



Evaluation

*of the Paris Declaration,
Phase 2*

*Case Study Austria
Final Report*



Imprint

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This is an independent evaluation report. Views and conclusions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the contractors.

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PREFACE

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD, 2005) is an important agreement between development agencies and partner countries conducting necessary qualitative improvements in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG, 2000). The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA, 2008) reinforced the qualitative targets and introduced the formerly missing civil society. Austria endorsed the PD and the AAA and set out an Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness (2006-11) as well as an Austrian Action and Implementation Plan for the AAA (2009-11).

The monitoring and evaluation scheme of the PD / AAA consists of three monitoring surveys (2006 / 34 participating countries, 2008 / 55 countries, 2011 / number of participating countries?) and two phases of evaluations of the implementation, each one including evaluations of the recipient countries as well as studies of the donor headquarters. Evaluation Phase I (2007-08) was mainly focused on inputs and procedures; evaluation phase II (2009-10) on outcomes and results of development cooperation. Findings and conclusions so far are summarized in the synthesis report on the first phase of the evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration.

Phase II of the PD evaluation includes a total of 21 reviews of the outcome and impact in recipient countries and 7 reviews of the commitment, capacities and incentives in the donor countries. The findings and conclusions will be summarized in a second synthesis Report addressed to the fourth High Level Forum of the OECD in Korea (2011).

Austria is actively participating in the evaluation of the PD, (1) by contributing to the evaluation of Uganda during phase I and phase II, (2) by commissioning a HQ study during the present phase II and (3) by participating in the monitoring rounds. The present Austrian headquarter study is focusing on the Austrian Development Cooperation system, including the concerned ministries, the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the Development Bank of Austria (OeEB) and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as intermediary or implementing agencies in Vienna as well as the cooperation offices in the priority countries of the Austrian Development Cooperation. The task was complex because of the structural and functional differences between the Austrian Official Development Assistance (ODA) on one side, to which a multitude of institutions contribute, and the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC) on the other, consisting of the policy setting Ministry of European and International Affairs (BMeiA) and the facilitating agency ADA only. Whenever possible, this report strictly distinguishes between ODA and ADC. Where the distinction cannot be made clearly, the term Austrian development Aid is used.

The responsibility for the Austrian HQ study lies with the ADA Evaluation Unit, heading the Austrian Reference group. This group consists of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Finances, the Austrian Development Agency, representatives of academia, and civil society organisations.

After three major reviews with similar interests in the last two years (ADA evaluation 2008, DAC Peer Review 2009, Review of the Austrian Court of Audit 2009), this present HQ study took place in an atmosphere of a certain evaluation fatigue. In the complex institutional landscape of the Austrian development Aid it is simply not possible to implement all recommended measures. In the individual case, one can however find big differences in the implementation of the recommendations. Almost all of the recommendations of the ADA evaluation, but only few of those of the DAC peer review are implemented. In addition, the shrinking of Austrian ODA in 2009 draws the attention of the informed public considerably more to the finances than to qualitative aspects of development cooperation.

The opinions presented in this study are those of the external expert and do not necessarily reflect those of the interviewed persons or those of the organisations they represent. Comments of the organisations to the draft report are included in the summary as well as in the chapter about methodology. Once the report is final it can be downloaded from the website: www.entwicklung.at.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The evaluator thanks all interviewed persons for their willingness to contribute in intensive discussions and to provide later additional written or oral information. I am obliged to heads of cooperation offices for completing the questionnaires. Specific thanks go to the members of the Austrian reference group for their most valuable inputs and critical comments on the inception report and the first draft report. I am indebted to all organisations providing comments on the second draft report. And finally, it would have been impossible to accomplish my work without the continuous careful support of the ADA evaluation unit and the ADA statistics unit. It goes without saying that any errors which may remain are the sole responsibility of the external evaluator.

Bernhard Wenger

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction – scope of the evaluation

Austria endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD, 2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA, 2008). In these two documents development agencies and partner countries agreed to carry out necessary qualitative improvements in order to enhance aid effectiveness and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG, 2000). Austria set out an Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness (2006-11) as well as an Action and Implementation Plan for the AAA (2009-11).

Austria participates in the evaluation of the PD (1) by contributing to the evaluation of Uganda, (2) by a Headquarter study, and (3) by participating in the monitoring rounds. The present Austrian Headquarter study is focused on the Austrian Development Cooperation system, including the concerned ministries, the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the Development Bank of Austria (OeEB) and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as intermediary or implementing agencies in Vienna as well as the cooperation offices in the priority countries of the Austrian Development Cooperation.

The evaluation of the Paris Declaration includes 19 donor studies and 29 evaluations of recipient countries. The synthesis of the results will be discussed during the fourth OECD High Level Forum in Korea in 2011. The evaluation is guided by an international management group which provided a general approach paper, generic terms of reference and operational matrices for both country evaluations and HQ studies, literature review references, draft outlines, etc.

The *focus of the evaluation* is on three enabling conditions:

- *Commitment*: Does the government of Austria make clear-cut pledges and define a suitable development cooperation policy in order to implement its commitment to the principles of the Paris Declaration?
- *Capacities*: Does the government of Austria install sufficient and adequate capacities to put the principles of the Paris Declaration into practice? Is Austria able to expand good practices system-wide and learn from failures?
- *Incentives*: Does the Government of Austria provide measures that are likely to encourage the involved parties in development cooperation to follow the principles of the Paris Declaration and avoid measures to discourage them to do so?

An Austrian reference group composed of representatives of the Ministry of European and International Affairs, the Ministry of Finances, the Austrian Development Agency and Civil Society Organisations provided most useful feedback to the terms of reference, the inception report and the first version of the draft report.

Methodology included the reading of both international and national documentations about the Paris Declaration, a series of 45 semi-structured interviews with representatives of involved organisations carried out in Vienna (September 20 - 28 2010) as well as an electronic survey in all 12 coordination offices.

The draft report was well received by the reference group and by the interviewed persons. Generally, they appreciated the plain language of the report. The majority of the audience of the two presentations agreed with the diagnosis that Austrian ODA is going through a crisis but were sceptical about opportunities to use this crisis as a chance for improvement. Their comments related foremost to the demand for a clearer distinction between ADC and ODA.

Main Findings and Conclusions

Key features: Austrian ODA is regressing from € 1'321 millions in 2007 (0.50% of Gross National Income) to € 820 millions in 2009 (0.30%). Austrian ODA is highly fragmented: in 2009, 136 countries (out of 150

eligible for ODA) receive Austrian ODA, with an average of € 1.9 millions. Austria is almost renouncing to a selection, yet the trend is still towards even more fragmentation. In 2008, only *three* of the Austrian priority countries are among the top ten ODA recipients (Iraq, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Chad, Egypt, Turkey, China, *Kosovo*, Europe regional/multicountry, Sub-Saharan Africa regional, *Uganda*). In the last couple of years, country programmable aid represented a low share of around 10% of Austrian ODA only. Austria is placed at the last but two position among DAC bilateral donors for the share of country programmable aid and at the next to last position for concentration (2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour, p. 21 and p.28). The volume of the other shares in Austrian ODA is oscillating very much: debt relief (55% - 5%), contributions to EU development cooperation (25% - 15 %) and contributions to international financing institutions (23% - 6%).

Legal set-up: Austrian laws (Federal Ministries Act, Federal Act on Development Cooperation, different acts for financial contributions to IFIs, Guidelines for the Federal Finances, and several others) provide an unbalanced basis for the overall Austrian development aid and create diverging operational conditions for the different parts of ODA. Differences are specifically found among bilateral development cooperation, contributions to international financing institutions and contributions to international organizations (UN, EU).

Development policy: An overarching Austrian strategy for development cooperation is missing. There are various attempts to create coherence in Austrian development policy at the next lower strategic level, the ministerial and interministerial guidelines. Yet, they are very general in nature and overruled by the Guidelines for the Federal Finances. Moreover, they are not conducive for a proper political steering of Austrian ODA and they are not backed up by strong strategic monitoring mechanisms.

Structural problems: These structural problems, which cause high fragmentation of Austrian ODA, low internal coherence and strong oscillations in funding, are not on the domestic political agenda. In its statements towards an international public, the Austrian government does not address these problems.

Research for solutions: Austria has, however, made several attempts to overcome this situation. These attempts match well with the PD principles although they were made without direct reference to the PD. The most important of these attempts was the Foundation of ADA in 2004, in order to create a flexible and competent organization capable to manage roughly the double amount of ADC. Since ADA was endowed with low institutional flexibility, unclear role distribution with BMeiA and by far less funds than anticipated, this attempt was not yet successful. Other attempts failed, as the ODA-path towards the EU ODA-target of 0.51% in 2008 or the “White paper approach” in 2009.

Implementation of PD principles: Under these circumstances, the implementation of the PD principles was restricted to the country programmable aid. In that small share of overall ODA (around 10% of total ODA), Austria is making slow but good progress towards the implementation of the PD.

Potential for further progress is limited because of the low priority of development cooperation in the Austrian political agenda, the unclear role distribution of the involved actors, the complicated processes and the inadequate formats of policy and strategy documents.

The involved actors searched solutions mostly in top-down procedures such as the amendment of the law on development cooperation (2003), the ODA path (2008), a “White paper approach” (2009) or in out-of-the middle procedures such as the interministerial strategic guidelines on Environment and Development or Security and Development(2009-10), but these attempts did not achieve strong results or even failed. There was almost no attempt to adjust unsatisfactory existing instruments such as the Three Years Programmes in bottom-up procedures.

Assessing contextual factors: There is no development cooperation strategy that could guide an overall implementation of the PD in Austrian ODA. Austria disposes of a specialized agency for Austria development cooperation, the Austrian development Agency (ADA), founded in 2004. Immediately after its foundation, ADA did embark on the implementation of the PD principles. The Ministry of European and

International Affairs, responsible for coordinating Austrian development policy and for development cooperation, sets other priorities in the overarching agenda higher than PD principles, e.g. participation in UN councils or Austrian widespread visibility. The Ministry of Finances, responsible for contributions to the IFIs, gives the PD principles high priority, but implementation is to a great extent in the responsibility of the supported IFIs themselves. The involved Austrian actors do not share the same view on the binding character of the PD and the political consequences for Austria. In the absence of an overall development cooperation strategy, it is difficult to assess to which degree the approaches of the different actors are coherent and complementary. So far, evidence for direct influence of the PD principles on the country programmable aid is very limited (in 2009 around 45 % of new ADA commitments, representing approximately 5% of total ODA are actively programmed according to the PD principles).

Assessing commitment: The fall of the Austrian ODA volume by 31.2% in 2009 did reveal some structural problems in policy setting that did not receive sufficient attention in a large public before, as long as Austria scored well on the way to the EU 2010 ODA target of 0.51%: There is no domestic policy mechanism in place covering all Development Aid. Being a mixture between an overarching strategy and an operational plan for BMeiA and ADA, the 3YP cannot be used as such a mechanism in its present form. A shift to a politically endorsed medium-term development policy is therefore necessary for reducing overlaps and divergences among ODA and ADC. A decisive point for the Austrian commitment will be the Government programme for the 25th Legislation period 2014-17. Other commitments for individual targets of the PD, as e.g. increased joint missions and joint project implementation units, the further deployment of delegated cooperation, increase of the share of pooled funding, etc, are of minor importance but should nevertheless be tackled in a redesigned programming procedure.

Assessing capacities: Austria has remarkable capacities for delivering innovative solutions in small units in specific working contexts, but these efforts fall short of being extended to system-wide operational plans, to systematic mutual learning about potentials and risks. There is room for more delegation of competencies, for redefining working relations as well as for improving collaboration and exchange among the main parties. A rapid improvement of Austrian capacities could be achieved, if the three main actors BMeiA, BMF and ADA would cooperate better, bringing bilateral and multilateral, financial and technical development cooperation into closer working relations under the following premises:

- Filling the gap at the head of the hierarchy of policy documents by an overarching Austrian strategy for development cooperation
- Reducing the total amount of policies, strategies and programmes at inferior level
- Transferring discussions from working groups into the line responsibilities
- Simplifying the division of labour among the three involved parties

The best means for remedying the problem of the limited deployment of capacities would be providing ADA more institutional independence from BMeiA as well as a funding adequate to its size by an amendment of the federal act on development cooperation.

Assessing incentives: Incentives and disincentives are not well balanced. The staff of ADC has good intrinsic motivation. Disincentives stem from weak political support, missing overall development cooperation policy, distortions in ODA, a share of country programmable aid which is too small, inappropriate division of labour between BMeiA and BMF, unclear role allocation between ADA and the ministries, complicated communication of the Ministries with the coordination offices, inadequate volume of country programmes, and missing result orientation. Another hindering factor for result orientation is the Austrian cultural specificity to give higher priority to the willingness to do something than to the quality of its result.

Assessing implementation issues: At strategy level, PD principles are partly implemented in the 3YP and the interministerial strategic guidelines. They are fully implemented in the new country programmes for priority countries since 2010 and the strategic guidelines on IFIs. At operational level, they are fully implemented in ADA. However, they are scarcely implemented in other institutions. Increased comple-

mentarity and division of labour in the priority countries are likely to reduce duplications (because of less sectors and more donor coordination, etc.). But this positive trend is affected by adverse tendencies such as the increase of ODA fragmentation and the high number of overlapping policies and strategies. At financial level, the downwards trend in ADC represents an obstacle for implementing the PD principles. Multi-year commitments in the bilateral cooperation are still not sufficiently built up. In more than half of all ODA recipient countries, financial volumes are so small that proper programming cannot be done cost-effectively. The main problem with regard to mutual accountability is the missing platform for discussing Austrian political accountability at Government or Parliamentary level.

Beyond the term of the PD: The high degree of fragmentation in Austrian ODA is undermining its credibility of Austrian ODA. Austria has to reduce the number of recipient countries of small Austrian ODA contributions in order to avoid further reputation damages. An update of the Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness for the years 2012ff may be helpful for steering the process.

Recommendations

General Recommendations

- (1) **Repositioning Austrian development policy:** The external evaluator recommends to the Austrian Government: to carefully prepare the repositioning of Austrian development policy not only for a post PD period but much more so also for the next government programme.
- (2) **Designing new regional programmes according to PD principles:** The external evaluator recommends to the Austrian Government: sharpening the focus of future regional programmes (e.g. the Black Sea Region) according to the five PD principles.
- (3) **Step-by-step approach for restructuring Austrian ODA:** The external evaluator recommends to BMeiA: developing a step-by-step approach for restructuring Austrian ODA with the objective to create a legally binding, multiannual financial framework for the overall ODA, setting deliberate priorities in strategic partnerships with other ministries.
- (4) **Streamlining strategies:** The external evaluator highly recommends to BMeiA and ADA: continuing the streamlining process that has resulted in some good achievements so far such as the two action plans 06-11 and 09-11, the new format of the country strategies, and the baseline for aid modalities despite the presumable difficult financial situation.
- (5) **Simplifying procedures:** The external evaluator recommends to BMeiA and ADA: creating transparency on strengths and shortcomings of the present ADC in a pragmatic approach, analysing the basic choices for the specific profiles in the concentration/fragmentation consequently, simplifying procedures, shifting more to a hands-on work style in the international development cooperation.

Specific Recommendation to BMeiA

- (6) **Interministerial task group:** The external evaluator recommends to BMeiA to mandate its division VII with establishing an interministerial working group at division level including representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Science and Research, Environment, ADA, and optionally others, with the objective of defining a step by step approach for restructuring Austrian ODA.

Tasks of the group should include:

1. Assessing options such as an amendment of the law on development cooperation, a redesign of the 3YP, a clarification of the thematic priorities, the bundling of existing strategic instruments, a redesign of ODA financing mechanisms, shifts in attribution of responsibilities among the Ministries,
2. Prioritizing the options
3. Listing the necessary measures for implementing options with the highest priorities

4. Setting a proposal for implementation including a time-frame
5. Informing the Ministries involved in the task group with parallel notes on the proposal.

The first step above should at least include the adjustment of the 3YP to the requirements of the PD, namely by:

- a) Formulating objectives and related results with quantitative indicators
- b) Making reference to objectives and results achieved in the prior programme period
- c) Making clear-cut reference to international agreements and Austrian commitments
- d) Distributing responsibilities for results among the involved Ministries

Specific Recommendation to BMeiA division VII

- (7) ***Focus on strategies:*** The external evaluator recommends to BMeiA division VII to concentrate on timely delivery of concise strategic guidelines that include clear-cut distribution of responsibilities, planned results, planned financial inputs and to reduce operational programming.

Specific Recommendation to ADA

- (8) ***Reduce and simplify strategies, concepts and programmes:*** The external evaluator recommends to ADA to reduce duplications of documents (e.g. company statute / company concept, working programme / sectoral working programme) and overlaps (e.g. 3YP - working programme); to reduce own policy considerations in all documents, but to refer to policy documents of Austrian or partner governments where necessary; and to include in all documents review-outlook comparisons and results backed by indicators.

Specific Recommendation to Austrian NGOs

- (9) ***Shift from appeal to alliances:*** The external evaluator recommends to NGOs to strengthen their domestic advocacy competences, to argue less in methodological or project implementation terms but more in political terms, and to forge stronger alliances in campaigns.

ACRONYMS

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action 2008
ADB	African Development Bank
ADA	Austrian Development Agency
ADC	Austrian Development Cooperation (BMeiA and ADA)
BKA	Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt)
BMeiA	Ministry of European and International Affairs (<i>Bundesministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten</i>)
BMF	Ministry of Finances (<i>Bundesministerium für Finanzen</i>)
BMI	Ministry of the Interior (<i>Bundesministerium des Inneren</i>)
BMLFUV	Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (<i>Bundesministerium für Land-, Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft</i>)
BMLV	Ministry for Defence (<i>Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport</i>)
BMUKK	Ministry of Education, the Arts and Culture (<i>Bundesmin. für Unterricht, Kunst und Kultur</i>)
BMWA	Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour (<i>Bundesmin. für Wirtschaft und Arbeit</i>) until 2009
BMWF	Ministry of Science and Research (<i>Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Forschung</i>)
BMWFJ	Ministry for Economic Affairs, Family and Youth (<i>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend</i>), since 2009
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DFID	UK Department for International Development
ICM	Indirect Centralised Management Scheme of the EU
IFI	International Financing Institution
LDC	Least Developed Country
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
ODA	Austrian Official Development Assistance
OeEB	Development Bank of Austria (<i>Oesterreichische Entwicklungsbank</i>)
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategies
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organisation

1 INTRODUCTION

Section 3 presents a narrative description of the Austrian Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC)¹ based on the analysis of documents, observations and information provided by the interview partners. All statements are made from the point of view of the external evaluator, stating what ODA and ADC are and what they are doing, and what they are not and what they are not doing, respectively. Section 3 answers the question “What are the key characteristics of Official Austrian Development Assistance (ODA) in general and Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC)?” (See Annex 12.2: Evaluation matrix). It is, however, much more than a narrative description of the “contextual factors” as asked for by the terms of reference. It presents a synthetic overview of the Austrian aid system with a focus on instruments and structures, referring less to principles and processes.

In the sections 4 - 8, the Austrian ODA is assessed against the criteria of the evaluation matrix: contextual factors, commitment, capacities, incentives and implementation issues. The assessment draws on the information gathered in document analysis, interviews and an electronic survey in the Coordination Offices.

The sections 3 - 8 include specific conclusions and if possible specific recommendations to the respective issues. The conclusions are summarized in section 9 “General Conclusions”. The recommendations are summarised in section 10. Section 11 deals with the implications beyond the term of the PD.

2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 *International Design*

The HQ study Austria is part of a huge general framework of the evaluation of the Paris Declaration, phase 2. The results of the second phase of the Paris Declaration evaluation will be presented and discussed during the fourth OECD High Level Forum in Korea in 2011. 21 country evaluations and 7 donor agency / HQ studies are carried out in a well defined common evaluation setting, including a general approach paper, generic terms of reference and operational matrices for both country evaluations and HQ studies, literature review references, draft outlines, etc.

Since these documents are easily accessible on the website <http://www.oecd.org/>, they are not quoted in this report. The TORs for the Austrian HQ study draw heavily on the international generic terms. They differ, however, in one important aspect: where the international terms speak of “Donor/Agency Headquarter”, they distinguish between ODA and ADC.

¹ Official Development Assistance (ODA): “Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.”, DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts, www.oecd.org/dac/glossary
Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC): Development Cooperation Activities of the Ministry of European and International Affairs (BMeiA) and the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) (see www.entwicklung.at)

2.2 The Case Study Austria

Mandate

The Austria HQ study was carried out on mandate of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) under the terms of reference of February 4 2010 (see Annex 12.1). The external evaluator participated earlier in a similar exercise as a member of the ADA evaluation 2008.

The *focus of the evaluation* is on three enabling conditions (according to the generic terms):

- *Commitment*: Does the government of Austria make clear-cut pledges and define a suitable development cooperation policy in order to implement its commitment to the principles of the Paris Declaration?
- *Capacities*: Does the government of Austria install sufficient and adequate capacities to put the principles of the Paris Declaration into practice? Is Austria able to expand good practices system-wide and learn from failures?
- *Incentives*: Does the Government of Austria provide measures that are likely to encourage the involved parties in development cooperation to follow the principles of the Paris Declaration and avoid measures to discourage them to do so?

The terms of reference mention the following deliverables:

- *Inception report*: contextualizing the evaluation approach, presenting a first analysis of the relevant documents, drafting the methodology and the instruments and proposing a detailed work plan (see evaluation matrix in annex 12.2). The matrix follows the model given in the generic donor HQ study matrix though it is adapted to the purpose of the Austrian case study: questions are reformulated and related to assumptions. Indicators and sources of information are clearly separated (see annex 12.2).
- *Draft report*: in a format given by the TORs, presenting the results of the document analysis, the interviews and the electronic survey. Presentation of that draft report in a working session of the Austrian reference group and in meetings with interviewed persons and representatives of the major involved parties within Austrian ODA/ADC. Modification of the draft report on the basis of the feedbacks received by the reference group, the involved actors and the international evaluation management group.
- *Final Report*

Interviews

Semi-structured interviews with representatives of involved organisations as mentioned in the evaluation matrix were conducted in Vienna in the period September 20 – September 28 2010. Respondents were selected by the ADA evaluation unit on the basis of proposals from both, the Austrian reference group and the external evaluator. The interview with the representatives of the NGOs was organised as a focus group interview. The interviews with four persons absent or ill during the period of the stay of the external evaluator in Vienna were conducted telephonically between October 08 and October 11 2010. Interviews took between one and one and half hours, depending on the amount of information the partner provided. The focus group interview took two and a half hours. The statements of the interview partners and the coordinators are kept confidential.

Electronic Survey

Due to lack of time, the *electronic survey* mainly consists of a closed questionnaire, which includes only very few open questions at the end asking for positive and negative experiences and general comments. The survey was addressed to heads of all the twelve coordination offices and was answered by all of them. In order to keep the answers confidential, the feedback was handled directly by the external

evaluator. Initially the electronic survey should be extended to a larger public, including staff responsible for ODA/ADC in Austrian diplomatic missions in countries without Austrian coordination office but figuring on the list of the top ten recipient countries of Austrian ODA. The idea was abandoned after discussion with BMeiA and ADA because the embassies in those countries were not involved in the ODA transfers. These are made directly by the Austrian Ministry of Finance to the respective Finance Ministries, within the framework of debt release. The embassies in these countries were therefore not involved in the implementation of the Paris Declaration.

