


**AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP**



**EVALUATION OF THE JOINT AFRICA INSTITUTE**

**OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT  
(OPEV)**

**25 September 2008**

## Preface

1. One of the key development challenges facing Africa is the need for increased skills, knowledge, and capacity across the region. Gaps in skills and capacities are found not only in government at various levels, but also in the private sector and civil society. The work of the Joint Africa Institute (JAI) represents a major collaborative effort to address the capacity-building challenge. This evaluation considers how successful this effort has been, what lessons can be drawn from the experience, and makes recommendations for future action.

2. In 1999, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to establish the Joint Africa Institute. They viewed the Institute as a unique opportunity to contribute to capacity development in Africa. As defined in the original Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishing the JAI, “The primary purpose of the JAI is to provide a policy-related training to selected government officials and other participants from African countries.”

3. The Joint Africa Institute started its training program in November 1999 at the AfDB Headquarters in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, initially on topics related to policy formulation and macroeconomic management. The JAI’s program subsequently broadened to cover a wide range of topics. Over 4,000 people have participated in JAI training courses. These have mainly been senior officials in African governments, although participants have also been drawn from the private sector and civil society. When the AfDB headquarters moved to its present temporary location in Tunis in 2003, the JAI also moved and it remains based in Tunis today.

4. In December 2006, the Board of the AfDB approved a proposal to continue supporting the JAI until the end of 2009. The Board also directed the Bank’s Management to “initiate a detailed evaluation of the activities of the JAI and submit a proposal to the Board of Directors on the future of the JAI beyond the period of the duration of the JAI MOU.” It was agreed that the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV) should undertake an independent evaluation. A team of consultants was contracted to undertake the evaluation, comprising Professor R.L. Stirrat of the University of Sussex, UK, and independent consultant Ms. Oumoul Khayri Ba Tall, with research assistance provided by Annelle Bellony of the University of Sussex. Mr. Anthony Curran, Senior Evaluation Officer, was the OPEV Task Manager.

5. The objective of the evaluation was to assess the performance of the JAI in terms of its relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact, for the purpose of informing decisions about the future of the JAI and similar capacity-building initiatives. Evaluation activities were conducted in late 2007, and a complete draft circulated to key stakeholders in the AfDB, WB, and the IMF for comment in March 2008. All comments received were given careful consideration by the evaluation team. Most (but not all) were accepted, and are reflected in the final report.

6. This report follows two previous reports on the JAI, undertaken separately by the IMF and WB in 2005. While these were fairly light reviews, the intention of the present study was to undertake a more exhaustive “detailed evaluation” in line with the wishes of the AfDB Board. Accordingly, a wide range of documentation was reviewed and interviews conducted with key

personnel. Selective reference is also made to recent literature on training and capacity building for development. It was envisaged that the impact of JAI training would be traced and assessed. However, this proved impossible with the resources available, partly because the information held by the JAI on course participants is not available in a format that can be readily analyzed, and partly because of a very low response rate from participants who were contacted (see Annex 2). Nevertheless, the evaluation draws on a wide range of available evidence, and reaches clear and carefully considered conclusions on the JAI's relevance and its efficiency in organizational, pedagogical, and cost terms, while arriving at much more limited conclusions regarding the JAI's effectiveness and impact.

7. The key findings and a range of significant lessons learned are summarized in sections 4 and 5 of the report. The overall conclusion is that although the JAI has achieved a great deal, it could have achieved much more. It is argued that the JAI, lacking clarity regarding its mission, has not realized its full potential.

8. The evaluation marshals evidence on the JAI's performance, draws lessons, and makes recommendations concerning its future, as well as the AfDB's support for capacity building in general. It stops short of making detailed proposals for the future of the JAI or AfDB assistance for capacity building more widely. Indeed, it will be the task of Management to develop such plans and proposals, drawing on relevant evaluation evidence and other information and analyses.

9. Nevertheless, in developing recommendations for the JAI's future, the evaluation team found it useful to consider a range of options or possible scenarios, weighing up the arguments for and against each option in the light of the evidence from the evaluation. The evaluation concludes that current proposals for folding the JAI into the AfDB's training unit, the African Development Institute (ADI), would probably be inefficient and impractical. Relaunching the JAI as a major capacity-building institution would face competition from established capacity-building organizations, although there may be a specialized or niche role for the JAI to play in hosting high-level seminars and other fora on development policy in Africa. The final option reviewed is to close the JAI, thereby freeing up resources for each of the partners to deploy appropriately for capacity building in other ways. In the case of AfDB, this approach might support capacity development that is more clearly responsive to country needs and demands. The evaluation team considers this to be the preferred option. The key recommendation is therefore that the AfDB Board and Management should make arrangements to close the JAI at the end of 2009, while making careful plans to minimize possible adverse consequences.

10. A further important recommendation arising from the evaluation concerns the AfDB's approach to training and capacity building more generally. The Bank currently lacks a clear and comprehensive policy on capacity building. It is clear from recent work on "best practice" in capacity building (see Annex 8) that training alone is insufficient to ensure that capacity is effectively built and retained in the Bank's regional member countries. It is critical to undertake accurate needs assessments focused on specific country requirements, and to ensure that there is not only strong country-level leadership for any capacity-building process, but also a supportive "enabling environment." Training is important but only as part of a wider process of change. Effective monitoring and evaluation arrangements need to be in place to ensure that interventions

achieve the intended results. Accordingly, this evaluation strongly recommends that AfDB formulate a comprehensive policy on capacity building (including training) before launching further initiatives in this area. This would supplement the AfDB's knowledge management strategy recently approved by the Board.

11. This report includes the Management response to the evaluation (Annex 9).

12. If capacity building is a key challenge for Africa's development, it is clear that every effort in this direction should aim to be as efficient and effective as possible. Resources must be deployed with minimum waste to achieve best results. The review and recommendations in this report are presented in this spirit. Recognizing that the JAI has achieved a great deal, the evaluation nevertheless concludes that the substantial resources committed to the JAI could in future years be devoted to capacity-building efforts that are more clearly in line with emerging best practice.



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Tunis,  
July 2008

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## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

ACBF	Africa Capacity-Building Foundation
ADBI	Asian Development Bank Institute
ADI	African Development Institute
AERC	African Economic Research Consortium
AfDB	African Development Bank
BEAC	Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Central
COFEB	Centre Ouest Africain de Formation et de l’Etudes Bancaires
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DBSAVA	Development Bank of Southern Africa Vulindela Academy
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EADI	<i>See</i> ADI
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDEP	African Institute for Economic Development and Planning
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMFI	International Monetary Fund Institute
JAI	Joint Africa Institute
JVI	Joint Vienna Institute
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEFMI	Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and South Africa
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
OC	Oversight Committee
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEV	Operations Evaluation Department
RMC	Regional Member Country
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WAIFEM	West Africa Institute for Financial and Economic Management
WB	World Bank
WBI	World Bank Institute

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### ***Context and Objectives***

1. The overall purpose of the evaluation is to inform decisions about the future of the Joint Africa Institute (JAI) and similar capacity-building initiatives. The specific objectives are to assess the performance of the JAI in terms of its relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency in delivering policy-related training services and its contribution to building the capacity of African institutions.

### ***Methodology***

2. The evaluation is based on a review of the available documents relating to the establishment and management of the JAI, an examination of a small sample of course materials used in JAI training events, interviews with key personnel involved in the JAI, and survey material relating to past training event participants. Owing to major problems in contacting past participants in JAI training events, it proved impossible to arrive at any convincing, evidence-based conclusions on the effectiveness or impact of the JAI.

### ***The JAI and its Work***

3. The JAI was established in 1999 as a partnership between the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the African Development Bank (AfDB). The aim of the JAI was to provide high-level training and develop a cadre of policymakers in Africa. Originally housed in Abidjan, the JAI was relocated to the AfDB headquarters in Tunis in 2003. An Oversight Committee (OC) consisting of representatives of the three partner institutions is responsible for the overall management of the JAI whilst a director assisted by a small administrative team is responsible for routine management.

4. From its inception there has been a tension between two differently conceived models of the JAI. On the one hand, there is a vision of the JAI as being primarily a service provider responsible for facilitating the delivery of training events designed, delivered, and funded by the three partner agencies, usually on an individual basis. On the other hand, there has been a more ambitious vision which sees the JAI as a vehicle to foster synergy between the partner institutions, thereby creating an organization that delivers more than the sum of its parts.

5. Up to mid-2007, 127 training events attracting over 4,300 participants had been delivered under JAI auspices. Of these, the IMF had delivered 51% of all training events. AfDB has become increasingly important in recent years, largely because of the decision of the WB to reduce its level of commitment to the JAI. Over 80% of the training events have been held in either Abidjan or Tunis. According to JAI reports, total expenditure between 1999 and 2006 amounted to just over US\$19 million.

### ***Relevance of JAI Activities***

6. A distinction has to be made between the training events sponsored by the IMF and those supported by the WB and the AfDB. The former were highly focused on areas of interest to the IMF, were planned to address financial management issues, and the participants were identified

and chosen by IMF country staff. The courses mounted by the IMF through the JAI were part of their international training portfolio. There is little evidence though that IMF courses have adapted to the changing agenda of the development community in recent years.

7. As far as the training events sponsored by the WB and the AfDB are concerned, little effort appears to have been made to identify or prioritize training needs or to develop a clear rationale linking developmental objectives, capacity building, and training, although themes did respond to the changing development agenda. The themes and content of training events appear to have been often determined by supply-side considerations.

### *Efficiency of the JAI*

8. Organizationally, as a service provider and facilitating body, the JAI has performed in a highly efficient fashion. However, there are major shortcomings in its management of information, the manner in which records are kept, and its failure to monitor and evaluate its activities.

9. Pedagogically, in general the methods used by the JAI have been efficient, consisting of a mix of formal courses and workshops to address a range of issues. However, little attempt has been made to define training outcomes or to evaluate how far these outcomes had been achieved. Despite early hopes that distance-learning techniques would be developed by the JAI, this dream has not materialized and little effort appears to have been made in this area.

10. Assessing the true cost-efficiency of the JAI is extremely difficult. Whilst it is possible to identify direct costs, it is much harder to put a value on hidden costs (e.g. the services provided by the AfDB to the JAI without charge) and even more difficult to estimate the opportunity costs involved (e.g. the cost of AfDB personnel seconded to produce training materials or act as trainers). It appears that at no point has any systematic attempt been made by the Institute to estimate the actual costs of training supplied through the JAI.

### *Effectiveness and Impact*

11. Difficulties associated with records kept by the JAI, the failure to define clear training outcomes, the absence of any performance monitoring, and the failure to identify the expected impacts in participants' countries make any evaluation of JAI's effectiveness and impact extremely difficult. From the very limited data available, it appears that the courses sponsored by the IMF were effective and did have an impact in improving the performance of trainees. The effectiveness and impact of training events sponsored by the AfDB and the WB appear to have been less marked.

### *Main Lessons Learned*

- In order to be relevant, effective, and have an impact, training has to be incorporated into the wider context of capacity building. A results-chain approach has to be adopted in which developmental objectives are defined and prioritized and clear needs assessments are elaborated.



- In order to be efficient and effective, records have to be kept in a manner that facilitates accessibility and that supports an effective monitoring, evaluation, and feedback mechanism.
- Where partnerships are established, there must be clear agreement from the outset on the objectives of the partnership. Furthermore, there needs to be a degree of autonomy and flexibility – both financial and managerial – to allow the partnership to realize its potential to be greater than the sum of the individual partners’ inputs.

### ***Recommendations***

- It is **strongly recommended** that the AfDB formulate a clear and comprehensive policy on capacity building (including training) before it develops further training activities. This should link capacity-building priorities with explicit development objectives, to ensure that training does not become an end in itself.
- It is **recommended** that over the next 12 months the AfDB, in collaboration with the two partner institutions, seriously consider future options for the JAI, to include:
  - Careful consideration of the plans for the JAI to be integrated with the ADI in 2010 and achieving greater clarity as to what this will involve, in both organizational and financial terms;
  - Assessing the viability of a relaunched JAI with much greater autonomy to develop its own character; and
  - Clearly analyzing the costs and benefits of closing the JAI at the end of 2009, with a view to maximizing potential gains and managing any negative consequences.
- The policy **recommended** by the evaluation team is that the JAI should be closed at the end of 2009 and that the AfDB should develop its own training and capacity-building activities in support of country policies and practices.

# **1. INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1 The Context and Objectives of the Evaluation**

1.1.1 The overall purpose of this evaluation is to inform decisions about the future of the Joint Africa Institute (JAI) and similar capacity-building initiatives.<sup>1</sup> The specific objectives as laid down in the Terms of Reference (see Annex 1) are to assess the performance of the JAI in respect of its relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency in delivering policy-related training services and its contribution to building the capacity of African institutions. The evaluation also attempts to assess the organizational effectiveness of JAI and any comparative advantage it may have within the current management and resources context.

1.1.2 The evaluation covers all JAI activities since inception and pays particular attention to assessing the experiences and benefits of the JAI as a formalized partnership between the three member institutions (the AfDB, the IMF, and the World Bank) in terms of synergies and complementarities. By mid-2007, 127 training events attracting over 4,300 participants had been delivered under JAI auspices. According to JAI reports, total expenditure between 1999 and 2006 amounted to just over US\$19 million.<sup>2</sup>

1.1.3 It was originally intended that each of the three partner organizations would review the operations of the JAI in the fourth year of its operations (2003) but these reviews were delayed. The WB produced a review in June 2005, with the IMF producing their review six months later (Le Gall 2005; Feinstein and Khatri 2005).

## **1.2 Methodology**

1.2.1 A number of sources of information have been used in producing this evaluation. These include:

- Reviews of the available documentary material, in particular the Minutes of the Oversight Committee and the Activity Reports produced by successive directors of the JAI, as well as the MOUs relating to the JAI;
- Reviews of a small sample of teaching materials used in JAI courses;
- Reviews of comparative material relating to other organizations involved in similar activities to the JAI;
- Discussions with the acting Director of the JAI and other JAI staff in Tunis;
- Interviews with AfDB staff who have been or are involved in JAI activities;
- Interviews with IMF staff running a JAI course in Tunis;

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<sup>1</sup> The evaluation was commissioned by the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV) and carried out by Professor R.L. Stirrat (University of Sussex, UK) and independent consultant Oumoul Khayri Ba Tall, mainly between September and November 2007, with additional input provided by Annelle Bellony (University of Sussex, UK). The OPEV Task Manager was Tony Curran.

<sup>2</sup> See section 3.2. section "Cost Efficiency" and Annex 5.

- Telephone interviews with individuals connected with the operations of the JAI in the past but who are now based in North America and Europe. These include past members of the Oversight Committee as well as ex-JAI staff;
- Questionnaire data obtained from a sample of participants in JAI training events followed up with telephone interviews;
- Questionnaire data obtained from participants' supervisors, again followed up with telephone interviews.

