

**ANNEX 5 A CASE STUDY ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND'S  
COUNTRY PROGRAMME IN AFGHANISTAN**

# Evaluation

## A Case Study on Peace and Development in Finland's Country Programme in Afghanistan

Jon Bennett

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This report was commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to Itad Ltd.  
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# CONTENTS

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

## ABSTRACT

Finnish

Swedish

English

## SUMMARY

Finnish

Swedish

English

Summary of main findings, conclusions and recommendations

## INTRODUCTION

### 2 APPROACH

2.1 Scope and purpose

2.2 Methodology and limitations

### 3 country context

3.1 Social and economic indicators

3.2 Support to peace and development in Afghanistan

3.3 Development assistance to Afghanistan

### 4 FINLAND'S SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN 2007–12

4.1 Overview of Finnish development cooperation and financial disbursements 2007–12

4.2 Contextual analysis

### 5 EVALUATION OF PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH AFGHANISTAN

5.1 Relevance of support to the drivers of peace and development

5.1.1 Extent to which the design of and strategic choices made within each country programme are based on good contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analyses

5.1.2 Extent to which intervention logics underpinned the designed strategy, and the extent to which these were relevant, valid and understood by Finland's Ministry for Foreign Affairs and its partners

5.1.3 Extent to which other Ministry for Foreign Affairs' interventions (political dialogue, humanitarian action) have complemented and/or provided leverage to development cooperation

5.1.4 Extent to which the mix of Finnish development cooperation aid instruments and modalities was appropriate to achieve objectives

5.1.5 Extent to which the sectors chosen by Finland were done so in recognition of the characteristics and priorities relating to the fragility of the country/region

5.1.6 Extent to which Finnish country strategy identified specific areas of intervention where its added value would be apparent and recognised by stakeholders

5.2 Policy coherence and resource allocation

5.2.1 Extent to which the policy priorities stipulated by Ministry for Foreign Affairs (particularly in the 2009 Guidelines) were understood and incorporated into country-level interventions

5.2.2 Extent to which security and justice priorities are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these

5.2.3 Extent to which economic development and employment issues are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these

5.2.4 Extent to which statebuilding and governance priorities are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these

5.2.5 Extent to which results-based management is able to monitor and evaluate compliance and coherence with global policies

- 5.2.6 Extent to which the totality of resources made available and disbursed was equal to the ambitions set by programme objectives
- 5.3 Cross-cutting objectives
  - 5.3.1 Extent to which cross-cutting objectives were taken into account in the analysis and design of Finnish interventions
  - 5.3.2 Extent to which cross-cutting objectives were taken into account in political and policy dialogue
  - 5.3.3 Extent to which Finnish development cooperation has contributed to the stated objectives and intended outcomes of its interventions
  - 5.3.4 Extent to which lessons on implementing cross-cutting objectives have been recorded and disseminated
- 5.4 Aid effectiveness and development results
  - 5.4.1 Extent to which Finland has applied and integrated its aid efficiency commitments in the country/region
  - 5.4.2 Extent to which national ownership and alignment with national policies is incorporated into interventions undertaken
  - 5.4.3 Extent to which Finnish development cooperation is coherent with and complementary to the development strategies and programmes of other major bilateral and multilateral donors
  - 5.4.4 Extent to which the results of Finnish development cooperation have, through the choice of its aid modalities, contributed to peacebuilding and/or statebuilding objectives
  - 5.4.5 Extent to which the results and achievements to date are likely to endure in the longer term
- 5.5 Intervention logic revisited
- 6 CONCLUSIONS
- 7 RECOMMENDATIONS

## REFERENCES

- ANNEX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE
- ANNEX 2 PEOPLE INTERVIEWED
- ANNEX 3 DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
- ANNEX 4 EVENTS TIMELINE ANALYSIS
- ANNEX 5 INTERVENTION LOGIC

## TABLES

- Table 1 Top 10 donors of gross ODA to Afghanistan (2011–12 average) (US\$ millions).
- Table 2 Finland's project support disbursements 2010–13 (€ millions).
- Table 3 Division of ARTF funding provided by Finland (€ millions).
- Table 4 Division of Finnish development cooperation and small projects through the PRT, Mazar-e-Sharif (€ millions).

## BOXES

- Box 1 Summary of key findings for evaluation question 1.
- Box 2 Summary of key findings for evaluation question 2.
- Box 3 Summary of key findings for evaluation question 3.
- Box 4 Summary of key findings for evaluation question 4.

## FIGURES

- Figure 1 Afghanistan: Finland's disbursements between 2007 and 2012 (€ thousands).

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Research for this evaluation was conducted between July 2013 and August 2014 by a team of consultants contracted by Itad Ltd, which is based in Hove, UK. The team comprised Jon Bennett in the role of team leader, lead author of the synthesis report and lead author of the Afghanistan case study; David Fleming as Itad evaluation manager, co-author of the synthesis report and member of the Ethiopia sub-team; Bill Sterland as lead author of the Western Balkans case study; Debi Duncan as lead author of the Palestinian Territories case study; Tuija Stenbäck as lead author of the Ethiopia case study; Zehra Kacapor Dzihic and Rozeta Hajdari as members of the Western Balkans sub-team; Mohammed Mussa as member of the Ethiopia sub-team; Akbar Sarwari as member of the Afghanistan sub-team; and Samir Baidoun as member of the Palestinian Territories sub-team. Itad extends thanks to the evaluation team for their commitment and engagement throughout in what has been a very challenging and exciting evaluation.

The evaluation team was supported by a number of Itad staff and associate consultants. David Fleming (Senior Consultant) was responsible for evaluation management and coordination, with the support of Jodie Ellis (Senior Project Officer) and Dane Rogers (Managing Director). Itad's Duty of Care team comprising Julian Barr, Sarah Ockenden, Alice Parsons and Susannah Bartlett, supported by Brennan Dwyer and the Safer Edge Team, provided logistical and security arrangements for the Afghanistan fieldwork. Former Itad Director, Derek Poate, provided quality assurance and methodological insights throughout the evaluation, for which the team is extremely grateful. In Finland the team was supported by Erja Hänninen (Junior Expert). Proof-reading was carried out by editing consultant Chris Steel and abstract and summary translations were carried out by Karoliina Zschauer and Wolfestone.

Itad Ltd and the team wishes to express sincere gratitude to the Unit responsible for development evaluation (EVA-11) attached to the Office of the Under-Secretary of State in Finland's Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA): Jyrki Pulkkinen (Director), Riitta Oksanen (Senior Advisor), Sanna Pulkkinen (Senior Evaluation Officer), Riikka Miettinen (Evaluation Officer) and Kristiina Kuvaja-Xanthopolous (Counsellor).

The team is extremely grateful to all of the staff members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki as well as the embassies in Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and the Representative Office in the Palestinian Territories for their kind support in facilitating the team's fieldwork and for being available for interviews and freely expressing their views.

We are indebted to Akbar Sarwari, Itad's national consultant, for accompanying the team leader in Kabul, conducting additional interviews and contributing to the report. We would like to thank Finland's Kabul Embassy staff for their invaluable assistance in providing substantive information and in correcting factual errors in the draft report. We would also like to thank MFA staff past and present who were interviewed for the study in Helsinki and by phone.

The team would also like to take this opportunity to gratefully acknowledge and thank the numerous individuals interviewed. They graciously gave their valuable time to facilitate the team's country and mission visits and to provide information, analysis, interpretations and explanations. The views of all of these stakeholders were crucial in helping the team to formulate its assessments and recommendations. The team has attempted to address all the evaluation questions in the Terms of Reference. Needless to say, the flaws and omissions are entirely ours. The team is also responsible for the views and recommendations expressed in the final report.

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme
AREDP	Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CCO	Cross-Cutting Objectives
CDC	Community Development Council
CRIP	Community Recovery Intensification Programme
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
FLC	Fund for Local Cooperation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KEPA	Umbrella organisation for Finnish NGOs
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MEC	Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
MISFA	Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
Nordic+	Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Estonia, Belgium
NRVA	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
NSP	National Solidarity Programme
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSG	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal
QIP	Quick Impact Project
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TMAF	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

## TIIVISTELMÄ

Afganistanin osaevaluaatio on osa laajempaa evaluaatiota Suomen rauhan ja kehityksen tuesta hauraissa valtioissa. Tämä evaluaatio arvioi Suomen kehitysyhteistyön toimia, sen yhteyttä siviilikriisinhallintaan sekä konaisvaltaisen turvallisuutta ja kehitystä koskevan lähestymistavan tuloksia. Evaluaatio sisälsi kattavan dokumenttianalyysin sekä Suomen ulkoasiainministeriön henkilökunnan kanssa tehtyjä haastatteluja Helsingissä ja lyhyen kenttätutkimusjakson Kabulissa.

Suomi on käyttänyt tehokkaasti yhteisrahoitusmekanismeja, mutta yhteyksiä ohjelmatulosten ja rauhanrakentamisen välillä ei ole osoitettu. Nordic+ ryhmässä Suomi on tehokkain avunantaja naisten- ja ihmisoikeuksien saralla. YK:n turvallisuusneuvoston päätöslauselma 1325 edistäminen on ollut hidasta, mutta prosessi on tärkeä. Poliisien palkkoihin ja institutionaalisiin reformeihin annettu tuki on ollut johdonmukaista, mutta siviilikriisinhallinnan tulisi selvittää, kuinka lisätä julkista vastuuvollisuutta turvallisuussektorin instituutioissa. Yksittäiset PYM/NGO hankkeet ovat kartuttaneet siirrettäviä taitoja, mutta portfolio ei ole saavuttanut liian kunnianhimoisiksi asetettuja tavoitteita. Strategisemmän lähestymistavan tulisi sisältää korkeamman tason kapasiteetin kehittämistä. Liberaalin keskushallinnon luomista on painotettu liikaa, eikä huomiota inkrementaalille ja jatkuvalla kansalaisyhteiskunnan tuelle ole annettu tarpeeksi. Suomi ei voi oikaista paljon suurempien avunantajien aiheuttamia vääristymiä.

Suosituksissa kehoitetaan vahvistamaan ohjelmasuunnittelua ja yhdistämään tavoitteet ja vaikutusindikaattorit UM:n hauraiden valtioiden toimintaohjeistukseen, siirtämään NGO/PYM ja yhteisohjelmien prioriteetit sosi-aali- ja talussektoreille sekä vahvistamaan riskianalyysejä ja esittämään, kuinka kasvavaa etäjohtamista voidaan tehokkaasti toteuttaa.

*Avainsanat:* Afganistan, evaluaatio, rauha, kehitys, Suomi.

## ABSTRACT

Den afghanska fallstudien ingår som en del av en bredare utvärdering av Finlands stöd till fred och utveckling i bräckliga stater. Den bedömer Finlands bidrag genom utvecklingssamarbetet, dess koppling till civil krishantering och resultaten av en övergripande strategi för säkerhet och utveckling. Utvärderingen innefattar omfattande granskning av dokument, intervjuer med utrikesdepartementets personal i Helsingfors och en kort fältinsats i Kabul.

Finland har effektivt använt mekanismen med gemensam finansiering, men kopplingen mellan programmets resultat och fredsbyggande är inte fastställd och de ekonomiska resultatindikatorerna är fortfarande otillräckliga. Ifråga om kvinnor och mänskliga rättigheter är Finland mest effektivt inom Nordic+-gruppen, i och med att de är konsekventa i sin användning av politiska påtryckningar kring dessa frågor. Framstegen i främjandet av UNSCR 1325 har gått långsamt, men processen är viktig. Stöd till polisens löner och institutionell reform har varit konsekvent, men ifråga om civil krishantering borde man undersöka hur man kan öka den offentliga ansvarsskyldigheten i säkerhetssektorns institutioner. Enskilda FLC/NGO-projekt har ökat överförbara färdigheter, men portföljen har inte lyckats möta de överambitiösa mål man satt; ett mer strategiskt tillvägagångssätt skulle innehålla en högre nivå av kapacitetsutveckling. Det har varit för mycket fokus på att bilda en liberal centralstat, och inte tillräckligt på ett stegvist och ihållande stöd till det civila samhället för att motverka patriarkala överdrifter. Finland kan inte kompensera snedvridningar orsakade av mycket större biståndsgivare.

Rekommendationer ges för att stärka programutformning och relatera målen och resultatindikatorer till UD:s riktlinjer för bräckliga stater, skifta NGO/FLC och gemensamma programprioriteringar mot sociala och ekonomiska sektorer, stärka riskanalysen och fastställa hur en hantering som sker alltmer på avstånd skall kunna genomföras effektivt.

*Nyckelord:* Afghanistan, utvärdering, fred, utveckling, Finland.



## ABSTRACT

The Afghanistan case study is part of a broader evaluation of Finland's support to peace and development in fragile states. It assesses the contributions of Finland's development cooperation, its link with civilian crisis management and the outcomes of a comprehensive approach to security and development. The evaluation involved extensive document review, interviews with Ministry for Foreign Affairs staff in Helsinki, and a short field mission to Kabul.

Finland has effectively used pooled funding mechanisms, but linkages between programme outcomes and peacebuilding are not proved. Finland is the most effective donor on women's and human rights within the Nordic+ group. Progress in promoting UN Security Council Resolution 1325 has been slow, but the process is important. Support to police salaries and institutional reform has been consistent, but civilian crisis management should explore how to increase public accountability in security sector institutions. Individual local cooperation fund/non-governmental organisation projects have increased transferrable skills but the portfolio has not met the over-ambitious objectives set; a more strategic approach would include a higher level of capacity development. There has been too much emphasis on liberal central state formation, and not enough on incremental and sustained support to civil society. Finland cannot offset distortions caused by much larger aid donors.

Recommendations are given to strengthen programme design and relate objectives and impact indicators to MFA *Fragile States Guidelines*, shift NGO/FLC and joint programme priorities towards social and economic sectors, strengthen risk analysis, and establish how increasingly remote management can effectively be undertaken.

*Keywords:* Afghanistan, development, evaluation, Finland, peace.

### Johdanto

Tämä evaluaatio tarkastelee Suomen kehitysyhteistyötä Afganistanissa vuosina 2007–12. Evaluaation tarkoitus on tarjota monipuolinen katsaus Suomen kehitysyhteistyön saavutuksista, osuudesta ja heikkouksista rauhan ja kehityksen tukemisessa Afganistanissa. Se pyrkii tarjoamaan opetuksia ja suosituksia, jotka tukevat Suomen ulkoasianministeriön (UM) hauraiden valtioiden rauhan ja kehityksen edistämisen linjausten ja ohjelmastrategioiden suunnittelua.

Tiimi kehitti yhtenäisen, neljän laaja-alaisen arviointikysymyksen ympärille rakennetun evaluaatiokehiksen kaikille osaevaluaatioille. Aluksi suoritettiin dokumenttianalyysi, joka sisälsi asiakirjakatsauksen sekä haastatteluja Helsingissä. Tämän jälkeen tehtiin lyhyt kenttävierailu Kabuliin tiedonkeruuta ja dokumenttianalyysin alustavien tulosten triangulointia varten.

### Tulokset

#### *Tuen merkitys rauhan ja kehityksen edistämisessä*

Suomi lainaa suurelta osin kontekstuaalisen analyysinsä luotettavilta lähteiltä, kuten Maailmanpankilta, YK:lta ja muilta Nordic+ avunantajilta. Afganistanin 2008 kansallisen kehitysstrategian (ANDS) sisäisessä kommentissa Suomi positioi itsensä enemmän alhaalta ylöspäin, kuten ihmisoikeuksiin, sukupuoleen ja elinkeinoihin suuntautuviin ohjelmiin, ja on tehokkaasti käyttänyt rajoitettua poliittista vaikutusvaltaansa näissä asioissa.

Suomen yhteisrahastomekanismien käyttö on ollut tehokasta ja tarkoituksenmukaista, mutta yhteyksiä hankkeiden tulosten ja rauhanrakentamisen välillä ei todistettu. Suomen jatkuvan tuen kanavoitinta yhteisrahoitusmekanismien kautta budjettitukeen on kannustanut erittäin läpinäkyvät talousprosessit Afganistanin hallinnon keskeisillä tasoilla. Kansallisella solidaarisuusohjelmalla on saavutettu rohkaisevia tuloksia, mutta yhteisöjen kehittämisneuvostojen (Community Development Councils) toiminnan kestävyys on kyseenalaista, etenkin kun provinssitasoisen budjetointikapasiteetti on edelleen heikkoa. Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien kehitysohjelman (UNDP) hallinnoimaan poliisirahastoon (Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan) kohdistettiin korruptiotutkimuksia vuonna 2012. Vaikka ollessaan vaatimassa tutkimusta Suomi päätti, että vetäytyminen perusturvallisuussektorin tukemisesta, kuten tästä, voisi aiheuttaa ei-toivottuja levottomuuksia.

Suomen osallistuminen Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) prosessiin on jälkikäteen kyseenalaistettu, johtuen tuen huonosta ohjautuvuudesta. Laajemmin hanketulosten ja rauhanrakennuksen väliset yhteydet ovat spekulatiivisia ja harvoin erityisillä indikaattoreilla seurattuja.

Vaikka Suomen apuinstrumenttiyhdistelmä sopii strategiaan, se ei voinut ennakoida lisääntyvää riippumattoman monitoroinnin lopettamista ja nyt vaadittavaa etäjohtamisen tason tarvetta. Suomi voisi hyötyä hyvin perustellusta riskianalysista, mikä sisältäisi realistiset kriteerit hankkeen jatkamiselle tai supistamiselle.

#### *Politiikan johdonmukaisuus ja resurssien allokointi*

Suomen poliittisten päädirektiivien noudattaminen on ollut optimaalista ja Suomi on pitänyt kiinni kaikista suurissa avunantajien konferensseissa tekemistään sitoumuksista, mukaan lukien budjettituen käyttö. Afganistanin jälleenrakennusraha- (ARTF) on toiminut hyvin, erityisesti kansallinen solidaarisuusohjelma (NSP), vaikka ohjelmassa saavutettuja taloudellisia hyötyjä ei ole systemaattisesti taltioitu. Kapasiteetin kehittämistä ja palveluiden tuotantoa on yleensä käsitelty kahtena eri kokonaisuutena, jotka eivät ole helposti yhdistettävissä.

Evaluaatio toteaa Suomen portfolion olevan yleisesti kustannustehokas, hyvin suunniteltu, ennustettava ja hallintoelinten tarpeisiin vastaava. Vuoden 2009 jälkeen ohjelman rationalisoiminen oli välttämättömyys, joka mahdollisti Suomen ulkoasiainministeriön (UM) henkilökunnalle paremmat vaikuttamisen mahdollisuudet hallinnon korkeammilla tasoilla. Mutta paikallisen yhteistyön määrärahojen (PYM) ”kansalaisyhteiskunnan vahvistamistavoitteet” ovat vuoteen 2013 asti olleet liian kunnianhimoisia suhteessa käytettävissä oleviin kansalaisjärjestöihin (NGO) ja hankeskaalaan. Transaktionaaliset kulut pysyvät korkeina, mutta pienen avunantajan, kuten Suomen, lisäarvoa voisi ja tulisi vahvistaa suuremmilla resursseilla.

### ***Läpileikkaavat tavoitteet***

Suomen tuki ihmisoikeuksille, erityisesti naisten oikeuksille toteutuu tehokkaimmin korkean tason yhteisaloitteiden, erityisesti Nordic+ avunantajaryhmän kautta. Tämä on myös mahdollistanut Suomelle vahvan äänen TMAF:ssa ja merkittävässä yhteisrahoitusohjelmissa (ARTF, LOTFA). Tätä täydentävät NGO hankkeet, jotka ovat investoineet ihmisten kapasiteetin ja siirrettävien taitojen vahvistamiseen tuoden kansainvälisiä standardeja tähän asti laiminlyödyille aloille (journalismi, ihmisoikeusinstituutiot).

Ympäristökysymyksissä aikaisemman työn ydin oli kansallisen ympäristönsuojeluviraston (NEPA) kapasiteetin kasvattaminen vuonna 2009. Hiljattain Suomi on myös uudistanut Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien ympäristöohjelman (UNEP) kumppanuuden Bamyán yliopiston rinnalla työskentelevän kansalaisjärjestön kautta. Ajatellen Suomen ja UNEP:n pitkäaikaista globaalia kumppanuutta, jälkimmäisen suhteellisen ”neutraalia” poliittista asemaa maassa ja sen arviota ympäristökysymysten linkityksestä konfliktiin, on hämmästyttävää, ettei tämä ole ollut Suomen pääsektori jo viime vuosina.

Kansallisen toimintasuunnitelman kehittäminen YK:n turvallisuusneuvoston päätöslauselmalle 1325 (UNSCR) on ollut hidasta – kuvaa kansallisia (ja YK:n) resursseja – mutta usein prosessi on yhtä tärkeä kuin tulos. Ihmisoikeuksissa Suomi on ollut merkittävä rahoittaja ja osaltaan ohjannut Afganistanin itsenäisen ihmisoikeuskomission (AIHRC) nykyisen korkean kansallisen profiilin saavuttamista.

### ***Avun tuloksellisuus ja kehitystulokset***

Suomi on onnistuneesti pyrkinyt läheiseen yhteistyöhön Nordic+ avunantajien kanssa ylläpitäen samalla sitoumuksiaan suhteutettuun budjettitukeen Afganistanin hallitukselle. Kuten monien avunantajien, Suomen tavoitteista tasapainottaa yhteisrahoitteiset ja kahdenväliset NGO hankkeet on tingitty kapasiteetin (sekä Suomen että Afganistanin) ja valvonnan rajoitteiden takia.

Suomi ei ole täysin hyödyntänyt sitä lisäarvoa, mitä se voisi antaa kansalaisyhteiskunnan toimijoiden inkrementaalille ja jatkuvalla tuella, joka voi olla pysyvää riippumatta Afganistanin tulevien vuosien valtiomallista.

### **Päätelmät ja opit**

- Yhteisrahoitusmekanismin käyttö on ollut tehokasta ja asianmukaista, mutta hanketulosten ja rauhanrakentamisen välisiä yhteyksiä ei ole todistettu. Riskianalyysi ja strateginen reagointi lisääntyvään ”bunkeroitumiseen” ovat riittämättömiä.
- Suomen globaalin politiikan noudattaminen on hyvää, mutta hauraiden valtioiden periaatteiden tulkinta voisi olla joustavampaa etenkin kansalaisyhteiskunnan rakentamisen yhteydessä. Yhteisrahoitusohjelmien budjettituki täyttää sitoumukset, mutta taloudellisten vaikutuksen indikaattorit ovat yhä riittämättömiä. Siviilikriisinhallinnassa tarvitaan suurempi julkinen vastuuvastuu turvallisuussektorin instituutioille.
- Nais- ja ihmisoikeusasioissa Suomi on tehokkain toimiessaan Nordic+ ryhmässä. Tuki Afganistanin itsenäiselle ihmisoikeuskomissiolle (AIHRC) on ollut alusta alkaen tärkeää. UNSCR 1325:n edistymisen on hidasta. Yksittäiset kansalaisjärjestöhankkeet ovat lisänneet siirrettäviä taitoja, mutta ovat yhä ”ad hoc”.
- Suomi ei voi kamppailla suurempien avunantajien aiheuttamia vääristymiä vastaan. Tuotosten ja kapasiteetin välillä on kaikki tasot kattava yhteensovittamaton kahtiajako. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) -mallia ei ole vielä kokonaan arvioitu.
- ”Modernin” valtionhallinnon instituutioiden muodostamista on painotettu liikaa, eikä huomiota ole annettu tarpeeksi inkrementaalille ja jatkuvalla kansalaisyhteiskunnan tuella, joka tasapainottaisi patrimonialisia ylylöntejä.

### **Suosituksukset**

- Ohjelmasuunnittelussa tulisi määritellä yksityiskohtaisemmat tavoitteet, prosessi näiden saavuttamiseksi sekä vaikutusindikaattorit. Jokaisen näistä tulisi selvästi nojata hauraiden valtioiden toimintaohjeisiin ja periaatteisiin.
- Yhteis- ja NGO/PYM ohjelmien prioriteettien tulisi siirtyä kohti sosiaali- ja taloussektoreita. Integroitu ohjelmatyö voi vaatia tietyillä maantieteellisillä alueilla työskentelyä.
- Turvallisuussektorin uudistuksen (SSR) tulisi siirtyä teknisestä avusta kohti kysynnän luomista ihmiskeskeiselle SSR:lle, sisältäen kansalaisyhteiskunnan suuremman osallistumisen.

- Selkeämpi, realistiset tulokohdat sisältävä, gender-strategia tulisi suunnitella yhdessä samanhenkisten avunantajien kanssa. Tämän tulisi sisältää strategia turvallisuusneuvoston päätöslauselman 1325 valtavirtaistamisesta ja naisten suuremmasta osallistumisesta rauhanprosessiin.
- Rajatumman ohjelmityön tulisi sisältää riskianalyysi ja arvio siitä, kuinka etäjohtaminen voidaan tehokkaasti toteuttaa.
- Kansalaisyhteiskunnan tuen tulisi sisältää strategia kapasiteetin kehittämiseksi, ja valittujen aktiviteettien tulisi täydentää paremmin toisiaan.

## SAMMANFATTNING

### Introduktion

Denna utvärdering ger en studie av Finlands utvecklingssamarbete i Afghanistan från 2007 till 2012. Den syftar till att ge en omfattande översyn av vad som uppnåtts, bidrag och svagheter i Finlands utvecklingssamarbete för att stödja fred och utveckling i Afghanistan. Syftet är att ge erfarenheter och rekommendationer som kommer att stödja utrikesdepartementet (UD) i utformningen av politik och programstrategier för att främja fred och utveckling i bräckliga stater.

Med hjälp av de fyra övergripande utvärderingsfrågorna i "Terms of Reference" (ToR) som utgångspunkt utvecklade teamet en utvärderingsram som är gemensam för alla fallstudier och som anger mer detaljerade områden för utredning och de analytiska metoder och informationskällor som skall användas i vägledningen för det systematiska insamlandet och analys av data. Efter att en skrivbordsstudie genomfördes med en detaljerad genomgång av UD:s policydokument och bredare kontextuella studier, såväl som intervjuer i Helsingfors, genomfördes ett kort fältbesök i Kabul för ytterligare intervjuer, insamling av ytterligare bevis och triangulering av preliminära resultat från skrivbordsstudien.

