

# COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION

DEMOCRATIC  
REPUBLIC OF CONGO  
2003-2008

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## OVERVIEW OF COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATIONS

DFID has a rolling programme of Country Programme Evaluations (CPEs) with 5 or 6 evaluations of countries or regions per year. A synthesis report pulling together findings from 5 recent CPEs is also produced annually. CPEs are challenging evaluations attempting to provide an overview of the entire DFID programme over a 5 year time frame and evaluate whether DFID made appropriate strategic choices in the given context and delivered effectively. CPEs are ideally undertaken in the year prior to development of a new Country Assistance Plan, as they are designed to meet DFID's needs for lessons that can inform future strategy and programming, as well as accountability for funds spent at country level. CPEs are intended for a wide audience including DFID's country office staff and partners, senior DFID managers in the relevant regional divisions and members of the public/ other stakeholders.

Each CPE is managed by DFID's Evaluation Department and carried out by 4-6 independent international consultants with a mixture of evaluation and development skills. The terms of reference for the CPE programme include a generic evaluation framework closely linked to standard evaluation criteria; this is customised a little for each individual evaluation (and annexed to the report). For CPEs, interpretation of each of the evaluation criteria is as follows:

- Relevance** – CPEs should provide high quality, well evidenced material and judgements on whether 'DFID did the right things'
- Effectiveness** – CPEs should examine key interventions and partnerships and identify and explain successes and failures
- Efficiency** – CPEs should tell a narrative around the allocation of resources (financial and staffing) to deliver the results DFID was hoping to achieve
- Impact** – CPEs cannot produce new information on impacts attributable to DFID, but should consider DFID's contribution to long term outcomes
- Sustainability** – CPEs should discuss evidence on progress towards sustainability in terms of ownership of reforms, capacity development and resilience to risks.

Typically CPEs comprise a one week inception mission to the country to make contacts, scope the boundaries of the evaluation, customise the generic evaluation matrix and make decisions around issues such as field visits. The main CPE fieldwork then takes place around a month later and lasts up to three weeks. DFID's Evaluation Department provides each evaluation team with a large documentary evidence base comprising strategies, project/ programme information and context material sourced from a thorough search of paper and electronic files, DFID's intranet system and the internet. During the fieldwork the team interview stakeholders in country and current and past DFID staff. A list of people consulted is annexed to each study.

The views expressed in CPE reports are those of the independent authors. The country office can comment on these in a 'management response' within the Evaluation report. CPE reports are quality assured by an independent consultant who has no other involvement in the CPE programme.

**DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

**Evaluation Report Ev704**

# **Country Programme Evaluation DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**

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Full responsibility for the text of this report rests, however, with the authors. In common with all evaluation reports commissioned by DFID's Evaluation Department, the views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those of DFID or of the people consulted.

## Preface

This evaluation of DFID's country programme in DRC is one of a series of regular Country Programme Evaluations (CPEs) commissioned by DFID's Evaluation Department. The studies are intended to improve performance, contribute to lesson learning and inform the development of future strategy at country level. Collectively, the CPEs are important in terms of DFID's corporate accountability and enable wider lessons across the organisation to be identified and shared

The evaluation was carried out by a team of independent UK and national consultants, led by ITAD Ltd. The evaluation focused on DFID's programme during the period 2003-2008 and was managed by Lynne Henderson and Iain Murray of Evaluation Department (EvD). The evaluation field work was carried out between July and September 2008.

In accordance with EvD policy, considerable emphasis was placed on involving the country office staff during the process and on communicating findings. They were invited to discuss findings at a workshop during the evaluation and offered written comments on draft reports.

The evaluation finds that the rationale for engagement in DRC has been strong and aimed to promote peace and development from the outset. DFID's plans to scale up support, from £20m in 2003/04 to £80m in 2007/08, and move to larger, multi-donor programmes was also deemed appropriate given the country's huge needs for reconstruction and lack of donor coordination in the early years of the evaluation period. . The evaluation acknowledges the challenges of working with government and partners with limited capacity resulting in delays in launching some joint donor programmes during the latter part of the evaluation period. Nevertheless, DFID support was effective in a number of areas such as the road rehabilitation and other infrastructure projects.

This has been an important lesson learning opportunity for DFID, particularly in terms of working in a difficult and complex political environment. We are pleased that the report was timely and helpful to the country office in feeding into their country planning process. EvD would like to acknowledge the contribution made by the evaluation team itself, as well as DFID staff and development partners in DRC.

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## **Abbreviations**

ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
ADB	African Development Bank
AIT	Appui aux Institutions de Transition
APEC	Appui au Processus Electoral en RDC
AR	Annual Review
BCMI	Bureau de Coordination de Marchés d’Infrastructures
BCeCo	Bureau Central de Coordination
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CAF	Country Assistance Framework
CAP	Country Assistance Plan
CAR	Capability, Accountability, and Responsiveness
CBFF	Congo Basin Forest Fund
CBFP	Congo Basin Fund Partnership
CEEAC	Economic Community of Central African States
CELC	Commission d’Ethique et de Lutte contre la Corruption
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Union
CEP	Country Engagement Plan
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CIAT	Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CG	Consultative Group
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CLEAR	Country led Approaches and Results team, DFID
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défence du Peuple
COMIFAC	Conférence of the Ministers of Forestry of Central Africa
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CPE	Country Programme Evaluation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CTB	Coopération Technique Belge
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DBERR	Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
DDP	Director’s Delivery Plan
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DEX	Direct Execution
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DFID HQ	DFID Headquarters
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department for Trade and Industry
EAC	Eastern African Community
EC	European Commission

ECHO	European Commission’s Humanitarian Office
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
EU	European Union
EvD	Evaluation Department, DFID
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FCI	France Coopération Internationale
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
GoDRC	Government of DRC
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIBM	Groupe Inter-bailleurs sur les Médias
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Germany
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	International Development Assistance
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IFESH	International Foundation for Education and Self-Help
IRC	International Rescue Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDRP	Multi-Donor Reintegration Programme
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MLC	Mouvement de Libération du Congo
MoD	Ministry of Defence, UK
MTPI	Ministry of Public Works and Infrastructure
MONUC	Mission de l’ONU en RD Congo
MSF	Médecins sans frontières
NAO	National Audit Office
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ONU	Organisation des Nations Unies
PAP	Plan d’Actions Prioritaires
PF	Pooled Fund
PFM	Public Financial Management

PMPTR	Programme Minimum de Partenariat pour la Transition et la Relance
PIU	Programme Implementation Unit
PRGF	Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
PRGSP	Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper
PRGSP	Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper
PSA	Public Service Agreement
PSI	Population Services International
QUIP	Quick Impact Project
RATECO	Réseau des Radios et Télévisions Communautaires de l'Est de la RDC
RCN	Réseau Citoyens Network
RENOSEC	Réseau national de l'observation et la surveillance d'élections au Congo
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAIC	Staff Appointed In Country
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SMP	Staff Monitored Programme
SoS	Secretary of State, DFID
SONAS	Société Nationale d'Assurance
SPEC	Sécurisation du Processus Electoral Congolais
SSR	Security Sector Reforms
SSRJ	Security Sector Reforms and Justice
TNG	Transitional National Government
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS.
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WaSH	Water, Sanitation And Hygiene programme
WSSP	Water Supply and Sanitation Programme
WB	World Bank

## **Executive Summary**

S1. The Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) for Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) assessed the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and – to the extent possible – the impact and sustainability, of the Department for International Development (DFID)'s assistance programme from 2003 to 2008. Over this period, DFID DRC's programme has been rapidly scaled-up, from around £20 million in 2003/04 to £83 million in 2007/08.

S2. The timing of the evaluation covers two country strategy cycles. Following completion of the Country Plan (2008), the programme is currently undergoing major changes; many bilateral projects are in the process of being phased out and large-scale multi-donor programmes have just been launched or about to start. The country programme in 2009/10 will look very different from previous years. However, the evaluators can only assess the effectiveness and impact of the programme as it was during the period under review.

## **Context**

S3. The modern history of the DRC has been particularly difficult. Full-scale civil war broke out in 1997, marking the end of Mobutu's 32-year regime. The civil war lasted almost continuously until 2003 and involved seven other African countries. In 2001, President Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph, was installed in his place. The ratification of the Global and Inclusive Accord in Sun City (South Africa) in April 2003 paved the way for an inter-Congolese dialogue and the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG).

S4. With the support of the United Nations (UN) and international community, a permanent new constitution was endorsed by popular referendum in 2005 and the following year a two-round election process was held. In the final presidential run-off Kabila defeated Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the largely northern Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), in a vote endorsed by the international community as broadly fair. Following violent clashes between his private militia and Kabila's troops in Kinshasa in March 2007, Bemba was forced to leave the country. The newly appointed government, which was reshuffled in November 2007, was headed by Antoine Gizenga, a veteran of the early post-independence political era, until he resigned in September 2008. Instability in the east of the DRC has meanwhile persisted, perpetrating one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.

S5. The transitional national government normalised relationships with donors, following International Monetary Fund (IMF) approval of a three-year Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) in 2002. Hyper-inflation was brought under control and the country made good progress towards economic recovery. A Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP) was finalised in mid-2006. The PRGF arrangements could not be concluded, however, because of fiscal slippage and delays in structural reforms. The government has yet to meet all the conditions for the approval of a new PRGF and with it access to debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative with the IMF. This will in part hinge on the government's renegotiation of the terms of Chinese loans, worth US\$9bn (since revised to US\$6bn).

S6. Despite DRC's rich natural resource base and well-watered climate, poverty levels remain extremely high, with the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP)'s Human Development Index for 2007/08 ranking the DRC in 168th place out of 177 countries. Following the end of the civil war, real GDP per capita has increased on the back of economic growth. DRC will not meet any of the MDGs by 2015, although the lack of reliable data makes it difficult to see how far the country is off track.

S7. DRC has been an active participant of the aid effectiveness agenda and is a signatory of the Paris Declaration (2006). The country is also involved in the discussion on the Principles of International Engagement in Fragile States. The drafting of a joint donor strategy in 2006 remains the main donor response to the aid effectiveness agenda in DRC. Aid resumed gradually after the end of Mobutu's regime, reaching a peak of \$4.5bn in 2003. Total aid amounted to \$1.9bn in 2006, according to the OECD/DAC. However, donors have fallen behind the \$4bn pledges they made during the World Bank-led Consultative Group in 2007 in support of the PRGSP and Plan d'Actions Prioritaires (PAP) for the 2008–2010 period.

S8. The UK has become the third largest bilateral donor, after the US and Belgium. Total spend surged from £20m in 2003/04 to more than £80m in 2007/08, making DRC the tenth largest recipient of UK bilateral aid. Humanitarian assistance totalled £168m over the evaluation period, equivalent to 65% of all UK aid to the country. The size of the programme (outside humanitarian assistance) is now comparable with that of Kenya, also a non-budget support country, but a traditional partner for the UK.

### **Programme Relevance**

S9. The UK rationale for engagement in DRC has been strong and aimed to promote peace and development in the country from the outset. DFID's plans to scale up support and move to larger, multi-donor programmes was also appropriate, given the country's huge needs for reconstruction and lack of donor coordination in the early years of the evaluation period.

S10. With regards to strategic quality, CEPs during Phase I (2003–2005) were mostly revised in an ad hoc manner to reflect previous experience and/or new corporate priorities. Under Phase II (2006–2008), the finalisation of the CAP was delayed so that DFID could become an active participant in the joint donor CAF process. As a result, DFID functioned without a CAP for more than two years.

S11. DFID first took a pragmatic approach to its engagement in the DRC by choosing to build from existing projects implemented by UN agencies and INGOs in humanitarian assistance. As a result, DFID's portfolio of projects covered a wide range of sectors right from the beginning.

S12. Attempts to prioritise failed under Phase II, in large part because of the lack of sufficient guidance from DFID HQ. The launch of the Pooled Fund in 2006, while highly relevant to the DRC context, was driven by DFID HQ. Some sectors (including forestry and PFM) were also kept because they reflected corporate priorities, while activities in mining were left on the back-burner, and opportunities to scale down support in other sectors, notably health, were missed.

S13. Barring some concerns over the relevance of the health pilot projects, DFID's added value in PFM, and attention being diverted from the mining sector, DFID's choice of areas of intervention was largely relevant to the country's context. Under Phase I, DFID was right in its decision to finance the

elections and the transition institutions, as this was part of the Global and Inclusive Accord.

S14. The model of working through other donors was ill adapted to the reality of the DRC context in the early years of the evaluation period. Consequently, an early and constant feature of DFID programme has been the institutional support that it provided to multilateral agencies. DFID also successfully built partnership with less traditional partners, including China, France and USAID. In part thanks to DFID's continued efforts, the model of working through other donors is now about to become a reality.

S15. While the diversity of partners has declined over the years, DFID performed relatively well in mixing aid delivery mechanisms in most sectors. This approach fitted well with DFID 2006 White Paper and the OECD DAC Fragile States Principles. DFID's approach to risk broadly addressed external and organisational risks.

### **Programme Effectiveness and Efficiency**

S16. DFID's country programme over the evaluation period consisted of more than 40 projects. This number did not fall as fast as expected, as a result of delays in launching joint donor programmes under Phase II.

S17. The challenges of working with government and partners with limited capacity, coupled with delays in approving the Country Plan (2008) explain this. As a result, much of DFID (alongside other donor) development assistance was not ready in time to support the post-election period. This has undermined the effectiveness of DFID's programme under Phase II.

S18. Support to help secure security around the elections was effective. However peace-building projects performed poorly, in part because of poor project design, weak management, and overambitious targets.

S19. DFID supported UNDP programmes contributed to building the capacity of transition institutions, holding free and fair polls, and ensuring security during the electoral period. Support to Civic education was less effective but Media performed outstandingly well, with Radio Okapi playing a key role in ensuring balanced reporting during the elections.

S20. Road rehabilitation and other infrastructure projects have contributed to improved communication in DRC, although some failed to initiate a satisfactory maintenance system and links with the government's own plans have yet to materialise under Pro-Routes. Activities have barely started in the mining and forestry sector.

S21. The humanitarian response has become more coordinated, following the launch of the PF in 2006. Whereas processes have evidently strengthened, improvement in the humanitarian response has been more difficult to measure.

S22. DFID DRC was largely effective in mainstreaming HIV/AIDS and gender in its programme, though addressing environmental issues was limited to CBFF and the road infrastructure projects. Conflict sensitivity has been relatively high at strategic levels, but has not been mainstreamed at project level.

S23. Expectations in terms of joint programming were unrealistic; DFID DRC had to spend substantial time lobbying and supporting other donors over the evaluation period. Silent partnerships were formed only recently.

S24. Harmonisation, which DFID championed throughout the evaluation period, did not make as much progress as expected. The CAF process, while relevant, was longwinded and donor-focused.

S25. Relations between DFID and FCO were strong and essential to lobby the GoDRC. Whereas the FCO–DFID collaboration has been effective, more could be done to promote a whole-of-government approach to development and peace in DRC.

S26. Devolution in 2005 was largely successful, although the country office found it difficult to attract staff with the right skills and experience. Hence, the office was under-staffed throughout the evaluation period. DFID HQ also underestimated the importance of mastering French as a working language.

S27. Working in a fragile and challenging country like DRC is more labour intensive with higher and less predictable running costs. This, coupled with a heavily project-based portfolio and limitation on headcount, has left staff over-stretched.

S28. Working through other donors was not as good value for money as it first appeared. What was saved in administrative cost was often spent on covering administrative costs of other partners.

S29. DFID's M&E framework in DRC has lacked continuity and robustness. Plans to establish a results matrix for the entire programme have now been completed. DRC will also be a pilot country for DFID's Result Action Plan. The lack of regular access to first source information will remain an issue.

### **Impact and Sustainability**

S30. The lack of up-to-date poverty data in DRC makes it impossible to properly assess trends in poverty reduction over the evaluation period, let alone DFID and other donors' contribution to them. General perceptions are that the population at large has not yet seen the benefits that were expected to follow the installation of the new regime.

S31. Most bilateral projects financed by DFID can claim to have had a positive impact on the local population's welfare. Their collective and lasting contribution to national levels of poverty remains unknown. Because of delays in starting large programmes, the donor community, including DFID, has not met their commitments to kick-start development assistance after the elections.

S32. Large-scale development programmes will work to scale and within government structures. Experience elsewhere, however, has shown that low government capacity and leadership (as well as the lack of in-country capacity of other partners) can slow these programmes significantly in their first years of operation.

S33. Furthermore, the GoDRC's willingness to provide equitable access to services to the population as a whole appears weak. Corruption in DRC – a country awash with mineral resources – is widespread. There is at the same time strong government momentum to show results before the 2011 elections, as demonstrated by the government's decision to borrow \$6bn from China to fast-track the implementation of the president's five priority work sites, referred to as "5 Chantiers".

S34. Support for democratisation and accountability also face considerable challenges. On the political side, donor support for the 2006 elections has had

a major positive impact on prospects for peace and national reconciliation in the country. Yet, the country could still face a crisis of legitimacy if the local elections are delayed or held in an unsatisfactory manner. In addition, national check-and-balance institutions have shown little sign of wanting to hold the government to account. Whether increased support at provincial levels will be more effective remains unknown.

S35. Harmonisation and alignment, according to the 2008 survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, are weak. The main achievement over the evaluation period has been the recent consolidation of institutional arrangements to support dialogue between donors, civil society, and government around 15 thematic groups.

S36. Despite improved coordination at the centre, donor harmonisation in DRC is still a long way off in practice. This is in part because the core of development assistance is disbursed using non-governmental channels, leading to a multiplication of projects and initiatives, and in part because of the lack of government leadership.

S37. Donor-supported capacity building programmes are also confronted with sustainability issues. This calls for better alignment with national programmes and improved learning and knowledge management to ensure better dissemination.

## **Lessons and Recommendations**

### **Lessons**

- In a post-conflict country like DRC, transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery, peace and development is slow and non-linear.
- In the DRC context, DFID plans to move from INGO-implemented projects to large-scale government-owned interventions have proved unrealistic.
- Building up assistance from a largely humanitarian portfolio can lead to an excessively broad, diverse and unfocused programme. In a country where everything needs doing, prioritisation and sequencing are extremely difficult tasks. Prioritisation may require hard decisions from HQ.
- Prioritisation across sectors and/or areas of interventions requires strong guidance from DFID HQ, in a country like DRC where all needs urgently doing. Locating where government ownership is the greatest can help.
- Sector prioritisation must take place in the early years of engagement, before substantial financial contribution makes it difficult to pull out of specific sectors.
- A diversification of partners – both within and across sectors – seems appropriate in a country, where non-state actors remain important service providers and the risk that the political situation deteriorates is high.
- Recognising the legitimacy of a regime before full completion of the electoral cycle comes with a risk of political instability. In the case of DRC, the newly elected government has been inclined to postpone local elections indefinitely.

- Prior to the elections, donors in DRC made good use of a critical paths analysis to identify and agree on milestones in their support to the country's democratisation process.
- DFID's peace-building approach, consisting of mainstreaming conflict and peace-building issues throughout the programme, is no substitute for targeted process-oriented interventions that focus primarily on dialogue and reconciliation between and within communities.
- While the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in holding the government to account is seen as strategically important, donors have yet to find the most effective ways of supporting them.
- The partnership between FCO, MOD and DFID has been essential in supporting DFID's plans for peace consolidation in the country. It has also allowed a close monitoring of security and political developments in the country and effective dialogue and influencing.
- The practical experience gained through bilateral programmes with INGOs and other implementing agencies has been instrumental in supporting DFID's engagement in DRC. Understanding the DRC context remains essential.
- Corporate demands, and in particular the launch of vertical or regional funds, can detract attention from strategic goals in the country programmes. This has a negative impact on programme delivery and undermines a genuine country-led approach, sending confusing signals to partners based in the country.
- Plans for scaling up must be matched with adequate staff resources. Working in a fragile environment is extremely challenging and labour intensive. Attracting staff with the appropriate skills and experience is all the more difficult in a non English-speaking country like DRC.
- Working through multilateral agencies may not be as good value for money as it first appears. While savings are made in administrative costs, substantial advisory and financial support is required to build the partners' in-country capacity, cover the management costs, and ensure sufficient oversight, monitoring and evaluation, and influencing.
- While in line with the Paris Declaration commitments, working primarily through other donors, and therefore, principally behind the scenes, goes against setting up a visible and effective network of influence to deliver UK objectives.
- There is a risk that DFID's flexibility and responsiveness is diverted to support multilateral partners, and no longer trickles down to output delivery.

## **Recommendations**

### **For DFID DRC:**

- DFID DRC should do more to mainstream conflict awareness in its programmes, by showcasing examples of conflict mainstreaming at project level. DFID DRC should also work with other donors to update the critical paths analysis produced in 2005. Benchmarks and targeted interventions should be defined to support the period leading to the next general elections in 2011. This includes national reconciliation, the

holding of local elections, and improved revenue and natural resource management. The conflict risks attached to decentralisation should also be identified and lead to shared discussion amongst donors.

- DFID DRC should be more explicit in what they see as the right balance in their choice of partners (state and non-state actors) and interventions (short-term and long-term).
- As the large amount recently committed to multi-donor programmes tends to overshadow other aspects of DFID's programme, reporting more regularly on minor, yet, strategic, spend and non-spend activities is required. The workplans recently established for the three delivery teams (Natural Resources Governance and Growth; Governance; Social Sectors and Humanitarian governance) could be used for this purpose.
- DFID DRC's expectations with regard to the role that Congolese CSOs can play in holding the government to account in DRC should be clarified. DFID should pay particular attention to the way outputs and outcomes will be measured and monitored in this area, as plans to launch the Civil Society Fund forge ahead.
- DFID DRC should promote and publicise good practice in support of a whole-of- government approach in the mining sector. Whereas distinct activities falling under the responsibility of DFID, FCO, and Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR), will remain distinct, their complementarity should be discussed both across Whitehall and externally. The forthcoming FCO/DFID Joint Communication Unit strategy could provide an opportunity for communicating DFID's approach in this sector to external stakeholders.

**For DFID HQ:**

- DFID HQ should dedicate more staff resources in supporting country offices operating in fragile states. Staff working in IT, procurement and other internal procedures should be encouraged to build up practical experience through occasional field visits and sharing of best practice.
- DFID HQ should start providing estimates on the costs and benefits of working through other partners, with particular emphasis given to their appropriateness in fragile states.
- DFID HQ should refrain from launching new initiatives that distract country offices from their Country Plan objectives unless additional staff resources can be invested in-country.

## 1. Introduction and Methods

1.1 The government of the United Kingdom (UK) continues to increase development assistance in line with its commitment to meet the UN target of 0.7 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2013. As the prime vehicle for delivering UK development assistance, the Department for International Development (DFID) faces a number of challenges in attempting to improve the effectiveness of development assistance while continuing reform within the organisation. In line with the shift towards decentralisation (therein referred to as devolution) and becoming more relevant and responsive to the country context, the vast majority of DFID's bilateral assistance is delivered through country programmes. In DRC, the office opened in 2003, with devolution taking place in 2005. The office has since been able to design and implement programmes of development assistance with delegated authority.

1.2 The UK government is committed to evaluating the effectiveness of development assistance and learning lessons to improve future performance and impact in politically uncertain and fragile environments like DRC. This is the report of an evaluation of DFID's country programme in DRC. The evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Department (EvD) of DFID and undertaken by ITAD Ltd. This is one of a series of Country Programme Evaluations (CPEs) undertaken in 2008/09 with the aim of assessing the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of DFID assistance at country level. Each CPE is a retrospective evaluation covering five years, in the case of DRC, the focus is from 2003 to 2008.

1.3 **Methodology:** The CPE exercise was conducted in three main stages (see Terms of Reference (ToR) in **Annex A**). An initial one-week country visit was undertaken in July 2008 to plan the evaluation, collect documentation, conduct initial interviews and adjust the approach in line with the issues raised. Based on this visit, an inception note was produced to provide an agreed basis for the remainder of the CPE assignment, including an adapted evaluation matrix that forms the core evaluation instrument (see **Annex B**). For the second stage, a three-week visit to Kinshasa by a team of four independent consultants (three international, one national) took place between 28th August and 13th September 2008. One team member also visited Goma, east of the country for a week. The third stage was the drafting of the main report, followed by circulation for comment and report finalisation.

