

Aid for Trade?

An Evaluation of
Trade-Related
Technical Assistance



Buitenlandse
Zaken

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Preface

‘Aid is just a recipe for permanent poverty’, wrote President Museveni of Uganda in the Wall Street Journal (November 6, 2003), arguing that ‘The only way we can break out of this vicious cycle of poverty is through trade and export-led growth.’ Is he right? Can trade be a tool to alleviate poverty and make developing countries less dependent on what Museveni describes as ‘handouts’ from the rich countries?

What are the views and objectives of the Netherlands government on this? The Netherlands government does not subscribe to the extreme view of ‘trade, not aid’ nor to the opposite view of ‘aid, not trade’. It considers aid and trade to be two major intervention strategies, each of which can contribute to poverty alleviation. It also believes that aid can be essential to help developing countries to profit from trade and trade liberalisation. For that reason the Netherlands actively supports policies and instruments that enable poor countries and poor people to profit from international trade.

A major objective of Netherlands foreign policy is the further integration of developing countries into the world trading system. Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) is considered to be one of the key instruments to contribute to this integration, together with the removal of trade barriers to developing countries. TRTA is a collective term for different types of technical assistance aimed at strengthening developing countries’ trade-related negotiating capacity, national trade policy and/or capacity to trade.

The Netherlands has twinned the objective of integration with the objective of trade liberalisation. It considers two criteria to be important for trade liberalisation: the liberalisation has to be rule-based and pro-poor. Furthermore, it considers that the most important way of contributing to rule-based trade liberalisation is to strengthen the multilateral trade system and the participation of poor countries in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as the rule-making body and global

parliament of international trade in which every member state has equal voting powers. Consequently, the Netherlands has supported TRTA (as provided by the WTO, other multilateral agencies and international NGOs) to help developing countries to understand, negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements. To contribute to pro-poor trade liberalisation, the Netherlands not only wishes to strengthen the negotiation capacity of poor countries at multilateral trade talks but also to strengthen these countries' capacity to develop pro-poor trade policy and to trade. To this end, the Netherlands has supported TRTA (through multi-lateral and bilateral channels) to address institutional problems and supply-side constraints of developing countries.

The Netherlands considers TRTA to be a form of aid to prepare developing countries to integrate or further integrate into the world trading system and to profit from international trade, trade negotiations and trade liberalisation. TRTA is the fishing rod meant to help developing countries to catch bigger fish through international trade. The Dutch views on TRTA are not unique but are in fact shared by nearly all the WTO members. Ever since the very first Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Singapore in 1996, the international donor community has made firm commitments to provide and coordinate TRTA. A proposal to launch an Aid for Trade? Facility is currently being discussed in depth by donors in the run-up to the sixth Ministerial Conference to be held in December 2005 in Hong Kong.

Whereas the Netherlands and other donors have developed a strong interest in value for money, little is known about results of TRTA in terms of output, outcome and impact. This evaluation therefore seeks to explore and assess the results of TRTA funded or co-funded by the Netherlands. It has focused on programmes and organisations that the Netherlands has considered to be of strategic importance.

The evaluation research was prepared, designed and supervised by inspector Otto Hospes of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was assisted by research assistant H el ene de Jong, who meticulously conducted desk studies. The field studies of selected multilateral programmes and international NGOs/IGOs in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Jemen, Tanzania and Geneva were conducted by a team of consultants from ECORYS/NEI, comprising Paul Wijmenga (lead consultant), Piet Lanser, Richard Liebrechts and Nora Plaisier. Their extensive field reports were published as IOB working documents and together form the empirical basis of the present report written by Otto Hospes (IOB). A committee of scholars and staff of the

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs and the OECD provided comments and advice on drafts of the working documents and the present report. After her retirement as an IOB inspector, Marie Hulsman remained a critical and constructive reader of the report. The input of these advisors was most helpful, yet final responsibility for this evaluation remains with IOB.

Henri Jorritsma

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Main findings and issues

Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) is a collective term for different types of technical assistance aimed at strengthening the trade-related negotiating capacity, national trade policy and/or capacity to trade of developing countries.

High political commitment to TRTA at WTO ministerial conferences, the Netherlands' role as an active supporter of TRTA, and its strong interest in showing results prompted the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to undertake an evaluation of TRTA. From the first WTO conference in 1996, the Netherlands has been a strong advocate of focusing TRTA programmes on Least Developed Countries (LDCs), demand-led approaches and ownership, and coordinating the provision of TRTA.

The objective of the IOB evaluation is to describe and assess the results of TRTA funded by the Netherlands, individually or jointly with other donors. The findings of the evaluation and the review of critical issues are intended to enable Dutch policymakers:

- to account for Dutch TRTA funding to the Dutch parliament;
- to determine whether larger, smaller or different commitments are justified, in light of the policy and objectives that constitute the framework for funding and channelling TRTA.

The evaluation focused on multilateral programmes and international organisations because the Netherlands considers the multilateral channel as the principal channel for funding TRTA. These programmes and organisations were primarily oriented towards trade policy and regulation, rather than trade or business development. The results were assessed on the basis of two Dutch objectives in supporting TRTA: enhancing developing countries' capacity to negotiate at multilateral trade talks and strengthening their ability to formulate a pro-poor national trade policy.

In the period 1992-2002 the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided a total of € 109.9 million to support 91 activities in the field of trade policy and regulation. To measure and assess the results of this support, two types of study were conducted in 2003-2004: a desk study of 73 selected activities (with a total expenditure of € 30.4 million) and field studies of seven cases in Geneva and at country level (involving Dutch support of € 4.2 million of a total of € 43.8 million in donor grants). These seven cases comprised four multilateral programmes (the IF, JITAP and two UNCTAD technical assistance programmes) and three international organisations (ACWL, AITIC and QUNO).

A. Main findings

The main finding of the desk study was:

1. *The design and implementation of nearly all selected TRTA activities devoted too little attention to formulating and using measurable indicators that could provide an insight into what is actually done with TRTA and what it achieves.*

In 35 of the 73 activities, the main objective was to deliver an input or an output. In these cases, funding or providing TRTA was considered more important than its effects. In 70 of the 73 activities, the main objectives did not specify the desired situation on the basis of target values or indicators of outcome and impact. As a result, the dossiers did not provide a sufficient basis for drawing conclusions on the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the activities.

Mid-term reviews, policy reviews and other evaluation reports of projects and programmes provided few insights into outcome and impact because measuring and assessing results was not the main objective. Though the reviews and evaluations aimed to improve a specific project or programme, they did not aim to learn from the past by assessing the results achieved previously.

The main findings of the case studies were:

2. *There was respect for UNCTAD's technical assistance in the field of investment and competition, but its use-value could not be determined. UNCTAD was not a transparent and efficient channel for TRTA.*

UNCTAD aims at the 'development-friendly' integration of developing countries into the world economy. Providing technical assistance is one of its main pillars. The two TRTA programmes assessed – on the Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment (PMFI) and on Competition Law and Policy for African Countries (CLPAC) – place a strong emphasis on knowledge generation and transfer in the field of investment and competition on the basis of research, analytical reports, seminars and advisory services.

There was respect among representatives of developing countries and developed countries alike for the high quality of UNCTAD's work on competition and investment. However, the use-value of technical papers and regional seminars – in terms of contributing to trade negotiating capacity or strengthening ability to formulate trade policy – could not be determined. The IOB evaluation showed that UNCTAD was not a transparent and efficient channel for the two programmes. This confirmed a review of UNCTAD's administration and the conclusions of other evaluations.

3. *TRTA provided by small and single-issue organisations serving non-LDCs was efficient and effective.*

Unlike UNCTAD, small international NGOs/IGOs did not deliver theoretical papers, extensive analyses and publications aimed at a wide audience. Instead, they provided accessible information, short papers, tailor-made advice and/or facilities for informal exchange, on-the-job training and interactive learning.

Technical assistance provided to non-LDCs by these NGOs/IGOs proved to be efficient and effective in strengthening the negotiating capacity of these countries. This can be explained by their thematic focus and demand-led approach, tailoring services seamlessly to the concerns of their clients. Another possible explanation is the nature of the clients of these small and specialised NGOs/IGOs: the representatives of non-LDCs in Geneva, who are already active in the WTO and have some knowledge and experience of multilateral trade negotiations.

4. *Large-scale, integrated multilateral TRTA programmes targeting LDCs were neither efficient nor effective in the countries visited.*

Unlike the small international NGOs/IGOs operating in Geneva, the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs (IF) and the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) are broad, country-based programmes. The IF was designed by multilateral agencies as the principal mechanism for least developed countries to mainstream their national trade objectives into national development plans and to coordinate the supply of TRTA. The core agencies of this programme are the WTO, the ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, the IMF and the World Bank. JITAP was designed by multilateral agencies as a country-based programme to comprehensively address a broad spectrum of trade issues confronting LDCs and other poorer developing countries in Africa. The core agencies for JITAP are the WTO, the ITC and UNCTAD.

These two broad multilateral programmes were not efficient in the four LDCs visited (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Yemen), all of which are Dutch partner countries. Their effects in terms of contributing to country-led and pro-poor trade policy formulation were weak. The disappointing performance of these large-scale, integrated TRTA programmes in the countries visited can be explained by their ambitious design and the limited absorption capacity of the LDCs concerned. Another factor is the lack of high political commitment at country level. This is dealt with in greater detail under the next finding.

5. *Country ownership of the IF and JITAP, in the sense of high political commitment and strong involvement of the private sector and civil society, was weak in the countries visited.*

In Yemen not a single ministry adopted a pro-active role in steering the IF. In Ethiopia one minister showed commitment to the programme. In both countries, the private sector and civil society were hardly involved in the IF process, and the key concept and main objective of the IF of mainstreaming trade into development appeared to be very abstract. There was confusion among ministries about whether the IF should start looking for trade opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises or large, capital-intensive industries. If they were aware of the IF at all, the ministries in Ethiopia and Yemen were interested because of the prospect of funding and much less because of what they saw as a vague concept of mainstreaming trade into development. The private sector saw investment, not trade, as the engine for growth and employment. In fact, the private sector argued that the link between trade and growth works in the opposite direction; an improved investment climate could lead to growth in domestic economic activities, which would then lead to more trade.

In Tanzania, the total lack of political commitment to the JITAP turned it into an empty shell. In Burkina Faso, high-level officials were strongly committed to the cotton case: a proposal to abolish Western subsidies on cotton growing, launched by four cotton-producing African countries at the WTO ministerial conference in Cancún in 2003. These officials made effective use of one JITAP institutional facility, the inter-institutional committee, to prepare the cotton case and identify negotiating positions.

6. *Coordination between The Hague and Dutch embassies on the IF and JITAP was poor in the countries visited.*

The embassies of bilateral donors supporting the IF and JITAP, including the Netherlands, either had a negative opinion of the programmes or hardly knew about them. They preferred to concentrate on their own bilateral aid projects. Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom are global supporters of the IF and JITAP in the countries studied, but on the ground their embassies devoted little attention to the programmes. The Netherlands was no exception in this respect. In Burkina Faso and Tanzania, the Dutch embassy was hardly aware of JITAP. In Ethiopia, the embassy showed little interest in the IF. In Yemen, the embassy was critical of the IF, identifying low participation and lack of Yemeni ownership as a result of limited institutional capacity. The embassy found expectations regarding the IF in the ministry in The Hague unrealistic.

In theory, one of the advantages of supporting multilateral programmes is a reduction in duplication, transaction costs and donor administration. In practice, this took an extreme form in the countries visited: there was no active involvement or monitoring of the multilateral programmes at all by the Dutch embassies. The embassy in Yemen was involved in the IF but limited its role to raising donor interest for funding concrete TRTA projects.

A holistic approach, with multilateral TRTA programmes (aimed at formulating pro-poor trade policies and/or strengthening negotiating capacity) linked to complementary Dutch economic cooperation or business support programmes, was not pursued by the Netherlands in the countries visited. In Yemen, the embassy kept funds available to provide financial support to TRTA projects of IF but at the same time adopted an exit strategy for bilateral projects in the economic sector.

B. Issues

The main issue to emerge from the desk study was:

1. *How to make the assessment memoranda reflect the Ministry's desire for greater insight into what is actually done with TRTA and what it achieves?*

Internal dossiers available to budget holders give poor insight into what has actually been done and achieved with TRTA funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field of trade policy and administration. The question is how the ministry in The Hague and Dutch embassies can monitor, support and conduct a dialogue with contract parties or beneficiaries on the right action to take when such information is lacking.

If the ministry wants to be able to assess and demonstrate what is actually being done and achieved with the TRTA it provides, more and systematic attention should be paid to formulating measurable outcome and impact indicators in the appraisal memoranda for funding applications. A second-best option is to insist on the formulation of measurable indicators when drawing up terms of reference for project and programme evaluations. A specific issue here is whether the ministry can apply the Ministry of Finance's guidelines and instructions for evaluations in its evaluations of multilateral TRTA programmes funded or co-funded by the Netherlands.

The main issues emerging from the case studies which need further attention from policymakers are:

2. *Should UNCTAD's role as a carrier or channel for TRTA be improved or terminated?*

Since 1991 the Netherlands has supported UNCTAD's technical assistance activities with an annual contribution of € 450,000, with no clear overview of or insight into the effects of the activities on individual capacity-building or the actual use of the knowledge by officials drafting or amending national policy and legislation in developing countries. Current procedures within UNCTAD do not allow for a thorough assessment of the agency's efficiency, effectiveness and relevance as a carrier and provider of TRTA supported by the Netherlands. The management of multidonor trust funds is not transparent; the funds seem to be owned by everybody, but nobody in particular. Can the Netherlands accept UNCTAD's project cycle management, if it wants a clear insight into the agency's performance in the field of TRTA?

The IOB evaluation of the two UNCTAD programmes confirms the findings of other evaluations and a review of UNCTAD's administration which identify a lack of transparency and accountability, and an absence of indications of the actual use and policy significance of TRTA provided by the agency. The policy issue is whether the Netherlands as a donor finds it worthwhile to see how the transparency and accountability of UNCTAD's multidonor trust funds can be improved, or believes the time has come to consider a fundamental review of UNCTAD's role in the field of TRTA, varying from a major adjustment of its approach to withdrawal.

3. *Can effective TRTA provided by small and single-issue organisations serving the representatives of non-LDCs in Geneva be expanded to include LDC representatives or capitals?*

Small and single-issue organisations provided TRTA to the representatives of non-LDCs in Geneva efficiently and effectively. LDCs, however, have not taken up the offer of TRTA from selected international NGOs/IGOs in Geneva to help them prepare WTO trade negotiations or dispute settlements. This raises a number of questions: are LDCs not interested in strengthening their negotiating capacity? Are small and single-issue organisations not attractive enough to LDCs? Or do LDCs face structural barriers hampering their access to and use of Geneva-based international NGOs/IGOs?

The case of the JITAP in Burkina Faso and the proposal by the four West African countries at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún to abolish Western subsidies on cotton growing clearly suggest that LDCs can show a strong interest in strengthening their negotiating capacity, and benefit from it. Faced with financial constraints and a lack of human resources, they give priority to strengthening the negotiating capacity of their capitals, not of representation in Geneva. Since they are unable to participate regularly in multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, LDCs have little or no representation there. The policy issue is whether the Netherlands should propose that international and Geneva-based NGOs/IGOs take on the role of advocating for LDCs in Geneva or expand their services to LDC capitals. The first option might run counter to the philosophy of these organisations: they might not be willing to speak on behalf of LDCs and consider the advocacy role as not compatible with capacity building in less-developed countries. The second option could be very costly, demanding, complicated and risky. Expanding their services to LDC capitals is not something that international NGOs/IGOs could easily take on alongside their core business in Geneva, especially if their financial and human resources remain more or less at the same level.

4. *Should mainstreaming trade into development through the IF be considered a priority tool to integrate LDCs into the world trade system?*

Multilateral agencies have identified the IF as the principal mechanism for LDCs to mainstream their national trade objectives into national development plans. The Netherlands was one of the spiritual founders of the programme, which was launched in 1997. In 2003 the Netherlands declared the IF “one of the most comprehensive and promising programmes to promote trade development and to provide technical assistance”.

However, ministries and private sector interests in LDCs are not aware of, do not understand or do not agree with the IF's key objective and concept of mainstreaming trade into development planning. Despite the fact that this joint programme of six multilateral agencies considers tripartite consultation between ministries, the private sector and civil society as critical for mainstreaming trade into development planning, the different expectations and views of stakeholders have been overlooked or ignored. First of all, ministries in LDCs were less impressed by the concept of mainstreaming than by the prospect of receiving donor funds. Secondly, ministries could not agree on whether to concentrate pro-poor trade policies on capital-intensive international companies or small domestic enterprises. Lastly, while multilateral agencies saw export expansion as vital for pro-poor growth, private sector interests in beneficiary countries saw domestic investment as more important.

These different expectations and views among stakeholders call for a review of the concept of mainstreaming trade into development as a priority tool to integrate LDCs into the world trade system. They also lead us to question what should be seen as the engine of pro-poor growth in LDCs: trade liberalisation and export expansion or domestic investment and a country's investment climate? In his review of growth policies in the developing world, economist Dani Rodrik (2004) identifies inadequate levels of private investment and entrepreneurship as the most important symptoms of low economic growth. He therefore challenges the 'from trade to growth' view of Washington-based agencies (the view that underlies the IF) and proposes a reverse intervention logic 'from growth to trade'.

What position does the Netherlands want to take in this fundamental policy debate? And what are the implications for its traditional support for the IF? Do the findings of the IOB study, which confirm the conclusions of earlier reviews and other independent evaluations, imply that time has come to review the Netherlands' traditional commitment to the IF? Or would this mean throwing away the baby with the bathwater? Does the IF – as a multi-country, multidonor and multi-agency programme – simply need more time to deliver? Should it be disqualified because its objectives are vague, overly ambitious and unrealistic? Either way, one fundamental problem has to be dealt with effectively: lack of country ownership.

5. *Can multilateral agencies give LDCs ownership of large-scale, integrated TRTA programmes?*

Earlier reviews of the IF and JITAP concluded that ‘the glass is half full’, that these broad, multilateral programmes need more time to overcome the obstacles and achieve the expected results. JITAP was allowed to continue twice as long as originally planned and to enter a second phase. The IF was ‘revitalised’ after nearly grinding to a halt in 1999 and being reviewed in 2000. Reviewers who concluded that the glass was half full expect efficiency and effectiveness to improve with time, so that the glass will eventually be full. They do not consider the possibility that performance may not improve, or may even worsen. This is strange, certainly if obstacles prove to be fundamental and persistent.

In the case of the IF, lack of ownership was considered a ‘fundamental obstacle hampering progress’ during a mid-term review and overall evaluation. Several reviews and evaluations of JITAP conducted at different phases concluded that the programme is characterised by little government commitment and ownership. A summative evaluation confirmed the conclusions of an appraisal study, qualifying the programme as donor-driven and largely run from Geneva, and noted again the lack of government commitment. The IOB studies of the IF and JITAP in selected countries confirmed these findings, also showing that high political commitment can make a difference (as in the case of JITAP in Burkina Faso).

Independent consultants have repeatedly proposed giving ownership of the IF to LDCs. The issue is whether this is possible at all given their lack of absorption capacity. A more fundamental problem, however, is the different views and priorities of multilateral agencies and stakeholders in LDCs. If these differences are ignored, efforts on the part of multilateral agencies and donors to give LDCs ownership could be interpreted as them imposing their own ideas and interpretations of problems or even giving orders to LDCs. The IF and JITAP were designed, and are being implemented by, multilateral agencies. Are these spiritual parents prepared to let go of their babies? Are LDCs willing to adopt them, and do they see enough opportunities to raise them according to their own standards? If these issues are not dealt with, the IF and JITAP glasses will remain half full.

6. *Can the Dutch division of tasks aimed at helping developing countries integrate into the world economy be upgraded into tripartite cooperation?*

To help developing countries to integrate into the world trade system, the Netherlands considers the removal of supply-side constraints and strengthening developing countries' negotiating capacity a dual challenge.¹ In this light, the Netherlands supports private sector development, multilateral programmes aimed at formulating pro-poor trade policies, and international NGOs/IGOs helping developing countries to prepare for multilateral trade negotiations. In general terms, Dutch embassies concentrate their efforts on bilateral projects and programmes at country level directed at private sector development, budget holders in The Hague have worldwide multilateral programmes in their portfolio, and the Netherlands' permanent mission in Geneva tries to put Dutch concerns on the agendas of WTO trade negotiations.

This division of tasks makes sense. Unfortunately, Dutch embassies are hardly aware of multilateral TRTA programmes in their countries, let alone make a link with their programmes and projects directed at private sector development. The ministry in The Hague lacks a monitoring mechanism and has difficulties gaining an insight into what is going on with multilateral TRTA programmes on the ground. Embassies could play a pro-active role in monitoring multilateral programmes and contributing to an integrated approach in which multilateral TRTA programmes in LDCs are linked to complementary Dutch economic cooperation or business support programmes. The permanent mission in Geneva is best placed to monitor multilateral trade negotiations and to report to the ministry in The Hague and the embassies on the possibilities they offer for improving coordination of TRTA directed at business development, national policy formulation and the negotiating capacity of developing countries.

The issue is whether the Dutch division of tasks to address the dual challenge of helping developing countries integrate into the world trade system can be transformed into tripartite consultations and cooperation between budget holders in The Hague, the permanent mission in Geneva and Dutch embassies in the field of business, trade and development.

1. Supply-side constraints refer to the lack of a stimulating national policy environment and investment climate, limited support for individual enterprises, and insufficient production and export capacity.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and justification

Trade-related Technical Assistance (TRTA) is a collective term for different types of technical assistance aimed at strengthening the trade-related negotiating capacity, national trade policy and/or the capacity to trade of developing countries.

At ministerial conferences of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1996, bilateral donors and multilateral agencies have declared their strong commitment to the provision of TRTA to developing countries, in particular to Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In 2000 the percentage of Official Development Assistance spent on TRTA was declared an indicator of the Millennium Development Objective of ‘further developing an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory’. The Netherlands describes itself as an active supporter of TRTA.

Whereas the Netherlands and other bilateral donors have developed a strong interest in getting value for money, little is known about the results of TRTA in terms of output, outcome and impact. Therefore, the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation is committed to demonstrating the results to Dutch parliament (AEV 2003).

Commitment to TRTA from high political level, the qualification of the Netherlands as an active supporter of TRTA, and the strong interest of the Netherlands in obtaining and demonstrating value for money, prompted IOB to start an evaluation of the instrument of TRTA in June 2003.

1.2 Objective and central questions

The objective of the IOB evaluation was to describe and assess the results of TRTA funded or co-funded by the Netherlands. ‘Results’ were taken to be ‘the output, outcome and impact of a development intervention’ (OECD/DAC 2002).

The central questions addressed by the evaluation were:

- **Efficiency:** to what extent has input (resources and time) resulted in output (courses, programmes, studies, publications, strategic documents, strategy development, plans, etc.) in accordance with the timetable, plan and budget?
- **Effectiveness:** to what extent has output contributed to the knowledge, understanding and skills of individual beneficiaries (outcome)?
- **Relevance:** to what extent has outcome contributed to the ability of developing countries to formulate pro-poor trade policy and/or to negotiate multilateral trade issues (impact)?

The findings of the evaluation and review of critical issues are intended to enable Dutch policy makers (1) to account for Dutch funding of TRTA to the Dutch parliament and (2) to determine whether commitments should be larger, smaller or different, in light of the policy and objectives that constitute the framework for funding and channelling TRTA.

1.3 Organisation and methodology

Three components

The evaluation study had three components, each consisting of one or two major studies: a description and analysis of the policy context of TRTA, an inventory and classification of TRTA activities of the Netherlands, and the measurement and assessment of the results of selected TRTA.

Two studies were set up to describe and analyse the policy context of TRTA. The first was a review of the integration agenda and institutional features of the WTO, with the aim of positioning and explaining the need for TRTA, the supply of TRTA and negotiations on TRTA. The second study was a description and analysis of the integration agenda of the Netherlands as part of long-term Dutch commitment to further the development of the multilateral trade system. A specific purpose of this study was to generate insights into theories underlying Netherlands policy and objectives to be assessed.

The starting points of both studies were the products or written results of deliberations and negotiations: ministerial declarations, de-briefings to parliament, inter-departmental publications, joint surveys, definitions, categorisations, written announcements of the start of a trust fund. All these framed how TRTA has been deployed to achieve set objectives. They literally

form the context of TRTA. These texts have been agreed upon and created by different parties participating in deliberations and negotiations. They express consensus and compatibility of interests but also hide different priorities and are based on compromise. For both studies, different views, underlying assumptions and hidden objectives about the use of TRTA were identified on the basis of comparing different products of negotiations, analysing speeches and internal memoranda, and interviewing staff of the WTO, international NGOs and Dutch ministries.

In order to inventory and classify TRTA, lists and surveys of TRTA as funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs were reviewed. Interviews with Ministry staff yielded additional information. All these sources provided useful but differently structured items of information spanning relatively short periods of time (1 or 2 years). As it was not easy to aggregate the information, a database was constructed of expenditure in the period 1992-2002, using the internationally agreed WTO/OECD classification (2002) of categories and CRS-codes of TRTA for this purpose. An extensive search in the world of MIDAS resulted in a database of 237 activities (of which 163 had been completed by March 2003 and 74 were still running).

Two types of study were set up to measure and assess the results of the selected TRTA: a desk study in The Hague and field studies in Geneva and at country level (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Yemen). For the desk study, 73 activities – all focused on trade policy and administration – were selected from the 237 in the database. The sources of information for the desk study included funding proposals, assessment memoranda, reports of meetings, reviews, progress reports, completion or final reports, correspondence and any available evaluation reports. In addition, active and former handling officers were interviewed, to verify the description of objectives and information on output, outcome and impact. Seven cases were selected for the field studies: four multilateral programmes and three international organisations in the field of trade policy and administration. Together they were being financed through 14 separately administered activities.

Evaluation criteria

The generic evaluation criteria used to assess the results of TRTA were efficiency, effectiveness and relevance. Efficiency is to do with the relationships between input and output, whereas effectiveness is about the relationships between output and outcome. Relevance refers to the relationships between outcome and impact.

For the desk study, a questionnaire was used to record results and to collect any findings of other internal or external evaluations of the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of TRTA activities. The questionnaire was also used to identify how and to what extent the objectives and reported results had been quantified in terms of target values or other indicators.

Specific evaluation matrices and specific indicators of output and outcome adapted to the specific features of each programme or organisation were designed for each of the seven cases selected for field study so that the evaluation would take account of the particular design or programmatic context of TRTA provision (see Annex 3). The impact of selected multilateral programmes and international organisations was measured using two Netherlands objectives for supporting TRTA as the main criteria or indicators: strengthening the ability of developing countries to identify trade policy interests, and increasing the negotiating capacity of developing countries in the WTO. For every main indicator of impact, a set of programme- or organisation-specific indicators was designed.

Output, outcome and impact were assessed per specific indicator and in terms of their relationship with respectively input, output and outcome. This resulted in up to 10 specific ratings of efficiency, of effectiveness and of relevance for every provider or programme (see Annex 4). The indicators were assessed using a five-point scale: Poor (P), Weak (W), Fair (F), Good (G) and Excellent (E).

For the overall score of efficiency and effectiveness, the average of specific scores per evaluation criteria was calculated. For this purpose unweighted, specific scores were rated as follows: P=1, W=2, F=3, G=4 and E=5. Two average scores were calculated for relevance, so that the evaluation would take account of the particular design or programmatic context of TRTA provision. One score was for the contribution to national trade policy formulation and the other was for the contribution to the trade negotiation capacity of developing countries. In principle, these two average scores were not averaged again with a view to determine one overall score. This was because one of the criteria for selecting cases was that the main objectives of programmes or organisations should be similar to one or two specific Netherlands TRTA objectives: country-led identification of trade policy interests resulting in the formulation of pro-poor national trade policy and/or the strengthening of the trade negotiation capacity of developing countries (see Annex 5 for the Rating Methodology).

The average scores were rounded up to whole numbers, because in a few specific indicators it was difficult to decide which rating to assign (e.g. Poor or Weak). The use of different indicators and also the systematic review by the evaluation team of the source of rating, were intended to prevent hasty and subjective judgement.

Philosophy underlying the evaluation

Simply put, the philosophy underlying the methodology of the evaluation was ‘the proof of the pudding is not in the eating but in what happens after the pudding has been eaten’. A distinctive feature of the evaluation was to identify what had actually been done or achieved by developing countries or their representatives with the technical assistance provided by multilateral agencies and international organisations. Instant measuring of client satisfaction at the close of courses, seminars, etc. was considered to be an inappropriate method of measuring results. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that the reliability of measuring client satisfaction on the basis of participant evaluation forms is limited.

The philosophy of the evaluation strongly affected the organisation and methodology of the evaluation. Measuring what had actually been done or achieved by developing countries or their representatives is a complex and time-consuming exercise, especially if indicators of outcome and impact have not been formulated *ex ante* by donors and providers of TRTA. As a result, the team of consultants doing the field studies had to spend much time designing programme-specific evaluation matrices in preparation for the recording and measuring of results. The objective of measuring not only output but also outcome and impact meant that there had to be a strong focus and that fact-finding missions had to be sent out into the field.

In the field studies it was decided not to identify and use a ‘without situation’ when assessing the selected organisations and programmes, because of the widely reported shortcomings of such an approach. ‘Before and after’ comparisons were also rejected because monitoring systems had not been put in place and baseline studies were lacking. The approach – considered typical for policy evaluation – was to collect evidence from the field to determine whether organisations and programmes considered to be strategically very important to the Netherlands offered value for money, put Dutch approaches and principles into practice and contributed to the realisation of Dutch policy objectives of TRTA.

1.4 Scope and limitations

The evaluation focuses on TRTA as an instrument to further the integration of developing countries into the world trade system. Though the Netherlands considers this integration to be a contribution – if not a precondition – to poverty reduction and international order, this evaluation does not focus on the intended effects of integrating developing countries into the world trade system: TRTA was not evaluated as an instrument of poverty alleviation or international order. The complex relationships between trade liberalisation, international trade, economic growth and poverty alleviation also fall beyond the scope of this evaluation study. Instead, the evaluation focuses on the lower rungs of the goal–means–effect hierarchy that provides the policy-based terms of reference for the Netherlands’ support to the instrument of TRTA. It does so for the following reasons:

- For the Netherlands, the main objective of TRTA is to further the integration of developing countries into the world trade system.
- It is difficult to measure what effects (positive or negative) the integrating of developing countries into the world trade system have on poverty and international order because so many processes, events and actors affect poverty and international order.
- A study that focuses on the lower rungs of a goal–means–effect hierarchy is more likely to investigate and assess the effects of Dutch aid – and has more concrete opportunities to do so – than a study that focuses on the higher rungs of such a hierarchy.

The lower rungs are to do with the following operationalised objectives and means of integrating developing countries into the world trade system: strengthening the ability of developing countries to formulate a pro-poor national policy, enhancing the capacity of developing countries to negotiate at multilateral trade negotiations, and increasing the capacity of developing countries to trade. In this study, TRTA has been evaluated in terms of its ability as an instrument to achieve these operationalised objectives. The study concentrated on TRTA and its contributions to the ability of developing countries to formulate pro-poor trade policies and their negotiation capacity. The contribution of TRTA to the trade capacity of developing countries was not investigated in this study for the following reasons:

- The Netherlands considers that the principal channel to support TRTA providers, programmes and projects is the multilateral channel. Multilateral programmes and international organisations supported by the Netherlands have primarily been directed at strengthening trade policy and/or negotiation capacity, not at trade capacity.

- In 1999 IOB concluded an evaluation of the Centre for the Promotion of Imports (CBI) from developing countries. This Centre is considered the main bilateral activity of the Netherlands directed at promoting the export capacity of entrepreneurs from developing countries.
- Developing countries' share in the imports and exports of world trade is an indicator of trade capacity. This share is affected by many processes, events and actors, including market access and multilateral negotiations on market access. It is very difficult to isolate and determine what effect TRTA to a developing country has on the share of that country's world trade imports and exports.

For the same reasons, instead of concentrating on the development of trade, the measurement and assessment of results concentrated on TRTA activities classified under trade policy and regulation. In the period 1992-2002 the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent a total of € 109.9 million on trade policy and regulating trade. The activities selected for measuring and assessing the results covered € 30.7 million (or 27.9 percent of the total).

As already noted, the field studies concentrated on four multilateral programmes and three international organisations considered to be strategically important to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a donor. Methodological considerations largely defined the scope and limitations of these studies. A major criterion for selecting cases was the geographical concentration of the beneficiaries of the TRTA provider or programme. Taking into account the methodological and practical problems of measuring the outcome and impact of 600 short WTO technical missions per year that are scattered throughout the world (WTO 2002, 2003), the IOB evaluation of WTO technical assistance, for instance, was limited to two large and country-based programmes (IF and JITAP) enjoying financial support (both direct and earmarked) from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹.

The evaluation of UNCTAD technical assistance concentrated on two programmes on which the Netherlands had concentrated its support. Because of this focus, the findings of evaluation research on technical assistance from multilateral agencies could not be generalised up to the level of the multilateral agency (UNCTAD) or programme (IF and JITAP) as a whole. To compensate for this

1. The WTO secretariat plans to do its own evaluation of its comprehensive technical assistance and training programme in 2005. This plan excludes an evaluation of and field research on the two large and multi-agency programmes that were included in the present IOB evaluation.

limitation and to see whether the IOB findings were unique or not, conclusions and lessons learnt from reviews and other evaluations with a broader geographical scope were added.

The total Dutch contribution to the four selected programmes of multilateral agencies and three international organisations amounted to € 4.1 million. The evaluation did not single out or isolate the Dutch contribution from the total of € 43.8 million of donor subsidies to selected multilateral programmes and international organisations in Geneva and the four countries visited.

The evaluation registered the results of selected programmes and organisations that had been achieved by the end of 2003 or beginning of 2004. It should be remembered that this was a snapshot and that the performance of the subsequent phases or programmes of these organisations might not be the same. The IOB evaluation is not meant to predict future performance, however, but instead to provide policymakers with the data and insights to enable them to determine whether the results achieved so far justify consolidating the policies, strategies and channelling of TRTA, or whether a review is necessary.

1.5 Structure of this report

The structure of the report is briefly as follows: policy context of TRTA (chapters two and three) – input to TRTA (chapter four) – results of TRTA (chapters five, six and seven).

Chapters two and three outline the policy context of TRTA as supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This context consists of different, often interlinked, policy arenas. In this report, two arenas are dealt with. The first is the global parliament of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Ministerial Conference, and its preparations and follow-up meetings. In this arena negotiations are held on the architecture of the multilateral trade system. The second arena is the Netherlands Government, submitting its agenda on the integration of developing countries into the world trade system to the Dutch parliament and accommodating different departmental concerns, new approaches and internationally agreed definitions of TRTA.

Chapter two discusses the integration agenda of the WTO Ministerial Conference and the position of TRTA on this agenda. It explains the status of TRTA as a political commodity and how multilateral trade regulation by the WTO has led to an

increasing need for and supply of TRTA. Finally, TRTA objectives and approaches of multilateral agencies and bilateral donors are presented, together with the fundamental and practical concerns of developing countries.

Chapter three is about the integration agenda of the Netherlands and the place of TRTA on this agenda. It explains how the threefold Dutch objective of TRTA mirrors three different and co-existing policy theories of Dutch policymakers on what is the biggest obstacle to the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trade system. The chapter also reports on the principal channel of Dutch funding of TRTA and the integral elements of a Dutch approach to TRTA.

Chapter four discusses Dutch financial support to TRTA, with a focus on the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This chapter provides an overview of expenditure on TRTA per category and per channel in the period 1992-2002.

Chapter five, which is based on a desk study, is a report on the measurement and assessment of the results of 73 activities in the field of trade policy and administration.

Chapter six, which is based on field studies, measures and assesses the results of TRTA in seven selected cases: four multilateral programmes and three international NGOs/IGOs. In the final sections of the chapter, the results are presented per type of provider and compared with the findings of earlier reviews and evaluations. Types of providers include multilateral programmes versus international NGOs or IGOs, programmes providing assistance to LDCs versus programmes providing assistance to non-LDCs, and integrated programmes versus single-issue programmes. The findings of earlier and other evaluations have been added, with a view to collecting more information on results and to see whether these findings confirm, complement or contradict those of the IOB field studies.

Chapter seven is an assessment of the Dutch approach to TRTA on the basis of the seven selected cases. It describes and assesses the multilateral programmes and international organisations selected for field studies in terms of focus on LDCs, demand-led approaches and ownership, and coordination of agencies and donors. In this way, this chapter also tries to provide plausible explanations of the performance of these programmes and organisations. To determine whether these explanations are unique or not, the appraisals and judgements of other evaluators of these issues and programmes have been added.

2 The WTO as the policy and institutional context of TRTA

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been orchestrating negotiations on the multilateral trade system since 1995. In that year the 47-year-old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) merged into the WTO as the new governing body of international trade². A number of the institutional features of the WTO distinguish this organisation from the GATT and make multilateral trade negotiations comprehensive, complex, critical and cumbersome:

- WTO not only regulates the international trade of goods but also of services and intellectual property.
- WTO is not only a negotiation forum but also a rule-making body and referee in international trade disputes.
- WTO agreements and dispute settlement are binding.
- Membership consists of 148 countries (as per 13 October 2004), of which 46 are low-income countries, 65 are middle-income countries and 37 are high-income countries³.
- Decision-making at the highest authority of the WTO, the Ministerial Conference, is based on consensus and the principle of the 'single undertaking': nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.⁴

The moment suprême of negotiations on the multilateral trade system is the WTO Ministerial Conference, at which the delegates are the representatives of national

2. For an overview of functions and basic principles of the WTO, see Hoekman (2002). For a brief history of agreements on agriculture under GATT and WTO, see Lapperre (2005).

3. This classification is based on the country classification of economies by the World Bank for 2003 (using Gross National Income per capita in USD as the main indicator). There are no WTO definitions of 'developed' or 'developing' countries. Developing countries in the WTO are designated on the basis of self-selection, although this is not necessarily automatically accepted in all WTO bodies. As per 13 October 2004, membership included 32 countries that are listed as Least Developed Country (LDC) by the UN.

4. The Doha Ministerial Declaration states that '...the conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking' (paragraph 47). The WTO's website describes the concept of the single undertaking as: 'Virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'.

governments (WTO ministers). The conference is prepared in many venues. At the WTO secretariat, agreements are drafted by committees and working groups. National governments (called capitals) and their representatives at the WTO (called delegates) prepare negotiation positions – often forming coalitions with other countries. Since the start of the WTO in 1995, there have been five WTO Ministerial Conferences. At the close of three of them (Singapore 1996, Geneva 1998, Doha 2001) a ministerial declaration was adopted⁵. At the other two conferences (Seattle 1999, Cancún 2003), no consensus could be reached on the agenda and working programme to be adopted.

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section is about the integration agenda of the WTO and its ministerial conferences as the international policy context of TRTA to developing countries. The second section describes the increase in the demand and supply of TRTA as related to the integration agenda and institutional features of the WTO. The third section presents the objectives, channelling and co-ordination of TRTA by multilateral agencies and bilateral donors, together with the fundamental and practical concerns of developing countries. In the fourth section, some conclusions are drawn.

2.1 The integration agenda of the WTO, other agendas and the role of TRTA

The mission of the WTO is to liberalise international trade within a rule-based system, not to alleviate poverty. However, with a view to strengthening the multilateral trade system, the WTO is concerned about the marginalisation of LDCs. In fact, WTO members are firmly committed to measures directed at integrating developing countries – particularly LDCs – into the multilateral trading system. Integration is considered to be not so much a panacea as a precondition or process that may enable reduction of poverty⁶. During the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trade system was not on the agenda⁷. The commitment to stimulate such integration became a distinctive feature of the new series of negotiations on the multilateral trade system after the establishment of the WTO.

5. The Ministerial Declaration of the WTO is basically a letter of intent, a commitment to make an effort, adopted at the WTO Ministerial Conference. In legal terms, this declaration can be described as soft law. Its adoption, however, is certainly not without significance, as the WTO members make up over 70 percent of all countries of the world (as per October 2004) and have undertaken to continue working on the liberalisation of trade within a rule-based system or have pledged to reject the deployment of protectionism. Furthermore, the declaration is a general terms of reference for establishing legally binding agreements on specific trade disciplines and for drafting action plans as a follow-up to the declaration.

The declaration of the first WTO Ministerial Conference (Singapore 1996) contains a special paragraph on marginalisation, in which representatives of national governments (referred to as WTO ministers) declared their commitment to addressing the problem of the marginalisation of LDCs and promised to continue to work for improved coordination between the WTO and other agencies in providing technical assistance to these countries. In a special paragraph on LDCs, the WTO ministers agreed to foster an integrated approach to assisting LDCs to enhance their trade opportunities. In the same paragraph they agreed on the principle of positive discrimination of LDCs (phrased as ‘positive measures on an autonomous basis’) and made a commitment to giving operational content to a Plan of Action for LDCs by providing favourable market access conditions for the products of LDCs. As a follow-up of the first Ministerial Conference, a High-Level Meeting on LDCs was held in Geneva in 1997. The two items on the agenda were market access and trade-related technical assistance. The discussion on trade-related technical assistance and the need to coordinate this assistance led to the establishment of a new multi-agency and multi-donor programme in 1997: the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs (see 6.2).

The second WTO Ministerial Conference (Geneva 1998) confirmed the need to address the marginalisation of LDCs. The WTO ministers declared they ‘remain deeply concerned over the marginalisation of least-developed countries and certain small economies and recognise the urgent need to address this issue’. The initiatives taken by the WTO and other agencies to implement in an integrated manner the Plan of Action for LDCs as agreed in Singapore and further discussed at the High-Level Meeting in Geneva in 1997, were ‘welcomed’.

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6. In 1996 WTO ministers agreed on the following text for their joint declaration: ‘The integration of developing countries in the multilateral trade system is important for their economic development and economic expansion’. Five years later they cautiously declared that ‘International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic development and poverty alleviation’. Multilateral agencies demonstrated a much firmer belief in trade as a tool to address poverty. The heads of ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP and WTO, for instance, jointly declared trade to be ‘the best way to tackle world poverty’ (Powell 2002: 10). Academia and policy analysts have refrained from sweeping statements, arguing instead that the relationships between trade liberalisation, international trade, economic growth and poverty alleviation are complex, not unilateral, and subject to controversy. According to Harvard economist Rodrik (2002), ‘Greater trade openness is generally associated with higher economic growth, although both the direction of the causality and the measurement of “openness” continue to be debated. What can be said with relative certainty, though, is that in recent years no country has developed successfully by turning its back on international trade and long term capital flows’ (p. 9). Referring explicitly to the poor instead of poverty, Solignac Lecomte (Development Centre of OECD) concludes that ‘There is no clear-cut answer as to whether, on the whole, trade liberalisation is beneficial or detrimental for the poor [...] On the whole though, open economies tend to achieve greater growth performance and trade liberalisation has been a key element of policies that successfully reduced poverty’ (2002: 1).
7. In his dissertation entitled ‘Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round’ Koekkoek (1989: 42) notes that ‘The integration of developing countries into the GATT system does not feature separately on the agenda of the Uruguay Round’.

The third Ministerial Conference (Seattle 1999) failed to reach consensus, but at the fourth (Doha 2001) WTO ministers agreed ‘to seek to place the needs and interests [of developing countries] at the heart of the Working Programme adopted in this Declaration’. The declaration of this conference, generally known as the Doha Development Agenda, is considered to be ‘the most ambitious attempt to date to move the issue of development to the core of the multilateral trading system’ (EC 2002: 16). The WTO ministers agreed to ‘continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. In this context enhanced market access, balanced rules and well-targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity building programmes have important roles to play’. In a special paragraph on LDCs, the WTO ministers declared ‘We recognise that the integration of LDCs in the multilateral trading system requires meaningful market access, support for the diversification of their production and export base, and trade-related technical assistance and capacity building’. It appears that two policy instruments are considered to be of great importance for integrating LDCs in the multilateral trading system and securing developing countries a share in the growth of world trade: enhanced or meaningful market access, and trade-related technical assistance and capacity building. The Doha Declaration includes 12 references to technical assistance and capacity building, of which eight are in relation to the Singapore issues (see Box 2.1), two are in the paragraph on LDCs, and is in one in the opening statements. In a special paragraph on technical cooperation and capacity building it is confirmed that, ‘technical cooperation and capacity building are core elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system’.

Summing up, the integration agenda of the WTO consists of three levels. At each level the concept of integration is not explicitly defined but used in a loose way to refer to the following three processes and approaches that include the use of the instrument of TRTA:

- I. The integration of developing countries, particularly the least developed ones, in the multilateral trading system as a desirable process and general objective.
- II. Concerted action or combined use of instruments to integrate developing countries, particularly the least developed ones, in the multilateral trading system. TRTA is one of the instruments, the others being diversification of the production and export base, enhanced market access and balanced rules.

III. The integrated approach to the use of the instrument of TRTA. At this point the declarations underline the importance of improved coordination of the supply of TRTA to developing countries, particularly the least developed ones, and encourage multilateral agencies to take the lead in this.

The ministerial declarations of the WTO give much room for negotiation and different interpretations. They do not specify the relative weight, relationship or sequencing of increased participation of the WTO, the implementation of WTO agreements, or increasing the share of developing countries in the growth of the world market. Neither do the declarations explain how to develop a combined strategy, nor which strategy or instrument is pivotal or should be used first under what circumstances. The texts underline the importance of improved coordination of the supply of TRTA but do not provide instructions on the use of demand-led approaches. Neither is ownership of TRTA defined. Finally, one overarching question remains unanswered at all levels of integration: integration on whose terms?

TRTA as a political commodity

Discussion on TRTA is part of the negotiations on the multilateral trade system. As such, commitments to TRTA are not a matter of sending teachers or consultants in the first place but of sending trade diplomats, donors and multilateral agencies, who make proposals and defining the need to provide TRTA. It is precisely because it is trade-related that this technical assistance is not merely a technical affair but has become a political commodity, together with proposals to improve market access and to design balanced rules (Powell 2002: 6). Because of the principle of the single undertaking of the WTO Ministerial Conference, the making or confirmation of commitments of WTO ministers to the provision of TRTA greatly depends on whether or not consensus is reached about the critical and complex dossiers of market access and balanced rules. At the same time, the offer of TRTA is also used to try to achieve agreement on these dossiers. A final implication of the status of TRTA as a political commodity is that the results of earlier conferences indirectly affect the likelihood of the commitments to TRTA being confirmed, or new commitments emerging. These mechanisms have largely determined whether or not high-level political commitments have been made to TRTA at WTO ministerial conferences (see Box 2.1).

