of the 15 centres (Between 5 and 8 M USD), without counting the costs of different members sending experts to visit the centres). Indeed, although the system has its own system for evaluation, monitoring etc..., donors consider that this is not enough.</p> <p>Also affecting efficiency is the growing source of discontent among the centres regarding the functioning of the CGIAR (Secretariat, Science Council and Executive Committee). The majority of centres are in favour of changing the current structure to be more supportive of the centres, less bureaucratic, having better communication and consultation with the centres as legal entities, and to cater less to the international donor community. Hence, the current system is believed to be out of balance with the centres as the "third pillar", being more directed than supported by the other two "pillars" (Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007)</p>
GFATM	<p>UNAIDS mentioned the implementation crisis due to the multiplicity of actors in weak institutional environments. On 25 April 2004, UNAIDS, the United Kingdom and the United States co-hosted a high-level meeting at which key donors reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening national AIDS responses. The Global Fund supports the harmonizing principles of UNAIDS "Three Ones" initiative — one agreed HIV action framework, one coordinating authority with a broad-based partnership and one agreed country level M&E system. (Source: Partners in impact: results report, The Global Fund)</p>
HIPC TF	<p>For the work it carries out for the Commission in the framework of the HIPC Initiative (monthly financial reporting, monthly reporting of debt relief operations carried out, annual report on the debt situation of HIPCs towards the EDF), the EIB charges annually the European Commission a lump sum fee of €400,000. Cumulated over five years, this represents 0.3% of the Community contribution as a donor to the HIPC Initiative.</p>

FEMIP Support Fund	The 2006 Mid-term evaluation states (p. IV) that <i>“the effectiveness and efficiency of the management of the TA Support Fund is in the majority of individual operations acceptable or better, but on the level of the programme as a whole is still not fully satisfactory”</i>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	As to the 2001 Evaluation, efficiency was satisfactory for all projects evaluated, with only minor procedural delays <i>(Source: Evaluation of financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries managed by the EIB on behalf of the EC, May 2001, p viii)</i> Analysis on a sample of three Monitoring Reports from 2006 indicates that the efficiency of implementation to date is rated as ‘good’ in two of them and ‘very good’ in one of them. The quality of project design is rated as ‘very good’ in two of them and ‘good’ in one of them.

Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>The assessment of the EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV is that overall the implementation results for the individual loans analysed seem acceptable, as only in two cases outturn costs were significantly higher than expected at appraisal. However, delays in completing the projects were significant in several cases.</p> <p>When comparing this with ex-post evaluations performed in the EU over the last 5 years, there is no significant difference on costs increases (on average 20% of the projects show increases of more than 20%), but the comparison on delays is less favourable to ACP projects. It reflects the fact that contracts are signed at an earlier stage (mainly with public sector borrowers), allowing them to initiate procurement procedures only once the financing is secured.)</p> <p><i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p21)</i></p> <p>The EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV assesses as well that the projects evaluated show a high variation in terms of their ex-post financial and economic profitability. Some investments have achieved a high profitability, while others are clear failures. This indicates that the risks involved in the projects are high.</p> <p>Note. The EIB estimated the projects' efficiency through the financial and economic profitability of the specific investments financed.</p> <p><i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p25)</i></p>
PSNP	<p>Scarce information on efficiency of the implementation and factors hampering or enhancing efficiency. Some interlocutors mention the human resource constraints for the management of the programme and the problem of qualification of staff on the government side.</p> <p>In the monitoring report, the efficiency of the programme is considered as a problem mainly because of delays at different levels:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - transfers of contribution from the donors to the WB - transfers of payment from the federal level to the local level and to the final beneficiaries - transfer of good quality financial reports from the GoE to the donors. <p><i>Sources: MN 51;</i> <i>Source: Monitoring report 1620.01 – Support to the Safety nets programme.</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>For the TFF/VCF, the ROM report give a “c” note (“c” = problems) to the efficiency of implementation, due to the delays in mobilising international TA and thus implementation of the activities. This has an impact in the disbursement of Commission funds.</p> <p>For HEMA, the ROM report give a “c” note (“c” = problems) to the efficiency of implementation, since no activities have been implemented by the WB and delays have occurred in reaching agreements between the EC and the WB as well as between the WB and the beneficiary.</p> <p>For PRSC, the ROM report give a “b” note (“b” = good) to the efficiency of implementation. <i>The programme progress is impressive (...) and the first payments was made promptly after the signature (of the EC/WB Agreement).</i></p> <p><i>Source: Result Oriented Monitoring report. Support for Forest Sector Development in Vietnam, Result Oriented Monitoring report. Support to Vietnam's Poverty Reduction support strategy under PRSC 3, Result Oriented Monitoring report. Health Care Support to the Poor of Northern Uplands and Central Highlands</i></p>

EQ6	To what extent did EC channelling contribute to the visibility of the EC support vis-à-vis its taxpayers, the beneficiaries, the partner countries, its MS and the international community? To what extent did it enhance its ability to promote EU policies and priorities?
	<i>EQ 6 on Visibility</i>
JC 6.1	Visibility clauses exist and are respected
ARTF	The visibility article as agreed in the EC-WB Framework Agreement is included in the EC-WB ARTF Administration Agreement (2002).
Risk Capital Lomé IV	The EIB presents itself outside the EU as an European instrument. (Source: MN 28)
HIPC TF	World Bank reports on the implementation status of the HIPC Initiative hardly provide information on donor contributions to the HIPC Trust Fund. No reference is made in the text of the report to these contributions, which are only to be found in an annex table. But the HIPC Initiative finds its origin in a request addressed to the BWI by the G7 group of countries in which participate the four largest EU member States. The European Community involvement in the Initiative has been discussed and approved by the European Council and the European Parliament. Financing decisions have been adopted by the EU-ACP Council of Ministers. EU member states and beneficiary governments were therefore well aware of the Initiative and of the support it received from the Community.
WB TFs in Vietnam	For the PRSC and PFM , No visibility issues have been raised by the majority of stakeholders interviewed and documents examined. The AA always include a visibility clause for each TF and they are respected. For TFF/VCF and HEMA , according to the answers to the questionnaire, the visibility clauses have not been respected. Interviews confirmed that and document analysis show that visibility is generally low in the components of the TFF/VCF and it is not always obvious that project funding is coming from the Commission. <i>Source: Survey, MN 70, 71, 72, Result Oriented Monitoring report. Support for Forest Sector Development in Vietnam</i>
I-6.1.1	Existence of visibility rules/clauses on the Commission's side and at the level of the interventions or channeling entity
MDF	The EU is the largest donor for the tsunami. However, its visibility is not as high as for other smaller donors, such as the US. For this reason, appropriate EU visibility will be supported by the EC. The requirement for visibility is enshrined in Communications on relations with Asia which have been agreed and endorsed by Member States. On direct projects, the EC will request suitable publicity and visibility measures to be built into project design, from boards through to media dissemination plans. EU visibility will also be assured through Trust Funds. First, specific agreements will be obtained with the World Bank that enable visibility for the EC and the EU. Second, given that EU countries and EC will be the main contributors to Trust Funds, the EU will demand a senior strategic position on the boards and committees that will oversee the Trust Funds. (...) Lastly, specific visibility projects will be considered by the EC to highlight the role played by the EU in the tsunami reconstruction, both locally and internationally. In this regard, the 'Europe House' proposal in Aceh will not only boost coordination but will also enhance visibility. (Source: C(2005)1490 Tsunami Indicative Programme (2005 – 2006) for Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Maldives, pp16-17)
CGIAR	Regarding the relationship of the centres with the CGIAR Secretariat and the Science Council, there is a strong need for better communication and consultation with the centres, more transparency on fund allocations, and better guidance on how to increase the visibility of project outcomes and sponsorship. (Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007) There is no specific strategy towards enhancing EC visibility in the research projects it co-finances. As a rule, the centres do not single out donors for individual recognition except at special project level. Donor contributions are routinely acknowledged in the centres' Medium Term Plans (MTPs) annual and audit reports, and technical publications. (Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007) In some cases the delegations are not even aware of the activities of the centres. This lack of contact means that the delegations are not able to take advantage of the centre's work for visibility purposes, nor can it use the centres to assist in the preparation of EC Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and National Indicative

	Programmes (NIP) for that matter. Similarly the local knowledge of the EC delegations is not used when the EC is developing its funding strategy for the CGIAR. (Source: <i>Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGLAR, Ecorys, 2007</i>)
GFATM	At the intervention level, the Administration Agreement include an Article 4 on Visibility : “ <i>All information provided by IBRD concerning contributions to the Trust Fund shall list the European Community as a donor along with other donors</i> ” ¹³ .
HIPC TF	Technical and administrative provisions for implementation of the Community’s contribution to the World Bank-managed HIPC Trust Fund state that “In order to ensure adequate visibility, monitoring and financial control of the EU contribution to the HIPC Trust Fund, these resources will be isolated within the HIPC Trust Fund in a separate account.” The Contribution Agreement between the European Commission and the World Bank states that “when mention is made of donor support to the HIPC Trust Fund in press releases and related public announcements, appropriate positive visibility will be given to this contribution.” Actually the World Bank issued a press release announcing the involvement of the European Community in the HIPC Initiative and its commitment to provide close to € 1 billion to the Trust Fund. But the Implementation Status reports released by the BWI devote few attention to the donors’ contributions. These are mentioned in a table in the annexes to the reports. In this table contributions from the EDF are attributed to EC member States in relation to their contribution to EDF funding. According to interviewees in the Commission this split of EDF contributions between the EU members states was done by the World Bank on request of the member States themselves.
FEMIP Support Fund	The framework agreement does not contain specific visibility clauses, nor does the implementation agreement. Interviewees met stated that the EIB is following its own visibility rules.
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	Interviewees at HQ and Delegation level (in Morocco) indicated that the EIB considers the EU as the centre of its visibility. There are no rules on this within the EIB, which usually takes over the general Commission recommendations on this (although these are not considered as stringent nor binding). Interviewees indicate as well that there is a reference in the financial contracts of the interventions. Press releases mention the Commission’s funding in the text. (Source: MN 27)
PSNP	Visibility clauses exist and are laid down in the AA between the Commission and the WB (article 4) Source: <i>European Commission and WB, Administration Agreement for the MDTF for Ethiopia – Productive safety net program, 2005</i>
I-6.1.2	Degree of compliance with the agreed visibility rules (e.g. logos on reports, etc.)
TFET	The Commission’s 2004 interim evaluation does not tackle the issue of the degree of compliance with the agreed visibility rules
GFATM	At the intervention level, the Administration Agreement include an Article 4 on Visibility : “ <i>All information provided by IBRD concerning contributions to the Trust Fund shall list the European Community as a donor along with other donors</i> ” ¹⁴ .
HIPC TF	Agreements between the European Commission on the one hand, the World Bank and the EIB on the other hand, do not foresee any specific measure aimed at ensuring visibility of the Community except the one mentioned above (I.6.1.1)
FEMIP Support Fund	Interviewees met explained that guidelines were applied and that the EU is, for instance, visible on all reports.
PSNP	The WB considers that visibility requirements are fulfilled but this is not the case for the Commission. However, the visibility strategies within the PSNP are evolving and more generally the Commission is giving an increasing priority to visibility. Documents examined and majority of stakeholders met have not raised the visibility issues. Source: MN 51; MN 59; MN 58; MN 66

¹³ Administration Agreement for the European Community Grants to the Trust Fund for the Global Fund to Fight Aids Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2003

¹⁴ Administration Agreement for the European Community Grants to the Trust Fund for the Global Fund to Fight Aids Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2003

JC 6.2	<i>Beneficiaries, partner countries and the international community are aware of the magnitude and the intervention locations of the Commission's channeled development aid</i>
HIPC TF	<p>As pointed out above the HIPC Initiative status implementation reports released by the IMF and the World Bank mention, although only in an annex table, the contributions of the European Community and of EU member States to the funding of the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund. These reports indicate for each beneficiary country what has been the impact of the Initiative on its debt burden.</p> <p>Since ACP governments have adopted in the framework of the EU-ACP Council of Ministers the decision to allocate funds from the EDF to the HIPC Initiative and since the Community contribution to the EC was hence earmarked for debt relief measures in ACP countries, neither beneficiary governments nor the international community could ignore the magnitude of the Community support to the HIPC Initiative nor what it was meant for.</p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>According to the Survey results, partner country officials, EU MS and the other donors are aware of the presence and magnitude of the Commission's funds channelled through the WB TFs. Final beneficiaries and local stakeholders are less aware.</p> <p>This has been confirmed by the country missions interviews with all stakeholders involved.</p> <p><i>Source: Survey, MN 69, 70, 76, 77, 82, 83, 86</i></p>
I-6.2.1	Degree of awareness of beneficiaries, partner country officials, and the international community.
TFET	Interviewees met consider that the leading figures at national level and the partners were very well aware of the Commission's role in the TFET.
MDF	<p>Two years after the tsunami, the EU acting in cooperation with the international community is recognised as an effective partner in the reconstruction efforts.</p> <p><i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p2)</i></p> <p>The MDF communications strategy places special emphasis on information to projects beneficiaries and strong visibility for donors. The MDF is currently conducting a radio and newspaper campaign in targeted areas of Aceh and Nias to ensure that people are aware of their entitlements.</p> <p>The Commission in cooperation with the University of Indonesia's Centre for European Studies organised a seminar aimed to give an overview of the challenges faced by Indonesia, and Commission's role to support Indonesia, both in the field of disaster relief and in support of the peace process. The seminar was titled "Beyond the Tsunami: From Recovery to Peace" and was held on the 3 May 2006. The event was organized to highlight the Commission's strong commitment and involvement in both peace process and reconstruction efforts in Aceh and was attended by high-level political figures and prominent experts in both fields of peace and reconstruction. The occasion managed to contribute in increasing Commission profile as an institution that has made strong efforts in supporting peace process and tsunami reconstruction in Aceh and Nias.</p> <p><i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p11)</i></p> <p>The Commission opened "Europe House" in Banda Aceh in October 2005. Europe House has been established as a means of enhancing co-ordination and ensuring efficient implementation of Commission-funded rehabilitation and reconstruction and peace process projects and enhancing dialogue with local communities and authorities in the ground. Europe House is run by a technical team led by a Commission's Head of Office. Its work is overseen by the EC Delegation in Jakarta.</p> <p><i>(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/indonesia/assistance_to_aceh/index.htm)</i></p> <p>The Europe House based in Banda Aceh is making a pivotal role in ensuring Commission and MS participation in workshops, seminars and other donor co-ordination meetings in Aceh, ensuring visibility of EU financed programs and operations and participation in high-profile media events.</p> <p><i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p11)</i></p> <p>+ See also "I-6.5.2"</p>
CGIAR	Beneficiaries, such as NARS, national ministries, are generally well aware of the EC involvement in the research projects because of their close involvement with the projects and EC country programmes. When it comes to the visibility of the EC co-financed research projects amongst EU countries, this is reported to be low but slowly improving because of the modus operandi of the Challenge Programmes by involving EU

	<p>research institutes in project implementation. (Source: <i>Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGLAR, Ecorys, 2007</i>)</p>
GFATM	<p>From interview with key informant at the Commission it was stated that : “Visibility at Board level is excellent while at country level it is low (“GFATM money”), although it depends on the way the EC is involved in the CCM. In any case, there are no stickers on the cars”.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>As the major initiative of the international community to tackle at world level the indebtedness of poor developing countries and support the fight against poverty, the HIPC Initiative has been given a very large publicity. It is common knowledge for all those interested in development and aid that the European Union has been and remains highly supportive of the Initiative and has had a major contribution to its financing.</p> <p>Furthermore decisions to allocate EDF resources to the Initiative was taken by the EU-ACP Council of Ministers. Therefore governments of African HIPCs, which thanks to this contribution benefited of a substantial reduction of their debt towards the AfDB and the EIB, were perfectly aware of the European Community contribution to the HIPC Initiative.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>In this respect, the 2006 mid-term evaluation notes (p. 53) that “<i>undeniably, the TA operations have engendered an important image effect for the Bank. Our impression is that with help of the TA, FEMIP became more visible, and thereby the programme in particular and the Bank in general, have found a much higher recognition than before</i>”.</p> <p>Stakeholders met in Morocco stated that EIB projects which receive Commission funding are seen as EU projects. (Source: MN 100)</p> <p>The use of EU-funds for FEMIP (TA, risk capital and interest subsidies) is mentioned in the FEMIP annual report. In general, the visibility of EIB activities in Mediterranean countries is done by the EIB through a range of channels, from the FEMIP annual report and brochures, annual FEMIP Ministerial meetings (with lots of publicity) and FEMIP conferences on various topics (in the EU and in Mediterranean countries), press releases on meetings and on individual operations (e.g. signature of loans), a video tape, travels by the EIB-Vice President for FEMIP and his staff, the three EIB local offices in the region etc. Most documents are available in at least English, French and Arabic. (Source: <i>Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007)</i>)</p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>The use of EU-funds for FEMIP (TA, risk capital and interest subsidies) is mentioned in the FEMIP annual report. In general, the visibility of EIB activities in Mediterranean countries is done by the EIB through a range of channels, from the FEMIP annual report and brochures, annual FEMIP Ministerial meetings (with lots of publicity) and FEMIP conferences on various topics (in the EU and in Mediterranean countries), press releases on meetings and on individual operations (e.g. signature of loans), a video tape, travels by the EIB-Vice President for FEMIP and his staff, the three EIB local offices in the region etc. Most documents are available in at least English, French and Arabic. (Source: <i>Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007)</i>)</p> <p>Stakeholders met in Morocco explained that the EU had a clear visibility for the Government, promoters and the EU MS, but not for the wider public. (Source: MN 97)</p>
PSNP	<p>The other donors in Ethiopia and the GoE are aware of the Commission's contribution and its magnitude but this is explained more by the coordinated approach rather than by visibility actions. According to government officials, the final beneficiaries in the regions covered by the PSNP consider the programme as a government initiative. Source: MN 54; MN 57; MN 60; MN 61; MN 63; MN 64</p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>See information at the level of JC 6.2</p>
I-6.2.2	<p>Reference of EC interventions in other donors' documentation</p>
HIPC TF	<p>On 10 July 2000 the World Bank released to the press the information that the European Union had committed itself to contribute USD 950 million to the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.</p> <p>As mentioned above, the Implementation reports released by the BWI detail what is done with the money made available to the HIPC Trust Fund, but except for a table in the annexes they do not provide any information on donors' contributions.</p>

JC 6.3	<i>Tax payers and MS are aware of Commission's channeling of aid</i>
CGIAR	When it comes to the visibility of the EC co-financed research projects amongst EU countries, this is reported to be low but slowly improving because of the modus operandi of the Challenge Programmes by involving EU research institutes in project implementation. <i>(Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007)</i>
HIPC TF	In October 1998, the European Commission presented a Communication on the HIPC Initiative and the problems raised by its enhancement to the Council and the European Parliament. Information of the larger public on the issue of poor countries' indebtedness and on the HIPC Initiative was provided by NGOs rather than by the Commission.
WB TFs in Vietnam	<i>See information at the level of JC 6.2 for EU MS. No evidence for tax payers</i>
I-6.3.1	Specific initiatives are taken to raise awareness (folders, joint campaigns, press conferences ...)
HIPC TF	Except for a page on the Initiative on its development website, the Commission did not take any special action to raise the public awareness on the issue of poor countries' indebtedness and the HIPC Initiative. NGOs active in the field of development aid have contributed to raise public awareness on the debt issue. Special mention must be done to the Jubilee Debt Campaign which united a large number of NGOs in a campaign supporting the objective of debt relief for poor developing countries.
I-6.3.2	Information is provided in general communication tools
HIPC TF	One page information on the HIPC Initiative and the EC contribution is available on the website of the European Commission. From this page, the visitors can download the annual reports on the Commission participation to the HIPC Initiative as well to the study mandated by the Commission on the management of HIPC funds in beneficiary countries. This webpage also provides links to other sites among which the website of the Jubilee Debt Campaign.
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	EIB activities (interest rate subsidies and others) are generally not recognised in key EC docs (such as programming documents, AIDCO and RELEX reports). Annual reports from Aidco very seldom refer to EIB activities. The same is true for most DG DEV and Relex programming documents and even more recently of the EU Donor Atlas where the channelling of EC funds through the EIB is not taken into consideration whereas bilateral MS contributions are included. To date, only the EIB is reporting on the use of funds that are channelled from the EC. <i>Source: EIB, 2008-10-17</i>
I-6.3.3	Evidence of awareness of tax payers
HIPC TF	Participation of the European Community in the HIPC Initiative has been debated by the European Parliament in January 1998.
JC 6.4	<i>The Commission has an influence on the decision making process with respect to the interventions</i>
PSNP	The Commission influence on the decision making process of the PSNP is considered by the stakeholders as satisfactory. Indeed, the Commission participates actively in the joint donor meetings and have influenced the WB to fulfil some of Commission requirements regarding reporting format or payment transfer chain. This influence can also be explained by the strong coordination approach among donors. <i>Source: MN 51; MN 58</i>
WB TFs in Vietnam	For PRSC and PFM , the Commission participates actively in the steering committees and coordination meeting where it has an influence on the TFs. For TFF/VCF and HEMA , the Commission is not satisfied with the influence it has on the activities of the TF. This has been mentioned in the answers to the Survey as well as confirmed by the interviewees explaining that the Commission is not a major donor in the forest sector, for example, and thus has less weight in the discussions than other bigger donors. <i>Source: Survey, MN 70, 71, 72, 76</i>
I-6.4.1	Testimonies of the Commission's influence from design to implementation & reporting
PFMR	The Commission has had great influence on the design, the implementation and the reporting of the PFMR TF. Indeed, the PFMR mechanism was based on the Commission expertise in budget support. The Commission was the main contributor to the PFMR. It participated in all supervision missions to assess the progress of the PFMR. Moreover, at the end of the PFMR TF, the Commission, contrarily to all other donors, decided to split its already committed funds into two tranches and not to disbursed all its funds at

	<p>once. As a result, the Commission was the only donor with funds in the last tranches but the PA did not fulfil the two benchmarks for the last tranche. At the Bank's suggestion, no further extensions were granted and the PFMR closed in June 2006, and the PFMR outstanding balance was returned to the EC.</p> <p><i>Source: WB, "Completion Report to Donors. WB-GS PFMR"</i></p>
TFET	<p>As mentioned earlier the Commission was a pro-active participant to the Joint Assessment Mission and to the different donors conference (of which one in Brussels was hosted by the Commission) leading to the creation of the TFET.</p> <p>In terms of governance of the TF, it should be noted that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ "Each contributor to TFET was entitled to appoint a representative to the TFET Donors' Council created to oversee TFET operation. The Council meets at least semi-annually (later on this was cut to annual meetings)¹⁵ to discuss and approve the work programmes submitted by the two implementing agencies which indicate projects and programmes proposed to be funded from TFET, the amount of TFET funding proposed for each such project and programme, the identity of the proposed recipient of TFET funding, and the identity of the Implementing Agency proposed to be responsible for such project or programme ; ▪ The amount of TFET funding proposed in a work programme should not exceed the aggregate amount of contributions provided for in contribution agreements between the Trustee and contributors plus the amount of any contributions from the Bank and any investment income earned thereon, less aggregate amounts retained by the Trustee to administer TFET and to cover the costs incurred by the Implementing Agencies (see below) and of funding approved in prior work programmes. ▪ TFET work programmes are subject to the approval of the TFET Donors' Council. Decisions of the TFET Donors' Council are made, to the extent possible, by consensus. In the absence of a consensus, each contributor is entitled to one vote for each US dollar equivalent, as determined by the Trustee, of its paid-in contribution to TFET and matters requiring a decision of the TFET Donors' Council will be determined by the majority of the votes cast by contributors represented at the meeting of the TFET Donors' Council. Contributors represented at the TFET Donors' Council holding a majority of all the votes of the contributors shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at a meeting of the TFET Donors' Council. ▪ The objective of the semi-annual Donors' Council meetings is to ensure that TFET is in line with the priorities of the contributors. Broader coordination meetings of donors assisting Timor-Leste (on the Consultative Group format) are usually held the day after the TFET Donors' Council meetings. A donor coordinating committee has also been established in Dili. It is chaired by the World Bank's Chief of Mission and provides a means of considering requests for TFET assistance between the Donors' Council meetings. ▪ In addition to the semi-annual Donors' Council meetings, there are also semi-annual joint donor sectoral missions in which the Implementing Agencies and donors review project implementation progress. <p>In line with these provisions, the Commission's participated as an active member to the Donors Council. Interviewees met explain that the Commission participated to all decisions related to the TFET. More detailed information on the impact of this participation has not been obtained yet.</p>
WB ITF	<p>The supported sectors and cross-cutting themes by the WB ITF are initially based on the Joint Needs Assessment made by the WBG and the UN in 2003. Experts from the Commission have participated to this Joint Needs Assessment mission together with the WBG and the UN and other donors.</p> <p>Conclusion of the Joint Iraq Needs Assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identification of 14 priority sectors with the immediate and medium-term priorities: education, health, employment creation, water and sanitation, transport and telecommunications, electricity, housing and land management, urban management, agriculture, water resources, and food security, finance, state-owned enterprises, investment climate, mine action, and government institutions. - Identification of 3 cross-cutting themes with the immediate and medium-term priorities: human rights, gender and the environment

¹⁵ In 2002, it was decided to hold the TFET Donors' meetings only once a year. The World Bank still produces its six monthly Report of the Trustee, but the donors' consultation is "virtual", i.e. by e-mail for the December report, while an actual meeting takes place to discuss the May report.

	<p>- Identification of development priorities for Iraq: Strengthening institutions of sovereign, transparent, and good government; restoring critical infrastructure and core human services destroyed and degraded by years of misrule and conflict; and supporting an economic and social transition that provides both growth and social protection.</p> <p>- Creation of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRRFI) in which two TF have been set up: the WB Iraq TF and the UNDG Iraq TF. The Terms of Reference for the IRRFI were released to the international community of donors in December 2003.</p>
MDF	<p>The Commission is co-chairing MDF together with BRR as the representative of Government of Indonesia, and WB as trustee, and as such the Commission is playing a significant role in the whole recovery policy making process.</p> <p>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p11)</p>
GFATM	<p>"The EC has been a founding member of the GFATM. It actively participated in the setting up of the Fund through the Transitional Working Group [as the Director general of AIDCO was seating at this Transitional Group], established in Brussels in 2001, as well as in the definition of the governance of GFATM through the Board, where it seats [...] In March 2006, the EC Board Member has been unanimously elected Vice Chair of the Board.¹⁶" As a member of the Board, the Commission is a voting member for the approval of the grants.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>As the Commission has to approve the eligibility of each individual project, it should be able to have an influence the design of the project.</p> <p>+ see for interest rate subsidies in MEDA</p>
Interest rate subsidies in MEDA	<p>For interest rate subsidies in the MEDA region and for the FEMIP Support Fund (but also for the other EU-financed instruments under FEMIP), the EIB consults the Commission for permission "at an early stage". It subsequently sends proposals for interest rate subsidies to the so-called "Article 14 Committee" for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (consisting of representatives of the EU MS and in which the Commission also participates) and the EIB Board of Directors (on which the Commission has a seat). For the FEMIP Support Fund, the Commission also signs an annual implementation agreement. Furthermore, the eligibility of each individual activity needs to be submitted to the Commission for approval.</p> <p>Interviewees met in Morocco further explained that the EIB is hardly engaged in policy dialogue, as it essentially mandated to provide project finance (no sector support or reform programmes). The instruments funded were said to hardly offer material for a dialogue and to have hardly been used for that purpose in practice.</p> <p>(Source: MN 101)</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>EIB interviewees specify that the MS are channelling 7th-8th EDF resources to the Commission to be transferred to the EIB. The Commission has hereby a role of "financial transfer". The main decision power is at MS level; reporting is also primarily targeted to the MS.</p> <p>The Commission is part of the 'Committee 21/28' though, as are the MS.</p>
I-6.4.2	Number of steering groups in which the EC is an active member
ARTF	<p>The ARTF governance arrangements are similar to those established in previous cases but include an intermediate tier owing to the partnership with other multilateral agencies. Between the WB as Administrator and the group of donors contributing to the ARTF, there is an ARTF Management Committee (MC), composed of the WB, ADB, UNDP and IsDB (Islamic Development Bank). The MC meets monthly to review funding proposals, after they have been reviewed and endorsed by the Government. A Donor Committee—constituted of donors who have contributed at least \$5 million per year plus two seats for representatives of other contributing donors—meets quarterly to review overall ARTF performance, based on reports provided by the MC.</p> <p>Source: <i>Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-conflict Situations, Schiavo-Campo 2003</i></p> <p>Interviewees indicate that the most important governance body is the Donor meeting, held once a year, which includes the Afghan Government and the Commission. Directions are discussed and agreed there.</p> <p>(Source: MN 29)</p> <p>The Commission is not part of the Management Committee, which consists only of multilateral institutions, none of them being donors to the fund. The decision makers are thus not contributors to the fund itself. . An additional rather unique aspect of this committee is that the national authorities are not on the Management</p>

¹⁶ Update on progress of the GFATM in 2006, January 2007 by DG Dev

	<p>Committee, though as of late 2005, the Government is generally invited as an observer.</p> <p>The Commission is a member of the Donor Committee, as other donors which contribute more than \$5m per year. This committee is to meet on a quarterly basis in Kabul, and to review progress in the implementation of activities and to provide guidance to the Management Committee on grant allocation strategies. (source: <i>Administration Agreement 2002</i>)</p> <p>While the meetings are seen as an important forum for updating the donors on the status of activities, over the last year donors have wanted more issues focused meetings that could address the framework problems the ARTF is facing. (source: <i>Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF, February 2007</i>)</p> <p>The 2005 Assessment of the ARTF reports that donors meetings are seen as helpful, but too focused on administrative and financial detail and without policy content.</p> <p>Interviewees indicate that the Commission should be more active on policy level in the Donor meeting, but that it lacks active means to do so, i.e. capacity, understanding, and competence.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In Brussels: there are 3 people (2 RELEX + 1 AIDCO) (+1 ECHO for own programmes) working permanently on Afghanistan. As the ARTF represents only 14% of the funds for Afghanistan and the rest are direct Commission interventions, resources for the ARTF are quite limited. - In the DCE: 3-5 people are involved in the ARTF (but not full time), which is quite limited, especially compared with other donors (e.g. DFID). <p>(Source: MN 29)</p>
WB ITF	<p>The Commission has participated to the UN/WB Joint Needs Assessment by provided technical experts. The Commission is an important player in the Donor Committee as it is one of the biggest contributor to the WB ITF. The Donor Committee “is responsible for endorsing overall priorities and providing strategic guidance to the Facility's two trust funds” (WB ITF and UN ITF). The Donor Committee meets on a semi-annual basis.</p> <p>Source: <i>United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment (2003)</i> Source: <i>United Nations/World Bank. International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Terms of Reference. (2003)</i></p>
MDF	<p>The Commission as the largest single donor is co-chairing the Steering Committee¹⁷ of the MDF together with BRR¹⁸ as the representative of Government of Indonesia, and WB as trustee. It has as particular responsibility: to engage with other members of the Steering Committee, especially all other contributors, to ensure that a consensual and constructive spirit is maintained (in particular liaising with the large bilateral donors, the ADB and the UN, to help ensure that their programs are complementary to those of the MDF), and facilitating the Steering Committee's policy dialogue with the Government on special issues as tasked by the Steering Committee - such as the Aceh Peace Process.</p> <p>The EC is playing a very active and successful role in relation to these coordinating issues. (Source: <i>2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p5</i>), <i>MDF Operational Manual, pp3-8</i></p> <p>The BRR and the recovery community provide updates on the progress of the recovery process at regular Steering Committee meetings. The meetings have also been used to discuss policy issues such as the impact of inflation, government budgeting delays, the integration of gender and environmental concerns and the strategy for sustainable economic development. (Source: <i>MDF Progress Report III, December 2006, p4</i>)</p> <p>The MDF governance structure consists of a one-tier Steering Committee (SC) that is made up of six voting representatives from the Government, one vote for each donor that had contributed at least \$10M, and two voting representatives from Aceh civil society (the latter nominated by the Government). The UN and one representative from the international NGO community meet as observers, as do the important donors, Australia and Japan, who are not members of the MDF. (Source: <i>Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p62</i>)</p>

¹⁷ Details on the role of the MDF Steering Committee can be found in the MDF Operational Manual, pp3-8

¹⁸ The "Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) is the Aceh-based government agency responsible for the overall coordination and planning of the reconstruction:

	<p>The Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds considers that having several co-chair of a TF is useful if the co-chairs dedicate own staff time to the function and thus provide value-added. However, it considers that in the case of the MDF, the Commission should have been more pro-active in this regard. (Source: <i>Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p67</i>)</p> <p>The EC proposes to channel all its ALA budget resources - €200 million – for Indonesia tsunami reconstruction through the MDF for three explicit reasons. One of them is the fact that “the combined contributions of the EC plus EU MS represent the majority portion of the MDF. This will ensure EC and EU MS will have a highly strategic role to play in the Steering Committee of the MDTF and enable European policy objectives (achievement of millennium development goals, fight against poverty, consolidation of governance and the rule of law) to feature highly in the initiative”. (Source: <i>C(2005)1490 – Tsunami Indicative Programme (2005 – 2006) - Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, p19</i>)</p>
GFATM	<p>The Commission is a voting member in the Board and participates to two committees : Policy and strategy Committee, and the Financial and Audit Committee.</p> <p>It is interesting to note that the Commission Delegations in countries assessed (Ethiopia and India) have little interaction with GFATM. These is a lack of integration with the programmatic approach. (Source: <i>Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation (p.48)</i>)</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<i>See below for interest rate subsidies in MEDA</i>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>EuropeAid takes part on behalf of the Commission in the so-called “Article 14 Committee” for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (<i>see summary box above</i>), consisting of representatives of the MS. Discussions are held on individual projects, related to risk capital and interest subsidies. They are organized by the EIB around four times a year, and are held in Luxembourg.</p> <p>Proposals for interest rate subsidies are presented to the “Article 14 Committee” (including the Commission), before being presented to the EIB Board of Directors. The decision on the subsidy should theoretically already have been taken at this stage ; the Commission checks in this committee that the loan corresponds to what the subsidy was supposed to support. (Source: <i>MN 27</i>)</p> <p>Not only for the FEMIP (TA) support fund, but also for the other EU-financed instruments under FEMIP, the EIB asks the Commission for permission. This 'early stage' consultation takes place before proposals are sent to the member states' committees (Article 14 Committee for FEMIP, in which the Commission also participates) and the EIB Board of Directors (in which the Commission has a seat). (Source: <i>Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007)</i>)</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	The Commission is part of the Committee 21, which became the Committee 28.
JC 6.5	<i>Channeling through IFIs allows the Commission to better promote its own policies and priorities</i>
HIPC TF	<p>One cannot say that channeling its contribution to debt relief through the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund allowed the Commission to better promote its own policies and priorities. The original design of the Initiative was not fully consistent with the Commission policies and priorities to the extent where it put financial considerations at the forefront.</p> <p>But the Commission contributed to redesign the Initiative in order to make of it an instrument for poverty alleviation.</p> <p>This having been done, the IFIs technical capacity and political leverage have probably been decisive in persuading the HIPCs to develop PRSPs.</p>
I-6.5.1	Testimonies of Commission's increased influence on policy dialogue with the country of intervention
ARTF	<p>The Commission recognises that the EC and the WB are joint focal points for livelihoods and social protection within the Consultative Group structure. The WB is focal point for energy, telecoms and mining. (Source: <i>RELEX briefing for meeting with WB president, 14/11/2005</i>)</p> <p>An informant confirmed in an internal document that “the Commission was appreciating that the WB was managing the ARTF (...). However and as highlighted in the ARTF donor meeting of last year, the</p>

	<p>Commission would appreciate if ARTF could be used more as an instrument to facilitate policy dialogue between donors and the ARTF in line with the Afghan Compact and the Afghan National Development Strategy (both adopted in London last year)." <i>(Source: Note for the file on Meeting with the World Bank - Brussels 11 April 2007)</i></p>
MDF	<p>The EU (Commission and Member states) played a leading role in the overall international response. It pledged and deployed funds and resources quickly. <i>(Source: Brief Tsunami)</i></p> <p>The Commission as the largest donor is co-chairing the Steering Committee of the MDF, together with BRR¹⁹ as the representative of the Government of Indonesia, and the WB as trustee. The Commission is playing as such a significant role in the whole recovery policy making process. It has as particular responsibility: to engage with other members of the Steering Committee, especially all other contributors, to ensure that a consensual and constructive spirit is maintained, and facilitating the Steering Committee's policy dialogue with the Government on special issues as tasked by the Steering Committee - such as the Aceh Peace Process. <i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p5, p11)</i></p> <p>The specific role of the Commission is to look at the complementarity with the peace process and at the relations with the Government. It is playing the intermediary between communities and the Government, as the former trust more a third party than the Government. <i>(Source: MN 26)</i></p> <p><u>In addition to the MDE</u>, the EU has also been instrumental in the successful Aceh peace process. The Commission funded the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) which assumed a mediation role leading to the signing of a peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Aceh rebel movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). The EU was invited to actively monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement, through the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). AMM is a civilian crisis management operation developed under the European Security and Defence Policy and undertaken in partnership with five contributing ASEAN states. The overall objective of the AMM is to assist the Government of Indonesia and the GAM in the implementation of the MoU. <i>(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/indonesia/assistance_to_aceh/index.htm)</i></p> <p>Note. For multi-donor TFs administered by a single institution, there is a problem of structural asymmetry in the "information market". This problem is even more important in emergency and weak governance situations. Information is scarce and costly to access, so that actors who have privileged access to decision makers, such as the WB in its relations to the Government in general and the BRR in particular, will always know a lot more than others. Coupled with the fact that the WB has a much greater capacity to prepare projects and at the same time has written the ground rules regarding how projects are to be assessed, the WB will always have an "unfair" information advantage over other actors. The MDF is seen in this context as a limited source of funding that all comers should have equal access to, but the WB is using its privileged position to "crowd out" other possible partner/implementing agencies. <i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p63)</i></p> <p>The EC proposes to channel all its ALA budget resources - €200 million – for Indonesia tsunami reconstruction through the MDF for three explicit reasons. One of them is the fact that “the combined contributions of the EC plus EU MS represent the majority portion of the MDF. This will ensure EC and EU MS will have a highly strategic role to play in the Steering Committee of the MDTF and enable European policy objectives (achievement of millennium development goals, fight against poverty, consolidation of governance and the rule of law) to feature highly in the initiative”. <i>(Source: C(2005)1490 – Tsunami Indicative Programme (2005 – 2006) - Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, p19)</i></p>
GFATM	<p>Policy dialogue issue is raised as an expectation for the Programme for Actions: “substantial amount of work needs to be done in terms of ‘policy dialogue’ and the use of instruments for policy development and dialogue.”</p>

¹⁹ The "Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) is the Aceh-based government agency responsible for the overall coordination and planning of the reconstruction:

	<p><i>Source: COM(2001) 96</i></p> <p>But in the country of intervention policy dialogue is not properly addressed : “A salient feature of the GFATM in Ethiopia and India is that it has taken a passive approach to policy dialogue and has tended to adopt a vertical, project-based approach. In Ethiopia, the GFATM has remained marginal to the donors' effort to build a policy dialogue in the HIV/AIDS area, and more generally a sector-wide programme. The GFATM in both India and Ethiopia lacks an adequate institutional set-up to discuss policy issues. Other donors in the sector, both in India and Ethiopia, perceive the GFATM's interventions in India as too loosely connected to the national strategy in the sector and too narrowly focused on the provision of medical inputs as opposed to a policy-based approach encompassing all necessary policy and institutional complements. This outcome does not appear to be the outcome of specific options of GFATM teams in Ethiopia and India but, rather, derives from the GFATM's general principles. For example, a principle emphasised by the GFATM and other large GFPs in the health sector is that their interventions should be “demand driven”; however, lessons learnt by traditional donors show that requests for no-cost grants are imperfect demand signals when it comes to prioritise interventions in a given sector..</p> <p><i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation (pp.6-7)</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>The Enhanced HIPC Initiative requests the beneficiary countries to develop a PRSP. Once PRSPs have been adopted they offered a basis for a policy dialogue between the European Commission and partner governments on the issues related to poverty alleviation. The implementation by the European Commission of budget support as one of its main aid instruments strengthened this trend towards a policy based partnership between the Commission and developing countries.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>The 2006 Mid-term evaluation explains (p. 51) that for most of the TA operations visited, the policy relevance was rated as positive and that the majority of the initiatives corresponds with the actual needs of the target countries and adequately reflects the policy priorities defined for FEMIP and the European Neighbourhood Policy. In this respect and taking into account a number of other positive outcomes, the evaluation states that these “<i>may demonstrate that the Support Fund responded successfully to the policy concerns of the European Commission when it provided the Bank with this facility</i>”.</p> <p>In general, the EIB is hardly engaged in policy dialogues, as it provides project finance (no sector support or reform programmes). Furthermore, impact on dialogues was not a reason for the Commission for choosing the EIB as a channel, and the instruments used (TA and interest subsidies attached to EIB loans and risk capital) hardly offer material for a dialogue. Therefore, these questions don't seem relevant for the EIB.</p> <p><i>(Source: Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007))</i></p>
Interest Subsidies in MEDA	<p>Through project conditionality, interest rate subsidies have further offered the leverage to encourage gradual policy reform.</p> <p><i>(Source: Analysis of EIB operations under the External Lending Mandate 2000-2006, Annex 2, p19)</i></p> <p>Interviewees indicate that interest rate subsidies, proposed to soften loan conditions, also make it easier to impose more conditions. This is indeed easier with subsidised loans than when they are not subsidised. In addition to financing projects, it is an opportunity for policy dialogue regarding sector reform and institutional reform.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 27)</i></p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>The formal dialogue is held mainly between the Commission and the authorities of the individual ACP countries. The EIB systematically participated in this dialogue during the first financial protocol, but was less involved in the second.</p> <p><i>(based on source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV, p11)</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>Through the PRSC, the Commission has been able to have influence on the policy dialogue with the Government of Vietnam. Without the possibility to do direct budget support, the PRSC was the best option at the time of the Commission's decision to support the Development Strategy of Vietnam. However, it should be noted that some stakeholders mention the fact that TFs should not be a “donor driven approach” and that influence of donors can be incompatible with pooled funding.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 76, 88</i></p>
I-6.5.2	<p>Testimonies of Commission's increased ability to influence the dialogue between the IFI and the country of intervention</p>
MDF	<p>The representative of the Aceh Reconstruction Agency stated during the Aid Effectiveness Forum held in Manila, Philippines, in October 2006: "in the context of the Aceh reconstruction effort, (...) we feel the MDF</p>

	<p>is currently the best forum for government and recovery dialogue, leading to a better coordination overall among donors and the government in the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias".</p> <p><i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p3)</i></p> <p>Note. 85% of the grants to the MDF come from Commission and Member States.</p> <p><i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p2)</i></p> <p>The Commission, in view of its responsibility as MDF co-chair, played an important role in advocating for more coordination and dialogues on policy issues within the MDF and the government agency BRR. Thereby the MDF is in the position to contribute to the Indonesian Government's policy-making process, and therefore to leverage its impact to the overall reconstruction and rehabilitation in Aceh and Nias. In November 2006 the Commission prepared and hosted the first policy dialogue meeting focusing on forestry and environment issues, seeing these as key for the sustainability of the reconstruction effort.</p> <p><i>(Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p11)</i></p>
GFATM	As part of the Policy and strategy Committee, the Commission is partly responsible for the process which organize the relations between the GFATM and the public representatives in the Country Coordinating Mechanisms
HIPC TF	Here again, the main change is linked to the adoption by beneficiary countries of PRSPs whose implementation is supported by donors among which the European Commission, EU member states and the BWI. Once a year a PRSP implementation annual review gives rise to discussions between the governments and the donor community. In the framework of these discussions the Commission interacts with the BWI, particularly the World Bank.
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>In this respect the 2006 mid-term evaluation notes that <i>"for the Bank some of the TA measures facilitated the dialogue with the highest political level and thereby improved conditions for integrating FEMIP in the national policy"</i></p> <p>The EIB is hardly engaged in policy dialogues, as it provides project finance (no sector support or reform programmes). Furthermore, impact on dialogues was not a reason for choosing the EIB as a channel, and the instruments used (TA and interest subsidies attached to EIB loans and risk capital) hardly offer material for a dialogue. Therefore, these questions don't seem relevant for the EIB.</p> <p><i>(Source: Comments on first version of desk report (25-07-2007))</i></p>
I-6.5.3	Testimonies of increased EU voice within the IFI due to the Commission's channelling of funds
GFATM	The GFATM been independent from the WB, the Commission's influence in the GFATM Board do not have any consequences at the IFI level.
HIPC TF	<p>The European Commission does not have a formal representation in the Boards of the World Bank and of the IMF. The paper produced by ECDPM on European Coordination in Multilateral fora even points out that there is no formal coordination between the EC Delegation in Washington and the Executive Director Offices in the Bank. Furthermore, for various reasons clearly explained in the ECDPM paper, EU members do not act as a coherent group within the World Bank Board of Directors.</p> <p>It is therefore all the more remarkable that the European Commission, considering its major contribution to the financing of the HIPC Trust Fund, was exceptionally allowed to participate in the HIPC discussions in the World Bank Board meetings.</p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>In Vietnam, where the Commission is not one of the major donor, the EU voice is not increased due to the fact that the Commission is channelling funds through the WB. According to some interviewees, EU MS have their own agenda which they try to follow even if the Commission has another agenda. Some EU MS feel more close to some other donors outside the EU than those that are in the EU.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 69, MN 73, MN 81, MN 77</i></p>

EQ7	To what extent did aid channelling improve coordination between the Commission and EU MS and complementarity between the Commission and other donors?
	<i>EQ 7 on Coordination & Complementarity</i>
JC 7.1	Channelling funds to an IFI is preceded by consultation with the MS
HIPC TF	Involvement of the Community in the HIPC Initiative is based on a Council Decision and on Decision by the EU-ACP Council of Ministers. As pointed out above (See J.C.2.2) EU member States contributed more than 50% of all bilateral contributions to the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund.
I-7.1.1	Evidence of consultation between the Commission and the MS prior to channelling funds via an IFI.
WB ITF	In its Iraq Assistance Programme, 2004, the Commission states on page 15 that: <i>“Recognise that strong donor co-ordination equally assists in the rapid implementation of both humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The EC should seek a closely coordinated EU wide response in order to avoid overlap in certain sectors and regions.”</i> In section 5.4 p 18 of the same document, it is said that: <i>“The Commission will take steps to ensure coordination with EU Member States as they develop their assistance strategies”.</i> <i>Source: European Commission, Iraq Assistance Programme, 2004. COM(2004)667</i>
MDF	The dangers of inadequate coordination (too many individual donors and NGOs doing their own thing) and the need for transparency, efficiency and flexibility have underpinned the proposal by the Commission to route much of its support through the Trust Funds that governments are setting up with the IFIs, generally the World Bank. <i>(Source: C(2005)1490 – Tsunami Indicative Programme (2005 – 2006) - Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives)</i> This same document states (p15) that <i>“The EC will channel much of its tsunami reconstruction aid through the Trust Funds that the countries are setting up with the World Bank. The EC will also push for others to join in this initiative, including member states.”</i> Moreover, it specifies that <i>“this is a unique opportunity to deliver a best case example of coordination between Commission and EU member states. In the case of Indonesia, a ‘Europe House’ will be established in Aceh to coordinate and promote joint EU Member State and EC actions. The ‘Europe House’ in Aceh will complement the central donor coordination mechanisms in Jakarta. In Sri Lanka and Indonesia, coordination meetings are taking place regularly at HOMs level. (...) In Indonesia, the Commission is currently the largest single contributor and, as Co-Chair of the MDF Steering Committee, will play a crucial role in coordinating policy dialogue with the Government on special issues (security in Aceh, human rights etc.). These arrangements should promote EU coordination, visibility and strategic influence. The Commission has also established a virtual network on its website to which all EU member states and Commission can provide information for the wider public. This would allow tracking of pledges and commitments, as well as monitoring actions in priority countries”.</i> During the fact-finding and programming missions undertaken in January and February 2005, Commission teams carried out extensive consultations with the three Governments as well as with EU member states and other international donors (including World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, US and Japan). A key part of this process has been to ensure government ownership of the proposed programmes and to explore maximum possible synergy and joint action with the EU member states. <i>(Source: C(2005)1490 – Tsunami Indicative Programme (2005 – 2006) - Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, p18)</i>
CGIAR	According to the 2007 <i>Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR</i> , the EC co-financed projects are well complemented by those of individual EU member states. Some cases were quoted where long term funding had been received from one EU member state and how this complemented with the EC funding to produce added value. Clear synergies have been created by EC and member state funding and there is no evidence of duplication of efforts. However, while the European Initiative for ARD (EIARD) brings some cohesion to the overall agenda, there are inevitable weaknesses. Member states have widely different priorities and methods for funding projects. These differing research agendas do not always coincide with that of the EC. The centres see little evidence of coordination by member states at the planning or implementation stage. Also, the level of interaction between the centres and the EC delegations is very variable. In some cases the delegations are not even aware of the activities of the centres. This lack of contact means that the delegations are not able to take advantage of the centre's work for visibility purposes, nor can it use the centres to assist in the preparation of EC Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and National Indicative Programmes (NIP) for that matter. Similarly the local knowledge of the EC delegations is not used when

	<p>the EC is developing its funding strategy for the CGIAR. (Source: <i>Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, 2007</i>)</p> <p><i>For the identification of programs the Commission works together with experts from the MS. The administration agreement (for instance the one for 2003) specifies that the different steps leading to the selection of programmes (i. Review and confirmation of the EC strategy to assist the CGIAR; ii. Selection of programmes most relevant to the EC strategy amongst the CGIAR portfolio; iii. Allocation of resources according to Regions, Centres and programmes selected) are "carried out through close collaboration (meeting and electronic contacts) between the relevant EC Directorates generals (DG DEV, AIDCO, RTD) and the EU Member States through the European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development (ELARD)". Collaboration with EU MS also takes place at the level of the monitoring. Indeed, the AA specifies that "in the case of co-funded projects with EU Member States, "load-sharing" arrangements will be considered through ELARD.</i></p> <p>EIARD's purpose is to enhance the appropriateness and effectiveness of European investments in ARD at national, regional and international levels both in Europe and developing countries. To achieve this purpose, EIARD has four broad objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordinated European positions on ARD (including that undertaken by national agricultural research systems (NARS), regional and sub regional research organisations (RO/SROs), and international research organisations), and coherent positions and synergies between research, development, and other relevant policies; - Effective ARD partnerships within Europe, and between European and other partners; - Effective ARD collaboration between Southern organisations; - Sustainable institutional development of NARS. <p>These objectives are in full compliance with articles 130 (g) and (h) for Research, and 130 (u) and (v) for Development Cooperation, of the Treaty of the European Union; and give Europe a more proactive role and greater recognition on international ARD matters.</p>
GFATM	<p>Existence of coordination between the Commission and some member states before the channeling of funds, since Belgium, Finland and Portugal are represented by the Commission at the GFATM Board. Nevertheless, France and Germany are also, independently, members of the Board.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>The HIPC Initiative is a response of the BWI to a request of the G7 group of countries in which the four largest EU member states participate.</p> <p>The Initiative was discussed within the European Council, which adopted in July 1998 the decision that the European Community would participate in the Initiative as a creditor to HIPCs.</p> <p>The EU-ACP Council of Ministers, in which all EU member states are represented, took between 1999 and 2003 the Decisions that allowed to mobilize unused resources of the EDF in support of the Initiative.</p>
FEMIP Support Fund	<p>The FEMIP support fund has been created further to decisions of the European Council.</p> <p>In terms of collaboration with MS, the 2006 Mid-term Evaluation specifies (p. 51) that <i>"the Support Fund succeeded in enlarging the collaboration with various other donors in TA policy, many of them are being bilateral (coming e.g. from Belgium, France or Germany). Some TA operations are executed in close coordination with them and other facilitated joint-investment projects between the Bank and Funding Agencies of various European Countries"</i>.</p>
PSNP	<p>The decision to channel the funds through the WB for the PSNP was a joint decision with the Joint Donor Group in Ethiopia which included EU MS (DFID and Irish Aid). There is a close collaboration between the Commission and EU MS within the strong coordination mechanisms existing in Ethiopia (Development Assistance Group, European Union road map, Joint donor committee). According to stakeholders met, the Commission has a leverage effect for EUMS with small amounts for contributing in the PSNP (e.g. German cooperation and Spanish cooperation).</p> <p>In 2007, SIDA decided to join the group and contribute to the PSNP. Before taking this decision, SIDA had assessed the Commission involvement in the PSNP and had interaction with the Commission</p> <p>Source: MN 58; MN 64</p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>According to the results of the survey, for PRSC, PFM and TFF/VCF, the EU MS have been consulted before the channelling of Commission's funds. For HEMA, no consultation of EU MS have been carried out.</p> <p>Source: Survey</p>

I-7.1.2	Absence of a situation where an intervention is funded directly by one or several MS and/or the Commission whereas another of these actors supports the same intervention through an IFI. Existence of appropriate justification in such a situation is observed
TFET	As explained (see I.5.2.2) apart from the TFET, several other aid mechanisms were used in the country.
MDF	All Commission & MS' funds for the post-tsunami for Indonesia go to the MDF (it is considered as an "EU operation", as to interviewees). (Source: MN 26)
HIPC TF	Such a situation didn't exist in the case of the HIPC Initiative. EU member States alike the Community contributed to the financing of the World Bank-managed HIPC Trust Fund. There is no example of a EU member State dealing negotiating debt relief measures directly with a HIPC or with a multilateral bank detaining claims on a HIPC.
PSNP	No such situation observed in the field mission
WB TFs in Vietnam	For the PRSC , Spain contributes directly to the Government of Vietnam and does not channel its funds through the WB. However, they are still in the PRSC coordination process and participates to the discussion. From 2008, the Commission will do the same as they consider that the Government can now benefit from direct budget support. The Commission will still participate to all the coordination mechanisms within the PRSC. (Source: MN 70, MN 76)
JC 7.2	<i>The policy dialogue accompanying the preparation and implementation of multidonor interventions channelled via IFIs is conducted with the beneficiary either through a coordinating donor group organised to this end or by a single donor explicitly mandated by the others.</i>
HIPC TF	Conditionalities that have to be met by HIPC to benefit of the Initiative have been defined and are checked by the BWIs. The volume of debt relief that can be provided to each single HIPC is also based on principles and rules defined by the BWIs. But responsibility for utilising European Community contributions to the HIPC Fund are shared between the World Bank and the Commission. In partner countries utilisation of the budget resources freed by the debt relief operations is framed by the PRSP and is the subject of a policy dialogue between the government and the donor community.
I-7.2.1	Existence and nature of coordination mechanisms between the beneficiary and the participants in the intervention funded via an IFI (it may involve delegation of power to one donor).
TFET	The JAM was coordinated by the WB and included experts from five donor countries, four UN agencies, the EC and the ADB. The involvement of Timorese experts was critical in orienting the mission to the Timorese context. In this respect the WB 2002 progress report underlines that the JAM was a success and allowed for a truly "joint" approach in planning with both national counterparts and donors. Through the presence in the donor council and other coordination mechanism donors can enhance coordination. The Commission's 2004 interim evaluation also notes that in the Donor Council, from the start, the World Bank tried to involve Timorese in the preparation of the work programmes, including the selection of projects to be processed.
WB ITF	In the IRRFI ToR, the interface between Iraqi National Authorities and the Facility is explained on page 4 and 5: the existing Iraqi Entities (the Iraqi Strategic Review Board, the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and the CIC Assembly) are the main actors in the reconstruction of Iraq and the main interlocutors with the Donors and the IRRFI. (Source: United Nations/World Bank. International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Terms of Reference. (2003))
MDF	The MDF is the best recent example of effective donor coordination and largely promoted by the EU. (Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p3) The WB-UNDP-ADB decided commonly to have only one multi-donor TF. The WB would be trustee, but there would be different implementing agencies taking full responsibility, such as the UNDP. (Source: MN 26) All Commission & MS' funds for the post-tsunami for Indonesia go to the MDF (it is considered as an "EU

	<p>operation”). However, the MDF does represent only ~10% of the total international community post-tsunami aid. It is nevertheless a signal to the Government of how reconstruction should happen. Objective of the MDF is to have a best-case practice.</p> <p><i>(Source: MN 26)</i></p>
GFATM	<p>At country level, the Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) composed of representatives of public, private and civil society organisations is responsible for the project identification and proposal to the TRP, as well as for the funds implementation, directly or through partners. If this demand driven system could be a example to intervention ownership, but in reality, in the absence of “invisible hand’ the CCM would need better support from the GFATM who do no have field staff.</p> <p>CCMs in India and Ethiopia have developed into complex institutions which run parallel to existing public institutions and to the mechanisms used by other donors. The GFATM is, perhaps inevitably, gradually acquiring the features of a fully-fledged donor complete with specific requirements at each step of the project cycle, including implementation. These requirements are additional to those of other donors and are perceived by governments as additional costs.</p> <p><i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation (p.7)</i></p> <p>An initiative with UNAIDS has taken place in 2004 to simplify the activity coordination: the Three Ones (see I-5.4.1)</p> <p>Moreover, the GFATM uses its specific implementation mechanisms even when fully-developed Sector Wide approach programme (SWAPs) exists. Thus the GFATM do not participate in national policy dialogue and is insufficiently engaged in horizontal cross-donor programme at country level.</p> <p>“In Ethiopia and India, the use of the same counterpart by the GFATM and leading donors in the areas has facilitated donor coordination and minimised transactions costs on the part of the Government.”</p> <p><i>Source: Added Value of Global Partnerships and Global Funds to Development Cooperation (p.7)</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>The conditions for a HIPC to be eligible to the Initiative, to reach the Decision Point, then to reach the Completion Point have been clearly defined. Checking if these conditions are met has been entrusted to the BWI. Even when the European Community intervenes as a creditor and channels its support through the EIB, it relies on the BWI to assess whether the partner country meets these criteria.</p> <p>The volume of aid in the form of debt relief that a HIPC is entitled to receive is determined on the basis of a debt sustainability assessment carried out by BWI’s experts. This should ensure that all HIPCs are treated on a equal footing.</p> <p>But the Technical and Administrative Provision for implementation of the European aid states that “with respect to decisions concerning transfers made from the EC account [within the HIPC Trust Fund] to EC country allocation accounts, the decision will be taken by the Commission services.”</p> <p>There is therefore a clear sharing of responsibilities between the BWI and the European Commission.</p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>The EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV recommends that co-operation with other co-financiers in particular other MDBs needs to be strengthened to ensure a more co-ordinated approach towards the identification, formulation, and follow-up of project related and other measures that need to be taken to support the successful implementation and operation of projects (e.g. environmental impact assessments, monitoring systems, market or institutional reforms).</p>
PSNP	<p>Within the PSNP, there is a joint donor working group including the donors and the GoE. They meet every 2 weeks and is chaired by a rotating chair.</p> <p><i>Source: MN 51</i></p>
WB TFs in Vietnam	<p>Within the PRSC, several coordination mechanisms exist such as the partnerships groups in line with the various ministries benefiting from the PRSC. According to the specificity and expertise of the donors, meeting are organised between the line ministries and the donors to follow progress and give advice. The EU development counsellors meeting is another mechanisms of coordination between the EU MS within the PRSC.</p>

	<p>The Like Minded Donor Group, counting seven donors involved in the cooperation with Vietnam, meets regularly and carry out mid term reviews for the PFM.</p> <p><i>Source: Survey, MN 70, MN 76, Mid Term Review of the Multi Donor Trust Fund in support of the Public Financial Management Reform Initiative</i></p>
I-7.2.2	Evidence of improved control and command of the beneficiary over activities channelled via an IFI vis-à-vis activities funded separately by several donors.
ARTF	<p>The Government was a strong supporter of the ARTF, particularly during the first years of its existence. The Minister of Finance on a number of occasions expressed a clear desire for the donors to provide funding through the ARTF as the best means of supporting the Government budget.</p> <p><i>(Note. No further justification provided)</i></p> <p>Nevertheless, the national authorities are not on the ARTF Management Committee. However, the Government is invited as an observer to the Management Committee meetings and to four of the Donors Committee meetings, as of late 2005.</p> <p><i>(source: Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF, February 2007)</i></p>
TFET	<p>The WB 2002 progress report underlines that the differing and complex modes of aid provision mentioned above created barriers to national ownership of the reconstruction planning process in the initial period, and prevented the integration of all funding sources into the national budget.</p> <p>According to the Commission's 2004 Interim Evaluation, the TFET was a success but a relative success because the mechanism did not significantly improve the country's low institutional capacity and failed to develop Timorese ownership of the reconstruction programme.</p> <p>More information needs to be collected on improved control and command by the beneficiaries over activities channelled via the TFET compared to the other aid mechanisms in the country.</p>
MDF	<p>During the fact-finding and programming missions undertaken in January and February 2005, Commission teams carried out extensive consultations with the three Governments as well as with EU member states and other international donors (including World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, US and Japan). A key part of this process has been to ensure government ownership of the proposed programmes and to explore maximum possible synergy and joint action with the EU member states.</p> <p>In Indonesia, the EC's reconstruction strategy was discussed in depth with the Indonesian National Planning Board (BAPPENAS) and the World Bank. The Government has officially recommended to all donors who are in a position to do so to pool their resources into a single Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). The Government has produced a Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan for Aceh and North Sumatra in March 2005. The plan will be used as a basis for the work of the MDF.</p> <p><i>(Source: C(2005)1490 – Tsunami Indicative Programme (2005 – 2006) - Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, p18,)</i></p> <p>The Government immediately established leadership of the tsunami response. Already the day after the disaster, the President issued a decree declaring the tsunami a national disaster, and issuing 12 directives for immediate response. The Government rapidly produced the Damage & Loss Assessment and subsequently the Master Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. A large number of actors were involved, but with the Government in the driving seat as far as the process and the final products were concerned. Establishing the BRR and placing it in Aceh was an important sign of the Government commitment to the MPRR and its implementation. However, the tendency has been to treat Aceh much as any other part of the country, particularly as subsequent disasters have also required central bureaucrats' attentions. Ownership of the MDF program was narrowly focused on the BRR. This has improved, however, as the BRR has become better at working with local officials and local offices of line ministries. But it means that strength of leadership in the first instance led to strong but narrow ownership on the government side.</p> <p><i>(Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p71)</i></p> <p>Since its inception the government agency BRR²⁰ has coordinated donor and NGO funds for €2.8B, in addition to the own government allocated funds for Aceh reconstruction that in 2005 and 2006 amounted to €1.77B (\$2.2B). The total funds under coordination and supervision by BRR, therefore, has reached €3.85B (\$4.8B). This amount represents 75% of the total amount needed for the rehabilitation and</p>

²⁰ The "Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) is the Aceh-based government agency responsible for the overall coordination and planning of the reconstruction:

	<p>reconstruction program estimated at €4.8B (\$6B) (Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p5)</p> <p>The representative of the Aceh Reconstruction Agency stated during the Aid Effectiveness Forum held in Manila, Philippines, in October 2006: "in the context of the Aceh reconstruction effort, we can identify [the MDF current projects] are set-up in response to the needs of the people, with a strong focus on community-driven development projects." (Source: 2006 Progress Report on the European Commission Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, p3)</p> <p>The Aid Effectiveness Forum's overall conclusion that the close working relationship between the BRR and the MDF is the base of its success to date. The MDF pursued this close relationship from the outset when it integrated its operations within the structures of the Indonesian Government. There were two aspects of this integration. Firstly, the MDF preferred to finance programs that channel funds through the Government's budget (called "on-budget projects"). Secondly, the MDF implemented a policy of only considering projects that have already been screened and submitted by the BRR. The strong partnership was reinforced when the BRR decided to contribute almost \$300 million of its own funds to co-finance three projects with the MDF and to extend the MDF-financed Kecamatan Development Project until 2009. (Source: MDF Progress Report III, December 2006, p3)</p> <p>The governance model of the MDF faces the question whether the MDF, since it provides such a small share of total funding, is the best forum for policy issues or if this should be discussed in a larger setting. Since the Government has not really provided for this, the MDF by default has had to take on the policy issues, but this may both have made the forum too donor dominated, and created challenges in accommodating views that do not emanate from the MDF setting (such as NGO, Acehnese and other stakeholder positions). (Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p67)</p> <p>The Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds considers that having several co-chair of a TF is useful if the co-chairs dedicate own staff time to the function and thus provide value-added. However, it considers that in the case of the MDF, the Commission should have been more pro-active in this regard. (Source: Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, February 2007, Annexes p67)</p>
CGIAR	<p>The involvement of partner countries in the planning stage of the centres' projects is high in general, as well as a continued involvement of the partners during project implementation. This is especially the case with capacity building programmes, breeding programs and germplasm distribution. It should be noted that there is progressively more input from the CGIAR centres towards creating national agricultural development policies. (Source: Evaluation of EC Contribution to the CGIAR, Ecorys, October 2007)</p>
GFATM	<p>The beneficiaries, here considered as the members of the CCM, have improved control of the choice of the activities financed as they identify the project to be financed. But they lack institutional support to improve their command of the project implementation at large.</p>
HIPC TF	<p>Debt relief through the HIPC Initiative resulted in resources being freed for other utilisations than debt servicing within the budget of beneficiary countries. Donors insisted that these resources are used to fund pro-poor expenditures but the control and command of the government on these resources is much greater that it is on donor resources allocated to projects.</p> <p>More generally, as pointed out in many other places, a major change induced by the HIPC Initiative has been the adoption by beneficiary countries (as well as by other developing countries which did not belong to the HIPC group) of poverty reduction strategies. This created favourable conditions for a move of donors' aid from the project approach to sectoral approach and for the utilization of budget support as a main aid instrument. Whereas project aid entails the risk that donors deliver public services in place of the government and without ownership of this one, these new approaches to aid restore the government responsibility in the delivery of public services.</p>

Interest Subsidies in MEDA	As to interviewees, it is the local Government (the “promoter”) which requests interest rate subsidies. It should already be clearly indicated in the NIP. (Source: MN 27)
PSNP	The GoE is fully implementing the programme. Through the channelling of funds to the WB, the GoE has only one interlocutor and do not have to duplicate its interaction with the donors. This reduces the transaction costs of the government and allows a coordinated approach of the donors. Source: MN 51; MN 58; MN 54
WB TFs in Vietnam	No evidence
JC 7.3	Channeling via a single intervention grouping together the resources of several donors allows for more comprehensive and strategic coverage of the needs of the beneficiary.
HIPC TF	There is no doubt that the indebtedness of HIPCs could have hardly been comprehensively addressed but in a coordinated intervention of all main donors under the leadership of the BWIs.
I-7.3.1	Existence of studies analysing the needs of the beneficiary and identifying the required responses (in the form of priority action matrices, road maps, etc.) elaborated with the beneficiary and serving as a framework for channelling interventions via an IFI
ARTF	The ARTF as a channel for what is essentially direct budget support, has enhanced alignment of donor support with Government priorities (source: Review of post-crisis multi-donor TF, February 2007) Interviewees report that the Afghan authorities put into question different assessments done by the international community, saying e.g. they were hijacked by foreign investors. (Source: MN 29) The “Afghanistan National Development Strategy” was presented to the donor community by the Government in 2006. This strategy is considered by the international community as the first step towards a Poverty Reduction Strategy. (Source: MN 29)
TFET	The JAM has involved national counterparts.
MDF	A Damage and Loss Assessment was first produced within a few weeks after the tsunami and presented to the international community mid-January 2005 as the basis for mobilizing external resources. It was led by the Ministry of Planning and the WB on the international community side. The UN, under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, carried out a related assessment in January as background for its FLASH appeal. It is generally agreed that the DLA work was "best practice": international expertise from the UN system, the lending agencies, bilateral donors etc were quickly mobilized and brought into the different working groups. The collaboration between the different actors involved was also seen to be positive and constructive. The Government was recognized to be in charge of the process. The DLA was followed by a more detailed Master Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (MPRR), also led by the Government. The process behind the MPRR was consultative, with a wide range of local stakeholders and public offices being heard. The MPRR was presented on 26 March 2005.
GFATM	The Programme for Action sets clear objectives and explains the rationale. The Programme follows a High-Level Round Table (28 September 2000) ²¹ and a Council resolution of 10.11.2000, In order to ensure a broad consultation on the new Communication, the EC, in partnership with WHO and UNAIDS, convened a High-Level Round Table in Brussels on 28 September 2000. The Round Table brought together over 170 stakeholders, including 25 developing countries, notably ACP states, EU Member States, the European Parliament, international development agencies, civil society, researchers and leaders of major pharmaceutical companies. A high degree of consensus was reached among stakeholders on the content of the Communication. (Source: COM(2001) 96 final) Base on demand driven project identification, absence of strategy and programming process from the

²¹ Organized with WHO and UNAIDS, Involving over 170 stakeholders, including 25 developing countries, notably ACP states, EU Member States, the European Parliament, international development agencies, civil society, researchers and leaders of major pharmaceutical companies.