1.2.2 The original plans for this evaluation stressed the importance of reviewing both the quality and relevance of the training offered by the JAI and the degree to which this training has led to an increase in the organizational capabilities and performance of policymakers and managers in Africa. To this end, considerable efforts were made to contact past JAI participants and their supervisors in the beneficiary countries. This proved extremely difficult because (a) the records kept by the JAI did not facilitate identification of a representative sample of participants, nor clear analysis of the composition of participants, nor easy communication with event attendees and (b) because of difficulties in locating participants (see Annex 2). Consequently, the conclusions arrived at in this evaluation which relate to effectiveness and impact are extremely tentative.

1.2.3 Given the problems faced by the evaluation team in assessing effectiveness and impact through interviews with ex-participants and their supervisors, the approach adopted in this evaluation focuses on processes rather than impacts (AfDB 2004). It takes as its point of reference notions and standards of "best practice" amongst comparable agencies working in training and capacity-building for development (see Annex 8). It focuses on questions such as whether or not the training supplied by the JAI met identifiable needs and priorities, whether it was delivered in an efficient and effective manner, and whether the existence of the JAI added value to the activities of the three institutions involved.

### **1.3 Structure of the Report**

1.3.1 The objectives and methods of the evaluation are set out above. Section 2 describes the history of the JAI, and provides an analysis of its objectives and activities. Section 3 presents the evaluation findings in detail, developing the analysis in terms of the JAI's relevance and efficiency, and to a limited extent its effectiveness and impact. Section 4 summarizes the evaluation findings, and Section 5 sets out the lessons learned. The reader with limited time may wish to turn to these first. Finally, Section 6 presents an assessment of options for the future of the JAI, and clear recommendations follow in section 7.

## **2. THE JAI AND ITS WORK**

### **2.1 The Establishment and Evolution of the JAI**

2.1.1 In 1998 the then President of the AfDB, Mr. Omar Kabbaj, approached the WB seeking support for the establishment of an institution associated with the AfDB which was broadly

comparable with the International Monetary Fund Institute (IMFI) and the World Bank Institute (WBI). Whilst there was support from the WB for the establishment of the JAI, mainly on the grounds of deepening the relationship between the WB and the AfDB, there was less interest on the part of the WBI, which was already involved in running training courses in Africa. However, with an agreement from the WB's Africa Region to shoulder some of the costs, the WBI agreed to support the establishment of the JAI. As far as the IMF was concerned, the JAI offered an African venue for the worldwide training program run by the IMFI.

2.1.2 Mr. Kabbaj presented the proposal to establish the JAI to the AfDB Board on March 26, 1999 (AfDB 1999). This followed discussions with the IMF and the WB which were premised on an earlier study by the African Governors of the World Bank in which "the lack of capacity in the areas of economic policy formulation and management" was identified as a key issue retarding economic progress in Africa (World Bank 1996). It was expected that by providing "high quality training in macro-economic management and policies as well as in structural and social issues", the JAI would make "an important contribution to helping develop a cadre of policymakers and managers who would formulate sound economic policies and programs and manage them effectively" (AfDB 1999: 5). In addition, it was expected that the JAI would help to strengthen the Bank's own capacity for economic and sector work.

2.1.3 The JAI was in part modeled on the already existing Joint Vienna Institute and the Singapore Training Institute, in which the IMFI was a major player. These institutions supplied policy-related economics training tailored to the "specific needs of different regions" (AfDB 1999: 8). It was intended that the JAI should follow this model and that over time an increasing number of courses would be offered on a joint basis. It was also planned that "modern distance learning facilities" would be used in the provision of training (AfDB 1999: 7).

2.1.4 The MOU establishing the JAI was signed by the three partner institutions – the AfDB, the WB, and the IMF – on April 25, 1999. Under this MOU, each of the partner institutions would bear the costs of their staff involved in running the JAI and delivering training events, while participants' costs would be shared equally among the three institutions. It was also planned that the AfDB would provide accommodation for participants once a permanent building had been obtained. The JAI began operations in September of the same year.

2.1.5 The original MOU was valid for a period of five years but the life of the JAI was subsequently extended to December 2005 by the first amendment, agreed in September/October 2004. This amendment allowed time for negotiations to take place in light of WB's expressed wish to reduce its involvement in the JAI.

2.1.6 The second amendment of January 2006 provided for a further extension during which negotiations over the financing of the JAI could be finalized. In the meantime, the financial involvement of the WB was limited to supporting its own training events and those in which it was jointly involved with the IMF and the AfDB, but not those sponsored by the IMF or the AfDB.

2.1.7 In February 2007 a third amendment was signed which further revised the financial arrangements of the JAI. All costs (except accommodation costs) for all participants in joint

training events were to be supported equally by all three institutions, whilst accommodation costs would be met by the AfDB. In addition the AfDB would be responsible for 50% of all costs of IMF training events organized through the JAI up to a maximum of 10 per year. The costs of any IMF courses in excess of this figure and any other courses organized by individual agencies would be met by the sponsoring agency. In addition, this MOU declared that, “the AfDB will gradually integrate the operations of the JAI within the African Development Institute (EADI) with a view to having the EADI take full responsibility for the JAI program by January 1, 2010.”

2.1.8 The JAI was originally housed at AfDB headquarters in Abidjan. In the initial years, there were major problems in locating suitable premises, and much of the energy of the first two directors was expended on the issue of accommodation. Once this had been resolved, the worsening political situation in Côte d’Ivoire led to the relocation of the AfDB and the JAI to Tunis in 2003. Presently, the JAI is housed in the AfDB and depends directly on the AfDB for much of its administrative needs.

## **2.2 The Objectives of the JAI**

2.2.1 Although all three partner institutions agreed on the need for capacity building in Africa, each had different expectations of the precise role of the JAI. Furthermore, for the WB at least, there has been a shift over time in the nature of its involvement in the JAI.

2.2.2 For the IMF, involvement in the JAI provided a regional center through which an array of courses could be mounted. The IMF viewed the primary objective of the JAI as providing effective logistical and administrative support in a cost-efficient manner. Although the IMF has cooperated in joint training events, the main focus of its activities has been on its own courses.

2.2.3 The WB’s involvement has changed over the life of the JAI. Initially it sought to support the AfDB’s attempt to establish the JAI as a world-class training center in Africa. Thus not only did it sponsor courses itself but it also assisted the AfDB in its training activities. But by 2004, changes in policy within the WB and the WBI (in particular a growing country-focus in capacity building activities) led to a desire on the part of the WB to reduce its involvement in the JAI. Although it continued to supply key personnel, support its own courses and participate in joint training events, by 2006 it had withdrawn from the cost-sharing agreement.

2.2.4 The most ambitious vision of what the JAI could achieve was that of the AfDB. Thus the proposal that was presented to the Bank in 1999 stressed the importance of joint courses capitalizing on the regional expertise of the AfDB, coupled with the global development experience of the WB and the IMF. It was envisaged that this would create a synergy leading to the development of a specifically Africa-orientated training program. In sum, what was envisaged was an institution and a training program that would go beyond the separate interests and capabilities of each of the partners.

2.2.5 These different objectives envisaged for the JAI are manifest in a tension between two models of what the JAI should be (see Annex 4). The first sees it as a service organization providing logistical support to the three partner institutions which mount the training events.

The second sees it as an agency in itself, responsible for delivering the dream expressed in the foundational documents. This tension underlies many of the issues identified by the evaluators.

2.2.6 Both present and past directors of the JAI have stressed to the evaluators that in their view the JAI is a “service delivery” organization. They argue that the JAI has no oversight of any training curriculum and that the content of courses is the responsibility of the partners that are delivering them. The responsibility of the JAI is thus limited to ensuring the logistical and administrative support for courses delivered through the JAI and acting on behalf of the partners. And they point out that the original MOU makes each partner institution responsible for preparing and delivering its own courses and seminars. In other words, they stress the division of labor between the three institutions, each exploiting its comparative advantage.

2.2.7 It was suggested to the team that a number of the JAI’s features reflect this vision:

- The absence of any pedagogical or training experts on the staff of the JAI until the appointment of a Senior Training Officer last year;
- The lack of a permanent cadre of senior staff in the JAI, as the partner organizations second individuals for limited periods of time;
- The lack of any significant funds directly controlled by the JAI, since the partner organizations are responsible for funding specific activities including training through a system of cost sharing;
- The absence of any attempt by the JAI to monitor the quality or effectiveness of training events carried out under its auspices.

2.2.8 This view fits uneasily with the vision/model expressed in other foundational documents of the JAI which stress the synergy to be created through the partnership of the three organizations. This synergy was seen as “adding value” to the work of the JAI, the whole being more than the sum of the parts.

2.2.9 The alternative model of what the JAI should be is evidenced in a number of ways, including:

- The job descriptions of senior staff. The Director of the JAI is responsible not simply for the smooth running of the JAI, but also for ensuring that the quality of the training is of the highest quality, and liaising with the beneficiary countries to ensure that it is line with their needs. Similarly, the Chief Economist’s Officer role is not only to assist the Director in these activities but also to establish evaluation mechanisms and oversee the selection of trainees;
- The “branding” of training events as JAI events rather than as events mounted by the partner organizations;
- The attempts to create a JAI Trust Fund to promote the autonomy of the JAI;

- The proactive attempts by senior staff in JAI to lead in the design and preparation of some training events;
- JAI’s annual “learning program,” as approved by the Oversight Committee (OC), which represented more than a collection of unrelated courses and training events.

2.2.10 Tension between these two models of the JAI and the lack of clarity as to what the JAI was meant to be is a theme that runs through this evaluation. The failure to resolve this tension appears to have constrained the full realization of the JAI’s potential. It amounts to a failure of governance and could be seen as negligence on the part of the partner organizations.

## **2.3 Structure and Activities of the JAI**

2.3.1 Administratively, the JAI is controlled by an Oversight Committee (OC) consisting of representatives from each partner institution, the Chair rotating between the institutions on a tri-annual basis. Meetings are held at least annually, either in person or by video-link, and supplementary meetings are occasionally held to discuss major issues. The OC is responsible for all major decisions concerning the JAI, including oversight of the JAI’s budget and approval of the annual program of training events.

2.3.2 The Director of the JAI is present at OC meetings. The Director is assisted by the JAI’s Chief Economist Officer (after 2007, the Chief Training Economist) and an Administrator who is charged with maintaining the administrative and logistical aspects of the JAI and with managing the support staff employed by the JAI. Just as the Chair of the OC revolves between the three partner institutions, so too do the posts of Director and Chief Training Economist. In 2007, a Chief Training Officer was added to the staff of the JAI.

2.3.3 The professional staff of the JAI are supported by a number of other staff responsible for logistical and administrative matters. At present these include four training associates (directly responsible for the administration of individual training events), one secretary, one protocol assistant, and one technician.

2.3.4 From its inception up to mid-2007, the JAI had mounted 127 training events (courses, seminars, and workshops), which represents an average of 25 per year. In total, this amounted to 187.5 weeks of training and involved over 4,300 participants, although some attended more than one course. Table 1 below shows the overall contribution of the three partners, both separately and jointly. The vast majority (96%) of the courses were organized by individual agencies, and these were attended by a similar proportion of participants (97%). Of the partner organizations, the IMF was by far the most active, sponsoring 51% of all training events and attracting 44% of all participants. Only five training events, attracting around 3% of participants, were jointly organized by two or more of the partner organizations. However, these figures are somewhat misleading in that in a number of cases (at least another five), there were significant inputs from partners into training events for which they had no organizational responsibility. In most cases this involved WB inputs into AfDB-sponsored training events.

**Table 1: Total Number of Training Events, Training Weeks and Participants by Sponsoring Organization 2000-2007<sup>a</sup>**

Sponsoring Organization	Training Events		Training Weeks		Participants	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
AfDB	27	21%	29.4	16%	878	20%
WB	30	24%	44	23%	1,296	30%
IMF	65	51%	109.6	58%	1,936	44%
AfDB/IMF/WB	3	2%	2.5	1%	206	5%
AfDB/WB	1	1%	1	1%	22	1%
AfDB/IMF	1	1%	1	1%	27	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>187.5</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>4,365</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>a</sup> 2007 covers January to June 2007.

Source: JAI End of Year Reports of Activities and Expenditures

2.3.5 Over time, the relative inputs of the three partners have changed (see Table 2), in large measure as a result of the WB's reduced involvement in the JAI. The IMF has remained the major actor but the AfDB has become increasingly important in recent years, both in terms of numbers of participants trained and events organized. There was also a decline in the number of jointly organized training events after the relocation of the JAI (and the AfDB) to Tunis in 2003.

2.3.6 The majority of training events took the form of one- or two-week courses, mostly sponsored by the IMF, while the WB and the AfDB focused on seminars and workshops. This is related to the sorts of topics covered by the different sponsors. Whilst the IMF provided training in specific skills orientated to the financial sector, the AfDB and the WB focused on more general topics, approached them in a less didactic and formalized way, and aimed to provide a platform for policy dialogue.

2.3.7 Most training events organized through the JAI are aimed at middle- to high-level functionaries and to lesser extent representatives from the private sector and civil society in the beneficiary countries. In contrast, the relatively small number of high-level seminars is orientated toward policymakers and seeks to foster dialogue on issues of common interest rather than serve as vehicles for training *per se*.



**Table 2: Number of Training Events and Participants by Sponsoring Organization 2000-2007**

Sponsoring Organization (s)	2000 <sup>a</sup>		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007 <sup>b</sup>		Total of Training Events	Total of Participants
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B				
AfDB	2	59	3	101	2	59	1	23	5	160	6	217	6	189	2	70	27	878
WB	3	119	3	127	4	136	4	123	6	193	6	322	4	276			30	1296
IMF	5	140	7	220	6	183	8	221	9	273	11	315	11	337	8	247	65	1936
AfDB/IMF/WB	1	133	1	37	1	36	-		-		-		-		-		3	206
AfDB/WB	-		-		-		1	22	-		-		-		-		1	22
AfDB/IMF	-		-		1	27	-		-		-		-		-		1	27
<b>Annual Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>451</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>485</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>441</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>626</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>854</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>802</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>317</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>4,365</b>

**Notes**

A: Number of training events

B: Number of participants

<sup>a</sup> 2000 includes training courses convened during November–December 1999.


<sup>b</sup> 2007 covers data for the period January–June 2007.

2.3.8 In terms of location, the vast majority (over 80%) of JAI training events were held in either Abidjan (prior to 2003) or Tunis (after 2003). Only 22 training events were held outside Abidjan or Tunis in venues such as Dakar, Cape Town, Nairobi, and Accra.

2.3.9 Besides residential training events, a very small number of JAI training events employed distance learning techniques. In addition, the JAI launched a website in November 2001 to facilitate networking with other African institutions and the sharing of knowledge amongst participants in JAI and other training events. It was also seen as a means of raising the profile of the JAI and encouraging interest in its activities amongst the population of the beneficiary countries.