Box 2.1 TRTA as a tool and result of multilateral trade negotiations

At the first Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Singapore, developed countries proposed to start negotiations on the issues of competition, investment, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. Many developing countries, however, were not really certain it was in their interest to start negotiations on these issues. The offer of TRTA was used by developed countries as a bargaining chip to nudge developing countries into agreeing to begin negotiations on these so-called 'Singapore issues' (see Duran 2003: 6).⁸ Developing countries accepted the proposed ministerial declaration reluctantly.

At the second Ministerial Conference in Geneva (1998) a number of developing countries expressed serious concern about the lack of capacity in their countries to implement earlier agreements. In spite of these concerns, the ministerial declaration was adopted in the presence of world political leaders celebrating the 50th anniversary of the multilateral trade system.

At the third Ministerial Conference (Seattle 1999) the concerns of developing countries could no longer be adequately addressed. The conference did not result in a ministerial declaration and in that respect was considered to be an outright failure. Developing countries believed that proposals from industrialised countries to review their agricultural policies and open their markets were not drastic enough.

At the fourth Ministerial Conference (Doha 2001) a major effort was made to address the concerns of developing countries. It was declared that the needs and interests of developing countries are 'at the heart' of the proposed working programme. Taking into account the criticism of developing countries raised during the last two conferences, the WTO ministers agreed the following: to provide special and differential treatment for developing countries (giving developing countries more time to implement earlier WTO/GATT agreements), to enhance access of LDCs to western markets, and to improve the coordination of technical assistance, in particular to LDCs.

8. In Singapore the future working programme of the WTO was defined to include four new issues: investment, competition, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation.

Box 2.1 Continued

The concerns of developing countries about the timely implementation of WTO agreements in their countries were partly assuaged by the agreements on special and differential treatment (SDT) and the political commitment of bilateral donors and multilateral agencies to provide technical assistance to developing countries, in particular LDCs. Technical assistance was proposed as a new element of SDT, which had traditionally been directed at exempting developing countries from GATT rules and obligations (see Michalopoulos 2000; Sally 2002).

The fifth Ministerial Conference (Cancún 2003) fell apart and no declaration was adopted. Earlier and comprehensive commitments to TRTA made at Doha were not confirmed, let alone deepened and elaborated.

Sources: WTO Ministerial Declarations of Singapore (1996), Geneva (1998) and Doha (2001); Duran 2003

Other agendas on TRTA

The ministerial declarations of the WTO show that TRTA occupies a very prominent position on the integration agenda. What they do not show is the co-existence of different more or less unofficial views of individual stakeholders on the rationality or strategic importance of TRTA.

Some WTO officials and consultants say that TRTA is meant to sustain the status quo and to divert attention from the fundamental issue. They believe that if the developing countries' market access to the EU, USA and Japan does not structurally improve, TRTA is meaningless. In their eyes, TRTA is a distraction or pacifier. Some staff of Geneva-based NGOs as alternative providers of TRTA believe that regardless of what the hidden agenda of donor countries or multilateral agencies might be, developing countries could grasp the offer of TRTA/CB as a means of reducing their lack of knowledge, preparing their negotiation positions and effectively defending their interests. Some bilateral donors believe that developing countries will only be taken seriously in multilateral trade negotiations if and when they use TRTA to strengthen their capacity to implement earlier agreements and to address the Singapore issues, by so doing attracting foreign investors, stimulating businesses, and increasing their trade capacity.

Related to this, there are contrasting views about what is appropriate knowledge and what should be the main purpose of provision of technical assistance. Should the main purpose be to explain the rules of the game of the multilateral trade system to developing countries with a view to enabling them to (better) implement these rules? Or should the purpose be to help developing countries to better understand the rules, with a view to enabling them to discuss, change or even break these rules to their advantage? Some WTO officials say that unless there is a critical understanding of the WTO and room to discuss the rules of the multilateral trading system from the outset, TRTA will only be functional to mainstream developing countries in the system and will keep them subservient to the system, not enable them to change it in their favour. In this light, they question whether agencies like the World Bank, EU and even the WTO are the most appropriate agencies to provide TRTA, given their trade policies, trade interests or technical approach to TRTA. Critical observers have concluded that one of the most high-profile multilateral TRTA programmes, the Integrated Framework, is just another tool of the World Bank to implement its new trade policies, rather than an emancipatory tool in the hands of LDCs (Powell 2002).

Finally, some donors promote TRTA with a view to furthering non-trade concerns and interests. For instance, in a special information note to the members of committee 133, the Directorate General for Trade of the EU has proposed using TRTA as a tool of impression management, following the approach of the US. In the same note, the EU refers to the political-strategic stance of the USTR in using TRTA as a facilitator/leverage to achieve US trade goals⁹:

If we look at the commitments reported for the year 2001 in the TCDBB the figure reported by the EU (Community and Member States) is of US \$ 466.6, against the commitments of the USA reported to be US \$ 555.9. According to our assessment these figures do not represent the 'real' figure. One reason is that EU figures, for different reasons, are under-reported whereas the US used quite an extensive interpretation of trade related assistance in its reporting, managing to reach a high level of commitment [...] The US is [...] building up an offensive media campaign to show their activism in this field. [...] Given that the next report will be made public right before the Cancún Ministerial Conference, the Commission attaches great importance to the way the EU will appear to the

9. The evaluation report of USAID programmes to build trade capacity concluded that 'Country allocations appear to be heavily influenced by US international political interests rather than the quality of a country's economic environment' (2004: 2).

world as far as provision of trade related assistance is concerned.

The purpose of this Information Note is to raise your awareness to take steps which will allow the EU (EC and Member States) to have a fairer representation on the database (EC 2003).

2.2 The WTO and the need for and supply of TRTA

The demand for and supply of TRTA are largely shaped by institutional features and declarations of the WTO. The broad scope of issues and the principle of the single undertaking have contributed to an increase in the demand for TRTA. WTO ministerial conferences marked the beginning of new multilateral initiatives.

The need for TRTA

As the supply of and demand for TRTA are part of multilateral trade negotiations, it is difficult to identify the real need for TRTA. This is further complicated by the developing countries' lack of human resources to participate in WTO meetings in Geneva (Michalopoulos 1998).

This said, it can be noted that developing countries have repeatedly tried to voice their worries at WTO ministerial conferences in practical terms, referring to basic problems hampering their integration into the multilateral trade system: lack of capacity to implement GATT/WTO agreements, obstacles to efforts of LDCs to expand international trade, and lack of funds to increase this capacity and remove these obstacles. In negotiations with bilateral donors and multilateral agencies, developing countries have emphasised their need for huge sums of money and TRTA to address their supply-side constraints (WTO 1997: 7):

- problems related to physical infrastructure (internal transportation, shipping, air transport, ports, warehousing, telecommunications);
- problems related to institutional capacity (quality control, customs);
- inadequate foreign and domestic investment, particularly in productive sectors.

Overcoming supply-side constraints would both increase the capacity to implement GATT/WTO agreements and lead to expansion of trade. From this perspective, developing countries and also World Bank staff and donors (such as the Netherlands) have proposed that donors have to accept the obligation to provide TRTA directed at strengthening institutional capacity (quality control, customs), if and when developing countries are bound to implement GATT/WTO agreements but lack the capacity to do so (see Hoekman 2002).

As an independent observer, Kostecki (2002) believes that ‘The multilateral trading system cannot function properly without technical assistance. The needs are enormous and they are likely to grow’.¹⁰ He explains that ‘What was sufficient for the old GATT is not enough for the WTO with its enlarged scope of issues, complex negotiations and a trend towards a quasi-universal membership’ (p.11). The principle of the single undertaking implies that members have to implement all agreements. As stated above, developing countries, particularly LDCs, have experienced difficulties with timely implementation. TRTA is considered to be a prerequisite for facilitating implementation.

The WTO secretariat has reported that ‘Since 1995, WTO TA activities have grown by 660% - from 79 activities to over 600 activities requested for 2002’ (WTO 2003: 7).¹¹ In 2003 the WTO received more than one thousand requests for assistance, 441 of which were included in the Technical Assistance Plan of the WTO of 2003 (WTO 2004: 3). With a view to realising a ‘geographical balance’ of its TRTA portfolio and because it was simply unable to meet all requests, the WTO secretariat has rationed its supply of TRTA: no more than three activities per LDC and no more than two activities per developing country. According to the WTO ‘The WTO’s technical assistance is principally provided to government officials of beneficiary countries who have specific responsibilities with regard to the implementation of WTO Agreements’ (WTO website 2002). This suggests that the needs of developing countries for assistance to address implementation problems are large and have grown enormously since the start of the WTO.

The new supply of TRTA by multilateral agencies

The two WTO ministerial conferences that are generally considered to have been the most successful are the first (Singapore 1996) and fourth (Doha 2001). In both cases an ambitious Ministerial Declaration was adopted. In both cases the agreement to provide technical assistance to developing countries, in particular LDCs, was a key element of the Ministerial Declaration. The commitment to the instrument of TRTA at both conferences marked the beginning of new initiatives

10. The observation that the multilateral trading system cannot function properly without technical assistance has a wider significance: all WTO members, whether developed or developing countries, that want to sustain and profit from a rule-based multilateral trade system, have a shared interest in meeting developing countries’ needs for technical assistance.

11. The bulk of the technical assistance of the WTO consists of short-term technical missions, regional workshops and national seminars (WTO 2002). An internal audit reported that, ‘WTO’s TA is by definition short-term and highly fragmented’ (WTO 2002: 9). Description of a random sample of activities showed that ‘In 75 per cent of the cases, the duration of the TA was between 2 and 3 days’ (WTO 2003: 4).

in the field of TRTA and gave an enormous boost to the supply of TRTA. In both instances the call for coordination of the supply of TRTA was also very loud and widely shared. Multilateral agencies were considered to play a key and innovative role in this. Political commitments at Singapore and Doha spawned new generations of TRTA and high expectations of multilateral programmes in particular.

The first WTO Ministerial Conference and its follow-up High-Level Meeting in Geneva led to the establishment of a multi-agency and multi-donor programme in 1997: the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries. In 2001 WTO ministers declared that ‘We endorse the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries (IF) as a viable model for LDC’s trade development’. At a meeting of heads of ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP and the WTO in June 2002, trade was described as the ‘best way to tackle poverty’ and ‘at the heart of this’ lies the IF (UNCTAD 2002). In the same year the WTO presented the Integrated Framework as one of the core elements of its comprehensive technical assistance strategy and the best response to the challenge posed by the LDCs and other low-income economies (WTO 2002: 3)¹². The Director-General of the WTO reported to the Ministerial Conference of 2003, held in Cancún, that ‘[The IF] can be considered the principal mechanism for LDCs to integrate priority national trade policy objectives, and related assistance needs to overcome obstacles to achieving these objectives, into national development plans such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)’ (WTO 2004: 7). In 2001 the heads of the six multilateral agencies of IF had adopted the objective of mainstreaming trade into PRSPs (WTO 2001), proposing that high priority should be given to the formulation and implementation of pro-poor trade policies in LDCs.

Another follow-up to the call for coordination of TRTA at the first WTO conference was the launching of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme to Selected Least Developed and Other African Countries (JITAP) in 1998. This multilateral programme of ITC, UNCTAD and WTO was presented as the ‘most high profile technical assistance programme in the world’ (Haefliger et al. 2000), an ‘innovative approach to technical assistance’ and a ‘path-breaking effort’ to address the problems of least-developed and other poorer developing countries in

12. ‘The 49 LDCs have priority focus. They have the most urgent and acute trade development needs. They constitute the real challenges for the WTO. The WTO has significant contributions to make to LDC’s trade development, but on its own cannot meet the full complexity of that challenge. This is why the Integrated Framework, chaired by the WTO, is the best response to the challenge posed by the LDCs and other low income economies’ (WTO TA Plan 2003: 16).

their relations with the MTS (De Silva and Weston 2002). In 2004 the Director-General of the WTO described JITAP as ‘a major capacity-building programme put in place by WTO, UNCTAD and ITC to address trade-related capacity constraints of African countries’ (WTO 2004: 8).

The fourth WTO Ministerial Conference led to the establishment of the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund (DDAGTF) to finance the Technical Assistance and Training Programme (TATP) of the WTO. As a follow-up to the Ministerial Conference, the WTO and OECD took the initiative of jointly establishing the Doha Development Agenda Trade Capacity Building Database (TCBDB). The main objectives of this database included transparency of TRTA delivered, minimisation and/or avoidance of duplication, and coordination and coherence.¹³

It should be added that the failure of WTO ministerial conferences (like those of Seattle and Cancún) to adopt a declaration has not deterred member countries from jointly taking inter-governmental initiatives, circumventing the constraints of the single undertaking. An example is the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL). This inter-governmental organisation was launched by Colombia and the Netherlands at the WTO Ministerial Conference of Seattle in 1999. A selection of WTO members, comprising OECD countries as well as developing countries, joined the ACWL (see 6.2).

2.3 Objectives, channels and coordination of TRTA

There are over one hundred providers of TRTA, including multilateral agencies, regional organisations, bilateral donors, NGOs and research institutes. Together, they finance thousands of activities per year in over a hundred countries, both LDCs and non-LDCs. This section provides a general overview of official objectives, priority channels and plans to co-ordinate the TRTA of these providers, focusing on multilateral agencies and bilateral donors.¹⁴

13. At the WTO Ministerial Conference of Doha in 2001, WTO ministers pointed at ‘the critical importance of coherence and coordination at three different levels: at the national level in beneficiary countries, at the international level, at the inter-agency level’ (DAC/OECD 2001: 2).

14. WTO/OECD reported 2,500 new commitments of TRTA/CB in 2001 from a total of 21 bilateral donor countries and seven multilateral agencies. In July 2003, the database of the WTO/OECD contained over 8,000 activities for 2001, 2002 and early 2003, provided by 28 bilateral donor countries and 11 multilateral agencies (WTO/OECD 2003: 1 and 10). The WTO electronic overview of providers of technical assistance lists 22 multilateral and 20 regional organisations (Guide to source of trade-related technical assistance). The study by Meeldijk (2004) of the knowledge networks of WTO delegates in Geneva, includes a review of 10 organisations. A number of NGOs and research institutes providing technical assistance to representatives of developing countries are based in Brussels, Washington, Nairobi and other capital cities of OECD and non-OECD countries.

Objectives of providers of TRTA

In their joint report (2002) the WTO and OECD defined TRTA/CB as ‘activities that intend to enhance the ability of the recipient country to:

- formulate and implement a trade development strategy and create an enabling environment for increasing the volume and value-added of exports, diversifying export products and markets and increasing foreign investment to generate jobs and trade; or
- stimulate trade by domestic firms and encourage investment in trade-oriented industries; or
- participate in and benefit from the institutions, negotiations and processes that shape national trade policy and the rules and practices of international commerce’.¹⁵

In its Guidelines on Strengthening Trade Capacity for Development (2001) OECD/DAC defines trade capacity building as follows: ‘Trade capacity building enhances the ability of partner country policy-makers, enterprises and civil society actors, to:

- collaborate in formulating and implementing a trade development strategy that is embedded in a broader national development strategy;
- strengthen trade policy and institutions - as the basis for reforming import regimes, increasing the volume and value-added exports, diversifying export products and markets and increasing foreign investment to generate jobs and exports;
- participate in - and benefit from - the institutions, negotiations and processes that shape national trade policy and the rules and practices of international commerce’ (p. 13).

The definition and aims of trade capacity building as given by the DAC are very similar to the definition and aims of TRTA/CB as given by the WTO/OECD, but with three important differences: firstly, the DAC explicitly refers to the role of policymakers, entrepreneurs and other actors from the midfield of civil society in achieving the desired aims; secondly, the DAC aims differ in their emphasis on embedding a trade strategy in a broader development strategy (this is also known as mainstreaming); the third difference is that the DAC emphasises the

15. The guidelines of the WTO/OECD database on how to select TRTA/CB activities include two extra criteria: ‘a) Trade-related technical assistance/capacity building is explicitly promoted in activity documentation; and b) The activity contains specific measures to develop trade policy and regulations, enhance the ability of enterprises to participate in international trade, or increase national capacity to participate in the multilateral trading system’.

strengthening of trade policy and of institutions, whereas the WTO/OECD definition emphasises the promotion of trade. DAC describes the strengthening of policy and of institutions as being ‘the basis’ for increasing and diversifying exports.

Comparing the objectives of the support of 18 bilateral donors to TRTR/CB as formulated in 2002 with those formulated by the WTO/OECD in the same year leads to the following observations:

- Seven donors (the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the UK, Sweden and Switzerland) wish to contribute to mainstreaming trade into plans for national development and poverty reduction, or aim to strengthen the capacities of developing countries to develop a coherent trade strategy within the framework of an overall poverty-oriented development strategy; 11 bilateral donors lack an objective to do with enhancing the ability of the recipient country to formulate and implement a trade development strategy.
- Five donors wish to address supply-side constraints (trade-related infrastructure, enabling environment, investment environment) or strengthen the competitiveness of developing countries; four donors (the Netherlands, France, Norway and Sweden) wish to improve the export capacities of developing countries; three donors wish to use TRTA/CB to strengthen small- and medium-sized enterprises; six bilateral donors lack an objective to do with stimulating trade by domestic firms and encouraging investment in trade-oriented industries.
- Twelve donors (the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the UK and USA) have an objective that is directed at strengthening of negotiation capacity of developing countries or at the increased use of the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. Six bilateral donors lack such an objective.

Bilateral donors have defined their own specific set of objectives, reflecting their own views on what developing countries need most or first in order to integrate into the world economy. The set of objectives of TRTA/CB as jointly defined by WTO and OECD (2002) offers a summary statement of the specific objectives of bilateral donors. This set also shows that in 2002 the objectives of two thirds of 18 of the bilateral donors included strengthening of trade capacity and strengthening of negotiation capacity. One third of these 18 bilateral donors aimed to increase the ability of developing countries to formulate and implement a trade policy strategy.

Channels and coordination

In the ministerial declarations of the WTO, neither the multilateral nor the bilateral channel has been a priori considered to be the most strategic or the principal channel. Instead, ever since the very first ministerial conference of the WTO in 1996, the need to coordinate technical assistance of bilateral donors and multilateral agencies has been repeatedly emphasised.

Though not aimed at the coordination of bilateral programmes, since 1997 the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs (IF) and the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Program to African countries (JITAP) have consistently been promoted as the multi-donor and multi-agency programmes for improving the coordination of TRTA. Coordination of delivery of technical assistance has been defined as one of the two main objectives of the IF (see WTO 2003: 7).

The first of the seven broad objectives of the New WTO Strategy for Technical Cooperation as formulated in 2002, is to ‘coordinate effectively with key development partners to enable countries and customs territories, beneficiaries of WTO technical assistance, to participate and integrate more meaningfully in the multilateral trading system, in order to increase incomes for growth, poverty reduction and development’ (WTO 2002: 1).

Though the commitments of bilateral donors to multilateral providers of TRTA/CB formed only a small fraction of the total commitments of bilateral donors to TRTA/CB in 2001 and 2002, WTO/OECD concluded that for these years ‘Multilateral agencies and programmes are the main TRTA/CB channels for most donors’ (2002: 1). Unfortunately, the report does not specify the number of donors. A similar conclusion was drawn in the report of 2003, but then WTO/OECD referred to ‘many donors’ instead of ‘most donors’ – again without specifying the numbers (WTO/OECD 2003: 11).¹⁶

In both reports it is noted that ‘some donors such as the EC, Canada, Japan, the UK and the US also have substantial bilateral programmes’. In addition, it is

16. The commitments of bilateral donors to multilateral TRTA/CB providers (WTO, IF, ITC and JITAP) amounted to USD 23.3 million in 2001, or 8.7 percent of the total of commitments of bilateral donors to trade policy and regulations in that year (WTO/OECD 2002: 10). In 2002, these commitments amounted to USD 30.2 million, or 11.1 percent of the total of commitments of bilateral donors to trade policy and regulation (WTO/OECD 2003: 10) in that year. The contribution of bilateral donors to multilateral providers as a percentage of total amounts committed by bilateral donors to trade development and trade policy and regulations was 2.5 percent in 2001 and 2.6 percent in 2002.

observed that ‘Some other donors, e.g. France and Germany, have created new bilateral programmes for TRTA/CB since Doha’.¹⁷ These were the largest seven donors of TRTA/CB in the period 2001-2002, according to data collected by the WTO/OECD. They also happen to include three top economic powers of the world that have traditionally been very active as major stakeholders defending their trade interests at multilateral trade negotiations: EU, USA and Japan.

Concerns of developing countries

Being dependent on donor money for TRTA and capacity building, many developing countries have taken a low-profile position on the issue of multilateral versus bilateral programmes. They generally point at their lack of funds and human resources to implement GATT/WTO agreements or participate actively in multilateral negotiations of the WTO.

Not only developing countries but also critical observers (including researchers, NGO staff and donors) have expressed their concern about new multilateral programmes intended to improve the coordination of the supply of TRTA both in practical and fundamental terms. Donors and NGO staff have warned that the human resources of developing countries, in particular LDCs, to handle multi-agency capacity-building programmes are limited (Duran 2003, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003). LDCs have indicated that they find it difficult to commit their limited time and resources to integrated TRTA programmes that are directed at the formulation and implementation of pro-poor trade policies at country level but do not immediately lead to the funding of concrete projects or the construction of physical trade infrastructure. They have also expressed their concern that such programmes will not be sufficient to address issues of growth and poverty reduction if they continue to face barriers to their products in industrial and developing countries (WTO 2000: 16).

17. On the basis of data collected by WTO/OECD on commitments of TRTA/CB by donors in 2001 and 2002, the following observations can be made: the EC is the largest donor of all multilateral agencies, committing USD 700 to 800 million per year to TRTA/CB. The USA is the largest bilateral donor, committing USD 500 to 600 million to TRTA/CB per year. France, Germany and the UK rank second, each committing USD 75 to 100 million per year. Canada and Japan rank third, each committing about USD 50 million per year.

2.4 Conclusions

The integration agenda of the WTO and the role of TRTA

1. Almost all the members of the WTO consider TRTA to be a key instrument – along with enhanced market access and balanced rules – for helping developing countries, particularly LDCs, to integrate into the multilateral trade system. Integration refers to increased participation in the multilateral trading system, the implementation of GATT/WTO agreements, and increasing or securing a share in the growth of the world market and/or in the multilateral system.
2. To contribute to integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system, WTO membership proposes (a) combined or integrated use of different instruments (including enhanced market access, balanced rules and TRTA) and (b) the coordination of the supply of TRTA through integrated programmes.

WTO and the supply and demand of TRTA

3. The WTO principle of the single undertaking ('nothing has been agreed until everything has been agreed') has politicised the supply and demand of TRTA. TRTA has become a political commodity at multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO, next to proposals on market access and balanced rules.
4. Institutional features of the WTO created the need for TRTA: the broad scope of issues and the package deals resulting from the WTO principle of the 'single undertaking', have contributed to an increase of the demand for TRTA. The WTO also created the new multilateral supply of TRTA: high-level commitments to the use of TRTA at WTO ministerial conferences marked the beginning of joint integrated programmes and trust funds of multilateral agencies in the field of TRTA (such as IF, JITAP and DDAGTF).
5. With a view to improving the coordination and coherence of the supply of TRTA/CB, the WTO secretariat and OECD set up a database of annual commitments of bilateral donors and multilateral agencies to TRTA/CB. To this end, these two agencies have together provided a comprehensive definition of TRTA/CB as activities that are intended to enhance one of the following abilities of a recipient country:

- the ability to formulate and implement a trade development strategy and create an enabling environment for increasing the volume and value-added of exports, diversifying export products and markets and increasing foreign investment to generate jobs and trade;
- the ability to stimulate trade by domestic firms and encourage investment in trade-oriented industries;
- the ability to participate, negotiate and benefit from institutions, negotiations and processes that shape national trade policy and the rules and practices of international commerce

Single undertakings of bilateral donors

6. The WTO principle of the 'single undertaking' has not ruled out bilateral TRTA programmes and initiatives outside the realm of WTO. These programmes and initiatives have given bilateral donors the room to set their own priorities and pursue specific sets of objectives reflecting:
 - their own views on trade and development or on what developing countries need most or first in order to integrate into the world economy;
 - non-trade concerns, including food safety but also political/strategic considerations for allocating TRTA, or;
 - the aim to correct, complement or improve the WTO (an example being the initiative of the Netherlands – together with Colombia – to start the Advisory Centre on WTO Law).

The seven largest donors of TRTA (USA, Canada, Japan, EU, and three EU member states) have substantial bilateral programmes or have started new ones since the WTO Ministerial Conference of Doha, where it was agreed to improve coordination and stimulate joint efforts.

Concerns of developing countries

7. Ever since the first WTO ministerial conference, developing countries have pointed out their limited capacities to implement GATT/WTO agreements on time and their supply-side constraints to increasing their market share of world trade.
8. The lack of human resources in developing countries, in particular in LDCs has hampered their participation in WTO meetings in Geneva, their ability to provide timely input to these meetings and to address their concerns.

9. LDCs have expressed their concern that the formulation and implementation of a pro-poor trade policy will not alone be sufficient to address the issues of growth and of poverty reduction if they continue to face barriers to their products in both the industrial and developing countries. LDCs find it difficult to commit their limited time and resources to TRTA that is directed at the formulation of pro-poor trade policies at country level but does not immediately lead to the funding of concrete projects or the construction of physical trade infrastructure.

3 Dutch policies on integrating developing countries into the multilateral trade system

The Minister of Economic Affairs or the Minister for Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Economic Affairs reports to the Dutch parliament on the Netherlands points of departure and the concerns the Netherlands wishes to see addressed at the WTO Ministerial Conference. The Ministry of Economic Affairs presents the Netherlands' policy position on trade at the weekly meetings of Committee 133 of the European Council. This committee assists the European Commission in formulating its trade policy and preparing the EU's strategy at the Ministerial Conference. The Ministry of Economic Affairs also coordinates the weekly interministerial consultations in The Hague to discuss and decide on the Dutch position on trade policy to be presented in Brussels.

As the Netherlands is an EU member state, it has limited scope to voice its own views at the WTO Ministerial Conference because trade is a part of the exclusive competence of the European Union. In principle, the EU speaks with one voice at the WTO Ministerial Conferences (see House of Representatives 25074, 21 October 1996, no. 1, p. 1). However, 'trade and development' is a mixed competence, meaning that both the European Union and the individual member states have a mandate and can present their own views at the Ministerial Conference. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken this mandate very seriously, and from the very start of the new round of negotiations has challenged the dividing line between trade and development and has argued that every trade issue is a development issue. Former Minister for Development Cooperation Eveline Herfkens described this as 'mainstreaming' development into trade. The current development minister, Agnes van Ardenne, has urged her colleagues to follow her example and actively participate in WTO Ministerial Conferences. The Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained to the Dutch parliament that 'the government considers expansion of trade as a result of the reduction of trade barriers as the most powerful tool of developing countries in their fight against poverty' (2003). Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents itself as the main

actor in and most generous supporter of TRTA/CB (trade-related technical assistance/capacity building) to developing countries and LDCs in particular (DGIS 2001, WTO/OECD 2002).

In 1999, after consultations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, the Minister for Foreign Trade formulated four objectives for the Dutch government with regard to further development of the multilateral trade system for the new round of negotiations at the WTO (House of Representatives 25074, no. 12, pp. 3-8, 28 May 1999):

- I. Strengthening the WTO
- II. Further trade liberalisation
- III. Further integration of developing countries
- IV. Acknowledgement and elaboration of cross-cutting issues at the interface of trade and other policy domains (environment, labour standards, animal welfare, health, consumer concerns, food safety).

In 2002 the Minister of Economic Affairs explained to the Dutch parliament that the Netherlands' ambitious proposals to drastically reform the EU's protectionist agricultural policy are not widely supported. Indeed, on this issue, the Netherlands is part of a minority group of member states. The minister also informed parliament that traditionally, the interests of developing countries have been lower on the EU's agenda than in the Netherlands (House of Representatives 25074, no. 68, p. 6). As regards the issue of trade and food safety, the Netherlands does not intend to take a divergent position within the EU: 'The international and EU frameworks are decisive for the Netherlands' approach to non-tariff trade barriers' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, 2003: 51, our translation).

This chapter will not focus on Dutch negotiations on trade in the EU or on how the Netherlands proposes to contribute to the objectives of strengthening the WTO, furthering trade liberalisation, and acknowledging and elaborating cross-cutting issues. Instead, it concentrates on the Netherlands' objective of further integrating developing countries into the multilateral trade system, presenting trade liberalisation and the WTO (as the director of the rule-based multilateral trade system) as a means of contributing to this. It spells out the different ways in which the concept of integration is used, the different Dutch approaches discernable on how to further the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trade system, and the role TRTA can be expected to play.

3.1 The Netherlands' integration agenda and the role of TRTA

Ever since the start of the WTO and the new round of multilateral trade negotiations, the Dutch government has committed itself to the further integration of developing countries into the world trade system. In her debriefing to the House of Representatives on the first WTO Ministerial Conference, the then Minister for Foreign Trade, Anneke van Dok-van Weele, explicitly mentioned that all WTO members – partly under pressure from the Netherlands – underscored the aim of integrating the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) into the world trade system (House of Representatives 25074, no. 8, p. 1). In her report to the second Ministerial Conference in Geneva in 1998, the minister emphasised: 'My intervention during the informal session on implementation was entirely devoted to the importance of integrating developing countries into the world trade system' (House of Representatives 25074, no. 11, p. 5, 15 June 1999). In the run-up to the third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, her successor Gerrit Ybema described the 'further integration of developing countries' as one of the Dutch government's four main objectives with regard to further development of the world trade system (House of Representatives 25074, no. 12, p. 3). Between the fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha in 2001 and the fifth in Cancún in 2003, Minister for Foreign Trade Joop Wijn also specified the 'further integration of developing countries' as one of the four main objectives of Dutch involvement in the WTO talks (House of Representatives 25074, no. 52, p. 4). In the same period, the Ministers of Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs indicated in their joint memorandum on coherence between development cooperation and agricultural policy that the Netherlands has continually insisted that 'the integration of developing countries into the global economy should be one of the main objectives of a new WTO round' (p. 29). At the fifth Ministerial Conference, EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said in a statement on behalf of all EU member states: 'But let us recall that the goal remains the integration of developing countries into the world economy'.

The parliamentary papers on the WTO Ministerial Conferences contain no definition of the integration of developing countries into the global economy of the world trade system. The 1996 Explanatory Memorandum does, however, provide a description of the opposite of integration, or at least of what integration is not: '... in practically all developing countries there is a growing conviction that an externally-oriented development policy can produce results, that it is better to aim for integration into the global economy than protected status' (p. 82).¹⁸ The letter from Gerrit Ybema

18. According to Koekkoek (1989): 'Integration of developing countries into the GATT system requires the progressive application of GATT rules and procedures to developing countries in the same way as they apply in principle to developed countries' (p. 42).

(House of Representatives 25074, 28 May 1999, no. 12, p. 6) also makes it clear what integration is not, and that the opposite of integration is marginalisation. The letter suggests that integration means that developing countries can both participate fully in the activities of the WTO and increase their share of global trade (p. 5).

To contribute to the integration of developing countries, Ybema advocates paying ‘constant attention’ to three points, and further elaborating them (House of Representatives 25074, 28 May 1999, no. 12, pp. 6-7). The points are:

- I. Market access: improving the access of developing countries, especially LDCs, to the markets of the EU and other industrialised countries;
- II. Technical assistance: building up expertise in the field of trade policy in developing countries and coordinating the provision of technical assistance by international organisations, especially for LDCs;
- III. Special and differentiated treatment: being more lenient and granting longer transition periods to various categories of developing countries, especially LDCs, and allowing them to gradually open their markets to prevent congestion problems as they implement their commitments under the Uruguay round.

In the instructions for the Dutch delegation to the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle the following ‘means to allow developing countries and LDCs in particular to benefit from the advantages of international trade and membership of the WTO’ were mentioned: ‘an asymmetric approach to the market access negotiations, elaboration of the concept of Special and Differentiated Treatment, more intensive and better coordinated technical assistance, and better coordination with the efforts of other international organisations, especially the World Bank and the IMF’ (House of Representatives 25074, 12 November 1999, no. 31, p. 5).

Joop Wijn stated that further integration of developing countries into the world trade system must be seen ‘in the context of poverty reduction and strengthening of the international legal order’, adding that ‘the interests of developing countries often run parallel to those of the Netherlands’ (House of Representatives 25074, 2002, no. 52, p. 4). In the context of the ‘development agenda’ Wijn noted that the following would benefit developing countries:

- the further dismantling of the protectionist agricultural policies of the rich countries, and the opening up the markets of developing countries;
- the developing countries themselves taking advantage of their status and of international solidarity to acquire special treatment in the form of unilateral

access to the markets of the rich countries, not by taking refuge behind their protected position but by playing a full part in negotiations and taking initiatives to liberalise; technical assistance and capacity building are required here to ‘make well-balanced decisions’ and find the way to achieve the greatest benefits;¹⁹

- having balanced WTO rules that take account of countries’ level of development and implementation capacity; an ‘appealing theme’ meriting ‘special treatment’ is the impact of protecting intellectual property on public health.

In his instructions to the Dutch delegation to the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún (18 August 2003, House of Representatives 25074, no. 68, p. 2) Minister of Economic Affairs Laurens Jan Brinkhorst stated – in the context of further integration of developing countries into the multilateral rule-based WTO system – that the Netherlands attached great importance to achieving ‘essential results’ in Cancún which would especially stimulate economic growth in developing countries. These included:

- I. Substantial liberalisation within and outside the agricultural sector;
- II. Agreement on TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) and medicines;
- III. Agreement on strengthening existing SDT (Special and Differential Treatment) provisions;
- IV. Trade-related technical assistance.

In summary, in the new round of negotiations, the Dutch government wishes to contribute to the further integration of developing countries, especially the LDCs, by focusing on the following three factors: (1) improving market access, (2) providing technical assistance and capacity building, and (3) drafting balanced rules. Each of these instruments has different aspects. Improving market access entails not only liberalising the agricultural policies of the rich countries but also opening up markets between developing countries. Technical assistance and capacity building mean not only building up expertise in the area of trade policy but also helping developing countries meet existing commitments. Drafting balanced rules means not only taking account of countries’ level of development and implementation capacity, but also increasingly treating developing and developed countries equally in applying WTO rules.

19. In the context of the ‘development agenda’, in his letter to the House of Representatives Wijn refers explicitly to the importance of capacity building as an element of the EU’s ‘positive trade agenda’: ‘Such capacity building must enable developing countries to meet global market requirements in the areas of environment, food security and working conditions’ (House of Representatives 25074, 4-12-2002, no. 52, p. 7).

Returning to the four fundamental objectives of the Dutch government in promoting the multilateral trade system (see above) it can be stated that improving market access for developing countries through trade liberalisation is not only one of the Dutch government's objectives, but is also seen as a means of integrating developing countries into the multilateral trade system. The same applies to drafting balanced rules and strengthening the role of the WTO.

It can also be concluded that integrating developing countries into the world trade system and the global economy has the following significance for the Dutch government: the participation of developing countries in the WTO's activities, complying with the rights and obligations implied by WTO membership, and actively participating in world trade. 'Further' integration means that developing countries are already integrated but – in the eyes of the Dutch government – not enough, and that there are benefits to be had from 'more' integration. Seen in this light, further integration of developing countries means advanced and effective participation, reaping more benefits from their WTO membership and increasing their share of world trade.

In its official publications, the Dutch government argues that working on supply-side constraints and strengthening developing countries' negotiating capacity is a dual challenge (2004: 23). At the same time, different theories are espoused by Dutch ministers and civil servants about which problem is the most serious and needs to be tackled first in order to further integrate developing countries into the global economy.

Three theories and their implications for TRTA

The first theory is based on the assumption that the greatest problems for developing countries, and LDCs in particular, are created by their supply-side constraints. These include the absence of a stimulating national policy environment and investment climate, inadequate support for individual companies, and insufficient production and trade capacity. The idea is that if these countries have nothing to offer on international markets, they cannot make use of or benefit from the opportunities offered by trade liberalisation. The argument is that developing countries without a substantial share of the global market can have no voice or influence in multilateral trade talks.

At the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996, the Netherlands called for LDCs to be supported in expanding and diversifying their exports, so

that these countries could be integrated into the world trade system (Parliamentary papers 25074, no. 8, p. 1, July 1997). The 2002 joint policy memorandum of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on coherence between development cooperation and agricultural policy states that ‘practice shows that the poorest developing countries are often not sufficiently able to benefit from increased possibilities for market access and from the liberalisation of international trade in agricultural products. Development cooperation policy at global, European and bilateral level must therefore help to strengthen the productive and trade capacities of the agricultural sector’ (p. 10, our translation). The two ministries emphasise in the memorandum that, in the case of LDCs, the priority is to tackle the problems on the supply side. The productive and trade capacities of these countries, and especially of agriculture as a potential driver of economic growth and poverty reduction, need to be boosted so that the LDCs can capitalise on their international rights and the opportunities those rights offer. The policy paper (2003) of the present Minister for Development Co-operation, Agnes van Ardenne, takes a similar view, arguing that sustainable poverty alleviation benefits from a strong private sector that is growing steadily. Based on this policy theory, several initiatives have been taken or planned in order to strength the local business climate, the agricultural sector and the capacity to trade (Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities 2003: 24-25).

According to the second theory, the major obstacle to the integration of developing countries into the global economy is their lack of negotiating capacity in multilateral trade talks. Thus, because they do not play a full part in multilateral trade negotiations, their main agricultural products will never have full access to rich countries’ markets. The argument is that as they have no prospect of improved access to these markets, developing countries see no point in expanding their productive and export capacities.

Minister for Development Cooperation Eveline Herfkens has noted the ‘strange phenomenon’ that ‘developing countries are first helped to increase their production, and then their products are excluded from major markets’ (House of Representatives 25074, no. 36, p. 5, 15 June 2000). Herfkens was referring to the lack of coherence between development policy and trade policy. She also stressed the importance of helping developing countries to better defend their interests in the multilateral trade system.

In 1996, Anneke Van Dok-Van Weele pointed out that because of their low level of development, developing countries had insufficient human resources and institutional capacity to ensure that their rights were respected in the WTO.²⁰ The joint memorandum of the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs *Business Against Poverty*, published in September 2002, stated that the Netherlands wishes to contribute to the further integration of developing countries into the global economic system (one of the objectives of the new WTO round) by ‘striving to adjust international agreements in favour of developing countries and by helping these countries to exploit existing and future opportunities more effectively. To achieve this, these countries must be able above all to take a full part in the trade talks. Despite the fact that as many as 112 of the 137 WTO member states are developing countries, they have so far been unable to defend their interests as effectively as the industrialised nations’ (p. 26, italics added). The document drawn up in November 2003 by the United Nations and International Financial Institutions Department (DVF) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, appraising the WTO’s Technical Assistance and Training Plan, states that ‘one of the main factors in preventing developing countries from benefiting sufficiently from expanding global trade in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction is their lack of knowledge of the multilateral trade system and of negotiating capacity. Knowledge and skills are essential for effective participation in world trade. This knowledge is often lacking in developing countries, especially in LDCs [...] Technical assistance is an important condition for economic growth because it enables countries to defend their interests in the multilateral trade system and implement WTO agreements adequately.’

The third theory is a selective mix of the first two. It focuses on the administrative and institutional dimensions of the first theory: it considers the formulation and implementation of national pro-poor trade policies as a condition for poverty reduction through international trade. Like the second theory, it concentrates on the ‘soft’ infrastructure of a developing country rather than on production and marketing structures. Whereas the focus of the second theory lies on negotiating capacity in multilateral trade talks, the third theory lays emphasis on the national trade policy of developing countries.

20. In particular, the minister stated that developing countries have ‘insufficient trained legal experts to initiate a successful disputes procedure against another WTO member state that may have failed to meet its obligations to them’ (House of Representatives 25074, 21 October 1996, no.1, p. 4). This eventually gave rise to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), set up on the initiative of the Netherlands and Colombia (see chapter 5).

As a former permanent representative in Geneva (1996-1998) and Minister for Development Cooperation (1998-2002), Eveline Herfkens has been a fervent advocate of this theory in multilateral and multidonor consultations. She played an active part in developing an action plan for LDCs as a follow-up to the first WTO Ministerial Conference. The plan led to introduction of the Integrated Framework (IF) aimed at 'mainstreaming trade into PRPS'. In the time that Herfkens was development minister, good governance was a central policy theme, and was seen as an important condition for development and also as an objective of development. To a certain extent, mainstreaming trade into development planning can be seen as an intervention strategy aimed at promoting good economic governance.

The Netherlands is one of the architects of the multilateral programme of IF and has been a strong supporter of this programme since it began in 1997. As such, the Netherlands has presented itself as firmly believing in the concept of mainstreaming trade into development. The de-briefing by the Minister of Economic Affairs to Dutch Parliament in August 2003 about the Dutch agenda for the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancún shows that to the Netherlands, mainstreaming of trade into development was not a flash in the pan: 'The Netherlands remains a supporter of the Integrated Framework as one of the most comprehensive and promising programmes to promote trade development and to provide technical assistance' (House of Representatives 25074, 18 August 2003, no. 68, p. 21).

3.2 Dutch objectives and the principal channel of TRTA

The Netherlands sees the strengthening of trade policy and of the negotiating and trading capacity of developing countries as an important strategy, means or operationalised objective in integrating developing countries into the multilateral trade system. TRTA is considered to be an important instrument for bringing this about in every strategy.

As a contribution to the First Joint WTO/OECD Report on Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in 2002, the Netherlands formulated its general and specific objectives in providing TRTA/CB as follows: 'Dutch TRTA/CB aims to help integrate developing countries into the world trading system and strengthen their position in the system so that they can maximise benefits. The objectives of TRTA/CB are to:

- encourage the national policy process of identifying trade policy interests;
- increase the negotiating capacity of developing countries in the WTO, to implement GATT and WTO Agreements, and make use of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism;
- enable developing countries to make more effective use of trade opportunities created by trade liberalisation, i.e. to raise the export capacity of developing countries' (p. 16).

These three objectives not only reflect the three different policy theories (see 3.1), they also come very close to the WTO/OECD description of TRTA/CB (see 2.3).

The contribution to the 2002 WTO/OECD report distinguishes three channels through which the Netherlands provides TRTA/CB, with the most important being the multilateral channel:

- I. Multilateral and joint programmes and organisations are the principal channel, including active support for the Integrated Framework, the Advisory Centre on WTO Law and the World Bank trade research programme;
- II. Bilateral cooperation focuses on the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI), which supports businesses in developing countries. In addition, there are occasional TRTA/CB projects in countries which have chosen a productive sector as the focus of bilateral cooperation;
- III. Non-governmental organisations and academic research institutions in developing countries aimed at increasing research, knowledge and stimulating informed trade-policy debate are an important target of Dutch policy (p.16).

The 2003 memorandum on coherence between development cooperation and agricultural policy also states that multilateral organisations are the most important channel, and gives the following reason: 'With regard to technical assistance, capacity building and institutional development to increase market access, the Netherlands focuses mainly on the relevant multilateral organisations, since international standards are created in an international context' (p. 52).

The Netherlands' 2004 report on its contribution to the development of a global partnership for development (MDG 8) states that 'to strengthen negotiation and trade capacities of developing countries, the Netherlands primarily uses the multilateral channel'.

Explanatory memoranda and letters to the House of Representatives on WTO negotiations, as well as interministerial policy memoranda, refer to various

multilateral organisations and programmes. In the first half of the 1990s, attention focused on UNCTAD. Later in the decade, it shifted to new multilateral initiatives: the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs, the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Program (JITAP), trade capacity building projects of the Bank Netherlands Partnership Programme (BNPP) and lastly the WTO Doha Development Global Trust Fund. Since 1998, the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), partly founded by the Netherlands, has been repeatedly praised for its exemplary financing. The Agency for International Trade, Information and Cooperation (AITIC) received an 'honorary mention' on several occasions. The Netherlands sees all of these providers of TRTA as strategic in strengthening developing countries' trade policies and negotiation and/or trading capacity.

Another, very good reason for the Netherlands to give priority to the multilateral channel is related to the great importance that it has attached (practically since the first WTO Ministerial Conference) to better coordinating the provision of TRTA/CB with a view to improving efficiency, delivering coherent technical advice and formulating pro-poor trade policies.

At the High-Level Meeting in October 1997, Anneke Van Dok-Van Weele's aim was to focus attention on 'the coordination of technical assistance and other forms of aid' (House of Representatives 25074, no.8, p. 1). One of the 17 specific Dutch aims into which the four central objectives for the further development of the world trade system were translated was: 'adequate technical assistance for developing countries and promoting greater coherence between the work of the WTO and other international organisations, especially the IMF, the World Bank and UNCTAD' (House of Representatives 25074, May 1999, no. 12, p. 12). In July 1999 Eveline Herfkens, as Minister for Development Cooperation, noted that 'technical assistance also frequently goes wrong because different donors give contradictory advice. In that respect, there is complete confusion. If we can do something about that, it will be a great step forward' (House of Representatives 25074, 15 July 1999, no. 13, p. 12).

Because 'multilateral institutions have regularly supplied contradictory or conflicting advice to governments in developing countries', the Netherlands has 'helped to set up a coordinating mechanism designed to 'inject more cohesion into the advice given (p. 28). This mechanism, the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs, was introduced in 1997 to promote

policy-related and institutional development in LDCs in the fields of trade and development. The Integrated Framework is a multilateral programme in which six multilateral organisations collaborate (for a description of the framework, see 6.2).

The 2003 Memorandum on Coherence between Agricultural and Development Policy states that improved donor coordination and close cooperation between multilateral institutions are of great importance in building trade capacity through technical assistance (p. 13). The foreign affairs and agriculture ministries, which produced the document, consider it 'essential that trade-related technical assistance not be provided in the form of small, disconnected projects, but as part of a consistent programme' (ibid: p. 41). They see coordination between donors and between multilateral institutions as an efficient means of achieving the objective in mind. The most important reason for them to advocate cooperation between bilateral and multilateral donors, however, is the 'multiplicity of trade development goals' (p. 40). The two ministries want discussion and negotiation on these objectives, with the intention of achieving better coordination.

Coordination was not only thought to be important for efficiency reasons but also as a way to contribute to the development of a coherent trade development strategy:

'Channelling TRTA/CB through multilateral channels has been a strategic principle since 1997, with the establishment of the Integrated Framework. The reason for this is that cooperation and coordination between multilateral and bilateral donors is key to a coherent strategy of trade development, with the recipient country as the active owner, embedding the strategy into its poverty reduction strategy' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001).

Coordination between suppliers and donors of TRTA, and recipient country's ownership of TRTA are conceived of here as two integral elements of an approach directed at the formulation of coherent and pro-poor trade policies. Coordination by multilateral agencies and donors is intended to prevent duplication of TRTA and to develop integrated approaches to TRTA. It is considered that the mechanism to contribute to formulation of trade policies that are country-based and pro-poor as well as to prevent supply-led or donor-driven TRTA is the recipient country's active ownership of TRTA.