1.4 The CPE methodology provides an important synopsis of existing reviews and evaluations, a systematic appraisal of perceptions from government and other development partners, as well as an independent, external analysis of the evidence. This evidence is drawn primarily from the documentation and stakeholder interviews conducted during the three-week visit. A large volume of documentation was reviewed, including hardcopy and electronic file correspondence, as well as programme records, commissioned studies and independent evaluations. The review in particular focused on DFID's internal documentation, such as Project Memorandums, the logical frameworks, Annual Reviews (ARs) and Project Completion Reports (PCRs). Guided by the evaluation matrix, interviews were conducted with DFID country staff (past and present), plus a range of stakeholders including other

donor agencies, officials in government, representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), consultants and academics. A summary list of those consulted is given in **Annex C** and documents reviewed in **Annex D**. On completion of the country visit, the team presented and discussed preliminary findings with the Deputy Head of Office and programme team of DFID DRC.

**1.5 Limitations:** Given the scale of DFID's investment in DRC over the past five years, the CPE approach can be characterised as relatively 'rapid and light' in comparison<sup>1</sup>. As a result, the CPE methodology is constrained in a number of ways. Firstly, access to documentation was hindered particularly for the latter years where the computerised QUEST system proved both time consuming and the electronic file structure made it difficult to obtain a comprehensive documentary trail – especially in comparison with the physical files. Secondly, no primary data collection through surveys, participatory methodologies or commissioned studies was undertaken. The limited extent to which the team has been able to independently verify the evidence needs to be borne in mind when reading the report. Furthermore, the timing of the evaluation covers two country strategy cycles. Following completion of the Country Plan (2008), the programme is currently undergoing major changes; many bilateral projects are in the process of being phased out and large-scale multi-donor programmes have just been launched or are about to start. The country programme in 2009/10 will look very different from previous years. However, the evaluators can only assess the effectiveness and impact of the programme as it was during the period under review.

**1.6 Report Structure:** The CPE report is structured as follows. **Chapter 2** describes the country context in DRC, the level of development assistance and DFID's own history of assistance since 2003. **Chapter 3** then looks at DFID's strategy over the period, including the relevance of its choice of sectors and partners, how risk was assessed, and the attention given to cross-cutting issues and alignment with corporate policy. This leads to a review of the programme's effectiveness in **Chapter 4**, where the results achieved in the different sectors and through different aid instruments are examined. Efficiency issues are also discussed. **Chapter 5** then places the results of DFID's support within the context of DRC's overall development progress for the period under review. In **Chapter 6**, conclusions are drawn regarding DFID's strengths and weaknesses, and a set of lessons and recommendations are presented to guide future assistance in DRC and inform DFID globally. **Chapter 7** is the Management Response provided by DFID DRC, which discusses any areas where there is agreement or disagreement with the independent country programme evaluation and outlines how they will respond to the evaluation recommendations.

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<sup>1</sup> The CPE methodology has evolved considerably from the pilot studies conducted in Brazil, Cambodia and Romania during 2004. Nevertheless the approach is still characterised as 'rapid and light' by many, due to the heavy reliance on existing documentation and reviews, as well as the views of key stakeholders.

## **2. Context**

2.1. This chapter provides an outline of the political and socio-economic context in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It outlines the country's progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the pattern of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other official financing flows and DFID's own programme expenditure over the evaluation period.

### **Political context**

2.2. Even by sub-Saharan standards, the modern history of the DRC has been particularly difficult. One of Africa's largest countries, its territory embraces regions that are markedly different in their ethnic and political orientation and in the natural pattern of their economic connections; they are separated by vast tracts of barely inhabited rainforest. Independence, in 1960, was rapidly followed by civil war. Mobutu Sese Seko, the military strongman who seized power in 1965, forged a sense of national identity, renaming the country Zaire, and investing heavily in education; the country developed a capable core of government technocrats. However, Mobutu's 32 years in power were also characterised by personalised governance, endemic corruption, and, in the final years, the partial disintegration of the state machine, increasing violence and military looting, a decline in donor support and the near-collapse of the economy. By the mid-1990s, public services and infrastructure were in an advanced state of decay.

2.3. Full-scale civil war broke out in 1997, with the rebellion instigated by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and lasted almost continuously until 2003. Seven other African countries became involved, allying themselves with the rival factions and motivated also by attempts to gain access to the country's mineral riches. Mobutu, seriously ill and out of the country for medical treatment, was displaced by Kabila in May 1997; he died in September of that year. Kabila, once installed as president, changed the country's name back to Congo (prefaced by "Democratic Republic of..." to distinguish it from the much smaller Republic of Congo, its north-western neighbour). The competing domestic factions and foreign states involved signed a ceasefire in July 1999, in Lusaka, but this did not bring all violence to an end, particularly in the east, where Rwanda and Uganda and their local allied proxies, were vying for control of mineral resources. A UN peacekeeping force, MONUC (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en RD Congo) was established in November 1999. With a budget of close to US\$1bn per annum it is the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world. The war is estimated to have cost three million lives.

2.4. In 2001, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated. His son, Joseph, was installed in his place and an inter-Congolese dialogue initiated. The evaluation period covered by this report begins in 2003. That year saw the ratification of the Global and Inclusive Accord in Sun City (South Africa), paving the way for the introduction of a transitional constitution. A government of national unity or Transitional National Government (TNG), representing all main signatory parties, was subsequently created. This laid the basis for an acceleration of the peace and stabilisation process, vigorously pushed by the UN and the international community. Regular foreign troops from neighbouring countries started withdrawing from 2004 and transition

institutions, comprising the Senate and National Assembly and the five civic commissions<sup>2</sup> were established. A permanent new constitution was endorsed by popular referendum in 2005 and the following year a two-round election process was held. The presidential elections were boycotted by the veteran opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, of the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS). In the final presidential run-off Kabila defeated Jean-Pierre Bemba, one of the four vice-presidents in the transition government and leader of the largely northern Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), in a vote endorsed by the international community as broadly fair, despite resumed violence in some areas (including Kinshasa) in between the two rounds. Fighting between government troops and forces loyal to Bemba in March 2007 in Kinshasa served as an uneasy reminder of the challenges ahead. The fighting prompted MONUC and EUFOR peacekeeping troops to intervene. Bemba sought shelter in the South African Embassy, before opting for exile in Portugal, and, later, Belgium.

2.5. In May 2008 Bemba was arrested in Brussels, under an indictment from the International Criminal Court (ICC) for human rights crimes allegedly committed by MLC forces in the Central African Republic in 2002/03. In the absence of a clear opposition leader in the country, the internal political situation remains complex. In many provinces Kabila's supporters did not win the elections. However, political pluralism has been slowly eroded, as opposition forces are marginalised by the dominance of the president's supporters. After coming third in the presidential first round, Antoine Gizenga, a veteran of the early post-independence political era, was appointed prime minister; but his government, which was reduced from 60 to 45 members in a major reshuffle in November 2007, was criticised for weak policy leadership and failure to deliver significant change and in September 2008 the 83-year-old premier resigned.

### **Socio-economic context**

2.6. This complex history of upheaval and weak governance has left the DRC as one of Africa's poorest and least developed societies, despite its great natural and human resources and large economic potential. In contrast to many neighbouring countries in the three regions with which it naturally interacts – east, west, central and southern Africa – the DRC has suffered from political instability, negative economic growth and deteriorating social conditions for two decades. At the same time, its sheer size and diversity, and the scale of the potential mineral resources at play, have created an environment that easily fosters centrifugal political ambitions and factional rivalries.

2.7. In this context, it is no surprise that it has proved so difficult to establish a sustained, clearly coherent process of economic reconstruction and development in recent years. The Congolese and their external partners are not attempting to reassemble a well-functioning machine that broke down for

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<sup>2</sup> Commission Electorale Indépendante, la Haute Autorité des Médias, l'Observatoire Nationale des Droits de l'Homme, la Commission Vérité et Réconciliation, la Commission d'Ethique et de Lutte contre la Corruption.

several years; they are almost attempting to build this machine from scratch, or from miscellaneous fragments that have not operated as an effective whole for several decades at least. After so many years of bad governance and civil conflict, the DRC faces a huge task in building effective national and provincial administrations and core education, health and revenue collection services, and restoring run-down infrastructure.

2.8. However, the country does have several factors working in its favour. Fundamentally, it has the makings of economic viability, in terms of resources, climate and geographical location. There is strong international demand for its main exports, and a readiness among donors to give substantial assistance, especially in light of the DRC's wider strategic significance. The scale of mineral resources gives the country a degree of leverage in its international dealings.

2.9. Efforts to stabilise the economy began in the late 1990s, but at first they were seriously impeded by the ongoing civil war. By 2003 per capita GDP had sunk to just \$85 – compared with \$224 in 1990. War spending undermined any serious effort to keep expenditure under control, pushing government finances deep into deficit. Inflation was galloping and the reintroduction of the Franc Congolais in 1997 failed to stop the dollarisation of the economy. However, from 2002 the DRC began to make progress towards macroeconomic stability, embarking on a six-month IMF Staff Monitored Programme (SMP). A close partnership with the World Bank (WB) was re-established and a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) was signed with the IMF in 2002. Hyper-inflation was brought under control and the country made steady progress towards economic recovery (see Table 1).

2.10. The last review under the PRGF arrangement could not be concluded in 2006, however, because of fiscal slippages and delays in structural reforms. A new SMP was instead approved for April–September 2006. With the approach of the 2006 elections, above-budget national security spending and the rise of the public sector wage bill placed renewed pressure on the public finances, with the risk that other priority spending programmes could be jeopardised. By early 2007 the IMF was publicly pressing for renewed efforts to control resurgent inflation and revive revenue collection efforts. The government of DRC (GoDRC) responded and by September inflation had been brought down to 14% year-on-year, while real GDP growth was running at 6%. In the end, most quantitative and qualitative benchmarks under the 2006 SMP were not met. Talks with the IMF led to a new SMP being approved in September 2007.

**Table 1. Key macroeconomic indicators**

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Real GDP growth (%)	5.8	6.6	7.9	5.6	6.3	10.0
Real GDP per capita growth (%)	2.8	3.5	4.7	2.5	3.2	6.8
Consumer price inflation (%)	12.8	4.0	21.4	13.2	16.7	17.5
Fiscal balance excl. grant aid (% of GDP)	-6.7	-8.7	-9.1	-3.9	-3.0	-0.8

Source: IMF, Country Report 2008.

2.11. At the end of 2000 external debt was \$13bn, equal to 280% of GDP, external payment arrears stood at \$9bn and reserves were sufficient to pay for only two and a half weeks' goods and services imports. The government prepared an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in 2002 and qualified for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) deal in 2003. A final Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP)<sup>3</sup> highlighting the government's commitment to poverty reduction was completed in 2006. Yet, access to full debt relief will not be granted until a new PRGF is signed. Uncertainty has hung over the prospects for a new programme because of concerns over a vast new "minerals for finance" deal, worth \$9bn (now revised to \$6bn), agreed between the DRC and China in early 2008.

### **Progress towards poverty income reduction and MDGs**

2.12. While statistical data are lacking, available indicators show that underlying poverty levels and social indicators remain grim. According to the World Bank statistics<sup>4</sup>, per capita Gross National Income in DRC amounted to US\$140 in 2007. This compares dismally with other poor sub-Saharan countries that have suffered prolonged or frequent conflict, such as Sierra Leone (US\$260). This is a graphic measure of the huge challenges to be overcome simply to bring the DRC to a stage where levels of economic activity and income are sufficient to make serious inroads into poverty. Despite a rich natural resource base and well-watered climate, poverty in DRC remains extreme, with at least 75% of the population living below US\$1 a day<sup>5</sup>.

2.13. UNDP's Human Development Index<sup>6</sup> for 2007/08 ranks the DRC in 168th place out of 177 countries. Given the wide contrast in conditions between regions of the DRC, it may be unrealistic to forecast that the country as a whole could attain any Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and the detailed data that would be required to assess longer-term trends are mostly not yet available. The 2007 Demographic and Health Survey<sup>7</sup>, partly funded by DFID, shows that national HIV prevalence is 1.3%, a significantly low rate when compared with neighbouring countries, such as Zambia; women have an average of 6.3 children, one of the highest fertility levels in the region; and under-five mortality in DRC is very high, with one child out of seven dying before reaching age five. Life expectancy is estimated to be 43 years.

### **Development Assistance**

2.14. The DRC is heavily dependent on donor aid, both for specific humanitarian and development programmes and to support the government's financial position.

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<sup>3</sup> République Démocratique du Congo (2006), *Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper*, June 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Key Development Data and Statistics, World Bank, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org).

<sup>5</sup> PRSGP, 2006.

<sup>6</sup> UNDP, Human Development Report, 2007/08.

<sup>7</sup> République Démocratique du Congo, Enquête de Statistiques et de Santé, Ministère du Plan, 2007.

2.15. According to the OECD/DAC figures, the signing of the Global and Inclusive Accord in 2003 led to a surge in net development assistance to more than \$4.5bn, in part because of debt relief. While OECD/DAC data mostly show substantial disbursements by France and the US, most bilateral and multilateral donors resumed their assistance to the country in that year. Net ODA to DRC was just below \$2bn in 2006 (see Table 2). Bilateral donors play an important role, accounting for 72% of the gross total aid that year. The country is a major priority recipient for the USA, whose assistance outstrips both that of the World Bank and the European Commission institutions. For historic reasons, the former colonial power, Belgium, is the biggest European donor, followed by the UK and France.

2.16. Although no up-to-date figures are available, the country did not witness the same increase in development assistance after the elections in 2006. Donors have fallen behind the \$4bn pledges they made during the World Bank-led Consultative Group in 2007 in support of the PRGSP and PAP for the 2008–2010 period. In a presentation to donors in 2008, the Ministry of Plan also indicated widespread disparity of aid distribution across provinces, with Kinshasa receiving the lion's share of donor assistance.

**Table 2. Total net ODA receipts for selected donors, 2002–2006 (US\$m, current prices)**

Donor	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
US	12.75	20.23	79.99	1,295.78	131.39	134.96	817.73
EU	34.14	44.00	72.71	80.06	249.81	213.58	222.22
UK	8.03	17.04	14.93	22.66	300.97	77.57	132.52
Belgium	25.80	48.30	61.80	785.30	287.60	222.50	252.40
France	13.93	11.91	12.94	1,196.78	154.78	111.92	60.76
Sweden	7.69	5.46	7.69	170.97	23.30	23.71	39.98
Germany	12.50	12.94	21.11	516.20	78.83	50.87	35.70
Netherlands	4.67	12.00	135.03	220.55	58.75	46.23	29.88
Japan	0.47	0.32	0.85	0.63	48.47	22.37	28.12
Canada	5.60	6.38	9.77	74.49	20.29	24.83	28.07
Norway	5.66	3.87	12.47	17.1	18.00	19.29	20.71
Ireland	0.59	1.31	2.28	2.41	4.08	5.89	12.79
Italy	2.36	1.59	3.87	413.11	23.80	1.02	1.27
<i>Sub-Total</i>	134.19	185.35	435.44	4,796.04	1,400.07	954.74	1,682.15
Other Donors	50.79	64.59	136.02	173.44	196.94	286.17	257.01
<b>All Donors, Total</b>	<b>184.98</b>	<b>249.94</b>	<b>571.46</b>	<b>4,969.48</b>	<b>1,597.01</b>	<b>1,240.91</b>	<b>1,939.16</b>

Source: OECD/DAC Statistics, 2008.

2.17. From the early part of the evaluation period, successive DRC governments have been actively involved in the aid effectiveness discussion under the OECD/DAC High-Level Meetings. DRC is a signatory of the Paris Declaration and participated in the two monitoring surveys (2006 and 2008).

DRC is also one of the countries to pilot the Principles of International Engagement in Fragile States<sup>8</sup>. The principles for state building and peacebuilding – namely focus on state-building as the central objective; prioritise prevention; recognise the links between, political, security and development objectives; and, promote non discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies - received particular attention in the roundtable discussion during the OECD-DAC High Level Meeting in Accra in 2008, which DRC co-chaired<sup>9</sup>. The drafting of a joint donor assistance strategy in 2006 constitutes the main donor response to the aid effectiveness agenda in DRC. A recent evaluation by the UN and World Bank shows mixed results (See Chapter 5)<sup>10</sup>.

### **DFID in DRC**

2.18. Historically, the UK did not regard the then Zaire as a major development partner in sub-Saharan Africa. The political relationship with the Mobutu regime was not particularly close and, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, the country's governance and relationships with the international financial institutions were not conducive to a large bilateral British aid programme of the kind provided to close partners in other parts of Africa. After Mobutu's departure, conditions at first remained difficult and unstable and often violent; this was a serious impediment to any normalised development assistance partnership.

2.19. However, in the years from 2003 onwards, the period covered for this report, the DRC has made substantial progress towards political and economic stabilisation, as outlined above. This has provided much more favourable conditions for action by DFID. Following a visit by the then Secretary of State (SoS), Clare Short, in 2002, the UK government announced its decision to scale up assistance in the DRC over the subsequent years. A small country office opened in 2003, which is when the SoS Hilary Benn promised to focus on poor populous countries like DRC (alongside Sudan, Nigeria, and Ethiopia). (For a full DFID timeline over the evaluation period, see Table 5). DRC has a huge need for external assistance – because of the severity of deprivation and human suffering, and the backlog of unmet development needs after decades of poor governance or instability. Additionally, the sheer size of the DRC and its location at the heart of central Africa mean that development progress in the country has wider implications for sub-Saharan development and stability.

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<sup>8</sup> OECD DAC (2007), *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, Paris: April 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Consequently, the UK whole-of-government agenda in the DRC and DFID's own approach to peacebuilding in its country programmes are treated as important aspects of DFID engagement in the country in this report.

<sup>10</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations)/World Bank (2008), *The DRC's Country Assistance Framework: A 'Big Tent' built from 'Big Ideas'?*, 30 May 2008.

2.20. Consequently, the DRC has recently become an important country for DFID engagement. The UK is now the third largest bilateral donor, and the second largest European bilateral contributor to the country's development. Over the assessment period, the relative importance of DRC as a recipient of UK assistance has steadily increased, from 2.8% of DFID's expenditure in Africa in 2003/04 to 6.2% in 2006/07 and 6.1% in 2007/08. Total spend increased from £20m in 2003/04 to £82.7m in 2007/08, making DRC the tenth largest recipient of UK bilateral aid and the sixth largest recipient of UK bilateral aid in Africa (see Table 3).

**Table 3. DFID bilateral programme in DRC, 2003–2008**

Year	DFID bilateral aid to DRC (£m)	DRC as % of DFID bilateral aid to Africa	DRC as % of DFID world total
2003/04	20.1	2.8%	1.0%
2004/05	29.2	3.4%	1.3%
2005/06	58.8	5.1%	2.2%
2006/07	75.2	6.2%	2.7%
2007/08	82.7	6.1%	2.8%

Source: Statistics on International Development 2008, DFID.

2.21. The DFID DRC programme remains relatively small, when compared with other poor, populous, African countries, like Nigeria and Ethiopia. Like Sudan, the bulk of UK aid has in fact been used for humanitarian assistance. Over the whole evaluation period (2003/04–2007/08), humanitarian assistance totalled £168m, equivalent to 65% of all UK aid to the country.

2.22. Even excluding humanitarian assistance, the increase of UK aid throughout the evaluation period remains impressive. After levelling at about £12–15m in 2004/05 and 2005/06, UK development assistance increased by a steady 60% in each subsequent year, reaching £36m in 2007/08. The DRC programme has now reached a size almost similar to that in Kenya (£40m), another non-budget support country, which, contrary to DRC, has had a longstanding partnership with the UK.


**Table 4. DFID bilateral aid (excluding humanitarian assistance) in selected African countries, 2003–2008 (£'000)**

Year	DRC	Sudan	Kenya	Nigeria	Ethiopia
2003/04	5.0	2.8	25.5	31.1	24.8
2004/05	12.8	6.1	29.7	46.8	55.6
2005/06	14.6	19.3	46.5	77.8	53.4
2006/07	23.1	26.2	52.0	80.3	88.5
2007/08	36.5	43.5	40.0	84.3	134.5

Source: Statistics on International Development 2008, DFID.

2.23. The launch of the humanitarian Pooled Fund (PF)<sup>11</sup> assisted DFID in meeting its spending targets, as laid out in CEPs and the devolution documents. DFID was also able to increase its bilateral aid to DRC more rapidly from 2005/06, as large-scale INGO projects and multi-donor support for the elections started (see figure 1). At the start of the assessment period, the DRC benefited from almost £3m of UK interim debt relief, under the HIPC initiative. As is always the case with HIPC relief, the actual cash flow benefit to the country, in terms of savings on debt service payments, is very much smaller than the nominal “headline value” of the write-off. Much more significant, in real development terms, is the new money and other assistance provided by DFID under the programme that has been steadily growing in DRC over the past five years.


**Figure 1. DFID spend by aid instrument (£ millions)**



<sup>11</sup> Common Humanitarian Funds were established as pilots in DRC and Sudan in 2006. In Sudan, the Fund is known as the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), while it is called the Pooled Fund (PF) in DRC.

2.24. Interventions over the evaluation period remained spread across sectors, with governance and health receiving the largest contribution after humanitarian assistance (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2. Spend by broad sector 2003/04–2006/07**



## **SUMMARY BOX**

The modern history of the DRC remains particularly complex. A full-scale civil war broke out in 1997, marking the end of Mobutu's 32-year regime. The war lasted almost continuously until 2003 and involved seven other African countries. In 2001, President Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph, was installed in his place. The ratification of the Global and Inclusive Accord in Sun City (South Africa) in April 2003 paved the way for an inter-Congolese dialogue and the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG). With the support of the United Nations (UN) and international community, a new constitution was endorsed by popular referendum in 2005 and the following year a two-round election process was held. In the final presidential run-off Kabila defeated Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), in a vote endorsed by the international community as broadly fair. At the same time, violent incidents took place in Kinshasa and instability in the east has persisted, perpetrating one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.

The TNG normalised relationships with donors, following International Monetary Fund (IMF) approval of a three-year Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF), in 2002. A Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PGRSP) was finalised in mid-2006. The new PRGF arrangements could not be concluded, however, because of fiscal slippage and delays in structural reforms. The government has yet to meet all the conditions for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative. This will in part hinge on the government's renegotiation of the terms of Chinese loans, worth US\$9bn (since revised to US\$6bn). Despite DRC's rich natural resource base and well-watered climate, poverty levels remain extremely high, with the UNDP's Human Development Index for 2007/08 ranking the DRC in 168th place out of 177 countries. DRC will not meet any of the MDGs by 2015, although the lack of reliable data makes it difficult to see how far the country is off track.

DRC has been an active participant of the aid effectiveness agenda and is a signatory of the Paris Declaration (2006). The country is also involved in the discussion on the Principles of International Engagement in Fragile States. The drafting of a joint donor strategy in 2006 remains the main donor response to the aid effectiveness agenda in DRC. Aid resumed gradually after the end of Mobutu's regime, reaching a peak of \$4.5bn in 2003. Total aid amounted to \$1.9bn in 2006, according to the OECD/DAC. However, donors have fallen behind the \$4bn pledges they made during the World Bank-led Consultative Group in 2007 in support of the PRGSP and PAP for the 2008–2010 period.

The UK has become the third largest bilateral donor, after the US and Belgium. Total spend surged from £20m in 2003/04 to more than £80m in 2007/08, making DRC the tenth largest recipient of UK bilateral aid. Humanitarian assistance totalled £168m over the evaluation period, equivalent to 65% of all UK aid to the country. The size of the programme (outside humanitarian assistance) is now comparable with that of Kenya, also a non-budget support country, but a traditional partner for the UK.

### 3. Programme Relevance

3.1. This chapter assesses the relevance of DFID's strategic approach and programming in DRC from 2003 to 2008. In the first section, the chapter examines DFID's strategic objectives and the evolution of its country strategies throughout the period. The following sections consider the quality of DFID's approach in relation to its choice of sectors and partners. The fourth and fifth sections discuss the programme's alignment to the GoDRC priorities, as well as DFID HQ priorities. This chapter finishes with an analysis of DFID's approach to risk.

#### Strategic Quality

3.2. DFID DRC laid out its strategic objectives over the evaluation period in three main documents: the Country Engagement Plans (CEPs), the joint donor Country Assistance Framework (CAF, 2007) and the Country Plan (2008–2010).

