"Infrastructure Financing in Argentina: Lessons from the PPP Experience"

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Road Map

- PPPs in a Nutshell
- Investment in Argentina
- The Argentinean Experience
- Conclusions




PPPs in a Nutshell

- PPPs shall be seen as an intermediate alternative between traditional public investment and privatization
- There exist several PPPs mechanisms
 - BLT (build, lease and transfer)
 - BOT (build, operate and transfer)
 - BOO (build, operate and own)
 - DBFO (design, build, finance and operate)
 - Concesion
- Getting value for money and the efficient distribution of risks between the private and public sector are at the heart of the PPPs schemes



PPPs in a Nutshell

 In most cases of PPPs, the public sector pays only during the operation period, and based on output delivered by the private party



- Attractive from a short-sight fiscal perspective
 - Construction expenditures are distributed in future fiscal periods (different from direct public investment financed either by current revenues or debt)
 - The liability is not registered as it is in the case of debt




PPPs in a Nutshell

- Necesary (but not sufficient) conditions for an efficient functioning of PPPs
 - Correct identification and priorization of investment needs
 - Proper evaluation of projects in terms of their suitability for a PPP scheme
 - Institutional and political commitment to implement PPPs
 - Efficient mechanism of state supervision of the quality of the services provided
 - Availability of long-term financing (particularly, in local currency)
- PPPs have extensive implementation in the UK
- In Latin America, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru are leading the way



Investment in Argentina

 As expected, Gross Domestic Fixed Investment (GDFI) subject to economic cycles




Source: own elaboration based on Minister of Economy

 After the crisis, public investment gained participation in the total GDFI



Investment in Argentina

But public GDFI still dependent on overall fiscal



Source: own elaboration based on Minister of Economy and Budget Argentinean Association (ASAAP)

 Alternative mechanisms for providing public services shall be explored



- In 2000, the "Promoting Private Participation in the Infrastructure Development Scheme" was the first formal attempt to include PPPs-like mechanism in Argentina (Decree 1299, later ratified by law 25414 in 2001)
 - Was of the DBFO type
 - A guarantee fund was constituted (in the form of a financial trust) using oil-related revenues and the proceeds of the sale of state-owned assets
 - An Administrative Council was established (within the Infrastructure Ministry)
 - Biased towards infrastructure projects (roads)
- Six months later, the first tender for participating was initiated......
-but then the full-blown economic crisis erupted



 In 2005, two new regimes were established at the federal level, the Private Initiative Regime (PIR) and the Public-Private Initiative Regime (PPIR)

Salient features	PIR	PPIR
Initiator	Private	Public
Authority in charge	Minister of Planning	Minister of Planning and Minister of Economy
Evaluation Committee	Yes	Yes
Declaration of Public Interest	Yes	Yes
Financing	100% private	Mixed
Tender	Yes (the initiator has a 5% advantage)	Yes
Public Offer Regime	No	Yes



- Since then, 7 projects were declared of public interest within the PIR. Of them, 2 are in the process of public tender
- In 2007, a new regulation was established to assure participation of institutional investors (private pension funds) in the financing of PPIR
- There are basically three options for financing PPIR projects within the Public Offer Regime: stocks, bonds, and financial trusts
- However, after five years of experience, there are no concrete examples of successful implementation of PPPs projects



- Moreover, other instruments gained notoriety for financing infrastructure: public trust funds
 - They distort and discredit trust funds, since this suigeneris type does not separate the settlor from the trustee
 - They are opaque in nature, and out-of-budget in some cases
- After the nationalization of private pension funds, the public pension fund started to invest heavily on infrastructure projects (doubling its participation in the portfolio, now in the order of 9%)
 - But some of the projects are financed "privately", i.e. there is no adherence to the public offer regime



Conclusions

- What can be learnt from a "non-experience"?
 Well, several things
- There is a need for broad political consensus on acceptance of PPPs as an alternative for financing public services
- Building capacity of policy-makers is essential for a proper understanding of how PPPs work
 - Public perception of PPPs as a another form of privatization (the "bad press" issue)
- When in charge of the Planning or Infrastructure Minister, then APPs are seen as mechanism for financing public investment, and not as a mechanism for providing public services



Conclusions

- From the regulatory side, more transparency should be required to avoid misuse of the instrument based on "budgetary-related" advantages
- Participation of institutional investors with a longterm investment profile is required
 - In addition, participation of multilateral institutions (IADB, World Bank) either through direct financing or providing guarantees have proven successful in certain countries in the region (Chile and Peru)
- If the state is to participate in the financing part of a PPP (through SWF or PPF as it is the case in Argentina), greater transparency is required and costs of financing shall be established at arm's length conditions