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# Financial Distress and the Role of Management in Micro and Small-Sized Firms

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- ☐ Global instability fuelled by Covid-19 importance of **corporate management** in coping with **firms' financial distress** during **economic downturns**.
- □ Role of managerial ability education and experience on firm outcomes under adverse exogenous shocks.
- Literature labour and finance: managerial human capital key asset in decision processes and firm performance.

Aim

- Analyse impact of managerial features on financial distress and recovery of financially distressed firms (FDF).
- Explore managerial ability on financial performance of micro and small-sized firms, prevalent in our context.
- Systematize managerial features in 3 types of human capital:

formal education | within-firm knowledge | previous functional experience.

Empirical analysis of full sample and according to firms' size.

# Literature on **Management**

**Carpenter (2002)**, **Darrat et al. (2016)** - Management teams have executive power directly affecting firms' productivity and performance.

Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) - Positive relationship between education and quality of management practices.

**Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)**, **Bloom et al. (2013)** - Firms with better management practices tend to be more efficient, to grow faster and to have higher survival rates.

Custódio and Metzger (2014) - CEO experience in finance relevant to firms' optimal financial policies.

Mion and Opromolla (2014) - Positive impact of managerial export knowledge on firm trade performance.

**Sazedj et al. (2018)** - New knowledge by outsider CEOs - significant effect on firms' productivity and their capability to survive to negative economic shocks.

Most of the approaches: case studies and surveys on medium and large-sized firms, being less effective in dealing with micro and small-sized firms.

Our contribution: empirical analysis of managerial human capital - micro and small firms' financial performance.

# RESEARCH QUESTIONS

**H1**: Does management teams' human capital reduce the probability of financial distress, namely of micro and small-sized firms?

**H2**: To firms in a state of financial distress, **does management teams' human capital increase the odds of recovery**, namely of micro and small-sized firms?

**H3**: Does the impact of management teams' characteristics on the financial condition of firms **vary across firm size**?

# Case analysis - Portuguese economy and financial distress

- Micro and small firms: pervasive in the Portuguese business structure, accounting for more than half of total employment and value added.
- During the international financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010/2013, the Portuguese economy went through a severe crisis.
- High share of highly leveraged and financially distressed firms, reaching a peak of 15.1% in 2012.
  Smaller-sized financially distressed firms: 92% of total FDF, 29.8% of FDF employment, 20.8% of FDF value-added.

#### **Data Sample**

- <u>Data Panel</u>: covers the aftermath of 2008/2009 financial crisis, the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2013 and the global economic recovery, up to 2018.
- <u>At firm-level</u>: Sample of 49,254 firms corporate society status with at least one manager, aged 10 years or more. SCIE dataset of about 350,000 firms yearly. 'Integrated Business Accounts System', INE 2018.
- <u>At worker-level</u> on management variables: unique matched employer-employee dataset of about 3,000,000 workers yearly. 'Personnel Records database' QP, INE 2018.

lable Selection - overall Structure	Variable	Description	Source
	Financially Distressed Firm (FDF)	FDF = 1 if financially distressed; 0 otherwise.	SCIE
		FDF has been defined as having an interest cov-	
:: Dependent Variables		erage ratio inferior to one over three consecutive	
		years.	
	Recovered Financially Distressed Firm	Recovered=1 if the firm recovered from the finan-	SCIE
		cially distressed status; 0 otherwise. Recovered	
		firm is defined as being in a non-FDF state over	
		two consecutive years.	
:: Management Variables	Managers' age	AgeManager = managers' average age	QP
Wanagement variables	Managers' education	EducManager = managers' average years of	QP
		schooling	
	Manager with a college degree	CollegeManager = 1 if at least one manager has a	QP
:: Formal Education		college degree; 0 otherwise	
I offinal Education	Share of managers with a college degree	${\it Share College Manager = share of managers with a}$	QP
		college degree (%)	
	Managers' tenure	TenureManager = managers' average years in the	QP
·· Within-firm knowledge		firm	
:: Within-firm knowledge	Managers' experience	ExpManager = managers' average years of experi-	QP
		ence in former firms	
	Managers' experience in finance	FinExpManager = managers' average years of	QP
:: Previous experience		overall finance experience in former firms	
(management, finance,	Managers' experience in foreign-	IntExpManager = managers' average years of ex-	QP
export, international)	owned/ international firms	perience in former international firms	
expert) meemationary	Managers' experience in exporting	ExportExpManager = managers' average years of	QP
	firms	experience in former exporting firms	
	Leverage Ratio	LevRatio = Total Liabilities/Total Equity and Li-	SCIE
		abilities	
:: Firm-level control variables	Productivity per worker	Productivity = Gross Value-Added at cost of fac-	SCIE
		tors (/1000 euros)/Total Workers	
	Exports ratio	ExportsRatio = Total Exports/Total Sales	SCIE
	m 14 G	Turnover	OP
	TeamManagerSize	Number of individuals in the management team	QP
	NWorkers	Number of workers by each firm	SCIE
	Sources: SCIE and QP.		