	<p>GFATM which is a financial instrument and not an implementing entity</p> <p>However, as the spending on AIDS has gone up sharply in the recent years, there's still a financial gap if the massive requirements for treatment as well as prevention and mitigation are to be met. <i>Source: Global Fund – WB HIV/AIDS programs, comparative advantage study, 19 January 2006</i></p>
HIPC TF	<p>As regards indebtedness the debt sustainability assessments carried out by the BWI experts resulted in detailed assessment of the debt situation of all HIPCs and of their capability to service their external debt. These assessments, although they were often found to be optimistic as regards their underlying macroeconomic assumptions, made possible a case by case adjustment of the volume of debt relief granted to each HIPC. If such analysis had been carried separately by several donors they would have likely led to diverging conclusions and would have therefore been incapable of providing the basis for a coordinated action of donors.</p> <p>More widely the HIPC Initiative led to the elaboration of poverty reduction strategies which identified priorities for the joint action of governments and donors.</p>
Interest rate subsidies in MEDA	<p>Beneficiaries met in Morocco confirmed that interest rate subsidies and TA on EIB loans offered them a more flexible, comprehensive and attractive response to their needs. <i>(Source: MN 97, MN 101)</i></p>
Risk Capital Lomé IV	<p>The EIB has adopted with the second financial protocol (Lomé IV B) a more flexible approach, with a much less rigid programming exercise with less formal and detailed involvement of the EIB. It has allowed the EIB to adapt rapidly to changing lending environments and to reflect a country's needs. Therefore, within given country targets, the EIB was relatively free to identify investment projects and programmes that meet its general project criteria, as well as the development objectives of the convention. <i>(Source: EIB Evaluation of its funding through individual loans under Lomé IV)</i></p>

Annex 5 - Study of the EC contribution to the HIPC initiative

1. The HIPC initiative and the European Community contribution

1.1 From structural adjustment and debt rescheduling to the HIPC initiative

Mexico's default on its external debt service in 1982 marked the outbreak of a crisis that drew attention of the development aid community on the dangerous accumulation of foreign debt by many developing countries and put this issue at the core of the development aid policy.

The mechanism that was implemented all along the 1980s' and most of the 1990s' to address the debt problem of developing countries can be summarized as follows:

- Adoption by the government of the debtor country of a stabilisation and economic reform programme (structural adjustment programme) agreed with the Bretton-Woods institutions and whose implementation is supported by concessional loans from these institutions;
- Flow rescheduling agreement with Paris Club creditors on concessional terms possibly followed by a stock-of-debt operation under condition that the debtor country demonstrates good track records under both IMF arrangements and rescheduling agreements;
- Agreement by the debtor country to seek at least comparable terms on debt owned by non-Paris Club bilateral and commercial creditors;
- Bilateral forgiveness of ODA debt by various creditors;
- New financing on appropriately concessional terms.

If this approach proved effective to ease or solve the debt problem of medium-income countries it didn't succeed at providing a way out to the debt problem faced by most low-income countries. In spite of significant increases of the concessional dimension of the Paris Club debt rescheduling scheme from the so-called "London terms" to the "Toronto terms" (1988) and finally the "Naples terms" (1994) it became increasingly obvious that for many low-income countries more far-reaching concessions would be needed if their debt situation was to be improved on a durable basis. The HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) Debt Initiative jointly launched in September 1996 by the IMF and the World Bank aimed at addressing this issue in such a manner that poor countries would "exit, once and for all, from the rescheduling process" and would resume "normal relations with the international financial community characterised by spontaneous financial flows and the full honouring of commitments"¹.

¹ A.R.Boote & K.Thugge, Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries and the HIPC Initiative, IMF, March 1997

1.2 The HIPC initiative

The original HIPC scheme

Leaders of the G7 countries² in a statement issued at their annual Summit in 1995 had declared that “measures have to be taken to ensure that the burden of multilateral debt does not impede the growth prospects for the poorest countries (.../...) The IMF and World Bank should take the lead in developing a comprehensive multilateral approach to assist countries with multilateral debt and debt-service ratios above prudent levels in addressing their debt burdens ...”.

The HIPC initiative is the response of the Bretton-Woods institutions to the demand of the G7 Summit.

This initiative was likely to concern 41 countries classified as being poor and heavily indebted³. This group includes 32 countries with a 1993 GNP per capita of \$695 or less and whose 1993 net present value (NPV) of debt to exports was higher than 200 percent or whose NPV of debt to GNP was higher than 80 percent (World Bank classification of severely indebted low-income countries) as well as nine countries that had received concessional rescheduling from Paris Club creditors or were potentially eligible for rescheduling.

The HIPC Initiative is based on six guiding principles:

- The initiative does not aim at cancelling the foreign debt of HIPCs but at reducing it to a level where it becomes sustainable⁴;
- Action is envisaged
 - only after the debtor country has demonstrated ability and willingness to implement sound macroeconomic and financial policies,
 - After all possibilities offered by the classical rescheduling process have been exploited;
 - On the basis of a coordination among all creditors with broad and equitable participation;
- The financial integrity and preferred creditor status of multilateral creditors should be preserved;
- New external financing for the countries concerned is to be provided on concessional terms only.

² Four EU countries participate in G7 meetings ; they are France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom

³ See the list of HIPICs in appendix 1

⁴ Although debt sustainability analysis is carried out on a case-by-case it was commonly admitted at that time that a country external debt is sustainable as long as the debt to export ratio in NPV terms it is kept under 200 to 250 percent and the debt service to GNP ratio under 20 to 25 percent. These standards figures were revised in 1999 (See below)

At country level implementation of the Initiative extends over two stages.

During this first stage, whose duration is three years, the beneficiary country is expected to demonstrate a positive track-record in implementing sound macroeconomic and financial policies as required to qualify for a stock-of-debt operation from Paris Club creditors, and to make full use of the classical debt rescheduling mechanisms at Naples terms.

Satisfactory completion of this first stage leads the debtor country to the "Decision Point". On the basis of a debt-sustainability analysis, the IMF- and IDA Executive Boards decide on the country's eligibility for the Initiative. Staffs of the Bretton-Woods institutions prepare a "Preliminary HIPC Debt Initiative Document" that defines debt sustainability target ranges, estimates the impact of bilateral and commercial creditors' action, and accordingly recommends action by multilaterals commensurate with reaching the debt targets.

During the second stage, whose normal duration is once again three years, the debtor country is expected to satisfactorily implement IMF and IDA-supported adjustment programmes. Paris Club creditors provide flow rescheduling and commit themselves to provide a stock-of-debt operation upon completion of this phase.

A positive assessment by the IMF and the World Bank of the country's implementation of the adjustment programmes eventually leads to the "Completion Point". At that stage, the Paris Club creditors provide the committed stock-of-debt reduction (up to 80 percent debt reduction in NPV terms) and multilateral banks cancel part of their claims up to the point where the total debt burden is reduced to a sustainable level. The IMF provides assistance through a special Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) grant or loan earmarked for covering debt service to the IMF. The World Bank provides financial assistance via the HIPC Trust Fund established for that purpose. Other multilaterals participate in the Initiative through appropriate schemes including via the World Bank-managed HIPC Trust Fund.

Enhanced HIPC

Responding to proposals for improvements of the HIPC Initiative issued by the G8 summit in June 1999, the IMF and World Bank adopted in September 1999 a set of modifications to the Initiative initial scheme.

The Enhanced HIPC Initiative allows for:

- Deeper debt relief through:
 - Lower debt sustainability targets⁵;
 - Calculation of the HIPC assistance at the Decision Point on the basis of actual data rather than on forecasts of the expected situation at Completion Point.
- Earlier assistance through:
 - The provision of assistance during the transition period between the Decision Point and the Completion Point, notably financing by the donors of the annual debt service;
 - Removal of the minimum duration of the transition period; the Completion Point is reached as soon as the debtor country has implemented a set of key, pre-determined structural reforms (floating Completion Point);
 - Front-loading of debt relief after the Completion Point.
- Broader assistance :
 - As a consequence of the measures mentioned above, the number of countries likely to receive assistance from the HIPC Initiative was expected to increase from 29 to 36⁶ and the total cost of debt relief under the Initiative from US\$ 12.5 billion to 27.4 billion⁷ in 1998 NPV terms.

Furthermore, as requested from the beginning by the European Community, a strong link was established between debt relief and poverty reduction. Elaboration through a participative process of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was made a key condition for reaching the Decision Point. This should favour a reallocation of the resources freed in the budget of the beneficiary countries by reduced debt service to public expenditures contributing to poverty alleviation. The IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility was refocused towards fighting poverty and transformed into a new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).

Initially HIPCs had been given a two-year deadline for meeting the conditions of the Initiative eligibility requirements. This deadline was however postponed several times. By end-2006, the Executive Boards of the IMF and the IDA decided that countries that had not met by that time the policy performance eligibility criterion of the HIPC Initiative might become eligible for the Initiative assistance if they adopt, at any time, a qualifying IMF- and IDA-supporting programme.

⁵ In particular, the targeted NPV debt to export ratio was lowered from the 200 to 250 range to 150 and the NPV debt service to GDP ratio from 20-25 percent to 15 percent.

⁶ Out of a total of 41 HIPC countries.

⁷ And even 36 billion if conflict-affected countries of Liberia, Somalia and Sudan were included in the calculation.

As of end-September 2007, out of the 41 HIPC's, 22 countries had reached the Completion Point, 10 were in the transition period between Decision Point and Completion Point whilst the 9 remaining countries had not yet reached the Decision Point. At that time, the total cost of the Initiative was estimated at US\$ 67.7 billion in end-2006 NPV terms.

Since 2005 the HIPC Initiative is complemented by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which aims at cancelling 100 percent of the debt claims of the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the AfDB on countries that have reached the Completion Point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.

It is important to point out that while the IMF and the World Bank have had a key role in the design of the HIPC Initiative and have a major contribution to its implementation, the Initiative involves all creditors of HIPC's, whether multilateral banks, bilateral donors or commercial banks. The European Community, in particular, as we will see below, contributed to the Initiative through three different modalities:

- As a creditor, the Community cancelled its claims on ACP HIPC's through a Trust Fund managed by the EIB;
- As a donor, it contributed to the World Bank-managed HIPC Trust Fund;
- Indirectly it supported the implementation by HIPC's of the IMF and World Bank programmes through the provision to these countries of structural adjustment grants, then of budget support.

1.3 European Community contribution to the HIPC initiative

The European Community's was first involved in the HIPC Initiative as a creditor holding claims to HIPC countries. On 6 July 1998, the European Council decided to make grant resources available to ACP countries eligible for the HIPC Initiative for meeting their outstanding debt and debt service obligations towards the Community. This assistance was financed from interest accrued on the resources of the European Development Fund. An initial amount of ECU 40 million was reserved for that purpose. Provision of assistance should be decided by the Commission on a case-by-case basis.

Additional support to the HIPC Initiative was provided by the Commission through an increase of the resources allocated to its structural adjustment facility, designed to underpin and expand the social dimension to programmes negotiated by debtor countries with the IMF.

On 26 October 1998 the European Commission presented to the Parliament and the Council a communication⁸ addressing the issues raised by the enhancement of the HIPC Initiative. This Communication pointed out, in particular, the difficult situation faced by multilateral development banks (MDB). On the one hand, growing pressure was exerted on multilateral institutions for meeting their contributions to the Initiative. On the other hand,

⁸ Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on a Community participation in the debt relief initiative for highly indebted poor countries (HIPC), COM(1999) 518 Final

internal resources that MDB could mobilise for that purpose were limited if these contributions should not be made at the expense of their aid programmes. The Communication stressed in particular that for the African Development Bank (AfDB) the exercise was almost impossible

The Communication proposed a contribution of the European Community to the HIPC Initiative based on three elements:

- Enhancement of the action undertaken under the Council Decision of 1998 to reduce the Community claimable debt on HIPCs. The full cost of this measure was estimated at Euro 550 million, well above the 40 million made available by the 1998 Council Decision;
- Increased structural adjustment support to eligible HIPCs having reached the Decision Point. The Communication proposed to devote some Euro 150 million to this measure;
- A contribution in the range of Euro 200 to 300 million to the overall financing of the HIPC Initiative, and specifically to the HIPC Trust Fund.

As far as ACP countries are concerned, a series of four decisions by the ACP-EU Council between 1999 and 2003 resulted in a total allocation to the HIPC Initiative of Euro 1,560 million of unallocated resources of the EDF. Out of this total Euro 680 million were allocated to the cancellation of Community claims on ACP HIPCs (contribution of the Community as a creditor) and Euro 880 million to contributions of the Community as a donor. The Community contribution as a creditor was transferred to a specific EIB HIPC Fund and its contribution as a donor to the World Bank-managed HIPC Trust Fund. Most of the Community contribution to the World Bank Trust was earmarked for reimbursement of AfDB' claims on African HIPCs.

In addition to the EDF contribution to the World Bank HIPC Trust Fund earmarked for ACP countries, the Community allocated to this fund from the Commission's budget 54 million meant to finance debt relief operations in Latin American HIPCs (45 million) and Asian HIPCs (9 million). The total contribution of the Community to the World Bank Trust Fund thus reached Euro 934 million of which Euro 100 million still had to be disbursed by mid-2007.

Altogether the European Community allocated Euro 1.6 billion to the HIPC Initiative.

EC pledges to the HIPC Initiative

	Million Euro
Contribution as a donor	
Joint EU-ACP Council Decision of December 1999	680
Commission contribution for Latin America and Asia	54
Joint ACP-EU Council Decision of May 2003	200
<i>Total pledges of the Community as a donor</i>	934
Council Decision of July 1998	40
Joint EU-ACP Council Decision of December 1999	320
Joint EU-ACP Council Decision of December 2001	60
Joint EU-ACP Council Decision of December 2002	125
Joint EU-ACP Council Decision of May 2003	135
<i>Total pledges of the Community as a creditor</i>	680
Total pledges	1,614

2. Study of the HIPC Initiative and of the European Community contribution

The Data Collection Grid in Annex 4 provides at the level of indicators and judgment criteria information on which the HIPC Initiative and the European Community's contribution to the Initiative can be assessed in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

2.1 Relevance

In spite of repeated attempts all over the 1980s and 1990s to solve the problem of poor countries indebtedness through rescheduling operations, the debt crisis remained at the end of the 1990s a major two-pronged problem. On the one hand, the debt service burden exerted an extremely severe constraint on the budget of debtor countries, which as a consequence had to make cuts in very much needed public expenditures in social sectors and to sacrifice the maintenance and development of key economic infrastructure. On the other hand, the accumulation of bad loans in the balance sheet of multilateral development banks threatened to impair their lending capacity.

The HIPC-Initiative, designed by the IMF and the World Bank as a response to a request of the G7 group of countries, is extremely relevant to the extent where it addresses the debt crisis in its two dimensions. On the one hand, debt relief operations should bring down the external debt of HIPCs to the point where it becomes sustainable that is to the point where these countries are able to service their external debt without having to operate drastic cuts in priority public expenditures. On the other hand, the costs involved in the reduction of HIPCs debts towards multilateral banks should be mainly supported by bilateral and multilateral donors, rather than by the multilateral banks themselves, so as to avoid that the lending capacity of the latter is diminished.

The revision in 1999 of the Initiative design, giving rise to the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, further improved its relevance, especially with respect to the priorities of the European Commission's development policy. Beyond the reduction of the HIPCs' debt burden and the protection of the multilateral banks lending capacity, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative put the fight against poverty at the core of the Initiative, as recommended by the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee of the EU. HIPC countries were from that time requested to design and implement a Poverty Reduction Strategy for being eligible to debt cancellation.

2.2 Effectiveness

Expected outcomes of the HIPC Initiative were:

- A reduction of the HIPCs' external debt to the point where it becomes sustainable;
- The implementation by governments of HIPCs of macroeconomic and financial policies supportive of a balanced and hence sustainable economic growth;
- A larger share of HIPCs budget resources allocated to public expenditures contributing to poverty reduction;
- An increase in the total volume of development aid.

The evaluation of the HIPC Initiative⁹ carried out by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group in 2006 examines how far these objectives have been achieved.

External debt

As could have been expected the HIPC Initiative was successful at achieving what was its primary objective: reducing the debt burden of beneficiary countries.

In the 13 Post-Completion Point countries qualified for debt relief under the *export criterion*¹⁰, the Net Present Value of debt to exports declined from a simple average of 310 prior to Decision Point to 142 percent at Completion Point. For the 5 countries that qualified under the *fiscal criterion*¹¹, the NPV of debt to revenues was reduced between the same two milestones from 445 percent to 181 percent.

To what extent this reduction of the HIPCs debt burden is sustainable will be examined later when dealing with the overall sustainability of the Initiative.

⁹ World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Debt Relief for the Poorest, an Evaluation Update of the HIPC Initiative, 2006

¹⁰ The debt to export ratio of these countries was higher than 150 percent

¹¹ The debt to government revenue ratio of these countries was higher than 250 percent

Macroeconomic and financial policies

All HIPCs are due to implement prior to reaching the Decision Point, then during the transition period between Decision and Completion Point, policy programmes designed with the IMF and intended to improve their macroeconomic management. Nevertheless indicators of macroeconomic management of these countries show disappointing results.

Since 1999, all low-income countries, whether HIPC beneficiaries or not, have improved their policy performance as measured by their aggregate CPIA score¹². HIPC countries that reached Completion Point started out with higher scores, and still score higher than other poor countries.

But at the time of the evaluation, the CPIA score of the ten HIPCs that had not yet reached the Decision Point had worsened since 2002 and their ranking for all six KKM¹³ governance indicators, including control of corruption and government effectiveness, had declined in 2004 relative to 1996. Furthermore Decision Point countries, too, have slipped. Seven of the ten Decision Point countries have a worse CPIA score for economic management in 2004 than in 2001, driven mainly by worse public debt management and poor fiscal management.

These disappointing results raise questions regarding the effectiveness of conditionalities set by the donors as a tool for improving policies in developing countries.

Reallocation of budget resources to poverty-reducing public expenditures

It is noticeable that an increasing number of HIPCs, which did not do it earlier, started to report their poverty reducing spending as defined in their PRSPs. In 2005, 19 countries reported such spending, compared to only four in 2002.

The World Bank evaluation points out that in the 28 countries that reached Decision Point poverty-reducing expenditures increased on average from 6.4 percent to 8.1 percent of GDP in 1999 to 2004. But the sector analysis of these expenditures shows that emphasis has been put on social services, especially education, whereas public expenditures that might have contributed both to poverty reduction and to economic growth, such as expenditures in agriculture or transportation, did not register any significant increase as a percentage of GDP or even decreased in some HIPCs.

Volume of development aid

On the basis of aid transfers trends in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the World Bank evaluation concludes that in 21 out of 28 HIPCs debt relief has been additional to other aid

¹² The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Index, estimated by the World Bank, aims at providing an overall assessment of a country economic management.

¹³ World Bank experts Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi (KKM) have defined a series of indicators for assessing the quality of a country governance.

modalities, and that in only seven HIPCs non-debt-relief transfers have had a lower rate of growth after the launch of the Initiative than in the 1990s.

The evaluation also points out that the 28 Decision Point countries have received 46 percent of transfers to all developing countries since 1999, compared with 33 percent from 1990 to 1999. This remark however raises the question whether increased aid to HIPCs has not been balanced by a lower volume of aid to non-HIPC developing countries.

As far as the European Community is concerned, the major share by far of its contribution to the Initiative has been financed by the EDF. On the one hand, one could consider that the EDF resources are earmarked for development aid, which means that allocating some of these resources to the HIPC Initiative does not result in an increase of the Community aid volume. But on the other hand, the Community contribution was financed from resources of the EDF that had remained idle until then. Mobilising these resources for the Initiative can therefore be considered as an increase of the Community aid.

2.3 Efficiency

The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) have had a major role in the design and the implementation of the HIPC Initiative.

As far as design of the Initiative is concerned, the BWI defined the conditions for a country to be considered as an HIPC as well as the conditions for HIPCs to benefit of debt relief. They also defined the debt sustainability criteria that determine the magnitude of debt relief that can be granted to a given HIPC.

At the implementation level, the IMF contributed to design the macroeconomic policy programmes that HIPCs had to implement to reach the Decision Point, then the Completion Point, and verified that these policies were consistently implemented. The HIPC Trust Fund managed by the World Bank has been the main channel through which donors financed debt relief.

Involvement of the BWI in the HIPC Initiative had been requested by the G7 countries. From an efficiency point of view the rationale was to rely on the BWI to design and implement measures addressing the indebtedness of poor countries. The IMF is entrusted by article IV of its statutes with the responsibility of carrying out a macroeconomic surveillance of all member countries. Together with the World Bank it had been heavily involved in the design and implementation of structural adjustment programmes in developing countries. Because of these earlier involvements, the BWI possess information and experience on the debt situation of developing countries and on related macroeconomic issues that are without equivalent in any other institution. They were therefore in the best position to carry out at the lowest cost the tasks involved in the Initiative.

Furthermore entrusting the BWI with the responsibility to design and implement the Initiative was a guarantee that all poor indebted countries would be treated in accordance

with the same principles and rules. It also limited the transactions costs incurred by HIPC's and multilateral banks, which had to deal with one single interlocutor.

The European Community, while it has had a major contribution to the World Bank-managed HIPC Trust Fund, relied on the EIB to channel its contribution as a creditor to the HIPC Initiative. Resorting to the EIB rather than to the HIPC Trust Fund was quite rationale since the claims under consideration in these operations were special loans and risk credits that had been granted by the Community precisely through the EIB. The EIB was therefore the only possible channel for cancelling or reducing these claims. But the conditions applied to these debt relief operations were those defined by the BWI and the latter were made responsible for verifying that these conditions were actually met by beneficiary countries. Commission staff members involved in the management of the EU contribution to the HIPC Initiative consider that for some years the operational performance of EIB in managing the EU contribution has been poor. Since the signature in November 2006 of a new management agreement between the Commission and the EIB the implementation process has been streamlined and a substantial increase in the annual processing fee paid by the Commission has made it possible for the EIB to allocate to this task an appropriate level of human resources. As a consequence processing by the EIB of the Commission's contribution does not raise critics anymore.

2.4 Impacts

Expected impacts of the HIPC Initiative were stronger economic growth and reduction of poverty in the beneficiary countries.

Economic growth forecasts produced by the IMF experts in the framework of the Debt Sustainability Assessments they carried out in HIPC's were optimistic. Average GDP projections for 2005-2010 were more than twice their 1990-2000 averages, and more than 2.5 times their 1980-2002 historical averages. Export projections were 1.7 times their 1990-2000 averages and 2.5 times averages for 1980-2001.

The evaluation of the HIPC Initiative released in 2006 point out that it is too early to assess how far these projections were realistic. But it notices that earlier growth figures do not show any unequivocal acceleration of economic growth in the countries that have benefited of the Initiative.

Group of countries	Number of countries	Real GDP growth rate		
		1980-1993	1994-1998	1999-2003
Post-Completion	18	1.7%	4.3%	4.3%
Decision Point	10	2.2%	1.2%	2.7%
Pre-Decision Point	10	0.5%	7.0%	2.7%
Non-HIPC poor countries	30	1.1%	3.5%	3.8%

Source: World Bank, Evaluation of the HIPC Initiative, 2006

As far as poverty is concerned, the evaluation examines which progress has been registered with respect to the MDGs in the 18 post completion countries. This examination delivers mixed results. Countries have made progress in improving gender equality and reducing

child mortality, and more modest progress in primary education, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing global partnerships for development. However, on development goals such as poverty and infectious diseases, there has been no measurable change. The report stresses that data are frequently missing for an accurate assessment of poverty reduction.

As pointed earlier a major achievement of the HIPC Initiative, and one which should induce large impacts in the future, has been the elaboration by HIPCs of PRSPs through a participative process involving the civil society and the countries' partners in development. These documents have put reduction of poverty at the core of the government strategies and have established a framework for a closer partnership between governments and donors. In the absence of this policy framework general budget support and the policy dialogue it involves would not have emerged as an important modality of development aid.

2.5 Sustainability

When examining the effectiveness of the HIPC Initiative we noted that its results as regards the improvement of public policies have been disappointing. An important opportunity for sustainable impacts of the Initiative was thus missed as demonstrated by the lack of any significant acceleration of HIPCs rate of economic growth.

The most surprising however is that the HIPC Initiative did not achieve a sustainable improvement of HIPCs external debt situation. The World Bank evaluation notes that in 11 out of 13 countries with current data, debt ratios have deteriorated since Completion Point. The longer the interval since Completion Point the more likely is a country's debt indicator to have deteriorated. Several factors explain this reversal: growth of GDP and exports lower than forecast by the IMF when carrying out debt sustainability assessment, the consequence being lower denominators of the debt to GDP or exports ratios; fall in the countries' currency exchange rate, which has increased the NPV of the hard currency-denominated debt of HIPCs; increases in debt level owing to new borrowings.

The evaluation points out that six of the 18 Post-Completion Point countries (Burkina-Faso, Ethiopia, Guyana, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Uganda) will not be able to maintain the HIPC thresholds ratios for the entire nine-year Post-Completion-Point period, and that under more pessimistic assumption than those of the IMF about growth, more countries would be in the same situation.

The evaluation concludes on this issue that "the HIPC experience shows that debt relief, by itself, cannot ensure sustainable levels of debt, no matter what the threshold. It needs to be accompanied by significant efforts to improve the repayment capacity. (...) To ensure that stakeholders do not view debt reduction as sufficient for achieving debt sustainability, debt relief proposals should stress the importance of other policy actions by governments and external partners".

Indeed the most successful achievement of the HIPC Initiative in terms of sustainability has been the elaboration of poverty reduction strategies in all HIPCs as well as in several non-HIPC developing countries. These strategies have put poverty reduction at the core of public policies in developing countries; led to the establishment of monitoring and

evaluation systems of public policies; induced progress towards a more participative approach to policy-making; created the basis for a partnership between governments and donors in the implementation of development and poverty-reduction policies. The European Community, which from the start insisted for poverty reduction to be put at the core of the HIPC Initiative, can be given some credit for this achievement.

Appendix 1: List of heavily indebted poor countries

Completion Point (23 countries)	Decision Point (10 countries)	Pre-Decision Point (9 countries)
<u>Benin</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>Comoros</u>
<u>Bolivia</u>	<u>Burundi</u>	<u>Côte d'Ivoire</u>
<u>Burkina Faso</u>	<u>Central African Republic</u>	<u>Eritrea</u>
<u>Cameroon</u>	<u>Chad</u>	<u>Kyrgyz Republic</u>
<u>Ethiopia</u>	<u>Democratic Republic of Congo</u>	<u>Nepal</u>
<u>The Gambia</u>	<u>Republic of Congo</u>	<u>Somalia</u>
<u>Ghana</u>	<u>Guinea</u>	<u>Sudan</u>
<u>Guyana</u>	<u>Guinea-Bissau</u>	<u>Togo</u>
<u>Honduras</u>	<u>Haiti</u>	
<u>Madagascar</u>	<u>Liberia</u>	
<u>Malawi</u>		
<u>Mali</u>		
<u>Mauritania</u>		
<u>Mozambique</u>		
<u>Nicaragua</u>		
<u>Niger</u>		
<u>Rwanda</u>		
<u>São Tomé Príncipe</u>		
<u>Senegal</u>		
<u>Sierra Leone</u>		
<u>Tanzania</u>		
<u>Uganda</u>		
<u>Zambia</u>		

Source: World Bank ; last updated 10/05/2008

Annex 6 – Survey questionnaire

This annex contains the survey questionnaire sent to the Commission representatives in charge of the management of Commission's contributions to WB TFs. It also includes a clarification note on specific questions of the survey questionnaire.

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Please read carefully the following instructions before completing the questionnaire.

This is an on-line questionnaire. It is important that you complete it on-line as this will allow the team to monitor the replies and facilitate the joint processing of the answers to the questionnaire.

If you are in charge of European Commission contributions to several World Bank (WB) Trust Funds (TFs), please note that it is essential to complete one questionnaire per TF. In that case, please do not refer in any given questionnaire to answers provided in another.

The on-line questionnaire is divided in 10 parts. It is important to press "next" at the bottom of the page when you have completed one part.

In case you want to erase the set of answers, you may press "reset".

You can also go back to a previous part by pressing "back".

When you have completed the questionnaire, please do not forget to press "submit".

You can also save the questionnaire as a draft and work on it again later. To do this, please log in again to the questionnaire page, and select the section not yet completed in the bottom part of the page.

Whenever you have used the option "Save as draft", do not forget to Save the questionnaire again (in the last page by using "Submit" button ! Without your submittal, the questionnaire is not saved into our database.

Please note also that the questionnaire has been drafted to include as many multiple choice questions as possible so as to allow you to respond quickly. In many cases space is provided for comments. Space is also provided at the end of the questionnaire for any additional information you wish to provide. Please note that the space provided at different places in the questionnaire is limited but should normally be sufficient (the number of characters used in relation to the maximum number available is displayed in the questionnaire).

Please note that you can also print the pdf version of the questionnaire attached to the email.

Completing this questionnaire will take you between 30 and 60 minutes.

For any additional information please contact M. Antoine Hanin by email: antoine.hanin@ade.be or by phone: +3210454510

Thank you for your co-operation!

Q1 Personal identification

Q1(a) Please give your Name and First Name

Q1(b) You work in:

OEC Headquarter

OEC Delegation

Q1(c) Function:

Q1(d) Type of responsibility for this TF:

Q1(e) Phone number in format + Country Code + Local Code + Phone Number

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q1 Personal identification

Q1(f) E-mail address:

Q2 Trust Funds Information

Q2(a) Within the Commission who is in charge of the follow-up to the TF contribution

EC HQ

EC Delegations

Both

Q2(b) Name of Trust Fund:

Q2(c) EC reference code (e.g. CRIS number) :

Q2(d) WB reference code (e.g. Trust Fund number):

Q2(e) Does the TF implement activities at country, regional or global level?

Country

Regional

Global

Q2(f) Year of the first signature of the agreement on the Commission's contribution

Before 1999

2001

2004

1999

2002

2005

2000

2003

2006

Q2(g) Planned or effective end-date for the Commission's contribution

Before 1999

2001

2004

After 2006

1999

2002

2005

2000

2003

2006

Q2(h) What was the total amount committed (in €) by the Commission for this Trust Fund:

0 - 100 000

5 million - 10 million

100 000 - 500 000

10 million - 35 million

500 000 - 1 million

35 million - 100 million

1 million - 5 million

> 100 million

Q2(i) Percentage of committed amount (€) that has been paid by the Commission to the WB for this TF, to date (no decimal):

Q2(j) Estimated percentage of funds committed which will have been paid at the end of the intervention (if different of the above):

0 %

0 - 20%

20 - 50 %

50 - 80 %

> 80 %

Q2(k) Total amount (€) contracted by the WB for activities under this TF

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q2 Trust Funds Information

Q2(l) Period in which amounts have been contracted by the WB for this TF (in format: "start year" - "end year")

Q2(m) Single-donor (SD) or multi-donor (MD) Trust Fund?

