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Best Practices / Guidelines


  • 12-June-2020

    English

    Consumer data rights and competition

    In June 2020, the OECD held a roundtable on consumer data rights and their impact on competition, in a period where many jurisdictions were adopting new data rights for customers, and the role of competition advocacy and enforcement was tested in an ever evolving connected world.

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  • 11-June-2020

    English

    Start-ups, killer acquisitions and merger control

    In June 2020, the OECD held a Roundtable on start-ups, killer acquisitions and merger control to look at theories of harm in the acquisition of nascent firms, how to identify the relevant counterfactual, and how to assess the competitive effects of such mergers. The topic was later adressed at the OECD Competition Open Day on 24 February 2021.

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  • 10-June-2020

    English

    Conglomerate effects of mergers

    In June 2020, the OECD held a roundtable on the conglomerate effects of mergers which have taken on new prominence in the digital era. This discussion focused on how to assess the potential harm to competition from conglomerate mergers, and how to overcome practical challenges associated with investigating conglomerate theories of harm.

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  • 9-June-2020

    English

    Criminalisation of cartels and bid rigging conspiracies

    In June 2020, the OECD will hold a roundtable on Criminalisation of cartels and bid rigging conspiracies. The roundtable will examine different types of criminal sanctions imposed against firms and individuals, the different approaches to investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, and the role of leniency programmes and co-operation between competition agencies and prosecution authorities.

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  • 8-June-2020

    English

    Line of business restrictions as a solution to competition concerns

    In June 2020, the OECD held a hearing on Competition and line of business restrictions, to look at how effective structural and behavioural restrictions such as non-discrimination have been, and to understand the case for such restrictive regulations in relation to self-preferencing by digital platforms.

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  • 4-December-2019

    English

    Hub-and-spoke arrangements in competition

    Hub and spoke arrangements are horizontal competition restraints on the supplier or retailer level (spokes), which are implemented through vertically related players that serve as a common “hub”. The OECD discussed this topic in December 2019.

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  • 4-December-2019

    English

    Barriers to exit in competition

    In December 2019, the OECD held a roundtable to discuss what barriers to exit are; how they affect allocative efficiency, and what their impact on competition is. It also discussed how authorities consider barriers to exit in their enforcement and advocacy work and explore cases where barriers to exit were an important consideration to the case.

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  • 2-December-2019

    English

    Access to the case file and protection of confidential information

    Providing access to the file and to the evidence to be used in court protects the parties’ rights of defence and promotes transparency and the rule of law. How access is granted varies across jurisdictions. The roundtable in December 2019 examined different types of rules and modes of access to the file and different approaches to protecting confidential information.

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  • 2-December-2019

    English

    Independent sector regulators and competition

    Independent regulators are those that operate autonomously and with no undue influence from political forces or private entities. In December, the OECD held a roundtable discussion to explore these issues. All related materials for the discussion are available on this page.

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  • 7-June-2019

    English

    Vertical mergers in the technology, media and telecom sector

    In June 2019, the OECD Competition Committee discussed how competition authorities can effectively use merger control to reduce the risk of competition harm posed by potentially problematic vertical mergers, without compromising the many efficiencies typically associated with vertical integration.

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