3.3. **Strategic objectives:** Her Majesty's Government's (HMG) rationale for engagement in DRC is strong. Plans for scaling up DFID's programme and presence in the country stemmed from the realisation in the early 2000s that the UK government had to invest in the poorest, most populous, and sometimes most fragile countries, if it was serious about the fight about global poverty. In addition, DFID retained highly consistent strategic objectives to support its engagement in DRC throughout the evaluation period.

3.4. Firstly, DFID aimed to promote peace and development in the country from the outset. Whereas the UK government was active on the diplomatic and military side through its support to MONUC and the peace negotiations, early interventions from DFID (excluding humanitarian assistance) included a number of peace-building initiatives and support to the MONUC-linked radio station, Radio Okapi. This twinned approach of promoting peace and development continued in the ensuing years under the CAF and the Country Plan.

3.5. Secondly, harmonisation has been a constant, and important, feature of DFID's strategy for engagement in the DRC. The DRC programme was seen by Africa Directors in London as an opportunity for DFID to move away from traditional development cooperation programmes and embrace new ways of working – typically working through multilaterals and closely with other donors through joint funding. The objective put forward by Africa Division following the donor Consultative Group (CG) in Paris in November 2003 was to “operate as far as possible within the framework of multi-donor programmes and trust funds”.

3.6. The move to larger, multi-donor programmes was, and is still, seen as an essential prerequisite towards meeting the country's huge needs for reconstruction for four main reasons:

- The move to larger programmes allows donors to scale up their development assistance.
- It facilitates upstream support to the host country's policy, allowing closer alignment to the country's policies, and when possible, systems.

- It allows closer donor coordination through joint funding, and hence reduces transaction costs for the government.
- It serves DFID's internal purpose of "doing more with less", as joint donor programming is expected to reduce transaction costs for DFID, hence allowing more money to be disbursed within the same administrative framework (see Chapter 4).

3.7. Whereas DFID's strategic objectives in the DRC have been highly consistent over the evaluation period, the programme has lacked focus in practice. Challenges presented to DFID in its achievement of strategic objectives have been threefold:

- how to work in a post-conflict environment, with relatively limited visibility geographically and uncertainty over the future of the country;
- how to work in a country, which is new to DFID, and in which DFID has a limited knowledge of the organisations and institutions in place;
- how to work within an evolving aid landscape, in which donors steadily but slowly move from humanitarian assistance to development cooperation and in which few partners have in-country capacity to implement large programmes.

3.8. **Phase I – CEPs (2003–2005):** DFID's strategy for engagement in the DRC in the early years of the evaluation period is encapsulated in a series of draft CEPs. The CEPs were written with a view to moving to a full Country Assistance Plan (CAP) within one to two years, as the country graduated to Public Service Agreement (PSA) status<sup>12</sup>. A first discussion paper was produced in March 2003 in preparation of a roundtable on "Planning for involvement in a peaceful DRC". In the CEP (September 2003), DFID's future engagement was introduced around two core tasks: "ensuring a successful transition process", and "establishing basic systems of governance for conflict prevention and poverty reduction".

3.9. The CEP was last updated in June 2005. This confirmed a two-pronged HMG approach to promoting military and diplomatic support on the one hand and development cooperation on the other to support progress in five main areas:

- the establishment of basic security and rule of law;
- the establishment of a functioning state;
- reconstruction and development;
- the management of natural resources and enhanced revenue generation;
- humanitarian assistance.

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<sup>12</sup> Under PSA, DFID sets itself key aims and objectives to reduce poverty and make progress towards MDGs in 14 countries in Africa.

3.10. More than eight CEP drafts were circulated internally over the period 2003 to 2005. However, CEPs were revised in an *ad hoc* manner to reflect relative success or failure in engaging in specific sectors and/or incorporate new corporate priorities. Therefore, CEPs did not guide decisions effectively. The only significant addition was in June 2005, when DFID formally endorsed the PMPTR (Programme Minimum de Partenariat pour la Transition et la Relance, minimum programme for the transition and recovery) as the main framework for donor support in the DRC. Produced by the GoDRC under the stewardship of the World Bank (WB), the PMPTR was approved by donors at the CG in 2004 pending the finalisation of a PRGSP.

3.11. **Phase II – From CAF to CAP/Country Plan (2006–2008):** The office started to work on a three-year CAP from 2006. This coincided with the end of the transition period, and, with it, rising expectations that the country would move from the short-term goals of humanitarian assistance and stabilisation to the longer-term goals of peace consolidation, recovery and reconstruction. The three-year framework of a CAP therefore seemed appropriate.

3.12. In June 2006, the now devolved country office in Kinshasa submitted “DRC: Initial Thinking on a CAP for DRC” to the Ministerial Team. Expectations were that donor discussions started earlier in the year would lead to a joint donor engagement strategy for the DRC:

“In the last couple of weeks it has just become clear that we may be able to join with the World Bank, the UN, the Belgians and possibly the EC in a joint strategy development process. This process, which we have pushed hard for, provides opportunities to develop a critical mass of like-minded partners, promote harmonisation and bring the key multilaterals into much closer routine working. A joint strategy development process could entail changes to the plans and priorities described here.”<sup>13</sup>

3.13. As a result, it was agreed to delay the finalisation of the CAP until the successful completion of the joint strategy development process. Throughout 2006, the DFID head of office and senior advisers became active participants in the CAF process. The office meanwhile pressed ahead with the design of individual programmes on the back of ministerial support for the Initial Thinking Paper.

3.14. The CAF process was highly relevant to the context of DRC; there was indeed a great need for donors “to put their house in order”. The main objectives of the CAF were to agree on a joint diagnosis around the recently finalised PRGSP and start coordinating programming, using a common results matrix. In the final document, the joint chapters included five thematic annexes for each of the PRGSP pillars (governance, growth, basic social services, HIV/AIDS and community dynamics). It was expected that donors would incorporate the CAF “joint chapter” verbatim in their respective strategies. Consequently, DFID stated in the Country Plan that the “Country Plan does not contain an analysis of the country context, because this is

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<sup>13</sup> DFID (2006), DRC: Initial Thinking on a CAP for DRC (internal document)

provided in the CAF to which DFID contributed”. A limitation of the CAF process was that it did not go far enough to meet the criteria of a Joint Donor Assistance strategy and, notwithstanding a shared analysis on high-level policy issues, no decision was made on joint funding mechanisms or division of labour. From DFID’s point of view, more work was therefore needed to finalise a CAP that would both reflect DFID’s harmonisation commitment and meet corporate requirements.

3.15. By the time a first draft of the CAP was submitted in March 2007, the Ministerial Team in London had changed. New requirements were introduced and the CAP was consequently redrafted. It was to take another year before the document received Ministerial approval in February 2008. This delay reflected DFID’s internal ways of working, but also rising political uncertainty as a result of the September 2006 and March 2007 violence during and after the elections.

3.16. As a result, DFID functioned without a CAP (Country Assistance Plans are mandatory for programmes of over £20m) for more than two years. The office continued to press on for programme approval, on the back of the Initial Thinking submission, and was able to renew most existing projects. However, the lack of a formally approved and publicly available Country Plan (previously CAP) delayed disbursement and contributed to uncertainty over DFID’s long-term engagement in DRC. Whereas the Country Plan was discussed with partners in DRC and in the UK, consultation with the GoDRC was principally *ad hoc* through the CAF process.

3.17. Table 5 shows how DFID DRC had to juggle different priorities and timelines over the evaluation period.

**Table 5. A comparison of national, DFID and international timelines**

	NATIONAL	DFID	INTERNATIONAL
<b>2003</b>	Global and Inclusive Accord signed	DFID Office opens	
<b>2004/05</b>	<u>June 2005:</u> Election delayed by another year <u>December 2005:</u> Constitutional referendum	<u>November 2004:</u> Country Engagement Plan (Draft) <u>Feb 2005:</u> Devolution approved <u>June 2005:</u> Country Engagement Plan (Final Draft) <u>October 2005:</u> Devolution takes place	<u>June 2004:</u> Consultative Group
<b>2006</b>	<u>July:</u> PRGSP completed <u>July:</u> Presidential and parliamentary	<u>Nov 2005–May 2006:</u> Internal DFID planning process	<u>Jan–Feb:</u> Discussion on joining up efforts to support the government after the elections start.

	<p>elections</p> <p><u>August:</u> Fighting in Kinshasa</p> <p><u>October:</u> 2<sup>nd</sup> round of elections</p> <p><u>November:</u> President Kabila wins election</p> <p><u>December:</u> Inauguration speech “5 Chantiers”</p>	<p><u>June:</u> DFID DRC CAP, 2007–2011: Initial Thinking on Objectives and Areas of Intervention, approved by the Secretary of State, Hilary Benn.</p>	<p><u>May:</u> Discussion on Governance Compact EC–WB begin</p> <p><u>June–August:</u> UN and WB discuss with bilateral partners</p> <p><u>September–November:</u> Discussion on thematic papers (including education)</p>
<b>2007</b>	<p><u>February:</u> Appointment new government</p> <p><u>March:</u> Fighting in Kinshasa</p> <p><u>June:</u> Plan d’Actions Prioritaires (PAP) produced</p> <p><u>October:</u> PAP approved by Council of Ministers</p>	<p><u>February:</u> Prioritisation exercise</p> <p><u>July:</u> Change in Ministerial Team, DFID.</p> <p><u>October:</u> DFID Under-Secretary of State, Shriti Vadera, visits DRC and requests for new format for CAP.</p> <p><u>December:</u> Submission of new Country Plan</p>	<p><u>February:</u> Consultation on CAF with government begins</p> <p><u>August:</u> CAF finalised, signed by 17 donors</p> <p><u>December:</u> Consultative Group meeting held in Paris to discuss the CAF/PAP and government/donor co-ordination.</p>
<b>2008</b>	<p><u>February:</u> 15 thematic groups established to coordinate PAP implementation</p>	<p><u>February:</u> approval of Country Plan</p>	<p><u>February:</u> 15 thematic groups established to coordinate PAP implementation</p>

### Choice of sectors and interventions

3.18. In the early years of the evaluation period, DFID took a pragmatic approach to its engagement in the DRC by choosing to build from existing projects implemented by UN agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) in humanitarian assistance. As a result, DFID’s portfolio of projects covered a wide range of sectors right from the beginning, ranging from health and education to food security and road construction.

3.19. By mid-2005, DFID had started or planned activities in the following areas (as described in the CEP (June 2005) sub-headings):

**Table 6. Choice of interventions, 2005**

<b>From Country Engagement Plan (June 2005):</b>	
<b>Strategic objectives</b>	<b>Planned activities</b>
Security and Rule of Law	Army integration and reforms; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration; Police Reform; Local-level peace-building initiatives
A Functioning State	Transition Institutions; Media; Elections
Reconstruction and Development	PMPTR (including infrastructure); PRSP; QUIPs; HIV/AIDS
Management of Natural Resources and Enhanced Revenue Generation	Management of Natural Resources and Enhanced Revenue Generation
Humanitarian Assistance	Humanitarian Assistance

3.20. The mandate remained ambitious, given DFID’s lack of prior knowledge of DRC and its limited in-country capacity. Concerns that DFID was spreading across too many sectors were raised as early as 2003<sup>14</sup> and the need to prioritise became evident. The rationale for prioritisation reflected staffing constraints as well as the need to show “an example to the Transitional National Government” on the need to be rigorous about setting priorities. In the absence of well-defined government priorities across all sectors, DFID decided to hold its decision until the completion of the PRGSP.

3.21. In its June 2006 submission<sup>15</sup>, DFID DRC acknowledges that they may be trying to do too much “in a context where everything needs doing”. A prioritisation exercise took place in February 2007 to seek to address this issue<sup>16</sup>. The criteria used to support this exercise were: coverage by other donors, priority for government, DFID corporate priority, CAP priority, DFID comparative advantage or added value.

3.22. Options for prioritisation were explored. It was agreed that some activities would become prioritised, others would become “secondary” (with a view to phasing out funding in the near future), while others would be dropped<sup>17</sup>. DFID also commissioned a number of studies in 2006, including a

<sup>14</sup> DFID (April 2004), *DRC: Focusing the Programme – Sector Choice?*, Bill Kilby, Jonathan Hargreaves, internal document.

<sup>15</sup> DFID DRC (2006), *DRC: Initial Thinking on a CAP for DRC*, internal document.

<sup>16</sup> An internal “Exercise Paper” was drafted to guide the discussions.

<sup>17</sup> DFID Paper (February 2007), *Prioritisation of Our Programme Engagement in DRC*, internal document.

Drivers of Change analysis<sup>18</sup>. This study served as a good reminder of the multiple challenges attached to state-building in DRC, but provided little insight on possible entry points to bring positive changes in the country.

3.23. In the end, selected INGO peace-building activities, direct bilateral financial support to civil society, funding for the PRSP process, and customs revenue were dropped. DFID’s portfolio of ongoing or planned activities by mid-2008 was as follows:

**Table 7. Choice of interventions, 2008**

<b>From Country plan:</b>	
<b>Strategic Objectives</b>	<b>Choice of interventions</b>
Social Sectors and Humanitarian Delivery	Education; Humanitarian; Community Recovery; Health; HIV/AIDS
Governance Delivery	Democratisation and Accountability; Security Sector Accountability and Police Programme; Anti-Corruption and PFM
Natural Resources Governance and Growth Delivery	Minerals; Forestry; Roads; Watsan

3.24. As a result, DFID programme under Phase II remained too broad and lacked focus. Three factors explain the lack of effective prioritisation in DFID DRC programme. Firstly, the criteria used to support the prioritisation exercise were relatively unhelpful – no sector in DRC (outside PFM at central level) suffers from donor congestion, given the huge needs of the country; all sectors fall within the government’s priorities (as laid out in the PRGSP, 5 Chantiers, and PAP) and DFID’s comparative advantage (such as pro-poor financing) did not necessarily match the DRC context and its relatively new involvement in some sectors.

3.25. Secondly, because of corporate commitments to promoting “soft issues” starting with good governance, DFID was not prepared exclusively to finance the “5 Chantiers”<sup>19</sup>, which is where government ownership is the greatest. This is unlike non-traditional donors, including China, India, and Saudi Arabia, many of whom have responded to government request to finance the 5 Chantiers. Promoting good governance in DRC is nonetheless highly relevant to the country’s prospect for peace, stability and development, and therefore should rightly remains high on the agenda for DFID.

<sup>18</sup> Putzel James, Stefan Lindemann and Clare Schouten (2008), Drivers of change in the DRC: the rise and decline of the state and challenges for reconstruction: a literature review, Working Paper No. 26- Development as State-Making Crisis States Research Centre, January 2008.

<sup>19</sup> The 5 Chantiers (or work sites) identify Infrastructures, Employment, Water and Electricity and Health and Education as work site priorities.

3.26. Finally, only hard decisions from HQ could have helped the DFID office to streamline its programme. DFID DRC received insufficient guidance and support from HQ to take some hard decisions, by prioritising sectors and streamlining interventions. Instead, some sectors (including forestry and Public Finance Management (PFM)) were kept or added in Phase II because they reflected corporate priorities, while activities in mining were left on the back-burner and opportunities to scale down support in other sectors, including health, were missed.

### **Alignment to the country's priorities**

3.27. In 2003, Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT)<sup>20</sup> came to a shared understanding with GoDRC of what they felt was required for DRC. In a critical path analysis, they outlined a timetable for "crucial and interdependent prerequisites" for a "successful" transition, including security reforms, DDR, police and justice, the unification of the country, the holding of elections, and improved revenue and natural resource management. The first four strategic objectives of the 2005 CEP outlined in Table 6 were closely aligned with this analysis. Humanitarian assistance was the fifth objective. This next section takes these objectives as a starting point for assessing the relevance of specific interventions.

3.28. **Security and the Rule of Law** Consistent with DFID's strategic decision to support the DRC peace process, the main focus of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) activities under Phase I was to work with the DRC authorities and other partners to contribute to ensuring security during the elections. As a result, DFID and other donors opted to support the UNDP-managed programme, Support to the Election Security (Sécurisation du Processus Electoral Congolais (SPEC)), as well as additional police training by the South African Police Service, which together received the lion's share of DFID's Rule of Law programme launched in 2005. Through this and support under the FCO-DFID-MOD Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), DFID was able to work with a wide range of partners, including EUSEC. DFID's objective is now to promote accountability in SSR, as laid out in the Country Plan (2008).

3.29. Local-level peace-building activities were the first area of intervention by DFID in the DRC, after it diversified away from humanitarian assistance. These activities led by INGOs focused on restoring dialogue and understanding between and within communities in the east, where social fabric has been particularly damaged by the war. Such initiatives are in principle highly relevant to the security agenda in a country like DRC, which remains deeply divided along ethnic-regional lines and where needs for national reconciliation and conflict resolution are huge.

3.30. Results have been disappointing in this area (see 4.5-4.9), and DFID's approach is now to mainstream conflict prevention across all DFID

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<sup>20</sup> CIAT was set up to support the transition period leading to the 2005-06 elections. CIAT comprises representatives in the DRC of the five permanent members of the Security Council - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States - as well as Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, South Africa, Zambia, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and the UN Organization Mission in the DRC.

programmes, therefore moving away from a specific focus on local dialogue and reconciliation. DFID DRC's choice of cross-cutting issues is discussed further in Chapter 4.

**3.31. A Functioning State** From 2004 to 2006, support for the transition institutions and the organisation of peaceful **elections** became the main focus of DFID's engagement in the DRC. Despite the high risk environment, DFID's decision to support the transition period in DRC was appropriate. Three UNDP-managed programmes were launched in 2005, namely the basket fund Support for Electoral Process (Appui au Processus Electoral en RDC (APEC)); the Transition Institution programme (Appui aux Institutions de Transition (AIT)) and SPEC.

**3.32.** DFID, alongside the rest of the international community, were right in their decision to finance the elections. There was indeed a real need for supporting the elections and institutions of transition, as both were part and parcel of the Global and Inclusive Accord, signed by all parties in 2003.

**3.33.** Support for the transition institutions remained highly relevant to the context at the time. The role of the transition institutions was to contribute to the main objectives laid out in the Global and Inclusive Accord within their respective mandates. These were reunification, pacification, and reconstruction of the country; national reconciliation; army reintegration; organisation of free and transparent elections; establishment of new structures to support the new regime.

**3.34.** DFID's bilateral support for the media also became highly relevant around the elections. As discussed in a 2005 DFID paper, a main risk faced by DFID is partisan media: "Overtly negative or positive media coverage can influence electoral processes, meaning that external assistance is devalued. This is particularly relevant in those states where there is little history of multiparty elections"<sup>21</sup>. The decision to drop DFID direct bilateral support to media activities (outside the UNDP programme) after the elections was subsequently reversed because of the outstanding performance of the above projects and the possibility of a silent partnership with France Coopération Internationale (FCI).

**3.35.** From 2008, DFID aims to promote accountability and democratisation in DRC principally through the UNDP Governance Programme, with a £68m contribution. The focus of DFID support will be political governance (support to national and provincial parliaments; political parties; and electoral cycle); decentralisation and the fight against corruption –all ambitious but highly relevant areas of intervention in DRC.

**3.36. Reconstruction and Development** activities initially focused on the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QUIPs) by INGOs. Building on existing partnerships, DFID supported the following QUIPs under Phase I:

- Primary education programme, with Catholic Relief Service
- Malaria bed nets programme, with Population Services International (PSI)

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<sup>21</sup> Claire Vallings (June 2005), *DFID electoral assistance in fragile states* DFID London.

- Basic health services programme, with International Rescue Committee (IRC)
- Health programme, with Merlin
- K2
- Water, sanitation and health, with UNICEF

3.37. By supporting multi-annual interventions in social sectors, QUIPs were highly relevant to the DRC's post-conflict rehabilitation needs. QUIPs were new modes of intervention developed by INGOs in a post-conflict environment in an attempt to support the transition between humanitarian assistance and recovery. DFID also saw QUIPs as an important tool to provide peace dividends to the population.

3.38. It was subsequently decided that QUIPs should be dropped in favour of direct support for the government-owned PMPTR. As a result, while being introduced as a main activity in the 2003 CEPs, QUIPs were only mentioned in passing in the 2005 CEP. The main reason for moving away from the QUIPs from 2005 was that, in order to support service delivery, DFID needed to move from an approach focused on quick impacts through small and ad hoc projects to large-scale interventions that fitted within the country's longer-term development objectives. With hindsight, this move was over-optimistic and failed to realise that the transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and development would be slow and non-linear. Because working through other donors in support of the government-owned programmes took longer than expected, many of the QUIP projects were allowed to continue and expand throughout the evaluation period.

3.39. The 2006 prioritisation exercise saw support to Water and sanitation, Health, Education and HIV/AIDs included under the Country Plan Social Sectors and Humanitarian Delivery Objective. Water and Sanitation was retained because it was high corporate priority in 2007. The Ministerial Team renewed its commitments in this area in response to the Commission for Africa Report<sup>22</sup> and the Stern Review<sup>23</sup> and support in this sector was justified, given the country's huge needs. In addition, Community Reconstruction was added as a priority, as the design for a 3-year, £24.8m community-driven reconstruction programme (also known as Tuungane) in Eastern DRC was finalised.

3.40. Most reconstruction and development projects supported by DFID over the evaluation period directly responded to some of the country's needs. Some also respond to the government's own priorities: for example, NGOs involved in the health sector are committed to provide the minimum package of health services as promoted by the government. The move upstream is nonetheless recent: the recently-launched (or forthcoming) programmes in infrastructure,

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<sup>22</sup> Commission for Africa (2005), *Our Common Interest*, London: June 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Stern N (2006), *Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change*, London: October 2006.

water and education not only aim to be closely aligned to the country's policies and systems, but also aim to support their development<sup>24</sup>.

3.41. In **education**, DFID has decided to complement the World Bank education sector programme, Congolese Education Sector Support Project (PARSE), through additional funding via a World Bank Trust Fund. A major expectation is that DFID will continue to support the move towards free education in the second phase. DFID's support for free schooling is aligned with the country's priorities. Free primary education was called for in the PRGSP and importantly, in the National Constitution and 5 Chantiers. To compensate for delays in launching the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), DFID has also started working directly with the Ministry of Education to pay the insurance premium on behalf of parents through the Société Nationale d'Assurance (SONAS).

3.42. Scaling down support in **health** was suggested at the time of prioritisation but not carried through. With Phase I DFID-funded activities in the health sector being humanitarian or QUIP-type projects, there was an opportunity to demote health (outside humanitarian assistance) to a secondary sector only. Instead, in part reflecting time already spent on designing projects, £30m was committed for two pilot projects (carried out by two INGOs, IRC and Merlin), health was maintained as a primary sector.

3.43. These pilot projects, implemented by, IRC and Merlin, aim to test the introduction of free health care. Yet, the Ministry of Health and many donor agencies do not share this mission since free access to health services increases utilisation rates substantially. The projects remain poorly aligned with the government's health financing policies. Evidence gathered during their implementation may prove useful in shaping government practice and policy. However, there is still a problem of sustainability, as neither government nor donors will be able or prepared to support free health care across the country.

3.44. It was also decided that **HIV/AIDS**, an important corporate priority, would continue, but receive a smaller spending allocation. DFID DRC's decision not to drop its programme in HIV/AIDS was sound. DFID's focus on HIV/AIDS prevention seemed highly relevant to the post-conflict environment. In the 2007 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) survey the prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in DRC was below 1.5%, a relatively small rate compared with other African countries. However, there is a high risk that the virus will spread fast, as communications, infrastructure and the economy expand.

3.45. Pro-Routes, the main multi-donor programmes in road construction and rehabilitation, is highly relevant to the DRC context as a modality. At present, DFID's current level of interventions in this sector remains limited and are not to scale with the country's needs. By contrast, Pro-Routes will support the national programme of road rehabilitation and maintenance and work with government structures to implement it. The level of intervention

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<sup>24</sup> Many of these programmes had barely started at the time of writing and are therefore not discussed individually elsewhere in the report.

will also increase significantly and be more to scale with the needs of the country.

**3.46. Management of Natural Resources and Enhanced Revenue Generation** DFID DRC originally intended focusing its intervention on the mining sector, since gaining access to mineral resources has been a powerful incentive for continuing violent conflict in DRC. In 2002, the UN panel report highlighted the central role that natural resources had played in exacerbating the conflict<sup>25</sup>. DFID's conflict analysis (2006)<sup>26</sup> confirmed this view. DFID's focus on supporting good governance in mining, by working at local level (support to artisanal mining and work with mining companies) and at macro-level Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), seems therefore appropriate. DFID's plans to support corporate social responsibility in the mining sector in Katanga through a project with USAID are both innovative and highly relevant to the DRC context.