Table 1: Sample of interlocutors

<i>Category</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>No interviews</i>	<i>Interviewed persons</i>	<i>Questionnaires</i>
ADC	BMeiA	11	11	
	ADA	12	12	
	Coordinators			12
ODA(*)	BMF	5	7	
	Other ministries	5	8	
	Academia	5	5	
	CSO	1	4	
	OeEB	1	3	
	Parliament	1	1	
	Regional Government	1	1	
	Private Companies	3	3	

(*) *including members of the ADA Board and the Consultative Group on Development Cooperation of the BMeiA*

The term respondent refers to the interviewees and the heads of coordination offices in the Austrian priority countries. The sample covers the two parties ADC and ODA in a fairly balanced way. In Austrian domestic matters, it is representative for ODA and ADC. Despite the efforts of the evaluation unit, it was difficult to involve political representatives in the sample. This may reflect the low priority of development cooperation on the present Austrian political agendas. The sample abroad covers ADC only, but at a reflux rate of 100%.

The analysis of the answers given in interviews and questionnaires was done with qualitative methods only. Answers were classified under the questions of the evaluation matrix and assessed against the assumptions in this matrix.

Feedbacks to the Draft Report

The reference group and the international evaluation management group provided detailed feedback to aspects which are factually not correct and methodological errors of the draft report. The interviewed persons and representatives of the organisations involved in Austrian ODA were invited to a presentation of the draft report and provided valuable comments on the political assessment. The majority of the audience of the two presentations agreed with the diagnosis that Austrian ODA is going through a crisis but were sceptical about opportunities to use this crisis as a chance for improvement. The comments focused on the demand for a clearer distinction between ADC and ODA, and inevitably on the financial situation in Austrian ODA.

Limitations

One specific characteristic of Austrian ODA is not enough covered by the evaluation: due to its longstanding economic, social and cultural relations with South East Europe, Austria has a very high interest in good neighbourhood with that region. In this context, development cooperation is not seen as an end in itself by most of the contacted persons; it is normally seen as instrumental to the Austrian or

European neighbourhood policy. Under these circumstances, many of the interviewees were less concerned with the question “What outcome/results may Austrian aid have?” than with other questions such as “Is the partner country ODA-eligible?” or “May Austrian economic, social or cultural activities in those countries be subsidised by ADC?”. It was not possible to adjust the methodology adequately to this marked difference in Austrians interests between South East Europe and other ODA recipients without leaving the common ground of the HQ studies given by the generic terms.

Available time and resources did not allow for the integration of the “mirror questions” proposed by the international generic terms into the analysis. A direct comparison of the Donor Austria with priority recipient countries was not possible, neither at the input - output nor at the approach - outcome level. Such a cross-check would have been difficult to realise anyhow because the data basis of the country studies and the HQ study do not match. Austria put considerable effort into adapting PD standards to internationally available data and the requirements of its own programming throughout past years. It was not possible at all to repeat such an exercise in the context of this HQ study by harmonising donor and recipient data or by disaggregating the figures of multilateral aid for donor countries and recipient countries conveniently.

The evaluation is therefore about Austria’s intentions and actions as a donor in a complex context, not about results in developing countries.

3 THE AUSTRIAN ODA

This section presents the context of the institutional landscape and policy set-up only insofar as it is directly relevant for the analysis of the Austrian ODA. It answers the first question under the heading “contextual factors” in the evaluation matrix (annex 12.2): “What are the key characteristics of Official Austrian Development Assistance (ODA) in general and Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC)?”

3.1 Key data

Table 2: Key data of Austrian ODA (Disbursements)

ODA in million euros	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
bilateral ODA	202	284	991	870	967	855	364
of which							
ADA budget (operational)²	67	73	85	95	92	103	90
Other public donors ³	135	211	907	775	875	752	274
of which Debt relief	34	75	727	603	675	508	42
multilateral ODA	245	262	275	324	354	333	456
of which							
UN	19	21	22	22	34	29	26
IFI	74	77	72	113	127	98	193
EU	150	161	178	188	190	203	235
Total ODA ⁴	447	545	1'266	1'194	1'321	1'188	820
ODA GNI	0.20%	0.23%	0.52%	0.47%	0.50%	0.43%	0.30%

Source: ADA

² The ADA operational budget is representing the part of ODA, which is programmable according to the PD principles (approx 7 – 11% between 2005 and 2009; for the part that is effectively programmed according to the PD principles see table 3 below). In 2003 (before the foundation of ADA, BMeiA expenses are calculated in the same way).

³ incl. ADA-administration fee

⁴ rounding differences possible

Table 3: ODA programmed according to PD principles (Commitments)

ADA-Total portfolio 2009	
Contract volume (€)	102'884'867
No of contracts	231
<i>of which: country-programmable</i> ⁵	46'726'109
<i>No of contracts</i>	62
<i>Percentage country-programmable</i>	45%

Source: ADA Baseline study 2009

Table 4: Top ten recipients and priority countries of Austrian ODA (Disbursements)

ODA 2008: Top Ten Recipients (Net ODA in million Euros)		ODA 2008: Priority countries/partners (Net ODA in million Euros)			
1	Iraq	470	Bosnia and Herzegovina	26.3	
2	Bosnia and Herzegovina	26	2	Kosovo	13.6
3	Chad	20	3	Uganda	9.9
4	Egypt	19	4	Serbia	9.7
5	Turkey	19	5	Mozambique	8.8
6	China	14	6	Ethiopia	6.7
7	Kosovo	14	7	Nicaragua	5.9
8	Europe regional/multi-country	12	8	Occupied Palestinian Terr.	5.7
9	Subsaharan Africa regional	10	9	Albania	5.4
10	Uganda	10	10	Burkina Faso	5.3
			11	Moldova	3.1
			12	Macedonia	2.7
			13	Montenegro	2.5
			14	Bhutan	1.9
			15	Cape Verde	1.9

Source: ADA

Table 5: Core thematic areas of ODA

Core thematic areas of ODA			
1	Water and sanitation	4	Private sector development
2	Rural development	5	Education and scientific cooperation
3	Energy	6	Good governance: including human rights, rule of law democratisation, conflict prevention and peace

Source: 3YP 2009-11

⁵ "Country Programmable Aid (CPA) reflects the amount of aid that can be programmed by the donor at partner country level. CPA is defined through exclusions, by subtracting from gross ODA aid that is unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt forgiveness and reorganisation), entails no cross-border flows (development research in donor country, promotion of development awareness, imputed student costs, refugees in donor countries), is not country programmable by the Donor (core funding ton national NGO and International NGOs) or is not susceptible for programming at country level (e.g. contributions to Public Private Partnerships, for some donors aid extended by other agencies than the main agency" (Source DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts)

3.2 Legal Foundations of Austrian ODA

Federal Ministries Act

The Federal Ministries Act (1986) distributes the responsibilities for the ODA among different ministries as follows. The Federal Ministries Act is regularly amended. The actual version (25.11.10) provides the following regulations with explicit relations to development cooperation:

- Ministry of European and International Affairs: development cooperation, cooperation with the Central and East European States and the New Independent States, coordination of international development policy; cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Red Cross
- Ministry of Finance: negotiations with international financial institutions about lending and borrowing

The lists of competences of other ministries do not provide any indication about their relevance for ODA, even if some of their activities are ODA-eligible, as e.g. immigration and disaster relief (Ministry of the Interior): environmental policy (Ministry of Environment), etc. The Federal Ministries Act neither constitutes development cooperation as a specific policy sector nor does it attribute full responsibility for it to one of the ministries. Nevertheless the distribution of responsibilities defines development cooperation in a much simpler and narrower way than the criteria for ODA eligibility.

The Federal Act on Development Cooperation

The Federal Act on Development Cooperation (2002, amended 2003)

- defines development policy as any measure of the federal government promoting the sustainable economic and social development of developing countries;
- defines development cooperation as any development activity of the Federal Government that is reported as ODA to DAC/OECD; (art. 1.2 and 2.1);
- sets three goals (1) reducing poverty, (2) ensuring peace and security, (3) preserving the environment and protecting natural resources (art 1.4);
- distinguishes among two categories of federal activities in development cooperation: (1) direct actions of the federal government, (2) the promotion of development organisations (under Austrian private law);
- defines rolling three years plans as the instruments for policy setting: (art. 3.1 and 4.1);
- constitutes the Austrian Development Agency ADA as a non-profit company with limited liability owned by the Federal Government, represented by BMeiA (section 2, art. 6ff);
- splits the financing of ADA in two parts: a fixed charge for administrative expenses, depending on the annual budget (art. 10.1) and contributions to the operational activities (art. 10.2).

The federal act on development cooperation consists of two parts: (1) the act in the proper sense of the term, providing the legal basis for the overall official development (ODA) and (2) the ordinance on the Austrian development cooperation (ADC), providing (a) the rules and regulations for the implementation of ADC and (b) the dispositions for constituting the Austrian Development Agency (ADA). The document is unbalanced in various senses: there are several cross-references among part 1: act and part 2: ordinance. The document is not complete: the quantitatively important financial contributions to international organisations are not mentioned in the categories of activities of the Act. There are no rules and regulations for that part of ODA which is not ADC; regulations on ADA are much more detailed than the general ones. Moreover, the act does not provide a basis broad enough for governing the Austrian institutional setup of development cooperation involving government and specialised development organisations. In its present form, the Federal Act on Development Cooperation is no suitable legal instrument for rebalancing the distinction between ODA and ADC - or to put it in other words, for reshaping the Austrian ODA according to the PD principles. It must be amended for that purpose.

Legal Foundations of the non-ADC part of ODA

The non-ADC part of ODA has different legal foundations: (1) the legal basis for the replenishments of the core capital of international financing institutions or of their development funds are specific object and time bound acts prepared by the Ministry of Finance (BMF); (2) the legal basis for development related activities of the other ministries are the respective acts governing the activities of those ministries.

Guidelines for the Federal Finances

On June 11 2010 the federal government published the law providing guidelines for the federal finances 2011-14 that determine ceilings in absolute figures for the expenditures and the workforce in all policy sectors. These ceilings are limiting the expenditures for most of the policy sectors to an increase near to zero. There are, however, some sectors with a planned decrease, among them three sectors with high influence on ODA: Finances, Foreign Affairs and Environment.

Table 6: Anticipated economies in 3 key policy sectors 2011-14)

<i>Sector / million €</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>
Finances	1'232.9	1'188.3	1'191.4	1'100.4
Environment	795.6	796.9	613.9	593.4
Foreign Affairs	427.1	414.1	408.2	393.5

Source: Austrian Government, Guidelines for the federal finances, 11.0.2010

With these ceilings, a further reduction in the overall ODA has to be anticipated. There are only minimal chances of following the scenario for reaching 2015 ODA targets as published by the EC in the 2010 Financing for Development Progress Report, which calculate a necessary annual increase of € 258 millions, 19% annual growth rate in ODA volume (EC, SEC (2010) 420 final, p. 51). The Government decided the budget figures for 2011 at the end of October and presented them to the Parliament in December 2010. All persons addressing this point in the interviews anticipate that the ODA ratio will persist at the 2009 level, with an increase of multilateral aid and high probabilities of new debt relief commitments.

Federal Law on Export Promotion

The Federal Law on Export Promotion was amended in 2008 by an article constituting the Development Bank of Austria Corporation (*OeEB*). The Bank is entirely affiliated with the Austrian Control Bank Corporation, which is the Austrian Export Bank. *OeEB* has to work according to goals and principles of the Federal Act on Development Cooperation. Its aims are: (1) providing long term credits at conditions that are close to the market in order to promote sustainable investments in difficult markets, specifically in developing countries with a public liability for credit risks and (2) to implement advisory programmes which are to prepare possible investments and to enhance the development effects of the investment projects. The small part of advisory activities is ODA-eligible; the credits are not, unless the federal government has to pay in case of credit loss. On request of the *OeEB*, the BMF decides on taking over liabilities. The *OeEB* is advised by an advisory body consisting of eight representatives: BMF (Head), of, BMeiA, Federal Chancellery, Ministry for Economic Affairs, ADA, Chamber of Trade, Chamber of Labour, *OeEB* (without voting power).

3.3 Policies and strategies

Government Programme

Since the Austrian Government works with a system of direct responsibilities of the ministries and does not have any overarching guideline competencies by the Federal Chancellor, the agreement on the government programme between the coalition partners is the most important overarching policy document. Coalition governments cannot easily change their priorities during a legislation period. The government programme is therefore the key for setting and shifting priorities of policy sectors. The single

most important aspect for development of cooperation of the present government programme for the 24th legislation period 2008-13 (p. 245/46) is the asterisk on top of the section on development cooperation, meaning, that activities and expenses in this policy sector are left to the discretion of the federal government and are depending on funds made available by the annual budgets. This lack of unambiguous political will qualifies the reconfirmation of the 0.51% ODA-target (2010) and of the Austrian contribution to the MDGs in the text. Sustainability of development cooperation and coherence are declared as objectives for all policy sectors but no specific measures for realising or ensuring these transversal objectives are indicated.

ODA Path

In 2007, the federal government mandated the two state secretaries in BMeiA and BMF to define a national ODA path. They were commissioned to find ways of reaching the EU 0.51% ODA-target for 2010, a target that was integrated in 2007 into the government programme for the 23rd legislation period. In the meantime, the two state secretaries stopped these activities without any indications about future resumption of its work. For the time being, Austria does not give a strategic response to the requests of the EU and the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to plan increases in its ODA in a way that would allow fulfilling its commitments. There is an urgent need to reverse the growing discrepancy between Austrian declarations to be still in line with its ODA-commitments and the downsizing of the development cooperation budget.

Three Year Programme (3YP)

The 3YP is the core policy setting instrument in Austrian ODA. The yearly rolling elaboration of the 3YP is an intense and time-consuming process, in which all concerned parties are involved. The Minister of European and International Affairs presents the 3YP to the council of ministers. Due to the long elaboration process, he normally does so at the end of the first year of the programme period.

The 3YP is a mix of development policy and operational programming of the bilateral ADC. This hybrid character did not change since the Nineties. Only the policy aspects of the document (section 1, 2, 3 and 5) are dealt with in this paragraph about policies and strategies, whereas section 4 "bilateral programming" is dealt with in para 3.4 below.

In the first section, the 3YP 2009-11 sometimes quotes and at other times describes shortly and without a strong systematic structure various international, European and national strategic guidelines which have unequal binding character for Austrian ODA and ADC. The more they are related to ADC, the more they are precise and binding, for example the list of priority countries and the thematic priorities of the ADC. The strategic guidelines mix operational aspects (such as the opening of a liaison office with an international organisation or the participation in a specific committee) with very large references (for example "recognition of the Global Marshall Plan"). Amazingly, there is no mention of either the MDGs or the PD. If Austria wants to translate its commitment to the PD into political action, a clear-cut reference to the MDGs and/or the PD must appear at this place.

MDGs and PD are, however, important for the second section on Austria's participation in the EU development cooperation. In this context, Austria fully subscribes to harmonisation, division of labour, improving efficiency and effectiveness of the international development cooperation, however, without translating these principles into operational guidelines, neither for ADC nor for Austrian financial contributions to development cooperation programme of the European Commission. The second section of the 3YP 2009-11 describes seven challenges: (1) Support to developing countries for overcoming the financial and economic crisis, (2) climate change, (3) treaty of Lisbon (4) harmonisation and division of labour for enhanced effectiveness of development cooperation, (5) coherence, (6) Africa and (7) Economic partnership agreements. It sets seven thematic priorities for the Austrian contribution to the EU ODA. They are not completely coincident with the six domestic thematic priorities for the ADC. The 3YP does not fulfil the minimal quality criterion: Consistency of the thematic profile within one single document.

Table 7: Thematic priorities in 3YP 2009-11

Thematic priorities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. ADC	Water & Sanitation	Energy	Governance (incl. Peace & Security, Conflict Prevention)	Rural Development	Private sector development	Education & science	
2. EU - ODA	Water & Sanitation	Energy	Peace, Security & Development	Rural Development	Food Security	Decentralisation & local development	Gender

Section 3 “Multilateral Development Cooperation” is a narrative description of the most important challenges within the UN and the IFIs on one side and the intended Austrian contributions to resolve these challenges on the other. In some points those Austrian contributions are general: “Austrian supports XY”, in other they are specific: “Implementation of the recommendations of the OECD/DAC peer review” or “Austrian strategy for FAO membership 2009-11”.

Section 5 on Policy coherence presents the same blend of specific activities and general considerations as section 1 - 3.

The 3YP includes neither operational targets nor planning figures. The only financial figures are the ones in the ODA prognostic scenario, bringing back the ODA-ratio to 0.37% in 2010 and 2011 after the 2009 backdrop. With this lack of planning figures the 3YP cannot be used as a proper steering instrument.

On December 14 2010, BMeiA presented the new 3YP 2010-12 to the cabinet of ministries. This document is even less consistent than its precursor 2009-11. To give one example only: in this document, the EU-ODA thematic priorities are reduced to 4 (Energy, Water & Sanitation, Gender, Food Security). There is no longer a summary list of thematic priorities of ADC. However, the operational matrix lists 13 thematic priorities in an inconsistent terminology (additional to the 2009 priorities: health, transport, economy and employment, technical education and vocational training, tourism, environment, migration).

Strategic Guidelines of the Ministry of Finances on International Financial Institutions

The strategic guidelines (2009) refer to the federal act on development and the 3YP as well as to the Strategy Framework of the BMF, namely to the foreign trade strategy. This combination results in objectives at four different levels:

Global level	MDG, crisis prevention, global security, positive globalisation and fair trade
Institutional IFI-level	optimal efficiency and effectiveness of the IFI
Developing countries level	Poverty reduction, growth, sustainability, ownership, harmonisation and alignment
Austrian Interests	Implementation of Austrian strategies, specifically in the IFIs, coherence, focusing Austrian interventions, developing international markets and returning to the Austrian economy

The strategic guidelines contain a detailed analysis of the development context as well as of the role of the IFIs in that context, specifically for Austrian foreign trade. They define the sectoral priorities: energy, water and sanitation, and trade. They provide the orientation of the BMF in the individual IFIs. Each section starts with an analysis of the strategies and governance structure and ends with Austrian priorities, orientations or intentions. In all sections, the guidelines focus on the five PD principles. The IFIs that signed the PD are themselves responsible for implementing programmes according to the PD principles. Austria is only responsible for steering its financial contributions. The guidelines do that in convincing quality.

Interministerial Strategic Guidelines

In order to move towards increased policy coherence for development, BMeiA and other involved ministries started in 2009 to establish interministerial strategic guidelines on transversal policy issues that are not fully covered by development policy. Guidelines on *Environment and Development* were published. Guidelines on *Security and Development* are in the process of elaboration. The intention is to fix large strategic targets in a whole-of-government approach, to ensure coherence through the participation of the concerned actors in various ministries, civil society, private enterprises and academia from the beginning.

The guidelines include an analysis of the challenges set by the addressed transversal issue, formulate principles for Austrian activities, identify thematic areas of activities and objectives, define a common implementation strategy, set the entry points for the individual involved parties, and summarise planned activities of all involved ministries in an implementation matrix. For the first time in Austrian strategy building, the guidelines explicitly include the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation.

These guidelines represent a progress in harmonising the agendas of the involved ministries. Nevertheless, the involved parties remain sceptical about their practical utility in the implementation since the principles are formulated in a very generic way, for example: "to make use of synergies between protection of the environment and poverty reduction".

There is an improvement between the two guidelines with regard to result orientation: whereas the implementation matrix in the 2009 guidelines on *environment and development* just distributes responsibilities among the ministries, the draft of the 2010 guidelines on *security and development* includes priorities, approaches, intended results and references to good practices. But since the qualitative formulations of the targets are still very large, and there are no quantitative targets/indicators, involved parties think that it will be hard to monitor and assess progress towards these targets and to specify the Austrian contribution to positive changes in these complex contexts.

Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness 2006 – 2010/11

In 2008 BMeiA and ADA published a report on the Austrian way to implement the PD in a deliberate concentration on ADC. The report shows Austria's progress in implementing the PD in the years 2005-2008, including the following targets:

- Supporting the formulation of PRS and sharing of best practice examples
- Sharpening of ADC's thematic and geographic profile
- Slowly moving into budget support with 10% - 15% of the operational budget
- Harmonising, including Division of Labour work stream mechanisms of the EU
- Gradually adapting ADC programme cycles to partner-countries operational strategies
- Streamlining internal procedures in BMeiA and ADA
- Emphasising the capacity development and institution building yet even more

The report is also designing the approach for the years 2008-11. It is a systematic midterm exercise, assessing each of the PD principles as well as cross cutting issues (fragility, environment, gender) in a strategic view, providing cases, examples and figures, presenting ADC as a learning system able to draw lessons for the second term of the plan period. In an implementation matrix, the Action Plan lists all realised and planned implementation activities against the PD commitments. As a specific contribution, the PD Action Plan also proposes a new classification of aid modalities which is better suited for presenting and analysing the aid flows in a PD development context than the traditional CRS/DAC classification. The report shows the evolution until 2008 in detailed and very informative figures and tables. But it sets only qualitative goals and contains no financial figures (with the exception of the 0.51% ODA target for 2010).

Table 8 presents key achievements in normal letters, *adverse results* and *not fulfilled commitments* in *italic* letters.

Table 8: Key achievements in improving Austrian Aid Effectiveness since 2005

PD Principle	Key achievements at Austrian Headquarter level
Ownership	In priority countries, Austria takes actively part in supporting the partner countries in developing poverty reduction strategies. <i>No progress in domestic ownership for Austrian commitments to ODA targets or PD principles in the legal set-up or at policy and strategy level.</i> <i>No progress in domestic leadership for development cooperation policy.</i>
Alignment	New country strategies since 2010 are oriented towards partner developments strategies. Slow adaptation of aid modalities in programmable aid according to PD principles.
Harmonisation	Integration of the EU code of conduct and Division of Labour principles into strategic documents. <i>Increasing fragmentation of Austrian ODA.</i>
Managing for Results	Ability to provide evidence for programming according to PD principles since the 2009 baseline study. Approx 5 % of Austrian ODA programmed according to PD principles in 2009 (commitments). Since 2009 strategies include targets at result level. <i>Yet no monitoring or report of development results achieved so far.</i>
Mutual Accountability	<i>No progress in predictability of Austrian ODA or ADC.</i> <i>Lack of forward spending plans for ADC.</i>

Austrian Action and Implementation Plan on the Accra Agenda for Action 2009 – 2011

In May 2010, BMeiA and ADA published a second report, showing how Austria meets its commitments as signatory of the AAA. By setting a systematic plan of operations for implementation, the AAA Action Plan also takes the recommendations of the Austria DAC Peer Review 2009 into account. This plan is selective: it takes up roughly half of the AAA statements regarding the three packages of measures agreed upon: country ownership, effective and inclusive partnerships and development results. The Austrian AAA Action Plan is structuring the Austrian activities according to six categories: (1) country ownership, (2) division of labour, (3) predictability and transparency, (4) mutual accountability and results reporting, (5) fragile situations, (6) public and political support. In these categories, the Austrian AAA Action Plan is attributing Austrian deliverables, time frames and responsibilities to the individual AAA statements. In doing so, the document reduces complexity in a clever way. Nevertheless, the qualitative formulations on activities and results remain at a very general level, and indications about timeframes and responsibilities are unspecific in most of the cases, which limits the operational utility of the document.