3.3 Conclusions

1. The Netherlands firmly believes in a rule-based multilateral trade system as a contribution to international order, economic growth and poverty reduction. Since the start of the new series of multilateral trade negotiations following the completion of the Uruguay round in 1994, the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trade system has been one of the Netherlands' main objectives in furthering the development of the multilateral trade system. Integration means participation in negotiations, implementation of agreements and participation in world trade.
2. The Netherlands considers lack of negotiation capacities to discuss market access at multilateral trade talks, lack of production and export capacities, and lack of pro-poor trade policies of developing countries to be three major bottlenecks for these countries' integration in the world economy and thus as three barriers to addressing poverty. Trade-related technical assistance has been conceived of by the Netherlands as one of the key instruments for helping developing countries, in particular LDCs, to further integrate into the multilateral trade system. Three TRTA objectives of the Netherlands are: the strengthening of developing countries' negotiation capacity, export capacity and capacity to formulate pro-poor trade policies.
3. The Netherlands considers the multilateral channel to be the principal channel of TRTA. This is based on the following premises. First, the diverse need of TRTA can most comprehensively be addressed by the varied offer of TRTA through the multilateral channel. Second, the supply of TRTA can best be coordinated by multilateral agencies to avoid duplication of TRTA and to deliver coherent technical advice. Third, multilateral agencies are best equipped to help developing countries to formulate pro-poor trade development policy at country level and to advise them how to comply with WTO agreements and standards. For these reasons, the Netherlands has been a strong supporter of the Integrated Framework ever since its start in 1997. This multilateral programme is aimed at mainstreaming trade into development planning and coordinating the multilateral supply of TRTA.
4. Ever since the very first WTO conference, the Netherlands has vigorously advocated developing TRTA programmes for LDCs, putting the needs and concerns of LDCs at the heart of TRTA programmes, and coordinating the supply of TRTA. Together, these three epitomise the Dutch approach to TRTA,

which is characterised by a focus on LDCs, demand-led approaches and ownership, and coordination of the supply of TRTA.

4 Dutch financial support to TRTA

This chapter provides an overview of Dutch expenditure on TRTA per category and per channel in the period 1992-2002, based on a database compiled for the period 1992-2002, plus other inventories and earlier lists of TRTA activities spanning shorter periods. The focus is on expenditure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This ministry is the largest departmental donor of TRTA to developing countries.²¹

The financial support from other Dutch ministries is limited. Their most high-profile programmes in the field of TRTA are co-funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has funded two activities: the technical assistance and training programme of the WTO (1998-2002) and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (2001-2005)²². In 2003 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over the role of donor of the technical assistance and training programme of the WTO from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The Ministry of VROM recognises the role of trade and investment as part of an international strategy to contribute to sustainable development (VROM 2002). However, this has not led to the funding of a large number of ecologically or socially 'sustainable' trade programmes and projects in developing countries. The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality has funded two main types of activities in which trade or TRTA was a component: training activities in the Netherlands (scholarships, courses at the

21. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds TRTA not only directly but also indirectly through the Dutch Co-financing Programme. The Ministry provides the budget for this programme, which is allocated to six co-funding agencies. These agencies in turn provide financial assistance to partner organisations based in developing countries and to network organisations based in The Hague, Brussels or Geneva. Some co-funding agencies and their partner or network organisations have put much effort into campaigns and lobbies against protective agricultural policies of the EU or USA – with a view to improve developing countries' access to markets. This indirect funding of TRTA falls beyond the scope of this study. The direct funding of international NGOs by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is, however, included in the present overview (see, for instance, Table 4.3) and has also been included in the case studies (see Chapter 6).

22. The Ministry of Economic Affairs funded TA activities of the WTO in the period 1998-2002, contributing a total of 8.2 million Dutch guilders to three generations of trust funds at the WTO. The funding of ACWL was done together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Economic Affairs contributed USD 125,000 to the annual contribution of the Netherlands in 2001 and committed USD 250,000 per year for 2002-2005.

IAC, the programme of international cooperation of the Directorate for Agricultural Research) and bilateral projects (with China, Mozambique, Turkey, Indonesia, Netherlands Antilles, Aruba). One of the ministry's prime concerns is food quality and food safety in global food chains (LNV 2001 and 2002). Together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality committed itself to the four-year partnership programme on Market Access through Meeting Quality Standards for Food and Agricultural Products (exported by four African and three Asian countries to markets of Europe and other industrialised countries).

This chapter consists of three sections. The first presents expenditures of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs per category of TRTA in the period 1992-2002. The second outlines volumes of support through three different channels in the same period. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the category and channel on or through which the Netherlands spent the largest volume of money in that period, and to identify possible trends and changes in expenditure on TRTA and channelling of funds. In particular, the chapter investigates whether the multilateral channel that has been considered the principal channel of TRTA by the Netherlands since 1997 has evolved into the biggest channel for funding TRTA. In the third section the findings are summarised and some conclusions are drawn.

4.1 Financial support per category of TRTA

WTO and OECD (2002) classify TRTA under trade policy and regulations or trade development. These two categories are described as follows:

- I. **Trade policy and regulations** covers support to foster recipients' effective participation in multilateral trade negotiations, the analysis and implementation of multilateral trade agreements, trade policy mainstreaming and technical standards, trade facilitation (including tariff structures and customs regimes), support of regional trade arrangements and human resources development in trade.
- II. **Trade development** covers business development activities aimed at improving the business climate, access to trade finance and trade promotion in the productive sectors (agriculture, forestry, industry, mining and tourism), including at the institutional and enterprise levels (WTO/OECD 2002: 3-4).

Scholars and practitioners distinguish two similar categories of TRTA. According to KostECKI (2001), 'Trade-related technical assistance covers assistance in trade promotion and in trade policy'. He adds that 'Technical assistance is a service. In

trade policy, such a service may be defined as an activity or a performance, which enhances know-how, improves networks and increases the ability to conduct optimal trade policies' (p.4). Likewise, Duran (2003) distinguishes two components of TRTA: 'assistance to trade more and assistance to understand international trade rules better'.²³

When constructing the database of TRTA funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs for this IOB evaluation, the two categories of TRTA distinguished by the WTO/OECD were adopted. The second category of 'trade development', however, was split into two: one category for business support services and institutions (in accordance with the similarly-named CRS-category) and another category for all other trade development activities: programmes and projects directed at banking or financial services, productive sectors or environmental policy – but with a trade component. Table 4.1 provides an overview of expenditure on TRTA in the period 1992-2002 based on this classification of TRTA.²⁴

The following conclusions can be drawn from this table:

- Numbers: the largest number of funding activities (91) in the period 1992-2002 was directed at trade policy and regulation. It is only two more than the number of funding activities (89) directed at trade development through business support services and institutions in the same period. The lowest number of funding activities (57) was directed at banking and financial services, productive sectors (agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry) or environmental policy – with a trade component.
- Average per activity: the average sums expended per activity were € 1.2 million on trade policy and regulation, € 1.9 million on business support services and institutions and € 2.5 million on programmes and projects in the field of banking and financial services, productive sectors or environmental policy – with a trade component.
- Average per year: the average annual expenditure was € 10.0 million per year for trade policy and regulation, € 15.1 million for business support services and institutions, and € 13.3 million for banking and financial services, productive sectors or environmental policy - with a trade component.

23. Duran describes these components as two sides of the same coin, arguing that 'real integration into the multilateral trading system necessitates a holistic approach that would include capacity to produce exportable goods or services and to develop adequate physical infrastructure (roads, ports, customs facilities) on the one hand and on the other the training of government officials to enable them to understand, implement and negotiate internationally-agreed rules' (2003: 4).

24. The information for the database came from MIDAS. In the period 1992-2002 this documentation system was used to administer the Ministry's financial activities.

Table 4.1 Expenditure on TRTA by the Netherlands in the period 1992-2002 (in € million)¹

Year	Trade policy and regulations (91 activities)	Business support services and institutions (89 activities)	Other services and sectors - with a trade component (57 activities) ²	Total (237 activities)
1992	6.6	0.0	1.8	8.4
1993	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.9
1994	0.6	0.0	17.0	17.6
1995	0.5	0.2	20.4	21.1
1996	10.4	6.6	12.0	29.0
1997	11.8	6.9	12.9	31.6
1998	11.6	7.9	22.6	42.1
1999	11.4	10.1	36.8	58.3
2000	17.5	40.3	12.4	70.2
2001	29.9	57.2	8.8	95.9
2002	9.1	36.4	0.8	46.4
Total	109.9	165.6	145.9	421.4

Source: IOB desk study of expenditure on TRTA, 2003.

1. The figures in the boxes have been rounded off to one decimal point, which is why the total expenditure is 0.1 higher or lower for 2000, 2001 and 2002 and for the last two columns.

2. Other sectors and services are: banking or financial services, productive sectors (agriculture, forestry, industry and mining) and environmental policy.

- **Total sums:** The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent a total of € 109.9 million on trade policy and regulation and € 165.6 million on business support services and institutions in the period 1992-2002. In the same period, the Ministry spent a total of € 145.9 million on programmes and projects with a trade component. These programmes and projects were directed at banking and financial services, productive sectors or environmental policy.
- **Trends:** expenditure on trade policy and regulation and also on trade development through business support services and institutions rose sharply from 1995 (the year in which the WTO was established) to 1996. Nearly 65 percent of the total (€ 421.4 million) was spent in the period 1999-2002. Until 1999, the sums spent annually on trade policy and regulation and other services and sectors with a trade component each exceeded the sums spent

annually on business support services and institutions. After 2000 the pattern reversed.

4.2 Financial support to TRTA per channel

In the period 1997-2003 the Netherlands contributed to several inventories or surveys of trade-related technical assistance activities of bilateral donors, conducted by multilateral agencies. In addition, at the request of the Minister for Development Cooperation, overviews of ODA funding of trade-related technical assistance were drafted for internal purposes. On the basis of a chronological review of the surveys and overviews, augmented by the data collected for this report, this section sets out to provide a profile of Dutch channelling of TRTA.

DAC survey of 1997

As a contribution to the WTO High Level Meeting on 'Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries' Trade Development' in October 1997, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) conducted a survey of trade-related technical assistance activities of its members. The survey reveals that the profile and channelling of Netherlands support is bilateral: 'The Dutch trade-related development co-operation activities are mainly conducted by the Dutch Centre for the Promotion of Imports from developing countries (CBI), which has been operating since 1971 within the policy framework set by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the responsibility of and funded by the Ministry of Development Co-operation' (OECD 1997: 54). The profile of the Netherlands is largely a presentation of the seven main activities of the CBI. Under the heading of 'other Dutch trade promotion activities' some regional co-operation projects are mentioned. A short section on trade enhancement is devoted to investment by the Netherlands in physical infrastructure and support to business associations, again mentioning CBI. The DAC survey does not provide data on commitments and expenditure.²⁵

Internal overview of 1999

In 1999 the Minister for Development Co-operation, Eveline Herfkens, commissioned an overview of trade-related technical assistance activities as funded by the Netherlands. In contrast to the DAC profile of 1997, this overview focused on multilateral agencies and programmes, international NGOs and IGOs, and research institutes. It revealed that nearly 62 percent of the total contribution

25. A commitment is a firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide assistance for a specified purpose and under specified terms and conditions for the benefit of the recipient country or organisation (see WTO/OECD 2002: 3).

of € 10.7 million Dutch guilders in 1998-1999 was donated to multilateral agencies, multilateral programmes or IGOs (such as UNCTAD, World Bank Partnership Program, JITAP and ACWL). In these years, African and Dutch research institutes (such as AERC, NEI, Wageningen Agricultural University and SOW) received more than 24 percent of these subsidies, and international NGOs (like ICTSD, IDLI, ZNF and QUNO) received nearly 14 percent.

It could be inferred that at the end of the 1990s the main channel to support TRTA was the multilateral channel. However, the CBI budget was reportedly about three times the total amount of contributions to all multilateral agencies together in 1998-1999.²⁶ It can therefore be concluded that at the end of the 1990s the funding of TRTA was largely through the bilateral channel.

Trade Capacity Database of the WTO/OECD (2001-2003)

In the period 2002-2004 the Netherlands provided information to the Doha Development Agenda Trade Capacity Database (DDATCDB) annually about the Dutch commitment to TRTA/CB in the previous year. Specific information was provided on the contribution to multilateral TRTA/CB providers (WTO, IF, ITC and JITAP). Dutch contributions to multilateral agencies amounted to USD 3.5 million in 2001 and USD 3.3 million in 2002 (WTO/OECD 2004). In 2003 the Netherlands contributed USD 3.5 million to WTO, IF, ITC and JITAP. Whereas Dutch commitments to trade promotion through bilateral activities increased enormously in 2003, contributions to multilateral agencies remained constant. As a result, the percentage share of Dutch contributions to multilateral TRTA/CB providers of the total of commitments to TRTA/CB went from 11.0 percent in 2001 and 14.1 percent in 2002 to 4.9 percent in 2003.²⁷

26. In the field of trade development, the CBI has offered a large variety of instruments or types of TRTA, varying from identification of market niches and opportunities to workshops, seminars and trade fairs. The core programme of the CBI is a four-stage package of technical assistance to actual and potential exporters: the Integrated Export Promotion Programs (GEPP) (DAC 1997: 54; IOB 1999: 131-153). These programmes are intended to help individual entrepreneurs to adjust their supply to demand in West European countries and to prepare them to compete with other suppliers in these markets. In WTO terms, GEPPs aim to address supply-side constraints at the level of entrepreneurs through special promotions for product groups, product modification missions and product seminars. Helping entrepreneurs to participate in a trade fair is the fourth and final phase of a GEPP. For an evaluation of the CBI programme in the period 1990-1996, see the IOB evaluation *Hulp door Handel* (1999).

27. With the arrival of a new Minister for Development Co-operation in 2002, a new trend was set in motion. OECD/WTO (2003) reported that 'Since 2002, the Netherlands has intensified bilateral activities in the area of quality and safety standards. A partnership project entitled "Market Access through Meeting Quality Standards" will be implemented (2003-2006) jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, in co-operation with the private sector. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will also be co-funding the "International Federation of Agricultural Producers' Program on Trade Capacity Building" (2003-2006), together with other donors'. The budget for this programme is USD 7.8 million.

Note, however, that Dutch contributions to multilateral providers in 2001-2003 were large by comparison with other bilateral donors. Data collected by the WTO/OECD show that the Netherlands was the second largest bilateral donor of multilateral TRTA/CB providers (WTO, IF, ITC and JITAP) in 2001, after Switzerland. In 2002 the Netherlands ranked fourth of all bilateral donors, after Switzerland, Sweden and Norway. In 2003 the Netherlands ranked fifth, after Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark (OECD/WTO 2003: 14).

IOB research on the period 1992-2002

The IOB research on Dutch expenditure on TRTA in the period 1992-2002 revealed the following (see Table 4.2):

- Numbers: in the period 1992-2002 most activities were funded through the bilateral channel (109); the second largest number were funded through NGOs and research institutes (88) and the lowest number through multilateral programmes and IGO (40).
- Average per activity: in the period 1992-2002, on average € 2.3 million was spent per activity through the bilateral channel, € 1.6 million per activity on multilateral programmes and IGOs, and € 1.2 million per activity through NGOs and research institutes.
- Annual average: in the period 1992-2002, the annual average spent was € 23.1 million through the bilateral channel, € 9.3 million on NGOs and research institutes and € 5.9 million per year on multilateral programmes and IGOs.
- Total volumes: in the period 1992-2002, about 60 percent of the total expenditure was spent through the bilateral channel, nearly 25 percent through NGOs and research institutes, and more than 15 percent on multilateral programmes and IGOs - assuming that activities that are partly trade-related were spread evenly over all channels (e.g. subsidies for agricultural projects or for BNPP 1998, see Box 5.2).
- Trends: annual support through the bilateral channel increased gradually from nearly 20 million in 1995 to 50 million in 2001; annual expenditure through NGOs and research institutes rose sharply from not more than € 4 million per year in the period 1992-1999 to more than € 20 million in 2000 and later; annual support of TRTA programmes and projects of multilateral and intergovernmental agencies was, on average, less than € 4 million in the period 1992-1998, peaked in 1999 (to more than € 22 million), and then in the following three years decreased again to an average of about € 5 million.

Table 4.2 Expenditure on TRTA per channel in the period 1992-2002
(in € million)¹

	Multilateral programmes and IGOs (40 activities)	NGOs and research institutes (88 activities)²	Bilateral agencies (including Ministry, embassies, CBI and FMO) (109 activities)	Total (237 activities)
1992	6.6	0.0	1.8	8.4
1993	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.9
1994	0.9	0.2	16.6	17.6
1995	1.0	0.2	19.9	21.1
1996	2.4	1.7	24.9	29.0
1997	3.6	1.4	26.6	31.6
1998	12.1	3.3	26.7	42.1
1999	22.3	3.7	32.4	58.4
2000	6.0	23.5	40.6	70.1
2001	9.1	36.1	50.7	95.9
2002	0.5	31.9	14.0	46.4
Total	64.9	102.0	254.5	421.4

Source: IOB desk study of expenditure on TRTA, 2003.

1. Data per box have been rounded off to one decimal point, which is why total expenditure is 0.1 higher or lower for 1994 and for every column.
2. This only includes direct funding of international NGOs by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not indirect funding by the Ministry through the Co-Financing Program.

4.3 Conclusions

Category of TRTA

1. Numbers: in the period 1992-2002, the number of TRTA activities directed at trade policy and regulation was almost the same as the number of TRTA activities directed at trade development through business support services and institutions: 91 versus 89. The lowest number was directed at other services and sectors (banking and financial services, productive sectors and environmental policy) with a trade component (57).
2. Volumes: financial volume per category showed the exact opposite: in the period 1992-2002 the largest volume (€ 145.9 million) was spent on services and sectors with a trade component, such as banking, agriculture and environment policy; the second largest was spent on business support services and institutions (€ 165.6 million); and the smallest volume was spent on trade policy and regulation (€ 109.9 million). Supporting trade policy and regulation does not cost as much per activity as supporting business, or supporting a banking programme and agricultural project.
3. Trends: expenditure on trade policy and regulation as well as trade development through business support services and institutions rose steeply from 1995 (the year the WTO was established) to 1996. Thereafter, annual expenditure on trade policy and regulation remained fairly constant at about € 10 million per year, increasing to € 17.5 million in 2000 and nearly € 30 million in 2001. From 1996, annual expenditure on business support services rose gradually, but jumped to more than € 40 million in 2000. From 2000 onwards, annual expenditure on business support services and institutions exceeded annual expenditure on trade policy and regulation.

Channelling of TRTA

4. Numbers: in terms of numbers of activities, the bilateral channel was the biggest channel of TRTA in the period 1992-2002. In that period the second largest channel comprised the NGOs and research institutes, and the smallest channel was the multilateral channel.
5. Volumes: in terms of total expenditure, the biggest channel of TRTA in the period 1992-2002 was the bilateral channel. IOB data collection revealed that in the period 1992-2002 about 60 percent of total expenditure on TRTA

was spent through the bilateral channel, nearly 25 percent through NGOs and research institutes, and more than 15 percent through multilateral programmes and IGOs. The figures confirm the findings of earlier surveys, overviews and databases. These other sources show that annual commitments through the bilateral channel were at least three times the annual commitments through the multilateral channel.

6. Trends: the adoption by the Netherlands of the strategic principle of funding TRTA/CB through the multilateral channel with the establishment of IF in 1997, led to an increase of expenditure through the multilateral channel in 1998-1999. This increase was not sustained in 2000 and beyond. In terms of volumes of money flows, the bilateral channel has been the main channel both before and since 1997.

5 Desk study of TRTA for trade policy and administration

In this chapter the results of TRTA are described and assessed on the basis of a desk study. For the description, profiles were made of a selection of activities in terms of their objectives, approaches, types and expenditure on TRTA. For the assessment of these activities, two steps were taken. The first was to collect any information on quantified targets as specified in objectives. The second was to record any information on output, outcome and impact of TRTA as included in the dossiers consulted.

It is necessary to describe the objectives and record of results in order to be able to evaluate the results on the basis of a desk study. This chapter therefore pays much attention to profiling the activities in terms of their objectives, as well as to recording the results. As such, this chapter not only attempts to assess the results of TRTA based on a desk study but also offers an assessment of the quality of objectives and reporting. A central question is whether data available to budget holders give enough insights into what has been achieved and has actually been done with TRTA funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This chapter comprises five sections. In the first section, the selection of activities for the desk study is explained. The second section presents the profiles of selected activities in terms of their main objectives, approaches, types and expenditure on TRTA. In the third section, the results are presented, focusing on the availability and quality of information. In the fourth section, these results are assessed. In the fifth section, some conclusions are drawn.

5.1 Selection of activities

For the desk study, all 58 activities of the IOB data-base (see Chapter 4) classified as ‘trade policy and administrative management’ (CRS code 33110) were selected, to reflect the Netherlands’ objectives of contributing to the formulation of trade policy and to the negotiation capacity of developing countries through the

provision of TRTA. They formed the core and majority of the 91 funding activities classified as ‘trade policy and regulation’²⁸. The selection was also made to reflect the Netherlands’ strategic principle of supporting the provision of TRTA through multilateral agencies and other international organisations. Some 15 activities with another CRS code were added on the suggestion of staff of DDE and as a result of short overviews of programmes and organisations in the field of TRTA as mentioned in memoranda to the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation. Though these 15 activities were not classified under ‘trade policy and administrative management’, each of them was considered to be a high-profile activity in this field. The final number of activities included in the desk study was therefore 73.

5.2 Profiles of selected activities

In 27 of the 73 selected activities, the programme or project was being executed by one or more multilateral agencies; in a further 27 cases the executing agency was an international NGO. In nine cases a research institute was executing a programme or project, and in the remaining 10 other cases the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs was doing so. The total number of activities with project funding amounted to 36 whereas the total number of activities with programme or organisation funding was 37.²⁹

Main objectives

For the profiling and description of main objectives, two methods were used: first, the kind of result the activity was directed at was determined, using the main objectives as formulated by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the funding agency: output, outcome and/or impact.³⁰ Second, it was determined

28. The other sub-categories of ‘trade policy and regulation’ were trade facilitation (CRS 33120) and regional trade agreements (CRS 33130).

29. Project funding is the funding of a time-bound, specific and relatively small activity. Programme funding is the funding of a comprehensive part of the total of activities of the contract party. Organisational funding is the funding of the integral costs (personnel and material costs) that are incurred by the contract party when designing and implementing programmes or projects (HBBZ 2004). This includes core funding and contributions to endowment funds.

30. Output refers to a tangible result of the input: a seminar, workshop or conference held; a course or traineeship provided; a publication issued; a strategic plan formulated; an informal meeting held; an electronic exchange system put in place, etc. Outcome refers to knowledge, insights or capabilities acquired by individuals on the basis of participation in the seminar, etc. Impact refers to effects of the use of this knowledge, insights or capabilities on the formulation of national trade policies, participation in multilateral trade negotiation and/or export capacity (see 1.3).

31. A target value (streefwaarde) is a quantified description of the desired situation (RPER 2001: 16). In the present study a target group has been defined as (1) a category of people (e.g. officials, business people or staff of NGOs) or (2) a specified number and category of countries – at which the assistance is directed. ‘Developing countries’ or ‘LDCs’ have not been considered a target group.

whether or not the main objectives of every activity included a target value, an end-term (that is, the date by which the objective is expected to have been achieved) or target group.³¹

The main objectives of activities were directed at one or two kinds or levels of results (see Table 5.1). In 26 cases the main objective was output (a seminar, meeting, research activity, publication, training programme, etc.) or the delivery of output (see Boxes 5.1 and 5.3 for two illustrative cases).³² Examples of main objectives formulated as activities are:

- to execute a mission;
- to hold a seminar;
- to make an inventory;
- to publish a study;
- to disseminate research findings;
- to foster exchange of thoughts;
- to foster informal dialogue;
- to provide catalytic support;
- to coordinate technical assistance.

In the first four examples, a concrete output has been formulated. In the last five examples the output is less tangible.

In 43 cases the main objectives of activities were directed at outcome. The main objectives of these activities can be classified as follows:

- to transfer, increase or share knowledge on multilateral trade issues;
- to obtain or promote insights into, for example, the role of trade for development, or problems with regard to the participation of LDCs in multilateral trade negotiations;
- to build the capabilities of southern NGOs and representatives of developing countries in preparing multilateral negotiations.

In 34 cases, the objectives of activities were directed at impact. The main objectives of these activities can be classified as follows:

- to increase, facilitate or strengthen the contribution, participation or effective participation of developing countries or southern NGOs in multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO;

32. In the assessment memorandum of the structural contribution to technical assistance of the UNCTAD in 1998, even sustainability was defined at the level of output rather than of impact: 'The activities lead to a sustainable production of research reports, analyses, policy paper etc. that are meant to support developing countries with their process of integration into the world economy'.

- to contribute to trade systems of developing countries that are compatible to WTO rules and agreements;
- to assist or to strengthen trade policy formulation in developing countries;
- to promote international trade between developed and developing or transition countries;
- to increase the position of the South in the world trade system.

Though input cannot be considered a type of result, in 9 cases the provision of input (financial support) was the one and only main objective. This includes four cases in which multilateral organisations were the executing agencies, four cases in which the Ministry itself was the executing agency, and one case in which an NGO was the executing agency. In another case in which a multilateral organisation was the executing agency, the main objective was the provision of both input and output.³³ Examples of the delivery of input formulated as objectives were:

- to combat the costs related to the logistical support of delegates;
- to finance a symposium;
- to facilitate participation in a course;
- to provide a Netherlands contribution;
- to co-fund a lunch meeting.

Most of the multilateral agencies were directed at impact and/or outcome; in 14 cases, multilateral agencies were directed at both outcome and impact. Most of the international NGOs and research institutes focused on outcome. Eight international NGOs were directed at both outcome and impact, compared with only one research institute. The Ministry, as executing agency, concentrated in most cases on delivering output (see Table 5.1). Project funding was mostly directed at output (18 activities) or outcome (18 activities). Programme or organisational funding was mostly directed at outcome (24 activities) or impact (25 activities).

33. Thus the total number of activities in which the main objective was to deliver an input and/or an output was 35.

Table 5.1 Frequency of expected results per type of executing agency

	Output	Outcome	Impact	Total
Multilateral	7	16	17	40
NGO	9	18	13	40
Ministry	5	2	2	9
Research Institute	5	7	2	14
Total	26	43	34	103

In 3 of the 73 cases, the main objective included a target value. In 11 of the 73 cases, the end-term or time at which the main objective was expected to have been achieved was specified. In 44 of the 73 cases the main objective included a reference to a target group. Specification of the target group was most common in the category of NGOs (21 out of 27 cases) and most uncommon in the category of multilateral agencies (10 out of 27 cases) (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Description of the main objective per type of executing agency

	Target value		End-term		Target group	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Multilateral	1	26	6	21	10	17
NGO	0	27	3	24	21	6
Ministry	2	8	2	8	6	4
Research institute	0	9	0	9	7	2
Total	3	70	11	62	44	29

With one or two exceptions, target values were missing both for project funding and for programme/organisational funding. An end-term was specified in the main objective in 8 of 36 cases of project funding and 3 out of 37 cases of programme/organisational funding. A target group was mentioned in the main objective in 25 out of 36 cases of project funding and in 19 out of 36 cases with programme or organisational funding.

Approaches to TRTA

Every TRTA activity is more or less implicitly based on a particular mindset about why and when knowledge is useful and is used. The desk study of activities in trade policy and administration yielded at least three different approaches: academic, functional and ownership. Given that exponents of these approaches are still being funded by the Dutch government, one may conclude that all three approaches are presently supported by the Netherlands.

The **academic approach** is based on the assumption that insights generated by scientific research are useful and will be used by the policymakers in developing countries. The central objectives of programmes and projects characterised by this approach were the generation of knowledge, dissemination of knowledge, stimulation of research by Southern researchers and the setting up of North–South research networks. The objectives had been formulated as an activity or in terms of an output (seminars, publications). Capacity building was viewed as the generation of knowledge and the building of research networks. Examples of the academic approach are the technical cooperation programmes of the UNCTAD, the EU-LDC network (see Box 5.3) and the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC).³⁴ The approach has been used in the multilateral channel and by research institutes.

The **functional approach** does not focus primarily on the generation of knowledge but rather on the functional use of knowledge. Thus the major concern is not output (seminars, publications, advice) but outcome, i.e. what can be done and achieved with the output. The functional approach emphasises the need for accessible information, short papers, and customised advice rather than theoretical essays, extensive analysis and general publications. The central assumption of the functional approach is that the starting point should be the interests, queries and limitations of potential or actual users of knowledge. In view of the time and resource constraints of developing countries, it considered to be critical to reduce complex issues or bureaucratic discourse to the essential points (a bulleted list). An underlying principle is that knowledge and insights should help officials in developing countries to make up their minds, develop a strategy or prepare a negotiation position. Capacity building is the human resource development of high-up officials, representatives and negotiators of

34. Haarberg (2002) reports that a significant part of the UNCTAD services delivering technical cooperation comprises short courses and seminars. Developing countries have described these as 'awareness raising, not capacity building', regretting that UNCTAD's assistance was not taking place close to the beneficiaries.

developing countries at multilateral trade talks. Technical assistance is offered to potential and actual clients on-the-job.

The functional approach has been developed not only by international NGOs and IGOs but also by multilateral agencies. Examples of the approach are programmes and projects of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), the Agency for International Trade, Information and Cooperation (AITIC), the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD, see Box 5.1) and Quakers United Nations Office (QUNO), and also the short-term missions of WTO staff to capital cities, responding to requests for technical assistance from WTO members.³⁵ The approach of the research projects on trade of the Bank Netherlands Partnership Programme (BNPP) is concrete and focused on preparing upcoming negotiations of LDCs, and as such may also be considered to be an example of the functional approach (see Box 5.2).

The **ownership approach** is an institutional and country-based variant of the functional approach, based on the idea that the need for TRTA can and should be determined solely by developing countries themselves. Thus the basis, precondition and mechanism for the coordination of the supply of TRTA is seen to be a needs assessment conducted by a developing country itself. Advocates of the ownership approach believe that developing countries should be the owners of the process of problem diagnosis, policy formulation and needs assessment. The Integrated Framework for Technical Assistance to LDCs embodies the needs assessment or ownership approach. In fact, this approach could be termed the Integrated Framework approach. The objective is formulated beyond the level of output or outcome, namely: the mainstreaming of trade into development.

The academic approach has a relatively long history. The Netherlands started to finance the EU-LDC network (see Box 5.3) and UNCTAD technical assistance (see 6.2) in the early 1990s on the basis of long-term or framework contracts. The

35. What distinguishes these missions from the long-track approach and emphasis on analytical and negotiation skills of international organisations like ACWL and QUNOA, is the short-track approach and emphasis on knowledge that is intended to aid the understanding of WTO agreements and of how to implement them.

36. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was the donor of this Trust Fund. In 2000 the remainder of this fund was transferred to the Global Trust Fund of the WTO, to which the Ministry of Economic Affairs contributed an extra 2.6 million Dutch guilders. Something similar happened in 2002 when the Global Trust Fund was renamed Doha Development Global Trust fund. In 2003 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over from the Ministry of Economic Affairs as the Dutch donor of the WTO technical assistance and training programme.

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has supported international NGOs and IGOs financially by means of a functional approach since 1998. The Netherlands Trust Fund to support the technical cooperation programme of the WTO came into effect in 1997.³⁶ The BNPP was concluded in 1998 (see Box 5.2). The Netherlands is one of the architects of IF and from the outset has been a strong supporter of this multilateral programme.

Types of TRTA

The project funding was directed at seminars, studies, training or trade missions (see Table 5.3). All 17 seminars lasted less than one week. The average duration of the 11 studies was close to six months. The five training activities lasted more than one year in the case of on-the-job training with multilateral agencies (four activities) and less than one week in the case of a course. The three missions to identify and discuss trade opportunities each lasted less than one week.

Table 5.3 *Number of types of TRTA as supported with project funding (specified per type of executing agency)*

	Seminar	Study	Training	Trade mission	Total
Multilateral	5	2	5	0	12
NGO	7	2	0	1	10
Ministry	5	3	0	2	10
Research institute	0	4	0	0	4
Total	17	11	5	3	36

Programme or organisational funding was used to offer a combination of different types of technical assistance over a period of one to three years (see Table 5.4). In 14 cases of multilateral programme funding, three or more different types of TRTA were being offered. On average, international NGOs and research institutes provided two different types of TRTA. In contrast to project funding (see Table 5.3), programme or organisational funding (see Table 5.4) has been directed at information management and exchange, such as high-level meetings, expert meetings, informal dialogue, electronic networks, and networks of researchers and policymakers.

Table 5.4 Number of types of TRTA as supported with programme or organisational funding (specified per type of executing agency)

	Seminar	Study	Training	Advice	Information management and exchange
Multilateral	14	13	6	13	13
NGO	9	8	3	3	7
Research institute	5	0	0	0	5
Total	28	21	9	16	25

Expenditure

In 31 of the 73 selected activities expenditure exceeded € 500,000, in 25 cases it was less than € 50,000. In the remaining 17 cases, expenditure was between € 50,000 and € 500,000. Most of the programmes or projects executed by multi-lateral agencies, international NGOs, or research institutes, involved expenditure of more than € 500,000. The largest number of projects or programmes with expenditure exceeding € 500,000 are those executed by one or more multilateral agencies. Most projects executed by the Ministry itself involved expenditure of less than € 50,000 (see Table 5.5). The total volume of expenditure was € 30,724,374.³⁷

Table 5.5 Number of activities per category of expenditure (per type of executing agency)

	< € 50,000	€ 50,000 to 500,000	> € 500,000	Total
Multilateral	8	4	15	27
NGO	7	9	11	27
Ministry	8	2	0	10
Research institute	2	2	5	9
Total	25	17	31	73

37. Trade is one of the twelve windows of BNPP 1998 (see Box 5.3). In order not to inflate the total expenditure of the 73 activities, only the sum of money spent on trade (€ 2,161,000 of a total budget of € 35,101,556.02) was included.

Nearly all the programme funding was directed at activities executed by international NGOs (17 activities) or multilateral agencies (15 activities). Project funding was quite evenly spread between activities executed by multilateral agencies (12 activities), international NGOs (10 activities) and the Ministry itself (10 activities).

5.3 Record of results

The data collection and collation of information on results consisted of two steps. The first was to determine whether results had been described in the dossier and, if so, at what level. This was not limited to the level or type of results mentioned in the main objective. For instance, if the main objective was directed at some kind of impact, we also looked for evidence of output and outcome. Similarly, if the main objective was formulated as an activity, any reporting of results at the level of outcome or impact was also noted (for an example, see Box 5.1). The second step was to determine whether the reported results were measurable, i.e. had been quantified or supported with quantified data (such as a stepping stone which could be used when assessing the results, see next section).

Output

In 37 of the 73 cases the dossier included information about results achieved in terms of output. In 36 of these 37 dossiers, output was quantified or supported with quantified data – though not in great detail, i.e. there was information indicating e.g. that a planned workshop had been held and the expected number of people had indeed participated, the planned study had been completed and published, the planned inventory had been done, on-the-job training had been provided to trainees, etc.

The lack of detailed reporting of output is related to the lack of performance indicators and to input being considered to be a result. In his comparative review of TRTA of UNCTAD, WTO and ITC, Haarberg (2002) concludes that, ‘Concerning the management of technical cooperation activities, there is a scarcity of measurable performance indicators. [...] UNCTAD’s reporting is based primarily on input indicators’ (p.5).

Outcome

In 20 of the 73 cases the dossier contained some reporting about the knowledge, insights or capabilities gained by a target group (for an example, see Box 5.1). The reporting was narrative, not quantified or supported with quantified data on the

basis of specific indicators. Also, in 17 of these 20 cases it could not be determined what had actually been done back in the office or in follow-up activities with the knowledge and insights acquired. In all but one dossier there was no analysis of who had actually participated in/benefited from TRTA. In the single case in which this was done, it was reported that people other than those invited participated in the seminar. In 53 of the total of 73 cases, there was no reference at all to results at the level of outcome.

Box 5.1 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)

Two fundamental goals of ICTSD, based in Geneva, across all its programmes are:

- I. The delivery of the most relevant information in a context that is useful to constituents.
- II. Improving the coordination across and within programmes by ensuring that they are mutually supportive in scale and sequence (ICTSD, April 1998).

SPM consultants (2000) concluded that 'Since the Centre's objectives are formulated as activities rather than as desired situations to reach, it is not possible to measure or give an opinion on the effectiveness of the ICTSD'. Having said this, SPM added that 'It is, however, clear that the Centre has been performing well in the three areas of operation: enabling dialogue, facilitating interaction and supporting participation in trade policy issues [...] The Centre has made significant achievements in the following areas:

- Contribution to furthering the discussions on trade in the interface of sustainable development
- Capacity building in the developing countries regarding trade policy issues. For example, NGOs of developing countries can meet with the WTO-secretariat and have easy access to information regarding trade policies being discussed.
- NGOs have become involved in the discussion and development of policies regarding the trade system
- The Centre has facilitated ministerial meetings to discuss trade and sustainable development issues' (SPM 2000).

The one-week review of SPM thus suggests that the dissemination of information, organisation of informal meetings and research of ICTSD has had results at the level of outcome and possibly of impact. But it is still unclear whether 'significant achievements' refers to the activities of ICTSD or to the effects of these activities. The lack of programme-specific indicators of outcome and impact means the positive but general appreciation of ICTSD can neither be rejected nor confirmed.

Box 5.1 Continued

In contrast to the activity bias of the objectives as formulated by ICTSD (April 1998), in its assessment memorandum the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs formulated objectives at the level of impact and outcome: ‘The mission of ICTSD is to realise the integration of the principles of sustainable development in the development of the world trade system’.

The general objective of the Centre is ‘to realise a more effective transfer of information and communication between civil society and policymaking institutes (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998, our translation).

The Ministry did not specify when ‘integration of the principles of sustainable development’ is realised and what is a ‘more effective transfer of information and communication’.

The Netherlands became the largest donor of ICTSD in 1998 (SPM 2000). In the period 1998-2003 the total expenditure of the Netherlands on core funding and regional seminars of ICTSD amounted to € 1.9 million.

Sources: ICTSD, April 1998, Update to ICTSD’s funding proposal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands for core funding 1998-2000; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Assessment memorandum of core funding ICTSD, November 1998; SPM Consultants, May 2000, Review of the ICTSD

Impact

In 10 of the 73 cases the dossier contained some reporting on impact in terms of a contribution to the negotiation capacities and participation of developing countries in multilateral trade talks (for an example, see Box 5.2). In all these 10 cases, one or more multilateral agencies (World Bank, UNCTAD, WTO and ITC) were executing the programme (BNPP, JITAP, UNCTAD Technical Cooperation programmes). The reporting was narrative, not quantified or supported with quantified data on the basis of specific indicators. No reporting was included of impact in terms of a contribution to pro-poor trade policy formulation, trade capacity or export volumes (as a percentage of world trade) of developing countries. In all other 63 cases, the files contained no information about results at the impact level.

Box 5.2 The Bank Netherlands Partnership Programme

BNPP is a framework agreement between the World Bank and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs for funding and executing development activities and programmes that are not country-specific. The Programme started formally in 1998. Most of its activities are related to testing and disseminating new approaches and methodologies, training and capacity building, and applied research. 'Trade' is one of the 12 windows under which programmes and activities are categorised.

In 1998 the Netherlands committed € 35.1 million to BNPP. In 1999 the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation asked the administration to provide an overview of trade-related technical assistance as supported through BNPP. Four projects were listed with a total of € 1.9 million of Dutch support. In their profile of projects under the window of trade, independent evaluators of BNPP listed these four again in 2003, next to six new ones (SEOR 2003, volume II). The evaluators' conclusions about this window were 'The inadequacy of funding proposals and absence of project concept documents stand in the way of effective project appraisal' (p.210). Notwithstanding this, some internal Trust Fund Completion Reports by the World Bank of trade projects do contain narrative reporting of outcome and impact. Three of the four projects that had already attracted the attention of the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation back in 1999 stand out here:

- I. The World Bank concluded that the project 'Positioning the Least Developed Countries to Ask for Bound Assistance to Implement WTO Agreements' had 'significantly influenced analytical thinking of the international community, shifting from looking for the development dimension of a trade issues to looking for the trade dimension of a development issue'. A study on the costs of a developing country to implement WTO obligations 'has been widely cited in policy debates and in the media. It was a substantial part of the basis on which the developing countries insisted in Seattle that dealing with the implementation problems must be included in any future negotiation'.
- II. Upon completion of the project 'Preparing a Concrete Plan for Supporting Developing Countries in the Next WTO Round', the World Bank concluded that as a result of this project 'During the Doha Round African representatives were more focused, involved and participated more energetically than in the earlier meetings'.
The project consisted of two parts: the organisation of two conferences and the secondment of consultants to trade ministries. The conferences were indeed held. The secondments were not implemented 'due to political changes in client countries and limited interest on the part of trade ministries'.

Box 5.2 Continued

were not implemented 'due to political changes in client countries and limited interest on the part of trade ministries'.

- III. The World Bank concluded that the analytical work as facilitated under the project of 'Preparing African LDCs for Upcoming WTO' had 'helped African countries to evaluate their interests, options and strategies in the upcoming negotiations' and that 'African stakeholders and partners have used the initial findings of the analytical work funded by this project in various African Ministerial Meetings in African and Geneva'. The findings of the project 'have enhanced the interests and capacity of African experts to provide timely analytical findings to support policy discussion'.

Sources: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 1999, Memorandum to the Minister for Development Cooperation on trade-related assistance; SEOR, May 2003, Evaluation of the Bank Netherlands Partnership Programme (BNPP), Volume I and II; World Bank, Trust Fund Completion Reports of trade projects.

5.4 Assessment of results

Efficiency

On the basis of the desk study it is possible to draw some limited overall conclusions. Of the 73 selected dossiers, 37 contain information on results in terms of output. In 30 of these 37 dossiers, 80 to 100 percent of the planned results at the level of output was realised (see Table 5.6).³⁸ In 23 of these 37 cases the planned output was realised without exceeding the budget; in 11 cases it could not be determined whether the budget had been exceeded. In 16 out of 37 cases the output was realised within the planned time; in 14 cases this could not be determined.

Looking at the 37 files that did indeed contain information on output, for every type of executing agency, the percentage of activities with an output score of 80 to 100 percent was 75% or more (see Table 5.6).

38. Planned output is defined here as output that was foreseen in the main objective or work plan.

Table 5.6 Percentage of realisation of planned output (per type of executing agency)

	80-100%	50-80%	0-50%	Could not be determined	Total
Multilateral	9	1	1	1	12
NGO	10	1	1	0	12
Ministry	8	0	1	0	9
Research Institute	3	1	0	0	4
Total	30	3	3	1	37

In six of the 10 files (60 percent) with information on the output of programme/organisational funding, 80 to 100 percent of the planned results at the level of output was realised. In 24 of the 27 files (88.9 percent) with information on the output of project funding, 80 to 100 percent of the planned results at the level of output was realised (see Table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Percentage of realisation of planned output per type of funding

	80-100%	50-80%	0-50%	Could not be determined	Total
Programme/organisational funding	6	3	1	0	10
Project funding	24	0	2	1	27
Total	30	3	3	1	37

In sum, in half of the number of activities there is information on output; for these activities, in about 80 percent of the cases output was delivered according to the work plan, in more than 60 percent of the cases output was delivered according to plan, and in close to 45 percent of the cases output was delivered without exceeding the budget. Two conclusions can be drawn: first, information on output is limited. Second, the available information suggests that the delivery of output is good but efficiency is poor to fair.

Effectiveness and relevance

The data on results as stored in dossiers are too weak a basis for drawing general conclusions on the effectiveness and relevance of activities in the field of trade policy and administrative management, let alone for drawing conclusions specifically for different types of executing agencies. Thus, this desk study was unable to ascertain the extent to which participants/beneficiaries from developing countries have been able to really do something in their departments with the information and insights offered by and through trade-related technical assistance. Neither was it possible to determine overall to what extent the participants/beneficiaries from developing countries have used such knowledge to design pro-poor trade policies or to prepare negotiations at multilateral trade talks and to participate in these negotiations. This is because the dossiers contain too little information on outcome and impact, and what information is available is of poor quality, that is, neither quantified nor supported with quantified data.

The reports of meetings, progress reports, completion and final reports provided little information on outcome and even less on impact. Mid-term reviews, policy reviews and other evaluation reports yielded few insights into outcome and impact. There are three explanations for the limited amount of information that could be drawn from reviews and earlier evaluation reports:

- I. The main objective of the review or evaluation was not to measure and assess results but to improve a programme or project or to demonstrate how opportune ('relevant') a programme or project is for meeting beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, partners' policies or global priorities (today and in the future). The emphasis was on identifying obstacles to progress or to the process. Little or no attention was given to systematically measuring and assessing the achievements to date.
- II. The main objective of the evaluated programme or project was to deliver an output (see for example, Boxes 5.1 and 5.3). As a result, the evaluator was hesitant or found it difficult to measure outcome and impact.
- III. Methods proved unreliable and sources were biased: questionnaires to measure participant satisfaction showed positive scores only; rates of return of questionnaires to ex-participants were 20 percent or less; ex-participants/beneficiaries had taken other positions/jobs and could not be traced; the back-at-office reports of trainers or consultants dealt solely with output.

More could be said about effectiveness on the basis of the desk study if we were to follow the DAC definition of effectiveness³⁹ and take the main objective as the yardstick to assess effectiveness. In all 9 cases (100 percent) in which the main objective was to deliver an input, the input was indeed delivered. In 19 of the 26 cases (73.1 percent) in which one of the main objectives was to deliver an output, goal achievement was 80 to 100 percent. In 20 of the 43 cases (46.5 percent) in which one of the main objectives of the technical assistance or capacity building was to help beneficiaries to gain knowledge, insights or capabilities, some gain in this respect was reported. In 10 of the 34 cases (29.4 percent) in which one of the main objectives of the programme or project was formulated at the impact level, it was reported that technical assistance had helped some developing countries (or their representatives) to prepare, participate or negotiate at multilateral trade talks.

Though the percentages in brackets in the paragraph above could be taken as measures of effectiveness, this would divert attention from two fundamental problems:

- I. In nearly half of the number of cases (35), the main objective or a major objective of an activity of the funding or executing agency was to deliver an input or output⁴⁰.
- II. In nearly all cases (70), the objectives did not specify the desired situation on the basis of target values or indicators of outcome and impact. Neither the funding agency nor the executing agency offer definitions of desired situations, nor do they stipulate criteria and indicators to assess when and whether objectives have been achieved.

If the two problems have not been addressed in the design phase of programmes and projects, it is rather misleading and meaningless to use objectives as the yardstick to assess their effectiveness ex post. There is also a great risk that the Ministry and contract party will muddle on together for a long time, without having insights into effects in terms of outcome or impact (see Box 5.3 for an example).