3.47. HQ priorities encouraged DFID DRC to switch its attention to forestry in 2006-08 principally to support the UK government's strategic objectives for climate change. The rationale to focus on the forestry sector in terms of peace and stability for DRC as a country appears weaker. DFID's comparative advantage in this area is limited both at HQ and country level. The main entry point in DRC was DFID's support for a series of participatory workshops which brought donors and civil society together to develop a common vision for alternative forest financing and management approaches in the DRC. A £50m Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) was launched and forestry was not dropped in the prioritisation exercise (despite DFID DRC's attempts). Preparation for the CBFF has required extensive consultation with stakeholders in the region<sup>27</sup>. The rationale for the Fund is strong, with aims to promote livelihoods, improve forestry management and fight deforestation (and indirectly global warming) in the second largest tropical forest in the world. It complements other existing initiatives<sup>28</sup>.

3.48. The initiative has been received with mixed views, in part because it reflects a UK political mandate, and in part because there are concerns over its funding arrangements and ways of working (see 4.25-4.26). DFID DRC was able to again dedicate more time to the minerals sector after the CBFF was launched in June 2008.

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<sup>25</sup> UN Panel of Experts (2003) *Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, NY: 2003. DFID thinking was also informed by a Global Witness study, entitled 'Same Old Story – A Background Study on Natural Resources in the DRC', Global Witness (2004)", which it commissioned in 2003.

<sup>26</sup> DFID and Conflict in DRC: Analysis and Response (Kinshasa, April 2006).

<sup>27</sup> CBFF is not a DFID DRC-led initiative. This evaluation nonetheless takes the view that the amount of time dedicated to this initiative by DFID staff in DRC calls for a succinct analysis of its relevance and effectiveness.

<sup>28</sup> Regional institutions include high-level COMIFAC (Conférence of the Ministers of Forestry of Central Africa) and the network organisation, Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP).

3.49. Concerning enhanced revenue generation, initial plans to support custom reforms were dropped (see 3.62-3.67), but Public Financial Management (PFM) became a key priority area under Phase II. Engagement in PFM contrasted with the early years of the evaluation period, when macroeconomic management and budget management reforms were left to International Financial Institutions (IFIs). DFID HQ rationale to be involved in PFM in DRC is in line with corporate priorities, and in particular the conditionality policy paper (see 3.79). DFID's comparative advantage in PFM Francophone systems appears weak given the number of actors already involved (WB, IMF and EC in particular).

3.50. **Humanitarian Assistance.** DFID's approach to humanitarian assistance in post-conflict DRC shows how corporate priorities have fed into the country strategy cycle. In the early years of the evaluation period, it was implicitly assumed that there would be no need for humanitarian assistance to increase substantially, should stabilisation in the east remain on track.

3.51. In the event, the launch of PF in 2006 was a major factor explaining the increase in DFID spending from about £29m in 2004/05 to about £59m in 2005/06. The Pooled Fund was initiated by DFID HQ as a way to pursue agreed humanitarian reforms and support the principles of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. While not initially envisaged in CEPs, the rationale for increased, and more coordinated, humanitarian assistance remained strong. In the period 2003–2005 humanitarian aid had only partially responded to humanitarian needs in the country. Key sectors of the humanitarian/emergency response were left without the minimum level of resources to adequately respond to need. Response also remained poorly coordinated on the ground, despite the establishment of consolidated appeals process under the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) in the 1990s.

### **Choice of partners**

3.52. **Donors:** Before the opening of the office in 2003, DFID in London was principally working with IFIs and other like-minded donor agencies with a presence in Kinshasa. DFID worked very closely with the WB in specific sectors, notably education. Discussions under the CAF and preparations for joint funding mechanisms shaped DFID's relationships with other donors under Phase II.

3.53. Overall, the model of working through other donors was ill adapted to the reality of the DRC context. The assumption was that other donors in the country, starting with multilateral agencies, would have enough capacity and be ready to implement large-scale development assistance programmes. Yet, in the early years of the evaluation period, there was no history of development programmes due to prolonged conflict, little donor coordination outside pledges made during the CG meetings, and very few donors with a strong in-country presence.

3.54. Consequently, an early and constant feature of the DFID programme in DRC has been the institutional support that it provided to multilateral agencies. Under Phase I, this entailed technical assistance through secondment and the payment of in-country staff salaries for the WB and UNAIDS. Under Phase II, DFID's support to multilateral organisations increased to include support to the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs (OCHA) under the PF, the recruitment of two in-country WB advisers (education, PFM), and a £1.8m allocation to support UNDP capacity building.

3.55. Elsewhere, DFID successfully built partnerships with less traditional partners, for example with China in the road sector. With China soon to become a major investor in road rehabilitation, DFID's plans to work with its Embassy and the GoDRC on setting socio-environmental standards in road construction seem highly appropriate. DFID has also developed a partnership with South Africa on police reform, which involved £5m of funding for training and restructuring advice, implemented by South African partners. Another example is France Cooperation International (FCI) in support of the media.

3.56. In mining, the collaboration with USAID is also unusual for DFID corporately, because USAID does not link into national policy and institutional processes. Its work with the private sector is, however, well-known, and in this example, the partnership with USAID is at provincial level<sup>29</sup>.

3.57. DFID's choice of Coopération Technique Belge (CTB, road rehabilitation), and more recently Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, forestry) as partners was also highly appropriate. The two implementing agencies have long been involved in their respective sectors in the DRC. Attempts to share resources were also made, with the DFID-appointed conflict adviser allocating 20% of his time to work with the Dutch development programme in 2005.

**Table 8. Partnerships and Aid Delivery Mechanisms, Country Plan (2008–2010)**

Strengthening Democracy and Accountability	£5m through UNDP for local elections £57m for UNDP national governance programme £8m through media programme through FCI (France)
Security Sector accountability and police reform	Accountability £30m; Police reform £40m (through two management agencies, to be tendered for); Access to justice in the east £2m (through Rejusco)
Minerals	Initial pilot project including £200,000 for EITI and £500,000 for Public Private Partnership in Katanga, if successful to be followed by £15m.
Roads	£38m over five years, principally through Pro-Routes (WB)

<sup>29</sup> Some INGOs have criticised DFID's close partnership with USAID and the WB (all non French-speaking partners). DFID has since widened its partnership with other donors and is now active in the mining donor group, which includes Germany, Belgium, and Canada, and more recently, the EC and Sweden.

Education	£55m over five years, principally through WB MDTF
Health	£31m over three years through INGOs
Water and Sanitation	£24m over four years, principally through UNICEF
Community Reconstruction	£24m to NGO consortium
Humanitarian Assistance	£35m each year, principally through Pooled Fund

Source: Country Plan, 2008.

3.58. In part thanks to DFID's continued efforts, the model of working through other donors is now about to become a reality. Table 8 summarises how DFID plans to use its resources per cluster in the Country Plan (2008–2010). This indicates that, in terms of spending, UNDP and the WB will become by far DFID's main donor partners.

3.59. This will have direct bearing on DFID DRC's partnership with others. This is further discussed in Box 1.

**Box 1 DFID's move to the UNDP Governance Programme and its effect on partnership**

From 2008, DFID will principally rely on the UNDP to implement the Governance Programme and will have limited bilateral contact with the main beneficiaries of the programme. This model contrasts with the early years of the evaluation period, when DFID provided technical assistance to some institutions of transition, notably the anti-corruption coordinating body, Commission d'Ethique et de Lutte contre la Corruption (CELC). DFID's decision to take a step back reflects in part disappointing results with CELC (which no longer exists under the new constitution) and in part the potentially high reputational risk attached to donor support for the fight against corruption in the country. Using a politically neutral agency, like the UNDP, to channel funds and work with national institutions, therefore makes sense.

The UNDP Governance programme will also include a civil society component to promote advocacy activities; this Civil Society Fund is to be managed by an external agent after concerns were raised that the UNDP was not the appropriate agency to manage civil society programmes (see DFID's approach to risk).

Such model of working through other donors fits well with DFID's "doing more with less" agenda. There is a risk, however, that this approach may reduce opportunities for DFID to learn from practitioners on the ground, and with it, might reduce DFID's ability to feed practice into policy. In response, DFID will now seat in various UNDP committee as well as maintain a role in governance in the Civil Society Fund. This will give DFID opportunities to meet with implementing partners and help shape future strategic direction.

3.60. **INGOs:** DFID retained strong relationships with the INGOs it funded in the first years of the evaluation as outlined in the discussion of QUIPs in 3.31-3.33. DFID's decision to support INGOs in consortia, rather than individually, responds to the corporate demand of "doing more with less" as well as addressing the need for scaling up in a country like DRC. In the case of

peace-building, DFID also promoted a consortium approach to move beyond “dialogue and reconciliation” activities and instead support integrated programmes that addressed root causes of conflict. It was also acknowledged that working to scale when solely dealing with heavily process-driven reconciliation issues remains particularly challenging as demonstrated in the 2003 joint Ulstein study of peace-building<sup>30</sup>. DFID notably encouraged different partners (including development NGOs and specialist conflict resolution organisations) to build a consortium around a common project, but this failed. In the end, DFID decided against providing direct support to dialogue and reconciliation activities, despite its longstanding relationships with some partners.

3.61. The launch of the PF in 2006 also changed DFID’s relationship with INGOs in humanitarian assistance, as it allowed DFID to reduce its number of bilateral projects. Presently, DFID continues to disburse about 8% of its humanitarian assistance budget on a bilateral basis, mainly to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins sans frontières (MSF).

3.62. In its current form, DFID’s partnership with INGOs has become less direct and more selective. There is a risk, however, that by limiting bilateral relationships –and direct funding – to selected large INGOs, the policy views and approaches promoted by the latter prevail on the ground. It seems, for example, that the Tuungane project was principally designed by the IRC, with previous partners, such as International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH), now questioning this ambitious model as good practice.

3.63. In response, DFID DRC has sought to maintain a regular dialogue with British INGOs and other INGOs that they fund by inviting them to the office to discuss specific issues (such as decentralisation, minerals sector, vulnerability analysis, etc.) in a standing forum. These quarterly meetings started in summer 2007. DFID has also maintained a reasonably good level of dialogue with British INGOs involved in Natural Resources, such as Global Witness<sup>31</sup> and Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID)<sup>32</sup>.

3.64. **Government:** DFID’s relationship with the government under Phase I involved key ministries, notably the Ministry of Planning because of DFID’s support for the PRGSP process, but also the ministries of Interior, Justice and Defence. Importantly, the UK was represented in the Comité International

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<sup>30</sup> Synthesis Report of the Joint *Ulstein Study of Peacebuilding*, Oslo, Norway: The Royal. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007.

<sup>31</sup> DFID commissioned a study with Global Witness in 2004.

<sup>32</sup> The choice of mining companies in the USAID-and DFID-funded Public-Private Partnership has been subject to strong lobbying and criticism on their part (see 3.69). DFID also attempted to play a brokering role by promoting dialogue between the World Bank and INGOs on forestry issues, as the development of a WB-led multi-trust fund to support forestry government suffered repeated delays, amidst strong lobbying from environmental INGOs.

d'Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT) during the transition period. Whereas this meant that the FCO was formally in the driving seat with regard to high-level policy dialogue, DFID and FCO ultimately worked with complementary entry points. Under APEC, for example, the UK DFID sat on the Technical and Steering Committees, which involved regular consultation with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). DFID advisers have continued to work closely with selected ministries (Interior, Education, in particular) under Phase II, while increasingly taking part in policy discussion as part of the preparations for Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs).

3.65. DFID has yet to establish a direct relationship with the Ministry of Mining, but now works in partnership with the Ministry of Environment bilaterally and through GTZ. It is worth noting that the relationship between DFID and the Ministry of Finance has become more distant, after DFID decided against supporting Crown Agents' plans to support customs reforms in the country. Discussion between the Ministry of Finance and Crown Agents was already well advanced when DFID and FCO decided to support the project on the condition that Crown Agents was subject to a transparent bidding process. The risk that the UK may be perceived as pushing a UK company partly explained this decision.

3.66. **Civil society:** Early scoping work in 2002/03 had included a nationwide consultancy to advise on a strategy for strengthening civil society in the DRC. In the first years of the evaluation period, DFID provided small, but strategic, funding to Congolese Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) as part of its support to PRGSP and support for raising awareness activities around the elections. DFID's decision to support CSOs' advocacy and public awareness activities around the elections was highly relevant. These elections were the first in 40 years; and the population had no prior experience of such an exercise.

3.67. DFID's relationship with Congolese civil society changed under Phase II, following DFID's decision to stop all direct financial support. This decision was discussed during the 2007 prioritisation exercise, in recognition that DFID lacked the capacity to manage "separate" civil society programmes. Strategically, DFID continues to see CSOs as key actors to hold the government to account. In fact the role of CSOs is perhaps about to become better mainstreamed as a cross-cutting issue at sector levels under Phase II. For example, DFID's SSRJ programme aims to increase the ability of civilian oversight institutions to hold the police, defence and justice sectors to account. The education MDTF also envisages a monitoring and oversight role for Congolese CSOs. Other stakeholders have credited DFID for effectively advocating for the involvement of civil society organisations in the Committee on Police Reform.

3.68. DFID has also earmarked a £2.5m contribution over three years to support civil society advocacy activities under the UNDP Governance Programme<sup>33</sup>. It is too early to say whether this Civil Society Fund will

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<sup>33</sup> After the evaluation period, this contribution was increased to £10m, to be earmarked to an independently managed civil society fund, procured by UNDP.

become an effective instrument to support non-state actors in DRC to hold government to account. Experience from elsewhere (including Tanzania<sup>34</sup>) indicates that, beyond an effective and transparent management of the fund, particular attention to outputs and outcomes will be required. In addition, many CSOs in DRC remain heavily politicised, opportunistic and (outside religious networks) lack representativeness in the country.

**3.69. Private sector:** DFID DRC has no partnerships with businesses, outside its work with USAID on promoting public–private partnerships with mining companies. This initiative aimed at supporting companies in Katanga that showed responsible business behaviour and commitment to local-level development. Amongst the four companies involved in the project was Anvil Mining – a controversial choice given that this Canadian–Australian company has been linked to the massacre of civilians by the Congolese Armed Forces in Kilwa (Katanga) in 2004<sup>35</sup>. Anvil Mining has itself publicly admitted that it provided transport and other logistical support to the Congolese Armed Forces, but said it had no choice in the matter. Anvil Mining is no longer involved in the PPP discussion, after questions were raised over its ownership.

### **Choice of aid delivery mechanisms**

3.70. Beyond a discussion on the relevance of specific interventions and/or partners, an important aspect of DFID’s country programme, which calls for further scrutiny and lesson learning, is the complementarity that various aid delivery mechanisms – and with it, implementing partners – can bring to address both short-term and long-term needs in a country like DRC. As pointed out by the then Secretary of State, Hilary Benn, in his response to the June 2006 submission, there is a “need to balance short-term stabilisation and longer-term capacity building as well as delivery through both state and non-state actors” in a fragile country like DRC.

3.71. This approach implicitly guided DFID’s choice of partners and interventions in DRC. For example, the combination of short-term and long-term interventions was used successfully in the SSR and Justice (SSRJ) sector. From 2005, the DFID Rule of Law Programme, focused on supporting “immediate operational improvements in the police and in the justice system” and helping “to prepare for longer-term reforms, much of which can only be implemented after a successful political transition” (see 3.25). Elsewhere, it was generally expected that many interventions, such as health and water, would continue with humanitarian assistance, if the political situation deteriorated and the move to support multi-year INGO projects and/or government-owned programmes stalled.

3.72. Other examples below show how DFID has mixed its choice of partners and aid delivery mechanisms in key sectors of interventions.

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34 See Kassam, Yusuf and Ruta Mutakyahwa (2006), *Institutional Assessment of the Foundation for Civil Society, (Final Report)*, E.T. Jackson and Associates Ltd. Ottawa: May 2006.

35 This event was widely reported in the international press at the time. For more information, see RAID and Global Witness (2007) “*Kilwa Trial: a Denial of Justice: A Chronology October 2004 – July 2007*”, 17 July 2007, London.

- **HIV/AIDS:** DFID DRC's institutional support to UNAIDS has filled an important gap, pending the launch of the Global Fund and the World Bank multi-country HIV/AIDS programme. DFID's choice of other partners in HIV/AIDS is also seen as highly relevant to the DRC context. For example, working with PSI to deliver Behaviour Change and Communication and condom provision services has been key in the delivery of HIV services to vulnerable groups.
- **Support for the elections:** The choice of a UNDP basket fund to support the elections was highly appropriate. The basket fund proved essential to mobilise sufficient financial resources from the donor community and, with it, allow regular consultation between donors and the Congolese authorities. DFID's support included funding to the domestic observation network, Réseau national de l'observation et la surveillance d'élections au Congo (RENOSEC), and civic education by faith organisations.
- **Humanitarian assistance:** In terms of partnership, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNDP were appropriate agencies for implementing and financing the PF. By injecting liquidity into the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP), the PF is an appropriate response to the lack of donor coordination and sufficient funding in this field. In addition, DFID has continued to provide direct support for selected INGOs, including Médecins sans frontières and ICRC, and in so doing retain more direct linkages to project implementation.
- **Infrastructure:** DFID has pledged support for the UNICEF Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Village Assaini government-owned programme. In addition, DFID DRC will continue to finance a CTB project to provide safe water to Mbuji-Mayi, the second largest city in the DRC. The same mix of aid delivery mechanisms is also apparent in the road sector, where DFID has recently launched a MDTF with the World Bank, while providing continued support to CTB-implemented projects.

3.73. Working with both state and non-state actors is also recognised as best practice in DFID's 2006 White Paper. The Programme's alignment to DFID corporate priorities is discussed in the following section.

### **Relevance to DFID corporate priorities**

3.74. DFID DRC's approach of promoting peace and development is closely aligned to corporate priorities. This approach requires close relationships between DFID, FCO, and to a lesser extent MOD. This is in line with the UK government's commitment to the OECD/DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. The fifth principle, which is to "recognise the links between political, security and development objectives", promotes a whole-of-government approach, involving "those responsible for security, political and economic affairs as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance".

3.75. It also reflects commitments made in various policy papers, including: *Fighting poverty to build a safer world*, (DFID, March 2005); the 2006 policy

paper *Preventing Violent Conflict*, and the 2006 White Paper *Making Governance Work for the Poor*<sup>36</sup>. For example, working in an interdependent region was chosen as a main principle of UK engagement in CEP (2005). Notwithstanding the end of the civil war and departure of regular foreign troops, the principle of working in an interdependent region remains relevant to the context of DRC today. Some initiatives, mostly from DFID HQ, fit well with this principle. This includes the Multi-Donor Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and more recently the CBFF Initiative and the Trading for Peace research work carried out by DFID HQ.

3.76. DFID DRC's commitment to corporate priorities is also reflected in its choice of cross-cutting issues in the Country Plan (2008). The Country Plan includes the following six cross-cutting issues: conflict, gender, HIV/AIDS, accountability, anti-corruption, and environment. Although there was no reference to cross-cutting issues before finalisation of the Country Plan, some, notably gender and HIV/AIDS, were important strategically throughout the evaluation period. This indicates that DFID DRC programme is broadly aligned with DFID Gender Policy and DFID HIV/AIDS Policy. The mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues is further discussed in Chapter 4.

3.77. The Country Plan is also in line with the Capability, Accountability, and Responsiveness (CAR) framework of the 2006 White Paper. It focuses on accountability as the most important entry point to promoting good governance in the DRC. The approach promoted by DFID in the White Paper is one that seeks to

“do much more at the grassroots end of political governance, working with organisations that train citizens' groups in budget monitoring to make sure that money is spent where it's supposed to be; increasing our support to a free press and media in developing countries; and offering much more support in areas like elections, human rights, parliaments and trade unions”<sup>37</sup>.

3.78. Elsewhere, and as confirmed by the February 2008<sup>38</sup> report, the programme did not always conform with DFID conditionality policy over the evaluation period. This policy defines DFID's partnership with host countries, on the basis of their government commitments to poverty reduction, sound PFM and respect for human rights. The audit report noted that the draft Country Plan did not take account of the conditionality policy nor ensure that the requirements of the Human Rights Act have been considered during policy and programme development. This was rectified in the final Country Plan, which includes respect for human rights as a basis for DFID partnership with

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<sup>36</sup> DFID (2005), *Fighting poverty to build a safer world*, London: March 2005; DFID (2006), *Preventing Violent Conflict*, London:2006; DFID (2006), *Making Governance Work for the Poor*, London:2006.

<sup>37</sup> H. Benn, Preface, DFID 2006 White Paper.

<sup>38</sup> Internal Audit Department, Final Report: DFID Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Programme, 2008.

GoDRC, as a way of measuring progress in DRC, and as an identified outcome in the security sector reform programme.

3.79. DFID DRC now has plans to benchmark and monitor governance indicators in the DRC more closely, including human rights. This joint FCO–DFID exercise, using the recently drafted Country Governance Analysis<sup>39</sup>, is to inform discussion with the GoDRC on governance issues. DFID’s analytical input and a close monitoring of the human rights situation in the country does not per se guarantee a systematic and consistent approach to human rights by the UK government in the country. Much will depend on whether coordinated EU and bilateral lobbying on human rights cases (including by FARDC and mining companies<sup>40</sup>) takes place as and when needed; and whether DFID-funded UNDP Governance Programme will specifically support parliament to scrutinise government actions on human rights matters.

### **DFID’s approach to risk**

3.80. The CEPs describe working in DRC as “very high risk, but potentially equally high gain”. Table 9 shows that most projects are rated as medium risk.

**Table 9. Levels of risk across projects (2005-08)**

	Totals	
Risk	No.	%
Low Risk	4	9%
Medium Risk	31	67%
High Risk	11	24%
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: DFID Project Performance Reviews.

3.81. **External risk:** DFID has clearly been willing to support high (operational) risk projects, in particular with regard to rule of law and governance issues over the evaluation period. Major risks were taken in the run-up to and during the elections. However, the high risk taken by DFID was justified by its assessment that the main alternative scenario to elections would be a slide back into all-out war.

3.82. DFID DRC has continued to identify political instability as the main risk to the effective implementation of its programme. A risk analysis was shared amongst donors during the CAF process. Six key areas of risk (political instability and conflict; macroeconomic stability; slow economic and

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<sup>39</sup> DFID/FCO (2008 draft), Country Governance Analysis .

<sup>40</sup> For example, the UK government said in a press statement (June 2008) that it had raised the issue of Anvil’s involvement in the massacre of the people of Kilwa with Anvil staff, NGOs and the Congolese authorities, including with the DRC Minister of Human Rights (the latter having, however, little influence in decision-making).

governance reforms; corruption; lack of donor coordination; operational performance/project implementation) were identified. The DFID Country Plan (2008) now uses the CAF analysis and a joint FCO–DFID scenario planning exercise to consider how the DFID programme might change with different circumstances. Promoting dialogue with the Congolese authorities remains the main mitigation risk strategy advocated by DFID.

**3.83. Organisational risk:** DFID DRC has been relatively effective in pre-empting organisational risks related to joint donor programmes. For example, the risks which DFID identified for the PF included the reluctance of other donors to engage, lack of support by the humanitarian community (NGOs in particular), and a sub-standard action plan and allocation of funds. DFID has played a key role in addressing some of these risks before and since the launch of the PF.

3.84. DFID also noted the UNDP’s poor track record at managing civil society support as a particular risk to the forthcoming work on Democracy and Accountability. This concern was shared by other contributing donors. The civil society component of the Governance Programme will now be managed through an external agent. As previously discussed, DFID has also allocated £1.8m to support capacity building with UNDP, in support of its Governance Programme.

**3.85. Portfolio management:** As part of the prioritisation exercise, DFID DRC justified its decision to work in both education and health on the basis that, in a highly risky environment like DRC, health would provide a back up “if things went wrong with education”. In a highly uncertain environment, working in different sectors can help to ensure a minimum level of activities – and, with it, spending – across the programme. Risk mitigation from a developmental point of view, however, suggests a different approach, in which appropriate measures are taken to reduce the risk of donor disengagement in key sectors. This approach implicitly drove DFID DRC’s choice of aid delivery mechanisms in most sectors.