#### **Variables**

#### **Dependent Variables**

### . Financially Distressed Firm (FDF)

Firm having an interest coverage ratio - ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses - inferior to one, over three consecutive years, aged 10 years or more.

#### **FDF evolution 2011-2018**



Source: SCIE, QP. Total obs. 327,460; Total firms 49,254; Total obs. FDF 37,123.

## . Recovered Financially Distressed Firm

Recovered firm is defined as being in a non-FDF state over two consecutive years.

#### **Recovered FDF evolution 2011-2017**

	non-Recovered	Recovered	Aggregate	Share recovered (%)
2011	6,457	548	7,005	7.8
2012	6,280	890	7,170	12.4
2013	5,458	1,359	6,817	19.9
2014	4,508	2,013	6,521	30.9
2015	3,452	2,694	6,146	43.8
2016	2,648	3,219	5,867	54.9
2017	1,828	3,568	5,396	66.1
Firms	10,944	4,509	10,946	41.2
Observations	36,963	14,291	51,254	27.9

Source: own computations using data from SCIE and QP.

#### **Management Variables**

. Manager

. Managers' **formal Education** 

. Managers' within-firm knowledge

. Managers' **Previous Experience** - functional background

Managing Directors and Chief Executives (112); Administrative and Commercial Managers (12); Production and Specialized Services Managers (13); Hospitality, Retail and Other Services Managers (14). CPP2010 national classification of occupations.

- EducManager = managers' average years of schooling;
- CollegeManager = dummy equal to one if at least one manager has a college degree;
- ShareCollegeManager = share of managers in the management team with a college degree (%).
- TenureManager = managers' average years in the firm.
- ExpManager = managers' average years of experience in previous firms;
- FinExpManager = managers' average years of overall finance experience in former firms;
- IntExpManager = managers' average years of experience in former international, foreignowned firms;
- ExportExpManager = managers' average years of experience in former exporting firms.

#### **Firm Size classes and Control Variables**

. Firm S	ize
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O Micro firms - up to 10 workers