- Single Donor
 Multi Donor

Q2(n) If MD, please indicate the number of other donors

Q2(o) Estimated share of EC contribution in the total amount of the TF for the period covered by the EC contribution

- Less than 5 % Between 50% and 75%
 Between 5 and 20 % More than 75%
 Between 20 and 50 %

Q2(p) Please describe briefly the type of activities the TF is carrying out

Q2(q) Please indicate under which of the following categories, the TF concerned falls (please indicate only the category that is most relevant as in several cases, more than one category may apply). The definitions of the categories are explained in the explanatory note of the questionnaire.

- Bank-executed Trust Funds (BETF) Recipient-executed Trust Funds (RET) Financial Intermediary Funds (FIF)

Q2(r) Please give the TF website or source of information

Q3 Prior to the decision to contribute to the WB TF, did the Commission:

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q3(a) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the needs to which the TF was intended to respond?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q3(b) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the TF's objective?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q3(c) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the TF's governance mechanisms?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q3(d) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the TF's implementation mechanisms?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q3 Prior to the decision to contribute to the WB TF, did the Commission:

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q3(e) Consult the EU MS on the issue?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q4 Prior to the decision to contribute to the WB TF, did the Commission undertake or examine an analysis of alternative ways of funding this type of intervention? - e.g. through one or more of (please indicate):

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q4(a) other organisations (such as the UN, NGO)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q4(b) direct EC interventions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q4(c) no intervention at all	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q4(d) other	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q5 If other, please explain	<hr/> <hr/>		

Q6 Among the following, what were the main reasons for channeling through the WB?

	Critical	Important	Less important	No role in the decision	Do not know
Q6(a) The WB's comparative advantage in the sector	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(b) The WB's knowledge of the country/region	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(c) The WB's knowledge of the specific context (emergency, post-conflict etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(d) The WB's experience with managing large TFs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q6 Among the following, what were the main reasons for channeling through the WB?

	Critical	Important	Less important	No role in the decision	Do not know
Q6(e)	Complementing Bank loans with non-reimbursable TA				
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(f)	Reduced transaction costs for the beneficiary through the need to interface with only one donor for these activities				
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(g)	Reduced management costs for the Commission				
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(h)	Ability to influence the decisions related to the activities funded				
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(i)	Right to a seat in the decision-making forum (e.g. steering group) for the TF				
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(j)	Ensuring that the Commission is associated with the intervention				
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(k)	Desirability of a multilateral approach				
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(l)	The fact that such interventions could not be conducted by a single donor				
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q6(m)	The absorption capacity of the TF (allowing rapid disbursement of Commission funds)				
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q7	Does any official document exist that provides a justification for the decision to channel the funds?				
	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No	<input type="radio"/> Do not know		
Q8	If yes, please indicate which:				

Q9	Please indicate what in your opinion would have been done with the funds if they had not been channeled through a WB TF (see the explanatory note for definition of concept used in the multiple choice)				
	<input type="checkbox"/> They would have been used for direct implementation by the Commission <input type="checkbox"/> They would have been channeled through another organisation <input type="checkbox"/> They would have been allocated to another project/action <input type="checkbox"/> They would not have been used <input type="checkbox"/> Other				

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q10 If other, please explain

Q11 Prior to the decision did you have at your disposal formal guidance criteria that helped you decide whether or not to channel funds and through which organisation? Do you or would you consider such guidance useful?

	Yes	Available	No	Yes	Useful	No
Q11(a) Whether or not to channel funds	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>
Q11(b) Which channel to use	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>

Q12 If available, please state in which document

Q13 What was the role of the Commission in the set-up of the TF?

- None, the TF already existed
- The Commission was involved in the set-up of the TF as one of the donors
- The Commission had a leading role in the set-up of the TF
- The TF was created further to an explicit demand of the Commission

Q14 Please feel free to comment on the above question

Q15 Was the fact that the Commission contributed to this WB TF a factor that stimulated other donors to contribute also?

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q15(a) EU MS	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q15(b) Partner Country Authorities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q15 Was the fact that the Commission contributed to this WB TF a factor that stimulated other donors to contribute also?

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q15(c) WB (using specific conditions)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q15(d) UN	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q15(e) Other Development Banks	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q15(f) Other donors (please specify in the box below)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q16 Please feel free to comment on the above question

Q17 In your opinion would the TF activities have been implemented without the Commission's contribution?

Yes No

Q18 Please feel free to comment on the above question

Q19 Do you have any examples during the period 1999-2006 of planned WB TFs or of WB TF activities that either were not established or did not take place because the Commission decided not to participate?

Yes No

Q20 If yes, please explain

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q21 How would you assess the disbursement rate of funds from the TF to beneficiaries ?

	In line	Below	Above	No sufficient information on the disbursement rates to assess them
Q21(a) Compared to Commission's expectations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q21(b) Compared to the disbursement rates for similar intervention implemented directly by the Commission	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q22 For its contribution did the Commission:

	Yes	No
Q22(a) Earmark its funds de facto (i.e. creation of a separate TF within a more global initiative, to ensure compliance with EC requirements)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q22(b) Formally earmark its funds (i.e. impose a specific use for its funds) ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q22(c) Formally express "preferences" for the use of its funds (i.e. a donor request, not formally binding for the WB TF) ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q22(d) Undertake specific actions to ensure conformity with its objectives or, if that proved impossible, interrupt or stop the activity?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q23 If yes to one of the above questions, please explain

Q24 Was this earmarking/preference in relation to:

	Yes	No	Not applicable
Q24(a) sectors of intervention	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q24(b) geographical location	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q24 Was this earmarking/preference in relation to:

	Yes	No	Not applicable
Q24(c) activities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q24(d) beneficiaries to be targeted	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q25 Do you consider that the task manager of the Commission

	Yes	No
Q25(a) Received all or most of the agreed documents required (monitoring reports, evaluations, etc...)?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q25(b) Has documentary evidence on the degree of sustainable achievement of the results?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q25(c) Had sufficient resources to monitor this funding activity?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q25(d) Had the right in-house sectoral expertise monitor to this funding activity?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q25(e) Had sufficient interaction with the TFs managers in the WB to follow up the TF's progress?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q26 Have you been sufficiently informed on the activities and the results achieved? <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No		
Q27 Please feel free to comment on the two above questions		

Q28 How would you assess the results achieved by the TF:

	In line	Below	above	No sufficient information on the result to assess them
Q28(a) compared to the Commission's expectations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q28(b) compared to those achieved for similar interventions administered directly by the Commission	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q28 How would you assess the results achieved by the TF:

	In line	Below	above	No sufficient information on the result to assess them
Q28(c)	compared to those achieved for similar interventions implemented through an organisation other than the WB			
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q29 Please feel free to comment on the above question

Q30 Please feel free to comment on factors that enhanced or hampered the achievement of results?

Q31 Do you consider that by channeling funds through a WB TF the Commission has been able to widen the range of (financial) instruments it can offer to beneficiaries (for instance by financing through the TF TA related to WB loans)?

Yes No

Q32 If yes, please explain

Q33 Did you experience delays in the following areas:

	Yes	No	Do not know	Not applicable
Q33(a)	Period between the first identification study for the intervention and the Agreement proposal ?			
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q33(b) Period between the Agreement proposal and the signature of a Contribution Agreement between the Commission and the WB ?

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q33 Did you experience delays in the following areas:

	Yes	No	Do not know	Not applicable
Q33(c) Period between the signature of the Contribution Agreement and the signature of implementation contracts ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q33(d) Reporting by the WB (annual monitoring, evaluation reports, etc.) ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q33(e) Other	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q34 If other, please explain

Q35 Please feel free to comment on the two above questions

Q36 What are the management costs charged by the WB (in % of the Commission Contribution).

Q37 What do these management costs cover?

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q37(a) Intervention of the WB as Financial Intermediary Funds	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q37(b) Administration of the TF by the WB	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q37(c) Implementation of the activities by the WB	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q37(d) Other	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q38 If other, please explain

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q39 Do you consider that the Commission's management costs (WB management fee plus Commission costs for follow-up of the contribution) were:

	Lower	Higher	Comparable	Do not know
Q39(a) compared to direct Commission interventions ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q39(b) compared to EC funds through another organisation ?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q40 With respect to the EC-WB framework agreement (FA) and the annexed model for the administration agreement (AA):

	FA		AA	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Q40(a) Do you consider them to be sufficiently clear ? If not, please explain below	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q40(b) Do you know who to contact for questions regarding the FA / AA and their implementation?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q40(c) Do you consider the prescribed rules and procedures to be adequate for the channeling of funds through the WB? If not, please explain below	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q40(d) Do you consider that the prescribed rules and procedures contributed to facilitating the signature of an agreement with the WB? If not, please explain below	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q40(e) Did the EC and the World Bank Group have different interpretations of the FA / AA ? If yes, please explain below	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q40(f) Do you have any other comment on the application of the FA / AA? Please explain below	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q41 Please feel free to comment on the above question				

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q42 Please list the main factors that enhanced or hampered the efficiency of implementation?

Q43 Prior to contributing to the TF, did you agree with the WB on visibility clauses other than those provided for in the framework agreement, or constituting a specification of these?

Yes No

Q44 If yes, please explain

Q45 Were the agreed visibility clauses respected?

Yes No

Q46 Please feel free to comment on the above question

Q47 Do you consider that the following were sufficiently aware of the fact that the Commission was one of the donors to the TF?

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q47(a) Partner country officials	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q47(b) EU Member States	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q47(c) Other donors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q47(d) Final beneficiaries	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q47 Do you consider that the following were sufficiently aware of the fact that the Commission was one of the donors to the TF?

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q47(e) local stakeholders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q48 Do you consider that the following were aware of the magnitude of the Commission's contribution to the TF?

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q48(a) Partner country officials	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q48(b) EU Member States	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q48(c) Other donors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q48(d) Final beneficiaries	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q48(e) local stakeholders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q49 Did the Commission have a significant impact on the following in respect of the TF or its activities?

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q49(a) Design	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q49(b) Implementation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q49(c) Management	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q49(d) Evaluation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q50 Please feel free to comment on the above question

Q51 Was the Commission a member of the TF Steering Group (or equivalent)?

Yes No

Q52 If yes, did it participate in its meetings?

always in fewer than half the meetings
 with a few exceptions (almost) never

Q53 If (almost) never, please explain

Q54 Do you consider that the Commission's influence on the TF (activities, implementation, supervision and management, etc.) was at least satisfactory, taking into account the level of its contribution?

Yes No

Q55 Please feel free to comment on the above question

Q56 Are there EU MS that:

	Yes	No	Do not know
Q56(a) Contribute to the intervention but not through the WB (i.e. direct intervention, intervention through another organisation, etc.)?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q56(b) Decided not to contribute as the Commission is/was already contributing?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Q56(c) Is there close coordination of activities with the beneficiary authorities of the country?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Questionnaire on the Commission's Contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

Q57 Please feel free to comment on the above question

Q58 What mechanisms are in place for coordination with other activities in the country including those of the Commission? Please explain the role of the Commission in this respect.

Q59 What coordination mechanisms are in place to ensure consistency with the country's PRSP and respect for Paris Declaration principles? Please explain the role of the Commission in this respect.

Q60 Please feel free to provide any additional information that has not been tackled by the questionnaire

ADE's evaluation team would like to thank you for completing this questionnaire !

Clarification note on specific questions of the questionnaire on the Commission contributions to World Bank Trust Funds

A number of questions might require some clarifications that are provided hereafter. For any additional clarification, please do not hesitate to contact the evaluation team.

Q2 (q) (also Q39)

The World Bank distinguishes between three broad categories of TFs, which cover diverse donor interests, myriad Bank roles, and different partnership arrangements.

- 1) **Bank-Executed Trust Funds (BETFs)** are those for which the Bank has spending authority (for example, for procurement of consultants). BETFs support:
 - Key elements of the Bank's own work program, including analytical and advisory activities ;
 - Project-related activities in conjunction with IBRD/IDA-financed or as free-standing operations;
 - Partnership secretariats and TF administration.
- 2) **Recipient-Executed Trust Funds (RETFs)** are those which the Bank passes on to a third-party recipient. For these funds, the Bank normally plays an operational role including appraisal and supervision of funded activities. RETFs enable recipients to carry out development activities and typically finance the investment and recurrent needs of service delivery, capacity building and technical assistance activities. They are either explicitly linked to Bank-financed operations or are designed as stand-alone funds. They are most similar to IDA and IBRD lending programs which support country-based initiatives.
- 3) **Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs)** comprise a heterogeneous mix of TFs not covered by either BETFs or RETFs. They include funds with financial engineering and complex financial schemes, or arrangements in which the Bank provides specific administrative or financial services with a limited fiduciary or operational role. They typically encompass multi-donor financial initiatives designed to implement international agreements in support of global partnerships and programs. The major funds in this category include the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), Carbon Funds, and, more recently, the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm).

Q9 (but also for instance Q1, Q41, Q42)

- « Direct implementation » by the Commission should be understood as projects and programmes funded and managed by the Commission or by operators directly contracted by the Commission ;

- «Channelling through an organisation» should be understood as projects and programmes managed by an intermediary (for instance the World Bank, a United Nations body, an NGO) or by operators contacted by this intermediary, but for which the Commission provided funds directly to this intermediary. The contributions of the Commission to WB TFs typically fall under this category;

Q11

By “channel” we mean an organization (for instance the WB, the UN, an NGO) to which the Commission contributes for the administration and implementation of certain activities. As an example, for the Commissions contributions to the WB TFs, the WB is considered as the “channel”.

Q22

- Q22 (a): By “de facto earmarking” one should understand that in a situation where earmarking was not allowed, the Commission took other measures (such as the creation of a separate TF within a more global initiative) to make sure that it could comply with its requirements. As an example, within a global TF, for which EDF funds could be made available, the Commission and the WB could have decided to create a separate TF dedicated to ACP countries as EDF funds can only be used in ACP countries;
- Q22 (b): “Formal earmarking” in the sense of a clearly defined and compulsory use of Commission funds is normally not allowed for Commission contributions to WB TFs under the EC-WB F.A.. However there might be specific cases or exceptions which we would like to capture here
- Q22(c): “Formally expressed preferences” refer to cases where the Commission expresses in the administration agreement a preferred use of its fund (for instance for a specific sector or activity). Usually this means that there is no “tracking” of the Commission contributions, but that it is agreed that the TF as such should spend for the preferences expressed an amount that is at least equivalent to the amount the Commission is providing for this activity;

Q31

This question refers to for instance WB loans that have been prepared (for example a risk assessment) through means provided by the TF.

Q42

This question refers to the EC-WB framework agreement (FA) and the administration agreement (AA). For the AA, one should distinguish between the *model* annexed to the FA and the actual signed AA for a specific TF. All the questions refer to the model annexed to the FA.

Annex 7 – Survey results

1. Introduction

This annex presents a methodological synopsis of the responses to the survey on the Commission's contribution to World Bank Trust Funds (WB TFs). This survey was sent to Commission staff, at headquarter and in delegations, who were identified as being in charge of the Commission's contribution to one or more WB TFs.

The questionnaire is based on the Evaluation Questions of the Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB. It aims at gathering information on the decision-making process to contribute to a WB TF; the impact of channelling on the scaling up of aid; the results and impacts of channelling funds to a WB TF; the type of expertise provided by the WB; the cost reduction and implementation of a WB TF; the visibility; and the aspects of coordination and complementarities when channelling funds to a WB TF. The questionnaire has been submitted to the Reference Group and approved by the Joint Evaluation Unit before sending it to addressees. Furthermore a pilot test was conducted with two trust fund managers.

The questionnaire was introduced by a letter sent by the Joint Evaluation and was sent to addressees on 27 November 2007, with a request to complete it for 7 December 2007. To increase the number of responses two reminders were sent on respectively 10 and 17 December 2007. Upon request of some addressees the team accepted to extend the final deadline until 10 January 2008. A specific reminder was sent for this last deadline by the Joint Evaluation Unit.

The present note contains the following information:

- Characterisation of responses ;
- Approach for analysing the responses ;
- Appendix: Raw answers to the questionnaire.

2. Characterisation of responses

2.1 Number of Trust Funds covered

The table below displays the number of TF concerned by this evaluation, those for which addressees were identified and those for which responses were received. It also provides information on the rate of responses compared to the total number of TF and those for which a questionnaire was sent.

Table 1 – Number of TF covered

Total number of WB TF to which the Commission has contributed over the period 1999-2006	83
Adjusted number of addressees	60
Number of respondents	45
Rate of addresses on the total number of WB TF	72%
Rate of respondents on the total number of WB TF	54%
Rate of respondents on the adjusted number of addresses	75%

There were 83 WB Trust Funds over the evaluation period 1999-2006 that fell within the scope of the present evaluation. Initially, for 65 of these TF, addressees have been identified through the following sources:

- For 36 TF: through information contained in the CRIS database
- For 15 TF: communicated by Geo-coordinators (13)
- For 14 TF; addressees were identified with the support of the EuropeAid Evaluation Unit and the Reference Group members of this evaluation.

The questionnaire was therefore sent out for 65 TF (37 in Delegations and 28 at headquarter in Brussels). For 5 TF, addressees have informed the evaluation team that they were not the relevant person to address the questionnaire and could not indicate the person in charge of the Commission's contribution to that WB TF, hence the notion of "adjusted number of addressees".

Responses to the questionnaire were received for 45 TF, representing a rate of response of 54% on all WB TFs, and of 75% on the WB TFs for which a person in charge could be identified.

2.2 Types of trust funds covered

Responses to the questionnaire cover 91% of the total payments received by the WB from the Commission for the period 1999-2005¹. Indeed, in that period payments were received for 69 TF representing € 2.3 B and responses relate to 36 TF representing € 2.1 B. Out of the 14 TF signed in 2006, answers to the questionnaire have been received for 9 TF covering a total amount committed by the Commission that represents in total between € 107.5 M and € 326 M.

The 45 responses can be characterised as follows.

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¹ Data on Commission payments to WB TF have been collected until 2005 (see Inventory Note)

Table 2 - Location of respondents

Commission headquarters	21	47%
Commission delegations	24	53%
Total	45	100%

Table 3 - Location of the activities of the WB TF

Country level	30	67%
Regional level	8	16%
Global level	6	18%
Empty response	1	2%
Total	45	100%

Table 4 - Year of signature of Commission-WB contribution agreement²

Year of signature	<1999	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Number of answers	2	1	1	3	5	5	8	8	11
Number of answers (%)	4%	2%	2%	7%	11%	11%	18%	18%	24%

Table 5 - Status of Commission's contribution to WB TF

On-going	35	78%
Completed	8	18%
Empty response	2	4%
Total	45	100%

Table 6 - Commission's commitments to WB TF

<€1M	6	13%
€1M-€5 M	12	27%
€5M-€10M	5	11%
€10M-€35M	8	18%
€35M-€100M	8	18%
>€100M	6	13%
Total	45	100%

A little more than 50% of the respondents are in charge of Commission's contribution to a WB TF equal to or below € 10 M and 50 % are in charge of contributions above € 10 M.

■ _____
² One respondent did not specify the year of the first signature.

Table 7 - Single-donor versus multi-donor WB TF

Single-donor TF (SDTF)	33	73%
Multi-donor TF (MDTF)	12	27%
Total	45	100%

Table 8 - WB role in TF³

Bank-Executed TF (BETF)	22	49%
Recipient-Executed TF (RETF)	20	44%
Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF)	2	4%
Total	45	100%

3. Approach for analysing responses

The raw responses to the questionnaire are shown in the appendix to the present Annex 11. They are presented firstly as a list with absolute numbers, secondly as relative numbers (as % of the 45 TF responses). They are structured per question, as totals and with a categorisation in terms of location of respondent (HQ or Delegation), single-donor vs. multi-donor TFs, size of the Commission's contribution to the TF, level of TF activities (country, regional, global), and responsibilities (Bank-executed TF, recipient-executed TF, financial intermediary fund).

The main findings emerging from the 45 responses to the questionnaire are integrated into the present volume in section 3.2 on Preliminary Findings. They present responses in terms of the above-mentioned categories (single/multi-donor TF, size of the contributions, etc.) as well as according to other types of analysis such as their correlation coefficient with responses to other questions of the questionnaire.

■ _____

³ Bank-Executed TF (BETF) are TF for which the WB has spending authority.
 Recipient-Executed TF (RETF) are TF for which the WB passes funds on to a third party recipient
 , Financial Intermediary Funds (FIF) are TF for which the WB provide specific administration or financial services with a limited fiduciary or operational role.
 Note. These notions were explained in the questionnaire.

Questionnaire Results – Table of absolute numbers

Questionnaire on the Commission's contributions to World Bank Trust Funds
Absolute Numbers

Total	#	EC	HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Coun-try	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF
100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2

The decision to contribute to a WB TF

Q3 Prior to the decision to contribute to the WB TF, did the Commission:

Q3(a) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the needs to which the TF was intended to respond?

Yes	71%	32	13	19	8	24	3	9	5	6	5	4	24	3	5	14	16	1
No	4%	2	1	1	1	1				1	1		1	1		1	1	
Do not know	24%	11	7	4	3	8	3	3		1	2	2	5	3	3	7	3	1
Empty responses	0%																	

Q3(b) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the TF's objective?

Yes	71%	32	13	19	8	24	3	9	5	6	5	4	24	4	4	14	16	1
No	7%	3	2	1	1	2		1		1	1		1	1	1	2	1	
Do not know	22%	10	6	4	3	7	3	2		1	2	2	5	2	3	6	3	1
Empty responses	0%																	

Q3(c) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the TF's governance mechanisms?

Yes	60%	27	14	13	6	21	3	7	3	5	5	4	18	5	4	11	14	1
No	13%	6	1	5	2	4		2	2	1	1		5	1		3	3	
Do not know	24%	11	6	5	3	8	3	3		1	2	2	6	1	4	7	3	1
Empty responses	2%	1		1	1					1			1			1		

Q3(d) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the TF's implementation mechanisms?

Yes	69%	31	14	17	8	23	4	10	3	6	4	4	21	5	5	16	13	1
No	13%	6	2	4	2	4		1	2	1	2		5	1		2	4	
Do not know	18%	8	5	3	2	6	2	1		1	2	2	4	1	3	4	3	1
Empty responses	0%																	

Q3(e) Consult the EU MS on the issue?

Yes	69%	31	12	19	7	24	4	6	3	7	7	4	23	5	3	11	18	1
No	22%	10	5	5	3	7	1	4	2	1	1	1	7	1	2	8	2	
Do not know	9%	4	4		2	2	1	2				1	1	3	3	3	1	
Empty responses	0%																	

Q4 Prior to the decision to contribute to the WB TF, did the Commission undertake or examine an analysis of alternative ways of ft

Q4(a) Other organisations (such as the UN, NGO)

Yes	40%	18	7	11	4	14	1	5	2	3	4	3	15	1	2	9	8	1
No	29%	13	6	7	5	8	2	4	3	2		2	8	1	4	8	4	
Do not know	27%	12	6	6	3	9	3	3		3	2	1	6	4	2	4	7	1
Empty responses	4%	2	2		2								1	1		1	1	

Q4(b) Direct EC interventions

Yes	40%	18	5	13	6	12	1	5	4	2	3	3	17	1		8	10	
No	22%	10	6	4	2	8	2	4	1	2			1	5	1	4	7	2
Do not know	31%	14	8	6	3	11	3	3		3	3	2	6	4	4	5	7	2
Empty responses	7%	3	2	1	1	2				1	2		2	1		2	1	

Q4(c) No intervention at all

Yes	24%	11	6	5	11	1	6	1	1	1	1	1	7	1	3	7	3	
No	31%	14	5	9	5	9	1	2	4	3	1	3	12	1	1	7	7	
Do not know	29%	13	7	6	4	9	4	3		3	1	2	6	4	3	6	6	1
Empty responses	16%	7	3	4	3	4		1		1	5		5	1	1	2	4	1

Q4(d) Other

Yes	11%	5	4	1		5					4	1	4	1		3	2	
No	29%	13	6	7	3	10	1	3	2	3	1	3	10	1	2	7	6	
Do not know	40%	18	8	10	3	15	3	8	1	3	1	2	9	4	5	8	8	1
Empty responses	20%	9	3	6	6	3	2	1	2	2	2		7	1	1	4	4	1

Q6 Among the following, what were the main reasons for channeling through the WB?

Q6(a) The WB's comparative advantage in the sector

Critical	20%	9	2	7	2	7	1	3	2	1		2	7		2	6	2	1
Important	44%	20	10	10	7	13	3	5	3	4	3	2	13	2	5	10	8	1
Less important	20%	9	6	3	1	8	1	1		2	3	2	7	1	1	4	5	
No role in the decision	4%	2		2	1	1							2			2		
Do not know	11%	5	3	2	1	4	1	3		1			1	4		2	3	
Empty responses	0%																	

Q6(b) The WB's knowledge of the country/region

Critical	2%	1		1		1						1	1				1	
Important	40%	18	6	12	6	12	3	4	3	4	4		13	3	2	8	9	1
Less important	29%	13	8	5	3	10	2	4	1	2	1	3	10		3	9	3	
No role in the decision	16%	7	3	4	2	5		1	1	1	2	2	4		3	3	3	1
Do not know	11%	5	3	2	1	4	1	3		1			1	4		2	3	
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1							1			1		

Q6(c) The WB's knowledge of the specific context (emergency, post-conflict etc.)

Critical	16%	7	2	5	2	5		3	1	2	1		5	1	1	3	4	
Important	29%	13	6	7	4	9	1	3	3	2	1	3	9	1	3	6	6	1
Less important	27%	12	9	3	2	10	1	3	1	4	3	7	7	1	4	5	5	1
No role in the decision	13%	6		6	2	4	3		1	1	1		6			5	1	
Do not know	11%	5	3	2	1	4	1	3		1			1	4		2	3	
Empty responses	4%	2	1	1	1	1				1	1		2			1	1	

Q6(d) The WB's experience with managing large TF

Critical	16%	7	4	3	1	6				2	4	1	4	2	1	2	4	1
Important	58%	26	12	14	7	19	3	8	3	5	4	3	19	3	4	14	10	1
Less important	7%	3	1	2	1	2		1	1			1	3			1	2	
No role in the decision	9%	4	2	2	2	2	2	1	1						2	3	1	
Do not know	11%	5	2	3	1	4	1	2		1		1	2	2	1	2	3	
Empty responses	0%																	

Q6(e) Complementing Bank loans with non-reimbursable TA

Critical	2%	1		1		1							1					1
Important	9%	4	2	2	1	3		1		1	2		2	2		2	2	
Less important	16%	7	2	5	3	4		2	2	2	1	7			3	4		
No role in the decision	56%	25	13	12	6	19	5	6	2	6	2	4	16	3	6	14	9	1
Do not know	16%	7	3	4	2	5	1	3		1	1	1	3	2	2	3	3	1
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1							1			1		

Q6(f) Reduced transaction costs for the beneficiary through the need to interface with only one donor for these activities

Critical	18%	8	2	6	1	7	1	2		2	2	1	6	2		3	5	
Important	40%	18	8	10	5	13	3	4	2	4	3	2	14	2	2	11	5	2
Less important	9%	4	3	1	1	3		1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	
No role in the decision	22%	10	5	5	4	6	1	3	2	2	1	1	6		4	5	5	

	Total	# EC HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF	
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2
Do not know	7%	3	2	1	1	2		2				1	2	2	1	2	1	
Empty responses	4%	2	1	1		2	1				1	2					2	
Q6(g) Reduced management costs for the Commission																		
Critical	7%	3	2	1		3		2			1	1	1	1	1	3		
Important	36%	16	7	9	7	9	2	5	2	3	3	1	11	3	2	6	10	
Less important	24%	11	3	8	1	10	3	2	2	2	1	1	9	1	1	6	4	
No role in the decision	20%	9	6	3	2	7		1	1	2	2	3	7		2	4	4	1
Do not know	11%	5	3	2	1	4	1	2			1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1
Empty responses	2%	1	0	1		1						1				1		
Q6(h) Ability to influence the decisions related to the activities funded																		
Critical	4%	2	0	2		2					1	2					2	
Important	40%	18	4	14	5	13	2	6	3	3	4	15	2	1	8	9		
Less important	24%	11	8	3	3	8	1	1	2	3	2	2	8	2	1	7	4	
No role in the decision	20%	9	6	3	3	6	2	2		1	2	2	4		5	4	3	2
Do not know	11%	5	3	2	1	4	1	3				1	1	3	1	3	2	
Empty responses	0%	0	0															
Q6(i) Right to a seat in the decision-making forum (e.g. steering group) for the TF																		
Critical	9%	4	1	3		4				2		2	4			1	3	
Important	38%	17	9	8	1	16	2	5	1	3	4	2	10	4	3	8	7	1
Less important	29%	13	3	10	8	5	2	2	4	2	3		13			7	6	
No role in the decision	13%	6	5	1	2	4	1	3		1		1	2	1	3	4	2	
Do not know	11%	5	3	2	1	4	1	2			1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1
Empty responses	0%	0	0															
Q6(j) Ensuring that the Commission is associated with the intervention																		
Critical	16%	7	2	5	2	5	1			3		3	7			4	3	
Important	47%	21	10	11	5	16	3	6	1	4	6	1	15	3	3	10	9	1
Less important	18%	8	4	4	2	6		3	4			1	5	2	1	4	4	
No role in the decision	9%	4	2	2	2	2	1	1		1			2		2	2	2	
Do not know	9%	4	2	2	1	3	1	2				1	1	2	1	2	2	
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1					1			1				1
Q6(k) Desirability of a multilateral approach																		
Critical	36%	16	6	10	3	13	1	2	2	3	4	4	14	1	1	8	7	1
Important	36%	16	8	8	4	12	3	3	3	3	3	1	11	3	2	9	7	
Less important	9%	4	2	2	1	3		3		1			2	1	1	1	2	
No role in the decision	9%	4	2	2	3	1	1	2		1			2		2	2	2	
Do not know	9%	4	2	2	1	3	1	2				1	1	2	1	2	2	
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1								1				1
Q6(l) The fact that such interventions could not be conducted by a single donor																		
Critical	24%	11	5	6	1	10		1	1	3	2	4	8	2	1	4	6	1
Important	27%	12	7	5	3	9	2	2	1	2	3	2	8	2	2	8	4	
Less important	13%	6	1	5	1	5	1	2	2	1			5		1	2	3	
No role in the decision	24%	11	5	6	6	5	2	5	1	2	1		7	1	3	7	4	
Do not know	9%	4	2	2	1	3	1	2				1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1						1						1
Q6(m) The absorption capacity of the TF (allowing rapid disbursement of Commission funds)																		
Critical	9%	4	3	1		4		1		1		2	2		2	1	2	1
Important	29%	13	2	11	5	8	2	3	1	4	3		12	1		5	8	
Less important	31%	14	6	8	4	10	2	4	3	2	1	2	10	2	2	9	4	
No role in the decision	18%	8	6	2	2	6	1	2	1	1	2	1	4	2	2	5	3	
Do not know	11%	5	3	2	1	4	1	2			1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1						1						1
Q7 Does any official document exist that provides a justification for the decision to channel the funds?																		
Yes	58%	26	12	14	5	21	1	9	3	5	3	5	17	4	5	15	10	1
No	7%	3	1	2	2	1		1		1		1	3			3		
Do not know	33%	15	7	8	5	10	5	2	2	2	4		9	3	3	7	6	1
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1					1		1					1
Q9 Please indicate what in your opinion would have been done with the funds if they had not been channeled through a WB TF (see the explanatory note for definition of concept used in the multiple choice)																		
They would have been used for direct implementation by the Commission	36%	16	4	12	6	10	2	5	3	1	1	2	12		2	8	6	
They would have been channeled through another organisation	24%	11	6	5		11	1				3	3	6	1		1	6	
They would have been allocated to another project/action	40%	18	12	6	4	14	3	4	1	4	2		7	2	4	9	4	
They would not have been used	7%	3		3	1	2		1		1			2			1	1	
Other	0%																	
Empty responses	0%							2	1	2	2	1	3	3	2	3	3	2
Q11 Prior to the decision did you have at your disposal formal guidance criteria that helped you decide whether or not to channel funds																		
Q11(a) avai Whether or not to channel funds																		
Yes	20%	9	2	7	4	5		2	1	3	2	1	8	1		2	7	
No	62%	28	15	13	7	21	4	7	4	5	3	5	18	3	7	17	9	1
Empty responses	18%	8	4	4	1	7	2	3			3		4	3	1	3	4	1
Q11(a) use Whether or not to channel funds																		
Yes	38%	17	7	10	3	14	2	5	2	6	2		12	3	2	8	9	
No	20%	9	4	5	3	6	1	2	2	1	3		6		3	5	3	1
Empty responses	42%	19	10	9	6	13	3	5	1	2	5	3	12	4	3	9	8	1
Q12(b) avai Which channel to use																		
Yes	20%	9	3	6	3	6		3	1	2	2	1	7	1	1	2	7	
No	58%	26	13	13	7	19	4	6	4	5	3	4	18	3	5	15	9	1
Empty responses	22%	10	5	5	2	8	2	3		1	3	1	5	3	2	5	4	1
Q12(b) use Which channel to use																		
Yes	40%	18	7	11	4	14	2	5	3	6	2		13	3	2	9	9	
No	18%	8	4	4	2	6	1	2	1		1	3	5		3	4	3	1
Empty responses	42%	19	10	9	6	13	3	5	1	2	5	3	12	4	3	9	8	1
Q13 What was the role of the Commission in the set-up of the TF?																		
None, the TF already existed	16%	7	3	4	1	6		6			1		3	2	2	3	2	1

	Total	# EC HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF	
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2
The Commission was involved in the set-up of the TF as one of the donors	44%	20	9	11	1	19	3	3	1	5	5	3	13	2	4	6	12	1
The Commission had a leading role in the set-up of the TF	27%	12	6	6	3	9	2	1	1	2	2	3	7	2	1	7	3	
The TF was created further to an explicit demand of the Commission	16%	7	2	5	7		2		3	1		5		1	4	2		
Empty responses								2				2	1		2	1		

Impact of the channeling on the scaling up of aid

Q15 Was the fact that the Commission contributed to this WB TF a factor that stimulated other donors to contribute also?