2.3.10 Figure 1 indicates the overall contributions by the sponsoring organizations to participants' direct training costs,<sup>3</sup> whilst the range of topics covered by the training events is shown in Table 3. Further details are supplied in Annex 5.

**Figure 1. JAI Sponsoring Organization's Contribution to Participants' Direct Training Costs 2000-2006**



<sup>3</sup> Further discussion of costs, including overhead costs and hidden costs, appears below in section 3.2., "Cost Efficiency."

**Table 3: Topics Covered by JAI Training Events**

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Number</b>
Financial Management	33
Statistics	14
Poverty Reduction	14
Macro-economic Issues	13
Health	11
Governance	11
Entrepreneurship/Franchising	9
Project Design	6
Export Strategies and Trade Issues	5
Regional Issues	4
Public-Private Partnerships	3
Agricultural Development	3
Privatization	3
Evaluation	3
Infrastructure	2
Water	1
Gender	2
<b>High-level Seminars</b>	<b>6</b>

*Note:* Some training events covered more than one topic and thus these figures are greater than the number of training events. Full details are available in Annex 6.

### **3. THE EVALUATION FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS**

#### **3.1 Relevance**

3.1.1 The JAI has operated during a period when development thinking has been changing, new priorities and new foci being adopted by a wide range of development institutions including the WB and the AfDB. These include:

- Adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which set a series of targets and a broad framework within which development agencies work;
- A shift toward a country focus that acknowledges that different countries are facing specific problems and that agencies should recognize this variety;
- A move toward country ownership and the growing importance of “partnership” between donors and developing countries;
- An emphasis on harmonizing the activities of donors;
- An emphasis on good governance;
- A growing interest in the developmental implications of climate change.

3.1.2 How relevant have JAI training activities been *vis-à-vis* these changing policy directions? Here, the activities of the three partners have to be reviewed separately.

3.1.3 First, there are courses mounted by the IMF, which lay emphasis on financial probity and good economic management. There is a close relationship between capacity-building needs as identified by IMF personnel working in Africa, the content of the courses, and the selection of the participants. Through their experience of working with Departments of Finance, national banks and treasuries, IMF personnel have been able to identify gaps in knowledge and skills and to target suitable candidates for training in order to fill these gaps. This led to some courses being repeated on a number of occasions: the course on Financial Programming and Policies being held 11 times and closely associated courses on Statistics 12 times.

3.1.4 The IMF encourages the adoption of the same techniques and practices in all countries in which they are active. In this way, they have been able to call on existing courses mounted at other centers and adapt them to specific needs of Africa. Many of the staff running these courses have worked with the same African agencies represented by the participants, and so are aware of their specific needs.

3.1.5 In sum, the IMF has been able to create a “virtuous circle” within which the IMF both defines the objectives and provides the means of supplying relevant training to meet these objectives.

3.1.6 The situation faced by the WB and the AfDB is more complex and much less clear-cut. At a general level, there has been no systematic attempt to link their training activities with broad developmental objectives, nor to identify what capacity-building activities are necessary and relevant for the beneficiary countries. There has been no comprehensive needs assessment or analysis of the role that training could play in addressing these needs. On the other hand, training events supported by the WB and the AfDB have sought to address many of the emerging development issues. Thus many courses have related directly to specific MDGs (e.g. Innovative Agriculture and Rural Development Strategies for Poverty Reduction; Integrated Water Resources Management), country ownership (e.g. Designing a Result-Based Country Strategy; Regional Integration and Trade), governance issues (e.g. Decentralization and Local Governance; Role of Parliament in Promoting Good Governance), and climate change (e.g. Economics of Climate Change).

3.1.7 There is evidence that successive JAI directors held discussions with the AfDB and WB personnel, as well as with representatives from the beneficiary countries, on the type of courses that might be most relevant. However, this did not eventuate in a detailed, formal, and transparent assessment procedure nor any prioritization of what these needs might be. More broadly, there was no attempt to identify what other activities (e.g. institutional reform, post-training support and the establishment of peer support groups) were necessary to support training and thus increase capacity.

3.1.8 There is some evidence that at times the training events put on by the WB and the AfDB were driven by the availability of resources rather than by prioritized developmental relevance.

This issue was recognized by successive directors of the JAI, who made major efforts to bring direction and order to a somewhat random range of training events. This involved directors suggesting to ADI and other departments in the AfDB suitable training events to complement the already existing portfolio of courses, often with limited success. But what is striking is that there appears to have been little attempt by the OC to ensure greater relevance. This could have been remedied if the JAI had led a general needs assessment and prioritization process, which would have fostered a better understanding of the relationship between training, capacity building, and policy objectives.

3.1.9 Similarly, at the level of individual courses, there is little evidence that any needs assessments were carried out before the contents were determined. The only exception identified by the evaluation team is the training needs assessment carried out by OPEV in 2006 in the context of monitoring and evaluating PRSPs. In the Activity Reports produced by the JAI, and in the minutes of the OC, there is no mention of any discussions or consultations with representatives from African governments or organizations.<sup>4</sup>

3.1.10 The training events sponsored by the AfDB and the WB would have had greater relevance if there had been an agreed results chain linking training to specific goals. The evaluation team found no evidence of any attempt to generate such a conceptual structure, for instance through the use of a logframe. Implicitly it would appear that the logic underlying the JAI links activities (training) to outputs (better trained professionals) to purpose (participants more effective in their policy analysis and management work) to goals (institutions more effective in policy management). However, given the lack of an explicit overall conceptual framework, the focus of the JAI remains lodged in activities and outputs, and no attention is paid to the factors that might confound the links in this results chain and affect the relevance of the training events. Furthermore, given the structure of the JAI, it is unclear where the responsibility for identifying relevance lies: with the JAI itself, or with the partner organizations?

## **3.2 Efficiency**

3.2.1 As far as the efficiency of the JAI is concerned, there are three key questions that need to be addressed:

- Is it run in an organizationally efficient manner?
- Is it pedagogically efficient?
- Is it cost-efficient?

### ***Organizational Efficiency***

3.2.2 Overall responsibility for the management of the JAI is exercised by the OC. This responsibility is exercised with a very light touch and there is little evidence that the OC actively engages in the internal workings of the JAI. Members of the OC approach issues from the particular positions of their agencies rather than focusing on the efficient management of the JAI. One example of this is that the three amendments to the foundational MOU failed to give clear

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, the OC minutes for the January 2007 meeting detail discussions over potential courses between the three partner organizations, but there is no mention of any input from beneficiary countries.

direction to the JAI or set up targets and indicators against which its performance could be assessed.

3.2.3 As a facilitating organization, arranging the venues for training events and providing the necessary administrative and logistical support, the JAI has proved remarkably successful. Despite the difficulties over accommodation in its early years and the disruptions caused by the temporary relocation of the AfDB from Abidjan to Tunis, the JAI has been able to run training events for every year of its existence. Representatives from the IMF and the WB have commented on the efficiency with which training events have been managed, as have participants, and the evaluators have heard no criticisms of the JAI's management of training events. According to JAI administrators, this has been facilitated by its administrative independence. They argue that if the JAI had been subject to the bureaucratic and administrative demands of the AfDB, this would have negatively impacted its capacity to deal efficiently and quickly with the problems that arise in organising pan-African training events.

3.2.4 On the other hand, the JAI has managed information inefficiently. Financial data have not been kept in a consistent fashion, making it difficult for economic efficiency to be achieved or assessed (see "Cost Efficiency" below). Records concerning participants have not been kept in a manner that would allow JAI staff to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and impact of the JAI training events. A key position – that of Chief Economist Officer, who *inter alia* is responsible for monitoring and evaluation – was left unfilled for over two years; this indicates that such functions were not seen as central to the efficient management of the JAI. There is no indication that the JAI personnel made any attempt to evaluate their own activities nor to consider whether alternative means might offer advantages in delivering training. Again, it is not clear as to whether the JAI or the partner organizations were responsible for these functions.

3.2.5 The evaluation team found little evidence of efforts to disseminate the knowledge generated by training events to a wider audience. This is related to the failure to develop an effective distance-learning framework (see "Pedagogic Efficiency" below) but is also evident in the poor quality of the JAI's website. Although the website makes training materials on certain courses available to a wider audience, the presentation makes access difficult for a general audience.

3.2.6 At no point in the life of the JAI has there been any systematic attempt to assess the effectiveness of the training it provides – that is, whether it has influenced behavior or has led to changes at the institutional level. Monitoring activities have been limited to immediate post-course satisfaction surveys, which tell us little about the effectiveness of the training events, a point which has been well known for a number of years (see Chandler 1978). No attempt has been made to use methods such as the "Four-level" evaluation system employed by the WBI in assessing its own courses (see Kirkpatrick 1994).

### ***Pedagogic Efficiency***

3.2.7 How efficient are the pedagogic methods used by the JAI? Has the JAI fully considered the alternative methods that are available?

3.2.8 Training courses sponsored by the IMF generally last at least a week and consist of formal lectures backed up by course material and group exercises. Given the sorts of skills, techniques, and knowledge that the IMF expects its participants to gain, this appears to be an efficient method. Furthermore, the IMFI has strong professional interests and experience in delivering similar courses throughout the world; it has developed sets of teaching materials and has generated specific pedagogic skills.

3.2.9 Although some training events developed by the WB and the AfDB employ a mix of lectures and group exercises, in many cases training events consist of seminars and workshops. Given the sorts of topics these partners focus on, such methods are more suitable than formal lectures in that they allow for an exchange of experience and views amongst participants, encouraging new ways of approaching and thinking about problems rather than gaining specific skills and knowledge or mastering specific techniques.

3.2.10 The training materials used on JAI courses are generally good. They are well produced, cover the topics in a systematic fashion, and provide an up-to-date approach to the issues in question.

3.2.11 However, what is lacking – particularly in the training events sponsored by the AfDB and the WB – is any specific attempt to define training outcomes in advance in order to construct structured and coherent training programs. The evaluation team found no evidence of any formal attempt to assess the degree to which the expected skills, techniques or knowledge had been successfully transferred to participants. Admittedly, there were many training events, especially those sponsored by the AfDB and the WB, where simplistic “tests” would have been inappropriate. But in terms of pedagogic efficiency, systems need to be in place to assess training outcomes so that the findings can feed back into the design of training delivery systems.

3.2.12 A distinction has to be drawn between the courses offered by the IMF and those offered by the AfDB and the WB. Although there was no clear specification of training outcomes in the IMF-sponsored courses, the “virtuous circle” which links training to IMF activities in the beneficiary countries implies an implicit recognition of what training outcomes should be, and that feedback mechanisms were in place to ensure that the training objectives were being met. In the case of the training events mounted by the WB and the AfDB, there was much less specificity and no “virtuous circle” to link training, capacity building, and needs in a direct fashion.

3.2.13 There is no evidence that the JAI itself reviewed the ways in which training could be delivered. This remains a matter that is largely left to the partner organizations, although very few alternative training methods have been utilized by any of the partners. In the original MOU, emphasis was placed on “the use of modern distance learning facilities to reach a large audience,” yet very little has been done to fully explore what could be achieved through such means and whether this might be a more efficient means of delivering training. Distance learning techniques involving elements of *e-learning* have only been used in a few cases. Whilst acknowledging that there may be major problems in delivering training through distance-learning and electronically based means, especially in Africa, it is unfortunate that the

possibilities of such a delivery system were not more fully investigated as a substitute for certain training events (e.g. through workplace learning approaches).

### *Cost Efficiency*

3.2.14 Any attempt to estimate the cost efficiency of the JAI is fraught with difficulties. Partly this is a matter of conceptualization, but it is partly attributable to the quality of the data available to the evaluation team. The available data are presented in Annex 5. According to JAI reports, total expenditure between 1999 and 2006 amounted to just over US\$19 million.<sup>5</sup> Average annual expenditure in the years 2004-2006 was reportedly just over US\$3.3 million.

3.2.15 Conceptually, three categories of cost can be identified:

- **Direct costs:** those associated with particular training events such as accommodation, participants' travel, and the production of training materials;
- **Overhead costs:** those associated with the running of the JAI itself, such as salary costs and administrative costs;
- **Hidden costs:** those for which payment is not directly charged. These include the supply of office space and other services by the AfDB to the JAI, the "opportunity costs" of staff from the partner agencies supplying the training and ideally the opportunity costs of participants in the training events.

3.2.16 Whilst in principle it is relatively easy to calculate direct and overhead costs, it is much more difficult to quantify the opportunity costs involved in the training events mounted by the JAI. Even with direct costs, there are problems owing to the quality of the data available. Not only are there errors in the financial and narrative reports, but there are also uncertainties; for example, the number of weeks reported is not always consistent with the corresponding number of days. Furthermore, any attempt to compare JAI costs with those in comparable institutions is severely constrained given the lack of available data and the different methodologies adopted by different institutions.

3.2.17 The JAI delivered a total of 127 training events from its inception up to June 2007. This translates into 6,553 participant-weeks of training to an estimated 4,365 beneficiaries. The simplest method of estimating training costs is in terms of cost per participant-week and this is computed as total direct training costs divided by total participant-weeks.

3.2.18 In 2000<sup>6</sup> the total direct cost per participant-week<sup>7</sup> amounted to US\$1,651. This rose to US\$1,894 in 2001 and to US\$2,170 in 2002, largely as the result of increasing travel costs. So in 2001, the number of course participants rose by 8% in comparison with 2000 but total travel

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<sup>5</sup> Includes direct costs and overhead costs.

<sup>6</sup> 2000 figures include training and operational costs incurred in 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Direct participant costs given as cost per participant week includes costs associated with participants' travel expenses, health insurance, per diem, accommodation, resource persons, interpreters, training room, and social activities.



expenses increased by 39%. In 2002, the number of course participants fell by 9% over 2001, but overall travel expenses rose by 11%. On average, travel expenses accounted for 43% of total direct participant training costs for the period 2000-2007 and formed the largest budget item for the JAI.

3.2.19 Direct costs per participant-week peaked in 2003 (US\$2,867) partly as the result of the need to relocate training events to other African venues owing to the civil unrest in Côte d'Ivoire. Direct costs declined to US\$2,280 in 2004 and US\$1,529 in 2006, fueled by reductions in the unit costs of travel and to a lesser extent the containment of the unit costs of accommodation. Hence, as the JAI began operating in a more stable environment and the number of courses and participants increased, the direct participant-week cost declined, pointing to greater efficiency in operations.

3.2.20 Within this broad pattern of change, there were significant variations in direct costs. Not surprisingly, high-level seminars represented the most expensive activity in terms of direct costs (e.g. US\$9,600 per participant week for the IMF-sponsored seminar on Financial Integration held in 2003). More worrying perhaps has been the continuing problem over recovering the costs expended on unused airline tickets, which bedeviled the JAI for a number of years. One rather puzzling feature is that the direct costs of AfDB courses appear to be substantially higher than those run by the IMF. This is due to the greater use of consultants and external resource persons by the AfDB.