### Resultaten

#### *Betydelsen av stödet till de som driver på för fred och utveckling*

Finlands deltagande i Afghanistan är baserat på FN:s säkerhetsråds mandat och är i sin tur relaterat till dess åtaganden genom den internationella säkerhetsstyrkan (ISAF: International Security Assistance Force). Den logiska grunden för det förbundna utvecklingssamarbetet kan hittas i regeringens vitbok om Afghanistan och 2009 års handlingsplan för Afghanistan. Dessa återspeglar ett allmänt samförstånd bland givare om vad som anses "bräckligt" i landet. Finland hämtar till stor del sin kontextuella analys från välrenommerade källor såsom Världsbanken, FN och andra nordiska givare. Finland placerar i sin interna kommentar på 2008 års nationella utvecklingsstrategi för Afghanistan (ANDS: Afghanistan National Development Strategy) sin "nisch" i program som är mer "bottom-up", såsom mänskliga rättigheter, genus och försörjningsmöjligheter och man har effektivt utnyttjat en begränsad grad av politiska påtryckningar kring dessa frågor.

Finlands användning av mekanismer för förenad finansiering har varit effektiv och lämplig, men kopplingen mellan projektresultat och fredsbyggande har inte visats. Finlands fortsatta stöd för budgeterat stöd genom fonder gemensamma för flera bidragsgivares vilka förvaltas av Världsbanken och Förenta nationerna (FN) uppmuntras genom alltmer transparenta budgetprocesser på centrala nivåer av Afghanistans förvaltning, särskilt från finansdepartementet. National Solidarity Programmes flaggskeppsprogram har haft uppmuntrandande resultat, men hållbarheten för samhällsutvecklande råd är tveksam, särskilt när budgeteringskapaciteten på provinsnivå fortfar att vara svag. Förvaltningsfonden för lag och ordning i Afghanistan administrerad av UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) som för det mesta betalar polisens löner undersöktes för korruption under 2012; trots att Finland stod bakom kraven på en undersökning, drog man slutsatsen att det skulle kunna leda till ovälkomna oroligheter om man drog sig tillbaka från grundläggande stöd av det här slaget till säkerhetssektorn.

Fredsbyggandet är ett flytande och oklart definierat begrepp, svårt att tillämpa programmässigt. Finlands deltagande i Afghanistans freds- och återintegreringsprogram (APRP: Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program) har i efterhand ifrågasatts, med tanke på nivåerna av fångad elit i processen. Mer allmänt är kopplingarna mellan projektresultat och fredsbyggande ofta spekulativa och övervakas sällan med avseende på specifika indikatorer. De gradvisa förbättringarna i till exempel Förenta nationernas projekt mot droger och brottslighet (UNODC: UN Office on Drugs and Crime) överskuggas av programmets allmänna misslyckande att minska produktion och handel med opium.

Även om blandningen av finska stödinstrument matchade strategin, kunde de inte ha förutsett den ökande "nedstängningen" när det gäller oberoende övervakning och nivåerna för fjärthantering som nu krävs. Finland skulle kunna dra nytta av en väl underbyggd riskanalys med realistiska kriterier för projektets fortsättning eller inskränkning. Korruptionen är den största utmaningen för förvaltningens legitimitet, men ökande "bunker-

sering” av stöd förvärrar givarnas ineffektivitet att ta itu med problemet. Mot bakgrund av ökande fjärrhantering krävs en ny strategi, en som inkluderar att bygga upp kapaciteten för nationella övervakningsinstitutioner.

### ***Samstämmighet i policy och resursallokering***

Efterlevnad av Finlands viktigaste politiska direktiv har varit optimal, och Finland har efterlevt sina åtaganden som stadfästs vid alla stora givarkonferenser, inklusive budgeterade utgifter. Förvaltningsfonden för den afghanska rekonstruktionen, ARTF (Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund) har presterat bra, särskilt med avseende på det nationella solidaritetsprogrammet (NSP), men de kumulativa ekonomiska fördelarna av utvecklingsprogrammet har inte blivit systematiskt dokumenterade. Kapacitetsutveckling och leverans av tjänster har tenderat att behandlas som två olika enheter, vilka inte är lätta att integrera. Inrättningen för investeringsanslag till mikrofinansiering i Afghanistan (MISFA: Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan, också “favoriserad” av Finland) fungerade inledningsvis väl, men drabbades av återbetalningskris 2008 och undermåliga prestationer från vissa kontrakterade mikrofinansinstitut.

Säkerhetssektorn och rättsstaten blev relativt försummade inom det internationella samfundets agenda för uppbyggnaden av staten fram till sent 2000-tal. Den potentiella (nyliga) överlappningen mellan civil krishantering inom EU:s polisinstitution (EUPOL) och budgeten för samarbetsutveckling tilldelad UNDP:s fond för lag och ordning i Afghanistan (LOTFA: Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan) framgår. Vi noterar, med ytterligare detaljer nedan att vissa finska kommentatorer har tagit upp frågor om det mervärde som Finland bringar till säkerhetssektorn mot bakgrund av oron kring ansvarsskyldighet och den låga nivån av civilt engagemang.

Utvärderingen konstaterar att den finska portföljen generellt är kostnadseffektiv, välplanerad, förutsägbar och lyhörd för behoven som uttrycks av statliga organ. Rationaliseringen av programmet från 2009 var nödvändig, så att personalen vid Finlands utrikesdepartement (UD) fick ökat utrymme för opinionsbildning på högre nivåer inom statsapparaten. Men målsättningarna med “förbättringar inom det civila samhället” hos fonden för lokalt samarbete (FLC) har fram till 2013 varit alltför ambitiösa i förhållande till tillgängliga val av partners bland icke-statliga organisationer (NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation) och magnituden på gällande projekt. Transaktionella kostnader fortfar att vara höga, men mervärdet som tillförs det här fältet av en liten givare som Finland kan och bör förstärkas med ökade resurser.

### ***Övergripande mål***

Finskt stöd till mänskliga rättigheter, särskilt kvinnors rättigheter, bedrivs mest effektivt genom gemensamma initiativ på hög nivå, särskilt inom den nordiska givargruppen. Det har också gjort det möjligt för Finland att utveckla en stark röst inom TMAF och de större poolade finansieringsmekanismerna (ARTF, LOTFA). Komplementärt till detta finns NGO-projekt som har investerat i människors kapacitet och överförbara färdigheter, vilket därmed introducerar internationella standarder i hittills försummade sektorer (journalistik, människorättsinstitutioner). Utbildningsprogrammen för kvinnliga journalister i Finland (och Afghanistan) bedömdes framgångsrika, även om vi noterade (som med polisutbildningen i Finland) att flera av dem som deltog begärde asyl när de befann sig i Finland.

I fråga om miljöfrågor var kapacitetsuppbyggnad i nationella miljöstyrelsen (NEPA: National Environment Protection Agency) under 2009 kärnan i tidigare arbete på miljöfrågor, och Finland har nyligen återupptagit sitt partnerskap med Förenta nationernas miljöprogram (UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme) genom en NGO som arbetar tillsammans med Bamyans universitet. Med tanke på Finlands långsiktiga globala partnerskap med UNEP, den senares relativt “neutrala” politiska ställning i landet, och sin bedömning av hur miljöfrågor är länkade med konflikt drivande frågor, är det förvånande att Finland inte har prioriterat denna under senare år.

Utvecklingen av en nationell handlingsplan för FN:s säkerhetsråds resolution (UNSCR: UN Security Council Resolution) 1325 har gått långsamt – en spegling av nationell (och FN:s) kapacitet – men processen är ofta lika viktig som produkten. I fråga om mänskliga rättigheter har Finland varit avgörande för att finansiera och i viss mån styra Afghanistans oberoende kommission för mänskliga rättigheter (AIHRC: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission) till dess nuvarande höga nationella profil. Kommissionen är ett exempel på ett oberoende statligt (i motsats till myndighet) organ med en unik profil och uppsökande verksamhet i de flesta provinser. Typiskt för framgångarna i Afghanistan är dock att AIHRC har drabbats av vissa problem med absorptionsförmågan då givare varit angelägna om att finansiera det.

### ***Biståndets effektivitet och utvecklingsresultat***

Geopolitiska intressen och kontrasterande mandat för ledande givare i Afghanistan har lett till en extrem snedvridning av biståndet under många år. Trots att detta gått så långt att det inte går att rätta till, har Finland framgångsrikt sökt en nära samordning med nordiska givare, likaväl som man upprätthållit sina åtaganden om proportionellt budgetstöd till Afghanistans regering. Som för många andra givare äventyras Finlands ambitioner när det gäller att balansera poolade fonder med bilaterala NGO-projekt av begränsningar (både finska och afghanska) i kapacitet och övervakning.

Finska rådgivare har från tid till annan postats i norr till Mazar-e-Sharifs provinsiella återuppbyggnadsteam (PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team, stängt 2014) där de övervakat program i norr där upp till 25% av de finska resurserna har anslagits. Finland finansierade ett flertal små projekt med snabb effekt (QUIP: Quick Impact Projects) genom PRT. Trots Finlands komfortabla proportion av utgifterna mellan den militära sektorn och utvecklingssektorn, återstår ännu att göra en tillförlitlig bedömning av PRT-modellen och dess effekter.

Ser man till resultatens livskraft på sikt, är det viktigt att gå tillbaka igen till de strukturer och drivande krafter i Afghanistan som på det hela taget är stick i stäv med den moderna statsmodell som förkunnas av internationella givare. Finland har inte fullt ut utnyttjat det mervärde som man skulle kunna bidra med till ett inkrementellt och ihållande stöd till entiteter i civilsamhället vilka kan ha ett bestående värde oavsett vilken statlig modell som växer fram i Afghanistan under de kommande åren.

### **Slutsatser och lärdomar**

- Omfattningen av Finlands program fastställs i hög grad av UNSCR-mandatet. Användningen av mekanismer för poolad finansiering har varit effektiv och lämplig, men kopplingen mellan projektresultat och fredsbyggande har inte visats. Riskanalysen och det strategiska gensvaret på den ökade "bunkerisering" är otillräckliga.
- Överensstämmelse med global finsk politik är bra, men tolkningen av principerna för bräckliga stater skulle kunna vara mer flexibel, särskilt när det gäller att bygga upp det civila samhället. Budgetering av resurser genom poolade fonder uppfyller åtagandena, men ekonomiska resultatindikatorer är fortfarande otillräckliga. Inom den civila krishantering behövs en ökad offentlig ansvarsskyldighet för säkerhetssektorns institutioner.
- Ifråga om kvinnor och mänskliga rättigheter är Finland mest effektivt inom Nordic+-gruppen. Stöd till Afghanistans oberoende kommission för mänskliga rättigheter (AIHRC) har varit viktigt från början. Framstegen på UNSCR 1325 sker långsamt. Enskilda NGO-projekt har ökat överförbara färdigheter, men är fortfarande ad hoc.
- Finland kan inte bekämpa snedvridningar orsakade av mycket större biståndsgivare. Det råder en oförenlig dikotomi mellan leverans och kapacitet på alla nivåer. Det återstår att fullt ut bedöma effekterna av modellen med provinsiella återuppbyggnadsteam (PRT).
- Det har varit för mycket fokus på att bilda centrala institutioner hörande till en «modern» stat, och inte tillräckligt på stegvis och ihållande stöd till det civila samhället för att motverka patriarkala överdrifter.

### **Rekommendationer**

- Mer specifika och detaljerade förslag för varje rekommendation som presenteras här kan hittas i avsnitt 7.
- Mer specifika målsättningar, processer för att uppnå dessa och effektindikatorer bör definieras i utformningen av programmen. Var och en av dessa bör vara tydligt relaterade till riktlinjerna och principerna för bräckliga stater.
- Man bör skifta NGO/FLC och gemensamma programprioriteringar mot sociala och ekonomiska sektorer. Integrerad programmering kan kräva att man arbetar inom särskilda geografiska områden.
- Reformstödet för säkerhetsområdet (SSR) bör flytta från teknisk assistans till att skapa en efterfrågan på människocentrerad SSR, inbegripet en mer direkt inblandning av det civila samhället.
- En tydligare genusstrategi, inbegripet realistiska startpunkter, bör utarbetas tillsammans med likasinnade givare. Detta bör innefatta en strategi för integrering av UNSCR 1325, och ett större deltagande av kvinnor i fredsprocessen.
- Mer kringskuren programmering bör innefatta riskanalys och en bedömning av hur man kan åstadkomma effektiv fjärrhantering.
- Stöd till det civila samhället bör innehålla en strategi för utveckling av kapacitet likaväl som ökad komplementaritet mellan valda aktiviteter.

## SUMMARY

### Introduction

This evaluation provides a study of Finland's development cooperation in Afghanistan from 2007–12. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive review of the achievements, contributions and weaknesses of Finnish development cooperation in supporting peace and development in Afghanistan. It seeks to provide lessons learned and recommendations that will support the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in designing policy and programme strategies to promote peace and development in fragile states.

The team developed an evaluation framework common to all of the case studies structured around four overarching evaluation questions. After a desk study was carried out involving document review and interviews in Helsinki, a short field visit was conducted in Kabul to gather additional evidence and triangulate preliminary findings from the desk study.

### Findings

#### *Relevance of support to the drivers of peace and development*

Finland to a large extent borrows its contextual analysis from reputable sources such as the World Bank, UN and other Nordic+ donors. In its internal comment on the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Finland locates its “niche” in more bottom-up programmes such as human rights, gender and livelihoods and has effectively exploited a limited degree of political leverage around these issues.

Finland's use of pooled funding mechanisms has been effective and appropriate, but linkages between project outcomes and peacebuilding are not proved. Finland's continuing support for on-budget support through multi-donor trust funds is encouraged by increasingly transparent budgetary processes at central levels of the Government of Afghanistan. The National Solidarity Programme has had encouraging results, but the sustainability of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) is questionable, particularly when the provincial level budgeting capacities remain weak. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) was investigated for corruption in 2012; though demanding an investigation, Finland concluded that withdrawing from basic security sector support such as this may incur unwelcome unrest.

Finland's involvement in the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is retrospectively questioned, given the levels of elite capture in the process. More broadly, the linkages between project outcomes and peacebuilding are often speculative and rarely monitored against specific indicators.

Though the mix of Finnish aid instruments matched the strategy, they could not have anticipated the increasing “shut down” in terms of independent monitoring and the levels of remote management now required. Finland could benefit from a well-argued risk analysis with realistic criteria for project continuation or curtailment.

#### *Policy coherence and resource allocation*

Compliance with Finland's key policy directives has been optimal, and Finland has adhered to its commitments made at all major donor conferences, including on-budget expenditures. The Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) has performed well, particularly the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), though the accrued economic benefits of the programme have not been systematically recorded. Capacity development and service delivery have tended to be treated as two different entities, not easily integrated.

The evaluation finds the Finnish portfolio to be generally cost-efficient, well-planned, predictable and responsive to needs expressed by government bodies. The rationalisation of the programme from 2009 was necessary, allowing Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) personnel greater scope for advocacy at higher levels of government. But until 2013, the “civil society enhancement” objectives of Local Cooperation Funds (FLC) have been too ambitious in relation to the available choice of non-governmental organisation (NGO) partners and the scale of projects undertaken. Transactional costs remain high, but the added value of a small donor such as Finland in this field could and should be reinforced with greater resources.



### ***Cross-cutting objectives***

Finnish support to human rights, notably women's rights, is pursued most effectively through high-level joint initiatives particularly within the Nordic+ group. It has also enabled Finland to develop a strong voice within the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) and the major pooled funding mechanisms (ARTF, LOTFA). Complementary to this are NGO projects that have invested in people's capacities and transferable skills, introducing international standards to hitherto neglected sectors (journalism, human rights institutions).

On environmental issues, capacity building in the National Environment Protection Agency in 2009 was at the heart of earlier work, and Finland has recently resumed its partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) through an NGO working alongside Bamyán University. Given Finland's long-term global partnership with UNEP, the latter's relatively "neutral" political standing in the country, and its assessment of how environmental issues link to drivers of conflict, it is surprising that this has not been a priority sector for Finland in recent years.

The development of a national action plan for UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 has been slow – a reflection of national (and UN) capacities – but the process is often as important as the product. On human rights, Finland has been instrumental in funding and to some extent guiding the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to its current high national profile.

### ***Aid effectiveness and development results***

Finland has successfully sought close coordination with Nordic+ donors, as well as upholding its commitments to proportional on-budget support to the Government of Afghanistan. Similar to many donors, Finland's ambitions with respect to balancing pooled funds with bilateral NGO projects are compromised by capacity (both Finnish and Afghan) and monitoring constraints.

Finland has not fully exploited the added value it could bring to incremental and sustained support to civil society entities that can be of lasting value irrespective of the state model that emerges in Afghanistan over the coming years.

### **Conclusions and lessons**

- Use of pooled funding mechanisms has been effective and appropriate, but linkages between project outcomes and peacebuilding are not proved. Risk analysis and the strategic response to increasing "bunkerization" are inadequate.
- Compliance with global Finnish policy is good, but interpretation of Fragile States principles could be more flexible, especially in relation to building civil society. On-budget resources through pooled funds meet commitments, but economic impact indicators are still insufficient. Within civil crisis management, greater public accountability is needed for security sector institutions.
- Regarding women's and human rights, Finland is the most effective within the Nordic+ group. Support to the AIHRC has been significant from the outset. Progress on UNSCR 1325 is slow. Individual NGO projects have increased transferrable skills but are still ad hoc.
- Finland cannot combat distortions caused by much larger aid donors. There is an irreconcilable dichotomy between delivery and capacity at all levels. The impact of PRT model has yet to be fully assessed.
- There has been too much emphasis on the formation of central "modern" state institutions, and not enough on incremental and sustained support to civil society to counterbalance patrimonial excesses.

### **Recommendations**

- More specific objectives, process towards achieving these, and impact indicators should be defined in the programme design. Each of these should relate clearly to Fragile State guidelines and principles.
- There should be a shift of NGO/FLC and joint programme priorities towards social and economic sectors. Integrated programming may require working in specific geographic areas.
- Security sector reform (SSR) should move from technical assistance towards creating demand for a people-centred SSR, including greater involvement of civil society.
- A clearer strategy on gender, including realistic entry points, should be devised in conjunction with like-minded donors. This should include a strategy for mainstreaming UNSCR 1325, and the greater involvement of women in the peace process.

- More circumscribed programming should include risk analysis and an assessment of how remote management can effectively be undertaken.
- Support to civil society should include a capacity development strategy as well as greater complementarity between chosen activities.

## Summary of key findings, conclusions and recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>To a large extent Finland borrows its contextual analysis from reputable sources such as World Bank, UN and other Nordic donors. Finland's continuing support for on-budget support through multi-donor trust funds (World Bank and UN) is encouraged by increasingly transparent budgetary processes at central levels of the government, but linkages between project outcomes and peacebuilding are often speculative and rarely monitored against specific indicators. This will be more difficult as access is impaired by security.</p>	<p>Scope of programme is largely determined by UNSCR mandate. Use of pooled funding mechanisms has been effective and appropriate, but linkages between project outcomes and peacebuilding need to be more explicit. Risk analysis and the strategic response to increasing "bunkerization" are inadequate.</p>	<p>1 More specific objectives, process towards achieving these, and impact indicators should be defined in the programme design. Each of these should relate clearly to fragile state guidelines and principles.</p>
<p>Finland has adhered to its commitments made at all major donor conferences, including on-budget expenditures. The ARTF has performed well (particularly the NSP), though the accrued economic benefits of the programme have not been systematically recorded. Capacity development and service delivery have tended to be treated as two different entities, not easily integrated. FLC has until 2013 been over-ambitious in relation to current NGO capacities.</p>	<p>Compliance with global Finnish policy is good, but interpretation of Fragile States principles could be more flexible, especially in relation to building civil society. On-budget resources through pooled funds meets commitments, but economic impact indicators are still insufficient. Within civil crisis management, greater public accountability is needed for security sector institutions.</p>	<p>2 There should be a shift of NGO/FLC and joint programme priorities towards social and economic sectors. Integrated programming may require working in specific geographic areas. 3 SSR should move from technical assistance towards creating demand for a people-centred SSR, including greater involvement of civil society.</p>
<p>On women's and human rights Finland is the most effective within Nordic+ group. Support to AIHRC has been important from the outset. Progress on UNSCR 1325 is slow. Individual NGO projects have increased transferrable skills but are still ad hoc.</p>	<p>Mainstreaming cross-cutting objectives (CCOs) in joint programming has been good, but the chosen range of individual projects for CCOs and the necessary degree of close supervision has been constrained by two factors: (a) the small number of development staff in the Embassy; and (b) the self-imposed criteria and fund application process that necessarily favours the small Afghan NGO elite in Kabul.</p>	<p>4 A clearer strategy on gender, including realistic entry points, should be devised in conjunction with like-minded donors. This should include a strategy for mainstreaming UNSCR 1325, and the greater involvement of women in the peace process.</p>

<p>Through the Nordic+ group, Finland's coherence and cooperation with like-minded donors has been very good and it may be able to retain some important influence beyond this transitional stage. The building of a "modern" state may have to be replaced by more adaptive incremental measures that ensure a continuing "voice" for those previously neglected sections of the population whose relative profile and power has slowly enabled a degree of checks and balances to be introduced in recent years – women, civil society, small businesses, etc.</p>	<p>Finland cannot combat distortions caused by much larger aid donors. There is an irreconcilable dichotomy between delivery and capacity at all levels. There has been too much emphasis on the formation of central "modern" state institutions, and not enough on incremental and sustained support to civil society to counterbalance patrimonial excesses.</p>	<p>5 More circumscribed programming should include risk analysis and an assessment of how remote management can effectively be undertaken.</p> <p>6 Support to civil society should include a capacity development strategy as well as greater complementarity between chosen activities.</p>
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## 1 INTRODUCTION

This report is one of four case studies that contribute to a strategic, thematic “Evaluation of Peace and Development in Finland’s Development Cooperation”. In compliance with the Terms of Reference (ToR) it is:

a comprehensive overall independent view on the achievements, contributions and weaknesses of Finnish development cooperation in supporting peace and development in fragile states. [It will] provide lessons learned from the past... and give recommendations on how to enhance the implementation of policy priorities in supporting peace and development through development cooperation.

Rather than being a conventional country programme evaluation, it focuses on the peace, security and development nexus. Fragility is interpreted here in a broad sense to encompass not only those states currently or recently in conflict, but also those that have an important role to play in regional stability and peacebuilding. The chosen case studies cover a spectrum from relative stability (Ethiopia) to those still in the midst of conflict (Afghanistan). The evaluation is geared towards the usability of findings both at headquarters and country levels; it is a learning process that captures how strategy is translated into action at the country level. It should also help support the implementation of the new *Fragile States Guidelines* published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA 2014).

The majority of Finnish development cooperation includes a wide range of interventions supporting conflict prevention and mitigation indirectly, with development cooperation being implemented in parallel with diplomacy, crisis management and humanitarian assistance. Hence, an important element of the evaluation is a contextual analysis of events over time, how Finnish development cooperation interplays with wider international development cooperation, and how strategy has evolved in relation to national priorities and policies. Humanitarian aid and civilian crisis management operations are not included in the scope of the evaluation, but we do explore the interface between development cooperation and other official development assistance (ODA)-financed activities at the country level. Likewise, individual projects will not be evaluated as such, but may be used to illustrate wider strategic learning.

The analysis and evaluation addresses both the “why?” questions flagged in the intervention logic(s) – the rationale for, and consequences of, decisions made by Finland over time; and the “how” questions – the manner in which policy has translated into action. In particular, we take the new guidelines on fragile states (MFA 2014) and retrospectively apply these to the case study, examining the extent to which Finnish interventions were aware of, and responsive to, the characteristics of fragility found in Afghanistan. Although our focus is on development cooperation, the continuity between this and the totality of Finland’s approach will be explored, as well as the leverage that development cooperation affords to political dialogue in Afghanistan.

## 2 APPROACH

### 2.1 Scope and purpose

This case study focuses on Finland’s country programme in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012. It is neither a country programme evaluation nor a project evaluation but rather a thematic evaluation to assess how Finnish development cooperation in Afghanistan has contributed to peace and development. The purpose of the case study is to raise issues, identify lessons and make recommendations on Finland’s contributions to peace and development in fragile states. The emphasis is therefore on this higher level of analysis and learning rather than the specifics of the country programme.

More specifically, the objective of the evaluation is to provide answers to four key evaluation questions set out in the ToR:

- 1 Has Finnish development cooperation provided relevant support to the drivers of peace and development in fragile states including poverty reduction? Have the choice and mix of sectors and instruments contributed to these targets?
- 2 What have been the mechanisms to integrate the Finnish development policy priorities also stipulated in the 2009 Guidelines “Development and Security, in Finland’s Development Policy”, in the country level interventions? Are development interventions on the ground complying with the priorities and thematic focuses of the development policies and the 2009 Guidelines?
- 3 How have the cross-cutting objectives (CCOs) been integrated in Finland’s development interventions in fragile states? How has their integration/non-integration affected identified and achieved results? What are the lessons learned and best practises in implementing the CCOs?
- 4 How have the aid effectiveness commitments been integrated in the Finnish development interventions? How has their application supported development results and the overall objective of peace and development? What have been the lessons learned and best practises?

The report begins by outlining the methodology for the case study, including limitations of the selected approach. Section 3 provides an outline of the country context, including an overview of the socioeconomic and political situation during the evaluation period, as well as global development assistance. Section 4 provides an overview of Finnish support to Afghanistan during the evaluation period as well as a detailed contextual analysis of the security-development nexus in Afghanistan. Section 5 presents key findings around the four evaluation questions, covering issues of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, coherence and coordination. In the final two sections, conclusions are drawn on the extent to which Finnish development cooperation has supported peace and development in Afghanistan, followed by recommendations to improve the implementation of policy priorities and the new Fragile States guidance.

## 2.2 Methodology and limitations

The Afghanistan case study evaluation was undertaken in three contiguous stages: (a) an inception phase; (b) a desk study phase, which included interviews in Helsinki with key MFA personnel as well as an analysis of strategy, programme, project memorandum, appraisal, monitoring and evaluation reports, internal memos and independent secondary sources; followed by (c) a “field” phase, which in the case of Afghanistan consisted of telephone/Skype interviews with key personnel and a brief visit to Kabul in May 2014. The work was undertaken by a team of two persons – one international (the evaluation team leader) and one national consultant.

