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Sida Evaluation

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# Sida's TRADE-RELATED ASSISTANCE: Results and management





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This report is part of *Sida Evaluations*, a series comprising evaluations of Swedish development assistance. Sida's other series concerned with evaluations, *Sida Studies in Evaluation*, concerns methodologically oriented studies commissioned by Sida. Both series are administered by the Department for Evaluation, an independent department reporting to Sida's Director General.

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# Preface

What is the outcome of Sida's trade related support? The main approach in this evaluation is to make the most of the information that Sida is already in possession of on this topic: i.e. what information is contained in project and programme documents and in the recall of the project managers? This may seem like a rather simple exercise but proves to be quite demanding, mainly because the results information on projects and programmes is not readily available – Sida does not know what it knows. Therefore, apart from making an assessment of Sida's Trade Related Assistance (TRA) a second important objective of the evaluation is to use the TRA portfolio as a case for diagnosing Sida's results information system.

Based on the findings derived from the 20 programmes reviewed, Sida's trade related support appears to be well implemented in terms of delivering inputs and producing planned outputs. However, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions on outcomes and impacts further down the results-chain. This does not necessarily mean that the programmes have been unsuccessful. The problem is a methodological one. At project and programme level it is usually not possible to attribute higher level outcomes and impacts to Swedish contributions, and the evaluators argue that trying to do so would not be a meaningful exercise in most cases.

Existing documentation does contain plenty of information on *outputs* and the more *immediate outcomes*. From a portfolio management point of view the problem is thus not so much the lack of information, but rather that the system for handling and making use of the information is dysfunctional. Therefore the evaluation recommends that Sida's results information and management system needs to be reformed.



Joakim Molander

Head of Secretariat for Evaluation  
Sida



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# List of Acronyms

BEST	Business Environment Strengthening Programme
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
DTIS	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study
EABC	East African Business Council
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
E-doc	Sida's electronic documentation system
EPOPA	Export Promotion of organic products from Africa
ESAMI	Eastern and Southern African Management Institute
FSDT	Financial Sector Deepening Trust
GEA	Gateway East Africa
ICTSD	International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
IF	Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance
IFOAM	International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITP	International Training Programme
LDC	Least Developed Country
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
MfDR	Managing for Development Results
NALEP	National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Programme
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NIR	International Council of Swedish Industry
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSEA	Regional Co-operation for Organic Standards and Certification
PLUS	Sida's accounting and reporting system
PSD	Private Sector Development

PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RBMIS	Results-Based Management Information System
RBM	Result-Based Management
ROM	Result Oriented Management
SAPP	Southern Africa Power Pool
SiRS	Sida Rating System
SMRS	Results-Based Monitoring System
SRILAC	Sri Lanka Quality Infrastructure Development Project
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards
SSTP	South-South Trade Promotion (ITC)
STDF	Standards and Trade Development Facility
SWEDAC	Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assessment
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TCCIA	Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Trade and Agriculture
TRA	Trade-Related Assistance
TRAPCA	Trade Policy Training Centre in Africa
TRDC	Trade-Related Development Co-operation
TRS	Trade-Related Support
TTIS	Tanzania Trade Integration Study
WTO	World Trade Organization

# Executive Summary

The purpose of this evaluation is threefold: 1) to assess the outcome of Sida's Trade-Related Assistance (TRA);<sup>1</sup> 2) to assess the relevance of such assistance; and 3) to assess the appropriateness of Sida's results information system and of the management of TRA. On the last point, the evaluation should propose means to improve such a system, if possible in a generalised form. As a basis for the evaluation, twenty projects were selected as case studies including global, regional, bilateral as well as projects of different types. The selection of projects focused on the larger TRA projects in Sida's portfolio 2001–2008. The country perspective was studied for two countries, Tanzania and Uganda. The evaluation was carried out as a desk review of secondary sources of information in addition to a visit to Tanzania.

Trade-related assistance is a relatively new and expanding focus area of development assistance, and its definition is evolving. WTO's Task Force on *Aid for Trade* has defined six types of TRA, namely: (i) *trade policy and regulation*, (ii) *trade development*, (iii) *trade-related infrastructure*, (iv) *building productive capacity*, (v) *trade-related adjustment*, and (vi) *other trade-related needs*. Until recently Sida has defined trade-related assistance only for *trade and policy regulations* and *trade development* projects, and also for a small portfolio of *trade-related infrastructure* projects of more recent date. Disbursements for these categories in 2008 were about MSEK 300, representing about two percent of Sida's total disbursements. Nevertheless, there has been a steady growth of trade-related projects in Sida's operations from a level of about MSEK 100 year 2000. Global and regional programmes dominate, accounting for 70% of total disbursements (2008).

## Results

In general the projects appear to be well implemented in terms of delivering *inputs* and producing planned *outputs*. Trade education of good quality has been delivered, standards and certification systems established, accreditation institutions set up, market systems developed, etc. Beyond this, the *outcomes* of the TRA projects in terms of reaching their development objectives, such as influence on trade policy, provision of services to the trade sector, improve competitiveness and increase trade, are much less clear based on the available result-reporting from these projects. In only one of the reviewed TRA projects can we

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<sup>1</sup> The Terms of Reference for the evaluation use the term Trade-Related Support, TRS. However, the most common terminology used internationally is Trade-Related Assistance. For that purpose we have taken the liberty of using TRA also when quoting the ToR. It should be noted that Sida and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs use the term Trade-Related Development Co-operation, TRDC, but is a term less common internationally and therefore not used in this report.

conclude that the project has contributed to Sida's overriding objective, reduction of poverty. This is not because the other projects have failed or were poorly designed, but because the *causal linkages* between what the Sida projects are delivering and reduced poverty, continues to be based on a series of assumptions.

These *results-chains* have not been tested empirically in the reviewed reports, nor would such tests be possible in most of the projects. The higher in the chain of results such assessments are attempted, the greater are the problems of attribution and counterfactuals, besides the issue of time when such impact can be expected. The same analytical limitations as for poverty reduction are largely true also for the impact of TRA projects on competitiveness of local industries, trade performance, and economic growth.

### Capacity-building and institutional development

Capacity-building and institutional development are more tangible potential results of the TRA projects than trade, growth, industrial competitiveness or poverty reduction. The problems of attribution and counterfactuals tend to be fewer. The result-reporting from several of the reviewed projects shows that capacity-building seems to have been achieved or is underway.

### Results from core funding of international organisations

Several of the projects are core funding of global programmes by international organisations e.g. the World Bank, ITC and WTO or special entities set up by organisations such as the Integrated Framework (IF) and the Standards and Trade Development Fund (STDF). In these cases, Sida's allocations contribute to the financing of a large number of sub-projects and activities. While these organisations/programmes have built-in monitoring and evaluation systems of good overall quality, and while specific reporting systems and external evaluations usually are an added feature of donor support, the multitude of sub-projects and activities creates an added problem in determining results. Sida's results-reporting of these tends to be limited to judgements of how effective and efficient the organisations seem to be, sometimes complemented with an evaluation of a sample of their projects. Overall, the transparency in results-reporting of such global programmes is less than in conventional bilateral projects due to the nature of the support.

### Are the trade related projects Pro-Poor?

Of the projects assessed only a few can be considered to have a pronounced Pro-Poor orientation, while in the majority of cases no judgement can be made *ex-ante* or *ex-post*. The TRA portfolio in its totality is probably less pro-poor than the rest of Sida's work. The reason is that it has a large portion of global programmes many of which (excepting IF) are less targeted to the poorest countries

than Sida's bilateral aid. Yet, Sida in its support to global programmes, has a conscious strategy of influencing these programmes towards a greater poverty focus in their design as well as implementation.

### The cross-cutting issues

*Gender* is the mainstreaming issue given most prominence in the reviewed projects. The focus varies, however, from the gender dimension not being mentioned in design documents to efforts to push for a stronger gender focus. For multi-donor projects through international organisations, e.g. the World Bank and ITC, Sida has made the gender dimension one of the main issues for dialogue both during design and implementation.

Some of the reviewed TRA projects have a strong *environmental* dimension in the sense that they base their design on an environmental agenda. Examples include sustainable trade (ICTSD), and organic certification and market development of organic products (EPOPA). In other projects, there is no or only marginal focus on environment, a surprising finding given the importance of this issue in trade in general. Some projects address HIV/AIDS (strongly in a road safety project in southern Africa), while, with one or two exceptions, the reviewed projects do not discuss human rights/democracy.

### Relevance of Sida's trade development assistance

Sida has a strong focus on support to trade policy and regulation within the *Aid for Trade* agenda in line with Sida's Trade Policy. At the same time there is a growing awareness in the donor community that the key constraints for the poorest countries to enhance their participation in international and regional trade are often 'behind the border.' Such constraints are associated with low competitiveness, limited production capacities, weak capacity to diversify and innovate among local producers, and infrastructure deficiencies. There may be a risk of over-supply on trade policy/regulations in Sida's current TRA portfolio. Given the rapid change in the *Aid for Trade* agenda internationally, the Trade Policy of 2005 is in need of change. This will take place through the Swedish government's current work to formulate a new trade development policy.

### Country case studies

A conclusion from the Tanzanian case study is that TRA is well integrated into Sweden's country programme. Sweden, in its position as a lead donor, has a strong, instrumental role in the overall donor support in *Aid for Trade*. In Tanzania there is a critical mass in trade work, which makes Sida an effective donor. This contrasts to Uganda where, in spite of being a priority area for Swedish support, trade is a marginal form of assistance so far. Trade is a marginal form of assistance in Sida, and the required critical mass at country level seems dif-

difficult to achieve given all of the other demands and objectives of the Swedish aid except in exceptional cases (such as Tanzania).

### Sustainability, ownership and donor coordination

*Sustainability* is a complex issue to review in the portfolio due to the variety of projects. Overall, sustainability seems not to be a critical issue as most institutions that have been supported have a good self-sustaining capacity. As many of the TRA projects are global programmes implemented by international organisations, the degree of *ownership* by the recipient countries is difficult to determine. Regional TRA projects such as ECOWAS, Walvis Bay and SAPP, seem to have strong ownership exercised by their host organisations. To a large extent Sida is channelling its TRA support jointly with other donors into multi-donor projects, a factor which assures donor co-ordination. In summary, *donor co-ordination* is generally well taken care of in the reviewed projects.

## Sida's Results-Based Management Information System

Sida has adopted the Results-Based Management (RBM) concept and the relevant tools in different ways since the early 1980s. Yet, the overall impression is that results-based management is not functioning well. An example is that the application of Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) is poorly integrated into the management system. Furthermore, Sida's Rating System (SiRS), an effort to introduce a qualitative rating system of performance, never took off due to organisational resistance. Studies have argued that Sida does not have a results-oriented management culture, in spite of the substantial reporting as well as studies carried out with results-reporting as their objective. At least seen from a TRA projects perspective, Sida's project reporting system, PLUS, and its new documentation system, E-doc, leave much to be desired in terms of transparency and usefulness for management purposes. In many ways Sida's overall portfolio management system is dysfunctional, and requires urgent reform.

In general Sida has a well established and often elaborate system for results-assessments through annual reports, reviews and evaluations. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to provide critical points on this results-reporting: for example, the poor quality of much of the reporting from implementing entities (often too vague, incomplete, too late or not done); the lack of effective internal results-information systems in partner countries; the absence in evaluations of triangulations or rare discussions of counterfactuals; the limited use of baselines, and the infrequent use of LFAs in results-assessments are examples of such weaknesses. While improvements in methodology can always be done, the focus in this evaluation is instead on using the *existing* information and system much more effectively as elaborated below.

## Recommendations

Our recommendations in terms of improving on results-based management information are:

- Use information already produced by Sida, but make this information manageable by *condensation* and fit for operational use both inside and outside the organisation. For this purpose, introduce an electronic system of regularly updated *project files* with summarized relevant key project/programme information already available such as Sida's Decision Memo, summary of the Assessment Memo, an LFA, summaries of all reviews and evaluations, and a project bibliography. Combine this with continuous assessment of performance by the Sida person or team in charge of the project or programme as elaborated below.
- Use the skills and judgements of staff in Sida to provide qualitative assessments of performance and integrate these with the proposed *project files*. Such regular assessments should also include performance on cross-cutting issues.
- Adjust the LFAs to what is realistically *measurable* without major attribution problems and integrate these clearly in Sida's Assessment Memos as benchmarks. Use them systematically in project reviews and evaluations.
- Rely more systematically on *external* reviews of project results focusing on what is measurable in terms of *outcome* (avoiding often impossible impact assessments). In general, provide more resources for such external reviews as they are the only means Sida has to access independent and analytical results-information. They can have the added value of providing inputs to strengthen partner countries' results-reporting systems.
- Introduce a new element in results-assessment through a type of evaluation focused on the upper levels of the results-chain, i.e. linkages between outcomes of projects and poverty reduction. Apply these to clusters for similar projects with the purpose of testing assumptions on poverty impact and to inform policy. These evaluations, which this report calls *causality evaluations*, should take place ex-post to allow impacts to mature.
- Increase the *transparency* in the system, thereby reducing pressure on the organisation to deliver results-information through time-consuming efforts. This can be accomplished through the proposed *project file* and *rating system*, but also by placing much more of Sida's project information in the *public domain* through the Web.





# I. Introduction

Facilitating and promoting exports from developing countries is an aid form, which today is rapidly expanding. The European Community has taken a decision that its aid in this area will reach 2 billion Euros of which half will come from the individual member countries. On 1 July 2009 Sweden assumes the presidency of the EU, and is expected to have Trade Related Assistance, TRA, as one of the focus areas in its work.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in the process of developing a new policy for trade-related support to which Sida is providing inputs. The current study is a part of that work. It has been undertaken by two consultants which have extensive experience of trade-related assistance by Sida and other development organisations, but with no direct involvement in planning or implementation of any of the studied projects.<sup>3</sup>

In *Part I, Introduction*, the purpose of the assignment and some methodological aspects are highlighted, and the definition of the population of trade-related projects is discussed. In *Part II* we account for our findings with reference to achievements and performance of the assessed projects, and the topics of *cross-cutting issues* (gender, HIV/AIDS, environment and democracy/human rights), *relevance*, *ownership*, *donor coordination* and *sustainability* are reviewed. In *Part III* we turn to the discussion of a *results-based management information system* at Sida for trade-related projects and provide a series of simple and low-cost solutions to improve Sida's current system.

## 1. Purpose and Methodology

The purpose of the evaluation is threefold (our italics):

- provide results-information relevant to Sida's reporting on the *outcome*<sup>4</sup> of its TRA efforts;
- assess the *relevance* of Sida's TRA;
- assess the appropriateness of Sida's TRA *results information system* and of the management of TRA in order to contribute to enhanced management for development results in this area, but also for other areas, to the extent that it is possible to generalise from the findings.

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<sup>2</sup> For the terminology used in this report concerning trade-related assistance, see footnote in the Executive Summary

<sup>3</sup> However, a few of the assessed projects have been subject for earlier reviews by one of the authors. These projects are marked in the list of projects in Annex 1.

<sup>4</sup> The terminology used in this report is based on the official glossary issued by Sida and the Swedish government in 2007 for evaluations and result-based management. In turn, this is based on OECD/DAC terminology. For example, *results* in this report means *outputs*, *outcomes* and *impact* of a development intervention.

In total 20 projects were selected for the study with a focus on Sida's larger projects either on-going or completed after 2001. Four of these projects are *not* formally classified as trade by Sida.<sup>5</sup> The projects are listed in Annex 1. The projects cover the three categories of TRA specified in the ToR, i.e. i) *trade policy and regulation*, ii) *trade development* and iii) *trade-related infrastructure*. As the classification of TRA has been arbitrary to some extent in these three categories by Sida, we have based our analysis on the full portfolio rather than on the three categories of TRA as suggested by the ToR.

We have assessed the selected projects based on documentation available at Sida, in some cases complemented by interviews with Sida staff. We would like to stress that only secondary information has been used. The main documents consulted for the TRA project reviews are:

- Sida's Decision and Assessment Memos which outline the design of the projects, including the LEAs.
- Reviews and evaluations during implementation and after completion with the purpose of examining performance, i.e. actual outputs and achievements of objectives (outcome and impact).

In addition to these base documents, our assessment has included underlying project documents by governments or consultants, memos by Sida's Project Committee, annual reporting, narrative reports by implementing organisations, minutes from steering committee meetings and other documents on a case-by-case basis. We would like to stress that the document reviews have been quite selective as for some of these projects Sida's E-doc system non-systematically lists several hundred entries. Our assessment of the projects has followed a set format to ensure uniformity. These Project Assessment Sheets are attached in Annex 5 and should be used as reference material for the conclusions of this report. The study has also included two country studies, Tanzania and Uganda, in line with the ToR.<sup>6</sup> The case country studies were carried out on the basis of a week's field trip to Tanzania by one of us and a 'distance review' of Uganda.<sup>7</sup> For a list of documents and persons interviewed, see Annexes 6 and 7.

There is an obvious risk that any selection of projects which is not random will contain a bias of one sort or another. We have tried to compensate for this by choosing the largest projects in Sida's TRA portfolio. Thus the sample represents a major share of Sida's TRA funding 2001–2008. Furthermore, *we*, rather than Sida staff, made the final choices of projects without being acquainted with

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<sup>5</sup> The selection was not based on a random sample, as Sida's project portfolio system does not allow this for reasons discussed later in this report. Of the four 'non-TRA projects', we chose two based on our prior knowledge of these projects because we believe they are trade-related. Two were added as a result of the Tanzania case study.

<sup>6</sup> Tanzania and Uganda were also identified in two studies as those with the largest allocation of Sida funds for TRA in the mid 2000s. See Scanteam (2007): *Review of Sida support to trade in light of international experience*; (unpublished); and Andersson, J. (2007) *Review of Sida support to trade in light of international experience*, Sida.

<sup>7</sup> The reason for the latter was partly due to time constraints and partly as no specific trade projects were on-going in Uganda.

most of these projects in advance. As noted earlier, in terms of result-reporting we have been entirely dependent on available documentation. Hence the potential biases contained in such reporting have been inherited by this report.

## 2. Defining Trade-Related Assistance

### 2.1 An evolving international definition

Trade-related assistance is a relatively new and expanding focus area of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Therefore, the definition of TRA is evolving internationally especially as the *Aid for Trade* agenda is being pursued. At an international level, WTO's Task Force on Aid for Trade has defined six types of development assistance to be included, namely: (1) Trade policy and regulation; (2) Trade development; (3) Trade-related infrastructure; (4) Building productive capacity; (5) Trade-related adjustment; and (6) Other trade-related needs.

The first two of these categories represent the traditional trade-related assistance, sometimes referred to as *trade-related technical assistance and capacity building*, and reported on for some years by OECD/DAC. The definitions of the four new categories are still in a state of development. There is currently a process underway to harmonise the *Aid for Trade* definition with the OECD/DAC's classification system for ODA, the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) which donors, including Sweden, use.

### 2.2 Sida's classification of TRA

In Sida, category 1 of Aid for Trade, i.e. *trade policy and regulations*, has for some years been defined in Sida's overall portfolio of projects and registered in Sida's classification system, PLUS using OECD/DAC's CRS codes with 20 sub-categories.<sup>8</sup> Category 2, *trade development*, is in OECD's and Sida's reporting a sub-category mainly found under business support, but also under banking and financial services, agriculture, fishing, industry and tourism. Identification of such trade-related projects is still largely a manual accounting exercise in Sida. In its reporting during 2009 Sida will introduce a 'policy marker' for coding of trade development in these categories. Category 3, *trade-related infrastructure*, is a newer area in Sida's registration and reporting of TRA, requiring a manual identification of such projects recently started. A consequence of the above is that Sida only has a clearly defined portfolio of trade-related assistance for *trade and policy regulations* a less distinct portfolio of *trade development* projects and a small and so far poorly defined portfolio of *trade-related infrastructure* projects of more recent date. As discussed further below, there is certain misclassification in category 1, supporting the argument that a comparison between the three categories is not meaningful.


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<sup>8</sup> CRS codes 331xx.

### 2.3 TRA in Sida's work

Trade-related assistance is not a major area of Sida's operations. Disbursements in 2008 were about MSEK 300 for the narrowly defined TRA, i.e. the categories *trade policy and regulations* and *trade development*, representing about two percent of Sida's total disbursements this year. Nevertheless, there has been a steady expansion of TRA since 2000 as indicated in Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1. Sida Annual Disbursement in TRA (MSEK) 2000–2008**



Source: Sida's internal reporting on TRA


As shown by the figure, *trade policy and regulations* expanded rapidly until 2007, and accounted last year for slightly more than half of the total TRA disbursements.<sup>9</sup> In terms of *trade policy and regulation*, the classification system for TRA is in OECD's system limited mainly to aid in the context of WTO agreements. However, Sida has tended to include projects and programmes with little relation to *trade policy or regulation*, but which should be considered *trade development* in general. In our view, Sida is therefore over-reporting its support for *trade policy and regulation*.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of Sida's TRA in 2008. Global and regional programmes account for over 70% of the total disbursement this year, a feature which sets TRA apart from most, if not all, other Sida support. Given Sida's policy, allocation on Sub Sahara Africa is surprisingly low for bilateral projects.

<sup>9</sup> *Trade-related infrastructure* has not been recorded by Sida for these years, and therefore is not included in Sida's reporting.

<sup>10</sup> The reason for this over-reporting is that *trade policy and regulation* is the only elaborate and clearly defined CRS code for TRA in OECD and the PLUS system.

**Figure 2. Geographical Distribution of Sida's TRA in 2008, MSEK**



Source: Sida's internal reporting on TRA

## II. Results of Sida's Trade-Related Assistance

### 1. Introduction

#### 1.1 The reviewed projects

The 20 projects reviewed in this evaluation comprise a wide variety as can be seen in Annex 1. They range in size from over MSEK 150 such as the Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa (EPOPA) and the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance (IF) to less than MSEK 4 for the Regional Co-operation for Organic Standards and Certification (OSEA). There are global programmes providing core support in a multi-donor context to international organisations such as the World Bank, WTO and ITC, as well as special structures set up by these organisations such as the IF and the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF). There are 'old-style' bilateral projects implemented by consultants chosen by Sida, such as the support to Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Trade and Agriculture (TCCIA), the support of Sri Lanka Quality Infrastructure Development (SRILAC) and EPOPA. There are projects which have trade development as their sole objective, and others where trade is one of several objectives. In the portfolio of reviewed projects there are those that began in the 1990s and were carried on for 15 years for which extensive result-reporting now exists, as well as projects which were initiated only a few years ago and limited to two years, for which there is documentation only for the design and early stage implementation. These differences are important considerations in the results-analysis. The possibilities to assess results vary to a great extent with the nature of the projects, their channels of implementation and their age.

#### 1.2 General impressions

Our overall view of the portfolio is that, with few exceptions, the projects appear well implemented in terms of delivering the inputs and activities envisaged and producing the planned outputs. Sida 'has come of age' as a delivery mechanism of development assistance to judge from this sample. There are no 'rusting pumps' and no 'white elephants' in our sample, but rather a set of generally well-executed projects. Most observations for these projects are limited, however, to the *input* and *output* levels: inputs have been delivered and activities carried out as planned, (such as trade policy training courses undertaken), and

outputs have been produced (such as people successfully trained in trade policy). Based on the available results-reporting there is much less to say about the *outcome* of the TRA projects in terms of reaching their development objectives, such as influence on trade policy, providing useful services to the trade sector, etc. With few exceptions, we can say nothing about *impact*, such as influence on the competitiveness of local producers on international markets, trade patterns, economic growth, and to what extent the projects have contributed to Sida's overriding objective of reducing poverty. This is further discussed below.

## 2. Achieving the Overriding Objective: Reducing Poverty

### 2.1 Overall assessment

There is no available evidence that the reviewed TRA projects have contributed to reduction of poverty (with the exception of the EPOPA project, further discussed below). This is not because the other projects have failed or were wrongly designed. It is due to the fact that the projects are of such a nature that the causal linkages between what the Sida projects are delivering and the overriding objective of reducing poverty, are based on a series of assumptions in largely untested results-chains.<sup>11</sup> The higher in the chain one goes, the greater the problems relating to *attribution* and *counterfactuals* are. In addition, there is a time issue: actual poverty reduction, if it could be traced to a specific Sida project, is likely to be a longer-term effect. The existing result-reporting in Sida (such as reviews and evaluations), rarely or never takes place after required maturity. To a large degree, conclusions about this higher link will have to rest on assumptions and on postulates derived from theory and, in certain cases, from major analytical studies of similar projects elsewhere. Sida is not different from other donors in this respect, nor is TRA much different from other forms of economic assistance based on similar complex results-chains. In section III we discuss how a higher degree of evidence-based result-reporting could be achieved.

### 2.2 Contribution to enhancing trade, competitiveness and economic growth

To a large extent the analytical limitations discussed above concerning poverty impact are true for the impact of TRA projects at the second layers of objectives in the results-chain, i.e. trade performance and economic growth. Based

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<sup>11</sup> For example: delivered training in trade policy to officials in developing countries is assumed to result in enhanced capacity by governments in these countries to formulate more effective trade policies, a capacity which is assumed to result in implementation of such policies, which in their turn are assumed to result in better access on better terms for local producers in these countries to international or regional markets, which is assumed to result in actual increase in trade (volume, value and diversification), which is then assumed to result in improved incomes for these producers, more employment and more taxes for governments to spend on social services, leading to economic growth, all of which is assumed to result in reduction in poverty directly and indirectly.

on the results-information available for the reviewed projects, we are not able to demonstrate that these projects have had an impact on volumes, values or composition of the traded goods and services, and even less their contribution to economic growth. The exception is the EPOPA discussed below.<sup>12</sup>

In several of the assessed projects, a parallel *decline* in market development and trade occurred while the projects were ongoing. For example, during the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) a rapid decline in regional energy trading occurred during project implementation to such an extent that at project completion, there was no regional day-trading market left. This had nothing to do with the project as such, but to an exogenous factor: the national demand for electricity increasingly outstripped supply in the region, leaving nothing to trade regionally in the end (at least not on the short-term market, which the project focused on). According to the external review of the project, this situation was unlikely to change in the short and medium term. In Tanzania the competitiveness of the Tanzanian industries has shown a deteriorating trend while the Sida projects Business Environment Strengthening Programme (BEST) and TCCIA have been implemented. The problems of counterfactuals in assessing the role of the projects in such an environment are considerable.

### 2.3 EPOPA – the untypical story

The Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa stands out among the reviewed TRA projects from several perspectives: it is large with a total Sida contribution of MSEK 160; it is a long-lasting TRA project which started as a SwedCorp pilot project in 1993 with a completion date in 2008 over several phases; it is a ‘classic’ bilateral project, implemented by consultants chosen by Sida; it has a clear target of smallholders; and it is extensively reviewed and assessed during the course of its implementation. Together this makes the project unique among those assessed, as it is possible to review the full results-chain from Sida-funded inputs to trade development to the impact on poverty. But EPOPA is also untypical as it was initiated from the ‘market-perspective’, using local traders with international links as a vehicle for development. It turned out to be a ‘market-maker’, catching onto the organic trend in Western markets early. It was a major contributor to making Uganda a well-established exporting nation of organic products such as coffee. Initially it was not fully appreciated in the department responsible for agriculture in Sida, perhaps due to its unorthodox nature. It was a donor driven project, initially of little interest to the governments in Uganda and Tanzania and would most likely never have emerged from a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and possibly not even a Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS), had such efforts been undertaken in the early 1990s.

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<sup>12</sup> Also, the National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP), a project so far not formally classified as trade-related, might be classified as an exception, as well as some of the projects among subsistence farmers in Africa organized by ITC. In the latter case, it should be noted that such sub-projects concern a smaller share of ITC’s activities.