3.2.21 How do these direct costs compare with those of comparable institutions? The IMF considers the direct costs incurred by the JAI as being high in comparison with the US\$1,000 per participant-week they report from their other training centers. However, precisely what is included in this comparative cost is unclear. For instance, in the case of the Vienna Institute, hotel accommodation does not have to be rented, which would substantially reduce the direct costs of participants. What is clear, however, is that travel expenses are a major component of the direct costs for participants at the JAI, varying between US\$610 and US\$1,356 per participant. In large measure this is the result of the geographical location of Tunis and raises the bigger question as to whether more training events should be held at other locations in Africa. Even so, the direct costs of mounting comparable events using commercial facilities in centers such as Dakar (US\$2,500-3,000 per participant-week) would be broadly comparable with those incurred in Tunis.

3.2.22 These direct costs tell only part of the story: overhead costs are also important. Over the lifetime of the organization they have risen from around US\$800,000 to over US\$1,150,000 per annum. However, with the exception of 2003, when the disruption to the JAI's activities in Côte d'Ivoire were at their height, the overheads have steadily fallen in terms of participant-weeks, and in 2006 they were approximately 37% lower than in 2000.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> In 2006, overhead costs per participant-week were US\$788, the lowest recorded overhead costs for the 2000-2007 operational period of the JAI. In 2006, the number of participant-weeks was significantly higher than previous years and in addition the staff complement at the JAI totaled 9 compared to 10 in the 2004-2005 period. Hence the lower levels of growth in the overhead categories of infrastructure and salaries in concert with the above-average level of growth in the number of participant-weeks resulted in the low level of overhead costs in 2006.

3.2.23 Finally, there are the cross-subsidies from AfDB which are not reimbursed by the JAI. Here all that can be sensibly done is to list all the other costs which need to be taken into account.

3.2.24 First, there are the costs to the AfDB of providing the JAI with office space and administrative support. These costs are presently not charged to the JAI and amount to a hidden subvention.

3.2.25 Second, and much more significant, are the opportunity costs associated with those who mount the training events. The costs of personnel employed by the IMFI and the WBI in preparing course materials and delivering training do not enter into the formal accounts of the JAI. Nor do the inputs from the AfDB, and here most of those involved in preparing and delivering training are based in the operational departments. The activities of the JAI thus involve major opportunity costs for all three of the partner agencies but this is perhaps most serious for the AfDB in that the primary function of IMFI and WBI staff is to supply training.

3.2.26 The contribution by sponsoring organizations to participants' direct cost is highest for the IMF at 48% for the 2000-2006 period. The WB and the AfDB contributed 24% and 18% respectively for the same period. The nature of the data recording did not allow for an itemized breakdown by sponsoring organization for joint training events; consequently, these have been reported separately. In 2006, the IMF provided 100% funding for a seminar on "Preparedness within the Financial Sector for an Avian Influenza Pandemic" and this was outside the cost-sharing formula. It is occurrences like this which render the relative inputs of the different organizations difficult to compute.

3.2.27 So how efficient in cost terms is the JAI? Certainly, direct and indirect costs have fallen over the lifetime of the organization, from around US\$3,000 per participant week in 2000 to around US\$2,300 in 2006. This tends to support the conclusion that overall, the JAI has been run with regard to cost efficiency. But given the lack of clarity in much of the data and the lack of any evidence as to the hidden costs involved, such a conclusion is fragile. Comparative data are hard to come by, but it is reported that training costs at the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) totaled US\$3,853 per participant for a five-day course excluding contributions from co-financiers (Asian Development Bank Institute 2006: 7). This figure does, however, include the costs of secondment of Asian Development Bank staff to the ADBI.

3.2.28 A related issue is that of the cost/benefit ratio to the three partner institutions. It is argued that the existence of the JAI allows the partner institutions to benefit from economies of scale, in that the JAI provides a common training center for all three institutions and that otherwise each would have to provide its own. Over the lifetime of the JAI, unit costs have fallen as the number of participants has risen, partly as a result of lower overhead costs per participant.

3.2.29 The lack of clarity in the financial records of the JAI (see above 3.2.14) and the absence of any attempt to estimate the real costs of its activities reinforce a picture of a poorly organized institution.

### ***Overall Efficiency***

3.2.30 In some respects the JAI has maintained an admirable measure of efficiency. Overall, training events have been run in an efficient fashion and there is evidence that strenuous attempts have been made to control costs. Yet at the same time there have been major problems. Record keeping has been poor, which has made estimates of financial efficiency difficult to assess. Pedagogically there are major weaknesses relating to the lack of a firm definition of training outcomes and the absence of any mechanisms providing feedback into course design and delivery. Overall it has to be concluded that the JAI could have been run in a much more efficient manner.

### **3.3 Effectiveness**

3.3.1 One of the key objectives in setting up the JAI, at least as far as the AfDB was concerned, was to create a synergy between the three partners which would result in something greater than the sum of the parts. The JAI has not been effective in developing this synergy largely because it is structured in such a way that the separate interests of the three partner organizations determine the nature and content of the training offered. “Partnerships” in the JAI context involve little more than a division of labor and not the generation of a supra-entity that transcends the separate interests and identities of the three organizations involved.

3.3.2 Turning to the training itself, was the training provided through the JAI effective in achieving the transfer of desired forms of knowledge and skills? Given that there was no general attempt to define desired training outcomes and no systematic means of assessing whether or not these (undefined) training outcomes had been achieved, it is impossible to make any comprehensive judgment in this respect.

3.3.3 The only direct evidence relating to training effectiveness consists of end-of-event questionnaires completed by participants. These uniformly indicate a very high level of satisfaction with the training received and a widespread claim that their training is highly relevant to their professional lives. There is little difference in the responses from participants in training events run by different partners.

3.3.4 Overall, it appears that the training events organized by the IMF have been most effective because of the “virtuous circle” linking course content, training methods, and the objectives of the IMF. Thus some participants remarked that they are now in a better position to deal with their IMF counterparts and to meet IMF reporting requirements. This is supported by evidence from surveys commissioned by the IMF of their global training activities. These indicate not only that participants in IMF courses considered that they had gained new skills and improved their ability to formulate and implement policy, but that many had been given added responsibility and gained promotion. However, some participants commented that courses were too short to be truly effective.

3.3.5 The training events sponsored by the WB and the AfDB reveal varying effectiveness. It is clear that participants in these events did gain knowledge and experience, but the lack of any definition of training outcomes and systematic indicators against which effectiveness could be

measured is even more marked. Individuals who attended WB and AfDB training events, for instance those concerned with franchising and the role of SMEs, also report that as a result, they are better equipped to carry out their professional duties.

### **3.4 The Impact of the JAI**

3.4.1 Given the time and resources at the evaluation team's disposal, it has not been possible to make a judgment on the developmental impact of the JAI. Any satisfactory analysis would involve detailed work in a number of beneficiary countries and pose major analytical issues concerning attribution, accountability, and confounding factors.

3.4.2 It is unclear how far the training received through the JAI has impacted institutional capacity in the beneficiary countries. Once again, the main exception is the training provided by the IMF. There is evidence that significant numbers of staff from individual departments have attended IMF-sponsored courses and that particular individuals have attended more than one IMF course. The result is a growth in capacity at an institutional level.

3.4.3 However, most participants in WB and AfDB training events come from a range of countries and on the whole attend only one course. It is unlikely in such circumstances that any significant input has been made in building institutional capacity in any of the beneficiary countries. There are, however, some exceptions. AfDB-sponsored courses on franchising appear to have generated considerable interest amongst participants and have led to the creation by participants of their own network of contacts and increased franchising activities in a number of countries. The WB sponsored two courses on health insurance in 2001-2002. Three-quarters of the participants on the second of these courses had attended the earlier one and were involved in drawing up the training agenda to meet their needs. Although WB country teams reported that there was little increase in the uptake of health insurance, they did report an increase in interest and plans to establish a website for the exchange of information.

3.4.4 In general, however, it appears that the AfDB and WB training events have had little institutional impact. The JAI did not take a sufficiently strategic approach to capacity development, training being treated as an isolated event rather than as part of a wider capacity-building effort involving organizational reform and the setting up of incentivization schemes. A number of participants mention such factors and the need for follow-up activities to ensure that the full potential of training events is realized. This is in line with recent thinking on the nature of capacity building, which questions whether training alone is viable as a capacity-building strategy (World Bank 2008; OECD 2006).

3.4.5 One of the original motives underlying the establishment of the JAI was to enhance training capacities within the AfDB. The idea was that the JAI would provide a forum through which training could be delivered, with AfDB personnel learning from the WB and the IMF. There is little evidence to show that this has happened. Members of staff from the operational units were involved in delivering training, but there is no evidence that this was encouraged, or that they received assistance or resources to develop these skills. Indeed, in so far as the establishment of the JAI has led to a resources being directed away from the ADI toward

supporting the JAI, it is possible that the existence of the JAI has decreased training capacities within the AfDB.

#### **4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

4.1 The evaluation comes to the following main findings:

##### ***Relevance***

- a) The relevance of the IMF courses to the needs and contexts of the intended beneficiaries is clearly established, given the linkages between IMF policy advice, support programs, and the training delivered.
- b) The training events supported by the AfDB and the WB reveal an awareness of recent changes in the development environment.
- c) There is little evidence of a systematic process of needs assessment to identify capacity-building and training priorities.
- d) There is no evidence of efforts by the JAI's OC to ensure the development and delivery of a more focused and responsive portfolio of courses and events.

##### ***Efficiency***

- e) The JAI management has been severely constrained in promoting synergistic approaches amongst the three member institutions due to the design and funding arrangements of JAI.
- f) Organizationally, the JAI appears to have been very efficient at ensuring the smooth delivery of training courses and other events.
- g) The JAI has no history of developing and applying strategic planning approaches in the development of its programs or of systematically monitoring and evaluating its overall effectiveness and impact. The JAI also appears to have had no influence on course organizers in terms of ensuring an adequate level of monitoring and evaluation of capacity-building programs.
- h) The JAI appears to have had little input into the pedagogic approaches used in the courses and events that were delivered through it. Little investment appears to have been made in seeking to use distance training approaches in order to achieve a greater impact with course resources.
- i) Assessing the cost efficiency of JAI is very problematic, due to the lack of a clear and consistent approach and the paucity of available data on full course costs. JAI's administrative and financial record-keeping processes are not of the quality required to enable effective management.
- j) JAI seems to be reasonably cost-efficient. However, costs have been assessed as high by WB and IMF at various times. This is partly explained by the high transportation costs associated with the Tunis location. Cost savings could probably be attained by running more of the JAI programs in alternative African locations.

- k) The full cost of course delivery is likely to be significantly higher than those reported by JAI, due to the fact that a number of services are provided by the member institutions (especially the AfDB) for which no charges are made.

### *Effectiveness*

- l) Contrary to original expectations, very little synergy was achieved between the institutions in the development and delivery of capacity-building activities.
- m) Evidence on effectiveness is scarce. End-of-course evaluations are positive but this does not tell us much. Beneficiaries are generally positive about the relevance and utility of the JAI activities to their professional work.<sup>9</sup>
- n) Improvements in individual capacities have been reported as a result of many of the JAI courses/events. However, we do not know if these have been of the scale and nature required to impact institutional performance.
- o) Given the scale, frequency, and type of capacity-building activities conducted by the JAI, it is unlikely that sustained capacity increases in policy development and implementation have been achieved as a result of the training events run by AfDB and WB. It is more likely however, that the IMF courses have achieved the levels of individual capacity improvement required to achieve lasting impact.

### *Impact*

- p) Lacking relevant evidence, this evaluation has been unable to establish the degree to which institutional capacities and performance in development policy-making and implementation have increased as a result of the activities of JAI.
- q) The nature of IMF policy-strengthening objectives, its trainee selection and follow-up and support processes suggest that significant impact has been achieved through IMF courses, though the extent of this is not known.
- r) For WB and AfDB courses, it is far less likely that long-lasting impact has been achieved. This is owing to the absence of pre- and post-course support processes to ensure that individual skill-development translates into institutional capacity development.
- s) There is little evidence that ADI capacity has increased significantly as a result of the JAI's work.

## **5. LESSONS LEARNED**

5.1 Much of what the JAI has done over the eight years of its existence is laudable. It has provided training to over 4,000 people and this training has in one way or another been generally relevant to the overall developmental issues facing the beneficiary countries. Yet it could have

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<sup>9</sup> Feedback from this evaluation's questionnaire has been extremely weak and thus conclusions cannot be judged as representative.

done much better, and there is a series of lessons which can be learned from the experience of the JAI. These include the following:

- a) Before training schemes similar to those of the JAI are launched, there must be a clear assessment to identify (i) the nature of developmentally significant gaps in capacity; (ii) how training might help to fill these gaps; and (iii) what sort of training might be most effective.
- b) A results-chain approach needs to be put in place in which the linkages between training activities, trained personnel, increased capacities, and developmental impacts are clearly defined.
- c) Where there is a collaborative venture involving a number of organizations, there must be clear agreement on objectives. Without this, effective and consistent cooperation among partners is difficult to obtain.
- d) Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms need to be put in place, in order to assess effectiveness and modify activities so as to increase effectiveness.
- e) Training has to be seen as only one component in an approach to capacity building that recognizes the importance of the wider institutional context in which trainees are placed, and the system of incentives which governs their own and institutional actions.
- f) To be effective, training organizations have to investigate and utilize the potential of new technologies and new methods.
- g) Without efficient and accessible records, it is extremely difficult to make judgments on efficiency. It follows that organizations cannot make cost-efficient choices in the absence of such information.
- h) Without their own financial resources, organizations dependent on external funding are unlikely to be sustainable or able to act in an independent fashion.

## **6. FUTURE OPTIONS**

6.1 Present plans envisage that the JAI will be incorporated into the ADI by January 1, 2010. Before looking at this (and other) options for the future, a more general question has to be raised: should the AfDB be involved in training and capacity building in the future, and if so, what form should this involvement take?

6.2 The emerging consensus, which is partly supported by the findings from this evaluation, is that training in itself does not lead to capacity building (see Annex 8). Rather, training should be one element in a wider approach to capacity building which involves organizational reform and the introduction of suitable incentives amongst other things. Furthermore, before embarking on capacity-building ventures, there has to be a clear identification of needs and these needs have to be prioritized. It is also becoming increasingly clear that for most forms of capacity building, the specificities of beneficiary countries have to be taken into account. And finally, there have to be clear linkages between capacity-building activities and developmental impacts.

6.3 To date, the AfDB has not developed a clear capacity-building strategy. Consequently, it is difficult to determine the future role of training within the overall range of activities undertaken by the AfDB, especially in relation to other training and capacity-building organizations active in Africa. There are three broad options for the future of the JAI:

- Incorporating the JAI into the ADI;
- Re-establishing the JAI as an autonomous capacity-building institution;
- Closing the JAI.

These are summarized in Table 3.