39. OECD/DAC (2002) has defined effectiveness as 'the extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance'.

40. The WTO technical cooperation audit came up with similar results on the basis of its review of TRTA provided by WTO staff during their short-term missions in 2002: '56 percent of the reports examined contained project activities set out as an objective' (WTO 2003: 6). On the basis of its review of 145 back-at-office reports of WTO staff in 2003, the internal audit concluded: 'TA providers' activity was set out as an objective in 51 percent of a total of 145 cases' (WTO 2004: 9).

Box 5.3 The European Union/Least Developed Countries Network

In May 1993 the Commission Research Project of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs/DGIS accepted the proposal to fund the EC-LDC Trade and Capital Relations Network, noting the Minister for Development Cooperation's special concern that 'in future evaluations special attention should be given to the extent to which participants of developing countries have been able to really do something with the information offered by and through the network and have been actively using this information in their institutes or policymaking departments'. In the period 1993-2004 the Netherlands was the only country to donate to the EU/LDC: it gave a total of € 2.5 million. Throughout this period neither the executing agency (Netherlands Economic Institute, Rotterdam) nor the evaluators and reviewers of the EU/LDC network, were able to address the special concern of the Minister for Development Cooperation. Addressing the issue of dissemination and impact, the evaluation of the first phase of the Network merely concluded that 'Overall the Network's output has a wide reach to the targeted audience. The Newsletter is read by policy makers and researchers in EU and LDC and is judged to contain useful information for policy purposes and somewhat less for research' (Ndulu 1997: 4).

The inability to address outcome and impact had much to do with the objectives having been formulated as activities during all contract periods, that is: phase I (1993-1997), the interim phase and its extension, and phase II (2000-2004) of the funding of the EU/LDC Network. In October 1992, NEI described the general objective of the Network as 'to encourage data collection and information exchange in the field of EU-LDC Trade and Capital Relations and to disseminate analysis of research in this field'. In May 1993 the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined the primary objective as 'to expose researchers and policymakers in developing countries and developed countries to information and research findings on EC-LDC trade and capital relations, with the view to adequately inform them and to create a sustainable dialogue among them'. In June 2000 the Ministry distinguished the following three objectives:

- I. To disseminate relevant information on EU-LDC relations, with a view to clarifying their potential implications for resource flows, economic growth and equity;
- II. To promote and support dialogue and interchange amongst researchers, policymakers, representatives of civil society organisations and other interested parties on issues relevant to EU-LDC relations;
- III. To seek to influence the research agenda on EU-LDC relations towards ensuring that sufficient attention is given to the needs and demands of LDCs.

Box 5.3 Continued

These three objectives were confirmed by the mid-term review in 2003 of phase II of the funding of the Network. What this means is that NEI was formally not even supposed to address concerns on outcome or the actual use of information by researchers and policymakers of developing countries at their institutes or departments. Without proposing or agreeing on a reformulation of objectives, in its long and not always easy dialogue with NEI the Ministry expressed other concerns as well: the lack of ‘ownership’ of the network of developing countries, the one-way flow of information from NEI to members (Ndulu 1997), and the lack of other sponsors of the Network, apart from the Netherlands.

In 2003, consultants doing the mid-term review of phase II distinguished an overall objective of the Network: ‘to help to contribute to the design of effective policies for dealing with problems of economic development and, in particular, to address those aspects with a specific “Europe-developing country” dimension contributed to debate on certain policy issues’. Though this objective was still written down as an activity and ‘problems of economic development’ is a very wide concept, the Network is certainly directed at results at the impact level. Unfortunately, the review does not provide a crystal-clear insight into the Network’s contribution to the design of effective policies for dealing with problems of economic development. Whether for this reason or rather the failure of NEI to address the repeated concerns of the Ministry, in 2004 the Ministry decided not to renew the funding contract with NEI on the EU/LDC Network.

Sources: Netherlands Economic Institute, October 1992, The Establishment of a Network in the Field of EC-LDC trade and capital relations, second revised proposal; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 1993, Memorandum of the Secretary of the PCO on the ‘Network EC-LDC Trade and Capital Relations’; Ndulu, Benno J. June 1997, Evaluation of the EU-LDC Network on Trade and Capital Relations: A Synthesis of Reports; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2000, Assessment Memorandum of Phase II of the EC-LDC Network; Boyer, D. and Krijnen, J. July 2003. EU-LDC Mid-Term Review.

5.5 Conclusions

1. The main channels to support trade policy and administrative management are multilateral agencies and international NGOs.
2. In half of the 73 activities selected, it was impossible to determine the efficiency, due to lack of information on output. In the remaining half, the efficiency was poor to fair.
3. Dossiers were too weak a basis for drawing conclusions on the effectiveness and relevance of activities in the field of trade policy and administrative management: the information they contained on outcome and impact was cursory and neither quantified nor supported with quantified data. This again is the result of poor design of activities:
 - In nearly half of the 73 selected activities, the main objective was the delivery of an input or output.
 - In nearly all 73 selected activities, the main objectives did not specify the desired situation on the basis of target values or indicators of outcome and impact.
4. Mid-term reviews, policy reviews and other evaluation reports yielded few insights into outcome and impact because the main objective was not the measuring and assessing of results. Though reviews and evaluations wanted to improve a programme, they were not aiming to learn from the past on the basis of an assessment of the results achieved so far. Evaluations that wanted to demonstrate the opportunity of a programme (related to beneficiary requirements, country needs, policies and priorities) did not produce insights into results.
5. The internal dossiers available to budget holders give very little insight into what has been achieved and actually done with TRTA in the field of trade policy and administration as funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

6 Field study of seven cases of TRTA

Measuring input, output, outcome and impact with a view to assess efficiency, effectiveness and relevance, is a difficult and time-consuming exercise, especially when performance indicators have not been formulated beforehand by donors and providers of TRTA. As a consequence, only a limited number of activities that were part of the desk study could be selected for field research in Geneva and at country level. In total, seven cases were selected: four multilateral programmes and three international organisations. These seven cases were being financed by the Netherlands through 14 separately administered activities to the sum of € 4.1 million out of a total of € 43.8 million of donor subsidies.

The main questions used to assess efficiency, effectiveness and relevance, were the same for every case; all were based on the definition of generic performance indicators (see Annexes 2 and 3). A design of the evaluation research was prepared for every programme or organisation, specifying not only the indicators of input, output, outcome and impact but also the sources of data and research methods (see Annex 3).

This chapter consists of seven sections. In the first section, the selection of cases for field research is explained. In the second section, profiles of the selected programmes and organisations are given in terms of their main objectives, types of TRTA, budget and support from the Netherlands. In the third section, the results of every programme or organisation are briefly presented. In the fourth section, the results are assessed, based on IOB field research. The fifth section presents the results per type of TRTA provider. To put the results of the field study in perspective, the sixth section presents the findings of earlier evaluations: summative evaluations, meta-evaluations and comparative reviews.⁴¹ The purpose

41. A summative evaluation is 'a study conducted at the end of an intervention (or a phase of that intervention) to determine the extent to which anticipated outcomes were produced'.

A meta-evaluation is 'the term used for evaluation designed to aggregate findings from a series of evaluations. It can also be used to denote the evaluation of an evaluation to judge its quality and/or assess the performance of the evaluators' (OECD/DAC 2002).

is to provide extra or other evidence of results, given the focus and limitations of the IOB field studies, and to see whether the IOB evaluation confirms, complements or contradicts the findings of earlier evaluations. In the seventh section some conclusions are drawn.

6.1 Selection of cases

For the selection of cases in the field of trade policy and administration, the following five steps were taken. First, programmes and organisations were shortlisted on the basis of consultations with DGIS/DDE, DGIS/DVF and the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands in Geneva. Staff members were asked to propose different types of programmes and organisations in terms of scale, age and approach, yet with TRTA as a focal point or core business. They were also asked to identify only the programmes and organisations they considered to be policy relevant and strategic in the field of trade policy and administration. They could therefore only shortlist programmes and organisations that were supposedly oriented at contributing to one or both of two specific Netherlands objectives to support TRTA: contributing to the formulation of national trade policy, and contributing to the trade negotiation capacity of developing countries.

Secondly, the Netherlands strategic principle of supporting the TRTA of multilateral agencies or international organisations was used as a selection criterion. Thirdly, organisations and programmes with a relatively large budget, trust fund or endowment fund (of more than € 10 million) were given priority. Fourthly, a special role, contribution or position of the Netherlands in supporting the organisation or programme (e.g. initiator, lead agency, major donor, earmarked contributions) was considered. Fifthly, the following methodological criterion was applied: given the difficulty of tracing ex-participants/beneficiaries of TRTA, the organisation or programme preferably had to have most of its former or present participants/beneficiaries in the country in question or near the main office.

On the basis of these steps and criteria, the following four multilateral programmes and three international NGOs or intergovernmental organisations were selected for measuring and assessing the results:

- I. Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries (IF).
- II. Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP).

- III. UNCTAD programme on Possible Multiple Framework on Investment (PMFI).
- IV. UNCTAD programme on Competition Law and Policy for African Countries (CLPAC).
- V. Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL).
- VI. Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC).
- VII. Quakers United Nations Office (QUNO).

To assess what results have been achieved so far on the ground, for each of the two country-based programmes (IF and JITAP), two partner countries of the Netherlands were selected for field research: Ethiopia and Yemen for IF, and Burkina Faso and Tanzania for JITAP. The selection was based on the following considerations: the Netherlands had been the lead agency of IF in Yemen and very much wanted the IF process in Ethiopia to be linked to the development of Ethiopia's economic sector. The Netherlands had earmarked its financial support to the first phase of JITAP for four African LDCs, including Burkina Faso and Tanzania.

6.2 Profiles of cases

In this section profiles will be given of the four multilateral programmes and three international NGOs or intergovernmental organisations in terms of main objectives, types of TRTA (locus, focus/scope, and approach), and finally, in terms of the total budget and financial support from the Netherlands as well as other roles of the Netherlands in supporting the organisation or programme.

Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs (IF)

When the IF was launched in 1997, its main objective was 'to increase the benefits that Least-Developed Countries derive from the trade-related technical assistance available to them from the six Agencies involved in designing this Framework, as well as from other multilateral, regional and bilateral sources, with a view to assisting them to enhance their trade opportunities, to respond to market demands and to integrate into the multilateral trading system' (Liebrechts and Wijmenga 2004: 1; Rajapathirana and others 2000: 15). Other related objectives were to ensure that TRTA is demand-driven and to enhance ownership of the IF by LDCs, so that it meets individual country needs effectively. The six participating multilateral agencies were (and still are): the International Trade Centre (ITC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). On the basis of a review

in 2000, these six agencies decided to prioritise the linking of the IF to the development assistance architecture. The main objective of the IF was reformulated. Two distinctive objectives were distinguished:

- I. To mainstream trade into the national development plans and PRSPs of LDCs.
- II. To coordinate, sequence and synchronise the TRTA activities of the above six agencies.

The assistance from the multilateral agencies is given in the individual countries: the IF started off in five LDCs in 1997 and was extended to fourteen other LDCs in 2001. The thematic focus of this assistance is the formulation of pro-poor trade policy. Multilateral agencies designed the IF as an institutional approach or mechanism directed at the mainstreaming of trade and development policy as well as at the coordination of technical assistance. LDC ownership was defined as a core element of the process of mainstreaming.

The IF Trust Fund finances the mainstreaming work. Several bilateral donors as well as the World Bank and UNDP contributed to the IF Trust Fund. In March 2003 the contribution to the IF Trust Fund amounted to USD 12 million.

In the period 1996-1998 the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands at the United Nations in Geneva, Eveline Herfkens, played an active role as one of the architects of the IF, conceiving this framework as a strategic instrument to mainstream development issues into trade and to coordinate the supply of TRTA (see Chapter 3). From 1998 to 2002, she was keen to make this programme work in her capacity as Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the three pilot diagnostic trade integration studies in Madagascar, Mauritania, and Cambodia to the tune of USD 330,000. As part of the revitalisation of the IF in 2001, the Netherlands became the lead agency for Yemen, one of its partner countries. The Netherlands organised and sponsored a two-day workshop on the IF in The Hague in April 2003 (at a cost of € 63,880) for bilateral donors to discuss issues about the IF and possible roles of donors in trade-related capacity building through this framework.

Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP)

In 1996 the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations Conference and Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Trade Centre (ITC) launched the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme to Selected Least Developed and Other African Countries (JITAP). The programme, which effectively

started in 1998, was initially intended to run for a period of two and a half years and had three main objectives:

- I. To build national capacity to understand the evolving multilateral trade system (MTS) and its implications for external trade;
- II. To modify the national trading system to the obligations and disciplines of the new MTS;
- III. To seek maximum advantage from the new MTS by enhancing the readiness of exporters.

JITAP is a country-based programme. In the period 1998-2002, JITAP covered eight African countries, four of which were LDCs. The scope of JITAP is wide: a generic programme consisting of 15 clusters was designed by the three multilateral agencies, based on their joint fact-finding missions and needs assessments at country level. JITAP has a holistic and institutional approach. JITAP aimed (and still aims) to approach trade issues comprehensively, bringing together in one programme a broad spectrum of issues in trade negotiations, and the application of trading rules and new trade opportunities. For the implementation and coordination of technical assistance at country level, central roles were given to national steering and inter-institutional committees. These committees were supposed to bring together representatives from the government, civil society and private sector.

A group of 14 donors financed the Common Trust Fund (CTF) of JITAP. The budget of this trust fund was USD 10 million. After the programme expired at the end of 2002, a second four-year phase was started in the beginning of 2003, covering a further eight countries, six of which are LDCs. The eight countries from the first phase are still included in the new programme, having benefited from an exit strategy to consolidate activities started during the first phase. The budget for this consolidation phase is USD 1.5 million. The budget for the new countries under JITAP II amounts to USD 12.6 million.

The commitment of the Netherlands to JITAP-I was € 453,780. The Netherlands earmarked its financial support for four LDCs: Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda and Tanzania. The Permanent Mission of the Netherlands in Geneva was a member of the CTF Steering Group. The contribution of the Netherlands to the consolidation phase of JITAP amounted to € 122,360. For JITAP-II an assessment memorandum approved a sum of € 800,000 over four years as an unearmarked contribution to the CTF.

UNCTAD programme on Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment (PMFI)

In 1997 UNCTAD started a three-year working programme of knowledge generation and capacity building on the possibilities of establishing a multilateral framework on investment. Investment has been a very sensitive issue in the negotiations of developed versus developing countries since the first WTO ministerial conference in Singapore in 1996. The main objective of UNCTAD's programme on PMFI was 'to build capacity among policymakers and negotiators from developing countries and economies in transition as regards issues related to a possible multilateral framework on investment (MFI), especially regarding (i) the development-relevant lessons that can be drawn from existing international instruments and (ii) the key issues at stake in relation to a possible MFI' (Liebrechts and Wijnenga 2004: 6). It was hoped that increasing policymakers' awareness and capacity would enable them to participate as effectively as possible in the discussion of a possible MFI.

The loci of technical assistance from UNCTAD staff in the field of PMFI were Geneva and the capital cities of developing countries. The technical assistance was directed at a global audience: between 500 and 800 policymakers in capital cities in all regions and 125 – 150 delegates to UNCTAD and the WTO in Geneva would benefit directly from the planned activities. In addition, numerous other policymakers would benefit indirectly through the preparation and dissemination of technical papers. The thematic scope was limited to investment. The approach of UNCTAD was issue-wise and academic, characterised by a strong emphasis on knowledge generation and the transfer of knowledge on the basis of writing analytical reports, and on seminars and training on single topics.

Donors contributed a total of € 2,355,255 to the trust fund (UNCTAD reference INT/97/A26) of the working programme.⁴² The Netherlands was the third largest donor to the trust fund. In the period 1997-2000, a total of USD 348,001 of Dutch tax revenue was used to finance the PMFI.

Jan Pronk in his capacity as Dutch Minister for Development Co-operation (1989-1998) was a strong advocate of UNCTAD as a platform for developing countries to discuss and develop their views on trade and development. From 1991 to 2001 the Netherlands contributed about € 450,000 per annum to UNCTAD for technical assistance under a framework contract whose short-term objective was to support the policymaking of developing countries, individually and in groups. The long-

42. Some of the activities of this trust fund were rolled over to the successor fund INT/07/0BG.

term objectives of every annual contribution to UNCTAD under the framework contract were:

- Strengthening policy formulation in developing countries in those areas for which UNCTAD is mandated and – based on feedback from developing countries – to strengthen the analytical work carried out by UNCTAD in these areas;
- Building on the analysis and policy insights arising from UNCTAD’s efforts in the policy- relevant technical assistance;
- Structural support of the policy-relevant and policy-supporting technical assistance and analysis of UNCTAD.

Up until 2001 the annual contribution of the Netherlands was used for 12 to 18 different programmes, including PMFI. In 2002 the Netherlands decided to earmark its annual budgetary support of € 450,000 to the technical cooperation of UNCTAD for two of four ‘Singapore issues’.⁴³ This included investment (in addition to competition policy), paying special attention to LDCs.

UNCTAD programme on Competition Law and Policy for African Countries (CLPAC)

In 1997 UNCTAD started a special three-year working programme on the important but also sensitive ‘Singapore’ issue of competition, with a regional focus: Competition Law and Policy for African Countries.⁴⁴ The main objective of UNCTAD’s programme on CLPAC was ‘to provide support to interested countries in institutional and capacity building in the formulation of national competition law and policy and consumer protection legislation, with a view towards helping these countries to benefit from the liberalisation and globalisation of the world economy and allowing them to effectively participate in the multilateral discussions on competition policy and development.’

The technical assistance by UNCTAD staff in the field of CLPAC was given in Geneva and capital cities of African developing countries. Technical assistance was directed at a broad audience in Africa: the target groups were experts from relevant government agencies or ministries, business circles (including business lawyers), consumers, researchers and academics. The thematic focus was on competition. UNCTAD took an issue-wise, academic and at the same time

43. In the period 2001-2003, UNCTAD’s average annual expenditure on technical cooperation amounted to USD 23 million. In 2003 UNCTAD’s budget for technical cooperation on investment issues was USD 6.3 million.

44. See Chapter 3 for a brief description of the four Singapore issues. In the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001, WTO ministers agreed to address these four issues with the help of TRTA. In the same declaration special emphasis was also put on the need for TRTA for LDCs.

consultancy approach, conducting research and offering advisory services, seminars and training on one topic.

For every programme on competition, UNCTAD managed a special trust fund. The Netherlands was the only donor to the trust fund on CLPAC (UNCTAD reference RAF/97/A41). In the period 1997-2000, a total of USD 617,602 of Dutch donor funding was used to finance the programme of CLPAC.

As noted above, from 1991 to 2001 the Netherlands contributed about € 450,000 annually to UNCTAD for technical assistance under a framework contract (see profile of PMFI above for the objectives of this framework contract). Up until 2001 the annual contribution of the Netherlands was used for 12 to 18 different programmes, including PMFI. In 2002 the Netherlands decided to concentrate its annual budgetary support of € 450,000 of the technical cooperation of UNCTAD on two of four 'Singapore issues'. This included competition policy (next to investment), paying special attention to LDCs.

Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL)

In the agreement establishing ACWL in December 1999, the purpose of the Centre is formulated as follows: to provide legal advice, support and training on WTO law and dispute settlement procedures to developing countries, in particular to the LDCs among them, and to countries with economies in transition. Given that many developing countries do not have access to the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO because of lack of expertise in WTO law and of capacity to manage complex trade disputes, the executive director of ACWL formulated its two main objectives as follows:

- I. To enable developing countries to better understand their rights and obligations in the WTO;
- II. To provide developing countries with an equal opportunity to participate in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.

ACWL is a member-based inter-governmental organisation, which had 33 members in January 2004: nine developed countries and 24 developing countries or economies in transition. As of 1 January 2004, ACWL had one African country as a member: Egypt.

ACWL provides services to clients based in Geneva. Developing and transition countries that are members of ACWL have access to all services of ACWL for a reduced fee. LDCs that are not members of ACWL are also entitled to services of

ACWL for a reduced fee, provided they are members of WTO. The thematic focus of the assistance of ACWL is on WTO law and WTO dispute settlement. The approach is demand-led and advisory, with supplementary activities directed at knowledge transfer through training. The Netherlands and Colombia jointly led the creation of ACWL. The Netherlands Permanent Mission in Geneva acted as chair of the preparatory committee and administered the interim account of ACWL. The Netherlands was one of the 29 signatory countries of the Agreement for the establishment of ACWL in December 1999 as an intergovernmental organisation (IGO). The chairman of the General Assembly of ACWL is the former deputy head of the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands in Geneva.

ACWL has an Endowment Fund to which founding members from developing and developed countries have contributed. In addition, developed countries have made multi-year contributions. As of June 2003, the total support for ACWL from all these contributions was USD 32.25 million. Nine developed countries had contributed USD 14.25 million and 23 developing countries USD 18 million. In 2002 a Technical Expertise Trust Fund was established to finance the input from specialised technical experts in dispute settlement proceedings. Up until April 2003, CHF 708,160 (approximately € 475,000) had been committed to this Fund.

In 1999 the Netherlands committed an amount of USD 2,250,000 to ACWL. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed USD 1,125,000, that is, USD 1 million to the Endowment Fund and USD 125,000 to the annual contribution of the Netherlands to ACWL. The Ministry of Economic Affairs contributed USD 125,000 to the annual contribution of the Netherlands in 2001 and USD 250,000 to the annual contributions for the following four years (2002-2005). In 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs committed an additional amount of € 171,500 for the Technical Expertise Fund of ACWL. This support covers a period of three years (2002-2004).

Agency for International Trade, Information and Cooperation (AITIC)

AITIC was established in Geneva as an NGO in February 1998. The recognition that many developing countries had neither actively participated in WTO negotiations nor had been involved in any major way in WTO activities prompted the Swiss government to facilitate the setting up of an organisation that could address this problem. The main objective of AITIC is 'to help less-advantaged countries (LACs) to benefit from the globalisation process in general, and the multilateral trading system in particular, by assisting them in taking a more active part in the work of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other trade-related organisations in

Geneva, as well as the negotiations under the auspices of the former organisation.⁷ According to the director of AITIC, the aim of AITIC is to integrate Less Advantaged Countries into the world trading system, taking a two-tier approach: increasing awareness among these countries of the WTO and then increasing their knowledge of the WTO with a view to enable them to participate more actively in negotiations. By January 2004, the number of developing countries that had become Participating Members of AITIC had reached 32, including 19 LDCs (fourteen in Africa, three in Asia, two in Latin America).

To realise its main objective, AITIC has carried out the following activities: publication of background notes, organisation of seminars and workshops, provision of personalised assistance and a number of specific services for less-advantaged countries with no representative in Geneva (non-residents). The primary locus of activities of AITIC is Geneva. In addition, LDCs and developing countries with no representative in Geneva ('non-residents') are targeted by AITIC's mailing on upcoming WTO meetings. AITIC follows a demand-led approach and does not have a thematic focus or specialisation. The annual budget of AITIC grew from CHF 180,000 in 1998-1999 to CHF 1,827,000 in 2001-2002. To further improve the financial and functional basis of AITIC, a process of transforming the organisation from an NGO into an intergovernmental organisation (IGO) was started in 2001. The Netherlands was one of the signatories to the Agreement of 2002 to transform AITIC into an IGO. The Permanent Mission of the Netherlands in Geneva represented the Netherlands in the preparatory committee for AITIC's transformation. By signing and ratifying this agreement, the Netherlands became a Sponsoring Member of AITIC, next to six other bilateral donors. The Netherlands committed € 2,058,000 for the first five years of operation, becoming the second largest contributor after Switzerland.

Quakers United Nations Office (QUNO)

The regulation of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) emerged as a new and critical issue after the establishment of the WTO. Anticipating the review of article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement in 1999, QUNO decided to focus on this review and launched its TRIPS programme in the same year. The review could have major implications for bio-diversity and food security in developing countries, so QUNO therefore decided to follow it closely and support developing countries in the process. QUNO's main objective for the TRIPS programme is to strengthen the capacity and understanding of WTO developing country governments, to obtain greater equity and justice in the TRIPS negotiating process.

To realise this objective, QUNO carried out four different activities: the publication of background papers, the organisation of small informal discussion seminars among Geneva-based delegates, the organisation of two-day residential seminars that involve a larger audience, and the organisation of regional conferences in developing countries and national conferences in developed countries to involve more interest groups in the discussions on TRIPS. The primary locus was, however, Geneva. QUNO targeted its activities at government officials of developing countries in WTO decision-making bodies. Based on strategic considerations and consultation with its own worldwide, non-governmental network of Quakers, QUNO thematically focused on TRIPS in the period 1999-2004. The approach of QUNO was issue-wise, informative and characterised by informal dialogue and two-way exchange of views between consultants and country representatives.

The TRIPS programme consists of three phases, covering five years altogether: phase I from 1999 to 2001, phase II from 2001 to 2002, phase III from 2002 to 2004. The first phase was funded by the Quakers. The budget for core and supplementary activities of the second phase was CHF 600,501. The budgeting of the third phase of two years was cut in two (as activities for the second year would depend on the outcome of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003). The budget for the first year of the third phase was CHF 460,200. The Netherlands was the biggest donor of the TRIPS programme of QUNO, altogether providing nearly half of the necessary funds for the second and third phases. The Netherlands also played an important role in needs assessments of the TRIPS programme. The Permanent Mission of the Netherlands financially supported the scoping exercises of the second and third phases of the TRIPS programme. These exercises were held to identify the interest of delegations, donors and other organisations in QUNO's plans and activities.

6.3 Record of results

Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs (IF)

The major output of the IF in Ethiopia as per end of 2003 was a study: the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS). The document is long (700 pages) and covers practically all impediments to trade and integration of Ethiopia in the world economy. The last annex of the second draft includes a detailed econometric analysis of the correlation between trade and poverty and explores how trade policies may affect poverty. The DTIS summarises previous studies but lacks up-

to-date and in-depth analysis of impediments of economic sectors to trade. Some sections of the DTIS are descriptive, not diagnostic.

The output and impact of DTIS were mainly concerned with the Ministry of Trade and Industry. A small number of officials of the Ministry of Trade and Industry gained experience in dealing with trade matters. The Minister of Trade and Industry expressed his strong commitment to the IF and to the coordination of TRTA of the six multilateral agencies. In other ministries, awareness of IF was limited. No participatory process of consultation was organised with stakeholders from the private sector and civil society. The DTIS, however, did reinforce and elaborate basic notions on trade and development as presented in the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan. The PRSP particularly recognises the importance of exports in the fight against poverty. Prior to the formulation of this plan, a nation-wide consultation was organised, to discuss, among other things, the basic idea of trade as an engine for growth and to alleviate poverty. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the results of IF in Ethiopia up to the end of 2003.

The major output of IF in Yemen as per end of 2003 was also a Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS). The document addresses all components as set out in the general and broad terms of reference developed for trade integration studies. The DTIS is largely based on material from earlier World Bank reports. It addresses the issue of a pro-poor trade integration strategy to a limited extent and lacks analysis of effects of different trade policies on employment and the poor.

The outcome of DTIS in **Yemen** was limited and accidental. The national committee for preparation and negotiation with the WTO (including 14 deputy ministers and two representatives of the private sector) gained knowledge about pro-poor integration strategies after that committee had been designated the national IF steering committee. The IF focal point learned to think about international competitiveness of economic sectors as a result of the study on tourism. Another spin-off was that the work of DTIS has helped the Yemeni WTO accession team understand some of the issues that are relevant for the accession. Some of the DTIS work was actually used by this team in drafting one of the memorandums required for WTO accession.

The impact of DTIS in terms of the contribution to mainstreaming of trade into the PRSP was virtually zero. From the very start of the IF in Yemen there was no active participation, no initiatives taken and no leadership from national stakeholders.

Table 6.1 Results of IF in Ethiopia

Output	Outcome	Impact
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) 2. One national workshop (in November 2003) 3. Long-list of recommendations for the Plan of Action 4. Incomplete overview of existing TRTA/CB activities; draft list of five TA priorities ready for submission to Window II (earmarked funding) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Four staff members of the Ministry of Trade and Industry gained experience in dealing with trade matters; preparation actions to follow up DTIS recommendations 2. Increased awareness among participants in national workshop of links between trade and poverty reduction; follow-up actions on impact analysis of trade policy on the poor, production chains and employment opportunities included in the Plan of Action 3. No monitoring system installed, but point of attention of Ministry of Trade and Industry and donors 4. Coordination of TRTA of six multilateral agencies by Ethiopian officials not reported, but Ministry of Trade and Industry committed to take leading role 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The DTIS did not kick-start the mainstreaming of trade into the national PRSP. This PRSP was rather an elaboration of the DTIS that recognises the importance of exports in the fight against poverty. 2. Contribution of DTIS to institutional capacity building and country ownership of IF was limited to one ministry: the Minister of Trade and Industry was actively involved; in other ministries, awareness of IF was limited; no participatory process was organised with stakeholders from private sector and civil society.

Source: Liebrechts, R. and Wijmenga, P. (2004). Evaluation of the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to the Least Developed Countries. Country Reports of Ethiopia and Yemen. IOB Working Document.

Table 6.2 Results of IF in Yemen

Output	Outcome	Impact
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 2. One national workshop (in June 2003) 3. No overview and analysis of existing TRTA 4. No overview of prioritised TRTA/CB projects 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The national committee for preparation and negotiation with the WTO gained knowledge about pro-poor integration strategies; the IF focal point learned to think about international competitiveness of economic sectors; DTIS work was used by the WTO accession team in drafting a memorandum; no monitoring system of recommended follow-up installed for all national stakeholders; no concrete plans of coordination of TRTA of multilateral agencies by Yemen officials 2. No follow-up actions undertaken by Yemen officials on DTIS recommendations discussed at national workshop; no follow-up actions in terms of impact analysis of trade policy on the poor, important production chains, and employment opportunities for the poor 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. DTIS did not bring trade into PRSP or national development plan 2. Contribution of DTIS to institutional capacity building was very limited. Country ownership was not demonstrated by active participation of national stakeholders. There was no high-level political commitment to IF; ministries were not very aware of IF and were not actively participating; neither private sector nor civil society were involved in the DTIS

Source: Liebrechts, R. and Wijmenga, P. (2004). Evaluation of the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to the Least Developed Countries. Country Reports of Ethiopia and Yemen. IOB Working Document.

There was no high-level political commitment to IF. Ministries were not very aware of the IF, let alone pro-actively participating. The private sector and civil society were not actively involved in the preparation of DTIS. Table 6.2 summarises the results of IF in Yemen up to the end of 2003.

Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP)

The output of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso was very diverse and included the setting up of organising committees, information centres, workshops, reports and studies. The major achievements were the setting up of institutional facilities rather than the production of reports, studies, or books. The actual use of the output was not impressive. Many facilities were not used – with one exception: the inter-institutional committee. This committee was used by the Government of Burkina Faso to prepare negotiations at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003. The large delegation and high-profile role of the Government of Burkina Faso at this conference was not the result of JITAP, yet the CNSC/OMC certainly proved helpful for mapping negotiation positions. The impact of JITAP in terms of contributing to formulation of national trade policy was zero. Table 6.3 summarises the results of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso.

As in Burkina Faso, the output of JITAP-I in **Tanzania** was diverse. The use of output in Tanzania was very limited. Facilities were installed but were not functioning. Unlike in Burkina Faso, the inter-institutional committee in Tanzania had no teeth. Without a budget and legal status, this committee was not able to effectively address the lack of coordination of public sector agencies in preparing multilateral trade negotiation positions and the limited knowledge of WTO issues in private sector associations. Neither was this committee used to organise a direct contribution to the formulation of the national trade policy document. Table 6.4 provides an overview of results of JITAP-I in Tanzania.

Table 6.3 Results of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso

Output	Outcome	Impact
1. Inter-institutional committee (CNSC/OMC) set up, with three statutory sub-committees and with annual budgets included in the regular state budget	1. CNSC/OMC held regular meetings and got heavily involved in preparations of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún; it drafted an overview of main negotiation positions	1. No contribution to formulation of national trade policy papers
2. National Enquiry Point on TBT and SPS established	2. Priority sectors for development of certificates and standards identified	2. The CNSC/OMC was functionally used by the Government to prepare negotiations at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún. Burkina Faso sent a large delegation to this MC. In a coalition of four cotton-producing African countries, Burkina Faso launched the high-profile proposal to abolish Western subsidies for growing cotton.
3. Communication and Discussion Facility set up	3. Communication and Discussion Facility was not utilised	
4. Two JITAP reference centres established	4. One JITAP reference centre was used, the other not	
5. Nine training workshops held and ten generalists trained	5. Understanding of public civil servants of multilateral trade issues was enhanced; association of trainers did not become active	
6. One workshop on customs	6. No follow-up to workshop on customs	
7. One WTO impact study	7. No legal adjustments made in line with conclusions of WTO impact study	
8. One report identifying potential export products and export markets; one export development strategy formulated for oleaginous products	8. Development strategy for oleaginous products understood and validated	
9. Trade secrets guide was not published		
10. Export financing book and export answer book not published		

Source: Lanser, P., Mwazyunga, P. and Wijmenga, P. (2004). Evaluation of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP). Country Reports of Burkina Faso and Tanzania. IOB Working Document.

Table 6.4 Results of JITAP-I in Tanzania

Output	Outcome	Impact
1. Inter-institutional committee established (with five sub-committees) but without budget and legal status	1. Inter-institutional committee organised few meetings; two of the five sub-committees were active	1. No contribution to national trade policy document nor to key issues of the Government in the implementation of its trade policy
2. National Enquiry Point on TBT and SPS established	2. National Enquiry Point could not realise awareness training due to lack of funds to cover operating costs	2. Contribution to capacity building of Tanzania in multilateral trade negotiation and implementation was limited: the work of two ICC sub-committees was helpful to discuss the WTO agenda on Agriculture/SPS and on Trade in Services. JITAP did not help Tanzania to build analytical skills to quickly assess multilateral trade negotiations.
3. Communication and Discussion Facility established	3. CDF not utilised	
4. Three JITAP Reference Centres established	4. Two of the three JITAP Reference Centres not functioning properly	
5. Nine training workshops held	5. Courses sensitised participants but they did nothing with the knowledge gained, nor did they train anybody; Institute on Multilateral Trade System exists on paper	
6. Two workshops held for officials of the Customs Department	6. Other technical assistance needs at Customs were not addressed	
7. Three MTS studies	7. No legal adjustments made as follow-up to MTS studies	
8. Assessment report of potential export products and export markets written; two export development strategies developed (for textiles & clothing and spices); one export financing book written but no export answer book	8. Strategies understood and validated for two products; export financing book was not sold. Guide on trade secrets was not released	

Source: Lanser, P., Mwazyunga, P. and Wijmenga, P. (2004). Evaluation of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP). Country Reports of Burkina Faso and Tanzania. IOB Working Document.

UNCTAD programme on Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment (PMFI)

The output of the UNCTAD programme of Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment consisted of technical papers, seminars and negotiation forums. Representatives of developing and developed countries expressed their appreciation of the technical papers. However, there was very little evidence of the contribution of these UNCTAD papers to analytical skills, or of UNCTAD papers being used for drafting texts for international investment agreements. Though regional seminars were appreciated because of their wide coverage, their contribution in terms of human capacity building could not be determined. One of the two negotiation forums facilitated by UNCTAD resulted in the conclusion of an unspecified number of Double Taxation Treaties. The other forum resulted in

Table 6.5 Results of PMFI of UNCTAD

Output	Outcome	Impact
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ten technical papers 2. One web-site on international investment agreement 3. Seminars: seven regional, one sub-regional and one interregional 4. Three seminars in Geneva and one informal pre-Seattle seminar 5. One pilot training course 6. Two forums (one in Geneva and one in Sri Lanka) 7. Two public-private sector dialogues 8. One BIT round (in Thailand) 	Could not be determined	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conclusion of eight bilateral investment treaties and an unspecified number of double taxation treaties. Two LDCs adjusted their investment policy and legislation. 2. Contribution to papers submitted by developing countries to WTO working group on trade and investment could not be determined.

Source: Liebrechts, R. and Wijmenga, P. (2004). Evaluation of Trade-Related Technical Assistance. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): Programmes on Investment and Competition. IOB Working Document

the conclusion of eight bilateral investment treaties. With the exception of two LDCs, the adjustment of investment policies and legislation at country level as a direct result of the PMFI could not be reported. In the period 1988-2003 10 countries submitted 19 papers to the WTO working group on trade and investment. No evidence was found of a direct relationship between the delivery of these papers and the PMFI.⁴⁵ Table 6.5 summarises the results of PMFI.

UNCTAD programme on Competition Law and Policy for African Countries (CLPAC)

UNCTAD produced a large number of technical papers and regional seminars on competition. However, UNCTAD could not provide a detailed account of what activities in this field were financed out of the trust fund of the programme of Competition Law and Policy for African Countries. The reports on investment-oriented technical assistance provided by UNCTAD included activities undertaken after the trust fund had expired. Given this situation, it seems likely that the output of the CLPAC consisted of technical papers, regional seminars and advice on competition legislation of individual countries. Table 6.6 only includes those activities that were delivered during the time frame of the trust fund. As regards the technical papers and regional seminars, there was very little evidence of their usefulness for the daily work of representatives of developing countries. Some 14 African countries that had received legal advice from UNCTAD staff adjusted their competition policy and legislation. Whereas only two African countries had prepared a trade policy review before the start of the trust fund of CLPAC, 10 African countries finalised their trade policy reviews for the WTO shortly after this trust fund terminated. However, for the present report it was impossible to determine the relationship between the CLPAC and this increase of trade policy reviews. Table 6.6 summarises the results of CLPAC.

45. Most papers were submitted by India (8), Costa Rica (4) and China (3). Only one paper involved two African LDCs.

Table 6.6 Results of CLPAC of UNCTAD

Output	Outcome	Impact
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. One annual paper and seven technical papers on competition law 2. Six country-specific comments on draft competition laws and four country-specific comments on draft competition bills 3. Five regional seminars 	Could not be determined	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Adjustment of competition policy and legislation in 14 African countries. Contribution to establishment of competition authorities in two African countries and UEMOA. 2. Contribution to trade policy reviews prepared by African countries could not be determined

Source: Liebrechts, R. and Wijmenga, P. (2004). Evaluation of Trade-Related Technical Assistance. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): Programmes on Investment and Competition. IOB Working Document

Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL)

The output of ACWL consisted mainly of giving members legal advice and assisting them to settle disputes. In addition, public sessions and courses on WTO law were held. The legal advice on whether to proceed with a case were not shelved by delegates but were followed up in nearly all cases. The input of ACWL in dispute settlement was considered crucial or useful by all delegates, even in the few cases in which the dispute was lost. All the different types of input of ACWL helped delegates to get a better understanding of WTO dispute settlement. In terms of impact, the contribution of ACWL was much less impressive. In the period 1995-1999 no African country had been a complainant in a dispute settlement of the WTO. This did not change after the establishment of ACWL at the end of 1999. In the period 2000-2003 no African country instigated a case at the WTO as a complainant. The difference between the number of cases brought to the WTO by members of ACWL before and after the creation of ACWL was very small. Table 6.7 presents the results of ACWL.

Table 6.7 Results of ACWL

Output	Outcome	Impact
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. legal advice on WTO law provided 35 times: 29 times to members, four times to non-member LDCs and twice to non-member developing countries 2. Support in 14 dispute settlement proceedings of members, six of these cases still running 3. Two courses on WTO law, two expert presentations, and occasional meetings or seminars 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Nearly all delegates followed up the advice of ACWL on whether or not to go ahead with a case 2. Delegates from the three countries that had won a dispute considered the input of ACWL as crucial. Delegates from three countries ending up with a settlement found the input of ACWL useful. Delegates from the two countries that had lost a dispute did not put the blame on ACWL 3. Training, legal advice and support during the process of dispute settlement helped delegates to get a better understanding of WTO dispute settlement 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ACWL contributed to new national law and regulations complying with WTO rules but provided no contribution to trade policy formulation of developing countries 2. ACWL was mainly approached and used by developing countries that were already active in the WTO and had been involved in dispute settlement in the past. The difference between the number of cases brought to the WTO by members of ACWL before and after the creation of ACWL was very small.

Source: Plaisier, N. and Wijmenga, P. (2004). Evaluation of Trade-Related Technical Assistance. Three Geneva-Based Organisations: ACWL, AITIC and QUNO. IOB Working Document.

Agency for International Trade, Information and Cooperation (AITIC)

The information delivered by AITIC consisted of easy-to-read background notes on various WTO issues in the three working languages of the WTO, a very extensive glossary of commonly used international trade terminology with particular references to the WTO, and hundreds of personalised replies to individual requests for information. Another output was the Early Warning System that regularly provides information to countries without a Geneva-based representative ('non-residents') on upcoming WTO meetings and their agenda. Information from AITIC mainly reached representatives of LDCs and developing countries in Geneva and EU capital cities, and also their capital cities. As well as delivering accessible and up-to-date information, AITIC organised seminars and informal meetings, often jointly with third parties. Participation was mixed, including representatives of developing countries, international organisations and the private sector. Well over half (>60 percent) of the participants were representatives of LDCs and developing countries.

The information supplied by AITIC helped representatives of LDCs and developing countries in different ways: to understand and follow WTO debates, to learn of upcoming events and/or to adopt a more informed negotiation position. While all respondents said they had acquired a better understanding of WTO issues as a result of AITIC's information service, most of their countries had not yet submitted a proposal to the WTO. Also, the size of their delegation in Geneva remained small. Most countries on which AITIC focused its assistance were not very active in the WTO and remained so. The contribution of AITIC to the formulation of a national pro-poor trade policy in the developing country on the basis of dissemination of information and some visits to non-residents was limited. Table 6.8 summarises the results of AITIC, specifying numbers where available.

Quakers United Nations Office (QUNO)

The output of the TRIPS programme of QUNO consisted of papers, informal meetings and seminars. These different types of output had different but complementary functions for delegates: the papers were used to identify and analyse current issues; the informal meetings were instrumental for exchanging views with other delegates and experts; the seminars in Geneva increased delegates' knowledge of long-term developments and issues. In contrast to the large numbers of people that received papers, the groups participating in the regular informal meetings at the Quaker House were small (10 – 15 people). Representatives of 12 developing countries, including India, participated in nearly

Table 6.8 Results of AITIC

Output	Outcome	Impact
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 30 background notes and working documents (in the three official languages of the WTO); one extensive glossary of international trade terminology; website on trade 2. 23 seminars and informal meetings 3. Answers to 280 specific requests for documents and advice 4. A quarterly publication giving an overview of upcoming WTO meetings (Early Warning System), translation of 26 documents and logistic support – for non-residents 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Concise and non-technical language of publications enabled country representatives to understand and follow debates in the WTO; every month on average 4,600 visitors consulted the website on trade 2. Seminars helped participants to get a better understanding of the WTO issues dealt with 3. Information of AITIC helped WTO delegates to better understand issues and adopt a more informed negotiation position 4. Non-resident delegates were informed by AITIC about upcoming events or meetings that they were unable to attend themselves 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Contribution to national pro-poor trade policy at country level was limited. 2. No increase of participation of WTO delegates of LDCs and developing countries in the WTO because their delegation remained small

Source: Plaisier, N. and Wijmenga, P. (2004). Evaluation of Trade-Related Technical Assistance. Three Geneva-Based Organisations: ACWL, AITIC and QUNO. IOB Working Document.

Table 6.9 Results of QUNO

Output	Outcome	Impact
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 30 discussion, issue, occasional and other papers 2. About 70 informal meetings of 10-15 persons 3. Five seminars in Geneva, two seminars in a developed country and five regional seminars 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase of technical knowledge on TRIPS that helped delegates of developing countries to analyse the debate and to determine their country's position in multilateral trade talks on intellectual property, health and biodiversity. 2. Informal meetings provided a forum and on a number of occasions helped developing countries to come up with a common position 3. Participants acquired knowledge of long-term development issues 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Contribution to formulation of pro-poor trade policy at country level was limited 2. Five proposals on TRIPS and health were submitted to the TRIPS Council of the WTO by countries that had actively participated in QUNO's informal meetings. QUNO had helped countries that actively took part in multilateral negotiation on TRIPS, resulting into two pro-poor decisions on TRIPS and health

Source: Plaisier, N. and Wijmenga, P. (2004). Evaluation of Trade-Related Technical Assistance. Three Geneva-Based Organisations: ACWL, AITIC and QUNO. IOB Working Document.

all of these informal meetings. A small number of LDCs also participated in the informal meetings but not as frequently as the 12 developing countries. On some occasions, delegates of developed countries, donor representatives and staff of international organisations (such as the South Centre, ICTSD and UNCTAD) also participated.

The multilateral negotiations on TRIPS and health resulted in two important WTO documents: the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, in November 2001, and the decision of the General Council on the implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, in August 2003. The first document emphasises the obligation of WTO

members to protect public health and promote access to medicines for all. The second document allows countries lacking adequate pharmaceutical manufacturing to issue a compulsory licence and import generic drugs from countries that do have such capacity. Both agreements are pro-poor regulations that limit the power of the Western pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. QUNO had helped countries that actively took part in the negotiations on TRIPS that led to the two agreements.

As QUNO focused its TRIPS programme on delegates in Geneva, its contribution to formulation of pro-poor trade policies at country level was limited. The regional seminars that were not core business of QUNO facilitated the exchange of views and experiences between national stakeholders on TRIPS legislation, biodiversity and traditional knowledge. Table 6.9 summarises the results of QUNO in the field of TRIPS.

6.4 Assessment of results

This section contains the assessment of results of the selected four multilateral programmes and three international NGOs or IGOs. The scores are presented per indicator, providing highlights for each programme or organisation. Annex 4 explains the rating methodology and Annex 5 provides detailed overviews of the rating for efficiency, effectiveness and relevance per case.

Efficiency

Two indicators were used to assess efficiency: the relationship between input and output and the delivery of output according to plan, budget and schedule. The relationship between input and output in each programme and organisation will now be discussed and then rated.

Under IF in Ethiopia and Yemen about USD 400,000 was spent in each country to produce a document: the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study. Both documents are comprehensive and lengthy. They summarise earlier (World Bank) studies but lack up-to-date and in-depth analysis of impediments of economic sectors to trade or effects of trade policies on employment and the poor. The input–output relationship of IF in Ethiopia is therefore rated as fair. For IF in Yemen this relationship is rated as weak because in that country there was not much more than just the DTIS and a national workshop. This contrasts with Ethiopia, where concrete ideas for TRTA/CB activities were also proposed.

Under JITAP-I in Burkina Faso and Tanzania about USD 1.5 million was spent in each country to set up a diverse set of institutional and information facilities and to produce strategic reports and handbooks. Burkina Faso had good performance in terms of institutional output. A major achievement was that the inter-institutional committee in Burkina Faso – in contrast to the one in Tanzania – was given legal status and entrusted with its own budget by the national government. Burkina Faso had weak performance in terms of delivering guide books (export financing and export answer books) and strategic reports on export development. The production of these reports was modest in Tanzania. In both countries, only one or two workshops for customs were organised. Considering all specific indicators in every country, the input–output relationship of JITAP-I in both Burkina Faso and Tanzania is rated as fair.