Country Strategies

On the website www.entwicklung.at, the following country programmes respectively strategies for Austrian priority countries can be found. The list shows that Austria is moving from operational programming to strategy building at country level. Even if operational bilateral programmes still dominate today, there is a clear trend to generalise the country strategies. New country strategies are announced for a couple of countries:

Table 9: Country Programme /Strategies available at present

Country	Country Programme /Strategy	Other documents
Ethiopia	Country Strategy 08-12	MoU on the Austrian-Ethiopian Indicative Country Programme 08-12
Burkina Faso	Mémoire d'entente sur le programme indicatif de coopération 08-13	
Mozambique	Country Strategy 10-13	
Nicaragua	Country Programme 03-06	
Uganda	Uganda Country Strategy 10-15	National Development Plan 10/11-14/15
Palestinian Territories		<i>Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 08-10</i>
Bhutan	Country Strategy 10-13	
Albania	Country Programme 07-09	
BiH	Country Programme 05-07	
Kosovo	Country Programme 08-11	
Macedonia	Country Programme 05-07	
Moldova		
Montenegro	Country Strategy 2010-2012	
Serbia	Country Programme 06-08	

The comparison of the older country programmes (classical bilateral programmes on the basis of a bilateral agreement) to the new country strategies (with different types of references to EU division of labour or the PD principles) shows the move of ADC towards harmonised and aligned development cooperation. These new strategies are up to standard, including an international strategy frame between development partners, objectives, result frames with baselines and benchmarks. Whereas the Ethiopia 2008-12 strategy is still a long document, including the normative parts indispensable for a strategy as well as long narrative descriptions and general considerations, the format of the Mozambique, Uganda and Bhutan Strategies, all starting 2010, are reduced to an appropriate size. They are presenting a situational analysis, the alignment with the operational development strategy of the partner country at strategy and implementation level, references to strategies of other actors, the Austrian strategic response including areas of intervention, modalities and a budget scenario (the last one in Bhutan and Mozambique only). They include result matrices with quantified baselines and targets. The new generation of documents presents a full-fledged integration of the Austrian bilateral strategy in a harmonised international development context. So far, there is no joint country strategy with other donors.

Country strategies are elaborated in cooperation between BMeiA and ADA in lengthy processes that cause big delays in almost all cases. The Mozambique Strategy 2010-13 was published only in August 2010, the Uganda Country Strategy 2010-13 in September 2010 and the Bhutan Country Strategy 2010-13 has recently been completed. Due to the long lasting discussions over a new format for the country strategies, the first country strategies following the new format and the PD principles (Uganda, Mozambique, Bhutan) were published only five years after the PD declaration.

A specific situation is found in the South-East Europe and the Balkan States: the dominant working context being the accession to the EU, other policy frames as the stability pact and the accession process, as well as other technical agreements for funding as the EU Neighbourhood Initiative, the instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) were considerably more influential than the PD. In fact ADC did not really make the step forward from bilateral programming to harmonised strategy setting in this region.

Regional Strategic Considerations

ADC strategies and programmes normally argue at both regional and national level. The concept of "region" is largely a geographic one, the most prominent examples in ADC being Western Balkans, South-

Eastern Europe, Himalaya/Hindukusch, Southern Africa, East Africa, and Western Africa. In the last couple of years, ADC has strengthened its regional approach by expanding the cooperation with regional organisations as partners for regional programmes (e.g. Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of West African States, etc.) The selection of the regions, however, is barely motivated by an analysis of the regional context and of the potential partner organisations, but is mainly influenced by Austrian political and economic interests. The new 3YP 2010-2012, submitted to the council of ministers in December 2010, presents 8 priority regions: Africa (AU), Western Africa (ECOWAS), Southern Africa (SADEC), the Danube Region, the Black Sea Region, Himalaya/Hindukush (ICIMOD), Central America and the Caribbean. In most cases, the regional cooperation seems to be limited to the collaboration with one specific partner organisation.

3.4 Institutional set-up

The Puzzle

The Austrian Development cooperation website www.entwicklung.at presents a large ODA puzzle of many public actors consisting of nine ministries, ADA, provinces and municipalities, as well as a small ADC puzzle consisting of two actors only, BMeiA and ADA. The responsibilities of those actors are defined in the so called allocation of affairs (*Geschäftseinteilung*).

Reality is less complicated than this double puzzle structure. There are three important organisations within Austrian ODA:

- With its responsibility for the IFI, for the EU (development cooperation budget and European development fund) and for debt relief, the BMF is by far the most important actor in quantitative terms. Within BMF, operations are run by small line teams in the directorate general III, responsible for economic policy and financial markets.
- BMeiA Division VII is responsible for multilateral cooperation with the UN and the bilateral cooperation, as well as for the coordination of the development policy in the Federal Government.
- ADA as an outsourced intermediary organisation facilitates the implementation of the big majority of the bilateral programmes under the auspices of the BMeiA.

Despite important financial shares in the ODA, all other involved parties play an inferior role in shaping Austrian Development Aid. Their activities follow their own technical logic and not the logic of an international development cooperation agreement as e.g. the PD. Their contribution to international agreed development objectives is indirect, is not programmed as part of Austrian development cooperation and is not included in agreements of bilateral or multilateral harmonised and aligned development cooperation (e.g. the imputed student costs, accounted for by the Ministry of Science and Research).

BMF and BMeiA each dispose of consultative bodies (e.g. the “Beirat für Entwicklungspolitik” of BMeiA) and consultation procedures for policies and programmes. According to the members of these bodies, the debate going on in these fora has only limited impact on the distribution of responsibilities and budget shares among the involved parties in development aid. On the other hand, there is an extremely intense and complex communication between BMeiA and ADA, leading to enormous delays in most of the policy and strategy setting processes. Most of my interview partners attending either the consultative bodies or the BMeiA - ADA discussions criticise their inadequate set-up and the low impact on policy decisions.

Interministerial Working Groups and Task Forces

Apart from the consultative bodies that are directly related to BMeiA, BMF or ADA, there is a wide range of interministerial working groups and task forces with specific tasks, most of them of informal consultative status with low or none relevance for the policy decisions of the involved institutions. Among the interview partners, the impression prevails that these thematic working group are useful for the mutual

understanding but that the discussions in the different fora have little impact on the daily business of the participating organisations. Note, that the following list is incomplete.

Table 10: Interministerial Working Groups and Task Forces

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Participants</i>	<i>Meetings</i>	<i>Objective</i>
Interministerial Working groups			
Environment and Development	BMeiA , BMF, BMLFUW, BMWF, BMVIT, BMWFJ, WKÖ, ÖeEB, IUFE, Koo, Care, WWF, Red Cross, Global 2000, ÖAD, CDR, ADA	2x p.a.	Strategic Guidelines Environment and Development
Security and Development	BMLVS, BKA, BMF, BMWFJ, BMWF; BMUKK, BMI; BMJ, BMLFUW, BMVIT; WKÖ, ADA		Strategic Guidelines Security and Development
Security Sector Reform (SSR)	BMLVS, BMeiA, BMI, BMJ, BMF, BKA, ADA	2x p.a.	Overview, training, common activities
UNSR Res 1325, NAP	BMeiA, BMLVS, BMI, BKA, BMJ, BMWFJ, ADA	2x p.a.	Austrian Action Plan to 1325
Water	BMF, BMeiA, BMLFUW, OeB, ADA	2 x p.a.	Informal exchange
Budget Support	BMeiA, BMF, ADA	6x p.a.	Informal exchange
Gender Equity	BMF , BMeiA, BKA, BMWFJ, BIM, WIDE, ADA, KOO		
3YP	BMeiA , BMF, BMWFJ, BMUKK, BMI, BMLFUW, BMVIT, BMLVS, BKA, WKÖ, ADA, OeEB	min. 1x p.a.	Elaboration of the 3YP
Policy coherence	BMeiA , BMF, BMWFJ, BMUKK, BMI, BMLFUW, BMVIT, BMLVS, BKA, WKÖ, ÖFSE, ADA, OeEB		Matching of positions and activities
Task Forces			
Human trafficking	BMeiA , BMI; BKA Frauen, BMLVS, BMWF; BMUKK, BMJ, BIM, LEFÖ, ADA, Vienna City	6x p.a.	Austrian Action plan
Black Sea Region	BMWFJ , BMLVS, BKA, BMF, BMWFJ, BMWF; BMUKK, BMI; BMJ, BMLFUW, BMVIT; WKÖ, IV, ÖGB, BAK, IDM, ADA	2x p.a.	Elaboration of an Integrated Regional Programme
Discussion Fora			
Poverty Reduction	ADA , BMF, BMASK, VIDC, ÖFSE, Div. Universities	Ca. 8 x p.a. 1 publ. event	Informal exchange
Fragile States	ADA , BMeiA, OIIP, ÖFSE, University of Vienna,	4x p.a.	Informal exc., Mainstreaming of DAC Principles
Gender International	BKA , BMeiA, BMWFJ, BMF, BIM, WIDE, ADA, KOO, Development Cooperation Club of Parliament, Political Parties,		
Gender Budgeting	ADA, BMeiA, BMF, BKA, WIDE, CARE, KOO	4x p.a.	
Educational Cooperation	BMeiA, BMASK, BM.I, BMWF, ADA Div. Universities, FHK NGOs, ÖFSE		Informal exchange
Humanitarian Aid	BMeiA, BMI, BMLVS, ADA	ca. 3x p.a.	Informal exchange

ADA Company Statute

ADA was constituted by a declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 2005 as a limited liability company owned exclusively by the federal government, which is represented by BMeiA. ADA is a non-commercial, non-profit organisation, which is, however, allowed to offer its services in competition with other providers. The company statute lists the specific tasks of ADA:

- preparing and implementing programmes and projects in the frame of the 3YP
- supporting sustainable economic, social and environmental development in developing countries

- acquiring international financing (EU and IFIs) and to act as a broker for the participation of private enterprises and development organisation in project
- supporting the deployment of Austrian experts
- advising the BMeiA

The company statute entitles ADA to engage Austrian public funds in multiannual commitments but imposes strong limits: the commitment for the second year may not exceed 60% of the first years, all additional years together may not exceed 40%.

ADA's structure and procedures are strongly depending on BMeiA: ADA's operational budget is defended in the council of ministers by BMeiA; the president of the ADA board as well as five other board members (out of 12) are representing BMeiA; the managing director is appointed by the BMeiA (the first two since ADA foundation being diplomats, appointed for one rotation turn before going back to their diplomatic services); the board decides on individual projects with a financial volume of € 2 millions and on programmes with a volume higher than € 3 millions.

Legally, ADA is considered a spin-off of BMeiA. There is some evidence for that point of view: the status as a facilitating, intermediary (non-implementing) organisation; the staff transfers from BMeiA; the new responsibility for the coordination offices, etc. There are other elements in the institutional set up corresponding rather to a merger: the takeover of Comment, an formerly independent organisation dealing with education for development, the take-over of the private consultancy firm previously responsible for coordinating office facility management, and the staff mixture: staff members who previously worked for BMeiA or for Austrian NGOs. Managing the outsourcing and the merger at the same time was a complex task. ADA managed to stop the proliferation of consultants and institutes administering development components and to regroup all those functions into a modern new operational agency. On the other side, ADA did not get enough institutional autonomy to become an attractive service provider outside the sphere of influence of BMeiA.

Development Bank of Austria (OeEB)

The objective of the Development Bank of Austria is to strengthen the financial sector in developing and transition countries. OeEB provides commercial loans for transactions in difficult markets and tries to combine development objectives with export promotion. In 2009, its first regular year, OeEB realised a successful, but relatively modest business volume with fifteen staff members. It consisted of 8 investment financing projects (71 Million EUR), 19 advisory programmes for project preparation and accompaniment (17.2 Million EUR) and 2 foreign trade programmes (5 Million EUR) (source: OeEB Relevant No 1a/2010). Only the advisory programme is ODA eligible. Since OeEB is running bank activities with all the implications of the business, it needs to split risks and to avoid chunk risks. The loans of the bank do complement the instruments of the Austrian development cooperation, but can only in a small part be subsumed under the PD principles, and more specifically the logic of concentration and division of labour among states stakeholders.

Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs)

In the Nineties, Austrian bilateral development cooperation was mainly implemented by Austrian NGOs in project contracts concluded with the division in the federal administration responsible for development cooperation. At that period, NGOs fulfilled an important dual capacity as respondents of the government as well as speakers for the civil society in development matters. The foundation of ADA weakened their position considerably, splitting off the former symbiotic relationships between the federal administration and the implementing NGO's. Although contracts are now concluded by ADA as the intermediary organisation, NGOs have not gained more independency from official federal positions. In collaboration with the European NGO confederation for relief and development *concord*, they are trying to be integrated in a structured dialogue on the further evolution of development cooperation. In this regard, they are committed to the PD and AAA principles. Nevertheless, for the moment, the capacity of the Austrian NGOs to advocate development cooperation within Austria does not go beyond moral ap-

peals. As far as implementation is concerned, Austrian NGOs are mostly still working on the project implementation mode and do not dispose of programme core contribution arrangements with ADA although with the framework programme agreements a first step towards a programme contribution has been taken.

3.5 Bilateral Operations

ADA Company Concept

According to art. 9 of the federal act on development cooperation, ADA has to plan its operations on the basis of a company concept. In December 2005, the Board of ADA accepted a first company concept for the years 2005-07. After a two years intermediary period the board accepted a new version in December 2009. The document bearing the title "2010 Company Concept" has no limitation of validity for a specific period. Hence, the difference to the company statute is not clear. There is no need to duplicate the documents.

The document describes the mandate of ADA as well as the division of labour between ADA and BMeiA. The company concept declares the 3YP as the relevant national strategic framework. At the international level, it quotes MDG, PD and AAA as international standards of development cooperation with the remark, however, that an alignment to those strategies is only possible if both, the strategic and the operational level are considered (section 1).

The six company goals (section 2) take up the principles of the PD/AAA:

- Enhanced Aid effectiveness
- Reinforced collaboration with civil society
- Synergies with the Private Sector
- More knowledge about development cooperation
- Enhanced knowledge management
- Systematic further development of structures and processes

The operational break-down of these goals foresees improvements in concentration, implementing the EU code of conduct, reducing individual projects in favour of working in programmes, etc.

Section 3 illustrates three core tasks of the company as follows:

- Policy dialogue and efficient deployment of the operational budget for programmes and projects
- Education on and communication about development policy
- Provision of expertise and services in development policy

The strong focus on development policy contributes to the role confusion between BMeiA and ADA. The broad definition of the core tasks is not suitable for positioning ADA as services provider with specific professional competencies. This is also true for the following sections: 4 on instruments, 5 on organisational set-up and 6 on finances. They are written in the same degree of generality.

The implementation of the company concept is planned in a specific ADA internal implementation plan 2010-2012 breaking down the six company goals to 27 measures with yearly objectives and activities. This document informs much more specifically, how ADA plans to adjust its activities to the PD principles. The section on aid effectiveness is the most specific one, particularly general are the sections 2 on the collaboration with civil society, 5 on knowledge management and 6 on the organisational development of ADA.

Programming

3YP Programme section 4: In accordance with the PD principles Result Orientation and Harmonisation, the 3YP 2009-11 integrates a column "Results" and a column "Other ODA-actors and important partners of ADC" into the programming matrix for the first time. Even if this fact is positive in itself, it still accentuates the problematic status of the 3YP even more, mixing up strategic and programmatic (implemen-

tation) considerations. The programmed results cannot be assessed against targets since no such targets are set. Results are formulated in a purely qualitative, generic way as for example “strengthening of institutions” or “sustainable contribution to regional development”. In fact, the matrix only works as a list of reference - every involved party seeks to ensure the appearance of his activity in unspecific terms. The matrix can hardly be used as a guideline for programme management. A format with timebound objectives and results, both defined by accurate indicators, is needed for that purpose.

ADA working programmes: The minister of European and international affairs annually accepts ADA working programmes for the bilateral operational programme and project planning. These working programmes reconfirm the principles of the 3YP and the ADA Company Concept, repeat their geographical priorities and vary the thematic priorities slightly (introducing new sector distinctions as for example “Gender and Development”, “Energy, Transport and ICT”). The two documents are produced in a parallel process. The working programme 2010 is clustered in “Working Areas”, indicating either priority countries or regions or specific areas of work as private sector partnerships, NGOs, education and science, humanitarian aid, anti-mining actions, communication, evaluation. All clusters present a clear nexus to the PD principles in specific paragraphs “Aid effectiveness related activities”. These paragraphs contain lists of initiatives, meetings, and working groups the respective unit is supporting or attending.

As the strategic documents quoted above, the annual programme document presents the programmes without any reference to assessments of earlier programmes or ongoing activities, albeit to realised results in former programme periods.

The 2010 working programme announces the closing of the coordination offices in Cap Verde, Montenegro and Macedonia (for mid 2010), the downsizing of HQ staff from 81 (in 2009) to 75 (in 2010), and of the expatriate staff abroad from 22 (in 2009) to 18 (in 2010). In the mid term outlook, the working programme, however, remains ambiguous; reiterating on one side ADA’s growth strategy based the Austrian commitment to the 0.51% ODA target; considering on the other side geographical concentration. A specific annex on the measures for implementing the “Aid Effectiveness Agenda” informs about the ADC’s principles for implementation. The fact that Austria delivers an Aid Effectiveness Action Plan is positive, only very few countries do so. But the annex is indeed a declaration of intent, not a plan. All plan-specific elements (as for example smart objectives, attributions of responsibilities, time frames, and definitions of volume of activities) are not dealt with at this level, but operationalised in the sectoral working programmes (“Arbeitsfeldprogramme”) according to the respective context. They are also elaborated in close relationship between ADA and BMeiA. There are too many overlaps between 3YP, ADA working programme and sectoral working programmes, which make the document hierarchy too complicated and too heavy. All those documents do not provide ADA with a specific technical profile sufficiently independent from BMeiA.

Mandates: In the present institutional set-up, which is heavily dominated by BMeiA, ADA has very low potential to attract mandates by other ministries in Austria. Therefore, ADA’s hopes for delegated cooperation go to the European ICM scheme. This scheme is an instrument to implement the EU code of conduct on complementarity and division of labour. ADA, which is certified as one of the few organisations to run programmes under ICM so far, has concluded first implementation contracts and is expecting new mandates with rapidly growing turnover. Under the present financial and institutional constraints, it will be a challenge for ADA to guarantee the necessary added value that the EU requires when starting an ICM project with member state countries. So far there is no evidence of the expected rapid growth of the financial volume created by ICM mandates, which would allow ADA to keep the present staff and the capability to cope with the implementation modalities and overhead remuneration of ICM.

Staffing

Shortly after the Foundation of ADA, the unclear distinction of the roles of BMeiA and ADA began to create tensions and disfunctionalities. One of the intentions of the outsourcing was to reduce the labour

force in BMeiA. Staff numbers in division VII of BMeiA, responsible for development cooperation, sank from 41.6 Fulltime-equivalents (FTE) in 2003 to 33.1 in 2004, but afterwards rose to 36.5 in 2008 (source: Austrian Court of audit 2009, p.14ff). BMeiA VII would have enough staff under some conditions: (1) concentration on its core mandate development policy and guidelines and renouncement to operational management, (2) appointment of more technically competent staff for that mandate and less diplomats as generalists, (3) streamlining of the too many and too complex policy setting procedures, (4) adjustment of the inappropriate formats of the policy and strategy documents and reduction of their number. Unfortunately the solution was not sought in an attempt to review, modify and reduce these instruments – as suggested by all external reviews. Rather, a solution was sought in outsourcing strategy mandates to ADA which contributed still more to role confusions, lengthy processes and duplication of efforts.

This was possible because ADA could increase its staff in a grand scale in expectation of a rapidly growing operational turnover. Financed over the separated budget line for administration, ADA built up its HQ staff from 33 persons in 2003 to 88 in 2008 while keeping the number of expatriate staff abroad constant until 2009 (source: Austrian Court of audit 2009, p.15ff). Despite some internal problems (staffing imbalances between the operational units, splitting the core business, i.e. geographical and thematic responsibilities into very small units of one to two persons per function), ADA was well equipped with staff until 2009. My respondents are of the opinion that the main reason for the present downsizing of the staff is the potential to reduce salary costs immediately, and that the staff cuts are only to a very small extent the result of an attempt to further clarify the roles of BMeiA and ADA.

Monitoring

Strategic monitoring has an extremely low profile in Austrian ADC. The situations are different for the three main actors: BMeiA keeps the 3YP at a general political level without introducing binding targets that could hamper the flexibility of the diplomatic process. BMF is steering the Austrian contributions to the IFIs at the level of guidelines, without a specific monitoring of the observable / unobservable effects of these contributions. ADA has an operational monitoring for all its programmes, based on PCM, log frames, monitoring plans as well as regular evaluations.

There is however a common denominator: a widespread absence of quantitative targets and indicators and planning figures in strategies and implementation programmes. In the qualitative monitoring there are big differences in technical standards among the individual documents such as the combination of review and outlook in one single document; the use of analogue formats for the review and planning; the distinction of such objectives of the earlier period that are maintained and others that are changed in the new period, respectively; and the justification of slight variations of generally similar priority lists from one document to the other. This makes the comparison of documents rather difficult. Responsibilities for overarching monitoring tasks are not assigned. For example neither the DAC desk at BMeiA nor the ADA evaluation unit nor the ADA controlling unit have the mandate to monitor the PD target indicators.

Financial monitoring of the ODA on the contrary is excellent. The ODA figures are presented clearly and analysed according to the DAC categories. Austria was very active in the DAC Statistics Working Group to adapt the aid modality categories to the requirements of the PD monitoring. The available figures present a good basis for the analysis of Austrian ODA flows (see para 3.6 below).

Evaluation

ADC has a strong evaluation culture. Three major reviews at policy level with similar interests were conducted in the last two years: ADA evaluation 2008, DAC Peer Review 2009, Review of the Austrian Court of Audit 2009. ADA conducts three to four strategic evaluations per year. All evaluations are publically available online. They are listed, their findings and recommendations are summarized, and an intense detailed follow-up of the individual evaluations is done. There is a systematic discussion process on the lessons learned. There is, however, neither a synthesis for the findings at institutional level in ADA or in

BMeiA nor a consequent implementation of measures enhancing strengths and correcting weaknesses. As a consequence, problems identified such as the inadequate format of the 3YP, the big overlaps of programmes and strategies, etc., are persisting over long periods. The evaluation culture rarely includes the activities of other ODA partners beyond ADC.

The *ADA evaluation* highlighted the overly strong operational entanglement and the overly inflexible relations between BMeiA and ADA, the concentration on administrative rules and regulations, the insufficient growth of the operational turnover for the installed ADA capacities, the insufficient volume of individual operations and the missing result orientation. The evaluation recommended a clearer role division between BMeiA as policy setting body and ADA as service providing organisation; a move to multiannual programme arrangements with bigger volumes; the resolute enforcement of the ODA-path; a debureaucratisation in order to strengthen professional development capacities; and the strengthening of ADA's entrepreneurship. Follow-up: BMeiA did not yet implement the recommendations at strategic level for financial and political reasons, ADA improved current operations following the recommendations; as a final result relations between BMeiA and ADA did not change.

The *DAC Peer Review* focused on the fragmentation of the Austrian aid system; the small weight of the 3YP in shaping Austrian ODA and creating coherence; the upcoming deficiency of the EU ODA target; the unsatisfying results of the 2004 organisational reform, i.e.: the imbalances in modalities of Austrian ODA, the unsuitable mechanisms for translating strategies into operations; and the vague status of humanitarian action. The DAC Peer Review recommended a "white paper" addressing the fragmentation of Austrian ODA and creating policy coherence; a concentration of the programmes; an in-built results focus into programmes; learning from experiences and evaluations; a system-wide operational plan; and increased finances and streamlined approaches in humanitarian aid. Follow-up: some preliminary work for a "white paper" process was done but the process has been stopped for the moment. Since the guidelines for the federal finances were published in June 2010, all actors were much more concerned with avoiding cuts in their budget than discussing increased coherence. Finances will most likely not increase, a slow concentration process can be observed. The introduction of two new columns in the 3YP (results and other ODA-parties) is a first attempt to streamlining the planning process.