**Table 3: Options for the Future of the JAI**

	Option	Main Advantages	Main Disadvantages
<b>1 Incorporate the JAI into the ADI</b>			
1a	JAI and all its functions subsumed under the ADI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reduction of overheads by removing the need for independent administration</li> <li>▪ No need for complex inter-agency negotiations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Claimed lack of capacity in ADI</li> <li>▪ Lack of flexibility needed to mount a complex training program</li> </ul>
1b	JAI forming an autonomous entity within the ADI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ JAI expertise in organizing and managing training events maintained</li> <li>▪ Non-AfDB partners would continue to use JAI facilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A continuation of the problems involved in the status quo</li> </ul>
<b>2 Recreating the JAI</b>			
2a	The JAI becomes a high-level policy forum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Builds upon one area in which JAI has had a measure of success</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Would compete with existing organizations</li> </ul>
2b	The JAI as a totally autonomous capacity-building organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Independence would allow a reborn JAI to meet capacity-building needs of beneficiary countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Many existing capacity-building organizations in Africa</li> <li>▪ Major challenge in raising donor support</li> </ul>
<b>3 Closing the JAI</b>			
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Saves money and savings could allow AfDB to build ADI capacity</li> <li>▪ Allows AfDB to develop alternative capacity-building strategy in line with its country-focused approach to development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Would remove one of the major training centers in Africa</li> <li>▪ Might reduce presence of IMFI in Africa unless alternative arrangements were made.</li> </ul>

#### 6.4 Option 1: Incorporating the JAI into the ADI

6.4.1 The present plan for the future of the JAI envisages that the ADI will take over “full responsibility” for the JAI program. The advantages and disadvantages of this scenario depend on what “full responsibility” actually means.



***Option 1(a): Subsuming the JAI within the ADI***

6.4.2 One scenario is that the JAI in effect ceases to exist as an autonomous entity or at best becomes a sub-unit within the ADI. This would reduce the overhead costs of running the JAI by removing or reducing the need for a dedicated administrative organization, the hidden costs of the OC etc. In this scenario the IMF (and possibly the WB) would continue to offer its courses through the ADI. At the same time, the ADI would organize its own training events calling on the resources of the AfDB, and would also presumably take the lead in organizing joint training events.

6.4.3 This scenario has been extensively criticized, most notably by the ex-Director of the JAI, on the grounds that much of the success and efficiency of the JAI has depended on its flexibility and autonomous status free from the bureaucratic procedures of the AfDB. Loss of this independent status would eventually, it is claimed, lead the IMF to cease channeling its courses through the JAI and thus much of the *raison d'être* of the JAI would disappear.

6.4.4 This pessimistic view of the ADI is supported by the report of the recent WB Reconnaissance Mission, which concludes that in the period 2007-2009 the ADI, with limited capacity, should concentrate its efforts on training relating to procurement and AfDB project implementation work. As it presently stands, it appears that the ADI lacks sufficient organizational capacity to support the logistical and other requirements for mounting successful training events on a significant scale. Furthermore, the record of the ADI as a training event provider to the JAI has not been good. Informal comments indicate that the main catalyst for such events came from successive JAI directors in direct collaboration with AfDB staff in the Operations Departments.

6.4.5 In sum, the disadvantages of this scenario almost certainly outweigh its advantages.

***Option 1(b): Establishing the JAI as an Autonomous Unit within the ADI***

6.4.6 An alternative scenario is for the JAI to come under the wing of the ADI, but in such a way as to recognize, protect, and even increase the JAI's level of operational autonomy. So even if the ADI were to become "fully responsible" for the JAI, there would be sufficient "operational flexibility" – sufficient devolution of powers, authority, and competencies – for the JAI to continue to act as an independent and efficient organizer of the logistical and administrative aspects of training events.

6.4.7 Such a scenario has some advantages, notably that it would ensure continuity of what is perhaps the most valuable aspect of the JAI, namely its organizational and logistical experience in running training events successfully. This would encourage the IMF to continue to mount its courses through an AfDB-based JAI and also encourage new training events to be generated within the AfDB as well as joint events involving a number of agencies.

6.4.8 The major disadvantage of this proposal as a continuation of the status quo, is that it would require a separate administration and some sort of successor to the present OC, with significant resource implications. Whilst notionally part of the ADI, the unit would in effect be

independent, a recipe for administrative confusion and dissension. Once more the disadvantages of this scenario outweigh the advantages.

6.4.9 This leads on to questions of how training activities would be financed under either of these scenarios. The present cost-sharing arrangements which involve the AfDB paying a considerable proportion of the costs of the IMF-sponsored courses will presumably come to an end in January 2010 and it is unclear what arrangements are envisaged for the future. The present arrangements are a major charge on the resources devoted by the AfDB to training and a decision will have to be taken as to whether the AfDB would be willing to continue supporting the IMF-sponsored courses or to support other forms of training and capacity-building. Any successor to the JAI will only be attractive to the IMF if the financial (and other) arrangements are attractive. Cost considerations and the existence of a range of other institutions in Africa which could provide facilities for such courses might well attract the IMF away from Tunis, which it already views as an expensive venue.

## **6.5 Option 2: Recreating the JAI**

6.5.1 A second option which has been suggested to the evaluation team involves recreating the JAI not as a service provider but as an autonomous institution delivering its own programs tailored to meet capacity-building needs in Africa. This would involve not only the AfDB, IMF, and WB but other donors with a shared developmental interest.

6.5.2 Here the key would be that the reborn JAI would be independent, identifying training needs, designing its own events and using its own funds to bring together expertise from a range of institutions. Thus the idea of “synergy,” which informed the origins of the JAI, could more truly be realized and the JAI could move beyond serving as a vehicle for other agencies. Such a vision does seem to have informed some aspects of the JAI in the past – for instance, the attempts to create a Trust Fund whereby the JAI could support its own initiatives. This second option would involve the revival of this concept.

6.5.3 There are two non-exclusive potential areas of activity focus for a revived JAI: very high-level policymakers on the one hand and middle-ranking policymakers, managers and implementers on the other.

### ***Option 2(a): The JAI as a High-level Policy Forum***

6.5.4 The JAI has proved successful in the past in organizing high-level seminars that bring together senior policymakers from across Africa to exchange information and views. These seminars seem to have attracted the right people and provided fora for constructive discussion. One potential role for the JAI involves building on this experience to provide an arena which could react quickly to the changing developmental environment and provide African policymakers with a forum in which high-level policy initiatives could be developed.

6.5.5 How attractive this would be to policymakers, whether donors would be willing to support such an initiative, and how far such a function is already being provided by other African

institutions remain open questions. While building on the JAI's experience, it would nevertheless face stiff competition from similar initiatives and institutions.

### ***Option 2(b): The JAI as a Totally Autonomous Organization***

6.5.6 The second, more radical focus is to build upon the JAI's past experience in mounting courses and workshops but to decouple the JAI from the three organizations that have been involved in its funding and management to date. In line with contemporary developmental thinking, this new JAI would respond to capacity-building needs as determined by beneficiary countries and would define its role not simply in terms of supplying training courses but also in post-course support and a continuing involvement in the process of capacity-building.

6.5.7 Such an institution would retain many of the virtues of the present JAI, such as the recognition of shared interests across agencies and beneficiary countries in Africa. It would also safeguard the Institute's flexibility to carry out administrative and logistical functions in an efficient and timely manner. More importantly, because it would be independent of the supporting agencies, it would be in a better position to respond to the capacity-building needs of the beneficiary countries. Finally, it would be better placed to monitor the effectiveness and impact of its activities and to ensure that they remain relevant to the changing developmental needs.

6.5.8 Whether there is room in Africa for another institution of this sort is doubtful. The Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) covers some of this ground and a more fruitful way forward might be to increase support for the ACBF rather than establish yet another capacity-building organization in Africa (see Annex 7). Alternatively, a recreated JAI could perhaps focus on areas that complement the coverage of organizations such as the ACBF.

6.5.9 So although there may be certain advantages in this recreation of the JAI, the risks would be extremely high, with doubtful prospects of success given competition from established institutions.

## **6.6 Option 3: Closing the JAI**

6.6.1 The third possibility is simply to close the JAI at the end of 2009 (i.e. the period covered by the third amendment). Given that there are now effectively only two partners involved, that very few training events are jointly sponsored, and that the JAI has been unable to create any meaningful synergy among the partners, it should be accepted that the JAI has reached the end of its useful life. If there is a demand, the courses presently offered by the partners could continue to be offered in Africa, each agency working independently of the others yet ideally coordinating their activities to avoid overlaps. These training events could be delivered through the range of alternative training and capacity-building organizations in Africa (see Annex 7) or through alternative venues. A more progressive alternative would be to integrate training and capacity-building activities into country programs and to develop more country-focused approaches to capacity-building.

6.6.2 Closing down the JAI would have certain costs and would close off certain opportunities. It would mean abandoning the project of creating enhanced coordination between development agencies and increase the risk of duplication and concentration of effort in a few areas. It would remove one of the main sources of training for development professionals in the region and destroy the potentialities that the JAI has as a focus and coordinator for professional development in Africa. And finally, it might seriously reduce the presence of the IMFI in Africa.

6.6.3 Yet this option offers clear advantages. First, it saves scarce human and financial resources. It removes the need for a specialized secretariat to handle logistics and administration, and the need for senior officials and an OC. Cross-funding and hidden costs would be eliminated. Agencies would be able to build on their own expertise and what they see as their comparative advantage, to tailor their activities to suit their particular interests, and to seek cost-efficient means of delivering training. In the case of the AfDB, funds would be freed up to support other forms of capacity-building and training, including increased resources for the long-term strengthening of the ADI.

6.6.4 Approached constructively, taking care to maximize gains and manage risks, there is much to commend this third option.

## 7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 It is **strongly recommended** that the AfDB formulate a clear and comprehensive policy on capacity building (including training) before it develops further training activities. This should link capacity-building priorities with explicit development objectives, so that training does not become an end in itself.

7.2 It is **recommended** that over the next 12 months the AfDB, in collaboration with the two other partner institutions, seriously consider future options for the JAI. These include:

- Careful consideration of the plans for the JAI to be integrated with the ADI in 2010 and achieving greater clarity as to what this will involve, in organizational and financial terms;
- Assessing the viability of a relaunched JAI with much greater autonomy to develop its own character; and
- Clearly analyzing the costs and benefits of closing the JAI at the end of 2009, with a view to maximizing potential gains and managing any negative consequences.

7.3 The policy **recommended** by the evaluation team is that the JAI should be closed down at the end of 2009 and that the AfDB should develop its own training and capacity-building activities in support of country policies and practices.

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## TERMS OF REFERENCE

### AfDB EVALUATION OF THE JOINT AFRICA INSTITUTE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CONSULTANCY SERVICES

OPEV – August 10, 2007

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#### **1. Context**

1.1 The African Development Bank (AfDB) is a multinational institution with a mandate to alleviate poverty in Africa and promote sustainable development. In 1999, the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) agreed to establish the Joint Africa Institute (JAI). They viewed the Institute as a unique opportunity to contribute to capacity development in Africa. As defined in the original Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishing the JAI, “The primary purpose of the JAI is to provide a policy-related training to selected government officials and other participants from African countries.”

1.2 The Joint Africa Institute started delivering training in November 1999 at the AfDB Headquarters in Abidjan. Initially the topics covered by JAI were macroeconomic management and policy formulation. Expanding the array of courses it offers, the JAI training now includes financial programming, monetary and exchange operations, public finance, banking supervision, monitoring and evaluation, and statistics. Courses in poverty reduction, gender, growth, environment, governance, sector-related issues, and reform policies were progressively added to the JAI training program.

1.3 The JAI is administered and governed by the three sponsoring institutions through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The first MOU was signed in April 1999 for 5 years and it expired at the end of 2004. It was then extended for one year to allow for consultations among the three sponsoring institutions regarding the management of JAI activities including cost-sharing arrangements. At the end of 2005, the MOU was extended further for another year. The new MOU has been in effect since January 1, 2007, and will expire in December 2009.

1.4 From 1999 to 2003, the JAI was physically located at the bank’s Headquarters in Abidjan, operating in close collaboration with the African Development Institute (ADI) of the Bank. Due to the civil unrest in Côte d’Ivoire and the subsequent temporary relocation of the Bank, JAI was relocated to Tunis along with other units of the Bank, and its presently occupying part of the premises of the Bank.

1.5 During its deliberations of December 2006 on the Bank support to JAI for the period 2007-2009, the Board approved a proposal for the Bank to continue to support the JAI and to sign the third amendment to the JAI MOU for the following three years (2007-2009). The Board of Directors directed also the Bank’s Management to “initiate a detailed evaluation of the activities of the JAI and submit a proposal to the Board of Directors on the future of the JAI beyond the period of the duration of the JAI MOU.”

1.6 During the discussions during the third amendment of the MOU, the three partners agreed that at the end of this extension period (2007-2009), AfDB would assume full responsibility for the Management of the JAI.

1.7 According to the original MOU, a review of the JAI operations by each of the three institutions was planned at the end of the first 5-year period (1999-2004). However, an amendment was made postponing by one year the date for the review of JAI operations. The IMF and the WB conducted their reviews of JAI operations in 2005 while the AfDB has taken the opportunity of the last amendment to initiate the proposed AfDB evaluation study of the JAI activities.

1.8 A team of two international consultants is now required to undertake the evaluation.

## **2. Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation**

2.1 The overall purpose of the evaluation is to provide sound evidence contributing to policy and planning with regard to capacity building in Africa; and in particular to inform decisions about the future of JAI and similar capacity-building initiatives.

2.2 The specific objectives of the evaluation are to assess the performance of the JAI in terms of its relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency in delivering policy-related training services and its contribution to building the capacity of African institutions. As far as possible, indications of the development impact and sustainability of JAI's work should also be identified, including the financial sustainability of its services. The evaluation will also assess the organizational effectiveness of the JAI and any competitive advantage it may have within the current management and resources context.

2.3 The evaluation will cover all JAI activities since inception and will pay particular attention to assessing the experiences and benefits of the JAI as a formalized partnership between the three member institutions in terms of synergies, complementarities etc.

## **3. Main Evaluation Questions**

The major evaluation questions should include the following:

### **Relevance**

- a) To what extent have the objectives and activities of the JAI been relevant to the priority needs of the intended beneficiary countries in terms of poverty reduction, sustainable development, economic growth, and governance?

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

- b) To what extent has the JAI achieved its objectives? What were the critical factors associated with this?
- c) How cost-effective and efficient has the JAI been in the achievement of these results?
- d) To what extent does the JAI appear to have used the most appropriate approaches to achieve its capacity-building objectives?
- e) Is the JAI's current institutional format the most appropriate one for achieving its stated aims? If not, what alternatives should be considered by the three collaborating institutions for the future?

**Impact and Sustainability**

- f) What overall impact does the JAI appear to have had both within beneficiary countries and within the collaborating institutions?
- g) How sustainable do the capacity-development benefits delivered by the JAI appear to have been? What are the main explanatory factors for this and what are the implications for the JAI and the way it operates?

