Abuse of dominance in digital markets

Many digital markets exhibit certain characteristics, such as low variable costs, high fixed costs and strong network effects, that result in high market shares for a small number of firms. In some cases, these lead to “competition for the market” dynamics, in which a single firm captures the vast majority of sales.

Firms in these concentrated markets may possess market power, the ability to unilaterally and profitably raise prices or reduce quality beyond the level that would prevail under competition. There is an ongoing debate about whether competition policy is adequately making use of this tool in digital markets today. However, authorities face numerous challenges when bringing abuse of dominance cases in digital markets:

• First, determining whether a firm is dominant is a substantial challenge. 
• Second, authorities must decide whether to use new theories of harm, such as self preferencing, rather than existing theories such as tying and bundling, or refusal to deal. 
• Third, abuse of dominance cases can be lengthy and resource-intensive. 

In December 2020, the OECD Global Forum on Competition discussed the main types of abuse of dominance concerns that can emerge in digital markets, what makes these markets unique, and how have competition authorities around the world tackled these challenges.

This page contains all related materials for the discussion. 

SEE ALSO 

OECD Global Forum home page

OECD Handbook on Competition Policy in the Digital Age

Full list of Competition Policy Roundtables

Cristina CAFFARRA Bio  ‌  ‌
Vice President, Head of European Competition Practice, Charles River Associates

Amelia FLETCHER Bio ‌ ‌
Professor of Competition Policy, University of East Anglia 

Pablo IBÁÑEZ COLOMO Bio ‌ 
Professor of Law, London School of Economics

Lina KHAN Bio ‌ ‌ 
Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School

This blog series is based on the 2020 Global Forum on Competition agenda and highlights some of the key issues that each session addressed.

#1 How can competition law tackle misconduct in digital markets?

#2 Can market studies be a more effective tool for tackling emerging competition issues?

#3 Are digital markets bringing new challenges in abuse of dominance cases?

#4 Economising economic analysis for mergers in smaller markets

#5 How does the UK use market studies to tackle emerging competition issues?

#6 How is Mexico using market studies to tackle emerging competition issues?

#7 Economics in merger control: an invaluable tool at every step of the process

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OECD background note

SUMMARY DOCUMENTS

Executive summary with key findings

Summary of the discussion

PAPERS BY PARTICIPATING DELEGATIONS

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo on what makes digital abuse of dominance cases unique

Amelia Fletcher on the need to consider the consumer side in digital abuse of dominance cases

OECD Handbook on Competition Policy in the Digital Age

Market Power in the Digital Economy and Competition Policy, 2022

March 2021 edition of the OECD Hungary Regional Centre newsletter on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets 

Consumer data rights and competition, OECD Policy Roundtables 2020

OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets, OECD Workshop 2019

Implications of E-commerce for competition policy, OECD Policy Roundtables 2018

Rethinking the use of traditional antitrust enforcement tools in multi-sided markets, OECD Policy Roundtables 2017

Competition issues in aftermarkets, OECD Policy Roundtables 2017

Competition and sanctions in antitrust cases, OECD Global Forum on Competition 2016

Abuse of dominance and monopolisation, OECD Policy Roundtables, 1996

Global Forum website

OECD Competition Youtube channel

Full list of Competition Policy Roundtables