For a sum of USD 1.8 million UNCTAD staff delivered 10 technical papers and 12 planned seminars on the Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment. In addition, UNCTAD staff organised five ad-hoc meetings at the request of developing countries. The amount of time spent on the PMFI was very large: 107.6 man-months. Altogether, the input–output relationship of the programme of PMFI is rated as fair. About USD 600,000 of the trust fund of the UNCTAD programme of Competition Law and Policy for African Countries was spent. UNCTAD could not clarify which output had been achieved with which input from the trust fund. It is probable that the output included seven technical papers and five regional seminars on competition law. In sum, it was impossible to determine the input–output relationship of CLPAC, which suggests that UNCTAD administration was not managing CLPAC efficiently.

Despite having a relatively small staff, ACWL produced much legal advice and supported developing countries in a limited number of complex cases of dispute settlement. The advisory centre was able to provide output immediately after it became operational in 2001. The sum of money used to deliver output was substantial (CHF 4,283,000). Overall, the input–output relationship of ACWL can be rated as fair. Too little information was available on AITC input to be able to assess the input–output relationship. This lack of information may indicate inefficiency. QUNO produced much output with limited input, mainly using consultants as experts in a flexible way and supporting their own very small staff. About CHF 1 million of donor grants was used for the TRIPS programme in the period 1999–2003. The input–output relation for QUNO is therefore rated good to excellent.

As regards the delivery of output according to plan, budget and schedule, the programmes and organisations were rated as follows:

In both Ethiopia and Yemen the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study of IF was not delivered on time. Preparation took about twice as long as expected, if it is assumed that nine months is the benchmark preparation time of a DTIS. Both countries' efficiency in the writing of DTIS is rated as weak.

JITAP-I was too ambitious a programme: originally planned for a period of two and a half years, the first phase of JITAP lasted nearly twice as long. Delays in Burkina Faso and Tanzania were long, especially in the beginning, due to under-resourced focal points in the Ministries of Trade, long procurement procedures for equipment, and donors failing to supply funds at the agreed times. The management under JITAP-I, which operated from Geneva via regional coordinators and national facilitators was ineffective. For instance, in Burkina Faso and Tanzania JITAP-I did not reach its targets for the writing of strategic documents and guides. Altogether, in both Burkina Faso and Tanzania the efficiency of JITAP in terms of delivery according to plan, budget and schedule is rated as poor.

UNCTAD proved not to be an efficient channel or carrier of selected TRTA programmes. Of the 25 technical papers planned as part of the UNCTAD investment programme of PFMI, only 10 were delivered. These 10 papers turned out to be twice as costly as expected. Only one of the three planned pilot training courses was given. UNCTAD organised five meetings that had not been foreseen in the original work plan, adequately responding to ad-hoc requests for TRTA from developing countries. In spite of the unforeseen expenses, the total expenditure and total amount of working months under the investment programme of PFMI were slightly less than planned. Altogether, therefore, the efficiency of PFMI in terms of delivery of output according to plan, budget and schedule is rated as poor. The trust fund of the UNCTAD competition programme of CLPAC was underspent by about 40 percent. It was impossible to determine whether output was delivered according to plan, because of the lack of quantified indicators. Whether output was delivered according to schedule could not be determined because UNCTAD could not clarify which activities were financed out of the trust fund of the CLPAC. This lack of transparency may be considered an indicator of inefficiency. An additional assessment of UNCTAD's administration of trust funds and review of earlier reports showed frequent errors and repeated problems that point to poor efficiency of UNCTAD as a carrier and channel for providing TRTA.

The legal advice and support to dispute settlement of ACWL did not follow annual action plans but were demand-driven. Requests of delegates from developing countries set the agenda and were responded to in a timely fashion. ACWL was well endowed and underspent its budget (by over 50% in 2001 and about 30% in 2002). Though strictly speaking ACWL did not deliver according to plan and budget, its efficiency can be rated as fair because of the delivery upon demand and lack of budget overruns. As AITIC could provide no action plans and no financial data, it was impossible to ascertain whether its outputs had been according to plan, budget and schedule. QUNO carried out its activities largely in accordance with its budgets and work plans, showing good performance in this respect.

Table 6.10 summarises the efficiency ratings of the seven selected TRTA programmes and organisations. As a result of lack of information on input and/or output, it was impossible to measure the efficiency of the CLPAC of UNCTAD and AITIC. This lack of information suggests inefficiency.

Table 6.10 Efficiency ratings of seven selected cases

Programme/ Organisation	Relationship between input and output	Output delivered according to plan, budget and schedule	Average rating for efficiency
IF	in Ethiopia: F in Yemen: W	in Ethiopia: W in Yemen: W	W
JITAP	in Burkina Faso: F in Tanzania: F	in Burkina Faso: P in Tanzania: P	W
PMFI of UNCTAD	F	P	W
CLPAC of UNCTAD	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd
ACWL	F	F	F
AITIC	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd
QUNO	G/E	G	G

P= Poor, W= Weak, F= Fair, G= Good, E= Excellent, Cnbd= Could not be determined.

Effectiveness

As only a small number of officials of the Ministry of Trade of Ethiopia were involved in the preparation of the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study of IF, this preparation had limited effect in terms of contributing to the knowledge and analytical skills of individuals. In contrast to Ethiopia, in Yemen there was no ministry demonstrating commitment to IF. One side effect, however, was that some of the DTIS work was used by the WTO accession team from Yemen to draft the memorandums required for WTO accession. For both Ethiopia and Yemen, the effectiveness of DTIS in terms of contributing to knowledge and capacity of individuals is rated as weak.

In Burkina Faso the only facility of JITAP-I that was not a hollow shell and performed very well was the inter-institutional committee, which the government used to prepare its negotiations at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún. The Communication and Discussion Facility and one of the two reference centres were not used in Burkina Faso. The training workshops did indeed enhance the understanding of public servants of multilateral trade issues, but no association of trainers became active. As in Burkina Faso, in Tanzania the limited use of institutional and information facilities indicates that the effects in terms of knowledge generation and capacity building of individuals were limited. In Tanzania, only two of the five sub-committees of the inter-institutional committee were active. Two of the three reference centres were not functioning properly and the Communication and Discussion Facility was not used. Though JITAP-I scored slightly better in Burkina Faso than in Tanzania, in both countries the effectiveness of JITAP-I is rated as weak.

The effect of papers and seminars organised as part of the UNCTAD programmes of PFMI and CLPAC in terms of knowledge generation and capacity building of individuals could not be determined. Papers and seminars were 'appreciated' by representatives of both developing and developed countries. It was impossible to determine whether and to what extent technical papers and seminars strengthened the analytical skills of officials of developing countries and their ability to draft international investment agreements or competition law.

The three international NGOs or IGOs are rated 'good' in terms of effectiveness. The concise and technical information provided by AITIC helped representatives of developing countries to understand and follow debates in the WTO. Developing countries without a representative in Geneva were informed by AITIC about

upcoming WTO events or meetings that they were unable to attend. The legal advice of ACWL not only provided a greater understanding of WTO law but also made it very clear to delegates whether it was feasible to proceed with a case. In nearly all cases the advice was followed. The contribution of ACWL to complex dispute settlement procedures was considered crucial and useful by delegates from developing countries. The informal meetings and discussions of papers written by order of QUNO not only led to an increase of technical knowledge on TRIPS but also helped participants to analyse the debate on this issue, to determine their country's position and to come up with a common position.

Table 6.11 summarises the effectiveness ratings of the seven selected TRTA programmes.

Table 6.11 Effectiveness ratings of seven selected cases

Programme/organisation	Average effectiveness rating	
IF	in Ethiopia: W in Yemen: W	W
JITAP	in Burkina Faso: W in Tanzania: W	W
PFMI of UNCTAD		Cnbd
CLPAC of UNCTAD		Cnbd
ACWL		G
AITIC		G
QUNO		G

P= Poor, W= Weak, F= Fair, G= Good, E= Excellent, Cnbd= Could not be determined.

Relevance

Two indicators were used to assess relevance: the contribution to country-led formulation of national policies at the interface of trade and development, and the contribution to the capacity of a developing country to negotiate multilateral trade agreements.

In Ethiopia, some attention to trade and development was given before the start of the IF process, as part of the establishment of the PRSP. The Diagnostic Trade

Integration Study of IF elaborated the idea of trade as an engine for growth and to alleviate poverty as presented in the PRSP. One Ministry – of Trade and Industry – became actively involved in IF. Because of staff shortages at this ministry, however, external consultants largely undertook the DTIS. The contribution of the DTIS to national policies at the interface of trade and development in Ethiopia is therefore rated as weak to fair. In Yemen, no strong links were developed between the DTIS team and the PRSP unit. Neither was there any high-level political commitment to IF. Ministries were not greatly aware of IF and the private sector and civil society were not involved in the DTIS. Therefore DTIS's contribution in Yemen to pro-poor national trade policies is rated as poor. One positive spin-off from the preparation of the DTIS in Yemen, however, was that part of this work was useful for the Yemeni WTO accession team, as it helped them understand some of the issues relevant for accession. The contribution of the DTIS to negotiating multilateral agreements is rated poor to weak in Yemen and poor in Ethiopia.

The contribution of JITAP-I to national policy was weak in Burkina Faso and Tanzania. JITAP had no input in the new trade policy document in Tanzania released in 2003, which was produced with the assistance of a bilateral donor. Neither did JITAP help this country to build analytical skills to assess multilateral trade negotiation positions. In Burkina Faso, however, JITAP-I made a useful contribution to multilateral negotiations about raw cotton, the so-called Cotton Initiative: in a coalition of four cotton-producing African countries, Burkina Faso launched a high-profile proposal to abolish Western subsidies for growing cotton. JITAP was used by the Government of Burkina Faso to prepare for negotiations at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún.

UNCTAD produced a large number of papers and organised several regional seminars at country level to discuss the possibilities of a multilateral framework on investment. However, these did not lead to results at impact level: instead, two unplanned forums facilitated by UNCTAD resulted in the conclusion of eight bilateral investment treaties and an unspecified number of double taxation treaties. It was impossible to determine whether technical papers and the lessons drawn from regional seminars played any role at these forums. Furthermore, it was impossible to determine the relationship between PMFI and documents submitted by developing countries to the WTO working group on trade and investment during the implementation of PFMI. Finally, neither the papers, nor the seminars and forums resulted in a pro-poor multilateral agreement on investment being adopted at a WTO ministerial conference. As the usefulness of

UNCTAD technical papers and regional seminars was unclear, it was impossible to determine the relevance of the PMFI.

In the field of competition law and policy, UNCTAD also produced numerous papers and organised several seminars. UNCTAD staff helped 14 African countries to adjust their competition laws. However, it was not clear what papers, seminars and legal advice were actually funded out of the CPLAC trust fund. In addition, it could not be determined whether insights from UNCTAD papers and seminars in the field of competition law were used by officials from African countries. Nor was it possible to ascertain the relationship between CLPAC and trade policy reviews of African countries prepared for the WTO. Finally, the CLPAC competition programme did not lead to new trade policies being formulated for African countries. So, in all, it was impossible to determine the relevance of CLPAC.

Though delegates trying to win or settle a dispute settlement made use of the legal advice and support of ACWL, there was hardly any difference between the number of cases brought to the WTO by members of ACWL before and after the creation of ACWL. Prior to ACWL, no African country had started a case at the WTO as a complainant. This did not change after ACWL had been created. ACWL strengthened the capacity of those developing countries (e.g. India, Philippines and Thailand) that were already active in the WTO and had previously participated in dispute settlement. So, considering dispute settlement as a specific form of negotiation, ACWL is rated fair in terms of contributing to the negotiation capacities of developing countries. Its contribution to the formulation of trade policy in developing countries is rated weak, as that contribution was small, indirect and limited to legal issues: at the request of a few member countries, ACWL checked the compatibility of their new national laws with WTO obligations. On average, the relevance of ACWL is therefore rated weak to fair.

AITIC targets its activities on Geneva delegates and non-residents of developing countries in EU capital cities. The contribution of this organisation to national policy making in the capital cities of developing countries was weak. Sixty percent of the members of AITIC are LDCs, the others are developing countries (but not India, Philippines or Thailand). The impact of AITIC on the capacity of these members to negotiate multilateral trade agreements was weak. Although AITIC had contributed to delegates of developing countries understanding more with respect to WTO issues, nearly all member countries were and continue to be inactive in WTO negotiations. Altogether, the relevance of AITIC is rated as weak

QUNO clearly contributed to the capacity of developing countries to negotiate multilateral trade issues, particularly in the area of intellectual property rights. Countries that had actively participated in QUNO's informal meetings submitted five proposals on TRIPS and health to the WTO. The multilateral negotiations on TRIPS in which these countries had actively participated resulted in two pro-poor documents on TRIPS and health being adopted by the Ministerial Conference and General Council of the WTO. Though the WTO agreement on TRIPS and health is at a supra-national rather than national level, it is important for national policies because it allows individual developing countries to ignore the intellectual property rights of the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry so they can access cheap medicines to protect public health. The regional seminars facilitated by QUNO led to an exchange of views between different stakeholders at country level, not to the adoption of pro-poor trade policies or national laws on TRIPS. The relevance of QUNO is therefore rated as fair.

Table 6.12 summarises the ratings for relevance of the seven cases. The average ratings per programme or organisation for the two main indicators have not been calculated because one of the criteria for selecting cases was that programmes or organisations should aim to contribute to one or two specific Netherlands TRTA objectives: country-led identification of trade policy interests resulting in formulation of pro-poor national trade policy and/or strengthening of trade negotiation capacity of developing countries. To highlight the ratings of programmes or organisations pursuing main objectives similar to specific policy objectives of the Netherlands, the ratings have been presented in italics (see Table 6.12). The same approach has been used in the next section, in which ratings are presented per type of provider.

6.5 Overview of ratings per type of provider

In this section the average ratings for efficiency, effectiveness and relevance have been grouped together per type of TRTA provider. The following types of TRTA providers and provision are distinguished:

- Multilateral programmes versus international NGOs or IGOs.
- Country-based programmes with an institutional approach versus Geneva-based organisations directed at strengthening the analytical and/or negotiation skills of WTO delegates.
- Programmes providing assistance to LDCs and/or their representatives versus programmes providing assistance to non-LDCs.
- Integrated programmes versus single-issue programmes.

Table 6.12 Relevance ratings of seven selected cases

Programme/organisation	Relevance (1): contribution to formulation of national policy at interface of trade and development	Relevance (2): contribution to capacity of developing country to negotiate multilateral trade agreements
IF	in Ethiopia: W/F in Yemen: P	in Ethiopia: P in Yemen: P/W
JITAP	in Burkina Faso: W in Tanzania: W	in Burkina Faso: G in Tanzania: W
PMFI of UNCTAD	Cnbd	Cnbd
CLPAC of UNCTAD	Cnbd	Cnbd
ACWL	W	F
AITIC	W	W
QUNO	W/F	G

P= Poor, W= Weak, F= Fair, G= Good, E= Excellent, Cnbd= Could not be determined.

Table 6.13 Ratings of multilateral programmes versus international NGOs/IGOs

	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Relevance (1)	Relevance (2)
Multilateral programmes				
IF (in Ethiopia and Yemen)	W	W	W	P
JITAP (in Burkina Faso and Tanzania)	W	W	W	F
PMFI of UNCTAD	W	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd
CLPAC of UNCTAD	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd
International NGOs/IGOs				
ACWL	F	G	W	F
AITIC	Cnbd	G	W	W
QUNO	G	G	W/F	G

Ratings: P= Poor, W= Weak, F= Fair, G= Good, E= Excellent, Cnbd= Could not be determined.

Relevance (1) refers to contribution to formulation of national policy at the interface of trade and development. Relevance (2) refers to contribution to capacity of developing country to negotiate multilateral trade agreements. Italics indicate that the programme or organisation pursued main objectives similar to specific policy objectives of the Netherlands.

- Programmes targeting a wide audience with an academic approach versus programmes attracting a small audience with a functional approach tailored to clients' needs.

The efficiency of multilateral programmes was weak or could not be determined (see Table 6.13), which may be considered a sign of their inefficiency. The effectiveness or usefulness of their studies, papers and seminars was either weak or could not be demonstrated. The efficiency of selected NGOs/IGOs was fair or good (or could not be determined, which may be considered a sign of their inefficiency). The effectiveness of selected NGOs/IGOs was good: their papers, seminars and advice not only helped delegates to understand and follow debates in the WTO but also to adopt a more informed negotiation position, to formulate agreements or to prepare a case for dispute settlement.

The relevance of multilateral programmes in terms of contributing to the formulation of pro-poor national trade policy could not be determined or was low. Furthermore, international NGOs/IGOs did not contribute much to such formulation either, which is scarcely surprising given their focus on Geneva-based negotiations and delegates. These organisations, however, did reasonably well in what can be considered their niche in the market of TRTA: helping Geneva-based WTO delegates from developing countries to make use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism or to participate in WTO rule-making, except for AITIC. QUNO and also ACWL proved to be effective as tools to strengthen the negotiating capacity of developing countries or their use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism but did not reach the poorest developing countries (LDCs). JITAP in Burkina Faso was the only multilateral programme that proved to be useful for strengthening the negotiating capacity of a developing country (see Table 6.12). The national government of Burkina Faso used JITAP as an instrument to prepare and participate in multilateral trade negotiations.

Table 6.14 Ratings for country-based programmes versus Geneva-based organisations directed at WTO delegates from developing countries

	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Relevance (1)	Relevance (2)
Country-based programmes with an institutional approach				
IF (in Ethiopia and Yemen)	W	W	W	P
JITAP (in Burkina Faso and Tanzania)	W	W	W	F
Geneva-based organisations directed at WTO delegates				
ACWL	F	G	W	F
AITIC	Cnbd	G	W	W
QUNO	G	G	W/F	G

Ratings: P= Poor, W= Weak, F= Fair, G= Good, E= Excellent, Cnbd= Could not be determined.

Relevance (1) refers to contribution to formulation of national policy at interface of trade and development. Relevance (2) refers to contribution to capacity of developing country to negotiate multilateral trade agreements. Italics indicate that the programme or organisation pursued main objectives similar to specific policy objectives of the Netherlands.

The selected organisations that had provided TRTA to delegates of developing countries in Geneva were efficient and effective. The country-based programmes were not (see Table 6.14). As regards relevance, it can be concluded that with the exception of AITIC, the selected Geneva-based organisations were fairly successful in strengthening the participation of developing countries (but not LDCs) in WTO rule-making and dispute settlement, whereas country-based programmes generally failed to kick-start country-led formulation of national policies.

The assistance of Geneva-based organisations that target WTO delegates attracted representatives of non-LDCs, who found them useful. These organisations' efficiency and effectiveness proved to be good (see Table 6.15). However, though the country-based programmes of IF and JITAP (as studied in this evaluation) focused on LDCs, the assistance these programmes offered was not very relevant, either in contributing to country-led formulation of national policies

Table 6.15 Ratings of programmes providing assistance to LDCs versus organisations providing assistance to non-LDCs⁴⁶

	Efficiency	Effec- tiveness	Relevance (1)	Relevance (2)
Programmes providing assistance to LDCs				
IF (in Ethiopia and Yemen)	W	W	W	P
JITAP (in Burkina Faso and Tanzania)	W	W	W	F
Organisations providing assistance to non-LDCs				
ACWL	F	G	W	F
QUNO	G	G	W/F	G

Ratings: P= Poor, W= Weak, F= Fair, G= Good, E= Excellent, Cnbd= Could not be determined.

Relevance (1) refers to contribution to formulation of national policy at interface of trade and development.

Relevance (2) refers to contribution to capacity of developing country to negotiate multilateral trade agreements. Italics indicate that the programme or organisation pursued main objectives similar to specific policy objectives of the Netherlands.

or in strengthening the capacity of LDCs to prepare and negotiate their position at multilateral trade talks (see Table 6.15). One exception was JITAP in Burkina Faso. The Government of that country used JITAP to prepare its participation and negotiation at the Ministerial Conference of Cancún (see Table 6.12).

Both IF and JITAP were conceived as programmes that ‘aim to enhance trade as an integral part of development strategies for least developed and other low-income countries’ (Progress Report on Developing Global Partnerships 2004: 23). Such integrated or institutional programmes (of three or more multilateral agencies following a holistic approach to TRTA or aiming at linking trade and development) were not efficient (see Table 6.16). UNCTAD’s results from its single-issue programmes (focusing on a particular problem or multilateral issue) could not be determined, mainly due to its poor administration. The single-issue programmes of ACWL and QUNO, however, were efficient and effective.

46. AITIC has not been included in this table because its membership is mixed: 60% LDC members and 40% non-LDC members.

Table 6.16 Ratings of integrated programmes versus single-issue programmes

	Efficiency	Effec- tiveness	Relevance (1)	Relevance (2)
Integrated programmes				
IF (in Ethiopia and Yemen)	W	W	W	P
JITAP (in Burkina Faso and Tanzania)	W	W	W	F
Single-issue programmes (of organisations)				
ACWL	F	G	W	F
QUNO	G	G	W/F	G
PMFI of UNCTAD	W	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd
CLPAC of UNCTAD	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd

Ratings: P= Poor, W= Weak, F= Fair, G= Good, E= Excellent, Cnbd= Could not be determined.

Relevance (1) refers to contribution to formulation of national policy at interface of trade and development.

Relevance (2) refers to contribution to capacity of developing country to negotiate multilateral trade agreements. Italics indicate that the programme or organisation pursued main objectives similar to specific policy objectives of the Netherlands.

It was impossible to determine whether and to what extent seminars and general papers produced by UNCTAD and offered to a wide audience were actually used by beneficiaries. The functional and client-oriented approach of ACWL and QUNO, taking the problem statement of individual countries as the starting point and offering discussion facilities and advice during different phases of a negotiation process, was effective (see Table 6.17).⁴⁷

Some of this approach could also be seen in the activities of UNCTAD's programmes on investment and competition. In the cases of the facilitation of round tables at the request of developing countries and of the provision of legal and country-specific advice, results were realised at the impact level (in the form of the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties and adjustment of national competition law). However, it was impossible to determine whether these UNCTAD activities contributed to human resource development (knowledge generation, analytical skills, negotiating capabilities of individuals). Neither was

47. For a brief description of some characteristics of the functional approach to TRTA, see the three approaches as identified in section 5.2.

Table 6.17 Ratings of programmes targeting a wide audience, with an academic approach, versus programmes attracting a small audience, with a functional approach tailored to clients' needs

	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Relevance (1)	Relevance (2)
Academic approach (knowledge transfer through seminars and papers)				
PMFI of UNCTAD	W	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd
CLPAC of UNCTAD	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd	Cnbd
Customised long-track approach				
ACWL	F	G	W	F
QUNO	G	G	W/F	G

Ratings: P= Poor, W= Weak, F= Fair, G= Good, E= Excellent, Cnbd= Could not be determined. Relevance (1) refers to contribution to formulation of national policy at interface of trade and development. Relevance (2) refers to contribution to capacity of developing country to negotiate multilateral trade agreements. Italics indicate that the programme or organisation pursued main objectives similar to specific policy objectives of the Netherlands.

it possible to determine whether UNCTAD comments had been decisive in the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties and adjustment of national competition law. At the same time, there were indications that developing countries were using UNCTAD's facilities (forum) to do what they wanted to do anyway (conclude bilateral investment and double taxation treaties).

6.6 Comparing the results with the findings of earlier evaluations

Prior to the IOB evaluation, the three selected international NGOs/IGOs had not been evaluated by independent consultants.

IF, which was launched in 1997, was reviewed in 2000 and evaluated in 2004 by independent consultants. The primary objective of the evaluation was ‘to make recommendations that strive for continuous improvement in the implementation and results achieved by the IF’. Consequently, the evaluation focused on identifying issues that were hampering the progress of the IF, rather than on what had been achieved so far and on recording the results at country level. Though the review and evaluation cannot be used to compare results of the IOB evaluation, they help to put these results in perspective and to allow them to be compared with other findings of the IOB evaluation related to ownership, demand-led approaches and needs assessment. This will be dealt with in chapter 7.

The only programmes that had earlier been subjected to product evaluation are the technical cooperation programmes of UNCTAD: in 2002 a meta-evaluation was conducted on 12 programme evaluation reports on the basis of DAC evaluation criteria. Though the main objective of the policy review of UNCTAD’s technical cooperation programmes in 1994 was not the measuring and assessing of results, that review does mention these programmes’ results in the fields of human resources development, national policy development and strengthening of negotiation capacities. JITAP was subjected to a summative evaluation in 2002, from which results in terms of output, outcome and impact can be extracted.

UNCTAD technical cooperation programmes

In 1994 a policy review of UNCTAD technical cooperation programmes was conducted (see Box 6.1). The findings of this review are strikingly similar to those of the present and much more focused IOB evaluation: the review could not say with certainty whether training activities had actually been instrumental to officials; UNCTAD seemed to serve the interests of a broad audience, not those of developing countries only; there was no significant evidence of research and analysis being translated into policymaking in developing countries, or of the intellectual expertise available in selected developing countries being mobilised for this purpose.

Box 6.1 Policy review of UNCTAD's technical cooperation programmes

The objective of the policy review of UNCTAD's technical cooperation programmes (1994) was to advise the Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD on how 'technical cooperation should be strengthened, expanded with the resources available and integrated into all relevant areas of UNCTAD work'. Though the main objective was not the measuring and assessing of results, the overview of the strengths and weaknesses of UNCTAD's technical cooperation programmes does mention the results: see below.

The following output was reported as human resource development: 'around 4,000 persons have been trained each year in various fields'. However, there was 'little hard information on types of participants, their subsequent deployment and their perception of training'.

As a result, the evaluators cautiously reported about outcome, saying that, 'UNCTAD training activities [...] appear to have been instrumental in equipping a large number of relevant officials of developing countries with a basic knowledge of trade issues' (p.15).

As regards the impact of UNCTAD in terms of strengthening the negotiating capacity of developing countries, the evaluators reported the following: 'Developing countries have been virtually unanimous in saying that such projects [of high quality research] were of invaluable assistance in enabling them to deal with market access, in responding to developments in the services sector and in intellectual property, and for those countries which are seeking to enter GATT, in clarifying the implications of accession' (p. 11-12). At the same time, the evaluators put this result into perspective, observing that, 'UNCTAD's assistance did not only strengthen the negotiation capacities of developing countries but served the interests of all parties by elucidating a number of substantive issues and so assisting in policy development' (p.12). It was impossible to determine the impact of UNCTAD in terms of contributing to national policy development: 'There is no significant evidence that such research and analysis is translated into policymaking in developing countries'. In this connection, a shortcoming of UNCTAD's assistance was explicitly mentioned: 'the relative failure to be more attentive to the potential for institutional development in developing countries, or to use to the maximum the intellectual expertise available in selected developing countries' (ibid).

Source: Anstee, Margaret J. and De Silva, L., Review and Evaluation of Work Programme (Mid-Term). Policy Review of Technical Cooperation of UNCTAD. March 1994.

In 2002 a meta-evaluation was conducted of 12 programme evaluation reports of UNCTAD programmes of technical cooperation. The experiences of the independent evaluators are very similar to those of the IOB evaluation team and those of Haarberg (2002), who conducted a comparative review of UNCTAD, WTO and ITC: it was impossible to determine the results because appropriate data were not available and emphasis had been put on activities rather than outcome. Haarberg concluded that ‘Concerning the management of technical cooperation activities, there is a scarcity of measurable performance indicators. [...] UNCTAD’s reporting is based primarily on input indicators’ (p.5). A review of UNCTAD administration of trust funds as conducted as part of the present IOB evaluation revealed frequent administrative errors, lack of transparency, and lack of common procedures on project formulation, monitoring and evaluation (Liebrechts and Wijmenga 2004: 44-46).

Box 6.2 *What can be learnt from the meta-evaluation of UNCTAD’s technical cooperation activities?*

In 2002 a meta-evaluation was conducted of capacity building in UNCTAD’s technical cooperation activities. Its objective was ‘to assess the performance of these activities as far as capacity building is concerned, to link such performance to underlying explanatory factors and to make recommendations with a view to improving UNCTAD’s delivery in capacity building in the future.’ Capacity building was defined as ‘the ability of a technical assistance programme to enable beneficiary countries to perform and sustain targeted functions on their own as a direct result of that programme’. Twelve programme evaluation reports of UNCTAD programmes of technical cooperation were selected for assessment of capacity building performance along five dimensions:

- I. Relevance (defined as appropriateness of an activity in terms of national priority and in relation to capacity shortcomings).*
- II. Effectiveness (defined as achieving objectives defined prior to the implementation of a programme).*
- III. Efficiency (defined as input/output ratio).*
- IV. Sustainability (defined as survival potential once support has been terminated).*
- V. Impact (no definition provided).*

The evaluators could not draw conclusions on efficiency because programme evaluation reports ‘claim that appropriate data are not available to assess efficiency in any meaningful manner’ (p.11).

Box 6.2 Continued

Neither could the evaluators draw conclusions on sustainability and impact as these were not adequately addressed in the programme evaluation reports. Performance could only be assessed for two parameters: relevance and effectiveness. And even for these two dimensions, the reliability of findings was not beyond doubt. Whereas nearly all the respondents were positive about the appropriateness of UNCTAD's technical assistance programmes, five of the 12 selected programme evaluations reported major capacity shortcomings. Based on their review of the programme evaluation reports, the evaluators stated that seven of these programmes scored well or very well in terms of effectiveness, adding that, 'placing the emphasis on activities rather than on outcomes is no substitute for effectiveness'. Summing up, very little could be learnt from the evaluation of programme evaluations because of the limited scope of these evaluations and lack of the data necessary to assess performance. The meta-evaluation of capacity building in UNCTAD's technical cooperation activities showed that according to beneficiaries and other stakeholders the selected 12 UNCTAD technical assistance programmes only scored well in terms of appropriateness. The meta-evaluation could not draw conclusions on the efficiency, sustainability and impact of these selected 12 programmes, and its conclusion on effectiveness was tentative.

Source: Denis, Jean-Emile, Saha, H. and Griffiths, D. 2002. Evaluation of capacity building in UNCTAD's Technical Cooperation Activities. Prepared for the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board. TD/B/WP/155.

Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP)

In 2002 JITAP was subjected to a summative evaluation (see Box 6.3). The objective, scope and general conclusion of this evaluation differ from those of the present IOB evaluation. The objective of the summative evaluation was to improve the implementation and procedure, rather than to record and assess results. The geographical scope of this evaluation was broad: the evaluation covered all eight African countries of JITAP, whereas the focus of the IOB evaluation was on two countries. The general conclusion of the summative evaluation was positive: the glass is half full. The evaluators expected training activities, reference centres and support to customs to produce results in the future. The IOB evaluation focussing on Burkina Faso and Tanzania showed that there was little follow-up to training activities, reference centres were not functioning, and very little was actually being done in the field of customs. The overall conclusion of IOB evaluation research of JITAP in Burkina Faso and Tanzania was that though something had been poured into the glass, it was left alone and quickly evaporated.

As regards impact, however, the summative evaluation and the IOB evaluation of results of JITAP are strikingly similar. Both studies conclude that JITAP has failed to contribute to the formulation of country-based export-sector strategies or pro-poor national trade policy documents. Both studies also conclude that the country-based Inter-Institutional Committee has helped some participating countries to prepare and play an active role at multilateral trade negotiations in Doha. Related to this, both studies also point out the importance of a positive response from the national government in facilitating and using JITAP for its own purposes. In the summative evaluation, Kenya is singled out as the outstanding example. It is described as the country 'which has performed most effectively out of eight JITAP countries'. Kenya had only half the resources available to other countries. In the IOB evaluation, Burkina Faso stands out, because its government used the inter-institutional committee effectively for its negotiation purposes at the WTO ministerial conference in Doha.

Box 6.3 Summative evaluation of JITAP

The objective of the summative evaluation of JITAP (2002) is not explicitly formulated but mentions that it 'should be seen in the context of the mid-term evaluation, as many observations made therein are still relevant'. The objective of the mid-term evaluation of JITAP (2000) was 'to improve the implementation and procedures'.

The independent consultants of the summative evaluation (2002) were of the view that 'the glass is more than half full, as it [JITAP] has many achievements to its credit, while there is at the same time the realisation that its potential has not been fully realised and that it could have performed significantly better than it has done so far'. To substantiate their view that the glass is more than half full, the evaluators refer to the following output, outcome and impact:

In the field of human resource development, the following output is reported: 'A total of about 500 persons have been trained through one-week and three-week seminars and these trainees have then converted themselves as trainers and have in turn undertaken training and familiarisation activities in their own countries'. Having said this, the evaluators expect that, 'many if not all of those who have received training can in turn become trainers themselves'.

In the field of trade infrastructure (laws governing trade; customs; reference centres and information points), the evaluators refer to the following output: 'JITAP has provided narrowly focussed technical assistance and training as well as equipment and

Box 6.3 Continued

documentation'. The evaluators expect that having been provided with these facilities the customs authorities have acquired the capacity to implement the new valuation system required by the WTO. Also, they expect the reference centres to play an important role in JITAP. At the same time the evaluators show that outcome (the actual use of these facilities) is unclear, unforeseen or still limited. The extent to which reference centres are used by businesses for market survey/promotion work is unclear. In some countries, foreign companies make more use of the services of national enquiry points than national companies. In other countries, trade laws have not been drafted, let alone passed; for instance, most countries have no anti-dumping or safeguard legislation.

In the field of policy development and domesticating the MTS, the evaluators refer to the following outcome. First of all, they conclude that JITAP has played an important role in making MTS issues familiar in the eight countries in which it has been implemented. Second, they conclude that JITAP has enabled MTS issues to be discussed not only within government but also with the private sector and civil society. The evaluators also refer to impact in the field of negotiation capacity, concluding that JITAP has enabled 'many of its participating countries, especially those of East Africa', to play an articulate role in multilateral trade negotiations, particularly in Doha. Much of the preparation for multilateral trade negotiations of participating countries was undertaken by the Inter-Institutional Committees (IICs) of JITAP.

Four findings are included in the summative evaluation that explain why as per 2002 the glass of JITAP is not only half full but also half empty:

- I. The 15-cluster approach to TRTA has contributed to extensive fragmentation and the loss of a holistic perspective at the field level.
- II. Human resource development has largely focused on government institutions – not engaging local universities, business schools and similar bodies in building up HRD capacities.
- III. In spite of the establishment of IICs and the familiarisation and facilitation of discussion on MTS issues at the national level, not a single country has completed an export-sector strategy.
- IV. The link between trade and poverty issues was not an explicit feature of JITAP.

Source: De Silva, L. and Weston, A. (2002). Report of the Summative Evaluation of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP).

Reviewing the evaluations of selected multilateral TRTA activities leads to the following three observations. First, a common feature of nearly all these evaluations of multilateral TRTA activities is that they are not based on assessments of results, though very often the objective is to improve the programme. Second, multilateral agencies have themselves been heavily engaged in the selection of independent consultants for the evaluation of their own programmes, for instance, ITC on behalf of the three lead agencies of JITAP. Furthermore, evaluations of TRTA programmes were conducted by former and present managers of a programme. The summative evaluation report of JITAP in Tanzania, for instance, was written by a national consultant involved in the JITAP programme. In such cases, there is no strong inbuilt incentive to demonstrate why the glass is half empty. As a result, the evaluation reports give an overoptimistic picture of programmes. Thirdly, surveys to measure client satisfaction (using participant evaluation forms) are used as the principal tools to 'evaluate' programmes. Evaluations of UNCTAD programmes, for example, often draw their conclusions by measuring the appreciation of beneficiaries.

Such evaluations are not in accordance with guidelines and prescriptions for monitoring and evaluation as stipulated by the Ministry of Finance in the Dutch Regulation on Performance Data and Evaluation Research by the Government (RPER 2002). This regulation, for instance, prescribes the formulation of target values as quantifiable performance indicators and the specification of end terms. The question remains whether the Netherlands can apply guidelines and prescriptions for research done by its own Ministry of Finance to evaluate multilateral TRTA programmes.

6.7 Conclusions

Efficiency and effectiveness

1. The four selected multilateral programmes were neither efficient nor effective in terms of contributing to knowledge, understanding and skills of individual beneficiaries. The 'highlights' per programme are listed below.
 - A considerable sum of money invested in IF in Ethiopia and Yemen was spent on writing diagnostic trade integration studies. They mainly summarised earlier World Bank documents and lacked in-depth analysis of the effects of trade policies on employment and the poor. It took twice as long as expected to do these studies and they had limited effects in terms of contributing to the knowledge and analytical

- skills of local officials, as only a small number of people were involved.
 - Many facilities of JITAP in LDCs visited (Burkina Faso and Tanzania) were just an hollow shell. Programme implementation took nearly twice as long as planned. JITAP was too ambitious.
 - UNCTAD did not manage the trust funds of the two selected programmes on competition and investment in a transparent way. UNCTAD was not an efficient channel or carrier of these technical assistance programmes.
2. The three selected international NGOs and IGOs were effective. Two of them were also efficient. The highlights per organisation are given below.
 - With a relatively small staff and large budget, ACWL formulated much legal advice and supported developing countries in a limited number of complex cases of dispute settlement. ACWL delivered not according to plan and budget but according to the demand from clients – and did so in a timely fashion.
 - The output of AITIC was large and diverse. Unfortunately, it was impossible to determine the efficiency of AITIC, due to the lack of action plans and financial data.
 - With a relatively small staff and small budget, QUNO produced a lot of output – largely in accordance with its own budget and work plans.
 3. In the countries visited the country-based and integrated programmes operating in LDCs (IF and JITAP) were neither efficient nor effective. The Geneva-based and single-issue programmes of international organisations serving representatives of non-LDCs (ACWL and QUNO) were efficient and effective.
 4. Programmes following an academic approach or a giving-ownership-to-LDCs approach proved to be neither efficient nor effective. However, programmes following a functional approach tailored to the needs of clients proved to be efficient and effective: ⁴⁸
 - The two selected UNCTAD programmes followed an issue-wise and academic approach. Their effectiveness could not be determined. What had actually been done or achieved by individual beneficiaries of UNCTAD TRTA remained unclear.
 - The multilateral agencies of IF strongly emphasised the importance of giving ownership to LDCs. However, in the countries visited, IF was

48. For a brief description of these three approaches, see section 5.2.

not efficient or effective (in terms of contributing to the knowledge, understanding and skills of individual beneficiaries).

- ACWL and QUNO followed a single-issue approach but very much tailored to the problems and needs of individual clients or representatives of developing countries. This approach proved to be efficient and effective.

Relevance

5. In the LDCs visited (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Yemen), IF and JITAP did not prove to be effective tools in terms of contributing to the ability of countries to formulate pro-poor trade policies. The relationships between trade and poverty alleviation were poorly addressed by multilateral agencies of IF and JITAP, which were supposedly assisting LDCs to use trade as an engine for growth and to alleviate poverty.
6. The contribution of the two UNCTAD technical assistance programmes on investment and competition to country-led and pro-poor formulation of trade policies of developing countries and to negotiation capacities of developing countries could not be determined.
7. JITAP was effectively used by the national government of Burkina Faso to prepare negotiations at multilateral trade talks, but not so in Tanzania. QUNO and ACWL proved to be effective tools in terms of strengthening negotiation capacity of developing countries. AITIC was not able to transform the representatives of small missions of LDCs and non-LDCs into active negotiators at WTO meetings.

Comparing the results with the findings of earlier evaluations

8. The findings of the IOB evaluation as regards the two selected UNCTAD programmes are not unique. A review of UNCTAD administration of trust funds conducted as part of the present IOB evaluation revealed frequent errors, lack of transparency, and lack of common procedures on project formulation, monitoring and evaluation. The findings of the IOB evaluation are also strikingly similar to those of earlier policy review and meta-evaluation of UNCTAD technical assistance programmes:
 - Results could not be determined because data were not available, data management was not transparent and objectives had been formulated as activities.

- It could not be determined whether training activities had been useful for officials.
 - There was no significant evidence of research and analysis being translated into policymaking in developing countries.
9. The summative evaluation (2002) of JITAP covering all 8 African participating countries concluded that JITAP failed to contribute to the formulation of pro-poor export-sector strategies. The evaluation of JITAP in Burkina Faso and Tanzania as conducted as part of the IOB evaluation, confirms this finding.
10. The summative evaluation (2002) of JITAP concluded that the inter-institutional committee of JITAP in Kenya played an important role in preparing Kenya's participation in multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha. The IOB field research came to the same conclusion, but for the inter-institutional committee of JITAP in Tanzania.

Double evaluation standards

11. Evaluations of multilateral programmes that aim to improve the programme give low priority to measuring the results in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance. Target values to quantify and assess performance are not used or designed. Value-for-money is not demonstrated. A common conclusion is that the glass is half full and more can be expected from the programme. Such evaluations are not in accordance with guidelines and prescriptions for monitoring and evaluation as stipulated by the Dutch Ministry of Finance. The question remains whether the Netherlands can apply guidelines and prescriptions for evaluation research of its own Ministry of Finance in evaluations of multilateral TRTA programmes funded or co-funded by the Netherlands.

7 Assessing the Dutch approach to TRTA on the basis of case studies

This chapter is an assessment on the basis of case studies of the approach to TRTA as advocated by the Netherlands. The Netherlands is a strong supporter of targeting TRTA to LDCs, demand-led approaches and ownership of TRTA programmes as well as co-ordination of TRTA by multilateral agencies and bilateral donors. This chapter questions whether the focus on LDCs was put into practice in the multilateral programmes and international organisations selected for this evaluation and whether a focus on LDCs is justified. It also reports on what ownership or giving ownership meant and whether co-ordination by multilateral and bilateral agencies actually took place. By describing different elements of the Dutch approach of TRTA on the basis of case studies, this chapter sets out not only to assess this approach, but also to provide plausible explanations of the performance of selected multilateral programmes and international organisations.

As the evidence comes from only four multilateral programmes and three international organisations, care must be taken when drawing general conclusions on the Dutch approach to TRTA. It should be added, however, that information on the focus on LDCs, ownership and coordination – not as theories or principles but in terms of whether and how these theories and principles have been put into practice – is scarce. To determine whether the IOB observations and qualifications with respect to LDC focus, ownership and coordination are unique or not, the appraisals and judgements of other evaluators on these issues and programmes have been added.

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section discusses the selection and attraction of LDCs and non-LDCs. The second section discusses demand-led approaches and giving ownership to LDCs. The third section discusses agency and donor coordination of TRTA. In the fourth section some conclusions are drawn.

7.1 Focus on LDCs or non-LDCs: selecting or attracting the right target countries?

The Netherlands is a strong supporter of targeting TRTA to poorest countries because these countries most lack the capacity to negotiate and address supply-side constraints. The seven cases, however, show that the countries actually selected included non-LDCs as well. They also show that LDCs not only lack negotiation capacity and pro-poor trade policies but also the capacity to manage and absorb multilateral TRTA programmes intended to address their limitations. TRTAs intended to strengthen negotiation capacity of delegates from developing countries in Geneva attract non-LDCs.

IF focuses solely on LDCs. Within JITAP-I the Netherlands earmarked its financial support to the four LDCs that participated in that programme. However, the criteria for admitting LDCs to IF and JITAP were very general and unclear. The field studies of these multilateral programmes showed that no selection criteria had been formulated, let alone applied, in terms of high-level political commitment. Neither were criteria formulated in terms of financial-economic infrastructure. Also, there were no specifications of the ways and the extent to which the ruling class should be working on improving the economic governance of a country.

In the countries visited there was a mismatch between services offered by IF and JITAP and the capacity to absorb these services. The Ministries of Trade and Planning did not have enough human resources or capacity to absorb these multi-agency and multi-activity programmes. For instance, JITAP-I involved three multilateral agencies and 15 clusters of technical assistance, requiring the implementation of ‘more than 1,000 project activities’ (Haefliger et al., 2000) in two and a half years. It appeared that the few people who were responsible for IF and JITAP programmes in the ministries were overloaded with work. Often the same people were also involved in WTO accession or implementation issues. Capacity-building activities were hindered, simply because there were insufficient human resources in the relevant institutions. Thus the institutions’ capacity for capacity-building programmes was low. This constrained the possibilities of implementing the large and comprehensive programmes of IF and JITAP according to the timetable and also explains the low efficiency ratings.⁴⁹ A lack of human resources also limited the possibilities of local officials formulating their own ideas and actively steering the programme. The independent consultants

49. For an overview of ratings of programmes focused on LDCs and organisations serving non-LDCs see section 6.5.

conducting ex-ante, mid-term and summative evaluations of JITAP put it this way: the programme is too ambitious and run from Geneva (Tertium Consulting 1999, Haefliger et al. 2000, De Silva and Weston 2002).

The UNCTAD programme of Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment (PMFI) did not focus on LDCs but instead served a wide range of countries all over the world. Regional seminars were held in Asia and Latin America but not in Africa. UNCTAD reported that representatives of 41 out of 49 LDCs attended one of the regional seminars of the PMFI. The UNCTAD programme on Competition Law and Policy for African countries (CLPAC) did indeed focus on African countries. The 14 African countries in which competition policy and legislation were adjusted included eight LDCs.

QUNO and ACWL, the two organisations with highest performance ratings, mainly worked with representatives of non-LDCs in Geneva. Although QUNO did not have a specific policy for targeting countries, it mainly attracted developing countries that were already quite active in the WTO, as these countries were most interested in detailed discussions about developments in negotiations on TRIPS and in making new proposals. ACWL also mainly served developing countries that were already active in the WTO and had a basic understanding of their rights and obligations under the WTO. LDCs made hardly any use of the services provided by QUNO and ACWL. Not one African country made use of the services of ACWL to start a case at the WTO as a complainant. As the beneficiary countries of QUNO and ACWL already had some knowledge and experience in multilateral trade negotiations, the technical assistance provided to these countries fell on fertile soil and had a strong impact: the capacity of these non-LDC countries to negotiate in dispute settlement or to effectively participate in the drafting of multilateral trade regulations was strengthened as a result of the services of QUNO and ACWL.

In contrast, AITIC focused on Least Advantaged Countries (LACs), which are countries that traditionally have not participated actively in the multilateral trading system and which include LDCs, several low- and middle-income developing countries, and several economies in transition. Most of these countries have small missions and not enough human resources to be able to closely monitor and participate in the work of the WTO. Although AITIC contributed to increasing the understanding of its beneficiaries on WTO issues, it was too small to change these countries into active players, largely because the delegations of these countries remained small in terms of staff.