**3.86. Working through the government:** Working with government systems is particularly high risk in DRC, given the high level of corruption within the state structures. As a result, DFID has given attention to the fiduciary and accountability risk associated with its forthcoming programme in education. Three different mechanisms will be established to ensure accountability: Independent Monitoring Agency to carry out various audits, accountability mechanisms at school level (to be carried out by INGOs) and a communication strategy to inform parents of which fees they should no longer be charged.

3.87. In terms of financing the school insurance premium on behalf of parents, through SONAS, DFID DRC has worked with GoDRC and partners to develop a financial aid programme which would not use government PFM systems but rather involve a parallel system including a number of short-term safeguards to manage the associated fiduciary risk with respect to flow of funds, financial reporting and audit arrangements. Though not completely foolproof, it is clear that DFID has put a huge amount of effort into its risk mitigation strategy in education.

3.88. In conclusion, barring some concerns raised by the evaluators over the relevance of the health pilot projects, DFID's added value in PFM, and attention being diverted from the mining sector, DFID's choice of partners and areas of intervention was largely relevant to the country's context. The programme as a whole, however, was too broad and lacked focus. Hard decisions by HQ in dropping one or two sectors would have helped. DFID also performed relatively well in combining state and non-state partners on one hand, and short-term with long-term measures on the other. The diversity of partners – and in particular those that have direct contact with DFID - has declined as the country programme has moved to support large-scale programmes.

## **SUMMARY BOX**

The UK rationale for engagement in DRC has been strong and aimed to promote peace and development in the country from the outset. DFID's plans to scale up support and move to larger, multi-donor programmes was also appropriate, given the country's huge needs for reconstruction and lack of donor coordination in the early years of the evaluation period.

With regards to strategic quality, CEPs during Phase I (2003–2005) were mostly revised in an ad hoc manner to reflect previous experience and/or new corporate priorities. Under Phase II (2006–2008), the finalisation of the CAP was delayed so that DFID could become an active participant in the joint donor CAF process. As a result, DFID functioned without a CAP for more than two years.

DFID first took a pragmatic approach to its engagement in the DRC by choosing to build from existing projects implemented by UN agencies and INGOs in humanitarian assistance. As a result, DFID's portfolio of projects covered a wide range of sectors right from the beginning.

Attempts to prioritise failed under Phase II, in large part because of the lack of sufficient guidance from DFID HQ. The launch of the Pooled Fund in 2006, while highly relevant to the DRC context, was driven by DFID HQ. Some sectors (including forestry and PFM) were also kept because they reflected corporate priorities, while activities in mining were left on the back-burner, and opportunities to scale down support in other sectors, notably health, were missed.

Barring some concerns over the relevance of the health pilot projects, DFID's added value in PFM, and attention being diverted from the mining sector, DFID's choice of areas of intervention was largely relevant to the country's context. Under Phase I, DFID was right in its decision to finance the elections and the transition institutions, as this was part of the Global and Inclusive Accord.

The model of working through other donors was ill adapted to the reality of the DRC context in the early years of the evaluation period. Consequently, an early and constant feature of DFID programme has been the institutional support that it provided to multilateral agencies. DFID also successfully built partnership with less traditional partners, including China, France and USAID. In part thanks to DFID's continued efforts, the model of working through other donors is now about to become a reality.

Although the diversity of partners has declined over the years, DFID performed relatively well in mixing aid delivery mechanisms in most sectors. This approach fitted well with DFID 2006 White Paper and the OECD DAC Fragile States Principles. DFID's approach to risk broadly addressed external and organisational risks.

## 4. Programme Effectiveness and Efficiency

4.1. This chapter reviews the extent to which DFID's programme in DRC has been effective at delivering results, and whether DFID DRC has used aid resources efficiently. The first section assesses the programme's effectiveness across sectors. The second section focuses on the effectiveness of DFID's approach to partnership. The third section, on programme efficiency, assesses the extent to which devolution and working through other donors has led to a more efficient use of resources. The operational challenges of working in a fragile state are also discussed. The final section discusses the quality of DFID DRC's monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

### Programme effectiveness

4.2. Assessing DFID country programme effectiveness in DRC comes with some limitations. The country programme as a whole has not been supported by an effective M&E framework (see 4.72-4.75). In addition, most DFID projects over the evaluation period are below £1m and therefore not subject to DFID's internal scoring system.

4.3. In addition, many of DFID's larger programmes have just started, or are about to start, and it is too early (and outside the remit of this evaluation) to assess their performance. The numerous delays encountered in finalising DFID's large-scale support after the elections, partly because of joint programming (see 4.37-4.42) and partly because of delays in finalising the Country Plan, have undermined the effectiveness of DFID's strategy in DRC from 2006. Two years after the general elections, DFID, alongside other donors, have not been able to meet their pledges for development assistance in DRC. This comes with an opportunity cost in a highly-unstable country like DRC, where acting fast should take precedence

4.4. On a project-by-project basis, Table 10 shows that most DFID projects scored have performed relatively well as rated by DFID. Approximately two-thirds of projects scored "2" for both purpose and output. Four projects (9%) performed outstandingly well, scoring "1" at output level, although roughly the same proportion of projects scored "3". None of the projects rated were scored as either 4 or 5. The discussion that follows assesses effectiveness related to the CEP 2005 objectives.

**Table 10. DFID Project purpose and output ratings<sup>41</sup>**

Purpose rating	No.	%	Output rating	No.	%
1	5	11%	1	4	9%
2	35	76%	2	36	78%
3	3	7%	3	5	11%
4	0	0%	4	0	0%
5	0	0%	5	0	0%
X	3	7%	X	1	2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>46</b>	<b>100%</b>

4.5. **Security and Rule of Law** DFID supported programmes focused on security and the rule of law performed well and largely achieved their purposes and outputs. The UNDP SPEC programme, contributed to election security by helping develop the capacity of the police. The Rule of Law programme, notably the provision of radio equipment to the police by South Africa, also performed well (both projects consistently scored “1” or “2”). Due to early engagement and optimisation of its portfolio, DFID has been able to take on a lead role in police reforms. DFID noted that “close consultation and sharing of information between the National Police (Ministry of Interior), EC, MONUC, UNDP and DFID, as the major programme partners, has led to a very well run programme”<sup>42</sup>.

4.6. DFID contributed about 30% of the £7m Rejusco programme (with the European Commission (EC) as lead donor and CTB as implementer), aimed at improving justice sector infrastructure in eastern DRC and supporting judicial personnel in the region. Whereas the programme is on schedule in terms of new constructions (courts, prosecutors’ offices etc.), it is behind schedule in terms of personnel support and support to the establishment of court systems, because judicial staff recruitment and despatch to the region is slow, and judicial skills are lacking.

4.7. DFID support to peace-building initiatives<sup>43</sup> proved less effective. This was due to relatively poor project design and weak management on the part of implementing NGOs. The projects also lacked focus on strategic impact and

<sup>41</sup> The scores range from 1 (all project purposes or outputs are likely to be achieved), to 2 (likely to be largely achieved), 3 (likely to be partially achieved), 4 (only achieved to a very limited extent), 5 (where they are unlikely to be realised) and X – sometimes written as 6 – (too early to assess).

<sup>42</sup> DFID Annual Review 2007, Rule of Law Programme.

<sup>43</sup> For example, the “Conflict Resolution in Eastern Congo” and “Peacebuilding and Citizenship in the DRC” projects led by International Alert, and the “Peace and Reconciliation Strengthening” project implemented by Christian Aid.

often came with overambitious or loosely defined project objectives (scores varied between “2” and “3” over the period).

4.8. However, the projects were effective in part. For example, a significant contribution of peace-building projects in eastern DRC has been to ensure that information on aspects of the conflict in eastern DRC was researched and disseminated. International Alert and partners supported by Christian Aid were among those that first drew attention to sexual violence against women in the context of the DRC conflict. While difficult to measure, these projects also contributed to enhancing the involvement of key groups (including, for example, Roman Catholic Bishops and members of parliaments) in the search for a negotiated settlement in eastern DRC.

4.9. **A Functioning State** Support to the transition institutions through the UNDP AIT Programme was effective in that it largely achieved its outputs (scoring “2” at completion). These were:

- The five Civic Commissions as well as the parliament and senate were provided with a legal framework;
- Technical capacities of the IEC were strengthened;
- Parliament strengthened its functions; and
- Population informed of their rights and responsibilities.

4.10. However the transition institutions received substantial support from other sources, so the achievement of this goal cannot be fully attributed to AIT – a fact recognised by DFID. While all transition institutions did not receive the same level of donor support most were able to develop legal frameworks and management tools. However, only a few received sufficient support to execute their mandate to the full.

4.11. The Transition Parliament, the IEC, and the media authorities are the three institutions where achievements have been the greatest. Even then, activities financed by the UNDP AIT programme were limited to certain aspects of their mandates. Under AIT, capacity building activities principally focused on the drafting of the laws rather than the check and balance role that the parliament was meant to play during the transition. DFID recognised these limitations and concludes that the AIT project has helped restore state functioning, but that a lot more needs to be done to strengthen democratic functioning of the supported institutions.

4.12. Basket fund support for the electoral process, through the APEC programme proved particularly effective. The constitutional referendum and the holding of the presidential, parliamentary and provincial assembly elections are exceptional achievements. Like AIT, all cannot be attributed to APEC alone. For example, MONUC logistical support was also key to the success of the elections.

4.13. Another main achievement under APEC was the use of the basket fund to mobilise and manage much needed financial resources (US\$283m) and to support coordination around one common strategy. As confirmed by the

independent review (May 2007)<sup>44</sup>, the Technical Committee and Advisory Committees have been key in ensuring successful coordination of this project. Given its complexity and timeline, this project required constant monitoring and adjusting along the way (APEC consistently scored “2” with “1” at purpose level in 2007).

4.14. Civic education is where donor assistance was the least successful under APEC. The APEC budget earmarked for micro- and macro- civic education activities carried out by NGOs and UN agencies was left unspent. Because civic education did not receive enough attention under APEC, many donors, including DFID, ended up supporting bilateral projects in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner. As a result, the spread and quality of civic education was mixed, with some groups of the population being better informed than others. Evidence shows that religious confederations seemed to have used their networks effectively to raise awareness about the elections.

4.15. Importantly, the APEC and AIT projects were both extended after the transition period. As a result, the AIT project was able to provide essential support to the newly elected parliaments. In the absence of a Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante, the IEC mandate has been extended and remaining APEC funds have been reallocated under the UNDP Governance Programme to help IEC in its task of preparing the local elections.

4.16. DFID’s support to the media proved particularly effective. All projects performed well – achieving scores of “1” or “2” in annual reviews. The media success story is further explored in Box 2.

**Box 2. DFID support for Radio Okapi in the DRC**

DFID’s support to the media in DRC started at the end of 2001 with a grant to Fondation Hironnelle to help launch Radio Okapi at a time when the country was still divided and the peace talks were only just starting. There was concern that media could be used negatively, following the experience of Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda in the build up to the genocide. The early 2000s saw the liberalisation of the media in the DRC, which resulted in a mushrooming of radio channels (up to 50 channels in Kinshasa alone, many of which are political and religiously inspired; and about 250 independent channels throughout DRC by 2007). There was a clear need for a reliable news outlet which could override the disinformation of the warring factions, help promote the peace process, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, and unite families divided by war. At the same time DFID made a modest grant through Institut Panos Paris (IPP) to work with Hautes Autorités des Médias (HAM) and equip community radios in the east.

DFID internal scoring supports widely shared views that Radio Okapi has played a key role in supporting DRC’s transition period. Radio Okapi achieved its main purpose of establishing a credible, accurate and reliable broadcasting structure at both national and regional levels. In just under three years it set up 10 fully functioning stations, 12 relays and 2 mobile stations covering all the key population centres in the country. In an output-to-purpose review, DFID reports that “without

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<sup>44</sup> Astorkia, José Maria et alii (May 2007), *Rapport d’évaluation du Projet d’Appui au Processus Electoral au Congo (APEC)*, Kinshasa.

exception, respondents report that Okapi is providing a trustworthy and impartial news and information service – the only one to be covering the whole of this vast and volatile country. There are many concrete instances that show that it has genuinely and constructively contributed to peace and to the political transition process”.

DFID has been the largest bilateral donor in the media sector to date. DFID was the largest contributor to Radio Okapi, which also received support from the governments of Switzerland, USA and the Netherlands. Alongside the French Embassy, DFID has also been active in forming and supporting the media donors’ group, the Groupe Inter-bailleurs sur les Médias (GIBM), which meets regularly in Kinshasa and is chaired by the French Embassy. One of the central aims of the GIBM is to arrive at a coordinated strategy in support of the media sector, including a basket funding mechanism. DFID will not therefore have a direct relationship with media operators, but through the Project Medias, France Coopération Internationale (FCI), which is set up to enable other donors to join and has significant technical expertise in the media sector. FCI cite their early partnership with DFID as successful and innovative. This is the first time DFID has worked with FCI.

**4.17. Reconstruction and Development.** Most QUIP projects focused on service delivery effectively met their outcomes. Many, such as the Insecticide Nets project by PSI, were extended, while others were transformed into bigger projects, such as the two health projects by IRC and Merlin. The Social Fund for Kabinda proved less effective (scoring “3” each year). Implemented by CTB, this project appeared to have been designed too ambitiously: delays also occurred due to the failure to establish formal agreements with the local authorities at the start of the project. Important lessons were drawn and used to support the design of DFID-funded £24m community-driven reconstruction project, also known as the Tuungane project. The first Annual Review for Tuungane project rated the Purpose as a “2” (likely to be largely achieved). This project appears very ambitious. The NGO consortium, led by IRC, aims to work in 1,400 villages in three provinces (South Kivu, Katanga and Maniema), benefiting around 1.8 million people and delivering more than £12.3m worth of projects directly to communities. Surprisingly, given lessons from the Social Fund for Kabinda project, such as the time needed to establish Village Development Committees, the time frame for this project has been set at only three years. However, there is considerable scope and appetite in DFID to consider an extension or new phase depending on the progress with the decentralisation process. One of the objectives of Tuungane is indeed to experiment with decentralisation before the formal process is in place by encouraging community participation and organisations initially to access project funds. The next phase could envisage devolving funds to local government.

4.18. DFID has yet to step up its engagement in water and sanitation through UNICEF’s Village Assaini programme<sup>45</sup>. The CTB project to provide safe water to Mbuji-Maya, the second largest city in the DRC, started in 2007 and hence it is too early to say if DFID’s support for water and sanitation has been effective.

4.19. In road construction, the two main projects supported were DRC CTB Road Rehabilitation in Kabinda and Rehabilitation and Maintenance of K2

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<sup>45</sup> This programme was launched after the evaluation period.

Road. The CTB project for the rural roads rehabilitation in the Kabinda district (2005–2008) has led to increased trade, and with it promoted trade and economic activity (it scored “2” each year). The £4m project for the rehabilitation and maintenance of the Kisangani-Ubundu K2 road by UNOPS was initially described as a peace-building and humanitarian project, with the aim of providing access to markets and social services through employment opportunities for the local population. Although the road was opened, a sustainable maintenance system has not been established. As a result, DFID recently decided to expand the project by another year so that a road rehabilitation and maintenance system can be established between the two cities (K2 scores varied between “2” and “3”).

**4.20. Management of Natural Resources and Enhanced Revenue Generation:** DFID activity in the mining and forestry sector has remained limited over the evaluation period. This is in part explained by DFID’s limited advisory capacity at the time, but also by hefty donor procedures, the lack of political drive by government, and, maybe indirectly, strong advocacy by INGOs.

4.21. On forestry, the £50m CBFF was launched in June 2008. At around the same time, the UK allocated another £8m as start-up funds to pre-empt likely delays in the selection of projects under the CBFF. Funds were allocated to support DRC’s “special needs”, with £3m going to the Ministry of Environment through the up-and-running capacity building programmes implemented by GTZ, and another £1.5m going to the British NGO Forest Monitor. With few government agencies and local NGOs having the capacity to submit winning proposals under the competitive bidding process it is possible that most of the CBFF could end up being allocated to INGOs. Beyond supporting a plethora of activities, the CBFF will also have to demonstrate a real and lasting impact on the ground.

**4.22. Humanitarian Assistance (HA):** HA covers a very wide range of activities. Partly for this reason it is difficult to draw out clear patterns about the effectiveness of HA intervention. The majority of projects directly funded by DFID nonetheless appear to have been able to achieve all or most of their objectives (scores for projects above £1m are mostly “1” or “2”). In many cases effectiveness came down to good project design and an in-depth understanding of local conditions displayed by the major NGOs. Inter-agency coordination and cooperation with local authorities were also seen as important aspects of success.

4.23. The main objective of the PF is to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian response in meeting critical humanitarian needs in DRC. Improvements in humanitarian outputs – and how the PF has contributed to them – have remained difficult to measure (see 5.4). In the 2007 Annual Review of the PF<sup>46</sup>, DFID confirmed: “We lack sufficient information/evidence to establish whether the humanitarian response in DRC is now more effective due to the PF’s introduction.”. There is little evidence yet to show that the

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<sup>46</sup> DFID (2007), Annual Review, Pooled Fund.

launch of the PF has led to more money being disbursed to the beneficiary implementing agencies<sup>47</sup>.

4.24. On the positive side, the humanitarian response in DRC has become better planned and coordinated. The 2007 PF evaluation report<sup>48</sup> recognises the role played by the PF in the overall humanitarian response through better planning, prioritisation and coordination. The same evaluation also concludes that the PF helped strengthen the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), and reinforced coordination mechanisms.

4.25. The cost of setting up the PF was significant: Annex E shows that the annual operating cost for coordination and support services reached a peak with the launch of the PF of US\$57.2m in 2006, before falling to US\$37.8m in 2007 (US\$27.8m according to the 2007 evaluation report)<sup>49</sup>.

4.26. Importantly, operational issues in the first two years of the PF have been dealt with effectively. However, DFID's 2007 Annual Review of the PF noted that: "The use of Clusters and Provincial Inter-Agency Coordination groups (CPIAs) to determine priorities, needs and gaps has yet to prove an effective mechanism. The system is personality led and many Clusters lack the skills and competent personnel to undertake these new tasks. Little or no training has been provided to Cluster leads to help in this process."<sup>50</sup> Cluster coordination mechanisms have improved with revisions in the Terms of Reference in 2007, allowing for more transparency, wider participation of INGOs and stronger M&E systems.

4.27. DFID also provided effective support to the pilot Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), which is operated jointly by OCHA and UNICEF. DFID called successfully for the RRM to be rolled into the PF, while remaining separate from the UNICEF-led management structure. The 2007 evaluation<sup>51</sup> stated that the RRM in the DRC "is becoming subsumed into the Common/Pooled Fund as a rapid response 'window' which seems to be working well"<sup>52</sup>.

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<sup>47</sup> According to the 2007 evaluation report, three fund allocation rounds took place in 2007, USD 116.7m was allocated to support the activities of 200 humanitarian/emergency projects implemented by 9 UN agencies (104 projects), as well as 32 INGOs and 11 national NGOs (96 projects).

<sup>48</sup> UN Humanitarian Coordinator (2008), *DRC Pooled Fund Annual Report 2007*, Kinshasa: May 2008.

<sup>49</sup> Co-ordination and support services cover all logistics, including telecommunications and joint funded air services as well as some security provision.

<sup>50</sup> DFID Annual Review (2007), Humanitarian Pooled Fund

<sup>51</sup> UN Humanitarian Coordinator (2008), *DRC Pooled Fund Annual Report 2007*, Kinshasa: May 2008.

<sup>52</sup> In addition to the Pooled Fund, DFID has also contributed (through the Voluntary Contributions Fund) to the Central Emergency Relief Fund, managed by OCHA at Headquarters level. According to the 2007 evaluation of the Pooled Fund, the DRC "was the largest recipient of Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) grants in 2006, receiving a total of \$38 million for the under-funded emergencies window. In 2007, it has received \$41.9 million, again through the CERF's two allocations for under-funded emergencies."

4.28. However, as the Fund becomes more established, it will probably become necessary to streamline its different rapid response mechanisms. The 2007 evaluation noted that the diversity of procedures has “led to some confusion amongst both NGOs and donors” and recommended, *inter alia*, that all rapid response interventions be “funded through the OCHA RRF since OCHA has a quick decision-making process, uses simple proposal and reporting formats and can disburse fairly quickly”.

### **Addressing cross-cutting issues**

4.29. **Gender** and HIV/AIDS have been relatively well mainstreamed across all sectors. Gender issues that have retained DFID attention include gender access in primary education; reduced sexual violence against women, children, and men; and gender equity in political representation. DFID was particularly active in promoting gender equity during the electoral period.

4.30. Mainstreaming **HIV/AIDS** activities in DFID programmes where appropriate (e.g. infrastructure programmes humanitarian, police and community reconstruction) is included in DFID HIV/AIDS strategy in the DRC. This has largely been achieved. DFID own internal policy on HIV/AIDS is also satisfactory<sup>53</sup>.

4.31. The CBFF and the environmental components under Pro-Routes and K2 are DFID’s principal response to tackling **environment** issues in the DRC. The CBFF, launched in June 2008, will support proposals made by ten central African countries to protect the Congo Basin rainforest – the second largest in the world and roughly twice the size of France – from destruction. DFID has also lobbied its main partners for more systematic and thorough socio-environmental impact assessments to support rehabilitation programmes in road, water and sanitation. With regard to road construction, the rise in the trade of endangered species and illegal logging remains an issue of particular concern; DFID and other donors have struggled to find a possible remedy to this situation. Importantly, DFID has recently formed a partnership with China and the GoDRC to support socio-environmental studies on the impact of China’s roads investments.

4.32. Elsewhere, DFID has identified **conflict prevention** as a cross-cutting theme in the Country Plan. The mainstreaming of conflict across all DFID programmes has been mixed. At a strategic level, conflict analysis has broadly informed the choice of interventions, in particular with regard to media, police reforms, mining and support for the elections. The risk of elections causing a return to conflict was seen as very real and taken on board in the way DFID and the wider community supported the process. A better understanding of the links between conflict dynamics and some aspects of governance (in particular decentralisation) is still required.

4.33. At a project level, the mainstreaming of conflict dynamics has been limited. Here, conflict sensitivity is concerned with, on one hand, assessing the risk of conflict and its impact on project performance and on the other ensuring a “do no harm” approach through targeting and relationships with stakeholders. Within DFID’s portfolio, the K2 link road rehabilitation project

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<sup>53</sup> DFID (2008), internal audit report.

was the only project that explicitly linked conflict reduction with development. Other QUIP-type projects were implemented with little focus on conflict sensitivity. The extent to which the K2 link project has helped to reduce local conflict has not been assessed.

4.34. It is also too early to say whether the Tuungane project has helped to reduce conflict at community level. While relevant, these grass-root initiatives principally focus on promoting dialogue around specific needs in selected villages. They therefore only partially replace peace-building activities that focused on dialogue and advocacy within and across regions, and in which the middle-range leadership (religious leaders, women associations, academic and intellectuals) participated.

4.35. As DFID starts working increasingly through other partners, keeping conflict sensitivity issues high on the agenda will become challenging. Little is known for example about the conflict sensitivity of humanitarian assistance projects financed through the PF.

4.36. **Corruption** is another cross-cutting issue in the Country Plan. In its draft anti-corruption strategy for DRC (updated in 2007), DFID starts by saying:

“Corruption in DRC is deep rooted and pervasive across government and civil society. Indeed in many areas corruption is the system. It is a largely a result of a long history of an extractive state working for personal interests, exacerbated by the uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources. Vested interests in maintaining a corrupt system are very strong since they support access to power and resources”.

4.37. Evidence on the effectiveness of DFID’s programme in supporting PFM and anti-corruption activities is lacking. On anti-corruption, DFID withdrew its direct support to the CELC, because of poor governance, corruption, and lack of independence. Elsewhere, DFID DRC has made a commitment to fight the uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources, the main cause of corruption in the country. In practice, this will depend on whether DFID’s resumes support for activities in the mining sector (EITI in particular).