The argument in this report is not necessarily that Sida should focus more on long-term bilateral trade projects for which impact on trade and poverty is more easily observed due to the specific target orientation. There is nothing to say that the effectiveness in reducing poverty, dollar-by-dollar in assistance, is greater in EPOPA than for the other types of TRA projects. The point is that larger, longer term projects with specific target groups are more readily evaluable.

## 2.4 Capacity-building and institutional development

Of the TRA projects reviewed, most have the objective of enhancing human and institutional capacities. Examples of such institutional development include: reform of business regulations (BEST, Tanzania); implementation of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) in STDF, establishment of organic standards in East Africa for agricultural products (OSEA); establishment of a mechanism for day-ahead trading of energy (SAPP); establishment of a competent accreditation bureau in Sri Lanka (SRILAC), and strengthening of a Chamber of Commerce in Tanzania (TTCIA).

Capacity-building and institutional development is a more tangible and immediate potential result of a TRA project than impact on trade, industrial competitiveness or poverty reduction. The result-reporting from several of the reviewed projects (when such reporting is available) also shows that capacity-building seems to have been achieved or is underway in many projects. For example, the Trade Policy Training Centre in Africa (Trapca) seems to be on the way to establishing a high quality institution for masters training in trade policy although it is only a few years into implementation. Without Sida funds, such an institution seems unlikely to have seen the light of day, at least in the medium term perspective. In this case, the attribution and counterfactuals are not major problems.<sup>13</sup> The Regional Co-operation for Organic Standards and Certification Capacity in East Africa, OSEA, achieved most of its stated institutional objectives in a small MSEK 4 Sida project. Some of the capacity building projects, such as the International Training Programme (ITP) courses in quality infrastructure; and the trade policy training project through ECOWAS, show good achievements in terms of outputs of trained officials which rate the training to have been relevant and of high quality.<sup>14</sup> The support given to Chambers of Commerce development in Tanzania and Ethiopia show some tangible results in terms of capacity-building and in the BEST programme in Tanzania there seem to be promising prospects for institution building. The assessment of results in terms of capacity-building and institutional development for the reviewed projects is summarized in Annex 2.

<sup>13</sup> A question can be raised, on the other hand, why Sida needs to invest near MSEK 100 in creating an attached training institution to ESAMI, an organisation which basically is self-financed from fees.

<sup>14</sup> However, these projects lack result-reporting whether this training resulted in any institutional development in the home countries of the trainees.

## 2.5 Results from core funding of international organisations

Out of the 20 projects reviewed, 5 major projects are core funding of global programmes by international organisations (World Bank and ITC), special programmes set up by such organisations and donors (STDF and IF), and funding of an international NGO, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). These projects pose a special problem for Sida with respect to assessments of results. The Sida allocations – all of them in a multi-donor context – contribute in most cases to the financing of a large number of sub-projects and activities by these organisations and programmes. These organisations have in-built monitoring and evaluation systems of varying but mostly good quality and specific reporting systems and external evaluations usually are an added feature of the donor support to which Sida is a party. However, the multitude of sub-projects and activities creates an added problem for determining the results of the ‘Sida project’ (The host organisations have the same problems as Sida in determining impact on poverty, trade, growth, etc for single projects. This problem is exacerbated by the often small size of technical assistance projects in the project portfolios of these organisations). Therefore, Sida’s results-reporting of these global programmes tends to be limited to judgements about how effective and efficient the organisations are in delivering inputs and outputs, substantiated by an external evaluation concerning achievements based on an often small sample of these sub-projects.

Core funding support to well-established international organisations for TRA is a mode of support with many merits (the organisations are professional and specialised; they have critical mass to undertake such development; there is a merit in co-funding in the spirit of the Paris Declaration, etc.). It must, however, be recognised that there is a loss of transparency in results-information, partly due to the problems of aggregating information from many smaller sub-projects. This is partly due to the fact that Sida depends on results-analysis and reporting by others.<sup>15</sup>

## 2.6 Are the TRA projects pro-poor?

We define a ‘pro-poor’ TRA intervention as a project or a programme for which benefits mainly accrue to lower income groups, directly or indirectly. Thus a pro-poor project is an intervention from which the poor benefit more than they would have done from a ‘neutral’ intervention. Pro-poor can be considered at two levels: international (focus on the poorest countries) and national (focus on the poorest people in a specific country). Sida has a stated policy of directing its assistance to the poorest countries with a focus on Africa and the LDCs. The

<sup>15</sup> In its support to the World Bank Multi-donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development, Sida (and co-financing DfID) made demands that systems for establishing LFAs and result-reporting for all sub-projects to be undertaken by the Bank under the fund be introduced. Although the project is in at too early a stage to gain feed-back, such result-reporting will be confronted with the problems of aggregating results of often quite different sub-projects, an issue further discussed later in this report.

TRA portfolio is probably less pro-poor than most of Sida's work as it has a large proportion of global programmes many of which (excepting IF) are less targeted at the LDCs than in Sida's bilateral work. Yet, Sida in its support to global TRA programmes, has a conscious strategy to influence these programmes towards more poverty focus in their design and implementation.<sup>16</sup>

At project level, it is generally difficult to judge *ex ante* whether the orientation of the intervention is pro-poor or not. For example, is a project which trains officials in Sanitary and Photosanitary regulations pro-poor or not? On the surface it might not seem so, but if a country with a strong dominance of smallholder agriculture in its export portfolio manages to gain better access to international food markets as a result of such a project, and this leads to increased income for smallholders and more rural employment, such a project might in reality be very pro-poor. Assessing the actual pro-poor effects of the TRA projects are not strong features of the results-reporting in the reviewed projects. To a large extent this is due to methodological problems: these effects cannot be assessed due to attribution and time problems, especially when measurable outcome is at the level of institutional development. The exceptions to this are the agricultural projects mentioned above, which have clear target populations, i.e. EPOPA and NALEP. A summary rating of the TRA projects from a pro-poor perspective is shown in Annex 3.

### 3. The Cross-Cutting Issues – How Effective is Mainstreaming?

#### 3.1 Gender

Gender is the mainstreaming issue given most prominence in the 20 reviewed projects. However, we would like to stress that none of these projects is oriented towards women as such, or has a focus which clearly benefits women specifically. Thus, gender is not the driving force in the project design. Rather, the projects overall have an implicit orientation towards existing gender structures. The gender mainstreaming in these contexts varies from the gender dimension not being mentioned in the design documents (e.g. STDF) or broad general statements (e.g. IF, TCCIA), to efforts to push for a stronger gender dimension such as efforts to get more women to participate in training projects (e.g. ITP, OSEA) and inclusion of a gender strategy in the design (e.g. ECOWAS). For multi-donor projects through international organisations, such as the World Bank and ITC, Sida has tried to make the gender dimension one of its thrusts in collaborating with these organisations in project design and implementation (for example, by offering a gender specialist to work with the programme in the

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<sup>16</sup> This was the case of the World Bank trust fund project where a conflict of interest emerged when the Bank wanted to include middle-income countries as recipients of the fund. Also in the core funding to ITC, Sida has taken several initiatives to influence ITC towards more poverty-oriented development activities.

case of the World Bank, or by requesting that gender be reflected in LFA structures in ITC). To what extent such efforts are successful is harder to assess. Sida's ability to exert an impact in such cases depends on the leverage of its funds and the level of its efforts. In ITC's project activities we conclude that ITC's attention to the mainstreaming issues is uneven at best. See further Annex 5.

### 3.2 Environment and climate

Some of the reviewed TRA projects have a strong environmental dimension in the sense that their design is based on an environmental agenda. Examples include 'sustainable trade' (ICTSD), 'organic certification' (OSEA), and 'market development of organic products' (EPOPA). This Sida focus must be considered positive and forward-looking, especially as some of these projects were initiated back in the 1990s. On the other hand, a surprising number of the projects reviewed lack any environmental impact discussion in their design, while others just make a reference to an existing environmental policy of the host organisation without further discussion. In some cases Sida's Assessment Memorandum states that no environmental impact assessment has been done as it is considered not to be relevant. The result-reporting tends to be even weaker in the environmental dimensions. Climate and climate impact is absent all together in the reviewed projects in both design and result-reporting.<sup>17</sup> Given the current prominence of the environmental issues and that trade has strong environmental impacts at all levels of production and transport, the overall weak treatment of this mainstream issue should be noted.

### 3.3 Human rights, democracy, HIV/AIDS

Human rights and democracy are nearly totally absent from the reviewed TRA projects in their explicit expressions. This should not come as a surprise, given the nature of TRA. However, there is a general implicit belief in the 'trade paradigm' that international trade in the long run will contribute to a more open and democratic society. There is also the implicit dimension of human rights in projects aiming at strengthening poor countries in multilateral trade agreements and regimes.<sup>18</sup> The issue of HIV/AIDS in most projects reviewed is not made explicit. A clear exception is the 'road safety' project Walvis Bay Corridor, where HIV/AIDS is a main feature and an explicit component with defined objectives. In fact, this trade related assistance emerged out of an HIV/AIDS project, a somewhat unusual track for an infrastructure project.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> It should be noted that climate became a thematic priority for Swedish Development Cooperation only in 2007, which probably explains why climate is absent in many of the reviewed projects.

<sup>18</sup> In a few cases, however, the assessment memos state that a connection between SME development and democracy and human rights has been shown in various projects from time to time. Sida's support to the World Bank trust fund also includes a discussion on the rights perspective, which has a clear link to human rights and democracy.

<sup>19</sup> In the PSD-Hub project in Ethiopia, the chamber has prepared an HIV/AIDS policy paper, which is the basis for designing a national HIV/AIDS programme for the business community.

We refer to Annex 5 for an analysis of the mainstreaming issues for each of the 20 projects reviewed.

## 4. Relevance of Sida's TRA

### 4.1 Sida's trade policy and plan

Sida established a trade policy in 2005 named *Sida's Policy for Trade Development Co-operation*. This policy took as its platform the overriding Swedish policy for development co-operation<sup>20</sup> as well as the UN's eighth Millennium Development Goal: the creation of an open, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system. While noticing that trade support can include many dimensions of development assistance and that there are various overlaps with private sector development and economic development in general, the policy limited itself to *trade policy and regulations*, and *trade development*. The policy stated that the focus would be on the former of these two areas due to 'increased demand'.

In 2008 Sida prepared a *Plan for Trade-Related Assistance* in response to the government's request for such a plan.<sup>21</sup> A main feature of this plan was strengthening the integration of trade into Sida's overall development co-operation. The Plan established certain key principles for Sida's TRA work, namely that it should:

- be demand-driven, i.e. respond to recipient countries' demand as expressed in PRSPs and more specifically the DTIS made under the IF;
- use Swedish 'comparative advantages' expressed by a strong 'Swedish resource base';
- create synergies with other Sida support and be mainstreamed and integrated in certain areas of Sida's work such as private sector development, rural development, infrastructure, research, civil society and democratic governance;
- prioritise Sub-Saharan Africa; and
- focus on larger contributions while including global programmes, regional and national projects.

The Plan identified five priority areas:

1. trading of agricultural products, particularly SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) in relation to the WTO agreements;
2. power trading by drawing on Swedish competences in this field;
3. 'transaction costs', including costs associated with trade procedures and transport;

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<sup>20</sup> Sveriges politik för global utveckling, PGU

<sup>21</sup> Sida (2007a): *Plan för Sidas handelsrelaterade utvecklingssamarbete*.

4. trade development, including business support organisations such as chambers; and
5. research, education and policy processes.

In terms of coherence between the Policy and Plan on the one hand, and the actual TRA portfolio on the other, there appears to be good coherence. Sida is largely pursuing the orientation of the Policy and the Plan (although many of the projects reviewed originate prior to both). Especially the focus on *trade policy and regulation* in the Policy with focus on SPS, has permeated in the actual portfolio.<sup>22</sup>

## 4.2 Relevance of the policy and plan

Trade is possibly one of the most controversial dimensions of development assistance due to the underlying factors of globalisation (with its strong advocates and also critics), the political dimension of trade (the double standards of free-trade arguments on the one hand, and subsidies of agriculture by rich countries, on the other), and the intensive debate linked to the WTO agreements.<sup>23</sup> None of this is reflected in Sida's policy or its plan. It might be argued that these largely political issues are not the mandate of Sida, but should be reflected in the on-going process in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to formulate a trade development policy.

Relative to other donors, Sida seems to focus more on support to *policy and regulation*, a tendency, which is increasing, as noted earlier.<sup>24</sup> At the same time, there is a growing awareness in the donor community that the key constraints for the poorest countries and LDCs for enhancing their participation in international and regional trade is in 'behind-the-border' constraints. Such constraints are associated with competitiveness, production capacities, capacity to diversify and innovate among local producers and infrastructural deficiencies. Therefore there might be a risk that Sida is focusing on an area of TRA where an over-supply of support is emerging, while under-financing more basic pre-requisites for trade development. However, as noted earlier, the actual portfolio is less *policy and regulation* focused than it appears in Sida statistics due to classification issues. In general, the rapid development of the broader *Aid for Trade* agenda makes the current Policy increasingly obsolete.

The overriding concern at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to what extent trade really permeates Sida's work and how the trade dimension is integrated in other sectors. Given the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the strong drive for the recipient countries to 'own' the development assistance, it is questionable whether Sida should try to define 'priority areas' in its TRA. Instead the binding constraints should determine the supply of aid, and Sida should

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<sup>22</sup> The current portfolio of TRA includes a limited number of projects with a focus on 'transaction costs' and power-trading, but this plan is very new and therefore has not permeated the portfolio.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Andersson, J. (2007) and de Vylder, S. (2007): *The least developed countries and world trade*, Sida studies 19.

<sup>24</sup> Andersson (2007).

respond to such demand whatever form it takes. It is our belief that through the use of international organisations and NGOs, Swedish organisations, consultants, and resource persons, Sida can respond to basically any such identified binding constraints without worrying about whether such assistance is within Sida's competence or not.<sup>25</sup> More critical is how well the analytical process for defining binding constraints is conducted in PRSPs and DTIS. This is an issue beyond the scope of this study.

### 4.3 Trade in Sida's country co-operation – two cases

**Tanzania.** Sida has been an active supporter to Tanzania for several decades in trade development assistance. There have been a large number of smaller projects, for instance through ITC, which today are mostly terminated. Sweden's portfolio of trade-related private sector development in Tanzania consists today of 15 different interventions.<sup>26</sup> There are three on-going multi-donor supported programs: BEST, which focuses on government and legislative reform, the BEST-Advocacy for the private sector, and the Financial Sector deepening Trust (FSDT) which is basically a fund for small credits. There is a single framework agreement for *Aid for Trade* through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding based on the Integrated Framework process in Tanzania. This is support which the Swedish embassy is giving to local IF interventions separate from Sweden's global support to IF. There is another multi-donor programme under preparation, also based on the IF. There are also two ongoing bilateral interventions: Support to the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a support to government to build institutional capacity for the emerging bio-fuel industry. The portfolio also includes seven different projects, which are not managed by the Swedish Embassy but either by Sida headquarters (3 cases) or by other actors outside of Sida.<sup>27</sup> Several of the projects are 'classical Private Sector Development (PSD) projects' (e.g. BEST, FSDT, and TCCIA), but today the trade profile and focus in these projects is so emphasized that all donors, including Sweden, formally define them as trade-related.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> One of our conclusions in this evaluation is that Sida is already doing more in trade than the organisation is accounting for, but also that interventions which have, or should have, a strong market driven focus, such as agriculture support, tend to have a conventional supply orientation. The review of NALEP is a case in point (see further Annex 5).

<sup>26</sup> This includes some terminated projects and some that are also classified as PSD projects, and the word portfolio used in this context should not be confused with Sida's official portfolio of trade-related development cooperation.

<sup>27</sup> For example: a twinning arrangement between the Swedish Chemicals Agency and its Tanzanian counterpart; the International Training Program (ITP), with many participants from Tanzania; the Start South Programme in Tanzania, the objective of which it is to facilitate joint ventures in Tanzania and Sweden through concessional financing of business development studies and training; and the Open Trade Gate Sweden. There is support to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing for the formulation of a national trade policy, implementation of a fair competition policy and law, establishment of a fair trade tribunal; and Gateway East Africa, GEA. This project was created and is managed by the International Council of Swedish Industry (NIR) in cooperation with the East African Business Council (EABC).

<sup>28</sup> There is a discrepancy, however, between the classification in the Sida PLUS system, the one used for official reporting of Sida's TRA portfolio, and the classification used in Tanzania. Thus, BEST is not officially a TRA project in Stockholm, but seen as such in Dar es Salaam.

Among the main donor-partners in trade-related aid, coordination is today pervasive and quite active even if not all trade donors participate.<sup>29</sup> Sida chaired the PSD/Trade donors group until August 2008. Sida's responsible officer has been nominated as the IF facilitator and in this capacity is pursuing various initiatives, among them processing an arrangement whereby all donors together with the government will sign a Memorandum of Understanding which says that all donors will adhere to certain common principles for trade-related assistance, and that coordination and harmonization in this area will be further enhanced. The main coordination document is the DTIS, in practice replaced by or converted into the Tanzania Trade Integration Study (TTIS). Any new trade related support programmes must be programmed in accordance with the DTIS/ TTIS matrix.

According to the EU, in spite of today's quite strong and active donor coordination:

“Tanzania's government is still weighed down by parallel systems and procedures for delivering, managing, monitoring and evaluating development assistance as well as multiple missions, meetings and studies. The still widespread provision of off-budget financing, most notably for projects, has impeded strategic resource allocation in the national budget process as well as transparency and domestic accountability in the utilization and performance of external resources.”<sup>30</sup>

In this context, it should be noted that in the World Bank's 2006 Doing Business report, Tanzania is ranked 140th out of 155 countries in terms of 'ease of doing business'. Trade policy issues constrain Tanzania's exports less than the 'behind-the-border' problems.

A conclusion from the Tanzanian case study is that TRA is well integrated into Sweden's country programme, and that Sweden, in its position as lead donor, has a strong, instrumental role in the overall donor support in *Aid for Trade*. In Tanzania there is a critical mass in trade focus which, we believe, has helped Sida to play an important role in TRA.

**Uganda.** In the Swedish government's country strategy currently being prepared for the period 2009–2013, private sector development, including trade and financial systems, is one of three priority areas.<sup>31</sup> However, the impression one gains from comparing the country strategy of 2001 with the one now being prepared, is that economic development in general has been given a somewhat

<sup>29</sup> In an inventory of "recent, ongoing or planned trade-related technical assistance", prepared with the support of Sida in 2007, a total of 275 projects were identified for the period 2000–2010. The list includes investment promotion issues, PSD, and transport and other infrastructure interventions. The DTIS matrix (dated 2006) includes 127 specified interventions grouped in the three basic OECD/DAC categories: 1) trade policy and regulation, 2) trade development and 3) trade-related infrastructure (in the case of Tanzania this category is limited to transportation).

<sup>30</sup> Quote from an EU official in Dar es Salaam

<sup>31</sup> UD/Sida (2009): *Förslag till samarbetsstrategi för Uganda 2009–2013*.



lesser focus in the current strategy and that there is a shift in focus from economic development to a more rights-based development. This reflects both Sweden's overall policy for development co-operation and efforts to concentrate on sectors in view of the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness. The 2001 strategy was explicit on a number of potential areas for co-operation in the economic sectors, including energy, various credit instruments, agricultural development and small and medium enterprise development. This is lacking in the new strategy. A review of Sida's current total portfolio in Uganda by this evaluation (all projects active in early 2009) shows that:

- there is currently (April 2009) no on-going trade-development project;
- the relevance of trade in the portfolio is very marginal, the portfolio being dominated by relief, health, support via Swedish NGOs and research co-operation; and
- an assessment of what in the co-operation might be an indirect trade linkage reveals that trade still emerges as marginal. To judge from the current portfolio, the scope of integration of trade with the overall thrust of the Swedish country programme is very limited.

Our conclusion is that trade likely will remain a marginal Sida activity in Uganda, and that the critical mass we identified in Tanzania seems to be lacking in Uganda. The reasons for this conclusion are: (i) the thrust of Sida's current support to Uganda in terms of its overall portfolio to 'non-economic sectors'; (ii) the proposed country strategy phasing out support for infrastructure, energy and water & sanitation; and (iii) the hitherto limited identification of future interventions in trade-related assistance.<sup>32</sup>

## 5. Sustainability, Ownership and Donor Co-Ordination

### 5.1 Sustainability

Sustainability of the TRA projects can be interpreted at two different levels: (i) sustainability of the institutions and programmes implementing the projects, and (ii) sustainability of the outcome and achievements as a result of the activities of these institutions. For some of the implementing organisations such as the international organisations, sustainability is not an issue. For the global programmes they have established, like STDF and IF, it is unclear whether the purpose of these is long-term sustainability or not, but continuous donor support is paramount for their existence. Sida has initially taken a high stake in some of these, for example STDF. The sustainability of international NGOs, such as the International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements

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<sup>32</sup> One project in 'quality infrastructure' by the government is under investigation

(IFOAM) and ICTSD, is equally an issue and critical for the relevance of the support. In those two organisations, support by Sida (and other donors) has strongly contributed to their successful survival and growth to the extent that sustainability, at least in a medium term perspective, can be assured. In this, Sida has played a quite useful role given the uniqueness of the organisations.

At the regional level, Sida support has been channelled to institutions for which the TRA projects are not essential for survival, such as ECOWAS, SAPP and Walvis Bay Group. As a regional training organisation, on the other hand, Trapca is receiving high volumes of support over a five year period and is expected to be fully self-financing thereafter. Whether this will happen cannot be assessed today, but is a crucial determinant of whether the support was worthwhile or not. Sustainability of supported institutions at national level is paramount for the effectiveness of the support. For example, the Tanzanian Chamber of Commerce is an organisation which, at its current level of operation, is dependent on Sida funding although over the 12 years of support, the degree of self-financing has improved.

Sustainability of achievements at recipient country level beyond the institutions is more difficult to assess for many of the assessed TRA projects because: i) there has not been any result-reporting addressing the issue (for example, ITP); and ii) it is too early to assess due to the newness of the projects. Result-reporting for some projects, such as EPOPA, claims assured sustainability (a market has been created), while the result-reporting of other projects states that unless there is further funding the achievements are unlikely to be sustainable (for example, OSEA and SAPP).

As is obvious from the above, no general statements can be made concerning sustainability of Sida's TRA portfolio. Nevertheless, a general conclusion might be that a major issue of the past – that Sida financed projects received support for several decades in order for them not to collapse – seems not to repeat itself.<sup>33</sup> *Exit* it is not a major issue in most of the TRA projects.

## 5.2 Ownership

As many of the TRA projects are global programmes implemented by international organisations, the degree of 'ownership' by the recipient countries is difficult to trace. Such programmes are generally formulated by these organisations, sometimes jointly with donors, and sometimes as an outcome of major conferences such as the Doha WTO round. Ideally, they should emerge as a response to 'perceived collective needs' by developing countries and translated by the professional organisations into programmes. We are not in a position to judge whether this is the case or not. In other cases, such as core funding of ITC, the specific sub-projects implemented are expected to be a result of needs expressed by the recipient countries. Therefore the country ownership is largely

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<sup>33</sup> Catterson, J. & Lindahl, C. (1998): *The sustainability enigma* EGD

determined by the policies and practices of the host organisations. At least in the case of ITC, this is largely the pattern.

Regional TRA projects reviewed, such as ECOWAS, Walvis Bay and SAPP, all seem to have strong ownership exercised by their host organisations which have requested the support. On the other hand, the regional project EPOPA was ‘donor-driven’ initially and not primarily an interest expressed by the recipient governments. Nevertheless, as the project succeeded over time, ownership from local organisations grew.

In the current development paradigm of the Paris Declaration, projects should emerge from concerted needs-analysis expressed in PRSPs, the DTIS of the IF and so forth as noted above. At least some of the reviewed (national) projects are of this nature. The BEST programme in Tanzania is an example. A surprising finding is that the programme has been slow to get off the ground and has met early implementation problems due to what appears to be a low degree of ownership by participating ministries. Whether this is a common problem in the IF process, or just a coincidence, is not possible for us to judge based on this evaluation.

### 5.3 Donor co-ordination

One of the main thrusts of the Paris Declaration is the need for donors’ to co-ordinate and to divide labour among themselves. If we disregard projects which were initiated in the 1990s, the Assessment Memos of the reviewed projects generally make strong points of dialogue with other donors involved in the same area, institution or project with only one or two exceptions. While a correct assessment of this issue would require interviews with other donors and recipients, we have no grounds to believe that Sida is not adhering to the Paris Declaration in its TRA support. Another factor which should assure donor co-ordination is that Sida is channelling its TRA support jointly with other donors in multi-donor projects and programmes. Of the projects studied in Tanzania, most were coordinated with other donors. The conclusion of the evaluated TRA portfolio is that donor coordination seems generally to have been good.

### 5.4 Integrating TRA at Sida

A category of projects containing a large potential positive impact on trade development is agricultural sector programs, such as NALEP. Through the years these programs have been supply side-oriented, their main focus being on enhancing the capabilities and productive capacities of the small farmers. In the case of NALEP this program appears to have been successful in building up a cadre and organisation of dedicated extension workers, but this resource seems today to be used for market development and export promotion only to a limited extent. Therefore, for Sida’s TRA group this category of projects seems to offer a big potential for engaging in important export promotion develop-

ment cooperation. However, these programmes were not conceived as trade-related projects, and Sida's TRA managers do not seem to play an active role in how they are run and developed. In the case of NALEP apparently trade representatives were involved when writing the revised project document, which reflects a desired shift in the market direction. However, looking at the developments in terms of work plans and budgets, trade promotion objectives have been translated into actual project activities only to a limited degree.

# III. Sida's Results-Based Management Information System

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Result-based management

Result-Based Management (RBM) or its equivalent Result Oriented Management (ROM) and Managing for Development Results (MfDR), are concepts given much attention in the last decades. RBM and the other concepts in essence mean that management should be oriented towards results (outcomes and impact) rather than inputs, activities and outputs. Sida has adopted the RBM concept and the relevant tools in different ways since the early 1980s. Yet, external reports commissioned by Sida to review various aspects of results-management tend to come to the common conclusion that results-based management is not functioning well, or in the words of one of the reviewers: "Sida has a non-results management oriented culture."<sup>34</sup> These studies have found that the application of *LEAs*, while mandatory, is not well (or not at all) integrated into the management system and that an effort to introduce a qualitative rating system of performance, the Sida Rating System (SiRS), never took off due to organisational resistance. At the same time, like most other donor agencies, Sida spends considerable time on measuring results and produces a multitude of reports and documents on the subject. In the newly organised Sida, RBM has been given renewed attention and its application is being developed in a proposed Sida Results-Based Monitoring System.

The discussion in this report should contribute to this on-going work by identifying problems with the current results-information system and by raising some ideas for improvements. We have not tested our findings on other contributions than TRA, nor are we fully familiar with the intensive work currently ongoing in Sida's department *METOD* on RBM,<sup>35</sup> for instance. Still we believe most of our observations are general for Sida, rather than specific for TRA.

<sup>34</sup> Schmidt (2007) *A review of results management at Sida*.

<sup>35</sup> In the annual appropriations letter for fiscal year 2009 the government has directed Sida to develop a comprehensive goal- and results management system. The government has formulated Sida's mandate as follows: "Sida should soonest introduce a uniform and comprehensive goals- and results management system, including a system for assessment of Sida's development cooperation work and for systematic risk analyses. Sida shall by 30 September give an account to the government (Foreign Ministry) how the implementation is advancing".

## 2. Sida's Current Results-Information System

### 2.1 Our experience evaluating TRA

The experience gained when assessing the projects in Part II above, forms the basis for our analysis of the current result-information system as it pertains to TRA.