**“Jointness” and Partnership**

- h) Did the partnership function as originally envisioned in the MOU and promote joint work and synergy between the three institutions?
- i) What were the difficulties or constraints affecting the partnership, and how were they managed or resolved?
- j) What influence, if any, has the JAI had on the regular capacity-building work, or any other aspect, of the AfDB, IMF, and WB?

**Program Development Processes**

- k) Were the JAI program development processes sufficiently consultative and responsive to the needs of its intended clients?
- l) How open, fair and transparent has JAI been in its selection of both beneficiary organizations and individual participants for its courses? Has adequate attention been given to questions of gender and diversity as well as the balance between government and non-government beneficiaries?
- m) To what extent did the JAI have an adequate and functional performance monitoring and evaluation system in place? To what extent do JAI’s planning and program development processes appear to have benefited from M&E results?

**Governance and General Management**

- n) How effective and efficient have the JAI’s governance and operational management arrangements been? How have the three institutions (and particularly the AfDB) participated in these?
- o) How have the wider institutional setting and specific governance arrangements affected JAI’s performance?

**Resourcing**

- p) Were JAI activities adequately staffed and resourced by the partner organizations? Has sufficient attention been given to sustainability aspects?

**Lessons**

- q) Based on the JAI experiences to date, what are the lessons for the JAI and its three sponsoring institutions regarding how to best address the challenges of policy-related capacity building in Africa in the future? Are there wider lessons for capacity building in Africa?



#### **4. Tasks to be Performed by the Consultant**

4.1 The tasks to be performed by the consultants are the following:

- (i) Collate and review relevant documentation relating to JAI (including plans, reports, financial reports, performance reviews, course materials and evaluations etc.) and documents relating to other relevant capacity-building initiatives in Africa.
- (ii) Consultation with JAI staff, representatives of the 3 institutions, partner organizations and individual consultants involved in course design and delivery.
- (iii) Consultations with course participants and representatives of participants' institutions for a sample of courses.<sup>10</sup>
- (iv) Consultations with a small selection of institutions delivering similar kinds of courses to similar types of beneficiary institutions in Africa.

4.2 The consultants will split their work time between Tunis and their home bases. Electronic and telephone communications and much of the desk-based work will be conducted from their home bases.

#### **5. Reporting**

5.1 The consultant(s) will report to the Task Manager, Mr. Antony Curran (Senior Evaluator, OPEV).

5.2 The consultant(s) will deliver the following outputs:

- (i) An inception report (within 5 working days of beginning the assignment) presenting the outline and structure of the final report together with a description of the approach of the evaluation, including the main activities to be conducted and a schedule. The Task Manager will authorize further work on this basis.
- (ii) A brief PowerPoint presentation of the main findings of the evaluation (within 20 working days of beginning the assignment).
- (iii) A draft final report (within 25 working days of beginning the assignment).
- (iv) A final report (within 30 working days of beginning the assignment).

5.3 The final report (excluding annexes) should not exceed 25 pages including sheets and tables.

#### **6. Timing**

6.1 The assignment duration is set for thirty (30) working days (or six weeks). The final report should be completed by November 30, 2007.

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1. This would be done via telephone, e-mail and possibly video-conference and not through conducting field visits.

## **7. Evaluation Team**

7.1 The evaluation team will consist of two international consultants with extensive experience of the development and delivery of capacity-development programs for African development institutions and good knowledge of governance and economic reform programs. They will also have substantial program evaluation experience. At least one of the consultants should be fully functional in the French language.

7.2 The contracted consultants will be provided with the service of an OPEV research assistant who will be available on a part-time basis to provide support with document retrieval, basic data analysis, communications etc.

## **8. Obligations**

### ***Obligation of the Consultant***

8.1 The selected individual consultant(s) shall take all the necessary steps to ensure that the entrusted task is executed properly and on schedule in accordance with the established terms of reference. The selected consultant shall:

- Undertake to perform the task in accordance with the terms of reference and according to internationally accepted standards;
- Maintain a complete list of sources of information used, and surrender all documents to the Bank at the end of the study.

### ***Obligation of the AfDB***

8.2 The AfDB shall provide the consultant(s) with available documents and reports including background review notes on the JAI activities and operations, etc. The Bank shall also facilitate contacts with the WB and IMF and other partner institutions as well as access to Bank's databases and any information essential to the proper conduct of the assignment.

## **METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES**

### ***Introduction***

1. The data have been approached in terms of the DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance with the proviso that little has been said about sustainability and much more about organizational factors. In order to avoid many of the problems associated with attempting to identify attribution in approaches such as “theory based evaluation” and the use of “scientific” methods of evaluation, this evaluation takes as its point of reference notions and standards of “best practice” amongst contemporary agencies as well as contemporary thinking on how training can be associated with the achievement of developmental objectives (AfDB 2004).
2. As originally conceived, this evaluation was to be based on four sources of information:
  - Documentary and electronic material relating to wider issues of training and capacity building in the context of development;
  - Documentary material relating directly to the JAI;
  - Interviews with key players involved in the JAI and those in the AfDB whose work interfaced with the JAI; and
  - Survey data concerning participants in JAI courses.
3. Whilst the evaluators were able to realize the first three sources of data, they were unable to obtain a satisfactory response from participants in JAI courses.

### ***Documentary material on general issues pertaining to capacity building and training***

4. The evaluation team reviewed recent reports regarding training and capacity building produced by such agencies as the OECD, WB, DFID, and UNDP. This provided the broad background of emerging “best practice” in capacity building, against which the performance of the JAI could be compared.

### ***Documentary evidence relating to the functioning of the JAI***

5. The evaluation team was provided with a full set of activity reports and minutes from the OC. In addition, the evaluation team perused the foundational documents of the JAI, the terms of reference of the professional staff of the JAI, and the various amendments to the MOU establishing the JAI. In addition, the evaluation reports produced by the WBI and the IMF of the JAI were made available to the team as were various documents pertaining to the future of the JAI and its relationship with the ADI.
6. The evaluation team also had access to the records of the JAI covering the financial arrangements of the JAI and lists of participants in training events sponsored by the JAI. Unfortunately there were some major problems in analyzing these data. Financial matters had not been recorded in a consistent fashion and data on participants were generally held in a form which made analysis prohibitively expensive and time consuming.

7. The evaluation team also examined a small sample of training materials used on JAI courses.

*Interviews with key players*

8. The evaluation team sought interviews with past directors of the JAI, members of the OC, individuals who had been involved in training activities, and AfDB staff who had an interest in the past performance and future status of the JAI. In the majority of cases, requests for interviews were granted. These interviews focused on the management and performance of the JAI, the definition of its role, and the degree to which it had attained its objectives.

*Survey data*

9. The original strategy was that data held by the JAI would be used to provide the email addresses of all participants in training events and that they all would be sent a short questionnaire which would be used as the basis for follow-up telephone interviews with a smaller sample of participants and their supervising officers. However, once the data were located, it was discovered that most information was held in the form of Word files rather than Excel files. This proved a major logistical problem in that all the information in the files could only be extracted manually and time and costs constraints made such an approach nonviable. It also meant that data on the gender of participants and their country locations were not easily accessible.

10. It was then decided to focus effort on a sample of 15 training events chosen to reflect the relative inputs of the three partner organizations. Questionnaires were sent by email to all 530 participants in these training events but this effort elicited only 15 responses. At this point an attempt was made to retrieve the situation. Attempts were made to contact those who had not responded but this led to the realization that few of the contact numbers given actually led directly to the participant, and that even when they did, there were further difficulties in locating the participants despite continuing efforts.

11. Eventually, it was decided that this aspect of the evaluation had to be abandoned. It was decided that the costs and time involved were unlikely to produce a satisfactory and robust set of data. Under 30 satisfactory responses were obtained – out of a total of over 4,000 participants!

12. The low rate of response is not unusual in such circumstances. Thus the WB evaluation of capacity building in Africa was only able to achieve a 19% response rate in their survey sent out to WB and WBI staff in Africa. In the case of the JAI, it would probably have been more effective if the focus had been on country rather than training event, but even then, the quality of the data held by the JAI is such that identifying individuals would have been extremely difficult.

**LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED**

Karin Millet	Ex-Director, JAI; WBI
Peter Isard	Member OC; IMFI
Frannie Leautier	Ex-VP, WBI
Marc Quintyn	IMF
Reza Vaez-Zadeh	Director, JAI
Alex Mourmouros	Acting Director, JAI
Raja Gara	Administrator, JAI
Guy Darlan	WBI
Françoise Le Gall	IMF
Louis Kasekende	Chief Economist, AfDB
Issiaka Zoungran	Principal Training Officer, AfDB
Richard Dewdney	Executive Director, AfDB
Ibrahima Diallo	African Development Institute, AfDB
Mohammed Manai	Chief Evaluation Officer, OPEV, AfDB
Peninah Kariuki	Country Economist (Tanzania), AfDB
Mohammed Kisubi	Divisional Manager, Training and Staff Development, AfDB
Hailu Mekonnen	Chief Poverty Reduction Specialist, AfDB
Bola Elegbe	Lead Capacity Building Expert, AfDB
Temitope Oshikoya	Director, Development Research Department, AfDB

## **COMMENTS ON THE MOU AND LATER AMENDMENTS**

### **1. Service provider or proactive agent?**

1.1 The original MOU was signed on April 25, 1999. Paragraph 3 of the MOU states that:  
*“Each partner institution, or the institutions concerned in the case of joint offerings, will be responsible for preparing and delivering its or their respective courses/seminars and for selecting the participants.”*

1.2 This would appear to imply that the JAI is little more than a service provider and indeed in the MOU the only mention of a greater role for the JAI is through its function in deciding the ‘learning program’ (paragraph 4). But at the same time, the TOR for the Director and Chief Economist Officer of the JAI imply something rather different. Thus the TOR for the Director includes:

- a) Ensuring that the training provided through the JAI is of the highest quality;
- b) Ensuring gender balance in the trainees of the JAI;
- c) Mobilizing resources from bilateral donors and other participating institutions for the activities and training program of the Joint Institute;
- d) Liaising with the governments of regional member countries of the African Development Bank to ensure that the training program of the Institute is in line with the needs of these countries.

1.3 The responsibilities of the Chief Economist Officer echo those of the Director but also outline other duties, including:

- a) Overseeing the selection process of trainees to ensure that the selected target group is selected and that there is gender and regional balance;
- b) Establishing mechanisms for the evaluation of the training program of the Institute to enable its continuous improvement;
- c) Establishing mechanisms to allow for the design and delivery of joint training courses, seminars, and workshops by the three sponsoring institutions.

1.4 In practice, the JAI has followed the strict wording of the MOU and has been little more than a service provider.

### **2. Cost sharing**

2.1 The original MOU outlined the cost-sharing arrangements thus:

- a) The AfDB to provide premises for the JAI including offices and accommodation;

- b) The costs of participants' travel and accommodation to be shared equally between the three partner organizations;
- c) The partner institutions to be responsible for the salaries etc. associated with their appointees to the JAI and of the costs of their staff involved in the training events.

2.2 The second amendment to the MOU signed in January 2006 altered the arrangements so that the WB was no longer part of the cost-sharing arrangements. It was now responsible only for the costs of participants attending the courses it sponsored, with the IMF and the AfDB sharing costs equally for all the courses they sponsored. However, the WB remained responsible for the salary costs of its nominees to posts within the JAI.

2.3 The third amendment, dated February 2007, further modified the cost-sharing arrangements:

- a) The partner organizations remain responsible for the salary costs of their appointees to the JAI;
- b) Each partner organization is responsible for the costs of their staff involved in courses that they sponsor;
- c) For jointly organized courses and high-level seminars, costs for travel are to be borne by all three partners on an equal basis;
- d) Accommodation for participants for all courses jointly organized are to be borne by the AfDB;
- e) The AfDB is responsible for 50% of participants' costs in any IMF course run in Tunis up to a maximum of 10 per year;
- f) Individual institutions are responsible for all costs associated with courses they run by themselves – except for the 10 IMF-sponsored courses;
- g) AfDB is responsible for all local operational costs, including the costs of support staff in Tunis.

2.4 In essence, these changes reflect the declining role of the WB in the JAI coupled with a shift in the burden of costs toward the AfDB. The latter is now responsible for all the local support costs in Tunis (i.e. the costs of running the JAI), the total cost of any course it runs itself, a third share of any joint courses, and a 50% share of all IMF courses, plus the accommodation costs of participants in all jointly run courses.

**Table 5.1: Number of Participant-weeks**

<b>Sponsoring Organization(s)</b>	<b>2000<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>Total by Organization 2000-2007</b>
AfDB	118	167	59	23	160	112	141	44.2	824.2
WB	185	167	207	183	267.5	404.5	759.8	0	2,173.8
IMF	273	343	367	336	561	543	568.6	375	3,366.6
AfDB/IMF/WB	66.5	37	36	-	-	-	-	-	139.5
AfDB/WB	-	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	22
AfDB/IMF	-	-	27	-	-	-	-	-	27
<b>Annual Total</b>	<b>642.5</b>	<b>714</b>	<b>696</b>	<b>564</b>	<b>988.5</b>	<b>1,059.5</b>	<b>1,469.4</b>	<b>419.2</b>	<b>6,553.1</b>

**Notes**

<sup>a</sup> 2000 includes training courses convened during November–December 1999

<sup>b</sup> 2007 covers data for the period January–June 2007.

*Source:* JAI End of Year Reports of Activities and Expenditures.



