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Agence canadienne de  
développement international

# EVALUATION OF THE CIDA □ TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM □ IN BRAZIL

## Summary Report

### November 2003

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**Canada** 

**EVALUATION OF THE CIDA  
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM  
IN BRAZIL**

**SUMMARY REPORT**



**JOINT EVALUATION  
AMERICAS BRANCH & PERFORMANCE REVIEW BRANCH  
CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY  
NOVEMBER 2003**

## **Acknowledgements**

The evaluation team was composed of Lloyd Strachan as Senior Lead Consultant and Rémy Beaulieu, Senior Program Evaluation Manager of Performance Review Branch. This evaluation would not have been possible without the full cooperation of dozens of CIDA's partner institutions, in Brazil and Canada, who enthusiastically participated in Focus Groups, willingly completed a long questionnaire and shared their experiences with us in a frank and open manner through face-to-face interviews. The information shared with us represents the building blocks for this evaluation report. We also wish to recognize the efficient work of the CIDA program staff who, when planned systems failed, were willing to spend long hours organizing site visits and focus group meetings in Brazil.

## **Cover Photo**

The photo on the cover page is an advertisement used by the Brazilian Government to promote the need for change. The text can be translated as: "We will untie this knot. We will transform this country". This can also be seen to represent the challenges of the Canadian Cooperation Program in assisting Brazilian partners to identify the major bottlenecks (nós) and necessary changes (mudanças) that will make Brazil a more secure, equitable and prosperous society. We recognize, of course, that it is only Brazilians themselves who can bring these changes about.

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABC	Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (Brazilian Cooperation Agency)
BTC	Bilateral technical cooperation
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFID	Department for International Development
DRINK	Dissemination, Replication, Information and Knowledge
ECLAC	Economic Council for Latin America and the Caribbean
GDP	Gross domestic product
GETS	Grupo de Estudos do Terceiro Setor
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
ISPI	Information Sharing and Promotion Initiative
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PNUD	Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PSF	Program Support Fund
PSSR	Local Public and Social Sector Reform Fund
PSU	Project Support Unit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker's Party in Brazil)
RBM	Results -based Management
SC	Steering committee
SWAPS	Sector-Wide Approaches
TORs	Evaluation Terms of Reference
TTF	Technology Transfer Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

## Management Response

We would first like to acknowledge the quality of the work done by the evaluation team of Rémy Beaulieu and Lloyd Strachan. We also wish to note the significant contribution of our many Canadian and Brazilian partners. Without them, we could not have achieved a product so useful in improving CIDA's bilateral cooperation program in Brazil. The evaluation team's recommendations and lessons learned provide an invaluable source of input. This input will be used to prepare a revised programming framework for CIDA's Brazil program.

The program team has already given a very detailed response to the evaluation. It shows that management agrees with many of the evaluation team's recommendations. The following text summarizes this response. It mirrors the recommendations made in the evaluation summary.

A programming framework is now being developed. It suggests that CIDA's Brazil program maintain its current funding level, as recommended. We will better integrate our delivery mechanisms. We will increase complementarity with the Canadian Partnership Program. We will continue to cooperate with the Government of Brazil. As a result, the Brazil program's relatively small budget (\$5 million per year) will produce significant results.

CIDA and its Brazilian counterpart, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), have launched formal procedures to review the contribution agreement between Canada and Brazil. Pending the ratification of a new agreement, the excellent cooperation between CIDA and ABC will ensure that our program is delivered smoothly, effectively, and continuously.

Management recognizes that better integrating the various bilateral mechanisms would help to make our Brazil program more effective. This issue was widely discussed and considered in preparing the revised programming framework. The final document should fully meet the evaluation team's recommendation. Thus, as suggested in the evaluation report, a monitoring and evaluation framework will accompany our programming framework. The monitoring and evaluation framework will reflect the nature of our Brazil program. It will better measure the CIDA program's impact on reducing inequality in Brazil.

We also very seriously considered the recommendation to expand activities in northeastern Brazil. Our revised programming thus suggests focusing more CIDA resources on Brazil's poorest region. To meet CIDA's poverty reduction objectives to a greater extent, our program will also consider programming components that focus on urban poverty.

Finally, Brazil program management and Americas Branch senior management must discuss the program management recommendations in greater detail. Among other things, this discussion will focus on the issue of human resources needed to deliver a responsive program. It will consider how the Brazil program helps to strengthen bilateral relations between Canada and Brazil. It will also

consider the leverage of our shared-cost delivery mechanisms.

The evaluation confirmed several perceptions shared by Brazil bilateral team members. It also highlighted other key factors. Moreover, the evaluation confirmed that CIDA had a very appropriate approach to cooperation with a regionally influential country such as Brazil. This responsive approach is based on solid, shared-cost partnership between Canadian and Brazilian institutions, both in civil society and at the various government levels.

## Executive Summary

This document is the Summary Report of an evaluation of the Canadian International Development Agency's bilateral Technology Transfer Fund Program in Brazil. This is the seventh year of this phase of Canadian technical cooperation in Brazil. The evaluation is part of an overall country program review of Canadian bilateral support in that country, taking place during 2003.

### THE PROGRAM

The initial Technology Transfer Fund (TTF) was approved in 1996. It was designed to multiply institutional linkages between Canada and Brazil in support of sustainable development. Priority programming areas included environment, the social sector and public sector reform. The 2000 approval document of Phase II of the TTF incorporated the orientation of the 1999 CIDA Programming Framework for Brazil, with an emphasis on promoting equity.

Three other fund mechanisms have been approved within the overall TTF umbrella:

- PSSR (Local Public and Social Sector Reform Fund), created in 1998 to promote short-term, low-cost exchanges;
- DRINK (Dissemination, Replication, Information and Knowledge Fund), designed in 2002 to replicate and disseminate successful practices developed through technology transfer;
- PSF (Programme Support Fund), approved in 2003 to support program-level activities through analyses, communication and direct support.

These four funding mechanisms comprise CIDA's TTF Program in Brazil. This evaluation has assessed the overall program funding mechanism, with a focus on TTF and PSSR funds, as DRINK and PSF are too recent for meaningful assessment. The program has funded over 60 sub-projects since 1996.

### PROGRAM CONTEXT

Brazil is a large and relatively wealthy country by Latin American standards. With a GDP/capita of over US\$2,000/year, it is readily characterized as a middle-income country. Yet Brazil has one of the world's highest levels of income disparity, based on the Gini Index, and a level of poverty in many rural areas, in urban slums and in its north and northeast regions similar to some of the poorest countries on the globe.

The newly elected government, led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has focused on redressing inequity and promoting *cidadania*, a concept that combines full citizens rights for all, with corresponding responsibilities. The *Programa Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger Program) represents the government's initial attempt at addressing deep poverty, especially (but not only) in Brazil's rural regions. This concern by government for reducing hunger and poverty in Brazil is closely aligned with the global community's focus

on the Millennium Goals and coincides with CIDA's corporate goal of poverty reduction.