**What is the TRA portfolio?** What we believed would be an easy question to answer was not that easy. To some extent, this is a specific problem to TRA due to the evolving and expanding *Aid for Trade* agenda. The definition of TRA is in flux and requires redefining current classification in Sida's PLUS system. TRA is not only an evolving category of ODA, it has its own complications as a cross-cutting form of assistance. As TRA expands to include all the six categories in WTO's *Aid for Trade*, this requires not only reclassification, but also is dependent on the subjective judgement of the staff in defining projects and programmes. What is 'trade-related infrastructure' and what is 'building productive capacity'? What is 'trade-related adjustment' and assistance towards 'other trade-related needs'? WTO's Task Force suggests that it is "anything which has been explicitly identified as trade-related priorities in the recipient country's national development strategies." This definition places a heavy burden on the PRSP and IF processes and also a system in Sida tracing projects to such plans when classification takes place. In the current system we have come across projects which are strongly trade-related but not identified as such by Sida (or by the country PRSPs),<sup>36</sup> and others which are classified as trade-related (at least at embassy level) but where such links raise a major question.<sup>37</sup> Overall, in Sida's Assessment Memos, the linkage of the proposed project or programme to PRSPs or DTIS is not well developed, making classification of TRA in the broad *Aid for Trade* agenda difficult.

In short, an accurate definition of TRA (in line with WTO/OECD's *Aid for Trade*) not only requires an accurate classification system, but also creates a need to (i) make the linkage of projects to PRSPs and DTIS explicit, and (ii) 'sensitise' Sida staff doing the categorisation to what trade-related assistance is. This is not just a matter of fulfilling reporting criteria and demands. More importantly, it is a means of allowing trade to integrate with Sida's other programs to create synergies, thereby making Sida fully effective in trade development.

**What is in the TRA portfolio?** Once the definition of TRA was agreed, the PLUS system produced very long lists of ongoing contributions on our request. Thus, for 2007, with a total disbursement of MSEK 280 several hundred contributions emerged in the category *Trade policy and regulations* only. A closer look at these lists showed contributions (agreed amounts) of everything from a few thousand SEK to MSEK 90. The 'portfolio' in PLUS includes single trips, stud-

<sup>36</sup> For example, the agricultural programme NALEP in Kenya.

<sup>37</sup> For example, the micro credit project FSTD in Tanzania.

ies and courses as well as full-fledged multi-million dollar TRA programmes. An examination also showed that the same project appeared several times under different sub-categories depending on how it had been classified under different agreements. The next problem was that the name of these contributions was in most cases in the form of unintelligible acronyms. When asking people in Sida what all these acronyms meant, the common answer was “I don’t know, talk to the person in charge.” In short, the information system in Sida is poor in producing intelligible information about Sida’s portfolio even to its own staff. It also shows that Sida is a highly ‘person-centred’ organisation – not surprising for an organisation involved in one of the most complex businesses in the world – but also reflecting that Sida’s general reporting system does not function well.

**Where are the key documents?** After the Sida TRA projects had been identified, our next question was: how do we find the key documents for these projects? Sida’s information system, E-doc, sometimes showed hundreds of documents under a specific project (finding the particular project in E-doc from PLUS was an art in itself). To scan through the multitude of documents in order to find the few key documents essential to a review like ours (Sida’s Decision on Contribution, the Assessment Memo, the LFA, any external review or mid-term evaluation undertaken), turned out to be very time consuming as the E-doc is not set up to do this. Instead it records everything, in line with the demands on a public authority. As we discovered, E-doc is not a particularly useful management tool, even from the point of view of Sida staff.<sup>38</sup>

**What is in the key documents?** Once Sida’s key documents had been provided to us for our selected TRA projects (mostly by helpful staff who found them in E-doc or in their own files), the next step was to go through these. In some cases there were several hundred pages of documentation per project to sort through in order to get an idea of basic facts and results. One can argue that this is the job of a consultant. This is not, however, acceptable from a Sida Manager’s point of view where being able to understand the portfolio quickly is important. There is not much point in improving *quality* of results-information if such results-information is drenched in sheer quantity. There is a clear need in Sida for a concise ‘file’ for each project and programme, regularly updated, which in a snap-shot summarises key information on design (what it is about, its objectives and planned outputs), its results in terms of outputs, outcome and, when possible, impact. We provide some ideas later in this report how such a project file could be established.

**Results-information at country level.** The Sida management information system is not much better organised at country level, i.e. at the Embassy. Taking the case of Tanzania, there is no formal system governing the processing and storing of project and results-information at the Embassy. It is largely left up to each

<sup>38</sup> A particular frustration with E-doc is that main documents are often an e-mail which might inform about a staff member’s skiing trip and why a report was delayed in delivery, while key documents such as an evaluation could be an attachment to such an e-mail. The user has to click through a lot of meaningless material to get to the main documents.

individual programme officer and how he/she chooses to organize the contents of ring binders and computer hard disk. Trade-related PSD projects are so central to Sweden's development cooperation with Tanzania that they have the full time attention of a senior and experienced Sida officer. Therefore the system works. But there is no *generic* information system; no system which is independent of the organisational skills of the staff, and which easily can be transferred from one officer to another.

## 2.2 Results information at project level

A results-based information system in development cooperation needs to have as its foundation the activities which are the core expression of the organisation: its financial contributions to various projects and programmes (however these are defined). It is true that development co-operation is more than such financing and includes dialogue, strategy-making, research and communication, but the contributions are clearly the paramount 'output' of the organisation. Projects and programmes are the base elements of Swedish development assistance. Our discussion will therefore focus on what we call 'projects' as a generic term and see how a RBM information system is built from this.

**Design – the benchmark for result-information.** The 'design' of a project as expressed in Sida's Assessment Memo and supplemented by project documents, LFAs and other material sets the basis for the results-information by: 1) outlining the *inputs* and *activities*, and financial contribution; 2) expressing what the *expected outputs* and *objectives* are; 3) elaborating the assumed *results-chain*, i.e. how the Sida contribution will contribute to the Swedish ODA's overriding objective of poverty reduction; and 4) expressing the means and ways of how results will be *reported*. Thus, the design is an *ex-ante system* to define what results should be looked for, what the underlying assumptions are, why they should materialise and how this information will come about. Our impression from the reviewed TRA projects (supported by our general knowledge of Sida) is that Sida's Assessment Memos – the key design document – generally are of good and improving quality from a results-reporting point of view. However, the LFA which ideally is the tool for expressing in a condensed form all of the assumptions and ways of assessing results, is often the weak element. We agree with a Sida commissioned study which claimed that:

“Repeated studies confirm that LFA has become an obligatory routine rather than an operational instrument. There is a sentiment that LFA is too mechanical and non-flexible to serve as support to comprehensive contribution management.”<sup>39</sup>

This is unfortunate as a realistic LFA can be a powerful tool in result-based management. We strongly suggest that a reformed LFA system becomes a core function of a Results-Based Management Information System. However, the

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<sup>39</sup> Schmidt (2007)



LFAs must be realistic and manageable, and not excelling in finding hundreds of possible indicators, nor assuming that poverty reduction at country level can be verified because of, for example, a training course in certification. This is further discussed below.

### 2.3 Results-assessment

Results-information covers everything from how activities are carried out to impact assessment. Our focus is on *outputs*, *outcome* as a result of the contribution and longer-term *impact*. Sida has in general a well established and often elaborate system for result-assessment of its contributions.<sup>40</sup> It includes tools such as regular reports on performance delivered by implementing entities, minutes from participation in steering groups and annual review meetings; in some cases special external monitoring teams attached to a project with reporting requirements to Sida, reviews and evaluations carried out by external consultants commissioned by Sida or jointly by donors; completion reports by implementing agencies and ex-post evaluations and reviews undertaken by external resource persons such as consultants.

From the outside, it is not too difficult to provide critical views on this results-reporting. There are weaknesses of different kinds: the low quality of reporting from implementing entities (often too vague, incomplete, too late or not done); the lack of effective internal results-information systems in partner countries; the need in evaluations of triangulations (never used) or assessment of counterfactuals (rarely done); the lack of baselines (often requested, but very rarely done); the limited use of LFAs in results-assessments (surprisingly rarely used). Rather than discussing such methodological aspects, which always can be improved and are being improved over time, we will focus on some other issues which we believe to be more basic.

**Need for condensed information.** There is a glaring problem in the lack of *condensed* results-information from projects for management purposes. As noted earlier, beyond the needs of the person in charge of a project, performance information can be difficult for managers to absorb within a reasonable time frame, especially when dealing with portfolios rather than individual projects. There is an urgent need for condensation in order to provide useful information on results to higher level management in Sida and to external users. A relatively simple system would in our view do more to improve result-based management in Sida without any need for additional studies, methodological development, additional budget or other, than any other reform we can think of.

**The importance of external reviewers.** External, independent reviews and evaluations are critical to get a grip of performance towards outcomes and impact. They largely eliminate the bias involved in self-assessments and reporting from

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<sup>40</sup> The focus here is on documents, not what is in the head of staff as a result of meetings etc., in itself a very essential element of an information system.

implementing organisations. Whether the latter are consultants, authorities or governments, they are all stakeholders with natural vested interests. External reviews also provide an overview and a penetration of a project or issue, which is rarely possible for Sida staff due to time and resource constraints. If well done, these evaluations provide considerable inputs for learning both at project and policy level.

Our recommendation for enhancing Sida's result management information without too much complexity is that Sida undertakes external reviews and evaluations more systematically than today, allocates sufficient resources to them, ensures that the persons undertake them have no vested interests, and then feed this information (in *condensed form*) into the management information system. It might be argued that this is already a distinct feature of Sida's work. However, the process can be further strengthened. Some projects reviewed by us have had no external reviewing (e.g. OSEA) or very shallow reviewing in spite of the fact that they have been going on for many years (e.g. ITP). Others have relied on the same consultants for many years and run the risk of getting 'one-sided' assessments (e.g. EPOPA). Furthermore, the application of both *reviews* and *evaluations* does not make much sense. There is no obvious difference in methodology, but the names depend on who orders it in the organisation. The quality of the review process might improve if UTV functioned as quality control and assurance for all such external results-reporting. The allocations for external reviews/evaluations could also be discussed. For the larger projects, Sida often allocates not more than one percent of the total budget, a percentage which seems small by international comparison.

External results-assessment is not contradictory to partner countries' needs. Such reviews could use their existing reporting systems, most likely indicate weaknesses in them for improvement, and be involved in a dialogue with partners on result-management information positive for all parties.

**Lack of ex-post evaluations.** Development assistance is usually a longer term process with results permeating over time, especially higher up in the results-chain. Real results-assessments need to be done when contributions and projects have matured, when it is clear whether the contribution was a non-sustainable affair with only short-term effects or whether it created a process of change towards lasting impact. Reviews and evaluations of projects and programmes are mostly driven by a need to make decisions on the prolongation of support and thus are done during implementation rather than *ex-post*. Our suggestion is that Sida complements these reviews with real *ex-post* evaluations on a case by case basis such as for clusters of similar projects, or different TRA projects in the same country as further discussed below in what we call 'causality evaluations.'

## 2.4 Results-assessment on trade, economic growth and poverty impact

As already discussed in Part II of this report, the lack of results-information at higher levels of the assumed results-chain, is a major impediment for true results-reporting of the TRA projects. This problem would not be solved by more elaborate LFAs, more indicators, more sophisticated internal reporting systems and so forth. Instead, we suggest the following:

- 1) At the *design stage*, a realistic LFA should be established, providing indicators and means to verify results up to the point in the results-chain where outcomes *realistically* can be measured without too overwhelming attribution problems. The rest of the chain should be spelled out, based on best judgements grounded in theory, but without an attempt to test it empirically through explicit indicators and other means.
- 2) *Results-assessments*, whether internal reporting, reviews or evaluations, should focus on the lower levels to determine *outcome* (and impact in those cases where it is relevant and realistic) in line with the LFA, avoiding both too lengthy discussions on inputs and meaningless statements on non-tested and non-evidence-based effects in relation to higher level objectives.
- 3) Results-assessment should, however, make *judgements* on whether there are reasons for questioning the assumed results-chain at higher levels in the LFA. Questioning the assumed results-chain could be due to a poorly argued case in the Assessment Memo, changes in general theory or experience from other interventions of the same kind, or conditions in the environment of the projects which have changed compared to *ex-ante* situation
- 4) On a case-by-case basis, Sida should undertake evaluations which specifically focus on the untested part of the results-chain. Such evaluations, which might be focused on clusters of similar projects, should try to respond to questions such as: ‘if projects are successful in enhancing the quality of or establish standards organisations, what is the evidence that such organisations impact on competitiveness of local firms, on trade and on poverty?’ We call these *causality evaluations*.

The reasons for dividing the results-assessment along these two lines are:

- to avoid the tendency in many project reviews and evaluations of routinely repeating untested postulates, thereby leading to the false impression that they found the projects to impact positively on poverty;
- to make *project specific reviews and evaluations* focus on what can be measured and assessed and turn them into a key element in performance assessment; and
- to inform policy and future project design through more elaborate and specialised studies to test the underlying theory or assumptions.

Reference is made to a model presented in Annex 4.

### 3. Proposal for a Results-Based Management Information System

Based on our TRA evaluation, our recommendations for a more effective Results-Based Management Information System for Sida are simple and inexpensive to undertake. Our recommendations are general and not for Trade Related Assistance specifically. However, they could be tried out for the trade portfolio on a trial basis.<sup>41</sup>

**Recommendation 1:** Use information already produced by Sida, but make this information manageable and fit for operational use. This can be achieved by:

- systematising the PLUS system (or the system which replaces it) so that clearly distinct projects and programmes are easily identified. Link this system to any other information system using the *same* code structures.
- introducing a system of regularly updated *project files* containing the following: (i) a summary sheet; (ii) the Sida Decision Memo; (iii) the summary of the Sida Assessment Memo; (iv) the LFA; (v) summaries of all reviews and evaluations as they emerge; (vi) an regularly updated project bibliography; and (vii) continuous assessment of performance by the Sida person or team in charge of the project or programme. Such a system in electronic form, would facilitate everything from a one minute quick glance by management of a certain portfolio to week-long in-depth reviews of a specific project. In our view, very little of this information needs to be kept confidential, and can be placed in the public domain.
- reintroducing the LFA as an operational tool with realistic ambitions and adjusting the LFAs and project specific evaluations and reviews to what is realistically measurable without major attribution problems, and requesting evaluations to analyse the assumed results-chain in light of current theory.
- increasing the transparency in the system, thereby reducing pressure on the organisation to deliver results-information through time-consuming efforts. We believe this can be accomplished by placing much more of Sida's project information in the public domain through the web.

**Recommendation 2:** In addition to using information already available, we propose:

- relying more systematically on *external* reviews of project results by independent reviews/evaluations and extending those to real *ex-post* evaluations as outlined below. Allocate larger resources than at present (often less than one percent of project budgets) to this and make such efforts a form of technical assistance to upgrade partner country systems when applicable;

<sup>41</sup> It can be questioned whether it is meaningful to introduce a system just for TRA which risks becoming outdated or irrelevant the day an overall Sida-system is introduced. The *project files*, which we are proposing, are meant to take a minimum of time to prepare, and be simple and robust enough to be compatible with any new Sida-wide RMB system introduced in the future.

- introducing a new element in results-assessment through a type of evaluation focused on the upper levels of the results-chain, i.e. linkages between outcomes of projects and poverty reduction covering clusters of similar projects. Use such *causality evaluations* to inform policy. See further below.

**Recommendation 3:** A *rating system* of performance would improve results-information especially when results have to be aggregated. As noted above, such a system was attempted in Sida, but never launched.<sup>42</sup> If Sida establishes a system using the knowledge and judgement of staff familiar with the projects, and they rate the results against measurable objectives (at output and outcome-level), an essential additional management tool is introduced. Such a system can give an overall sense of performance of the portfolio against the criteria included.<sup>43</sup> It can identify trends in performance, identify projects in implementation needing special attention, and contribute to the development of ‘best practices’ in the terms of what performs well and what does not. A rating system can assist in reporting results externally by providing easily identifiable examples of successes and failures. If it is integrated with our proposed *project file system* with concise, transparent and easily accessible information, we believe Sida will have taken an important step towards a simple, results-based management information system.

**Recommendation 4:** In a learning organisation such as Sida there should be a two-way interface between policies, strategies and plans on the one hand, and the concrete manifestations of these steering instruments, i.e. Sida’s financial contributions, on the other. Thus, it is equally important that projects are coherent with policies and plans, as it is that there is learning to inform policies and plans from projects. This feedback is sometimes called *evidence-based policy making*.<sup>44</sup> It is difficult to envisage formal tools to establish such learning, except that evaluations play an essential role in this process. However, we believe the evidence-based policy and strategy making can be enhanced by introducing a type of evaluation which focuses on the ‘upper’ links in the results-chain. Such an evaluation should test the hypotheses underlying the linkages between, on the one hand, in the immediate objectives of TRA (such as establishing standards organisations and providing training in policy) and, on the other hand, the broader objectives of enhancing competitiveness, increasing trade and improving income. This is the proposed *causality evaluation* mentioned above.

<sup>42</sup> There are currently renewed efforts to establish a rating system in Sida.

<sup>43</sup> A rating system can, for example, also include all the mainstreaming dimensions such as gender.

<sup>44</sup> See, for example Kabell, D. and Visti, M. (2007): *Results based management in developing agencies*.

# Annex 1 The List of Projects Assessed in This Evaluation

<b>Project and programme (Implementing organisation)</b>	<b>MSEK Period</b>	<b>Focus area</b>	<b>CRS classif.</b>
<i>Global programmes</i>			
1 World Bank Multi-donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development (Core funding)	90 2007–09	Global	General (33182)
2 ITC Global Trust Fund (Core funding)*	60 2006–08	Global	General (33120)
3 IF: Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance (Core funding)*	129 2006–	LDCs	General (33120)
4 ICTSD: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (Core funding)	57 1996–09	Global	Policy (33113; 33140)
5 Trade Promotion Chambers of Commerce* (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce)	32 2005–2008	Global	Promotion
6 STDF: Standards and Trade Development Facility (WTO led trust fund) Core funding	16 2005–09	Global	SPS (33113)
7 ITP: International Training Programme: Quality Infrastructure (through SWEDAC)	50 1999–2010	Global	Training (33181)
<i>Regional programmes/projects</i>			
8 TRAPCA: Trade Policy Training Centre in Africa (ESAMI and University of Lund)	98 2006–11	LDCs (Africa)	Training (33181)
9 EPOPA: Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa (Consultants)	160 1995–2008	Tanzania, Uganda	Agriculture (33120; 33182; 25010)
10 OSEA: Regional Co-operation for Organic Standards and Certification (IFOAM – international NGO)	3,6 2005–07	East Africa	Agriculture (33151)

<b>Project and programme (Implementing organisation)</b>	<b>MSEK Period</b>	<b>Focus area</b>	<b>CRS classif.</b>
11 ECOWAS: Capacity Building in Trade Negotiations (ECOWAS)	42 2004–09	West Africa	Training (33181)
12 Walvis Bay Corridor – Safe Way and Transport (Walvis Bay Corridor Group, Namibia)	15 2007–11	Southern Africa	Trade-related infra. (25012)
13 SAPP: Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)	10 2005–08	Southern Africa	Trade related infra.
<i>National projects</i>			
14 SRILAC: Quality Infrastructure Development (SLAB)	8 2007–09	Sri Lanka	Quality infrastructure (33112)
15 Business Environment Strengthening Programme, BEST (PMU under Government of Tanzania)	40 2004–13	Tanzania	Business dev. (25010)
16 TCCIA: Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Trade and Agriculture*	55 1995–2008	Tanzania	Business dev. (33120)
<i>'Non-trade'</i>			
17 Chambers of Commerce Ethiopia*	19 2001–07	Ethiopia	Business dev.
18 NALEP Kenya*	327 2001–11	Kenya	Agriculture
19 Financial Sector Deepening Trust, FSDT	40		Finance
20 BEST Advocacy (run by private sector)	19		

**CRS codes:**

25010 Business services	33140 Multilateral trade negotiations
25012 Private sector development	33143 TRIPS
33112 Technical barriers to trade	33151 Trade and environment
33113 SPS	33181 Trade education
33120 Trade facilitation	33182 Other trade pol. & reg.

\* Projects which earlier have been reviewed by one of the authors.

# Annex 2 Summary of the Assessment of Capacity Building and Institutional Development

<b>Project and programme</b>	<b>Current status</b>	<b>Achieving institutional objectives</b>
<i>Global programmes</i>		
World Bank multi-donor trust fund for trade and development (Core funding)	Mid phase 1	Large number of sub-projects, results not reported.
ITC Global Trust Fund (Core funding)	End phase 1	Large number of sub-projects; full assessment not possible; ITC assessed as an effective organisation
IF: Integrated Framework for trade-related technical assistance (Core funding)	On-going	The successful enforcement of the DTIS process implies a strong institution building effect in the participating ministries and institutions
ICTSD – International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (Core funding int. NGO)	End phase III	Organisation considerably strengthened
Trade promotion Chambers of Commerce (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce)	New phase to start in 2009	Some institution building in beneficiary countries e.g. through twinning
STDF: Standards and Trade Development Facility (WTO lead trust fund) Core funding	End phase II	‘on its way to achieve the objectives of capacity building’
ITP International Training Programme: Quality Infrastructure (through SWEDAC)	On-going	Questions as to outcome at institutional level
<i>Regional programmes/projects</i>		



<b>Project and programme</b>	<b>Current status</b>	<b>Achieving institutional objectives</b>
TRAPCA: Trade Policy Training Centre in Africa (ESAMI and University of Lund)	Mid term	Institution established, 'impressive start'
EPOPA: Export promotion of organic products from Africa (Consultants)	Completed	Successful
OSEA: Regional co-operation for organic standards and certification (IFOAM – international NGO)	Completed 2007	Standards and protocols delivered; some adopted
ECOWAS Capacity building in trade negotiations (ECOWAS)	End phase II	Enhanced professional capacity of participants
Walvis Bay Corridor – Safe way and transport (Walvis Bay Corridor Group, Namibia)	Mid-term	Too early to be assessed
SAPP: Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)	Completed	Systems for day-ahead trading in place
<i>National projects</i>		
SRILAC: Quality Infrastructure development (SLAB)	Mid term phase 1	Too early to be assessed
BEST: Business environment strengthening programme (PMU under Government of Tanzania)	On-going	Shows large potential of contributing to institution building
TCCIA: Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Trade and Agriculture	Completed in 2008	Has achieved some, but important aspects of institution building and sustainability remain to be addressed
<i>'Non-trade'</i>		
Chambers of Commerce Ethiopia		Has achieved some successful institution building
NALEP Kenya	Mid-term last phase	Promising capacity building of farmer business cooperation
Financial Sector Deepening Trust, FSDT		
BEST Advocacy (run by private sector)		

# Annex 3 Summary Rating of the TRA Projects from a Pro-Poor Perspective

<b>Project</b>	<b>Focus on poor countries</b>	<b>Focus on poor people</b>
<i>Global programmes</i>		
World Bank multi-donor trust fund for trade and development (Core funding)	Neutral	Neutral
ITC Global Trust Fund (Core funding)	Neutral	In general neutral, but there is a recent emphasis in ITC on working directly with export potential of the rural poor
IF: Integrated Framework for trade-related technical assistance (Core funding)	Yes, LDCs	Neutral
ICTSD – International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (Core funding int. NGO)	Pro-poor mandate	Pro-poor mandate
Trade promotion Chambers of Commerce (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce)		Neutral
STDF: Standards and Trade Development Facility (WTO lead trust fund) Core funding	Neutral	Neutral
ITP International Training Programme: Quality Infrastructure (through SWEDAC)	Neutral	Neutral
<i>Regional programmes/projects</i>		
TRAPCA: Trade Policy Training Centre in Africa (ESAMI and University of Lund)	Yes, LDCs and Africa	Neutral
EPOPA: Export promotion of organic products from Africa (Consultants)	Yes, Tanzania and Uganda	Yes
OSEA: Regional co-operation for organic standards and certification (IFOAM – international NGO)	Yes	Possibly

<b>Project</b>	<b>Focus on poor countries</b>	<b>Focus on poor people</b>
ECOWAS Capacity building in trade negotiations (ECOWAS)	Yes, West Africa	Neutral
Walvis Bay Corridor – Safe way and transport (Walvis Bay Corridor Group, Namibia)	Somewhat – Southern Africa	Maybe due to HIV/AIDS
SAPP: Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)	Somewhat – Southern Africa	No
<i>National projects</i>		
SRILAC: Quality Infrastructure development (SLAB)	No	Neutral
BEST: Business environment strengthening programme (PMU under Government of Tanzania)	Yes	Neutral
TCCIA: Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Trade and Agriculture	Yes	Neutral
Chambers of Commerce Ethiopia	Yes	Neutral
NALEP, Kenya	Yes	Yes
Financial Sector Deepening Trust, FSĐT	Yes	Yes
BEST Advocacy (run by private sector)	Yes	Neutral

# Annex 4 A Structure for Results Assessment of TRA Projects

(using a TRA intervention as an example)

LFA	Indicators	Assumed results-chain	Results		
			Outputs Short-term	Outcome Medium-term	Impact Long term
<b>Ultimate objective</b>	NO	Poverty reduction ①	–	–	Not measurable due to attribution problem Continuous assumption
	NO	Economic growth, increased incomes and employment, more taxes	–	–	See above
	NO	Increased trade, diversified trade, better terms trade	–	–	See above
	YES	Higher competitiveness and better access to international markets by local producers	–	–	Measurable Ex-post evaluation; e.g. industry analysis
<b>Development objective</b>	YES	Greater awareness of local producers of quality standards on international markets	–	–	Measurable Ex-post evaluation e.g. surveys
<b>Immediate Objective</b>	SPECIFIC	More effective trade support organisation in standards ③	–	Measurable Evaluation ③④	Measurable Ex-post evaluation
<b>Outputs</b>	SPECIFIC	Enhanced knowledge and capacity of local officials in standards	Measurable M&E	Measurable M&E	Measurable Ex-post evaluation
<b>Activities</b>		Training and capacity building in standards ①	Monitoring ②	–	–
<b>Inputs</b>		Consultants, courses, materials	Monitoring	–	–
<b>Sida funding</b>		Money ②④	Financial recording	–	–

<p>① <b>Relevance</b></p> <p>– is the result chain valid?</p>	<p>② <b>Efficiency</b></p> <p>Relationship between what is delivered and costs</p>	<p>③ <b>Effectiveness</b></p> <p>– to what extent have objectives been achieved?</p>	<p>④ <b>Cost-effectiveness</b></p> <p>– achieved objectives in relation to costs</p>
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## Explanation

First, second and third column: the input – goal hierarchy applied in LFA and referred to in the Assessment Memo, spelling out the assumed results-chain. Indicators established ex-ante only to the level it realistically can be measured. Rest of columns should provide results with different time-frames. The boxes under these, indicating what can be *measured* in a project-specific evaluation and what cannot be measured with any reliability. The boxes below the figure, the commonly used terms in evaluations and how they (marked by the arrows) relate to the results-chain/objective chain above.