**Table 5.2: JAI Total Budget 2000-2006 (All participants) US\$**

	2000 <sup>a</sup>	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Participants' Direct Training Costs</b>							
Travel Expenses	392,153	546,294	607,160	765,209	840,895	868,778	1,084,772
Per Diem	140,356	169,756	179,219	176,357	198,050	199,863	167,861
Health Insurance	20,928	36,901	39,358	11,970	36,392	40,899	32,484
Accommodation and board	331,959	363,437	418,598	306,949	540,039	542,821	498,831
Social Activities	39,564	39,314	54,492	93,864	108,382	88,827	74,076
Operational Cost				896		10,770	
Training Rooms, equipment, technician documentation/material, press conference	32,404	29,711	39,285	88,688	194,054	216,264	71,256
Interpreters	-	-	-	-	-	27,350	66,343
Resource persons	39,942	75,541	89,073	80,131	219,972	142,301	172,618
Miscellaneous (transportation, group photo)	10,591	6,676	38,328	57,051	17,508	50,097	16,917
<b>Total Direct Training Costs</b>	<b>1,007,897</b>	<b>1,267,630</b>	<b>1,465,513</b>	<b>1,581,115</b>	<b>2,155,292</b>	<b>2,187,970</b>	<b>2,185,158</b>
<b>Direct Operating Costs<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>52,909</b>	<b>84,668</b>	<b>45,103</b>	<b>36,074</b>	<b>98,835</b>	<b>28,419</b>	<b>61,793</b>

	2000 <sup>a</sup>	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Total Direct Costs</b>	<b>1,060,806</b>	<b>1,352,298</b>	<b>1,510,616</b>	<b>1,617,189</b>	<b>2,254,127</b>	<b>2,216,389</b>	<b>2,246,951</b>
<b>Overhead Costs</b>							
<i>Salaries (net)</i>	657,500	690,375	724,894	807,443	847,816	941,258	988,321
<i>Infrastructure</i>	149,950	152,949	156,008	159,128	162,311	165,557	168,868
<b>Total Overhead Costs</b>	<b>807,450</b>	<b>843,324</b>	<b>880,902</b>	<b>966,571</b>	<b>1,010,127</b>	<b>1,106,815</b>	<b>1,157,189</b>
<b>Total JAI Annual Costs</b>	<b>1,868,256</b>	<b>2,195,622</b>	<b>2,391,518</b>	<b>2,583,760</b>	<b>3,264,254</b>	<b>3,323,204</b>	<b>3,404,140</b>

**Notes**

<sup>a</sup> 2000 includes training courses convened during November–December 1999

Source: JAI End of Year Reports of Activities and Expenditures

**Table 5.3: Individual Participant Costs (by Participant-week)**

	2000 <sup>a</sup>	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Training Events	11	14	14	14	20	23	21
Training Weeks	19.5	21	22	20	31.5	31.7	31.4
Number of Participants	451	485	441	389	626	854	802
Participant-weeks	642.5	714	696	564	988.5	1059.5	1469.4
Travel Expenses (by participants weeks)	610.36	765.12	872.36	1,356.75	850.68	819.99	738.24
Accommodation (by participants weeks)	516.67	509.02	601.43	544.24	546.32	512.34	339.48
Total Direct Participant Costs <sup>b</sup> (US\$)	1,060,806	1,352,298	1,510,616	1,617,189	2,254,127	2,216,389	2,246,951
Total Overhead Costs (US\$)	807,450	843,324	880,902	966,571	1,010,127	1,106,815	1,157,189
Total JAI Costs (US\$)	1,868,256	2,195,622	2,391,518	2,583,760	3,264,254	3,323,204	3,404,140
Total Direct Participants' Cost/ Participant-Week (US\$)	<b>1,651</b>	<b>1,894</b>	<b>2,170</b>	<b>2,867</b>	<b>2,280</b>	<b>2,092</b>	<b>1,529</b>
Total Overhead Costs <sup>c</sup> / Participant Weeks (US\$)	<b>1,257</b>	<b>1,181</b>	<b>1,266</b>	<b>1,714</b>	<b>1,022</b>	<b>1,045</b>	<b>788</b>
Total JAI Costs/ Participant Weeks (US\$)	<b>2,908</b>	<b>3,075</b>	<b>3,436</b>	<b>4,581</b>	<b>3,302</b>	<b>3,137</b>	<b>2,317</b>

**Notes**

<sup>a</sup> 2000 includes training courses convened during November-December 1999

<sup>b</sup> See Annex 2 table 1, for full details on participants direct cost

<sup>c</sup> Overhead costs include the costs of staff salaries and infrastructure.

Source: JAI End of Year Reports of Activities and Expenditures

**Table 5.4: Sponsoring Organizations' Total Contribution to Participants' Direct Operational Cost**

<b>Sponsoring Organization Direct Cost</b>	<b>2000<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
IMF-Training cost	443,498	629,407	658,820	895,795	925,319	977,111	1,214,337
AfDB-Training cost	172,732	318,606	194,282	107,045	390,432	341,452	576,288
WB-Training cost	293,205	229,492	350,526	493,637	839,541	505,919	81,687
AfDB/IMF/WB-Training cost	98,460	90,123	100,955	-	-	-	-
AfDB/WB-Training cost	-	-	-	84,639	-	259,931	312,845
AfDB/IMF-Training cost	-	-	160,931	-	-	-	-
Other operating cost	52,909	84,668	45,103	36,074	98,835	28,419	61,793
<b>Total participants' direct cost</b>	<b>1,060,806</b>	<b>1,352,296</b>	<b>1,510,617</b>	<b>1,617,190</b>	<b>2,254,127</b>	<b>2,112,832</b>	<b>2,246,950</b>

**Notes**

<sup>a</sup> 2000 includes training courses convened during October–December 1999

Source: JAI End of Year Reports of Activities and Expenditures.

**Table 5.5: Sponsoring Organizations Contribution to Participants' Direct Operational Cost (unit cost per participant-week) US\$**

Sponsoring Organization	2000 <sup>a</sup>	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
IMF	1,625	1,835	1,795	2,666	1,649	1,799	2,136
AfDB	1,464	1,908	3,293	4,654	2,440	3,049	4,087
WB	1,585	1,374	1,693	2,697	3,138	1,251	-
AfDB/IMF/WB	1,481	2,436	2,804	-	-	-	-
AfDB/WB	-	-	-	3,847	-	-	-
AfDB/IMF	-	-	5,960	-	-	-	-
<b>Total participants' direct cost</b>	1,651	1,894	2,170	2,867	2,280	2,092	1,529

**Notes**

<sup>a</sup> 2000 includes training courses convened during October –December 1999.

Source: JAI End of Year Reports of Activities and Expenditures.

**Table 5.6: Sponsoring Organizations' Contribution to Participants' Direct Operational Cost (%)**

<b>Sponsoring Organizations' Direct Cost</b>	<b>2000<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>% Average Cost 2000-2006</b>
IMF-Training cost	43%	49%	45%	56%	43%	47%	55%	48%
AfDB-Training cost	18%	26%	14%	7%	19%	17%	27%	18%
WB-Training cost	29%	19%	24%	31%	39%	24%	5%	24%
AfDB/IMF/WB-Training cost	9%	7%	7%	-	-	-	-	2%
AfDB/WB-Training cost	-	-	-	5%	-	12%	14%	5%
AfDB/IMF-Training cost	-	-	11%	-	-	-	-	1%

**Notes**

<sup>a</sup> 2000 includes training courses convened during October–December 1999.

Source: JAI End of Year Reports of Activities and Expenditures.

**LIST OF JAI COURSES PER YEAR**

<b>LIST OF COURSES OFFERED BY INSTITUTIONS</b>		<b>70</b>		<b>27</b>		<b>30</b>
<b>1999-00</b>						
	<b><u>IMF</u></b>		<b><u>AfDB</u></b>		<b><u>WB</u></b>	
	Money and Banking Statistics	1	Restructuring and Privatization of Public Enterprises	1	Policy Institutional Reforms for Sustainable Development	1
	Financial Programming and Policies	1	Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation	1	Governance, Transparency and the Media for a Sustainable Economic Development	1
	Banking Supervision -On-site Supervision	1			Macroeconomic Management: Current Policy Issues and Quantitative Methods	1
	Public Finance	1				
	Monetary Operation	1				
	<b><u>Joint AfDB/IMF/WB</u></b>					
	Inaugural Seminar	1	Governance and Economic Growth			
	<b><u>IMF</u></b>		<b><u>AfDB</u></b>		<b><u>WB</u></b>	
<b>2001</b>	Value Added Taxation	1	Post Privatization and Regulation	1	Social Health Insurance	1
	Foreign Exchange Policies and Operations	1	Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction	1	Capacity Building for Oversight and Watchdog Institutions	1
	Money and Banking Statistics	1	Governance and Economic Growth	1	Quantitative Macroeconomics Analysis for Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies	1
	HL Seminar: Globalization and Africa	1				
	Banking Supervision - Off-site Supervision	1				
	Financial Programming and Policies	1				
	Government Expenditure Policy and Public Expenditure Management	1				

<b>2001</b>	<b><u>AfDB/IMF/WB</u></b>					
	Poverty Reduction Strategies	1				
<b>2002</b>	<b><u>IMF</u></b>		<b><u>AfDB</u></b>		<b><u>WB</u></b>	
	Financial Programming and Policies	1	African Labor Markets and Poverty Reduction	1	Health Insurance	1
	Balance of Payment Statistics	1	Financial Sector Development and Reform (cancelled)	0	Health Insurance II	1
	Money and Banking Statistics	1	Poverty Reduction, Design and Monitoring of PRSPs	1	Quantitative Macroeconomic Analysis for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies	1
	Fiscal Management	1			Project Appraisal, Monitoring and Evaluation	1
	Banking Supervision Off-site	1				
	Financial Programming and Policies II	1				
	<b><u>AfDB/IMF/WB</u></b>					
	Poverty Reduction Strategies	1				
	<b><u>AfDB/IMF</u></b>					
	HL on NEPAD	1				
<b>2003</b>	<b><u>IMF</u></b>		<b><u>AfDB</u></b>		<b><u>WB</u></b>	
	Financial Programming and Policies	1	Challenges of Rural Development	1	Health Insurance	1
	Tax Policy and Administration	1			Health Insurance	1
	Fiscal Management	1			Quantitative Macroeconomics	1
	Safeguard Assessment of Central Banks	1			Macroeconomic Management	1
	Financial Programming and Policies	1				
	Macroeconomic Forecasting	1				
	Financial Soundness Indicators	1				
	HL Seminar on Financial Integration in Africa	1				



	<b><u>AfDB/WB</u></b>					
	Poverty Reduction Strategies	1				
<b>2004</b>	<b><u>IMF</u></b>		<b><u>AfDB</u></b>		<b><u>WB</u></b>	
	Financial Programming and Policies	1	The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Regional Integration	1	Assurance of Quality of Project/Program Design and Implementation in Africa	1
	Balance of Payments Statistics	1	Treasury and Risk Management Tools	1	From Project Finance to Public Private Partnership	1
	Financial Programming and Policies	1	Development of SME	1	Public-Private Partnerships and Regulation in Transport Infrastructure	1
	Financial Programming and Policies	1	Risk Management	1	The Coverage of Health Risks in Francophone Africa	1
	Payment Systems	1	Franchising within an SME Development Strategy	1	Quantitative macroeconomic Analysis for Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction	1
	Expenditure and Policy Management	1			Workforce Policies in Health Sector	1
	Financial Programming and Policies	1				
	Government Finance Statistics	1				
	Monetary and Financial Statistics: compilation and reporting issues	1				
<b>2005</b>	<b><u>IMF</u></b>		<b><u>AfDB</u></b>		<b><u>WB</u></b>	
	Financial Programming and Policies	1	Development Evaluation	1	Assurance of Quality of Project/Program Design and Implementation in Africa	1
	Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal Issues	1	Decentralization for Local Governance and Service Delivery for the Poor	1	Health Insurance in Francophone Africa	1
	Monetary and Financial statistics	1	Improving Africa's place in the International Trading System	1	Knowledge, Competitiveness and Development Strategies for Maghreb Countries	1
	Financial Market Analysis	1	Promoting African Women Entrepreneurship	1	Infrastructure Reform and Utility Regulation for Media and Civil Society	1
	Safeguard Assessments of Central Banks	1	Treasury and Risk Management Tools	1	Health Sector Reform and Sustainable Financing for Portuguese Speaking Countries	1

	Legislative Drafting Workshop on the FATF Revised Recommendations and CFT	1	Franchising within SME Development Strategy	1	Accelerating and Diversifying Export Growth in Africa	1
	Monetary and Foreign Exchange operations	1				
	External Debt Statistics	1				
	Monetary and Financial Statistics Compilation and Reporting	1				
	Financial Programming and Policies (French)	1				
	Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal Issues	1				
<b>2006</b>	<b><u>IMF</u></b>		<b><u>AfDB</u></b>		<b><u>WB</u></b>	
	Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Africa Countries	1	Role of Parliament in Governance	1	Assurance of Quality Project Design and Implementation	1
	Financial Programming and Policies (English)	1	NEPAD: Infrastructure and Regional integration (HL Roundtable)	1	Local Governance and Pro-poor Outcomes (HL seminar)	1
	Realizing the Potential for Profitable Investment in Africa (HL seminar)	1	Improving Africa's Trade Position in the Global Economy	1	Conducting Hospital Reform (French)	1
	Monetary and Financial Statistics	1	Franchising within SME Development Strategy	1	Export Development E-learning	1
	Financial Programming and Policies (French)	1	Improving Governance in Africa (cancelled)	0		
	Avian Influenza Pandemic	1	Monitoring and Evaluation	1		
	Governance Finance statistics	1	Finance and Business Services for VSEs	1		
	Macroeconomic Management and Debt Issues	1				
	Assessing Loan Credit Quality	1				

	Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism	1				
	Balance of Payments Statistics	1				
<b>2007</b>	<b><u>IMF</u></b>		<b><u>AfDB</u></b>		<b><u>WB</u></b>	
	National Accounts Statistics	1	Challenges of Regional Integration	1		
	Treasury Management	1	NEPAD	1		
	Financial Programming and Policies (French)	1				
	International Trade-in-services Statistics	1				
	Using Off-site Bank Examination Information	1				
	Expenditure Policy Issues in Low-income countries	1				
	Monetary and Financial Statistics	1				
	Workshop on AML/CFT for Financial Institutions	1				

## **LIST OF TRAINING ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH CAPACITY BUILDING**

This does not claim to be a comprehensive list of the vast range of organizations active in training and capacity building; it is simply indicative of the range of organizations which are relevant to the work of the JAI.

### **(A) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

#### **1. World Bank Institute (WBI)**

1.1 The WBI started life as a training institution but has widened its remit to tackle capacity building and has moved away from a reliance on training. Presently it takes a country focus and stresses working through in-country partners. It concentrates on 45 ‘focus countries’ and the development of multi-year, country specific programs. There are strong links between its activities and WB operations and a stress on evaluating impact.

**Source: WB Operations Evaluation Department 2005. Capacity Building In Africa: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support; N. Khattri 2007. ‘Effectiveness, Outcomes and Quality of WBI’s Learning Programs: What Does Evaluation Evidence Show?’ WBI Evaluation Series EG07-128**

#### **2. IMF Institute**

2.1 The IMFI was founded in 1964 to provide economic management training to officials of IMF member countries. Besides Washington, training courses mounted in seven regional centres (including Vienna and Singapore). In Africa the IMFI collaborates with COFEB and BEAC in Francophone Africa and MEFMI and WAIFEM in Anglophone Africa. They also run independent courses in various African cities.

2.2 The Joint Vienna Institute (JVI) was in some ways the model for the JAI. It has two “primary members” (the IMFI and the Government of Austria), and four “Contributing Members” (the EBRD, the WB, the OECD and the WTO). It also receives contributions from donor countries. Courses are mounted by individual members, the IMF being the major player. There is one course mounted by the JVI itself: a 10-week course on Applied Economic Policy. Most of the courses are aimed at the emerging economies of Eastern Europe.