This reorientation of national policy creates an opportunity for Canada to negotiate a new Bilateral Agreement with Brazil (the present one has become outdated) that has a sharper focus on equity for the poor, both rural and urban.

Unlike most countries in which CIDA works, Brazil receives technical assistance from developed countries and provides support to developing countries. These activities, including CIDA's bilateral program, are managed through the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC).

### THE EVALUATION

The evaluation was conducted taking into consideration:

- Recent thinking on official development assistance and how this can best be applied to the Brazilian situation;
- The fact that Brazil is a middle-income country and that donor cooperation here has somewhat different characteristics than in poorer countries; and
- The evolution of CIDA's Brazil program over time, with adjustments to reflect changing realities in Brazil and Canada.

Evaluation information was collected from key documents, individual and group interviews, site visits in Brazil, questionnaires (73 sent out, 74% returned) and focus groups (two in Canada and four in Brazil). Evaluation fieldwork in Brazil took place over four weeks during April-May 2003.

### DESIGN AND PROGRAMMING

The equity focus of CIDA's TTF Program coincides with the present government's concern with 'untying the knots' that keep poor people poor in Brazilian society. The program is flexible and responsive, providing Brazilian institutions with the opportunity to assume initiative and leadership, while simultaneously forging strong partnerships with Canadian institutions. The program has evolved over time, demonstrating creativity in the face of challenges.

On the other hand, the creation of different funds as new needs and opportunities arose has resulted in less than ideal integration, in limited synergy between sub-projects and in only partial cooperation with ABC on program decision-making. Northeast Brazil, a region characterized by deep poverty, is under-represented in the program due to a number of factors, including: limited knowledge of the program in that region; lack of experience in negotiating with external donor agencies; difficulty by Northeast institutions in meeting the program's local cost requirements, and; competition for CIDA funds from institutions in Brazil's south and central regions.

Program design and programming issues identified by the evaluation team as requiring attention include: the Bilateral Agreement with Brazil; program-building and the funding



structure; regional imbalance; program development theme selection; and nature of support for Brazilian partner institutions.

Opportunities exist to create more focus and integration in program activities, while maintaining the responsive nature of the program. One possible approach would be to: identify high-priority and/or emerging development issues and opportunities; plan a strategy, in close cooperation with leading institutions in the sector, for addressing these issues, and; adopt a responsive methodology to focus program resources in these areas.

### **PROGRAM MANAGEMENT**

As presently structured, the TTF program is management and labour intensive. Management of the various funds has been successful due to committed and hard-working CIDA staff, support from ABC in TTF fund management and enthusiastic partner cooperation at the sub-project level.

Issues arising in the management area include: the participation of ABC in program management; staff workloads; reporting, monitoring and evaluation; gender, and; language.

Given the finite volume of both human and financial resources available to the CIDA program, a more strategic management approach could be considered. This would involve a review of the level of effort required for program activities, possible outsourcing of labour-intensive tasks and greater involvement of ABC in program decision-making.

### **PARTNERSHIP-BUILDING**

Strong Canada-Brazil partnerships have been created through the program, despite institutional and cultural differences. Equality between the partners has been achieved to a great extent. Strong TTF fund partnerships have facilitated technology exchange in the program and a few PSSR sub-projects have resulted in partnerships strong enough to qualify for TTF funding.

Opportunities and challenges in the partnership area include: the efficiency of multi-partner arrangements; the need for institutional assessments; effectively involving private sector partners; and the dissemination of the partnership experience.

### **PROGRAM RESULTS**

**Outputs.** Principal program outputs are seen to be the transfer of technology and the formation or strengthening of institutional partnerships. Both appear to have taken place successfully within the Program, although the dispersed nature of sub-projects makes an aggregated measure of technological change promoted by the Program difficult to measure.

The program has moved past the one-way, North-South exchange of technology to a situation of mutual knowledge exchange, with flow-back to Canada of improved models

and techniques. This evolution indicates that a change in the name of the program is in order.

**Outcome.** The primary program outcome is pro-equity institutional change -- an expanded vision of how inequity and poverty can be addressed by the institution through policy input and improved service delivery. Various partners demonstrated an awakened understanding of what this means in their institutions.

More focus on improving the policy environment within which the sub-project operates will help make the interventions more sustainable, but both Canadian and Brazilian partner institutions require additional mentoring in this area. However, from an equity perspective, strengthening institutions and policies that do not have potential to generate improved opportunities for the poor are meaningless. Measuring outcomes in terms of institutional change, and especially pro-poor institutional change, continues to represent a challenge.

### **PROGRAM IMPACT**

The program goal of promoting greater equity is consistent with world development trends and with the key policy of Brazil's new government. For a program that works at the institutional (meso) level rather than the local community (micro) level, measuring program impact in terms of equity presents a number of challenges.

At the sub-project level, the simplest and most encouraging indicator of impact is the strong belief, expressed by a majority of partners, that their project is making a difference in that area. More systematic measurement of change at the sub-project level using RBM principles in monitoring and evaluation, and devising methods to incorporate unexpected results into this instrument, will permit partners to translate their belief into more concrete measurements. Measuring impact of the program will require developing a program-level RBM structure.

### **SUSTAINABILITY**

There are indications that many of the results generated by the sub-projects will be sustainable at the level of the partner institutions, although the introduced 'technology' is generally adapted and modified to such an extent that it quickly loses its 'nationality.' Autonomous spread of the technology is a powerful indicator of its appropriateness, 'profitability' and probable sustainability, but extensive adaptation makes measurement of this process a challenge.

At the sub-project level, the sustainability of institutional partnerships after CIDA funding ends depends on personal relationships, mutuality of interest and access to financing. At the program level, documentation and dissemination of results, in cooperation with partners and ABC, will strengthen the program internally and encourage support at the corporate level.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations and suggestions are listed at the end of this report. Issues which the evaluation team considers have highest priority for consideration by CIDA and ABC are listed here:

**Recommendation 1. Future funding:** CIDA is encouraged to replenish funding for the TTF Program in Brazil, providing steps are taken to more clearly focus activities on the goal of reducing inequity.

Given the strong convergence between CIDA's bilateral goal of improving equity in Brazil and the desire by that country's new administration to seriously address deep poverty, as expressed in programs such as *Fome Zero*, CIDA should explore all opportunities to strengthen Canada-Brazil cooperation, including reorienting the TTF program and/or considering other potential cooperation mechanisms.

**Recommendation 2. Development themes:** It is recommended that program staff review the process of development theme selection, in order to reflect recent changes in CIDA policy and incorporate a greater degree of local program ownership.

Given the mature technical cooperation relationship that exists between Canada and Brazil, the development focus of the program would ideally be guided by greater Brazilian government and civil society input.

**Recommendation 3. New agreement:** Canada is encouraged to begin negotiations on a new cooperation agreement with Brazil in the near future. A new agreement can create space for a more focused approach on the equity issue.