# Annex 5 Assessment Sheets for the Reviewed Trade-Related Projects

## Global programmes

- 1 World Bank Multi-donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development
- 2 ITC Global Trust Fund (Core funding)
- 3 IF: Integrated Framework for trade-related technical assistance
- 4 ICTSD – International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
- 5 Trade promotion of Stockholm Chambers of Commerce
- 6 STDF: Standards and Trade Development Facility
- 7 ITP International Training Programme: Quality Infrastructure

## Regional programmes/projects

- 8 TRAPCA: Trade Policy Training Centre in Africa
- 9 EPOPA: Export promotion of organic products from Africa
- 10 OSEA: Regional co-operation for organic standards and certification
- 11 ECOWAS Capacity building in trade negotiations
- 12 Walvis Bay Corridor – Safe way and transport
- 13 SAPP: Southern African Power Pool

## National projects

- 14 SRILAC: Quality Infrastructure development
- 15 Business environment strengthening programme, BEST
- 16 TCCIA: Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Trade and Agriculture
- 17 Chambers of Commerce Ethiopia
- 18 NALEP Kenya
- 19 Financial Sector Deepening Trust, FSDT
- 20 BEST Advocacy (run by private sector)

# 1. World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development

<b>Project description</b>	
Background	Sida and the World Bank initiated the discussions on the possibility of cooperating on trade issues in the beginning of 2005. Sida and DfID agreed to join forces to develop a multi-donor trust fund together with the Bank. A concrete proposal for Sida support was discussed in the Project Committee in Sida in May 2007, resulting in a recommendation to management not to make a decision on support to the FUND based on the current assessment memo due to a number of questions that needed further elaboration in the assessment. After certain amendments and changes, the project was approved in September 2007.
Period	2007–2009
Sida contribution	MSEK 90
Sida 'sector'	33143 Trade policy and regulations
Sida desk officer	Erik Ringborg (previously Tina Trollås)
Country focus	Global, but with a strong preference for IDA-eligible and/or LDCs and Africa.
Implementation organisation	World Bank (The Bank's assistance to developing countries in support of trade has been substantial over the last 25 years. During this time, more than 500 lending operations were dedicated fully or partially to trade in 117 countries. Total lending amounted to \$38 billion, or some 8.1 percent of total Bank commitments.).
Direct stakeholders	Not specified, varies according to the respective activities financed under the Fund.
Current project status	Project on-going; decision for possible extension after year three based, among other things, on the outcome of an evaluation to be carried out year 3 (2009).

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### Objectives, outputs and activities

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Sida Objectives (arranged as a log frame)	<p>1) Contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction, by</p> <p>2) supporting countries to strengthen the role of international trade, through</p> <p>3) supporting trade reforms at the country, regional and global level;</p> <p>In addition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• serve as mechanism to pool donor resources to support trade activities while reducing administrative costs,</li> <li>• provide a facility for the donors and the World Bank to exchange views on trade-related development cooperation,</li> <li>• allow donors to engage in a partnership with the World Bank and to contribute to the shaping of the World Bank's work on trade (Sida 2007).</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specifically on the last point:</li> <li>• opportunities to continue to influence the World Bank's work to be more country-driven and poverty-focussed,</li> <li>• providing an opportunity for Sida to draw on the World Bank's overall expertise in trade and especially on the experiences in providing country- and regionally-focussed support, with the view to increasing Sida's regional and bilateral trade support,</li> <li>• investing in public goods, such as data collection and new research on trade, especially related to poverty links,</li> <li>• harmonising the World Bank's and Sida's trade work with that of other donors.</li> </ul>
Planned outputs	Not specified, to be determined in the various activities to be financed under the Fund.
Activities	<p>Examples of inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• policy analysis and diagnostics to support country development programs</li> <li>• technical assistance</li> <li>• research</li> <li>• capacity building and training</li> <li>• compilation of trade data and training in trade analysis (e.g., gathering of data on non-tariff measures and WITS dissemination),</li> <li>• conferences and workshops</li> <li>• knowledge management</li> <li>• project preparation</li> </ul>

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### Means to assess results

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Result-reporting	<p>An elaborate reporting system set up with annual 'result and performance' reporting on the whole programme; and on specific work programmes to be reviewed by the steering committee.</p> <p>The trust fund will rely on the World Bank's regular systems for follow-up, monitoring, and evaluation as well as on the Steering Committee's role in the governance structure of the trust fund. This should allow for sufficient monitoring and follow-up of the trust fund. An independent evaluation of the overall trust fund will be performed during year three.</p> <p>The Swedish contribution will not be earmarked for specific purposes and the systems for monitoring, evaluation and quality assurance of the Swedish contribution will therefore be the same as for the trust fund in its whole.</p> <p>"An independent evaluation will be performed during the third year of the trust fund. The necessary funds for the evaluation will be allocated from the trust fund resources. The expected result that may be able to evaluate during year three is results available in a short to medium term time perspective. These may include the outputs (whether the World Bank has addressed Sida's priorities of strengthened poverty and distributional focus, including gender with greater emphasis on the country and regional levels in the implemented activities), and to some extent the outcome for the beneficiaries in a short term time perspective. The impact results, i.e. has the activities resulted in poverty reducing growth, will, if successful be realised only in a longer time perspective than three years since it involves dynamic effects on the economy. Hence the long term outcome will not be possible to evaluate during the third year" (Sida 2007).</p> <p>The program document calls for an evaluation of the trust fund during its third year to determine if the MDTF should be extended past its closing date of March 31, 2010. Donors require that an interim evaluation to be carried out before any new contributions can be pledged. Preparation for the interim evaluation begun in February 2009 to ensure that it is completed before the closing date (Steering committee 2008).</p>
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Internal result assessment	<p>“The global as well as the regional work programs that are being developed will be linked to specific goals, outputs, and verifiable indicators that can be used to measure outcome of each activity to be financed by the trust fund. The activities supported under the trust fund will be subject to regular World Bank monitoring and quality assurance procedures. Work programs will identify the quality assurance procedures in place for each activity” (Sida 2007).</p> <p>The activities of the trust fund will be evaluated according to the World Bank’s existing systems for evaluation. A number of procedures are in place at the Bank to determine quality of the results and the impact achieved (Sida 2007).</p>
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Log frame	Yes generic for global, regional and country activities, one for the whole of the Trust Fund and common to all donors of the Fund and the World Bank; base line data collected in 2008 to be ready for the evaluation in 2009.
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### **Results**

General	Too early to be assessed (project slightly more than a year in implementation).
Actual outputs	See above although some outputs reported on in emerging semi-annual reporting by the Fund.
Achievements of objectives	See above.
Poverty reduction	Too early to be determined. Sida requires in steering committee more efforts ex-ante how activities will lead to impact on poverty.
Economic growth	Too early to be determined.
Pro-poor growth	Sida requires more efforts ex-ante how activities will lead to impact.
Trade	Too early to be determined.
Institutional development and capacity building	<p>World Bank: During the design phase of the multi-donor trust fund Sida has been successful in influencing the Bank towards more poverty focus and more country focus (Sida 2007). However, during implementation so far certain frustration expressed on lack of impact.</p> <p>Recipient countries: Too early to be determined.</p>

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### Mainstreaming issues

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Gender	<p>Ex-ante</p> <p>Donors emphasized that they would like to see greater attention to gender issues in the trust fund. They noted that gender was only being addressed ad hoc in a limited number of activities. The World Bank acknowledge the difficulty in generating demand driven gender focused activities and asked for better guidance on what types of trade and gender issues donors would like to see reflected in work programs. Sida and Norway suggested that one approach would be to have a gender specialist from the PREM Gender Unit review proposal submissions to identify potential links between trade and gender. The Trade Department agreed to explore this option. Sida also renewed its offer to second a trade and gender specialist to the Trade Department (Steering Committee 2008).</p> <p>Implementation During the initial stages of implementation, Sida frustrated with the limited 'mainstreaming', an issue taken up at steering committee meeting.</p>
HIV/AIDS	Not explicit ex-ante or during implementation.
Environment/ Climate	Not explicit ex-ante or during implementation.
Democracy and Human rights	Not explicit ex-ante or during implementation. Added comments by Sida: (underlying reason for support is a rights perspective to support poor countries in international trade agreements).

### Aid management issues

Sustainability	<p>Fund – increasing interest by donors to support the fund; Fund in its existing mode to operate to 2010. Prolongation to be determined at this time by donors.</p> <p>Results on the ground – too early to be assessed.</p>
Ownership	<p>The Fund not derived from any specific 'demand' in developing countries, but initiated and designed by WB + donors.</p> <p>Request by Sida that activities undertaken by the Trust Fund be clearly demand driven; questions in many cases by donors, but justified by the Bank in meetings.</p>
Counterpart effectiveness	<p>Assumed high</p> <p>"The World Bank is a central actor in the area of trade and development, with an outstanding influence on the international policy dialogue. Few other international organisations which Sida is not already supporting in the trade area can compare with the World Bank in terms of competence and effectiveness" (Sida 2007).</p>

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Donor coordination	Good Programme initially developed by WB, DFID and Sida; Norway and Finland joined the fund in 2008, and other donors are planning to join.
Sida learning	Explicit objective of the support; too early to assess impact.
Sida management	Steering committee of donors and WB to meet once a year; more frequent meetings with staff; intensive reporting.
Relevance Sida policies	Sida's Policy for trade-related development cooperation and Sida's Plan for trade-related development: Difficult to judge as the activities to be carried out not yet fully elaborated.
Cost-effectiveness	Too early to be assessed.

### References

Sida (2007) *Support to the World Bank Multidonor Trust Fund for Trade and Development 2007–2009*

Various biannual reports from the Fund;

Sida memos and notes from steering committee meeting

Sida (2007) *Decision memorandum*

Sida (2007) *beslutspromemoria*

Sida (2007) *Protocol from project Committee meeting*

Comments by T. Trollås, Sida

## 2. International Trade Centre (ITC) Global Trust Fund

<b>Project description</b>	
Summary and background	<p>ITC is the focal point in the United Nations system for technical cooperation with developing countries in trade promotion, particularly with small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). ITC's technical assistance concentrates on helping the private sector understand the rules of the World Trade Organization; strengthening enterprise competitiveness; and developing new trade promotion strategies. ITC has the multilateral trading system's largest team of trade specialists in development cooperation, offering technical assistance in trade and international business development. ITC has a worldwide network of partners with special emphasis on Africa and Least-Developed Countries, addressing the trade-related needs of policy-makers, trade support institutions and enterprises, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises.</p> <p>Apart from its regular resources from its "parent" organizations (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)), the programmes and projects by ITC are financed through ITC's Global Trust Fund. The objectives of the programmes and projects undertaken with the resources of the Global Trust Fund are to assist developing countries and transition economies achieve sustainable development through the development on their trade, focusing on export growth, with an emphasis on competitiveness.</p>
Period	2006–2008
Sida contribution	60
Total project cost	
Sector	
Sida desk officer	Ingela Juthberg/Göran Edehorn
Country focus	Global
Implementation organisation	
Direct stakeholders	The 50 LLDCs
Current project status	

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### Objectives, outputs and activities

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Sida objectives	<p>In Sida's Agreement with ITC on support to ITC's Global Trust Fund, October 2006, (Article 6: "<i>Conditions for the utilization of the Swedish contribution</i>" Paragraph 10), Sida's position is stated as follows:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">"Sweden ...would like to see that ITC increases its efforts in a number of areas. <i>First</i>, Sweden wishes to see an enhanced poverty-reducing focus of the activities of ITC, particularly by ITC increasing the share of services of importance to the poorest... (including the informal sector and female entrepreneurs)"....</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">"<i>In addition</i> Sweden wishes ITC to consider the ecological and gender aspects of each of ITC's services to ensure that if affecting these issues, ITC's services contribute positively to sustainable development and gender equity"</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">..."<i>Another issue</i> which Sida will follow is how ITC takes into account HIV/AIDS issues in its services..."</p>
Planned outputs	n.a
Activities	n.a

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### Means to assess results

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Result-reporting	<p><i>ITC's reporting to Sida</i></p> <p>According to article 9 of the agreement between ITC and Sida, ITC shall provide Sweden with:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">"<i>... a Substantive report – a yearly report on the results obtained by the programs and projects carried out with the resources of the Global Trust Fund. These reports shall be analytical in approach and include a presentation of difficulties and shortcomings and discuss possible remedies.</i>"</p> <p>No such reporting has occurred, the reason being that Sida in its negotiations with ITC had accepted ITC's argument that its reporting should be limited to the established UN (and WTO) rules, which in this case refers the reporting done in preparation for the annual Consultative Group meetings. Paragraph 12 of Annex 1 of the agreement (<i>General Conditions for the implementation of the global trust fund</i>) contains a lists of these reports. None of them include any mention of a <i>substantive report</i>, at least not one being analytical and dealing with possible difficulties and shortcomings.</p> <p><i>Format for reporting</i></p> <p>ITC having hundreds of small projects it is difficult for external parties (e.g. Sida) to evaluate or even monitor what is going on w.r.t. gender, HIV, environment and poverty in a project. Best therefore would be to have the respective ITC officers do write ups of their respective projects, thereby following a simple format which Sida could perhaps suggest to ITC. In the ITC mode of work, it is the ITC officers themselves who implement and actively follow up on each project, and they can therefore be expected to be fully knowledgeable of what is going on in the projects, which means they could do simple write ups without any preparation.</p> <p>A straightforward simple format for the answers Sida want to have about the cross-cutting issues could be the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Is there an explicit (formal) focus in the present project on gender etc.?</li> <li>2 If not, does the project actually affect these issues appreciably/tangibly – directly or indirectly?</li> </ol>
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3 Have the four cross-cutting issues been taken account of in the project documents – discussing them and explaining why or why not they are relevant and important in the project? Please provide excerpts of these texts?

4 Regarding the four cross-cutting issues: what has happened worth reporting in the last year or so?

In 2005 an external evaluation of ITC was carried out by a consortium financed by Danida in 2005.

In October 2008 Sida commissioned an assignment to assess how ITC works with the cross-cutting issues *gender, environment, and HIV/AIDS*, and to what extent its interventions focus on *poverty alleviation*, as well as a number of other questions regarding the projects. The assessment was carried out by comparing ITC's current work with baseline data from before 2005, and was based on a sample of five different ITC projects as case studies, namely: the Buying from Africa for Africa-program in Zambia, the National program of Liberia, the South-South trade promotion (SSTP) of Window II, the Bangladesh Quality support programme, and the Trade related Human Resources and Enterprise Development for foreign trade in Central America phase II. The first two were assessed based on brief field visits, while the other three were assessed on desk-study basis.

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Internal result assessment

*Lack of analytical reports; few evaluations:*

There appear to be very few evaluations carried out of ITC activities. This is not surprising given that ITC's development cooperation consists of many different small projects scattered over more than 100 countries. An external evaluation would have to visit many countries in order to get a sample big enough to allow conclusions to be made. Because of this lack of independent evaluations, one would instead expect there to be many [smaller] follow-up reports of different kinds – be they travel memos, back to office reports or different sector analyses – which tell about what is going on in the projects and also discuss problems that have been encountered. This is what one usually finds in most agencies of development aid – be it Sida, the World Bank or others. This however does not seem to be the case in ITC.

In the last few years ITC has produced several important documents on gender, which would seem to suggest that the organization is now intent on making a concerted effort on this cross-cutting issue.

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Log frame

The use of LFA in ITC appears not yet to have reached a mature stage where all program officers are comfortable with it and use it actively as a tool for planning, implementation as well as for monitoring and evaluation. Some LFAs contain repetitions and tautologies.

There are still logical failures or unclear features in LFA schedules put out by the ITC. Often something belonging at the activity or output level will be labeled as effect. A case in point could e.g. be the task of producing and distributing a manual. This should correctly be labeled as an activity or perhaps output in the sequence *Input – Activity – Output – Effect – Impact*. But in ITC documents it is often described as an effect or even impact.

Indicators of achievement are not used for a structured monitoring system and Results Based Management has not come far in ITC. Accounting of projects is generally activity and output oriented rather than results oriented.

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## Results

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General      The 2005 evaluation concluded that ITC has strong competencies in 15 of the 17 defined areas. The evaluation also carried out a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats), comparing ITC with other suppliers of trade development. This analysis found that from the perspective of the beneficiaries, ITC's strengths were: its technical expertise with world leading skills in many fields, useful generic services for local trade organisations, flexibility in responding to country needs, and impartiality, without a political bias in its support. The main weaknesses of ITC, as perceived by its beneficiaries, were related to its scale and funds: too limited resources for more substantial country-specific projects, too limited resources for local capacity building, and too limited field presence. The evaluation also assessed the many tools and services ITC applies and found that ITC's partners in beneficiary countries uniformly gave a positive assessment of the relevance of ITC tools and services.

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Actual outputs

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Achievements  
of objectives

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Poverty  
reduction      *The buying from Africa for Africa* program is designed to promote economic growth, and it can be said to have an indirect poverty focus. There is, however, no [explicit] reference to the poverty issue in the project documents, nor in the implementation. In *Liberia*, a main component of the project is to support poor chili farmers in distant provinces to become earners of export income. Thus the project, by its design, has a strong poverty focus. A challenge in the on-going implementation is that indicators of poverty target achievements be developed. With regard to the *SSTP* the same applies as for the *BAA*, namely that the project has an indirect poverty alleviation effect.

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The *Bangladesh* quality program, according to its project document, has a poverty focus, but this is not really true – at least judging from available documentation. The *trade-related human development project in Central America*, finally, has a strong poverty focus through the special pilot *EPRP* component included in the program. It should, in this connection, be remembered that a project can have effects (positive or otherwise) on poverty and on the cross-cutting issues even if ITC has not accounted for such effects in the documents. Partly the prevalence of such effects will be a function of the type of sectors that the program chooses to work with.

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Economic growth

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Pro-poor growth

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Trade

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Institutional  
development and  
capacity building

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### Mainstreaming issues

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Gender HIV/AIDS Environment/ climate	<p>In the <i>Buying from Africa for Africa</i> program, there is not one word in the project document either on gender, HIV, or environment, nor are these issues routinely brought up when doing the profiles of the companies and the agencies involved in the program. ITC's explicit policy is to base all of its interventions on the analysis provided in the country's DTIS. However, the words gender, HIV and environment are <i>not</i> mentioned in the DTIS (Zambia) Action Matrix. It is possible that in this project there could be an economic, if not financial, gain from mainstreaming e.g. gender into the project. Our visits to companies revealed that there are at least some cases where e.g. the HIV issue could and should have been targeted into the project, e.g. the trucking company hauling goods across borders in southern <i>Africa</i>.</p> <p><i>In the Liberia</i> program, the issue of gender has been mainstreamed in several ways, however not HIV or environment, at least not explicitly. The gender dimension is included in the export strategies for the country, and is also duly reflected in the set of LFA indicators of success. However, neither the gender issue, nor HIV were among the topics included in the month-long training of the chili project. In the main documents of the SSTP project not one word is said about gender, HIV, poverty or environment.</p> <p>The <i>Bangladesh quality project</i>, according to its project document has a gender focus, but among the ten different sets of indicators that have been specified to measure successful outcome of the project, <i>none</i> has anything to do with either gender, HIV, environment or poverty. In the <i>Central America program</i>, according to the project document, the EPRP-component will give "special attention to. the involvement of women in the production process and to environmental and social issues" However, in the stated immediate objectives of the project, there is nothing said about either gender, HIV, poverty or environment. Neither are any of them mentioned among the project's expected outputs, activities and inputs. In a seven-page long <i>Terminal Report</i> (which however does not seem to cover the EPRP component), the words gender, poverty reduction, environment and HIV/aids are not mentioned.</p>
Democracy/ human rights	

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### Aid management issues

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Sustainability	<p>The ITC is not a profit making entity and would not be able to continue most of its activities if they were not financed by donor support. Some of the services delivered by ITC are in certain cases partly financed by the beneficiary of the service. Turning the ITC into an organization only providing services to those who are able to pay for them is not an option as the aim is to reach those with limited economic resources. In addition, there would be a risk that the most developed of the ITC's beneficiaries would dictate the activities undertaken, while the aim rather should be for ITC to target the ones most in need. However, having the economically strongest beneficiaries contribute to the services they demand enhances the ability of ITC to deliver and gives an indication of the demand for and value of the services provided.</p> <p>ITC's programmes are likely to produce lasting results. ITC focuses on building long-term capacity within firms, governments and private sector organisations, and ITC's support is delivered in partnership with private and public institutions in the beneficiary countries based on their needs. Once the first contact is concluded with a foreign buyer, the developing country supplier is likely to benefit for several years. Furthermore, many programs foster public-private sector cooperation, which also has the potential to endure beyond the programme activities.</p>
Ownership	
Counterpart effectiveness	
Donor coordination	<p>Donors need to be more concrete and operational in the dialogue with ITC. ITC has on more than one occasion announced that it welcomes the advice and inputs from its donor partners.</p> <p>"ITC is constantly on the lookout for practical ways of measuring impact better, and had hoped that the [2005 external] evaluation would provide concrete suggestions for developing a stronger performance management framework together with a set of indicators for monitoring and measuring results".</p>
Sida learning	
Sida management	
Relevance	<p>The relevance of ITC interventions is generally regarded to be very high by its partners. Country specific projects are viewed as specially useful by partners.</p>

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Relevance of target group	<p>The <i>Buying from Africa for Africa</i> program is a hands-on export promotion activity working with established companies trying to “push” them over the export threshold. So the target group of somewhat bigger companies is the right one, and on the buying side it is obvious which are the right institutions for the programme to work with. A challenge in the day-to-day work for ITC is to involve the individuals that are the real decision makers for sales strategy in the companies and for procurement work in the agencies respectively. In the Liberia program, the aim is to help the farmers move up through the value chain so that they can avail of the benefits of international trade. To achieve this it may not be enough for the project to work just with the farmers and their communities. One may also have to develop the capability of middlemen/ traders who can provide the chili farmers with extension services, fertilizers, etc. In the Central America project the target group and the participants of this project were the relevant ones. This is true both for the entrepreneurs who are invited to seminars and workshops, as it is for the participating small and medium farmers in the EPRP component.</p>
Cost-effectiveness	<p>It seems that ITC has relatively high backstopping costs, partly because of the high frequency of staff travel. Including all backstopping costs, it is possible that ITC’s cost-effectiveness could be questioned. Donors should encourage ITC to start measuring its cost-effectiveness more systematically.</p>

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#### **References**

– ITC’s Development Cooperation in 2008 and Beyond: Some Observations with Reference to the Focus Issues (Poverty Alleviation, Gender Equity, Hiv/Aids and Environmental Sustainability,) advocated by Sida. By Karlis Goppers, Devfin Advisers AB, Stockholm 27 October 2008

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### 3. IF: Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance

<b>Project description</b>	
Summary and background	<p>The IF is a process to support Least-Developed Country (LDC) Governments in trade capacity building and integrating trade issues into overall national strategies for development. It is an international initiative through which the IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, the World Bank and the WTO combine their efforts with those of LDCs and donors to respond to trade development needs of LDCs.</p> <p>The IF is built on the principles of country ownership and partnership and the overall goal of the IF is to enhance the capacity of least-developed countries (LDCs) to integrate into the multilateral trading system in order to reduce poverty and benefit from increased market access.</p> <p>The focus of the IF is the mainstreaming of trade into national development plans and poverty reduction strategies of LDCs and the co-coordinated delivery of trade-related assistance. Sweden has since 2001 supported the IF Trust Fund by contributions from both Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. About 45 LDCs are at present involved in the process in some way.</p>
Period	2006–
Sida contribution	129
Total project cost	<p>The IFTF consists of two windows operating simultaneously:</p> <p><i>Window I</i> is a general fund for un-earmarked contributions dedicated to the diagnostic studies (DTIS) and the mainstreaming process.</p> <p><i>Window II</i> funds are allocated to a few of the specific priority projects identified in the DTIS. Its purpose is to keep the IF process on track by ensuring that priority projects from the Action Matrix are initiated in the lead-up period to the holding of a Consultative Group Meeting or Round Table. The other projects prioritized in the Action Matrix are thereafter expected to be financed through regular development co-operation.</p>
Sector	Trade policy and regulation
Sida desk officer	Erik Ringborg
Country focus	Global

**Implementation organisation** The IF Steering Committee (IFSC) serves as the overall governing body of the IF, and consists of the LDCs, the six core agencies and the donors. The IF Secretariat handles the day-to-day management of the IF operation. A kernel of the enhanced EIF Secretariat already exists in the form of the IF Programme Implementation Unit at the WTO. The Secretariat staff supports governments in managing the IF process, as well as provide assistance to national focal points and national implementation arrangements.

A National Steering Committee is set up in each LDC. It provides information to all national stakeholders and co-ordinates the national needs and priorities. Each LDC designates a person to be its *IF Focal Point*. This is the person in charge of the national IF process and the first contact point in the LDC Government for IF-related issues. A lead donor (“Donor Facilitator”) facilitates the process in the LDC. The facilitator role includes a special responsibility for assisting and supporting the LDC government. Sweden is currently the IF Donor Facilitator in Tanzania. Finally, a Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC) consisting of representatives of all stakeholders makes decisions on the use of Window II funds in each LDC (i.e. the bridging money received from the central IF process to kick start implementation of the Action Matrix at the country level).

**Direct stakeholders** The host government and the participating ministries and institutions.

**Current project status**

### **Objectives, outputs and activities**

**Sida objectives**

**Planned outputs**

**Activities** The Integrated Framework is a four-part process:

- 1 Awareness-building on the importance of trade for development.
- 2 Country-level analytic work called Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) to identify constraints to trade, sectors of greatest export potential, and to develop a plan of action (“Action Matrix”) identifying the most important trade-related capacity constraints and which of these the LDC prioritize for donor support.
- 3 Integrating the Action Matrix into the national development plan, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP).
- 4 Implementation of the Action Matrix in partnership with the development cooperation partners.