7.2 Demand-led approaches and ownership

The Netherlands attaches much importance to demand-led approaches and to developing countries owning TRTA programmes. All the selected programmes and organisations conducted needs assessments or claimed to follow a demand-led approach but each did so in its own way. In fact, the terms ‘demand-led’ and ‘ownership’ covered a wide variety of approaches. It was not always clear whether the supplier of TRTA assumed or assessed needs, giving the targeted beneficiaries scope to express what they want most or what they want first. Likewise, it was not clear what was actually meant by ownership or by giving ownership of a TRTA programme to an LDC.

Needs assessments and demand-led approaches

On the one hand, the six multilateral agencies of IF believed that LDCs need to mainstream trade into development. On the other hand, these agencies attached great importance to problem diagnosis and assessment of TRTA needs in the form of relatively lengthy diagnostic trade integration studies, in which different ministries were expected to play a leading role and input was also expected from the private sector and civil society. In the countries visited, however, broad participation of different ministries, private sector and civil society during the problem diagnosis and assessment of needs was not realised. For the needs assessment of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso and Tanzania, a traditional approach was followed: ITC, UNCTAD and WTO conducted joint and short missions after which the beneficiary country was invited to comment on the mission’s findings. Needs assessments under IF and JITAP were two stand-alone exercises. In Tanzania a DTIS was conducted in 2003, while at the same time in a separate exercise the programming of the second phase of JITAP was discussed.

The terms of reference for UNCTAD’s investment programme of PMFI were discussed annually with developing countries in conformity with UNCTAD’s mandate. However, it remained unclear to what extent LDCs were actually involved in those discussions. Under UNCTAD’s competition programme of CLPAC, technical assistance was provided on the basis of requests from developing countries. This led to the extreme situation that originally planned project activities were not executed if and when – some time during the project period – developing countries demanded funding of other activities. As a result, it was very difficult to monitor and evaluate the programme. AITIC provided accessible and up-to-date information to a broad audience but also replied to the specific demands of representatives of developing countries. ACWL followed a practical

and client-oriented approach, with its agenda being determined by requests from its members for legal advice and assistance in dispute settlement. QUNO took an interactive and informal approach in its needs assessments. The NGO consulted its world-wide network and organised informal dialogues with delegates in Geneva. In that way, QUNO achieved excellent problem analyses which it used to provide its clients with the desired know-how and expertise, closely following ongoing multilateral discussions and negotiations. Hence, the timing of QUNO's activities was also in accordance with its clients' demands.

Ownership

The multilateral agencies of IF greatly emphasised the importance of ownership of LDCs. However, in Yemen the country ownership of IF in the sense of high political commitment to the framework was poor. No single ministry had adopted a proactive role in steering the IF. In Ethiopia, country ownership of IF was limited to one ministry. In both Ethiopia and Yemen, country ownership of IF in the sense of strong involvement of private sector and civil society was also poor. In both countries, the private sector and civil society were hardly involved in the IF process and as a result lacked ownership.

Strong political and society-wide commitment to IF was complicated in Yemen and Ethiopia because of confusion and disagreement about IF's key concept of mainstreaming trade into development. The mainstreaming of trade into development appeared to be a very abstract concept for the relevant ministries and private sector organisations. In the ministries there was confusion about where IF programmes should first look for trade opportunities: in the existing domestic enterprise structures, including small and medium-sized enterprises, or, alternatively, in existing trade patterns, for example of the oil sector or free economic zones. If they were aware of IF, ministries in Ethiopia and Yemen were interested in the framework primarily because they saw it as a source of funding and much less so because they subscribed to the – in their view, vague – concept of mainstreaming of trade into development. The private sector in these countries was unfamiliar with IF's focus on trade. It saw investment, not trade, as the engine for growth and employment, and considered a country's investment climate to be the main obstacle to development.⁵⁰

50. As a result of this confusion, it is problematic if not impossible to monitor the desired mainstreaming. When is mainstreaming on track? Specific, measurable and time-bound objectives to monitor and evaluate mainstreaming are lacking. This is not in accordance with the perspective on policymaking as outlined in the Dutch policy paper 'Van Beleidsbegroting tot Beleidsverantwoording', nor with the prescriptions and guidelines as stipulated in the Dutch regulation 'Regeling Prestatiegegevens en Evaluatieonderzoek Rijksoverheid' (2002). These official notes respectively aim to obtain more result-oriented and transparent management models, and guarantees of high-quality monitoring and evaluation functions.

The diagnostic trade integration studies of IF in Yemen and Ethiopia did not contribute much to clarifying the concept of mainstreaming of trade into development and to developing a national perspective shared by different ministries. The IF studies did not assess the relationships between trade and the alleviation of poverty adequately: the effects of new trade policies, reforms and export strategies were hardly analysed in terms of changes to income, production and the consumption of people with low incomes. Little analysis was included of the consequences of new trade policies and export strategies on the labour mobility of the poor.

The findings of the IOB evaluation of IF in Ethiopia and Yemen concerning lack of country ownership and lack of a clear and common understanding of the concept of mainstreaming trade into development, are neither new nor specific to Ethiopia or Yemen (see Box 7.1).

Box 7.1 *Fundamental issues as explanations of the poor performance of IF?*

A review of IF in 2000 concluded that many of the original objectives had not been realised. The main objective of IF was to increase the benefits that LDCs derive from TRTA made available to them by the six agencies involved in designing this Framework as well as by other multilateral, regional and bilateral sources, with a view to assisting them to enhance their trade opportunities, to respond to market demands and to integrate into the multilateral trading system (WT/LDC/HL/1/Rev.1, 23 October 1997). Other related objectives were to ensure that TRTA is demand-driven and to enhance LDC ownership of IF so that it meets individual country needs effectively. The independent consultants who reviewed IF identified three fundamental issues hampering the progress of IF:

- I. A difference in perception between LDCs and donors regarding the policy objectives of the IF.
- II. The IF process did not lead to prioritisation of TA needs and there was no link to the overall development assistance architecture.
- III. In the minds of LDC officials, the IF was not sufficiently demand-driven.

On the basis of the review, it was decided not to stop the IF but to improve it. The first three measures suggested to improve the IF were:

- I. To clarify the policy objectives of the IF.
- II. To prioritise and link the IF to the overall development assistance architecture.
- III. To give ownership of the IF to the LDCs.

Box 7.1 Continued

The heads and representatives of the six agencies took the second recommendation very seriously and in 2001 decided 'to assist the efforts of LDCs to mainstream trade and trade-related technical assistance into national development plans and poverty reduction strategies'. The objectives of the IF were redefined accordingly. The mainstreaming of trade into the national development plans or poverty-reduction strategies of LDCs became one of the two central objectives of the IF, the other being the coordinated delivery of TRTA in response to needs identified by individual LDCs.

In 2003 the 'revitalised' IF was evaluated, the primary goal being 'to make recommendations that strive for continuous improvement in the implementation and results achieved by the IF'. The three fundamental issues hampering progress that were identified by the reviewers of the IF in 2001 reappear in the evaluation report of the 'revitalised' IF in 2003 as issues that need to be addressed to improve the performance of this framework:

- I. Different perceptions of donors and LDCs regarding the objectives and scope of the IF (p.4).
- II. The DTIS of the IF tend to be too generic and often lack a pro-poor dimension (p.10).
- III. Lack of ownership by LDCs of the IF (p.7).

The proposed ways to systematically enhance the IF at these points are also very similar to those proposed earlier by the reviewers of the old IF, namely:

- I. To clarify the objectives and scope of the IF (p.19).
- II. To develop a greater pro-poor focus and integration in DTIS and action plans (p.19).
- III. To increase participation of LDCs in pre-DTIS activities, to strengthen their involvement in the DTIS and to promote greater LDC ownership of the mainstreaming activity (p.23 and 25).

Sources: Adriene, M.H., Lusthaus, C. and Rajapathirana, S. 2000. Review of the Integrated Framework (IF) for Technical Assistance for Trade Development of Least Developed Countries; Capra-TFOC Consortium. 2003. Evaluation of the Revamped Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to the Least Developed Countries. Final Report.

The independent reviewers of IF concluded in 2000 that LDC officials found IF insufficiently demand-driven. To overcome this 'fundamental issue hampering progress' of IF, they proposed that multilateral agencies and bilateral donors should give ownership of IF to LDCs. They did not specify whether this meant intellectual ownership, financial ownership or both. In 2003 an overall process evaluation (based on focus-group discussions with multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and LDCs) again concluded that lack of country ownership was perceived

to be one of the major obstacles to the progress of IF. Again, country ownership was not defined, but it seems that giving ownership to LDCs was difficult to put into practice. As a participant at a donor meeting on IF in 2003 put it: 'The IF is our baby. It is difficult for us to give it to LDCs and for LDCs to adopt it'.

The 2000 review of IF and the 2003 process evaluation of IF implicitly also provided explanations for this. Both concluded that the difference in the perceptions of donors and LDCs regarding the objectives and scope of IF was hampering progress. The consultants who did the reviews reported that donors and multilateral agencies consider IF primarily as a tool for mainstreaming trade into PRSPs and the DTIS as a way to design and practise such mainstreaming. However, the LDCs saw IF more as a tool for attracting adequate and timely funding of concrete projects. Finally, the overall process evaluation also reported diagnostic trade integration studies to be too generic and lacking a pro-poor dimension. These observations perfectly match the evidence from the IOB evaluation research on IF in Ethiopia and Yemen.

Lack of country ownership was described as a design error of JITAP in an appraisal study and as a weakness of JITAP in a summative evaluation⁵¹. The IOB field studies revealed that strong political commitment to the programme can be very decisive and can account for the differences in the impact of JITAP in Burkina Faso compared to Tanzania. In Burkina Faso, high-level officials were extremely committed to the cotton case. In this connection they appreciated and used JITAP, in particular the inter-institutional committee, as one of their vehicles for preparing multilateral trade negotiations. In Tanzania this was not the case, in spite of the fact that in this country a crop (coffee) is grown that is similar to cotton in terms of production regime (smallholder cultivation), coverage (wide) and national importance (as an international cash crop and source of income). In Tanzania, JITAP became a hollow shell.

In the two UNCTAD programmes of investment and competition, developing countries did not participate in designing and funding the programme. Furthermore, they were not supposed to acquire ownership of the two programmes on the basis of strong political commitment or a society-wide

51. An appraisal study of JITAP commissioned by the Finish Government described the design and approach of JITAP as 'donor-driven', 'Geneva-centred' and characterised by 'little government commitment and ownership' (Tertium Consulting 1999). Three years later, not much seemed to have changed. In their summative evaluation De Silva and Weston (2002) conclude that, 'there is a perception at the country level that JITAP is largely a programme run from Geneva'.

consultation process. Being mandated by the international community to provide technical assistance in areas of its competence, UNCTAD designed the two programmes and delivered papers, seminars and advice. Some developing countries did approach UNCTAD to access the budget of PMFI to fund their own initiatives. UNCTAD accommodated their specific and ad hoc requests, explaining to donors to the trust fund that unforeseen expenditure is inevitable if the approach is demand-led.⁵² UNCTAD used the contributions of different donors to top up the budget of every trust fund. The two trust funds were multi-donor funds. Somehow everybody but nobody in particular owned the two programmes.⁵³

In the case of the smaller organisations, the issue of ownership was of a completely different nature. Like UNCTAD, the much smaller organisation of QUNO was dependent on donor money and wanted to practise a demand-led approach. However, unlike UNCTAD, before drafting its programme on TRIPS and raising funds from donors, QUNO first listened to the major concerns of delegates from developing countries at the WTO. Developing countries made a huge contribution to this programme. Their concerns, problems and queries formed the major input from the outset and during the course of the programme. In that sense, they owned the programme. QUNO is part of a world-wide movement of Quakers, whose mission is to tackle economic and social injustice and contribute to peaceful and just solutions to conflicts in the world. QUNO does not want developing countries to adopt its views on TRIPS. For QUNO, giving ownership to developing countries (after having started a programme) is a non-issue. Its strategy has been to listen to developing countries first before starting a programme. Of all the selected cases, QUNO and its TRIPS programme had the highest ratings for efficiency, effectiveness and relevance.

As inter-governmental organisations, AITIC and ACWL are membership-based. Their members include both developed and developing countries. ACWL members have to contribute to the endowment fund. As a result of the member-based ownership structure, these organisations could and actually did work in a demand-driven way. Their effectiveness in terms of contributing to the knowledge and capacities of representatives of developing countries was good.

52. As LDCs did not have exclusive access to the programmes, donors (like the Netherlands) that wanted their money to be focused on LDCs, could not be sure that their contributions were actually used by LDCs.

53. UNCTAD tried to accommodate the different funding requirements and modalities of donors (with earmarked and non-earmarked funding) but at the same time also to be responsive to requests from developing countries. Being simultaneously donor-dependent and demand-led, UNCTAD was unable to standardise procedures, set target values and share accessible and transparent information (see chapter 6 or Liebrechts and Wijmenga, 2004, for a full account).

7.3 Coordination

Ever since the very first Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 1996, the Netherlands has emphasised the need to coordinate multilateral agencies and bilateral donors. The seven case studies of country-based multilateral programmes presented in chapter 6 showed a mixed picture, varying from a functional division of labour and emerging cooperation to a lack of coordination and rivalry. In the countries visited, the cooperation between the donor's capital city and embassies in supporting and monitoring multilateral programmes was poor.

Agency coordination at country level

In both Ethiopia and Yemen the World Bank was the leading agency and conducted most of the diagnostic work as part of the trade integration study of IF. One staff member of the WTO secretariat contributed to the DTIS of Ethiopia. UNDP decided to become more involved with IF in Ethiopia in June 2003, marking the beginning of coordination with the World Bank. At the request of the World Bank, the EC delegation became 'lead facilitator' of IF in Ethiopia and organised a meeting with donors, together with UNDP and World Bank, and agency coordination gradually took shape.

In contrast to Ethiopia, inter-agency coordination of IF hardly emerged in Yemen. Even worse, the only two multilateral agencies that were locally represented in that country, World Bank and UNDP, each went their own way. UNDP was not involved in the preparation and implementation of the DTIS. It considered the latter study to be incomplete, not providing insights into the links between trade and poverty from a human development perspective. UNDP did not seek coordination with World Bank but approached the Ministry of Planning unilaterally to discuss alternative plans.

The evaluation team did not observe any rivalry between the three core agencies of JITAP (ITC, WTO and UNCTAD) in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. Also, the contributions of the three individual agencies were similar and complementary, with ITC delivering most. In this respect, the coordination of the three agencies under JITAP was good.

There was no coordination between the two programmes IF and JITAP. For example, in Tanzania, two different needs assessment procedures were conducted simultaneously but separately, namely a DTIS study for IF and a programming exercise for JITAP II. There were no examples in which JITAP had been approached

and adopted as the executive arm of IF. Whereas IF appeared to take a slow step-by-step approach with DTIS, JITAP was more inflexible in delivering a pre-defined menu of activities.

AITIC actively contributed to conferences and seminars organised by multilateral agencies (UNCTAD and WTO) and regional organisations (ACP Secretariat and the Commonwealth Secretariat). QUNO did not organise conferences or seminars in cooperation with multilateral agencies; instead, it regularly organised informal meetings with WTO delegates from developing countries, in which UNCTAD staff also participated. To prevent duplication of activities and to identify possibilities for joint action, QUNO also participated in a group of NGOs discussing upcoming events once every two months. Like QUNO but for different reasons, ACWL also did not seek to develop close working relationships with other agencies. As a legal advisor and mechanism meant to correct unequal access to WTO dispute settlement, it cannot coordinate or share its confidential activities with other agencies.

Donor coordination

Two types of donor coordination can be distinguished: intra-donor and inter-donor. Intra-donor coordination is the coordination between a donor's capital city and its embassies, as well as the linking of a donor's programmes at country level. Inter-donor coordination is the coordination between donors, here focusing on the country level.

Intra-donor coordination was poor under IF and JITAP. The embassies of bilateral donors who government support IF and JITAP viewed IF and JITAP negatively or knew little about these multilateral programmes and kept to their own aid projects. For example, though the UK, Sweden, Germany and Denmark are global supporters of IF and JITAP in the countries studied, their embassies in these countries were ignoring these programmes. The Netherlands was not much better: in both Burkina Faso and Tanzania, the Embassy of the Netherlands was hardly aware of JITAP. In Ethiopia, the Embassy of the Netherlands was scarcely interested in IF. In Yemen, the Embassy of the Netherlands was critical about IF, pointing at the low participation and lack of ownership of Yemenis and attributing this to the limited institutional capacity in Yemen. The Embassy considered the expectations in The Hague about IF to be unrealistic.

In theory, one of the advantages of supporting multilateral programmes is the reduction of the duplication, transaction costs and administration of the activities of donors with a presence in the developing countries. In practice, this took an extreme form in the countries visited: the Netherlands embassies were neither actively involved in the multilateral TRTA programmes, nor did they monitor them. The priorities of the embassies of the Netherlands did not include facilitating or monitoring multilateral TRTA programmes. This is regrettable, given the time invested in IF and JITAP by Dutch government staff stationed in The Hague and in Geneva. The only exception was Yemen, where the Netherlands was assigned the role of lead facilitator of IF to raise donor interest in the funding of concrete TRTA projects.

In the countries visited, a holistic approach in which multilateral TRTA programmes in LDCs are linked to complementary Dutch economic cooperation or business support programmes (with active engagement of CBI or FMO) was not practised. In that respect there was no integrated approach of TRTA on the part of the Netherlands. In Yemen, the Embassy of the Netherlands kept budget lines available to provide financial support to TRTA projects of IF and at the same time adopted an exit strategy in its bilateral relationship for projects in the economic sector.

Inter-donor coordination was poor in the case of the country-based programmes of JITAP in Burkina Faso and Tanzania and the two UNCTAD programmes. There was no coordination between donors with respect to the earmarking and timely transfer of money to multi-donor trust funds. This led to delays in the implementation of JITAP in Burkina Faso and Tanzania and to problems with the administration and accountability of the UNCTAD programmes.

The EC and the Netherlands did not coordinate in supporting selected programmes and organisations – the exception being IF. Like the Netherlands, the EC is an active participant in donor meetings of IF in Geneva and also a country-based lead facilitator (in Ethiopia). The EC and the Netherlands each presented their own views at donor meetings. For instance, whereas the Netherlands strongly supported giving ownership to LDCs, the EU's DG Trade proposed giving more powers to the Geneva-based multilateral management of IF, to make this framework progress. The EC, unlike the Netherlands, has not been funding JITAP, the two UNCTAD programmes, AITIC, ACWL, or QUNO. Referring to its exclusive competence in the field of trade, the EC regretted that two EU member countries, the Netherlands

and UK, had not consulted the EC when preparing to set up ACWL. With the funding of ACWL, and to some extent QUNO and its TRIPS programme, the Netherlands and other EU donors were strengthening the capacity of economic opponents of the EU to take legal steps against the EU or to propose regulation that challenges the intellectual property rights and power of European pharmaceutical industries. With the funding of JITAP, the Netherlands and other EU donors, supported Burkina Faso to prepare its negotiation position and to pursue the cotton case at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún. The DG Development of the EU, like the Dutch minister for Development Cooperation, welcomed the initiative of the four West African countries to mount a case against the protective cotton policy of the USA.

7.4 Conclusions

Focus on LDCs or non-LDCs

1. The Netherlands funding of JITAP and IF was completely focused on LDCs. The funding of the two UNCTAD programmes and AITIC reached a mix of LDCs and non-LDCs. The funding of QUNO and ACWL reached non-LDCs only.
2. The criteria for LDCs to join IF and JITAP were not formulated in terms of high-level political commitment and minimum level of human resources to manage these multilateral programmes. In the countries visited, the lack of human resources constrained the opportunities to implement the large and comprehensive programmes of IF and JITAP according to the timetable. A lack of human resources also limited the possibilities of the countries formulating their own ideas and actively steering the programme. The mismatch between the ambitious programmes of IF and JITAP and the limited capacity to absorb these programmes at LDC level, contributed to the programmes' inefficiency and to the lack of country ownership.
3. QUNO and ACWL attracted and served delegates from developing countries that were already active in the WTO and had some knowledge of and experience in multilateral trade negotiations. The two organisations and their clients were ideally paired: non-LDCs were relatively experienced and knowledgeable; QUNO and ACWL were focused on their specific concerns. The result was that the effectiveness of these organisations was rated highly.

Demand-led approaches, needs assessments and ownership

4. All the selected programmes and organisations conducted needs assessments or claimed to follow a demand-led approach. In practice, the target beneficiaries or clients of multilateral programmes were given very little opportunity to have their say on the programme's design and approach. The multilateral agencies of IF failed to achieve the broad participation of stakeholders (ministries, private sector, civil society) during problem diagnosis and needs assessment. The multilateral agencies of JITAP drafted a 15-cluster approach as a generic model for every beneficiary country on the basis of their own and joint missions. UNCTAD did not conduct any needs assessment to prepare its TA programmes on investment and competition, but instead allowed developing countries to propose new activities after the start of the programme.
5. The design and implementation of activities of the international NGOs/IGOs strongly mirrored the concerns and requests emanating from developing countries. ACWL and the TRIPS programme of QUNO were launched on the basis of a problem analysis of the WTO, the identification of emerging issues and consultation with WTO delegates from developing countries. The international NGOs/IGOs listened to the concrete concerns, problems and queries of delegates before starting a programme or drafting a proposal. The day-to-day work of ACWL, QUINO and AITIC is dictated by the more or less continuous stream of requests for legal assistance, concerns about negotiation issues, or practical problems of developing countries.
6. Country ownership of IF in the sense of commitment from the highest political echelons and strong involvement of the private sector and civil society was poor in Ethiopia and Yemen. The key concept and main objective of mainstreaming of trade into development appeared to be very abstract. There was confusion about whether IF should look for trade opportunities first with small- and medium-sized enterprises or with large and capital-intensive industries. The private sector saw investment, not trade, as the engine for growth and employment.

Lack of country ownership of IF is not unique to Ethiopia and Yemen but had been reported to be a fundamental issue of IF in a review and process evaluation of IF covering all participating countries. Similarly, confusion about the concept of mainstreaming is not unique to Ethiopia and Yemen. A review

and process evaluation of IF covering all participating countries identified the co-existence of different perceptions of donors and LDCs about IF's policy objectives and scope as being a fundamental and recurrent problem of this multilateral programme.

7. Commitment in the highest echelons of politics was very decisive and also accounted for the difference between the impact of JITAP in Burkina Faso compared to Tanzania. In Burkina Faso, high-level officials were strongly committed to the cotton case and were using JITAP as a vehicle to prepare and effectively participate in multilateral trade negotiations. In Tanzania this commitment was totally lacking, turning JITAP into a hollow shell.

Coordination

8. In the countries visited, coordination between multilateral agencies was relatively poor under IF and relatively good under JITAP. There was no coordination between IF and JITAP at country level.
9. Coordination between the donor capital cities and embassies was poor under IF and JITAP. The embassies of bilateral donors (including the Netherlands) whose governments supported IF and JITAP had a negative opinion of these multilateral programmes, or hardly knew them.
10. In the countries visited, the Netherlands did not take a holistic approach in which multilateral TRTA programmes in LDCs are linked to complementary Dutch economic cooperation or business support programmes. In that respect, the Netherlands did not have an integrated approach to TRTA.
11. The Netherlands did not cooperate with the EC in supporting selected multilateral programmes and international organisations – except for IF. In supporting IF, the Netherlands and EC each played their own role and defended their own and different views. By funding ACWL, QUNO and JITAP in Burkina Faso, the Netherlands strengthened the capacity of developing countries to negotiate or start dispute settlement with the EU or USA.

Annex 1: About IOB

1 Objectives

IOB's overall objective is to meet the need for independent evaluation in all fields of foreign policy. Specifically, the aim is to fit the results of the evaluations into the knowledge cycle of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The reports of the evaluations are used as feedback to improve both policies and their implementation. With the results of previous exercises at their disposal, policymakers can prepare new interventions more purposefully and more effectively.

2 Quality and independence

Parliament has always shown great interest in IOB's independent reports. On the basis of the reports sent to the Lower House, the minister gives a policy response. The Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs then discusses the report and the policy response. The evaluation results are public and are used, for instance, by universities in their teaching.

3 Approach and methodology

IOB has a staff of specialists and its own budget. Given the growing complexity of policies and interventions, a multidisciplinary approach is required. This calls for evaluation expertise as well as specialist expertise in a large number of fields. For this reason IOB uses external consultants and specialists, whenever possible from the countries with which the Netherlands cooperates. This fits in with the policy of flexibilization and professionalization which IOB aspires to. For internal quality control, IOB uses reference groups of involved parties and external experts. In order to compare evaluations, relevant studies are 'clustered' by policy theme. This makes it possible to draw main conclusions for policy making on the basis of a series of studies. This generates an important synergy effect, so that greater attention can be paid to the spearheads of policy: poverty reduction within development cooperation, "good governance" (i.e. the functioning of public

authorities and civil society organizations in the countries concerned), issues of international order and the promotion of Dutch interests abroad.

4 Major shifts

Since IOB was set up in 1977, major shifts have taken place in its approach, areas of attention and responsibilities. In the early years, IOB's activities consisted mainly of separate project evaluations. Around 1985, the focus shifted to the sector and theme levels, and now its work is conducted on the basis of clustered evaluations.

In 1996, there was a review of Dutch foreign policy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reorganized. As part of the review, the name of the department was changed from Operations Review Unit (IOV) to IOB, and its sphere of activities was extended to cover all aspects of the Dutch government's foreign policy, in which development cooperation plays an important role.

5 Future-oriented thinking

This new package of activities will be further elaborated in the future. IOB also wants to increase the relevance of its evaluations for policy making and to heighten the impact of the results. Outside the field of development cooperation, IOB will undertake a growing number of evaluations in other policy areas, such as European integration. Within development cooperation, the aim is to expand cooperation with the evaluation services of other donors. And eventually the recipient countries themselves should evaluate the aid extended to them. This means that they have to acquire the necessary evaluation expertise and to manage the evaluations themselves: in short, evaluations have to become recipient-led. Donors and recipients have already taken first steps towards combined evaluations.

During IOB's history, there have been major shifts in the approach and methodology of the evaluations. What has remained unchanged over the years, however, is the strictly independent stance. Coupled with a meticulous approach and professional evaluations, this constitutes IOB's ultimate reason for existence.

Annex 2: Terms of reference of IOB-evaluation of trade-related technical assistance⁵⁴

1 Introduction

The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has included an evaluation of trade-related technical assistance (TRTA) in its programme for 2003. Many parties regard TRTA as a strategic instrument for strengthening the export capacity, trade policy and negotiating capacity of developing countries. In fact, they attribute a kind of snowball effect to TRTA: a small amount of TRTA can strengthen the capacity and negotiating position of developing countries, which in turn leads to effective participation in multilateral trade negotiations and an increase in the share of developing countries in global exports. Multilateral institutions, national governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) repeatedly call for bilateral donors to invest more in TRTA. The Netherlands funds various types of TRTA through a variety of channels.

Little evaluative research has been conducted into the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of TRTA in support of these views and commitments. During the 1996-2001 period there was not a single evaluation of the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field of financial and economic planning (as part of policy article 1) (Saltet and Van de Putte 2001).⁵⁵ Since then, interim evaluations, review studies, appraisal studies and internal audits of bilateral and multilateral TRTA programmes have been conducted under the supervision of multilateral organisations. In the main, these studies seek to demonstrate the need for a particular programme and stress the need for donors to make financial

54. This document is the English version of the Terms of Reference that was officially approved by the Director of IOB on June 19th of 2003. In drafting the Terms of Reference for the present evaluation, grateful use has been made of the insights, comments and suggestions put forward by DGIS/DDE, DGIS/CE, DGIS/DVF and the Permanent Mission in Geneva. Advice was also gathered from external experts and IOB inspectors. Finally, the conclusions of a working visit to the Permanent Mission in Geneva and various providers of TRTA also based there have been incorporated in the Terms of Reference.

55. In 1999, the IOB completed an evaluation of the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI) in the related field of cooperation with the private sector (policy article 12).

commitments to a particular programme because a funding base already exists. Bilateral donors have developed an increasing interest in value for money and the independent evaluation of different forms and channels of support for TRTA. The present evaluation aims to examine the effects of TRTA funded solely or jointly by the Netherlands and other donors. The information and insights thus obtained are meant to serve as guidelines for policy makers in determining whether larger or different Dutch commitments are justified, in light of the policy and objectives that constitute the framework for the funding of TRTA.

2 Background

2.1 Developments in the international supply of TRTA

TRTA is a collective term for all types of technical assistance aimed at promoting export capacity, developing national trade policy, increasing developing countries' influence on multilateral trade negotiations, or a combination of these aims. Kostecki argues that 'TRTA covers assistance in trade promotion and in trade policy' (2001: 4). This corresponds to the key distinction between 'trade development' and 'trade policy and regulations' in the joint survey by the WTO and the OECD on TRTA and capacity building (2002: 3).⁵⁶

TRTA is increasingly bracketed together with capacity building, but opinions about how they are related are divided and often only implied. Some see TRTA as a form of capacity building, while others see capacity building as a form of TRTA. An example of the latter appears in a review study published by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) (Kostecki 2001). According to the author, it is possible to identify three approaches to TRTA. In the first and oldest approach, TRTA is one-way traffic, involving short courses and knowledge transfer that takes place on an ad hoc basis. In the second approach, TRTA is a conceptual and programmatic element of international aid programmes and a key task or special service of multilateral institutions, national governments and NGOs. Kostecki reserves the term 'capacity building' for the third and newest approach to TRTA, which is characterised by long-term programmes, networks

56. 'Trade development' consists of 'business development activities aimed at improving the business climate, access to trade finance and trade promotion in the productive sectors (agriculture, forestry, industry, mining and tourism), including at the institutional and enterprise level'. 'Trade policy and regulations' consist of 'support to aid recipients' effective participation in multilateral trade negotiations, analysis and implementation of multilateral trade agreements, trade policy mainstreaming and technical standards, trade facilitation, including tariff structures and customs regimes, support to regional trade arrangements and human resources development in trade' (WTO/OECD 2002: 3).

and partnerships. This approach aims to organise TRTA in accordance with the wishes and needs of the beneficiaries, places a greater emphasis on strengthening capabilities and skills than on pure knowledge, focusing on ‘local skills, relationships and institutions capable of dealing with trade policy matters in developing countries’ (Kostecki 2001: 7). It strives for coordination and inclusiveness in relation to the supply and demand of TRTA by attempting to achieve a balance between the two. In this approach, companies and members of civil society are regarded as beneficiaries, alongside government institutions. According to Kostecki, capacity building is an ‘innovative concept’.

However, the question remains whether the development identified by Kostecki in the supply of TRTA (from a project-oriented approach to a programme-oriented approach and ultimately to an institutional approach) indicates an actual change in the organisation of TRTA over time or rather a change in terminology.⁵⁷ Kostecki is also quick to attribute negative and non-sustainable effects to the first approach and positive and sustainable effects to the third approach. In fact, when it is not clear what level (individual, organisation, sector or country) the capacity building is targeting or what effects are expected (Bolger 2000), it is debatable whether there is actually any question of capacity building.⁵⁸ Finally, it is important not to rule out the risk of capacity reduction in programmes specifically aimed at capacity building. On the basis of their appraisal study, Amoaten and Solignac (2000) thus warn that programmes aimed at capacity building can have a substantial negative impact on the negotiating capacity of developing countries if they are not conducted in the field and keep trainees away from their work for too long.

57. Kostecki argues that most WTO programmes conform to the second or third approach, but the author’s working visit to Geneva revealed that a key WTO programme is characterised by a large number (400-500) of short-term forms of TRTA that focus on the transfer of knowledge concerning the WTO’s methods and rules. Every one of these activities appears to be an example of the first approach. The report by Haarberg (2001) suggests that the oldest approach is still current in UNCTAD programmes: ‘A significant part of the technical cooperation delivery services still comprises short courses and seminars’ (p. 6). However, the desk study and the working visit also revealed examples of a more programmatic approach. All this means that Kostecki’s distinction should be applied with a certain amount of caution: old approaches are not a thing of the past, different approaches can exist alongside each other ‘under one roof’ and although a programme as a whole may appear to conform to one approach, its individual components may conform to another.

58. This evaluation therefore distinguishes between the effects of TRTA at the level of the individual (outcomes) and at the level of organisations, sectors and countries (impacts). See also section A.4.3.

2.2 The Dutch contribution

In a joint policy document published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the funding of TRTA is described as one of two instruments in the field of international trade (In Business against Poverty: Policy Memorandum on Economy and Development 2001). The other instrument is the provision of non-financial or indirect support by advocating the removal of trade barriers to developing countries in multilateral trade negotiations. The policy document also identifies coherence in the field of trade policy as ‘one of the Dutch government’s objectives’. However, it is not clear whether the government regards the use of these two instruments in the field of international trade as an example of efforts to achieve this objective.

The Netherlands characterises itself as an ‘active supporter of TRTA/CB’ (Doha Development Agenda Survey 2001). The Netherlands funds TRTA ‘to help integrate developing countries in the world trading system and strengthen their position in the system so they can maximise benefits’. This general aim comprises three specific objectives: (1) building a national trade policy process, (2) increasing the capacity to negotiate and implement trade agreements that reflect development concerns and (3) improving developing countries’ trade performance. Until now, there has been no suggestion of a hierarchy of objectives. This may mean that a policy-oriented debate on this issue has yet to take place, that all three objectives are considered equally important or that it is impossible to adopt a joint position on this issue (within DGIS or at the interministerial level) because of irreconcilable differences of opinion. In this context, for example, one might question whether TRTA aimed at strengthening the negotiating capacity of a developing country is worthwhile if the country in question has a very limited production and export capacity. Another related issue is whether the key target group or beneficiaries of TRTA should come from the private sector or from government.

Since the establishment of the Integrated Framework (a joint programme of the WTO, the World Bank, UNCTAD, UNDP, the IMF and the ITC aimed at TRTA and capacity building) in 1997, the Netherlands has applied the ‘strategic principle’ of supporting TRTA/CB through multilateral channels (Doha Development Agenda Survey 2001). This approach is based on the idea that cooperation between multilateral and bilateral donors is the key to the development of a coherent trade policy, in which the recipient country is an ‘active owner’, with a trade policy

59. The first two objectives correspond to TRTA aimed at ‘trade policy and regulations’. The third objective corresponds to TRTA aimed at ‘trade development’. See also footnote 3.

embedded in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). In addition to this strategic principle, the Dutch contribution to the Doha Development Agenda incorporates three other elements of Dutch strategy: support for 'complementary approaches' to intergovernmental and multilateral organisations with a 'comparative advantage', support for TRTA by embassies in the framework of the sector-wide approach and support for academic and non-governmental institutions aimed at increasing knowledge and stimulating the policy debate. In its contribution to the Doha Development Agenda, the Dutch government does not characterise support for TRTA through centralised and decentralised bilateral programmes either as a strategic principle or as part of its strategy. In fact, the Netherlands operates just a few bilateral programmes of this kind, the most important being the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI). In financial terms, however, this programme is by far the largest of all the TRTA activities funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During the 1992-2002 period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs committed more than € 100 million to 'trade policy and regulations' and 'trade development'. During this period, 91 activities were assigned to these categories, and both the annual number of commitments and the annual budget for TRTA displayed an upward trend. Almost half of all activities were launched between 1999 and 2002 (MIDAS, 12 September 2002). DGIS/DDE estimates the annual budget for TRTA during the 2000-2001 period at approximately € 16.6 million (Doha Development Agenda Database Survey). A significant portion of these funds (€ 10.3 million) consisted of funding for the CBI, which, like UNCTAD, is one of the few organisations aimed at promoting international trade in developing countries that have been receiving funding from the Netherlands for over ten years.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the largest but not the only body in the Netherlands funding TRTA. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (formerly the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries) also fund activities in this area. The funding provided by each of these two ministries during the 2000-2001 period is estimated at no more than € 1 million a year. As a follow-up to the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has taken responsibility for the Dutch contribution to the Global Trust Fund and co-finances the Advisory Centre on WTO Law in Geneva, which was established in 2001. The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality funds various programmes and projects with a TRTA component, the largest being the International Cooperation Research Programme.

3 Objective and key questions

The objective of the present evaluation is to provide insight into the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the various types of TRTA funded by the Netherlands. The key questions are as follows.

- Efficiency – What is the relationship between the inputs (resources and time) and the outputs (courses, programmes, organisations, studies, publications, strategic documents, strategy development, plans, etc.) of TRTA?
- Effectiveness – To what extent have these outputs contributed to the realisation of the intended objectives in terms of the capabilities (knowledge, understanding and skills) of individuals (students, trainees, participants and other TRTA recipients)?
- Relevance – What indications are there that the knowledge, understanding and skills obtained at the level of the individual (outcomes) have contributed to the realisation of the intended objectives in the field of trade policy and the negotiating capacity of developing countries (impacts)?⁶⁰

4 Methods

The present evaluation has three components:

- description and analysis of developments within Dutch policy and the background factors, viewpoints and assumptions that underpin support for TRTA;
- description and analysis of the characteristics of TRTA, as funded (solely or otherwise) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and
- measurement and assessment of the effects of TRTA provided by various organisations and programmes, as funded (solely or otherwise) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other donors.

The following sections describe the approach, methods and sources that will be used for the evaluation of each component.

4.1 Description and analysis of policy developments

The description of policy developments places the Ministry's position in a national and international perspective. At home and abroad, the Ministry is not the only

60. If the intended objectives include achieving sustainable effects, the present evaluation will examine what criteria have been established to assess this and whether there are any indications – according to these criteria – that such sustainable effects have been achieved.

61. The decision to reconstruct policy developments for the 1992-2002 period is related to the WTO's establishment. This key actor in the field of TRTA officially came into existence on 1 January 1995. In order to determine whether this was a time of consolidation, a breaking point or a starting signal for Dutch policy in the field of TRTA, the starting point for the policy reconstruction was set a few years before the WTO's official establishment.

institution that formulates policy and provides funding in the field of TRTA.

Specific research questions include:

- What was the status and significance of support for TRTA in the policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 1992-2002 period?⁶¹
- What viewpoints and assumptions underpinned the policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to support for TRTA during the 1992-2002 period?
- What distinguished the role and position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of support for TRTA in the national and international context?
- To what extent did the selection and funding of organisations and programmes that provided TRTA during 1992-2002 reflect developments in Dutch policy on support for TRTA?

The following sources will be consulted:

- Various policy documents and policy frameworks produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field of TRTA (explanatory memoranda, proceedings, parliamentary papers, policy memorandums and annual plans);
- Internal correspondence concerning a limited number of dossiers (TRTA programmes) which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regards as reflecting a breakthrough or change in its thinking on TRTA;
- Official documents and policy memoranda on TRTA and the WTO produced by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality;
- Minutes and file notes from interdepartmental consultations on TRTA and the WTO, in particular, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality;
- Policy documents and memoranda on TRTA and the WTO produced by the Permanent Mission in Geneva;
- Reports and websites of multilateral and intergovernmental institutions (WTO, the World Bank, UNCTAD, UNDP, the IMF, the ITC, the OECD, the European Union, etc.) on the WTO and TRTA (Doha Development Survey, etc.); and
- Reports and websites of international research and advisory institutions (ICTSD, ECDPM, AERC, etc.) on the WTO and TRTA/CB.

On the basis of these documents, the present evaluation will reconstruct the developments, viewpoints and assumptions that underpin Dutch policy and place them in a national and international perspective. By means of interviews with a limited number of informants inside and outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

this reconstruction will be checked for factual inaccuracies and adjusted, where necessary, as regards interpretations of the status and role of Dutch policy at the national and international level.

4.2 Description and analysis of TRTA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will establish a database for the description and analysis of TRTA. All activities that were registered in the Management Information Documentary Activities System (MIDAS) under 'trade policy and regulations', 'regional trade agreements', 'trade facilitation' (or 'trade development') or 'business support services and institutions' during the 1992-2002 period will be included in this database. A limited number of other CRS codes will be screened with a marker to facilitate keyword searches. In addition, an overview of current activities in the field of TRTA in 2001, as provided by the Netherlands to the WTO and the OECD in the framework of the Doha Development Survey, will be entered into the database. The staff of DGIS/DDE and DGIS/DVF will be asked to provide their own lists and/or additions to the database.

With the aid of a questionnaire, an attempt will be made to collect data concerning the characteristics of TRTA (objectives, target groups, selection mechanisms and approaches) and funding (channels, duration and type) provided by the Netherlands. For this purpose, the present evaluation will examine MIDAS and a selection of dossiers (from a total of approximately 250 activities).⁶² In so far as they are not included in these dossiers, any available project and programme evaluations will also be used as sources.

4.3 Measurement and assessment of results

On the basis of (1) a description and analysis of previous evaluations of all the activities included in the database and (2) an evaluation of a selection of activities, TRTA results will be collected, classified and assessed.

- (1) As part of the description and analysis of previous evaluations, an inventory will be drawn up of the types of evaluation that were conducted for each activity. In the process, the entire database (see section 4.2) will be screened.

62. Not all TRTA activities are administered under the headings 'trade policy and regulations' or 'trade development'. This explains why the overall scope of the database will probably exceed the aforementioned 91 TRTA activities that are administered under these two important CRS categories. Thus, for example, the CRS category of 'business support services and institutions' also includes a number of activities that could be classified as TRTA. As a rule, this type of TRTA does not focus on strengthening national trade policy or negotiating capacity in multilateral trade discussions, but on promoting the export and production capacity of individual companies and branches of the private sector.

A description of what these evaluations have concluded concerning the efficiency, effectiveness and effect of TRTA will then be provided. Finally, in order to place the findings of the evaluations in some kind of perspective, the nature and quality of previous measurements of the results of TRTA funded by the Netherlands will be analysed with the aid of a questionnaire (on the aims, methods, sources, client, provider and independence of the evaluation, etc.).

- (2) A selection of activities (organisations, programmes and projects) will be subjected to a separate evaluation of the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of TRTA. A brief description of the selection of activities appears below, preceded by an explanation of the selection criteria. This is followed by a general description of the methodology.

Definition and representativeness

The selection criteria and the selection of activities for the present evaluation were established on the basis of consultations between DGIS/DDE and the Permanent Mission in Geneva. The three most important selection criteria are:

- diversity
- policy relevance
- budget.

The selection of activities includes several types of TRTA (based on the approach, age and type of provider). This reflects the varied nature of the Dutch contribution in this field, although it does not encompass all types of TRTA. The Dutch strategy and, in particular, the Dutch strategic principle of supporting TRTA/CB through multilateral channels has been used as a second filter and an important selection criterion. As a result, the present evaluation emphasises TRTA aimed at increasing negotiating capacity in multilateral trade negotiations and strengthening national trade policy, rather than TRTA aimed at promoting national export capacity and business development.⁶³

The selection is also based on specific suggestions from DGIS/DDE and the Permanent Mission in Geneva, as well as several financial criteria. Only activities

⁶³ Neither centralised nor decentralised bilateral programmes have been included in the selection. This is because centralised bilateral programmes are not part of the Dutch strategy for supporting TRTA. Furthermore, the IOB conducted an evaluation of the most important bilateral programme, the CBI, in 1996-1999. Decentralised bilateral programmes concern programmes and activities conducted by embassies in the framework of the sector-wide approach. Such activities are very limited in number. This may be related to the idea that TRTA is a policy theme rather than a policy sector. In contrast, the total number of activities funded by Dutch missions in the field of 'business support services' is not so small in relative terms.

that involve a relatively large voluntary annual contribution to an organisation (approximately € 450,000), a programme with a relatively large budget (approximately US \$ 10 million) or a relatively large commitment to a project (approximately € 500,000) have been selected.

The selection is representative of the Netherlands' strategic choices regarding support for TRTA and, in particular, the strategic principle of providing support through multilateral channels. As a result, it does not include programmes or organisations that focus primarily on promoting the export or production capacity of companies and branches of the private sector. Only the activities with the most policy relevance and the largest budgets have been selected in each strategic category. In the key CRS category of 'trade policy and regulations' the selection represents about 25 per cent of the total volume of commitments.

A short description of the selected organisations, programmes and projects appears below.

(a) The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

UNCTAD presents itself as the 'focal point within the United Nations for the integrated treatment of trade and development'. Providing technical assistance to national governments is one of the organisation's key tasks. Since 1991, the Netherlands has annually contributed approximately € 450,000 a year to UNCTAD activities in the field of technical assistance. The short-term objective of this contribution is to provide policy support to individual developing countries and groups of developing countries. The three long-term objectives are to strengthen policymaking in developing countries in various fields covered by UNCTAD's mandate, to build on the analysis and policy insights resulting from UNCTAD's activities in the field of policy-relevant technical assistance and to provide structural support for UNCTAD's activities in the field of policy-oriented and policy-supporting technical assistance and analysis. Two of the five or six multi-year projects that are funded annually through the framework agreement with the Netherlands focus heavily on capacity building in developing countries and support for the formulation of national trade policy. Other bilateral donors have earmarked their funding for other UNCTAD technical assistance programmes. General evaluations of UNCTAD's technical assistance were conducted in 1994 and 2002.

(b) The Integrated Framework for Technical Assistance for Trade Development in LDCs. The Integrated Framework (IF) is a joint initiative of the WTO, UNCTAD, the ITC, the World Bank, the IMF and UNDP. The original proposal for this initiative was introduced at the 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore. Originally, the IF was mainly intended as an attempt to coordinate the existing supply of TRTA multilateral and bilateral organisations. The problem was perceived as a lack of coordination, rather than a lack of resources. Three pilot countries (Cambodia, Mauritania and Madagascar) were selected as pilot countries. In September 2001, the participating organisations decided to add a further 11 countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Yemen and Nepal) to the IF. The Netherlands is the lead agency for Yemen. Another eight developing countries have applied to join the IF. The organisation's main objective is 'to mainstream trade into development plans or poverty reduction strategies'. A review of all the countries that have joined the IF since 2001 will take place in mid-2003. The plan is to discuss this review at the next Ministerial Conference in Cancún (Mexico) in September 2003. In March 2002, the value of the IF Trust Fund amounted to US \$9.8 million.

(c) The Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP)
 JITAP is a joint initiative of the WTO, UNCTAD and the ITC. The programme was launched in 1998 and targets eight African countries (including four LDCs). JITAP claims to be 'the most high-profile technical assistance programme in the world' and is 'principally intended to be a capacity building programme'. JITAP's three objectives are 'to build national capacity to understand the evolving multilateral trade system (MTS) and its implications for external trade, to adapt the national trading system to the obligations and disciplines of the new MTS and to seek maximum advantage from the new MTS by enhancing the readiness of exporters'. The programme is divided into 15 clusters and is managed by national steering committees, interinstitutional technical committees and a head office in Geneva. Dutch support for JITAP has been earmarked for the four LDCs (Burkina Faso, Benin, Tanzania and Uganda). The Netherlands contributed over € 450,000 to the first phase of JITAP (1997-2001) in 1998 and provided an additional contribution of € 122,000 in 2002. For the implementation of the second phase (2003-2007), JITAP has asked the Netherlands and other bilateral donors to contribute a total of US \$ 12.6 million. A mid-term evaluation of JITAP was conducted in 2000 (De Silva et al.). A summative evaluation was conducted in 2002 (De Silva et al.)