### Evaluation approach

The case study team used a common evaluation framework, developed in the inception phase, for conducting analysis and gathering evidence. The framework set out between four and six sub-questions under each of the four overarching evaluation questions, together with indicators of success. The desk report presented an initial analysis against each sub-question and indicator, which enabled the team to develop a series of hypotheses to be tested and triangulated through field-level interviews and additional analysis.

The evaluation approach is centred on *intervention logic analysis*,<sup>1</sup> which was used to understand the theory behind Finland’s approach in Afghanistan and assess the results of Finnish engagement. To achieve this, we first reconstructed an intervention logic based on existing policy and planning documents as well as interviews. This set out Finland’s *planned* strategy for engagement in Afghanistan together with an elaboration of the critical assumptions that might have impeded achievement of outcomes. This was presented as part of the desk report. The intervention logic was then tested during the field phase to assess the extent to which it was (a) realistically assessed in terms of the underlying assumptions; (b) measurable, in terms of the kind of data analysis that was in place; and (c) realised in terms of what actually occurred within the lifetime of the programmes. The intervention logic is included in Annex 5 of this report; the accompanying analysis can be found in Section 5.5.

<sup>1</sup> According to EuropeAid’s evaluation methodology guidance, an intervention logic sets out “the expected effects of an intervention as well as the assumptions that explain how the activities will lead to the effects in the context of the intervention” (EuropeAid 2006).

Alongside the intervention logic analysis, our approach to assessing Finland's contribution to results in Afghanistan was guided by an adaptation of *contribution analysis*,<sup>2</sup> which was used to provide an account of not only why the observed results occurred (or not), but also other internal and external factors that influenced outcomes. It was used to confirm the intervention logic, providing evidence and a line of reasoning from which to draw plausible conclusions regarding the extent to which the programme has made an important contribution to the documented results. An analysis of Finnish contribution to results is set out in the findings and conclusions sections of this report.

### **Evaluation methodology**

In addition to the above analytical methods, three methodological tools were developed to contribute to our understanding of the “storyline” of Finnish engagement in Afghanistan: *contextual analysis*, *events timeline analysis* and *portfolio analysis*. A *contextual analysis* was conducted during the desk phase with the purpose of understanding the context in which Finnish interventions were implemented during the evaluation period, and to analyse the extent to which the country programme in Afghanistan was sensitive to country events, and was adjusted in response to changes in the conflict environment. The subsequent fieldwork used interviews with Finnish Embassy staff and other key stakeholders to add current trends and dynamics to the analysis. The contextual analysis is presented in Section 4.2 of this report.

An *events timeline analysis* was conducted alongside the contextual analysis during the desk study phase. This entailed setting out a selective listing of three concurrent elements in Afghanistan's recent history – major political/military events, events common to all donors, and a selection of project interventions or initiatives undertaken by Finland. The purpose in juxtaposing these three elements was to map the response of MFA to contextual and inter-donor events. This is far from an exhaustive list. There are, for instance, numerous non-governmental organisation (NGO) initiatives funded by MFA discussed in the main body of the report. The events timeline analysis is presented in Annex 4 of this report.

In addition, a *portfolio analysis* was conducted during the desk study phase. MFA disbursement data was collated and analysed with the purpose of constructing a picture of Finland's commitments and disbursements over the course of the evaluation period in Afghanistan, and understanding how these compare and fit with wider collective donor commitments. This analysis is presented in Section 3.4 and 4.1.

The following questions, supplementary to the key EQs, formed the basis of the interviews addressed to stakeholders in the country. These were tailored according to whom they are addressed, but as “key enquiries” they were applied across all stakeholders.

#### **Under evaluation question 1:**

- To what extent have the full set of MFA interventions (political dialogue, development initiatives and humanitarian action) been mutually reinforcing, and what evidence do we have for this?
- Has Finland been able to respond effectively to corruption by building capacity in the public administration and legal sectors, and what are the strengths/weaknesses and lessons derived from this?

#### **Under evaluation question 2:**

- With respect to statebuilding, how effectively have Finnish interventions addressed the inherent contradiction between building donor-compliant parallel funding structures (pooled funds, etc.) and on-budget government facilities?
- Although they use relatively small funding, to what extent have FLC project funds been a “litmus test” for challenges inherent in building local capacities, and how have these challenges been addressed?

#### **Under evaluation question 3:**

- To what extent, and how effectively, have Finnish interventions championed the causes of women's participation in public life, and have these efforts demonstrated a degree of lasting value in an extremely conservative milieu?

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<sup>2</sup> Contribution Analysis is an approach developed by John Mayne that seeks to provide “reasonable evidence about the contribution being made by the programme” through verifying the intervention logic or theory of change on which a programme is based and exploring other factors that influence outcomes (Mayne 2008).

- Have there been effective follow-up and dissemination strategies in capturing learning from, for example, the exchange programmes sponsored by Finland and the efforts towards promoting UN Resolution 1325?
- To what extent has there been a thorough appraisal of lessons learned from Finland's interventions in the illicit poppy cultivation sector?

#### **Under evaluation question 4:**

- What kind of trade-off is expected when Finland depends on donor coordinated joint structures (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund – ARTF, etc.) to address needs on the ground, and does this strategy effectively address statebuilding?
- How has Finland, as a relatively small donor, tackled the recognised danger of “political hijacking” of aid, and are there mitigating approaches that have demonstrable success in minimising this.

#### **Methodological limitations**

The major methodological limitation arose as a result of high levels of insecurity in Afghanistan at the time of the planned field visit. As a result, it was only possible to conduct a brief visit to Kabul in May 2014, where the team was restricted to conducting semi-structured interviews with representatives from Finland's Embassy in Kabul, representatives from the main development donors, UN representatives and NGO implementing partners. Although the original intention was to focus on a couple of specific illustrative projects as a purposive “sample” of Finnish development cooperation, there was neither an opportunity to visit project sites in Afghanistan, nor to conduct focus group discussions with project recipients. Moreover, as a result of the limited time in-country due to high-security threats (the Afghanistan Presidential elections compounding the usual security alert situation) we were unable to visit government ministries and consequently had no contact with government officials. This is a major constraint to the findings contained here: we could not explore government opinions regarding the Finnish programme. However, since this was not a country programme evaluation we were not tasked to verify project results. What is reflected in the following report is an appraisal of documentary evidence backed by opinions and insights from Finland's key implementing partners in the country.

A further limitation in relation to evaluating Finland's portfolio was that the MFA literature acquired by the team was almost entirely restricted to 2–3 page annual embassy reports per project. Figures on planned disbursements are given, but without actual dates; and levels of monitoring are – understandably in many cases, particularly the earlier projects – only cursory. There is an obvious reliance on partner monitoring reports, with occasional opportunities for MFA personnel to undertake field visits to project sites, though even these have been curtailed in the last two years. In addition to project reports, there were occasional “think pieces” available reflecting either the views of the incumbent MFA Kabul Embassy development advisor or an overview of extant literature (e.g. a note on “ownership” in Afghanistan in 2009) (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2009). Presentations to the Quality Board (per project) were also available, as were minutes of the Board. Again, these were only a broad summary of interventions undertaken, with the underlying assumption that the implementing partner would provide detailed results monitoring.

The reliance on partners to provide regular monitoring and occasional independent evaluations was confirmed by the MFA in Kabul. For the large pooled funds (ARTF, LOTFA) the quality and frequency of reporting appears to have been optimal given operational constraints in Afghanistan. With the smaller FLC and international/NGO funded projects, mostly implemented by NGOs, the frequency and quality was not always guaranteed; we further comment on this below. We found no NGO project outcome reports; only data referring to disbursements and project completion. Input/output data was available for most projects, but very little on medium-term outcomes or impact, other than the overall sector reports of implementing agencies. This presented obvious constraints to an evaluation of the specific contribution, and/or added value, imputed to Finland. In tracing the intervention logic from medium to high-level outcomes, we have therefore relied heavily on qualitative data from individual interviews, including perceptions on the added value a relative small donor can bring to a crowded donor arena.



## 3 COUNTRY CONTEXT

### 3.1 Social and economic indicators

In the last three years Afghanistan has sustained a robust economic growth. Favourable harvests ensured that gross domestic product (GDP) growth rose from 7,3% in 2011 to 11,8% in 2012. Inflation dropped to 6,4% and continuing high levels of aid helped to build up further international reserves (World Bank 2013). However, business confidence is still low, with limited private sector activity and a depreciating exchange rate. The banking sector has yet to fully recover from the 2010 corruption crisis in the Kabul Bank. The increase in on-budget aid has posed some major challenges to the government's capacity to manage and execute the national budget, particularly in the social sector. Domestic revenues remain low due to a narrow tax base and poor performance in the collection of customs revenues.

The largest contributor to GDP is the service sector (60%), including transportation and telecommunications. Some 30% of the total road network of about 42 150km is rehabilitated and paved (World Bank 2012). For the vast majority of the population, though, production from the land is what really counts. Agriculture accounts for 25–30% of GDP, depending on annual output, with wheat accounting for approximately 60% of this as the most important licit crop in the country. However, approximately one-third of the wheat production is rainfed, making agricultural output highly dependent on rainfall. Wheat production peaked in 2009 (5,1 million tonnes), dropped in 2011 (3,4 million tonnes) and rose again in 2012 (5 million tonnes) (ReliefWeb 2013).

Poppy cultivation and related processing and trade in illegal narcotics in 2011 was estimated to make up some 25–30% of the country's economy (Government of Finland 2011). Illicit opium is still the most important cash crop, though measuring opium production as part of the national income is not straightforward. Although the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated farm-gate incomes at about 3,3% of GDP in 2012, this does not include the processing and trading that might at least double that figure. Opium production peaked in 2007 (8 000 tonnes), dropped considerably by 2010 (3 500 tonnes) but again rose in 2011 (almost 6 000 tonnes), and is expected to remain high in 2013 (UNODC 2013). Oil accounted for only 1,8% of GDP in 2012, but is expected to rise considerably in the next few years. Also, the addition of new gas reserves from Sherberghan (Jowzjan Province) will increase fertilising and power plant production in Mazar-e-Sharif.

Significant progress has been made concerning community development. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), the government's flagship programme for community development supported by multiple donors, has disbursed about US\$950 million between 2002 and 2010 for block grants to communities (up to US\$60 000 per grant) to finance projects selected by them through an elected Community Development Council (CDC). Since its establishment in 2003, it has reached all 34 provinces and resulted in the establishment of 27 360 CDCs, which have undertaken almost 60 000 locally identified projects (IEG 2012).

Despite strong economic growth in recent years, Afghanistan remains extremely poor. Productivity and growth in the labour market are inhibited by corruption, weak government capacity and poor public infrastructure. The combination of unemployment and under-employment indicates that about 25% of the labour force in the country is not gainfully employed (CSO 2014). Living standards are among the lowest in the world, with the World Health Organization (WHO) estimating life expectancy as 59 for males and 61 for females. Infant mortality (the probability of dying under the age of five) is ranked among the highest in the world at 101 deaths per 1 000 live births (Australian Government 2013). Despite these sobering statistics, the number of functioning health facilities increased from 496 in 2002 to more than 2 000 in 2011. The number of trained midwives increased from 467 in 2003 to more than 1 950 by 2010 and the proportion of skilled health workers that were female increased from 25 to 72% in the same period, with an estimated 85% of the population now having access to a basic package health services compared with a mere 9% in 2003 (United States 2011).

Four decades of conflict in Afghanistan have been one of the key drivers of displacement, creating substantial refugee populations requiring support. Around 2,7 million Afghans live in Pakistan and Iran, while within the country, 450 000 people are displaced; 34% of them newly displaced in the first three-quarters of 2012 (IRIN 2013). Meanwhile, UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) informs that nearly six million ref-

ugees have returned to Afghanistan in the last decade, something that has put considerable pressure on the economy and services.

Afghanistan is currently in a state of transition. At the January 2010 London conference, Afghanistan and the international community agreed a phased transition for withdrawing troops, endorsed by NATO ministers and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in April, and detailed at the July 2010 Kabul Conference. It was agreed that full responsibility for security would be handed over to the Afghan National Security Forces by the end of 2014. This will undoubtedly have a profound and lasting impact on the country's economy and development prospects. Although not immediate, overall there will be a decline in international development assistance on which Afghanistan has relied since 2001. The increase of oil production in Amu Darya should offset this to some extent, but improvements in the legal and regulatory environment of mining are much needed to secure planned investment.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, the April 2014 presidential election took place without a clear winner, and at the time of writing the disputed ballot count had yet to be resolved. The spike of insurgent attacks at the start of 2014 was a reminder of widespread concerns about security situation ahead of the presidential elections.

### **3.2 Support to peace and development in Afghanistan**

The growing insurgency in 2006 took the donor community by surprise, rapidly inflated the cost of operating and, to some extent, increased competition over resources and “clients” between military and development actors (Bennett 2009). The newly emerging paradigm was that security increases with economic development and vice versa, hence the emphasis on “hearts and minds” projects that skewed development assistance in favour of insecure areas. The paradigm has proved controversial; it led to a spate of rushed funding lacking conflict sensitivity, accentuated by a high turnover of staff in donor agencies. This was not, of course, the case for all donors, but all were affected by the behaviour of a few.

A recent independent study of the flagship NSP (funded through the ARTF) found that the introduction of the NSP and the formation of CDCs led to a significant improvement in villagers' perception of their economic wellbeing and in their attitudes towards the government. At the same time, though, there were no notable improvements on the security situation in and around villages. The correlation between security and macro-level economic improvement remains untested; but at the micro-level, insecurity relates to a much wider set of variables (Beath, Christia and Enikolopov 2013). Another study confirmed the destabilising aspects of the war-aid economy that has fuelled corruption and delegitimised the government (Fishtein and Wilder 2012).

Security provisions necessary for the delivery of international aid have significantly increased overall costs. Yet without improvements to the economic and social situation of Afghanistan, security and safety alone will not bring peace to the country and its people. Sustainable security requires political, social and economic stability; and one of the biggest obstacles to this is corruption. According to the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index, a ranking published annually by Transparency International, Afghanistan has ranked 174 out of 176 countries with a score of 8 out of 100 (where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as highly transparent) (Transparency International 2012). According to a recent report by the Independent Joint Anticorruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), the cost of corruption in Afghanistan is nearly US\$3 billion every year.<sup>4</sup>

### **3.3 Development assistance to Afghanistan**

Virtually the entire development budget of Afghanistan is currently funded by donors and the overall volume of civilian aid to Afghanistan from 2002–11 exceeded US\$57 billion. International assistance to the country

<sup>3</sup> A new mining law was approved in the Lower House in April 2014, it still needs to be approved by the Upper House and the President.

<sup>4</sup> The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) (<http://www.mec.af/>) is a Kabul-based independent body that reports to the public, president, parliament and international community. The figures here were quoted by Sima Ghani in “Afghan Govt Graft on the Rise”, Tolo News, March 2014.

comes from over 50 development partners; 10 of whom have provided 85% of development assistance, with the USA providing 43% (Wilton Park, 2013). A one-year snap shot of the top 10 donors is presented in Table 1. Although there has been no comprehensive evaluation of overall international aid to the country, a recent Synthesis Paper commissioned by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group examines and compares the major evaluations completed over the past 10 years, finding that output indicators in virtually every sector have improved dramatically, including primary health, basic education, power supplies, transport, irrigation, and community development (Inder Sud, 2013).

**Table 1** Top ten donors of gross ODA to Afghanistan (2011–12 average) (US\$ millions).

No.	Country	US\$m
1	United States of America	2 924
2	Japan	812
3	Germany	527
4	United Kingdom	433
5	EU institutions	310
6	Australia	193
7	AsDB special funds	178
8	Canada	164
9	IDA	163
10	Turkey	141
<b>17</b>	<b>Finland</b>	<b>28*</b>

Source: Compiled from various OECD/DAC reports, [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org).

NB: This figure is for 2012 alone, taken from OECD/DAC 2013.

The multi-donor trust funds (World Bank-administered ARTF and the newly established Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund managed by Asian Development Bank) have proved to be the most successful vehicles for on-budget assistance to the Afghan government. They have played an important role in supporting some of the key government priorities, covered recurring costs of the Afghan civil service, and have critical importance to donors for harmonising their approaches over dialogue with the government on reforms and coordination in programme design.

The 2012 TMAF called for more aid on-budget, but there is still donor hesitancy over the government's absorptive and implementation capacity. TMAF has nevertheless become the main in-country donor coordination mechanism; Finland is represented by the revolving chair of the Nordic+ donors.<sup>5</sup>

## 4 FINLAND'S SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN 2007–12


### 4.1 Overview of Finnish development cooperation and financial disbursements 2007–12

Finland has been committed to long-term cooperation with Afghanistan since it first pledged development funding in 2002. From 2002–10 about €120 million in development aid funds was channelled to the country. From 2010–13 a further €74,2 million in development cooperation was spent with an average of some €18,5 million/year (MFA 2010b). The OECD reported that Finland's gross ODA for Afghanistan from 2008–10 was US\$27 million, making it the third largest country recipient of Finnish aid after Tanzania and Mozambique (OECD 2012).

<sup>5</sup> Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Estonia, Belgium.

The Finnish Liaison Office was converted into an Embassy in January 2006. By 2012, the total ODA budget was almost €26 million (Figure 1) and is set to increase to some €30 million in 2014. Development cooperation is essentially divided between three components – multilateral, NGO and FLC projects. We have added humanitarian and civilian crisis management expenditures and presented the overall disbursements for 2010–13 in Figure 1.

**Figure 1** Afghanistan: Finland’s disbursements between 2007 and 2012 (€ thousands).



Source: OECD/DAC database, [www.oecd.org/dac/stats](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats)

Note: Numbers include all aid from Finland, including humanitarian assistance.

MFA development cooperation efforts and the targeting of funds have been prioritised as follows:

- Promoting democracy, good governance and the rule of law principle through, for example, developing regional and local governance.
- Supporting activities related to human rights and equality as well as education, particularly securing the right of girls to receive formal education.
- Improving the conditions for Afghanistan’s own economic activity and participatory economic growth, and the sustainable use of natural resources. The White Paper states: “There will be a special focus on improving Afghanistan’s capacity to make use of and supervise its natural resources in a manner that benefits Afghan society as a whole.

**Table 2** Finland's project support disbursements 2010–13 (€ millions).

Project	2010	2011	2012	2013	TOTAL
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)	6.00	7.0	8.45	10.05	<b>31.5</b>
UNDP's Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA)	1.00	1.5	1.5	2.35	<b>6.35</b>
Provincial Drug Control Programme (UNODC)	1.00	1.50	1.55	0*	<b>4.05</b>
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)	0.90	0.40	0.40	0.40	<b>2.10</b>
Reproductive Health Programme (Marie Stopes International)	0.40	0.40	0.50	0.50	<b>1.80</b>
Support for the Parliamentary elections (UNDP)	0.25	0	0	0	<b>0.25</b>
Police–Prosecutor Coordination Rule of Law Training Programme (Crisis Management Centre Finland)	0.38	0.12	0.20	0.08	<b>0.78</b>
Capacity Building Programme on Migration Management for the Afghan National Assembly and Civil Service (IOM)	0	0.12	0	0	<b>0.12</b>
Increasing the Capacity of Mining Authorities (Afghanistan Geological Survey) (GTK)	0	0.10	0	0.46	<b>0.56</b>
Developing Afghanistan's National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and Related Resolutions (UN Woman)	0	0	0	0.30	<b>0.30</b>
Development cooperation and small projects through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Mazar-e-Sharif, Northern Afghanistan (Embassy of Finland in Kabul)	0.86	0.75	0.98	0.97	<b>3.56</b>
Fund for Local Cooperation	0.30	0.45	0.61	0.50	<b>1.86</b>
Support to Finnish NGOs and their local partners	1.21	1.73	1.78	1.46	<b>6.18</b>
Humanitarian aid	1.60	2.00	2.30	2.00	<b>7.90</b>
Humanitarian mine action	1.59	1.63	1.50	1.58	<b>6.30</b>
Civilian crisis management	3.04	4.00	4.35	3.81	<b>15.20</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18.54</b>	<b>21.70</b>	<b>24.12</b>	<b>24.45</b>	<b>88.81</b>

Source: Figures provided by MFA Kabul.

NB: The UNODC commitment for 2013 was disbursed in 2014.

A significant proportion of Finnish assistance has been through pooled funding mechanisms administered by World Bank (ARTF) and UN (LOTFA) with the rationale that this increases efficiency, avoids corruption and maximises results. Within ARTF Finland has, since 2007, allocated between 25–50% to core funding of recurring and administrative costs, mostly salaries. The Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) was preferred until 2010; Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Project (AREDP) was preferred 2011–13; Community Recovery Intensification Programme (CRIP) was preferred in 2011; and NSP was preferred every year.

**Table 3** Division of ARTF funding provided by Finland (€ millions).

Project	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Recurrent Cost Window and Investment Window/un-preferred	2.50	3.19	1.50	1.75	4.23	5.03	4.50
National Solidarity Programme	1.10	1.60	2.25	1.75	2.11	2.51	2.25
Microfinance for Poverty Reduction Project (MISFA)	1.40	1.60	2.25	0	0	0	0
Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Project (AREDP)	0	0	0	1.75	2.11	2.51	0
Community Recovery Intensification and Prioritisation (CRIP)	0	0	0	1.75	0	0	0
Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.25
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>6.40</b>	<b>6.00</b>	<b>7.00</b>	<b>8.45</b>	<b>10.05</b>	<b>9.00</b>

Source: Figures provided by MFA Kabul.

Support for rule of law has been extended through the UNDP-administered Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). The Fund is used to pay police officers' and Central Prison Department guards' salaries, build infrastructure such as police check points, and support the professionalisation of police officers. LOTFA also supports the functional and operational capacity of Family Response Units and Gender and Human Rights Units and works with MoI and other partners to ensure safe and equal working environment for both men and women police.

Civilian crisis management is not a direct subject of the evaluation, but security sector reform is inextricably linked to wider stabilisation concerns in Afghanistan. Finland's civilian crisis management programme increased threefold from 2008 to 2012. Most Finnish assistance in this sector is towards the EU police mission (EUPOL) that acts as an advisor in strategic development of the Afghan Ministry of Interior. EUPOL also provides special training for the police and prosecution authorities with a particular emphasis on building capacities to promote the rule of law and human rights. Through the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) in Kuopio, Finland, the MFA has trained more than 20 Afghan officials from the police and prosecution services during a pilot phase from 2009–11. The purpose was to mentor Afghan police officers and prosecutors in best coordination practices; the project also included creation of Police-Prosecutor Cooperation Manual, which is now in use all over Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan there has not been a civilian police force as such. With capacity constraints in the national army, much of the burden of counter-insurgency has also fallen to the 150 000 police force. Likewise, there has been poor cooperation between the police and judiciary, so the focus of the EUPOL mission has been on developing the Afghan police and prosecution at the central level, along with management training and certain special training areas.

Inside Afghanistan there has been a close relationship between military and civilian crisis management programmes. Finnish ISAF forces have been deployed together with Swedes in the Mazar-e-Sharif Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) covering four provinces of Northern Afghanistan: Balkh, Jawzjan, Samangan and Sar-e Pol. They numbered 145 military personnel in 2012, having particularly strong cooperation with Sweden. About 25% of Finnish aid has been channelled to Northern Afghanistan. Some (but by no means all) was through the PRT,<sup>6</sup> now re-named the Transitional Support Unit (it will close in 2014).

**Table 4** Division of Finnish development cooperation and small projects through the PRT, Mazar-e-Sharif (€ millions).

Project	2010	2011	2012	2013
Safe drinking water, sanitation and hygiene – project in schools (UNICEF)	0.50	0.50	0.50	0
Afghan Sub-national Governance Programme (UNDP)	0	0	0	0.50
Support for girls' education and equality (The Swedish Afghanistan Committee)	0	0	0.20	0.20
QIP in Mazar (including project support costs) (Finnish PRT)	0.36	0.25	0.28	0.27
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.86</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.98</b>	<b>3.56</b>

Source: Figures provided by MFA Kabul.

A prominent niche for Finland has been the promotion of the role of women in governance, the security sector and in access to judicial processes. Police training currently involves little or no training in gender-based violence or women's rights, particularly as training has been increasingly focused on counter-insurgency and security skills rather than crime prevention, crime solving and community policing. The Afghan government has failed to take proactive measures to prevent gender-based violence, investigate crimes, prosecute perpetrators, and ensure victims' safety and access to services (Human Rights Watch 2009). The reform of the legal sector has been slow and largely disconnected from the wider reform of the security sector (MFA 2009b).

Finland has spearheaded the promotion of Action Plans for UN Resolution 1325 (in Kenya and Nepal, for instance) and attempted to develop a national action plan (NAP) for Afghanistan (a signatory to the Resolution) to be developed by the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finland initially worked directly through the Af-

<sup>6</sup> The 25% commitment was dropped in 2013, with funding now being needs based.

ghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embedding a National 1325 Programme Coordinator in the Ministry since 2012, and from 2013 worked with UN Women as the designated implementing agency. Although the NAP has yet to be signed, the optimistic view is that with the draft now in place, it will be signed by the end of 2014.<sup>7</sup>

In addition, the UN Women's Livelihood Development for Self-Employment and Job Creation project was supported with €170 000 annually for the years 2009–11. With respect to improving the rights of women and children as well as other vulnerable groups (e.g. the disabled and prisoners), Finland has given significant and sustained support to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) which promotes human rights education: child rights, women's rights, transitional justice, monitoring and investigation and the rights of persons with disabilities.

Since 2007 Finland has funded UNODC in its efforts to tackle the illicit drug production and trade in Afghanistan through the Strengthening Provincial Capacity for Drug Control project. Finland has provided a total of about US\$14m, much of which has been on capacity building and livelihood initiatives. The UNODC project has had four objectives: (a) physical and operational capacity building for the Ministry of Counter Narcotics; (b) technical capacity building and the development of reporting and analysis systems for the Ministry of Counter Narcotics; (c) support for counter narcotics public awareness and pre-planting campaigns; and (d) support for the implementation of high impact alternative livelihoods activities. Finland and Sweden were the first two donors, later joined by Canada, Denmark, Japan and the UK.

Finland's chosen partner in addressing the huge challenge of reproductive health in Afghanistan has been Marie Stopes International, an organisation that offers health care services in clinics across the country, disseminating information about health and hygienic and improving the functional preparedness of local health care staff and communities. The organisation helps around 200 000 Afghans yearly (Mäkinen 2010). In 2010–11 Finland supported the organisation with €400 000 per year; for the period 2012–14 the allocated budget is €500 000 annually.