**Recommendation 4. Fund integration:** More integration between the various component funds of the program is desirable. Consideration should be given to creating a single, flexible fund.

**Recommendation 5. Strategic focus:** A more strategic approach in management and programming would permit creating a sharper focus for the program while at the same time retaining its responsiveness.

**Recommendation 6. M&E strategy:** As recommended in the 1999 evaluation of the TTF program, the evaluation team encourages CIDA to design and implement an RBM monitoring and evaluation strategy for the program.

**Recommendation 7. Northeast Brazil:** The program is encouraged to act more decisively on existing program directives to expand activities in the Northeast.

**Recommendation 8. Corporate approach:** The program is encouraged to continue efforts to build a corporate approach to cooperation assistance in Brazil, creating information and programming bridges between the various channels of Canadian assistance.

## LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons, drawn from the findings of this evaluation, reflect the principles of development effectiveness outlined in CIDA's policy statement *Canada Making a Difference in the World* (CIDA 2002).

**Lesson 1. Local ownership:** Responsive programming can promote strong local ownership, providing that organizations in the developing country participate as equals in planning and implementing the project.

**Lesson 2. Donor coordination:** Donor coordination starts with donor cooperation, based on common interests and mutual trust. It can serve as a valuable learning tool for all, but requires mutually defined expectations.

**Lesson 3. Strong partnerships:** Strong partnerships between two institutions, based on mutual trust and shared decision-making, are an essential but insufficient condition for creating significant development impact. Promoting synergy between multiple initiatives in a given area has potential for impact that is larger than the sum of the individual contributions.

**Lesson 4. A results-based approach:** With adequate assistance, local partners can successfully incorporate results-based management principles into project planning. But this assistance is unlikely to be sustainable unless accompanied by support for monitoring and evaluation.


**Lesson 5. Greater policy coherence:** Promoting coherence between CIDA programming and the policies of other Canadian government departments is a complex issue. Promoting effective coordination between CIDA's programs, a seemingly easier task, is still to be achieved in Brazil and in most countries where CIDA works.

**Lesson 6. Program approach:** Transforming a number of funds (projects) and sub-projects into an integrated program requires more than a name change. It will require critical thinking on what the program is to achieve and what elements are necessary, including the linkages between them, to achieve this.

**Lesson 7. Building capacity:** The hypothesis that institutions in middle-income countries do not require institutional strengthening and can adequately provide counterpart funding for development projects may be valid for large government institutions or otherwise well-funded organizations, but not for many other potential partners, including civil society organizations.

**Lesson 8. Engaging civil society:** Promoting change at the institutional level does not guarantee that civil society, especially individual members of it, benefit from this change. Mechanisms can (and should) be put in place to help ensure that this takes place.

## Poverty Map of Brazil



Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE)

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Program background

This document is the Summary Report of an evaluation of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)'s bilateral Technology Transfer Fund (TTF) mechanism in Brazil. This is the seventh year of this phase of the TTF in Brazil. The evaluation is part of an overall review of Canadian bilateral support to that country, taking place during 2003.

The Fund mechanism is comprised of four different funds: the Technology Transfer Fund (referred to in this report as the TTF fund), the Public and Social Sector Reform Fund (PSSR), the Dissemination, Replication, Information-Sharing and Knowledge Fund (DRINK) and the Program Support Fund (PSF). The PSF is too recent to be included in this evaluation. The individual activities of each of the first three funds, in which Brazilian and Canadian institutional partners are normally involved, are designated 'sub-projects'.

This Summary Report synthesises two volumes: Volume I – the Evaluation Text; Volume II – Evaluation Annexes. This report presents the socio-economic and political setting in Brazil (Ch.1) and the evaluation methodology (Ch.2), program inputs are analyzed (Chs. 3, 4 and 5), followed by an assessment of program outputs (Ch. 6), outcomes (Ch. 7), impact and sustainability (Chs. 8 and 9). Chapters on recommendations and lessons learned conclude the text report.

### 1.2 The Brazilian socio-economic and political environment

#### 1.2.1 Socio-economic setting

With nearly 175 million people, Brazil is second only to the United States in terms of population in the Americas. Its economy is the 10<sup>th</sup> largest in the world, with a GDP of US\$440 billion in 2002. Brazil is the undisputed leader in South America from both the political and economic perspectives, actively promoting MERCOSUL as a regional trading block providing a strong, united voice for the region.

Not only is Brazil an economic giant, but with a GDP/capita of over US\$2000/year, it is readily characterized as a middle-income country. In fact, standards of living in much of the southeast part of the country rival those of several industrialized countries. However, based on the GINI index, Brazil ranks 6<sup>th</sup> among the worst countries in the world in terms of income distribution and social inequality, with the level of poverty well above that for many middle-income countries (Folha de São Paulo 02/10/03). GDP/capita in Brazil's populous northeast - where one in every two persons are poor - is much below that of the southeast, and infant mortality is more than twice as high. Taken as a region, the northeast is as poor as many of the poorest African countries.

But Brazilian poverty is not limited to the northeast. People in Brazil's vast Amazon region and in the seething slums

of its largest cities (many located in the rich southeast region) also experience sub-human living conditions. In the latter, drug lords and common criminals conduct running battles with police, with local residents caught in the middle.

A recent calculation, presented in the following table suggests the figure of 46 million in 2001. Based on an average exchange rate for 2001, the average monthly income of the poor in Brazil (R43) was equivalent to little over US\$1.00/day, a widely accepted indicator of deep poverty or indigence.

Region	Persons ('000)	%	Families ('000)	%	Monthly income (Reis)
<b>Brazil</b>	46,126	27.3	9,998	21,4	43,09
<b>Large cities</b>	10,418	19.5	2,429	15,8	44,61
<b>Other urban</b>	23,574	26.3	5,148	20,8	44,45
<b>Rural areas</b>	12,134	47.3	2,421	37,3	39.11

Source: PNAD 2001, IBGE

Rural residents are between 50-100% more likely to be poor than urban residents, but the poor are more numerous in large metropolitan areas and their numbers are growing rapidly. The Poverty Map of Brazil, presented above, provides a recent graphic presentation of the distribution of poverty in Brazil. Estimates of the food-insecure also vary greatly, ranging up to 54 million Brazilians - over 30% of the population. This situation, in a country that regularly exports US\$50 billion worth of agricultural products annually, is considered unacceptable by the current Brazilian government.

#### 1.2.2 From military government to democracy

In 1985 Brazil emerged from more than 20 years of military government. The generals promoted nationalism and developed a command economy which boasted an 'economic miracle' during the 1970s, but the rich and the upper middle class were the big winners. While the post-dictatorship years offered new hope for the average Brazilian, resulting in mass mobilization to forge a new constitution in 1988, change has come slowly and painfully for Brazil's people.