The *Review of the Austrian Court of Audit* focuses on the ADA outsourcing set by the federal act on development cooperation and BMeiA in 2004. The Court of Audit reviewed how operations in institution building, programming, quality assurance, staffing and financing were conducted. It recommended a clear target-/result-orientation for all programme documents, the formulation of a new company concept, increased project volumes, and clearer procedures in staff planning and project implementation. Follow-up: ADA approved a new company concept. The working programme 2010, however, does not include measurable targets. Operational decisions in institutional changes, project and staff planning, for example the rapid reduction of coordination offices, continue to be made on a day-to-day basis, without explicit anchorage in strategic objectives.

Strategic evaluations: 15 out of 29 strategic evaluations available realized by ADA in the period 2000 - 2010 cover thematic aspects; four assess an Austrian programme in priority countries; four evaluate collaboration with Austrian NGOs; two assess international cooperation (EU) and two deal with communication and development education in Austria. The parallel follow-up of so many strategic evaluations represents a hardly feasible task for the management, leads to unclear operational priorities and impedes the emergence of a corporate identity of the organisation. When reading the reports, it is difficult to differentiate between the different types of reviews and evaluations: institutional reviews such as ADA evaluation, DAC Peer Review, Court of Audit; strategic evaluations about thematic issues, interinstitutional cooperation, or domestic working areas, operational reviews.

3.6 Finances

ODA

Funds from eight Ministries and ADA are reported as ODA:

Tab. 11: Source of Austrian ODA funds (disbursements)

Mio € 2008	Total	ADA	BMeiA	BMF	BMWF	BMUKK	BMI	BMLFUW	BMLV	Other
bilateral	855	115	22	555	70	17	22	2	33	2
Multi	333	---	20	301	---	---	---	2	---	3
Total	1'188	115	42	856	70	17	22	7	33	5

Source: ODA Report 2008, the table presents only Federal Finances

The ODA figure is a result of looking at the past year in the report to DAC/OECD. The 3YP clearly states that the ODA prognosis does not set any precedent for financial law and budget process. As continuously criticized by DAC Peer Review, there is no ODA budget. Internal prognoses on the consequences of the ODA-ratio, however, are made before government decisions on major blocks of ODA expenditures (debt reliefs, replenishments of International Development Funds) are made.

Table 12: Geographical Distribution of Austrian Bilateral ODA (disbursements)

Year	Total Recipient Countries (1)	Net disbursements without debt relief	Average	Priority countries within top 10	Priority countries within top 20	Countries with less than 1 mio EUR p.a.
2003	115	143'512'024	1'247'931	2	5	70
2005	127	240'607'182	1'894'545	3	6	79
2007	130	220'425'182	1'695'578	2	7	85
2009	136	261'576'205	1'923'354	2	10	90

Note: (1) Of which 15 are regional and multicountry programmes (slight variations over the years)

Source: ADA Statistic Unit, based on DAC/OECD statistics

The table above is based on the DAC-statistics on ODA. Some specific features of these statistics have been adapted to the purpose of the present analysis: In the Austrian national statistical presentations, Austria itself figures as an "ODA-recipient", meaning ODA-eligible donor's expenditures in Austria for development cooperation, for example administrative costs, support to national NGOs, and promotion of development awareness. Since 2006, the costs for refugees in donor countries are also included in this item. In DAC statistics, donors' ODA-eligible costs are added to the amount reported as "bilateral unallocated". Because of the special nature of this ODA item, the category Austria has been taken out of the ranking but it is shown in the position it would take if it were counted as a recipient in order to give an indication of the magnitude of flow (details see Annex 12.5). Debt relief activities were taken also out of the figures because of their specific character: they are not programmable in the same way as the other parts of bilateral cooperation. They are oscillating greatly from year to year and would therefore falsify the picture of the long term Austrian Aid efforts. The figures in table 12 present the approximated volume for Austrian bilateral aid.

The figures show that the fragmentation process went on despite all declarations in favour of concentration. Providing ODA to 136 recipient countries (out of a total of 192; 150 of them being ODA-eligible and the other 42 high income countries) virtually means renouncing an active selection. Austria is distributing ODA to almost all potential recipient countries according to the watering can principle.

Even if the debt relief is taken out of the figures, the volume of bilateral cooperation is still fluctuating very much. The predictability of Austria's bilateral cooperation is low. There are neither political nor strategic reasons for these fluctuations. Coincidences within the Austrian budget process have a bigger

influence on disbursements than strategic programming. The average volume of disbursements for the individual countries is low. In the country portfolio of Austrian ODA, there is no adequate blend between big recipients that deserve full attention in strategic negotiations, application of programming and reporting instruments and deployment of staff on one side; and smaller ones on the other, that can be dealt with in less complicated settings.

The table shows one clear improvement: priority countries are ascending, at least to the ranks ten to twenty.

ADC

Table 13: Bilateral ODA for ADC priority countries (disbursements)

Net disbursement (in EUR)	2003*	2005	2007	2009
Albania	3'246'568	3'365'183	5'398'653	5'881'888
Bhutan	3'046'835	2'935'876	1'193'570	2'405'973
Bosnia and Herzegovina	13'455'408	20'865'179	24'165'996	20'531'365
Burkina Faso	2'260'121	3'319'098	3'416'346	5'007'690
Cape Verde	2'566'684	2'013'855	1'856'151	1'816'177
Croatia	3'216'580	4'090'843		
Ethiopia	6'696'573	6'147'717	5'246'642	9'089'339
Kosovo				15'367'646
Macedonia	2'875'493	3'557'372	5'844'337	3'868'338
Moldova		5'347'562	2'888'174	2'512'712
Montenegro			2'168'279	2'423'008
Mozambique	2'966'399	3'468'157	2'781'669	6'360'363
Nicaragua	6'305'787	7'918'038	6'209'355	5'633'938
Palestinian Administered Areas	2'985'363	4'702'868	2'479'982	6'479'947
Rwanda	2'297'766			
Serbia			22'883'257	8'902'085
Serbia and Montenegro	16'925'225	27'803'043		
Uganda	4'798'850	6'775'327	7'493'778	8'034'738
Total	73'643'652	102'310'118	94'026'189	104'315'206
Average	5'260'261	7'307'866	6'716'156	6'954'347

Note (*) In 2003 countries in Eastern Europe were not yet formally included in the 3YP

Source ADA Statistic Unit, based on DAC/OECD statistics

The average size of country programmes oscillated between 2003 and 2007 in conformity with the general budget. Between 2007 and 2009 it did grow not adequately with the general budget growth. The analysis shows a constant growth over the whole period in three countries (Albania, Burkina Faso and Uganda). There is also a constant decrease in Cap Verde, corresponding to a declared phasing out strategy. The general picture is unsettled by the low continuity in Eastern Europe. In the given framework of increase and decrease of the bilateral disbursements, it is hard to find effects of deliberated concentrations as well as of shifts from finances from one country to another.

The Austrian action plan on aid effectiveness puts a specific focus on the question of how aid modalities must be adapted to the development conditions in the partner countries. Austria as co-chair of the Working Part on Statistics facilitated new classification modalities and presented the financial volumes of newly concluded funding agreements per year following this new classification in the action plan. That presentation (for the years 2006 and 2007) was extended by the ADA statistic Unit for the years 2008 and 2009. Since the guidelines for the implementation of the new categories decided in 2008 are

still in elaboration, only an approximate indication about the changes in aid modalities is possible (< 5% range of error).

Table 14 below presents the evolution of the percentages only in order to avoid a repetition of the oscillation effect in the absolute figures shown in table 13 above.

Table 14: Mix of modalities in the ADA portfolio (financial volume of new contracts)

Type	Identification	2005 %	2006 %	2007 %	2008 %	2009 %
A01	General Budget Support	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%
A02	Sectorial Budget Support	3%	4%	3%	6%	7%
B01	Core Contributions NGO /Privates	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
B02	Core Contributions Multilateral Org.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
B03	Programme contrib. multilateral Org.	13%	16%	12%	15%	13%
B04	Donor Baskets/Pooled Funding	2%	6%	4%	11%	9%
C	Projects	61%	58%	58%	52%	51%
D01	Donor staff (programmes)	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%
D02	Other Technical Aid	2%	2%	1%	1%	0%
E01	Scholarships in Donor Country ¹	7%	1%	7%	1%	7%
G & H	Domestic Donor cost	8%	10%	12%	6%	8%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<i>Volume in Euro</i>	<i>104'058'827</i>	<i>101'745'237</i>	<i>105'906'832</i>	<i>109'596'641</i>	<i>97'904'280</i>
	<i>Number of Contracts</i>	<i>337</i>	<i>277</i>	<i>244</i>	<i>247</i>	<i>225</i>

Note ¹ Scholarship contracts are concluded in a two years rhythm

Source ADA Statistic Unit

The table demonstrates an overall trend into the right direction but it also shows that changes are slow. With a more or less stable general amount of the newly contracted volume, the total number of contracts is decreasing constantly. This shows the tendency of moving away from the Austrian ADC traditional small scale project approach. This trend is confirmed by the financial share of project funding, sinking by 10% in five years. Nevertheless, the majority of the total volume is still going into project funding. Austria participates in harmonisation and alignment aid modalities to a very small but growing extent. ADA started the participation in sectoral budget support schemes and slowly increased it over time, but participated only in one general budget support. The comparative review of budget support completed in 2010 showed that Austria has built up a good understanding of the situations in the partner countries and the sectors where it has provided budget support, and that it is extremely difficult to engage more in this financing modalities without increased funds. Pooled funding and donor basket funding is on an upwards stream as well.

There are other aspects where no or almost no improvement is visible: NGO complain that administrative procedures are still very complicated and bureaucratic, despite the newly introduced framework programme agreements. In the day-to-day business they increase the formal requirements for financial contributions to NGOs and do not simplify and reduce them as e.g. a shift to regular core contribution basis would do. Contributions to multilaterals follow the same pattern: Austria is privileging more flexible specific programme contributions over long term core contributions. Scholarships continue to play an important role compared to other donors. The domestic donor cost that was continuously increasing in the past seems to be stopped for the moment.

2009 Baseline for PD Indicators

ADA elaborated a baseline for the PD indicators according to the Austrian action plan on aid effectiveness 2006-11. The baseline selected five target indicators of the PD suitable for monitoring in Austrian bilateral ADC, refined them by separating the different issues integrated in one indicator, and processed the data of the DAC/CRS statistical system. This operation was necessary because the existing scores of

the PD target indicators are by far too general for managing operational changes in donor finances. Since this data basis is conceived as a system for measurement of donor outflows towards developing countries and multilateral developmental organizations, these intentions of the donors at the point of outflow are the key for assigning classifications and for monitoring the programmable aid. For the moment, the baselines cover only the ADA commitments portfolio.

Table 12: Selected PD Indicators

PD Indicator	Description
3	Aid flows to government sector reported on budget
4	Coordinated support to capacity development
5	Use of country systems
6	Parallel implementation structures
9	Use of common arrangements and procedures

Table 13: Mix of modalities in the ADA portfolio (financial volume of new contracts) according to indicators for the Austrian Action plan

PD-Indicator	Acronym	Description	No of contracts	Volume, Mio. €
3	ATG	Aid to Government ⁶	15	23.63
3	ONB	Aid on Budget ⁷	11	18.38
4	CPD	Capacity Development	32	27.31
4	CPD-C	Coordinated Capacity Development ⁸	9	9.64
5	UCS-F	Use of country financial system	12	18.21
5	UCS-P	Use of country procurement system	15	23.71
5	UCS-M	Use of country monitoring & evaluation system	13	20.71
6	PIU	Parallel Implementation Units	8	7.93
9	PBA	Programme-based approaches	15	22.07
9	DLC	Delegated cooperation, delegating donor	7	3.29
9	DLC-L	Delegated cooperation, lead donor	3	4.23
0 -	void	⁹	13	5,44

Source: ADA Statistic Unit

Table 14: Programmable Aid in ADA-Baseline 2009 (Disbursements)

ADA-Total Portfolio		Total Baseline 2009:	
Contract volume (€)	102'884'867	Contract volume (€)	46'726'109
No of contracts	231	No of contracts	62
<i>of which: country-programmable</i>	<i>46'726'109</i>	<i>of which ADA-Budget:</i>	<i>45'616'109</i>
<i>Percentage country-programmable</i>	<i>45%</i>	<i>of which: 3rd parties finances</i>	<i>1'110'000</i>

Source: ADA Statistic Unit

Data analysis was done in close collaboration between ADA statistics unit and the head and the desks of the countries/regions unit. An aid effectiveness data sheet was used which attributes markers according

⁶ Disbursements to the Public sector of the partner country whether on budget or not

⁷ Disbursements are part of the budget of the partner country (=share of 2)

⁸ The capacity development component is part of a capacity development programme of the partner country

⁹ Contracts not corresponding to any of the markers above

the indicators for the Austrian action plan. In 2009, 62 out of 231 new contracts (contract signed, finances committed), representing 45% of the total financial volume, can be considered as country programmable. 15 out of these 62 contracts, which represent approximately half of the total country programmable aid (see footnote 5), foresee payments to the public sector of the recipient country (3-ATG).

The analysis is by its own merit a good achievement, breaking down nicely formulated targets to practical realities of programming. The overall picture of the baseline is mixed: only a small part of the new contracts can be considered as country programmable (approx. 5% of total ODA). Cooperation is not focused and specific enough. Too little effort goes into the core business, too much in various other aspects of ODA. Then again ADA has a good record in harmonising its country programmable activities with the Austrian PD/AAA indicators, only 13 contracts out of 62 not being in line with one or more of the of indicators at all. For ADA itself, these 13 contracts represent the potential for improvement in matching with PD indicators.

The instrument for steering activities is in place. What is needed now, are target values, monitoring of yearly progress and clear responsibilities for controlling. The core question certainly is whether target values should in future be set for the ADA portfolio only, programming in this way the commitment of approximately 10% of yearly Austrian ODA disbursements – “bonsai programming”, as it is called by harsh external observers -, or whether a larger share of Austria’s ODA should be included in the exercise.

Consequences of Budget Cuts

According to the budget proposal approved by the Government on October 22/23 2010, the upcoming budget 2011 of the Austrian Federal Government will reduce the yearly ADA budget (operational and overhead) from € 93.8 million (2010) to € 70.4 million (2014)(source ADA 15.12.2010). It will also reduce the voluntary contributions to multilateral organisations by € 13.1 million (2014) and the core contributions to UN organisations by € 5 million (2014) (source *profil* 22.10.11).

This is bad news for Austrian development cooperation anyway. But seen in the context, the case is even worse: The cuts seem to hit programmable aid, despite its very low share, much more than other parts of ODA. In the upcoming replenishments of IFI, Austria apparently wants to keep pace with the increase of its GNI. In relation to the candidature for the Security Council, Austria increased non programmable small scale project aid to Caribbean countries not appearing on the list of Austria’s recipient countries before. The same phenomenon is anticipated for Austria’s present candidature to the Human Rights Council. Austrian development cooperation is in a profound crisis.

This crisis threatens the existing Austrian capacities for development cooperation, sets achieved progress in approaches and instruments at high risk, widens the gap between Austrian public declarations and real implementation, damages Austria’s international reputation, and finally requires a serious reorganisation of the institutional set-up.

At present, the crisis management does not seem adequate: in the context of the budget cuts, that were already expected since the publication of the guidelines on federal finances in June 2010, the Ministry of European and International Affairs started a phasing out or downsizing process in Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Cap Verde. Together with the next candidate to be phased out (Nicaragua; source: 3YP 2010-12), this phasing out, downsizing or shifting from development cooperation to other modalities concerns half of the priority countries within three years. This hasty proceeding questions the present approach of Austrian development cooperation in general: Is it really necessary in the remaining countries, if it was abandoned so quickly in so many others?

3.7 Public support to ODA in Austria

Eurobarometer No. 318, May – June 2009 showed a high but slightly under the average score for Austria in the European context: In general, 78% think that development cooperation is important (European average 88%). Austrian self-interest is seen as the core motivation for delivering aid: trade, prevention against terrorism and unwelcome migration, as well as political relations with third countries. However,

as in other countries, Austrians are poorly informed about the MDGs (around 25% have heard about the MDGs.)

The 2009 *Lifestyle opinion poll* on development cooperation (GfK Austria May - July 2009, mandate ADA) confirmed that result but showed an increasing disinterest in aid among young women, worker/s, supporters of rightist parties and poorly informed people. Even though the main responsibility for aid is seen to lie with international organisations (64%) and the developing countries themselves (54%), a majority of the Austrians (55%) wish for a stronger involvement of the Austrian government, mainly in the health sector. A sinking share of the population thinks that aid is effective (48% in 2009). There are also doubts about the impact of aid on peace and global security (46% positive answers) on economic growth (44 % positive answers) and on global climate (38 % positive answers). Austrians trust in private charities more than in international organisations. A little more than 50% of the population are in favour of an Austrian ODA at the European average level.

Whereas the presence of aid issues in the *media* is generally low, the publication of the 2009 ODA figures by OECD/DAC in April 2010, showing the Austria as the rear-light of the OECD donors, provoked some harsh individual reactions in the press. They were reiterated after the statement by the Austrian president, Heinz Fischer, at the UN-MDG plenary meeting in September 2010. Press found his statement disappointing because he did not address the Austrian difficulties to fulfil the ODA commitments at all. The common denominator of these articles, including a statement of the Austrian minister for foreign affairs, Michael Spindelegger (Profil 23.08.10), is the regret in a resigned tonality that the Austrian financial commitment is notoriously low.

Civil Society: In past years Austrian development NGOs have made several attempts to campaign for more and better aid and have built up political pressure: 0,7% campaign 2003-2006; use of international alliances such as CONCORD, CIDSE, GCAP, and aid watch initiative. Several times, aid goals were included in party and government programmes but implementation failed. Aid is primarily received as private charity strongly based on church organisations and increasingly other NGOs but not as an obligation of the state. There is a generally positive atmosphere toward aid but few people give it high priority and it is not a vote gaining issue. Austrian development NGOs are dealing quite intensively with the PD. However, many NGOs criticise it as too technical and would like to see a broader concept of development effectiveness.

Very prominent positions of the *civil society* against this background can be found on www.initiative-entwicklung.at, a platform for engaged individuals, presenting statements of former ministers, parliamentarians, entrepreneurs, artists and university professors. The platform is a moral appeal. Up to now, there is no serious campaign by civil society organisations which translates public opinion into political action. In domestic politics, Austrian CSOs are still far away from alliances, coalition building and political pressure blocks even if they participate in such activities at the European level (e.g. Concord). A revealing symptom of their political insignificance might be the discrepancy between their intensive collaboration with the Federal Chancellery and the Ministry for Environment in the elaboration of standards and methodological guidelines for public participation on the one side and the absence of concrete action in the present situation on the other. Public critiques of the missing balance in the budget cuts are relatively weak.

4 ASSESSING CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

This section answers the remaining six questions under the heading “contextual factors” in the evaluation matrix (see annex 12.2) in a short synthesis. Most elements of these answers have already been presented in section 3 of this report where the focus was on the institutional analysis of the Austrian aid architecture and not on the PD evaluation:

Key characteristics of ODA and ADC most relevant to the implementation of the PD: There is no development cooperation strategy that could guide a overall implementation of the PD in Austrian ODA. Since the foundation of ADA in 2004, Austria disposes of a specialised agency for Austria development cooperation. As soon as the institution building process was more or less accomplished, ADA did embark on the implementation of the PD principles. The ADA budget represents around 10% of the Austrian ODA. The support of the BMeiA division VII to ADA was not always very effective because of the role confusion between the division and ADA. BMeiA as a whole has an overarching agenda that sets other priorities higher than the PD principles. BMeiA’s position as coordinator of Austrian development policy is weak in a double sense: (1) the legal basis for long term stable Austrian commitments is well-founded with regard to the contributions to the IFIs and the EU but not very sound with regard to bilateral development cooperation and contributions to the UN. (2) BMeiA is responsible only for a small share of total ODA (around 15 %), which reduces its institutional power for shaping Austrian ODA. BMF is supporting IFIs that are themselves responsible for the implementation of the PD. For all other actors, their contribution to ODA is a figure reported after the exercise and not a concern in implementation.

Coherence of involved Austrian actors in their view on and approach to the PD: The involved Austrian actors are not coherent in their views. They do not give the PD the same priority on the political agenda. They agree on the general level of the declaration of the principles. They disagree when it comes to a breakdown into operational programmes. The major difference in their opinions is the answer to the question, whether the commitment to the PD, which is not binding international law, should overrule Austrian laws. The arguments of those who are in favour are: moral obligations, international reputation, and credibility of Austrian foreign policy; those who are not argue with the respect of law and order and Austrian interests. The involved Austrian actors differ in their approaches to the PD. In the absence of an overall development cooperation strategy, it is difficult to assess to what degree their approaches are coherent and complementary. In the light of the shrinking ODA /GNI share, however, there are not many actors in Austria that would pretend they are.

Range and sphere of direct influence of the PD on government policies with implications for developing countries: The range of direct influence can be assessed since the ADA baseline study 2009. Direct influence in the country programmable aid is very small (around 45 % of new ADA commitments, representing approximately 5% of total ODA). For this small part of ODA, Austria can report considerable positive implications for developing countries. The sphere of direct influence on government policies is small as well.

Key actors in Austria who can make majors decisions on priorities, activities, programmes and projects of ODA / ADC: The Federal Government can make decisions on the share of programmable aid within ODA, on the attribution of the responsibility to one or several ministries. Within that set-up, each ministry can make decisions on priorities and activities in its responsibilities.

Extent and level of implementation of the PD principles: At strategy level PD principles are partly implemented in the 3YP and the interministerial strategic guidelines. They have been fully implemented in the new country programmes for priority countries since 2010 and the strategic guidelines on IFIs. At operational level, they are fully implemented in ADA. They are scarcely implemented in other institutions. At financial level, the downwards trend in ADC represents an obstacle for implementing the PD principles.

5 ASSESSING COMMITMENT

This section goes beyond the analysis of the commitment to the principles and targets of the PD in Austrian country programmable aid required by the terms of the evaluation and looks at the political framework for development cooperation in general). The extension of the argumentation is necessary because the PD principles are applied directly only in a small part of the ODA, because they have little relevance in the other parts of it, but would actually be highly significant for addressing the problems of Austrian ODA and) for reshaping Austrian development aid.

5.1 Interpretation of the PD in Austria

General Acknowledgement

On principle, the PD is recognized by most involved parties as the general politically binding frame for Austrian ODA. For various reasons however, the binding force of the PD is seen as low. First of all, the PD is seen as a kind of “fair weather-arrangement”: as long as Austrian economy and public finances are in good condition, there is no reason not to follow the principles of the PD. But when economic problems and cuts in the public finances occur, the PD principles are downgraded in the priority lists by almost all concerned parties. The typical case of such conflicting priorities can be found in the federal budget, where development cooperation figures only with the remark that it is subject to the discretion of the government and the parliament, and is no essential, legally bound expenditure among others. Secondly, the most important international stakeholder is considered to be the EU and not the OECD. In cases of overlapping priorities, for example among European Pre-accession Policy and ODA with South East Europe, the Austrian government and the individual ministries will normally give priority to the EU principles. If Austria has difficulties fulfilling all its international commitments, it will give priority to those for the EU. Thirdly, since the major share of Austrian ODA (with the exception of debt relief) is implemented by international organisations such as IFIs and the EU; many respondents believe that the PD is a technical arrangement for those international organisations, and not directly binding Austria politically. And finally, Austrian Development Aid is considered (from the government to the wide public) to be more of a moral obligation than a useful investment in a global future at all levels, done in well-deemed Austrian self-interest. In such a moral context of thinking, an international agreement with binding character is not as clearly indispensable as it is in an economic context.