Currently 10 Finnish NGOs have MFA funded projects in Afghanistan. Many of them focus on the health and rural sectors and/or promote especially the rights of women and disabled people. Also the Finnish NGO Foundation for Human Rights (KIOS) supports Afghan civil society partners.

Finland's participation in the International Afghanistan Contact Group's work allows it to be involved in the international debate on Afghanistan and stay informed on the country's development. The Contact Group is supported by four working groups focused on long-term commitment, transition, the reconciliation process and reintegration. On regional issues, in 2010 Finland (with a contribution of €5,6 million) joined a World Bank-managed fund supporting the reconstruction and stabilisation of Pakistani areas bordering Afghanistan – those that have particularly challenging conditions in terms of socioeconomic development. Finland ranks as the fifth largest supporter of the fund.

Finally, on humanitarian issues, Finland's has responded to the UN's consolidated appeals for Afghanistan, allocating increasing resources to UNHCR,<sup>8</sup> United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the Red Cross Movement for their emergency interventions. In addition, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been supported to train parliamentarians and civil servants in issues relating to policy on refugees and migrants. Finland has also given long-term support (approximately €1,5 million/year) to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Halo Trust in their work in helping clear the country of mines and ordnance.

## 4.2 Contextual analysis

The following analysis is taken from three main sources: discussions held with stakeholders in Kabul and elsewhere in the course of the evaluation; prior in-country experience and sources of the evaluation team, including participation in recent multi-actor conflict analyses;<sup>9</sup> and reputable current literature concerning Afghani-

<sup>7</sup> Interview with UN Women, May 2014.

<sup>8</sup> This is a regional grant supporting Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.

<sup>9</sup> Wilton Park, ODI and Oxford University.

stan. We have also prepared a timeline of key events across the evaluation period from 2007–12 (Annex 4), a selective listing of three concurrent elements in Afghanistan’s recent history – major political/military events, events common to all donors, and a selection of project interventions or initiatives undertaken by Finland. The purpose in juxtaposing these three elements is to map the response of MFA Finland to contextual and inter-donor events. In answering our four evaluation questions, we will reference some of these events while examining the flexibility of the given response to emerging events, as well as the effectiveness of the chosen instruments.

“Taking context as the starting point” (OECD/DAC 2007) requires a thorough and sound information base. Afghanistan is probably one of the most analysed countries in the world,<sup>10</sup> but this has not necessarily translated to applied knowledge. Our starting point should be that Afghanistan is a country, not a war. If seen purely through the prism of war, the short-term demand for “stabilisation”, defined essentially by external actors, engulfs and obscures those developmental concerns whose trajectory is much longer than the latest phase of foreign occupancy.

The departure of the ISAF combat troops under NATO command by the end of 2014 (to be replaced by a Resolute Support mission focusing on training and advice) has to some extent sharpened the debate over medium-term priorities in this “fragile” state. Rather than using blanket terms such as “insurgents”, a more subtle contextual analysis is required that takes in geographical, economic class and gender issues. Political geography is of huge importance and the strength of regional identities – as well as informal and local structures – in rural Afghanistan exist precisely because of the long history of conflict and problematic relations with the state. Even in very recent history new provinces have been created to accommodate and assimilate powerful individuals. Throughout its history, a political equilibrium between competing elites has been reached in Afghanistan without the central state achieving an overall monopoly of power, force or revenue collection (Imrichová 2011).

Poverty kills more Afghans than those who die as a direct result of the armed conflict (UNHCR 2010).<sup>11</sup> The language of poverty reduction in Afghanistan often assumes that the correlates of poverty – few assets, poor health and low income, for example – are the causes of poverty. This can sometimes overlook the structures that given rise to poverty differences – within the village, between villages, between districts and between provinces. The starting point for any useful contextual analysis of Afghanistan’s predominantly rural society is the immediate environment of the village and the social and power relations within it – for example those of gender and exclusion. Beyond this are the associated social and political relations. Recent research has confirmed that broadly speaking the more egalitarian, less hierarchical subsistence societies are in the north and central mountain areas (e.g. Badakshan, Balkh), whereas the relatively richer but socially less equal, and more hierarchical, agricultural surplus societies are in the plains (e.g. Kandahar, Helmand, Nangarhar, Herat) (Pain and Kantor 2010).

Corruption has become a major concern in Afghanistan. In 2008 the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA)<sup>12</sup> – the primary data source for poverty analysis and household wellbeing in Afghanistan – identified four main causes of Afghanistan’s vulnerability to corruption: weak state institutions and rule of law, the illicit drug market, vertical layers of contracting and sub-contracting; and the huge inflow of foreign funds (Icon-Institute 2008). Afghan “opinion surveys” – the latest tool in a country awash with political analysis<sup>13</sup> – suggest that spending too much too quickly with too little oversight in insecure environments is “a recipe for fuelling corruption, de-legitimizing the Afghan government, and undermining the credibility of international actors” (Wilder and Gordon 2009). Most surveys underline the fact that corruption is a key source of discontent, and that international aid organisations rarely appreciate, let alone address, the danger that their assistance will exacerbate this (Civil-Military Fusion Centre 2012).

<sup>10</sup> According to Thompson (2012), by late 2012 there were about 13 000 titles listed in the library of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), an independent research institute in Kabul.

<sup>11</sup> The foregoing analysis also draws on Bennett *et al.* 2012.

<sup>12</sup> This has been superseded by NRVA 2011/12, published in February 2014, but we quote the earlier version since it covers the main part of the evaluation period.

<sup>13</sup> The Asia Foundation, ICG and Tufts University have headed the plethora of opinion surveys currently available. There has been some concern that these polls have disproportionate influence, e.g. Lough 2012.



We should not under-estimate the impact of more than a decade of substantial foreign assistance. The World Bank has raised concerns over the severe economic distortions this has caused. For example, with unemployment at about 36–40%, there is an overreliance on service sector jobs based around the presence of international actors (e.g. guards, drivers, the property letting market), and a property bubble exists in the main cities (World Bank Afghanistan Country Team 2011).

The discourse over humanitarian space extends to “political space”. For Finland, as with many donors, the issue is particularly acute in Afghanistan in two respects – its relationship to the government, and its placement within the ISAF mission. No donor is politically neutral, and the statebuilding agenda goes hand in hand with working closely with a government whose legitimacy and acceptance is questioned by significant sections of the population. The distinctions between a “neutral” donor, the “Western-led” military agenda and the quest to build a modern state are not made precisely because those distinctions are not understood on the ground. The push towards a centralised state runs contrary to Afghanistan’s historical propensity for localised power bases, and the challenge is how to promote wider democratic practice (civil society, women) while retaining a working partnership with government institutions. The “New Deal” for engagement in fragile states emphasised country ownership and leadership, and widely influenced the approach particularly of European donors (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2011). Recognising the importance of statebuilding per se, it also challenges international donors to work more closely with NGOs/CDCs, shifting the emphasis from “supply” to more “demand-side” activities (such as support to civil society, anticorruption awareness and to the media). In Afghanistan this would also imply a more thorough screening of NGOs for political affiliation and possible bias.

We are aware that as a relatively small donor, the effectiveness of Finnish support relates very much to that of the larger multilateral entities to which it contributes. The weight of evaluation questions therefore shift to aid effectiveness and the strategic decisions made by MFA development cooperation to maximise the impact of its contribution. Moreover, although ODA contributions outside of development cooperation are not the focus of this evaluation, the security-development nexus is nowhere more prescient than in Afghanistan. Therefore, the interface between humanitarian, development and civil crisis management is extremely important, and will be further explored below.

## 5 EVALUATION OF PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND’S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH AFGHANISTAN

Our four main evaluation questions agreed at the inception stage and common to all four case studies in this evaluation were as follows:

- 1 Has Finnish development cooperation provided relevant support to the drivers of peace and development including poverty reduction? Have the choice and mix of sectors and instruments contributed to these targets, and recognised issues of fragility in the country/region?
- 2 What have been the mechanisms to integrate Finnish development policy priorities (stipulated in the 2009 guidelines “Development and security in Finland’s development policy”) in country-level interventions? Are development interventions on the ground complying with the priorities and thematic focuses of the development policies and the 2009 guidelines?
- 3 How have the cross-cutting objectives been integrated in Finland’s development interventions in fragile states? How has their integration/non-integration affected identified and achieved results? What are the lessons learned and best practices in implementing cross-cutting objectives?
- 4 How have the aid effectiveness commitments been integrated in the Finnish development interventions? How has their application supported development results and the overall objective of peace and development?

Here we capture the key findings of the evaluation based around the four Evaluation Questions and their corresponding judgement criteria. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact,

sustainability, coordination and coherence) are addressed within the judgement criteria (i.e. sub-questions). We recall that this is neither a country programme evaluation as such; nor a project(s) evaluation. It is a thematic evaluation wherein the evaluation questions, common to all our case studies (Afghanistan, Palestine, Ethiopia and Western Balkans) are formulated to raise issues, lessons learned and recommendations on Finland's contributions to peace and development in fragile states. The emphasis is therefore on this higher level of analysis and learning rather than the specifics of each programme.

## 5.1 Relevance of support to the drivers of peace and development

This section addresses whether Finnish development cooperation provided relevant support to the drivers of peace and development, including poverty reduction, and whether the choice of mix of sectors and instruments contributed to these targets, and recognised issues of fragility in Afghanistan.

### Box 1 Summary of key findings for evaluation question 1.

Finland's involvement in Afghanistan is based on the UN Security Council mandate and in turn is related to its commitments through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The rationale for the associated development cooperation can be found in the government White Paper on Afghanistan and the 2009 Afghanistan Action Plan. These reflect a general consensus among donors on what defines "fragility" in the country. In promoting its inter-departmental "comprehensive approach" Finland to a large extent borrows its contextual analysis from reputable sources such as World Bank, UN and other Nordic donors. But its comment on the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) locates the Finnish "niche" in more bottom-up programmes such as human rights, gender and livelihoods. Finland has effectively exploited political leverage around these issues, for example when visiting Finnish ministers are in Kabul.

Finland's intervention logic is anchored in the belief that bolstering the architecture of the state is a pathway to peace and development. But there are no specific indicators against which to measure progress towards these higher-level outcomes, and therefore no evidence that the paradigm is valid. At the level of effectiveness, Finland's continuing support for on-budget pooled funds (ARTE, LOTFA) is encouraged by increasingly transparent budgetary processes at central levels, especially from the Ministry of Finance. The NSP flagship programme also has had encouraging results, but the sustainability of the Community Development Councils may be challenged, particularly when the provincial level budgeting capacities remain weak. The multi-donor LOTFA police salary funds were investigated for corruption in 2012, but withdrawing from basic security sector support such as this may incur unwelcome unrest from a civil service highly dependent on external funding.

Peacebuilding is a fluid and ill-defined concept, difficult to apply programmatically. Finland's involvement in the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) might retrospectively be questioned, given the levels of elite capture in the process. The discourse of "political reconciliation" of the government has heightened ethnic cleavages; the Taliban has exploited these and exacerbating the potential for ethnic conflict. More broadly, the linkages between project outcomes and peacebuilding are often speculative and rarely monitored against specific indicators. For example, incremental improvements in UNODC projects are overshadowed by the general failure of the programme to reduce the production and trade in opium.

The mix of Finnish aid instruments was appropriate to the objectives set in the country strategy, and to the priorities set by Finland's own global development policies. But over a three-year period, 2009–13, it was contextual obstacles – including the curtailment of even basic supervision missions – that challenged the wisdom of continuing with such a diverse portfolio. Because Finland lacked a risk analysis, there was no recognisable criteria for project continuation or curtailment. Corruption is the greatest challenge to government legitimacy, but increasing "bunkerization" of aid exacerbates donor ineffectiveness to address the problem.

### **5.1.1 Extent to which the design of and strategic choices made within each country programme is based on good contextual, political economy, poverty and conflict analyses**

**Finland's contextual analysis depends largely on the consensus and prevailing views of larger donors.** We have commented above on the large and growing literature on Afghanistan. An inevitable consequence of security constraints placed upon foreign and national researchers and aid personnel, especially over last four years, is that the pool of knowledge is reductive, repetitive and often self-referential. At worst, it reinforces consensus that ethnic and geographic heterogeneity is the only explanation for continuing conflict, rather than fully analysing the interplay between root causes and proximate causes (e.g. Zia 2000). For Finland, the wider contextual analysis in Afghanistan has been largely dependent on partner overviews and reputable sources – World Bank, EU and UN – rather than Finland's own independent analysis. Notable exceptions were the analyses presented in the Afghanistan Action Plan 2009 that set the scene for Finland's interventions over the following three years (MFA 2009b) and the government White Paper on Afghanistan that placed Finland's programme in the wider context of civilian/military crisis management as well as development cooperation (MFA 2012a). We note that the series of development officers' reports submitted through the Embassy on individual projects also present important updates on the situation on the ground. We comment further on the relationship between contextual analysis and intervention logic in Section 5.5.

The Finnish MFA response to the 2008 ANDS was bold and critical. Comments included: (a) it lacked genuine national ownership; (b) rather than reflecting a profound understanding of Afghan development prospects, it was a projection of donor wishes; (c) it lacked strategy – or at least the prioritisation between the various strategic components – and was more a listing of desired outcomes; (d) there was no singular development vision for Afghanistan; (e) the quest for a nation state, with all the accompanying architecture of the state, was ill-conceived without a bedrock of “bottom-up” governance; (f) the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper concept of “poverty reduction” displays a limited understanding of human development, neglecting intellectual and moral progress and the preservation of positive cultural practice (MFA undated).

The above synopsis does not capture the richness of the cited short paper, but as a conceptual starting point it explains and reflects the MFA approach to bottom-up development. We note, however, that the paper's emphasis on education was not reflected in the Finnish country programme until as late as 2013, and is still a relatively low priority. As an internally produced paper, it is also indicative of ad hoc intellectual interventions that have occurred from time to time, but not of the overriding Finnish *raison d'être* in Afghanistan that is to a large extent determined from Helsinki. Contributing to Afghanistan's military stabilisation has been part of Finland's response to the UN Security Council mandate. Finland does not have an explicitly defined stabilisation strategy or division, but it has articulated a “comprehensive approach” to security, which confirms the inter-linkages between security, development and human rights (MFA 2009a).

### **5.1.2 Extent to which intervention logics underpinned the designed strategy, and the extent to which these were relevant, valid and understood by Finland's Ministry for Foreign Affairs and its partners**

**The implicit assumptions underlying Finland's intervention logic have not been robustly tested.** The intervention logic, implicitly or explicitly articulated in key MFA strategy documents since 2009, reiterates the belief that bolstering the architecture of the state is a pathway to sustainable development, and that this in turn is a precondition of peace. The logic is not, however, unpacked into its constituent priority components; moreover, there are no specific indicators against which to measure progress towards these higher-level outcomes. Finland is not alone in this. In 2001 there was a robust, even cavalier, attitude expressed by most donors that the formation of a modern state in Afghanistan could be achieved within a few years. As the disappointments and setbacks became ever more apparent, the breadth of ambition was reduced; even to the extent that “mission achieved” by the time of the draw-down of foreign troops in 2014 was finally measured in inputs and outputs only.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> There was, for example, a plethora of press opinion on both the Canadian and British prime ministerial 2014 declarations of “mission accomplished”, delivered as their respective troops withdrew. A more circumspect position was taken by US President Obama who simply declared “mission completed”, though even this was questioned by the Washington Post (2014).

This is not to deny the considerable improvements in development over the last decade. For Finland, however, the assumptions of the country programme design – particularly those on medium-term outcomes and goals – were not monitored or reported, other than in general terms in the advisors’ reports. Reliance on partners in this respect has in several cases rendered either incomplete or speculative data around peacebuilding. If we take one example – the Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan project, co-funded by Finland from 2008–09 – we find that, despite some very useful progress in promoting access to justice, evidence that this contributes to peacebuilding per se has yet to be established.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, though it did respond to clearly articulated Afghan government priorities, the project did not undertake any form of institutional analysis or capacity assessment as a basis for its capacity development investments with central institutions.

### **5.1.3 Extent to which other Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ interventions (political dialogue, humanitarian action) have complemented and/or provided leverage to development cooperation**

**Linkages between Finnish political advocacy and development cooperation have been strong.** MFA interventions are multi-tiered, but for a small donor the interplay between military involvement, political advocacy and development cooperation is taken for granted.<sup>16</sup> The visits of officials from Helsinki, for instance, present opportunities for dialogue at the highest levels of the Afghan government. The Finnish Foreign Minister visited the country, including the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif in June 2010 when Finnish troops in ISAF peaked at 195 soldiers; the Minister for Development Cooperation visited in 2012; and the Minister of Defence visited again in 2013. The visit of Afghan President Karzai to Finland in April 2013 for the signing of a new bilateral agreement was also an opportunity to remind the Afghan government of Finland’s continuing concerns over human rights and the status of women in the country (Finland Times 2013).

Finland was one of 12 donors to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) initiated in 2010 following the National Consultative Peace Jirga. Oversight is provided by the High Peace Council, established in October 2010. A link between this and development cooperation on the ground has been the Community Recovery Intensification and Prioritisation (CRIP) initiative, a sub-component of ARTE. This is a means whereby the goals of the APRP can be extended to high-risk communities through a prioritised scheme whereby NSP is rolled out quickly to those communities just emerging from conflict. There have been concerns that linking this to APRP might compromise (or endanger) NGO implementing partners, but a recent US Defense Report states, “Due to its unique focus in insecure districts, CRIP delivery is by nature indirect, limited, and unannounced, relying on the overall stabilisation effect attributed to NDP III rather than direct programming of activities to APRP reintegrees or their communities” (US Department of Defense 2013). The scheme was initiated in 2010 and by October 2012 US\$41.1m of US\$173.5m donations received had been spent (ISAF/NATO 2012).

Nevertheless, APRP critics have pointed to disagreement between international actors and the Afghan government over the sequencing of its two-track programme – reintegration and reconciliation (USIP 2011c). The legitimacy of the actors involved has also been questioned by the Afghan people (Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit 2012). The 2010 National Assembly elections and the discourse of “political reconciliation” of the government have heightened ethnic cleavages that the Taliban exploit and exacerbating the potential for ethnic conflict (USIP 2011b). The November 2010 Conference on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice revealed a troubling disconnect between the High Peace Council and Afghan civil society representatives who strongly criticised the Council’s inclusion of former militia leaders among its members, the lack of transparency in its activities, and the lack of clarity in its objectives. These criticisms indicate that for a peace process to have broad, popular support, the Afghan government and the international community should make greater efforts to engage local leaders in a dialogue and account for the interests of communities and interest groups that are not represented in the High Peace Council (USIP 2011a).

<sup>15</sup> An interesting debate on this is, including a chapter on Afghanistan, can be found in Call (2008).

<sup>16</sup> The MFA, the Ministry of Defence, Defence Command Finland and the Ministry of the Interior are the central implementers of Finland’s Action Plan for Afghanistan. Military expenditure amounts to about €15m per year.

#### **5.1.4 Extent to which the mix of Finnish development cooperation aid instruments and modalities was appropriate to achieve objectives**

**The mix of Finnish aid instruments was appropriate to the objectives set in the country strategy, and to the priorities set by Finland’s own global development policies.** However, over a three year period from 2009–13, it was contextual obstacles – including the curtailment of even basic supervision missions – that challenged the wisdom of continuing with such a diverse portfolio. When the impact of some project cannot be verified the rationale of the programme as a whole becomes questionable. The crucial question is this: what is the acceptable threshold of uncertainty in results, above which project closure would follow? MFA does not appear to have any project scoring or risk analysis system through which to make such a decision.

For all donors in Afghanistan there have been two mutually related levels of tension in development cooperation. First is the tension between on-budget and off-budget intervention and the commitment to improving levels of public finance management. The second is the tension between increasingly remote management and the need to demonstrate effective and efficient delivery of assistance. The Paris Principles, as well as the increasingly robust insistence of the Afghanistan government, have led to commitments with respect to channelling and reporting on funds issued through ministries and governed by national authorities; hence the priority given to multi-donor trust funds and pooled resources. By contrast all donors, including Finland, have retained a level individual funding that affords a degree of more immediate “control” as well as inroads and insight into civil society.

The International Budget Partnership has monitored progress on budget transparency in Afghanistan since 2008. It found that Afghanistan had increased its budget transparency score from 21 points out of 100 in 2010 to 59 in 2012 (Open Budget Survey 2012). This increase meant that Afghanistan’s citizens had greater access to the information they needed to participate in decision making and hold the government accountable for how it manages the public’s money. At the same, though, the way the budget is structured provides limited information on aid flows into Afghanistan, and the budget is not a true reflection of where the country’s money is being spent. Furthermore, the country’s dependence on donor funding and international technical assistance means that improvements in budget transparency may not be sustainable in the long run. The lack of a monitoring framework and firm indicators creates ambiguity in assessing budget transparency. Most importantly, confidence in government transparency will require further focus and resources to be dedicated to the provincial level, where the real execution of the budget happens. It is also essential to establish systematic linkages between budget transparency and anticorruption measures (Bizhan 2012).

With up to 50% of Finland development cooperation channelled through ARTF (including the NSP), it is critical to explore the efficiency/effectiveness of this instrument. Independent evaluations show that the most successful projects in Afghanistan have been those that have demonstrated solid expertise in rural Afghanistan, local conditions and local people’s own initiative and decision making. Where a degree of preferred funding has been possible, Finland has supported the NSP, microcredit projects (MISFA), both of which demonstrate sufficient levels of efficiency and effectiveness (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2007a). Finland has also preferred funding for the Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme (AREDP) and Community Recovery Intensification Programme (CRIP, linked to APRP).

There has been a lower level of confidence in the UNDP-administered LOTFA – another major pooled fund supported by Finland. In 2012 corruption was reported in the procurements processes surrounding salary payments, calling into question the management proficiency of UNDP and causing the EU and some donors (not Finland)<sup>17</sup> to put funding on hold that year pending an investigation (Khaama Press 2013). The matter has been resolved, but highlights the difficulties of relying on a development agency to administer a payroll system that was US\$580m in 2014, only 6% of which came from Afghan government revenues. Further issues pursued by Finland have been the extraction of sick leave funds and Welfare Funds from police salaries. The former, initially held by the Ministry of Finance, has now been returned, but the whereabouts and use of the latter has yet to be clearly indicated by the Ministry of Interior.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> The decision here was to balance continuity against corruption, with Finland arguing that interrupting payments to the police would incur proportionally greater security risks. (Interview with MFA, May 2014).

<sup>18</sup> Interview MFA, May 2014. We were not able to corroborate this information.

The “bunkerization” of international aid personnel in Afghanistan has detached them from the societies in which they work, leading to increased remote management and reliance upon secondary sources of information and monitoring (e.g. Collinson and Duffield 2013). In 2008 the Finnish MFA personnel had the advantage not only of greater freedom of movement within the country, but also of the satellite duty stations and personnel in the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT. Over the next two years the deterioration of security was to severely reduce movement, with Development Cooperation staff down to only two, with a third development advisor based in Mazar-e-Sharif until June 2013. The Mazar development advisor’s post shifted to Kabul in January 2014 in view of the soon-to-close PRT. The exclusive reliance on partner monitoring has increased at a time when MFA personnel have been increasingly constrained. One solution has been to seek local NGO or consultancy groups to conduct verification and/or research work, but competition intensified between donors for the few companies and/or individuals in Kabul with proved competence.

Finland recognises that it has only a modest role in development cooperation as a means towards conflict prevention, and in peace mediation as such. An interesting analysis was presented in an internal Embassy note of April 2012 that depicted a “crowded” international involvement, especially on international platforms, and the difficulties of choosing the appropriate entry point when MFA staff resources are limited (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2012a). The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)<sup>19</sup> in Helsinki in 2011 launched a series of civil society dialogues in Mazar-e-Sharif, Northern Afghanistan, where activists jointly discussed the causes, drivers and consequences of the conflict, and, more importantly, the prospects for peace (CMI 2013). However, this was regarded as somewhat peripheral to the main concerns of the Finnish-supported PRT in the region (Embassy of Finland, Kabul note 2012). Other geographically specific and time-bound initiatives have included support to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) border cooperation with Tajikistan, and the hosting of the panel discussion titled “Women, Peace, and Security in Afghanistan: Prospects on the Way Forward” in February 2012 as a follow-up to the December 2011 Bonn conference.

### **5.1.5 Extent to which the sectors chosen by Finland were done so in recognition of the characteristics and priorities relating to the fragility of the country/region**

**Although sectoral choices were appropriate, the ambitions set by Finland (and other donors) in respect of enhancing good governance and reducing corruption were unrealistic within the given time-frame.** At a macro-economic and security level, the prognosis for Afghanistan has been fairly clear over the last three years. International development aid is projected to be relatively stable and remain the bedrock of social sector expenditure (at around 90%), but with an Afghan government budget deficit currently at about US\$400m, and the reduction of international security forces likely to have a severe negative economic impact, growth will doubtless decrease further. The social consequences of this will be severe, but it also has security implications. If the government is unable to uphold promises on improved welfare for the population, this will play into the hands of the opposition or insurgency, leading to further strife.

For Finland the definition of fragility in Afghanistan has been conventional, with solutions centred on enhancing state functions and hence legitimacy. If the chosen Finnish niche was human rights (including gender), this was always strongly related to security sector reform, rule of law and enhanced livelihoods. In 2008 MFA development cooperation was mainly directed at two sectors: (a) good governance, the rule of law and human rights with special focus on the development of the security sector; and (b) development of the rural areas, with special focus on support lent to livelihoods replacing drug production.

Finland has also attempted to address the perceived dysfunctions of the opium related “hidden” economy and its security implications. The priority to contain the production of drugs was reiterated in 2009 when it was recognised that measure were needed to strengthen security, but also commensurate emphasis was given to supporting alternative livelihoods and applying incentives for giving up poppy cultivation. Finland recognised that combating drug crime and smuggling required regional cooperation with neighbouring countries. Further, “persons involved in drug production and smuggling should be identified in order to prevent them from being placed in high public offices” (MFA 2009b).