The first president to be elected directly since 1960 was impeached in 1992, three years into his mandate, for corruption. The next president, Henrique Cardoso, set out to address hyperinflation, the main challenge the Brazilian economy was facing at the time. He did so by opening the economy of the country to the international market. This process produced a widening gap between rich and poor,

maintaining the Brazilian economy as one of the most inequitable in the world.

The recently elected president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, rose through the ranks of the Workers Party (PT) to victory after several unsuccessful attempts over the past decade. One of his first acts as president was to announce the national *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger) program and to appoint a Special Minister for Food Security, linked directly to the presidential office. Another early initiative was to create a Special Minister for Human Rights, also directly under the president. All ministries have been instructed to present a proposal for implementing *Fome Zero* in their 2003 multi-year plans. These early signals suggest that this government will, within existing budget constraints, develop a pro-poor economic and social strategy designed to reduce poverty and support a broad improvement in citizens' rights. This will present Canada with an opportunity to fully support the new government through equity-oriented, pro-poor economic and social development.

**The number one priority of the Brazilian Government: Fome Zero**

'There is no easy formula to achieve *fome zero*. The country's economy must grow, we need to generate jobs, we need agrarian reform, we need to improve education, and we need to improve health.'

From a speech by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil. February 2003

**1.2.3 Bilateral technical cooperation and the role of ABC**

Annual bilateral technical cooperation (BTC) in Brazil is modest, totalling US\$100 million in 2002, down from US\$480 million as recently as 1997. This compares with an inflow of private investment of more than US\$20 billion in some years. While apparently miniscule in comparison, bilateral cooperation (a mixture of grants and loans) can make a difference in Brazil, a country where resources for key socio-economic development priorities are always in short supply.

Of the seven principal bilateral donors in 2002, Japan contributed 56%, followed by Germany (14%) and the United Kingdom (13%). Canada was in fifth place with 5% or approximately US\$5 million. Analysis by sector indicates that 40% of total BTC was invested in environment, 22% in agriculture, 12% in health and 10% in industry. For all major bilateral donors except France, environment was the principal area of investment in 2002, with most donors also investing in social areas. Canada is one of few donor countries that do not provide resident technical staff to manage its projects in the field (ABC 2003). This policy is based on the relative strength of institutions in Brazil and the desire to ensure sustainability of activities.

Unlike most bilateral assistance recipients, Brazil has a specific agency, the *Agência Brasileira de Cooperação* (ABC) of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, which manages both in-coming and out-going technical cooperation. Brazil is a donor for Lusophone Africa countries and for certain countries of the Americas. There is increasing interest in developing trilateral projects in which a donor from the north supports Brazil in developing a project in a developing country. Canada is in the process of developing one such project with Brazil and Bolivia.

**1.3 CIDA bilateral policies and program in Brazil**

**1.3.1 CIDA global development policy framework**

CIDA's technical cooperation program in Brazil reflects the Agency's overall policy framework. The most recent CIDA programming policy statement, *Canada Making a Difference in the World: Strengthening Aid Effectiveness*, reaffirms existing Agency policy, but provides a sharper focus on a number of issues to make programming more effective. The responsive programming approach based on partnerships contributes to increased local ownership, while ensuring policy coherence remains a continuous challenge.

As a middle-income country, despite widespread poverty, Brazil does not meet the 'poorest country' criteria, but does qualify as a regional leader.

**1.3.2 CIDA programming policy in Brazil**

Rationale for the Brazil program is based on that reality and on the depth of poverty in this country. When the Canada-Brazil Technology Transfer Fund (TTF) was first approved in 1996, following a decade of technology transfer projects during the 1990s (first in agriculture and then in environment), it was designed "to multiply institutional linkages between Canada and Brazil in support of sustainable development" (CIDA 1996b).

Priority programming areas were expanded to include, in addition to environment, the social sector and public sector reform. By 1999, when the *CIDA Programming Framework for Brazil* was prepared, the focus of the program was more clearly defined as promoting greater equity in Brazil. 'The goal of CIDA's bilateral program in Brazil is to contribute to the achievement of greater equity.' CIDA Programming Framework for Brazil, 1999, (p.14). Equitable development was cited as requiring greater economic stability and liberalization, equity/income distribution, regional equality, better access to social services, respect for human rights and the rule of law, environmental stability, and public sector reform. The priority programming areas remained the same as those identified in 1996, but with clearer indicators of success and with the addition of gender as a crosscutting theme.

The 2000 approval document of Phase II of the TTF fund incorporated the orientation of the 1999 *Programming Framework*, including emphasis on equity. Projects that advanced CIDA's Social Development Priorities were to be favoured. Furthermore, given the concentration of poverty in Northeast Brazil, CIDA was to 'privilege the

approval of projects with a focus in this region' (CIDA 2000b, p. 2). Expected program impact was to be more effective, efficient and equitable programs and practices adopted by Brazilian organizations in the three priority areas. This statement recognizes the fact that the CIDA program does not impact on directly on equity and poverty, but rather helps develop the capacity of Brazilian organizations to do so.

### 1.3.3 A Corporate Perspective of Canadian Cooperation in Brazil

Based on data available from corporate Memory and the Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance for fiscal year 2001-2002, Canadian Contribution to Brazil was as follows:

Branch	Total (\$million)	% of total
Bilateral	4.8	24,9
Multilateral	9.3	48,2
Partnership	5.2	26,9
Total	19.3	100.0

Considering the modest level of resources available through the bilateral channel in relation to the size of problems of inequity and poverty in Brazil, the 1999 CIDA Program Framework suggested a program approach. This implied strong coordination with the other channels of Canadian cooperation, especially with Canadian Partnership Branch (CPB). Based on the information available, however, the evaluation team concludes that coordination is still too weak to be able to talk of a corporate CIDA program in Brazil. Evidence of linkages is scarce, and non-existent in many cases. Bilateral and CPB channels appear to have much to share regarding their experience in Brazil.

Given the favourable political context in Brazil, and the new 'corporate perspective' on strengthening development effectiveness in CIDA, that there is an opportunity to correct such situation. The design of the new Program Framework can provide an opportunity not only for improved communications and coordination between CIDA branches and with the various Canadian stakeholders having a legitimate interest in Brazil, but also for expanded dialogue with ABC and Brazilian civil society.

## 2. Evaluation methodology

### 2.1 Rationale and purpose of the evaluation

An operational review of the Brazil TTF fund took place in 1999, in parallel with a review of CIDA's TTF program in the Southern Cone, at an early stage in fund activities. In 2000 a Canada-Brazil Lessons Learned Symposium was held in Brazil, attended by a large number of partner

representatives, to discuss the program and identify lessons to date. In early 2002 an internal Lessons Learned Review was conducted of CIDA's Local Public Sector Reform Funds of the Americas Branch, of which the PSSR fund is the counterpart in Brazil. The present evaluation, building on these initiatives, has the advantage of assessing the program several years after its inception in 1996.