There is widespread recognition that the five principles of the PD are the right ones to enhance the aid effectiveness. The principles are generally understood in the large sense of the terms, not in the technical definitions based on the indicators. A closer look at how various actors understand the PD principles shows big differences.

BMEIA has an overarching agenda with political objectives that have in their view higher priority than the fulfilling of the PD commitments, as e.g. given the participation in the UN security council or in the UN human rights council, the Austrian visibility on various continents or the own institutional flexibility needed for flexible answers to the policy agendas of international organisations (most prominent among them the EU). Due to the low priority of the PD principles, they are barely relevant for defining the Austrian foreign policy agenda. This is - to a smaller extent - also true for the *BMeiA* division VII: Development Policy. In the interviews *BMeiA* senior staff addressed these priority conflicts without any further discussion.

BMF also has an overarching agenda, currently determined by the financial sustainability of the household, budget cuts and debts reduction. The *BMF* division III: Economic Policy and Financial Markets is giving high priority to PD principles in the financing of the IFIs. There is no conflict of priorities within the *BMF*. In the interviews, *BMF* senior staff was concerned about the unresolved priority conflicts at national level, resulting in the present ADC crisis.

ADA is fully implementing the alignment and harmonisation principles in all country programmes. Programmes are aligned to the development strategies of the partners as much as possible. *ADA* coordina-

tors participate in donor coordination. And ADA is adjusting the country programmes to development results when a new programme phase starts. The new country strategies (Mozambique, Bhutan and Uganda) have a clear set of results.

Other actors: Most of the other involved actors acknowledge the PD principles generally but do not derive any operational consequences for their own activities from them.

Individual principles: In detail, great differences exist in the recognition of the individual principles. The interviewees deal with the vagueness of the term *ownership* easily and use it in a rather blurred way for the Austrian ownership on Austrian aid as well as for the ownership of the partners on their own development. The nearer to practical implementation the interlocutors are, the more this second understanding prevails (e.g. the coordinators). Many Austrian actors that do not implement development cooperation programmes (e.g. financial controllers) consider the principle of *alignment* as correct in theory but unfortunately not implementable because of the control requirements appropriated to Austrian rules and regulations. *Harmonisation* is accepted by the ministries and the NGOs with a certain reservation: fundamentally, there is no objection to the necessity of avoiding or fighting fragmentation but when it comes to specific cuts, every singular expenditure is defended, or when it comes to opportunities for Austrian interests outside agreed development agendas, ministries are inclined to neglect the principle. *Result orientation* is perceived in a double sense: (A) result orientation as a quality mark for the Austrian aid, and (B) results of the development processes in the partner countries. Despite the full and unconditional recognition of the principle, there generally is relatively little concern about the operationalisation of the principle - with the clear exception of ADA which is continuously adapting its operations to that principle. *Mutual Accountability* is accepted in a very large understanding of the term, meaning that development aid cannot be seen as a one way process. There are, however, only small common grounds in details, for example concerning the question whether Austria can be made responsible for non-achievement of development results agreed upon in a country strategy.

Awareness: Implementing actors, especially ADA and programmes supporting NGOs are highly aware of the importance of the PD agenda. ADA actively promotes the PD principles in coordination meetings, staff training and networks. Coordinators and desks directly working with the PD targets complain that their professional interlocutors in the Austrian and partner ministries are less interested (see annex 12.4. answers to question 7). Outside of directly implementing units, the knowledge of technical features of the PD (donor commitments under the five principles, target indicators and Austrian performance against these targets) is generally poor. Poor knowledge goes hand in hand with a vague acknowledgment of the principles). Operationalisation of the PD targets is normally discussed in terms of the EU implementation schemes, namely the Code of Conduct.

In the ministries and in the academia there is, of course, an ongoing debate about the conceptual conflicts between the five principles. Respondents from academia criticise that PD and AAA reconfirm the technical dominance of the donors over the recipient countries, imposing on them an overwhelming machinery of development business which can seriously jeopardise ownership in the developing countries. The conflict between the self-interests, which Austria is defending in its Foreign Policy, and the principle of Mutual Accountability, which would require adequate mechanisms for conferring responsibilities to the Partners, was another point of concern of the respondents. And finally, the concern that weak partners might not be able to guarantee results, mainly in fragile situations, was noted by several respondents.

Policy Coherence

In the first years after 2005, the PD had little or no direct influences on Austrian other government policies than multilateral and bilateral development cooperation. To give one example only: the guidelines for Austrian foreign trade call for a redefinition of Austrian priority countries on the basis of Austrian competences and strengths (BMWA, 2008, P. 240) without making reference to principles such as harmonisation or alignment. The federal government has only recently taken up the coherence agenda with

the series of interministerial guidelines (environment and development, security and development). This is seen as a positive evolution by almost all respondents. They are, however, highly skeptical about the willingness and the capacities of the involved parties - including their own - to implement these guidelines. Not only are measurable targets missing, there is also no legal obligation for actions according to the guidelines and there is no compulsory mechanism for budget allocation of the involved ministries for the common purpose. The positive aspect is that in these guidelines policy coherence has entered the range of vision. But to say that the strategic guidelines “anchor policy coherence in daily business of collaboration” (Guidelines Environment and Development 2009, p.3), is an optimistic exaggeration. Therefore, critical respondents ask whether it would not be better for Austria to break down the two guidelines into operational aspects, dealing with the coherence conflicts that will arise at this level before starting the same exercise with the next policy sector. Without doing so, they assume high risks that discussions again do not go beyond generalities.

Priority Setting in ODA and ADC

The PD has practically not affected the Austrian priority-setting for ODA. Austria’s influence on priority setting in debt relief and multilateral cooperation, which is about three quarters of Austrian ODA, is seen as small anyhow compared to big donors in the Paris Club or the IFIs. The driving factors are the annual fluctuation in the budget allocation; the annual rolling 3YP, very much favouring continuity in the overall portfolio; and the high proportion of small scale projects, favouring oscillations in detail. In the opinion of the respondents, these factors are hardly affected by the PD principles. On the other side, there is evidence for a positive influence of the PD principles on ADC, as table 13: Mix of modalities in the ADA portfolio shows. Austrian ADC is slowly modifying its modalities, giving preference to those modalities that are more appropriate for harmonised development cooperation. The shift from country programmes to country strategies and the concept of the recently published strategies show the same tendency: work style and instruments are continuously adapted to PD principles. The assessment of the present status of implementation, however, is difficult as the answers of the coordinators of the respective questions in the questionnaire show. The majority being convinced that the PD principles are an adequate means of streamlining international development cooperation (see annex 12.4, question 9), the coordinators provide a heterogeneous assessment of the present realisations (for example questions 32 on visible links between expenditures and results in the documents, or 35 about the use of country systems).

There is only low progress to overall ODA policy coherence. The main reason for this lies in the sharp division between ADC as small programmable aid and ODA as cumulative addition of heterogeneous policy sectors. They are only combined under the criterion of ODA eligibility but without sufficient common strategic orientation.

Roles of the HQ /Field Offices

The roles of the HQ /field offices have not been adapted much to the aid effectiveness agenda. Despite declarations of intent to decentralise, the ADC is still highly centralised in terms of both structures and thinking. The daily working routines are highly focused on the HQ. In order to implement an aid effectiveness agenda a strong focus on the work in the field is needed. Respondents have mixed opinions about this issue: on the one side they express pride about the individual cases where Austrian coordinators actively take part in donor coordination mechanisms (for example the troikas). But on the other side, the fear of losing control in Vienna is almost omnipresent.

Parliament and Public Opinion

With few exceptions, there is neither real ownership for the PD on the parliamentary level and nor by the civil society. One of the reasons for this is the prevalence of hostility against international bureaucracies in the Austrian population and the related political phenomena: cautiousness of politicians with regard to international agreements that are not easily understandable for the large public and disproportionate insistence on the Austrian visibility in international contexts, respectively. If it is hard to ex-

plain the EU mechanisms, how much more difficult is it to explain lesser known technical institutions such as the DAC for example?

Potential Conflicts

One of the important potential conflicts between development cooperation and other policy sectors is the growing outreach of technical ministries into developing countries, or to put it differently, the increasing convergence of industrialized and developing countries. An example for that growing overlap is the activity of the Ministry of Education in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. The main task of the eleven educational coordinators accredited in the embassies is to prepare educational partnerships with a mutual benefit in the long term. The Ministry of Education understands this activity explicitly as contribution to the MDGs and attributes high importance to development policy coherence. But nevertheless the educational cooperation is intended to continue in the future when these countries are no longer ODA-eligible. It is not seen as a specific activity within development cooperation. Synergies are intended at strategic level but not targeted at operational level. Similar overlaps evolve in the security sector: concerns on threats to international security draw attention of the Ministry of Defence on fragile states. At international strategic level, synergies between security and development are largely debated and operationalised under the CIMIC schemes: civil-militarian cooperation. There is no similar transfer from strategic to operational level in Austria yet. Climate change requires international responses in emerging countries, still qualifying as ODA-eligible. The strategic guidelines environment and development do not raise typical technical questions in this context such as the additionality of funds. Partnerships between universities in industrialised and developing countries can unfold scientific potential needed in both categories of countries, thus bringing in the Ministry for Science and Research. Austrian ministries should seek an appropriate division of labour between that multiplied direct working contacts of sectoral ministries and their counterparts on one side and development cooperation on the other in specific quantified programming not only at the level of general principles.

Future Options

An inherent danger of coherence building is the shift to higher levels of abstraction: a common umbrella in abstract terms covers conflicting or even incompatible concrete practices. In Austrian ODA, this phenomenon is well known and frequent. One typical example was the attempt to formulate a “white paper”, suggested by the OECD DAC Peer Review 2009, for harmonising the strategic positions of the different ministries. Even though accepted at first as a possible solution for coherence building, the elaboration of the planned “white paper” was stopped, when the involved parties noticed that they would probably not be able to resolve the practical conflicts by this approach.

Instead of realising such excessively demanding exercises, it would be much better for BMeiA to make a deliberate choice of one priority partner and to focus its attempts for coherence building on that collaboration. There are some factors of success for such an exercise: both, strategy and operational level have to be considered. Common operational plans have to be built up from actual present practices, experiences and institutional strengths of the involved partners. The entry point must be a routine procedure of at least one of the involved partners (and not a specific activity apart). Not everything can be done in parallel at the same time.

In the present situation various options for priority setting can be envisaged:

- BMeiA – BMF: coherence between bilateral and multilateral development cooperation. This option would focus on collaboration between the “development specialists”.
- BMeiA – BMF – ADA – OeEB: value chains (aid and trade). This option would focus on complementarities in Austrian cooperation with South Eastern Europe.
- BMeiA – BMLUV: climate change (environment and development).
- BMeiA – BMLVS: conflict prevention (security and development). The last two options would focus on common interests in specific thematic areas.

Once such priority collaboration for coherence is defined in a legally binding decision for a common activity, providing targets and means to reach them, discussions in a next priority sector can be opened.

5.2 Reflections in Policies

Key Actors

All key actors have little power to act in favour of more coherence in Austrian ODA.

BMeiA is hampered in its mandate to coordinate the Austrian ODA by: (1) its small financial share of the overall ODA budget, limiting its institutional weight in the debate; (2) the inadequate allocation of the coordinating mandate to a Division within the *BMeiA* (division VII responsible for development policy), with all the shortcomings of such an attribution: lower hierarchical position of the coordinating unit than their direct interlocutors in the presumably coordinated institutions, departments and interinstitutional settings; small staff provision; partially inadequate staff profiles); (3) the common understanding in Austria, that ODA in general and ADC have to be distinguished.

In the present legal setting, the *Government* has little capacity to create coherence for development: the separate ministerial responsibilities hamper decisions on interministerial transversal issues that are going beyond summing up the individual contributions of each involved ministry. An overarching strategy can practically not be set top-down in this context. It must be developed bottom-up (as suggested in the para "Future Options" above).

The oversight of the *Parliament* is weak. Since there is no strong civil society pushing for more coherence in Austrian ODA, the parliament will not try to exercise pressure on the governing grand coalition in order to respect the commitments of the government programme.

Since ADA is institutionally dominated by the *BMeiA*, it can neither evolve to an important platform for the debate on development coherence of Austrian policies nor to a big player as service provider for different ministries. It is crucial for ADA to dispose of more institutional autonomy, if it should play an important role for policy coherence as a company.

In the given institutional set-up, the *BMF* has an interest to deal with coherence aspects rather within its organisation itself (mainly between development and budget division) than to discuss it with the heterogeneous group of other actors.

Influences on Predictability

Factors of the domestic political discussion are influencing the institutional behaviour much more than the PD itself. The one single most important external factor is the publication of the ODA share by OECD/DAC. It has direct impact on Austrians international reputation. But my interlocutors agree, that the political influence of negative Austrian scores is minimal: The OECD information about ODA donor performance 2009, indicating the fall of Austria's ODA by 31.2% (compared to a fall of 0.2% in EU-15 provokes in the Austrian cultural context only a minimal name and shame-effect.

Predictability of Austrian ODA is mostly influenced by its different settings. In the multilateral cooperation with IFIs it is normal practice to fix the legal basis for a multiannual commitment period and an even longer disbursement period. Capital increments of the IFIs and replenishments of the development funds are decided this way. In this regard, Austria applies commonly agreed multi-year schemes on aid flows. This is not yet the case in bilateral cooperation, where commitments and disbursements are regulated by liability limitations in the contracts and by the yearly budget, thus limiting the predictability of the Austrian development cooperation. Monitoring Survey indicator 7, indicating that disbursements are on schedule and recorded by the government, shows some improvement of the predictability (up from 23 % in 2005 to 36% in 2008, Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey 2008) but Austrian practices do not yet provide equal conditions for that predictability in all parts of Austrian Aid (absence of a multiannual commitment framework, absence of guidelines on ODA finances, contractual limitation of multiannual

liabilities in contracts in bilateral cooperation (100% in the first year, max. 60% in the second year, max. 40% in all following years).

Fragile States

Even though reducing the number of priority countries, Austria will keep staying engaged in two different “fragile” contexts: the Kosovo and the Palestinian Territories. With the possible shift to the Black Sea Region, Austria looks forward to a third one (Caucasus). The decision is much more influenced by Austrian traditions and interests than by considerations on the DAC Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States.

5.3 Conclusions

Structural problems in policy setting that did not receive sufficient attention in a large public before, As long as Austria scored well on the way to the EU 2010 ODA target of 0.51%: there is no domestic policy mechanism in place covering all Development Aid. Being a mixture between an overarching strategy and an operational plan for BMeiA and ADA, the 3YP cannot be used as such a mechanism in its present form. A shift in the format is therefore necessary. The most important aspects of this shift are:

1. Formulation of objectives and results related to them
2. Reference to objectives set and results achieved in the prior programme period
3. Clear-cut reference to international agreements and commitments
4. Clear-cut reference to binding national policies
5. Balance between programmatic objectives and operational arrangements: objectives covering all ODA implementation, adequate operational arrangements for reaching the objectives
6. Clear-cut distribution of the responsibility for results among the involved Ministries
7. Multiannual framework for financial commitments and flexible disbursement period
8. Legally binding character of the document

Such a politically endorsed medium-term development policy would help to clarify overlaps and divergences among ODA and ADC and would also shape Austria’s contribution in the international development cooperation in a much higher visibility than today.

The initiative for this shift can only come from BMeiA as coordinating ministry. The initiative must not necessarily cover all aspects mentioned above: Points 1 - 6 can be introduced individually in the elaboration of the 3YP 2011-13; points 7 and 8 can be promoted as political objectives that should be included in the government programme for the 25th Legislation period 2014-17.

Compared to these overarching policy aspects, Austrian commitments for individual targets of the PD, as e.g. joint missions, joint project implementation units, the further deployment of delegated cooperation, pooled funding, etc. are of minor importance. Nevertheless, they should be integrated in the 3YP programme in unambiguous terms.

6 ASSESSING CAPACITIES

In this section, capacity will be discussed in a large understanding, comprising of (1) an adequate institutional set-up, (2) appropriate performing procedures and (3) sufficient available means in appropriate quality necessary for fulfilling the Austrian commitments.

A preliminary remark has to be made: Since there is no systematic monitoring of the implementation of the PD/AAA principles at operational level, neither in monitoring schemes of the country strategies nor in the monitoring of the financial contributions to the IFIs, nor in individual staff appraisals, the assessment is based on anecdotic evidence only.

6.1 Factors Supporting the Implementation of the PD

Austria makes good but low progress to a better international division of labour in all newly reformulated country strategies: as a typical example the new Uganda Country Strategy is consolidating Austrian activities into 2 areas of intervention (corresponding to 2 sectors by the partner country sector definition), down from 4 up to 2008/09 (and even more up to 2005/06). In one of these sectors, Water and Sanitation, Austria is one of the lead donors. Approximately 80 % of funds of the Uganda programme in 2010 are fully aligned to partner country sector strategies (including indicators and targets) and channelled through country systems.

Austria disposes of staff in the field and at the HQ desks, which has a general positive “Harmonisation and Alignment-drive” on the working level: there is no need to produce specific instructions, guidelines, operational directives and evaluation criteria and to disseminate them. The staff are convinced of it, and implement harmonisation, alignment and result orientation continuously: PD/AAA is their daily working environment and is constantly present in discussions with other stakeholders (NGOs both nationally and internationally, companies, universities, donors, partner countries’ ministries, etc.) This is all the more self-evident in contexts, where partners are eager to implement the PD/AAA, are devising planning and monitoring systems which provide comparison between baseline data and achievements, and where the same reports are used by all participating donors (e.g. Bhutan).

The positive impact of an international framework can be seen in the Western Balkans, where the common EU legal framework (Acquis) and the annual national EU assistance planning and programming process do streamline discussions and activities. It must be said, however, that the EU pre-accession context and connected to that, the fade out of classical development aid, play an important role for that pulling factor.

6.2 Factors Complicating the Implementation of the PD

The institutional set-up of Austrian ODA is characterized by the unfinished organisational reform of 2004. ADA was founded in order to create a flexible organisation disposing of the competencies and capacities to manage a considerably increased ADC (doubling to € 150-200 millions in a couple of years), but was endowed with too little flexibility, unclear role distribution with BMeiA and less funds than anticipated. This institutional context causes problems for the implementation of PD principles and the deployment of Austrian capacities: due to the small size and the qualifications of the workforce that remained with the BMeiA Division VII, there is not enough leadership in order to streamline Austrian ODA according to the requirements of the PD. The absence of a firm position of BMeiA on this issue and the frank communication of their diverging opinions by senior staff members about how to proceed in future adjustment of the institutional structure, are not helpful at all. The in-house temptations to directly instrumentalise ADC have a negative impact on the on-going implementation of the PD. A second open front is the much wider discussion on Austrian interests in development aid. Most Austrian politicians and entrepreneurs consider the relations with the neighbors in the Balkans as a well-working give and take relationship, wherein Austrian interests justify Austrian contributions to the development of the partner countries. Since the Austrian interests in the relations with most of the least developed countries are much less evident, the same politicians and entrepreneurs find it difficult to justify Austrian financial contributions and consider the relations with those countries as one-way cooperation.

The lacking integration of ADC within the overall ODA impedes Austria’s capacity to engage in a multi-level approach at central level and in the coordination offices or the diplomatic missions simultaneously. There is no Austrian follow-up of ODA contributions to the recipient countries by Austrian representations on the field, if there is no ADC coordination office.

The overall small size of ADC makes it difficult to reach a critical mass of implementing experiences. The division of labour between BMeiA and ADA is not clear enough to install complementary routines and avoid duplications. Operations are guided more by individual available professional knowledge and

common sense of the involved people than by clear strategies. Coordinators and staff members at HQ do not see sufficient capacity building efforts of the government. Coordinators and HQ staff members express the need for training and capacity building for implementing the PD principles.

Distribution and numbers of staff did not change much neither in the ministries nor in the NGO's. The PD principles are directly dealt with by small groups of staff with specific competences and personal experience in development cooperation work relatively isolated from each other (around 15 in BMeiA, around 10 in BMF, individual persons in the other Ministries and in NGOs, around 50 in ADA HQ, and all coordinators in the priority countries). The only considerable increase since 2005 was a in ADA. In the ongoing concentration process, the number of coordinators dropped from 15 in 2005 to 12 in 2010 and will continue to do so. These staff members have good knowledge and understanding of aid effectiveness as their documents, the interviews and the electronic survey in the coordination offices show. The large majority, however, feels marginalised in the overall context of Austrian politics.

ADA and BMeiA HQs have an open and flexible country tailored approach to the implementation of PD/AAA in the priority countries. To apply PD/AAA principles requires a change in the work of the coordination offices, specific technical know-how for the participation in the sectoral or national dialogue and revised contractual arrangements. Up to now, operational decisions about resource allocation for implementing the PD/AAA principles are more or less made by the coordination offices, without serious debates about the implications among coordination offices and the HQ. Austrian coordinators as well as those of other donors see an increase in their workload, but no sufficient organizational development that would allow the proper application of the PD/AAA.

Even if the small programmable funds in the priority countries are small, their thematic focus is too widespread. Moreover, it differs from partner country to partner country. Despite Austria's strong and internationally recognised expertise and comparative advantage in water and sanitation; the sector is only a focal area in two partner countries.

On paper, no additional delegation of competences to coordination offices occurred in order to empower them for implementing the PD. Most coordinators criticise that the intended decentralisation resulted in fact in a centralisation. Reporting procedures changed insofar as they now include a paragraph on international development and on the bilateral dialogue with the partner governments. They are still back to HQ Reports, written in a narrow quarterly rhythm, which is not suitable for reporting on development results and outcomes. There is still a large gap between design and reality of the policy dialogues. In design, Austria participates in the dialogue with a coherent whole-of-government position. In practice coordinators represent ADA and neither all of Austrian ODA concerned nor the other ministries working in the country. This is a strongly limiting factor with regard to the mutual accountability principle. The federal act on development cooperation imposes the duty on the coordinators to report on political affairs of their countries to the BMeiA. There are ongoing discussions between BMeiA and ADA on how far this rule has been implemented and whether these reports are useful and necessary. Yet, in a context of aligned cooperation, this would be an important point for a close collaboration between the political and the technical level. For the moment, much depends on the personality of the coordinator.

In the early period of the implementation of the PD, the involved staff rarely benefited from reduced duplication of efforts and from rationalised working procedures. On the contrary, taking-up of coordination structures among donors and with partner countries, fine tuning of institutional arrangements, and proceedings consumed a lot of energy and working time. In general, the reduction of the workload created by Austrian requirements was slower than the growth of additional work created by harmonised and aligned cooperation. According to the coordinators, the reduction of the number of contracts, thematic areas, formal requirements in programming and reporting is not progressing as fast as international requirements are growing on the other side of the balance.

The main problem Austria faces in fulfilling the PD commitment for managing for development results is the low formalisation in presenting development results in former programme and project documents.

Since 2005, there was not enough time for the change to a systematic result presentation. In statistics, for example, the baseline was set for 2009, and it will take some more years until significant analysis is possible. Because of this, people working in ADC consider the PD implementation timetable as too optimistic.

6.3 Conclusions

Building up Austrian ODA capacities in a division of labour requires analysis of the position of the various involved parties, recognition of their different characteristics, and adequate instruments for the management of their intersections. Austria has remarkable capacities for delivering innovative solutions in small units in specific working contexts but these efforts fall short of being extended to system-wide operational plans and to systematic mutual learning about potentials and risks. There is room for more delegation of competencies, for redefining working relations as well as for improving collaboration and exchange among the main parties.