UNODC’s country programme for Afghanistan 2012–14 is approximately US\$117m; the main donors are US, Canada, Denmark, Japan, UK and Finland. Since 2008 Finland has provided some US\$14 million, mainly for

<sup>19</sup> CMI is funded from the MFA’s NGO unit (KEO-30) and it is an independent project.

capacity building in the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and alternative livelihood initiatives. Despite empirical evidence of intermittent success in some locations from UNODC, the continuing record levels of poppy cultivation and export, compounded by an involvement of government officials as well as Taleban, is a stark reminder of how little impact donors are able to exert. Most donors now accept a level of seemingly insurmountable failure due to weak governance, widespread corruption, and that in some areas poppy producers are supported by the government officials. This is aggravated by the lack of capacity (and, to some extent, will) in the government as a whole (UNODC 2010). A key challenge has also been the lack of a viable market strategy to encourage alternative crop production.

This said, UNODC provides a useful service with five zonal offices (Balkh, Badakhshan, Jalalabad, Hirat, and Kandahar), the production of two surveys a year and regular donor briefings. At the level of research, policy and advocacy, including strengthening illicit crop monitoring, their achievements are notable. Other successes include reform initiatives within the criminal justice system<sup>20</sup> and increased access to quality drug prevention, treatment and rehabilitation services. On the other hand, UNODC seems to be afflicted by a constant shortage of appropriate technical expertise required for what has been described as an over-ambitious programme of work (UNODC 2010).

All donors, including Finland, have been unable to adequately address endemic corruption. Bad governance is exacerbated by a culture of impunity and non-observance of the rule of law, due to which the authorities are not sufficiently held liable for their actions (MFA 2009b). Corruption pervades all sectors, including the NGO sector. The collection and allocation of resources in provinces and districts is often managed by networks of regional and local power-holders whose main interests lie in maintaining political control and generating financial resources for themselves and their networks. This is partially achieved through a variety of corrupt practices, including patronage-based appointments and the buying and selling of positions (Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit 2010). The Karzai government's apparent inability (or unwillingness) to take a hard stance on corruption has both undermined its legitimacy, in addition to negatively effecting confidence building in the public sector (World Bank 2013b).

In line with the international community, Finland purports to respond to the challenge by allocating resources to fighting corruption and building capacity in the public administration and legal sector, while also demanding that the Afghan government makes stronger efforts in this regard (Government of Finland 2011). Yet international and Afghan stated intentions to dramatically alter sub-national governance were unrealistic within the stated timeframe and with the resources available.

#### **5.1.6 Extent to which Finnish country strategy identified specific areas of intervention where its added value would be apparent and recognised by stakeholders**

**Finland's added value in specific sectors – human rights, gender and security sector – are referenced throughout this report and recognised by like-minded donors.** It is useful also to look beyond our evaluation period of 2007–12 to the extent to which Finland has adapted and refined its approaches and priorities in the transition period 2013–14. Tables 2–4 (Section 4.1) show a gradual increase in overall funding, including continued and considerable investment in the ARTF and LOTFA. We further note that in 2014 Finland exceeded the US\$10 million threshold that allowed it to join the ARTF “key donor” group and thus have a more direct involvement in strategy and in setting priorities.

More recently there has also been an interesting explorative investment in helping to increase the capacity of the national mining authorities (Afghanistan Geological Survey, GTK) with a project that exploits a particular strength of Finnish expertise. This latter initiative was flagged in the 2012 White Paper as an opportunity to improve the prerequisites for Afghanistan's own industries and inclusive economic growth and for the sustainable use of the country's natural resources. Elsewhere Finland has stated that “A special priority is to improve Afghanistan's capacity to utilize and control its own natural resources so that society as a whole benefits” (Embassy of Finland, Kabul website). Since the implementation of this is beyond our evaluation period, we have not commented on progress to date, but simply note that this and Finland's extensive involvement in civilian crisis management are the two unique aspects of the portfolio that point to specific Finnish expertise.

<sup>20</sup> The drafting of legislation was noted as “a significant achievement” in UNODC (2008).

## 5.2 Policy coherence and resource allocation

This section examines the mechanisms used to integrate Finnish development policy priorities into interventions in Afghanistan, as well as the extent to which development interventions on the ground have complied with the priorities and thematic focuses of the 2007 and 2012 MFA development policies.

### Box 2 Summary of key findings for evaluation question 2.

Compliance with Finland's key policy directives has been optimal, and Finland has adhered to its commitments made at all major donor conferences, including on-budget expenditures. The ARTF has performed well, particularly the NSP (with "preferenced" funding from Finland), though the accrued economic benefits of the programme have not been systematically recorded. Capacity development and service delivery have tended to be treated as two different entities, not easily integrated. MISFA (also "preferenced" by Finland) initially performed well, but was hit by repayment crisis in 2008 and poor performance of some contracted microfinance institutions.

Security sector and rules of law were relatively neglected within the international community's statebuilding agenda until the late 2000s. The potential (recent) overlap between civilian crisis management within EUPOL and the development cooperation budget assigned to UNDP's LOTFA fund is apparent. Finnish commentators have raised questions over the added value Finland brings to security sector reform in light of concerns around accountability and poor levels of civilian involvement.

The evaluation finds the Finnish portfolio to be generally cost-efficient, well-planned, predictable and responsive to needs expressed by government bodies. The rationalisation of the programme from 2009 was necessary, allowing MFA personnel greater scope for advocacy at higher levels of government. But a broader "civil society enhancement" objective of the FLC is too ambitious in relation to the available choice of NGO partners and the scale of projects undertaken. Transactional costs remain high, but the added value of a small donor such as Finland in this field could and should be reinforced with greater financial and staff resources within both the FLC and NGO project windows.

We found some lack of policy coherence across sectors' in-country portfolio. Synergies between, for instance, aid and security were not always explicitly outlined. To some extent this is a symptom of there not being a country framework agreement to work to (as with long-term partnership countries). Perhaps more importantly, though, political fragility and uncertainty inevitably is mirrored by "trial and error" aid, and a propensity towards continuing funding those sector and projects that show evidence of incremental success, even if the picture as a whole is less encouraging.

### 5.2.1 Extent to which the policy priorities stipulated by MFA (particularly in the 2009 Guidelines) were understood and incorporated into country-level interventions

Finland does not have a country strategy programme document for Afghanistan, as with long-term partnership countries. However, there is an extant agreement between Finland and Afghanistan, the latest being signed in April 2013. This reconfirmed commitments made by the two parties at a series of international conferences, including the Bonn Conference (December 2011), the Chicago Summit (May 2012) and the Tokyo Conference (July 2012).<sup>21</sup> **Finnish objectives and actions in-country are consistent with those required of global MFA policies**, most particularly *Development Policy Programme 2007* (MFA 2008), *Guidelines on Development and Security in Finland's Development Policy 2009* (MFA 2009a), and *Finland's Development Policy Programme 2012* (MFA 2012a). But reporting is "generic", lacking specific indicators. The choice of compliant programme priorities is one thing; but this risks being rhetorical without a robust set of indicators, targets and grading of success over time. We note, however, that a results-based framework is currently under development.

Most donors are aware of the disconnect between the improvements made at central government level (particularly within the Ministry of Finance) and the prevalence of poor governance at sub-national levels where

<sup>21</sup> Partnership Agreement between The Republic of Finland and The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 29 April 2013.



state legitimacy is challenged most. In part this is due to access limitations in certain parts of the country, but also the inability of the central Government to allocate funds in a regular manner, and in accordance with provincial development plans (UN 2009). Meanwhile, the sustainability of national development programmes, if measured in terms of the ability of the government to maintain major on-budget initiatives without external funding, is simply not debated when less than 6% of nationally generated resources go towards social services.

In 2010–11, the World Bank estimated that just 12% of international aid to Afghanistan was delivered “on budget” and the Afghan government estimated that 82% of external aid from 2002–10 bypassed the government (Government of Afghanistan 2010; World Bank 2012). Yet even when aid is delivered through the government, it has a limited absorptive capacity. For example, the Afghan government is currently able to spend only an estimated 18–20% of the aid allocated to it by the US government (New York Times 2011). Where the Afghan government has succeeded in extending infrastructure, strengthening access to markets and improving access to basic services, it is largely reliant on services provided by the UN and NGOs. Contrary to popular perceptions, however, levels of development cooperation are not set to decline in the short term – at least not for the major on-budget programmes such as ARTF – even if the draw-down of international military forces will have a negative economic impact.

It is necessary to place Finland’s commitments in a wider context. Finland was unusual in making pledges at the 2012 Tokyo Conference that were linked to a specific Finnish MFA plan and spending schedule that has been honoured. By contrast, most of the other larger donors’ pledges were conditional on the Afghan government making major reforms to fight corruption and making efficient and flexible use of aid; and it was unlikely that the Afghan government would be able to deliver more than modest reforms. The problem of using aid to offset outside spending cuts and meet current Afghan needs goes far beyond economic development. The US\$16 billion pledged post-Tokyo as part of the TMAF Hard Deliverables (July 2012) was not tied to any credible assessment of actual requirements, plans for meeting them, and combined assessment of how to deal with the massive uncertainties in both the military and economic aspects of transition (e.g. Cordesman 2012).

### **5.2.2 *Extent to which security and justice priorities are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these***

**Finland has had considerable advisory and co-funded activity within security sector reform in Afghanistan, but conceptually and in terms of results this has provoked much debate.** In 2009 MFA Finland recognised that the reform of the legal sector had been slow, and its implementation was still being kept too far apart from the wider reform of the security sector. In such circumstances, comprehensive work for establishing the rule of law was made more difficult (MFA 2009b). We found that the appetite for Finnish investment in security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan has been dulled by three interrelated issues: (a) the inability of the international community to effectively deal with corruption and impunity within the national security services; (b) the blurring of edges between military and civilian entities, and the fact that the complete external funding of the police force has become an extension of counter-insurgency efforts; and (c) the relative inattention paid to developing civilian demand for an accountable community police force linked to wider judicial reform.

MFA Finland defines the United Nations as its most important partner for multilateral cooperation, and commits itself “to strengthening the authority and capacity of the UN and enhancing the effectiveness of the UN system with respect to development and security” (MFA 2009a). Within the field of foreign affairs, however, Finland has given equal if not greater emphasis to the importance of the European Union as a key arena and channel through which to exert influence. Notwithstanding its commitments to strengthening the UN development and security sectors (MFA 2009a, Section 1), Finland nevertheless anchors its “comprehensive security” approach<sup>22</sup> largely in policy concepts contained in the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy. Support for conflict prevention and fragile states were central to the priorities of the EU’s joint statement on development policy (the “European Consensus”). Finland aims to make the EU a strong provider of international security and an effective actor in crisis management.

<sup>22</sup> “Comprehensive security” refers to a concept of security which “strengthens the mutual connection between security, development and human rights. Comprehensive security requires broad-based international cooperation and efficient national operations across administrative sectors” (MFA Finland, 2007).

It is interesting to see how these dual commitments play out in Afghanistan. Finland's Civilian Crisis Management tasks have included considerable contribution towards EUPOL in which up to 400 experts (including up to 40 Finns) from 23 EU member states have been stationed as civilian and police advisors, currently in 12 provinces across the country. Launched in June 2007, the aim of the mission is to "contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective civil policing arrangements that will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system under Afghan ownership" (EUPOL website). It has covered criminal investigation, mentoring of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, police and criminal investigation training, the links of police activities to the wider rule of law sector, issues related to frontiers and general police affairs and anti-corruption action. An element within its wider EUPOL support has been Finland's support (through the Crisis Management Centre, Kuopio) of police-prosecutor coordination training. The pilot phase was carried out from 2009–11 during which two trainings were carried out in Afghanistan and two in Finland. The internal evaluation recorded general satisfaction with results, despite some setbacks: (a) the last-minute changes to senior Afghan participation; (b) the fact that 4 out of 23 participants applied for asylum in Finland during the trip (MFA 2010a).

Finland's 2009 Action Plan depicts support to the UNDP-administrated LOTFA as an element pertaining to the training provided in the police sector. In effect, though, this is a stand-alone project that until very recently was exclusively given to the payment of police salaries by donors. Important though this Pillar 1 activity is for the stability of the country, it does not play to UNDP's strengths. To its credit, Finland has, through insisting on un-earmarked funding within LOTFA, enabled UNDP to open new activities in institutional reform and professionalisation. By 2014, of a LOTFA budget total of US\$580m, some US\$40m is for institutional development. The shift will be towards three priorities: anticorruption and the strengthening of the Inspector-General's Office; women's representation within the force (of 150 000 police only 1 667 are women and abuse is still not adequately dealt with); and literacy (of 70 000 police on patrol, 70% are illiterate) (UNDP interview May 2014).

Finland and other donors are currently focusing on LOTFA Pillars II and III, in which institutional reform and gender issues are addressed. The target of 5 000 women in the national police force has not been reached, but issues of female abuse within the force have begun to be addressed more consistently. As the competency of the national army increases, the counter-insurgency role of the police force has reduced. More recently, several other (as yet unresolved) issues have emerged, including the lack of transparency over corporate tax and the use pension funds extracted from police salaries at source.

Finland's contributions to ISAF and EUPOL have dominated thinking around the development of military and civilian crisis management efforts in recent years, causing more debate than any other overseas operation. On a positive note, it has shaped and defined a role for Finland within NATO. But had Finnish politicians known how dramatically the operation in Afghanistan would change it is unlikely that they would have joined ISAF in early 2002 (Salonius-Palsternak 2012). From the point of view of security sector reform, we contend that Finnish approaches (and, by extension, others) were too technical, neglecting the political dimensions and underplaying principles such as local ownership and synergy with other initiatives (Viikki 2012).

### **5.2.3 Extent to which economic development and employment issues are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these**

**Results management within well-established pooled funds could still be further developed to ensure that economic and employment results are better captured.** Within the ARTF about 60% of expenditures are devoted to rural development programmes (including the National Solidarity Programme to which Finland contributes) and about 11% go to education, infrastructure and microfinance (including MISFA to which Finland has previously contributed). The widely regarded success of the NSP is down to robust monitoring and reporting of expenditures undertaken by the Community Development Councils (CDCs) (MFA 2012b). By mid-2012, 12 900 CDCs were in place in 361 districts, encompassing 50 000 projects with a total outlay of US\$840 million.<sup>23</sup>

Although there has been a huge amount of input/output disaggregated data produced by NSP, plus some positive perception data from the user community, there has been little documented impact data on the economic

<sup>23</sup> Briefing by Scanteam, "ARTF: Stock-taking and Looking Ahead", Kabul 25 June 2012. Powerpoint.

welfare accrued from the programme. Moreover, CDCs were intended as interim bodies, pending the election of village councils, but the infrastructure for such an elective process is not yet in place. The sustainability of the concept will depend on these councils sourcing funds outside of NSP (a few already do), and the commensurate capacity development this entails. There is still a mismatch between project delivery and capacity development, with NSP accepting that the latter lags behind.<sup>24</sup> Paradoxically, there has been a temporary surge – and hence overload – of donor financing for NSP in 2014 as the commitment to increase development assistance accompanies the draw-down of military assistance.

Finland has also “preferred”<sup>25</sup> its ARTF funding towards the MISFA, a national microcredit and microfinance programme that provides small loans to low-income earners to start new businesses. MISFA has been a key instrument in employment generation. About 65% of the loans have been to women, with repayment rates being more than 90%. In turn, these women hired an average of 1,5 employees and have created hundreds of thousands of jobs (MFA 2009d).

MISFA’s growth in its first five years was impressive. Yet although MISFA was able, by end-2012, to have given cumulative loans of about US\$204 million disbursed by MISFA’s 16 microfinance partners (MFIs), the extremely rapid growth of the sector with fragile institutions led to a repayment crisis in 2008. Finland was very much a “silent partner” on this issue; there was very little it could do about the situation. The rapid client outreach had come at the expense of proper due diligence in lending, compliance with internal control processes and internal monitoring of performance. These factors, combined with cost inflation and a deteriorating security environment, contributed to a decline in portfolio quality of most MFIs. Following this crisis, MISFA focused more attention on direct monitoring and supervision of MFIs (World Bank 2013c).

#### **5.2.4 Extent to which statebuilding and governance priorities are reflected in country interventions, and the results and learning obtained from these**

**A liberal state model is assumed, though not always defined, by donors, but actual practices in Afghanistan suggest the dominance of alternative modes of behaviour.** Within our evaluation period, significant changes have occurred in Afghanistan to confirm or deny the ambitious statebuilding agenda set by donors back in the early 2000s. Above all, the immense void between policy and on the ground realities in Afghanistan has widened, partly as a result of closed access to rural areas but also indicative of the top-down approach to statebuilding favoured by a centralised government, and reinforced by the propensity towards technical assistance solutions promulgated by donors. In the absence of coherent and coordinated policies, let alone resources, there has been something of a competition for “viable” Afghan counterparts who speak the language of the international community, leaving the statebuilding agenda very much in the hands of a Kabul elite.

At the same time there was, until the late 2000s, a relative neglect of rule of law and the security sector as an integral part of the statebuilding “project”. The results have been threefold: (a) increased drug-related criminality and corruption; (b) an even more acute challenge to state legitimacy. Despite the belated drafting of the National Justice Strategy, there has remained a lack of synergy between rule of law reform and the overall statebuilding process. The focus has been on bringing rule of law to Afghanistan rather than on analysing and using existing frameworks that could be adapted; and (c) a neglect of civil society involvement in the SSR process.

The multi-donor trust funds that Finland relies heavily upon (ARTF and LOTFA in particular) are interim solutions designed to contribute towards the statebuilding process and to the development of institutional capacity. But there is a concern that these “recovery” mechanisms entrench parallel structures without there being due attention given to building on-budget government facilities. For instance, the much-lauded NSP relies on a project implementation unit within the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; with relatively inflated salaries and conditions, it is unlikely to be sustainable without core donor funding.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with NSP officer, World Bank, Dubai, May 2014.

<sup>25</sup> Preferencing is not earmarking as such, but the recognition that up to 50% of a donors’ contribution can be allocated to certain ARTF projects once basic ARTF recurring costs are met.

Nevertheless, in general the consensus is that the NSP flagship programme has been a success, and statistical evidence on the creation of CDCs, financial disbursements and project completions bear this out. There are, however, concerns over the tendency towards CDCs choosing risk-averse projects and the prevailing gender bias.<sup>26</sup> One area that the NSP has not been able effectively to address is “elite capture” in terms of representation and influence on CDCs.<sup>27</sup>

### **5.2.5 Extent to which results-based management is able to monitor and evaluate compliance and coherence with global policies**

**Results-based management has not been fully incorporated into Finland’s country programme, though in some cases it is used by partners.** Finland produced a series of quality board and advisor statements, mostly annual, for the period 2007–12 in which comment on compliance with Finnish global policy as well as outcome and monitoring on major funds such as ARTF were reported on. In terms of monitoring ARTF outcomes, we note that from 2008–09 the designated agent Price Waterhouse Coopers and the Afghan government’s Central Audit Office conducted field visits in only 11 of 34 provinces. Moreover, greater attention was paid to auditing than to performance as such, a weakness highlighted as an area of concern for Finland (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2010a). The next external review of the ARTF was initiated by donors in February 2012. Several of its key recommendations concerned communication and results reporting, including improvements in gender reporting (ARTF 2012). A gender working group was established with Finland as an active member.<sup>28</sup>

Until recently, most results-based monitoring was, therefore, outsourced to the respective partners. But some projects have been subject to an internal audit. For instance, Finland’s Local Cooperation Fund (FLC) internal audit of 2007 remarked on the fact that until the arrival of a development specialist in June 2007 FLC funds were not monitored at all, and no sanction was imposed on misspent funds (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2007b). Most projects were inaccessible to international or even national monitors. Both issues have now been addressed in the new FLC plan. In 2009 the Finland Embassy decided to have a complete overhaul of FLC projects to coincide with the new 2009 Development Policy and to align itself with the decision that 25% of development funds were to be spent in northern Afghanistan (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2010b).

There appears to have been considerable improvement over the years in the management and monitoring of FLC projects. By 2012 the budget was €460 000 for 10 projects completed in that year, plus another five selected for funding (from 40 applications received). A four-day results-based management and basic financial management workshop (27–30 May 2012) was organised for implementing partners. Each project was independently monitored at least once during its implementation (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2013). The new FLC plan, includes results-based and financial management training organised to all partners.

### **5.2.6 Extent to which the totality of resources made available and disbursed was equal to the ambitions set by programme objectives**

**The rationalisation of Finland’s programme since 2007 has been optimal, but the management capacities of partners, especially NGOs, have not been adequately assessed.** Finland’s development cooperation with Afghanistan was last evaluated in October 2007. Finnish development and humanitarian aid were found to be cost-efficient, well-planned, predictable and geared towards recipient wishes. To a large extent, six years on, we concur with this finding: we found no instance where the predictability and disbursement of commitments was questioned. The ARTF continues to be applauded for its general efficiency. Where portfolio inefficiencies within the Finnish programme have occurred (LOTFA) the lack of alternatives are starkly apparent. The only exception to a broadly positive judgement was the anti-drug work, deemed ineffective through no direct fault of Finland, but simply because of the confounding complexities of tackling the industry (MFA 2007).

<sup>26</sup> For example, only 4,34% of the total budget disbursed through the NSP from 2003-2012 was directed toward education, and those funds were usually spent on the construction and refurbishment of schools. Only 30% of the schools built by the NSP were for girls (Amin 2012).

<sup>27</sup> Interview with World Bank NSP specialist, May 2014.

<sup>28</sup> There is now a separate Monitoring Agent (for Recurrent Cost Window) and a Supervisory Agent to monitor the progress of the key programmes at the field level.

Following the 2007 evaluation there was a reduction/rationalisation of Finland projects, though still within the same sectors. One of the problems has been the transactional cost involved in monitoring and administering NGO and FLC funds. It suggests that absorptive capacity of partners has not been adequately assessed. However, it also highlights a very limited appraisal of what constitutes civil society in Afghanistan. It is understandable that when security constraints and Finnish Embassy resources conspire to severely limit contact with, and research about, civil society, the default position is to fund the small number of tried-and-tested Afghan NGOs in the capital. The FLC contracts 10 such NGOs, mostly within fields of human rights and gender. But these are invariably multi-funded, are themselves sub-contracting work, and are unlikely to produce or commission self-critical evaluations since they depend strongly on continued donor funding.<sup>29</sup> Again, many of these issues are to be addressed in the FLC plan and portfolio.

### 5.3 Cross-cutting objectives

This section assesses how cross-cutting objectives have been integrated in Finland's development interventions in Afghanistan, and the results achieved. For the most part, we concentrate on gender and human rights issues since these were the chosen priorities for Finland.

**Box 3** Summary of key findings for evaluation question 3.

Finnish support to human rights, notably women's rights, is pursued most effectively through high-level joint initiatives, particularly within the Nordic +donor group. It has also enabled Finland to develop a strong voice within the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) and the major pooled funding mechanisms (ARTF, LOTFA).

Complementary to this are NGO and FLC projects that have invested in people's capacities and transferable skills, introducing international standards to hitherto neglected sectors (journalism, human rights institutions). The training programmes for women journalists in Finland were deemed successful, though we note (as with the police training in Finland) the proportionally high level of retention – i.e. those claiming asylum while in Finland.

The development of a national action plan for UNSCR 1325 has been very slow – again a reflection of national (and UN) capacities – but the process is often as important as the product. Finland has also been instrumental in funding and to some extent guiding the AIHRC to its current high national profile. The Commission is an example of an independent statal (as opposed to government) body with a unique profile and outreach in most provinces. Typical of successes in Afghanistan, though, it has been overloaded with financial and donor demands.

On environmental issues, capacity building in the National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA) in 2009 was at the heart of earlier work, and Finland has recently resumed its partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) through an NGO working alongside Bamyán University. Given Finland's long-term global partnership with UNEP, the latter's relatively "neutral" political standing in the country, and its assessment of how environmental issues link to drivers of conflict, it is surprising that this has not been a priority sector for Finland in recent years.

#### 5.3.1 *Extent to which cross-cutting objectives were taken into account in the analysis and design of Finnish interventions*

The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007–08 that covers our evaluation period confirmed that a consistent pattern of relative deprivation existed across almost all development sectors. Challenges remain with respect to women's mobility, participation in public life, decision making, health and access to economic and educational opportunities (EU 2008). Despite the millions already spent on women's rights and development projects, women have not been a central priority for the government. In a comment on the

<sup>29</sup> This was a constraint in our own evaluation: that NGOs contacted were not prepared to air grievances or weaknesses.

UNODC provincial drug control capacity building project to be funded by Finland from 2007, the advisor to the Embassy of Finland noted the absence of any consideration of a gender perspective; neither a gender equality analysis, nor monitoring indices (UNODC 2007). As we have seen above, Finland has advocated for, and participated in, the gender working group within the ARTF. It has also given particular attention to women's access to justice, notably for – and even within – the police force (EUPOL and LOTFA). Police training involves little or no training in gender-based violence or women's rights, particularly as training has been increasingly focused on counter-insurgency and security skills rather than crime prevention, crime solving and community policing. The Afghan government has failed to take proactive measures to prevent gender-based violence, investigate crimes, prosecute perpetrators, and ensure victims' safety and access to services (Human Rights Watch 2009).

**Beyond the advocacy interventions mentioned above, CCOs have been dealt with most directly through the somewhat ad hoc selection of NGOs and related project themes within the Finnish portfolio.** There have been some obvious limitations of available agencies and on the selection criteria imposed on, for example, the FLC funds. The Finland Embassy-supported FLC programme's main aim in 2007 included the advancement of women, vulnerable groups (such as street children, women prisoners and mine victims), and support for good governance. At that time there was no Action Plan as such from the MFA Kabul; and quite often the Ambassador had decisive influence over the selection of projects (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2007a). By 2010 the FLC covered 10 national NGO projects.

By 2010 Finnish NGOs were supported with around €2 million by MFA Finland. There were then eight Finnish NGOs involved with Afghanistan, including the Finnish Red Cross, KIOS (Finnish NGO Foundation for Human Rights), the Women Journalists in Finland, and four Christian organisations.

Women Journalists in Finland undertook a training project for Afghan female journalists. The Learning Together Project (2009–11) included training courses in Kabul that were planned according to the participants' needs. In August 2011 eight female journalists took part in the final seminar of the project in Helsinki. This was an exchange programme between Afghan Women Journalist Union and the Finnish Women Journalist Association. Two of the journalists did not return home, seeking asylum in Finland. In Afghanistan, though, the national training programme enabled many women to later join media centres or to pursue Bachelor's degrees in journalism. The provincial workshops in particular were well-received; in Bamyan, for instance, some 30 women benefitted from the project.<sup>30</sup>

Operation Mobilisation, one of the Christian organisations working in Afghanistan, has supported health education for women in the province of Nangarhar. The project encouraged school teachers to provide health education, and around 800 women and mothers-to-be participated in lessons on hygiene, nutrition and safe home births (Mäkinen 2010).