### 2.2 Evaluation team

The program evaluation has been built on a strong base of partnership and collaboration. The core evaluation team was comprised of two fulltime members, an external evaluator and a senior officer of CIDA's Performance Review Branch. In Brazil a Department for International Development (DFID) staff member, and an ABC staff person, to provide the team with broader knowledge of the ABC-donor relationship and the local context of the sub-projects visited, joined the team, on a part-time basis. CIDA program staff provided capable logistical support before and during the evaluation fieldwork.

### 2.3 Evaluation approach and methodology

**Evaluation sample.** Given the large number of sub-projects that have been funded through the program, a sub-set of nine (five TTF and four PSSR) were suggested in the Evaluation TORs as a possible sample.

**Questionnaires.** Electronic questionnaires were prepared by the evaluation team, and sent to all but two TTF fund partners (these two sub-projects were approved recently) and to a sample of PSSR participants. Response to the questionnaires was very high, with an overall response rate of 74%.

Questionnaire type	No. sent	No. back	Return rate
TTF Brazil	14*	11*	79%
TTF Canada	19*	18*	95%
PSSR Brazil	26	13	50%
PSSR Canada	14	12	86%
Total	73	54	74%

\* More than one respondent completed questionnaires for two of the TTF sub-projects.

**Sub-project site visits.** Evaluation fieldwork was conducted in four cities in Brazil: Brasilia, Recife, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Staff from ten TTF fund and five PSSR sub-projects were visited and interviewed during these visits. Of particular importance on each of these visits was the relevance of the technology for the partner, evidence that the partner organization has successfully integrated project knowledge or models, indication that dissemination is taking place and the likelihood that the impact will be felt by the final intended beneficiaries.

**Focus group meetings.** This mechanism was used, in both Canada and Brazil, to encourage groups of program partners to interact directly with each other in a neutral setting. While the evaluation team brought a minimum agenda to these meetings, participants were encouraged to discuss all issues related to the program that they felt important. Two half-day focus group meetings were held in Canada (Ottawa and Vancouver attracted 16 participants) and four in Brazil (Brasilia, Recife, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo attracted 60 participants).

A high level of interest was shown in the focus group meetings, especially in Brazil, where extra participants frequently showed up. The meetings were characterized by active participation, useful conclusions and interest in further exchange of experience between partners.

**Other information sources.** The evaluation team interviewed CIDA staff in Canada and Brazil, selected Canadian Embassy staff in Brasilia, and other donor staff in Brasilia (DFID and the German Cooperation Program - GTZ). Other institutional contacts outside of the program included Programa Fome Zero staff in Brasilia, and Oxfam, UNDP and Instituto Joaquim Nabuco staff in Recife.

Other useful sources of written information included: CIDA policy documents; TTF program, fund and sub-project documents; government of Brazil official documents, and; relevant daily news articles accessed while in Brazil.

### 3. Program policies and design

#### 3.1 The Technology Transfer Fund

In this section we will describe the fundamental characteristics of the "Technology Transfer Fund" approach.

**A responsive mechanism:** Using a fully responsive approach appears to the evaluation team as a very adequate approach for middle-income countries. The key design elements in TTF Phase II include:

- Focus on reducing inequity
- Technology transfer
- Support for Brazilian development trends
- Thematic focus (three areas)
- Demand-driven
- Strong partnerships
- Synergy and sharing lessons
- Leveraging of resources
- A results-based approach
- Capacity development

This set of design elements compares favourably with those identified in CIDA's 2002 policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness (CIDA 2002), suggesting that the Brazil program was not only advanced in incorporating emerging development trends, but was also providing innovative leadership in this area.

**Reducing inequity.** Inequity has frequently been identified as a major development problem in Latin America, and in Brazil in particular, creating a strong rationale for identifying this as CIDA's programming goal. Gender equality in TTF fund projects may be addressed through a specific sub-project component and/or a separate gender analysis and action plan.

What the fund documents do not elaborate on is whose equity is to be improved, since it can be convincingly argued that inequity exists among the better off as well as among the very poor. In the absence of a clear definition of who is to benefit, the TTF fund runs the risk of having a very diffuse impact on equity for the poor.

**Technology transfer.** While this name suggests the transfer of hardware and equipment, this has rarely taken place and is not funded through the TTF project. Typically, the technology consists of Canadian knowledge, models and approaches identified by the Brazilian partner as not existing in Brazil but relevant for local development issues. The transfer nearly always requires substantial adaptation to Brazilian institutional and local conditions. In a number of cases this transformed technology has been taken back to Canada for application there. Increasingly, the 'technology' involved relates to social development knowledge and models.

**Support for Brazilian development trends.** The intention of the TTF funds is to reinforce development trends in Brazil that promote greater equity and for which Canada has relevant experience to support. The 1999 *Programming Framework for Brazil* presents a brief analysis of development trends and challenges. These are repeated in the 2000 TTF approval document. The 1996 approval document contained no such analysis. In neither TTF approval documents is there an attempt to identify priorities among trends from an inequity reduction perspective, nor an analysis of how Canadian experience might be relevant in supporting positive trends.

It is recommended that an analysis of these issues become a part of the design of each future phase of the TTF funds, updated periodically when relevant change takes place. The DRINK or the PSF fund could be used for such analyses in Brazil. Such analyses would assist program staff in selecting sub-projects that are clearly focussed on priority development needs from an equity perspective and for which Canada has appropriate expertise.

**Thematic focus.** The TTF fund focuses on three development themes: public sector reform, social development and environmental management. The Phase II approval document identifies three sub-themes in social development (health, education and human rights) in keeping with the proposed emphasis on CIDA's Social Development Priorities. The three development themes correspond closely to the 1999 analysis of development challenges in Brazil and CIDA's corporate development agenda. An analysis of TTF sub-project funding, by phase and development theme, is presented in the Appendix. This analysis shows the shift from environment to public sector reform programming in Phase II, although the

former still represents over 55% of all TTF fund programming to date.

The importance given to the Fome Zero program by the present government is a reminder that food security - self-provision and access to purchased food of adequate quality – is also a high social priority for Brazil's poor that cannot be ignored. While an in-depth analysis of development priorities in Brazil was outside the scope of this evaluation, the area of pro-poor growth is widely recognized as essential if the Millennium Goals are to be reached.

Without employment and increased income for the poor, access to good quality food and secure access to land for the rural and urban landless, social services such as education and health will remain chimerical. This issue was flagged in *Canada Making a Difference in the World*, with reference to rural incomes (p.15) and is central to DFID's Sustainable Livelihoods Strategy. It is recommended that CIDA's Brazil Program Review now underway revisit the selection of priority themes for programming in Brazil, based on an analysis of development priorities and opportunities there, with particular attention to the need for promoting better income-generating opportunities for the poor. This analysis requires close collaboration with Brazilian partners so that CIDA's priority themes are closely aligned with Brazil's needs.