### **Partnership working**

4.38. **Joint programming:** As explained in Chapter 3, expectations in terms of joint programming were unrealistic; to get to where the programme is now, DFID DRC had to spend substantial time lobbying and supporting other donors over the evaluation period. Firstly, DFID could not establish “silent partnerships” until recently. As a result, DFID remained heavily involved in the design, implementation and monitoring of all its programmes with other donors. As relationships with other donors matured and their respective capacity increased, silent partnerships were formed in the media with the FCI (from 2007) and in forestry with GTZ (2008). The partnership in justice (from 2006) implemented by CTB and co-funded by the EC, Dutch and Belgium is gradually evolving towards a silent one.

4.39. Secondly, DFID-funded large-scale development assistance programmes in roads, governance, and education were all delayed. The UNDP Governance Programme started a year later than planned in 2008. DFID started discussion on options for a MDTF in infrastructure with the WB (and

to a lesser extent EC) as early as 2002 but the first Project Concept Note on donor support for the roads sector through PMPTR was only finalised in May 2005. After approximately two years delay, Pro-routes started in October 2008. DFID anticipated the MDTF education would start in time for the new school year in September 2008; but the programme with the World Bank will not now be launched until next year.

4.40. A number of reasons were identified for the delays in the design phase:

- Discussions at design stage were complex and it took longer for all parties (including the government) to reach agreement.
- The programmes have high budgets and aim to work through government structures. This comes with a high risk. Extensive scoping studies and institutional appraisals were needed to support capacity building, policy, and mitigation strategies (to counter the fiduciary risk in particular).
- DFID's main partner organisations lack in-country capacity and/or do not have sufficient delegated authority to precipitate decisions<sup>54</sup>.
- DFID's own internal procedures. While Project Concept Notes for joint donor programmes were approved ahead of the CAP in early 2006, the full programme memorandums were only approved upon completion of the Country Plan in early 2008. The sense of urgency by DFID DRC to kick-start large-scale development assistance after the elections has in this sense contrasted with the cautious approach of the new Ministerial Team.

4.41. By contrast, other joint donor programmes, namely the UNDP-managed AIT, SPEC and APEC, while slow to start up, were launched early enough to fulfil their mandates around the elections. That all donors in the country shared a common vision and agenda, namely a successful transition to democracy, and the smaller scale of the programmes, ensured their timely launch. They were also implemented under the so-called direct execution (DEX) mechanisms; this means little responsibility was assigned to the beneficiary institutions.

4.42. The DFID-supported vertical funds, the PF and the CBFF, all started on time. The launch of the PF and CBFF required consultation in country and with the headquarters of all main parties (DFID HQ and OCHA, UNDP for the PF; ADB for the CBFF). That both are vertical funds that work outside government structures, requiring limited involvement of the Congolese authorities, resulting in faster negotiation times and the dedication of DFID in-country advisers contributed to their timely launch.

4.43. **Harmonisation:** Outside joint programming, DFID has proactively and effectively contributed to stronger donor coordination through dialogue.

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<sup>54</sup> In the case of the UNDP Governance Programme, this was partly due to the delay in receiving a project document from UNDP. The first version arrived at the end of March 2007 and then required considerable work before it was completed. The lack of in-country capacity by DFID partners is mentioned in the same paragraph.

DFID was the main champion for donor harmonisation, and, more particularly, multi-donor joint funding mechanisms, during CG meetings. The UK presidency of the EU in the second part of 2005 gave extra leverage for the UK to push on harmonisation. As the first bilateral donor to join in, DFID's participation was instrumental in securing a credible CAF process. DFID DRC had set itself measurable objectives for the joint CAF. The first objective was to ensure that the process did not become exclusive or exacerbate tensions within the donor community. This was largely achieved. In total, 17 agencies were involved in the discussion and signed the final document.

4.44. The CAF process came with some shortcomings. As confirmed by the joint UN–WB review<sup>55</sup> of the DRC CAF (2008), the elaboration of the CAF strategic framework has not been enough to translate into coordination in practice. The CAF process was also long-winded (it took 18 months for the CAF report to be finalised). It is, however, difficult to envisage what DFID could have done differently to speed up or improve the process.

4.45. The main CAF weakness was that it primarily aimed at coordinating donor response to the PRGSP. As a donor-owned process, the CAF did not involve the government or CSOs. In this sense, the CAF only provided a *verbatim* donor response to the PRGSP, rather than a genuine donor attempt to discuss development policies with the government. The decision not to involve their Congolese counterparts in the discussion is largely explained by the absence of a legitimate government at the time. However, this ignores the fact that the Ministry of Planning had already been talking to donors about piloting the harmonisation approach in some key sectors. The CAF was formally endorsed by the newly installed GoDRC in the 2007 PAP and tripartite (government, donors, civil society) thematic groups have now been launched.

4.46. Importantly, expectations that working through other donors – i.e. through joint programming – would be conducive to wider donor coordination have not always been met. For example, DFID's partnerships with WB have remained for the large part bilateral. During discussions over Pro-Routes it became evident that the EC and WB viewed the role of the private sector differently. Under pressure to finalise its Country Strategy Paper, the EC decided not to wait for Pro-Routes to be launched and started its own infrastructure programme bilaterally.

4.47. Although other donors have now joined, DFID and UNDP, as the largest financial contributors, largely led the design and launch of the UNDP Governance Programme. The table below summarises the number of donors involved (or expected to join in) in the respective programmes.

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<sup>55</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations)/World Bank (2008), *The DRC's Country Assistance Framework: A 'Big Tent' built from 'Big Ideas'?*, 30 May 2008.

**Table 11. Donor involvement in DFID programmes**

	Lead agency	Donors involved presently (outside DFID)	Donors expected to join in
AIT (completed)	UNDP	Italy	
APEC (completed)	UNDP	South Africa, Germany, Belgium, Canada, EC, France, Italy, Norway, Holland and others	
SPEC	UNDP	EC, South Africa, France, Angola and others	
Governance	UNDP	Belgium, WB, Canada, European Commission, Switzerland	European Commission, Switzerland
Pro-Routes	WB	None	EC, ADB
Education	WB	None	Belgium
WASH	UNICEF	Japan	Not known
Pooled Fund	UNDP/OCHA	Sweden, Netherlands, Ireland, Canada, Belgium, Norway	Not known
Congo Basin Forest Fund	ADB	Norway	Not known

4.48. **Whole-of-UK-government approach:** DFID–FCO–MOD collaboration is an important feature of DFID’s programme in the DRC. In its Country Business Plan, the FCO shares many of its objectives with DFID and/or MOD.

4.49. The FCO–DFID–MOD collaboration worked well throughout the evaluation period (for a discussion on joint FCO–DFID management, see 4.67-4.68). As a perceived “friend of Rwanda”, the UK faced strong scepticism from the Congolese government in Kinshasa when the office opened in 2003<sup>56</sup>. DFID, with the backing of FCO, had to convince the GoDRC that its plans were genuine, while at the same time developing a close relationship with Congolese CSOs. DFID is now a trusted partner of the GoDRC in Kinshasa, although some government officials interviewed continued to argue that the UK government should put pressure on President Kagamé to support the Amani peace process in the east.

4.50. The active involvement of the UK Ambassador to DRC was key in boosting DFID’s credibility in the first years of the evaluation. The FCO–

<sup>56</sup> Relations between DRC and Rwanda remain tense, because the Rwandan Government refuses to take any responsibility for the presence of Interahamwe Hutu militias operating in eastern Congo. Rwanda also until recently denied any allegation of support for Nkunda troops. The DFID programme in Rwanda amounted to £27m in 2003/04, rising to £70m in 2005/06.

DFID–MOD collaboration was also instrumental in ensuring that UK support for the elections was effective. MOD’s support to MONUC, FCO’s participation in CIAT discussions, and DFID’s plans for increased development assistance combined well to support the transition period. Since an elected government has been in place, the international community, including the UK, has not had the same level of political leverage.

4.51. The African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) has remained the principal vehicle for supporting joined-up UK government (FCO–DFID–MOD) actions outside diplomacy and influencing. ACPP spend has principally supported interventions in security sector reforms (support to EUSEC staff, and EUSEC chain of payment); the integrated brigades project; and support for peace negotiations in the east (Amani). Importantly, an FCO representative has been posted in Goma since January 2008 to support the peace process. Having a permanent UK representation also seems to have benefited DFID-funded activities in the region.

4.52. In principle, as outlined in the interim FCO–DFID external communication strategy, DFID and FCO share a common mission, which is to “promote peace and foster development” in DRC. The UK has also some commercial interest in DRC and major UK mining companies are now active in the country. DFID DRC’s Natural Resource Engagement Strategy is based on a coordinated HMG effort, in which the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI, recently renamed Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR)) works with the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises, DFID supports policy reforms, and FCO remains engaged on political and UN Panel processes.

4.53. **Influencing:** In most sectors, DFID advisers have been able to combine joint programming, donor dialogue and direct relationships with key government officials to feed into policy and practice. The model of working through other donors provided DFID with invaluable entry points in some sectors. DFID has notably benefited from the client relationship that the WB has with government to take part in programme and policy-related discussion on education, PFM, forestry, governance etc. Partnerships with GTZ and CTB also provided entry points with GoDRC Line Ministries. Nurturing direct relationships with key government officials has also been important to ensure DFID visibility and access to first-hand information.

4.54. Under CAF, DFID failed to convince donors that “basic health care should be provided free in DRC”, its second objective for CAF. DFID’s main contribution as part of the CAF discussion was in fact in education (traditionally led by the Belgians), and DFID is now leading the thematic working group in this sector. DFID has also been able to claim a comparative advantage in police, based on its worldwide experience of SSR as an institutional, holistic, and developmental process.

4.55. DFID has had a positive and significant influence on the nature and scope of all its programmes with other donors. For example, DFID has played an important advisory role, sitting on technical committees (Pooled Fund; UNDP APEC), and taking part in field missions. There is some evidence to show that it has influenced its partners’ internal ways of working. For example

DFID has worked closely with the WB to reinforce alignment to government structures.

4.56. It is also worth noting that DFID has been able to agree to a common reporting format with some of its partners. While the UN retains its own M&E procedures, EUSEC and FCI have, for example, agreed to use DFID's reporting format.

4.57. Finally, donor partners often refer to DFID as their most "preferred" partner, and DFID advisers are invariably commended for their inclusiveness, availability, flexibility, pragmatism, and high-quality advisory input.

### **Programme Efficiency**

4.58. **Devolution:** Setting up a country office in Kinshasa was an integral part of the 2003–2005 Africa Director' Delivery Plan (DDP). The objective was to develop a long-term strategic development partnership with the DRC. As a result, plans for devolution were discussed shortly after the country office opened in January 2003. Transferring management responsibility and financial authority to Kinshasa was to be supported, or challenged, by a gradual increase in DFID spend.

4.59. Devolution was a success. According to an internal audit of DFID DRC administrative systems (2008)<sup>57</sup>, the systems and controls for managing the programme are now generally operating satisfactorily. However, a number of challenges and difficulties were met along the way.

4.60. Firstly, the office initially planned to have 36 staff: 10 UK-based and 26 staff appointed in country (SAIC). As a result of the new headcount target, the staff target was subsequently reduced to 30 before being increased to 40 today. Such changes in direction have made it difficult to plan ahead.

4.61. Secondly, attracting UK-based and SAIC staff with the right skills and experience has been difficult. As a result, the office was under-staffed – and staff over-stretched – through much of the evaluation period. In the first two years of the evaluation period, the office was headed by a less senior manager. With hindsight, it is evident that a much higher level of seniority was needed. DFID subsequently revised the salary and incentive packages globally to take into account the conditions of working in difficult environments. The office has now reached its optimal size.

4.62. Thirdly, DFID HQ also overlooked the importance of mastering French as a working language. Country office policy was revised in 2007 to allow more time for language training. The change in policy has no doubt impacted positively on newcomers' ability to perform. Higher levels of fluency are, however, required for policy influencing and this takes time and practice to build.

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<sup>57</sup> DFID (2008), Internal Audit Department, *Final Report: DFID Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Programme* (internal document), 2008.

4.63. Finally, three years after submission, the construction of the new office was still not completed<sup>58</sup>. As a result, all DFID staff were stationed in two portacabins. DFID HQ appeared committed to devolution to Kinshasa, but they initially seemed reluctant to commit an estimated £3m to the construction of the new office in a still unstable country.

4.64. The office structure chosen at the time of devolution, separated management from advisory functions. This appeared sound since newly recruited advisers were able to focus on their sectors, begin discussions with other donors and the host country, and start influencing programme and policy. On the downside, it led to some irregularities on the project management side, as many SAIC and UK-based staff were new to DFID rules and procedures. The office structure has since been revised, with advisers and project managers now working within the same thematic clusters. It is felt that the new structure has strengthened office cohesion, with advisers taking more of a monitoring and oversight role on the management side.

4.65. While difficult to measure, the impact of devolution on programme effectiveness and efficiency has no doubt been positive. Most donors and government partners rate DFID advisory capacity as outstanding. DFID has also more in-country advisory capacity to offer than other donors. Based in the country, advisers have found themselves in a better position to understand, monitor, and influence the context in which they operate. DFID could not have positioned itself as a lead donor agency, without its increased presence on the ground.

4.66. **Working in a fragile state:** Two years after devolution, DFID DRC continues to face significant challenges because of the difficult environment in which they operate. Working in a fragile country, like DRC, is more labour-intensive and expensive than elsewhere. Everything seems to take longer than expected for the following reasons:

- Other donors' in-country capacity is weak. As a result, DFID tends to take on a disproportionate share of the transaction costs related to donor coordination and joint donor funding.
- State institutions are weak. Working with government structures takes time.
- Staff are vulnerable to a highly risky and unstable environment. For example, following the March 2007 violence there was discussion as to whether DFID should still allow family "posting" in the country. The October 2008 Airserv crash<sup>59</sup>, killing 17 people (one from the UK) also served as an uneasy reminder of the risk that DFID staff take when living in DRC.

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<sup>58</sup> The construction of the new office was completed after submission of this report and is now occupied.

<sup>59</sup> Airserv received a little less than £1m from DFID.

- DFID internal communication and knowledge management systems are ill adapted to the environment of DRC, in particular, the slow IT systems.
- Travelling in-country is not easy, especially in the east. This means that DFID DRC staff are limited in their ability to obtain information on the ground, including that needed to monitor delivery of DFID programmes.
- DFID staff constantly face unorthodox situations that do not meet internal regulations. Examples range from fraud investigations, reallocation of UNDP funds, to procurement procedures with non-traditional partners (FCI). A lot of time is spent talking to HQ to resolve these issues.

4.67. It is also worth noting that project management in DRC was also particularly intense because of the large number of active projects throughout the evaluation period. A lot of time was also spent renewing projects from 2005 until now. (see Box 3). This, coupled with limitation on headcount, has left staff over-stretched.

**Box 3. DFID DRC's move from projects to programmes**

DFID's country programme over the evaluation period remained heavily project-driven, because the switch to larger programmes took much longer than expected. In March 2005, the office managed more than 45 bilateral projects, and roughly the same number in the following year. The office expected the number of projects to fall significantly from 2007, but the ministerial decision not to approve big spends until finalisation of the Country Plan meant that many projects had to be extended instead. As a result, the office was still managing more than 40 projects by mid-2008, although many were expected to be phased out.

Success in scaling up development assistance at sector level is reflected in the increase in the size of the projects over the evaluation period. While the average size of projects as of March 2005 was just above £1m, this average increased to £1.8m by March 2006, following the launch of two big spends: the UNDP basket fund APEC and the UNDP-managed SPEC. The average value of projects increased to £3.6m in 2007, following the launch of three main programmes, the PF; the PSI bednet projects; and support for integrated brigades.

4.68. **Office cost:** The cost of running the office in a country like DRC is also high. Duty of care policy and frequent high-level visits tend to inflate administrative costs. In addition, chartering a plane for monitoring and evaluation purposes is not included in the project budget and comes as an administrative cost. Rampant inflation has also made it difficult to plan ahead. Table 12 nonetheless shows that DFID DRC did not fare better or worse than other country programmes in Africa. DFID DRC administrative cost as a percentage of total spend was 5.2% in 2007/08, compared with 4.6% for seven other countries. The jump from 2.7% in 2005/06 to 5% in 2006/07 (see Table 13) reflects success in recruiting, but also the rising cost of doing business in DRC<sup>60</sup>.

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<sup>60</sup> The cost of running DFID office could increase significantly if proposals for a new service delivery agreement based on full economic cost recovery between DFID and FCO go ahead.

**Table 12. Trends in Administrative Costs as a % of DFID Spend**

	Financial Year			Average
	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	
DFID Burundi	1.1%	5.0%	8.0%	4.7%
DFID DRC	2.7%	5.0%	5.2%	4.3%
DFID Ethiopia	6.5%	4.5%	2.1%	4.4%
DFID Kenya	4.1%	4.4%	6.2%	4.9%
DFID Rwanda	3.1%	14.7%	4.8%	7.5%
DFID Sudan	2.5%	5.6%	3.7%	3.9%
DFID Tanzania	1.9%	2.2%	2.0%	2.1%
DFID Uganda	4.6%	5.3%	7.1%	5.6%

Source: DFID Evaluation Department.

**Table 13. Breakdown of Administrative Costs as a % of Total Spend for DRC**

	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Pay and related costs	252,536	606,461	766,690
Other Administrative Costs	982,254	2,695,810	2,422,792
Administrative Capital Costs	330,800	470,863	1,093,069
Total Administrative Costs	1,565,590	3,773,134	4,282,551
Programme Spend	57,266,681	71,477,372	78,428,667
Total DFID Expenditure	58,832,271	75,250,506	82,711,218
Admin costs as % of total spend	2.7%	5.0%	5.2%

Source: DFID Evaluation Department and DFID Statistics on International Development 2008.

**4.69. Flexibility and responsiveness:** One of the principles of engagement in fragile states is the need to act fast. Whilst there have been substantial delays in establishing multi-donor programmes DFID DRC has shown strong capability in learning by doing, often providing creative solutions to fill gaps or address potential deadlocks. The flexibility gained through devolution has been particularly welcomed by other donors with more centralised systems, and also by government officials.

**4.70.** DFID's ability to work relatively fast has allowed progress to fill gaps in some sectors. For example the majority of projects were expanded throughout the evaluation period, pending the launch of the larger programmes with multilateral agencies. In education, DFID has started to work on a bilateral basis with the Ministry of Education, pending the launch of the MDTF.

4.71. DFID DRC has also been good at responding to new evidence and adjusting project designs accordingly. For example, lessons on road maintenance in DFID first generation of road rehabilitation projects were used to support the design phase of Pro-Routes. DFID's support to the PF has allowed remedial actions to be introduced after a number of weaknesses were revealed; the redrafted TORs include help to improve cluster prioritisation, spending allocations and M&E.

4.72. **DFID–FCO joint management:** The relation between DFID and FCO has been described as the most joined up in Africa<sup>61</sup>. DFID and FCO are jointly committed to deliver high-quality support for British nationals in DRC, in normal times and at times of crisis. They have recently developed an external communication strategy, the overarching objective of which is to raise awareness of the UK's work in DRC in order to increase their influence. The use of a common branding (British Embassy) is being piloted.

4.73. Sharing an office space (and associated services) has helped strengthen partnership working. This close FCO–DFID collaboration has been particularly valued in times of uncertainty. Having a permanent UK representation in the east since January 2008 has also helped DFID with logistics during field visits.

4.74. **Cost of working through other donors:** The DRC programme shows that working through other donors may not be as good value for money as it first appears. Working through other donors allows for savings in administrative costs, which is in line with the UK government targets for efficiency improvements in the public sector. DFID advisers have spent significant time designing, monitoring and advising on programmes with multilateral partners. In a written answer to the House of Parliament (October 2008)<sup>62</sup>, it is estimated that “the costs of DFID's oversight, monitoring and evaluation and lobbying for humanitarian reforms will be much less than the 4.4% [5.2% in our report] of the share of administrative cost to total spend in 2007/08”<sup>63</sup>. However, what DFID saves in administrative cost is often spent on covering administrative costs of other partners, as part of programme spend.

4.75. For example UN agency management fees range between 5 and 12% which is not always considered good value for money. Hence, DFID negotiated with UNDP for a possible reduction in management fees in support of the PF. In addition, as well as committing advisory staff time to the respective programmes <sup>64</sup>, DFID DRC provided capacity building support to the

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<sup>61</sup> In November 2008, the British Embassy team in the DRC comprising people from Department for International Development, Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office won the UK Joined - Up Government Award and the title of Civil Service team of the year.

<sup>62</sup> <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081021/text/81021w0009.htm>

<sup>63</sup> DFID notes that capital is included in these estimates. The percentage is 3.9% if capital is excluded.

<sup>64</sup> For example, DFID envisages committing the following percentage advisory time under the UNDP Governance Programme: Senior Governance Adviser: 40%; Assistant Governance Adviser: 45%; Social Development Adviser: 15%; Conflict Adviser: 5%; Deputy Programme Manager: 15%..

multilateral agencies including £1.8m to a stand-alone UNDP capacity enhancement programme to address staffing and other institutional constraints identified during the design phase of the UNDP Governance Programme. This is on top of the 50% of DFID global fund earmarked for multilateral agencies. DFID also pays for the salaries of World Bank advisers in education and PFM, as well as UNAIDS officers.

4.76. Another cost of working through other donors is that DFID has become less visible to beneficiaries, including the GoDRC. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, evidence on whether multilateral agencies use DFID money in a cost-effective manner is lacking.

## **Monitoring and Evaluation**

4.77. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities by DFID and its implementing partners lacked consistency and robustness over the evaluation period despite regular attempts by DFID and other donors to establish results matrices to monitor progress. A change matrix was drafted as part of the CEPs in 2003. Five matrices were also developed as part of the CAF process, linking outputs and indicators with core PRGSP pillar objectives. None of these matrices have been used to monitor progress against PRGSP objectives. They were subsequently replaced by PAP matrices which were also not used for monitoring progress<sup>65</sup>. Another government-led initiative, the Pacte de Performance, was launched in late 2008 to monitor progress against the Paris Declaration commitments. This plethora of matrices, makes it difficult for DFID and other donors to promote a results-oriented approach to development in DRC.

4.78. As part of the Country Plan, DFID DRC has now designed nine matrices to link its interventions (democracy and accountability; SSR; minerals; roads; education; health; water and sanitation; community reconstruction; and humanitarian assistance), over 2008–2010 to key outcomes and impact to be achieved by 2010. A consolidated results matrix will report progress against the whole programme every six months. DRC has also become a focal country (alongside Bangladesh) to strengthen DFID's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practice under DFID's Results Action Plan.

4.79. At sector level, media projects exhibited good M&E practice. The recently launched community-led reconstruction projects and health pilot projects also come with an extensive baseline scenario and M&E system. DFID states, for example, that the baseline study for Tuungane is one of the most ambitious ever undertaken in the DRC.

4.80. There are concerns that DFID will continue to rely heavily on secondary source information, because of travel restrictions and its work through other partners. For example, evaluations of the PF in the first years of implementation noted some important shortcomings in M&E practices. OCHA has insufficient M&E capacity and also faces challenges in terms of its mandate, as it has no formal authority to monitor other UN agencies. New

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<sup>65</sup> This has now begun through the sector thematic groups, but has not yet been completed.

M&E practices were introduced in 2008 to allow better monitoring of Pooled Fund-funded humanitarian assistance projects.

**SUMMARY BOX**

DFID's country programme over the evaluation period consisted of more than 40 projects. This number did not fall as fast as expected, because of delays in launching large-scale joint donor programmes after the elections.

Support to help secure security around the elections was effective. However peace-building projects performed poorly, in part because of poor project design, weak management, and overambitious targets. DFID supported UNDP programmes contributed to building the capacity of transition institutions, holding free and fair polls, and ensuring security during the electoral period. Support to civic education was less effective but media performed outstandingly well.

Road rehabilitation and other infrastructure projects have contributed to improved communication in DRC, although some failed to initiate a satisfactory maintenance system and links with the government's own plans have yet to materialise under Pro-Routes. Activities have barely started in the mining and forestry sector.

The humanitarian response has become more coordinated, following the launch of the PF in 2006. Whereas processes have evidently strengthened, improvement in the humanitarian response has been more difficult to measure.

DFID DRC was largely effective in mainstreaming HIV/AIDS and gender in its programme, though addressing environmental issues was limited to CBFF and the road infrastructure projects. Conflict sensitivity has been relatively high at strategic levels, but has not been mainstreamed at project level.