(d) The Agency for International Trade, Information and Cooperation (AITIC)
AITIC strives to improve developing countries' negotiating position at the WTO. The organisation was established as an NGO in 1998, but became an intergovernmental organisation in 2002. AITIC profiles itself as an 'independent organisation' seeking 'to help less-advantaged countries to benefit from the globalisation process in general and the multilateral trading system in particular by assisting them in taking a more active part in the work of the WTO and other trade-related organisations in Geneva, as well as the WTO negotiations'. AITIC's target group consists of the Geneva-based delegations of LDCs that require 'personalised assistance on trade-related issues, specific information on subjects of interest to them or discussion on their trade interests, concerns and needs with like-minded partners in an informal way'. AITIC is funded by seven bilateral donors. The Netherlands is the second largest donor after Switzerland, with a commitment of over € 2 million. The Netherlands' aim in supporting AITIC is to provide information and advice in the field of international trade to countries whose ability to participate effectively in the multilateral trade system is united.

(e) The Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO)

QUNO is an international NGO with branches in New York and Geneva. The organisation's mission has always been to tackle economic and social injustice and contribute to peaceful and just solutions to conflicts. QUNO regards discrimination against small farmers and indigenous groups in developing countries in terms of intellectual property rights to seeds and seedlings as a source of economic injustice. The organisation's Geneva office believes that the key to solving this problem is to strengthen the capacity of developing country governments and increase their understanding of the WTO, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), in particular. Since 1999, one of the projects run by the Geneva office (which has received a some € 500,000 in funding from the Netherlands) has therefore focused on (1) enhancing the knowledge of the WTO delegations from developing countries with regard to the complex relationship between protecting intellectual property under TRIPS, developing agriculture and promoting biodiversity and (2) promoting informal dialogue between developing and developed countries and between various stakeholders. The key target groups are WTO delegations from developing countries and policy makers at the relevant government ministries in those countries.

Indicators, methods and sources

To measure the results of the selected activities, the present evaluation uses an evaluation matrix as a methodological framework (see Table 1).

Tabel 1 Evaluation matrix

Indicators	Methods	Sources
Input indicators: 1. Number of donors 2. Amount of funding 3. Staffing levels 4. Duration of each development phase	Desk study	MIDAS Activity dossiers Project and programme descriptions by TRTA providers Interim evaluations, review studies, appraisal studies, evaluations ex ante and internal audits
Output indicators: 1. Number, year and type of courses/modules provided 2. Number, age and type of networks, organisations and committees established 3. Number and type of studies, publications, strategic documents and plans produced 4. Number, cohort and type of participants/TRTA recipients	Desk study Interviews	Course reports, annual reports, monitoring reports and evaluation reports TRTA providers and recipients
Outcome* indicators: 1. Newly acquired knowledge and insights 2. Activities in the field of trade policy during or after TRTA (drafting documents and action plans, submitting proposals to the WTO, preparation for or participation in WTO working groups, etc.)	Desk study Interviews	Assessments of TRTA by participants, internal evaluations/self-assessments, external evaluation reports and unprocessed data TRTA recipients and their superiors, external evaluators

Tabel 1 Evaluation matrix

Indicators	Methods	Sources
Impact** indicators: 1. Size of WTO delegations 2. Number of proposals submitted at each WTO Ministerial Conference 3. Status and share of trade-related issues in PRSPs	Desk study Interviews	Michaloupoulos' capacity building database and volumes of WTO's telephone directories, dossiers WTO Secretariat and working group dossiers, PRSPs WTO delegations of LDCs, WTO Secretariat, TRTA providers, external experts

* Effects at the level of the individual.

** Effects on the negotiating capacity and trade policy of LDCs and developing countries.

For each activity, a work plan will be drawn up on the basis of the following insights and principles regarding the measurement of inputs, outputs and outcomes.

In the case of UNCTAD, the present evaluation does not concern the organisation itself or the whole range of its activities in the field of technical assistance, but the two technical assistance projects that are partly funded through the framework agreement with the Netherlands and focus heavily on capacity building and national trade policy in developing countries. Depending on their traceability and geographic concentration, interviews will be conducted with current and former participants in these TRTA projects and their superiors in the framework of the effectiveness study. Instead of visiting interviewees in their homes or at their place of work, they will either be interviewed over the telephone at central locations, or take part in e-platform discussions.

A preliminary study concerning the IF has indicated that the programme has not yet achieved very much in terms of deliveries (outputs) (see also Powell 2002). An examination of the IF's efficiency is thus important and – quite possibly – the only thing that is feasible at present. A desk study will look at experiences in the first three pilot countries (Vietnam, Madagascar and Mauritania) with regard to the introduction of the IF. The experiences of Yemen will also be examined, as the

Netherlands is the lead agency for this country on behalf of the bilateral donors. These may then be compared to the experiences of Ethiopia, another country with which the Netherlands maintains bilateral relations in the framework of the sector-wide approach. After a smooth start, Ethiopia appears to be participating successfully in the IF's multi-step programme. The preparation and completion of the planned review of all 19 IF countries between April and June 2003 and the report on this review that will be presented during the Ministerial Conference in Cancún (Mexico) in September 2003 will also serve as a source and a subject of study.

The evaluation of JITAP will focus on the programme's effect in the four African LDCs that have been earmarked for Dutch funding (Benin, Burkina Faso, Tanzania and Uganda). An effectiveness study will be carried out in two of the four countries on the basis of interviews with current and former participants in the programme.

In the case of QUNO and AITIC, interviews will be conducted with the Geneva-based delegations of developing countries as part of an effectiveness study and impact analysis. As both organisations claim to possess up-to-date details of former clients, telephone interviews will also be conducted with former members of these delegations. Whether a selection or random sample is taken will depend on the number of clients and the quality of the data management at the two organisations. The possibility of interviewing current and former delegations from countries that are also involved in the IF and JITAP will also be examined.

For the measurement and assessment of impacts, a special work plan will be drawn up on the basis of the following insights and principles. There are three impact indicators. The first two relate to negotiating capacity (which is a specific objective of Dutch policy, see section 2.2). The third relates to national trade policy (which is also a specific objective of Dutch policy, see section 2.2):

- The first indicator relates to the number of staff a country deploys at the WTO and at home for the purpose of negotiations concerning the multilateral trade system. The study by Michaloupoulos, which records staffing levels during three different years (1982, 1987 and 1997), will be taken as a baseline. The figures for 2002 will also be used. An increase in the number of staff used by a particular country or group of countries could be regarded as an indication of an increase in the negotiating capacity of a country or category of countries (LDCs or developing countries) in multilateral trade talks.

- The second indicator concerns the number of proposals drafted and submitted by a country or group of countries for any of the five WTO Ministerial Conferences. An increase in the number of proposals could also indicate an increase in the negotiating capacity of a country or category of countries (LDCs or developing countries).
- The third indicator concerns the extent to which trade-related issues are included in PRSPs, and how. This could indicate whether a country's trade policy has attained a more robust status in general, and in the context of its development strategy in particular.

For all three indicators, the focus will be on the countries targeted by the Netherlands' support for TRTA. In addition, the results of all three indicators must be interpreted in a cautious and meticulous manner. This will include a description of the processes and variables that play a key role in determining staffing levels and in the drafting of proposals for WTO Ministerial Conferences and PRSPs. This will be achieved by means of desk studies, literature searches and interviews with a selection of informants (submitters of proposals, the WTO Secretariat, academics and NGOs).

5 Organisation, planning and budget

5.1 Organisation

Inspector Otto Hospes is responsible for the organisation and overall supervision of the evaluation, which includes drafting specific work plans for all its components (policy reconstruction, database and result measurement). He will also actually perform the policy reconstruction and conduct on-site progress meetings with consultants. Finally, he is also responsible for producing a final report on the basis of the individual evaluations and working documents.

Research assistant H el ene de Jong will assist in the collection of policy documents for the purpose of policy reconstruction and the creation of the database of TRTA activities funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The first of two chief consultants will be responsible for conducting the evaluation of the IF, JITAP and two of UNCTAD's TRTA projects in Geneva. He or she will also be responsible for a short field study into the efficiency and effectiveness of the IF and JITAP in four still to be determined countries with which the Netherlands maintains bilateral relations in the framework of the sector-wide approach, where

the Netherlands is the lead agency in the IF country in question or has earmarked its funding for the JITAP country in question.

The second chief consultant will be responsible for evaluating the TRTA activities of QUNO and AITIC, as well as for conducting an impact analysis.

A reference group will be established to advise on work plans, the execution of the evaluation and reporting activities.

5.2 Overall planning (conditional on the full-time availability of the consultants)

Policy reconstruction	May-June 2003
Creation of database and desk study	April-June 2003
Selection of consultants, drafting of work plans and talks with consultants and TRTA providers	June and August 2003
Measuring inputs, outputs and outcomes of the IF, JITAP and UNCTAD	September 2003 - January 2004
Measuring inputs, outputs and outcomes of AITIC and QUNO	September-November 2003
Impact analysis	December 2003 - January 2004
Data analysis and draft report	February 2003 - April 2004

Estimated amount of time required (in days) for measuring results by means of desk studies and interviews (see section 4.3 and Table 1 for indicators and sources)

	Desk studies (in days)	Interviews (in days)
UNCTAD	10	5 in Geneva 15 by telephone
IF	15	10 in Geneva 2 x 10 in the field
JITAP	15	10 in Geneva 2 x 20 in the field
QUNO	5	20 in Geneva
AITIC	5	20 in Geneva
Impact analysis	30	20 in Geneva
Total	80	160

5.3 Budget

Staff

	Price per unit	No. of units	Cost (in €)
Research assistant	200/day	150	30,000
Chief consultant 1	800/day	140	104,000
Chief consultant 2	800/day	100	80,000
Subtotal 1			214,000

Missions

	Duration of mission (in days)		Cost (in €)
Four field missions: travel costs, DSA*, local costs	IF	2 x 10	5,500
	JITAP	2 x 20	12,300
Four missions to Geneva: travel costs, DSA*, tele- phone and other research costs	UNCTAD	1 x 5	1,800
	JITAP/IF	2 x 10	5,800
	QUNO/AITIC	2 x 20	10,800
	Impact analysis	1 x 20	5,800
Subtotal 2			42,000

* Daily subsistence allowance

Reports

	Cost (in €)
Working documents, final report, key sheet	33,000
Subtotal 3	33,000

Total

	Cost (in €)
Subtotal 1 + subtotal 2 + subtotal 3	289,000
Contingencies (5 %)	14,500
Total	303,500

Annex 3: Design of the evaluation research for selected cases of TRTA

This report contains a methodological design for the evaluation of results of six trade-related technical assistance activities (organisations, programmes, projects) financially supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each section discusses one TRTA activity on the basis of a similar format:

First, a profile is given in each section of the organisation, programme or project, with brief information on:

- the mission and objectives of the organisation that implements the programme or project;
- the kind of activities that are undertaken, the target group and/or the countries covered by the programme or project;
- the budget of the programme or project;
- the financial relationship between the programme or project and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- the existence of earlier evaluations of the programme.

Secondly, each section outlines the design of the evaluation research.

Every design consists of the following components:

- selection and focus;
- the main questions;
- the evaluation matrix;
- specific questions related to the organisation, programme or project.

Under selection and focus the scope of the evaluation is confined. The main questions are about the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the organisation, programme or project. The evaluation-matrix contains the selected indicators of input, output, outcome and impact; sources of data; and research methods. The collected data on input, output, outcome and impact will be used by the evaluation team to address the main questions. The specific questions are

questions that are organisation-, programme- or project-specific. They serve two main purposes:

- 1 First, they will be used with a view to put results into perspective and to look at how performance evolves through time. They are meant to provide an explanatory background to the results measured. They also try to assess what changes of performance in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance can be expected in the near future, given recent internal and external changes.
- 2 Secondly, the specific questions will address the relationship between the type of TRTA provider or provision on the one hand and results of TRTA in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance on the other. The following main types of TRTA providers or provision will be distinguished for this purpose:
 - TRTA programmes of NGO's and smaller intergovernmental organisations versus such programmes implemented by large multilateral organisations;
 - TRTA activities geared to LDC country level versus TRTA activities focused on Geneva;
 - TRTA activities geared to the least developed countries versus such activities focused on middle-income economies with trade potential;
 - TRTA through a tailored and personalized assistance approach versus an issue-wise technical approach versus an institutional approach directed at coordination of assistance and mainstreaming of trade and development policy.

1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

1.1 Profile

Mission and objectives of the organisation and its technical cooperation programme

According to its website, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) “aims at the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the world economy. UNCTAD is the focal point within the United Nations for the integrated treatment of trade and development and the interrelated issues in the areas of finance, technology, investment and sustainable development.” Its activities concentrate around three main pillars:

- I. Intergovernmental discussions and deliberations, aimed at consensus-building;

- II. Research, policy analysis and data collection in order to provide substantive inputs for the intergovernmental discussions; and
- III. Technical cooperation: Provision of technical assistance tailored to the needs of the developing countries, with special attention being paid to the needs of the least developed countries (LDCs), and transition countries.

Technical cooperation is provided in partnership with other multilateral organisations and donor countries, among others in the Integrated Framework for Trade-related TA (see Chapter 2). The thrust of the technical cooperation is capacity building in four main areas:

- I. Globalisation and development;
- II. International trade in goods and services and commodities;
- III. Investment, technology and enterprise development; and
- IV. Services infrastructure for development and trade efficiency.

TA with regard to investment issues is covered under “investment, technology and enterprise development”, by the UNCTAD DITE department. The programme on investment capacity/investment policy reviews is designed to enhance the attractiveness of a host country for foreign investment. TA with regard to competition policy is covered under “international trade in goods and services and commodities”, by the UNCTAD DITC department. The programme on competition law and policy provides assistance to countries in formulating or reviewing competition policies and legislation, contributing to a better understanding of the issues involved, and building national institutional capacity.

Activities and country coverage

The activities and country coverage of UNCTAD are carried out globally, but with a special emphasis on least developed countries and countries in transition.

Budget of the organisation/programme

UNCTAD's average annual total expenditure on technical cooperation amounted to USD 23 million over the past three years. In 2001, more than two-third of these expenditures were funded from the UNCTAD trust funds, 20 percent by the UNDP and the remaining four percent from the programme budget. The budget available for technical cooperation on investment issues amounted to USD 6.3 million in 2003. The budget for competition policy will be asked during the fieldwork in Geneva.

Financial relationship with the Netherlands

Since 1991, the Netherlands has contributed an approximate annual EUR 450,000 to the TA activities of UNCTAD. In the UNCTAD annual report 2001, the Netherlands was listed as the seventh largest contributor to the trust funds, with a total financial support of USD 3.65 million in the period 1998-2001, or five percent of the total.

According to the assessment memoranda (Bemo's), the objective of these contributions from the Netherlands has been to provide policy support to (groups of) developing countries. The wider objectives have been:

- to enhance policy formulation in developing countries in those areas for which UNCTAD is mandated, as well as to strengthen feed back on the analytical work carried out by UNCTAD in these areas;
- to build on the analysis and policy insights arising from UNCTAD activities with respect to policy relevant technical assistance. (*“Voortbouwen op de analyse en op de beleidsinzichten voortvloeiend uit het werk van UNCTAD in beleidsrelevant technische assistentie”*.)

The 1991 framework contract between DGIS and UNCTAD stated that programs and projects should contribute “to assist governments of developing countries in dealing with the economic, financial, technical, legal and operational issues in the area of trade and development”. In 2001, the contribution was put on hold to allow for a reconsideration of the Netherlands’ position towards UNCTAD. Meanwhile, a clean up action was undertaken to wind up several small programs that had been financed in previous years under the framework contract. In 2002, it was decided to concentrate the budgetary support on two of the four “Singapore issues”, investment and competition policy. A total contribution of € 450,000 was provided to co-finance activities in investment and competition policy, with specific attention to the least developed countries.

Earlier evaluations

Investment. An independent evaluation of the first work plan of INT/97/A26 was carried out from June 1998 till June 1999. The evaluating team reported a considerable under-implementation when judged against the originally foreseen number of events. In view of the time limitations and resources available to the secretariat, the team nevertheless concluded the secretariat made a remarkable effort. All donors approved the recommended six-months extension of the program. With regard to the quality of the TA provided, the team reported an

overwhelmingly positive feedback from the participants and the beneficiaries of the TA, both content wise and in organisation.

A number of activities of the original plan, i.e. the intensive training courses and the publication of technical papers was continued under the successor trust fund of the program. This program has also been under continuous evaluation, a mid-term report of which has been submitted by the same lead evaluator by the end of December 2002. As an “overriding general finding” of this evaluation, it was concluded that the work undertaken in this area is “unique, timely, necessary and of critical importance to developing countries.” In addition, there were strong indications that the work undertaken so far within this work programme “has achieved its set-out objectives and that the activities pursued have had a positive and measurable impact.”

UNCTAD has indicated that an impact evaluation of its work on investment is planned to start in 2004.

Competition. An evaluation of UNCTAD’s work on competition was carried out in 1999. In general, the conclusion was that the UNCTAD programme on competition law and policy “has performed well in recent years, in the face of an increasing number of requests for assistance from developing countries and countries in transition.” To maintain the increased level of donor funding it was concluded UNCTAD should ensure that “new competition laws are not only being drafted but are being implemented effectively.”

1.2 Design of evaluation research

Selection and focus

According to the Terms of Reference, the scope of the evaluation of the TA provided by UNCTAD is confined to the evaluation of two TA programs, (co-)financed by the Netherlands, and focused on capacity building and national trade policy in developing countries. Based on the conclusions of these evaluations, an attempt will be made to draw conclusions with respect to UNCTAD as a vehicle of implementing TRTA that is financially supported by the Netherlands. In selecting the TA programs for evaluation, we have taken account of the approach followed by DGIS in 2002. DGIS decided to focus the contribution to UNCTAD on “investment” and “competition policy”, two of the four so-called “Singapore issues”, without a further earmarking of the budget to program level.

Based on this attention to investment and competition policy, we propose to select the following two TA programs:

- I. “Possible multilateral framework on investment (PMFI)” (UNCTAD reference INT/97/A26). This program received a total contribution from the Netherlands of USD 348,001;
- II. “Institutional and capacity building in competition law and policy for African countries” (UNCTAD reference RAF/97/A41). This program received annual financing from the Netherlands in the period 1997 till 2000, amounting to USD 617,602 in total.

The selection of these two TA programs was based on two criteria:

- I. The share of the contribution to the program of the total financial contribution from the Netherlands;
- II. The timing of the Dutch contribution, i.e. the time passed should allow for a reasonable evaluation of the activities implemented since the last contribution.
- III. In the UNCTAD evaluation, all other TA programs in the areas of investment and competition policy that were (co-)financed by the Netherlands will be described.

The activities that were described in the assessment memoranda (Bemo’s) of the Netherlands’ government have remained the same over the period 1991-2001 and were:

- Analysis and study by consultants and experts of the UNCTAD secretariat;
- Formulation of policy recommendations;
- Support to policy makers in developing countries by field trips on a short and long term basis of consultants and experts of the UNCTAD secretariat;
- Organisation of meetings and seminars with respect to the above-mentioned analyses, study and policy formulation, dissemination of policy analysis results.

Main questions (to be addressed at the programme level)

1. Efficiency:
 - a. Were outputs delivered according to plan, budget and schedule?
 - b. What has been the relationship between the inputs and the outputs of the two individual programs?
2. Effectiveness:
 - a. Did the output of the two individual projects contribute to knowledge, insights and technical expertise of individual beneficiaries?

3 Relevance:

- a. To what extent has the outcome of the two projects led to the trade-related policy formulation by public agencies of the developing country?
- b. To what extent has the outcome of the two programs contributed to capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement trade and/or investment agreements?

Evaluation-matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
Of input:	For 1-4:	For 1-4:
1. Amount of financial support allocated to the two TA programs	UNCTAD financial and progress reports	Dossier study
2. Number of UNCTAD staff involved to prepare, execute and manage the TA programs	UNCTAD files and UNCTAD staff	Interviews with UNCTAD staff members
3. Number of working days spent by UNCTAD staff to prepare, execute and manage the TA programs		
4. Time span for preparing and delivering the two TA programs		
5. Number of DGIS working days to internally manage the programs	For 5: DGIS files and DGIS staff	For 5: Dossier study and interviews with DGIS staff
Of output:	For 1-4:	For 1-4:
1. Number of analytical reports and studies delivered	UNCTAD project files and activity reports, summaries of trainings, project officers	Desk study
2. Number of policy advices (sets of recommendations) formulated		Interviews with UNCTAD project officers in Geneva
3. Number of trainings realised		
4. Number of meetings and seminars organised		

Evaluation-matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
<p>Of outcome:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The acquired knowledge and expertise of individual beneficiaries (ex-participants of TRTA); 2. Conclusions and recommendations of outputs put into (draft) policy texts by ex-participants of TRTA 3. Number and type of recommendations and action points followed up; 4. Number and type of feedback reports of individual policymakers on the analytical work carried out by UNCTAD in the two selected areas 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. (Ex) participants of TRTA and their superiors 2. Idem, and (draft) policy texts before and after TA; 3. Idem to 2. 4. Project files and correspondence, policy makers, UNCTAD project officers 	<p>For 1-4:</p> <p>Interviews (face-to-face or by phone) with ex-participants and their superiors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • representing an LDC country in Geneva • holding a public office in an LDC • not any longer working for an LDC government <p>and desk study</p>
<p>Of impact:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Adjustment of competition policy and legislation of LDCs 2. Adjustment of investment policy and legislation of LDCs 3. Establishment of new competition authorities 4. Bilateral / regional investment agreements negotiated 5. Participation in multilateral discussions on investment agreements and competition policies 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ministerial notes and papers 2. (Draft) competition policy text, amended legislation 3. Agreement on establishment 4. (Draft) Text of Agreements 5. Minutes of multilateral discussion meetings 	<p>For 1-4:</p> <p>Desk study</p> <p>Interviews with: (ex)participants of TRTA and their superiors high level policy makers in LDCs</p>

Specific questions

Demand-led approach:

1. Has the UNCTAD followed a demand-led approach in organizing the two programs and selecting participants? Who were the demanders? If some developing countries asked for the programs, has it been easy for them to make their demands heard?

UNCTAD as the carrier and channel:

2. Unlike the WTO, the UNCTAD is not a rules-making body. Is there any evidence in the records or evaluation of the two programs that this has negatively or positively affected the ability and appreciation of UNCTAD to effectively contribute to trade policy formulation and negotiation capacity of developing countries?
3. On the basis of the evaluation of the two TRTA programs, what can be concluded about the efficiency of UNCTAD as a contractor of Netherlands TRTA to LDCs? How transparent is the decision-making on the organisation, funding and contents of the two TRTA programs?

Type of TRTA:

4. Are there any indications in the records of the two UNCTAD programs that TRTA provided in Geneva is more efficient, effective and relevant than TRTA provided in one or more LDC countries?
5. Are there any indications that the TRTA provided to (representatives of) LDCs is more efficient, effective and relevant than to (representatives of) middle-income countries with trade potential?
6. On the basis of the evaluation of the two TRTA programs and the approach practiced by UNCTAD, can it be concluded that UNCTAD is doing the right thing, that is: is UNCTAD following the right approach in TA?
7. Can the failure of Cancun be considered a success of TA provided to developing countries? What role has UNCTAD played in this respect?

Future performance:

8. What indications do exist that the performance of UNCTAD's two TRTA programs in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance will drastically change in the coming 2-4 years?
9. To what extent do UNCTAD's future plans in the field of competition and investment policy concur with the Dutch policy objectives for financial support to TRTA?
10. What is the probability that the future outcomes of UNCTAD interventions will contribute to the Dutch policy objectives in the field of TRTA?

2 Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical Assistance to LDCs (IF)

2.1 Profile

Mission and objectives

At its start in 1997 the IF sought ‘to increase the benefits that least-developed countries derive from the trade-related technical assistance available to them from the six Agencies involved in designing this Framework, as well as from other multilateral, regional and bilateral sources, with a view to assisting them to enhance their trade opportunities, to respond to market demands and to integrate into the multilateral trading system.’ The six participating Agencies were (and still are): International Trade Center (ITC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The objectives of the IF, after its first review, are: to mainstream trade into the national development plans and PRSPs of LDCs; and to coordinate, sequence and synchronise the TRTA activities of the above six agencies.

Activities and country coverage

IF was endorsed in October 1997 as the institutional mechanism for the delivery of TRTA to Least-Developed Countries. The locus of the activities is normally at individual country level.

In 1998 and 1999 IF started with country needs assessments prepared by individual LDCs, integrated responses by the six Agencies, preparation of multi-year country programmes and Round Table meetings.

After a review by end of 1999/early 2000, an IF Pilot Scheme was adopted for the undertaking of three diagnostic studies for mainstreaming trade integration into the development plans and poverty reduction strategies of three LDCs. In addition, an IF Trust Fund was established.

Budget of the organisation/programme

The IF Trust Fund finances the mainstreaming work. Several bilateral donors as well as the World Bank and UNDP contributed to the IF Trust Fund. In March 2003 the contribution to the IF Trust Fund amounted USD 12 million.

Financial relationship with the Netherlands

The Netherlands supported the three pilot diagnostic trade integration studies

in Madagascar, Mauritania, and Cambodia to the amount of USD 330,000. The Netherlands also has sponsored a two-day workshop in April 2003 on IF to discuss the role of donors and the relevance to poverty reduction of trade-related capacity building. As part of the revitalisation of the IF, the Netherlands becomes the lead-agency for Yemen, one of its partner-countries. Though not being an official lead agency for Ethiopia, the Netherlands very much wants the IF-process and economic sector development of this partner-country to be linked to each other.

Earlier evaluations

IF was reviewed by end 1999. This review mentioned the need for mainstreaming of trade into LDC's development plans. It also pointed to shortages of ownership and problems with funding, governance and management. An evaluation of the revitalised IF was scheduled to deliver its findings before the Cancun Ministerial Meeting.

2.2 Design of evaluation research

Selection and focus

The evaluation research will deal with the performance of the IF in five selected countries: Mauritania, Madagascar, Cambodia, Yemen and Ethiopia. The first three have been selected because they together are the pilot group of IF-countries after the 1999 review. The Netherlands has been one of the bilateral donors providing financial support to the diagnostic trade integration studies in these countries. The last two countries have been selected because they are partner-countries of the Netherlands. Also, the Netherlands plays a special role with regard to the IF-process in Yemen as a lead agency and wants to stimulate Ethiopia to link the IF-process to its own sector plan on economic development.

The focus in this evaluation will be on Yemen and Ethiopia, amongst others by means of field visits to both countries. The evaluation design presented below applies to the evaluation in Yemen and Ethiopia. For the three pilot countries the same design will be used, however this evaluation will be based solely on information collected from the six agencies and the delegations of the countries in Geneva.

Main questions (to be addressed at the IF country level)

1. Efficiency:
 - a. Were outputs delivered according to plan, budget and schedule?
 - b. What has been the relationship between the inputs and the outputs?

2. Effectiveness:
 - a. Did the output of the IF contribute to knowledge and capacities of individual public officers of the developing country in the field of trade and development?
3. Relevance:
 - a. To what extent has the outcome of the IF contributed to the formulation of a national policy by the developing country at the interface of trade and development?
 - b. To what extent has the outcome of the IF contributed to the capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements?

Specific questions

Ownership:

1. Genuine ownership of the IF process is of crucial importance. Such ownership can only evolve through a participatory approach in the undertaking of the mainstreaming work. What was the process of preparing and undertaking the trade integration studies in the LDCs? What was the participation from the part of the various ministries and the involvement of the private sector and other civil society actors? Were the same people involved as in the PRSP process? Who participated in the national IF team? What factors in this participatory process have caused delays and/or have negatively influenced the level of results?
2. Have sector plans been developed in which the TRTA proposed in the Action Matrices do fit? Have the countries been able to obtain funding for identified priorities. How long does it take to obtain funding once TRTA activities have been prioritised? To what extent is the financial support earmarked?

Differential effects of TRTA:

3. Are there any indications that the IF is more efficient, effective and relevant in countries that are in a more advanced stage of economic development and trade?

Coordination:

4. What has been the role of each of the six agencies in the IF process? Do the six TRTA agencies each provide an own unique added value within the IF? Does the IF make use of the comparative advantage that each individual organisation claims to have? To what extent do these six agencies coordinate?

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
<p>Of input:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Amount of financial support allocated to the IF in the two selected countries 2. Number of preparatory meetings (and working days spent for this purpose) of the six core agencies in relation to the IF in the two selected countries (roundtable meetings) 3. Number of preparatory meetings (and working days spent for this purpose) of the national IF Steering Committee in the two countries 4. Time span for preparing and delivering the DTIS in the two selected countries 5. Time span for realizing follow-up TRTA after delivering of the DTIS in the two selected countries 	<p>For 1-5:</p> <p>Files of Netherlands MFA (DDE and PV Geneva)</p> <p>Files of fund managers of IF at WTO and WB representative in Geneva</p> <p>Earlier monitoring and evaluation reports</p> <p>Publications by international NGOs</p>	<p>For 1-5:</p> <p>Dossier study</p> <p>Interviews with administrators and policy officers</p>
<p>Of output:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of national workshops 2. Overview/inventory and analysis of existing TRTA programmes 3. Number and type of prioritised TRTA/CB projects 	<p>For 1-4:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IF focal point, RNE, lead facilitator, rep offices of six agencies in the field work countries - Minutes of meetings held - Donor mappings - Draft or completed DTIS 	<p>For 1-4:</p> <p>(Desk study and interviews with officials and stakeholders involved in the IF in The Hague, Geneva, Sanaa and Addis Ababa)</p>

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
<p>4. Draft or Completed Diagnostic Trade Integration Study</p> <p>Of outcome:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number and type of follow-up actions undertaken by officials of the IF-country on DTIS recommendations 2. Number and type of follow-up actions on impact analysis of trade policy on the poor, on important production chains, on employment opportunities for the poor (like sector working groups established by officials of the IF-country for sectors identified with potential for trade, which are supposed to benefit the poor) 3. Active monitoring by all national stakeholders of recommended follow-up to DTIS 4. Coordination of the TRTA of the six core agencies by officials of the IF-country 	<p>For 1-4:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Team-leader DTIS - National IF Steering Committee / IF Focal Point - Rep offices of the six agencies 	<p>For 1-4:</p> <p>Interviews and desk study</p>

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
Of impact: 1. Trade and economic sectors brought into PRSPs or national development plans	For 1-2: PRSPs of Ethiopia and Yemen (World Bank PRSP document library) Donor facilitator and IF focal point	Desk study Interviews
2. Country ownership of DTIS and the IF-process at large (demonstrated by active participation, initiatives and leadership of national stakeholders from the very start of the IF)	For 2: Delegates of government, business sector and civil society participating in the national IF steering committees Minutes of IF steering committees	

5. What experiences do 'lead agencies' (bilateral donors and the EU) have in facilitating the IF process? As a result, has donor coordination improved? Are there economies of scale? What harmonisation has taken place in regard to administrative differences in procedures among donors and what can be reported on earmarking of funds? What views do the developing countries have on this?
6. What is the dialogue between The Hague and the Royal Netherlands Embassies at country level on the progress made in the IF process? What activities are undertaken within the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague to ensure a coherent Dutch policy reaction, complementary to the multilateral IF interventions?

Follow-up of earlier evaluation:

7. After the disappointing first review the question is whether the IF has improved its effectiveness in mainstreaming trade and whether it has improved as a mechanism for providing TRTA in terms of efficiency. In this respect it would be interesting to know whether the recommendations made by the review have been followed up? These included: restricting IF to technical assistance for trade-related development, linking IF to priorities of country development

strategies, requiring LDCs to prioritise their TRTA needs, strengthening governance, administration, coordination and funding. Also interesting is to learn from the latest evaluation what the remaining gaps and shortages are in the IF process.

8. Have monitoring procedures of TRTA activities under IF been thought out in advance? Is there a similar monitoring of PRSP implementation?

Future performance:

9. What indications do exist that the performance of IF in Yemen and Ethiopia in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance will drastically change in the coming 2-4 years?
10. To what extent do the future plans of IF for Yemen and Ethiopia in the field of TRTA concur with the Dutch policy objectives for financial support to TRTA?
11. What is the probability that the future outcomes of IF interventions in Yemen and Ethiopia will contribute to the Dutch policy objectives in the field of TRTA?

3 Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP)

3.1 Profile

Mission and objectives of the organisation or programme

ITC, UNCTAD and WTO started JITAP in mid 1998 to provide TRTA through an integrated approach to eight African countries. The goal of JITAP is to enhance development through more effective participation in the multilateral trade system (MTS). JITAP's common objectives are: building national understanding of MTS, conforming to MTS obligations and disciplines, and enhancing readiness of country's exporters.

Activities and country coverage

The JITAP activities started with needs assessments in the African countries that looked at weak areas in their supply-side geared to trade. The three agencies indicated what kind of TRTA could be extended. UNCTAD would focus on the impact of the multilateral trade system and the trade policy adaptation. WTO would deal with the adjustments to trade laws and regulations; and ITC would work on sector/product strategy and export supply & market potential. Programme elements were organised in fifteen clusters. Through donations in a common trust fund (CTF) the activities could start. The programme covered 8 countries of which 4 LDCs.

After a Mid-Term Review, the CTF Steering Group decided in December 2000 to consolidate the JITAP activities in four areas: i) Revitalising Inter Institutional Committees, ii) development of human resources for strengthening the participation at national level of actors who are engaged in the Multilateral Trade System, iii) Development of sector strategies / action plans with the private sector to enhance exports, iv) Strengthening of National Enquiry Points on standards.

The programme expired at the end of 2002 and was followed by a second phase that started in the beginning of 2003 for another period of four years. The programme is extended with 8 new countries, 6 of which are LDCs. The 8 countries of the first phase are still included in the new programme benefiting from an exit strategy to terminate and consolidate the activities started during the first phase.

Budget of the programme/organisation

Besides the Netherlands other European bilateral donors have contributed to JITAP. The original budget for JITAP was USD 10 million. The total budget for the consolidation phase was USD 1.5 million. The budget for JITAP II amounts to USD 12.6 million.

Financial relationship with the Netherlands

The JITAP activities that were financially supported by the Netherlands were earmarked for four LDCs: Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda and Tanzania. The commitment of the Netherlands for the first period of JITAP was NLG 1 million. The Permanent Mission of the Netherlands in Geneva has been a member of the CTF Steering Group. The contribution of the Netherlands for the consolidation phase of JITAP amounted to EUR 122,360. For JITAP II a BEMO is being approved at an amount of EUR 800,000 over four years as an unearmarked contribution to the CTF.

Earlier evaluations

Mid-term evaluation in October 2000 and a summative evaluation in June 2002. The main conclusion of the mid-term evaluation was that there had been considerable progress in building capacities to enhance the understanding of WTO processes, that the objective of adapting national trading systems to the obligations of the MTS was far from achieved and that activities to enhance export readiness at the country level had to be further consolidated. The summative evaluation concluded that JITAP has been an important instrument in familiarising and developing capacities on MTS issues in the eight countries in

which it has been implemented. The summative evaluation contained a general part and a part with country experiences. During this evaluation country case studies were made in each of the participating countries.

3.2 Design of evaluation research

Selection and focus

The Netherlands has earmarked its financial support in JITAP I to four of the eight JITAP countries, being four LDCs. The evaluation research will focus on the latter four countries, conducting field research in two of them: one Anglophone (Tanzania), one Francophone country (Burkina Faso).

The evaluation concerns JITAP I. Elements of JITAP II will only be taken into consideration when they could shed light on the implementation and results of the first programme.

Main questions (to be addressed at the country level)

1. Efficiency:
 - a. Were outputs delivered according to plan, budget and schedule?
 - b. What has been the relationship between the inputs and the outputs?
2. Effectiveness
 - a. Did the output of JITAP contribute to knowledge and capacities of individual public officers of the developing country in the field of trade and development?
3. Relevance:
 - a. To what extent has the outcome of JITAP contributed to the formulation of a national policy of the developing country at the interface of trade and development?
 - b. To what extent has the outcome of JITAP contributed to the capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements?

Specific questions

Ownership:

1. What is the ownership of JITAP by the government and private sector in Tanzania and BF?

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
<p>Of inputs</p> <p>1. Total funding of JITAP in Tanzania and BF</p> <p>2. Number of staff and working days spent to start and organize JITAP in Tanzania and BF</p> <p>Of outputs:</p> <p>1. Number and type of training courses per theme or subject organised</p> <p>2. National Steering Committees (NSC), Reference Centres (RC), Inter-Institutional Committees (ICC), National Enquiry Points (NEP) set up</p> <p>3. Number and types of tools developed by JITAP (incl., trade secrets, export financing, National Enquiry Point Standards, communication and discussion facility)</p> <p>Of outcome:</p> <p>1. Understanding of the multilateral trade system by individual officers</p>	<p>For 1-2:</p> <p>ITC, programme administrators, JITAP Focal Points, JITAP inter-institutional committees, DDE, RNE Embassies,</p> <p>1. JITAP Focal Points, Customs List of presence; course evaluation forms</p> <p>2. Ministry of Industry and Commerce, academic centres, other relevant organisation Implementation plans made and adopted, inspections visits, number of users, minutes of meetings</p> <p>3. Board of External Trade, National Export Association, Bureau of Standards; number of users, number of copies sold, number of selling points</p> <p>1. Participants of national symposia, courses, video-conferences and technical workshops.</p>	<p>For 1-2:</p> <p>Dossier study</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>For 1-3:</p> <p>Interviews, desk study (incl. evaluation reports), inspection visits</p> <p>For 1-4:</p> <p>Interviews, desk study</p>

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
<p>2. Number of meetings of NSC and IIC, involvement of private sector and NGOs</p> <p>3. Number and type of multilateral trade system impact studies completed</p> <p>4. Number of cases in which national legislation (trade regulatory framework) has been checked on conformity with WTO rules</p> <p>5. Number and types of strategies developed for priority sectors/products (incl. Identification of supply constraints and matrices of exportable products)</p> <p>Of impact: (in terms of national trade policy formulation and ownership)</p> <p>1. Increase of budget for Ministry of Commerce for trade-policy making</p> <p>2. Counterpart contributions from the government and private sector</p>	<p>2. Local participants, minutes of meetings</p> <p>3. Agency officials in Geneva, project reports, local officials</p> <p>4. Inter Institutional Committee (chairpersons and functionaries on the WTO); WTO Review Reports, Compliance with WTO Agreements, Tanzania Legal Reform Commission</p> <p>5. National Export Association, Chamber of Commerce & Industry</p> <p>For 1-2: Trade policy makers, National Steering Committee, National Focal Point in Tanzania and BF, ICC</p>	<p>For 1-8: Interviews and desk-study</p>

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
3. Number of cases in which national legislation (trade regulatory framework) has been adapted to comply with WTO rules	3. IIC, national legislator	
4. Number of national trade policy papers produced (in terms of negotiation capacity)	4. Ministry of Trade	
5. Number of bilateral or regional trade agreements negotiated by Tanzania and BF	For 5-7: Trade negotiators of Tanzania or BF; Instructions for trade negotiators of Tanzania or BF ; Inter-Institutional Committee;	
6. Multilateral trade negotiation strategy developed by Tanzania and Burkina Faso	Ministry of Industry & Commerce	
7. Number of multilateral trade issues in which Tanzania and BF are actively engaged (in terms of export capacity)		
8. Expanded export capacities: supply constraints of identified priority sectors and exportable products are removed; (more) enterprises are ready to export	For 8: Chamber of Commerce & Industry; export-oriented companies, National exporters association	

Aid for Trade?

Coordination:

2. Is there any relationship between JITAP and IF? Are their activities complementary or not?
3. To what extent do WTO, UNCTAD and ITC coordinate and integrate their activities through JITAP?
4. To what extent are JITAP activities coordinated with TRTA provided by other multilateral agencies?
5. Is there coordination and interaction between JITAP and the trade related activities that bilateral donors implement in the selected African countries?

Beneficiaries:

6. Is there any evidence on what type of companies in the selected African countries did benefit from the JITAP activities: larger companies or SMEs?

Follow-up of earlier evaluation:

7. Have the recommendations made by the evaluations been followed up in Tanzania and in Burkina Faso?

Future performance:

8. What have been the criteria for selecting the eight JITAP I countries and what for the new countries? If the criteria have been changed, was this on the basis of lessons learned from JITAP I and if so, which ones? Would other developing countries with more potential not be better candidates for trade capacity development?
9. What indications do exist that the performance of JITAP in Tanzania and BF in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance will drastically change in the coming 2-4 years? Will the JITAP II exit strategy be adequate to achieve sustainability?
10. Is it likely that there is no or a special role for JITAP when IF would come on stream?
11. To what extent do the future plans of JITAP II for Tanzania and Burkina Faso in the field of TRTA concur with the Dutch policy objectives for financial support to TRTA?
12. What is the probability that the future outcomes of JITAP II interventions in Tanzania and Burkina Faso will contribute to the Dutch policy objectives in the field of TRTA?

4 Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO)

4.1 Profile

Mission and objectives

QUNO aims to represent a broad base of Quaker concerns for peace, justice and equitable solutions among others when these concerns arise in multilateral institutions in Geneva. In the debates on TRIP's, QUNO's goal is to strengthen the capacity and understanding of WTO developing country member governments, including those with a substantial biological diversity and genetic resources, to obtain greater equity and justice in the TRIPs negotiation process.

Activities and country coverage

Delivery of discussion and occasional papers, organising seminars and informal discussion meetings in Geneva, regional seminars in developing countries and discussion meetings in developed countries. The focus of QUNO's activities is in Geneva. The participants in QUNO activities are primarily government officials of developing countries in WTO decision-making bodies.

Budget of the organisation/programme

QUNO Geneva operates on two budgets, a core budget for its programme and administrative staff and a project budget funded from grants. Of the budget proposed by QUNO for the first project (see next paragraph) the Netherlands was approached to contribute 47 percent of the total costs, the other donors being the Rockefeller Foundation and the UK Department for International Development.

Financial relationship with the Netherlands

Grants were awarded by the Netherlands to QUNO for three projects. First, for 'The Trips Process: Negotiating Challenges and Opportunities' (€ 143,391 for the grant period March 2001 to March 2002). Objective of the project is to strengthen the capacity and understanding of governments of developing countries that are WTO Members in the area of TRIPs, development of agriculture and biodiversity. Second, for 'TRIPs Health & Medicines' (€ 29,818.81 for the grant period July-December 2001). The objective of the second project is to build knowledge of WTO-delegations from developing countries regarding the relationship between protection of intellectual property rights and access to medicines and to support developing countries with the preparation of a declaration on this issue for the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference.

Third, for the TRIPS Phase III programme on Promoting participation in the post-Doha work programme (€ 331,116 for the grant period September 1, 2002 to August 31, 2004). The objective of the third project is to support developing countries with taking an informed position with respect to trade-related aspects of intellectual property, thereby promoting interaction between the negotiators in Geneva and policy-makers and other groups at national level in developing countries.

Earlier evaluations

None

4.2 Design of evaluation research

Selection and focus

The strategic issues and projects as defined by QUNO will serve as entry points for the evaluation research. The representatives of countries participating in informal meetings organized by QUNO will be targeted for research.

Main questions:

1. Efficiency:
 - a. Were outputs delivered according to plan, budget and schedule?
 - b. What has been the relationship between the inputs and the outputs?

2. Effectiveness:
 - a. Did the output of QUNO contribute to knowledge and capacities of individual representatives of the (developing) country in the field of trade and development? To what extent have the outputs of QUNO contributed to expertise of the beneficiaries to negotiate and to active participation of developing countries in the TRIPS preparatory discussion meetings and negotiation process?

3. Relevance:
 - a. To what extent has the outcome of QUNO contributed to the formulation of a national policy of the developing country at the interface of trade and development?
 - b. To what extent has the outcome of QUNO contributed to the capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements?

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
<p>Of Input:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Amount of financial support to QUNO in total and per project 2. Number of QUNO staff and working days spent to prepare, execute and manage projects 3. Time span for preparing projects 	<p>For 1-3:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - QUNO Narrative and Financial Reports, Contractual obligations; funding proposals, annual reports; - Executive director and supporting staff of QUNO; DDE; Permanent Mission of Geneva 	<p>For 1-3:</p> <p>Desk study and Interviews</p>
<p>Of output:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number and type of working papers, issue papers and occasional papers 2. Number and type of informal meetings, regional and residential seminars 	<p>For 1-2:</p> <p>QUNO Activity Plans, Budgets, Narrative and Financial Reports QUNO Library</p>	<p>For 1-2:</p> <p>Desk study</p> <p>Interview QUNO and ICTSD Representatives</p>
<p>Of outcome:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Expertise of beneficiaries to formulate proposals for (re)negotiation on TRIPs 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. (Re)negotiations of certain aspects of the TRIPs agreement; permanent missions from a selection of developing countries in Geneva; participants of seminars; assessment reports of workshops and seminars; 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Interviews of a selected group of about five permanent missions of developing countries in Geneva, which participated in QUNO activities; Questionnaire to participants of seminars (Q4.1) and to appropriate policy-makers in capitals of developing countries (Q4.2)

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
2. Active participation of delegations from developing countries in talks on TRIPs in Geneva	2. Attendance lists of meetings of the TRIPs Council and minutes of related preparatory discussion meetings; WTO Secretariat, TRIPs Council.	2. Interviews of WTO Secretariat and Chair TRIPs Council
3. Interest on TRIPs in capitals of developing countries	3. National Chambers of Commerce, Academics and policy-makers in developing countries (from EU-LDC network)	3. Questionnaire to appropriate policy-makers in capitals of developing countries (Q4.2)
Of impact:		
1. Declarations and proposals from developing countries on TRIPs and Health and on article 27.3 (b)	1. WTO Secretariat, selection of delegates of developing countries	1. Interviews
2. (Pro)active role of developing countries during preparatory process on TRIPs for the Decision on TRIPs and Health of 30 August 2003.	2. Selection of delegates of developing countries, TRIPs council of WTO	2. Interviews
3. Legal clarity on flexibilities within TRIPs to apply compulsory licensing and parallel import provisions	3. Separate Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health and outcome of negotiations of August 30, 2003	3. Desk study
4. Strategy outline for a moratorium on legal actions against governments using generic medicines to combat medical urgencies	4. Selection of delegates of developing countries	4. Interviews

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
5. Amendments of national laws to incorporate the compulsory licenses to protect public health	5. Selection of delegates of developing countries, WHO.	5. Interviews and desk study
6. Mandate for negotiating TRIPs articles 7 and 8 to arrive at a general exception clause for TRIPS obligations in relation to public health	6. Selection of delegates of developing countries	6. Interviews
7. (Other) negotiation results for developing countries on TRIPS and Public Health	7. QUNO experts F. Abbott and C. Correa; WHO documents; Seattle-, Doha-, and Cancun Ministerial Declarations compared; permanent missions of developing countries, missions of EU and USA in Geneva	7. Desk study and interviews

N.B. For interviews with permanent missions of developing countries in Geneva we intend to include, where relevant, the four countries in which fieldwork will be done at a later stage of the IOB evaluation.