**Source: Joint Vienna Institute 2006. Program for 2007**

#### **3. Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI)**

3.1 The ADBI carries out both work in capacity building and research relevant to developing Member Countries. In capacity building it concentrates on four themes: poverty reduction, regional cooperation, private sector development, and governance. There is a sophisticated end-of-course evaluation system in place which involves external evaluators and focuses on such issues as achievement of course objectives. In addition there are at least four assignments per course and end-of-course tests for participants. An independent evaluation in 2005

indicated that about 74% of participants and 75% of their supervisors considered that the impact on their organizations had been “significant” or “very significant”.

Source: AfDBI 2006. Three Year Rolling Work Program 2007-2009 and Budget for 2007.

## **(B) AFRICA-BASED ORGANIZATIONS**

### **1. African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)**

The ACBF, supported amongst others by the AfDB, the WB, and UNDP, is not strictly speaking a training institution but rather supports capacity-building projects in Africa. However, it does engage in certain programs and seminars which have a training component, for instance the “Senior Policymakers and Development Managers’ Knowledge Sharing Program” and workshops such as the “International Workshop on Performance Measurement in Capacity Building”.

Source: <http://www.acbf-pact.org/index.asp>

### **2. Development Bank of Southern Africa Vulindlela Academy (DBSAVA)**

Amongst its other roles, the DBSAVA seeks to provide capacity building services to Development Finance Institutions in the SADC region and beyond. Much of its work is aimed at low- to middle-ranking officials in local and national governments but some of its courses are aimed at higher-level personnel. It receives some support from JICA and has developed partnerships with a number of Southern African Universities.

Source: <http://www.dbsa.org/Vulindlela/Pages/default.aspx>

### **3. Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI)**

As its title indicates, MEFMI concentrates on macroeconomic policy. It runs courses and workshops on a broad range of topics for middle- to senior-ranking officials. It receives financial assistance from a range of European donors and has a partnership relationship with the AfDB and the JAI.

Source: <http://www.mefmi.org/index.aspx>

### **4. The West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM)**

Founded by five West African central banks, this institute focuses on three programs: Debt Management, Financial Sector Management, and Macroeconomic Management. Whilst some of its courses are generic, a large proportion focus on particular national issues.

Source: <http://www.waifem.org/>

### **5. Centre Ouest Africain de Formation et de l’Etudes Bancaires (COFEB)**

COFEB is supported by the central banks of the West African Francophone states. It runs an ambitious 12-month Diploma course in Economics and Finance which combines theoretical and practical elements. It is clearly laid out with specific learning outcomes and their relationship to pedagogic methods.

Source:

[http://www.bceao.int/internet/bcweb.nsf/pdf/brochForDipCOFEB.pdf/\\$FILE/brochForDipCOFEB.pdf](http://www.bceao.int/internet/bcweb.nsf/pdf/brochForDipCOFEB.pdf/$FILE/brochForDipCOFEB.pdf)

**6. Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC)**

The BEAC, along with BCEAO, runs four high-level seminars a year for public sector administrators. It also participates in training programs with the IMF, the ACBF, and the AfDB.

Source: [http://www.paris21.org/Dir\\_Partners\\_06/dir\\_partners\\_06\\_beac.pdf](http://www.paris21.org/Dir_Partners_06/dir_partners_06_beac.pdf)

**7. African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)**

Based in Nairobi, this involves a network of 21 universities in 17 SSA countries. They deliver a collaborative MA program as well as Doctoral training in matters relating to economic policy. In addition they sponsor Senior Policy Seminars as well as National Policy Workshops.

Source: <http://www.aercafrica.org/home/index.asp>

**8. South African Reserve Bank College (SARB College)**

The SARB College offers courses in Central Banking and Financial Markets. The focus is on Southern Africa.

Source: <http://www.reservebank.co.za/>

**9. African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP)**

Based in Dakar, IDEP runs a Master’s program as well as a series of short courses focused on Global Issues, Sectoral Policies and Applied Quantitative Techniques.

Source: <http://www.unidep.org/>

**10. International Law Institute – African Centre for Legal Excellence (ILI-ACLE)**

Based in Uganda, ILI-ACLE runs courses on a range of legal topics including those relating to governance and development.

Source: <http://www.ili.org/uganda/home.html>

**TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING: CURRENT IDEAS ON GOOD PRACTICE**

1. In the last few years, there has been considerable rethinking concerning capacity building and the role that training might play in such activities. Key publications include:

- OECD (2006) *The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice*. DAC Guidelines and Research Series. Paris: OECD.
- World Bank (2005) *Capacity Building in Africa. An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support*. Washington: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department.
- Carlos Lopes and Thomas Thelson (2003) *Ownership, Leadership and Transformation. Can We Do Better for Capacity Development?* London: Earthscan and UNDP.

2. Although differing in detail, these and other publications share certain common features in what is emerging as “best practice” in capacity building. Common findings include:

- Training in itself does not lead to capacity building. It may increase individual capacities but there is no guarantee that training will increase institutional capacity to attain developmental goals.
- Needs assessments are essential before effective capacity-building interventions can be designed.
- Capacity building has to be viewed in terms of a country focus with a strong accent on country ownership of the process.
- Particular attention has to be paid to creating an “enabling environment” suitable incentive systems, and organizational reform.
- Training has its place but only as one element in a country-focused and country-led process of change.
- Effective monitoring and evaluation systems have to be in place to ensure that activities (e.g. training) have the desired developmental effects.

## MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE EVALUATION OF THE JOINT AFRICAN INSTITUTE (JAI)

### **Introduction**

1. In its recommendation to the Boards of Directors for continued support to the Joint Africa Institute (JAI), Management had indicated that it would carry out a thorough evaluation of the JAI and the results of the evaluation would form the basis of a proposal on the future of the Institute. The evaluation of the JAI has been carried out by a team of independent consultants under the supervision of the OPEV Department. After a careful study of the report of the evaluation, Management would like to provide its response particularly with regard to lessons learned and recommendations. Management's response focuses broadly on: objectives of JAI, its organizational and pedagogical efficiency, relevance of its training programs, effectiveness and impact of its training, lessons learned and the future of the JAI. The response concludes with some observations on the methodology of the consultants.

### **Objectives of the JAI**

2. One of the important findings of the evaluation of the JAI is that it confirmed Management's concern that the Institute has not been operating in the way and manner that could enhance complementarities and synergy. As the report rightly states, each institution has a different perception as to the role of the JAI in capacity development in Africa. These divergent perceptions have been borne out of the fact that although the original Memorandum of Understanding stated that the three institutions would cooperate in such a way as to take "full advantage of the synergies and complementarities of the three institutions", it ironically provided that each partner institution would be responsible for "preparing and delivering its or their respective courses/seminars and for selecting the participants". As the report noted, Management has consistently stressed the need for an approach that capitalizes on the "regional expertise of the AfDB coupled with the global development experience of the other two partners" – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

3. All the three partner institutions are committed to the mission and continued operation of the JAI. What they need to do will be to review the current individual approaches to the achievement of the joint and mutually agreed goals of the Institute. They would explore the possibility of having relatively more permanent cadre of training experts who will monitor the quality and effectiveness of training events, and work with partner institutions to create a common framework of the capacity development needs of African countries within which training events would be determine. The next review of the MOU would take into account any existing handicap in fostering synergy through JAI.



### **Organizational Efficiency of the JAI**

4. Management is at one with the consultants that JAI has demonstrated high level of efficiency in the organization of the various learning events conducted by the three partner institutions. Its staff has demonstrated immense organizational skills in planning and organizing the events. Undoubtedly, its administrative independence, flexibility of operations, as well as support and cooperation from organizational units in the Bank has contributed to its efficiency.

5. The consultant's view that the state of record keeping is not satisfactory is rather surprising. The financial data are recorded and maintained meticulously and provide the basis for comprehensive reports to the JAI partners twice a year. The data base on participants includes all the relevant data needed for monitoring the activities. These data have been continuously improved, despite the lack of an information technology technician on the staff of the JAI. JAI staff have, in the past few months, not only developed a program for managing data on training but compiled relevant data on previous training programs.

### **Pedagogical Efficiency**

6. The report states that JAI has employed efficient pedagogical methods in delivering training. However, overall, its pedagogical efficiency is limited due to the following factors. First, JAI had little input into the pedagogic approaches in the courses and events which were delivered through it. Second, JAI has no history of developing and applying strategic approaches to the delivery of its programs. Finally, in its current mode of operation, JAI does not do needs assessment, determine the content or curriculum of courses, develop training materials, select course participants and deliver at learning events. This is because it does not have adequate professional staff with pedagogical expertise to play these roles. These factors can hardly be attributed to the failure of the JAI or the OC. The Memorandum of Understanding clearly states that each institution will prepare, design and deliver its own courses and seminars. It is difficult to expect JAI to influence the institutions in terms of design, delivery, monitoring or evaluation of the effectiveness of its programs as each institution has autonomy in those spheres.

7. As noted above, JAI professional staff will have to be relatively permanent to ensure that they can effectively adopt and participate in a typical training cycle, which consists of training needs assessment, design, delivery of events, and evaluation of training effectiveness. Each institution would need to work more closely with JAI and allow it to manage quality into every stage of the training event.

### **Relevance of Training**

8. On the one hand the report states that training events supported by the IMF are relevant to the needs and contexts of the beneficiaries, and those conducted by AfDB and WB showed an awareness of recent changes in the development environment. On the other hand, it claims that there is no evidence that JAI Oversight Committee ensure the development and delivery of a

more “focused and responsive” portfolio of courses and events. It is difficult to reconcile this claim with the preceding assertion. Training events that reflect awareness of recent changes in the development environment and that meet the needs of beneficiaries demonstrate a pragmatic, focused and flexible approach to responding to the needs of clients.

### **Effectiveness and Impact of Training**

9. The report states that the training activities of the World Bank and African Development Bank, unlike those of the IMF, were not based on training needs assessment; specific outcomes of training were not determined and were not driven by a results-chain approach. It then concluded that the “ADB and WB training events have had little institutional impact”. In the view of the consultants, the training conducted by IMF made greater impact than those conducted by the WB and AfDB. According to them the difference in impact was due to the fact that while IMF carried out a needs assessment or creates a “virtuous circle” the other two partner institutions did not. This conclusion appears tenuous in the light of the statement in the report which indicates that “given the problems faced by the evaluation team in assessing effectiveness and impact through interviews with ex-participants and their supervisors, the approach adopted in this evaluation focuses on process rather than impacts.” It is hard to comprehend the fact that while the evaluation focused on process rather than impact, conclusions could still be reached about the impact of training!

10. None of the three partner institutions ever undertook a continent-wide structured needs assessment. The training programs proposed and conducted in JAI by the AfDB are usually based on the information provided by country operations and sector departments who have close collaboration with the RMCs and are therefore in a position to know what individual countries consider each year to be their individual capacity development needs. Such information is collated from the relevant departments and constitutes a valid basis for determining training events that would be relevant, owned by and beneficial to the clients.

11. Furthermore, if indeed there were any differential impacts of the training conducted by the respective partner institutions, the reason appears to be due more to the kind of training rather than the failure to adopt results-chain approach. IMF provides training in specific skills oriented towards the financial sector and repeats it for the same group of participants. As the training is skills-based, it emphasizes changes in individual behaviors, and therefore easy to monitor and evaluate. In contra-distinction, the training events provided by the WB and AfDB aim, as the report also confirmed, at providing knowledge for policy making, and a forum for policy dialogue and sensitization to development challenges. Their impact is more difficult to evaluate because they tend to involve institutional changes which sometimes take years to implement. JAI would establish a mechanism for systematically monitoring and evaluating how effective all its training events are in the RMCs.

12. More importantly, plans are underway by the African Development Institute to undertake a comprehensive and holistic needs assessment of the RMCs. The results will provide a framework for the capacity development programs that ADI and JAI will offer to the RMCs in the future.

### **Lessons Learned**

13. Management accepts the recommendation that there is need to include in the results-chain approach a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness and impact of the training events delivered by JAI. This is to ensure that the JAI is able to ascertain whether or not it is making any impact in the development of capacity in Africa.

14. Management also accepts the recommendation that JAI should diversify its methodology of delivering training events by adopting new technologies and methods in training. It would have to expand its distance learning program. In that way the Institute would be able to transmit knowledge to a larger pool of beneficiaries and there would be a reduction in the current heavy reliance on the traditional face-to-face class room approach.

Management agrees with the view that training should be seen as only one component in JAI's approach to capacity development and attention should be paid to the wider institutional context in which trainees operate when they return to their jobs where they are required to transfer their learning and make an impact on their organization. To that extent JAI would seek to establish a monitoring system to ascertain factors that affect the transfer of learning so that appropriate safeguards could be included in the design and delivery of learning events.

15. Management will take the necessary action to endow the JAI with adequate human and financial resources to carry out the activities mentioned above.

### **The Future of the JAI**

16. After presenting three scenarios of the possible future of the JAI the report recommended that the Institute should be "closed down at the end of 2009". The rationale is that only two partners are "now effectively" involved, and funds would be freed up to support other forms of capacity building and training activities in ADI. The reasons adduced for the "close down" of the JAI are not empirically valid and are inconsistent with the commitment of the partner institutions. The World Bank might have appeared less active in 2007 than it had been in previous years. This was due to the fact that its training institute was putting in place a new strategy on capacity development. The strategy is now in place and the WB has renewed its commitment to the JAI.

17. At a recent meeting of the Oversight Committee of the JAI members agreed not only on the continued existence of the JAI but also on ways of strengthening it and funding more training activities of the Institute. For instance, the IMF is recruiting a new Director to replace the

current incumbent who is leaving on retirement at the end of the year. The World Bank is recruiting for the position of Chief Training Economist and plans to increase the number of its annual training courses through JAI because of its new shift in strategy from country focus to global and regional partnership in capacity development.

18. The commitment of the three institutions is to model the JAI on the Joint Vienna Institute or the Singapore Training Institute. In this regard, the Oversight Committee is exploring the possibility of sourcing for funds from different agencies, including private sector organizations that are committed to capacity development in specific areas in Africa. The idea of a Trust Fund could also be explored with a view to furthering the autonomy of the JAI and ensuring that there are adequate resources to implement its mandate without total dependence reliance on funding from partner institutions.

### **Conclusion**

19. The Oversight Committee will look into some of the concerns raised in the report with a view to removing any impediments to the achievement of complementarity and synergy in working together.

20. Management notes with concern that the report has tended to evaluate individual institutions rather than the JAI, and in the process has made recommendations that appear to be outside its terms of reference. For instance, not only did it criticize the Bank for not having a capacity building policy but it also made recommendations on what the institution should do in this regard. Secondly, certain conclusions about the Bank or the ADI do not have any basis except that a previous Director of JAI expressed his/her personal opinion. For instance, the report claims that JAI could not be merged with ADI because the latter lacks sufficient organizational capacity to support the logistical and other requirements for mounting successful training events on a significant scale. The ADI conducts no less than 20 training events, (excluding those with JAI) every year and has been solely responsible for the planning and organization of all the Bank Group's Annual Meetings Ministerial Roundtable discussions and High Level Seminars. This is a huge event in which the ADI has consistently demonstrated strong organizational abilities.