Note: Figures in this question should be read having in mind that "Empty responses" include all responses of single-donor TF

Q15(a) **EU MS**

Yes	40%	18	11	7		18	2	3	2	2	3	6	11	3	4	10	7	1
No	18%	8	2	6		8	1	5		1	1		5	1	2	3	4	
Do not know	13%	6	4	2		6		1		3	2		3	2	1	2	3	1
Empty responses	29%	13	4	9	12	1	3	3	3	2	2		11	1	1	7	6	

Q15(b) **Partner Country Authorities**

Yes	18%	8	4	4		8		1		4	2	1	4	2	2	2	5	1
No	31%	14	9	5		14	2	6	1	1	2	2	8	3	3	9	4	
Do not know	18%	8	2	6		8	1	2	1	1	2	1	6	1	1	2	5	1
Empty responses	33%	15	6	9	12	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	12	1	2	9	6	

Q15(c) **WB (using specific conditions)**

Yes	22%	10	6	4		10	2	2		2	2	2	6	1	3	6	3	1
No	29%	13	7	6		13		6	2	2	1	2	7	4	2	6	6	
Do not know	16%	7	3	4		7	1	1		2	2	1	5	1	1	2	4	1
Empty responses	33%	15	5	10	12	3	3	3	3	2	3	1	12	1	2	8	7	

Q15(d) **UN**

Yes	4%	2	1	1		2					1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
No	51%	23	12	11		23	3	8	2	5	3	2	14	5	4	12	10	
Do not know	11%	5	2	3		5		1		1	2	1	3	1	1	1	3	1
Empty responses	33%	15	6	9	12	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	12	1	2	9	6	

Q15(e) **Other Development Banks**

Yes	4%	2	1	1		2	1				1	1		1	1	1	1	1
No	47%	21	11	10		21	1	8	2	4	4	2	13	4	4	10	10	
Do not know	16%	7	3	4		7	1	1		2	2	1	4	2	1	2	4	1
Empty responses	33%	15	6	9	12	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	12	1	2	9	6	

Q15(f) **Other donors (please specify in the box below)**

Yes	27%	12	8	4		12	2	1	1	1	3	4	8	2	2	6	5	1
No	27%	12	4	8		12		7	1	2	1	1	7	2	3	5	6	
Do not know	16%	7	4	3		7	1	1		3	2		4	2	1	3	3	1
Empty responses	31%	14	5	9	12	2	3	3	3	2	2	1	11	1	2	8	6	

Q17 In your opinion would the TF activities have been implemented without the Commission's contribution?

Yes	56%	25	14	11		5	20	4	6	2	4	5	4	17	3	5	10	12	2
No	42%	19	6	13		6	13	2	5	3	4	3	2	13	3	3	11	8	
Empty responses	2%	1	1	1		1		1						1	1	1			

Q19 Do you have any examples during the period 1999-2006 of planned WB TF or of WB TF activities that either were not established

Yes	4%	2	2			2				1	1			1	1		1	1	
No	91%	41	18	23		10	31	6	11	4	7	7	6	29	5	7	20	19	1
Empty responses	4%	2	1	1		2		1	1				1	1	1	2			

Q21 How would you assess the disbursement rate of funds from the TF to beneficiaries?

Q21(a) **Compared to Commission's expectations**

In line	44%	20	12	8		2	18	4	5	2	3	1	5	10	4	6	11	7	1
Below	42%	19	6	13		7	12	2	6	1	5	4	1	16	3		8	11	
Above	0%	0																	
No sufficient information on the disbursement rates to assess them	7%	3	1	2		2	1		1	2			2		1				
Empty responses	7%	3	2	1		1	2		1	2		3		2		1	3	2	1

Q21(b) **Compared to the disbursement rate for similar interventions implemented directly by the Commission**

In line	36%	16	10	6		2	14	2	5	2	2	2	3	8	2	6	7	8	
Below	33%	15	5	10		7	8	2	6		4	3		12	3		8	7	
Above	9%	4	2	2		1	3	1	1		1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1
No sufficient information on the disbursement rates to assess them	18%	8	2	6		2	6	1		3	1	1	2	7	1				
Empty responses	4%	2	2			2						2	1		1	5	4	1	

Results/Impact

Q22 For its contribution did the Commission:

Q22(a) **Earmark its funds de facto (i.e. creation of a separate TF within a more global initiative, to ensure compliance with EC requirements)**

Yes	27%	12	6	6		5	7	3	1	2	1	4	1	9	1	2	6	5	1
No	71%	32	15	17		6	26	3	11	3	6	4	5	20	6	6	15	15	1
Empty responses	2%	1	1	1		1							1			1			

Q22(b) **Formally earmark its funds (i.e. impose a specific use for its funds)?**

Yes	42%	19	8	11		6	13	3	3	2	4	4	3	14	3	2	8	10	1
No	56%	25	13	12		5	20	3	9	3	3	4	3	15	4	6	13	10	1
Empty responses	2%	1	1	1		1							1			1			

Q22(c) **Formally express "preferences" for the use of its funds (i.e. a donor request, not formally binding for the WB TF)?**

Yes	27%	12	5	7		4	8	2	2	1	4	3	10	2		5	7		
No	67%	30	13	17		8	22	4	10	4	4	6	2	20	4	6	15	13	1
Empty responses	7%	3	3			3					2	1		1	2	2	2	1	

Q22(d) **Undertake specific actions to ensure conformity with its objectives or, if that proved impossible, interrupt or stop it**

Yes	27%	12	4	8		4	8	2	2	3	1	2	9	2	1	3	8		
No	62%	28	14	14		6	22	4	8	3	4	6	3	20	3	5	16	11	1
Empty responses	11%	5	3	2		2	3		2	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	

Q24 Was this earmarking/preference in relation to:

Q24(a) **sectors of intervention**

Yes	38%	17	7	10		6	11	4	2	1	5	2	3	14	1	2	6	10	1
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	Total	# EC HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF	
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2
No	13%	6	2	4	2	4		1	2		2	1	6			4	2	
Not applicable	40%	18	11	7	3	15	2	8	2	1	4	1	7	6	5	8	8	1
Empty responses	9%	4	1	3	1	3		1	2		1	3		1	4			
Q24(b) geographical location																		
Yes	31%	14	7	7	5	9	2	1	2	2	5	2	10	2	2	6	7	1
No	27%	12	5	7	4	8	2	3	1	3	1	2	10	1	1	7	5	
Not applicable	33%	15	8	7	2	13	2	7	2	1	2	1	6	4	5	6	7	1
Empty responses	9%	4	1	3	1	3		1	2		1	4			3	1		
Q24(c) activities																		
Yes	47%	21	9	12	7	14	4	3	3	7	1	3	16	3	2	10	10	1
No	9%	4	2	2	1	3				1			2	1	4		2	
Not applicable	33%	15	8	7	2	13	2	7	1		4	1	7	3	5	6	7	1
Empty responses	11%	5	2	3	2	3		2		1	1	1	3	1	1	4	1	
Q24(d) beneficiaries to be targeted																		
Yes	20%	9	3	6	4	5	1	2		3	1	2	6	1	2	3	6	
No	33%	15	6	9	5	10	3	1	3	3	3	2	14		1	9	5	1
Not applicable	38%	17	10	7	2	15	2	7	2	1	4	1	7	5	5	7	8	1
Empty responses	9%	4	2	2	1	3		2		1	1	3	1	1	3	1		
Q25 Do you consider that the task manager of the Commission																		
Q25(a) Received all or most of the agreed documents required (monitoring reports, evaluations, etc...)?																		
Yes	71%	32	16	16	6	26	5	7	4	6	5	5	21	5	6	16	14	2
No	24%	11	3	8	5	6	1	4	1	2	2	1	8	1	2	5	5	
Empty responses	4%	2	2		1	1					1		1	1		1	1	
Q25(b) Has documentary evidence on the degree of sustainable achievement of the results?																		
Yes	49%	22	8	14	2	20	4	5	1	6	4	2	17	2	3	11	10	1
No	44%	20	10	10	9	11	2	6	4	2	3	3	12	4	4	9	9	1
Empty responses	7%	3	3		1	2		1		1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	
Q25(c) Had sufficient resources to monitor this funding activity?																		
Yes	53%	24	10	14	5	19	3	6	4	5	4	2	17	3	4	13	9	1
No	33%	15	7	8	5	10	3	4	1	2	3	2	10	2	3	6	8	1
Empty responses	13%	6	4	2	2	4		2		1	1	2	3	2	1	3	3	
Q25(d) Had the right in-house sectoral expertise monitor to this funding activity?																		
Yes	67%	30	14	16	5	25	5	7	4	6	5	3	20	4	6	16	12	1
No	24%	11	4	7	6	5	1	3	1	2	2	2	9	1	1	4	6	1
Empty responses	9%	4	3	1	1	3		2		1	1	1	2	1	2	2		
Q25(e) Had sufficient interaction with the TF managers in the WB to follow up the TF's progress?																		
Yes	60%	27	13	14	5	22	5	7	4	4	5	2	18	3	6	15	10	1
No	31%	14	5	9	6	8	1	3	1	4	2	3	11	2	1	5	8	1
Empty responses	9%	4	3	1	1	3		2		1	1	1	2	1	2	2		
Q26 Have you been sufficiently informed on the activities and the results achieved?																		
Yes	69%	31	16	15	5	26	5	7	4	5	6	4	19	5	7	16	13	1
No	27%	12	3	9	6	6	1	4	1	3	1	2	10	1	1	5	6	1
Empty responses	4%	2	2		1	1		1		1	1	1	1	1		1	1	
Q28 How would you assess the results achieved by the TF:																		
Q28(a) compared to the Commission's expectations																		
In line	56%	25	15	10	3	22	5	5	3	3	4	5	14	4	7	14	8	2
Below	42%	19	5	14	8	11	1	6	2	5	4	1	16	2	1	7	12	
Above	0%	0																
No sufficient information on the results to assess them	2%	1	1		1			1						1		1		
Empty responses	0%	0																
Q28(b) compared to those achieved for similar interventions administered directly by the Commission																		
In line	47%	21	10	11	6	15	4	5	3	3	4	2	13	3	5	11	7	2
Below	20%	9	1	8	4	5	1	3	1	3	2		8	1		2	7	
Above	2%	1	1		1			1					1			1		
No sufficient information on the results to assess them	31%	14	10	4	1	13	1	4	1	2	2	4	8	3	3	8	6	
Empty responses	0%	0																
Q28(c) compared to those achieved for similar interventions implemented through an organisation other than the WB																		
In line	44%	20	8	12	3	17	4	5	1	5	4	1	13	2	5	8	9	2
Below	7%	3	1	2	2	1		3					2	1		1	2	
Above	9%	4	3	1	1	3					2	2	3	1		1	3	
No sufficient information on the results to assess them	38%	17	8	9	6	11	2	4	4	3	1	3	11	3	3	12	5	
Empty responses	2%	1	1		1					1		1				1		
Providing additional expertise																		
Q31 Do you consider that by channeling funds through a WB TF the Commission has been able to widen the range of (financial) instruments it can offer to beneficiaries (for instance by financing through the TF TA related to WB loans)?																		
Yes	33%	15	8	7	2	13	1	4	1	4	4	1	10	3	2	8	6	1
No	60%	27	10	17	9	18	5	7	4	4	3	4	20	3	4	12	14	
Empty responses	7%	3	3		1	2		1		1	1	1	1	2	2	2		
Cost Reduction & Implementation																		
Q33 Did you experience delays in the following areas:																		
Q33(a) Period between the first identification study for the intervention and the Agreement proposal ?																		
Yes	20%	9	3	6	4	5	2	4		2	1		7	1	1	5	4	
No	58%	26	11	15	6	20	1	5	5	6	5	4	18	3	5	12	12	1
Do not know	11%	5	2	3	1	4	2	3					2	3		3	2	
Not applicable	9%	4	4		1	3	1				1	2	2		2	2	1	1
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1							1				1	
Q33(b) Period between the Agreement proposal and the signature of a Contribution Agreement between the Commission a																		
Yes	24%	11	4	7	4	7	2	5		2	1	1	8	1	2	5	5	1
No	56%	25	12	13	6	19	1	4	5	5	6	4	17	3	5	12	11	1
Do not know	11%	5	2	3	1	4	2	3					2	3		3	2	
Not applicable	4%	2	2		1	1	1					1	1		1	1	1	
Empty responses	4%	2	1	1		2				1	1	2				1	1	
Q33(c) Period between the signature of the Contribution Agreement and the signature of implementation contracts ?																		
Yes	33%	15	6	9	7	8		4	3	5	2	1	12	2	1	7	8	
No	36%	16	7	9	2	14	2	3	2	1	5	3	11	1	4	8	7	1
Do not know	16%	7	4	3	1	6	2	4		1			2	4	1	3	3	
Not applicable	11%	5	3	2	2	3	2	1				2	3		2	3	1	1

	Total	#EC HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultID	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Coun-try	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF	
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2
Empty responses	4%	2	1	1	2				1	1		2			1	1		
Q33(d) Reporting by the WB (annual monitoring, evaluation reports, etc.) ?																		
Yes	42%	19	6	13	10	9	3	6	2	3	3	2	14	2	3	10	9	
No	49%	22	11	11	1	21	3	5	3	5	4	2	14	4	4	11	9	1
Do not know	2%	1	1		1			1						1		1		
Not applicable	4%	2	2		2						2	1		1			1	1
Empty responses	2%	1	1		1					1		1					1	
Q33(e) Other																		
Yes	16%	7	2	5	2	5	2	2	1	1		1	5	1	1	3	4	
No	13%	6	2	4	1	5		1	2		2	1	5	1		3	3	
Do not know	9%	4	4		2	2	1	2		1			2	1	1	3		
Not applicable	20%	9	6	3	9	2		2	2	2	3	6	1	2	3	5	1	
Empty responses	42%	19	7	12	7	12	3	5	2	4	4	1	12	3	4	10	8	1
Q37 What do these management costs cover?																		
Q37(a) Intervention of the WB as Financial Intermediary Funds																		
Yes	33%	15	9	6	2	13	1	4	2	4	1	3	9	4	2	8	6	1
No	29%	13	5	8	4	9	1	5	3	1	1	2	9	2	2	8	5	
Do not know	20%	9	3	6	4	5	3	2	2	2		7	1	1	3	6		
Empty responses	18%	8	4	4	2	6	1	1		1	4	1	5		3	3	3	1
Q37(b) Administration of the TF by the WB																		
Yes	73%	33	13	20	9	24	2	12	5	5	5	4	22	6	5	16	15	1
No	7%	3	1	2	1	2	1	2				1	2	1		1	2	
Do not know	9%	4	2	2	2	2	3			1			3		1	2	2	
Empty responses	11%	5	2			5				1	2	2	3		2	3	1	1
Q37(c) Implementation of the activities by the WB																		
Yes	20%	9	2	7	4	5	1	2	2	1	2	1	7	2		5	4	
No	51%	23	12	11	3	20	1	8	3	4	3	4	15	4	4	11	11	1
Do not know	13%	6	3	3	3	3	1		2			4	1	1	3	3		
Empty responses	16%	7	4	3	2	5	1	1		1	3	1	4		3	3	2	1
Q37(d) Other																		
Yes	22%	10	4	6	3	7		3		1	4	2	6	2	2	3	6	1
No	18%	8	4	4	1	7		3	1	1	2	1	5	2	1	4	4	
Do not know	22%	10	5	5	3	7	3	3	1	2		1	8		2	6	4	
Empty responses	38%	17	8	9	5	12	3	3	3	4	2	2	11	3	3	9	6	1
Q39 Do you consider that the Commission's management costs (WB management fee plus Commission costs for follow-up of the c compared to direct Commission interventions ?																		
Lower	31%	14	3	11	4	10		3	2	4	2	3	13	1		1	13	
Higher	18%	8	2	6	3	5	2	3	1		2		6	1	1	5	3	
Comparable	22%	10	7	3	2	8	3	3		1	2	1	4	3	3	7	2	1
Do not know	24%	11	7	4	3	8	1	3	2	3	1	1	6	2	3	8	1	1
Empty responses	4%	2	2			2					1	1	1		1	1	1	
Q39(b) compared to EC funds through another organisation ?																		
Lower	44%	20	7	13	4	16	1	3	2	4	6	4	17	2	1	6	13	1
Higher	2%	1		1	1			1					1			1		
Comparable	27%	12	8	4	3	9	5	5				6	2	4	9	2		
Do not know	22%	10	4	6	4	6		3	3	2	1	1	5	3	2	6	3	1
Empty responses	4%	2	2		2	2					1	1	1		1	1	1	
Q40 With respect to the EC-WB framework agreement (FA) and the annexed model for the administration agreement (AA):																		
Q40(a) FA Do you consider them to be sufficiently clear ? If not, please explain below																		
Yes	73%	33	14	19	10	23	6	7	5	7	6	2	22	4	7	16	14	2
No	13%	6	3	3	1	5		3		1	2	5	1		4	2		
Empty responses	13%	6	4	2	1	5		2		2	2	3	2	1	2	4		
Q40(a) AA Do you consider them to be sufficiently clear ? If not, please explain below																		
Yes	71%	32	13	19	8	24	6	8	4	5	5	4	22	3	7	14	15	2
No	13%	6	3	3	2	4		3		2		1	5	1		3	3	
Empty responses	16%	7	5	2	2	5		1	1	1	3	1	3	3	1	5	2	
Q40(b) FA Do you know who to contact for questions regarding the FA / AA and their implementation?																		
Yes	69%	31	11	20	9	22	4	9	4	8	4	2	23	4	4	14	16	
No	16%	7	5	2	2	5	2	1	1		1	2	4	1	2	6		1
Empty responses	16%	7	5	2	1	6		2		1	3	2	3	2	2	4	1	
Q40(b) AA Do you know who to contact for questions regarding the FA / AA and their implementation?																		
Yes	73%	33	13	20	8	25	4	10	3	7	5	4	25	3	5	13	18	1
No	11%	5	3	2	2	3	2	1	1			1	2	1	2	4		1
Empty responses	16%	7	5	2	2	5		1	1	1	3	1	3	3	1	5	2	
Q40(c) FA Do you consider the prescribed rules and procedures to be adequate for the channeling of funds through the WB ?																		
Yes	76%	34	14	20	10	24	6	9	5	6	5	3	24	4	6	17	15	1
No	4%	2	1	1	1	1		1		1		1	1		1	1		
Empty responses	20%	9	6	3	1	8		2		1	3	3	5	2	2	4	4	1
Q40(c) AA Do you consider the prescribed rules and procedures to be adequate for the channeling of funds through the WB ?																		
Yes	76%	34	15	19	9	25	6	10	4	5	4	5	24	3	7	16	15	2
No	7%	3	1	2	1	2		1	1	1		2	1		1	2		
Empty responses	18%	8	5	3	2	6		1	1	2	3	1	4	3	1	5	3	
Q40(d) FA Do you consider that the prescribed rules and procedures contributed to facilitating the signature of an agreement																		
Yes	73%	33	13	20	8	25	4	8	5	8	5	3	24	5	4	17	15	1
No	9%	4	2	2	3	1	2	2				2	2		2	2	1	
Empty responses	18%	8	6	2	1	7		2			3	3	4	2	3	4	1	
Q40(d) AA Do you consider that the prescribed rules and procedures contributed to facilitating the signature of an agreement																		
Yes	73%	33	13	20	7	26	4	9	4	7	4	5	25	4	4	15	17	1
No	9%	4	2	2	3	1	2	2				2	2		2	2	1	
Empty responses	18%	8	6	2	2	6		1	1	1	4	1	3	3	2	5	2	1
Q40(e) FA Did the EC and the World Bank Group have different interpretations of the FA / AA ? If yes, please explain below																		
Yes	22%	10	3	7	4	6	2	5		1	1	1	7	1	2	5	5	
No	58%	26	12	14	7	19	4	5	5	6	4	2	18	4	4	14	10	1
Empty responses	20%	9	6	3	1	8		2		1	3	3	5	2	2	3	5	1
Q40(e) AA Did the EC and the World Bank Group have different interpretations of the FA / AA ? If yes, please explain below																		
Yes	31%	14	4	10	5	9	2	5	1	2	2	2	11	1	2	6	8	
No	49%	22	11	11	4	18	4	5	3	5	3	2	14	3	5	11	8	2
Empty responses	20%	9	6	3	3	6		2	1	1	3	2	5	3	1	5	4	
Q40(f) FA Do you have any other comment on the application of the FA / AA ? Please explain below																		
Yes	9%	4	3	1		4		2				2	1	1	2	1	1	1
No	67%	30</																

Total	#EC HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF	
100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2

Q40(f) AA Do you have any other comment on the application of the FA / AA? Please explain below

Yes	16%	7	3	4	2	5	2	1	1	1	2	4	1	2	1	4	1
No	58%	26	11	15	6	20	5	8	3	4	3	20	3	3	13	12	1
Empty responses	27%	12	7	5	4	8	1	2	1	3	4	1	6	3	8	4	

Visibility

Q43 Prior to contributing to the TF, did you agree with the WB on visibility clauses other than those provided for in the framework agreement, or constituting a specification of these?

Yes	22%	10	3	7	6	4	3	1	1	1	2	2	8	2	5	4	1
No	64%	29	15	14	5	24	3	9	4	6	4	3	19	5	5	14	13
Empty responses	13%	6	3	3	1	5	2	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	

Q45 Were the agreed visibility clauses respected?

Yes	56%	25	12	13	4	21	2	4	4	6	5	4	17	4	4	12	11
No	24%	11	3	8	5	6	2	7	2	2	2	2	8	2	1	6	5
Empty responses	20%	9	6	3	3	6	2	1	1	3	2	5	1	3	4	4	1

Q47 Do you consider that the following were sufficiently aware of the fact that the Commission was one of the donors to the TF?

Q47(a) Partner country officials

Yes	71%	32	11	21	8	24	5	6	3	8	6	4	25	3	4	15	16
No	20%	9	7	2	2	7	3	3	2	2	2	5	2	2	4	3	1
Do not know	9%	4	3	1	2	2	1	3				2	2	2	3	1	
Empty responses	0%	0															

Q47(b) EU Member States

Yes	84%	38	17	21	8	30	5	8	4	7	8	6	28	4	6	17	18
No	4%	2		2	2				1	1			2			1	1
Do not know	11%	5	4	1	2	3	1	4					3	2	4	1	
Empty responses	0%	0															

Q47(c) Other donors

Yes	71%	32	15	17	4	28	5	5	2	7	7	6	24	4	4	15	15
No	11%	5	1	4	4	1	2	1	1	1			4		1	1	3
Do not know	18%	8	5	3	4	4	1	5	2				2	3	3	6	2
Empty responses	0%	0															

Q47(d) Final beneficiaries

Yes	24%	11	3	8	4	7	1	1	2	4	2	1	8	1	2	5	5
No	40%	18	7	11	4	14	2	5	3	2	4	2	14	2	2	9	8
Do not know	36%	16	11	5	4	12	3	6	2	2	3	8	4	4	8	7	
Empty responses	0%	0															

Q47(e) Local stakeholders

Yes	36%	16	3	13	5	11	3	1	2	5	4	1	13	1	2	6	9
No	29%	13	6	7	3	10	1	5	2	1	2	2	10	1	2	7	5
Do not know	36%	16	12	4	4	12	2	6	1	2	2	3	7	5	4	9	6
Empty responses	0%	0															

Q48 Do you consider that the following were aware of the magnitude of the Commission's contribution to the TF?

Q48(a) Partner country officials

Yes	60%	27	9	18	7	20	4	4	3	6	6	4	22	3	2	9	17
No	27%	12	8	4	3	9	1	5	2	1	2	1	7	2	3	9	2
Do not know	11%	5	4	1	2	3	1	3				1	2	3	3	1	1
Empty responses	2%	1		1		1									1		

Q48(b) EU Member States

Yes	76%	34	15	19	7	27	4	5	3	8	8	6	26	4	4	12	19
No	11%	5	2	3	2	3	1	3	1				3		2	5	
Do not know	13%	6	4	2	3	3	1	4	1				1	3	2	5	1
Empty responses	0%	0															

Q48(c) Other donors

Yes	58%	26	13	13	3	23	4	3	2	7	5	5	19	4	3	11	13
No	18%	8	2	6	4	4	1	3	1	1	2		6		2	6	2
Do not know	22%	10	5	5	5	5	1	5	2		1	1	5	3	2	5	5
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1		1							1		

Q48(d) Final beneficiaries

Yes	11%	5	1	4	3	2			2	2	1		4		1	2	2
No	58%	26	11	15	6	20	3	7	3	4	5	4	19	3	4	13	12
Do not know	29%	13	8	5	3	10	3	5	2	1	2	7	3	3	6	6	
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1					1		1		1		

Q48(e) Local stakeholders

Yes	20%	9	1	8	4	5	1		3	3	1	1	8		1	4	4
No	44%	20	9	11	5	15	2	6	1	3	5	3	15	1	4	9	10
Do not know	33%	15	10	5	3	12	3	5	1	2	2	2	7	5	3	8	6
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1		1					1		1		

Q49 Did the Commission have a significant impact on the following in respect of the TF or its activities?

Q49(a) Design

Yes	51%	23	9	14	7	16	3	3	4	5	5	3	18	3	2	11	12
No	36%	16	9	7	3	13		7	1	3	2	3	10	2	4	8	6
Do not know	13%	6	3	3	2	4	3	2				1	2	2	3	2	1
Empty responses	0%	0															

Q49(b) Implementation

Yes	38%	17	7	10	1	16	2	2	2	4	4	3	12	3	2	6	10
No	58%	26	13	13	10	16	4	9	3	3	4	3	17	3	6	14	10
Do not know	4%	2	1	1	1	1		1		1		1	1		2		
Empty responses	0%	0															

Q49(c) Management

Yes	31%	14	6	8	2	12	2	2	3	3	3	1	9	4	1	6	8
No	62%	28	12	16	9	19	4	9	2	5	4	4	20	2	6	15	11
Do not know	7%	3	3		1	2		1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Empty responses	0%	0															

Q49(d) Evaluation

Yes	42%	19	7	12	6	13	2	3	3	6	3	2	14	3	2	7	11
No	49%	22	11	11	5	17	3	8	2	2	3	4	14	2	6	12	8
Do not know	7%	3	2	1	1	2	1	1				1	1	2	3		
Empty responses	2%	1	1			1						1					1

Q51 Was the Commission a member of the TF Steering Group (or equivalent)?

Yes	76%	34	15	19	7	27	3	9	4	6	8	4	24	5	5	15	16
No	22%	10	5	5	4	6	3	2	1	2	2	2	6	1	3	6	4
Empty responses	2%	1	1		1	1		1					1		1		

Q52 If yes, did it participate in its meetings?

	Total	#EC	HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Coun-try	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2
always	56%	25	13	12	2	23	1	6	4	4	7	3	17	4	4	13	10	1
with a few exceptions	11%	5	1	4	1	4	1			2	1	1	4		1	1	3	1
in fewer than half the meetings	7%	3	1	2	3		1	2					3			1	2	
(almost) never	13%	6	2	4	4	2	3	1	1	1			4	1	1	3	3	
Empty responses	13%	6	4	2	2	4		3		1		2	2	2	2	4	2	

Q54 Do you consider that the Commission's influence on the TF (activities, implementation, supervision and management, etc.) wa

Yes	69%	31	14	17	6	25	3	7	4	7	7	3	22	4	5	17	12	1
No	20%	9	4	5	4	5	1	3	1	1		3	7	1	1	3	6	
Empty responses	11%	5	3	2	2	3	2	2			1		1	2	2	2	2	1

Coordination & complementarity

Q56 Are there EU MS that:

Q56(a) Contribute to the intervention but not through the WB (i.e. direct intervention, intervention through another organisation, etc.)?

Yes	36%	16	7	9	5	11	2	2	2	4	3	3	13	2	1	7	8	1
No	47%	21	6	15	5	16	3	6	3	4	3	2	16	3	2	10	11	
Do not know	13%	6	6		2	4	1	4			1		2	4	4			1
Empty responses	4%	2	2		2					1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	

Q56(b) Decided not to contribute as the Commission is/was already contributing?

Yes	7%	3	2	1	1	2	1				1	1	1		2	2		1
No	47%	21	8	13	3	18	3	5	2	5	4	2	16	3	2	10	11	
Do not know	42%	19	10	9	7	12	2	7	3	2	2	3	11	4	4	9	8	1
Empty responses	4%	2	1	1	1	1				1	1		2			1	1	

Q56(c) Is there close coordination of activities with the beneficiary authorities of the country?

Yes	64%	29	12	17	5	24	4	6	2	6	6	5	22	4	3	12	15	2
No	16%	7	3	4	3	4	1	2	2	2	1		5	1	1	3	3	
Do not know	16%	7	4	3	4	3	2	4	1				2	2	3	6	1	
Empty responses	4%	2	2		2					1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	

Questionnaire Results – Table of relative numbers

Questionnaire on the Commission's contributions to World Bank Trust Funds
Relative Numbers

Total	# EC HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF
100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2

The decision to contribute to a WB TF

Q3 Prior to the decision to contribute to the WB TF, did the Commission:

Q3(a) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the needs to which the TF was intended to respond?

Yes	71%	32	62%	79%	67%	73%	50%	75%	100%	75%	63%	67%	80%	50%	63%	64%	80%	50%
No	4%	2	5%	4%	8%	3%				13%	13%	3%	17%			5%	5%	
Do not know	24%	11	33%	17%	25%	24%	50%	25%		13%	25%	33%	17%	50%	38%	32%	15%	50%
Empty responses	0%																	

Q3(b) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the TF's objective?

Yes	71%	32	62%	79%	67%	73%	50%	75%	100%	75%	63%	67%	80%	67%	50%	64%	80%	50%
No	7%	3	10%	4%	8%	6%		8%		13%	13%	3%	17%	13%	9%	5%		
Do not know	22%	10	29%	17%	25%	21%	50%	17%		13%	25%	33%	17%	33%	27%	15%	50%	
Empty responses	0%																	

Q3(c) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the TF's governance mechanisms?

Yes	60%	27	67%	54%	50%	64%	50%	58%	60%	63%	63%	67%	60%	83%	50%	50%	70%	50%
No	13%	6	5%	21%	17%	12%		17%	40%	13%	13%	17%	17%			14%	15%	
Do not know	24%	11	29%	21%	25%	24%	50%	25%		13%	25%	33%	20%	17%	50%	32%	15%	50%
Empty responses	2%	1		4%	8%					13%		3%				5%		

Q3(d) Undertake or examine a documented analysis of the TF's implementation mechanisms?

Yes	69%	31	67%	71%	67%	70%	67%	83%	60%	75%	50%	67%	70%	83%	63%	73%	65%	50%
No	13%	6	10%	17%	17%	12%		8%	40%	13%	25%	17%	17%		9%	20%		
Do not know	18%	8	24%	13%	17%	18%	33%	8%		13%	25%	33%	13%	17%	38%	18%	15%	50%
Empty responses	0%																	

Q3(e) Consult the EU MS on the issue?