o Small firms - between 10 and 49 workers

Medium firms - between 50 and 249 workers

o Large firms - over 250 workers

. Leverage Ratio

LevRatio = Total Liabilities/ Total Equity and Liabilities

. Productivity

Productivity = Value Added at cost of factors/ Total Workers

. Exports Ratio

ExportsRatio = Total Exports/ Total Sales Turnover

# Management Variables: non-FDF and FDF - evolution 2011-2018

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					Par	nel B: n	on-FDF			
	Mic	cro	Sm	nall	Med	lium	La	rge	A	ggregate
	2011	2018	2011	2018	2011	2018	2011	2018	2011	2018
EducManager (years)	9.5	10.0	10.6	11.2	12.5	13.1	14.1	14.5	10.0	10.6
CollegeManager (%)	22.7	25.5	41.2	47.3	75.7	82	93.8	96.3	30.5	35.7
ShareCollegeManager (%)	19.5	22.2	28.8	34	49.5	55.9	67.9	73.3	23.7	28.0
TenureManager (years)	14.7	19.9	15.3	19.6	14.7	17.7	13.3	16.5	14.9	19.7
ExpManager (years)	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.8	2.2	1.7	4.6	0.2	0.6
FinExpManager (years)	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.6	1.5	1.3	3.4	0.1	0.4
IntExpManager (years)	0.003	0.1	0.03	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.7	2.3	0.02	0.1
ExportExpManager (years)	0.01	0.03	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.6	1.9	0.04	0.2
Firms by size	32,299		10,	939	2,242		376		45,856	
Observations by size	196,	944	74,	467	16,152 $2,774$		74	290,337		
Observations (share)	67	.8	25	5.6	5	.6	1	.0		
					I	Panel C:	FDF			
	Micro		Sm	nall	Med	lium	La	rge	A	ggregate
	2011	2018	2011	2018	2011	2018	2011	2018	2011	2018
EducManager (years)	9.3	10.1	11.2	12.3	13.2	14.1	13.8	14.7	10.0	11.1
CollegeManager (%)	20.1	26.2	50.7	60.3	85.1	90.7	93.1	100	31.1	42.9
ShareCollegeManager (%)	16.2	22.6	35.4	44.4	56.9	64.3	61.7	74.9	23.0	33.5
TenureManager (years)	15.5	20.4	15.1	17.7	14.3	14.6	13.3	16.3	15.3	19.1
ExpManager (years)	0.1	0.3	0.5	1.4	1.3	4	2.1	5.3	0.3	1.1
FinExpManager (years)	0.1	0.2	0.4	1.0	1.0	2.5	1.5	3.8	0.2	0.7
IntExpManager (years)	0.01	0.03	0.1	0.3	0.2	1.5	0.7	2.0	0.04	0.3
ExportExpManager (years)	0.01	0.05	0.1	0.3	0.4	1.0	0.5	1.7	0.1	0.3
Firms by size	7,8	10	2,3	392	50	)9	10	)5		10,816
Observations by size	26,1	148	8,3	337	2,0	086	55	52		37,123
Observations (share)	70	.4	22	2.5	5	.6	1	.5		

Source: own computations using data from SCIE and QP. We report variables' averages.

Note: Not here exposed, for parsimony. On financial control variables, **FDF** revealed in all size-classes, more deteriorated ratios of leverage, productivity and export intensity than non-FDF.

# Financially Distressed Firms (FDF) / non-FDF 2011-2018

- Management teams' characteristics: significant variation across different firm size classes. Human capital variables increase monotonically with firm-size.
- **Education** of management teams: significant improvement between 2011 and 2018, for all firm-size classes, in non-FDF and FDF, reflecting the progress in education in the last decades.
- FDF improved management teams' formal education more than non-FDF, from 2011 to 2018.
- **Tacit within-firm knowledge**: tenure increased in all size classes between 2011 and 2018, suggesting the steadiness of management teams in the same firm over time.

### • Previous functional experience:

Medium and Large firms - FDF management shows higher experience in overall management and in finance than non-FDF.

Small and Medium firms - FDF management teams show a higher average than in non-FDF, in international foreign-owned firms and in exporting companies.

# Management Variables: non-Recovered/Recovered - evolution 2011-2017

	Panel A: non-Recovered									
	Mie	cro	Sn	nall	Medium		Large		Aggregate	
	2011	2017	2011	2017	2011	2017	2011	2017	2011	2017
EducManager (years)	9.3	9.9	11.2	12.1	13.2	13.8	13.9	14.6	9.9	10.9
CollegeManager (%)	19.8	24.2	50.9	56.8	85.0	87.0	94.3	100	30.4	39.0
ShareCollegeManager (%)	15.9	20.9	35.6	42.1	57	61.3	62.5	74.4	22.6	30.6
TenureManager (years)	15.4	19.9	15.1	18	14.3	14.8	13.3	16.3	15.3	18.9
ExpManager (years)	0.1	0.3	0.5	1.1	1.3	3.3	2.2	4.9	0.3	0.8
FinExpManager (years)	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.8	1.0	2.2	1.5	3.4	0.2	0.6
IntExpManager (years)	0.003	0.01	0.1	0.2	0.2	1.2	0.7	2.4	0.03	0.2
ExportExpManager (years)	0.01	0.02	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.9	0.5	1.5	0.1	0.2
Firms by size	7,9	66	2,3	372	50	03	10	03	10,	944
Observations by size	26,4	463	8,0	)24	1,9	972	50	04	36,	963
Observations share $(\%)$	71	.6	21	1.7	5	.3	1	.4		
			<u> </u>	Pai	nel B: I	Recover	red		<u> </u>	
	Mie	cro	Sn	ıall	Med	lium	La	rge	Aggr	egate
	2011	2017	2011	2017	2011	2017	2011	2017	2011	2017