**Demand-driven programming.** At the level of sub-projects, this level of Brazilian input is already taking place. A major innovation of the TTF fund was the introduction of responsive programming, encouraging Brazilian institutions to take the initiative from the beginning. ABC and CIDA consider proposals only if full involvement of the Brazilian partner has taken place, frequently involving a trip to Canada to visit the proposed partner. This helps ensure that Brazilian priorities are being met and that the Brazilian institution is committed to implementing the activity, thus improving the probability of success and sustainability. Both Brazilian and Canadian partners uniformly expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the responsive nature of the program and the CIDA management flexibility that this implies.

One result of the responsive mechanism as presently implemented is that knowledge of the program (and subsequently, sub-project proposals) is concentrated in the prosperous south-central regions of the country. The addition of a CIDA staff person in Sao Paulo in February 2002, while helping divide the overall program workload, has resulted in even greater access for institutions in this region.

The degree of regional concentration of activities is suggested in the Appendix. This calculation, which demonstrates a weak presence of TTF fund activities in Brazil's poor Northeast region, is less than satisfactory since a breakdown of secondary partner activity for each sub-project was not readily available. There are indications that future TTF II projects, now being planned, will put somewhat more emphasis on the Northeast.

**Strong partnerships.** The TTF fund is designed for strong partners, those with a strong institutional base and with expertise in the proposed technological area. Selection of a Canadian partner with a proven track record is particularly important. An understanding of working in developing countries is also helpful. Brazilian partners must have adequate staffing and financial resources to cover local costs while participating actively in the long sub-project planning process (12+ months) and the implementation stage (3-4 years). The ability of Brazilian partners to adequately cover local costs as well as undertake necessary investments in staff, infrastructure and/or equipment essential for project success is central to the program's goal of leveraging resources through strong partners.

For the most part, the TTF fund has been quite successful in promoting the identification of strong partners, leading in many cases to strong partnerships. CIDA achieves leverage of resources by committing the Brazilian partner to invest a volume of resources in sub-project activities that is frequently larger than CIDA's contribution. While the team saw clear evidence of this investment during a number of site visits, reporting on this aspect is not systematic enough to permit assessment of the level of investment that actually takes place, as compared to the planned volume.

However, the selection of Brazilian partners from civil society and from the Northeast in particular which are least likely to present a high quality proposal and pass the 'strong partner' test and may in fact require direct CIDA financial support to cover local costs. When this situation has arisen in the past it has been resolved by CIDA and ABC after some delay and on an 'exceptional case' basis, without creating the necessary design changes in the program.

Developing a new bilateral agreement with the Brazilian government may resolve part of this impasse by creating the space for CIDA to more adequately support less well financed but strategic Brazilian partners.

### **3.2 The Public and Social Sector Reform Fund (PSSR)**

The PSSR was developed in 1998 as 'a mechanism to respond to immediate Brazilian needs for exposure or introduction to relevant Canadian know-how on a short-term but urgent basis'. The design of this fund was based on successful CIDA projects in Peru, Bolivia and the Southern Cone. The goal is to facilitate public and social sector reform through exposure to Canadian experience. As shown in the Appendix, PSSR sub-projects are of short duration and limited resources (an average of only \$18,000). While they are generally one-off activities, a number of partners have been granted a second PSSR and in one exceptional case three repeat sub-projects were approved. Repeat sub-projects frequently represented an evolution in terms of addressing the central issue at stake.

PSSR activities vary from attendance at a conference or a visit to a partner in Canada, to more complex and



sustainable exchanges of models and knowledge. Based on the questionnaire feedback and the sample of PSSR sub-projects visited by the evaluation team, there is a high level of participant satisfaction with this activity. In many cases the PSSR stimulated other related partner activities and in a few cases resulted in future TTF projects, although this latter outcome is not a specific focus of the fund.

PSSR programming has evolved over time, with a total of 51 sub-projects approved by January 2003. PSSR sub-projects are typically initiated by Brazilian institutions, or occasionally by individuals, wishing to acquire relevant knowledge available in Canada. While public agencies and government ministries qualify for a PSSR, the not-for-profit sector (NGOs, foundations) was cited in the PSSR approval documents as a special target group that might not otherwise qualify through the TTF fund.

In 2001-2002, a recent year with a large number of PSSR sub-project approvals, the breakdown of Canadian and Brazilian principal partners, by type, was: government (14), academic (6), NGO/civil society (13), and, individual (1). Of the NGO/civil society organizations involved in PSSR sub-projects that year, six were Canadian and seven were Brazilian. On average over the last six years, approximately one-half of the Brazilian partners have been civil society organizations.

None of the principal partners in that year were from Northeast Brazil, although the rationale for increasing TTF fund programming there would also apply to the PSSR fund. It is the evaluation team's assessment that increased access to information on the program is the key to reaching this target group.

Two PSSR design issues received special analysis by the evaluation team. The first refers to the fact that ABC has not assumed oversight of this fund, as it does not consider that the Brazil-Canada Agreement covers this fund. On the positive side, this situation facilitates rapid decision-making by CIDA, an important characteristic for a number of these sub-projects. On the other hand, it represents a major inconsistency in CIDA's expressed desire to work closely with ABC. The latter has recently shown a growing interest in participating more actively in the PSSR fund decisions, which could permit rapid resolution of the observed anomaly.

The second issue refers to the relationship between the TTF and PSSR funds. The PSSR approval document makes it clear that this is an additional funding instrument, with no direct relationship to the TTF fund. Equity is not mentioned as the fund goal in the PSSR Guidelines. Nevertheless, the potential for using the PSSR fund to stimulate the development of concept plans for the TTF fund is obvious, with 10 PSSR sub-projects having contributed in this regard to date and others with potential to do so in the future.

The evaluation team recommends that a much closer relationship be developed between the funds to increase the likelihood that PSSR investments more frequently lead to TTF and DRINK proposals or directly complement these

funds. This match-making role of the PSSR sub-project is likely to become increasingly important as sub-projects are developed with civil society groups and NGOs in northeast Brazil that do not have prior knowledge of relevant Canadian expertise.

### **3.3 Other Funds**

#### **3.3.1 Dissemination, Replication, Information-Sharing and Knowledge (DRINK) Fund**

This fund, approved little more than a year ago, proposes to increase the impact of the TTF program in Brazil. This will be achieved through four components:

- Dissemination of knowledge created through TTF and PSSR projects;
- Replication of successful, adapted Canadian technology to other non-partner organizations;
- Information sharing and coordination between TTF sub-projects, CIDA programs in Brazil and with bilateral and multilateral donors, including support for donor coordination led by ABC;
- Knowledge-building through regular policy analysis of key issues of interest to the Brazil program.

This fund is innovative in a number of respects. Dissemination and replication activities are responsive, making Brazilian partners responsible for initiating the request and directly managing the financial resources. The information and sharing component can fund exchanges between sub-projects, for which the evaluators registered a large demand. Systematic information sharing between CIDA programs in Brazil, which is presently embryonic, will create conditions for greater efficiency in overall CIDA resource use in Brazil. Planning for initial activities of the DRINK fund took place immediately before and during the evaluation fieldwork.

