## Two-Sided Trade & the Transmission of Shocks

Monica Morlacco (USC)


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Annual Conference of the OECD Global Forum on Productivity 2020

### Introduction

- De-globalization or slow-balization? [Antràs, 2020]
- How do GVCs adjust to shocks? Extensive margin: through supply chain disruptions Intensive margin: through lower volumes
- Takeaways:
- 1. In uncertain times bulk of adjustment at intensive margin
- 2. (Two-sided) firm characteristics determine intensive margin adjustment [Alviarez, Fioretti, Kikkawa and Morlacco, 2020]
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### High uncertainty about the future of world trade (COVID-19, U.S.-China trade war, Brexit)



Source: World Bank's World Development Indicators (link)



-	
800	
2018	



### I. GVCs and Firms: Some key facts

2. Taking stocks: Importance of intensive margin


3. "Two-sided market power in firm-to-firm trade" [Alviarez et al.,2020]



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GVCs and Firms: Key Facts

# #1: Relationships are Sticky



### Source: Monarch (2020)

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


Remarkable degree of persistence in buyer-seller links [Monarch, 2020]


Not just a U.S. phenomenon! ▶ 1993- 2017: 1.5% of French imports reflect one-shot buyers [Martin, Mejean and Parenti, 2020]

Why? Huge fixed costs of offshoring are often sunk! (i.e., customized inputs, intangible capital, "relational" capital..) [Antràs and Chor, 2013]





## #1b: Stickiness: The Role of Prices




### Source: Monarch (2020)

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Monarch (2020): lower prices are strongly correlated with higher relationship stickiness

Firms market power may determine churn rate of suppliers (more on this later..)

## #2a: Firms in GVCs are Granular



### Source: Author's calculations; French customs data (2017)

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In 2017, the largest French firm accounted for:

- 31% of total imports within 4-digit industries
- 26% of total exports within 4-digit industries

Concentration even more substantial in middleincome countries [Freund and Pierola, 2015]

Transactions within GVC distinct from from anonymous, spot trades as in standard theories



# #2b: Firms in GVCs have Market Power

among importers and exporters.

**□** Evidence from French and Belgian data:

1. Larger buyers pay lower input prices [Morlacco, 2020]


2. Larger sellers charge high markups and prices [Kikkawa, Magermann and Dhyne, 2019]

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**□** Prices in firm-to-firm trade seem to be correlated with concentration



# #3: The Role of Uncertainty



Source: Martin, Mejean and Parenti (2020)

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Uncertainty affects the dynamics of trade through the option value of waiting (i.e., "waitand-see") [Novy and Taylor, 2019]

Impact of an uncertainty shocks on extensive margin of GVCs decreases on stickiness measure [Martin et al., 2020]





# Taking Stock

- Three key facts about (firms in) GVCs:
- High degree of persistence (stickiness) in relationships
- 2. Firms in GVCs are granular, and have market power

- Most GVC adjustment at the intensive margin [Bricongne et al., 2012; Bernard et al., 1995]
- Only large, persistent shocks generate substantial trade reorganization [Hunneus, 2018]
- Firms are key actors determining the GVC adjustment to shocks

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With high uncertainty, extensive margin adjustment is stifled, the more so in 'stickier' relationship



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Alviarez, Fioretti, Kikkawa and Morlacco (2020)



## Model Overview


- Firm-to-firm trade with two-sided market power and granularity
  - Focus on relationship between exporter *i* and (U.S.) importer *j*
  - Network structure is m:m  $\implies$  concentration among importers and exporters
- Partial equilibrium: focus on price bargaining problem, taking as given: - (i) Demand (supply) downstream (upstream); (ii) Extensive margin of GVCs network - Solution concept: Nash equilibrium in Nash bargaining

concentration among importers and exporters Main application: Pass-through of cost shocks into import prices

- Key theoretical result: bilateral price depends on configuration of market power and market



## Model Overview



Foreign intermediates 
$$q_j^f = q^f (q_{1j}^f, ..., q_{ij}^f, ...)$$

Domestic intermediates,  $q_j^d$ 

### Main Theoretical Result

 $\mu_{ij} = \left(1 - \omega_{ij}(\tilde{\phi})\right) \cdot \mu_{ij}^{oligopoly} + \omega_{ij}(\tilde{\phi}) \cdot \mu_{ij}^{oligopsony}$ 

•  $\mu_{ij}$ : bilateral markup in firm-to-firm trade. Price is  $p_{ij} = \mu_{ij} \cdot c_i$ 

### Main Theoretical Result

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- $\mu_{ij}$ : bilateral markup in firm-to-firm trade. Price is  $p_{ij} = \mu_{ij} \cdot c_i$
- $\mu_{ij}^{oligopoly} > 1$ : pure oligopoly markup (buyer's share  $\rightarrow 0$ )
- $\mu_{ij}^{oligopsony} < 1$ : pure oligopsony markup (seller's share  $\rightarrow 0$ )

 $\mu_{ii}^{oligopoly} + \omega_{ij}(\tilde{\phi}) \cdot \mu_{ii}^{oligopsony}$ 

## Main Theoretical Result


$$\mu_{ij} = \left(1 - \omega_{ij}(\phi)\right) \cdot \mu$$

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- $\tilde{\phi}_{ij}$ : buyer's relative bargaining power;  $\omega(\tilde{\phi})$ : weighting factor, s.t.  $\omega' > 0$


 $\mu_{ij}^{oligopoly} + \omega_{ij}(\tilde{\phi}) \cdot \mu_{ij}^{oligopsony}$ 

# Bilateral Markups and Concentration


### (a) Exporter Concentration




### (b) Importer Concentration



## Application: Pass-through of Cost Shocks





(c) Symmetric Bargaining Power ( $\tilde{\phi}_{ij} = 1$ )



### Conclusions

- When uncertainty is high, GVC adjustment mostly at the intensive margin Much depends on how persistent is the shock -

  - So far, hard to conclude that COVID-19 likely to fuel much re-organization
- Firms in GVCs are granular and enjoy market power
  - Pass-through of a cost shock into prices (and volumes) depends on the configuration of market shares and market power among firms
  - High market power are the most resilient to shocks -

higher inequality

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 $\implies$  current crisis may lead to even high concentration and market power of firms, and