	Panel B: Recovered									
	Micro		Sm	nall	Medium		Large		Aggregate	
	2011	2017	2011	2017	2011	2017	2011	2017	2011	2017
EducManager (years)	9.1	9.4	10.4	11.5	12.8	13.7	14.8	14.3	9.4	10.1
CollegeManager (%)	16.2	19.6	42.1	50	85.7	87.1	100	96.6	21.7	29.7
ShareCollegeManager(%)	14.3	16.6	31.6	36.7	50.7	61.9	71.4	65.8	17.7	23.3
TenureManager (years)	14.4	19.5	16	18.4	13.7	16.1	8.4	15.7	14.6	19.1
ExpManager (years)	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.9	1.4	2.9	2.0	4.5	0.2	0.5
FinExpManager (years)	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.7	1.9	4.0	3.4	0.1	0.3
IntExpManager (years)	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.2	0.3	0.6	4.0	1.7	0.03	0.1
ExportExpManager (years)	0.01	0.02	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.9	0.3	1.6	0.03	0.1
Firms by size	3,4	13	8	74	19	92	3	0	4,5	509
Observations by size	10,	728	2,8	313	64	44	10	06	14,	291
Observations share $(\%)$	75	5.1	19	9.7	4	.5	0	.7		

Source: own computations using data from SCIE and QP.

Note: Not here exposed, for parsimony. On financial control variables, **Recovered FDF** revealed in all size-classes, better ratios of leverage, productivity and export intensity than non-Recovered FDF.

- Recovered FDF / Non-Recovered FDF 2011-2017
- **Education**: Recovered FDF show a lower relative weight of higher educated managers in management boards than non-Recovered counterparts.
- Non-Recovered FDF retain a considerable share of highly qualified managerial workforce.
- Managerial Tenure: managers of Recovered FDF are in general, more tenured.
- Previous functional Experience: slightly higher overall management, finance, international and exporting experience in the management teams of Recovered FDF, but tendency of non-Recovered to retain experienced managerial workforce over the years.

## ECONOMETRIC MODEL

#### **Data Panel Logit Model with fixed-effects**

$$P(FDF_{it} = 1 | \mathbf{X_{it}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \alpha_i) = \frac{\exp(\boldsymbol{\beta} \mathbf{X_{it}} + \alpha_i)}{1 + \exp(\boldsymbol{\beta} \mathbf{X_{it}} + \alpha_i)}$$
$$\boldsymbol{\beta} \mathbf{X_{it}} = \beta_1 \ EducManager_{it-1} + \beta_2 \ TenureManager_{it-1} + \beta_3 \ LevRatio_{it} + \beta_4 \ Productivity_{it} + \beta_5 \ ExportsRatio_{it}$$
$$+\beta_6 \ NWorkers_{it} + \beta_7 \ NWorkers_{it}^2$$

- . Managers' formal Education captured by three measures: EducManager, CollegeManager, ShareCollegeManager.
- . Within-firm knowledge proxied by TenureManager.
- . **Previous experience**: functional experience acquired in other firms, ExpManager, FinExpManager, IntExpManager and ExportExpManager.
- . Control variables at firm-level: LevRatio, Productivity and ExportsRatio, NWorkers.

## **Estimation Results on the probability of Financial Distress**

#### Formal Education

#### Within-Firm tacit Knowledge

Estimation results by firm size on Probability of FDF (2011 – 2018)

	Micro	Small	Medium	Large
		]	Panel A	
EducManager	-0.120***	-0.115***	-0.099*	-0.095
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.056)	(0.144)
TenureManager	-0.122***	-0.046***	-0.045***	-0.046
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.038)
		]	Panel B	
CollegeManager	-0.004***	0.002	0.002	0.012
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.009)
TenureManager	-0.120***	-0.036***	-0.033**	-0.049
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.039)
		]	Panel C	
ShareCollegeManager	-0.009***	-0.006***	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.009)
TenureManager	-0.121***	-0.042***	-0.039***	-0.045
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.038)

Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: \*, 10%; \*\*, 5%; \*\*\*, 1%.