<b>Means to assess results</b>	
Result-reporting	Sweden is working towards improving the monitoring, reporting and evaluation tools incorporated as part of the Enhanced IF.
Internal result assessment	
Log frame	
<b>Results</b>	
General	<p>To date, 37 LDCs (of a total of 50) have become beneficiaries under the IF; Of them 27 have completed the diagnostic stage and are now implementing the action matrix. An additional seven LDCs are in the preparatory phase to accession to the IF process.</p> <p>In the assessment memo for support to the IF in 2006 it was concluded that: i) the IF is likely to have led to <i>increased trade-related assistance</i> in the LDCs; ii) that <i>trade issues seem to appear in development plans of the LDCs</i> more and more often and increasingly prominently. iii) that there is more <i>efficient donor coordination</i>.</p> <p>A World Bank review from April 2007 on the status of the then 35 IF countries confirm that the completion of the DTISs have resulted in several trade issues being integrated in the majority of the LDC partners development-/poverty reduction strategies. Many of these countries already have an operational trade agenda as a result and have also started the implementation of jump-start projects under Window II.</p>
Actual outputs	
Achievements of objectives	<p>An evaluation of the IF in 2003/4 recommended the enhancement of the IF. The most important improvements are expected to take place in the beneficiary countries where the IF structures will be strengthened through a more effective partnership between national stakeholders, donors and IF agencies and through the establishment of national implementation arrangements, which will support the Focal Point. The recommendations of the IF Task Force reflect the main differences between the IF and the EIF: stronger ownership of the EIF process by the LDCs and increased commitments from donors who will be key in the EIF partnership both locally, in their capitals and in Geneva.</p>

Poverty reduction	<p>Enhanced trade is likely to lead to economic growth, and growth is in turn conducive to poverty reduction. While the linkages between these are complex, empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive relationship between openness to trade, growth, and ultimately poverty alleviation. Trade can be an important means in the fight against poverty, if trade reform is accompanied by complementary policies which ensure that the growth brought about by trade really benefits the poor.</p> <p>Sweden has clearly embraced the links between trade, growth and poverty reduction and has emphasized the importance of trade-related development cooperation. The former and new Swedish Governments have both stressed that Sweden shall focus on trade and development and shall increase this focus over time.</p>
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Economic growth

Pro-poor growth

Trade

Institutional development and capacity building

### **Mainstreaming issues**

Gender	<p>Trade is not gender neutral. Gender relations determine to what extent men and women are able to benefit from market activities, including international trade. The IF Manual published by UNCTAD in 2005 notes the structure of production and employment will affect how trade impacts the poor. For example, a very labor intensive sector such as the textile and garments industry tends to be dominated by female workers. Thus, any trade measures concerning this sector will have a considerable gender impact.</p>
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HIV/AIDS

Environment/ Climate	<p>The activities covered by the IF Trust Fund are deemed to have insignificant direct negative impact on the environment.</p>
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Democracy and Human rights

### **Aid management issues**

Sustainability

Ownership	<p>Increased country ownership is key, and once the LDC itself takes the lead, the IF process can be sustainable well beyond the steps identified in the IF process.</p> <p>The IF process recognizes this and attempts to foster country ownership in several ways and at various stages of the process.</p>
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Counterpart effectiveness	
Donor coordination	Coordination is at the heart of the IF. Along with LDC ownership, coordination is the guiding principle of the whole IF programme. By adopting a partnership approach including the main international agencies with bearing on trade and development, the donor community and the LDCs, the IF is an attempt to realize the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and its inclusion in trade-related development cooperation through the Aid for Trade-initiative.
Sida learning	
Sida management	
Relevance	
Sida policies	
Cost-effectiveness	

### References

- Support to the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to the Least-Developed Countries (IF) in 2006” (Sida Dnr 2006-001494)

## 4. ICTSD: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development

### Project/programme description

Summary and background	ICTSD was established in 1996 as a 'lobby organisation' by five international NGOs with the purpose to influence the international trading system towards a higher degree of sustainability by empowering the stakeholders through information, networking, dialogue, research and capacity building; the objective of the organisation is to create a more fair and equitable trade regime.
Project period	1996–2009
Sida contribution	1996–2003: MSEK 9 (core funding). 2004–2006 MSEK 15; (core funding). 2007–09 MSEK 33 (thematic funding) Sida's contribution is about 20% of total funding for selected 'themes'.  ICTSD also supported by Ministry for Foreign Affairs independent of Sida. For example, through a contribution of MSEK 2 for a project concerning trade and climate during 2008–2009.
Sector	33113 SPS



Sida desk officer	Elisabeth Löfvander
Country focus	Global
Implementation organisation	ICTSD – a non profit NGO based in Geneva, established 1996 currently operating on a budget of MSEK 50–60 per annum with some 35 staff (2008), main funding is provided by the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden.
Direct stakeholders	Policy makers in developing countries, lobby groups, international organisations, media, politicians, NGOs, etc., According to ICTSD more than 20,000 stakeholders of which half in developing countries; network with 120 organisations...
Current project status	On-going

### **Objectives, outputs and activities**

Sida objectives/ purpose	Contribute to poverty reduction by making the international trading system more in tune with sustainable development through empowering disadvantaged stakeholders from developing countries to participate more effectively in trade negotiations (Sida 2007).
Planned outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key stakeholders in trade policy are empowered.</li> <li>• The international trade system is more aware of sustainable development issues.</li> <li>• Key stakeholders in the international trade policy agenda are identified; key sustainable development issues and prospects in the trade policy agenda are identified. Key stakeholders in the international trade policy agenda are identified; key sustainable development issues and prospects in the trade policy agenda are identified.</li> </ul> <p>In most recent phase, the focus on support is from core to thematic, with new sets of outputs including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stakeholder empowering</li> <li>• Trade development promoted</li> <li>• Sustainable development is promoted through regional trade agreements</li> <li>• Trade is reconciled with environment and natural resources</li> </ul> <p>(Sida 2007).</p>
Activities	Funding of ICTSD's work communication and information, policy dialogue, research and capacity building.

### Means to assess results

Result-reporting	<p>Narrative annual reports by ICTSD covering the activities of the project and summarise to what extent its objectives have been achieved. "The reporting includes limited information on results and the outcomes – i.e. the positive or negative change for the beneficiaries (2004 mid term review).</p> <p>Mid term review 2004 (SPM consultants).</p> <p>Contribution report 2007 (SPM).</p> <p>Contribution Profile Report prepared by SPM 2007.</p> <p>Suggested mid term evaluation 2009.</p> <p>Separate reports by other donors (e.g. DFID) available to Sida; such reports claimed to be more result-management oriented.</p>
Internal result assessment	<p>In 2004, ICTSD had had no systemic approach to internally assess the dimensions of performance. In 2007, no performance monitoring system still in place. To develop and implement such as system was already in the plans 2003, but not much has so far happened. (2007 review); Sida claims ICTSD working on it, using consultants to establish a log-frame based M&amp;E system (Sida 2007). Reporting to other donors more result oriented (Sida 2007).</p> <p>User survey 2004.</p>
Log frame	None

### Results

General	The relevance and effectiveness of ICTSD's work were found high, the efficiency was found moderate, while the financial viability was found low by the mid-term review 2004. Same consultants claimed further improvements by 2007.
Actual outputs	The internal system to assess result not sufficiently developed to determine the results based on the objectives above. Sida claims considerable results in 'empowerment' and also the effectiveness of the organisation reflected in the demand on its services.
Achievement of objectives	General statements that so is the case, but issue of attribution highlighted (Sida 2007).
Poverty reduction	Assumed due to the mandate of the organisation, but not specifically assessed.
Economic growth	Not an objective as such, nor assessed.
Pro-poor growth	Implicit objective due to the mandate and goal of the organisation; degree of impact not explicitly assessed.
Trade	Objective to integrate poor countries in the global trade system on better terms, but no explicit assessment whether an impact is being achieved.

Institutional development and capacity building	An implicit objective as the stakeholders belong to various policy setting or policy influencing organisations – actual impact not assessed.
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### **Mainstreaming issues**

Gender	ICTSD has an explicit gender focus; the degree there is any effect not assessed.
HIV/AIDS	No explicit objective, nor assessed in reviews.
Environment/Climate	The mandate of the organisation is 'sustainable development'; given an increasing focus over time; the impact not explicitly assessed.
Democracy/human rights	An implicit objective, impact not assessed.

### **Aid management issues**

Sustainability	ICTSD largely depending on donor funding from the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. Organisational sustainability improving over time as more donors are attracted. Sida claims ICTSD sustainability is high (2007).  According to review 2007; the sustainability of the possible impact on trade regimes/policies, not assessed or discussed.
Ownership	An international NGO initiative not emerging from any 'PRSP etc. Ownership of the sponsors is high, however, and the organisation increasingly a part of the international development community.
Counterpart effectiveness	Mid-term Review 2004 claimed relevance and effectiveness of ICTSD's work were high, the efficiency moderate, while the financial viability was low. 2007 claimed further strengthening; Sida states ICTSD plays 'a unique role in the trading system for sustainable development'.
Donor coordination	Reasonable, but can be improved (DfID).
Explicit Sida learning	Sida seems to learn from other donors' modality of funding (DfID), but also external evaluations – more focus on result management.
Sida management	Management by desk officer at Sida. Project strongly dependent on one Sida official.
Cost-effectiveness	Sida (2007) claims probably good effectiveness as compared to other Geneva based organisations. Not assessed in more detail.

### **References**

- SPM (2004): *Mid term review*  
 SPM (2007) *Sida Contribution Review STCSD 2004–2006*  
 Sida (2007): *Bedömningspromemoria*  
 Sida (2007): *Decision on contribution*  
 UD (2008) *Bidrag till ICTDS avseende projekt om handel och klimat*

## 5. Trade Promotion Programme of the Swedish Chambers of Commerce

<b>Project description</b>	
Summary and background	This is an export promotion program which Sida has out-sourced to the Swedish Chambers of Commerce (SCC), consisting mainly of the sub projects Business intermediation, Capacity building and Promotional work. It is implemented during 2005–2008 and amounts to a total of SEK 32 million in Sida contribution and another 6,5 million in SCC's own funds.
Period	2005–2008
Sida contribution	SEK 32 million
Total project cost	
Sector	Trade promotion, trade development.
Sida desk officer	Göran Edehorn
Country focus	Global
Implementation organisation	To implement the program SCC has formed a steering group, a coordination unit, and also a network of representatives for Swedish industry and trade, authorities and organizations. In all a staff of 9 persons are working in the program.
Direct stakeholders	Recipient country organizations, member firms in Sweden.
Current project status	A new phase of the project has been decided, and tendering procedures have recently been completed.
<b>Objectives, outputs and activities</b>	
Sida objectives	The overall objective of the programme is increased economic growth in order to reducing poverty in the cooperation countries. The program goal is to develop the capacity of the economy to be able to export its goods and services. A stronger economy is a precondition for, development, job creation, and for poverty reduction. The program aims to make the experiences of Swedish firms, as well concrete support activities available to firms and organizations in the cooperation countries.
Planned outputs	
Activities	

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### Means to assess results

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Result-reporting      *Reporting to Sida*  
The reporting by SCC to Sida has been detailed and has covered all relevant parts of the program. Even if some of the reporting could be said to be repetitive and too extensive, it has generally been well disposed, logical and well reasoned. By not being afraid to expose and discuss in its reporting also those part of the program which have not functioned well, SCC has shown that it wants to be a learning organization.

An external assessment of the program done in 2007, examined the activity and the objective structure of the program and also discussed the programs relevance.

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Internal result assessment

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Log frame      *Project planning and LFA work*  
This work has been successful. SCC has designed LFA matrixes not only for the program as a whole but also for each independent project component. The LFA s appear to be relevant and correct, and also short and comprehensive. Therefore they can serve as basis not only for follow-up and evaluation, but also for managing and implementing the program.

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### Results

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General      *Overall assessment*  
All the different parts of the program have been implemented successfully, but some of the main program activities (Chamber trade, delegations and Market Guides) show a declining demand from the respective target groups.

A positive feature is that SCC in its reporting does not ignore this trend, but instead analyses how one can best revise the program and continue.

The long run relevance of the respective components must be further discussed and analysed in order to determine where the program focus should be placed in the future.

The initiative taken w.r.t. to *Special projects* has been successful and seems to offer a good opportunity for future focus, and also a possible expansion.

Another positive development is the increasing cooperation with other Nordic chambers of commerce.

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Actual outputs *Business Data Base "Chamber Trade"*  
 The number of published business inquiries has gone down. In recent years there have been more companies looking for than posting business offers. It is at this point difficult to assess if the decreasing interest should be seen as an indication that the usefulness of this program part can be questioned, and that it should therefore be discontinued.

*Delegations*  
 SCC today receives few requests for delegation visits from companies in the developing countries, which have a capacity to export. SCC's initiative to engage local cooperation partners in the selection of companies and to carry out preparatory work has so far not yielded positive results.

*Chamber Academy*  
 Even if the training of the Stockholm based trade attachés is valuable, it is probably more effective to increasingly offer training directly in their home countries to the organizations and the individuals who are seen as potential key persons for promoting the countries exports.

*Publications*  
 The set output targets have been achieved, but it remains unclear how positive the effect of this program is, since the demand for the market guides has gone down in the last years.

*Special projects*  
 Available information shows the so called special programs to be promising and having potential to concretely benefit their respective target groups. Today about 20% of total funds go to the special projects.

*Promotion work*  
 Without an analyses of what should be a suitable role for SCC in national as well as international promotion work, and what could be a suitable balance between the work done by Sida and by SCC in this regard, it is not easy to assess SCC's work in this area.

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Achievements of objectives It is difficult to relate the limited activities of the program, which take place on the micro level, to the overall objectives, which are on macro level. It is also, in practice, difficult to show that the project activities will result in actual business deals, because a very long time may pass between the activities and the business deals, to which the project activity has in any case just been a contributing influence.

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Pro-poor growth

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Trade

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Institutional  
development  
and capacity  
building

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**Mainstreaming issues**

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Gender *Gender, environment and ethics*  
Sida's decision memorandum states that in the planned training courses for the Embassy attachés, an increased focus will be placed on the gender, aspects of ethics and on environment. SCC in its work appears to have followed recommendation to the degree that it is possible. In general one may note that in these kinds of programs there are only limited possibilities to address the cross-cutting issues in a more pro-active way.

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HIV/AIDS

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Environment/  
climate Environmental aspects have or are to be integrated into all the different components of the program. There is for example already a guide for the Swedish market of ecological food stuffs.

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Democracy  
and human  
rights The program can be seen to promote a democratic development in the cooperation countries by strengthening the chances of the business associations to influence national decision making.

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**Aid management issues**

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Sustainability

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Ownership

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Counterpart  
effectiveness

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Donor  
coordination *Nordic cooperation*  
An even more intensive Nordic cooperation should be developed in the future. Both with respect to business contact intermediation and publications it is clear that most work could and should be done on a Nordic basis, because the objectives of the Nordic countries in this area are largely the same. This is also an aspect which SCC has focused on recently and important progress has taken place.

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Sida learning

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Sida  
management

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Relevance Sida policies	The export promotion program of the SCC well corresponds to the activities that are normally associated with trade development. There has in recent years been a trend away from work on the firm level towards more focus on institutional and sector level work. Also, in general Sida is today moving toward competence and institutional development rather than support to individual companies.
Cost-effectiveness	

### References

Översyn av Sidas stöd till Handelsfrämjande via Svenska Handelsskammarförbundet för perioden 2005–2007. Av Karlis Goppers, DEVFIN Advisers AB. 28 februari 2007

## 6. STDF: Standards and Trade Facility

### Project description

Summary and background	<p>STDF was an initiative of FAO, OIE, the World Bank, WHO and WTO at the Doha conference in 2001. STDF was established in 2002 as a trust fund with initial funding of the World Bank and WTO. In 2004, the STDF expanded membership to donors and representatives of developing country beneficiaries.</p> <p><i>The strategic aims of the STDF are:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>to assist developing countries enhance their expertise and capacity to analyze and to implement international sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, improving their human, animal and plant health situation, and thus ability to gain and maintain market access; and</li> <li>to act as a vehicle for co-ordination among technical co-operation providers, the mobilization of funds, the exchange of experience and the dissemination of good practice in relation to the provision and receipt of SPS-related technical co-operation.</li> </ul> <p>Sida began to support STDF with core funding in 2005. STDF has currently a strategy applying to year 2011.</p>
Period	<p>Phase 1: 2005–2007</p> <p>Phase 2: 2007–2008</p>
Sida contribution	<p>MSEK 12 (Phase 1); MSEK 4 (phase 2).</p> <p>Sida is the second largest funder of STDF after the UK, accounted for about 20% of the budget for 2005–2007.</p>
Sida sector	33113 Trade Policy and regulations (SPS).
Sida desk officer	<p>M. Davidson-Abdelli; 6985052.</p> <p>Erik Ringborg</p>



Country Focus	Global
Implementation organisation	STDF is a global programme in capacity building and technical co-operation established by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) with WTO in Geneva as lead agency.
Direct stakeholders	Experts and institutions in developing countries dealing with SPS.
Current project status	Sida holding further financing until results of evaluation 2008 concluded for future work of STDF (likely to be cleared spring 2009).
<b>Objectives, outputs and activities</b>	
Sida objectives	No specific Sida objectives established in 2005, but to support STDF (for STDF objectives, see above).
Planned outputs	No specific outputs established for Sida; For STDF in general: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To be a practical reference point in SPS</li> <li>• Long term capacity enhancing support to experts and institutions in dev. countries</li> <li>• Provide technical expertise in a technically complex field (Sida 2005).</li> </ul>
Activities	Consultancies; training, etc.
<b>Means to assess results</b>	
Result-reporting	Annual report on activities to Sida. Sida invited to participate in regular meetings in STDF with other donors. “Paragraph 92 of the STDF Operational Rules stipulates that the Facility shall be evaluated every four years by an external reviewer appointed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) after consultation with the STDF Working Group”. 2005 Evaluation (general for STDF) (before Sida support). 2008 Evaluation (general for STDF) by Swedish consultant.
Internal result assessment	Not known or elaborated by Sida.
Log frame	None

## Results

### General

Actual outputs	<p>Assessed by 2008 evaluation in the form of six activities/sub-projects (testing tools, training; standards). Of these five were rated as 'successful', meeting their objectives, while one only partly 'successful'.</p> <p>The impact of the six STDF projects that have been the subject of an <i>ex post</i> evaluation was reviewed by 2008 evaluation. The first resulted in the development and testing of a tool to evaluate national veterinary services, which has subsequently been used in many developing countries. The second, an OIE Training for Trainers project, was run successfully and largely met its objectives. The third, aimed at assisting developing countries in the implementation of an IPPC standard on regulating wood packaging material in international trade, was very successful and achieved the overall STDF goals. Two other projects on the development of tools for plant pest risk analysis were completed successfully. The sixth project, aimed at capacity building for implementation of the Codex Alimentarius Code of Good Practice for Animal Feeding, was only partly successful (Evaluation 2008).</p>
Achievements of objectives	STDF seemingly moving towards fulfilling its 'strategic objectives' in terms of capacity building.
Poverty reduction	Not assessed in 2008 evaluation.
Economic growth	See above
Pro-poor growth	See above
Trade	See above
Institutional development and capacity building	2008 Evaluation claims such results are at hand.

### Mainstreaming issues

Gender	Not elaborated in Sida decision memo, nor assessed in 2008 evaluation.
HIV/AIDS	See above
Environment/ climate	See above
Democracy/ human rights	See above

### Aid management issues

Sustainability	STDF is highly dependent on donor funding, with limited contributions from users; unclear of the long-term position of STDF as a programme.
Ownership	STDF is an international organisation initiative; the degree of active involvement of stakeholders in developing countries in the establishment not known or discussed in Sida memos or evaluations.
Counterpart effectiveness	Rated so far as good to very good by 2008 evaluation:  "The overall performance of the STDF is judged to be good and in many important areas very good. It carries out an important role that no other single body would be able to accomplish and the participation of the five partner organizations, the donors and the observer organizations means that it has ready access to expertise in a large number of SPS- and development-related areas."... The STDF makes efficient and effective use of its resources by arranging many of its activities back-to-back with or together with meetings organised by other organizations".... It now has a rich portfolio of projects and PPGs covering a wide range of SPS-related issues, from broad basic projects aimed at stimulating awareness at the national level of the importance of being able to meet SPS-related requirements to narrower, more technical projects aimed at finding solutions to specific problems preventing access of a product to international markets" (2008 evaluation).
Donor coordination	Rated high: STDF a multi-donor programme involving several international organisations. Co-ordination through common meetings and reporting.
Sida learning	
Sida management	Participating in meetings and through STDF reporting.
Relevance Sida policies	High – according to Sida's TRA policy and plan.  On poverty – assumed in causal chain between poverty – economic growth/trade – better market access – better capacity in SPS – project activities; such chain not yet tested in the particular project.
Cost-effectiveness	For outputs: Good as judged by 2008 evaluation.  Poverty – not assessed.

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## References

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- Website: [www.standardsfacility.org](http://www.standardsfacility.org)  
Sida (2005) bedömningsPM  
Sida (2005) Protokoll Komin.  
Tripple Line Consulting (2005): Review of the STDF  
Sida (2007): *Amendment to agreement*  
Slorach, S.(2008) *Report of a Review of the Standards and Trade Development Facility*
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## 7. ITP: International Training Programme – World Trade, Conformity Assessment and Quality Infrastructure Development

Draft

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### Project/programme description

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Summary and background	<p>ITP is a long-standing feature of Sida's work covering a broad range of subjects. The ITPs follow a similar formula, using the 'Swedish resource base' (authorities, organisations, consultants) as course arrangers and lecturers. Courses aimed at top and middle level executives in developing country organisations. The courses are currently of 1–2 months duration, spread over a year, taking place both in Sweden and participants home countries, and include a mix of lectures, study visits, web-based interaction, etc. Each course typically for 25 participants. The courses are free to the participants. In 2009, Sida is arranging some different 70 courses of which 9 are in 'trade-related assistance'.</p> <p>The Quality Infrastructure ITP has been on-going since 1999 every year as a global programme and also since 2004 as a regional programme in Middle East and North Africa (Mena). In total 15 courses have been conducted 1999–2008.</p>
Project period	1999–2010. Current agreement 2008–2010.
Sida contribution	Each programme had until 2005 a budget of about MSEK 2,5, increased to about MSEK 5 thereafter. Total for the period: about 50 MSEK.
'Sector'	33181 Trade education.
Sida desk officer	Anneli Hartmann 6985347.
Country focus	Global and regional (Mena); Sida invites specific countries to send applications.

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Implementation organisation	SWEDAC – The Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assessment.  (The organisation chosen after a tendering procedure with only SWEDAC as contender).  AQS – Swedish private consultancy group as a subcontractor to SWEDAC.
Direct stakeholders	Top and middle level staff in 'Quality infrastructure organisations' in partner countries.
Current project status	Agreement signed with SWEDAC for 2008–2010 with an option for two more years (2011–12).

### **Objectives, outputs activities**

Sida objectives	<p>1 General objective for the ITPs: To contribute to create conditions for partner countries and other developing countries to fight poverty through effective inputs for capacity and institutional development.</p> <p>2 Objective for the quality infrastructure courses: to provide information and training of officials and representatives of economic operators on international trade and related conformity assessment procedures and the development of national systems for regulatory and quality infrastructure (accreditation, certification, testing, inspection, metrology, and technical regulatory activities) with reference to WTO agreements.</p> <p>3 Added objective after 2007: programmes shall contribute to organisational change and reform, which shall thereby contribute to economic growth through trade...</p>
Anticipate outputs	About 25 participants in each course (375 persons trained 1999–2008).
Activities	Lectures, workshops, study visits in 2–3 phases; initially course 3–4 weeks but expansion of courses after 2004 to include a second phase in home countries.

### **Result-reporting system**

Result-reporting for Sida	Well established system (general for ITP) with reporting by implementing organisation after each course, annually and at end of contract period. Reporting primarily on activities and inputs, plus self-assessment by participants. Sida questionnaire to participants to assess quality, relevance etc of course an essential feed-back.  A review by external consultants in 2006.
Internal result monitoring	Not discussed – Assumed to satisfy Sida.
Log frame	No

## Results

General	<p>Feed-back from questionnaires – generally quite positive for relevance and quality of courses;</p> <p>Review 2006: The quality of the courses have generally been given high ratings by participants according to self-assessments, but questions raised to what extent the learning fully can be applied at home in day-to-day work.</p>
Actual outputs	In line with anticipation – about 350 persons 1999–2008.
Achievement of objectives	<p>Ref. above:</p> <p>1 Not assessed and only through assumed causality chain</p> <p>2 Fulfilled</p> <p>3 Probably not achieved to any greater extent in the past; no follow-up so far.</p>
Poverty reduction	Assumed in causality chain. No explicit assessment ex-ante or ex-post.
Economic growth	See above
Pro-poor growth	Unlikely given to design of programme.
Trade	Assumed in causality chain. No explicit assessment ex-ante or ex-post.
Institutional development and capacity building	<p>Ex-ante: Implicit assumption training will improve institutional capacity.</p> <p>Ex-post: According to 2006 review: Questionable (based on participants self assessment) to what extent the courses will lead to change in home institutions (participants seen to have limited influence due to their positions).</p>

### Mainstreaming issues

Gender	Efforts by Sida to increase female participation in the courses; gender to some extent included in programme content; no stated indicators of the objective to measure against.
HIV/AIDS	No assessment ex-ante or ex-post.
Environment/ climate	No assessment ex-ante or ex-post.
Democracy/ human rights	“Integrated to some extent in programme” (Bca consultants).

### Aid management issues

Ownership	Course designed by SWEDAC with no direct input from recipient countries; ITP can in general be considered ‘supply driven’, but likely to be responding to a perceived demand to a larger or lesser extent. (No ‘demand’ assessment done in the specific course)...
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Counterpart effectiveness	SWEDAC judged of high quality with a good standing internationally – the subcontracting to AQS questionable (Bca report); the cost-structure questioned in a review 2006.
Sustainability	The courses: sustainability entirely dependent on Sida funding. No self-financing from implementing organisation, nor fees from participants.  Sustainability of the ‘capacity building’ at human level and institution: Not discussed ex-ante, nor assessed ex-post.
Explicit Sida learning	Review 2006 led to a stronger focus on results in terms of organisational change and reform, through demand on result management by SWEDAC and the selection of participants (focus on selecting ‘change agents’).
Sida management	Mainly through the reporting by implementing organisation and annual consultations; due to the volume of different courses opportunities of bench-marking in quality.
Cost-effectiveness	Assessment 2006 of costs per participant (SEK 90,000–180,000). Costs considered high by the reviewer; Sida able to compare cost per course/participant with other types of ITPs, and considered the quality infrastructure course ‘in line with others’; no assessment made of cost-effectiveness versus the overall objectives.
Relevance for Sida policies	High in theory– Focal point for Trade related assistance; actual relevance not assessed.  Relevance for poverty reduction based on a long assumed ‘causality chain’ but not explicitly assessed ex-post.
Donor co-ordination	Low or none – A Sida initiative with no involvement by other donors, furthermore, restrictive in use of resources.

### References

- Sida (2009): International Training Programmes
- Bca consulting (2006); Översyn på uppdrag av Sida av Det Internationella Utbildningsprogrammet World Trade, Conformity Assessment and Quality Infrastructure Development
- Sida (2007): Uppdragsbeskrivning – ITP Quality Infrastructure in support of World Trade
- AQS (2006): World trade, conformity assessment and quality infrastructure development, verksamhetsberättelser 1999–2006, 2006
- Sida (different years): beslut, budgets contracts

## 8. Trapca: Trade Policy Training Centre in Africa

<b>Project description</b>	
Summary and background	A Sida initiative, leading to a pre-feasibility study in 2003 which recommended, based on perceived demand, a centre for trade policy training to be established in Arusha, Tanzania, in partnership with Eastern and Southern Management Institute, ESAMI. In 2006 a project was agreed and Trapca's first course took place in November 2006.
Period	2006–2011
Sida contribution	MSEK 98 (co-financed with ESAMI MSEK 11).
Sector	33181 Trade education.
Sida desk officer	Elisabeth Löfvander
Country focus	LDCs, but also low-income African countries.
Implementation organisation	– ESAMI – a well established management institute owned by ten African countries, 95% self-financed from fees and offering master training to 6,000 students yearly. – Lund's University.
Direct stakeholders	'persons with a graduate degree and officers with future careers in government agencies, universities, business, NGOs and international organisations, etc.'
Current project status	On going – about mid-term.
<b>Objectives, outputs and activities</b>	
Sida objectives Arranged as an LFA)	Poverty reduction through: 1 better access to foreign markets and an integration into the world economy on more beneficial terms for low-income countries through 2 enhanced understanding of trade policy issues in the LDCs.
Planned outputs	– At least 300 government and private sector persons trained annually for 4 years – a training institution established providing master programme and other short courses – network of research and trade information, including a data base – a forum for trade policy discussions (Sida 2006).



Activities	Vocational and academic training in trade policy at Masters level (2-years) and shorter courses, mainly in trade law, trade policy negotiations, WTO agreements, etc.
<b>Means to assess results</b>	
Result-reporting	Annual performance Reviews by Trapca. Mid term review after 3 years after which Sida has option to stop funding if progress not satisfactory (2009). An external monitoring team reporting system (see below). End or programme evaluation in 2011.
Internal result assessment	Applying ESAMI's Monitoring and evaluation system, including course evaluations; system to be based on an LFA.
Log frame	
<b>Results</b>	
General	'The development since the start up, confirms Trapca in highly relevant, and is unique in Africa; impressive achievements; we find the quality of produced papers impressive, which shows the courses are good and that the students are serious' (Mothander & de Vylder 2008).
Actual outputs	The planned outputs evaluable – project clearly on track to achieve these.
Achievements of objectives	Too early to be assessed even at the lowest level of the objective ladder. Impact only possible to assess on the long-run.
Poverty reduction	The causal chain assumptions expressed in Sida memo; too early to be assessed (see above).
Economic growth	See above
Pro-poor growth	See above
Trade	See above
Institutional development and capacity building	Trapca, as a part of ESAMI, 'impressive' development (Monitoring team). Capacity building at recipient countries – too early to be assessed.
<b>Mainstreaming issues</b>	
Gender	Will be a focus in the design stage; ESAMI also having a thorough gender perspective"; about 40% of participants women (de Vylder 2008).
HIV/AIDS	Integrated in the design; not assessed in implementation.
Environment/ climate	Not explicit objective in project document.