Expectations in terms of joint programming were unrealistic; DFID DRC had to spend substantial time lobbying and supporting other donors over the evaluation period. Silent partnerships were formed only recently.

Harmonisation, which DFID championed throughout the evaluation period, did not make as much progress as expected. The CAF process, while relevant, was longwinded and donor-focused.

Relations between DFID and FCO were strong and essential to lobby the GoDRC. Whereas the FCO–DFID collaboration has been effective, more could be done to promote a whole-of-government approach to development and peace in DRC.

Devolution in 2005 was largely successful, although the country office found it difficult to attract staff with the right skills and experience. Hence, the office was under-staffed throughout the evaluation period. DFID HQ also

underestimated the importance of mastering French as a working language.

Working in a fragile and challenging country like DRC is more labour intensive with higher and less predictable running costs. This, coupled with a project-based portfolio and limitation on headcount, has left staff overstretched.

Working through other donors was not as good value for money as it first appeared. What was saved in administrative cost was often spent on covering administrative costs of other partners.

DFID's M&E in DRC has lacked continuity and robustness. Plans to establish a results matrix for the programme have now been completed. DRC will be a pilot country for DFID's Result Action Plan. The lack of regular access to first source information will remain an issue.

## 5. Impact and Sustainability

5.1. This chapter attempts to estimate the extent to which DFID assistance has contributed to poverty reduction, state-building and aid effectiveness in DRC over the evaluation period.

### Poverty reduction and state-building

5.2. With an abundance of natural resources, DRC is potentially one of the wealthiest countries in the world. Extensive reforms are required to help the country turn its own economic resources into a source of equitable income opportunities for the population as a whole. The size of the country, the state collapse in the 1980s and 1990s, the predatory culture inherited from the Mobutu years and the civil war have raised the stakes significantly. The bulk of the population lives in dire poverty; stabilisation in the east remains fragile; and the country is characterised by deep-seated geographic, socio-economic, and ethnic divisions. Short-term gains and longer-term reforms are both required to reduce poverty and secure peace in DRC.

5.3. The lack of up-to-date poverty data in DRC makes it impossible to properly assess trends in poverty reduction over the evaluation period. For the same reason, the impact of DFID programme on poverty reduction in DRC cannot be measured because insufficient data on progress under MDGs. In addition, because they were extended time and again and did not reach completion, most projects supported by DFID in social delivery and infrastructure reconstruction have not been subject to extensive impact assessment analysis. As a result, their lasting impact remains largely unknown.

5.4. General perceptions are that the population at large has not yet seen the benefits that were expected to follow the installation of the new regime. The DHS 2007 also confirms wide disparity between urban and rural areas, and across gender. For example, 19 percent of women in urban areas are illiterate against 58 percent in rural areas; infant mortality was estimated at 108 per 1,000 live births in rural areas, versus 74 in urban areas; and the percentage of births for which the mother has delivered with the assistance of a health professional amounted to 63% in rural areas and 91% in urban areas.

5.5. While not about impact, humanitarian assistance and QUIP-type projects can claim to have brought substantial and immediate benefits to the local population during their respective lifetime. The Pooled Fund 2007 Annual Report<sup>66</sup> claims that humanitarian assistance disbursed through the Fund has reached over four million people, including vaccinating 1.2m children and treating 70,000 children in feeding centres.

5.6. The main issue with INGO-led projects remains sustainability. For example, a 2007 evaluation of the DFID-funded road K2 project indicates that

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<sup>66</sup> UN Humanitarian Coordinator (2007), *DRC Pooled Fund Annual Report to Donors 2006* Kinshasa: October 2007.

the rehabilitation of Kisangani-Ubundu (128km) had a significant boost on economic activities. The average tonnage increased with traffic from around 6 tons/day to 40 tons/day, with 18 tons/day being agricultural produce. A number of INGOs and UN agencies were also able to start activities along the road. These included UNICEF with Village Assaini and DFID-funded IRC. However, the K2 project had no maintenance system in place at the time, which means that with prevailing weather conditions and increases in heavy traffic, the road closed again within 6–12 months. Maintenance has since received adequate attention under Pro-Routes and the extension to K2.

5.7. Working to scale has just begun, with the recent launch of the joint donor programmes. DFID assistance will bring sustainable benefits to the population, if these programmes succeed in supporting state-building. The issue of sustainability is expected to be partially addressed: the new programme Pro-Routes will work to scale and with the government structures to rehabilitate and maintain the national road network. Other programmes, including the UNDP Governance Programme, UNICEF Village Assaini, and the education MDTF, will also work to scale and involve national and provincial authorities. This will help to build government capacity and address sustainability issues. Experience elsewhere, however, has shown that low government capacity and leadership (as well as the lack of in-country capacity of other partners) can slow these programmes significantly in their first years of operation.

5.8. At higher levels, the GoDRC's willingness and capability to provide equitable access to services to the population as a whole appears weak. There is little evidence that government commitment to poverty reduction in the PRGSP 2006 has translated into increased public spending. Under the PRGSP, the government had plans to increase budgetary allocations to education and health sectors (including HIV/AIDS) from a combined 15% of the state budget in 2006 to 40% in 2008. There is some doubt as to whether the PRGSP process is genuinely owned by the government or whether it is principally used as a tick box exercise for access to HIPC debt relief. There is, at the same time, strong government momentum to show results before the 2011 elections, as demonstrated by the government's decision to borrow \$9bn (now revised to £6bn) from China to fast track the implementation of the 5 Chantiers.

5.9. Furthermore, corruption in DRC – a country awash with mineral resources – is widespread. In this respect, there are concerns that prospects for more development assistance will create a moral hazard, as the Congolese authorities will be under less pressure to push for essential reforms to bring money to the economy. According to the World Bank<sup>67</sup>, fraudulent practices by companies and government agencies created a gap of \$35m in terms of royalties and surface rents alone. About US\$200m should be generated in tax revenue per year, but mining taxes collected in 2005 were reported at US\$27m. This means that roughly \$170m worth of the country's mining revenue went missing because of the lack of regulation in this sector;

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<sup>67</sup> World Bank (2008), *DRC: Growth with Governance in Mining*, Washington: May 2008.

compared with the £100m (\$150m) that DFID plans to disburse in DRC in 2008–2010.

5.10. Many donors, including DFID, now have plans to give their support directly to the provinces. The bulk of DFID assistance under the UNDP Governance Programme will in fact go towards decentralisation. There is a strong rationale for the international community including DFID to start investing in selected regions; the country cannot be run from the centre; and there are hopes that political will will be higher at provincial levels, because local authorities are closer to their people and hence will be more motivated to promote good governance. In addition, under the new constitution, provinces will retain 40% of the national revenue collection at source; they will also be in charge of providing basic services to the population.

5.11. On the political side, donor support for the 2006 elections has had a major positive impact on prospects for peace and national reconciliation in the country. Keen to act fast, donors have been criticised for turning a blind eye on long-term and systemic issues in their support to democratisation in DRC. For example, the international community stopped short of supporting the full electoral cycle before recognising the legitimacy to the newly elected authorities. As a result, the country could still face a crisis of legitimacy if the local elections are delayed or held in an unsatisfactory manner.

5.12. Support for democratisation and accountability faces considerable challenges now that a legitimate government is installed, since the check and balance institutions that directly dealt with key governance issues, such as the fight against corruption, respect for human rights and support for national reconciliation no longer exist. Holding the government to account to ensure that these issues are kept on the agenda will be a challenge now that the responsibility for them is with parliament.

5.13. Whether democratisation and accountability will be more successful when donor support switches to provincial authorities and their decentralised territorial entities is unknown. The opposition is stronger in provinces. For example, a number of provincial assemblies have held votes of no confidence regarding their governors. A vote of no confidence moved by the MLC in early June 2008 was passed on the governor of Kasai Occidental after he was elected in a highly controversial and contested poll in February. The governor, who is an ally of Mr Kabila, is the only governor so far to have lost such a vote. In early August, however, his position as governor was upheld by the Supreme Court. Outside intricate domestic political games, there is some doubt as to whether provinces will be committed to reduce poverty for the local population as a whole, regardless of their ethnic allegiances.

### **Aid Effectiveness**

5.14. DRC took part in the 2006 and 2008 surveys on Monitoring the Paris Declaration<sup>68</sup>. Both surveys use the same 12 indicators. A comparison between the two surveys indicates deteriorating harmonisation and alignment

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<sup>68</sup> OECD-DAC (2007), 2006 Survey on Monitoring The Paris Declaration, Country Chapters, DRC, Paris.  
OECD-DAC (2009), 2008 Survey on Monitoring The Paris Declaration, Country Chapters, DRC, Paris.

practices in the country despite donor efforts. As shown in Table 17, while the 2006 survey rates harmonisation and alignment as moderate, the 2008 survey rates them as weak<sup>69</sup>.

**Table 15. Results of Paris Declaration surveys**

	2006 survey	2008 survey
Ownership	Low	Moderate
Alignment	Moderate	Low
Harmonisation	Moderate	Low
Managing for results	Low	Low
Mutual accountability	Low	Low

5.15. The main achievement over the evaluation period has been the recent consolidation of institutional arrangements to support dialogue between donors, civil society, and government around 15 thematic groups (see Table 18). Previously whilst thematic groups existed including food security (FAO), capacity building (WB), PFM (IMF), Health (Germany to end 2005 then Belgium 2006/07 and Canada 2008/09), Human Rights and Justice (EC), HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and Education (UNESCO) only the last three involved the government. Donor coordination has been more effective in some sectors than others, for example, environment, health, education, police and justice whilst it has traditionally been weak in others, including PFM.

**Table 16. Thematic Groups, 2008**

		Lead Donor	DFID involvement
Governance	Judiciary and Security Governance	EUSEC EUPOL/EC Hollande	√
	Political and administrative Governance	UNDP	
	Culture and communication	France	DFID represented by France under silent partnership
	Economic Governance	WB	√

<sup>69</sup> This is in part explained by the tightening of definitions in the 2008 survey; the number of respondents increased from 16 in 2006 to 20 in 2008 (Spain, Greece, Netherlands, Poland took part in the 2008 survey but not in the 2006 survey).

Pro-poor Growth	Infrastructure and Transportation	EC	√
	Energy	ADB	
	Mines and Hydrocarbures	WB	√ (forthcoming)
	Agriculture and rural development	Belgium	
	Industry and Services	WB	
Social Services	Education	UK	√
	Health	Canada	√
	Social Protection, Gender and Urban Poverty	USAID / Belgium	
	Environment, Water and Sanitation, Forest	Germany	√
HIV/AIDS	HIV/AIDS	UNAIDS	
Community Dynamics	Community Dynamics	Japan	√

5.16. Despite improved coordination at the centre, donor harmonisation in DRC is still a long way off in practice. Promoting donor coordination in a country the size of DRC remains challenging. Strong government leadership is required. For example, donors have started to discuss and coordinate their actions to support decentralisation, under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior. WB will work with provinces in Katanga, Bandudu, and South Kivu; the UNDP (with support from DFID) will operate in Ecuator and North Kivu; and CTB will work with provinces in Bas-Congo and Oriental Province. Such an approach comes with a high risk of “balkanisation” and could undermine national cohesion if donor-supported programmes do not link clearly with the GoDRC’s decentralisation plans. Lessons could be learned from the coordination mechanisms in the health sector, in which all donors have attempted to maintain national coherence by supporting the same “basic packages of health services” across the country’s 515 health zones<sup>70</sup>.

5.17. Most donors, including China, which is a signatory of the CAF, have nominally aligned their programmes to the government’s policy priorities under the PRSGP. Alignment to government systems has yet to start. According to the 2008 survey, there were 146 parallel implementation units (PIU) operating in DRC. Belgium alone reported 79 PIUs, followed by the US with 33. The use of PIUs is largely explained by the weakness of government structures.

5.18. Results of the OECD/DAC 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration show that donor support for capacity building has become more aligned with national programmes, an essential step towards ensuring that

<sup>70</sup> Waldan R (2006), *Health in Fragile States: Country Case Study: Democratic Republic of Congo*, BASICS for USAID, June 2006.

their activities have a lasting impact in the country. However, donor-supported capacity building programmes which include support to legislative reforms and PFM, human resource management, planning, procurement and M&E, face a sustainability issue. The core of donor funding is likely to go towards training and other related activities. The sustainability issue here is linked to a possible loss of institutional memory, as these activities will only benefit today's civil servants and elected officials.

5.19. Recent and forthcoming multi-donor programmes, have the potential to be closely aligned with government policy and structures. For example, Pro-Routes aims to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Public Works and Infrastructure (MTPI) and its associated public entities, the Road Authority and the Urban Streets & Drainage Authority in order to support their full and effective engagement in the rehabilitation programme. MTPI is currently supported by an Infrastructure Unit, established by the EC, with the objective of enhancing coordination and capacity within the ministry.

5.20. Donors in DRC have achieved little with regard to managing for development results and mutual accountability. There is still no credible structure to support effective data collection in the country, despite the activities of the National Statistical Institute and the Congolese Observatory for Poverty and Inequality. On mutual accountability, the GoDRC has recently presented to donors a Performance Pact, under which donors will monitor progress against Paris Declaration commitments.

5.21. Aid predictability also remains weak. According to the 2008 survey, donors planned to disburse US\$798m in 2007, but only US\$156m, an equivalent 20%, was recorded by government, despite the fact that donors disbursed US\$802m, slightly more than pledged. In 2008, President Kabila criticised the donor community for their lack of delivery, especially with regard to the 5 Chantiers. In the 2007 CG meetings, the international community pledged US\$4bn in support of the country's development, an equivalent US\$1.3bn a year. Donors and the president consequently met in August 2008 to discuss aid effectiveness issues in the country and it was decided that similar meetings would take place on a regular basis.

5.22. In conclusion, there is increased recognition among donors that the transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and development will be slow and non-linear. A question linked to the state-building paradigm is how and when the international community should start working with the government systems to support social sector delivery. In the DRC, as in other countries with protracted humanitarian crises, some areas (e.g. the Kivus) and some sectors (e.g. health) receive both humanitarian and development assistance, albeit under different modalities and with different objectives<sup>71</sup>. For the international community, this raises the challenge of combining both approaches in ways that maintain the benefits of both.

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<sup>71</sup> This is particularly noticeable when humanitarian funds are channelled to institutions (like hospitals) that are otherwise managed by government authorities. As such, engagement with authorities at the appropriate level (namely local or regional authorities) is in effect an increasing part of the process of humanitarian assistance delivery.

## **SUMMARY BOX**

The lack of up-to-date poverty data in DRC makes it impossible to properly assess trends in poverty reduction over the evaluation period, let alone DFID and other donors' contribution to them. General perceptions are that the population at large has not yet seen the benefits that were expected to follow the installation of the new regime.

Most bilateral projects financed by DFID can claim to have had a positive impact on the local population's welfare. Their collective and lasting contribution to national levels of poverty remains unknown. Because of delays in starting large programmes, the donor community, including DFID, has not met their commitments to kick-start development assistance after the elections.

Large-scale development programmes will work to scale and within government structures. Experience elsewhere, however, has shown that low government capacity and leadership (as well as the lack of in-country capacity of other partners) can slow these programmes significantly in their first years of operation.

Furthermore, the GoDRC's willingness to provide equitable access to services to the population as a whole appears weak. Corruption in DRC – a country awash with mineral resources – is widespread. There is at the same time strong government momentum to show results before the 2011 elections, as demonstrated by the government's decision to borrow \$6bn from China to fast-track the implementation of the president's five priority work sites, referred to as "5 Chantiers".

Support for democratisation and accountability also face considerable challenges. On the political side, donor support for the 2006 elections has had a major positive impact on prospects for peace and national reconciliation in the country. Yet, the country could still face a crisis of legitimacy if the local elections are delayed or held in an unsatisfactory manner. In addition, national check-and-balance institutions have shown little sign of wanting to hold the government to account. Whether increased support at provincial levels will be more effective remains unknown.

Harmonisation and alignment, according to the 2008 survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, are weak. The main achievement over the evaluation period has been the recent consolidation of institutional arrangements to support dialogue between donors, civil society, and government around 15 thematic groups.

Despite improved coordination at the centre, donor harmonisation in DRC is still a long way off in practice. This is in part because the core of development assistance is disbursed using non-governmental channels, leading to a multiplication of projects and initiatives, and in part because of the lack of government leadership.

Donor-supported capacity building programmes are also confronted with sustainability issues. This calls for better alignment with national programmes and improved learning and knowledge management to ensure better dissemination.

## 6. Lessons and Recommendations

### Strengths

- DFID DRC has been able to adjust to, as well as influence, the DRC context over the years.
- DFID DRC has worked in a transparent and inclusive manner, allowing it to become a trusted partner amongst donors.
- DFID DRC has combined practical experience with comparative advantages at HQ level to position itself effectively in some key sectors, including SSR and humanitarian assistance.
- DFID DRC has been able to establish partnerships with non-traditional partners, including CTB, China, South Africa and France.
- DFID DRC's hands-on and pragmatic approach has ensured that deadlocks have been addressed, lessons learned and new evidence taken on board.
- Despite limited staff resources, DFID DRC has responded to HQ demands and worked towards the timely establishment of vertical funds, such as PF and the Congo Basin Forest Fund.
- DFID DRC's close collaboration with FCO has permitted a constant monitoring of the conflict in the east and political developments in Kinshasa and helped to support effective dialogue and influencing.

### Weaknesses

- DFID HQ's model of working through other donors only became a reality in the second part of the evaluation period. Pledges to scale up development assistance have not been met as a result.
- DFID DRC programme has lacked focus and is spread across too many sectors.
- Projects have been renewed time and again, pending the approval of the Country Plan. This has limited the scope for strategic thinking, when it was most needed.
- This, combined with the lack of a country assistance strategy in 2006 and 2007 and a limited communication strategy, has meant that few stakeholders know the full extent of DFID's programme.
- The move to large programmes has reduced DFID's range of aid delivery mechanisms, and with it opportunities to balance short-term with long-term considerations and diversify partnerships between state and non-state actors.
- DFID DRC had little knowledge of Francophone systems; working in a different language has reduced its advisers' ability to extend their network of influence.
- Travelling in-country remains difficult; this has greatly reduced DFID DRC's access to first-hand information to support M&E.

- The corporate push for some initiatives, notably the CBFF, has challenged DFID's commitment to work in partnerships with other donors and to follow a country-led approach.

## **Lessons**

- In a post-conflict country like DRC, transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery, peace and development is slow and non-linear.
- In the DRC context, DFID plans to move from INGO-implemented projects to large-scale government-owned interventions have proved unrealistic.
- Building up assistance from a largely humanitarian portfolio can lead to an excessively broad, diverse and unfocused programme. In a country where everything needs doing, prioritisation and sequencing are difficult tasks. Prioritisation may require hard decisions from HQ.
- Prioritisation across sectors and/or areas of intervention requires strong guidance from DFID HQ. Locating where government ownership is the greatest can help.
- Sector prioritisation must take place in the early years of engagement, before substantial financial contribution makes it difficult to pull out of specific sectors.
- A diversification of partners – both within and across sectors – seems appropriate in a country, where non-state actors remain important service providers and the risk that the political situation deteriorates is high.
- Recognising the legitimacy of a regime halfway through an electoral cycle comes with a risk of political instability. In the case of DRC, the newly elected government has been inclined to postpone local elections indefinitely.
- Prior to the elections, donors in DRC made good use of a critical path analysis to identify and agree on milestones in their support to the country's democratisation process.
- DFID's peace-building approach, consisting of mainstreaming conflict and peace-building issues throughout the programme, is no substitute for targeted, process-oriented, interventions that focus primarily on dialogue and reconciliation between and within communities.
- While the role of CSOs in holding the government to account is seen as strategically important, donors have yet to find the most effective ways of supporting them.
- The partnership between FCO, MOD and DFID has been essential in supporting DFID's plans for poverty reduction and peace consolidation in the country. It has also allowed close monitoring of security and political developments in the country and effective dialogue and influencing.
- The practical experience gained through bilateral programmes with INGOs and other implementing agencies has been instrumental in

supporting DFID's engagement in DRC. Understanding the DRC context remains essential.

- Corporate demands, and in particular the launch of vertical or regional funds, can detract attention from strategic goals in the country programmes. This has a negative impact on programme delivery and undermines a genuine country-led approach, sending confusing signals to partners based in the country.
- Plans for scaling up must be matched with adequate staff resources. Working in a fragile environment is extremely challenging and labour-intensive. Attracting staff with the appropriate skills and experience is all the more difficult in a non English-speaking country like DRC.
- Working through multilateral agencies may not be as good value for money as it first appears. While savings are made in administrative costs, substantial advisory and financial support is required to build the partner's in-country capacity, cover the management costs, and ensure sufficient oversight, monitoring and evaluation, and influencing.
- While in line with the Paris Declaration commitments, working primarily through other donors, and, therefore, principally behind the scenes, goes against setting up a visible and effective network of influence to deliver UK objectives.
- There is a risk that DFID's flexibility and responsiveness is diverted to support multilateral partners and no longer trickles down to output delivery.

## **Recommendations**

- DFID DRC should do more to mainstream conflict awareness in its programmes, by showcasing examples of conflict mainstreaming at project level. DFID DRC should also work with other donors to update the critical path analysis produced in 2005. Benchmarks and targeted interventions should be defined to support the period leading to the next general elections in 2011. This includes national reconciliation, the holding of local elections, and improved revenue and natural resource management. The conflict risks attached to decentralisation should also be identified and lead to shared discussion amongst donors.
- DFID DRC should be more explicit in what they see as the right balance in their choice of partners (state and non-state actors) and interventions (short-term and long-term).
- As the large amount recently committed to multi-donor programmes tends to overshadow other aspects of DFID's programme, reporting more regularly on small, yet, strategic, spend and non-spend activities is required. The workplans recently established for the three delivery teams (Natural Resources Governance and Growth; Governance; Social Sectors and Humanitarian governance) could be used for this purpose.
- DFID DRC's expectations with regard to the role that Congolese CSOs can play in holding the government to account in DRC should be clarified. DFID should pay particular attention to the way outputs and

outcomes will be measured and monitored in this area, as plans to launch the Civil Society Fund forge ahead.

- DFID DRC should promote and publicise good practice in support of a whole-of- government approach in the mining sector. Whereas activities under the responsibility of DFID, FCO, and DBERR, will remain distinct, their complementarity should be discussed both across Whitehall and externally. The forthcoming FCO–DFID Joint Communication Unit strategy could provide an opportunity for communicating DFID’s approach in this sector to external stakeholders.
- DFID HQ should dedicate more staff resources to supporting Country Offices operating in fragile states. Staff working in IT, procurement and other internal procedures should be encouraged to build up practical experience through occasional field visits and sharing of best practice.
- DFID HQ should start providing estimates on the costs and benefits of working through other partners, with particular emphasis given to their appropriateness in fragile states.
- DFID HQ should refrain from launching new initiatives that detract country offices from their Country Plan objectives unless additional staff resources can be invested in-country.

## ANNEX A – TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR EVALUATION OF DFID COUNTRY PROGRAMMES – 2008/09

### 1. Introduction

- 1.1 DFID's performance management system is supported by periodic independent evaluations at project, programme, sector and thematic level. Evaluation Department (EvD) carry out four to five Country or Regional Programme Evaluations (CPEs or RPEs) annually. These terms of reference (ToR) set out the scope of work for the 2008/09 period.
- 1.2 The CPEs provide important accountability and lesson learning functions for DFID. The primary audience for the evaluations is the UK government and DFID senior managers including heads of country offices. All evaluation reports are published externally.
- 1.3 Countries proposed for evaluation in 2008/09 are Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, DRC and Sudan. Each evaluation will use the country's most recent Country Assistance Plan (CAP) or equivalent, and related policy documents. Where the five year evaluation period spans two CAPs, or other strategy documents, the evaluation will relate to both.
- 1.4 While country-led approaches are central to the way DFID works, socio-political and environmental contexts will influence the progress and form of the development process. The CAPs articulate the country office's plans for operationalising corporate objectives within the country context, and in most cases they will build upon or reflect the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). These plans are therefore the logical starting point for the evaluation.