Size: Micro firms <10 workers; 10 <= Small firms < 50; 50 <= Medium firms <250; Large firms >=250.

#### Previous Functional Experience

Estimation results by firm size on the probability of FDF (2011 – 2018)

	Micro	Small	Medium	Large					
	Panel A								
EducManager	-0.057***	-0.077***	-0.005	-0.065					
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.052)	(0.144)					
F 16	0.000##	0.000	0.440444	0.054					
ExpManager	-0.063**	-0.039	-0.119***	-0.051					
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.047)					
		Pa	anel B						
EducManager	-0.058***	-0.079***	-0.008	-0.076					
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.052)	(0.142)					
FinExpManager	-0.070*	-0.012	-0.092**	-0.079					
	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.057)					
		Pa	anel C						
EducManager	-0.059***	-0.076***	-0.026	-0.076					
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.051)	(0.143)					
IntExpManager	-0.464**	-0.201***	-0.017	-0.112					
	(0.212)	(0.072)	(0.049)	(0.073)					
		Pa	anel D						
EducManager	-0.058***	-0.079***	-0.020	-0.078					
_	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.051)	(0.142)					
ExportExpManager	-0.276**	-0.064	-0.059	-0.102					
	(0.116)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.074)					

## **Estimation Results on the probability of Recovery from financial distress**

#### Formal Education

#### Within-Firm tacit Knowledge

Estimation results by Firms' Size on Probability of Recovery (2011 – 2017)

	Micro	Small	Medium	Large			
	Panel A						
EducManager	0.618***	0.459***	0.470***	0.289			
	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.096)	(0.208)			
TenureManager	$0.549^{***}$	$0.202^{***}$	0.124***	0.148*			
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.082)			
		P	anel B				
CollegeManager	0.022***	0.005**	0.002	0.000			
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.011)			
TenureManager	0.525***	0.154***	0.072***	0.143*			
101101101101100	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.079)			
	, ,	P	anel C	,			
ShareCollegeManager	0.062***	0.029***	0.020***	0.015			
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.015)			
TenureManager	0.542***	0.183***	0.098***	0.132*			
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.080)			

Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: \*, 10%; \*\*, 5%; \*\*\*, 1%.

Size: Micro firms <10 workers;  $10 \le 50$ ;  $50 \le Medium firms <250$ ; Large firms >=250.

#### Previous Functional Experience

Estimation results by Firms' Size on Probability of Recovery (2011 – 2017)

	Micro	Small	Medium	Large
		I	Panel A	
EducManager	0.195***	0.230***	0.177**	0.484**
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.084)	(0.231)
ExpManager	0.270***	0.235***	0.263***	0.739***
	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.195)
		I	Panel B	
EducManager	0.198***	0.229***	0.181**	0.556**
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.082)	(0.223)
FinExpManager	0.293***	0.209***	0.168***	0.786***
	(0.072)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.196)
		I	Panel C	
EducManager	0.200***	0.234***	0.211***	0.332
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.081)	(0.213)
IntExpManager	0.758**	0.487***	0.138*	0.179
	(0.345)	(0.137)	(0.078)	(0.171)
	P	anel D		
EducManager	0.197***	0.229***	0.201**	0.342
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.081)	(0.216)
ExportExpManager	1.281***	0.398***	0.169**	0.544**
	(0.497)	(0.122)	(0.073)	(0.273)

#### **Findings**

# Major Findings and Implications

- Management teams' formal education, within-firm and previous experience: effects vary on firms' size.
- On micro and small-sized firms highly significant impact in reducing probability of financial distress and in increasing chances of subsequent recovery.
- In the sequence of **negative exogenous shocks** such as the global financial crisis, which deteriorated firms' financial conditions, firms with higher skilled managerial workforce (education, within-firm knowledge, experience):
  - appear to be better equipped to avoid the expected outcome of becoming financially distressed;
  - are more likely to recover from a financial distress state.

- Policies that induce an **improvement in the managerial human capital of smaller-sized firms** may contribute to a better financial condition, reducing the likelihood of firms entering a state of financial distress.
- More skilled management teams may contribute to enhance performance and the resilience against adverse shocks, such as the pandemic Covid-19.



Questions | Suggestions