Democracy/ human rights	Not explicit objective in project document.
<b>Aid management issues</b>	
Sustainability	Plan: ESAMI to take over the Trapca to be financed though fees, consultancies, etc:- actual sustainability to early to be assessed. A weakness in design might be that the phasing out of Sida resources according to budget plan is abrupt last year.
Ownership	ESAMI is the formal owner; however, how the project emerged is unclear.
Counterpart effectiveness	Rated good by monitoring team (both ESAMI and Lund).
Donor coordination	A Sida initiative with no other donors involved. Potential issue of co-ordination if other training institutions established.
Sida learning	Premature to review.
Sida management	External advisory and monitoring team (part of the budget) which reports to Sida annually (2 reports so far).
Cost-effectiveness	The cost (MSEK 100) to establish a seemingly demanded training in a well established and functional management training institution seems difficult to explain. Costs almost exclusively course development and inputs.

#### References

- Sida (2006): *Assessment memo – Trade policy training centre in Africa*
- Mothander & de Vylder (2008): *Trapaca – Second report of the monitoring team*

## 9. EPOPA: Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa

### Project description

Summary and background	EPOPA is a private sector development programme, aiming at developing markets on the local and international levels through business, and in doing so it is expected to benefit rural communities by increasing agricultural production and smallholder farmers' incomes. It focuses on selected export commodities, mainly cotton, coffee, sesame, and cocoa. The project began as a small Swed-corp pilot activity in 1993 taken over by Sida in 1995. It became the formal EPOPA project in 1997. During implementation, the project expanded in scope to address basic issues in the environment of organic farming and related institutional development.
Period	1995–2008 in 4 phases.

Sida contribution	MSEK 160 in the period 1995–2008.
Sector	33120 Trade facilitation.
Sida desk officer	
Country focus	Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (Zambia aborted after a short period).
Implementation organisation	AgroEco Ltd, a Dutch consulting firm, specialising in trade promotion and agricultural development, particularly in organic products.  Grolink AB, a Swedish consultancy firm specialised in organic agriculture.  In the earlier phase, AgroEco was the sole implementor; companies selected through a bidding process.
Direct stakeholders	Exporters of organic produce in the target countries, and indirectly organic farmers; some 26,000 farmer most of which in Uganda, but potentially another 20,000 in Tanzania; total population of about 200,000.
Current project status	Completed. No concrete plans for a continuation, although the current country strategy for Uganda suggests organic farming as a potential area for Sida.

#### **Objectives, outputs and activities**

Sida objectives (arranged as log frame)	The objective of the EPOPA programme was to develop the export of organic products from Africa to increase and diversify exports, while at the same time exposing the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors to environmentally sound farming techniques. (Evaluation 2000).  In 2005 assessment memo:  1 Livelihood of rural communities in Africa improved, through 2 Export volumes of organic products increased, through 3 Exposure of African agriculture to organic farming techniques.
Planned outputs	Successful organic export projects developed.  Capacity in the organic sector increased.
Activities	Export projects for different farmer groups and in latter phase, development of institutions related to organic farming and certification.

### Means to assess results

Result-reporting 'A highly documented project' through, for example reports by Consultant on each sub-project every 6 months.

2 independent evaluations carried out year 2000 and 2004.

A country evaluation 2008;

Book produced by AgroEco and ProLink at the end of the project (2008).

Internal result assessment

Log frame Yes, of operational value.

### Results

General "Uganda is now recognized as the leading African nation in organic exports, and it is doubtful whether that would have been possible without the pioneering efforts of EPOPA" (Evaluation 2008).

"There is no doubt that the program has had a high impact on the farmers that were contracted, certified as organic producers, and that later had their products sold to the exporting firms. The price increases ranged between 20% and 300%" (Evaluation 2004).

Actual outputs

Achievements of objectives The overall objective of the project must be considered achieved.

Poverty reduction Evident among farmers participating in the projects, notably in Uganda. Assumed broader impact at country level by creating a new market for organic products (Uganda). Reason for impact – added value due to a price premium.

"More than 30.000 farmers produce certified organic crops in Uganda, and the value added paid into rural communities because of the organic premium was around USD 930.000 in 2006" (Country review 2008).

Economic growth Not assessed at macro level, but discussed at micro-level (target farmers) and to some extent sector level: The organic market was non-existent in mid 1990s in Uganda, in 2007 valued at USD 15 million with some 85,000 registered organic farmers (Forss 2008) The issue of attribution noticed.

Pro-poor growth Implicitly a 'pro-poor growth' approach, however not dealt with to any extent explicitly.

Trade Assessed in the sense of the project as a 'market creator'.

Institutional development and capacity building Institutional development as a specific objective added during later phases "The institutional development components, in particular training, have been successful and contribute significantly to the sector" (Forss 2008).

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### Mainstreaming issues

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Gender	Increasingly dealt with – “it is a complex and changing subject that may need more extensive research than can be achieved from a program of development cooperation.” (Forss 2004) After mid-2000, more of focus; reviewed in 2008 (end book).
HIV/AIDS	Initially not a focus, but added in mid-term; dealt with in assessment memo 2005 at some length and in project reviews.
Environment/ Climate	Organic farming assumed more environment friendly – project contributing through better farming techniques; less use of chemical inputs as a result of an expanding market. ‘Organic farmers ‘more sensitive to information...’ Environmental aspects dealt with throughout project.
Democracy/ human rights	No assessment.

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### Aid management issues

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Sustainability	Market creation is sustainable – “Project is sustainable’ due to the fact there is an increasing demand for organic products” (Evaluation 2008).
Ownership	Project not emerging from a national plan, PRSP or similar, but rather donor created (a market opportunity spotted in 1993). Today ownership remains with national stakeholder groups (evaluation 2004).
Counterpart effectiveness	Consultants chosen in competitive bidding throughout the project and followed up in reviews and Sida management; the consultants judged to be effective by evaluations.
Donor coordination	A ‘classic’ single donor project.
Sida learning	Considerable learning in market-driven agricultural development and specifically organic products. Unclear how this has permeated in Sida.
Sida management	Evaluations critical of poor co-operations in Sida (Natur – INEC) and ‘poor understanding in Sida of the project. EPOPA a new style market driven agro project using exporters as vehicle rather than direct focus on small farmers.  “Sida’s decisions have often come late. The program has not expanded to as many countries as it should have as the decisions to allocate funds were not taken”. EPOPA has still not been fully understood and/or accepted, and hence the integration of Sida’s resources and support has not been forthcoming. This hampered implementation of the second phase and is the main reason why some projects are behind schedule (Evaluation 2004).

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Relevance Sida policies	Project might be seen as an example of a 'project creating policy', rather than the reverse; Current TRA plan in line with the project and the area defined as a priority area.
Cost-effectiveness	Value added among farmers assessed and compared to programme cost. On a year by year basis, poor ratio 1 to 1, i.e. incremental value equal to annual project cost. However, if sustainable, the ratio would be good. A major issue why programme did not expand to Zambia (and Mozambique) as envisaged, leading to lower impact than possible. A problem according to the evaluation 2004 was due to Sida's management.  "The output of the EPOPA program however could have been better if Sida would have been faster in responding to the initiatives from program management on expansion into new crops and countries. The main factor that has hampered development during the second phase of EPOPA is connected to coordination between units in Sida and the allocation of funds." (Evaluations).

#### References

- Forss, K. and Sterky, E. (2000) *An evaluation of EPOPA – A Sida financed program to support the development of organic exports from Africa*
- Forss, K. and Lundström, M. (2005) *An evaluation of the program "Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa" phase 2*
- Sida (2005) *Assessment memo*
- AgroEco and GroLink (2008): *Organic exports – a way to a better life?*
- Forss, K. et al (2008) *Building a Competitive Advantage: A Study of the Organic Sector in Uganda*
- Website [www.epopa.com](http://www.epopa.com)
- Comments by J. Nakedde, Sida, Kampala

## 10. OSEA: Regional Cooperation for Organic Standards and Certification Capacity in East Africa

### Project description

Summary and background	A study was commissioned by Sida in 2002 concerning certification of organic products in Africa. As a result of the study, a project was developed to assist the stakeholders in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya to develop appropriate regional standards for organic agriculture. The project grew out of experience from the Sida supported EPOPA project.
Period	2005–2007

Sida contribution	MSEK 3,6
Sida sector	33113 Trade policy and regulation SPS.
Sida desk officer	Elisabeth Löfvander
Country focus	Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya.
Implementation organisation	<p>– IFOAM – a worldwide umbrella organization for the organic movement with some 750 member organizations in 108 countries. The head office of IFOAM is in Bonn, Germany and it has liaison offices in Rome, Italy and in Kampala, Uganda. IFOAM has a work force of 15 persons.</p> <p>– Gro Link AB, a Swedish consultancy group.</p>
Direct stakeholders	Organic sector organisations, NGOs etc.; ultimate organic farmers in the chosen countries.
Current project status	Project ended 2007; a new proposal was submitted by IFOAM for phase II in October 2007 for the period 2008–2010. A phase II project was prepared by Sida (MSEK 15) and approved by Sida's Project Committee in late 2008. Pending.
<b>Objectives, outputs and activities</b>	
Sida objectives	"To improve income and livelihood of rural communities in East Africa through facilitation of trade in organic products by means of a regional standard and regional certification cooperation" (Sida 2005).
Planned outputs	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 A draft standard is developed through stakeholder consultations and by field testing by the end of 2006.</li> <li>2 Joint protocols for the verification of compliance with standards are developed.</li> <li>3 A governance structure for the East Africa Organic Standards is established.</li> <li>4 An East Africa Organic Standard is adopted by early 2007.</li> <li>5 The East African Organic Standard has been approved by EAC or IFOAM.</li> <li>6 Consumers in the East African Countries have been informed about the standards and increased their understanding of organic agriculture.</li> </ol>

Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• national and regional meetings with stakeholders</li> <li>• regional meetings for selected stakeholders and technical working group</li> <li>• training seminars</li> <li>• consultants</li> <li>• web site and mailing list for communication, information and discussion.</li> </ul>
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**Means to assess results**

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Result-reporting	<p>Agreement: A narrative report on activities and results at end of project period by the implementing organisation.</p> <p>A report submitted in March 2008 by IFOAM.</p>
Internal result assessment	Not elaborated in the Decision memo.
Log frame	Included in Sida's Decision Memo – not followed up in final report.

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**Results**

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Actual outputs	Accomplished all its outputs, apart from the IFOAM approval of the standards due to IFOAM reorganisation of its certification. In addition, it produced more than planned, notably the East African Organic Mark and substantial and substantive policy influences (IFOAM 2008).
Achievements of objectives	The link between organic standards (the project output) and the objective of the project (improved farmers income) assumed but not tested, nor discussed in final report.
Poverty reduction	Assumed in project design, no ex-post assessment.
Economic growth	Not explicit in project design, nor ex post assessment.
Pro-poor growth	The orientation of the project is pro-poor (small African farmers with limited resources to procure inputs) but no assessment of the validity of the assumption in final report.
Trade	In support of the development of rapidly organic markets in Europe and elsewhere. No assessment of achievements in this respect in final report.
Institutional development and capacity building	Significant – “The East African Organic Products Standard was adopted by the EAC Council in April 2007 and officially launched by the Prime Minister of Tanzania at the organic conference in Dar May 2007. An East African Organic Mark was also established. This has provided the fundamentals for a further development of the local and regional markets” (IFOAM 2008).



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### Mainstreaming issues

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Gender	<p>Ex ante: 'a clear ambition to include women in the process as much as possible as well as an assessment of the standards from a gender perspective. to include women and apply gender perspective' (Sida 2005).</p> <p>Ex post: "the project engaged women to a large extent, also in prominent positions. While there is still a lot to do in terms of female empowerment also in the organic sector, the general awareness is there" (IFOAM 2008).</p>
HIV/AIDS	<p>Ex-ante: An assessment of the standards from an HIV/AIDS perspective will also be made, e.g. to ensure that not unnecessarily laborious methods are prescribed, as they will strongly discriminate against Aids victims as well as against single-parent or child led households (Sida 2005).</p> <p>Ex-post: The project didn't not manage to make a systematic assessment of the proposed standard from an HIV/AIDS perspective as outlined in the project proposal. HIV/AIDS related problems were however addressed during standard discussions (IFOAM 2008).</p>
Environment/ climate	An implicit assumption due to the character of the project; no specific follow up.
Democracy/ human rights	Not in design, nor follow up.

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### Aid management issues

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Sustainability	<p>Ex-ante: There are all reasons to believe that, as long as the ownership of the standards is clear and based on sufficient stakeholder participation, that sustainability will be assured (Sida 2005).</p> <p>Ex-post: The achievements of the OSEA project are sustainable. Nevertheless, more resources are needed to develop the organic sector further in the region (IFOAM 2008).</p>
Ownership	Project clearly 'owned' by IFOAM, and through links will organisations in target countries increasingly also recipients.
Counterpart effectiveness	No specifically assessed in project design or ex-post.
Donor coordination	Not explicit although IFOAM is sponsored by several donors.
Sida learning	Project emerged as a result of EPOPA – the utilisation in Sida of the learning in organic market development unclear.
Sida management	Entirely through one Sida desk officer.

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Relevance Sida policies	TRA clearly relevant and in line with policy and 2006 plan. Poverty – relevant by assumption of causality chain.
Cost-effectiveness	Not assessed ex-ante or ex-post.

### References

- Sida (2005): *Bedömningspromemoria och beslut*
- Sida (2005) *Agreement between Sida and IFOAM OSEA*
- IFOAM (2007) *Regional cooperation for Organic Standards and certification capacity in East Africa – OSEA Phase II – project proposal*
- IFOAM (2008): *OSEA – Final report to Sida*
- Comments by E. Löfvander, Sida

## 11. ECOWAS Capacity-Building in Trade Negotiations

### Project description

Summary and background	The project was conceptualised by member countries as an initiative from the Doha-round of WTO trade negotiations. A project was developed in 2001 jointly with Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), and during 2003 ECOWAS invited donor organisations to co-fund the project. Sida was approached which resulted in a 3-year agreement for the period 2004–2006, later extended to include 2007.
Period	Phase 1: 2004–2007 Phase 2: 2008–2009
Sida contribution	MSEK 42
‘Sector’	33181 Trade education –
Sida desk officer	Elisabeth Löfvander
Country focus	West Africa
Implementation organisation	ECOWAS – The Economic Community Of West African States is a regional group of fifteen countries, founded in 1975. Its mission is to promote economic integration in “all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters.
Direct stakeholders	

Current project status	On-going
<b>Objectives, outputs and activities</b>	
Sida objectives (arranged as a log frame)	<p>1 Contribute to reduced poverty in ECOWAS' member states by means of</p> <p>2 more beneficial outcome from their participation in international trade. (Improving ECOWAS member countries' position and participation in multilateral trade negotiations) through</p> <p>3 development oriented trade policy decision making and implementation, through</p> <p>4 setting up of institutional and organisational frameworks for trade policy formulation processes in member countries.</p> <p>In phase 2, suggested indicators on monitor impact are suggested external trade as share of GDP; economic growth, and 'balance of trade', while noting the problems of attribution.</p>
Planned outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased knowledge ....</li> <li>• Increased capacity in ECOWAS to negotiate multilateral trade agreements.</li> <li>• Increased regional integration in ECOWAS.</li> </ul> <p>Phase 1: 240 resource persons in the 15 member countries trained.</p> <p>Phase 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Common external tariff finalized and notified to WTO.</li> <li>• ECOWAS trade policy developed and proposed to Council of Ministers by 2009.</li> <li>• Inter-institutional committees for multilateral trade in function in all member countries by 2010.</li> </ul>
Activities	<p>Phase 1: 3 week training courses for to be delivered by especially selected and trained facilitators in each country and under the supervision of the project coordinator. The project also included activities to sensitise senior trade policy makers on its orientation and likely benefits.</p>

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### Means to assess results

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Result-reporting	<p>Phase 1: annual progress reports by ECOWAS.</p> <p>Evaluation at end of project 2008.</p> <p>In phase 2, an elaborate system of indicators related to anticipated outputs have been developed in the Sida project assessment memo, including indicators allowing assessment (rare in terms of sophistication as compared to other documents consulted).</p> <p>Monitoring team.</p> <p>Evaluation at end of project.</p>
Internal result assessment	Phase 2: the internal reporting system elaborated in Sida's decision memo.
Log frame	A log frame integrated in the project assessment memo 2008 and clearly linked to the text.

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### Results

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General	<p>Phase 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Over 400 participants trained, far above the target.</li> <li>• Interviews with participants in four member countries prove that the training has been very well appreciated.</li> <li>• Some participants from the public sector explain that they have taken career steps following the training.</li> <li>• Participants from the civil society and private sector pronounce deeper understanding and concern over their role in multilateral trade, and state that they have encouraged their organisations to develop capacity for advocacy in these matters.</li> <li>• National networks for multilateral trade have been encouraged and/or strengthened as result of the project.</li> <li>• ECOWAS has been benefited from being project manager, demonstrating capacity for competence development in multilateral trade negotiations and thus creating good will among member states in this field.</li> </ul> <p>(SPM 2007)</p> <p>Phase 2: too early to be assessed.</p>
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Actual outputs	Phase 1: outputs in terms of knowledge, capacity and integration seems to be accomplished; in terms of outputs of persons trained, actual output well above plan.  “A total of 437 persons have been trained compared to the target of 240 in the project document. Another around 80 persons will be trained during the remaining time of 2007 plus an additional 40 in early 2008, which means that more than double the initial target of participants will have been trained” (SPM 2007).  Phase 2: too early to be assessed.
Achievements of objectives	The hierarchy of objectives above, not assessed in the review 2008. Phase 2: too early to be assessed.
Poverty reduction	Ex-ante: assumed based on causal chain; ex-post (phase 1) not assessed; phase 2 too early to be assessed.
Economic growth	See above
Pro-poor growth	See above
Trade	See above
Institutional development and capacity building	Aim of the project; likely to be underway (phase 1). Phase 2: too early to be assessed.
<b>Mainstreaming issues</b>	
Gender	Phase 2: clear reference and strategy.
HIV/AIDS	Not addressed.
Environment/ climate	Not addressed in design or ex-post phase 1. Phase 2: reference to ECOWAS Treaty.
Democracy/ human rights	Not addressed in design or ex-post in either phase.
<b>Aid management issues</b>	
Sustainability	Improved during phase 1, still an issue in phase 2 design due to understaffing of ECOWAS trade department. ‘Hopefully it will improve’ However, under-funding a problem recognised..
Ownership	ECOWAS took initiative to project phase 1 and 2.
Counterpart effectiveness	

Donor coordination	Good Sida lead agency, but additional funding required. No other donors involved in same field, but Sida committed to inform the donor community and seek partners.
Sida learning	Learning from phase 1 to 2, however, very dependent on one staff; the institutional capacity in Sida an issue.
Relevance Sida policies	High – in line with Sida’s TRA policy and plan; focus on Africa.
Sida management	Phase 1: annual consultations. Phase 2: annual consultations plus a monitoring team.
Cost-effectiveness	Phase 1: high “The training has been performed at a substantially lower cost than anticipated. The average training cost per trainee has been reduced from the budget of USD 18 000 to the actual cost of USD 6 000. The figure includes preparatory training and travel, staff and other operational cost and meetings of the Steering Committee 2 (SPM 2007). Phase 2: too early to be assessed.

#### References

- SPM (2007) *The trade Negotiation Capacity Building project of ECOWAS – follow up of phase 1 and assessment of proposal for phase II*
- Sida (2008) *Assessment memo*
- Sida (2008) *Decision on Contribution*

## 12. Walvis Bay Corridor – Safe Way and Transport Corridors

### Project description

Summary and background	Sida has provided support to the Walvis Bay Corridor Group since years 2000, which up to 2007 focused on support of the HIV/AIDS programme of the Group. The group has the objective to make the roads linking the harbour of Walvis bay in Namibia with the countries in Southern Africa safer and more efficient for road transport. The group has the vision to establish Walvis bay as the leading transport route for the region.
Period	2007–2011
Sida contribution	MSEK 15
Sida sector	

Sida desk officer	Malin Ahrne
Country focus	Southern Africa, particularly Namibia (location of Walvis Bay harbour and WBCG).
Implementation organisation	Walvis Bay Corridor Group (WBCG), a private-public partnership in Namibia with the purpose to enhance road safety in the corridor roads to the Walvis Bay harbour, servicing trade to and from South Africa, Botswana, Zambia.
Direct stakeholders	WBCG, transport companies, exporters and drivers (HIV/AIDS).
Current project status	On-going

### **Objectives, outputs and activities**

Sida objectives (arranged as log frame)	<p>1 Reduce poverty in the region, by</p> <p>2.a Stimulating economic growth, and</p> <p>2.b Mitigation of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, STDs, through</p> <p>3 Improvement of the operating conditions and safety in specific road corridors in Southern Africa.</p>
Planned outputs	<p>The outputs include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of road safety action plans</li> <li>• Dissemination of best practices for secure transports</li> <li>• Provision of effective guidance of how to prevent HIV/AIDS and other STDs</li> <li>• Establish effective coordination mechanisms.</li> </ul>
Activities	Consultancy services.

### **Means to assess results**

Result-reporting	<p>Planned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bi-annual progress reports by WBCG</li> <li>• Monitoring impact on HIV/AIDS through surveys by WBCG</li> <li>• Completion report at end of project by WBCG</li> <li>• Mid-term review in 2009.</li> </ul> <p>A monitoring consultant to follow progress appointed in 2008 (budget MSEK 0,5, or 3% of project cost).</p>
Internal result assessment	Assessed in decision memo to be of "good quality".

Log frame	In project document prepared by consultant, but not in Sida's decision memorandum. Log frame of good operational value.
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### **Results**

Actual outputs	Too early to be assessed.
Achievements of objectives	See above.
Poverty reduction	Part of the assumed causal chain and objective, but not explicit in review requirements; too early to be assessed.
Economic growth	See above.
Pro-poor growth	Poor road safety claimed to be particularly hitting the poor (Sida 2007).
Trade	Part of the assumed causal chain and objective, but not explicit in review requirements; too early to be assessed.
Institutional development and capacity building	The key output of the project – too early to be assessed.

### **Mainstreaming issues**

Gender	Marginally addressed in design.
HIV/AIDS	Main feature of the project, including system to monitor impact.
Environment/ climate	Ex-ante: Improved road safety and transport has positive environmental effects (Sida 2007.)
Democracy/ human rights	Not addressed.

### **Aid management issues**

Sustainability	Ex-ante: the project is likely to prove to the stakeholders its value, hence continuation through fees etc (Sida 2007). Ex-post: too early to assess.
Ownership	The project initiated by WBCG.
Counterpart effectiveness	Ex-ante: WBCG considered an efficient organisation. Ex-post: too early to assess.
Donor coordination	Several donors supporting programmes by WBCG; coordination assumed to be undertaken by WBCG.
Sida learning	Too early to be assessed.
Sida management	
Relevance Sida policies	In line with TRA Plan as main focus area.



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Cost-effectiveness	Too early to be assessed.
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#### References

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Bruzelius (2007) *Project document*  
Sida (2007) *Beslut om insats*  
Sida (2007) *Assessment memo*  
Sida (2007) *Agreement with WBCG*  
[www.wbcg.com.na](http://www.wbcg.com.na)

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## 13. SAPP: Southern Africa Power Pool

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### Project description

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Summary and background	The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) was established in 1995 by SADC with the aim to coordinate the planning and operation of the electric power system among member utilities. In 2001, SAPP with the help of the World Bank started the SAPP power market project. The main objective of the project was to develop a competitive electricity market in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) In the same year SAPP introduced a Short Term Energy Market (STEM) aimed at facilitating the trade of surplus generation capacity as a first step towards realising this goal. After studying several international models, SAPP concluded that its future competitive market design should be based on the Nordic model because of important similarities. This was followed by an agreement at the end of 2003 between NORAD and SAPP and by another agreement between Sida and SAPP, in 2005. NORAD provided resources for the development of the SAPP Competitive Market project and Sida for the Long term transmission pricing and ancillary market development project.
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Period	2005–2008
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Sida contribution	MSEK 10 (NORAD has provided NOK 35 from 2003).
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Sida desk officer	
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Country focus	Southern Africa
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Implementation organisation	SAPP
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Direct stakeholders	National electricity suppliers and consumers.
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Current project status	Request for a second phase from SAPP, supported by external review 2008.
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<b>Objectives, outputs and activities</b>	
Sida objectives	The <i>project's</i> long term goal is to provide least cost, environmentally friendly and affordable energy and increase accessibility to electricity for rural areas in Southern Africa through the development of a competitive electricity market.
Planned outputs	<p>The Sida component's specific planned outputs ((objectives) were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To develop a transmission pricing policy methodology for SAPP, that would send the appropriate price signals and would be complementary to the design of the SAPP competitive electricity market</li> <li>• To design an ancillary services market that would send the appropriate price signals and that would support the SAPP day-ahead market.</li> </ul>
Activities/inputs	<p>Overall project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a Secondment of personnel to SAPP to assist with market design project</li> <li>b Simulation model to show how the SAPP day-ahead market could potentially function</li> <li>c Detailed design and specifications of the day-ahead market for SAPP</li> <li>d Drawing up of minimum telecommunications specifications to ensure reliable operations of the day-ahead market</li> <li>e Identification of suitable power system software</li> <li>f Facilitation of a visit to Norway to learn and understand the market operations in Nord Pool Consulting.</li> </ul>
<b>Means to assess results</b>	
Result reporting	End of project review by external consultants assessing both NORAD and Sida contributions in terms of results and suggestions for further support (2008).
Internal result assessment	
Log frame	
<b>Results</b>	
General	<p>Comprehensive review concluding that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Both projects (Sida an NORAD) have been carried out according to the agreed work plans</li> <li>• It is too early to conclude whether the projects have met their goals (see further below).</li> </ul>

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Actual outputs The planned outputs of the project have largely been delivered, for example:

- The Day Ahead Market (DAM) established, which represents a modern competitive electricity market that is in line with international best practice
- Numerous opportunities have been created and significant resources have been spent to train people in electricity trading and market operations.

Specific for the Sida component:

- The Consultant delivered a transmission pricing policy and costing methodology that would send the appropriate price signals (allow for the recovery of costs) and that is complementary to the DAM (fully integrated into price setting and settlements)
  - The results from the transmission price and loss factor model have been incorporated in the DAM which means that these charges are calculated and invoiced daily
  - The Consultant delivered an ancillary market design that would allow for the trade of ancillary services. The market design is comprehensive and covers a range of potential trading solutions.
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Achievements of objectives	So far low
	<p>The overall change on the regional electricity market in Southern Africa from a situation of surplus to a shortage during the project period has – at least for the time being – undermined the project in the sense that no short-term trading takes place today. Considerable expansion of the regional production is a pre-requisite for the objectives to be achieved, not likely to take place in the shorter term.</p> <p>“STEM trading volumes have declined from 2003 and all STEM trading ceased towards the middle of 2007. This is primarily due to the shortage of surplus generation capacity in the region. A lack of trading volumes in DAM will seriously undermine the projects’ long term objective of providing least cost energy through the development of a competitive electricity market.”</p> <p>“The lack of the necessary electricity infrastructure is placing a severe burden on the expansion of cross border trading. Progress with the roll-out of the planned projects, in particular the transmission projects, has been painfully slow. In addition, low levels of investment in existing infrastructure are also placing additional strain in aging networks which could ultimately impact on its availability and reliability. The lack of the necessary electricity infrastructure is placing a severe burden on the expansion of cross border trading. Progress with the roll-out of the planned projects, in particular the transmission projects, has been painfully slow. In addition, low levels of investment in existing infrastructure are also placing additional strain in aging networks which could ultimately impact on its availability and reliability.”</p>
Poverty reduction	Assumed as a result of better access to energy. No impact so far, nor the issue assessed in the final project review.
Economic growth	Assumed as a result of better access to energy. No impact so far due to reasons given above.
Pro-poor growth	Questionable if the project can be classified as pro-poor growth – no assessment of this dimension in evaluation.