Similar to TTF II, this fund is to give priority to programming in the Northeast, although only one of the first five sub-projects has this geographic focus. Similar to the PSSR, this fund is also considered by ABC to be outside of the Canada-Brazil Agreement, despite the fact that to date it has involved sub-projects that directly complement TTF fund sub-projects, for which ABC shares oversight with CIDA.

#### **3.3.2 The Programme Support Fund (PSF)**

This fourth program fund was approved in early 2003. It has as its expected impact to strengthen CIDA's ability to contribute effectively to a more innovative, visible and knowledge-based partnership in Brazil. While this fund is too recent to be included in the evaluation team's TORs, from the overall program policy perspective it is of interest to examine its components to assess how they might complement the other three funds. The three PSF fund components are:

- Program support for innovative and multi-donor development activities. (e.g. assess potential for multilateral and trilateral cooperation in Brazil; contract a U.N. Volunteer for specific tasks)

- Visibility and understanding of CIDA's development activities in Brazil. (e.g. provide support for ISPI press coverage, prepare and print various publications related to the program)
- Integration of local development knowledge into CIDA programming in Brazil. (e.g. support for the CIDA Brazil program review, develop a database to track CIDA activities in Brazil, etc.)

While a number of the suggested activities appear to duplicate those proposed for the DRINK fund, the distinction made in the planning document is that the PSF will complement the DRINK by addressing the 'how' of administrative and support issues, rather than the 'what'.

### 3.4 Support for policy development

This activity is a crosscutting issue that is increasingly seen as an essential task by program staff. There is no specific funding assigned to this activity and no systematic plan for moving this agenda forward, but a number of initiatives have taken place, are underway or are planned.

**Corporate collaboration.** Part of this activity relates to CIDA's own policies. At the corporate level, CIDA encourages collaboration between Agency branches, on the one hand, and between CIDA and other government ministries on the other. A Canadian government inter-departmental group on Brazil is conducting discussions on this issue. Within Brazil, the program does have close contact with Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) staff in the embassy, but has experienced considerable difficulty creating any significant level of information-sharing or collaboration with Partnership and Multilateral Branch-funded activities, despite interest in doing so. Discussions are under way as to how this might be achieved.

**Middle-income country policy.** CIDA does not have a specific policy on programming in middle-income countries such as Brazil, but it is recognized that such countries present different characteristics than poor countries (Box 3.2). In the spring of 2003 the Brazil Country Program staff took the initiative of organizing a workshop to share CIDA experiences in other middle-income countries such as South Africa, Southeast Asia and the Former Soviet Union. Characteristics of the TTF program that reflect Brazil's middle-income status include: responsiveness; selection of strong partners; equal partnerships; and resource leverage.

**Donor cooperation.** Cooperation with other donors was identified as one activity that could be developed with DRINK funding. Progress has been made in cooperating with some other donors in Brazil, especially DFID, and in discussing joint activities with some multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and UNICEF. CIDA staff can use the experience and lessons learned to help inform decisions on multilateral planning and project implementation.

**Sub-project policy influence.** The program also encourages input to policies in the Brazilian public sector through sub-project activities. Changing Brazilian policies

is not usually a goal specified in sub-project planning, but it may become necessary as the activity develops, or it may emerge as an unanticipated outcome of the sub-project. Although it is not the responsibility of donors to undertake policy change in Brazil, providing input to change based on solid development experience is valid, especially when this input is formulated and presented by the Brazilian partner.

#### Cooperation in middle-income countries

Like many other international organizations, CIDA is rethinking its cooperation in Brazil as part of a broader reflection concerning development assistance in middle-income countries.

In discussing this issue, CIDA's policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness states: "In addition to having a higher income per capita, (middle income countries) can generally be characterized as having a relatively strong and sophisticated governance capacity".

While these countries may contain significant numbers of extremely poor people, they normally have sectoral or national plans in place for reducing poverty. Their requirements for development assistance are usually specific and often involve sophisticated technical assistance rather than large amounts of resource transfers.

Assistance to these countries usually has a high success rate and achieves sustainable results. Canada does maintain considerable development cooperation with middle-income countries. While CIDA's presence in these countries is conditioned by foreign policy considerations, the content of its programs is driven by developmental priorities" (CIDA 2002, p.9).

## 4. Program Management

### 4.1 CIDA-ABC relations

CIDA is actively involved in managing the TTF program, supported by ABC in the case of TTF fund activities. The two ABC staff persons assigned part-time to the CIDA portfolio participate actively in reviewing TTF programming ideas, concept papers and implementation proposals. They accompany TTF sub-project progress with somewhat more difficulty, through occasional sub-project site visits and sub-project progress reports prepared by the Brazilian partners. When problems arise with sub-project implementation, ABC may be called upon to help, but lack of systematic contact with the sub-project makes this task more difficult.

A great deal of progress has been made in strengthening the CIDA/ABC relationship, with a high level of trust existing between the two partners today, despite a series of trade disputes that have coloured the overall bilateral

relationship. While most communication between CIDA and ABC is via phone or e-mail, periodic meetings are held to discuss issues at the program and sub-project level.

ABC staff is not involved in activities relating to the PSSR and DRINK funds, since these are not understood by ABC to be covered by the Canada/Brazil bilateral agreement, nor do they participate in CIDA's annual program steering committee meetings. In the interest of strengthening still further the CIDA/ABC relationship, the program should take immediate steps to integrate ABC in decision-making on PSSR and DRINK sub-projects, subject to ABC's interest and availability.

#### 4.2 CIDA program management

The program is managed directly by CIDA staff, despite past efforts to contract consultants to distribute the workload. The Head of Aid in Brasilia is program manager, supported by three locally contracted staff there. There is also one CIDA employee and a local support person in Sao Paulo, for a total of approximately 3.8 person/years in Brazil dedicated to this program. In Canada three CIDA staff persons provide 2.5 person/years of support to the program.

This total of 6.3 person/years is relatively high, by CIDA standards, for the \$5.25m/year program, attesting to the complexity of management functions. This labour-intensive approach is due to a number of factors: the program structure is complex, with four different funds and different regulations for each; the provision of considerable support and guidance to both the Canadian and Brazilian partners; given the large number of sub-project proposals (especially PSSR) and reports are analyzed each year; the fact that both Brazilian and Canadian partners are involved in most sub-projects (and multiple partners in both countries in many cases), makes monitoring of partnership-building and program implementation quite demanding.

In addition to responsibilities directly related to sub-project development, CIDA staff are responsible for other program-related activities such as: CIDA-ABC relations, program marketing and communications, program management meetings, reporting to CIDA, providing logistics for CIDA missions and official visits to the program.

In the 1998 amendment to TTF Phase I that increased funding by CDN\$3million, there was provision for contracting local consultants to assist in program management. The program reports that while two consultants were contracted on a trial basis to manage the initial stages of sub-project development, partners tended to by-pass and go directly to CIDA staff.