In 2009 Finland co-funded (with the EU and the Global Environment Facility) the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Capacity Building and Institutional Development for Environmental management programme in Afghanistan. Working with the National Environment Protection Agency, much of UNEP's focus is at the national level – building environmental institutions, improving technical expertise, and developing environmental management tools (such as laws and policies). But this work is symbiotically linked to its field-level projects, so that lessons learned from piloting new, innovative approaches at the community level feed into national-level policy development, and vice versa (UNEP 2009). Finland has recently resumed work with UNEP through a joint funding (€60 000–75 000) of the Afghan NGO Conservation Organisation for Afghan Mountain Areas that works closely with Bamyan University.<sup>31</sup>

### **5.3.2 Extent to which cross-cutting objectives were taken into account in political and policy dialogue**

**Contextual constraints in Afghanistan over gender and human rights are well known, Finland's advocacy has been strong, though in some areas (e.g. UNSCR 1325) progress has been slow.** The prospect for women's rights has often been excluded and ignored from the consultation, design and oversight of com-

<sup>30</sup> Interview with Afghan Women Journalist Union, May 2014.

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.myafghanmountains.org>

munity initiatives for peace and reintegration mechanisms. There has been a lack of women's representation – particularly at higher-level decision-making bodies; a lack of transparency; the absence of explicit guarantees of their constitutional freedoms; the risk of deal-making rather than reconciliation; the failure to take sufficient action on governance and security sector reforms; a lack of trust that the government is committed to protecting women's rights; and the failure to make progress on justice and impunity before pushing for reintegration and reconciliation (Human Rights Watch 2010).

Finland still has a long way to go in implementing UNSCR 1325 effectively in crisis management. Turning the mirror on its own national performance is revealing. For example, although increasing female participation in international missions is one of the official goals in the Finnish NAP for UNSCR 1325, in 2010 there were only four Finnish female soldiers in Afghanistan, while Sweden, by contrast, had deployed 50 women (Pykälä 2011).

The specific implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security is still challenging and unclear (Care International 2010). Finland started a twinning cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UN Women in 2011 aiming to advance the objectives set out in Resolution 1325, as well as creating a national action plan (NAP) for Afghanistan (Government of Finland 2011). This followed a memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries on 21 June 2011. From 2010 Finland expended a great deal of staff time on this, even being asked for input into US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's speech to Congress in 2011. Despite Finland's high profile on the matter, several obstacles have emerged. By their own admission, UN Women has not had the necessary in-country capacity to help draft the NAP;<sup>32</sup> the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declined to share its draft of the NAP with UN Women; and the general inertia pending presidential elections in 2014 has halted all work on this. The optimistic view is that after the elections the matter will gain traction and might even be signed by the end of 2014.<sup>33</sup>

The slow results are indicative of a wider challenge. Afghanistan has been obliged and encouraged by the international community to adhere to international norms without having the capacity or incentive to pursue these beyond the basic paperwork required to obtain seed funding for the relevant ministerial department. This is not to say that efforts towards the implementation of Resolution 1325 should be abandoned; rather, what is required is an incremental and necessarily long-term strategy that reflects and accepts other national priorities likely to take precedence in the current climate. UN Women recognises that complementary efforts should include promoting Resolution 1325 knowledge in other ministries and within civil society institutions that will create the demand for government action.

### **5.3.3 *Extent to which Finnish development cooperation has contributed to the stated objectives and intended outcomes of its interventions***

**The mainstreaming of gender issues within pooled funds such as ARTF requires continuing support and advocacy from donors such as Finland.** Finland has recognised the compromises inherent in supporting pooled funding mechanisms. For instance, its advisor's report in 2007 stated that one of the ARTF's biggest problems has been the lack of a gender strategy. Gender has always been designated as a cross-cutting objective within the fund's Financing Strategy, and therefore not in receipt of specific gender project funding (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2011b). Though the situation "improved considerably", there is still reticence within the donor community to confront anomalies head on, made more difficult by the increased confidence and conservatism of the government.

Finland has attempted to bridge the gap between security sector reform and the poor state of, and lack of confidence in, the justice sector. As we have explained above, one response has been the support to the AIHRC. The culture of impunity for human rights violations is closely related to the unresolved conflict and the security crisis. Finland's support to the AIHRC goes back to 2002 and by 2004 was the third largest donor after US and UK. The new Afghan constitution, which was passed in January 2004, provides an official status to the commission, and by 2014 received a small, but politically significant, contribution from the Afghan national budget (about US\$1,3 million/year). AIHRC is considered one of the best functioning institutions in Afghani-

<sup>32</sup> UN Women has generic skills on 1325 policy, but has been unable to attract personnel with the necessary skills for drafting policy documents of this nature in Afghanistan.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Finland MFA Development Advisor (2010–12) and with UN Women.

stan and the chairperson, Dr Sima Samar, is widely respected all over the world. In order to ensure countrywide coverage of the Commission's services, the Commission has eight regional offices and six provincial offices with more than 600 employees, including support staff members.

The areas of activity of the AIHRC include: human rights education; child rights, women's rights, transitional justice, monitoring and investigation and the rights of persons with disabilities. These areas of activity are supported by the following units: Research and Policy; Report and Donor Liaison; Reporting; the Resource Centre; Media and Publications; Database; Administration and Finance; Logistics; and Information Communication Technology. AIHRC has achieved 90% of the objectives of its thematic programmes, particularly human rights education in which Finland's contribution played a significant role. AIHRC has not received any direct technical assistance from Finland but the Embassy has had an advisor on HR & Gender since early 2010 and AIHRC has been a focus of this person's work. AIHRC donor meetings are held every four months (sometimes event-based meeting with several donors). It generates thematic and activity reports (generic reports) each four months and posts them in the website.

By 2010 the AIHRC was substantially funded by most of the big donors in Afghanistan. The bloated budget, and the attempts of some donors to earmark activities, challenged the absorptive capacity of the organisation. The Commission is a state mechanism, not a government body, but when its mandate expired in December 2011 there was some controversy over political appointments being promoted by President Karzai. Afghan civil society groups nominated candidates for the eight new Commissioners, all of which were turned down by the President, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights criticised the level of interference. Nevertheless, the AIHRC has remained independent to the extent of mapping and reporting on human rights issues and spearheading a Transitional Justice team that holds to account a number of senior figures in the country.

#### **5.3.4 Extent to which lessons on implementing cross-cutting objectives have been recorded and disseminated**

**Finland is generally good at recording and disseminating its experiences on gender advocacy and project outcomes.** Through the NGO, Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, Finland sponsored delegates from Afghanistan to advocate women's issues at the UN Headquarters in 2012 and present women's concerns directly to the Security Council (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2012b). Moreover, study trips to Finland in conjunction with the project Continued Capacity Building Programme on Migration Management for the Afghan National Assembly and Civil Service were organised twice; in 2009 for members of Parliament, and in 2010 for civil servants from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior. Also in December 2011, 11 members of the Parliament of Afghanistan spent a week learning about Finland's administration. The study trip was a part of the development cooperation project, funded by Finland, in which the IOM trains Afghan decision makers and administrators on refugee and migration issues.

Within the ARTF the record of disaggregated data on minorities and vulnerable groups has varied from project to project; it has not been a qualifying factor in funding. After years of raising concerns with the World Bank on the lack of a gender policy and focus, and information on how ARTF addressed gender issues, several Heads of Mission including Finland jointly signed a request to the World Bank in 2010 that resulted in a commitment to strengthen gender reporting and to ensure that gender equity was a cross-cutting objective in all ARTFs National Priority Programmes. Since April 2013, the gender working group has looked at gender results and challenges in NSP, challenges for women in the civil service; and the manner in which the new ARTF Scorecard and Results Matrix (ongoing) reflects gender concerns.

### **5.4 Aid effectiveness and development results**

This section assesses how aid effectiveness commitments have been integrated into Finnish development interventions, and how their application has supported development results and the overall objective of peace and development.



**Box 4** Summary of key finds for evaluation question 4.

Geopolitical interests and contrasting mandates of lead donors in Afghanistan have led to extreme distortions of aid over many years. Despite this being beyond repair, Finland has successfully sought close coordination with Nordic + donors, as well as upholding its commitments to proportional on-budget support to the Government of Afghanistan and alignment to its development priorities. Like many donors, Finland's ambitions with respect to balancing pooled funds with NGO/FLC and individually funded projects are compromised by capacity (both Finnish and Afghan) and monitoring constraints.

Finnish adherence with national development priorities and policies has been optimal. However, the seemingly irreconcilable dichotomy of delivery and capacity development persists. At the start of our evaluation period one influential report (Walman 2008) noted that about a quarter of all assistance to Afghanistan in 2008 was to technical assistance, yet with little impact (World Bank 2007). The PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif (closed in 2014) has been an important "outpost" for project monitoring. Despite Finland's comfortable ratio of spending between military and development sectors, QIPs funded through the PRT have yet to be adequately assessed in terms of impact.

The lack of donor coordination in Afghanistan has been the subject of much internal (Afghan) and external (evaluative) criticism over the years. For Finland, the Busan Agreement (Fragile States) and common approaches to this as advocated by Nordic countries has been represented best through the TMAF. Notwithstanding the continuing dominance of the United States within the donor fold, Finland within the Nordic+ group may be able to retain some important influence beyond the current transitional stage.

There has been too much misplaced emphasis on the formation of a modern state, and not enough on incremental and sustained support to civil society to counterbalance patrimonial excesses. Looking towards longevity of results, it is important to return again to the structure and driving forces within Afghanistan that broadly speaking run contrary to the modern state model promulgated by international donors. Finland has not fully exploited the added value it could, with sufficient staff resources, potentially bring to supporting civil society entities that can be of lasting value irrespective of the state model that emerges in Afghanistan over the coming years.

#### **5.4.1 Extent to which Finland has applied and integrated its aid efficiency commitments in the country/region**

Concerns about poor governance and accountability relating to public expenditures is one of the main reasons for the large share of donor assistance channelled through the external budget; donors seek to bypass weak government systems and deliver resources to projects and programmes directly and outside the core budget (World Bank 2009; World Bank and DFID 2010). Despite the high degree of power granted by the constitution to the central state, the national government in reality has limited control over regional and local power-holders. Significant problems in governance remain (Government of Finland 2011).

**Nevertheless, Finland has upheld its commitments towards on-budget support to the Government of Afghanistan through channelling the majority of its funds for development cooperation through trust funds for purposes of cost-efficiency.** Finland's largest development funding goes through the ARTF. Since the launch of the ARTF in 2001 Finland has contributed US\$69,1 million, corresponding to 1,3% of total ARTF donations (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2011a). Approximately half of the grant has been towards the state budget (recurring and capital costs), with the other half to NSP, MISFA, AREDP, CRIP and, since 2014, 25% to education programmes under EQUIP.

Some 10 Finnish NGOs were operating in Afghanistan by December 2010 (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2010c) and the evaluation notes that transactional costs associated with relatively small funds to national NGOs have been high (interviews at MFA 2013 October). There does not appear to be evidence in the project literature of specific reference to OECD Fragile States principles.

#### **5.4.2 Extent to which national ownership and alignment with national policies is incorporated into interventions undertaken**

**Finnish adherence with national development priorities and policies appears to have been optimal, and was reported as such in the 2007 evaluation and by most advisor reports to the Quality Board.** What is not reflected in written reports, however, is the persistent contradiction between service delivery and capacity development. Donor demands for results inevitably focus attention on the former, while the latter has a longer timeline. Capacity development, though intrinsic to all activities, often becomes a separate activity.

A key area of concern is around coordinating approaches towards government capacity development. Within all the larger projects, including those of the ARTF, there is still a heavy reliance on parallel donor-sponsored project implementation units in which skilled Afghans are paid higher salaries than their ministerial counterparts. The World Bank has made efforts to standardise salaries across all projects within the ARTF while simultaneously the government itself has begun the process of salary reform. The Capacity Building for Results Facility is a promising initiative, but moving external donor funded staff, the so-called second civil service, into the Afghan *Tashkeel* (civil service system) will be challenging. The government has emphasised the need for a phased but time-bound approach to winding down the second civil service and tackling the associated salary issues.

There remains a significant disconnect between donor views on the success of aid coordination and those of government, parliament, civil society and the Afghan private sector, all of whom rate donor performance as “poor” in this respect. The evaluation was, predictably, assailed with stories of overlapping initiatives, duplication in technical assistance and competition for “clients” through whom to implement projects. This last point is particularly pertinent to the NSP. Central to the approach is the creation and sustainability of CDCs across the country. These are elected bodies (including mandatory equal representation of women) with their own bank account, and many are maturing to the extent that they are able to seek funding beyond the NSP block grants. Yet some large donors (notably the USA) still insist on working through their own parallel village committees.

The Afghan view is that the Afghanistan Government’s New Aid Management Policy is a good document supported by donors in Kabul, but that donor capitals undercut the positions taken by their officials in the field. Driving the debate over aid effectiveness, donor coordination and aid modalities are external issues such as the domestic political climate and financial crisis in donor capitals, the military campaign and upcoming withdrawal, and anticorruption issues (e.g. Bennett, Betts and Gayfer 2012).

#### **5.4.3 Extent to which Finnish development cooperation is coherent with and complementary to the development strategies and programmes of other major bilateral and multilateral donors**

**Through the Nordic + group, Finland’s coherence and cooperation with like-minded donors has been very good.** Finland is an active participant in the coordination of international aid through, for example, the work of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, which liaises between the Afghan administration and the international community. However, the promotion of the Busan Agreement (Fragile States) and common approaches to this as advocated by Nordic+ group has been represented best through the TMAF, now two years old.<sup>34</sup> Here the Nordic+ group of seven countries is represented by an annually elected group of two. Finland and Netherlands were the lead countries in the first year; now it is Denmark and Sweden. Likewise, in the ARTF there tends to be a Nordic division of labour, with Finland currently taking a lead on the incentive programme.

A thorough inspection of donor coordination in Afghanistan over the last 10 years is beyond the scope of this study. In all analyses, the dominance of the US government comes to the fore, and the evaluation was reminded that despite renewed efforts to bolster national ownership of aid coordination through developing a database of projects in the Aid Management Directorate of the Ministry of Finance, the USA does not submit data through this.

<sup>34</sup> There is, in fact, a New Deal group for Afghanistan that also meets periodically and comprises Australia, Denmark, Netherlands and the UK.

Although the United Nations has managed to marginally improve aid coordination by setting some clear priorities it has not led to significant changes in the behaviour of the donors.<sup>35</sup> Yet declining aid could mean that the potential leverage of donor funding may be stronger than in the past. The evaluation was told by several Nordic donors that since coordination structures work on the basis of one-donor-one-vote, the size of the aid donation is not what determines influence. This may be true at the level of inter-donor coordination, but at a macro-political level the USA still exerts a huge influence. Given the levels of donor fragmentation, and the fact that some funding (e.g. for Afghan security forces) is tied to donor draw-down strategies, Finland within the Nordic+ group may be able to retain some important influence beyond this transitional stage (USIP 2012).

#### **5.4.4 Extent to which the results of Finnish development cooperation have, through the choice of its aid modalities, contributed to peacebuilding and/or statebuilding objectives**

**Contribution to peacebuilding is notoriously difficult to record, but Finland has been consistent in its support towards sectors such as civilian security.** We have already commented on the importance of paying police salaries through the LOTFA funds as an essential stabilising endeavour in itself. Security sector reform is inherently a sensitive and politically charged activity in which Finland has notable experience that it was able to draw upon.

On a smaller scale, Finland has adhered to the notion that for a military presence and engagement to gain traction and maintain security on a sustainable footing, quick impact projects (QIPs) provide “simple, visible, quickly achievable, relevant small-scale projects for village communities” to win the trust of the local population for international security forces and the central administration (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2007a). At the same time, Finland has prided itself on an appropriate ratio of military/development spending, Finland’s US\$57 billion in development aid to Afghanistan over 10 years was dwarfed by the estimated US spend of more than US\$460 billion. Also the ratio of military development spend for Finland was considerably more balanced: in 2010 Finland’s military spend was €34 million, compared with an ODA spend of €20 million (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2011a).

Interestingly, the debate over the separation of development funding from the activities undertaken by the PRT<sup>36</sup> in Mazar-e-Sharif meant that, in contrast to Finland’s QIPs, no Sida (Sweden) money was channelled through the Mazar PRT. In Table 4 (Section 4.1) we gave a breakdown of projects funded through the PRT, including QIPs. There has been a profound lack of agreed methods to measure the success and impact of the PRTs (cf. Save the Children 2004). Lessons learned and evaluation processes in ISAF have been weak and compromised by the heavy lead-nation drive behind the PRT network. Critics claim that the units deal with too many things, lacking the skills needed (Save the Children 2004). The humanitarian components attached to the work of PRTs raised intense debates concerning Civil-Military Cooperation trend among the humanitarian actors, especially due to the fact that the military humanitarian activities has blurred the line between humanitarian and military actors in the ground and seriously affected the neutral and impartial image of NGOs and UN among the local Afghan communities (e.g. Bennett 2009; Shirzay 2012). Our discussions with both Finnish and Swedish PRT teams in Mazar-e-Sharif confirmed that military prerogatives tended to drive the agenda as well as the direction and source of shared information.

The evaluation is concerned with reports that the women’s prison in Sheberghan, a penal facility built with Finnish assistance, had become notorious for prostitution and abuse. In 2009 MFA Finland was made aware of these allegations that came to light during a regular (Finnish) monitoring mission (Helsingin Sanomat 2009). The allegations referred primarily to events prior to the new prison construction being funded by Finland, and to its credit Finland helped raise the alarm over events (MFA 2009c). Nevertheless, the events caused some reputational damage for Finland because negative press reports suggested a lack of adequate risk assessment on the part of MFA Finland.<sup>37</sup> We were not able to substantiate this.

Finland’s heavy reliance on ARTF (and NSP within it) seems to have been vindicated by external evaluation. The NSP evaluation undertaken by the University of York (PWRDU 2006) assessed that in those villages

<sup>35</sup> Kai Eide interviewed by Global Policy Forum (GPF), Catherine Defontaine, November, 2011.

<sup>36</sup> The PRT is now renamed the Transitional Support Unit and will close in 2014.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with the then-PRT project manager, Rule of Law.

where the NSP is active (i.e. the municipalities in which the villagers themselves plan and implement the central government funds supported by small-scale projects), public trust in government is significantly higher than in the villages where the NSP is not present. The strength of the NSP is that it leans on local population participation and its ability to operate in high-risk areas in the south and east that are normally inaccessible to NGOs.

#### **5.4.5 Extent to which the results and achievements to date are likely to endure in the longer term**

**Finland has effectively exploited its flexibility and relatively “neutral” political position in Afghanistan, but sustainability is a mutable concept in Afghanistan.** If measured in terms of three to five years, donor trends suggest that the larger programmes within ARTF and the governance and capacity development programmes of the UN and EU will prevail at roughly current levels with measurable benefits accrued to individuals and communities dependent on external funding. Heavy aid dependency will continue throughout transition (2012–14) and the transformation decade (2015–25), but with considerable funding gaps to finance its security and non-security expenditures (Ministry of Finance 2011). The withdrawal of ISAF troops and the decrease in funding flows are expected to create a budget deficit of some 30–40% in 2014–16, the “atmosphere of general uncertainty will expose the country to considerable risks”, and may compromise human rights and in particular the position of women and girls, with rising tension between ethnic and religious groups (Government of Finland 2011).

The political context is thus less certain; the positive trajectory towards liberal democracy expounded for 10 years has been replaced by a more qualified and pessimistic outlook. The building of a “modern” state may have to be replaced by more adaptive incremental measures that ensure a continuing voice for those previously neglected sections of the population whose relative profile and power has slowly enabled a degree of checks and balances to be introduced in recent years – women, civil society, small businesses, etc. What this implies is resetting ambitions. Smaller and relatively “neutral” Nordic donors have a comparative advantage both politically and in terms of flexible use of resources. More conventional development projects – education, women’s access to justice, environment, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – still have traction.

### **5.5 Intervention logic revisited**

In the desk phase of this study we developed an intervention logic (or theory of change) that captured the intentions and the underlying assumptions of Finnish development cooperation in the country (see Annex 5). In some respects this was speculative because the planning documents were not always explicit in tracing the logic from interventions to final impacts. We have also found that in some cases they did not contain a risk analysis that anticipated context-related setbacks or changes in the political landscape. Thus our intervention logic was “strategy planned” rather than “strategy realised”.

In light of the above analysis we return to that original theory of change, asking to what extent it was (a) realistically assessed in terms of the underlying assumptions; (b) measurable, in terms of the kind of data analysis that was in place; and (c) realised in terms of what actually occurred within the lifetime of the programmes. This is more than just application of the DAC criteria on outcomes and impact. It asks not only “has X occurred” (because it may not yet have done so) but “are we confident that Finland’s contribution has had a positive influence in moving towards the upper level goals of our theory of change”.

Our original intervention logic was derived from two key papers: the *Government White Paper to Parliament* (Government of Finland 2011) and the earlier *Action Plan for Afghanistan* (MFA 2009b). Finland’s strategic approach in Afghanistan has been based on the assumption that national and regional stability pertains to the promotion of human rights and transparent democratic institutions, and that central to this is the building of national capacities to increase levels of trust that lead to a social contract between government and the populace. The assumption here is that the very cause of fragility is the fragmentation of social, political and economic enterprises in Afghanistan and the social exclusion that this has engendered. Only with a level of sustained development, poverty reduction and inclusive politics will stability be reinforced.

These are reasonable assumptions, and MFA Finland's response has been to build a fairly broad portfolio of projects that reflect their own competencies (i.e. special areas of interest and technical expertise) as well as the collective endeavour of like-minded donors (notably Nordic and EU). Of equal importance are the accompanying political dialogue and the leverage afforded by succinct NGO/FLC projects and funding for the Human Rights Commission, alternative livelihoods (anti-drugs) and mine action.

We contend, however, that problems arise when these interventions are collectively and individually correlated with the broader goals of the international development community – the shared ambition of the development of a modern liberal state. One pathway forwards has been the assumption that an increase in national absorptive capacities of state mechanisms would strengthen the social contract between people and the state. Moreover, the strengthening of state mechanisms (security, local and national governance, service provision and rule of law) would facilitate and mutually reinforce the potential for greater economic activity and employment.

In 2007, Finland feared that a significant portion of donor programmes were being hijacked by geopolitical interests, resulting in the skewing of funding. The only answer was a stronger UN and willingness for donors to tailor their programmes in accordance with UN collective design, and to ensure that a greater proportion of bilateral aid was pooled in this manner (Embassy of Finland, Kabul 2007a). In the event, neither the UN nor the Government of Afghanistan was able to set a common comprehensive agenda; the Paris Principles were always compromised by widely differing priorities and approaches decided in capitals a long way from Kabul.

The construction of Afghanistan's state institutions has been based on a development model, now widely and implicitly accepted within the development community, that may be flawed and profoundly ahistorical. In 1977 Niklas Luhmann proposed a societal differentiation framework that, if applied to Afghanistan, helps us understand why the quest for modern state in Afghanistan has been so elusive. Luhmann's framework posited three societal structures: (a) *Segmentation*, in which society is differentiated into equal subsystems characterised by personal interaction between members of society and a very low degree of formal offices; (b) *Stratification*, where society's subsystems are unequal, where elite positions are elevated and power, law, wealth and religion are hardly separable; and (c) *Functional differentiation*, where politics, law and economy are operationally closed to each other, but each produces collectively binding decisions. Society here is held together by the interdependence of functional systems rather than by a shared normative vision (Luhmann 1977).

Benjamin Brast (2012) applied the framework to the case of external statebuilding in Afghanistan, concluding that the country is characterised by stratification and, in some areas, segmentation. Therefore, enforcing modern statehood in the Afghan society leads to stark contradictions and can undermine the country's stability. Warlords often enjoy a competitive advantage because their model of governance is better suited to a stratified society. Imposing liberal democracy or a modern bureaucracy is not only contrary to patrimonial politics, but it might also exacerbate instability.

This is not simply an academic discussion. Aid has reinforced "client" relations in the country, and Afghanistan has often been referred to as a "rentier" state (Verkoren and Kamphuis 2013 for a recent exposition). It accumulates the biggest share of its income from external sources, with an unelected state class benefiting from political autonomy. State funds are used to co-opt or neutralise opposition – hence the enormous sized of the public sector – and governance is delivered through patrimonial networks. The neoliberal state model is thus distorted and although the components of such a model may be built they will not function in the manner intended. Indeed, despite their being some advocates within the Afghan government, the only reason why many of the constituents of the liberal state exist in Afghanistan is because of external funding accompanied by the shoring up of policy apparatus by external advisors. As an aspiration the individual components may have been desirable; as a sustainable model based on a social contract and attitudinal change, it is less viable.

Our contention is that the malleable governance models that will emerge in the coming decade will nevertheless still be responsive to lobbying and influence of stratified groups able to exert a degree of power within their communities. Within this configuration the efforts of a small donor like Finland would best be suited to help shape and sustain civil society entities that hold to account public institutions; power and influence within non-governmental bodies – although themselves also susceptible to corruption – may be the best guarantee against the excesses of patrimonial power within state mechanisms whose distortions are unlikely to change in the near future.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS

2014 marks the end of an era that saw billions of dollars spent on “stabilising” a country through a myriad of strategic approaches ranging from pure military objectives to hugely ambitious statebuilding goals. Historians will argue over the gains and losses of such a scale of international intervention, but for aid donors the lessons are about fragile states. Interventions in Afghanistan coincided with the formulation of OECD Paris Principles and Fragile States principles, followed by the Busan “New Deal”. Afghanistan joined the G7+ countries in 2010 and is a co-chair of the Working Group on New Deal Implementation. It is worth here recording the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) contained with the Busan agreement. These are also the cornerstone of MFA Finland’s *New Guidelines on Fragile States*:

- *Legitimate politics*: Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution.
- *Security*: Establish and strengthen people’s security.
- *Justice*: Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice.
- *Economic foundations*: Generate employment and improve livelihoods.
- *Revenues and services*: Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

Afghanistan has been one of the seven countries in which the New Deal has been piloted. Crucially, the **focus** is on supporting inclusive **country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility**. As we have seen, though, defining what is meant by “country-led” in Afghanistan is to confront the complexities of how an inflated war economy interplays with a patrimonial culture to create the quintessential “rentier” state. Finland has chosen security, justice and human rights as its main themes. If the onus is on promoting *people’s* security and *people’s* access to justice, it may be necessary to focus more fully on how this could be a more inclusive process that extends beyond the formal state apparatus.