Trade	<p>No apparent impact due to the following reasons:</p> <p>Trading volumes have declined steady from 2002 to the extent no regional trading occurred by 2008 (except through long-term bilateral agreements); The reasons beyond the control of the project and due to overall shortage of production vs demand.</p> <p>“It will take several years for the region to restore generation reserve margins to more acceptable levels. It is therefore unlikely that there will be meaningful quantities of surplus energy in the short-term. This is somewhat disappointing considering the huge effort that has gone into the design, development and implementation of the new market. However, one should realise that the DAM is not only a market for surplus energy. The DAM is suitable for surplus (day-ahead trading at market price) as well as long term transactions that are covered by long term bilateral financial contract.” (2008 review).</p>
Institutional development and capacity building	<p>Good achievements by strengthening SAPP and capacity building of personnel.</p> <p>“NORAD and Sida have, through their support of these projects, contributed enormously to build awareness, understanding, acceptance and capacity regarding the design and functioning of competitive electricity markets as well as transmission prices. Several meetings, dedicated workshops and training sessions helped to transfer highly specialised skills to SAPP employees, utility executives, managers and energy traders. These interventions laid a solid foundation on which energy trading will take place in the future.” (2008 evaluation).</p>
<b>Mainstreaming issues</b>	
Gender	Not specifically addressed in review (or required in ToR).
HIV/AIDS	See above.
Environment/ climate	In theory a well functioning market would lead to more efficient use of energy (hence less negative environmental impact per unit), but also to increases in use; no specific assessment of the environmental dimensions in 2008 Review.
Democracy/ human rights	Not specifically addressed in review (or required in ToR).

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### Aid management issues

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Sustainability	Currently low  “The ongoing support of agencies such as NORAD and Sida is essential to ensure that SAPP not only maintains its operations, but that it expands its services in order to promote trade and investment in Southern Africa. This support will probably be required until trading volumes in SAPP have reached a critical point. The next phase of support should start soon to keep momentum towards achieving the project’s long-term goal, which is to provide least cost, environmentally friendly and affordable energy and increase accessibility for rural areas in Southern Africa through the development of a competitive electricity market.” (2008 Review).
Ownership	High – initiative to project taken by SADC/SAPP.
Counterpart effectiveness	Judged as good by 2008 Review (SAPP a robust organisation with no undue political pressure).  Implementing consultants rated very good and professional by 2008 Review.
Donor coordination	Joint support by Sida and NORAD which worked well according to Review 2008.
Cost-effectiveness	Overall objectives vs costs: Low.  Outputs vs costs not assessed by 2008 Review.

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### References

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New Energy Consulting (2008): *End term review of the SAPP support*

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## 14. SriLac: Sri Lanka Quality Infrastructure Development

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### Project description

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Summary and background	Sida has supported quality infrastructure development in Sri Lanka from the mid 1990s until 2003 through general institution development as well as a separate project aimed at fisheries. These projects were judged successful, but a planned component on accreditation was not implemented due to delays in Sri Lankan law formulation. The current project is a follow up of the first, once the law and policy was in place.
Period	2007–2009
Sida contribution	MSEK 8

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Sida sector	
Sida desk officer	
Country focus	Sri Lanka
Implementation organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SWEDAC</li> <li>• Sri Lanka Accreditation Board for Conformity Assessment SLAB.</li> </ul>
Direct stakeholders	Sri Lankan quality infrastructure institutions including SLAB and testing laboratories; indirect companies utilising the services.
Current project status	Under implementation.

### **Objectives, outputs and activities**

Sida objectives (as log frame)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1a enhance the competence of the health care services to the general public through the use of accreditation</li> <li>1b increase the competitiveness of Sri Lankan products on national and international markets, by</li> <li>2 adapt the national regulatory and quality infrastructure in Sri Lanka to new requirements of international trade and best practices for conformity assessment, including accreditation and laboratory testing, ....</li> </ol>
Planned outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To establish and operate the SLAB</li> <li>• To review the national Quality Policy</li> <li>• To enhance the operations laboratories (called immediate objectives in Sida assessment memo 2005).</li> </ul>
Activities	Courses, consultancies, in a twinning operation with SWEDAC.

### **Means to assess results**

Result-reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reporting from the project (annual progress report)</li> <li>• Mid-term review by external sources</li> <li>• Completion report at end of project..</li> </ul>
Internal result assessment	Not reviewed by Sida.
Log frame	Yes

### **Results**

General	Progress reporting so far on inputs delivered.
Actual outputs	Not assessed.
Achievements of objectives	Too early to be judged.
Poverty reduction	Ex-ante: reference to policy and assumed causal chain between capacity building in trade and poverty reduction.

Economic growth	Not discussed.
Pro-poor growth	Not discussed.
Trade	See under poverty above
Institutional development and capacity building	The focus of the project, building on the experience of earlier projects.

#### **Mainstreaming issues**

Gender	Focussed on in design.
HIV/AIDS	Not considered in design.
Environment/ climate	Some focus in design.
Democracy/ human rights	Marginal in design.

#### **Aid management issues**

Sustainability	Ex-ante: SLAB an existing institution supported by Government of Sri Lanka, hence sustainability should be assured.
Ownership	Project based on a government request.
Counterpart effectiveness	SWEDAC a well-known partner for Sida.
Donor coordination	Consultations with other donors involved in TRA; no other donors involved in SLAB.
Sida learning	Too early to be assessed; support to quality infrastructure one of Sida's 'main thrusts in trade development.
Sida management	Project managed from the Swedish embassy in Sri Lanka with technical support from Sida.
Relevance Sida policies	In line with Sida's trade policy and plan – focal area; also in line with phasing out strategy for Sri Lanka with a institutional co-operation envisaged.
Cost-effectiveness	Too early to be assessed.

#### **References**

- Sida (2007) *Full assessment memo*  
 Swedish Embassy (2007) *Decision on contribution*  
 Swedac: Progress report: 2007–2008



## 15. BEST: Business Environment Strengthening Programme

<b>Project description</b>	
Summary and background	<p>The objective is to create an enabling regulatory environment for businesses to thrive and operate more efficiently through reduced cost of doing business, which is to be accomplished by “removing as many procedural and administrative barriers as possible and to improve the quality of services provided by the government to the private sector”.</p> <p>The BEST project was conceived and designed through the IF-process including both government and donors.</p>
Period	2004–2013 in 2 phases.
Sida contribution	SEK 40 million (first phase).
Total project cost	USD 100. Other donors are Denmark, UK, Holland and World Bank.
Sector	33120 Trade facilitation.
Sida desk officer	Jan Grafström (Swedish Embassy Dar es Salaam).
Country focus	Tanzania
Implementation organisation	<p>A project implementation unit, under the President’s Planning commission, consisting of, today, 16 professionals of which 6 are procurement officers, 2 of them on contract form British crown agents. The bulk of the work (studies etc) is carried out by contracted private consultants working in close contact with the concerned ministry and institution.</p> <p>BEST has today works with 19 different institutions implementing the programs.</p>
Direct stakeholders	SMEs, Ministries, various donor programs within PSD.
Current project status	Has now completed its first phase (6 years).
<b>Objectives, outputs and activities</b>	
Sida objectives	The overall objective is by the LFA given as “employment generated and poverty reduced through enterprise growth and competitiveness particularly among SMEs”.

Planned outputs	<p>In the current 2nd phase of the programme, the outputs are grouped along 7 different project <i>components</i>, each containing up to 8 different specified outputs, giving a total of 38 planned outputs. The components are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Business entry, regulation and exit</li> <li>2 Land registration reform</li> <li>3 Commercial dispute resolution reform</li> <li>4 Labour laws reform</li> <li>5 Tanzania investment centre</li> <li>6 Programme management and institutional support</li> <li>7 BEST Zanzibar sub component.</li> </ol>
Activities	<p>There are a large number of different project activities scattered over the 38 different output areas of this programme.</p>

### **Means to assess results**

Result-reporting	<p>The project implementation unit delivers quarterly progress reports. In addition, an Implementation Support mission, leaving behind a 42 page report, was carried out in November 2008 with the task of reviewing implementation. This mission found the quarterly progress reports to be lacking in both quality and timeliness.</p> <p>A mid-term review is planned for May 2009.</p>
Internal result assessment	<p>No particular mechanism or system for internal review has been foreseen. However, according to original plans an independent monitoring consultant was to be engaged. This apparently has not been done until this year.</p>
Log frame	<p>The revised programme document (august 2008) presents an LFA matrix 20 pages long. It is logically structured and appears to have well designed sets of indicators. However, because of its sheer length, its operational usefulness can be questioned.</p> <p>For the 7 component objectives a total of 49 “objectively verifiable indicators” indicators have been specified, and for the total of 38 different output areas given, a total of 193 (!) indicators are presented. This is too much for any project manager, donor program officer or anybody else to get an overview or understanding of the progress of a project. To develop a large number of indicators maybe useful as an exercises to understand the means and ends of a project, but as part of LFA to be used in a monitoring/evaluation system only the most important indicators should be kept.</p>

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## Results

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General	According to the review mission in November 2008 “the BEST program overall has progressed very slowly and the country as a whole has shown a deterioration of its competitiveness” In all of the three international indices used to measure county performance (namely 1. The World Bank’s “Doing Business”, 2. the Global competitiveness index, and 3. The corruption perception index) Tanzania’s score and rank has deteriorated markedly in the last year.
Actual outputs	According to the same source, there has been limited progress in delivering planned outputs. With most planned outputs still outstanding, the first phase of BEST has generated few tangible results, which is reflected among other things in the time taken and number of procedures required to start a business, obtain a license, register a property or enforce a contract.

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## Achievements of objectives

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Poverty reduction	Even if a logical connection has been established between the reform programs pursued by BEST and impact on poverty reduction, this is an indirect relationship and one which will manifest itself probably only several years after attainment of output goals. Given the limited progress in achieving output goals. Referred to above, it is obviously too early to discuss any impact on poverty.
Economic growth	Same reasoning as for poverty reduction applies here.
Pro-poor growth	
Trade	
Institutional development and capacity building	

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## Mainstreaming issues

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Gender	The reforms pursued by BEST are aimed at benefiting SMEs, and an expansion of SME activity are seen as offering a great poverty reduction potential for women. As was noted w.r.t. poverty reduction and growth above, it is today too early to see any positive impact on gender or any of the other mainstreaming issues below.
HIV/AIDS	There seems to be no direct implication for HIV/AIDS from the BEST project. According to the Assessment memo the programme will allocate financial resources for specific activities “if considered appropriate”.

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Environment/ climate	Sida's assessment memorandum states that no environmental impact assessment has been done "as it is considered not to be relevant for this programme". It also however says that it is recommended that BEST "promote the creation of a business environment that will attract investment from business committed to support sustainable development..."
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Democracy/ human rights	
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**Aid management issues**

Sustainability	The sustainability of the reform work pursued by BEST can be largely said to depend on the extent to which most of its work can be mainstreamed into the work plans and strategies of the different ministries responsible for each case of legislation, so as to make these ministries assume full ownership of the reform work.
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Ownership	Given delays and shortcomings in implementation so far, the ownership on part of some responsible ministries has been seen as weak. Mainstreaming the reform work pursued by BEST into government's strategic plans remains a challenge.
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Counterpart effectiveness	
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Donor coordination	In this, as in most donor-funded projects in Tanzania today, there is a rather active donor partner committee overseeing the project implementation.
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Sida learning	Given a rather active contact between the project and the embassy, the possibility for learning should be good, a tendency which would be greater enhanced when quality and timeliness of project reporting is improved.
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Sida management	As long as there is no simple and operational delivery of monitoring information from the project to donors, one cannot say that there is a management information system in place, and Sida management will thus not be served with timely information to base future decisions on.
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Relevance Sida policies	Given Sida's long history of advocating PSD reform in Tanzania, as well as in view of Sweden's current country strategy for Tanzania, where trade is one of three concentration areas, the BEST programme with its added focus on trade, seems highly relevant w.r.t. Sida's policies.
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Cost- effectiveness	Given the indirect relationship and also the long time span between the project outputs and its desired effects and impacts, it will always be difficult to calculate a cost-effectiveness measure. In this case at mid-project, when not even the outputs have started being produced, it is obviously too early to analyse cost-effectiveness.
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### References

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1. Assessment memo, Embassy of Sweden, 17 March 2003
  2. Aide Memoire Tanzania – Private Sector competitiveness Project Implementation support Mission, October 27–November 4, 2008
  3. BEST Program document, Volume 1, December 10, 2008
  4. BEST Program document, Volume 2, August 1, 2008
  5. BEST: Second Quarter Progress Report, Oct–Dec. 2008
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## 16. TCCIA: Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Trade and Agriculture

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### Project description

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Summary and background	<p>The purpose of the Swedish support is to develop TCCIA and its affiliated member associations to a sustainable and member-driven chamber network. The objectives and activities of TCCIA are by the donors seen as sufficiently trade-oriented so as to be included in the trade-related portfolio.</p> <p>A substantial part of the chambers activities is directly about [international] trade. It provides members info on trade opportunities and business inquiries from abroad. Search for business partners through national and international databases; trade exhibitions, sending and receiving business delegations. TCCIA is also the sole issuer of all certificates of origin for products originating from Tanzania.</p>
Period	2005–2008 phase 3, (phase I 1995–2001, and phase II 2001–2004).
Sida contribution	SEK 20 million; plus SEK 35 million during 1995–2004.
Total project cost	
Sector	33120 Trade facilitation.
Sida desk officer	Jan Grafström (Swedish Embassy Dar es Salaam).
Country focus	Tanzania
Implementation organisation	The support program is implemented by the Chambers themselves, supported by the Swedish consultancy company Indevlop.
Direct stakeholders	All firms in Tanzania, the focus being on SMEs.
Current project status	Third phase has been terminated.

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**Objectives, outputs and activities**

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Sida objectives To further develop TCCIA's capacity to provide a) income generating activities, b) demand-driven services to its members, c) increase the membership base, d) dialogue more effectively with the government, and e) improve planning, accountability and governance within the chamber.

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Planned outputs

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Activities

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**Means to assess results**

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Result-reporting Sid's assessment memo states that monitoring and follow-up of the project's achievements will be based upon TCCIA's business plans, and also that disbursement of funds will be linked to the performance. It does not appear that this has been followed.

It further claims that "Performance in relation to adapted business plans will be assessed quarterly. Corrective actions for deviations from plans, if not properly justified, have to be taken during the following quarter in order to receive further funds". It seems that neither this strict requirement has been adhered to.

Another requirement is that narrative reports on the implementation and achievements of the program shall be submitted to the embassy quarterly, together with financial reports for the same period. This has been followed although it can be questioned if the reports could sometimes focus more on results than on accounting for achievements at input and activity levels.

The Sida decision also specifies that TCCIA, the Embassy and the consultant shall meet semi-annually to follow-up the progress of the programme.

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Internal result assessment

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Log frame There is an LFA which is the product of a workshop held in November 2002, but this does not seem to have been operative in the implementation of the programme. It is simple and straightforward enough, so there should not be any problem to actually use it in current monitoring of the project.

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## Results

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General	<p>According to the end-of-programme review performed in July 2008, the results of Sidas support have been mixed.</p> <p>During the first two phases several results at output level were achieved, however, not the main objectives. Similarly under phase three, the main objectives have not been achieved, TCCIA still remaining weak financially, operationally and in service delivery. Several of the services do not appear to be sufficiently income-generating. Also, the chamber has so far only attracted less than 10% of the country's over 200,000 registered companies.</p>
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Actual outputs

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Achievements of objectives

Poverty reduction	Partly because the chamber's focus is on SMEs rather than larger firms, its activities are considered to have relevance for poverty reduction.
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Economic growth	Very indirect and long causal chain.
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Pro-poor growth

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Trade

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Institutional development and capacity building

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### Mainstreaming issues

Gender	The impact in terms of gender is considered to be positive as many of its members are women entrepreneurs. This is however not evident from available data.
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HIV/AIDS	The chamber has prepared an HIV/AIDS policy paper, based on which a national HIV/AIDS programme for the business community will be designed.
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Environment/ climate	Not applicable.
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Democracy/ human rights	Not applicable.
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### Aid management issues

Sustainability	<p>TCCIA has for the last 12 years to a very great extent been dependent on Sida funds for financing both its operations, rent of office and its advocacy activities.</p> <p>Today the level of self-financing has gone up to 60–70% from a level of about 50% five years ago.</p>
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Ownership	
Counterpart effectiveness	
Donor coordination	Yes, donors supervise this project and other projects in the local Development Partners group on PSD/trade.
Sida learning	
Sida management	
Relevance Sida policies	In an environment where the institutions needed for a market economy to function efficiently are still undeveloped, and where the voice of the private sector is still comparatively weak, there is a definite role for the Chambers to play, and Sida's support to this role therefore must be considered very relevant.

#### References

- Assessment Memorandum: Extended Support to Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA), January 2005–December 2007
- End of Programme in-depth Review: Capacity building for sustainability programme for TCCIA, ORGUT/Swedish Embassy Dares Salaam, July 2008

## 17. PSD-HUB in Ethiopia

### Project description

Summary and background	<p>The project consists of setting up a PSD (Private Sector Development) <i>Hub</i> in the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, whose main functions are to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 to coordinate and subcontract PSD-related investigations and research for the private sector to use as input in the dialogue on economic development with the government, and</li> <li>2 to coordinate and prepare, with technical assistance from international and local experts, a series of major PSD project interventions that will become “bankable” for international financial support.</li> </ol> <p>Both in its choice of reform projects (<i>Road map for accounting and auditing standards, Company register project, Studies, Networking</i>) as well as in its way of working together with the government, the PSD-Hub project has strong similarities with the BEST project in Tanzania.</p>
Period	First phase 2004–2001.



Sida contribution	During 2005–2007 Sida’s support amounted to some SEK 19 million plus an additional SEK 2,3 million for capacity building in the host organization AACCSA (Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Associations).
Total project cost	
Sector	PSD support with strong trade profile.
Sida desk officer	Åsa Hejne
Country focus	Ethiopia
Implementation organisation	To run the Hub-project a separate unit –consisting of 5 professionals plus two support staff – has been set up. It is housed within the offices of AACCSA, and it is integrated into the AACCSA hierarchy for needed decisions and in terms of accounting and financing.
Direct stakeholders	Private firms, government.
Current project status	On-going 2nd phase.

#### **Objectives, outputs and activities**

Sida Objectives In terms of Sweden’s development cooperation with Ethiopia this project – if successfully implemented – has the potential of realizing some important objectives of the Sida Infrastructure division, especially in a time when Sweden along with other donors have curtailed their direct financial aid to the Ethiopian government.

Planned outputs

Activities

#### **Means to assess results**

Result-reporting In 2006 and again in 2007 Sida commissioned two follow-up studies of the project with the purpose to provide a basis for Sida’s upcoming decision on whether to prolong its support for another three-year period.

The first one, in march 2006, addressed most of the usual implementation issues and also the project’s relevance, its likely sustainability, its additionality, how the project stands in relation to the general objectives of Sweden’s development cooperation (namely poverty alleviation and equality, economic growth, gender, environment and HIV/AIDS), and the project’s place and role in Sweden’s development cooperation with Ethiopia.

The 2007 report focused on drawing overall conclusions from the projects build-up phase 2004–2007 and to provide recommendations for possible Sida-support for a second, consolidation, phase of the project, 2007–2010.

Internal result assessment	
Log frame	A log-frame has been made, but so far not very operational.
<b>Results</b>	
General	After getting off to a slow and controversy-ridden start, the project is today running and functioning largely according to agreed procedures.
Actual outputs	Output targets have – with some delay – in general been reached, which is remarkable given that the project was heavily understaffed during its first year of operation. However, the Hub’s work, and probably its prospects of attaining long-run objectives, is severely hampered by its present lack of operational autonomy in relation to the Chamber. This and other problems must be addressed and remedied in order to make a possible second phase of the project more constructive.
Achievements of objectives	The project is still only in [the end of] its build-up phase, and there are not enough concrete outputs, which have had a chance to mature into effects and long-run impacts. Given, however, that the project activities are today implemented according to plans, and given that most observers seem to agree that the project idea is still relevant, we have no reason not to believe that the project’s long run objectives stand a good chance of being attained.
Poverty reduction	There is no direct impact of the PSD-Hub project on poverty alleviation, nor can it be said that the poorest segments of the population constitute a [direct] target group for this project. However, most analysts of the Ethiopian economy today seem to agree that Private Sector Development presents a most – if not the most – powerful method of creating economic growth. It is also widely accepted that economic growth is a prerequisite of being able to create substantial employment opportunities for those who are today outside the labour market, namely the poorest segments. Based on that reasoning we can therefore expect the Hub project – if successfully implemented – to have a positive <i>long run</i> effect on poverty alleviation and on equality.
Economic growth	Any project successfully promoting legal reforms in order to facilitate a market economy in a country where such has not existed before, is bound to be good for economic growth.
Pro-poor growth	
Trade	

Institutional development and capacity building	By supporting the activities of the Hub through a private sector agent, Sida is not only able to directly support the private sector, which is an objective in itself, but it also allows Sida to contribute to structural and systemic reform, something which has been a very pronounced goal of INEC in recent years. The two proposals for bankable projects, which have so far been started by the Hub, namely the Standardized Accounting System, and the Company Register, may not seem to be dramatic in themselves, but are in fact examples of central systemic reform, which can have strategic importance in a country trying to transition from a centrally planned to a modern market economy.
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### **Mainstreaming issues**

Gender	This project does not appear to have any direct observable effect either on gender equality, environment or on the HIV/AIDS situation.
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HIV/AIDS

Environment/  
climate

Democracy/  
human rights

### **Aid management issues**

Sustainability	The <i>sustainability</i> of the Hub's internal activities will mainly depend on how well the Addis Ababa Chamber is able to integrate the Hub and its activity into its own activities and into its own budget. If the build-up of the Hub is successful, the likelihood of sustainability should be rather high. But it can by no means be taken for granted, because the Hub largely engages in activities not previously carried out by the Chambers.
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Ownership	When preparing the project design for the next, consolidation, phase of the project, importance should be given to the issue of local ownership of the PSD-Hub project. One way of achieving enhanced local ownership is to try models, where the procurement of international consultants is located in Addis Ababa rather than in Stockholm.
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Counterpart effectiveness

Donor coordination	The Swedish Embassy has for a considerable time discussed with local donors the possibility of attracting other donors to the Hub-project, and has reportedly, recently met with success in this effort. Given that [the small donor] Sida in this project finds itself dealing with pieces of central structural reform, bringing in other donors appears to be a very good idea.
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Sida learning

Sida management

Relevance Sida policies	<p>The <i>relevance</i> of this Sida-intervention, in terms of design, purpose and choice of cooperation partner is strong. Through this support Sida has put itself in a position where it may be able to contribute substantially to private sector development in Ethiopia. Supporting PSD through a private cooperation partner – the Chamber of Commerce of Addis Ababa – is seen by major donors as the World Bank and the EU as innovative (many of the major donors are prevented by its rules from supporting the private sector directly), especially in a time when the government is seen to be dragging its feet on private sector development.</p> <p>The Sida-supported PSD-HUB at AACCSA is today strongly endorsed by donors such as the World Bank, EU and others. One donor's opinion was that "the PSD Hub is one of the best ways we have to reach out to the private sector in Ethiopia. Sida is the best and the most objective of all donors without own axes to grind"</p>
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Cost-effectiveness

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#### References

- Support to the Private Sector Development 2003–2005. Swedish Embassy in Addis Ababa 6 June 2003
  - Contributing to Systemic Change in an Unconducive Environment: Sida's Private Sector Development intervention in Ethiopia – a *Mid-term Review* by Karlis Goppers 17 May 2006
  - Review of Sida's support to the *PSD-HUB* hosted by the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce. by Karlis Goppers, 17 July 2007
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## 18. NALEP: National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme

<b>Project description</b>	
Summary and background	The National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Program, NALEP is meant to have a substantial trade promotion component, valued at something like SEK 15 million a year. It started in 2001 and is currently into its second phase, which Sida is committed to support with SEK 327 million over the next three years. Its purpose, according to the project document, is to be demand-driven, pluralistic and participatory. By promoting pluralism, competitiveness, cost-effectiveness, transparency and accountability, the program aims to move farmers away from handouts and do away with the “dependency syndrome”. It is a conceptual programme, which is not meant to prescribe the actual contents of activities, but to be a abroad-based program to <i>empower</i> the communities, for them to mobilize and generate their own projects. In the process the communities are linked to agencies and other actors specializing in e.g. marketing or exporting.
Period	2001–2011
Sida contribution	SEK 327 million for 2008–2010.
Total project cost	
Sector	Trade component within the National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme.
Sida desk officer	Kiara, Swedish Embassy Nairobi.
Country focus	Kenya
Implementation organisation	The staff of the Program’s Coordination Unit (PCU) today consists of 6 officers plus one program adviser. Responsible are the ministries of agriculture and the ministry of livestock. About half of the program’s extension activities refer to livestock.
Direct stakeholders	Small farmers and pastoralists.
Current project status	The project is now into its 2nd five-year phase, which started in 2007.

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### Objectives, outputs and activities

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Sida objectives It could be seen as remarkable that the revised program document, written in 2008, seven years after the program started, seems mainly to be concerned with its own administration, and how to organize its extension work, and relatively less on the *contents* of extension work in general and the marketing promotion in particular. Clearly this document does not emphasize a market perspective. The main thrust of the different program components are on addressing a host of supply limitations rather than on how to conquer and secure markets. When discussing the programs output areas (on pages 51–81), there is only 1/5 page text devoted to the subject of markets and marketing. This is in fact all that is said about this topic in this entire 146 page document. In terms of space it takes up one fifth of a page, out of a total of 30 pages. In comparison, 10 full pages (or 50 times more space) are devoted to the cross-cutting issues gender, HIV/AIDS, drugs, human rights, and environment.

The relative lack of market focus intended for NALEP is confirmed by the document “Sida’s. Country plan for development cooperation with Kenya 2008”, whose annex 5B, presenting the results frameworks indicators for NALEP, reveals that commercialisation or exports are *not* part of the [main] objective structure of the project. The same tendency was present in Sida’s program assessment memo for NALEP phase II from 2006.

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Planned outputs

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Activities

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#### Means to assess results

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Result-reporting An *impact assessment* was commissioned by Sida in 2006. In November 2008 Sida commissioned a study to assess the extent to which NALEP’s extension services today focuses on markets and commercialisation. This study also made suggestions on how the marketing and commercialisation aspects in NALEP can be enhanced, namely by 1, raising NALEP’s general expertise and capacity in markets, 2, introducing product profile and value chain manuals in NALEP’s work, and 3, availing of the opportunities of harmonization and cooperation with other programs.