Yes	69%	31	57%	79%	58%	73%	67%	50%	60%	88%	88%	67%	77%	83%	38%	50%	90%	50%
No	22%	10	24%	21%	25%	21%	17%	33%	40%	13%	13%	17%	23%	17%	25%	36%	10%	
Do not know	9%	4	19%		17%	6%	17%	17%		17%		17%	17%	17%	38%	14%		50%
Empty responses	0%																	

Q4 Prior to the decision to contribute to the WB TF, did the Commission undertake or examine an analysis of alternative ways of funding this type of intervention? - e.g. through one or more of (please indicate):

Q4(a) Other organisations (such as the UN, NGO)

Yes	40%	18	33%	46%	33%	42%	17%	42%	40%	38%	50%	50%	50%	17%	25%	41%	40%	50%
No	29%	13	29%	29%	42%	24%	33%	33%	60%	25%		33%	27%	17%	50%	36%	20%	
Do not know	27%	12	29%	25%	25%	27%	50%	25%		38%	25%	17%	20%	67%	25%	18%	35%	50%
Empty responses	4%	2	10%		6%					25%		3%	17%		5%	5%		

Q4(b) Direct EC Interventions

Yes	40%	18	24%	54%	50%	36%	17%	42%	80%	25%	38%	50%	57%	17%		36%	50%	
No	22%	10	29%	17%	17%	24%	33%	33%	20%	25%		17%	17%	50%	32%	10%		
Do not know	31%	14	38%	25%	25%	33%	50%	25%		38%	38%	33%	20%	67%	50%	23%	35%	100%
Empty responses	7%	3	10%	4%	8%	6%				13%	25%		7%	17%		9%	5%	

Q4(c) No intervention at all

Yes	24%	11	29%	21%		33%	17%	50%	20%	13%	13%	17%	23%	17%	38%	32%	15%	
No	31%	14	24%	38%	42%	27%	17%	17%	80%	38%	13%	50%	40%	17%	13%	32%	35%	
Do not know	29%	13	33%	25%	33%	27%	67%	25%		38%	13%	33%	20%	67%	38%	27%	30%	50%
Empty responses	16%	7	14%	17%	25%	12%		8%		13%	63%		17%	17%	13%	9%	20%	50%

Q4(d) Other

Yes	11%	5	19%	4%		15%				50%	17%	13%	17%		14%	10%		
No	29%	13	29%	29%	25%	30%	17%	25%	40%	38%	13%	50%	33%	17%	25%	32%	30%	
Do not know	40%	18	38%	42%	25%	45%	50%	67%	20%	38%	13%	33%	30%	67%	63%	36%	40%	50%
Empty responses	20%	9	14%	25%	50%	9%	33%	8%	40%	25%	25%		23%	17%	13%	18%	20%	50%

Q6 Among the following, what were the main reasons for channeling through the WB?

Q6(a) The WB's comparative advantage in the sector

Critical	20%	9	10%	29%	17%	21%	17%	25%	40%	13%		33%	23%		25%	27%	10%	50%
Important	44%	20	48%	42%	58%	39%	50%	42%	60%	50%	38%	33%	43%	33%	63%	45%	40%	50%
Less important	20%	9	29%	13%	8%	24%	17%	8%		25%	38%	33%	23%	17%	13%	18%	25%	
No role in the decision	4%	2		8%	8%	3%				25%			7%				10%	
Do not know	11%	5	14%	8%	8%	12%	17%	25%		13%			3%	67%		9%	15%	
Empty responses	0%																	

Q6(b) The WB's knowledge of the country/region

Critical	2%	1		4%		3%						17%	3%				5%	
Important	40%	18	29%	50%	50%	36%	50%	33%	60%	50%	50%		43%	50%	25%	36%	45%	50%
Less important	29%	13	38%	21%	25%	30%	33%	33%	20%	25%	13%	50%	33%		38%	41%	15%	
No role in the decision	16%	7	14%	17%	17%	15%		8%	20%	13%	25%	33%	13%		38%	14%	15%	50%
Do not know	11%	5	14%	8%	8%	12%	17%	25%		13%			3%	67%		9%	15%	
Empty responses	2%	1		5%		3%						13%		3%			5%	

Q6(c) The WB's knowledge of the specific context (emergency, post-conflict etc.)

Critical	16%	7	10%	21%	17%	15%		25%	20%	25%	13%		17%	13%	14%	20%		
Important	29%	13	29%	29%	33%	27%	17%	25%	60%	25%	13%	50%	30%	17%	38%	27%	30%	50%
Less important	27%	12	43%	13%	17%	30%	17%	25%		13%	50%	50%	23%	17%	50%	23%	25%	50%
No role in the decision	13%	6		25%	17%	12%	50%		20%	13%	13%		20%			23%	5%	
Do not know	11%	5	14%	8%	8%	12%	17%	25%		13%			3%	67%		9%	15%	
Empty responses	4%	2	5%	4%	8%	3%				13%	13%		7%			5%	5%	

Q6(d) The WB's experience with managing large TF

Critical	16%	7	19%	13%	8%	18%				25%	50%	17%	13%	33%	13%	9%	20%	50%
Important	58%	26	57%	58%	58%	58%	50%	67%	60%	63%	50%	50%	63%	50%	50%	64%	50%	50%
Less important	7%	3	5%	8%	8%	6%		8%	20%			17%	10%			5%	10%	
No role in the decision	9%	4	10%	8%	17%	6%	33%	8%	20%				7%		25%	14%	5%	
Do not know	11%	5	10%	13%	8%	12%	17%	17%		13%			17%	7%	33%	13%	9%	15%
Empty responses	0%																	

Q6(e) Complementing Bank loans with non-reimbursable TA

Critical	2%	1		4%		3%			20%				3%				5%	
Important	9%	4	10%	8%	8%	9%		8%		13%	25%		7%	33%		9%	10%	
Less important	16%	7	10%	21%	25%	12%		17%	40%		25%	17%	23%			14%	20%	
No role in the decision	56%	25	62%	50%	50%	58%	83%	50%	40%	75%	25%	67%	53%	50%	75%	64%	45%	50%
Do not know	16%	7	14%	17%	17%	15%	17%	25%		13%	13%	17%	10%	33%	25%	14%	15%	50%
Empty responses	2%	1		5%		3%						13%					5%	

Q6(f) Reduced transaction costs for the beneficiary through the need to interface with only one donor for these activities

Critical	18%	8	10%	25%	8%	21%	17%	17%		25%	25%	17%	20%	33%		14%	25%	
Important	40%	18	38%	42%	42%	39%	50%	33%	40%	50%	38%	33%	47%	33%	25%	50%	25%	100%
Less important	9%	4	14%	4%	8%	9%		8%	20%		13%	17%	7%	17%	13%	5%	10%	
No role in the decision	22%	10	24%	21%	33%	18%	17%	25%	40%	25%	13%	17%	20%		50%	23%	25%	
Do not know	7%	3	10%	4%	8%	6%		17%						33%	13%	9%	5%	
Empty responses	4%	2	5%	4%		6%	17%				13%		7%				10%	

Q6(g) Reduced management costs for the Commission

	Total	#	EC	HQ	DEC	SingleD	Multid	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2	
Q6(h) <i>Ability to influence the decisions related to the activities funded</i>																			
Critical	7%	3	10%	4%	9%	17%	9%	17%	13%	17%	7%	3%	17%	13%	14%				
Important	36%	16	33%	38%	58%	27%	33%	42%	40%	38%	38%	17%	37%	50%	25%	27%	50%		
Less important	24%	11	14%	33%	8%	30%	50%	17%	40%	25%	13%	17%	30%	17%	13%	27%	20%		
No role in the decision	20%	9	29%	13%	17%	21%	8%	20%	25%	25%	50%	23%	25%	18%	20%	50%			
Do not know	11%	5	14%	8%	8%	12%	17%	17%		13%	17%	3%	33%	25%	9%	10%	50%		
Empty responses	2%	1		4%	8%														
Q6(i) <i>Right to a seat in the decision-making forum (e.g. steering group) for the TF</i>																			
Critical	9%	4	5%	13%	12%	12%	48%	33%	42%	20%	38%	50%	33%	33%	67%	38%	5%	15%	50%
Important	38%	17	43%	33%	8%	48%	33%	42%	20%	38%	50%	33%	33%	67%	38%	36%	35%	50%	
Less important	29%	13	14%	42%	67%	15%	33%	17%	80%	25%	38%		43%			32%	30%		
No role in the decision	13%	6	24%	4%	17%	12%	17%	25%		13%	17%	17%	7%	17%	38%	18%	10%		
Do not know	11%	5	14%	8%	8%	12%	17%	17%		13%	17%	3%	33%	25%	9%	10%	50%		
Empty responses	0%	0																	
Q6(j) <i>Ensuring that the Commission is associated with the intervention</i>																			
Critical	16%	7	10%	21%	17%	15%	17%			38%		50%	23%			18%	15%		
Important	47%	21	48%	46%	42%	48%	50%	50%	20%	50%	75%	17%	50%	50%	38%	45%	45%	50%	
Less important	18%	8	19%	17%	17%	18%		25%	80%		17%	17%	33%	13%	18%	20%			
No role in the decision	9%	4	10%	8%	17%	6%	17%	8%		13%	13%		7%	25%	9%	10%			
Do not know	9%	4	10%	8%	8%	9%	17%	17%				17%	3%	33%	13%	9%	10%		
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		3%						13%				13%				50%
Q6(k) <i>Desirability of a multilateral approach</i>																			
Critical	36%	16	29%	42%	25%	39%	17%	17%	40%	38%	50%	67%	47%	17%	13%	36%	35%	50%	
Important	36%	16	38%	33%	33%	36%	50%	25%	60%	38%	38%	17%	37%	50%	25%	41%	35%		
Less important	9%	4	10%	8%	8%	9%		25%		13%			7%	17%	13%	5%	10%		
No role in the decision	9%	4	10%	8%	25%	3%	17%	17%		13%			7%	25%	9%	10%			
Do not know	9%	4	10%	8%	8%	9%	17%	17%				17%	3%	33%	13%	9%	10%		
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		3%						13%				13%				50%
Q6(l) <i>The fact that such interventions could not be conducted by a single donor</i>																			
Critical	24%	11	24%	25%	8%	30%		8%	20%	38%	25%	67%	27%	33%	13%	18%	30%	50%	
Important	27%	12	33%	21%	25%	27%	33%	17%	20%	25%	38%	33%	27%	33%	25%	36%	20%		
Less important	13%	6	5%	21%	8%	15%	17%	17%	40%	13%			17%	13%	9%	15%			
No role in the decision	24%	11	24%	25%	50%	15%	33%	42%	20%	25%	13%		23%	17%	38%	32%	20%		
Do not know	9%	4	10%	8%	8%	9%	17%	17%		13%			3%	33%	13%	5%	10%	50%	
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		3%						13%			3%		5%			
Q6(m) <i>The absorption capacity of the TF (allowing rapid disbursement of Commission funds)</i>																			
Critical	9%	4	14%	4%	12%	12%	8%		13%		33%	7%		25%	5%	10%	50%		
Important	29%	13	10%	46%	42%	24%	33%	25%	20%	50%	38%	40%	17%		23%	40%			
Less important	31%	14	29%	33%	33%	30%	33%	33%	60%	25%	13%	33%	33%	33%	25%	41%	20%		
No role in the decision	18%	8	29%	8%	17%	18%	17%	20%	13%	25%	17%	13%	33%	25%	23%	15%			
Do not know	11%	5	14%	8%	8%	12%	17%	17%		13%	17%	3%	33%	25%	9%	10%	50%		
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		3%						13%				10%	5%			
Q7 Does any official document exist that provides a justification for the decision to channel the funds?																			
Yes	58%	26	57%	58%	42%	64%	17%	75%	60%	63%	38%	83%	57%	67%	63%	68%	50%	50%	
No	7%	3	5%	8%	17%	3%	8%		13%		17%	10%				15%			
Do not know	33%	15	33%	33%	42%	30%	83%	17%	40%	25%	50%		30%	50%	38%	32%	30%	50%	
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		3%						13%		3%			5%			
Q9 Please indicate what in your opinion would have been done with the funds if they had not been channeled through a WB TF (see the explanatory note for definition of concept used in the multiple choice)																			
They would have been used for direct implementation by the Commission	36%	16	19%	50%	50%	30%	33%	42%	60%	13%	13%	33%	40%	10%	25%	36%	30%		
They would have been channeled through another organisation	24%	11	29%	21%	33%	17%					38%	50%	20%	17%		5%	30%		
They would have been allocated to another project/action	40%	18	57%	25%	33%	42%	50%	33%	20%	50%	25%		23%	33%	50%	41%	20%		
They would not have been used	7%	3	0%	13%	8%	6%		8%		13%			7%	0%	0%	5%	5%		
Other	0%																		
Empty responses	0%								17%	20%	25%	25%	17%	10%	50%	25%	14%	15%	100%
Q11 Prior to the decision did you have at your disposal formal guidance criteria that helped you decide whether or not to channel funds and through which organisation? Do you or would you consider such guidance useful?																			
Q11(a) avail <i>Whether or not to channel funds</i>																			
Yes	20%	9	10%	29%	33%	15%		17%	20%	38%	25%	17%	27%	17%		9%	35%		
No	62%	28	71%	54%	58%	64%	67%	58%	80%	63%	38%	83%	60%	50%	88%	77%	45%	50%	
Empty responses	18%	8	19%	17%	8%	21%	33%	25%		38%		13%	50%	13%	14%	20%	50%		
Q11(a) use <i>Whether or not to channel funds</i>																			
Yes	38%	17	33%	42%	25%	42%	33%	42%	40%	75%	25%	40%	50%	25%	36%	45%			
No	20%	9	19%	21%	25%	18%	17%	17%	40%		13%	50%	20%	38%	23%	15%	50%		
Empty responses	42%	19	48%	38%	50%	39%	50%	42%	20%	25%	63%	50%	40%	67%	41%	40%	50%		
Q12(b) ava <i>Which channel to use</i>																			
Yes	20%	9	14%	25%	25%	18%		25%	20%	25%	25%	17%	23%	17%	13%	9%	35%		
No	58%	26	62%	54%	58%	58%	67%	50%	80%	63%	38%	67%	60%	50%	63%	68%	45%	50%	
Empty responses	22%	10	24%	21%	17%	24%	33%	25%		13%	38%	17%	17%	50%	25%	23%	20%	50%	
Q12(b) use <i>Which channel to use</i>																			
Yes	40%	18	33%	46%	33%	42%	33%	42%	60%	75%	25%		43%	50%	25%	41%	45%		
No	18%	8	19%	17%	17%	18%	17%	17%	20%		13%	50%	17%		38%	18%	15%	50%	
Empty responses	42%	19	48%	38%	50%	39%	50%	42%	20%	25%	63%	50%	40%	67%	38%	41%	40%	50%	
Q13 What was the role of the Commission in the set-up of the TF?																			
None, the TF already existed	16%	7	14%	17%	8%	18%		50%			13%		10%	33%	25%	14%	10%	50%	
The Commission was involved in the set-up of the TF as one of the donors	44%	20	43%	46%	8%	58%	50%	25%	20%	63%	63%	50%	43%	33%	50%	27%	60%	50%	
The Commission had a leading role in the set-up of the TF	27%	12	29%	25%	25%	27%	33%	8%	20%	25%	25%	50%	23%	33%	13%	32%	15%		

	Total	# EC HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF	
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2
The TF was created further to an explicit demand of the Commission	16%	7	10%	21%	58%		33%		60%	13%		17%		13%	18%	10%		
Empty responses								17%				7%	17%		9%	5%		

Impact of the channelling on the scaling up of aid

Q15 Was the fact that the Commission contributed to this WB TF a factor that stimulated other donors to contribute also?

Note: Figures in this question should be read having in mind that "Empty responses" include all responses of single-donor TF

Q15(a)	EU MS	Yes	No	Do not know	Empty responses	100%	9%	50%	25%	60%	25%	25%	33%	40%	17%	25%	41%	30%	
Q15(b)	Partner Country Authorities	Yes	No	Do not know	Empty responses	18%	8	19%	17%	24%	33%	50%	20%	13%	25%	33%	27%	50%	38%
Q15(c)	WB (using specific conditions)	Yes	No	Do not know	Empty responses	22%	10	29%	17%	30%	33%	17%	40%	25%	25%	33%	20%	17%	38%
Q15(d)	UN	Yes	No	Do not know	Empty responses	4%	2	5%	4%	6%	50%	67%	40%	63%	38%	33%	47%	83%	50%
Q15(e)	Other Development Banks	Yes	No	Do not know	Empty responses	4%	2	5%	4%	6%	17%	67%	40%	50%	50%	33%	43%	67%	50%
Q15(f)	Other donors (please specify in the box below)	Yes	No	Do not know	Empty responses	27%	12	38%	17%	36%	33%	8%	20%	13%	38%	67%	27%	33%	25%

Q17 In your opinion would the TF activities have been implemented without the Commission's contribution?

Yes	56%	25	67%	46%	42%	61%	67%	50%	40%	50%	63%	67%	57%	50%	63%	45%	60%	100%
No	42%	19	29%	54%	50%	39%	33%	42%	60%	50%	38%	33%	43%	50%	38%	50%	40%	
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		8%			8%					17%			5%		

Q19 Do you have any examples during the period 1999-2006 of planned WB TF or of WB TF activities that either were not established or did not take place because the Commission decided not to participate?

Yes	4%	2	10%		6%	100%	92%	80%	13%	13%	100%	97%	17%	13%			5%	50%
No	91%	41	86%	96%	83%				88%	88%		83%	88%	91%	95%			
Empty responses	4%	2	5%	4%	17%		8%	20%				3%	17%		9%			

Q21 How would you assess the disbursement rate of funds from the TF to beneficiaries?

Q21(a)	Compared to Commission's expectations	In line	Below	Above	No sufficient information on the disbursement rates to assess them	Empty responses	44%	19	29%	54% <th>58%</th> <th>36%</th> <th>33% <th>50% <th>20%</th> <th>63%</th> <th>50% <th>17%</th> <th>53%</th> <th>50%</th> <th>75%</th> <th>50%</th> <th>35%</th> <th>50%</th> </th></th></th>	58%	36%	33% <th>50% <th>20%</th> <th>63%</th> <th>50% <th>17%</th> <th>53%</th> <th>50%</th> <th>75%</th> <th>50%</th> <th>35%</th> <th>50%</th> </th></th>	50% <th>20%</th> <th>63%</th> <th>50% <th>17%</th> <th>53%</th> <th>50%</th> <th>75%</th> <th>50%</th> <th>35%</th> <th>50%</th> </th>	20%	63%	50% <th>17%</th> <th>53%</th> <th>50%</th> <th>75%</th> <th>50%</th> <th>35%</th> <th>50%</th>	17%	53%	50%	75%	50%	35%	50%		
Q21(b)	Compared to the disbursement rate for similar interventions implemented directly by the Commission	In line	Below	Above	No sufficient information on the disbursement rates to assess them	Empty responses	36%	16	48%	25%	58%	24%	33%	50%	40%	50%	38%	17%	40%	50%	50%	27%	33%	75%	32%	40%

Results/Impact

Q22 For its contribution did the Commission:

Q22(a)	Earmark its funds de facto (i.e. creation of a separate TF within a more global initiative, to ensure compliance with EC requirements)	Yes	No	Empty responses	27%	12	29% <th>25% <th>42% <th>21% <th>50% <th>8% <th>40% <th>13% <th>50% <th>17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	25% <th>42% <th>21% <th>50% <th>8% <th>40% <th>13% <th>50% <th>17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	42% <th>21% <th>50% <th>8% <th>40% <th>13% <th>50% <th>17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	21% <th>50% <th>8% <th>40% <th>13% <th>50% <th>17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	50% <th>8% <th>40% <th>13% <th>50% <th>17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	8% <th>40% <th>13% <th>50% <th>17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	40% <th>13% <th>50% <th>17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	13% <th>50% <th>17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	50% <th>17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	17% <th>30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th></th>	30% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th></th>	17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th></th>	25% <th>27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th></th>	27% <th>25% <th>50% </th></th>	25% <th>50% </th>	50%
Q22(b)	Formally earmark its funds (i.e. impose a specific use for its funds)?	Yes	No <td>Empty responses</td> <td>42%</td> <td>19</td> <td>38%</td> <td>46%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>39%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>25%</td> <td>40%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>47%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>25%</td> <td>36%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>50%</td> <td></td>	Empty responses	42%	19	38%	46%	50%	39%	50%	25%	40%	50%	50%	47%	50%	25%	36%	50%	50%	
Q22(c)	Formally express "preferences" for the use of its funds (i.e. a donor request, not formally binding for the WB TF)?	Yes	No <td>Empty responses</td> <td>27%</td> <td>12</td> <td>24%</td> <td>29%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>24%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>17%</td> <td>20%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>25%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>33%</td> <td></td> <td>23%</td> <td>35%</td> <td></td>	Empty responses	27%	12	24%	29%	33%	24%	33%	17%	20%	50%	25%	50%	33%	33%		23%	35%	
Q22(d)	Undertake specific actions to ensure conformity with its objectives or, if that proved impossible, interrupt or stop the activity?	Yes	No <td>Empty responses</td> <td>27%</td> <td>12</td> <td>19%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>24%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>17%</td> <td>40%</td> <td>38%</td> <td>13%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>30%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>13%</td> <td>14%</td> <td>40%</td> <td></td>	Empty responses	27%	12	19%	33%	33%	24%	33%	17%	40%	38%	13%	33%	30%	33%	13%	14%	40%	

Q24 Was this earmarking/preference in relation to:

Q24(a)	sectors of intervention	Yes	No	Not applicable	Empty responses	38%	17	33% <th>42% <th>50% <th>33% <th>67% <th>17% <th>20% <th>63% <th>25% <th>50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	42% <th>50% <th>33% <th>67% <th>17% <th>20% <th>63% <th>25% <th>50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	50% <th>33% <th>67% <th>17% <th>20% <th>63% <th>25% <th>50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	33% <th>67% <th>17% <th>20% <th>63% <th>25% <th>50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	67% <th>17% <th>20% <th>63% <th>25% <th>50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	17% <th>20% <th>63% <th>25% <th>50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	20% <th>63% <th>25% <th>50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	63% <th>25% <th>50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th></th></th>	25% <th>50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th></th>	50% <th>47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th></th>	47% <th>17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th></th>	17% <th>25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th></th>	25% <th>27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th></th>	27% <th>50% <th>50%</th> </th>	50% <th>50%</th>	50%
Q24(b)	geographical location	Yes	No <td>Not applicable <td>Empty responses</td> <td>31%</td> <td>14</td> <td>33%</td> <td>29%</td> <td>42%</td> <td>27%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>8%</td> <td>40%</td> <td>25%</td> <td>63%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>25%</td> <td>27%</td> <td>35%</td> <td>50%</td> </td>	Not applicable <td>Empty responses</td> <td>31%</td> <td>14</td> <td>33%</td> <td>29%</td> <td>42%</td> <td>27%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>8%</td> <td>40%</td> <td>25%</td> <td>63%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>33%</td> <td>25%</td> <td>27%</td> <td>35%</td> <td>50%</td>	Empty responses	31%	14	33%	29%	42%	27%	33%	8%	40%	25%	63%	33%	33%	33%	25%	27%	35%	50%
Q24(c)	activities	Yes	No <td>Empty responses</td> <td>47%</td> <td>21</td> <td>43%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>58%</td> <td>42%</td> <td>67%</td> <td>25%</td> <td>60%</td> <td>88%</td> <td>13%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>53%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>25%</td> <td>45%</td> <td>50%</td> <td>50%</td> <td></td>	Empty responses	47%	21	43%	50%	58%	42%	67%	25%	60%	88%	13%	50%	53%	50%	25%	45%	50%	50%	

	Total	#EC	HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2
Not applicable	33%	15	38%	29%	17%	39%	33%	58%	20%	50%	17%	23%	50%	63%	27%	35%	50%	
Empty responses	11%	5	10%	13%	17%	9%	17%	17%	13%	13%	17%	10%	17%	13%	18%	5%		
Q24(d) beneficiaries to be targeted																		
Yes	20%	9	14%	25%	33%	15%	17%	17%	38%	13%	33%	20%	17%	25%	14%	30%		
No	33%	15	29%	38%	42%	30%	50%	8%	60%	38%	38%	33%	47%	13%	41%	25%	50%	
Not applicable	38%	17	48%	29%	17%	45%	33%	58%	40%	13%	50%	17%	23%	83%	63%	32%	40%	50%
Empty responses	9%	4	10%	8%	8%	9%	17%	17%	13%	13%	17%	10%	17%	13%	14%	5%		
Q25 Do you consider that the task manager of the Commission																		
Q25(a) Received all or most of the agreed documents required (monitoring reports, evaluations, etc...)?																		
Yes	71%	32	76%	67%	50%	79%	83%	58%	80%	75%	63%	83%	70%	83%	75%	73%	70%	100%
No	24%	11	14%	33%	42%	18%	17%	33%	20%	25%	25%	17%	27%	17%	25%	23%	25%	
Empty responses	4%	2	10%	0%	8%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Q25(b) Has documentary evidence on the degree of sustainable achievement of the results?																		
Yes	49%	22	38%	58%	17%	61%	67%	42%	20%	75%	50%	33%	57%	33%	38%	50%	50%	50%
No	44%	20	48%	42%	75%	33%	33%	50%	80%	25%	38%	50%	40%	67%	50%	41%	45%	50%
Empty responses	7%	3	14%	0%	8%	6%	0%	8%	0%	0%	13%	17%	3%	17%	13%	9%	5%	
Q25(c) Had sufficient resources to monitor this funding activity?																		
Yes	53%	24	48%	58%	42%	58%	50%	50%	80%	63%	50%	33%	57%	50%	50%	59%	45%	50%
No	33%	15	33%	33%	42%	30%	50%	33%	20%	25%	38%	33%	33%	38%	27%	40%	50%	
Empty responses	13%	6	19%	8%	17%	12%	17%	17%	13%	13%	33%	10%	33%	13%	14%	15%		
Q25(d) Had the right in-house sectoral expertise monitor to this funding activity?																		
Yes	67%	30	67%	67%	42%	76%	83%	58%	80%	75%	63%	50%	67%	67%	75%	73%	60%	50%
No	24%	11	19%	29%	50%	15%	17%	25%	20%	25%	25%	33%	30%	17%	13%	18%	30%	50%
Empty responses	9%	4	14%	4%	8%	9%	17%	17%	20%	50%	25%	50%	37%	33%	13%	23%	40%	50%
Q25(e) Had sufficient interaction with the TF managers in the WB to follow up the TF's progress?																		
Yes	60%	27	62%	58%	42%	67%	83%	58%	80%	50%	63%	33%	60%	50%	75%	68%	50%	50%
No	31%	14	24%	38%	50%	24%	17%	25%	20%	50%	25%	50%	37%	33%	13%	23%	40%	50%
Empty responses	9%	4	14%	4%	8%	9%	17%	17%	20%	50%	13%	17%	3%	33%	13%	9%	10%	
Q26 Have you been sufficiently informed on the activities and the results achieved?																		
Yes	69%	31	76%	63%	42%	79%	83%	58%	80%	63%	75%	67%	63%	83%	88%	73%	65%	50%
No	27%	12	14%	38%	50%	18%	17%	33%	20%	38%	13%	33%	33%	17%	13%	23%	30%	50%
Empty responses	4%	2	10%	0%	8%	3%	0%	8%	0%	0%	13%	17%	3%	17%	5%	5%		
Q28 How would you assess the results achieved by the TF:																		
Q28(a) compared to the Commission's expectations																		
In line	56%	25	71%	42%	25%	67%	83%	42%	60%	38%	50%	83%	47%	67%	88%	64%	40%	100%
Below	42%	19	24%	58%	67%	33%	17%	50%	40%	63%	50%	17%	53%	33%	13%	32%	60%	
Above	0%	0	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
No sufficient information on the results to assess them	2%	1	5%	0%	8%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	17%	0%	5%		
Empty responses	0%	0	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Q28(b) compared to those achieved for similar interventions administered directly by the Commission																		
In line	47%	21	48%	46%	50%	45%	67%	42%	60%	38%	50%	33%	43%	50%	63%	50%	35%	100%
Below	20%	9	5%	33%	33%	15%	17%	25%	20%	38%	25%	17%	27%	17%	0%	9%	35%	
Above	2%	1	0%	4%	8%	0%	0%	20%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	5%		
No sufficient information on the results to assess them	31%	14	48%	17%	8%	39%	17%	33%	20%	25%	25%	67%	27%	50%	38%	36%	30%	
Empty responses	0%	0	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Q28(c) compared to those achieved for similar interventions implemented through an organisation other than the WB																		
In line	44%	20	38%	50%	25%	52%	67%	42%	20%	63%	50%	17%	43%	33%	63%	36%	45%	100%
Below	7%	3	5%	8%	17%	3%	0%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	17%	0%	5%	10%	
Above	9%	4	14%	4%	8%	9%	0%	0%	0%	25%	33%	10%	17%	0%	0%	5%	15%	
No sufficient information on the results to assess them	38%	17	38%	38%	50%	33%	33%	33%	80%	38%	13%	50%	37%	50%	38%	55%	25%	
Empty responses	2%	1	5%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%	17%	0%	3%	0%	0%	5%		
Providing additional expertise																		
Q31 Do you consider that by channeling funds through a WB TF the Commission has been able to widen the range of (financial) instruments it can offer to beneficiaries (for instance by financing through the TF TA related to WB loans)?																		
Yes	33%	15	38%	29%	17%	39%	17%	33%	20%	50%	50%	17%	33%	50%	25%	36%	30%	50%
No	60%	27	48%	71%	75%	55%	83%	58%	80%	50%	38%	67%	67%	50%	50%	55%	70%	
Empty responses	7%	3	14%	0%	8%	6%	0%	8%	0%	13%	17%	0%	17%	25%	9%			
Cost Reduction & Implementation																		
Q33 Did you experience delays in the following areas:																		
Q33(a) Period between the first identification study for the intervention and the Agreement proposal ?																		
Yes	20%	9	14%	25%	33%	15%	33%	33%	25%	13%	0%	23%	17%	13%	23%	20%		
No	58%	26	52%	63%	50%	61%	17%	42%	100%	75%	63%	67%	60%	50%	63%	55%	60%	50%
Do not know	11%	5	10%	13%	8%	12%	33%	25%	0%	0%	0%	7%	50%	0%	14%	10%		
Not applicable	9%	4	19%	0%	8%	9%	17%	0%	0%	0%	13%	33%	7%	0%	9%	5%	50%	
Empty responses	2%	1	5%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%	33%	3%	0%	5%			
Q33(b) Period between the Agreement proposal and the signature of a Contribution Agreement between the Commission and the WB ?																		
Yes	24%	11	19%	29%	33%	21%	33%	42%	25%	13%	17%	27%	17%	25%	23%	25%	50%	
No	56%	25	57%	54%	50%	58%	17%	33%	100%	63%	75%	67%	57%	50%	63%	55%	55%	
Do not know	11%	5	10%	13%	8%	12%	33%	25%	0%	0%	0%	7%	50%	0%	14%	10%		
Not applicable	4%	2	10%	0%	8%	3%	17%	0%	0%	0%	17%	3%	0%	13%	5%	5%		
Empty responses	4%	2	5%	4%	6%	0%	0%	0%	13%	13%	13%	7%	0%	0%	5%	5%		
Q33(c) Period between the signature of the Contribution Agreement and the signature of implementation contracts ?																		
Yes	33%	15	29%	38%	58%	24%	33%	33%	60%	63%	25%	17%	40%	33%	13%	32%	40%	
No	36%	16	33%	38%	17%	42%	33%	25%	40%	13%	63%	50%	37%	17%	50%	36%	35%	
Do not know	16%	7	19%	13%	8%	18%	33%	33%	0%	13%	0%	7%	67%	13%	14%	15%		
Not applicable	11%	5	14%	8%	17%	9%	33%	8%	0%	0%	33%	10%	0%	25%	14%	5%	50%	
Empty responses	4%	2	5%	4%	6%	0%	0%	0%	13%	13%	13%	7%	0%	0%	5%	5%		
Q33(d) Reporting by the WB (annual monitoring, evaluation reports, etc.) ?																		
Yes	42%	19	29%	54%	83%	27%	50%	50%	40%	38%	38%	33%	47%	33%	38%	45%	45%	
No	49%	22	52%	46%	8%	64%	50%	42%	60%	63%	50%	33%	47%	67%	50%	50%	45%	
Do not know	2%	1	5%	0%	8%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	17%	0%	0%	5%		
Not applicable	4%	2	10%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%	33%	3%	0%	13%	5%	50%	
Empty responses	2%	1	5%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%	33%	3%	0%	0%	5%		
Q33(e) Other																		
Yes	16%	7	10%	21%	17%	15%	33%	17%	20%	13%	0%	17%	17%	17%	13%	14%	20%	
No	13%	6</																