A rapid improvement of Austrian capacities could be achieved if the three main actors BMeiA, BMF and ADA would cooperate better, bringing bilateral and multilateral, financial and technical development cooperation into closer working relations under the following premises:

- Filling the gap at the head of the hierarchy of policy documents by an overarching Austrian strategy for development cooperation
- Reducing the total amount of policies, strategies and programmes at inferior level
- Transferring discussions from working groups into the line responsibilities
- Simplifying the division of labour among the three involved parties

In the past, Austria made several attempts to remedy the problem of the limited deployment of its capacities. The most important attempt was the foundation of ADA. This was designed to overcome earlier fragmentation, to increase the capacities of bilateral development cooperation, and to increase the share of country programmable aid within Austrian ODA. Since ADA did neither get institutional independence from BMeiA nor funding adequate to its size, this attempt did not meet the expectations. In order to give ADA a real chance, its institutional set-up has to be changed by an adjustment of the federal act on development cooperation, providing ADA a better status as the Austrian platform for overall ODA and as a service provider for other ministries besides BMeiA.

7 ASSESSING INCENTIVES

7.1 Incentives

Staff Motivation

A majority of the operational staff members at field as well as at desk level is convinced that the PD principles are a good means for increasing the effectiveness of their work if these principles are implemented without excessive bureaucracy. In their opinion, the PD with its broad horizon differs from Austrian small-scale project and programme management with its detailed controlling style in a positive way. Working in a harmonised, aligned cooperation environment gives them a chance to operate at eye level with their colleagues in cooperating agencies. They are geared to internationally agreed professional standards instead of Austrian administrative formalities. There are two motivations for everything that has been realised in ADC and ODA with regard to the PD so far: the moral conviction and the attraction of the international professional set-up.

Organisational Targets

The Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness 2006-11 includes clear targets for implementation. The document does not divide the overall targets into specific organizational targets for ADA and the different involved ministries. In ADA, however, all involved parties automatically adopt the overall targets as

company targets, and important efforts are made in order to reach them such as the adaptation of country strategies and the participation in budget support schemes.

External confirmation of the own position

In many respects, the PD is seen as an international high level confirmation of long standing working principles and approaches and operational choices of ADC, for example the intensive collaboration with local partners in the recipient countries, the strong accentuation on capacity development, the attempts to define mutual responsibilities for the common programmes in MoUs, and so on.

7.2 Disincentives

Individual Performance Targets

In the staff appraisals of the ministries or ADA no reference to PD targets can be found, be it in the coordination offices or in HQ. The professional culture of ADC is dominated by approaches that are driven by values, in which even the idea of binding individual performance targets with organisational targets or to international goals would be a foreign matter.

Bureaucratization

For implementing organisations, NGOs, and private enterprises, the degree of administrative formalisation of ADC is by far the most important disincentive for engaging with ADC. They criticise the priority given to Austrian domestic control routines over feasibility considerations and operational flexibility. They see the PD targets and monitoring as additional complications, to which they react in two different ways: (1) they make a clear distinction between the implementing practitioners dealing with the down-to-earth and day-to-day problems of development cooperation and people engaged in academic policy debates, or (2) they consider themselves not to be concerned by the PD at all.

Missing Long Term Reform Agenda

Typical aspects of the Austrian domestic political system are seen as general obstacles for a smooth implementation of the PD /AAA agenda: successful right wing politicians impede Austria's potential to participate in international agreements fully since the strong and actual growing Austrian populism requires careful risk assessment, caution in action as well as unconditional priority on Austrian self-interest. Governing coalitions are heavily engaged in internal struggles which attract their interest to domestic issues at the forefront of public interest and reduce their capability to act in "minor" issues at international level such as development cooperation.

Split-off Human Resources

The total number of experienced and competent staff members dealing with international development cooperation at the technical level required by the PD in Austrian ODA is low. In the various organisations involved in ODA, they normally form small working teams. With a few exceptions, they are not in a position to realise an enabling working environment (marked by internal professional exchange free from institutional concurrence, in-built job-enrichment, regular rotation with the most important business partners and routinely updated data and information basis, etc.). Therefore, these small teams see the communication with the much larger number of staff in their own organisation without experience and specific competences in international development cooperation as a disagreeable administrative obligation far too often.

7.3 Conclusions

Incentives and disincentives are not well balanced. Incentives are reported on the level of the individual personality of the personnel, their intrinsic motivation, and on the level of the specific PD-related organisational targets. Disincentives stem from the Austrian cultural specificity to give higher priority to the willingness to do something than to the quality of its result.

The DAC/OECD Peer Reviews 2004 and 2009 as well as the 2008 ADA Evaluation led to very similar conclusions about disincentives in ODA / ADC on the institutional level: weak political support, missing overall development cooperation policy, distortions in ODA, a too small share of country programmable aid, inappropriate division of labour between BMeiA and BMF, unclear role allocation between ADA and the ministries, complicated communication of the ministries with the coordination offices, inadequate volume of country programmes, and missing result orientation. Incentives play a limited role in the Austrian ODA /ADC. Then again, complicated administrative regulations and procedures act as disincentives on closer collaboration with the Austrian aid system for all those not used to it, whereas insiders continue to apply for funds since other European development agencies have similarly complicated procedures.

In the given situation, it would be wise to maintain the existing intrinsic motivation as much as possible. One important contribution for this purpose would certainly be a systematic trust building among the concerned staff members by establishing a realistic strategy on how to overcome the institutional gap between ODA and ADC.

8 ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

This section answers the questions under the heading “implementation issues factors” in the evaluation matrix in a short synthesis (adjusting questions 5 and 6 of the international generic terms on new aspects, that were not yet included in the first phase of the PD evaluation, to the Austrian context). More details can be found in the previous sections of this report. *Less duplication*: The picture is mixed. There is increased complementarity and division of labour in the priority countries (fewer sectors, more donor coordination, etc) in ADC. On the other hand, also the fragmentation of ODA and the number of policies and strategies increased.

More collaborative behaviour; reformed, simplified policies and procedures: Austria increasingly delegates programme implementation to lead donors (and takes over lead functions in some other cases) in the ADC priority countries. The institutional reform of the Austrian aid architecture (ADA foundation) was not followed by an adequate increase or shift of funds to ADA. Policies and procedures were not simplified in past years.

Extent of predictable multi-year commitments: The proportion of aid being committed through multi-year frameworks increased slightly because of the relative increase of contributions to the IFIs and the relative drop of bilateral cooperation in the overall ODA, and of the introduction of multi-year commitment framework in the bilateral cooperation. In more than half of all ODA recipient countries, financial volumes are so small that proper programming cannot be done cost-effectively.

Burdens of aid management falling on partner countries: HQ Documents do not reflect this concern in operational terms.

Main Problem with regard to managing for development results: In the last couple of years, ADA was strongly engaged in creating preconditions for evidence in development results according to DAC/OECD standards. The instruments are now available. The main problem is how to transfer the approach to the other parts of ODA.

Main problem with regard to mutual accountability: A platform for discussing mutual accountability at governmental or parliamentary level is missing.

Reasons for lacks of use of country systems: Financial flows are strongly controlled by Austrian control and audit mechanisms at the level of very low amounts.

9 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Austrian laws provide an unbalanced basis for the overall Austrian development aid and create diverging operational conditions for the different parts of ODA. Differences are specifically found among bilateral development cooperation, contributions to international financing institutions and contributions to international organisations (UN, EU).

An overarching Austrian strategy for development cooperation is missing. There are various attempts to create coherence in Austrian development policy at the next lower strategic level, the ministerial and interministerial guidelines. Since they are very general in nature, they are overruled by the financial guidelines of the government, they are not conducive for a proper political steering of Austrian ODA and they are not supported by strong strategic monitoring mechanisms.

These structural problems causing high fragmentation of Austrian ODA, low internal coherence and strong oscillations in funding, are not on the domestic political agenda. In its statements to an international public, the Austrian government does not address these problems.

Austria has, however, made several attempts to overcome this situation. These attempts match well with the PD principles although they were made without direct reference to the PD. The most important of these attempts was the Foundation of ADA in 2004, in order to create a flexible and competent organisation capable of managing roughly the double volume of ADC. Since ADA was endowed with low institutional flexibility, unclear role distribution with BMeiA and by far less funds, this attempt has not yet been successful. Other failed attempts are the ODA-path to the EU ODA-target of 0.51% or the “White paper approach”.

Under these circumstances, the implementation of the PD principles was restricted to the very small share of overall ODA that is represented by Austrian development cooperation (around 10% of total ODA). Austria is making slow but good progress towards the implementation of the PD in country programmable aid.

Potential for further progress is limited because of the low priority of development cooperation in the Austrian political agenda, the unclear role distribution of the involved actors, the complicated processes and the inadequate formats of policy and strategy documents.

The involved actors search solutions mostly in top-down procedures: amendment of the law on development cooperation (2003), ODA path (2008), White paper approach (2009) or in out of the middle procedures (interministerial guidelines (2009-10), but hardly in bottom-up adjustments of unsatisfactory existing instruments.

10 RECOMMENDATIONS

General Recommendations

- (1) **Repositioning Austrian development policy:** The Austrian political system has precisely defined informal moments for decision making on policy changes. The next one will probably be the government programme 2014-17.

The external evaluator recommends to the Austrian Government: to carefully prepare the repositioning of Austrian development policy not only for a post PD period but much more so also for the next government programme.

- (2) **Designing new regional programmes according to PD principles:** With the interministerial guidelines as well as with the preparation of an integrated regional programme for the Black Sea Region, Austria embarked in a process towards more policy coherence for development. This is a positive evolution towards more Austrian ownership for its contribution to overall development goals. In this process, however, many aspects are mixed up with too little profile.

The external evaluator recommends to the Austrian Government: sharpening the focus of future regional programmes (e.g. the Black Sea Region) according to the five PD principles.

- (3) **Step-by-step approach for restructuring Austrian ODA:** So far, the Austrian ODA barely reflected the PD principles. It is by far too fragmented; depends much on Austrian domestic politics; lacks a common legal basis for all its parts; suffers under low predictability. Streamlining the overarching strategy for development policy and creating the necessary institutional set-up for a coherent Austrian ODA is by far the most important challenge if the PD targets should be followed beyond the small part represented by ADC.

The external evaluator recommends to BMeiA: developing a step-by-step approach for restructuring Austrian ODA with the objective to create a legally binding, multiannual financial framework for the overall ODA, setting deliberate priorities in strategic partnerships with other ministries.

- (4) **Streamlining strategies:** The PD principles gave momentum to an ongoing process within ADC, geared to streamlining strategic and programming processes according to internationally agreed professional standards. This process was carried out by few professional staff members without much other political support than unspecific references to international targets; lacking orientation by a clear-cut strategy of the Austrian development policy; in an atmosphere of low common understanding of the principles by the large public, the government and the Parliament; and affected by the backdrop of the Austrian ODA ratio. The process was slow but resulted in some good achievements such as the two action plans 06-11 and 09-11, the new format of the country strategies and the precise data on the baseline for aid modalities.

The external evaluator highly recommends to BMeiA and ADA: continuing the streamlining process that has resulted in some good achievements so far such as the two action plans 06-11 and 09-11, the new format of the country strategies, and the baseline for aid modalities despite the presumable difficult financial situation.

- (5) **Simplifying procedures:** In ADC, solid management of development processes still has a difficult stand in a context of moral justification of development cooperation; highly ambitious, but rarely complementary strategies; institutional power games; heavy administrative burdens and half way solutions in problem solving.

The external evaluator recommends to BMeiA and ADA: creating transparency on strengths and shortcomings of the present ADC in a pragmatic approach, analysing the basic choices for the specific profiles in the concentration/fragmentation consequently, simplifying procedures, shifting more to a hands-on work style in the international development cooperation.

Specific Recommendation to BMeiA

- (6) **Interministerial task group:** The external evaluator recommends to BMeiA to mandate its division VII with establishing an interministerial working group at division level including representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Science and Research, Environment, ADA, and optionally others, with the objective of defining a step by step approach for restructuring Austrian ODA.

Tasks of the group should include:

1. Assessing options such as an amendment of the law on development cooperation, a redesign of the 3YP, a clarification of the thematic priorities, the bundling of existing strategic instruments, a redesign of ODA financing mechanisms, shifts in attribution of responsibilities among the Ministries,
2. Prioritizing the options
3. Listing the necessary measures for implementing options with the highest priorities
4. Setting a proposal for implementation including a time-frame
5. Informing the Ministries involved in the task group with parallel notes on the proposal.

The first step above should at least include the adjustment of the 3YP to the requirements of the PD, namely by:

- a) Formulating objectives and related results with quantitative indicators
- b) Making reference to objectives and results achieved in the prior programme period
- c) Making clear-cut reference to international agreements and Austrian commitments
- d) Distributing responsibilities for results among the involved Ministries

Specific Recommendation to BMeiA division VII

- (7) ***Focus on strategies:*** The external evaluator recommends to BMeiA division VII to concentrate on timely delivery of concise strategic guidelines that include clear-cut distribution of responsibilities, planned results, planned financial inputs and to reduce operational programming.

Specific Recommendation to ADA

- (8) ***Reduce and simplify strategies, concepts and programmes:*** The external evaluator recommends to ADA to reduce duplications of documents (e.g. company statute / company concept, working programme / sectoral working programme) and overlaps (e.g. 3YP - working programme); to reduce own policy considerations in all documents, but to refer to policy documents of Austrian or partner governments where necessary; and to include in all documents review-outlook comparisons and results backed by indicators.

Specific Recommendation to Austrian NGOs

- (9) ***Shift from appeal to alliances:*** The external evaluator recommends to NGOs to strengthen their domestic advocacy competences, to argue less in methodological or project implementation terms but more in political terms, and to forge stronger alliances in campaigns.

11 IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE TERM OF THE PARIS DECLARATION

ADC Operational Issues

The successful implementation of specific measures for reaching PD targets took far more time in Austria than anticipated by the signatory agencies of the PD. The baseline data for steering a shift in aid modalities are established for the year 2009. The first two country strategies in the new format have been published only recently in August and September 2010. Even under the assumption that ADC is able to speed up its activities in this direction, it is self-evident that the process can never be finished within the initial time frame. The baseline data has to be amended with target values, monitored and controlled over a series of years. The country strategy format has to be applied in the other priority countries.

The Position of ADC within ODA

The decision to phase out almost half of the coordination offices in a time span of two and a half years would have important operational consequences for any agency, even if working in stable strategic and institutional surroundings. The likely future strategic orientation to a vaguely delineated concept of regional cooperation will make the task even more difficult and the strategic management of ADA even more complicated: Is the support to one singular regional organisation sufficient for a regional approach? Who has ownership in the region and for what? To what procedures should Austrian ODA align? With whom can it be harmonised? Who are the partners for mutual accountability arrangements? Questions already arising due to this new orientation are: Is there not a need for significant institutional change if the cooperation with new priority regions is conceived from the very beginning as a whole-of-government approach? Which profile should ADA have in such a new aid environment where development cooperation is more integrated with trade and foreign policy? Would it be possible to concentrate ODA by drastically reducing the number of ODA recipient countries that do not reach the threshold of

country programmable aid (with a financial indicator of around € 1 million per year)? What are the consequences for the remaining few priority countries with distinct bilateral cooperation programmes ? It is highly recommendable to take the PD principles in consideration while responding to these and other upcoming questions.

ODA

The present high (and still growing) degree of fragmentation in Austrian ODA is not adequately recognised in Austrian development policy and strategies. This fact is undermining the credibility of Austrian ODA. Austria has to reduce the number of recipient countries of small Austrian ODA contributions in order to avoid further reputation damages. There is no need for specific provisions in the Austrian development policy; there is a need for strong leadership within the government as a first priority. The necessary concentration will have important consequences for ADC. An update of the Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness for the years 2012ff may be helpful for steering the process.

Development Policy

As argued earlier in this report, the Austrian political system has precisely defined informal moments for decision making on policy changes. The next one will probably be the government programme 2014-17. It might be useful to prepare Austrian development policy not only for a post PD period but much more so also for the next government programme.

12 ANNEXES

12.1 Terms of Reference

1. Background and Rationale: the overall Phase 2 Evaluation

The Paris Declaration expresses a broad international consensus developed in the 15 years that preceded 2005, stipulating that new partnership relationships and ways of working between developed countries and partner countries are essential if development results are to be assured, aid well spent and aid volumes maintained.

The Paris Declaration¹⁰ was endorsed at the 2nd High Level Forum held in Paris in 2005 by 52 donors/agencies and partner countries and 30 other actors in the development cooperation field (United Nations and other multilateral agencies and non-governmental organizations). The Declaration consists of 56 “Partnership Commitments”, and aims to strengthen “partnerships” between donor countries and countries receiving aid (partner countries) in order to make aid more effective and to maximize development results.

The requirement for monitoring and independent evaluations was built into the original Declaration and reinforced in the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008.¹¹ The first phase of the Evaluation¹² ran from March 2007 to September 2008 and aimed at providing information on the “HOWs and WHYs” of the early implementation process of the Paris Declaration, looking at inputs and early outputs. It was designed to deliver practical lessons and help take stock of implementation performance at the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra, Ghana in September 2008. Monitoring Surveys were carried out in 2005 and 2007, covering 34 and 55 countries respectively. Eleven Donor/Agency HQ studies were carried out as part of the Phase 1 evaluation and these contributed to “Deepen[ing] our understanding of the lessons emerging from the Paris Declaration Baseline Survey” as one of the key objectives.

The second phase of the Evaluation will run from the 3rd High Level Forum in 2008 up to the 4th High Level Forum in Korea in 2011. This second phase will emphasize outcomes and results and offer answers to the critical policy question of whether the intended long-term effects of the Paris Declaration are being achieved or advanced. The evaluation is expected to analyze results in context, taking into account preconditions or enabling conditions that may lead to or inhibit positive development results supported by aid.

The building blocks for the Phase 2 Evaluation are illustrated in the Figure below (see next page).

The Core Evaluation Team: The Core Evaluation Team has overall responsibility for the synthesis of evaluation results generated at Country and Donor/Agency HQ levels as well as any supplementary studies, and for preparation of the overall Evaluation Synthesis Report. The team, consisting of six international consultants as Core Evaluation Team members and a number of associated team members for specific tasks, was competitively recruited through the Evaluation Management Group.


The Core Evaluation Team contributes to the Phase 2 evaluation across all components at all stages: at planning and set-up; on an ongoing basis to ensure consistency and solve problems that may arise; and in the final stages when it will be expected to bring together all evaluation findings in a free-standing Synthesis Report. The Core Evaluation Team reports and is responsible to the Evaluation Management Group through the Evaluation Secretariat.

¹⁰ The full Declaration can be found at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf> and the Accra Agenda for Action at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/16/41202012.pdf>

¹¹ The Evaluations complement the monitoring of the implementation of the Paris Declaration, undertaken through the Cluster D of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Working Party on Aid Effectiveness “Assessing Progress on Implementing the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.”

¹² Wood, B; D. Kabell; F. Sagasti; N. Muwanga; Synthesis Report on the First Phase of the Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, Copenhagen, July 2008. The report can be found at: http://www.diiis.dk/graphics/Subweb/paris_evaluation_web/index.htm

Building blocks of the Paris Declaration Evaluation Synthesis



2. Donor/Agency HQ Studies: purpose and objectives

Purpose: The purpose of the Donor/Agency HQ Studies (hereafter “HQ Studies”), most of which have been conducted during Phase 1, has been to assess what constitute better practices for Donor/Agency headquarters in implementing their Paris Declaration commitments in order to contribute to increased aid effectiveness. The emphasis is on learning, by asking the twin questions: are we doing the right things and are we doing things right? The series of studies, 11 in Phase 1 and an anticipated 7 new studies in Phase 2, with the possible addition of some factual updating of changes since the earlier Phase 1 studies, will serve:

- To deepen our understanding of the findings and results emerging from Monitoring Survey inputs;
- To facilitate global learning on aid effectiveness through the evaluation processes and to facilitate more efficient implementation of the Paris Declaration;
- To make specific recommendations to development agencies and to the global aid community for improving aid effectiveness;
- To supplement and strengthen the basis for the main focus of the Phase 2 evaluation, a strong set of Country-level Evaluations.

Objectives: Specific objectives of the HQ Studies include:

- To enable donors/agencies to clarify, improve and strengthen policies and practice consistent with the Paris Declaration in pursuit of aid effectiveness and development effectiveness.
- To highlight barriers and difficulties that may have limited the implementation of the Paris Declaration and its effects and impacts – and ways that these barriers and difficulties may be overcome.
- To enable sharing and exchange of experience among stakeholders, countries and partnerships so as to facilitate reflection, lesson-learning and policy improvement.

The Accra Agenda for Action further specified some of the Paris Declaration’s commitments with the aim in particular of strengthening country ownership; building more inclusive partnerships; and sharpening the focus on development results. The Phase 2 evaluation will therefore pay particular attention to assessing implementation of these Accra commitments, which address the current concerns of many stakeholders. For all five principles a short description of status and explanatory factors for progress or constraints to implementation need to be analyzed. In this regard relevant measures from the Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness 2009-2011 need to be considered as well. Among all principles particular emphasis needs to be given to “ownership” and “results based management”

Five principles of the Paris Declaration:

Ownership: Developing countries exercise leadership over their development policies and plans. **Alignment:** Donors base their support on developing countries’ policies, strategies and systems. **Harmonization:** Donors coordi-

nate their activities and minimise the cost of delivering aid. *Managing for development results*: Developing countries and donors orient their activities to achieve the desired results. *Mutual accountability*: Donors and developing countries are accountable to each other for progress in managing aid better and in achieving development results.

3. Case Study Austria

During Phase 1 Austria has supported the Uganda country study and will also continue to assist the Uganda study for Phase 2.

In the analysis of the HQ study it clearly needs to be differentiated between the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in general and the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC). The latter consists of the interventions and support of the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs and the Austrian Development Agency. In this respect it is important to distinguish between the existing and rather fragmented aid structure which includes at least eight separate ministries as pointed out in the latest DAC Peer Review and the more “shapeable” development assistance by others i.e. ADC. In the evaluation ODA and ADC needs to be reviewed using the three dimensions of “commitment to the Declaration principles, capacity to implement it, and incentives to do so”.

4. Scope and Focus of the Evaluation

Since the endorsement of the Paris Declaration in March 2005, most agencies have made major efforts to implement the Paris Declaration within their organizations and communicate its importance to their staff. However, as the Evaluation of Phase 1 showed, these corporate commitments are not always matched by practices. Three explanatory dimensions – “enabling conditions” – that are key to shaping donor/agency behaviour were examined during Phase 1:

- a) Commitment to the Declaration principles,
- b) Capacity to implement it, and
- c) Incentives to do so.

These 3 dimensions continue to constitute the main focus and scope of the Donor/Agency HQ Studies in Phase 2.

While the focus on Phase 1 was on input, output and enabling conditions, the focus of the second phase of the evaluation is on development outcomes and effectiveness. These effects will, however, mainly be captured by the country evaluations. Therefore, as in the first phase, the focus of the HQ Studies conducted during the second phase will be on the input level, through the assessment of the enabling conditions: commitment, capacity and incentives in terms of their alignment to the Paris Declaration commitments. Some outputs will also be captured, inter alia, through assessing field office behaviour.

The three concepts are explained as follows:

Commitment and Leadership

Identified as key enabling factors in the Monitoring Survey and in Phase 1 of the evaluation, donor/agency commitment and leadership can be analyzed from several angles. A useful option used in some of the Phase 1 reports (see for example France¹³) is to address it at two levels, focusing on internal and external factors:

- Internal factors will depend on the specific agency context, but include for example impetus from the political level, strategic/policy influence, and operational implications.
- External factors include peer pressure, European Union (EU) Code of Conduct (for some), impetus or constraining factors from civil society, inter alia.