Specific questions

Capacity-building:

1. Regarding 'capacity' and 'understanding' that QUNO aims to strengthen, what is the definition applied by QUNO for these two concepts and how has QUNO monitored the progress realised in them?

Target group:

2. As mentioned in the above, QUNO's goal is to strengthen capacity and understanding of WTO developing country member governments. Within this broad target group, has QUNO focused on certain groups of developing countries? If so, are these the least developed countries, the developing countries engaged in the Cairns group, the G21 Group, or an African Group?

How are the participants in the seminars and regional conferences selected?
How does QUNO select the topics for TRTA activities?

Multiplier effects of TRTA:

3. Can a relatively small financial contribution have an effect on the negotiation results for developing countries regarding health?
4. Can the failure of Cancun be considered a success of TA provided to developing countries? What role has QUNO played in this respect?

Special issues on TRIPS:

5. Has the TRIPS agreement become more in conformity with sustainable development objectives and protection of health through access to medicines?

Future performance:

6. Since the first phase of the QUNO activities, developing countries have expressed their opinions on multilateral trade issues already more clearly. Quick scans of the Doha and Cancun Ministerial Declarations will show that there is a lot of attention for implementation concerns, technical assistance and capacity building for developing countries. The question arises what will be the focus and relevance of the QUNO activities in relation to TRIPS after Cancun? Apart from the public health issues, perhaps extension of the protection of geographic indications?
7. What indications do exist that the performance of QUNO in terms of efficiency, effectivity and relevance will drastically change in the coming 2-4 years?
8. To what extent do the future plans of QUNO in the field of TRTA concur with the Dutch policy objectives for financial support to TRTA?
9. What is the probability that the future outcomes of QUNO interventions will contribute to the Dutch policy objectives in the field of TRTA?

Q4. *(Questionnaire / telephone interviews participants of workshops and seminars):*

- Position held of participant at the time of the workshop / seminar;
- Present position and description of current duties;
- Subjects dealt with during the QUNO workshop / seminar;
- How has the gained expertise been applied in practice?
- Benefits for the organisation where the participants work from the expertise gained during the workshop / seminar;
- Suggestions for models for future capacity building (e.g. location, duration and structure of the events);
- For what new areas a need for workshops and seminars is foreseen.

Q4.2 (Questionnaire / telephone interviews – trade policy-makers in capitals of developing countries):

Relevance of QUNO's activities for their organisation

- Reports received on topics dealt with at QUNO workshops and seminars;
- Instructions made by policy-makers for delegates on topics dealt with at QUNO workshops and seminars;
- Initiatives, if any, taken by the organisation following from QUNO's activities;
- Changes in trade policy in their country, if any, resulting from QUNO's activities.

Awareness of topics dealt with by QUNO

- Which organisations in their country have obtained an interest in the TRIPS Agreement;
- Media coverage and awareness of TRIPS issues in their country.

5 Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC)

5.1 Profile

Mission and objectives

AITIC's goal is to help less-advantaged countries (LACs) to benefit from the multilateral trading system by assisting them in the active participation in the work of the WTO and other trade-related organisations in Geneva as well as the WTO negotiations.

Activities and country coverage

Free, targeted and personalised assistance is given to delegates from LACs in Geneva and to Member countries and Observers of the WTO that do not have a permanent presence in Geneva. Other services provided by AITIC are briefing notes, workshops, training seminars and translation of documents on trade issues of interest to LACs. Specific services are provided to countries without a permanent representation in Geneva. AITIC's activities are targeted to the least developed countries. The LACs include the 49 least developed countries as defined by the United Nations.

Budget of the organisation

AITIC was created in February 1998 as an association with financial support of the

Swiss government. The growing number of services provided by AITIC did increase the budgetary needs of the organisation. At present AITIC is funded by seven bilateral donors (by end of 2002 these seven developed countries provided initial funding to AITIC to the amount of 18 million Swiss francs; also see next paragraph).

Financial relationship with the Netherlands

To expand the assistance to developing countries to participate more actively in the multilateral trade system and to attract more funding, AITIC's legal status was changed from an association into an Inter-governmental Organisation (IGO) in December 2002. The Netherlands supported the establishment of AITIC as an IGO and has committed EUR 2 mIn for the period of 2003-2006 (The Netherlands became the second bilateral donor after Switzerland).

Earlier evaluations

A study on Assistance and Representation Needs of the Developing Countries without WTO Permanent Representation in Geneva ("The WTO Non-Residents"), Commonwealth Secretariat, August 2001.

5.2 Design of evaluation research

Focus and selection

Though AITIC is a relatively small intergovernmental organisation based in Geneva, it has provided services to a large number of representatives of LACs, often in Geneva, sometimes in the capitals of the LACs. A selection will be made of the delegates from LACs that have enjoyed personalised assistance from AITIC, concentrating on delegates that have - compared to others - received a lot of support from AITIC. If not already included and if supported by AITIC, in addition, representatives of the selected countries for the evaluation research on the Integrated Framework (Chapter 2) and JITAP (Chapter 3) will be visited.

Main questions

1. Efficiency:
 - a. Were outputs delivered according to plan, budget and schedule?
 - b. What has been the relationship between the inputs and the outputs of AITIC as an association?
2. Effectiveness:
 - a. Did the output of AITIC contribute to knowledge and capacities of individual

representatives of the (developing) country in the field of trade and development? To what extent have the outputs contributed to more technical expertise of the individual beneficiaries? To what extent has AITIC's output contributed to negotiation skills of individual beneficiaries for participating in the multilateral trade talks?

3. Relevance:

- a. To what extent has the outcome of AITIC contributed to the formulation of a national policy of the developing country at the interface of trade and development?
- b. To what extent has the outcome of AITIC contributed to the capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements?

Specific questions

Demand-led approach and ownership:

1. How does AITIC find out what the prime trade interests and negotiations issues are of the LACs? How does the organisation ensure that its services are really demand-led? What is the demand for assistance by the individual delegates of LACs and WTO Non-Residents participating in the trade talks in Geneva and at WTO negotiations? How are the needs of those individual delegates established? With respect to the briefing notes and training materials is there overlap with other information providers?
2. Do AITIC's services for countries without a permanent mission in Geneva contribute to their institution building and ownership in the area of trade negotiations?

Target group:

3. Within the broad group of developing countries only a few large countries, such as Brazil and India, seem to be effective players in the WTO negotiations. Why does AITIC concentrate on the least developed countries? What are the criteria for other developing countries to make use of AITIC's services?

Multiplier effects of TRTA:

4. Can the failure of Cancun be considered a success of TA provided to developing countries? What role has AITIC played in this respect?

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
<p>Of input:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Amount of financial support 2. Number of AITIC staff in general 3. Number of working days spent on briefing notes, workshops/seminars, translation of documents, and personalized assistance 	<p>AITIC Activity and Financial Reports</p> <p>Project dossiers</p>	<p>Desk study and Interview AITIC Director</p> <p>Desk study and Interview DDE, Permanent Mission Geneva</p>
<p>Of output:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number and types of briefing notes produced 2. Number and type of workshops and training seminars delivered 3. Number and types of documents translated 4. Number of non-residents that have been given personalised technical assistance 	<p>For 1-4: AITIC Activity Reports AITIC staff</p>	<p>For 1-4: Desk study</p> <p>Interview AITIC Director</p>
<p>Of outcome:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Application of the outputs provided by AITIC by individual beneficiaries (e.g. use of briefing notes, training materials, actual use of the personalised technical assistance) 	<p>For 1: Selection of trade policy-making body in LAC Capitals; Selection of LAC's trade missions in Geneva that have enjoyed personalized assistance from AITIC and/or participated in AITIC seminars/workshops; Evaluation questionnaires of workshops/seminars</p>	<p>1. Questionnaire (for trade-policy officers in capitals, see Q5.1). Interviews.</p>

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
Of impact:		
1. Newly acquired positions taken by LACs (supported by AITIC) in WTO councils and subsidiary bodies on Agriculture, Market Access for Industrial Products, GATS, TRIPS, and S'pore issues.	1. AITIC executive director, selected LAC delegations	1. Interviews
2. WTO subjects where LACs cooperated and pooled resources	2. Selected LAC delegations	2. Interviews
3. Active participation of LACs in the WTO trade talks	3. Selected LAC delegations	3. Interviews
4. Negotiation results for LACs (that were personally assisted by AITIC)	4. Idem	4. Idem

N.B. Interviews of selected LAC delegations that participated in AITIC activities will also cover old delegates and the organisations they represented from the four countries in which fieldwork will be done in the course of this evaluation (see Chapters 2 and 3).

Future performance:

5. Will the adapted legal status of AITIC, changing from an association into an IGO, not affect the organisation's comparative advantage as hypothesized for a small flexible and non-bureaucratic association?
6. Will the (lack of) willingness of LAC delegate(s) to pay a fee for the personalised assistance provided by AITIC affect the future performance of AITIC?
7. The Netherlands Government has made a commitment to financially support AITIC for the period 2003-2006. What are the future plans of AITIC and how do they fit in the Netherlands strategy for supporting TRTA?
8. What is the probability that the future outcomes of AITIC interventions will contribute to the Dutch policy objectives in the area of TRTA?

Q5.1 (Questionnaire / telephone interviews – trade policy-making body in LAC Capitals)

The evaluation-matrix serves as the framework for the telephone interviews.

Specific questions for the trade-policy making officials are:

Effectiveness (outcome: output)

- What use have you made of AITIC's Internet Site?
- What use have you made of publications of AITIC?

Relevance (impact: outcome)

- Have AITIC's services been instrumental for new trade policy analyses of your LAC Capital? If so, on what trade policy subjects?
- What has been the effect of AITIC's services on the interaction between your LAC Capital and WTO delegation?
- Have the background notes and reports delivered by AITIC addressed the multilateral trade issues that have been of largest importance to the trade policy-making body of the LAC Capital?
- Has the trade policy-making body enhanced its capacity for dealing with WTO matters since 1998? If so, in what ways has AITIC been instrumental in this?
- Has AITIC assisted in enhancing your WTO representation in Geneva through facilitating networks or cooperation with neighbouring LACs or LACs with similar trading interests?

6 Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL)

6.1 Profile

Mission and objectives

In the agreement establishing ACWL the purpose of ACWL is formulated as follows: to provide legal training, support and advice on WTO law and dispute settlement procedures to developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and to countries with economies in transition.

In its activity report from July 2001 to July 2002 this objective is stated again, but in addition, two reasons for the creation of ACWL are presented:

To respond to the need of developing countries, least developed countries and economies in transition to better understand their rights and obligations under the WTO. To provide these countries with an equal opportunity to participate in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.

Activities and country coverage

ACWL provides three types of services: 1) legal advice on WTO law; 2) support to parties and third parties in WTO dispute settlement procedures; and 3) training to government officials in WTO law through seminars on WTO law and internships.

ACWL covers developing countries, countries in transition countries and least developed countries. Countries that are designated by the UN as LDCs and are also members of the WTO (or in the process of acceding to the WTO) are entitled to the services of ACWL without being a member. Developing and transition countries that are members have access to all services of ACWL against discounted rates (see budget). Non-members have only access to part of ACWL's services.

Budget of the organisation/programme

ACWL has an Endowment Fund in which founding members from developing and developed countries made contributions. Revenues from this Fund are used to finance operations after the first five years of operation. In addition, developed countries made "multi-year contributions" which are used to finance the annual budget during the first five years of operations. As of June 2003, the total support for ACWL from these multiyear contributions and the contributions to the Endowment Fund amounted to USD 32.25 million. Nine developed countries have contributed USD 14.25 million and 23 developing countries USD 18 million.

Countries that use ACWL's services have to pay fees for legal advice. General legal advice is free for members and for LDCs up to a maximum number of hours, while non-member developing countries pay an hourly rate between USD 250-350.⁶⁴ Fees for support in WTO dispute settlement proceedings are USD 100-250 for ACWL members and USD 25 per hour for LDCs. There are no reports on the total income of these fees.

In 2002 a Technical Expertise Trust Fund was established to finance the input from specialised technical experts in dispute settlement proceedings. Up until April 2003, CHF 708,160 (approximately EUR 475,000) was committed to this Fund.

Financial relationship with the Netherlands

In 1999, the Netherlands committed an amount of USD 2,250,000 to ACWL. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed USD 1,125,000: USD 1 million for the Endowment Fund and USD 125,000 to the annual contribution to ACWL.

⁶⁴ The exact fee is dependent on a country's share of world trade and per capita income.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs contributed USD 125,000 to the annual contribution costs in 2001 and USD 250,000 to the annual contributions for the following four years (2002-2005). In 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs committed an additional amount of EUR 171,500 for the Technical Expertise Fund of ACWL. This support covers a period of three years (2002-2004).

Earlier evaluations

According to the information currently available, there have been no evaluations of ACWL so far.

6.2 Design of evaluation research

Selection and focus

The focus of the evaluation will be on assessing membership of ACWL and results of legal advice and support to (third) parties in WTO dispute settlement procedures. In addition, the logic underlying the provision of training will be explored and what a first generation of trainees has gained from and done with the training provided by ACWL.

The quality of ACWL's work will only be assessed by looking at the effects and outcomes of their activities. This means that the beneficiaries will be asked about their opinion of ACWL's services, and that research will be done on the follow-up of the legal advice of ACWL. There will be interviews with beneficiaries in Geneva and in the capitals (by visits to Geneva, telephone and e-mail).

Main questions

1. Efficiency:
 - a. Were outputs delivered according to plan, budget and schedule?
 - b. What has been the relationship between the inputs and the outputs?
2. Effectiveness
 - a. Did the output of the ACWL contribute to knowledge and capacities of individual public officers of the developing country in the field of legal trade issues?
 - b. To what extent has the work of ACWL enabled developing countries to participate in the WTO dispute settlement procedure?

3. Relevance

- a. To what extent has the outcome of ACWL contributed to formulation of a national policy by the developing country at the interface of trade and development?

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
Of input:	For 1-3:	For 1-3:
1. Total amount of financial resources for ACWL	ACWL reports on operations	Dossier study
2. Number of ACWL staff and working days spent to carry out ACWL's activities	ACWL files and ACWL staff	Interviews with ACWL staff members
3. Number of DGIS/Economic Affairs staff and working days spent on ACWL	DGIS and Economic Affairs staff	Interviews with DGIS staff and Economic Affairs staff
Of output:	For 1-3:	For 1-3:
1. Number of general legal advices	ACWL reports on operations	Dossier study
2. Number of legal advices for dispute settlement procedures	ACWL files and ACWL staff	Interviews with ACWL staff members
3. Number of legal trainings to developing country officials (seminars, publications and internships)		
Of outcome:	For 1-3: ⁶⁵	For 1-3:
1. Number and type of follow-up actions undertaken by officials of the general legal advice provided by ACWL.	1. (Ex) officials in developing countries involved in legal advice provided by ACWL and (draft) policy texts before and after legal advice;	Desk study

⁶⁵ The extent, to which the evaluation team can identify and access these sources of information, will depend on the information that will be provided by ACWL.

Evaluation matrix

Types of Indicators	Sources of data	Research methods
2. Results of the dispute settlement procedures following the legal advice of ACWL	2. Involved officials of developing countries, WTO files, ACWL staff and files	Interviews (face-to-face or by phone) with ex-participants and their superiors:
3. The acquired knowledge and expertise of individual beneficiaries (ex-participants of training activities and clients)	3. (Ex) participants of training and their superiors	Interviews with ACWL staff
Of impact:		
1. More dispute settlement cases requested by developing countries	For 1-2: WTO files and staff,	Desk study and Interviews
2. Positive results for developing countries in dispute settlement procedures	Developing country officials involved in trade disputes.	

- b To what extent has the outcome of ACWL contributed to the capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements?

Specific questions

Objectives and type of TRTA

1. The objective of ACWL as stated in the agreement is very much input-oriented. What is the desired effect or impact of ACWL and how has this been monitored?
2. To what extent has ACWL focused on the implementation of current agreements, or instead on the dispute settlement procedure or negotiating new agreements?
3. What has been the main reason to provide training?
4. To what extent and how have ACWL services strengthened the capacity of clients to participate in international trade policy and regulation?

Demand-led approach

5. Are there no general lessons for developing countries arising from specific requests? What has ACWL done with these lessons learnt?
6. To what extent are developing countries reactive or initiating in asking for ACWL's services? Are there any notable developments in this respect?
7. Have the clients of ACWL got a full understanding of their rights and obligations in the case of international trade policy and regulation for which they request legal aid?

Membership and funding

8. Have there been any problems relating to the affordability of ACWL's services for developing countries?
9. Could ACWL perform mediation services in disputes between members?

Future performance:

10. The number of developing and transition country members is still low. Does ACWL intend to increase the number of members, and if so, what is the strategy for this?
11. Does the current financial structure make ACWL's activities sustainable?
12. What indications do exist that the performance of ACWL in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance will drastically change in the coming 2-4 years?
13. To what extent do the future plans of ACWL in the field of TRTA concur with the Dutch policy objectives for financial support to TRTA?
14. What is the probability that the future outcomes of ACWL activities will contribute to the Dutch policy objectives in the field of TRTA?

Annex 4: Rating methodology

For the assessment of results of the seven organisations and programmes selected for field studies, a five-point scale was used: Poor (P), Weak (W), Fair (F), Good (G), and Excellent (E). The purpose of this annex is to explain and illustrate how the rating of results of selected TRTA was conducted with the use of generic and programme-specific indicators.

Evaluation criteria as generic performance indicators

Efficiency, effectiveness and relevance were used as generic performance indicators for all seven organisations and programmes. These evaluation criteria were defined as follows:

- I. Efficiency is the relationship between input and output.
- II. Effectiveness is the relationship between output and outcome.
- III. Relevance is the relationship between outcome and impact.

Output and outcome were specified as results of technical assistance. Output refers to courses, programs, studies, publications, strategic documents, strategy development plans, etc of a TRTA provider or program. Outcome refers to knowledge, understanding and skills of individual beneficiaries of TRTA.

Policy objectives were used to specify results at impact level. Two Netherlands objectives to support TRTA have been used as main indicators of impact, namely enhancement of the ability of developing countries to identify trade policy interests and increased negotiating capacity of developing countries at multilateral trade negotiations.

Programme-specific indicators

For each of the seven TRTA providers and programs selected for field study, specific evaluation matrices and specific indicators of output, outcome and impact were designed (see Annex 3). These specific indicators reflected the

specific features of each provider or programme. The breakdown of generic performance indicators into various sub-indicators and sub-sub-indicators in each of the specific evaluation matrices was meant to minimize subjective assessments of results.

For the assessment of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance, unweighted averages of sub-scores and sub-sub-scores were calculated. For this purpose, the five-point scale was rated as follows: P=1, W=2, F=3, G=4 and E=5.

Below three examples are given of how scores on efficiency (of IF in Yemen), effectiveness (of JITAP in Tanzania) and relevance (of QUNO) were determined.

1 Efficiency of IF in Yemen

For measuring efficiency of IF in Yemen, two sub-indicators were defined: (1) the input-output relationship of the IF process and (2) delivery of Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) according to plan and time-schedule.

For the first sub-indicator of efficiency, the evaluation team looked at various sub-sub-indicators at the input side: the amount of financial support allocated to the IF/DTIS, the input of agency staff involved in the DTIS, and the number of meetings of the national IF steering committee. As for the output, the evaluation team looked at the following sub-sub-indicators: the national workshop, overview and analysis of existing TRTA, the draft or completed diagnostic trade integration study, and an overview of prioritised TRTA/CB projects.

The sub-sub-indicators at the input side were looked at in relation to the quantity of the output produced. In addition, the quality of the sub-sub-indicators at the output side were assessed and ranked accordingly:

- Did the input to the diagnostic trade integration study actually result into a document? How much money, how many meetings and how much of technical support of the core agencies was used to write this study? Was it original or rather a cut-and-paste piece of work? The input to the DTIS actually resulted into a document. The DTIS was produced for a sum of USD 440,000 and with the input of 3 FTE of WB resident office and nine meetings of the national steering committee. The document was not original. According the World Bank Sana'a Office, the study was based for about 70 percent on input of the World Bank, making use of data and material from earlier World Bank reports. Hence a rating of Weak for this sub-sub-indicator.

- Was there a broad participation from the private sector and civil society in the national workshop? Was this workshop a one-off event only? The national workshop in Yemen did not have a broad participation; there had not been much follow-up realised between the time of the national workshop in June 2003 and the evaluation mission in November 2003. Hence, a rating of Weak for this sub-sub indicator.
- Did the DTIS produce an overview and analysis of existing TRTA? The technical assistance matrix in the DTIS for Yemen had the following shortcomings: i) it is unclear which type of action is implemented and which ones are proposed; ii) there is no analysis of the experience with the existing type of actions; iii) there is no connection between the type of actions and the main body of the DTIS report. Hence, a rating of Poor for this sub-sub indicator.
- Was there an overview of TRTA/CB priorities for submission to Window II? Four months after the national workshop there was not yet a list finalised with TRTA/CB projects ready to submit to Window II. Hence, a rating of Poor for this sub-sub indicator.

The unweighted average of these ratings gives a rating of Poor/Weak for the first sub-indicator of efficiency: $(2+2+1+1)/4 = 1.5$.

For the second sub-indicator of efficiency, the evaluation team assessed delivery in terms of plan and schedule:

- Did the draft DTIS comply with the broad terms of reference for integration studies? Were the pro-poor aspects covered in the trade integration study? The draft DTIS did comply with the broad terms of reference for integration studies. However, linkages between poverty and trade were insufficiently paid attention to in the DTIS for Yemen. The DTIS was not diagnostic in the sense of providing analysis of effects of different trade policies on employment and the poor. Hence, a rating of Fair for this sub-sub indicator.
- Was the DTIS timely delivered? The time between the first preparatory mission and the approval of the DTIS by the authorities of the country, for which a WB benchmark of one year was taken. In the case of Yemen this time span was already more than 22 months in November 2003, hence a rating of Poor for this sub-sub-indicator.

The unweighted average of these ratings gives a rating of Weak for the second sub-indicator: $(3 + 1)/2 = 2$.

The unweighted average rating of the two sub-indicators gives the overall rating of Weak for efficiency of IF in Yemen: $(1.5+2)/2 = 1.75$.

2 Effectiveness of JITAP-Tanzania

For assessing the output-outcome relationship of JITAP-Tanzania the following questions and sub-indicators were addressed:

- Did the sub-committees of the Inter-Institutional Committee (IIC) organize regular meetings? Only two out of five subcommittees were active and organized regular meetings. Hence, a rating of Weak for this sub-indicator.
- Did the National Enquiry Point realise awareness training? It did not due to lack of funds to cover operating costs. Hence, a rating of Poor for this sub-indicator.
- Was the Communication and Discussion Facility used for communication and discussion? It was not utilised. Hence, a rating of Poor for this sub-indicator.
- Were the reference centres, containing WTO and multilateral trade documentation, used by individuals? Two out of three reference centres were not functioning as such. Hence, a rating of Weak for this sub-indicator.
- Did the training courses increase the knowledge and capacities of participants? Was the network of trainers and MTS experts maintained? Courses sensitised participants but participants considered training courses as too short and not comprehensive enough. Networking among trainers and MTS experts was minimal. An Institute of Multilateral Trade Systems was formed but was not operational. Hence a rating of Weak for this sub-indicator.
- Was follow-up organised of the workshops organised for Customs Officials? Though the Customs Department had expressed the need for more activities on technical and legal customs matters, no follow-up was organised of two ad-hoc workshop on customs. Hence, a rating of Poor for this sub-indicator.
- Did the three MTS studies result into legal adjustments? While Tanzania is lacking in terms of complying with WTO commitments, for instance on notifications, the responsible officials did not achieve any results with the impact studies regarding conformity checks and legal adjustments. Hence, a rating of Poor for this sub-indicator.
- Were the Trade Secrets Guide and Export Financing Book used? How many and what types of strategies were developed for priority sectors/products? The Trade Secrets Guide had not been brought out by JITAP. The Export Financing Book was given away for free by the BET. Two export development strategies for textiles & clothing and spices were developed with assistance of JITAP. The Board of External Trade independently prepared similar strategy reports for horticulture & mushrooms and fishery. Hence, a rating of Fair for this sub-indicator.

The unweighted average of these ratings gives a rating of Weak for effectiveness of JITAP in Tanzania: $(2+1+1+2+2+1+1+3)/8= 1.625$

3 Relevance of QUNO

For assessing relevance of QUNO, two sub-indicators were used: (1) contribution to the capacity of the developing country to negotiate multilateral trade agreements and (2) contribution to the formulation of a national trade policy at the interface of trade and development.

For the first sub-indicator of relevance, the evaluation team addressed the following questions and sub-sub indicators:

- Did the increased knowledge of beneficiaries lead to an active participation in the TRIPS negotiations in the form of participation in discussions in the TRIPS Council and of putting forward proposals? The beneficiaries of QUNO were very active, both in the discussions and in putting forward proposals. Hence, a rating of Good. (A rating of Excellent was not given because QUNO's beneficiaries were mainly developing countries that already had been quite active in the negotiations.)
- Did the increased knowledge of participants of the joint meetings of developing countries at the QUNO office lead to strategies and alliances between developing countries? Though it is difficult to identify strategies of developing countries because a strategy is not always visible, it was clear that developing countries had adopted a coordinated approach, especially by submitting joint proposals and making joint statements. Only on the paragraph 6 issue, there had been some differences in approach, but not on substance. Hence, a rating of Good/Excellent.
- Did the increased knowledge of the beneficiaries on TRIPS lead to positive negotiation results for developing countries? The Doha Declaration had been very important for developing countries, because it contained a number of important achievements for developing countries, e.g. that countries have the right to protect public health, not only in cases of health crises. The Decision on Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health is far from perfect from the perspective of developing countries. However, without their active participation and voicing of their arguments, the agreement would definitely have been worse. It should also be noted that external factors (like pressure from public opinion) also influenced the outcome of the negotiations, and therefore, the result cannot only be attributed to developing countries negotiators. Hence, a rating of Good for this sub-indicator.

The unweighted average of these ratings gives a rating of Good for the first sub-indicator of relevance: $(4+4.5+4)/3= 4.16$.

For the second sub-indicator of relevance, the evaluation team addressed the following questions and sub-sub-indicators:

- Did increased knowledge of participants of regional seminars organized by QUNO contribute to formulation of national policy in the field of TRIPS? QUNO conducted a number of activities in developing countries (regional seminars) where different national stakeholders were brought together. Sometimes these different stakeholders were also invited to Geneva to participate in informal meetings. In addition, publications were sent to a wide audience in developing countries. All these activities led to increased awareness in developing countries about the issues at stake and paved the way towards joint (national) action. to but left effects on national trade policy uncertain. Hence, a rating of Weak for this sub-indicator.
- Did increased knowledge of participants as a result of analytical work and informal meetings of QUNO help developing countries to formulate national trade policy in the field of TRIPS? QUNO analysed what options developing countries have in multilateral negotiations and how these options relate to their development. This information was used to determine a national position in multilateral negotiations, which is not the same as the formulation of a national trade policy, yet a specific and strategic element. Hence, a rating of Fair for this sub-indicator.

The unweighted average for the second sub-indicator on the basis of these two sub-sub indicators is $(2+3)/2= 2.500$.

The unweighted average rating for the two sub-indicators gives the overall rating of Fair for the relevance of QUNO: $(4.16+2.5)/2= 3.33$.

Annex 5: Assessment reports of selected cases

Meaning of ratings: P is Poor, W is Weak, F is Fair, G is Good, and E is Excellent. For the rating methodology: see Annex 4.

1 IF in Ethiopia and Yemen

Table A.1 Efficiency of IF in Ethiopia

Indicators	Ratings
Input-output relationship (see Table A.4)	F
Delivery of output according to schedule, plan and budget	W
Average rating	W/F

Table A.2 Effectiveness of IF in Ethiopia

Indicator	Rating
Knowledge and expertise gained by individual beneficiaries and the use of output (see Table A.5)	W

Table A.3 Relevance of IF in Ethiopia

Indicators	Ratings
Contribution to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development	W/F
Contribution to capacity to negotiate multilateral trade agreements	P

Table A.4 Input-output relationship of IF in Ethiopia

Input	Output (as of 31-12 2003)	Efficiency ratings
USD 355,000	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS)	W
Six man-months of local staff of multilateral agencies	One national workshop (in November 2003)	F
Two man-months IF facilitator	Long-list of recommendations for the Plan of Action	G
Two meetings of six multilateral agencies with donors, one meeting of national IF Steering Committee, 15 meetings of national IF Technical Committee	Incomplete overview of existing TRTA/CB activities; draft list of five TA priorities ready for submission to Window II (ear-marked funding)	F
Average rating		F

Table A.5 Output-outcome relationship of IF in Ethiopia

Output	Outcome (as of 31-12-2003)	Effectiveness' ratings
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS)	Four staff members of the Ministry of Trade and Industry gained experience in dealing with trade matters; preparation actions to follow up on DTIS recommendations	W
One national workshop (in November 2003)	Increased awareness among participants in national workshop of linkages between trade and poverty reduction; follow-up actions on impact analysis of trade policy on the poor, production chains and employment opportunities included in the Plan of Action	F

Table A.5 Output-outcome relationship of IF in Ethiopia

Output	Outcome (as of 31-12-2003)	Effectiveness' ratings
Long-list of recommendations for the Plan Action	No monitoring system installed, but point of attention of Ministry of Trade and Industry and donors	W
Incomplete overview of existing TRTA/CB activities; draft list of five TA priorities ready for submission to Window II (ear-marked funding)	Coordination of TRTA of six multilateral agencies by Ethiopian officials not reported, but Ministry of Trade and Industry committed to take leading role	W
Average rating		W

Table A.6 Efficiency of IF in Yemen

Indicators	Ratings
Input-output relationship (see Table A.9)	P/W
Delivery of output according to schedule, plan and budget	W
Average rating	W

Table A.7 Effectiveness of IF in Yemen

Indicator	Rating
Knowledge and expertise gained by individual beneficiaries and the use of output (see Table A.10)	W

Table A.8 Relevance of IF in Yemen

Indicators	Ratings
Contribution to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development	P
Contribution to capacity to negotiate multilateral trade agreements	P/W

Table A.9 Input-output relationship of IF in Yemen

Input	Output (as per end of November 2003)	Efficiency ratings
USD 440,000	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS)	W
72 man-months of local WB staff	One national workshop (in June 2003)	W
Nine meetings of the national steering committee	No overview and analysis of existing TRTA	P
	No overview of prioritised TRTA/CB projects	P
Average rating		P/W

Table A.10 Output-outcome relationship of IF in Yemen

Output	Outcome (as per end of November 2003)	Effectiveness' ratings
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS)	The national committee for preparation and negotiation with the WTO gained knowledge about pro-poor integration strategies; the IF focal point learned to think about international competitiveness of economic sectors; DTIS work was used by the WTO accession team in drafting a memorandum; no monitoring system for all national stakeholders of recommended follow-up installed; no concrete plans of coordination of TRTA of multilateral agencies by Yemen officials	F
One national workshop (in June 2003)	No follow-up actions undertaken by Yemen officials on DTIS recommendations discussed at national workshop; no follow-up actions in terms of impact analysis of trade policy on the poor, important production chains, and employment opportunities for the poor	P
Average rating		W

2 JITAP in Burkina Faso and Tanzania

Table A.11 Efficiency of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso

Indicators	Ratings
Input-output relationship (see Table A.14)	F
Delivery of output according to schedule, plan and budget	P
Average rating	W

Table A.12 Effectiveness of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso

Indicator	Rating
Knowledge and expertise gained by individual beneficiaries and the use of output (see Table A.15)	W

Table A.13 Relevance of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso

Indicators	Ratings
Contribution to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development	W
Contribution to capacity to negotiate multilateral trade agreements	G

Table A.14 Input-output relationship of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso

Input	Output	Efficiency ratings
USD 1.34 million [22 days per month of ITC staff and ... UNDP local staff]	Inter-institutional committee (CNCS/OMC) set up, with three statutory sub-committees and with annual budgets included in the regular state budget	G
15 meetings of JITAP national steering committee in period December 1999-December 2002	National Enquiry Point on TBT and SPS established	G
	Communication and Discussion Facility set up	G
	Two JITAP reference centres established	G
	Nine training workshops held and ten generalists trained	E
	One workshop on customs	P
	One WTO impact study	F
	One report identifying potential export products and export markets; one export development strategy formulated for oleaginous products	W
	Trade secrets guide was not published	P
	Export financing book and export answer book not published	P
Average rating		F

Table A.15 Output-outcome relationship of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso

Output	Outcome	Effectiveness ¹ ratings
Inter-institutional committee (CNSC/OMC) set up, with three statutory sub-committees and with annual budgets included in the regular state budget	CNSC/OMC held regular meetings and got heavily involved in preparations of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún; it drafted an overview of main negotiation positions	G
National Enquiry Point on TBT and SPS established	Priority sectors for development of certificates and standards identified	W
Communication and Discussion Facility set up	Communication and Discussion Facility was not utilised	P
Two JITAP reference centres established	One JITAP reference centre was used, the other not	F
Nine training workshops held and ten generalists trained	Understanding of public civil servants of multilateral trade issues was enhanced; association of trainers did not become active	F
One workshop on customs	No follow-up to workshop on customs nor other technical assistance addressed in the field of customs	P
One WTO impact study	No legal adjustments made in line with conclusions of WTO impact study	P
One report identifying potential export products and export markets; one export development strategy formulated for oleaginous products	Development strategy for oleaginous products understood and validated	F
Average rating		W

Table A.16 Efficiency of JITAP-I in Tanzania

Indicators	Ratings
Input-output relationship (see Table A.19)	F
Delivery of output according to schedule, plan and budget	P
Average rating	W

Table A.17 Effectiveness of JITAP-I in Tanzania

Indicator	Rating
Knowledge and expertise gained by individual beneficiaries and the use of output (see Table A.20)	W

Table A.18 Relevance of JITAP-I in Tanzania

Indicators	Ratings
Contribution to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development	W
Contribution to capacity to negotiate multilateral trade agreements	W

Table A.19 Input-output relationship of JITAP-I in Tanzania

Input	Output	Efficiency ratings
USD 1.6 million plus USD 300,000 from the IF	Inter-institutional committee established (with five sub-committees) but without budget and legal status	W
[22 days per month of ITC staff]	National Enquiry Point on TBT and SPS established	G
Five meetings of JITAP national steering committee	Communication and Discussion Facility established	G
	Three JITAP Reference Centres established	G
	Nine training workshops held	E
	Two workshops held for officials of the Customs Department	W
	Three MTS studies	F
	Assessment report of potential export products and export markets written; two export development strategies developed (for textiles & clothing and spices); one export financing book written but no export answer book	F
Average rating		F

Table A.20 Output-outcome relationship of JITAP-I in Tanzania

Output	Outcome	Effectiveness ¹ ratings
Inter-institutional committee established (with five sub-committees) but without budget and legal status	Inter-institutional committee organised few meetings; two of the five sub-committees were active	W
National Enquiry Point on TBT and SPS established	National Enquiry Point could not realise awareness training due to lack of funds to cover operating costs	P
Communication and Discussion Facility established	CDF not utilised	P
Three JITAP Reference Centres established	Two of the three JITAP Reference Centres not functioning properly	W
Nine training workshops held	Courses sensitised participants; Institute on Multilateral Trade System exists on paper	W
Two workshops held for officials of the Customs Department	No follow-up on workshops on customs nor other technical assistance addressed in the field of customs	P
Three MTS studies	No legal adjustments made as follow-up of MTS studies	P
Assessment report of potential export products and export markets written; two export development strategies developed (for textiles & clothing and spices); one export financing book written but no export answer book	Strategies understood and validated for two products; export financing book was not sold. Guide on trade secrets was not released	F
Average rating		W

3 Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment of UNCTAD

Table A.21 Efficiency of PMFI of UNCTAD

Indicators	Ratings
Input-output relationship (see Table A.24)	W/F
Delivery of output according to schedule, plan and budget	P
Average rating	W

Table A.22 Effectiveness of PMFI of UNCTAD

Indicator	Rating
Knowledge and expertise gained by individual beneficiaries and the use of output (see Table A.25)	Cnbd

Table A.23 Relevance of PMFI of UNCTAD

Indicators	Ratings
Contribution to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development	Cnbd
Contribution to capacity to negotiate multilateral trade agreements	Cnbd

Table A.24 Input-output relationship of PMFI of UNCTAD

Input	Output	Efficiency ratings
USD 1,839,118	Ten technical papers	F
107.6 man-months of UNCTAD staff	One web-site on international investment agreement	W
	Seminars: seven regional, one sub-regional and one interregional	G

Table A.24 Input-output relationship of PMFI of UNCTAD

Input	Output	Efficiency ratings
	Three seminars in Geneva and one informal pre-Seattle seminar	F
	One pilot training course	W
	Two forums (one in Geneva and one in Sri Lanka)	W
	Two public-private sector dialogues	W
	One BIT round (in Thailand)	W
Average rating		W/F

Table A.25 Output-outcome relationship of PMFI of UNCTAD

Output	Outcome	Effectiveness' ratings
Ten technical papers	Cnbd	Cnbd
One web-site on international investment agreement		
Seminars: seven regional, one sub-regional and one interregional		
Three seminars in Geneva and one informal pre-Seattle seminar		
Pilot training course		
Two forums (one in Geneva and one in Sri Lanka)		
Two public-private sector dialogues		
One BIT round (in Thailand)		
Average rating		Cnbd

4 Competition Law and Policy for African Countries of UNCTAD

Table A.26 Efficiency of CLPAC of UNCTAD

Indicators	Ratings
Input-output relationship (see Table A.29)	Cnbd
Delivery of output according to schedule, plan and budget	Cnbd
Average rating	Cnbd

Table A.27 Effectiveness of CLPAC of UNCTAD

Indicator	Rating
Knowledge and expertise gained by individual beneficiaries and the use of output (see Table A.30)	Cnbd

Table A.28 Relevance of CLPAC of UNCTAD

Indicators	Ratings
Contribution to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development	Cnbd
Contribution to capacity to negotiate multilateral trade agreements	Cnbd

Table A.29 Input-output relationship of CLPAC of UNCTAD

Input	Output	Efficiency ratings
USD 602,187	One annual paper and seven technical papers on competition law?	Cnbd
Staff input: unknown	Six country-specific comments on draft competition laws and four country-specific comments on draft competition bills?	Cnbd
	Five regional seminars?	Cnbd
Average rating		Cnbd

Table A.30 Output-outcome relationship of CLPAC of UNCTAD

Output	Outcome	Effectiveness' ratings
One annual paper and seven technical papers on competition law? Six country-specific comments on draft competition laws and four country-specific comments on draft competition bills? Five regional seminars?	Cnbd	Cnbd
Average rating		Cnbd

5 Advisory Centre on WTO Law

Table A.31 Efficiency of ACWL

Indicators	Ratings
Input-output relationship (see Table A.34)	F
Delivery of output according to schedule, plan and budget	F
Average rating	F

Table A.32 Effectiveness of ACWL

Indicator	Rating
Knowledge and expertise gained by individual beneficiaries and the use of output (see Table A.35)	G

Table A.33 Relevance of ACWL

Indicators	Ratings
Contribution to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development	W
Contribution to capacity to negotiate multilateral trade agreements (and capacity to participate in dispute settlement procedures in the WTO)	F

Table A.34 Input-output relationship of ACWL

Input	Output	Efficiency ratings
CHF 4,283,000 (2001-2003)	Legal advice on WTO law provided 35 times: 29 times to members, four times to non-member LDCs and twice to non-member developing countries	G
Staff growing from two persons in 2001 to nine persons at end of 2003	Support in 14 dispute settlement proceedings of members, six of these still running	F
	Two courses on WTO law, two expert presentations, and occasional meetings or seminars	F
Average rating		F

Table A.35 Output-outcome relationship of ACWL

Output	Outcome	Effectiveness' ratings
Legal advice on WTO law provided 35 times: 29 times to members, four times to non-member LDCs and twice to non-member developing countries	Nearly all delegates followed up the advice of ACWL on whether or not to go ahead with a case	G/E
Support in 14 dispute settlement proceedings of members, six of these still running	Delegates from the three countries that had won a dispute, considered the input of ACWL as crucial. Delegates from the three countries ending with a settlement, found the input of ACWL useful. Delegates from the two countries that had lost a dispute did not put the blame on ACWL	F

Table A.35 Output-outcome relationship of ACWL

Output	Outcome	Effectiveness' ratings
Two courses on WTO law, two expert presentations, and occasional meetings or seminars	Training, legal advice and support during the process of dispute settlement helped delegates to get a better understanding of WTO dispute settlement	G
Average rating		G

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Table A.36 Efficiency of AITIC

Indicators	Ratings
Input-output relationship (see Table A.39)	Cnbd
Delivery of output according to schedule, plan and budget	Cnbd
Average rating	Cnbd

Table A.37 Effectiveness of AITIC

Indicator	Rating
Knowledge and expertise gained by individual beneficiaries and the use of output (see Table A.40)	G

Table A.38 Relevance of AITIC

Indicators	Ratings
Contribution to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development	W
Contribution to capacity to negotiate multilateral trade agreements	W

Table A.39 Input-output relationship of AITC

Input	Output	Efficiency ratings
<p>Expenditures unknown</p> <p>Staff of 13 persons end of 2003 but FTEs unknown; time input of consultants unknown</p>	<p>30 background notes and working documents (in the three official languages of the WTO); one extensive glossary of international trade terminology; website on trade</p> <p>23 seminars and informal meetings</p> <p>Answers to 280 specific requests for documents and advice</p> <p>A quarterly publication giving an overview of upcoming WTO meetings (Early Warning System), translation of 26 documents and logistic support – for non-residents</p>	<p>Cnbd</p>
<p>Average rating</p>		<p>Cnbd</p>

Table A.40 Output-outcome relationship of AITIC

Output	Outcome	Effectiveness' ratings
30 background notes and working documents (in the three official languages of the WTO); one extensive glossary of international trade terminology; website on trade	Concise and non-technical language of publications enabled country representatives to understand and follow debates in the WTO; every month on average 4,600 visitors consulted the website on trade	G/E
23 seminars and informal meetings	Seminars helped participants to get a better understanding of the WTO issues dealt with	F/G
Answers to 280 specific requests for documents and advice	Information of AITIC helped WTO delegates to better understand issues and adopt a more informed negotiation position	G
A quarterly publication giving an overview of upcoming WTO meetings (Early Warning System), translation of 26 documents and logistical support – such for non-residents	Non-resident delegates got informed by AITIC about upcoming events or meetings that they were unable to attend themselves	G
Average rating		G

Table A.41 Efficiency of QUNO

Indicators	Ratings
Input-output relationship (see Table A.44)	G/E
Delivery of output according to schedule, plan and budget	G
Average rating ¹	G

Table A.42 Effectiveness of QUNO

Indicator	Rating
Knowledge and expertise gained by individual beneficiaries and the use of output (see Table A.45)	G

Table A.43 Relevance of QUNO

Indicators	Ratings
Contribution to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development	W/F
Contribution to capacity to negotiate multilateral trade agreements	G

Table A.44 Input-output relationship of QUNO

Input	Output	Efficiency ratings
CHF 404,244 of Netherlands contributions; expenditures of budgets funded by other donors could be determined	30 discussion, issue, occasional and other papers	G/E
	About 70 informal meetings of 10-15 persons	E
	Five seminars in Geneva, two seminars in a developed country and five regional seminars	G
Staff of 1.5 FTEs; experts spending 20-30 days per year		
Average rating		G/E

Table A.45 Output-outcome relationship of QUNO

Output	Outcome	Effectiveness ^a ratings
30 discussion, issue, occasional and other papers	Increase of technical knowledge on TRIPS that helped delegates of developing countries to analyse the debate and to determine their country's position in multilateral trade talks on intellectual property, health and biodiversity.	G/E
About 70 informal meetings of 10-15 persons	Informal meetings provided a forum and helped developing countries to come up with a common position on a number of occasions	G/E
Five seminars in Geneva, two seminars in a developed country and five regional seminars	Participants acquired knowledge of long-term development issues	F
Average rating		G

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Annex 8: Acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group
ACWL	Advisory Centre on WTO Law
AERC	African Economic Research Consortium
AEV	Mutual Interest, Mutual Responsibility (Aan Elkaar Verplicht)
AITIC	Agency for International Trade, Information and Cooperation
BET	Board of External Trade (of JITAP)
BIT	Bilateral Investment Treaties
BNPP	Bank Netherlands Partnership Programme
CBI	Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries
CHF	Swiss Franc
CLPAC	Programme on Competition Law and Policy for African Countries (of UNCTAD)
CNSC/OMC	Cellule National de Suivi et de Coordination des Accords de l'OMC
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CTF	Common Trust Fund (of JITAP)
DDAGTF	Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund
DDATCDB	Doha Development Agenda Trade Capacity Database
DGIS	Directorate-General for International Cooperation
DGIS/CE	DGIS Coherence Unit
DGIS/DDE	DGIS Sustainable Economic Development Department
DGIS/DVF	DGIS International Financial Institutions Department
DITE	Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development (of UNCTAD)
DTIS	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study

EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EU	European Union
FMO	Netherlands Development Finance Company
FTE	Full Time Equivalents
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEPP	Integrated Export Promotion Programmes
HBBZ	Handbook on Operational Management (of Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
HRD	Human Resource Development
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
ICTSD	International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
IDLI	International Development Law Institute
IF	Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
IIC	Inter-institutional Committee (of JITAP)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
ITC	International Trade Centre
JITAP	Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme
KS	Document of the Dutch House of Representatives (Kamerstuk)
LAC	Less Advantaged Country
LDC	Least Developed Country
LNV	Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality.
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIDAS	Management Information Documentary Activities System
MTS	Multilateral Trade System

NEI	Netherlands Economic Institute
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NLG	Dutch Guilder
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OMC	French acronym of WTO (Organisation Mondiale de Commerce)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PMFI	Programme on Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment (of UNCTAD)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PV	Permanent Mission of the Netherlands
QUNO	Quakers United Nations Office
RPER	Dutch Regulation on Performance Data and Evaluation Research by the Government
SDT	Special and Differential Treatment
SOW	Netherlands Foundation for Research on World Food Supply (Stichting Onderzoek Wereldvoedselvoorziening)
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards
TA	Technical Assistance
TATP	Technical Assistance and Training Programme (of the WTO)
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TCBDB	Trade Capacity Building Database
TK	Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer)
TRIPS	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
TRTA	Trade-Related Technical Assistance
TRTA/CB	Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building
UEMOA	French acronym of WAEMU (Economic and Monetary Union of Western Africa)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar

VROM	Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZNF	South-North Federation (Zuid-Noord Federatie)

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