**Finnish aid is well aligned with government priorities and with the priorities set out in international agreements, the latest of which was the 2012 Tokyo Agreement.** Finnish aid appears to have been strategically well placed in terms of a) alignment with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and other key government priorities; and b) alignment with like-minded donors, notably the Nordic+ countries and EU. With an increase in development specialist staffing from 2007, there was a noticeable improvement in reporting on all aspects of development cooperation, including adherence to the MFA’s 2009 policy priorities. But most internal reports were “generic”, reflecting secondary sources, and not always illustrating how compliance with objectives was achieved. This is not unique to Finland. The years 2008–12 were particularly problematic in terms of security in Afghanistan and “remote management” has become the norm for most donors.

**The reliance on pooled funding mechanisms maximises the effectiveness of a relatively small donor.** Finland has appropriately adhered to a combination of central (core) funding combined with preference funding for NSP, Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA), Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme (AREDP) and Community Recovery Intensification Programme (CRIP). Perceptions on donor coordination quite widely differ between Afghans and the international community, and notwithstanding the well-recorded shortcomings of some UN partners, should not deter Finland from continuing with this strategy. It may have been appropriate to have placed development advisors within the pooled structures – for example, a gender advisor inside the ARTF. Meanwhile, there are new opportunities for leverage gained by being a “permanent” donor at this precarious stage in Afghanistan’s history, for example, in being a more robust advocate on issues such as human rights.

**Gender mainstreaming in conjunction with other like-minded donors has been good, but the complementary range of programmes are fragmentary.** The chosen range of projects and the necessary degree of close supervision has been constrained by two factors: (a) the small number of development staff in the Embassy (though this has now increased to four); and (b) the self-imposed criteria and fund application process that necessarily favours the small Afghan NGO elite in Kabul.

**A small donor like Finland should concentrate resources on supporting national and sub-national bodies that hold government bodies to account** on issues such as human rights, women rights, the behav-

ior of the security sector and corruption. Current distortions within the liberal state model pursued by donors, and future uncertainties over what kind of state model is to emerge in Afghanistan, suggests that one insurance against patrimonial excesses is to invest in influential civil society institutions.

**A new strategy that includes appropriate investment in capacity development of institutions and individuals is required** to verify and monitor Finnish-funded projects on the ground. Security constraints are unlikely to improve in the near future, and remote management of projects will increase.

Finland should draw on the Afghanistan experience and define a streamlined and strategic approach to whole-of-government and inter-ministerial cooperation around the new Guidelines on Fragile States (MFA 2014). Finland should more clearly define its political objectives and working processes for programme design and implementation to achieve them.

**The new MFA *Fragile States Guidelines* emphasise the importance of conflict analysis to underpin all Finnish interventions. This has not been apparent in Afghanistan.** Although there are plenty of reputable alternative information sources (UN, World Bank, other Nordic donors), it would still be useful to have an independent conflict sensitivity assessment of the specific activities undertaken by Finland, along with interim monitoring of outcomes for compliance to Fragile States principles.

**Finland's engagement through the provincial reconstruction team structure (Maza-e-Sharif) is open to scrutiny.** Finland's assertion that QIPs funded through the PRT were both appropriate and timely still begs the question as to whether there was lasting developmental benefit offset against the potential political harm of these projects. Although Finland's contribution through the PRT was small, the overlap between security and development was more closely exhibited than by some other (including Nordic) donors.

**A "whole-of-government" Finnish strategy is not clearly articulated.** Although not formally termed a "long-term partner country", Afghanistan is in the top three recipients of ODA from Finland. The 2009 guidelines on development and security promote the concept of "comprehensive security through development policy". In Afghanistan Finland has successfully brought together development, security and defence staff as described in a White Paper to parliament. It also endorsed the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* in 2011 in Busan. However, the White Paper is a description of the situation in Afghanistan and of activities undertaken by different stakeholders. It does not describe how common development objectives will be achieved through a whole-of-government strategy in line with the ANDS.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, a cross-ministerial working group and lower-level coordination mechanisms were put in place to manage the Afghanistan programme, the example of which has been followed in Nepal.

**Capacity constraints are more apparent in FLC, NGO and individually funded programmes, but the threshold of risk could be set higher.** Greater emphasis should have been given to increasing the capacity of partner agencies – government and non-government – to self-monitor at international standards. For the larger pooled funds, administered by World Bank and UNDP, this has been less problematic than for some bilateral and NGO projects where stark capacity constraints have been exposed. Notwithstanding the disproportionate transactional costs associated with administering them, the FLC and NGO funding windows (about €2m/year combined) still represent a relatively small percentage of funding that perhaps could have been increased more rapidly. Nurturing high-risk projects – a necessary strategy in fragile situations – implies the acceptance of failure weighed against durable success. If peace "writ large" is an increasingly elusive goal, an alternative strategy is to invest in small-scale bottom-up initiatives that represent incremental, but tangible, change. Accepting that conflict is often localised in Afghanistan (as opposed to depicting the country crudely as a "conflict zone"), opportunities to combine localised conflict analysis with project interventions should always be pursued.

Current political and security conditions will continue to profoundly affect the balance between what is desirable and what is doable in Afghanistan, innovative approaches towards remote management by donors will be required. The "close down" of even basic supervision missions in the last two years is a stark reminder of how difficult it is to conduct business as usual. The problem is that the default approach of using national employees of private sector monitoring agents is simply not viable when capacity is low. Remote management

<sup>38</sup> This point was reiterated OECD 2012.

will depend on building the capacity of national monitoring institutions, and greater resources will have to be allocated towards this. A bottom-up strategy is more labour-intensive and expensive, but the rewards may ultimately be greater.

## 7 RECOMMENDATIONS

- A clearer strategy on gender, including realistic entry points, should be devised in conjunction with like-minded donors. This should include a strategy for mainstreaming UNSCR 1325, and the greater involvement of women in the peace process. There is a need for more critical research on gender in Afghanistan, and in particular on the prospects for promoting women's rights and gender equality in the coming years when the scale of international presence decreases. A joint Nordic research project might involve the Finnish 1325 Network and look into potential entry points in the development of the police and justice sectors. More immediately, it should look at ways of ensuring women's participation in the peace process as one of the key objectives of UNSCR 1325.
- On-budget support through demonstrably successful programmes such as the National Solidarity Programme should be maintained. But complementarity should be increased by shifting NGO/FLC and joint programme priorities towards social and economic sectors. Integrated programming may require working in specific geographic areas. Within the NGO/FLC programmes, particular attention should be given to developing SMEs, building on existing capacities of the CDCs. Specific geographical areas might be considered for integrated programming across sectors
- Across all programmes, support to civil society should include a capacity development strategy with specific funds allocated to this. Rather than an ad hoc selection of projects, greater complementarity between chosen activities should be sought, including explicit linkage and synergy between the Finnish NGO programme and the FLC programme.
- Security sector reform (SSR) should move from technical assistance towards creating demand for a people-centred SSR, including greater involvement of civil society. Too much attention has been given to purely technical reform of security and justice institutions. A people-centred SSR requires working with civil society and developing accountability structures (for example, independent ombudsman institutions) that reflect the expectations and capacities of the population and demand effective and accountable security governance. Geared specifically to fragile contexts like Afghanistan, Finland should articulate and develop the concepts, principles and programmatic outline for this within civilian crisis management.
- More circumscribed programming should include risk analysis and an assessment of how remote management can effectively be undertaken. In the medium term, a limited programme with realisable objectives should be drawn up. These should include precisely how, and by whom, monitoring and verification will be carried out as remote management increases. Acceptably higher risk activities should be embraced, provided the rationale for these is argued and defended on the basis of a strong conflict/peace-building analysis. Risk analysis should include a "do no harm" assessment based on contextual analysis.



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### 1 BACKGROUND TO THE EVALUATION

The evaluation at hand is the first evaluation of the Finnish development cooperation focusing on the peace, security and development nexus. Finnish development cooperation has been evaluated in several partner countries considered as fragile states; however, a large thematic evaluation combining analysis from different countries has not yet been conducted.

This evaluation will assess peace, security and development in the Finnish development cooperation through country and regional case studies. Some Finnish country programmes and aid portfolios in fragile states are addressing directly conflict prevention or crisis management with specific targeted activities. However, majority of the cooperation in these countries is addressing a wide range of development challenges supporting conflict prevention and mitigation in a comprehensive manner and often indirectly. Usually, development cooperation is implemented in parallel with other activities through diplomacy, crisis management and humanitarian assistance.

The evaluation will include two components. First component contains evaluation of the Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans which showcases a region that has come out of war and is now in different stages of EU integration. The second component, in turn, includes three other case study countries and areas each experiencing a different situation of fragility. The evaluation of the two components is organised in such way that the cross-fertilisation between them can take place. The findings of the both components are going to be merged into synthesis evaluation report and as such the two components are closely interlinked. This will guide the organisation of the evaluation process and the work of the evaluation team.

### 2 CONTEXT

Peace, security and development as well as the particular needs of fragile states have gained increasing attention in the international development discourse during the past decade. United Nations Millennium Declaration placed peace and security in the core of development together with poverty reduction, protection of the environment as well as human rights, democracy and good governance. The EU, in turn, in its key development policy document “The European Consensus on Development” of 2006 considered the needs of the fragile states as one of the five common principles defining EU’s response to development. The importance of fragile states was reaffirmed in the EU Council Conclusions “Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change” of May 2012. In addition, OECD agreed on the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations in 2007. They contain commitments to maximise the contribution of development partners in fragile states and their implementation was monitored also in connection to the Paris declaration monitoring process.

A new approach to the development of fragile states called “New Deal” was agreed at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness which was held in Busan in 2011. New Deal commits fragile states and their development partners to “do things differently” by designing and implementing interventions with an even greater consideration for the specific characteristics of fragile states; and to focus on “different things” by structuring development interventions around peacebuilding and statebuilding goals.

There are nearly 50 states in the world that are classified as fragile states. More than 1,5 billion people live in countries that suffer from violent conflicts or constant political and criminal violence. At the same time development is curtailed. Very often violence erodes the base underpinning peace processes that have brought an end to political violence. Weak institutions suffering from a lack of legitimacy are unable to generate security, justice or economic development that supports employment. This can lead to crises also in countries that appear to be stable.

The nature of conflicts and fragile situations has changed during the last decades. Conflict and fragility does not necessarily result from one-off episode of war but from a repeated cycle of violence, weak governance, instability, poverty and competition over environmental resources as well as environmental hazards. While the repetitive nature of conflicts increases in some countries and regions, their possibilities to achieve sustainable development are diminished. Some of the fragile states are on track in achieving part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); however, achieving the targets is particularly challenged in low-income fragile states. According to the OECD, ODA is the biggest financial inflow in fragile states.

## 2.1 Peace and development in Finnish development policy

The role of development policy as part of conflict prevention and peace mediation is included in the Programme of the Finnish Government (2011). The Programme states that Finnish development cooperation funds can be increased towards supporting comprehensive security. This is also stated in the Government Report of 2012 on Finnish Security and Defence Policy. Also the previous Government Programme of 2007 emphasised the role of crisis prevention and support to peace processes in the Finnish development policy. In addition, both Government Programmes have emphasised women's role in crises and conflict prevention. Finland has a national action plan on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security for the period of 2012–16.

Peace, security and development nexus has been one of the key elements of Finnish development policy during the past two decades. It is also a central element in the Finnish Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012 which emphasise the interconnectedness between security and development. Key concept in Finnish development policies has been “comprehensive security” that encompasses human rights, development and security. In overall, comprehensive security can be supported through complementarity of different means: development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, diplomacy as well as military and civilian crisis management. Finland perceives development cooperation to have a particular role in conflict prevention and crisis recovery. In addition, Finnish development policies have emphasised the continuum between humanitarian aid and development cooperation in responding to the reconstruction and development needs of countries recovering from crises.

Finnish Development Policy Programme of 2012 emphasises long-term vision and commitment in supporting fragile states. These countries' ability to fulfil their basic functions and create economic growth is the key prerequisite for poverty reduction. Basic functions include security and justice as well as the ability to collect tax and customs revenues, which in turn can secure basic services and promote employment. Security and justice encompass human rights, democratic governance and a functioning civil society. Legitimacy and authority of the state are built through transparency and efficiency of governance as well as state's accountability to its citizens.

In 2009 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a document “Development and security in Finland's development policy – Guidelines on cooperation”. Being based on the Development Policy Programme of 2007, the document outlines priorities for Finland's work in the peace, security and development in activities financed through development cooperation. The document takes as a starting point the multiplicity of factors affecting fragility and places the concept of comprehensive security into the core of development policy response. Guidelines showcase policy work and operational activities Finland is promoting globally as well as in different regions. It also stipulates the geographic and thematic priorities of Finnish development cooperation. While geographic focus is on selected fragile states and areas, the thematic focuses, in turn, are stipulated as: (a) ensuring security and justice; (b) creating enabling environment for economic development and employment; and (c) strengthening the legitimacy of the state by supporting transparency, efficiency and accountability of the state and its governance structures towards citizens. The document also lists the methods and channels of development cooperation.



### 3 SCOPE

The evaluation focuses on Finland's country programmes and development cooperation portfolios, related policy dialogues and partnerships in selected fragile states and areas. While the focus of the evaluation is on country programmes and aid portfolios, the evaluation also looks into how development cooperation programmes interact with other Finnish ODA-financed activities supporting peace and development at the country level.

The evaluation concentrates particularly on the aspects of peace and development in the peace, security and development nexus. Security is only addressed when it is part of the country programme and development cooperation portfolio. Crisis management operations are not included in the evaluation.

The evaluation consists of two components:

**Component 1** includes the evaluation of the Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans encompassing Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. While assessing the entirety of the Finnish development interventions in the region, the particular scope of Component 1 is the implementation of Finland's Development Policy Framework Programme in the Western Balkans for the years 2009–13. Component 1 also contains the final evaluation of two regional projects, namely (a) Education for Sustainable Development in the Western Balkans (ESD); and (b) Consolidation of the Human Capacities in the Forest Policy and Economics Education and Research in the South-East Europe Region (FOPER I and II). The evaluation of the two projects will contribute also to the evaluation of the entirety of the Finnish development interventions in the region.

**Component 2** consists of case studies on Finnish development cooperation in Afghanistan, Palestinian Territories and Ethiopia. All of them are identified by the OECD/DAC as countries or areas in fragile situations.

When analysing the country programmes and development cooperation portfolios in the case study countries, the evaluation is not intended to examine each individual intervention meticulously but rather focus on how the entire country programme or cooperation portfolio and the related policy dialogue and partnerships support the drivers of peace and development in that particular context.

The evaluation covers bilateral instruments and bilateral contributions through multilateral channels (so-called multi-bi cooperation). In addition to sector support, programmes and projects, the bilateral cooperation instruments include FLC administered by the Finnish embassies and projects under the Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI). Activities of the Finnish civil society organisations in the case study countries are looked at as an entirety and as part of the overall Finnish contribution in a country. Similarly, while humanitarian aid and civilian crisis management operations are not included in the scope of this task, the evaluation looks at the interface between development cooperation and other ODA-financed activities at the country level in enhancing comprehensive approach to peace, security and development.

The scope of information sources include the development strategies of the case study governments, Finland's Development Policy Programmes, thematic and geographic guidance documents, previously conducted country programme or thematic evaluations, country analyses, reviews and reports, country-specific development cooperation plans, agreed minutes of the bilateral or other consultations, programme and project documents and similar documents. The evaluation team is also encouraged to use different local sources of information when available.

The temporal scope of the evaluation is 2007–12 covering the two Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012. As an exception, the evaluation of Western Balkans (Component 1) covers the entire span of Finland's development interventions in the region.

## 4 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the evaluation is to draw lessons on how Finnish development cooperation supports peace and development in fragile states. In addition, the purpose of Component 1 is to provide an assessment on the overall results and lessons learned of the Finnish development interventions in the Western Balkans region.

It is expected that the evaluation will bring forward issues, lessons learned and recommendations on Finland's contributions to peace and development in fragile states to support decision-makers at different departments of the Ministry. The purpose of the evaluation is to benefit the overall development policy-making of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and, in addition, to support the Guidelines on Fragile States which the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is in the process of drafting.

Evaluation serves as a tool for accountability and its purpose is to inform also the general public, parliamentarians, academia and the wider community of development professionals on the use and achievements of the development cooperation which is financed by public funds.

## 5 OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION

The objective is to provide a comprehensive overall independent view on the achievements, contributions and weaknesses of Finnish development cooperation in supporting peace and development in fragile states. Evaluation will provide lessons learned from the past cooperation focusing on the priorities of the Finnish development policies. Finally, the evaluation will give recommendations on how to enhance the implementation of policy priorities in supporting peace and development through development cooperation.

The specific objective of the evaluation is to seek answers to the following main evaluation questions:

- 1 Has Finnish development cooperation provided relevant support to the drivers of peace and development in fragile states including poverty reduction? Have the choice and mix of sectors and instruments contributed to these targets?
- 2 What have been the mechanisms to integrate the Finnish development policy priorities also stipulated in the 2009 guidelines "Development and security in Finland's development policy" in the country level interventions? Are development interventions on the ground complying with the priorities and thematic focuses of the development policies and the 2009 guidelines?
- 3 How have the cross-cutting objectives been integrated in Finland's development interventions in fragile states? How has their integration/non-integration affected identified and achieved results? What are the lessons learned and best practises in implementing cross-cutting objectives?
- 4 How have the aid effectiveness commitments been integrated in the Finnish development interventions? How has their application supported development results and the overall objective of peace and development? What have been the lessons learned and best practises?

The main evaluation questions will be studied through total of four case studies covering countries and areas in different situations of fragility.

## 6 ISSUES BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

The following **issues by evaluation criteria** will guide the evaluation in all of the case studies. Priority issues for each criterion are indicated below. The listed priority issues have also benefitted from the DAC guidelines on Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility (2012). It is expected that the evaluation team will develop more detailed evaluation questions based on the priorities set below and expand the set of questions where it deems this necessary.

### Relevance

- Assesses the choice of development interventions and their stated objectives in the context of partner country's policies and development objectives as well as the particular situation of conflict and fragility of the country under examination.

- Analyses the extent to which the objectives of Finland’s country programmes or cooperation portfolios are consistent with the objectives of the Finland’s development policies also stipulated in the 2009 guidelines “Development and security in Finland’s development policy”.
- Includes assessment of relevance through the perceptions of different beneficiary groups at different levels of interventions (national, regional, local) with the particular focus on the final users and groups, including those addressed through cross-cutting objectives.
- *For Component 1 only:* Analyses the extent to which the objectives of Finland’s development cooperation in the Western Balkans are consistent with the objectives of Finland’s Development Policy Framework Programme 2009–13 for the Western Balkans.

### **Effectiveness**

- Considers how Finland has contributed to countries’ capacities to produce basic services and reduce poverty taking into account the context of fragility. Assessment includes an analysis on how the trends of fragility have affected the achieved objectives, how risks have been managed and how the implementation of aid effectiveness commitments has contributed to the achieved results.
- *For Component 1 only:* Assesses to what extent Finnish development cooperation has achieved its objectives in the Western Balkans as stated in the consecutive regional strategies and Development Policy Framework Programme.

### **Impact**

- Refers to the wider achievements of Finnish development cooperation in the country under examination in terms of contributions to security and justice, economic development and employment as well as strengthened the authority and legitimacy of the state.
- Focuses on how the impact is perceived by the different beneficiary groups with the particular focus on the final users and groups, including those addressed through cross-cutting objectives.
- *For Component 1 only:* Refers to the wider impact of Finnish development cooperation to Western Balkan’s development towards multiethnic societies, rule of law and European democracy.

### **Sustainability**

- In the context of fragile states, sustainability refers particularly to how different interventions support the sustainability of resilience towards trends of fragility and conflict. The analysis includes assessment if Finnish development cooperation has contributed to the long-term drivers of peace as a key element for sustainability.
- Assessment focuses on how leadership, ownership and capacity have been supported to strengthen sustainability of interventions. Analysis also considers how participation of men and women as well as different beneficiary groups have been organised.
- *For Component 1 only:* assesses if the exit from the overall regional framework programme has been managed in a way to support sustainability.

### **Coordination**

- Looks into the costs and benefits of investing in division of labour and other coordination activities. The analysis examines if Finnish development cooperation activities are coordinated with other development partners and if this coordination has improved the relevance, effectiveness and impact of Finnish development cooperation.

### **Coherence**

- Assesses the internal coherence of Finnish policies, policy dialogue and development cooperation including an assessment on how development cooperation has interacted with other Finnish ODA-financed activities at the country level.
- Assesses the coherence of Finnish policies and development cooperation with wider donor communities’ policies and interventions.

### **Efficiency**

- Focuses on the working modalities related to aid delivery and management. The assessment considers particularly if the chosen working modalities as well as the number and size of interventions have supported efficient aid delivery and reaching of the intended beneficiaries.

For the **final evaluation of the two regional projects (ESD and FOPER I & II) included in the Component 1** the priority issues for each criterion are indicated below. It is expected that the evaluation team will develop more detailed evaluation questions based on the priorities set below and expand the set of questions where it deems this necessary

#### **Relevance**

- Focuses on the objectives and achievements of the project and their consistency with the policies of the partner countries and with the needs and priorities of the different stakeholders, including all final beneficiaries.

#### **Effectiveness**

- Focuses on the achievement of project's immediate objectives.
- Assesses to what extent the achievements of the project have supported human rights and cross-cutting objectives of gender equality, reduction of inequalities and promotion of climate sustainability.

#### **Impact**

- Assesses the progress towards achieving the overall objectives of the project taking also into account the aspects of strengthening regional integration.
- Analyses the overall impact of the project, intended and unintended, positive and negative.
- Focuses on how the impact is perceived by the different beneficiary groups with the particular focus on the final users and groups.

#### **Sustainability**

- Assesses if the benefits produced by the project will be maintained, including the achievements in human rights, gender equality, reduction of inequalities and promotion of climate sustainability.
- Examines if the phasing out/exit from the project has supported the sustainability of the benefits produced.

#### **Efficiency**

- Focuses on the project's working modalities. The assessment considers particularly if the chosen working modalities and the size of the project have supported efficient aid delivery and reaching of the intended beneficiaries.

## **7 STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATION: COMPONENTS 1 AND 2**

The evaluation consists of two components. It is organised in such a way that the two components can learn from each other. While their findings are presented separate reports, they are also merged into one synthesis report.

### **7.1 Component 1: Evaluation of the Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans**

Component 1 of the evaluation contains the evaluation of Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans and the final evaluation of two regional projects, namely Education for Sustainable Development in the Western Balkans (ESD) and Consolidation of the Human Capacities in the Forest Policy and Economics Education and Research in the South-East Europe Region (FOPER I & II). Out of the Western Balkan countries Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina are considered as fragile states and they are also included into the geographic priorities of the 2009 guidelines.

Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans started in 1996. Cooperation has been guided by strategy papers of 1999, 2003 and 2009. The 1999 strategy paper identified livelihoods and support to civil society as priority areas for bilateral development cooperation. In the 2003 strategy, in turn, supporting human resources development, administrative capacities and civil society were identified as priority areas. Both strategies contained the use of different financing instruments (for example bilateral development cooperation, humanitarian aid and civil crisis management) in supporting stabilisation of the Western Balkans.

In 2009 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a Development Policy Framework Programme of the Western Balkans for the years 2009–13. The Policy Framework Programme has been implemented under Government Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012. The thematic priorities of the Finnish development cooperation were identified as stability and security, aid for trade, environment and social sustainability. In addition to country-specific programmes, the framework programme identified regional programmes particularly in the environment sector. The strategy emphasises complementarity and coordination of Finnish development cooperation with other donors, placing particular attention to the complementarity of the Finnish cooperation to the Instrument for Pre-accession Agreement (IPA) and other programmes of the European Commission. While the evaluation will assess the entirety of the Finnish development interventions, the particular focus will be on the implementation of the Policy Framework Programme of 2009–13.

The current Framework Policy Programme is ending in 2013. There is no new Framework Policy Programme or regional development cooperation strategy expected after this. In practise this means that Finnish development cooperation is scaled down. The scaling down has already started during the implementation of the current Framework Policy Programme.

Comprehensive evaluations on the Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans have been conducted on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 and on Kosovo in 2008. In Bosnia-Herzegovina Finnish development cooperation was considered generally relevant including the post-conflict perspective and that the set goals were reached. Development cooperation instruments were assessed to be well chosen and the management of projects effective and inclusive. According to the evaluation the main challenge was sustainability. The evaluation on Finland's development cooperation in Kosovo, in turn, found out that the cooperation had been innovative in terms of solutions and instruments. In addition, Finnish contributions were able to make a difference due to thematic concentration and the country programme had not suffered from deficient donor coordination. While Finnish support was found out to be successfully switched from emergency phase to development cooperation, the evaluation considered the planned cooperation in Kosovo too detached from the general goal of EU integration.

During the years Finland has supported the Western Balkans' regional stability and security and EU integration comprehensively by means of foreign and security policy measures, including military and civilian crisis management, economic and commercial activities, and development cooperation. In 2011, the Finnish ODA to the Western Balkan countries was €9,8 million.

## **7.2 Component 2: Other case studies on peace and development in Finnish development cooperation**

Component 2 consists of further case studies on how Finland has contributed to the peace and development in fragile states. The selected case study countries and areas represent different situations of fragility. In addition, the content and the programming process of Finnish development cooperation vary among the case study countries.

### **Afghanistan**

Finland's Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012 as well as the 2009 guidelines refer to Afghanistan as fragile country where Finland is committed to long-term development cooperation. Large part of the Finnish development cooperation in Afghanistan is channelled through multilateral trust funds such as the ARTF by the World Bank and LOTFA by the UNDP. Aid is also channelled, for example, through civil society organisations. Humanitarian aid and civilian crisis management constitute of a considerable share of the ODA in Afghanistan. In year 2011, the Finnish ODA to Afghanistan was €22,3million.

Finnish development cooperation in Afghanistan was evaluated in 2007. According to the evaluation Finnish aid in Afghanistan has been coherent and relevant to the priorities of Afghanistan and many programmes have had a positive impact with high impact potential. The evaluation recommended more considerations on possible negative consequences as part of the aid may have adverse effects.