	Total	#EC HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF	
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2
No	29%	13	24%	33%	33%	27%	17%	42%	60%	13%	13%	33%	30%	33%	25%	36%	25%	
Do not know	20%	9	14%	25%	33%	15%	50%	17%		25%	25%	23%	17%	13%	14%	30%		
Empty responses	18%	8	19%	17%	17%	18%	17%	8%		13%	50%	17%	17%		38%	14%	15%	50%
Q37(b) Administration of the TF by the WB																		
Yes	73%	33	62%	83%	75%	73%	33%	100%	100%	63%	63%	67%	73%	100%	63%	73%	75%	50%
No	7%	3	5%	8%	8%	6%	17%			13%	13%	7%	17%			5%	10%	
Do not know	9%	4	10%	8%	17%	6%	50%			13%		10%		13%	9%	10%		
Empty responses	11%	5	24%			15%				13%	25%	33%	10%		25%	14%	5%	50%
Q37(c) Implementation of the activities by the WB																		
Yes	20%	9	10%	29%	33%	15%	17%	17%	40%	13%	25%	17%	23%	33%		23%	20%	
No	51%	23	57%	46%	25%	61%	17%	67%	60%	50%	38%	67%	50%	67%	50%	50%	55%	50%
Do not know	13%	6	14%	13%	25%	9%	50%	8%		25%			13%	17%	13%	14%	15%	
Empty responses	16%	7	19%	13%	17%	15%	17%	8%		13%	38%	17%	13%		38%	14%	10%	50%
Q37(d) Other																		
Yes	22%	10	19%	25%	25%	21%		25%		13%	50%	33%	20%	33%	25%	14%	30%	50%
No	18%	8	19%	17%	8%	21%		25%	20%	13%	25%	17%	17%	33%	13%	18%	20%	
Do not know	22%	10	24%	21%	25%	21%	50%	25%	20%	25%		17%	27%		25%	27%	20%	
Empty responses	38%	17	38%	38%	42%	36%	50%	25%	60%	50%	25%	33%	37%	50%	38%	41%	30%	50%
Q39 Do you consider that the Commission's management costs (WB management fee plus Commission costs for follow-up of the contribution) were:																		
Q39(a) compared to direct Commission interventions ?																		
Lower	31%	14	14%	46%	33%	30%		25%	40%	50%	25%	50%	43%	17%		5%	65%	
Higher	18%	8	10%	25%	25%	15%	33%	25%	20%		25%	20%	17%	13%	23%	15%		
Comparable	22%	10	33%	13%	17%	24%	50%	25%		13%	25%	17%	13%	50%	38%	32%	10%	50%
Do not know	24%	11	33%	17%	25%	24%	17%	25%		40%	38%	13%	17%	20%	33%	36%	5%	50%
Empty responses	4%	2	10%			6%						13%	17%	3%	13%	5%	5%	
Q39(b) compared to EC funds through another organisation ?																		
Lower	44%	20	33%	54%	33%	48%	17%	25%	40%	50%	75%	67%	57%	33%	13%	27%	65%	50%
Higher	2%	1		4%	8%			8%					3%				5%	
Comparable	27%	12	38%	17%	25%	27%	83%	42%		25%			20%	33%	50%	41%	10%	
Do not know	22%	10	19%	25%	33%	18%		25%	60%	25%	13%	17%	17%	50%	25%	27%	15%	50%
Empty responses	4%	2	10%			6%						13%	17%	3%		5%	5%	
Q40 With respect to the EC-WB framework agreement (FA) and the annexed model for the administration agreement (AA):																		
Q40(a) FA Do you consider them to be sufficiently clear ? If not, please explain below																		
Yes	73%	33	67%	79%	83%	70%	100%	58%	100%	88%	75%	33%	73%	67%	88%	73%	70%	100%
No	13%	6	14%	13%	8%	15%		25%		13%			33%	17%	17%	18%	10%	
Empty responses	13%	6	19%	8%	8%	15%		17%				25%	33%	10%	33%	9%	20%	
Q40(a) AA Do you consider them to be sufficiently clear ? If not, please explain below																		
Yes	71%	32	62%	79%	67%	73%	100%	67%	80%	63%	63%	67%	73%	50%	88%	64%	75%	100%
No	13%	6	14%	13%	17%	12%		25%		25%		17%	17%		14%	15%		
Empty responses	16%	7	24%	8%	17%	15%		8%	20%	13%	38%	17%	10%	50%	13%	23%	10%	
Q40(b) FA Do you know who to contact for questions regarding the FA / AA and their implementation?																		
Yes	69%	31	52%	83%	75%	67%	67%	75%	80%	100%	50%	33%	77%	67%	50%	64%	80%	
No	16%	7	24%	8%	17%	15%	33%	8%	20%		13%	33%	13%	17%	25%	27%		50%
Empty responses	16%	7	24%	8%	8%	18%		17%			38%	33%	10%	33%	25%	9%	20%	50%
Q40(b) AA Do you know who to contact for questions regarding the FA / AA and their implementation?																		
Yes	73%	33	62%	83%	67%	76%	67%	83%	60%	88%	63%	67%	83%	50%	63%	59%	90%	50%
No	11%	5	14%	8%	17%	9%	33%	8%	20%			17%	7%	17%	25%	18%		50%
Empty responses	16%	7	24%	8%	17%	15%		17%		8%	20%	13%	38%	17%	10%	13%	23%	10%
Q40(c) FA Do you consider the prescribed rules and procedures to be adequate for the channelling of funds through the WB? If not, please explain below																		
Yes	76%	34	67%	83%	83%	73%	100%	75%	100%	75%	63%	50%	80%	67%	75%	77%	75%	50%
No	4%	2	5%	4%	8%	3%		8%		13%			3%	17%		5%	5%	
Empty responses	20%	9	29%	13%	8%	24%		17%		13%	38%	50%	17%	33%	25%	18%	20%	50%
Q40(c) AA Do you consider the prescribed rules and procedures to be adequate for the channelling of funds through the WB? If not, please explain below																		
Yes	76%	34	71%	79%	75%	76%	100%	83%	80%	63%	50%	83%	80%	50%	88%	73%	75%	100%
No	7%	3	5%	8%	8%	6%		8%		13%	13%		7%	17%		5%	10%	
Empty responses	18%	8	24%	13%	17%	18%		8%	20%	25%	38%	17%	13%	50%	13%	23%	15%	
Q40(d) FA Do you consider that the prescribed rules and procedures contributed to facilitating the signature of an agreement with the WB? If not, please explain below																		
Yes	73%	33	62%	83%	67%	76%	67%	67%	100%	100%	63%	50%	80%	83%	50%	77%	75%	50%
No	9%	4	10%	8%	25%	3%	33%	17%							25%	9%	5%	
Empty responses	18%	8	29%	8%	8%	21%		17%			38%	50%	13%	33%	25%	14%	20%	50%
Q40(d) AA Do you consider that the prescribed rules and procedures contributed to facilitating the signature of an agreement with the WB? If not, please explain below																		
Yes	73%	33	62%	83%	58%	79%	67%	75%	80%	88%	50%	83%	83%	67%	50%	68%	85%	50%
No	9%	4	10%	8%	25%	3%	33%	17%							25%	9%	5%	
Empty responses	18%	8	29%	8%	17%	18%		8%	20%	13%	50%	17%	10%	50%	25%	23%	10%	50%
Q40(e) FA Did the EC and the World Bank Group have different interpretations of the FA / AA ? If yes, please explain below																		
Yes	22%	10	14%	29%	33%	18%	33%	42%		13%	13%	17%	23%	17%	25%	23%	25%	
No	58%	26	57%	58%	58%	67%	42%	100%		75%	50%	33%	60%	67%	50%	64%	50%	50%
Empty responses	20%	9	29%	13%	8%	24%		17%		13%	38%	50%	17%	33%	25%	14%	25%	50%
Q40(e) AA Did the EC and the World Bank Group have different interpretations of the FA / AA ? If yes, please explain below																		
Yes	31%	14	19%	42%	42%	27%	33%	42%	20%	25%	25%	33%	37%	17%	25%	27%	40%	
No	49%	22	52%	46%	33%	55%	67%	42%	60%	63%	38%	33%	47%	50%	63%	50%	40%	100%
Empty responses	20%	9	29%	13%	25%	18%		17%	20%	13%	38%	33%	17%	50%	13%	23%	20%	
Q40(f) FA Do you have any other comment on the application of the FA / AA? Please explain below																		
Yes	9%	4	14%	4%				12%					33%	3%	17%	25%	5%	50%
No	67%	30	57%	75%	75%	64%	83%	67%	100%		75%	50%	33%	77%	67%	38%	77%	65%
Empty responses	24%	11	29%	21%	25%	24%	17%	17%		25%	50%	33%	20%	33%	38%	18%	30%	50%
Q40(f) AA Do you have any other comment on the application of the FA / AA? Please explain below																		
Yes	16%	7	14%	17%	17%	15%		17%	20%	13%	13%	33%	13%	17%	25%	5%	20%	50%
No	58%	26	52%	63%	50%	61%	83%	67%	60%	50%	38%	50%	67%	50%	38%	59%	60%	50%
Empty responses	27%	12	33%	21%	33%	24%	17%	17%	20%	38%	50%	17%	20%	50%	38%	36%	25%	
Visibility																		
Q43 Prior to contributing to the TF, did you agree with the WB on visibility clauses other than those provided for in the framework agreement, or constituting a specification of these?																		
Yes	22%	10	14%	29%	50%	12%	50%	8%	20%	13%	25%	33%	27%		25%	23%	20%	50%
No	64%	29	71%	5														

	Total	# EC HQ	DEC	SingleD	MultiD	100k-1M	1M-5M	5M-10M	10M-35M	35M-100M	>100M	Country	Reg.	Global	BETF	RETF	FIF	
	100%	45	21	24	12	33	6	12	5	8	8	6	30	7	8	22	20	2
	4%	2	8%	17%	17%	33%												
	11%	5	19%	4%	17%	9%	17%	33%					50%	25%	18%	5%		
	0%	0																
Q47(c) Other donors																		
Yes	71%	32	71%	71%	33%	85%	83%	42%	40%	88%	88%	100%	80%	67%	50%	68%	75%	100%
No	11%	5	5%	17%	33%	3%	17%	20%	13%	13%		13%	13%	13%	5%	15%		
Do not know	18%	8	24%	13%	33%	12%	17%	42%	40%			7%	50%	38%	27%	10%		
Empty responses	0%	0																
Q47(d) Final beneficiaries																		
Yes	24%	11	14%	33%	33%	21%	17%	8%	40%	50%	25%	17%	27%	17%	25%	23%	25%	50%
No	40%	18	33%	46%	33%	42%	33%	42%	60%	25%	50%	33%	47%	33%	25%	41%	40%	50%
Do not know	36%	16	52%	21%	33%	36%	50%	50%	25%	25%	50%	27%	67%	50%	36%	35%		
Empty responses	0%	0																
Q47(e) Local stakeholders																		
Yes	36%	16	14%	54%	42%	33%	50%	8%	40%	63%	50%	17%	43%	17%	25%	27%	45%	50%
No	29%	13	29%	29%	25%	30%	17%	42%	40%	13%	25%	33%	17%	25%	32%	25%	50%	
Do not know	36%	16	57%	17%	33%	36%	33%	50%	20%	25%	25%	50%	23%	83%	50%	41%	30%	
Empty responses	0%	0																
Q48 Do you consider that the following were aware of the magnitude of the Commission's contribution to the TF?																		
Q48(a) Partner country officials																		
Yes	60%	27	43%	75%	58%	61%	67%	33%	60%	75%	75%	67%	73%	50%	25%	41%	85%	50%
No	27%	12	38%	17%	25%	27%	17%	42%	40%	13%	25%	17%	23%	33%	38%	41%	10%	
Do not know	11%	5	19%	4%	17%	9%	17%	25%				17%	33%	38%	14%	5%	50%	
Empty responses	2%	1	4%		3%							3%	33%		5%			
Q48(b) EU Member States																		
Yes	76%	34	71%	79%	58%	82%	67%	42%	60%	100%	100%	100%	87%	67%	50%	55%	95%	100%
No	11%	5	10%	13%	17%	9%	17%	25%	20%				10%	25%	23%			
Do not know	13%	6	19%	8%	25%	9%	17%	33%	20%				3%	50%	25%	23%	5%	
Empty responses	0%	0																
Q48(c) Other donors																		
Yes	58%	26	62%	54%	25%	70%	67%	25%	40%	88%	63%	83%	63%	67%	38%	50%	65%	100%
No	18%	8	10%	25%	33%	12%	17%	25%	20%	13%	25%		20%	25%	27%	10%		
Do not know	22%	10	24%	21%	42%	15%	17%	42%	40%			13%	17%	17%	50%	25%	23%	
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		3%		8%							13%				
Q48(d) Final beneficiaries																		
Yes	11%	5	5%	17%	25%	6%		40%	25%	13%		13%		13%	9%	10%	50%	
No	58%	26	52%	63%	50%	61%	50%	58%	60%	50%	63%	67%	63%	50%	50%	59%	60%	50%
Do not know	29%	13	38%	21%	25%	30%	42%		25%	13%	33%	23%	50%	38%	27%	30%		
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		3%					13%		17%			5%			
Q48(e) Local stakeholders																		
Yes	20%	9	5%	33%	33%	15%	17%		60%	38%	13%	17%	27%	13%	18%	20%	50%	
No	44%	20	43%	46%	42%	45%	33%	50%	20%	38%	63%	50%	50%	17%	50%	41%	50%	
Do not know	33%	15	48%	21%	25%	36%	50%	42%	20%	25%	25%	33%	23%	83%	38%	36%	30%	
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		3%		8%								5%			
Q49 Did the Commission have a significant impact on the following in respect of the TF or its activities?																		
Q49(a) Design																		
Yes	51%	23	43%	58%	58%	48%	50%	25%	80%	63%	63%	50%	60%	50%	25%	50%	60%	50%
No	36%	16	43%	29%	25%	39%			20%	38%	25%	50%	33%	33%	50%	36%	30%	50%
Do not know	13%	6	14%	13%	17%	12%	50%	17%		13%		7%	33%	25%	14%	10%	50%	
Empty responses	0%	0																
Q49(b) Implementation																		
Yes	38%	17	33%	42%	8%	48%	33%	17%	40%	50%	50%	50%	40%	50%	25%	27%	50%	50%
No	58%	26	62%	54%	83%	48%	67%	75%	60%	38%	50%	50%	57%	50%	75%	64%	50%	50%
Do not know	4%	2	5%	4%	8%	3%		8%		13%		3%	17%		9%			
Empty responses	0%	0																
Q49(c) Management																		
Yes	31%	14	29%	33%	17%	36%	33%	17%	60%	38%	38%	17%	30%	67%	13%	27%	40%	
No	62%	28	57%	67%	75%	58%	67%	75%	40%	63%	50%	67%	67%	33%	75%	68%	55%	50%
Do not know	7%	3	14%		8%	6%		8%		13%	17%	3%	17%	13%	5%	5%	50%	
Empty responses	0%	0																
Q49(d) Evaluation																		
Yes	42%	19	33%	50%	50%	39%	33%	25%	60%	75%	38%	33%	47%	50%	25%	32%	55%	50%
No	49%	22	52%	46%	42%	52%	50%	67%	40%	25%	38%	67%	47%	33%	75%	55%	40%	50%
Do not know	7%	3	10%	4%	8%	6%	17%	8%		13%		3%	33%		14%			
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		3%							3%				5%		
Q51 Was the Commission a member of the TF Steering Group (or equivalent)?																		
Yes	76%	34	71%	79%	58%	82%	50%	75%	80%	75%	100%	67%	80%	83%	63%	68%	80%	100%
No	22%	10	24%	21%	33%	18%	50%	17%	20%	25%		33%	20%	17%	38%	27%	20%	
Empty responses	2%	1	5%		8%			8%					17%		5%			
Q52 If yes, did it participate in its meetings?																		
always	56%	25	62%	50%	17%	70%	17%	50%	80%	50%	88%	50%	57%	67%	50%	59%	50%	50%
with a few exceptions	11%	5	5%	17%	8%	12%	17%		25%	13%	17%	13%		13%	5%	15%	50%	
in fewer than half the meetings	7%	3	5%	8%	25%		17%	17%				10%			5%	10%		
(almost) never	13%	6	10%	17%	33%	6%	50%	8%	20%	13%		13%	17%	13%	14%	15%		
Empty responses	13%	6	19%	8%	17%	12%	25%		13%	13%	33%	7%	33%	25%	18%	10%		
Q54 Do you consider that the Commission's influence on the TF (activities, implementation, supervision and management, etc.) was at least satisfactory, taking into account the level of its contribution?																		
Yes	69%	31	67%	71%	50%	76%	50%	58%	80%	88%	88%	50%	73%	67%	63%	77%	60%	50%
No	20%	9	19%	21%	33%	15%	17%	25%	20%	13%		50%	23%	17%	13%	14%	30%	
Empty responses	11%	5	14%	8%	17%	9%	33%	17%		13%		3%	33%	25%	9%	10%	50%	
Coordination & complementarity																		
Q56 Are there EU MS that:																		
Q56(a) Contribute to the intervention but not through the WB (i.e. direct intervention, intervention through another organisation, etc.)?																		
Yes	36%	16	33%	38%	42%	33%	33%	17%	40%	50%	38%	50%	43%	33%	13%	32%	40%	50%
No	47%	21	29%	63%	42%	48%	50%	50%	60%	50%	38%	33%	53%	50%	25%	45%	55%	
Do not know	13%	6	29%		17%	12%	17%	33%			13%		33%	50%	18%			
Empty responses	4%	2	10%		6%					13%	17%	3%		13%	5%	5%		
Q56(b) Decided not to contribute as the Commission is/was already contributing?																		
Yes	7%	3	10%	4%	8%	6%	17%			13%	17%	3%		25%	9%			
No	47%	21	38%	54%	25%	55%	50%	42%	40%	63%	50%	33%	53%	50%	25%	45%	55%	
Do not know	42%	19	48%	38%	58%	36%	33%	58%	60%	25%	25%	50%	37%	67%	50%	41%	40%	
Empty responses	4%	2	5%	4%	8%	3%			13%	13%								

Annex 8 – Country missions' debriefing presentations

This annex contains three country missions' debriefing presentations that were presented by the evaluation team to representatives of the European Commission Delegations in Ethiopia, Vietnam and Morocco. The comments made during the presentations have been included in the following slides.

These focus country missions were carried out between 2nd June and 20th June 2008. The first two missions, in Ethiopia and Vietnam, focused on Commission's contributions through WB TFs; the last one, in Morocco, was for the study of Commission's contributions through the EIB. In this last country, the debriefing presentation was made for the Commission and the EIB jointly.

Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB

Country mission to Ethiopia

Debriefing Presentation

Addis Ababa, 5 June 2008



This document is designed as support to the oral presentation and is not intended to be used separately

Objectives of today

Objectives of today's debriefing

- To provide an overview of work done during the country visit
- To present and discuss information collected in Ethiopia (discuss / confirm / challenge mission findings)



- Reminder: this country mission is part of a broader process and allows to cross-check information with country-level experiences.


Agenda

- Interviews conducted during the country visit
- Presentation of mission findings

Objective of missions is to complete and cross-check information with country-level experience

Reminder

Information collection and cross-checking process



Organisation of the four days visit

Interviews conducted during the visit (focus on PSNP but als examination of PBS)

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing at DEC • European Commission Delegation in Ethiopia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Head of Delegation • Head of Cooperation • Head of Finance and Contracts section • Task managers of WB TFs (PSNP and PBS) • Evaluation & Monitoring manager • Aid effectiveness consultant • EU MS, Other Donors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID, IrishAid, SIDA • CIDA | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World Bank in Ethiopia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country Director • PSNP technical and management team (in Ethiopia and in Washington via video conference) • Financial manager • Beneficiaries (national agencies) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Representative of Food Security section in the NAO Office • Head of FSCB • Debriefing at DEC |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Agenda

- Interviews conducted during the country visit
- Presentation of mission findings

Investigation around seven Evaluation Questions

Reminder

EQ 1	Guiding Criteria
EQ 2	Scaling-up
EQ 3	Results/Impact
EQ 4	Specific Expertise
EQ 5	Cost Reduction & Implementation
EQ 6	Visibility
EQ 7	Coordination & Complementarity

EQ1 – To what extent are decisions to channel aid explicitly motivated and based on formal guidance criteria? Do these criteria provide the rationale for the observed evolution of channelled aid?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- Rationale for channelling (PSNP):
 - Have a harmonised approach among donors and coordinated with the Government
 - Lower administrative burden for donors (but not the critical factor because still a lot of follow-up needed by the DEC)
 - At the time of the decision it was not possible to finance the GoE directly
- Rationale for channelling through the WB (PSNP)
 - Government proposed to work with the WB
 - WB TF mainly used as an instrument among others within a strategy of pool funding
 - When the WB is present, donors have a tendency to rely on the WB
 - WB plays a role as intermediary, donors complement jointly
- In PBS, channelling through the WB is used as an alternative to GBS:
 - It allows assuring continuity in aid delivery in a difficult context,
 - While maintaining a close control of the expenditure, and
 - Providing additional accountability (trust)

EQ1 – To what extent are decisions to channel aid explicitly motivated and based on formal guidance criteria? Do these criteria provide the rationale for the observed evolution of channelled aid?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- Possible alternatives (in general):
 - the use of a WB TF is not the only solution for pool funding
 - In the future other channels could now be envisaged (EU MS, other Dev Banks)
 - EIB is not seen as an alternative to the WB
- Guidelines for decisions on channeling:
 - Could provide useful indications (but should in a short, operational document)
 - But it is essential to maintain flexibility to allow a case by case approach
- The observed evolution of channelled aid is explained more by the need of donor harmonization than by the possibility to use WB TFs

9

EQ2 – Did the channelling contribute to the scaling up of aid?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- The absorptive capacity plays a role but is not the basis for the decision (PSNP-PBS)
 - Without this possibility and in a context without BS, the Commission would not have been able to use all the 9th EDF money (and would have needed to scale down)
 - WB's presence and available infrastructure and resources facilitate absorption
 - However, problems of absorptive capacity on the GoE side
- Catalytic effect of the Commission :
 - EU members states contribute also in absence of the Commission
 - The Commission's presence is comforting for other donors (see case of SIDA who joined PSNP in 2007)
 - If the Commission would not contribute for specific sensitive reasons this would be closely examined by other donors (eg. Suspension of EC funds in 2006 for low financial reporting quality, which was followed by the other donors)
 - The presence of EU MS can also be comforting for the Commission (e.g. PBS)
 - It is more a matter of harmonised interaction between donors: nobody moves alone

10

EQ2 – Did the channelling contribute to the scaling up of aid?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- Value added for MS of intervening through the Commission:
 - Commission has substantial weight
 - MS also want to promote some specific priorities
- Critical mass :
 - The Commission is one of the biggest donors;
 - Key role in the donor community and with respect to the Government
- Levels of ODA have strongly increased in Ethiopia:
 - This is linked to the specific context of the country (one of the poorest in Africa)
 - It can also be linked to the international context of aid delivery (MDGs, etc.)
 - It cannot be linked to the channelling of funds (no role of FA and AA)

11

EQ3 – To what extent did channelling through IFIs contribute to achieving sustainably the intervention objectives the EC targeted when channelling its funds?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- Agreement on objectives and « earmarking » (PSNP) :
 - The intervention objectives are agreed upon among donors and with the Government through joint processes
 - The Commission subscribes to the objectives, but provides its contribution for cash transfer only (and not in-kind contribution)
 - There is no need for expressing preferences or stronger “tied aid”
- Organisation of follow-up
 - Of the activities of the PSNP
 - Different mechanisms in place (Government, Donors – also jointly with Government –, WB)
 - Payments have been delayed for reasons of weaknesses of follow-up from the GoE side – financial information is still scarce
 - WB plays its role as an intermediary, but donors need to insist and intervene also jointly and in close interaction with WB to obtain quality reporting of activities
 - Interaction with the WB:
 - Is globally satisfactory
 - Combination of WB HQ and country team is not optimal (but creates no major problems)

2

EQ3 – To what extent did channelling through IFIs contribute to achieving sustainably the intervention objectives the EC targeted when channelling its funds?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- No specific capitalisation with EC HQ, but sharing experience and good practices concerning other WB TFs would be appreciated. Need to have appropriate back up from HQ in terms of technical support/analysis and advice on TF management.
- Results of PSNP :
 - Donors and Government are globally satisfied with results
 - Basic objectives are met:
 - In the past three years, reduction of food insecure people among safety net beneficiaries;
 - Unlike non beneficiaries, safety net beneficiaries were not affected by the draught of 2008
 - Community infrastructures have been built and are used
 - The contingency budget of 20% has not been entirely used for PSNP beneficiaries but for others
 - No information available on the main objective of PSNP in terms of number of beneficiaries “graduating” out of food insecurity
 - Questions on capacity to trigger a self-sustaining development process remain
- Channelling through the WB and interactions within the joint donor group have facilitated the dialogue between the Commission and the WB.
- Link between reasons for channelling and results obtained : the WB has not been selected for a specific sector expertise in food security

EQ4 – To what extent did channelling through IFIs enable the Commission to offer a broader range of expertise and instruments to the beneficiaries?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- The WB has been used in this particular case for :
 - Its capacity to manage large funds (use of its financial and reporting channels)
 - Experience of working in a multi-donor context
- The WB has not been called upon for its specific expertise in the sector
- The sector expertise could also have been offered to beneficiaries through other channels
- The grants have not been used to mobilize other types of WB funding

EQ5 – To what extent did the Commission's channelling of funds contribute to swifter implementation and lower transaction costs?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- Delays and disbursement
 - Funds have been disbursed to the local level but some problems on the quality of the financial reporting from the GoE
 - Delays on the GoE side to deliver appropriate reporting (timeliness and quality) have led to temporary suspension of payments from the donors.
 - Discussions between the Commission and the WB on Administration Agreements (PBS and PSNP phase II) create delays (e.g. on inclusion of performance indicators)
- Transaction costs for the Commission
 - Management costs:
 - WB is perceived as relatively cheap compared to other channels (charging 0.5% for PSNP 1 and 2% for PSNP 2)
 - But comparisons are difficult
 - Difficult to decide to what extent it is good value for money (see also responsibility issues)
 - Within the Commission:
 - Channelling lowers the amount of human resources needed, but inputs required are still important
 - High workload for financial follow-up

EQ5 – To what extent did the Commission's channelling of funds contribute to swifter implementation and lower transaction costs?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- Beneficiaries consider that channelling facilitates their work (one interlocutor; one single set of procedures)
- Procedures
 - FA and AA are considered globally appropriate by both parties, but a revision on specific issues would be deemed useful
 - Concluding an AA sometimes required long negotiations, involving both HQs
 - Commission: considers that sometimes the Bank tries to include its own specific clauses, whereas the AA is standard
 - WB: considers that sometimes it is pushed to re-negotiate issues that are already solved in the FA
- Implementation costs
 - Scarce information on efficiency of implementation and factors hampering or enhancing efficiency
 - Some interlocutors mention human resource constraints for the management of the programme (problem of qualification of human resources on the GoE side)

EQ6 – To what extent did EC channelling contribute to the visibility of the EC^{CADE} support vis-à-vis its taxpayer, the beneficiaries, the partner countries, its MS and the international community? To what extent did it enhance its ability to promote EU policies and priorities?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- Visibility
 - Visibility strategies within the PSNP are evolving and more generally the Commission is giving an increasing priority to visibility
 - Documents examined and majority of stakeholders met have not raised visibility issues;
 - WB considers that visibility requirements are fulfilled. But this is not the case for the Commission who considers that they have low visibility in the PSNP
 - Donors other than the Commission state that visibility is not a high priority for them
 - Other donors and government are aware of the Commission's contribution (and its magnitude), but this is explained more by the coordinated approach than by visibility actions (final beneficiaries consider the PSNP as a GoE programme)
- The influence of the Commission on decision making:
 - Is considered satisfactory
 - Can be explained by the strongly coordinated approach

17

EQ7 – To what extent did aid channelling improve coordination between the Commission and EU MS and complementarity between the Commission and other donors?^{CADE}

Preliminary findings of country mission in Ethiopia

- Strong coordination mechanisms among donors and with the Government at different levels (Development Assistance Group, European Union road map, Joint Donor Committee)
- Close interaction Commission – EU MS within this framework. EC has a leverage effect for EU MS with small amounts for contributing in the Food Security sector (eg. German and Spanish cooperation)
- VA for the Commission to intervene through the TF:
 - Use of an instrument for donor harmonisation (among other)
 - Disbursement of the 9th EDF (avoid scaling down)
 - Manner to deal with human resources constraints
 - Benefit from WB's experience for managing large TFs and from its presence
 - Respond to a Government demand
 - Alternative to BS (specific to PBS)

18

Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery through development banks and EIB

Country mission to Vietnam

Debriefing Presentation

Hanoi, 13 June 2008



This document is designed as support to the oral presentation and is not intended to be used separately

Objectives of today

Objectives of today's debriefing

- To provide an overview of work done during the country visit
- To present and discuss information collected in Vietnam (discuss / confirm / challenge mission findings)



- Reminder: this country mission is part of a broader process and allows to cross-check information with country-level experiences.


Agenda

- Interviews conducted during the country visit
- Presentation of mission findings

Objective of missions is to complete and cross-check information with country-level experience

Reminder

Information collection and cross-checking process



Organisation of the five days visit

Interviews conducted during the visit

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing at DEC • European Commission Delegation in Vietnam <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Head of Delegation • Head and Deputy Head of Operations Section • Deputy head of Finance and Contracts section • Programme Officers in charge of WB TFs (PRSC, PFM, HEMA and Forest) • Communication Officer • HEMA TA team • EU MS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Netherlands, DFID, DANIDA, AFD | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World Bank in Vietnam <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acting Country Director • MDTF PFM manager • Financial management specialist • Procurement specialist • Communication specialist • Other IO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP and ILO • Beneficiaries (national agencies) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MoH • MARD • MPI • MoF • Debriefing at DEC |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

5

Agenda

- Interviews conducted during the country visit

- Presentation of mission findings

6

Investigation around seven Evaluation Questions

Reminder

EQ 1	Guiding Criteria
EQ 2	Scaling-up
EQ 3	Results/Impact
EQ 4	Specific Expertise
EQ 5	Cost Reduction & Implementation
EQ 6	Visibility
EQ 7	Coordination & Complementarity

EQ1 – To what extent are decisions to channel aid explicitly motivated and based on formal guidance criteria? Do these criteria provide the rationale for the observed evolution of channelled aid?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

- **Rationale for channelling through WB TFs**
 - Overall context of BS and SWAP and acting jointly (Paris Declaration)
 - Direct BS in Vietnam was not an option at the time
 - Specific advantages of the WB:
 - A major player in Vietnam
 - Capacity to manage large TFs
 - Fiduciary comfort
 - Important expertise of WB in certain fields (Public Financial Management, Forestry)
 - Other reasons:
 - PRSC: opportunity to join an existing structure for providing “indirect” budget support and intervene in the policy dialogue (combined with PFM for TA) – lack of specific HR in DEC
 - HEMA and Forest:
 - Expected absorptive capacity (without the TFs the funds would not have been contracted in time)
 - Forest: preparation of SWAP
 - Existence of a Framework Agreement and template for AAs with the WB
 - At the time, the Delegation was encouraged by HQ to work with the WB

EQ1 – To what extent are decisions to channel aid explicitly motivated and based on formal guidance criteria? Do these criteria provide the rationale for the observed evolution of channelled aid?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

- **Use of alternatives to WB TFs:**
 - Has been examined
 - The WB is generally seen as one possibility among others (EC, ADB, UN, ...)
 - The new Financial Regulation allows channelling through MS or on behalf of MS
- **Role of the Commission:**
 - Join existing TFs (PRSC/PFM) or combine with existing initiatives (Forest)
 - Initiator role (HEMA)
- **Need for additional guidelines:**
 - There is room for improvement of the Framework Agreement and AA
 - Additional guidance would be useful (see reply to questionnaires)
 - Need of assessment (country and sector specific) of the WB before channelling.
- **Willingness of complying with requirements of the Paris Declaration explains, together with other factors, the increase of channelling**

9

EQ2 – Did the channelling contribute to the scaling up of aid?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

- The expected absorptive capacity was a motivation to channel through the WB
- No particular “catalytic” effect of the Commission on donors was mentioned
- The Commission is one donor among others and not on its own one of the major players
- Channelling has impacted the level of ODA through its absorptive capacity. Providing the recipient sufficient capacity

10

EQ3 – To what extent did channelling through IFIs contribute to achieving sustainably the intervention objectives the EC targeted when channelling its funds?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

- Degree of agreement on objectives:
 - PRSC, PFM: agreement on common objectives
 - Forestry:
 - Contributions “earmarked” via SDTF for VCF;
 - TA component: compromise found on the Trade side of FLEG
 - HEMA: lack of agreement on objectives and respective roles EC – WB (duplication of TA) at the design phase.
 - Important coordination work to be done to avoid that TFs enters into a “donor driven approach” where more weight is given to priorities of individual donors
- Substantial delays are observed in the cases where there is no agreement on objectives
- Organisation of follow-up / management (Commission & WB):
 - WB TL in HQs is perceived as a problem by several stakeholders
 - WB TLs are in charge of many TFs on top of their own project portfolio: lack of easy availability
- Existence of a networks between EC Delegations in Asia where experiences on WB TFs are shared

11

EQ3 – To what extent did channelling through IFIs contribute to achieving sustainably the intervention objectives the EC targeted when channelling its funds?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

- Nature of available information on and satisfaction with results
 - PRSC and PFM:
 - Global satisfaction with results (also shared by other donors)
 - The Commission’s participation in the PRSC has allowed it to be actively present in the policy dialogue (one of the main objectives)
 - By allowing contributions to the PRSC, the TF has enhanced harmonisation and alignment
 - The WB organisational capacity to manage large TF has influenced the good results (more than its TA in the field)
 - HEMA has not generated the expected results so far:
 - It is only partially operational so far, despite processes launched since several years
 - Delays are due to difficulties in reaching suitable agreements between WB and EC at the design of the project, and between WB and the Government during the implementation phase. Lack of priority given by the WB to HEMA.
 - Forest: objectives are partially reached, although with delays

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EQ4 – To what extent did channelling through IFIs enable the Commission to offer a broader range of expertise and instruments to the beneficiaries?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

- Specific expertise of the WB:
 - PRSC, PFM, Forest: sector specific expertise
 - Expertise in management of large TF
 - Experience in the country
 - Procedures and standards offer security (Fiduciary confort)
- No mobilisation of other types of WB funding has been observed in Vietnam

13

EQ5 – To what extent did the Commission's channelling of funds contribute to swifter implementation and lower transaction costs?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

Timeliness

- PRSC and PFM: quick and smooth disbursement from EC to WB and from WB to GoV
- Forest TF: delays in both VCF and TA component (VCF: not TF related)
- HEMA: substantial delays, not yet resolved (TF related)

Transaction costs for the Commission

- PRSC and PFM: management costs were considered justified
- For HEMA: no common understanding of management costs
- Difficult to compare management costs with similar costs within the Commission as it would not be possible to hire resources from the same source of funds
- The new rate of 7% management costs is considered, in some cases, as too high

14

EQ5 – To what extent did the Commission’s channelling of funds contribute to swifter implementation and lower transaction costs?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

Transaction costs for beneficiaries

- HEMA TF has increased transaction costs for beneficiaries due to difficulties in the implementation
- For PRSC the channelling has little impact on transaction costs for beneficiaries (but reduces the funds available for the Government)

Procedures

- Difficulties with the negotiation of AAs with the WB (compared to other donors):
 - Specific difficulties when the Commission joins an already existing TF (PFM, PRSC)
 - Importance to agree with the WB **upfront** on the objectives of the project before signing the Financing Agreement with the Government (HEMA)
- Solutions have been found at Delegation level, but with delays
- Stakeholders agree that difficulties are more linked to the fact that one needs to work with two “heavy systems”, rather than to critical shortcomings in these respective systems

15

EQ6 – To what extent did EC channelling contribute to the visibility of the EC support vis-à-vis its taxpayer, the beneficiaries, the partner countries, its MS and the international community? To what extent did it enhance its ability to promote EU policies and priorities?

Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

Visibility

- Documents examined and majority of stakeholders met do not raise visibility issues
- Visibility in the strict sense is per definition low in PRSC, but on the other hand it allows reaching high levels of decision making and having influence
- HEMA: delays have a detrimental effect on the image among beneficiaries
- Most donors other than the Commission state that visibility is not a high priority for them

Influence of the Commission on decision making

- The Commission is not a major donor within the TFs (except for PRSC where EC provides the second largest contribution)
- The PRSC has allowed an active participation to the policy dialogue

16

EQ7 – To what extent did aid channelling improve coordination between the Commission and EU MS and complementarity between the Commission and other donors?



Preliminary findings of country mission in Vietnam

- Vietnam is a pilot country for the EU in terms of harmonisation of donor assistance and alignment with government policies and systems
- The Commission plays a central role in terms of coordination in specific sectors (health)
- There are several donor coordination mechanisms, but views on the degree of coordination vary strongly among donors
- The EU MS have different strategies; some EU MS have approaches that are more in line with other donors than with EU MS
- Channelling had an impact in terms of improved donor coordination mainly through the PRSC and provided the following advantages:
 - It allows benefiting from the specific expertise each donor brings in
 - Powerful messages can be delivered jointly, Commission brings EU dimension (goes beyond bilateral interests)
 - Broad constituency: positions are not identified as “only WB”

Evaluation de l'aide de la Commission européenne délivrée au travers des banques de développement et de la BEI

Mission au Maroc

Présentation de Débriefing à la DCE et la BEI

Rabat, 20 juin 2008



Ce document est destiné uniquement à être utilisé comme support à la présentation orale

Objectifs de ce débriefing

Objectifs de cette réunion de débriefing

- Fournir un aperçu du déroulement de la mission pays
- Présenter et discuter les observations de cette mission à Rabat: discuter, confirmer, tester



- Rappel: Il s'agit d'une évaluation stratégique et transversale et pas d'une évaluation spécifique au Maroc

Object, purpose and scope of the evaluation



Reminder

Evaluation Object	Commission's channelling of funds through development banks and EIB during the period 1999-2006
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Evaluation Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify key lessons from past experience for future decision-making • Strategic-level thematic evaluation "to assess to what extent the Commission interventions through the development banks and EIB have been relevant, efficient and effective and visible and what is their impact on sustainable development of the partner countries"
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Scope focus

Period	Institutions	Countries	Funds
1999 – 2006	WB and EIB	All countries, excl. ENLARG/ OECD	RELEX-DEV-AIDCO, Commission's Budget + EDF

Source: Terms of Reference

3

Agenda



- Entretiens réalisés lors de la mission
- Présentations des constats de la mission
- Synthèse de la valeur ajoutée

4

Entretiens réalisés

Entretiens réalisés au Maroc (Rabat) du 17 au 20 juin 2008

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing à la DCE • DCE au Maroc <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ambassadeur • Sections Opérationnelles et Finances • AT • Bonifications • Capital à risque • Chargée de Communication • BEI • Etats Membres <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allemagne (KfW) • France (AFD) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Autres bailleurs: Banques de Développement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Banque Mondiale • BAD • Bénéficiaires <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministère de l'Intérieur: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direction des Régies • Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direction du Trésor (Coordonnateur National) • ONEP (Office National Eau Potable) • Débriefing conjoint DCE-BEI |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Agenda

- Entretiens réalisés lors de la mission
- Présentations des constats de la mission
- Synthèse de la valeur ajoutée

Seven Evaluation Questions

Reminder

EQ 1	Guiding Criteria
EQ 2	Scaling-up
EQ 3	Results/Impact
EQ 4	Specific Expertise
EQ 5	Cost Reduction & Implementation
EQ 6	Visibility
EQ 7	Coordination & Complementarity

7

EQ1 – Guidance and rationale for channelling interventions? (1/2)

Constats préliminaires de la mission au Maroc

- **Bonifications**
 - **Processus de prise de décision**
 - **Au niveau général**, les décisions de l'utilisation de l'instrument sont prises dans le cadre d'accords globaux CE-BEI (Convention 1992, MEDA II)
 - **Au niveau des interventions**: 3 phases
 - **Phase de programmation**: Identification des interventions entre BEI et Promoteurs. Dialogue CE HQ-Gouvernement pour mettre ou non des interventions dans le PIN, sur base de fiches préparées par la BEI, si elles correspondent à la programmation de la CE
 - **Phase d'instruction**: Formalisation de la Décision dans le Comité Article 14 (présidé par CE, documents préparés par BEI). CE s'y appuie sur l'expertise BEI pour les décisions d'octroi (prêt et IS)
 - **Phase d'exécution**: Exécution par la BEI. Déboursement sur demande par la CE (seul rôle)
 - Ce processus n'est pas remis en question
 - **Les bonifications ont été octroyées dans un contexte d'accès difficile au capitaux**
 - Ce contexte a changé durant la période d'évaluation
 - La pertinence de cet instrument pour délivrer de l'aide dans le contexte actuel est remise en question par plusieurs parties

8

EQ1 – Guidance and rationale for channelling interventions? (2/2)



Constats préliminaires de la mission au Maroc

- **AT**
 - **Les décisions de l'utilisation de l'instrument** sont prises dans le cadre d'un accord global CE-BEI (FEMIP)
 - **Au niveau des interventions,**
 - **Phase de programmation:** CE prévoit enveloppe générale FEMIP dans le PIR. Programmation avec identification des AT particulières entre BEI et Promoteurs, au cas par cas (CE pas impliquée formellement)
 - CE trouverait utile d'être associée à ce stade ; cela a été plusieurs fois le cas récemment même si de façon informelle
 - **Phase d'instruction:** Au niveau des TdR: BEI soumet note de synthèse de chaque cas à la CE HQ pour approbation. CE HQ consulte alors DCE en règle générale (de façon informelle)
 - **Phase d'exécution:** Responsabilité BEI
 - Il n'y a donc pas lieu pour la CE de faire un examen d'alternatives
 - Ce processus pose question (voir EQ5)

9

EQ2 – Commission's channelling induced scaling up of aid?



Constats préliminaires de la mission au Maroc

- **Bonifications & AT**
 - Effet positif sur le décaissement d'aide (notamment par le préfinancement pour les bonifications)
 - Effet de levier des contributions de la CE
 - **Bonifications:**
 - Ratios d'effet multiplicateur de 1:5 sur prêts BEI
 - Ex. €20m de bonif. En valeur actuelle permettrait de contracter un prêt de €100m en valeur faciale sur 20 ans avec 5 ans de période de grâce
 - Mais surtout améliorer les conditions et orienter les actions dans un secteur non productif (environnement) – un prêt BEI aurait été contracté dans un autre secteur sinon
 - AT: Pas d'effet multiplicateur (mais meilleure qualité de l'intervention)
 - Impact (marginal) sur le niveau de l'APD via absorption des fonds

10

EQ3 – Availability of information on and realisation of results and impact?



Constats préliminaires de la mission au Maroc

- **Définition des objectifs:**
 - **Bonifications:** CE et BEI globalement en ligne sur les objectifs
 - **AT :** Cas où la consultation tardive de la CE révèle des désaccords sur les objectifs et l'approche
- **Suivi et M&E (Bonifications & AT)**
 - Information éparpillée au sein de la CE (pour BI, AT, RC)
 - Reporting de la BEI à la CE:
 - BI: aucun reporting BEI obligatoire
 - AT: pas formalisé (reporting financier par la BEI au Maroc, mais pas de reporting complet et formel)
 - Rôle de la CE en termes de suivi des "interventions" limité à un reporting général; Mécanismes BEI sont d'application
 - DCE dispose de peu d'information sur résultats & impact des interventions
 - Gestion centralisée par la BEI
- **Résultats des interventions:**
 - BI: ROM satisfaisants sur tous critères pour 4 sur 5 prêts.
 - AT: à approfondir sur base de documents reçus / à recevoir

11

EQ4 – Channelling took advantage of specific expertise of EIB?



Constats préliminaires de la mission au Maroc

- **La BEI offre une expertise:**
 - De maîtrise d'instruments financiers
 - En matière de suivi rigoureux des projets et des conditionnalités
 - Sectorielle: expertise reconnue en investissements en infrastructures
 - Egalement orientations stratégiques en Appui au secteur privé, Environnement et Capital humain (santé, éducation...): Expérience encore à construire pour ces deux dernières, mais encouragées par CE
- **Diverses Banques de développement** interviennent dans les mêmes domaines et offrent expertise et instruments similaires. Mais ont davantage d'expérience en matière de:
 - Dialogue politique (pas la vocation de la BEI)
 - Gestion de l'AT
 - Présence sur le terrain (*avis divergents*)
- **La BEI n'est pas plus compétitive que les Banques de Développement**, mais :
 - Les packages offerts grâce aux dons CE ont contribué à l'offre de conditions intéressantes. Bénéficiaires invoquent systèmes récents plus attractifs.
 - Logique de sélection de la banque la plus intéressante en fonction d'une série de considérations et besoins: financiers, procédures, délais, conditionnalités, devises, secteurs, etc.
- **La BEI est une institution européenne** et est la seule banque au Maroc identifiée en tant que telle (*cf EQ6*)

12

EQ5 – Channelling allowed swifter implementation, lower transaction costs?



Constats préliminaires de la mission au Maroc

- **Délais :**
 - BI: Pour la plupart des prêts bonifiés (source: ROM + interviews)
 - Inhérents au prêts dû essentiellement aux conditionnalités requérant des efforts substantiels.
 - Réactivité des bénéficiaires et recapitalisation des promoteurs parfois sources de délais également
 - AT: Rapportés pour les budgets importants (peu de délais CE-BEI pour les autres)
 - AT (gros budget: santé): délai de 2 ans dus à l'obtention d'accord DCE-BEI
- **Coûts de transaction :**
 - Pour la Commission: pratiquement nuls
 - BEI ne charge que peu de frais de gestion (<1%)
 - DCE : rôle limité (sauf désaccord sur AT importante: va-et-vient TdR)
 - CE siège: rôle limité
 - Pour les bénéficiaires: n'est pas mentionné comme difficulté
- **Coût de mise en œuvre de l'AT?**
- **Procédures :**
 - BI : pas de difficulté mentionnée
 - AT: circuits de décision et implication de la CE/DCE pas suffisamment clairs
 - Consultation de la CE au siège/DCE? A quel stade? Règles? Rapportage?

13

EQ6 – Channelling of funds contributed to visibility of Commission's support?



Constats préliminaires de la mission au Maroc

- **Visibilité du support CE via la BEI:**
 - BEI – Commission: deux institutions européennes, visibilité commune (autour du drapeau européen et de la terminologie « UE »)
 - BEI est une institution européenne et est la seule banque au Maroc identifiée en tant que telle
 - Ceci est une valeur ajoutée vis-à-vis d'autres Banques
 - Visibilité BEI-CE: potentiel encore sous-exploité
 - Visibilité est une priorité de la DCE
 - Parties prenantes sont au courant du support UE: Gouvernement / promoteurs, Etats membres, Banques
- **En général, l'UE a une visibilité claire pour les parties prenantes, mais insuffisante auprès du grand public marocain** (cf. sondage et moyens USAID)
- **Impact du channelling sur le dialogue politique**
 - BEI peu impliquée directement dans un dialogue politique
 - CE n'est pas en contact directement avec le gouvernement & promoteurs via les BI et TA
 - BI permettent cependant de promouvoir l'environnement

14

EQ7 – Channelling resulted in improved coordination of Commission and EU MS?



Constats préliminaires de la mission au Maroc

- **Pas de mécanisme général de coordination entre bailleurs**
- **Coordination avec EM à travers des 'groupes thématiques' sectoriels**
 - Créés autour de CE, BEI et EM, mais ouverts à d'autres bailleurs
 - Différences par secteur – Ex. Bonne coordination dans le secteur de l'eau & assainissement
- **Les dons CE via la BEI au travers de BI et AT n'ont pas d'influence sur la coordination avec les EM au niveau du pays**
 - BEI n'a pas de rôle de coordination entre banques.
 - BI et AT sur prêts BEI par CE uniquement
 - Certains EM ont leurs propres BD, qui agissent au même titre que la BEI
- **Pas de programmation commune DCE-BEI** au niveau des interventions

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Agenda



- Entretiens réalisés lors de la mission
- Présentations des constats de la mission
- Synthèse de la valeur ajoutée

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Valeur ajoutée – Bonifications

	CE	BEI	Bénéficiaire
Avantages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Intervention dans domaine stratégique (environnement) ■ Effet multiplicateur de ses dons ■ Déboursement (incl. préfinancement) ■ Visibilité et dialogue politique: instrument « UE » ■ Peu de frais de gestion ■ Participation à un autre mode de financement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Renforce sa position 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Financement important ■ Prêts à de meilleures conditions
Désavant./limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Décaissement lent (avant Préfinancement) ■ Pas de vocation politique pour BEI 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Etalement sur LT ■ Pas directement au Gouvernement ■ Restriction au secteur de l'environnement ■ Conditionnalités, EUR, garanties
Difficultés rencontrées	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Pas de difficulté majeure 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Délais pour remplir conditionnalités

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Valeur ajoutée – AT Fonds de Soutien FEMIP

	CE	BEI	Bénéficiaire
Avantages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Déboursement ■ Peu de frais de gestion ■ Qualité de l'intervention ■ Visibilité et dialogue politique: instrument « UE » ■ Participation à un autre mode de financement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Qualité de l'appui ■ Amélioration conditions de remboursement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Expertise et expérience ■ Appui avant et/ou durant le prêt
Désavant./limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Peu associée à la décision → pas nécessairement en accord ■ Pas de vocation politique pour BEI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Pas d'expérience BEI en AT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Pas de mention de désavantage majeur
Difficultés rencontrées	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Circuit pas clair; consultation en amont informelle ■ Charge de travail pour gros budget AT Santé (ex. 4 versions TdR) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Gestion gros budget d'AT Santé ■ Obtention d'accord CE pour AT Santé 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Délais dus à accord CE-BEI (ex. 2 ans)

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Annex 9 - List of persons met

1. European Commission HQ - EuropeAid

Surname, name	Institution/Organisation/Unit/Department	Function
Balzarro, Giorgio	Unit F4, Relations with EU institutions, international organisations and donors	Coordinateur des relations avec le "groupe II" des donateurs
Berckmans, Patrick	Unit E3, Social and human development	Quality Management Officer - Health & Population / Senior
Carton, Vincent	Unit G1, Programming and budgetary matters	Project / Process Officer Statistics
Chellafa, Nadia	Unit A3, Centralised operations for Europe, the Mediterranean and Middle-East	International Aid / Cooperation Officer – geo-coordinator
Daws, Alexandra	Unit 04, Information, Communication and front office	Information and Communication Officer
Downhill, Susan	Unit G2, Coordination of ICS and methodology for ex-post controls and auditing	External Auditor
Hermansson, Christer	Unit C4, Centralised operations for the ACP countries	Programme Manager
Hinojosa Martinez, Juan Carlos	Unit C4, Centralised operations for the ACP countries	Gestionnaire des programmes sociaux
Hoskins, Ian	Unit D1, Geographical coordination and supervision for the Mediterranean and Middle-East	Cooperation Officer – Desk West Bank & Gaza, Libanon, Israel
Ingrosso, Marco	Unit F5, Finance, Contracts and Audit for Europe, the Mediterranean and Middle-East	External Auditor - Auditeur externe et gestionnaire de contrats d'audit externe
Jacob, Frank	Unit 04, Central management of Thematic budget lines, Section Environment	Programme Manager
Knoth, Joachim	Unit D1, Asia & Central Asia, Desk Afghanistan	Cooperation Officer
Levecq, Cecile	Unit A2, Geographical Coordination and Supervision for the Mediterranean and the Middle East	International Aid / Cooperation Officer - Co-Coordonnateur géographique
Lipponen, Marianna	Unit F3, Central management of thematic budget lines	Programme Manager - Thematic Budget Lines
Martins, Paulo	Unit A2, Geographical Coordination and Supervision for the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Cooperation with IRAQ)	

Munaiz Samperio, José	Unit 04, Central, Section Food Security	Programme Manager
Nicora, Franco	Unit F2, General Operations Support, Management committees	Head of Unit
Page, Fernando Nino	Unit D1, Asia & Central Asia Desk Indonesia, East Timor, Brunei	Cooperation Officer
Pennington, Martyn	Unit F4, Relations with EU institutions, international organisations and donors	Head of Unit
Ramakers, Micha	Unit 04,	Administrator
Salinas, Claudio	Unit C4, Centralised operations for the ACP countries	Programme Manager
Tsiani Bondo, Augustin	Unit 4, Centralised operations for the ACP countries	Gestionnaire des programmes de coopération économique et commerciale
Valor Arce, Cesar	Unit G1, Programming and budgetary matters	Head of sector "DAC Reporting and help desk", Programming and budgetary matters
Van den Bossche, Michel	Unit 04, Section Environment	Programme Manager
Verougstraete, Mathieu	Unit 6, Multi-country programmes	Programme Manager
Zappino, Vincenzo	Unit G8, Relation with International Organisation	Programme Manager

2. European Commission HQ - DG ECFIN

Bouteiller, Didier	Unit D4	Head of Sector (Horizontal issues and liaison with multilateral institutions)
Garnier, Carole	Unit D4, Horizontal issues and co-ordination of financial assistance.	Head of Unit
Marenne, Jean-Martial	Unit 4, Horizontal issues and co-ordination of financial assistance. Development policy. Links with multilateral banks.	Budget Officer - Economic and Financial Officer (budgetary and legal issues, MFA coordination and procedures)
Tanttari, Lisa	Unit D4	Policy Officer
van der Lans, Clairette	Unit D4	Policy Advisor

3. European Commission HQ - DG DEV

Debois, Marc	DGA B2, Sustainable Management of Natural Resources	Head of sector Agriculture, Food Security and Rural Development
De Jonghe, Karen	DGA. A.3, Relations with international organisations and non EU States	Administrator and Policy Desk Officer B.W.I.
Mollica, Enrico	DGA B3, Human development, social cohesion and employment	Policy desk officer - Health, AIDS and Population
Probst, Norbert	DGA E1, Pacific	Administrator
Sarfatti, Paolo	DGA B2, Sustainable Management of Natural Resources	Policy Officers, Agricultural Research for Development. Policies

4. European Commission HQ - DG RELEX

Bertelsen, Christopher	Unit 2, United Nations, Treaties office	International Relations Officer
Horvath, Christophe	Delegation of the European Commission – Malawi - Food and Nutrition Security	Programme Manager
Jonkhart, Jolanda	Delegation of the European Commission – Cambodia – Economic Affairs and Cooperation	Programme Officer
List, Andreas	Unit H5, South East Asia	Principal Administrator
Mogni, Andrea	Unit L3, Horizontal coordination	Policy desk officer
Vasikeri, Vlassia	Delegation of the European Commission – Washington DC – Political and Development Section	Senior Advisor
Ynaraja, Ramon	Delegation of the European Commission – Mozambique – Trade & Private sector	Task manager

5. World Bank Group: Washington D.C. and Brussels

Al-Arief, Mohamad	External Affairs	
Bridi, Haleh	World Bank Brussels Office	Special Representative to the EU
Cadario, Paul M.	Trust Fund Quality Assurance and Compliance	Senior Manager
Carvalho, Soniya	Sector Thematic & Global Evaluation	Lead Evaluation Officer
Cliffe, Sarah F.	Fragile States Group	Head
de Amorim, Aude		Senior Advisor to the Executive Director for France
Datta, Namita	CGIAR, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	Governance Adviser
Desabatla, Praveen P.	Multilateral Trustee Operations	Financial Officer

Dorschel, Martin		Advisor to the Executive Director for Germany
Drewnowski, Sophia	Global Programs and Partnerships Group – Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships	In charge of EC matters – Senior Partnership Specialist
Duvall, Thomas A. III	Cofinancing and Project Finance Practice Group – Legal Department	Chief Counsel
Farooq, Zafar	Accounting Department	Senior Accounting Officer
Funk, Kathryn	Middle East Department – Middle East & North Africa Region	Lead Country Officer
Gerrard, Christopher D.	Sector Thematic & Global Evaluation	Lead Evaluation Officer
Jacobs, Véronique	World Bank Brussels Office	Counsellor
Kuijper, David	World Bank	Senior Advisor to the Executive Director
Lengkong, Dara M.	Trust Fund Operations Concessional Finance & Global Partnerships	Operations Officer
McNutt Miller, Alice	Multilateral Trustee Operations	Senior Financial Officer
Mealey, Elisabeth	Office of the Vice President East Asia and Pacific Region	Senior Communications Officer
Olalia, May		Operations Officer
Paralkar, Rajashree R.	Indonesia Country Unit	Country Officer
Quinn, Brian P.	Controllers, Strategy & Resource Management	Division Manager, Trust Funds
Rey, Christian	World Bank	MDF manager
Stout, Susan A.	Results Secretariat Operations Policy and Country Services Vice Presidency	Manager
Tan, David A.	Trust Funds Division – Accounting Department	Accounting Officer
Tata, Shey	CGIAR, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	Lead Financial Officer
Thalnitz, Margret	Global Partnerships and Programs	Director

6. EIB HQ

Alcarpe, Felismino	EIB Brussels, Corporate Responsibility Policies, Directorate for Strategy and Corporate Centre	Head division Strategy, Management & Financial Control Department
Bernard, Gordon	EIB Luxembourg, Directorate for Operations outside the European Union and Candidate Countries	Head of Division, ENPC-1, FEMIP Maghreb European Neighbourhood & Partner Countries Department
Bernard, Ziller	EIB Luxembourg, Policy, Reporting and Information Systems Unit	Head of Unit DEAS-PRISU

Church, Jacky	EIB Luxembourg, Lending operations outside the European Union	TA Officer (Near East region)
Collin, Catherine	EIB Luxembourg, IF Department Directorate for Operations outside the European Union and Candidate Countries	Head of Division, ACP-IF-PMP, Portfolio Management and Policy Africa, Caribbean, Pacific
Kerpen, Stefan	EIB Luxembourg, Lending operations outside the European Union	Head of Technical Assistance Unit
Macpherson, Jane	EIB Luxembourg, Directorate for Operations outside the EU and Candidate Countries	Head of Division, ENPC-2, FEMIP Near East, European Neighbourhood & Partner Countries Department
Prud'homme, Guido	EIB Brussels, Operational Lending Policies outside the EU	Senior Adviser

7. Country mission to Ethiopia

Sinigallia, Dino	European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia	Head of Delegation, Ambassador
Delcroix, Nicolas	European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia	Head of Operations
Curradi, Paulo	European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia	Head of Section - Rural Development and Food Security Advisor
Benfield, Andy	European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia	Aid Effectiveness Consultancy
Kelemework, Fasika	European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia	Monitoring and evaluation manager
Koçak, Micheline	European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia	Head of Finance & Contracts Section
Stadnik, Eva	European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia	Programme Assistant - Geographical Coordinator for Ethiopia
Vinuesa, José L.	European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia	Operations Manager - Economic Adviser
Yadetta, Abu	European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia	Food Security Expert
Al-Utaibi, Janet	UK Department for International Development (DFID)	Programme Manager DFID Ethiopia
Ato Birhanu	Food Security Coordination Bureau	Acting Head
Abdulahi, Muderis	Horn of Africa – Ethiopia-Canada Cooperation Office (ECCO)	Senior Advisor – Food security – Agriculture & Rural Development
Makonnen, Dejene	IrishAid	Senior Advisor – Rural Economic Development

Ato Sahalie	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development – NAO Office	Food Security expert
Fisseha, Aberra Kidane	Embassy of Ethiopia to the Benelux countries and Mission to the European Union	Minister Counsellor II
Laïke, Aklog	Swedish International Development cooperation Agency (SIDA)	Programme Officer (Food Security – Rural Development)
Freminatos Abrham, Tafesse	World Bank	Financial Management Specialist
Ohashi, Ken	World Bank	Country Director for Ethiopia & Sudan Africa Region
Tadesse, Endashaw	World Bank	Senior Operations Officer
Weismann, Will	World Bank	PSNP WB Team Leader

8. Country mission to Vietnam

Doyle, Sean	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	Ambassador – Head of Delegation
Farnhammer, Hans	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	First Secretary – Economic Co-operation Governance
Gualdi, Laura	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	Attaché Co-operation Section
Leon, Anne-Claire	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	First Secretary – Co-operation Section – Development Co-operation
Mersch, Emmanuel	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	First Counsellor – Head of Finance & Contracts Section
Nguyen Thi Ngoc Anh	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	Press and Information Assistant
Padilla, Anna	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	Second Secretary - Deputy Head of Section Finance and Contracts
Thanh, Hoang	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	Programme Officer – Rural Development & Environment – Cooperation Section
Thi Thu Hang, Nguyen	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	Programme Officer – Institutional & Private Sector Support – Co-operation Section
Thi Thu Phuong, Dinh	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	Co-operation Section
Van Thanh, Le	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	Programme Officer – Social Sectors – Cooperation Section
Vandenbergh, Willy	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	First Counsellor – Head of Co-operation
Vien Ngoc Bich	European Commission Delegation to Vietnam	Press, Cultural and Public Relations Officer
Henry, Alain	Agence Française de Développement (AFD)	Directeur Vietnam
Thi Ngoc Minh, Nguyen	UK Department for International Development (DFID)	Economic Adviser

Thi Thu Trang, Nguyen	UK Department for International Development (DFID)	Programme Support Manager
Anh, Ngo Kieu	Embassy of Denmark (DANIDA)	Economic Reforms Officer
Degnbol, Tove	Embassy of Denmark (DANIDA)	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission
Gromotka, Joachim	HEMA	International Technical Advisor
Breda Valerie	International Labour Organization (ILO)	Programme Manager
Hassendeen, Shafinaz	International Labour Organization (ILO)	Senior Programme Officer
Chuông, Chu Văn	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development – International Co-operation Department	Senior Program Officer
Tùng, Đỗ Quang	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development - Vietnam Conservation Fund	Manager
NguyenThwy Sam	Ministry of Finance	EC Desk Officer
Duong Huy Lieu	Ministry of Health, Dept of planning and finance	Director
Pham Duc Minh	Ministry of Health, Dept of planning and finance	Programme officer, HEMA
Tong Hoai Nam	Ministry of Health, Dept of planning and finance	Expert Finance
Nguyen Thanh Binh	Ministry of Planning and Investment	EC Desk Officer
van Loosdrecht, Bengt	Royal Netherlands Embassy	Deputy Head of Mission – Head of Development Cooperation
Awanyo, Kofi	World Bank	Sr. Procurement Specialist (EAPCO) – Procurement Hub Leader
Hong Ngan, Nguyen	World Bank	Communications Officer
Rama, Martin	World Bank	Lead Economist, Acting Country Director
Thomson, Jennifer K.	World Bank	Senior Financial Management Specialist
Van Minh, Nguyen	World Bank	Senior Economist
Bahuet, Christophe	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Deputy Country Director (Programme)
Tien Dung, Trinh	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Assistant Country Director – Head of Governance Unit

9. Country mission to Morocco

Belguenani, Hassane	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Chargé de programmes Eau & Assainissement
Berti, Marco	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Chef de section Coopération économique, facilitation des échanges (i.e. chargé section opérationnelle)
Deloge, Thierry	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Formation Professionnelle/transports
Dethomas, Bruno	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Ambassadeur, Chef de Délégation
Dupuis, Nadia	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Chargée de la Presse et de l'information
El Kesri, Fatema	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Assistante Coordination
Gomez Masquef, Joan Carles	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Responsable des audits et contrôles
Kachrad, Abdenbi	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Finances et contrats
Lalisse, Marion	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Chargée de Programmes d'Appui à l'Accord d'Association
Leon Lora, José Roman	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Chef de section Secteurs sociaux et développement durable
Olmos Llorens, Enrique	European Commission Delegation to Morocco	Chef des Opérations Développement
Perez, René	EIB - Bureau de Rabat	Représentant de la BEI au Maroc, Département ENPC
López-Calix, José R.	World Bank	Lead Economist – Morocco and Algeria
Matondo – Fundani, Nono J.S.	Banque Africaine de Développement – Fonds Africain de Développement	Représentant Résident – Bureau National du Maroc
Rais, Wadii	Banque Africaine de Développement – Fonds Africain de Développement	Analyste Financier – Bureau National du Maroc
Krieger, Christoph Gabriel	Bureau de la KfW au Maroc – Coopération allemande au développement	Directeur
Henzel, Andrea	Ambassade d'Allemagne	Conseillère intérimaire
Tirot, François	Agence Française de Développement PROPARGO	Directeur adjoint
El Azami El Idrissi, Driss	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances	Chef de la Division des Relations avec l'Union Européenne
Saboni, Benyoussef	Ministry of Economy and Finance	Deputy Director of Treasury and External Finance
Kadri, Mohamed	Ministère de l'Intérieur - Rabat	Directeur des Régies et Services Concédés
Saïdi, Abdelkader	Ministère de l'Intérieur	Ingénieur en Chef – Chef de la Division Etudes et Analyses

Badri, Samira	Office National de l'Eau Potable	Chef de la Division Financement – Direction Financière
El Ouali, Edouard	Office National de l'Eau Potable	Direction financière, organisations multilatérales

Annex 10 – Bibliography

Author	Document Title	Editing Year
GENERAL		
	United Nations Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals	2000
	Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development	2002
	Rome Declaration on Harmonization	2003
	Stockholm Principles, International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship	2003
	Joint Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for development results	2004
	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness	2005
Agence française de Développement	Annual report 2005 of the French Development Agency	2006
Asian Development Bank	Multilateral development bank COMPAS	2006
DANIDA	Annual report 2005 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark	2005
DFID	Annual report 2006 of the Development for International Development Department, United Kingdom	2006
European Commission	COM(2000)585, Accelerated action targeted at major communicable diseases within the context of poverty reduction	2000
European Commission	COM(2000)585, Accelerated action targeted at major communicable diseases within the context of poverty reduction	2000
European Commission	Technical and administration provision for implementation	2000
European Commission	The European Community's Development Policy	2000
European Commission	Building an effective partnership with the UN in the field of development and humanitarian affairs	2001
European Commission	COM(2001) 612 final, 2001/0251 (COD) Concerning the European Community contribution to the "Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	2001
European Commission	COM(2001) 96 - Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty reduction	2001
European Commission	Country Strategy Paper East Timor 2002-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2004	2002
European Commission	COM(2005) 153 final - Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in third countries	2003
European Commission	COM(2003)575 Commission Communication on the Madrid Donor's meeting for the reconstruction of Iraq.	2003
European Commission	COM(2003) 587 "Shaping support for private sector development in the Mediterranean"	2003
European Commission	Country Strategy Paper Afghanistan 2003-2006	2003
European Commission	The European Union and the United Nations The choice of Multilateralism	2003
European Commission	COM(2004)667 Iraq Assistance Programme	2004

European Commission	Translating the Monterrey Consensus into practice : the contribution of the EU	2004
European Commission	COM(2005)458 on the "EU-Palestinian cooperation beyond disengagement – towards a two-state solution	2005
European Commission	Policy coherence for Development –Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals	2005
European Commission	Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals- The European Union contribution	2005
European Commission	Financing for development and Aid effectiveness- The challenges of scaling up EU aid	2006
European Commission	Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility	2006
European Commission	Commission's MEMO/07/34 on Afghanistan, 26/01/2007	2007
European Commission	Communication and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions	2007
European Commission	Note for the file - Meeting with the World Bank - Brussels 11 April 2007	2007
European Commission	EU Visibility Guidelines for External Actions	2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006
European Commission, EuropeAid	Annual work Programme 2005 for Grants EuropeAid Food Aid and Food Security	2005
European Commission, EuropeAid	Questionnaire to Head of Delegation on Relations with EU institutions, international organisations and donors	2005
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European Council	Proposition de Décision du Conseil relative à la position à adopter par la Communauté au sein du Conseil des ministres ACP-EU concernant le solde de l'ensemble des prêts spéciaux accordés aux pays pauvres très endettés (PTTE)ACP faisant partie des pays les moins avancés, qui subsisterait après l'application de tous les autres mécanismes d'allègement de la dette des PPTE	2001
European Council	The Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities	2002

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