Capacities

The German report introduces the useful distinction between institutional and systemic capacity¹⁴. The former lends itself to classic organizational analysis (see also Finland’s report¹⁵), while the latter is based more on systems thinking and highlights the factors that support or constrain the implementation of the Paris Declaration Principles:

- Institutional capacity (such as information, knowledge, resources, training, procedures and guidance, institutional set-up including decentralization).

¹³ Evaluation de la mise en œuvre de la Déclaration de Paris par la France, Rapport Final – Version révisée

¹⁴ The Paris Declaration: Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Case Study of Germany, http://www.diiis.dk/graphics/Subweb/paris_evaluation_web/files/pdf/original/BMZ-Ev032e_print_0508.pdf, page 56

¹⁵ Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, the case of Finland, page 15

- Systemic capacity, i.e. factors that extend beyond the individual organization or organizations that are responsible for the donor country's aid programme (such as for example the status of an organization or the fact that a large number of agencies are involved).

Incentives and Disincentives

This dimension can be understood at different levels and a range of different analytical perspectives are used in the Phase 1 reports. Several reports (the Dutch, Danish and New Zealand reports, for example) address incentives at the level of individual staff and at agency level. These and the UK report all raise the strong linkage with the agency's performance management system and results culture. The New Zealand report also includes political incentives, at the level of government. As many countries are increasingly thinking of development assistance as a policy coherence issue, i.e. a "whole of government" concern, and in view of the evaluation's formative nature, more information and evidence on this dimension would be useful and consistent with the Country Evaluations' focus on aid context.

It is therefore proposed to address incentives at three levels:

- At individual level: career, agency's performance management system, professional satisfaction/personal commitment, peer pressure;
- At agency level: domestic political pressure, international peer pressure, performance/disbursement obligations, resources, visibility, culture;
- At level of government: political incentives and policy coherence.

5. Evaluation Questions

As mentioned above, the HQ Studies will focus on learning by asking the twin questions: 'are we doing the right things?' (Relevance of the choices agencies have made to deliver on the Paris Declaration commitments) and 'are we doing things right?' (effectiveness of the actions taken). The studies should in particular highlight examples of where potential obstacles to implementation of the Paris Declaration have been identified, how these have been overcome, and with what results (in terms of, for example, behaviour, "transaction costs", aid modalities, division of labour etc.). While these outputs and outcomes will also be captured in country studies, it is envisaged that at a minimum, outputs will also be addressed through questions and evidence from the field level in the HQ Studies.

Given the above, the questions outlined below shall be taken as explorative starting points for the assessments. The Donor HQ Study Matrix (operational matrix) developed by the International Management Group further divides the evaluation questions. It is expected that this matrix will be applied.

Contextual factors

For the final report contextual factors need to be considered. In this respect it is proposed that the studies draw, on annual reports, the latest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review, the Monitoring Surveys, the ADA evaluation and other reports to provide basic factual information on the following:

- Staff
- Budget
- Geographic spread of programme
- Multi/bilateral share, share provided to vertical funds, and aid modalities (project, programme, budget support, TA etc.)

Furthermore, it is proposed that the organizational structure be described, including the degree of de/centralization and the performance management system, along with existing Action Plans or policies and guidelines that are Paris Declaration related.

Specific analysis should be made on policy coherence. This should answer the following key questions:

- What is the range and sphere of direct influence of the Paris Declaration on government policies with implications for developing countries? (Aid and other policies such as policies affecting trade, climate change, global food security, environment, migration, security etc.) What have been the trends since 2005?
- Who are the key actors in the donor country (or constituency for multilateral agencies) who can take major decisions affecting aid, including decisions on priorities, activities, programmes and projects? What influence do the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action commitments have on them, in relation to their priorities and incentives?
- What are the most important national and international events that have affected the implementation of the Paris Declaration and Accra priorities, and how?

Assessing commitment and leadership

- Has the implementation of the Paris Declaration affected donor/agency priority-setting for development cooperation? Have the roles of Donor/Agency HQ/field offices been adapted to the aid effectiveness agenda? How or if not, why not?
- How is the Paris Declaration owned at Donor/Agency HQ level (e.g. what strategic directions are given to staff by top management)? How is the Paris Declaration acknowledged at the governing body/parliamentary level and by civil society? What are the potential conflicts with other governmental institutions and political/ administrative systems, and what is being done to resolve these?
- Are donor/agencies content that they are fulfilling their Paris Declaration commitments, including implementation of the DAC Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States? (Explain possible concerns and reasons for these.) Are there concerns linked to the relevance and coherence of the Paris Declaration commitments and indicators? Are there ways in which these might be overcome?

Assessing capacity

- What is the level of staff knowledge and understanding about aid effectiveness and its operational implications, particularly in the field?
- Have specific instructions, guidelines, operational directives and evaluation criteria been disseminated to staff to stimulate implementation of the Paris Declaration implementation plan? Are the levels and skills of staff available to implement appropriate and adequate?
- How is delegated authority structured, and why? Have there been any changes to procedures to meet Paris Declaration commitments? Is the development cooperation organization/agency sufficiently decentralized (staff, resources, delegation of authority) to address field-based aid management in line with the Paris Declaration?

Assessing incentives

- Are there specific incentives provided by the donor/agency – e.g. for recruitment, placement, performance assessment, promotion and training – for management and staff to comply with the Paris Declaration objectives of ownership, harmonization, alignment, results orientation and mutual accountability?
- Are there any perceived disincentives, in respect of other donor/agency priorities (e.g. excessive pressures for disbursement)?

Additional evaluation questions

The above were mostly questions included in the Phase 1 of the Evaluation. However, lessons from Phase 1, the commitments emphasized at Accra, as well as the country level evaluations and overarching evaluation framework for Phase 2, all call for some additional evaluation questions. In particular, the Country Evaluations ask questions that can be “mirrored” on the donor/agency side, so as to enhance the depth of the Phase 2 evaluation as evidence is provided from both levels. In order to be consistent with country level methodology, it is proposed to examine a number of intended outcomes identified in the Paris Declaration. Seven of the 11 intended outcomes relate specifically to donor/agency actions and the following questions are proposed:

- Has the Paris Declaration resulted in less duplication of efforts and rationalized, more cost effective donor/agency activities? It would in particular be relevant to look at Division of Labour and at the Monitoring Survey indicators 4, 9 and 10.
- Can more collaborative donor/agency behaviour and reformed and simplified policies and procedures be observed? Examples of delegated cooperation are highly relevant.
- To what extent has the donor/agency provided more predictable and multi-year commitments on aid flows? Has there been a change in the nature of conditionalities following Accra? Monitoring Survey indicator 7 provides some information.
- Is the level of delegation to field staff adequate to ensure effective aid administration? What prevents further delegation?
- What effects has the implementation of the Declaration had on the respective burdens of aid management falling on partner countries and donors/agencies, relative to the changing volumes and quality of aid and of the aid partnership itself? Are these effects likely to be transitional or long term?

There are also issues, highlighted under Phase 1, where a deepening of understanding is called for. Three such issues are:

- What is the main problem facing donors/agencies in fulfilling the Paris Declaration commitment to Managing for Development Results?

- What arrangements or mechanisms for Mutual Accountability have been in place and how well are they working? (See Phase 1 Synthesis Report for orientation.)
- What explains the lack of use of country systems even where these are considered relatively strong?

6. Approach and Methods

The evaluation work will include:

- An analysis of documents (DAC Peer Review, ADA evaluation, Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness, Monitoring Surveys, policy reports, annual plans, etc. see list of references)
- Semi-structured interviews with key respondents at the Federal Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and the Austrian Development Agency
- Semi-structured interviews with respondents of a selection of Austrian non-governmental organizations and other key stakeholders (politicians, other entities of the Austrian government system).

Altogether it is currently expected that at least 30 interviews will take place.

- A user-friendly questionnaire survey is suggested focusing on how instructions, guidelines etc. related to the Paris Declaration were put into practice by the 14 Coordination Offices. Possible telephone interviews could be considered, if additional information is required.
- Since the Paris Declaration Country Study of Uganda is also supported by Austria it is also expected that additional discussions (email, phone) may be required with the Coordination Office in Uganda, relating to the "mirror questions".
- Utilization of the Donor HQ Study Matrix (operational matrix) developed by the International Management Group.

Important is the verification of evidence emerging through ongoing triangulation between the multiple data sources and methods employed.

It is important to note that that the recommendations made in this report are expected to be concrete, realistic and feasible and are addressed to the right stakeholders.

7. Organisation of the Evaluation

The evaluation will be carried out by one or two external consultants contracted by the Evaluation Unit of the Austrian Development Agency. The Head of the Evaluation Unit, Karin Kohlweg, acts as Evaluation Coordinator and will be responsible for managing the evaluation process. She will also be the focal point for the international Evaluation Management Group.

In order to support the evaluation a reference group will be established to provide feed-back to the products of the evaluation. The reference group will be chaired by the Federal Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs and the Evaluation Unit of the Austrian Development Agency.

8. Conduct of Work and Time Schedule

The evaluation will be conducted from June 2010 until November 2010 and consists of three phases:

Inception

The generic ToR for donor agency was discussed in early 2010. After the consultant was selected the final draft ToR will be shared and documents provided. An introduction for the evaluator will be organized in Vienna, first discussions and interviews will take place in June 2010.

After these first discussions, interviews and review of documents the inception report need to be submitted by mail to the Evaluation Coordinator in July 2010. The inception report is expected to include:

- A contextualized evaluation approach based on the outlined evaluation questions of the present ToR also considering the Donor HQ Study Matrix (operational matrix)
- A first analysis of the relevant documents
- An overview of the data collection methods and draft instruments (interview guide, survey questionnaire for co-ordination offices)
- A detailed work plan and methodology.

The Evaluation Reference Group and the international Evaluation Management Group will be invited to comment on the draft inception report.

Data collection, analysis and reporting

Data collection and interviews in Vienna as well as a questionnaire survey for the 16 co-ordination offices will be conducted in summer and autumn 2010, followed by analysis and reporting. The evaluation report needs to adhere to the evaluation report outline, see annex 1. The evaluation report should be of 50 pages including the executive summary (excluding annexes). The draft final report needs to be submitted to the Evaluation Coordinator by 15th of October 2010 and will also be submitted to the international Evaluation Management Group.

The Evaluation Unit will solicit comments on the draft evaluation report from concerned people, the reference group and the international Evaluation Management Group. The draft report will also be presented by the consultant in Vienna early November 2010.

Dissemination and follow-up

The evaluation findings and possible recommendations will be discussed at development partner headquarters level before being finalised. The final report will be submitted to the international Management Group by 15th of November 2010.

During the assignment the consultant is expected to travel to Vienna at least three times.

Time schedule for the evaluation:

Timing	Activity
February/March	Preparation and discussions of ToR
February/March	Selection of consultant
June	First discussions, interviews, review of documents
July	Submission of inception report to the Evaluation Coordinator. Evaluation Coordinator submits inception report to the reference group and the international Evaluation Management Group
August/September	Further document review, data collection, interviews
15 th of October	Submission of the draft final report to the Evaluation Coordinator. Evaluation Coordinator submits report to the reference group and the international Evaluation Management Group
October	Review of draft final report by reference group
First week of November	Presentation of draft final report in Vienna
November	Further consolidation of comments, if necessary, by Evaluation Coordinator
15 th of November	Submission of final report to the international Evaluation Management Group.

9. Qualifications of the Consultant (Team leader)

- At least ten years of experience in development cooperation in general.
- Excellent knowledge of the aid effectiveness agenda/Paris Declaration (supported by details, i.e. reference list).
- At least five years of experience conducting studies, reviews and/or evaluations.
- Experience of having conducted a comparative study, review or evaluation.
- Experience as team leader in studies, reviews and evaluations

The evaluation can be carried out by one or two external consultants. In case two people are engaged it is expected that one senior person will act as team leader and a more junior person as assistant.

Appendix: Draft Outline for Donor/Agency HQ Studies Reports

No outline was proposed during Phase 1, but it has proven useful to encourage a certain standardization to ensure full coverage of key evaluation questions and facilitate the synthesizing of findings. This outline is proposed as a "minimum" list of what the report should ideally contain.

Preface

Acknowledgement

Acronyms

Executive Summary (Max. 5 pp.)

- Purpose and background
- Overall conclusions (on common and country-specific questions)
- Key lessons (on common and country-specific questions)
- Key recommendations if applicable (on common and country-specific questions)

A. Introduction (Max. 4 pp.)

- The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action: Engagement of Donor/Agency X
- Purpose and scope of the Phase 2 Evaluation, including donor/agency specific questions
- Approach, methodology and limitations

B. Methodology and Limitations (Max. 2 pp.)

- Case study methodology
- Field level assessments

C. Donor/Agency HQ Findings (Max. 25 pp.)

Contextual factors

- Staff
- Budget
- Geographic spread of programme
- Multi/bilateral share, share provided to vertical funds, and aid modalities (project, programme, budget support, technical assistance etc.)
- Organizational structure, including decentralization
- Policy coherence

Overall assessment

Short description of status and explanatory factors for progress or constraints to implementation of each of the principles (considering also relevant measures of the Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness):

- Ownership
- Alignment
- Harmonization
- Managing for Development Results
- Mutual Accountability

Assessing Commitment

- Internal factors (political level, strategic level, operational level, monitoring and evaluation)
- External factors (peer pressure, EU Code of Conduct (for some), civil society)

Assessing Capacities

- Institutional capacity (such as information, knowledge, resources, training, procedures and guidance, institutional set-up including decentralization)
- Systemic capacity, i.e. factors that extend beyond the individual organization or organizations that are responsible for the donor country's aid programme (such as for example the status of an organization or the fact that a large number of agencies are involved)

Assessing Incentives and Disincentives

- For individuals (career, professional satisfaction, personal commitment, peer pressure)
- At agency level (domestic political pressure, international peer pressure, performance/disbursement obligations, resources, visibility)
- At level of government (policy coherence)

- D. Key Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations** regarding the Generic (New Additional) Evaluation questions (Breaking out conclusions, lessons and recommendations) (Max. 5 pp.)
- E. Possible Key Implications beyond the Planned Term of the Paris Declaration. (Max. 3 pp.)**

12.2 Evaluation Matrix

Assumptions	Questions	Indicators	Sources of information
<p>Basic Assumption: Austria can improve the coherence of its development cooperation policy with other policy fields relevant for Austria's relations to developing countries, management and delivery of aid by working in a way that is consistent with Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.</p>			
<p>1. Contextual Factors</p>			
<p>In its political practice, Austria is missing so far a politically-endorsed medium-term development policy, strong political support for development cooperation and adequate instruments for inter-institutional collaboration among ODA involved Government bodies.</p>	<p>What are the key characteristics of Official Austrian Development Assistance (ODA) in general and Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC)?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organisational structure - Staff - Budget - Geographic spread of programmes - Operational programme shares: Bi/multi, vertical funds, Core contributions/programmable aid, aid modalities (project, programme, budget support, TA, etc) - PD / AAA Indicators - European Consensus [2006/C46/01] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Three-Years Programmes - ADA Company Concept 2010 - ADC Annual Reports - ADA-Annual Reports - ADA Evaluation Report - MoF Reports - DAC/OECD Peer Review 2009 - PD Monitor Survey - ODA / ADC Statistics - Interview with Parliamentarian Speakers for Foreign Affairs - Interview with Advisory Board on Development Policy of BMeiA
	<p>What are the key characteristics of ODA and ADC that have been most relevant to the implementation of the PD?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Principles and practices for aid programming and evolution of aid modalities - Attribution of responsibilities and competencies with the Austrian Government - Decision making system - Performance management system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews in BMeiA, MoF and other relevant Ministries - Interview with ADA supervisory Board - Round Table with NGOs - Electronic survey in Coofs and Embassies
	<p>Are the involved Austrian actors coherent in their view on and approach to the PD?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategies and action plans of the involved ministries, ADA and NGOs - Consultation procedure - Mechanisms for resolving incoher- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews with BMeiA, MoF and other relevant Ministries - Interviews with members of the ADA supervisory Board

Assumptions	Questions	Indicators	Sources of information
		ences	- Round Table with NGOs
	What is the range and sphere of direct influence of the PD on government policies with implications for developing countries?	- Volume of aid compared to other financial flows in trade, climate change, environment, migration, security, etc - Influences of these financial flows on aid allocation and aid predictability	- Statistics on Austrian Foreign Relations - Interview with ÖFSE - Interview with ADA Statistic Unit
	Who are the key actors in Austria who can take majors decisions on priorities, activities, programmes and projects of ODA / ADC?	- Ownership for PD / AAA in Austria - Domestic accountability - Reporting	- Interview with BMeiA Division VII - Interview with ADA
	What are the most important national and international events that have affected the implementation of the PD and AAA?	- List of events	- Interview with ADA communication unit
	To what extent and where have the PD principles been implemented?	- Progress/constraints for the implementation of each of the 5 principles	- Annual Reports ADC, ADA, MoF - Electronic survey in Coofs
2. Commitment and Leadership			
So far Austria's political commitment to the principles of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action did hardly lead to changes in development cooperation policy making, governance and delivery mechanisms. There is room for improving effectiveness and predictability of Austrian ODA and ADC.	Has the implementation of the PD Declaration affected Austrian priority-setting for development cooperation? Have the roles of the involved actors at HQ/field offices been adapted to the aid effectiveness agenda? How or if not, why not?	- Changes in priorities - Changes in staff profiles at country level - Changes in decision making capacities	- 3yProgrammes 05-07, 07-09, 09-11 - ADA programmes 06, 08, 10 - Country programmes (actual and 2 nd last versions) - Action Plan on Aid Efficiency 06-11 - Austrian AAA Action Plan 09-1 - Respective reporting
	How is the PD owned in Vienna? How is the PD acknowledged at the government/parliamentary level and by civil society? What are the potential conflicts with other governmental institutions and political/ administrative systems, and what is being done to resolve these?	- High level statements, parliamentary statements - Guidelines and policies explicitly referring to PD - Coherence /incoherencies analysis - Civil society related strategies/policies	- Interviews with Parliamentarian Speakers for Foreign Affairs - Interview with Advisory Board on Development Policy of BMeiA - Interview with ADA supervisory Board - Interviews with Representatives of Private industries

Assumptions	Questions	Indicators	Sources of information
			- Round Table with NGOs
	Are BMeiA, MoF and ADA content that they are fulfilling their PD commitments, including implementation of the DAC Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States? Are there concerns linked to the relevance and coherence of the PD commitments and indicators? Are there ways in which these might be overcome?	- Concerns and reasons	- Interview with BMeiA Division VII - Interview with MoF - Interview with ADA
3. Capacity			
Austria has remarkable capacities to deliver innovative solutions in small units and in specific working contexts, but these efforts fall short of being extended to system-wide operational plans, to systematic mutual learning on potentials and risks. There is room for more delegation of competencies, for redefining working relations and for improving collaboration and exchange among the main actors.	What is the level of staff knowledge and understanding about aid effectiveness and its operational implications, particularly in the field?	- Self-perception and perception of the other actors	- Electronic survey in Coofs and Embassies - Triangulation of electronic survey and interviews
	Have specific instructions, guidelines, operational directives and evaluation criteria been disseminated to staff to stimulate implementation of the Paris Declaration implementation plan? Are the levels and skills of staff available to implement appropriate and adequate?	- PD relevant changes in the set of guidelines, rules and regulations, sectorial strategies	- Interviews with ADA desks
	How much competencies are delegated to Embassies/Coordination Offices? Have there been any changes to procedures to meet PD commitments? Is the Austrian development cooperation sufficiently decentralized to address field-based aid management in line with the PD? Is the level of delegation to field staff adequate to ensure effective aid administration? What prevents further delegation?	- Changes in institutional set-up - Information, resources, training, procedures and guidance in HQ - Delegation of authority at Embassies, Coofs - Number, diversity of technical staff at field level - Share of aid committed ad decentralized level	- Electronic survey in Coofs and Embassies - Interviews with BMeiA, MoF and ADA
4. Incentives /Disincentives			
Incentives play a limited role in the Aus-	Are there specific incentives provided by	- Recruitment and placement proce-	- Guidelines on competencies of Coofs

Assumptions	Questions	Indicators	Sources of information
trian ODA /ADC. On the other hand, some administrative features of the Austrian aid system act as disincentives on its actors.	the donor/agency for management and staff to comply with the 5 PD principles?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - dures - Career perspectives - Professional satisfaction - performance assessment methods - promotion and training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with ADA Human Resource Management Unit - Interview with ADA Staff Representative - Electronic survey in Coofs and Embassies
	Are there any perceived disincentives, in respect of other donor/agency priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - uncertainty about budgets - pressures for disbursement - policy incoherencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Electronic survey in Coofs and Embassies - Interview with ADA Staff Representative
5. Implementation issues			
In the last 5 years, ADC prepared the ground for better implementation of the PD principles and improved its overall performance against the PD indicators. This is however scope for expanding those efforts to the whole system of the Austrian ODA.	Has the PD resulted in less duplication of efforts and rationalized, more cost effective donor/agency activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Division of Labour - Monitoring Survey indicators 4, 9 and 10 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Electronic survey in Coofs and Embassies - Interview with ADA Staff Representative
	Can more collaborative behaviour and reformed and simplified policies and procedures be observed in Austrian ODA / ADC?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Examples of simplified policies /procedures - Examples of delegated cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2008 OECD Monitoring survey report - Interview with ADA Staff Representative
	To what extent has Austria provided more predictable and multi-year commitments on aid flows? Has there been a change in the nature of conditionalities following the AAA?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Monitoring Survey indicator 7 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2008 OECD Monitoring survey report - 2010 Budget Support Evaluation
	What effects has the implementation of the PD had on the respective burdens of aid management falling on partner countries and Austria, relative to the changing volumes and quality of aid and of the aid partnership itself? Are these effects likely to be transitional or long term?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Austrian participation in aid coordination - Reallocations of resources as a result of changes to align to partner countries - No of diagnostic reviews of country systems, joint and Austrian alone 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Electronic survey in Coofs and Embassies - Interview with ADA evaluation unit
	What is the main problem Austria is facing in fulfilling the PD commitment to	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proportion of Austrian programmes and country strategies which specify 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Electronic survey in Coofs and Embassies

Assumptions	Questions	Indicators	Sources of information
	Managing for Development Results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> links between expenditure and results - Proportion of Austrian result frameworks which reflect national results areas - Joint initiatives for capacity development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interview with ADA evaluation unit
	What arrangements or mechanisms for Mutual Accountability have been in place and how well are they working?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recognized platforms for mutual accountability - Reviews by Parliament of ODA/ADC policies, strategies, budgets and performance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews with Parliamentary Speakers for Foreign Affairs - Interview with Advisory Board on Development Policy of BMeiA - Interview with ADA supervisory Board - Interviews with Representatives of Private industries - Round Table with NGOs
	What explains the lack of use of country systems even where these are considered relatively strong?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Diagnostic reviews on country systems - Rationale for existing/ new PIUs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Electronic survey in Coofs and Embassies - Interview with ADA evaluation unit - Interview with ADA Finance, Accounting and Audit Division