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Internal result assessment

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Log frame	<p>The apparent supply-, rather than market-orientation of NALEP, seems to be reflected in the way the indicators of the Logical Framework analysis matrix have been defined. On page 138, to measure success in terms of increase of sales and increase in farm incomes, the LFA suggests that the amount of training and product identification be used. This is not logical, as an indicator of achieving an outcome should be an output measure, not one of input or activity. In the logical framework schedule, <i>marketing</i> is not even mentioned as an output area.</p> <p>Under the OUTPUT AREA 4 (Collaboration and extension facilitating factors), which is one of five different output areas, the program contains a sub-component (Number 4.4) called “Promote Access to markets for Farmers, Pastoralists and Fisherfolk”, containing the following elements:</p> <p>4.4.1 train the extension staff in marketing issues and quality standards</p> <p>4.4.2 encourage market-oriented production by farmers, pastoralists and Fisherfolk</p> <p>4.4.3 train farmers, pastoralists and Fisherfolk and their groups to know the markets and facilitate the linkages to the markets.</p> <p>The overall expenditure on this sub-component for the 5-year period of NALEP II is (by the project document on page 102) stated to be 0,7% of the total (!).</p>
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**Results**

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General	<p>The 2006 impact study found the NALEP approach to be “highly relevant in addressing the current opportunities and constraints faced by the majority of Kenyan rural population”, and to be “highly efficient, particularly in the long term perspective”. According to an internal assessment made of the program “more than 70% of the [participating] farmers interviewed claimed that NALEP had assisted them in developing a surplus and profit from their farms”. The evaluation also concluded that “the relevant ministries appear strongly committed to the program”. On the issue of commercialisation and exports, even if 80% of the farmers stated that “the introduction of the program had offered new opportunities for men, women and youth”, and also that more than 70% of the farmers claimed that “the NALEP approach had led them to regard farming as a business rather than a way of surviving”, the assessment team reported its impression as being that “NALEP impact on exports or other commercial types of production is modest”.</p>
Actual outputs	<p>Achievements of objectives</p> <p>The 2008 study concluded that NALEP is relatively weak in terms of market orientation.</p>

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Poverty reduction	The Project document asserts that “in capacity building particular focus will be put on poverty, gender, human rights, democracy, governance and environmental targeting”, and true to this declaration of objectives, the cross-cutting issues have been and are today the most central and dominating features of the program.
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Economic growth

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Pro-poor growth

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Trade

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Institutional development and capacity building

*Upgrading NALEP’s expertise and capacity in markets and commercialisation*

NALEP already has an established organization for training and other interaction with farmers and their representative groups, and it has a large staff of extension workers, who according to the evaluation in 2005 are functioning well. What is more uncertain is, however, how qualified the organization and the individual extension workers are when it comes to teaching and disseminating the topics of markets and commercialisation. Given NALEP’s history of, up to now, having been mainly concerned with supply-side issues, and having focused – apparently quite successfully – on the cross-cutting issues, the expectation would be that the expertise and capacity of NALEP staff needs to be raised in the subjects dealing with markets, commercialisation, and export promotion. My assessment of NALEP documents as well as the brief visits to the field has not changed this perception. NALEP’s focus on marketing and commerce needs to be enhanced in every respect.

The Government’s Joint review of extension programs carried out in 2007 pointed out the need for additional expertise and capacity for NALEP in marketing, concluding that “There is a lack of expertise on value chain development at all levels within the existing public extension structure”. Also the World Bank, in preparing for the second phase of the KAPP, arrived at a similar conclusion, namely that the technical capacity to handle diversification, value addition, marketing and agri-business development is limited in the sector ministries as they have mainly tended to focus on production related issues. The Bank has therefore decided that a capacity needs assessment will be undertaken and where necessary capacity building will be done in these aspects.

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#### **Mainstreaming issues**

Gender	The cross-cutting issues of gender, HIV/AIDS, environment as well as democracy and human rights have been well addressed and mainstreamed in the NALEP.
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HIV/AIDS

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Environment/  
climate

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Democracy/  
human rights

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**Aid management issues**

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Sustainability

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Ownership

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Counterpart  
effectiveness

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Donor  
coordination

In the last few years the government has devoted considerable attention to the problem of lack of co-ordination among different donor-funded programs, and the need to harmonise them. Regrettably however, so far little concrete results seem to have happened “on the ground”. A Government Task Force in 2007 noted that the six programs have many similarities in approaches to extension, but different procedures for work planning, budgeting and reporting and require coordination through different institutional structures within the districts, where basically the same government officers as well as farmers have to participate. One of the points where the Government and donors have agreed to harmonize is on “formulation of a joint approach on linking extension activities to the market”. So Sida and NALEP here can be said to have a golden opportunity to act in the spirit of the Paris declaration of harmonization by designing the enhanced market focus in cooperation or jointly with one or more of the other programs.

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Sida  
management

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Relevance  
Sida policies

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Cost-  
effectiveness

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**References**

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- Sida. Country plan for development cooperation with Kenya 2008, undated draft
  - Embassy of Sweden Nairobi: Support to national agriculture and livestock extension program, NALEP phase II, 2007–2011
    - Assessment Memo, 4 October 2006, 50 pages
  - Sida, department for Africa: The national agricultural and livestock extension programme (NALEP) phase I – Impact Assessment; Sida Evaluation 06/31
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## 19. Financial Sector Deepening Trust, FSDT

<b>Project description</b>	
Summary and background	<p>This is a Pro-poor financial market development programme, implemented outside of the government, whose main activity is to extend small credits.</p> <p>The initial project assessment was presented in Sida's local investment committee in Dares Salaam in December 2002 and in Sida's main investment committee KOMIN in February 2003.</p>
Period	2005–2009
Sida contribution	SEK 40 million contribution to basket funding.
Total project cost	USD 47 million. Other donors are UK, Canada, Holland, Denmark and the World Bank through its Private sector Competitiveness project.
Sector	33120 Trade facilitation.
Sida desk officer	Jan Grafström (Swedish Embassy Dar es Salaam). Designed by Eva Hagvall.
Country focus	Tanzania
Implementation organisation	An international consultant company has been contracted by Danida (in her capacity as lead donor) to implement the project.
Direct stakeholders	The FSDT engages with a wide variety of actors in the financial sector. The majority are in the private sector. These range from the major commercial banks such as CRDB and NMB, through MFIs and SACCOs, a variety of NGOs and down to informal groups such as Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs) and Village Community Banks (VICOBAs). Other private sector actors with which the FSDT engages include providers of training, information systems and hardware, accountants, auditors and lawyers. The Government is also a key stakeholder and partner for the FSDT.
Current project status	On-going first phase.

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### Objectives, outputs and activities

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Sida objectives To develop a deeper financial system providing greater access to sustainable financial services for more people and businesses (*Indicators:* Reducing the proportion of the adult population totally excluded from 54% in 2006 to 47% by the end of June 2011, and Doubling the proportion of the adult population that is formally banked from 9% to 18% over the same period).

*Purpose:* To achieve improved capacity of Tanzania's financial sector to meet the needs of MSMEs and poor rural and urban people and to contribute to economic growth (*Indicators:* Credit extended to the private sector as a percentage of GDP from: 8.9% in 2006 to 13.1%; Volume of credit provided by a cross-section of micro finance providers (MFPs) to MSMEs and poor people increased by 300% by the end of 2011; Volume of deposits mobilised by a cross-section of MFPs from MSMEs and poor peoples has increased by 300% by the end of 2011).

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Planned outputs

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Activities

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#### Means to assess results

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Result-reporting Quarterly reports are produced by the management. The quarterly reports specify performance against set targets for about 50 different criteria, e.g. number of loans, or number of active borrowers, etc.

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Internal result assessment

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Log frame The project has adopted a new LFA together with a new monitoring and evaluation system for the Trust. The new log frame has five outputs, compared to seven in the previous one, leading to more clarity and "smarter" indicators.

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#### Results

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General

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Actual outputs A Review of Performance in September 2007 (report revised March 2008) made the overall conclusion that the project had got off to a very good start in circumstances that were sometimes difficult, and that the objectives of the Trust are likely to be largely achieved. The same review mission assessing FSDT's portfolio of projects found that of the 70 outstanding projects only 2 were likely to completely achieve output goals and purpose, 5 were likely to largely achieve, 2 were likely to partly achieve, 2 were likely to achieve only to a very limited extent, while 57 of the projects were either newly started (or in pipeline) or it was impossible to judge whether there had been any progress towards achievement of outputs or purpose.

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Achievements of objectives	
Poverty reduction	
Economic growth	
Pro-poor growth	
Trade	
Institutional development and capacity building	
<b>Mainstreaming issues</b>	
Gender	
HIV/AIDS	
Environment/ climate	
Democracy/ human rights	
<b>Aid management issues</b>	
Sustainability	It is apparently not clear whether this Fund is meant to remain permanently or not. In other words, we do not yet know if sustainability is a desirable feature.
Ownership	The programme is donor-driven. The government representative in the board has no voting right in the PIC. There seems to be no formal link or agreement with the Government.
Counterpart effectiveness	
Donor coordination	Donors act through the PIC, project implementation committee.
Sida learning	
Sida management	
Relevance Sida policies	
Cost-effectiveness	

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### References

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- Review of Performance October 2006–September 2007, by Matsuert, Odera and Stone, dated November 2007/ revised march 2008
  - Quarterly performance Report No 12 October–December 2008, 10 February 2009
  - Financial Sector deepening Trust: Revised Strategy paper, December 2007
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## 20. BEST, Business Environment Strengthening Programme; Advocacy Component

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### Project description

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Summary and background	In its first phase 2004–2008 <i>BEST advocacy</i> was one of five components of the BEST programme, designed to support and strengthen <i>the private sector's advocacy capacity</i> . In its second phase starting 1 July 2008, it has its own assessment memo and is for all practical purposes a separate project. From the outset it has been managed outside of the government structure.
Period	2004–2013 in 2 phases.
Sida contribution	SEK 19 million.
Total project cost	USD 18 million Danida, DFID and RNE are the other donors.
Sector	33120 Trade facilitation.
Sida desk officer	Jan Grafström (Swedish Embassy Dar es Salaam).
Country focus	Tanzania
Implementation organisation	The project is managed and implemented by a private consultants firm, COWI, procured and contracted by the lead donor Danida.
Direct stakeholders	The private sector in general and SMEs in particular.
Current project status	The project has completed its first phase 2004–2008 and since 1 July 2008 started on its 2nd phase which is to run until 2013.

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### Objectives, outputs and activities

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Sida objectives	The objective is to enhance the quality and credibility of private sector organizations to engage effectively in private public dialogue and to advocate for improvements in the business environment in Tanzania.
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Planned outputs	<p>1 Private sector organizations (PSOs) have demonstrated (managerial, technical and financial) capacity to advocate effectively on behalf of its members</p> <p>2 Capacity building partners will have increased their own capacity to support, train and advice PSOs on private sector advocacy</p> <p>3 Stakeholders, especially PSOs, will have engaged in more, and more effective networking and collaboration</p> <p>4 The project (i.e. BEST-AC) will have been effectively managed and governed.</p>
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Activities	The project provides grants, technical support and other capacity building support to relevant stakeholders. After the mid-term review made in may 2006 several changes were made in the project's approach, among other things it simplified its application procedures for giving grants.
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### **Means to assess results**

Result-reporting	<p>During the project's first phase a mid-term review was carried out by an independent consultant in October 2006, and an Implementation support review in May 2008 by the same consultant.</p> <p>Under the 2nd phase the contractor (COWI) is to provide quarterly and annual reports covering progress against the schedule of activities, feed-back on on-going projects, key lessons to date, and financial reports.</p> <p>The donor partners will jointly assess progress against indicators in the LFA on an annual basis. There will also be a mid-term and a end of term reviews.</p> <p>In addition to this the project will commission periodic evaluations of completed projects to assess their impact.</p>
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### Internal result assessment

Log frame	As part of the midterm review in 2006 the original LFA matrix was modified with a view to focus more on outcomes than on inputs and activities. Then in the end review in 2008 further modifications of the log frame, in light of experiences won by the project, were undertaken.
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### **Results**

General	The Sida assessment memo (12 September 2008) for the 2nd phase concluded that "experiences from the first phase are in general good. A recent review of the programme found considerable evidence of dialogue and advocacy taking place and some evidence that results are being achieved".
Actual outputs	The 2008 review undertook to measure performance quantitatively against some of the indicators of the LFA.

Achievements of objectives	
Poverty reduction	Economic growth that benefits SMEs will be beneficial to the poor, as research has shown that informal businesses provide the bulk of employment and income for poor people. Therefore focusing on the small firms and increasing their voice will be a priority for BEST-AC output targets.
Economic growth	Too early to assess this.
Pro-poor growth	Too early to assess this.
Trade	Too early to assess this.
Institutional development and capacity building	
<b>Mainstreaming issues</b>	
Gender	Promoting advocacy is important in all cases where women face constraints in running businesses or as employees. To this end the project has developed a cross-cutting approach.
HIV/AIDS	Sida's assessment memo emphasises that "together with other DPs we will stress the need to deepen consideration of gender and other cross-cutting issues such as environment, and HIV/AIDS during phase II.
Environment/ climate	See above.
Democracy/ human rights	The connection between SME development and democracy and human rights has been shown in various projects from time to time. The topic is however not explored here.
<b>Aid management issues</b>	
Sustainability	Phase II is to work more closely with larger partners as one way of increasing chances of greater sustainability.
Ownership	No info available to judge, but doubtful if it has been very successful.
Counterpart effectiveness	
Donor coordination	Donors participate on a rotating basis in the project's multi-stakeholder Project Board, which includes also government and the private sector.
Sida learning	
Sida management	

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Relevance  
Sida policies

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Cost-  
effectiveness

The 2008 review found that the project's administrative cost accounts for about 27% of the total budget, based on which it concluded that it is very good for a fund of this nature.

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**References**

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# Annex 6 Persons Interviewed

## Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida

Abdeli Davidsson, Margareta

Andersson, Stefan

Dahlgren, Stefan

Edehorn, Göran

Grafström, Jan

Hagvall, Eva

Hejne, Åsa

Horn von Ranzien, Mia

Johansson, Lars

Löfvander, Elisabeth

Malm, Anne-Charlotte

Ringborg, Erik

Trollås, Tina

Ygberg, Rebecca

## In Tanzania

Grafström, Jan      Swedish Embassy

Lyimo, Bede      Better Regulation Unit, BEST

Kweka, Josaphat      World Bank

Mrutu, Dunstan      Tanzania National Business Council, TBC

Kilua, Samweli      Royal Danish Embassy,

Schleunig, Stefan      Delegation of the European Commission

Sungula, Edward      Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, MITM

Mashauri, Specioza      Tanzania Chamber of Commerce,  
Industry and Agriculture, TCCIA

Members of Project Implementation Committee  
of the Financial Sector Deepening Trust, FSDT.

## In Uganda

Per Dans      Swedish Embassy (e-mail)

# Annex 7 List of References

- Andersson, J. (2007): *Review of Sida support to trade in light of international experience pre-study for a possible evaluation of Sida's trade related assistance*, UTV Working Paper 2007:2, Sida, Stockholm
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Documents, reports, websites and persons interviewed for each of the 20 evaluated projects are given in Annex 5.


# Annex 8 Terms of Reference

## Introduction

In 2007 Sida commissioned a pre-evaluation study of its Trade Related Support (Andersson 2007).<sup>45</sup> As pointed out in the pre-evaluation study systematic information on the results of Sida's TRS is lacking, why an evaluation effort is well overdue. Sida's TRS is growing. There is a need to account for past efforts as well as to learn for the future. How can Sida's TRS more effectively contribute to reducing poverty; what are the implications of choosing different channels and instruments; etc.?

Figure 1, presents a simple model of the underlying program theory. Starting from the bottom of the model, whether increased export actually achieves poverty reduction depends on the character of the change in the trading sector. Economic growth in general can be more or less pro-poor depending on the extent to which poor people are part of, and benefit from, growth. The same goes for growth in trading sectors. If for example trade growth takes place in sectors (goods and services) where poor people are economically active it will probably be more beneficial for poverty reduction.

**Figure 1. Programme theory for Sida's TRS**



<sup>45</sup> Trade Related Support includes support to policy and regulations, trade development and trade related infrastructure.

Hence, an important underlying assumption for linkage 8 to be valid is that the economic growth induced by increased trade is pro-poor in its character. Whether, this is true or not is influenced by a) the institutional set up for trade and also by b) the infrastructure and productive capacity of the trading country. Both these are influenced by activities to develop trade capacity, trade related infrastructure and trade policy and regulations (i.e. linkage 4, 5 and 6). When contributing to trade related activities Sida should hence consider to what extent they foster the development of pro-poor economic growth and trade.

Finally, Sida's contribution to trade policy and regulations and trade development in partner countries are often channelled through Swedish or international partners. Given the objective to contribute to a pro-poor trade development in partner countries does this choice matter? Which are the most effective and efficient channels to achieve this objective (linkage 1 and 2)?

The model above is of course a very simplified program theory. Trade can have both growth effects and distributional effects. The link between trade and poverty can be direct (e.g. poor people getting employment and incomes) but also indirect and longer term. An outward oriented development strategy may speed up technological change and increase productivity more generally in the economy.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, a more complete model should better represent the role of demand, import and consumption.

The allocation of funds for TRS is influenced by a number of parameters. In international trade related fora partner countries often emphasise the importance of strengthening trade. At the national level governments' priorities are expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers, Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks etc. and in the dialogue with the donor group. Furthermore, each donor have their own priorities for sector concentration etc. and between them, the donors are increasingly aiming at a division of labour at the country level. It might be that some of these aspects are conflicting. For example, it is not guaranteed that the demand for TRS as expressed by partner countries in international fora mirror the priorities expressed in their PRSPs. The donors are supposed to harmonise their support with needs and demand of the partner countries. However, if the expressed needs and priorities of partner countries differ depending on in which context it is expressed then the outcome with regard to what finally determines the allocations to TRS is less clear. It might be of particular interest to look at Sida's handling of the potential conflict between an exogenously determined target for TRS spending on the one hand and aid effectiveness and partnership principles on the other hand and the requirement that TRS shall be demand driven.<sup>47</sup>

The integration of TRS in Sida's strategies and programmes is an ongoing process. Trade has normally not in itself been a focus sector in country strate-

<sup>46</sup> That is, linkage 7 actually goes in both directions – institutional context and productive capacity matters for export but trade relations can also affect on productivity and institutions.

<sup>47</sup> See *Regeringens riktlinjer för handelsrelaterat utvecklingssamarbete 2008*

gies. Sida has integrated trade into its work with broader *market development*.<sup>48</sup> In a recent review of development cooperation strategies it was found that 15 of 21 strategies allow for cooperation on *market development*. In 3 of these, *market development* is a focus area (Andersson, 2008).<sup>49</sup> In the pre-evaluation study of Sida's TRS (Andersson, 2007) integration of trade into Sida's overall activities was suggested as one possible theme for an evaluation of Sida's TRS. Andersson also points to the potentially negative effects on aid effectiveness of having provision conditions regarding TRS spending in the Swedish development budget.

Another observation that came out in the pre-evaluation study was the surge in support to Policy and Regulation activities, especially through international and Swedish intermediaries. According to Andersson the share of Policy and Regulation support is relatively large in the Swedish TRS portfolio as compared with most other donors.<sup>50</sup>

The links between development cooperation, trade and the intended benefits from trade are complex and it is not possible to make an exhaustive study of the whole field. The study that these Terms of Reference concern is inward oriented focusing mainly on Sida's internal management of TRS. Other studies will cover other themes.<sup>51</sup> In the current study we will give special attention to the generation and use of results information. The evaluation is carried out in the context of the concentration of long term development cooperation, both geographic and sector wise. More than 30 new country strategies were formulated during 2008 and the government is currently working on a new Swedish Africa strategy. At the same time Sida has been reorganised with country teams as key operational units. Both the government and Sida put a stronger emphasis on results and Sida is currently strengthening results management system. One way or the other, all these changes will have an impact on Sida's management of its TRS.

## Purpose

The study has both accountability learning purposes. More specifically the objectives of the evaluation are to:

- provide results information relevant to Sida's reporting on the outcome of its TRS efforts,

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<sup>48</sup> Market development cooperation can have different sub-sector focuses, e.g. agriculture/rural development or private sector development.

<sup>49</sup> Before October 2008 the Trade Team at Inec/Market played an important role for the planning and management of Sida's TRA. Now it's role is taken over by the new unit for market development at the Department for Economic Cooperation.

<sup>50</sup> See Table 1 in Andersson (2007). However, caution is warranted since the definition of Policy and Regulations activities is not identical across countries and hence the figures are not fully comparable.

<sup>51</sup> The current study is part of a broader programme of studies that relates to TRS. Different themes will be covered. At a very aggregated level we will explore how aid and trade data correlates (Johansson and Pettersson, 2008). When it comes to identifying what works and what does not work in the area of TRS we shall as far as possible rely on available evidence from international studies. A joint evaluation of support to and through international organisations will most likely be performed. Finally, a synthesis covering all the themes will be produced.

- assess the relevance of Sida's TRS and,
- assess the appropriateness of Sida's TRS results information system and of the management of TRS in order to contribute to enhanced management for development results in this area but also for other areas, to the extent it is possible to generalise from the findings.

## Evaluation Questions

The poverty reduction relevance and effect of TRS activities are important underlying themes for the evaluation. Is Sida's TRS (policy, plan and activities) relevant from a pro-poor trade perspective? Do Sida's TRS activities contribute to reduce poverty? Is the implementation effective and efficient?

The evaluation is concerned with the results of Sida's TRS. It also covers the management of Sida's TRS and its integration into Sida's overall work. There will be special focus on results and the related results information system. Finally, the evaluator shall diagnose the TRS results information system and suggest how the system could be amended to better facilitate Sida's management needs.

### Past efforts: management and results

The first part of the study will rely on results information that can be extracted from existing project and program documents and on the recall of programme officers. It will cover the three main TRS categories and all TRS activities from 2001 until end of 2008. Questions to be considered are:

- What can be said about the outcome of the Policy and Regulations support? To what extent
  - have policies been influenced by Sida efforts,
  - has Sida contributed to the development of regulations and regulatory institutions,
  - has Sida contributed to changing regulations and
  - are these changes pro-poor?
- What can be said about the result of Trade Development activities:
  - has the export and import capacity increased,
  - has this resulted in increased trade (exports and imports) and
  - which groups of people have benefited from the export earnings – have the activities been pro-poor?
- What has been the effect of the support to Trade Related Infrastructure activities:
  - what can be said about the impact on trade,

- have TRI facilitated import and export and
- to what extent are the TRI activities pro-poor?

For all three areas it is of interest to explore what can be said, about the effect at the level of output, outcome and impact respectively. The consultant shall also assess the consideration of mainstreaming (gender, environment and democracy/human rights) issues in planning and results information. Other question that should be covered for all types of TRS:

- are achievements sustainable,
- how is the ownership issue dealt with in practice? How is the partners' demand expressed (by whom, through which channels<sup>52</sup>) and what is its impact on Sida's priorities and work?
- what is the quality of the results information? Are reported results based on independent evaluations, are observed effects triangulated, are outcomes related to a counterfactual, etc.?

How and to what extent is results information used in the management of Sida's TRS? What other important determinants are there for the management of Sida's TRS?

- What is the role of results information in decision-making and in setting priorities?
- How has Sida dealt with budget provision conditions for TRS? How does it affect the way Sida work with trade?
- Is the current practice the best one in order to increase TRS or are there other better ways to do it? What is the result of trade mainstreaming at Sida?

### Assessment of the TRS results information system

A second part of the study is a forward looking exercise that will serve the purpose to strengthen Sida's management of TRS. It includes the whole cycle from how priorities are set through the design of programmes and project contributions, determining indicators, performing evaluations, dissemination and learning. The system shall be diagnosed and areas for improvement identified. The first part of the study (see above) will be an important indicator for how Sida's trade related information system works.

The study will address the questions:

- what results information does Sida need for management, learning and accountability purposes,

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<sup>52</sup> E.g. what is the role of the PRSP, direct dialogue with the trade Minister, more general demand from the group of developing countries expressed at international trade fora, etc.

- relating to the results from the first part of the study, what are the gaps in the information available today compared to the information needed/preferred,
- how can we ensure better results information in the future – what changes are needed,
- why does Sida have the system it has – what internal and external factors influence/determines the TRS results information system,
- specifically, with regard to Sida's TRS Plan (Sida, 2007),
  - are objectives clear and possible to follow up and
  - is there a system in place that generates results information facilitating future assessments of implementation of the plan? If not, what measures are needed to ensure future evaluability?

To the extent there are specific information system challenges for the different TRS areas (see above) these shall be identified. The consultant shall provide suggestions for how to strengthen RBM/MfDR of Sida's TRS, i.e. use of results information to inform decisions and policies.

## Competency and Expertise Requirements

It is required that the consultant team includes the following competences:

- good knowledge of trade related development cooperation,
- good knowledge of Sida and Swedish development cooperation,
- experience in development evaluation,
- documented good presentation skills (oral and writing) and
- documented good analytical skills.

The consultant should preferably not have been directly involved in planning and implementations of Sida's TRS. In the tender the consultant should clarify his/her degree of independence/dependence towards the evaluation object.

## Scope

The study will cover the period 2001–2008 and contributions to global, regional and bilateral projects and programs. It includes interviews with program officers and heads of departments, units and teams and the review of evaluations and other program and project documents. This shall be done for Sida HQ and two embassies (preliminary: Tanzania and Uganda).

The consultant shall make an analysis of the appropriateness of the tools available to Sida in its management TRS (e.g. relevant manuals and guidelines, Plus and e-doc).

The assignment will take no more than 12 staff weeks.



## Expected Outputs

The expected outputs:

- During inception phase:
  - Draft inception report
  - Presentation of the draft inception report for the evaluation reference group
  - Final inception report
- Draft evaluation report
- One presentation of draft evaluation reports
- Final evaluation report (publishable quality)
- One presentation of final evaluation report for a wider audience

The evaluation report shall follow the format for Sida evaluation reports (see Sida, 2007b – Annex B). The report shall not exceed 20 pages (excluding executive summary, and annexes). The final report shall be edited by a professional text editor and the report shall be delivered to Sida in publishable quality. The consultant may also choose to provide non-included annexes to be archived by Sida and referred to in the report but not themselves published.

The DAC evaluation quality standards (2006a) apply in all part relevant for this evaluation.

## Time Frame

Invitation for tender	2009-01-29
Deadline for tender	2009-02-08
Contract award	2009-02-10
Signing call-off order	2009-02-20
Inception report	2009-02-28
First draft report	2009-03-15
Final report	2009-04-30
Dissemination seminar	2009-05

## References

- Andersson, Jens (2007), "Review of Sida support to trade in light of international experience – pre-study for a possible evaluation of Sida's trade related assistance", UTV Working Paper 2007:2, Sida.
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"Tied aid, trade-facilitating aid or trade-diverting aid?", draft.
- OECD (2006a), "DAC evaluation quality standards".
- OECD (2006b), "Trade-related assistance: what do recent evaluation tell us?"
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- Sida (2007b), "Looking back, moving forward", Sida evaluation manual, 2nd edition.
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# Sida's TRADE-RELATED ASSISTANCE:

## Results och management

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the outcome of Sida's Trade Related Assistance (TRA) as well as to assess the appropriateness of Sida's results information system as a management tool for TRA. The evaluation is based on already existing information in project and programme documents and on interviews with program managers.

In general, the projects appear to be well implemented in terms of delivering inputs and producing planned outputs. Beyond this, the outcomes and impacts of the TRA projects in terms of reaching their development objectives, such as influence on trade policy, providing services to the trade sector, reducing poverty, etc, are largely unclear. This is not necessarily because projects have failed or were wrongly designed, but rather because of the methodological difficulties of attributing change to what the Sida projects are delivering. However, on outputs and the more immediate outcomes there already exist quite a lot of information and the problem is not so much the lack of information as the management of this information. Existing information can be used much more effectively as elaborated in the report.

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