## **Palestinian Territories**

Finland's Development Policy Programmes of 2007 and 2012 as well as the 2009 guidelines refer to Palestinian Territories as a fragile area where Finland is carrying out development cooperation. Finland's development cooperation portfolio can be described as a statebuilding programme with an aim to support the peace process and the capacities of the Palestinian institutions to take care of state functions. Finnish development cooperation concentrates on education, land registration and water sectors. In addition to the bilateral programme, support has been channelled through multilateral organisations and the EU. Finland is also providing humanitarian aid in the Palestinian Territories and participates in the civilian crisis management operation in the country. In 2011, the Finnish ODA to the Palestinian Territories was €11,6 million.

## **Ethiopia**

Ethiopia is one of Finland's long-term partner countries and Finland has a comprehensive country programme to support drivers for peace and development. The guidelines of 2009 note that support to Ethiopia is justified from the perspective of fragility in addition to the overall development needs. In addition, Ethiopia is an important regional player and a centre of stability in the conflict prone and volatile Horn of Africa. The country programme concentrates on education, water and rural economic development. In addition to development cooperation through various instruments, humanitarian aid can constitute a large part of the ODA in Ethiopia. In 2011, the Finnish ODA to Ethiopia was €17,0 million.

Finnish country programme in Ethiopia has been evaluated in 2010. The evaluation found Finnish development cooperation tightly focused, relatively coherent and highly relevant. Development cooperation was also found reasonably effective and efficient. Its impact particularly on the water sector was considered significant. The overall sustainability and impact was found satisfactory. In addition to the country programme evaluation, Finnish cooperation in the Ethiopian water sector was evaluated part of a large thematic evaluation in 2010 (evaluation report 2010:3). This evaluation will also benefit from the results of the ongoing evaluation of the complementarity in the Finnish development policy and cooperation. The evaluation will assess the activities of the Finnish non-governmental organisations in Ethiopia among other countries. The results of the complementary evaluation will be available during second half of 2013.

## **Other evaluations**

In addition to the case studies listed above, the evaluation will benefit from the findings on the evaluation that assessed Finnish support to the peace process in Nepal which is one of Finland's long-term partner countries and considered as a fragile state by the OECD/DAC. The evaluation was done as part of a joint evaluation led by Denmark including also Switzerland and Finland (report "Evaluation of the international support to the peace process in Nepal 2006–12" is expected to be available during first half of 2013). Finland's contribution in the evaluation focused on the different peace building activities at the level of individual people, in particular women and ethnic minorities in rural areas. The report of the Finnish sub-evaluation was published in 2012 ("Finland's contribution to Building Inclusive Peace and Nepal". Evaluation report 2012:7). The findings of the evaluation can be used also in the context of Nepal's country programme evaluation report published in 2012.

## **8 GENERAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY**

As mentioned earlier, the evaluation looks at the country programmes or development cooperation portfolios as a whole. In addition, evaluation looks into the related policy dialogue and established development partnerships in the partner countries. Finland's contributions are analysed in the light of partner countries' policies and actions as well as part of the wider donor community operating in the country.

The evaluation takes as its starting point context analysis of the situation of fragility done during the desk study phase in each case study country or area and assesses Finland's development cooperation within this context.

The evaluation will involve stakeholders in the Ministry and Finnish embassies as well as relevant institutions and stakeholder groups in the partner countries. Principles of participatory evaluation are applied and during the field work particular attention will be paid to ensure that women, marginalised and vulnerable groups are included.

Interview groups for the desk study and field visit phases are to be identified by the evaluation team in advance. EVA-11 will inform those concerned within the Ministry and in the case study countries the evaluation team is introduced to the main governmental and administrative authorities by the Finnish Embassy. The actual logistics and arrangement of interviews is the task of the evaluation team. EVA-11 will provide also team with an introductory letter with the help of which the team can approach different stakeholders for interviews and document retrieval.

The field visits will be divided in a following way between the two phases:

**Component 1:** Western Balkans focusing on Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the Policy Framework Programme of 2009–13 bilateral programmes have focused on Kosovo while Bosnia-Herzegovina was former focus country in the region. In current Policy Framework Programme Bosnia-Herzegovina is a partner in the regional programmes and projects. Other shorter field visit countries in the region are Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia including also visits to the two regional projects.

**Component 2:** Afghanistan, Palestinian Territories and Ethiopia.

Particular attention is paid to the adequate length of the field visits to enable sufficient collection of data also from sources outside of the institutional stakeholders. Some of the case study countries pose particular practical issues related to the security of the evaluation team members. These issues are discussed more in detail in the beginning of the evaluation process and the evaluation team will conduct the field work taking the security instructions into account. The timing and organisation of the field visit to Afghanistan will be planned in close collaboration with the Finnish Embassy in Kabul and it will be conducted according to the security procedures of the Embassy.

The team is expected to use methods suitable to fragile contexts and take advantage of local sources of information including information collected from the final beneficiaries when possible. Evaluation team is expected to propose a detailed methodology in the evaluation matrix which will be presented in the inception report covering both Components 1 and 2. The methods used will be mixed multiple methods which enable triangulation in the drawing of results. Validation of results must be done through multiple sources. No single statements should be taken as a general outcome.

During the process particular attention is paid to a strong inter-team coordination and information sharing between the two components. In addition, the evaluation team is expected to show sensitivity to gender roles, ethnicity, beliefs, manners and customs of all stakeholders. The evaluators shall respect the rights and desire of the interviewees and stakeholders to provide information in confidence. Direct quotes from interviewees and stakeholders are not used in the reports.

The evaluation team is expected to raise issues which it deems important to the evaluation but are not mentioned in these Terms of Reference. Similarly, the team is expected to take up issues included in the Terms of Reference which it does not deem feasible.

## 9 EVALUATION PROCESS, TIMELINES AND DELIVERABLES

The evaluation consists of the following phases and will produce the respective deliverables. The process will move forward according to the phases described below and new phase is initiated when all the deliverables of the previous phase are approved by EVA-11.

### I Start-up meeting

**Deliverable:** Start-up note and start-up meeting

The purpose of the start-up meeting is to discuss the entire evaluation process including practical issues related to the field visits, reporting and administrative matters. Start-up meeting can be organised also as a video conference or a webinar. The start-up meeting is expected to be organised during the month of July 2013.

In the start-up note the evaluation team presents how it intends to approach the entire evaluation task. The start-up note will look more in detail to the issues related to the both components as described in these Terms of Reference. The start-up note is presented four (4) weeks after the signing of the contract.

## **II Inception**

**Deliverable:** Inception report

This phase includes the preparation of the inception report for both components and organisation of the inception meeting in Helsinki.

Production of the work plan and the evaluation matrix of the main evaluation questions presented in these Terms of Reference constitute the inception report. Evaluation questions are presented through more specific research questions, respective indicators and judgement criteria. Sources of verification are also indicated. Separate evaluation matrix is prepared for the two regional projects to be evaluated in the Western Balkans.

The methodology will be explained, including the methods and tools of analyses. The inception report will make special attention to the methodological needs of evaluating development cooperation in the context of fragility. It will also elaborate specific issues related to the fragility trends in the cases of Component 1 and 2 and how they affect the approach and methods.

The inception report will show the fine-tuning of the tasks between the team members involved in both components, present a list of stakeholder groups to be included into the interviews as well as an outline of the interview questions to be used for the interviews in Finland. The inception report will also suggest an outline of the final reports. The structure of reports will follow the established overall structure of the evaluation reports of the Ministry.

The inception report should be kept concise and should not exceed 20–25 pages, annexes included. The inception report will be submitted in September 2013.

## **III Desk study**

**Deliverable:** Desk study report

Desk study phase consists of analysis of the written material. Desk study report will provide a concise analysis of the policies, guidelines, and other documents related to the evaluation subject. It will also present a plan for the field visits including the identification of local interviewee groups (government authorities, academia, research groups/institutes, civil society representatives, other donors etc.) and sources of information (studies, publications etc.) and an outline of the interview questions according to the interviewee groups in each of the field visit countries.

Draft desk study report will be submitted to EVA-11 prior to the interviews in Finland and is subject to approval by EVA-11 prior to the field visit. The report should be kept concise and clear. It should be submitted latest six (6) weeks after the inception meeting.

Interviews in Finland will be conducted based on the analysis of the written material. This will enable informed discussions with the interviewees. Interviews with the high policy level interviewees of the Ministry will be organised as joint sessions including both components and all case studies of the evaluation.

## **IV Field visits to Western Balkans (Component 1) and to other case study countries (Component 2)**

**Deliverable:** Presentation supported by power point on the preliminary results.

The field visits of Components 1 and 2 are organised in such a way that the field visit to the Western Balkans is initiated first and is expected in January 2014. The field visit is going to focus on Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, however; it will also contain shorter visits to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro including also visits related to the final evaluation of the two regional projects ESD and FOPER I & II.

Field visit to the three (3) other case study countries is expected to be conducted in January – February 2014.

The purpose of the field visits is to reflect and validate the results of the desk study phase and assess the situation on the ground in the light of policy and programming analysis. The purpose of the field visit is to make



further assessments and fill any gaps in the information. The field visit will contain the collection of local sources of information as a key element of the evaluation.

The preliminary results of field visits will be presented, supported by a power point, to EVA-11 after the return from the field. Results are presented in a form of a webinar. The team is also expected to provide an oral presentation on the preliminary results at the end of the each field visit to the staff of the respective Finnish embassy or representative office. Webinars can also be used in the case of possible shared sessions between the embassies.

After the field visit further interviews and document study in Finland may still be needed to complement the information collected during the desk study phase and the field visits.

## **V Final reporting**

**Deliverable:** Final reports (including semi-final draft reports, final draft reports and final reports) and public presentation supported by power point.

The final reporting contains the following deliverables:

- Evaluation report on Finnish development cooperation in the Western Balkans including the findings of the final evaluation of the projects (a) Education for Sustainable Development in Western Balkans (EDS); and (b) Forest Policy and Economics Education and Research (FOPER I & II) as annexes.
- Synthesis report on peace and development in Finnish development cooperation. In addition to the synthesis, the results of each three cases of Component 2 will be presented and reported either as part of the synthesis report or separately.

The timetable of the delivery of semi-final draft reports, final draft reports and final reports is as follows:

The semi-final draft reports are available six (6) weeks after the end of the field visits. The semi-final draft reports will be commented by EVA-11. It is possible that semi-final draft reports will be also shared with some key informants.

Final draft reports will be available within three (3) weeks after the comments to the semi-final draft reports.

Final draft reports will be subjected to a round of comments by the parties concerned. It should be noted that the comments are meant only to correct any misunderstandings or factual mistakes instead of rewriting the report.

The reports will be finalised based on the comments received and will be ready within three weeks after receipts of the comments. The final reports are expected no later than in June 2014.

A special effort should be made by the evaluation team to produce concise the informative reports. Detailed instructions on writing the report are given in Section 8.1.

Presentation of the findings of the evaluation will be held in Helsinki no later than June 2014.

In addition to the presentations in Finland, a presentation of the findings of the evaluation will be organised through also through a webinar. Special attention is going to be made to include representatives of the partner countries in the webinar.

## **9.1 Writing of the reports**

The evaluation team will ensure that the evaluation reports are concise and informative and can be easily understood also by those who are not specialists in development cooperation.

Final reports must follow the Instructions to Evaluation Report Authors which will be provided to the evaluation team in the beginning of the assignment. The team should agree on common formats (type of bullet points, format of tables etc.) and to ensure that all team members are following the overall instructions to the

authors. The final reports shall be subjected to a language check and a thorough check of details before reports are submitted to EVA-11. The editorial and linguistic quality of the final report must be ready-to-print. The Ministry will be responsible for the translation of the abstract and the summary into Finnish and Swedish.

In addition to the assessments of the quality assurance experts, evaluation reports will be subjected to a peer review of international experts. The views of the peer reviewers shall be available on the basis of anonymity to the evaluation team.

In overall, the evaluation teams should observe in its work the OECD/DAC and EU aid evaluation quality standards of the evaluation process and reports. A matrix combining the OECD/DAC and EU quality standards for evaluations is made available to the team in the beginning of the assignment.

Should it happen that the final evaluation reports do not comply with the requirements spelled herein, the instructions to authors and the quality standards of the OECD/DAC and EU, there will be penalties to the service provide as specified in the contract.

Finally, each deliverable is subjected to EVA-11's approval. The evaluation team is able to move to the next phase only after receiving a written statement of acceptance by EVA-11.

## **10 EXPERTISE REQUIRED**

In overall, successful conduct of the evaluation requires a deep understanding of peace, security and development nexus. It also requires experience in and knowledge of the case study countries as an operating environment for development cooperation. Finally, the successful conduct of the evaluation requires experience on fragile states as a subject and environment for evaluations.

The evaluation team will include a mix of senior male and female experts. The team also includes experts from both developed and developing countries.

**All experts** shall have a minimum of MSc/MA university education and be fluent in oral and written English (level 6). One of the senior experts shall be a native speaker of Finnish language. Knowledge of local administrative languages of the case study countries among the experts will be an asset.

One of the senior experts of the team will be identified as the team leader. The team leader will lead the work of both components and will be ultimately responsible for the deliverables. The evaluation team will work under the leadership of the team leader who carries the final responsibility of completing the evaluation. The identified team leader will lead the work of both Component 1 and 2 of the evaluation to ensure the continuity of the process and feeding of the findings between the two components.

Detailed team requirements are included in the Instructions to the Tenderers (Annex A to the Invitation to the Tenderers).

### **10.1 Document retrieval and other assistance to the evaluation team**

It is necessary that the evaluation team consists of one junior expert to support the team in document retrieval as well as logistical arrangements.

Part of the documentation, particularly concerning the Western Balkans, is already collected and is available to the team. However, document retrieval is still needed and should be initiated in the beginning of the evaluation process. Document retrieval should be done by the junior member of the team under a supervision of a senior team member. EVA-11 will provide support in the document retrieval to the extent possible. However, it is the responsibility of the evaluation team to ensure that all documentation necessary to a successful conduct of the evaluation has been collected.

The junior expert will be a native speaker of Finnish language. She/he will serve in the document retrieval, practical organisation, logistics, and similar tasks in Finland. She/he may be required to review and summarise some documentation that exists only in Finnish language. His/her residential location should enable him/her to be available on a short notice.

The junior expert is required to have a minimum academic qualification of MSc or MA, and a minimum of two years of working experience after the graduation. The junior expert will be fluent in oral and written English (level 6).

There is no opportunity to claim per diems, rental or residential expenses, or other travel than local public transport fees to the junior expert from the evaluation budget.

## **10.2 Quality assurance**

Two quality assurance experts will be required. These two experts need to be highly experienced, their expertise and experience corresponding the level and qualifications of team leader position. They have provided quality assurance services at least for three (3) processes, and are familiar with the international frameworks of the OECD/DAC and the EU regarding the aid evaluation quality standards and of the evaluation reports.

The quality assurance experts will review all the deliverables and offer advice at each juncture of the evaluation process that includes submission of a deliverables. The reports of the quality assurance experts will also be submitted to EVA-11. At the end of the evaluation process the quality assurance experts will fill in the EU's quality grid for evaluation reports.

## **11 BUDGET**

The total budget of the evaluation including both Component 1 and Component 2 is €600 000 (VAT excluded).

## **12 MANDATE**

The evaluation team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this evaluation with pertinent persons and organisations. However, it is not authorised to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland. The evaluation team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity.

The evaluation team has no immaterial rights to any of the material collected in the course of the evaluation or to any draft or final reports produced as a result of this assignment.

Helsinki, 2 April 2013

Aira Päivöke  
Director  
Development Evaluation

## ANNEX 2 PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Name	Organisation	Position
Niko Heimola	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	AFG & PAK Desk Officer (Development Cooperation) 2008–
Ms Anja Paajanen	MFA Finland	Development Advisor PRT, Faryab, July 2004-Jan 2007 and Mazar-e-Sharif Jan 2008-Dec 2009
Ms Merja Färm	MFA Finland	Special Advisor/1st secretary – Good Governance and Rule of Law – Kabul 2010–12
Mr Janne Heiskanen	MFA Finland	Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation, Kabul, 2009–11
Mr Antti Kuusi	MFA Finland	Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation, Kabul, 2011–
Mr Mikko Harjulehto	MFA Finland	Political Advisor to the Senior Civilian Representative, Regional Command North, Mazar-e-Sharif, 2011–13
Mr Marko Pajunen	MFA Finland	Political Advisor, PRT Mazar-e-Sharif, 2007–09
Mr Sam Karvonen	MFA Finland	Senior Advisor for Development, Jun 2007–May 2009
Dr Olli Ruohomäki	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	Team Leader South Asia, previously Senior Advisor on Fragile States, Dept of Development Policy, 2007–12
Ms Merja Lahtinen	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	Advisor for Rule of Law
Mr Jaakko Jakkila	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	Advisor for Democracy and Good Governance
Ms Tanja Viikki	MFA Finland (Helsinki)	Advisor for Conflict and Governance
Pamela Fatima Husain	UN Women	Deputy Country Representative
Nina Hal Schjelderup	Norwegian Embassy	Counsellor
Karin Boven	Netherlands Embassy	Head of Development Cooperation
Nasrin Hoseni	Swedish Embassy	Program Manager (Education & Gender)
Bill Massey	UNDP	Programme Manager, LOTFA
Naila Ahmed	World Bank	NSP manager
Andrew Scanlon	UNEP	Country Manager
Ashita Mittal	UNODC Afghanistan	Deputy Representative

## ANNEX 3 DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

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- MFA 2012 *Development Cooperation Report*. Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- MFA 2012 *Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan (JHRA)*. AFG/0071252, Project Period: 26 June 2009–30 June 2012. Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- MFA 2014 *Finland's Development Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation* (unofficial translation), Ministry for Foreign Affairs, May 2014.
- OECD 2007 *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2014).
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## ANNEX 4 EVENTS TIMELINE ANALYSIS

We present here a selective listing of three concurrent elements in the recent history of Afghanistan: major political/military events (which are presented in the first column), events common to all donors (which are presented in the second column), and a selection of project interventions or initiatives undertaken by Finland (which are presented in the third column).

Major political/military events	Events common to all donors	Selection of Finnish initiatives
<b>2006</b>		
October – NATO assumes responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan, taking command in the east from a US-led coalition force.		
<b>2007</b>		
August – Opium production soars to a record high, the UN reports.	September – “Supporting the Stabilisation of Afghanistan”. The meeting discussed Finland’s future participation in crisis management in Afghanistan, development cooperation, humanitarian aid and other forms of assistance. Finland commits to long-term support for Afghanistan. The intention is to deepen both military and civil sector cooperation with Sweden and Norway in Northern Afghanistan.	
<b>2008</b>		
<p>June – President Karzai warns that Afghanistan will send troops into Pakistan to fight militants if Islamabad fails to take action against them.</p> <p>July – Suicide bomb attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul kills more than 50.</p> <p>September – US President George Bush sends an extra 4 500 US troops to Afghanistan, in a move he described as a “quiet surge”.</p>	<p>June – Paris Conference: this conference marked a new commitment of the international community to work in closer cooperation under the Afghan leadership to support Afghanistan’s first five year National Development Strategy (ANDS). The Government and the international community agreed to retain the Afghanistan Compact as the foundation of future activities. The agreed priority was to strengthen institutions and economic growth, particularly in agriculture and energy sectors. The other key elements identified in the Declaration of this conference were the importance of holding free, fair and secure elections in 2009 and 2010; ensuring protection of human rights and the provision of humanitarian assistance; and the need to improve ef-</p>	<p>February – Finland supports OSCE projects to promote border security and management between Tajikistan and Afghanistan: Finland allocated €400 000 to a pilot project aimed at training border guards to work in challenging conditions on the Tajik-Afghan border. The project to be coordinated at the OSCE Centre in Dushanbe. Learning Together (Women Journalists) The aim of the project was to organise additional professional education for the women journalists in Afghanistan and to form mentoring pairs between the women journalists in Afghanistan and Finland. The education contained special courses of journalism, ethical rules, the role of the media in</p>

	fective utilization of aid in order to ensure concrete and tangible development benefits for all Afghans.	developing democracy and women's rights. The idea was also to give a possibility to few Afghan women journalists to get to know the activities of the Finnish media houses.
<b>2009</b>		
<p>February – NATO countries pledge to increase military and other commitments in Afghanistan after US announce dispatch of 17 000 extra troops.</p> <p>March – US President Barack Obama unveils new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. An extra 4 000 US personnel will train and bolster the Afghan army and police and there will be support for civilian development.</p> <p>August – Presidential and provincial elections are marred by widespread Taliban attacks, patchy turnout and claims of serious fraud.</p> <p>October – Karzai declared winner of August presidential election, after second-placed opponent Abdullah Abdullah pulls out before the second round.</p> <p>December – US President Obama decides to boost US troop numbers in Afghanistan by 30 000, bringing total to 100 000.</p>	<p>The Hague Conference Declaration: Participants stressed the need for greater Afghan ownership of security and economic development.</p>	<p>January – UNEP Capacity Building and Institutional Development for Environmental management programme in Afghanistan funded by the European Commission, the Government of Finland and the Global Environment Facility.</p> <p>June – Training of women journalists, Afghanistan (NGO project) Women Journalists trained in Finland</p> <p>August – Finland discontinued its prison projects in Afghanistan because of “irregularities that have now come to light,” said Counsellor Rauli Suikkanen from the Unit for Asia and Oceania at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs</p>
<b>2010</b>		
<p>January. London Conference that started the transition process for withdrawing troops, endorsed by NATO ministers and ISAF in April.</p> <p>February – ISAF forces launch major offensive, Operation Moshtarak, in bid to secure government control of southern Helmand province.</p> <p>July – Whistle-blowing website Wikileaks publishes thousands of classified US military documents relating to Afghanistan. General David Petraeus takes command of US, ISAF forces.</p> <p>September – Parliamentary polls marred by Taliban violence, widespread fraud and a long delay in announcing results.</p>	<p>July – Kabul Conference: The Kabul Conference was held on 20 July 2010. Hosted by the Government of Afghanistan and co-chaired by the United Nations, the conference was envisioned by the government as a renewed commitment to the Afghan people. The government presented an Afghan-led plan for improving development, governance and security, including priority programmes to enhance service delivery. It put forward a credible, realistic and “doable” national agenda, underpinned by priority programmes and reform initiatives. These aim at producing tangible results for the Afghan people.</p> <p>November – The High Peace Council was established following the</p>	



<p>November – NATO – at summit in Lisbon – agrees plan to hand control of security to Afghan forces by end of 2014 and NATO and Afghanistan signed Enduring Partnership agreement</p>	<p>November 2010 Conference on Peace at which representatives from Afghan and international NGOs, as well as the UN, gathered for a one-day Conference on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice in Kabul to revitalize public discussion on peace and reconciliation with the government of Afghanistan, the international community, and Afghan civil society.</p>	
<p><b>2011</b></p>		
<p>February – Number of civilians killed since the 2001 invasion hit record levels in 2010, Afghanistan Rights Monitor reports.  April – Burning of Koran by a US pastor prompts countrywide protests in which foreign UN workers and several Afghans are killed.  Some 500 mostly Taliban prisoners break out of prison in Kandahar.  July – President’s half-brother and Kandahar governor Ahmad Wali Karzai is killed in Taliban campaign against prominent figures.  September – Ex-president Burhanuddin Rabbani – leader of High Peace Council and a go-between in talks with the Taliban – is assassinated.  November – President Karzai wins the endorsement of tribal elders to negotiate a 10-year military partnership with the USA at a loya jirga traditional assembly. The proposed pact will see US troops remain after 2014, when foreign troops are due to leave the country.  December – At least 58 people are killed in twin attacks at a Shia shrine in Kabul and a Shia mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif.</p>	<p>December – Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, boycotted by Pakistan and Taliban.</p>	
<p><b>2012</b></p>		
<p>January – Taliban agree to open office in Dubai as a move towards peace talks with the USA and the Afghan government.  April – Taliban announce “spring offensive” with audacious attack on the diplomatic quarter of Kabul. The government blamed the</p>	<p>February - The Embassy of Finland and USIP hosted a panel discussion titled “Women, Peace, and Security in Afghanistan: Prospects on the Way Forward.” The discussion was a follow-up to the International Afghanistan Conference held in Bonn in December 2011. The panellists</p>	<p>April – Common Security and Defence Policy, EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN). Finland supports the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan set in the context of the international community’s efforts to support the Afghans in</p>

<p>Haqqani Network. Security forces kill 38 militants.</p> <p>May – Arsala Rahmani of the High Peace Council is shot dead in Kabul. A former Taliban minister, he was crucial in reaching out to rebel commanders. The Taliban deny responsibility.</p>	<p>representing the governments of Afghanistan, Finland and the United States, as well as Afghan civil society examined ways to better ensure an active role for women in the current peace processes and reconstruction efforts.</p> <p>May – NATO summit endorses the plan to withdraw foreign combat troops by the end of 2014.</p> <p>New French President Francois Hollande says France will withdraw its combat mission by the end of 2012 – a year earlier than planned.</p> <p>July – Tokyo donor conference pledges US\$16bn in civilian aid to Afghanistan up to 2016, with US, Japan, Germany and UK supplying bulk of funds. Afghanistan agrees to new conditions to counter corruption.</p>	<p>taking responsibility for law and order. EUPOL is the only multi-lateral actor able to provide highly qualified civilian policing expertise as well as rule of law expertise.</p>
<b>2013</b>		
<p>March – US begins hand over of Bagram high-security jail to the Afghan government, concluded March 2013.</p> <p>As NATO troops begin to pull out, Kabul has the task of rebuilding society, Foreign-led reconstruction teams want to preserve progress in Afghanistan but may have failed to establish an “invisible” legacy</p>	<p>December – KEPA, the umbrella organisation for Finnish NGOs, to organise a public discussion on “Afghanistan – What Will the Future Bring? What will happen to Afghanistan after 2014 and the transition?” with Peter Brune, Secretary-General of ENNA, the European Network for NGOs in Afghanistan. Finnish civil society organisations gather to discuss the role of the civil society in contributing to a sustainable political agenda in Afghanistan – and how Finnish NGOs could contribute to this work.</p>	

# ANNEX 5 INTERVENTION LOGIC

AFGHANISTAN THEORY OF CHANGE (2009-2013)