12.3 List of people interviewed

<u>BMeiA</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. OR Mag. Michaela Ellmeier, EU Fragen Referat VII. 1a, 2. Ges. Mag. Marianne Feldmann, Abteilungsleiterin Sektion VII.4, Entwicklungs- und Ostzusammenarbeit; Koordination in Österreich (FGD); 3. Mag. Ursula Heinrich, Referat VII.4a Informations- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit bezüglich EZA; NRO; Statistik, (FGD); 4. OR. Dr. Ursula Werther-Pietsch, Kohärenz, Beirat für Entwicklungspolitik, (FGD), 5. MR DI Hannes Hauser, Abteilungsleiter Sektion VII.5, Planungs- und Programmangelegenheiten der EZA 6. Botschafter G. Lennkh, ehemaliger Leiter der Abt VII, derzeit Afrika Beauftragter des BMEIA, in Vertretung des Leiters der Afrika-Abteilung, Abteilung II, 7. Dr. Bernhard Zimburg, Leiter der Asien Abteilung, Sektion II, politische Sektion 8. Mag. Anton Mair, Stellvertreter der Sektion VII; 9. Mag. Klaus Steiner, Referat VII.2a; Qualitätssicherung und Evaluierungsangelegenheiten 10. Dr. Claudia Reinprecht, Kabinett des Bundesministers 11. Dr. Anita Weiss-Gänger, Sektion VII, OECD/DAC Delegierte
<u>BMF</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 12. Mag. Thomas Wieser, Sektion III, Wirtschaftspolitik und Finanzmärkte, Sektionschef und Mitglied des Beirats für Entwicklungspolitik 13. MR Dr. Ingrid Ehrenböck-Bär, Abteilung II/6, auch ADA Aufsichtsratsmitglied 14. Dr. Günther Schönleitner, Leiter der Abteilung III/3, internationale Finanzinstitutionen, 15. Mag. Johann Kinast, Abteilung Ausfuhrförderung, Ausfuhrgarantien, Umschuldungen, Silvia Maca, Head of Department Export Financing and International Export Promotion Policy 16. Finanzstaatssekretär Dr. Reinhold Lopatka, und Mag. Sven Pöllauer (Sekretariat des Staatssekretärs)
<u>BMWF</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 17. Mag. Stephan Neuhäuser, Leiter des Referates II/6c Kooperation mit außereuropäischen Ländern
<u>BMUKK</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 18. Mag. Jürgen Schick, Abteilung IA/2 (I/10), Internationale bilaterale Angelegenheiten – Bildung,
<u>BMLV</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 19. Generalmajor Johann Pucher, Defence Policy Director; Günter Barnet, Coordinator of the National Security Council
<u>BMLFUV</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 20. Mag. Elfriede-Anna More, Abteilungsleiterin V/9, Internationale Umweltangelegenheiten, auch ADA Aufsichtsratsmitglied, und Mag. Haufler
<u>BMWA</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 21. Mag. Josef Mayer, Leiter des Centers Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Europäische Integration, auch ADA Aufsichtsratsmitglied, Stellvertreter d. Vorsitzenden, und Mag. Irene Janisch, Head of Division EU-Coordination , Foreign Trade Policy and European Integration
<u>ADA</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 22. Mag. Brigitte Öppinger-Walchshofer, Geschäftsführerin, Mitglied des Beirats für Entwicklungspolitik 23. Mag. Robert Zeiner, Abteilungsleiter Programme und Projekte 24. Mag. Ursula Steller, Referatsleiterin Länder und Regionen 25. Mag. Margit Scherb, Referatsleiterin Qualitätssicherung & Wissensmanagement 26. DI Johanna Mang, Referatsleiterin NRO-Kooperation & Humanitäre Hilfe 27. Mag. Hans Jörg Hummer Leiter Wirtschaftspartnerschaften 28. Mag. Heidi Liedler-Frank, Stabsstellenleiterin Information und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit 29. Dr. Mag. Helmuth Hartmeyer, Abteilungsleiter Entwicklungspolitische Kommunikation & Bildung

	<p>30. Mag. Norbert Simon, Abteilungsleiter Finanz- Rechnungs- und Kontrollwesen</p> <p>31. Hedwig Riegler, Referatsleiterin Statistik</p> <p>32. Dr. Rudolf Holzer, Abteilungsleiter Allgemeine Verwaltung</p> <p>33. DI Günter Engelits, Betriebsrat, ADA Aufsichtsrat, Desk Ostafrika</p>
<u>ÖEB</u>	<p>34. Mag. Andrea Hagmann (Member of the Executive Board), Mag. Michael Wancata (Member of the Executive Board) , Mag. Kristin Duchâteau (Head of Department Advisory Programmes)</p>
<u>NROs</u>	<p>35. Roundtable</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mag. Petra Ossberger Globale Verantwortung, - Barbara Reiterer, CARITAS, Projektreferentin, - Johannes Trimmel, Licht für die Welt, Advocacy/Liaison Officer, - Thomas Vogel, Horizont 3000, Bereichsleiter Projekte und Programme
<u>Andere</u>	<p>36. Petra Bayr, Vorsitzende des entwicklungspolitischen Unterausschuss im Parlament</p> <p>37. Univ.-Prof. Dr., Ulrich Brand Professor für Internationale Politik, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien</p> <p>38. HR Dr. Gottfried Krasa, Amt d. NÖ Landesregierung, Abt. Umweltrecht, auch ADA Aufsichtsratsmitglied</p> <p>39. Univ. Prof. Dr. Martin Jäggle, Professur für Religionspädagogik und Katechetik an der Katholisch-Theologischen Fakultät, Mitglied des Beirats für Entwicklungspolitik</p> <p>40. Dr. Andreas Obrecht, Kommission für Entwicklungsfragen, Leiter, verantwortlich für den Aufbau eines Schwerpunktbereiches "Bildung & Forschung für Internationale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Österreichischem Austauschdienst/Austrian Agency for International Cooperation in Education and Research</p> <p>41. Dr. Michael Obrovsky, Österreichische Forschungsstiftung für Internationale Entwicklung (ÖFSE), Referent für Österreichische EZA und Entwicklungspolitik</p> <p>42. Dr. Walter Schicho, Universität Wien, Institut für Afrikawissenschaften, Mitglied der Kommission für Entwicklungsfragen (OEAD), Mitglied des Beirats für Entwicklungspolitik, Obfrau Stellvertreter des Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik</p>
<u>Private Sector</u>	<p>43. Jürgen Grandits, BFI Burgenland, Vice Managing Director</p> <p>44. Magdalena Stranner, Max Havelaar Foundation, Director, Step Label</p> <p>45. Otmar Schneider, Texport GmbH, Managing Director</p>

12.4 Electronic survey in the Coofs

Questionnaire

Procedure	<p>Electronic questionnaire with 37 standardised regarding individual situation, the focus areas of the evaluation as well as an overall assessment and 2 open questions for a good practice and a missed chance.</p> <p>In the Evaluation Report the Answers will be made anonymous</p>
Interviewees	12 Representatives of Austrian Coordination Offices (Heads or Deputies)

Please mark for each of the standardised questions the column, which corresponds best to your assessment of the respective statement:

- ☺☺ I agree very much with the statement
- ☺ I agree with the statement
- ☹ I do not know / I do not have an opinion
- ☹☹ I do not agree with the statement
- ☹☹☹ I do not agree at all with the statement

A	Your individual situation	😊😊	😊	😐	😞	😞😞
1	I am familiar with the principles of the Paris Declaration (PD) and The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA).					
2	The documents I am receiving make regularly references to PD /AAA.					
3	In the documents I am writing I regularly make references to PD /AAA.					
4	I adapted my working routines (PCM, reporting, controlling, etc) to the PD/ AAA principles.					
5	I observe in my professional context in the Partner Country, that working routines (PCM, reporting, controlling, etc) are continuously adapted to the PD/ AAA principles.					
6	I observe in my Austrian professional context, that working routines are continuously adapted to the PD/ AAA principles.					
7	I notice that my professional interlocutors try hard to implement the PD /AAA.					
9	The implementation of the PD / AAA principles in the international development cooperation is improving my career perspectives.					
10	I am convinced that the PD / AAA principles are useful for improving aid effectiveness.					
B	Commitment	😊😊	😊	😐	😞	😞😞
10	The commitment of the Austrian Government to the PD /AAA principles is clear and consistent.					
11	The Austrian Government is exercising effective leadership in reorienting Austrian ODA towards the PD / AAA principles.					
12	The Austrian Government is providing clear and consistent guidance for restructuring the collaboration among Public Administration, Private Sector and NGO's in order to improve aid effectiveness.					
13	The Austrian Government is providing clear and consistent guidance for restructuring the division of labour in the relations with recipient countries between the different Ministries involved in ODA.					
14	The Austrian PD Implementation Plan on Aid Effectiveness 2006-11 and the AAA Austrian Action and Implementation Plan 2009-11 are likely to improve the performance of Austrian ODA against the PD /AAA indicators.					
15	The Austrian PD Implementation Plan on Aid Effectiveness 2006-11 and the AAA Austrian Action and Implementation Plan 2009-11 are likely to improve the performance of Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC = Activities of BMeiA and ADA) against the PD /AAA indicators.					
16	BMeiA is exercising effective leadership in reorienting Austrian ADC towards the PD / AAA principles.					
17	BMeiA is exercising effective leadership in coordinating Austrian ODA on the basis of the PD / AAA principles.					
C	Capacities	😊😊	😊	😐	😞	😞😞
18	Analyses of shortcomings in the Austrian capacities to implement the PD / AAA principles and of potentials to build them up are available.					
19	The Austrian Government makes noticeable efforts for building up /strengthening capacities needed for the implementation of the Austrian PD / AAA action plans.					
20	Coordination offices and Diplomatic missions are provided with necessary competencies to implement PD /AAA principles effectively.					
21	Coordination offices and Diplomatic missions are provided with necessary competencies to implement PD /AAA principles effectively.					
22	Training and support for implementing PD /AAA principles is available.					
D	Incentives	😊😊	😊	😐	😞	😞😞
23	Analyses of factors acting as disincentives for implementing the PD / AAA princi-					

	ples (policies, structures, procedures, career plans, finances, etc.) and proposals how to solve those problems are available.					
24	The Austrian Government created incentives to encourage the involved Ministries and Agencies to implement the PD / AAA principles.					
25	BMeiA/ADA created incentive mechanisms to encourage the Coordination offices to implement the PD / AAA principles.					
26	Staff members in Ministries and Agencies are provided with incentives to implement PD / AAA principles.					
27	Staff members in Ministries and Agencies are aware of the disincentives hampering them to implement PD / AAA principles.					
28	The implementation of PD /AAA principles will reduce Austrian domestic administrative expenditures for Aid.					
E	Implementation Issues	☺☺	☺	☹	☹☹	☹☹
29	The implementation of PD /AAA principles since 2005 improved the aid effectiveness of Austrian ODA in the partner country (countries) I am working with.					
30	The implementation of PD /AAA principles since 2005 improved the efficiency and cost effectiveness of Austrian ODA in the partner country (countries) I am working with.					
31	The implementation of PD /AAA principles since 2005 simplified the cooperation procedures with the partner country (countries) I am working with.					
32	Proportion of Austrian programmes in the partner country (countries) specifying links between expenditures and results: ☺☺ 80-100% / ☺ 60-79% / ☹ 40 -59% / ☹ 20 -39% / ☹☹ 0-19%					
33	Proportion of Austrian programmes in the partner country (countries), whose result frameworks reflect national result areas: ☺☺ 80-100% / ☺ 60-79% / ☹ 40 -59% / ☹ 20 -39% / ☹☹ 0-19%					
34	Proportion of joint (Austrian, Government, other Donors) initiatives for capacity development within overall Austrian capacity development in the partner country (countries): ☺☺ 80-100% / ☺ 60-79% / ☹ 40 -59% / ☹ 20 -39% / ☹☹ 0-19%					
35	Proportion of reviews and evaluations of programmes and strategies using country systems (data, expertise, procedures) within all Austrian evaluations in the partner country ☺☺ 80-100% / ☺ 60-79% / ☹ 40 -59% / ☹ 20 -39% / ☹☹ 0-19%					
F	Overall assessment	☺☺	☺	☹	☹☹	☹☹
36	How do you rate Austrian Development Cooperation in the country you are working on implementation of the five PD principles (in terms of aid effectiveness)?					
	- Ownership					
	- Alignment					
	- Harmonization					
	- Managing for Results					
	- Mutual Accountability					
37	How do you rate Austrian Official Development ODA in the country you are working on implementation of the five PD principles (in terms of aid effectiveness)?					
	- Ownership					
	- Alignment					
	- Harmonization					
	- Managing for Results					
	- Mutual Accountability					
G Examples						

	Please sketch from your experience two examples for the implementation of PD / AAA principles by Austria, one for a good practice, another for a missed chance (max ½ p each):
38	Good practice for the implementation of PD / AAA principles by Austria:
29	Missed chance to implement of PD / AAA principles:
H	Comments

Table x: Results of the coordination offices survey

<i>n =12 (questions 32-35: 10)</i>	😊😊	😊	😐	😞	😞😞	Total	Avg.
1. Personal Familiarity	9	3				57	4.8
2. Doc in References	2	9	1			49	4.1
3. Doc out References	4	8				52	4.3
4. Personal Routines	3	9				51	4.3
5. Partner Routines	1	3	4	4		37	3.1
6. Austrian Routines	1	8	1	2		44	3.7
7. Professional Interlocutors		4	3	5		35	2.9
8. Career perspectives			8	4		32	2.7
9. Aid effectiveness	4	6		2		48	4.0
10. Austrian commitment	1	4	3	4		38	3.2
11. Austrian leadership	1	4	4	2	1	38	3.2
12. Guidance for PPP		4	4	3	1	35	2.9
13. Guidance for DoL		5	2	3	2	34	2.8
14. ODA Performance	1	4	6	1		41	3.4
15. ADC Performance	1	9	1	1		46	3.8
16. BMeiA leadership in ADC		5	3	4		37	3.1
17. BMeiA leadership in ODA		2	4	4	2	30	2.5
18. Analysis of Shortcomings		1	5	6		31	2.6
19. Capacity Building			7	4	1	30	2.5
20. Competencies of Coofs	1	2	4	4	1	34	2.8
22. Training and support	1	3	3	5		36	3.0
23. Analysis of disincentives		1	3	6	2	27	2.3
24. Government incentives		1	4	5	2	28	2.3
25. BMeiA incentives		5		5	2	32	2.7
26. Staff members incentives		1	5	4	2	29	2.4
27. Awareness of disincentives	1	1	8	2		37	3.1
28. Reduce admin. Expend,	1	3	5	2	1	37	3.1
29. ODA improved effectiveness	1	7	4			45	3.8
30. ODA improved efficiency		5	7			41	3.4
31. Procedures Simplified		3	2	7		32	2.7
32. Links Expenditures – Results	3	2		3	2	31	3.1
33. Reflecting national results	3	2	4	1		37	3.7
34. Joint initiatives capacity development	1	1	5	3		30	3.0
35. Reviews using country systems	3	1	4		2	33	2.8
36a Rating ADC Ownership	2	7	2	1		46	3.8
36b Rating ADC Alignment	6	4	2			52	4.3
36c Rating ADC Harmonization	4	5	2	1		48	4.0
36d Rating ADC MfDR	1	6	3	1	1	41	3.4
36e Rating ADC Mutual Account.		8	2	1	1	41	3.4
37a Rating ODA Ownership	1	5	5	1		42	3.5
37b Rating ODA Alignment	2	4	4	2		42	3.5
37c Rating ODA Harmonization	1	4	3	4		38	3.2
37d Rating ODA MfDR	1	3	4	2	2	35	2.9
37e Rating ODA Mutual Account.		5	4	3		38	3.2

12.5 2009 Hitlist of ODA Recipient Countries

Rank	Recipient Country	Commitments	Net Disbursements	of which debt relief	in %
	<i>Austria*</i>	66'125'096	65'797'764		18.07%
1	Bilateral unallocated	28'340'152	22'693'384		6.23%
2	Bosnia and Herzegovina	22'555'087	20'531'365	1'904'959	5.64%
3	Turkey	19'167'152	19'210'640		5.28%
4	Kosovo	16'994'291	15'367'646		4.22%
5	Europe, regional/multi-country	17'422'479	14'637'882		4.02%
6	Chad	14'155'899	14'155'899		3.89%
7	Côte d'Ivoire	11'315'871	12'747'266	12'714'719	3.50%
8	Togo	10'248'703	10'467'849	10'339'898	2.87%
9	Tanzania	9'066'422	9'308'265	8'424'000	2.56%
10	China	15'569'088	9'283'275		2.55%
11	Ethiopia	6'311'846	9'089'339		2.50%
12	Serbia	7'114'437	8'902'085		2.44%
13	Egypt	4'342'933	8'239'892	6'891'725	2.26%
14	Uganda	7'553'921	8'034'738		2.21%
15	Palestinian Administered Areas	6'317'572	6'479'947		1.78%
16	Mozambique	3'839'640	6'360'363		1.75%
17	Albania	7'983'278	5'881'888		1.62%
18	South of Sahara, regional/multi-country	8'845'977	5'727'226		1.57%
19	Nicaragua	4'324'506	5'633'938		1.55%
20	Burkina Faso	7'553'972	5'007'690		1.38%
21	Ukraine	4'957'424	4'846'833		1.33%
22	Guatemala	5'468'913	4'781'391		1.31%
23	Macedonia	5'296'612	3'868'338		1.06%
24	Croatia	3'842'553	3'850'873		1.06%
25	Iran	3'516'875	3'642'486		1.00%
26	North & Central America, regional/multi-country	3'849'780	3'551'191		0.98%
27	Viet Nam	906'472	3'349'666	270'946	0.92%
28	States of ex-Yugoslavia regional/multi-country	3'000'000	3'240'633		0.89%
29	Central Asia, regional/multi-country	2'888'005	2'547'952		0.70%
30	Moldova	2'588'250	2'512'712		0.69%
31	Montenegro	2'488'951	2'423'008		0.67%
32	Bhutan	4'371'966	2'405'973		0.66%
33	Senegal	1'855'548	2'342'627		0.64%
34	Pakistan	2'290'614	2'279'236		0.63%
35	Nepal	1'223'118	1'995'067		0.55%
36	Kenya	1'518'605	1'831'709		0.50%
37	Cape Verde	4'499'308	1'816'177		0.50%
38	Brazil	1'465'819	1'803'129		0.50%
39	Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire)	278'190	1'743'794	1'434'858	0.48%
40	India	1'780'232	1'679'401		0.46%
41	Sri Lanka	984'864	1'586'055		0.44%
42	Ghana	6'267'737	1'514'412		0.42%
43	America, regional/multi-country	1'493'284	1'424'498		0.39%
44	Indonesia	3'073'209	1'397'902	7'374	0.38%
45	Africa, regional/multi-country	859'735	1'186'229		0.33%
46	Rwanda	92'202	1'030'572		0.28%
47	South Africa	729'711	990'011		0.27%
48	Armenia	914'392	917'857		0.25%
49	Mongolia	755'333	822'067		0.23%
50	Georgia	838'957	790'362		0.22%
51	Belarus	769'110	740'910		0.20%
52	Thailand	682'435	737'489		0.20%
53	South Asia, regional/multi-country	393'806	737'339		0.20%
54	Colombia	649'917	700'845		0.19%
55	North of Sahara, regional/multi-country	610'709	616'126		0.17%
56	Philippines	417'054	596'886		0.16%
57	Afghanistan	651'424	588'166		0.16%
58	Peru	496'994	584'383		0.16%

59	Tajikistan	553'853	547'224		0.15%
60	Kyrgyz Republic	495'528	541'863		0.15%
61	Papua New Guinea	468'289	518'069		0.14%
62	El Salvador	371'537	517'759		0.14%
63	Nigeria	483'325	502'560		0.14%
64	Zimbabwe	425'803	490'551		0.13%
65	Asia, regional/multi-country	437'671	436'380		0.12%
66	Sudan	578'428	436'285		0.12%
67	Tunisia	887'271	433'401		0.12%
68	Azerbaijan	378'907	428'868		0.12%
69	Bangladesh	332'569	415'539		0.11%
70	Oceania, regional/multi-country	390'000	390'000		0.11%
71	Mexico	341'504	368'434		0.10%
72	Madagascar	358'020	365'857		0.10%
73	Cameroon	274'497	351'181		0.10%
74	Myanmar (Burma)	316'408	335'348		0.09%
75	Iraq	289'801	316'121		0.09%
76	Mali	309'354	309'354		0.08%
77	Malawi	256'500	278'107		0.08%
78	Turkmenistan	275'043	275'043		0.08%
79	Syria	256'690	274'405		0.08%
80	Burundi	32'816	270'068		0.07%
81	Sierra Leone	255'000	255'509		0.07%
82	Uzbekistan	230'301	250'404		0.07%
83	Kazakhstan	271'074	241'711		0.07%
84	Ecuador	163'383	221'507		0.06%
85	Argentina	205'666	215'989		0.06%
86	Bolivia	424'937	189'585		0.05%
87	Guinea	31'612	186'697	155'085	0.05%
88	South & Central Asia, regional/multi-country	486'400	168'200		0.05%
89	Venezuela	143'131	154'033		0.04%
90	Chile	136'726	136'726		0.04%
91	Libya	134'593	134'593		0.04%
92	Costa Rica	104'432	130'664		0.04%
93	Namibia	96'119	124'635		0.03%
94	Morocco	120'266	123'115		0.03%
95	Algeria	94'728	102'952		0.03%
96	Lebanon	77'564	92'085		0.03%
97	Jordan	78'202	91'077		0.03%
98	Malaysia	75'918	80'914		0.02%
99	Jamaica	0	66'873		0.02%
100	Somalia	65'633	65'633		0.02%
101	Congo, Rep.	49'432	63'196		0.02%
102	Central African Republic	0	61'647	61'647	0.02%
103	Timor-Leste	0	58'950		0.02%
104	St. Lucia	0	49'862		0.01%
105	St. Vincent & Grenadines	0	49'862		0.01%
106	Cuba	42'387	42'387		0.01%
107	Angola	41'612	41'612		0.01%
108	Belize	905	34'147		0.01%
109	Honduras	22'432	32'202		0.01%
110	Paraguay	31'909	31'909		0.01%
111	Laos	28'204	28'204		0.01%
112	Far East Asia, regional/multi-country	0	19'600		0.01%
113	Yemen	18'208	18'208		0.00%
114	Antigua and Barbuda	0	16'621		0.00%
115	Fiji	0	16'621		0.00%
116	Vanuatu	0	16'621		0.00%
117	Niger	13'204	13'204		0.00%
118	Guinea-Bissau	13'024	13'024		0.00%
119	Suriname	1'811	12'133		0.00%
120	St. Kitts-Nevis	0	10'323		0.00%
121	Benin	1'700	9'536		0.00%
122	Cambodia	905	8'345		0.00%
123	Equatorial Guinea	8'204	8'204		0.00%

124	Sao Tomé and Príncipe	8'204	8'204	0.00%	
125	Botswana	7'477	7'477	0.00%	
126	Dominican Republic	7'477	7'477	0.00%	
127	Korea, Dem. Rep.	7'477	7'477	0.00%	
128	Mauritius	7'477	7'477	0.00%	
129	Panama	7'477	7'477	0.00%	
130	Samoa	2'594	2'594	0.00%	
131	Uruguay	1'700	1'700	0.00%	
132	Guyana	0	1'132	0.00%	
133	Middle East, regional/multi-country	1'000	1'000	0.00%	
134	Eritrea	970	970	0.00%	
135	Gabon	905	905	0.00%	
136	Trinidad & Tobago	905	905	0.00%	
137	Gambia	10'077	-5'410'491	-1.49%	
TOTAL (Euro):		385'963'608	364'168'689	42'205'211	100.00%

Notes

* Austria, as an "ODA-recipient", means ODA-eligible donor's expenditures in Austria for development cooperation, e.g. administrative costs, support to national NGOs, and promotion of development awareness. Since 2006 also the costs for refugees in donor countries are included in this item. In DAC statistics, donors' ODA-eligible costs are added to the amount reported for "bilateral unallocated". Because of the special nature of this ODA item, "Austria" has been taken out of the ranking, but is shown in the position it would take, if it were counted as a recipient, to give an indication of the magnitude of flows.

Countries highlighted in bold are priority countries of Austrian Development Cooperation

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