### 2. Overarching objectives

- 2.1 The main objectives of the country programme evaluations are to assess:
  - Country strategy and links to poverty outcomes and DFID's corporate objectives
  - Choice of aid instruments
  - DFID's role as a development partner
  - DFID's success in implementing its country strategy
- 2.2 The CPEs will assess the DFID country programmes in terms of standard criteria although these may be customised to a degree for individual studies. The generic evaluation matrix can be seen at Annex A. It is based on DAC evaluation criteria adapted to take account of the fragile states context and considers:
  - The **relevance** of country programme objectives and the logic behind them given domestic policy objectives for poverty reduction, as well as DFID's own corporate level objectives;

- The **effectiveness** of the overall programme in achieving the objectives set out in the country strategy, including DFID's choice of aid instruments, harmonisation with other stakeholders, policy dialogue and influencing;
- The **efficiency** with which programme plans are translated into activities, including human resource and office management, collaboration and harmonisation with other stakeholders, policy dialogue and influencing, the use of financial instruments.

And to the extent possible:

- **Sustainability** – Are the reforms/ changes supported by DFID's country programme moving in the right direction and are they likely to be sustained? Has local capacity been built? Has transparency and accountability improved?
- **Outcome** – Did the country programme achieve the objectives set? Did the positive outcomes DFID achieved justify the financial and human resources used in the programme?
- **Attribution** – Given the direction of travel and external factors, how far did the country programme make a positive contribution to poverty reduction? How good a development partner was DFID?
- The success with which the programme had mainstreamed the cross-cutting issues of **poverty, gender, HIV/AIDS and environment** into all of its activities. What were the variables influencing the process of inclusion? What was the impact on the achievement of wider programme objectives?
- Ensure that any information collected or evidence produced on multilateral effectiveness in each CPE is highlighted and forwarded to EvD.

### 3. Methodology, Outputs and Timing

3.1 The consultants will produce one study report and executive summary for each country or region. The report shall be approximately 50–60 pages long (excluding annexes) and will include detailed lessons and recommendations. The evaluation summary (EvSum), should be approximately four pages, and will include the response from the relevant DFID office/department, which EvD will obtain.

3.2 The other outputs required from this contract include:

- Inception reports detailing the way in which each individual CPE is to be carried out and showing the customised evaluation matrix.
- A presentation of preliminary findings to country offices before the end of the fieldwork for each study.
- A publishable synthesis report pulling together findings across individual CPEs. In 2008/09 this will cover regional programmes and in 2009/10 it will cover fragile states.

DFID also requires access to the evaluation team's interim evidence summaries, e.g. completed matrices, although it is not expected that these should be of publishable quality.

- 3.3 Each evaluation will involve an 'inception visit' and 'fieldwork mission'. EvD and the consultant team leader will undertake the inception visit. A team of 3–6 consultants will undertake the fieldwork, generally involving up to three weeks in country. In some cases the inception phase may be undertaken in the UK and the fieldwork may be organised a little differently given the fragile states focus in this round of countries.
- 3.4 The 'inception visit' has four key objectives:
- i. Ensuring staff in the DFID country office are fully informed about the evaluation, its purpose and how it will work;
  - ii. Ensuring country/ regional office staff have an opportunity to feed in key questions they want the evaluation to address and decide whether they wish to undertake self-evaluation as part of the process;
  - iii. Determining the exact nature of the individual evaluation and resolving key methodological / practical issues;
  - iv. Ensuring the evaluation team has access to all relevant contacts – including all those who have worked in the country/regional programme over the fieldwork period and all relevant partners.
- 3.5 Between the inception visit and fieldwork the consultants will amend the standard evaluation framework for the study to address any country-specific issues raised during the inception visit. An inception report containing this matrix will be signed off by the country office.
- 3.6 If the DFID country office wishes to undertake self-evaluation they will be encouraged to produce a log frame for the entire country programme (unless this already exists), detailing the logic of their interacting projects and programmes and assessing what has been achieved. If the country office does not undertake this work and there is not a clear guiding framework, the evaluation team will attempt to create a similar log frame as part of the evaluation approach.
- 3.7 EvD will provide supporting documentation relevant to each CPE to the consultants in good time. This will include project documentation and relevant documentation about the design, implementation and monitoring/ evaluation of the country/ regional strategy and individual programmes (but not background policy information). Prior to undertaking fieldwork, the evaluation team need to be familiar with the DFID programme, the country context and the full range of DFID policy papers that are relevant to the country programme.
- 3.8 The consultant is responsible for identifying and engaging a team of consultants appropriate to each country context from within their company/ consortium. The team must have good evaluation skills, understanding of DFID and the local context and ability in the languages of the country. The team should cover all the major sectors of the country programme and if possible should include at least

one locally based consultant as a full team member. The consultant is responsible for setting up and planning the main field visit. If EVD wish DFID staff members to accompany the consultant CPE team, additional terms of reference specifying the roles and responsibilities will be developed. The planned consultancy team for each of the CPEs covered in this contract is shown at Annex B; it is recognised that there may yet be some changes to this (due to either DFID or the consultants) – particularly for the studies programmed later in the year.

- 3.9 During the main fieldwork the sector specialists and evaluation team leader will interview DFID staff (current and past) and partners (in government, multilaterals, other donors etc.) about all aspects of the programme over the five year evaluation period – using checklists as appropriate. Web based surveys of staff and other stakeholders (e.g. other donors and NGOs) will also be trialled on a pilot basis. The evaluators will systematically scrutinise the available documentation and supplement this where possible, and then use all evidence gathered to complete the evaluation matrix. One matrix should be completed for each main sector, pillar or thematic area, and the evaluation team leader (and deputy) will use these to compile the final report. Fieldtrips outside the capital city are not a standard part of a CPE but may be used on occasion if applicable. This will be determined during the inception phase for each study.
- 3.10 Before leaving the country the evaluation team should make a presentation to the country office on emerging findings. Within four weeks of the fieldwork finishing a high quality draft report of 40–60 pages (excluding annexes and with an executive summary) will be submitted to EvD. Following initial checks within EvD this will be sent to the country office and staff there invited to correct any factual errors and make comments. Although country offices may challenge findings they disagree with, and sometimes have additional information to support a claim, EvD will support the evaluation team to ensure that the report remains a truly independent evaluation. A second draft report and evaluation summary will be produced taking account of relevant comments. These will be subject to external quality assurance against the criteria shown at Annex C. It is expected that all draft reports submitted will have been checked for typos, formatting errors and consistency of data presented.
- 3.11 The Synthesis Report (which in 2009 will focus on fragile states), will be guided by a workshop scheduled for around June 2009 and should be completed by October 2009. It is anticipated that there will be a further meeting between the authors and relevant DFID policy leads to discuss emerging recommendations – perhaps after the first draft report has been produced and considered by DFID. This will assist in building ownership for the synthesis report. The report should be finalised within three months of the date of the workshop – including an EvSum; a follow-up dissemination event may be required. Note: during 2008 the synthesis report from the last contract will be produced focusing on regional evaluations.
- 3.12 The consultants will work to the strict deadlines set out in Annex D and the timeliness of the delivery of reports is of the essence. Any changes to these deliverables must be agreed in advance with EvD. Team composition and

timelines will be agreed prior to commencement of each of the country studies, including the necessity of any follow up visit to the country if major issues remain unresolved. The consultancy should start in April 2008.

#### **4. Competence and Expertise Required**

- 4.1 One consultancy organisation or consortium will be appointed to deliver the outputs described above.
- 4.2 A managing consultant with extensive evaluation experience and a track record of managing country/strategic level evaluations will be required to manage the planning and delivery of the CPEs. This individual will be expected to have strong written and oral communications skills as he/she will play a role in communicating lessons learned both to country programme personnel and to a wider DFID audience.
- 4.3 Each CPE should have a named team leader with expertise in evaluation methodology and monitoring and performance management issues. This must include understanding of the complexities of country programme evaluation. The Team Leader must also have up-to-date knowledge of DFID policies and performance, planning and data systems. Access to our online systems will be provided. Team Leaders will all have CTC security clearance, and for fragile states, this will be increased to SC clearance.
- 4.4 Each CPE team will be made up of a combined skill set covering governance, economics, social and institutional development and human resource management and the number of team members will be appropriate to the country programme. There is not one model that will work for each country/ region being evaluated, so flexibility in team composition is essential. The team members for each country evaluation will need expertise in evaluation methodology and familiarity with development issues in the CPE countries. They should also have up to date knowledge of DFID policies and systems, relevant experience in cross-cutting issues like gender mainstreaming, HIV/AIDS and the environment. The team should normally include a strong national/regional component.
- 4.5 The consultancy team will have responsibility for:
  - maintaining ethical standards in implementing the evaluation;
  - the timely production of evidence-based conclusions, lessons and recommendations to demanding quality standards;
  - managing logistics in country, with support from the DFID country office, to the extent mutually agreed in the respective Inception Visit.

## **5. Reporting and Dissemination**

- 5.1 The consultants will report to the Country Programme Evaluation Team Leader or the Deputy Programme Manager in DFID Evaluation Department.
- 5.2 Reports will be published and distributed, electronically and in hard copy, to a wide-ranging internal and external audience. The consultants should be prepared to present their findings to DFID staff and others as appropriate. Specific dissemination arrangements will be determined on completion of each country report and synthesis.

**Evaluation Department, March 2008**

## ANNEX B– EVALUATION MATRIX

(this matrix has been adapted for a fragile states context from the version in the 2007/08 TOR)

Sector: \_\_\_\_\_

EVALUATION CRITERIA	KEY QUESTIONS	Evidence Base to consult (key documents to be identified in inception phase)
	<b>(Chapter 1: Introduction and Methods)</b>	
	<b>Context</b> (to form <b>Chapter 2</b> of report: <b>Context: 2002–2007</b> )	
	<i>Political and post-conflict situation. Key events over period including factors beyond control of development partners, MDG progress (and variation by gender, rural/ urban, ethnic group, etc.); progress with peace-building. Importance of aid to the country and no. of donors active in area. Key agreements / strategies / reviews that influenced DFID's work.)</i>	
	<b>Relevance</b> (to form <b>Chapter 3</b> of report: <b>To what extent was DFID's strategic approach relevant in a fragile states context</b> )	

Country Programme Evaluation: Democratic Republic of Congo

EVALUATION CRITERIA	KEY QUESTIONS	Evidence Base to consult (key documents to be identified in inception phase)
Overall strategy and areas/sectors selected for intervention	<p><u>Strategic Profile</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Throughout the evaluation period, and as the context evolved, did DFID have clear and focused country/sector strategies that explained the rationale for interventions supported? (e.g. options considered, analysis done, choices made and why, etc.)</li> </ol> <p><u>Relevance to the Country Context</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Over the period, how far were country/sector strategies based on a realistic analysis of the country situation?</li> <li>How far were strategies aligned with development needs and policy priorities of the country?</li> <li>How far did country/sector strategies reflect changes in the political and socio-economic context? Were there too many/ too few adaptations?</li> </ol> <p><u>Relevance to UK policy</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent were strategies in line with DFID corporate priorities? (e.g. Fragile states policy (2005), Conditionality paper (2005), conflict guidelines, cross-Whitehall working and relevant sector strategies).</li> <li>How far were strategies aligned with, or determined by, broader UK government objectives?</li> <li>How did DFID DRC respond to DFID HQ demands and priorities?</li> </ol>	

*Country Programme Evaluation: Democratic Republic of Congo*

EVALUATION CRITERIA	KEY QUESTIONS	Evidence Base to consult (key documents to be identified in inception phase)
DFID's approach to cross-cutting themes	<p>8. Did DFID have a strategy for mainstreaming cross-cutting issues such as gender, social exclusion, human rights, HIV/AIDS and environmental protection? (and was this consistent with corporate policy on these issues?)</p>	
Portfolio profile	<p>9. What interventions did DFID support over the evaluation period? Did these fit with the strategic priorities/to what extent did the strategies guide DFID's interventions?</p> <p>10. Was DFID's decision to phase out some projects and move to larger programmes appropriate and timely?</p> <p>11. Was the level of resources anticipated within and across sectors appropriate? Has DFID maintained the right balance in their focus between output delivery and support for processes such as CAF?</p> <p>12. Were other donor resources and plans in the country taken into account to avoid over/under-aiding and aid volatility?</p>	
DFID's choice of aid instruments	<p>13. What mix of aid instruments was intended and how did this change over the evaluation period?</p> <p>14. Was there a sufficient balance in the use of different aid instruments (long-term and shorter-term /pooled funding, multilateral and bilateral funding)?</p> <p>15. Was there an appropriate balance between support through government and non-governmental channels?</p>	
DFID's approach to partnership	<p>16. How did DFID approach (a) working with government (central and local), b) civil society, c) multilateral organisations (WB, UN, EU), d) other bilateral donors? Were there explicit strategies? Was the balance among partners right? Was it the right model for DRC?</p> <p>17. How did DFID work with OGDs – FCO, MoD, No. 10.?</p> <p>18. How did DFID consult with and communicate its aims and objectives to development partners?</p>	
Risk Management	<p>19. How systematically did DFID assess the external risks (i.e. political governance, local and regional conflict, economic and fiduciary) and the internal threats to its country strategy?</p>	

EVALUATION CRITERIA	KEY QUESTIONS	Evidence Base to consult (key documents to be identified in inception phase)
Results focus	<p>20. How systematically did DFID assess the external risks and internal threats to its interventions?</p> <p>21. How comprehensive were plans to minimise the identified risks? What tools were used – e.g. scenario and contingency planning/complementarity/spread of interventions</p> <p>22. To what extent has DFID DRC programme been supported by effective monitoring systems? Were DFID’s planned interventions sufficiently results-focused?</p> <p>23. Were the results of reviews used to reconsider design/direction of work and resourcing and staff allocation priorities?</p> <p>24. How far did DFID use and support the country’s M&amp;E systems (sector, national)?</p>	PRISM documents
<b>II. Effectiveness and III. Efficiency (Chapter 4: How successful was DFID in terms of engagement in development and delivering results in a time of conflict?)</b>		
Delivering on strategy	<p>25. How far did DFID’s decision to establish a country office and scale up its programme over the evaluation period support its strategic objectives?</p> <p>26. How far were objectives set out in strategies achieved in practice? What explains any areas of divergence?</p> <p>27. Was DFID’s decision to spread across sectors effective?</p> <p>28. Did geographic coverage receive enough attention?</p>	
Results	<p>29. How far were the objectives and performance indicators for individual DFID interventions achieved (drawing on data from project reviews and PRISM scores)?</p> <p>30. What explains key successes and failures with regard to programme objectives? Was the DFID programme spread too thinly across sectors to be effective?</p>	

*Country Programme Evaluation: Democratic Republic of Congo*

EVALUATION CRITERIA	KEY QUESTIONS	Evidence Base to consult (key documents to be identified in inception phase)
DFID's delivery on cross-cutting themes	<p>31. How well were issues of gender, social exclusion, human rights, HIV/AIDS and environmental protection actually integrated across the programme?</p> <p>32. Were results disaggregated by gender, social group, etc. and what does the data show?</p>	
Partnership working	<p>33. How effective has DFID been in working with the government of DRC / working with the government systems? Was the decision to support and align to the PRSP effective in the DRC context?</p> <p>34. To what extent has DFID been able to influence government policy and practice over the evaluation period (given the language barriers)?</p> <p>35. To what extent has DFID been able to work with, and influence, other donors?</p> <p>36. How well has DFID communicated its results/lessons/good practice?</p>	
Aid Effectiveness	<p>37. How effective has DFID been in supporting donor coordination?</p> <p>38. How effective has DFID been in aligning to government policies and systems? Have parallel systems been set up to deliver projects?</p> <p>39. Was DFID's actual disbursement in line with expectations and plans? Were there any significant changes or delays?</p>	
Efficiency	<p>40. How successful has DFID been in establishing a country office and scaling up its programme over the evaluation period?</p> <p>41. How successful has DFID been in establishing new programmes (including vertical funds), in switching from humanitarian assistance to long-term development assistance?</p> <p>42. Has the model of working through other donors been good value for money?</p> <p>43. How did DFID organisational structure evolve over time? Was the skill mix and continuity of staff appropriate to the country context and strategy?</p> <p>44. How did the relationships between DFID and FCO help improve efficiency?</p>	

*Country Programme Evaluation: Democratic Republic of Congo*

EVALUATION CRITERIA	KEY QUESTIONS	Evidence Base to consult (key documents to be identified in inception phase)
Impact and Sustainability	<b>Chapter 5: What impacts has DFID DRC helped to achieve?</b>	
Outcomes and sustainability	45. What is the evidence to show that DFID has helped contribute to specific development outcomes and poverty reduction strategy achievements? 46. To what extent has the policy and governance environment (e.g. accountability, action on corruption) been strengthened? 47. Are the development changes or reforms supported by DFID's country programme likely to be sustained / difficult to reverse? 48. Has DFID added value through gains in aid effectiveness? 49. To what extent has local capacity been built? Are there plans to integrate PIUs into government systems?	
<b>Chapter 6: Lessons and recommendations</b>	<b>(What lessons can DFID draw from the evaluation for informing future country, regional or corporate planning and operations?)</b>	
Strengths and weaknesses of DFID	50. What are the key strengths demonstrated by the DFID office? 51. What are the key weaknesses demonstrated by DFID?	
Lessons	52. What lessons (from positive and negative findings) can be drawn for DFID's future work in the country? 53. What lessons can be drawn more widely for DFID and its work in other countries facing similar situations?	
Recommendations	54. What recommendations can be made based on the evaluation findings?	

## ANNEX C – PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Type of Organisations	Name	Title
<b>DFID DRC</b>		
	Fifteen	Including, Head of Office, Advisors, Programme and corporate services staff
<b>Other DFID Staff</b>		
	Six	Including former DFID DRC staff; staff from CHASE; Africa Regional advisors
<b>Consultants</b>		
	One	SDA consultant
<b>FCO</b>		
	Three	Including Deputy Head of Mission
<b>MOD</b>		
	One	Defence Attache
<b>European Commission / European Union</b>		
	Eight	Including Chef de la Cooperation, sectoral programme/ project managers
<b>EUSEC</b>	Two	Including Deputy Head of Mission
<b>IMF</b>		
	One	Country Representative
<b>World Bank</b>		
	Three	Including education, mining and public financial management advisors.
<b>African Development Bank</b>		
	One	Head of country office
<b>UN agencies</b>		
<b>UN</b>	One	Special Representative & Humanitarian Coordinator
<b>UN OCHA</b>	One	Head of Joint Unit, Pooled Fund
<b>Bilateral</b>		
<b>GTZ</b>	One	Coordinateur, Programme de la diversité et des Forêts
<b>Belgium</b>	One	Chef de Cooperation
<b>CTB</b>	Two	Resident Representative
<b>Sweden</b>	One	First Secretary, Swedish Embassy
<b>Netherlands</b>	One	Head of Dutch Cooperation
<b>USAID</b>	Two	Director and Forestry Coordinator
<b>France</b>	Two	Ambassade de France and Attache Audiovisuel pour l'Afrique Centrale, French Embassy
<b>International NGOs</b>		

*Country Programme Evaluation: Democratic Republic of Congo*

Type of Organisations	Name	Title
CARE International	One	National Director
PSI	One	Country Representative
IRC	One	Regional Director
Merlin	One	Country Director
Christian Aid	Two	Head of HIV Programmes and Country Manager
CAFOD	Two	Including Representative of Great Lakes and Programme Manager
RAID	One	Director
IDASA	One	DRC Representative
<b>DRC Government</b>		
Ministère des Affaires étrangères	One	Advisor, external resources mobilisation
Ministère des Mines	One	SEM
Ministère du Genre, famille, enfant	One	SE Madame
Ministère de l'éducation	One	Deur planification Ministre
Ministère des Infrastructures	One	SEM
Ministère EPSP	One	SEM
Ministere de la sante publique	Two	Ministre and Dir Planification
Ministère du Plan	One	SEM
Ministère de l'Intérieur, Décentralisation et Sécurité	One	SEM
Ministère de la Défense Nationale	Two	SEM and Vice-Ministre
Ministère de la Justice et Droits Humains	One	
Ministère de la Santé	One	SEM
Ministère de l'Industrie	One	SEM
Ministère des Finances	One	SEM
Ministère de l'Environnement	One	Secrétaire Général
Ministère des Travaux Publics	One	Coordinateur de la Cellule Technique des Infrastructures Routières
<b>Civil Society Organisations</b>		
RENOSEC	Two	
Coord Nationale ONG Santé	One	

**People met in Goma:**

Type of Organisations	Name	Title
<b>FCO</b>	One	UK Representative
<b>MONUC</b>	One	Eastern Coordinator
<b>MONUC</b>	One	Eastern Area Stabilisation Advisor

*Country Programme Evaluation: Democratic Republic of Congo*

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<b>Type of Organisations</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>
<b>UNHCR</b>	One	Head of Sub-Delegation
<b>UNHCR</b>	One	Senior Protection Officer
<b>UNICEF</b>	One	Head of Eastern Zone Office
<b>Belgian Technical Cooperation</b>	One	Deputy Coordinator, REJUSCO Project
<b>UNDP</b>	One	Head of Programme and Office, North and South Kivu
<b>WFP</b>	One	Head of Provincial Bureau, North and South Kivu
<b>Life and Peace Institute</b>	One	LPI Representative (based in Cyangugu, Rwanda)
<b>Pole Institute</b>	One	Director
<b>Cellule provinciale d'appui a la pacification</b>	One	Member
<b>RENOSEC</b>	One	President, Goma Office
<b>SOLIDARITES</b>	One	Goma Representative
<b>MERLIN</b>	One	Project Coordinator (Butembo-based)

## ANNEX D. KEY DOCUMENTS

The evaluation team had access to DFID internal project documents, reviews, papers and correspondence too numerous to list here. Existing key DFID policy documents of relevance to DRC were also referred to. The following list of documents is in addition to the huge DFID literature the team consulted.

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UN Humanitarian Coordinator (2007), *DRC Pooled Fund Annual Report to Donors 2006* Kinshasa: October 2007

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**ANNEX E: Humanitarian Assistance to DRC by Sector:  
Total Amount and Percentage of Requirements Funded<sup>72</sup>**

	2003		2004		2005		2006		2007	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Agriculture	4,060,677	31	8,268,932	71	8,502,201	57		N/A		N/A
Coordination and support services	7,364,571	98	8,612,728	97	18,578,926	80	57,200,561	86	37,868,559	38
Economic recovery and infrastructure	0		274,725	3			3,756,200	100	3,894,898	17
Education	1,747,251	36	96,626	4			7,649,155	32	2,522,088	9
Food	60,266,880	85	50,805,082	87	50,000,368	76	118,311,277	63	96,799,303	49
Health	5,829,613	10	1,324,385	5	6,300,715	16	64,808,616	34	26,804,975	23
Mining	0		508,824	10	1,575,941	12	5,727,948	36	8,977,054	0
Multi-sector	23,242,257	91	25,073,147	105	33,976,703	84	46,156,603	38	5,263,805	0
Protection, Human rights, Rule of law	1,349,208	19	1,074,550	11	3,496,422	30	20,195,022	46	38,431,363	18
Sector not specified	0		22,099,840		19,821,505		9,634,693		58,542,711	
Security	492,837	36	672,645	64	0			N/A		N/A
Shelter and NFI	2,265,344	29	0		247,500	4	6,172,648	43	10,564,478	25
Water and sanitation	1,552,372	49	0		0		14,023,586	49	13,351,810	16
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>108,171,010</b>		<b>118,811,484</b>		<b>142,500,281</b>		<b>353,636,309</b>		<b>303,021,044</b>	

Source: Evaluation of Common/Pooled Humanitarian Funds in DRC and Sudan, October 2007.

<sup>72</sup> In this table, the 2007 figures only cover one allocation round out of three.

## Department for International Development

DFID, the Department for International Development: leading the British Government's fight against world poverty.

One in six people in the world today, around 1 billion people, live in poverty on less than one dollar a day. In an increasingly interdependent world, many problems – like conflict, crime, pollution and diseases such as HIV and AIDS – are caused or made worse by poverty.

DFID supports long-term programmes to help tackle the underlying causes of poverty. DFID also responds to emergencies, both natural and man-made.

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- halve the number of people living in extreme poverty and hunger
- ensure that all children receive primary education
- promote sexual equality and give women a stronger voice
- reduce child death rates
- improve the health of mothers
- combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- make sure the environment is protected
- build a global partnership for those working in development.

Together, these form the United Nations' eight 'Millennium Development Goals', with a 2015 deadline. Each of these goals has its own, measurable, targets.

DFID works in partnership with governments, civil society, the private sector and others. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies and the European Commission.

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