**Program workload and staffing.** The substantial workload of CIDA staff in Brazil was evident to the evaluation team. Six persons provide approximately 65% of their time to the TTF program in Brazil. Over the past year this effort was divided as follows: TTF fund 24%, PSSR 31%, DRINK 14% and overall program

management 31%. The heavy investment in the PSSR and DRINK funds, relative to their size (approximately 3% each of total funding), is due to both funds being largely managed in Brazil, with the PSSR involving a large number of small initiatives and DRINK being a new fund still in the active planning phase. The three Canada-based staff invest most of their time on TTF fund issues (57%) and overall program management (35%).

Based on the interpretation of the present Canada/Brazil Bilateral Agreement, no long-term Canadian consultant can be stationed in Brazil and no Project Support Unit can be created there. This has restricted CIDA's ability to outsource technical and administrative tasks in Brazil. The placement of an additional CIDA employee in the São Paulo Consulate office in 2002 has partly resolved this problem, but the location is not ideal from the perspective of a more adequate geographic balance in the program. A United Nations volunteer was contracted in May 2003 for one year to implement the Information Sharing and Coordination activities provided for in the DRINK fund, but this person will not provide technical or administrative support outside of this component.

Two additional options to reduce CIDA staff workload could be considered. Local consultants could again be contracted with DRINK or PSF funding to assume technical or administrative tasks. Another option is to reduce the volume of PSSR programming somewhat.

**Targeted vs. responsive programming.** Responsiveness is a positive characteristic of the program, but is necessarily conditioned by overall CIDA programming criteria and sub-project selection criteria, specific to each fund. The volume and nature of project proposals are in turn conditioned by formal and informal dissemination of information about the program.

The significant change in TTF fund programming in Phase II, in which resources for environment sub-projects decreased substantially relative to Phase I, while those for public sector reform increased, is a clear example of successful targeted programming. The recent tendency of encouraging national institutions involved in sub-projects to include one or more locations in Northeast Brazil is another example in which targeted programming is being practiced.

It is evident that both targeted and responsive management methods co-exist and are being used positively in the program. In order to achieve the equity goals that underpin the rationale for the program, further program direction may be necessary. Ideally, this will be based on analysis of the Brazilian reality, on broad consultation with Brazilian stakeholders, on realistic assessments of what can be achieved with available resources and of the type of partners that are best able to promote necessary change. Involvement of ABC staff in this process would be important.

**Marketing and communications.** The program has already undertaken various measures to promote knowledge of the program in Brazil. A program brochure was distributed to approximately 500 institutions in

Canada and Brazil and information sessions held in the Northeast and elsewhere to explain TTF fund Phase II. A periodic newsletter (CIDA Brazil News) and a website also provide information on the program. An Information Sharing and Promotion Initiative (ISPI) has also been initiated by the program in order to better coordinate program communications, an activity that will now benefit from PSF funding.

A more specific marketing strategy will be necessary in order for the program to expand its presence in the Northeast. Among other things this could involve a rapid institutional analysis to identify relevant organizations and networks in the region, followed by one or more focus group meetings to present the TTF program and identify challenges and opportunities that CIDA could address. These meetings may result in identifying existing programs, networks or institutions with which CIDA can cooperate.

Participants in the focus groups organized for the evaluation in both Canada and Brazil emphasized the importance of information exchange between sub-projects. Partners indicated that considerably more information exchange between sub-projects is desirable.

The Lessons Learned Symposium, sponsored by CIDA and ABC in Brazil in 2000, with 85 Canadian and Brazilian sub-project representatives present, contributed somewhat to information exchange between sub-projects. The evaluation team suggests that smaller meetings based on a geographic or theme basis are likely to permit more effective exchange of experience and ideas between sub-projects. Some activities of this nature have been planned in Brazil for later in 2003 and early 2004.

**Program steering committee (SC).** SC meetings are held annually for selected CIDA staff from Brazil and Canada. These meetings have varied from 2-5 days in length, covering a wide range of topics. ABC is not invited to these meetings, presumably because they cover program aspects such as PSSR, DRINK and PSF for which ABC does not share management responsibility.

If CIDA accepts the evaluation team recommendation that the various TTF funds be combined, ideally under a revised Bilateral Agreement, it is suggested that ABC be invited to participate in the SC meetings. These might be combined with the bilateral consultation meetings now taking place between CIDA and ABC. In the interests of ensuring practical input from development practitioners, CIDA might also consider nominating one or two partner representatives and/or knowledgeable Brazilians to be part of the SC. To the extent that CIDA wishes to deepen its relationship with like-minded donors, representatives of these agencies could also be invited as observers.

**Monitoring and reporting.** Program staff attempts to visit TTF fund partners annually, usually during the sub-project steering committee meeting. ABC staff may also be present, but this has not happened systematically, partly due to resource constraints. CIDA and ABC are encouraged to ensure that these visits are coordinated. The monitoring reports resulting from these visits are

important records of project status and challenges. Use of a standard reporting format by program staff, with observations on progress towards planned outputs and outcomes, would assist in managing the program and in reporting to CIDA.

CIDA requires TTF fund sub-projects to prepare progress reports in English or French twice a year and an end-of-project progress report in English, French or Portuguese. ABC also requires regular reporting, in Portuguese. Ideally these reports would be a collaborative effort between the two partners, but language differences necessarily limit participation. In the case of TTF fund sub-projects, the Canadian partner assumes reporting responsibility, with contributions by the Brazilian partner(s). In the case of PSSR sub-projects, CIDA requires only a single, simplified end-of-project progress report.

Thought should be given to reducing and simplifying the burden of reporting for TTF fund partners. CIDA could consider requesting annual rather than six-monthly progress reports and establishing with ABC a common sub-project reporting format. The issue of the report language would have to be resolved.

### 4.3 Sub-project management

#### 4.3.1 CIDA participation at the sub-project level

CIDA staff is actively involved in guiding partner institutions through the various stages of project planning, in reviewing and approving proposals, problem solving, monitoring of sub-projects.

**Sub-project planning.** Planning of TTF fund sub-projects typically involves a lengthy 12-18 month process in which partners determine what their mutual interests are, prepare an initial project idea followed by a formal concept paper submitted to ABC and CIDA. Upon approval, various proposal drafts are frequently required until ABC and CIDA agree to accept the activity. In the case of PSSR sub-projects, proposal preparation is simple and approval rapid. Proposal preparation for DRINK funding is also relatively straightforward, as requests originate from already successful projects.

The TTF program has guidelines for TTF, PSSR and DRINK funds. TTF fund guidelines for Phase II were revised and strengthened. Proposals for the TTF fund must meet CIDA requirements in areas of gender, environment and results-based management (RBM). Program staff provides guidance to partners in all three areas, with RBM concepts presented in a formal training session. CIDA staff experience in project logistics and management is invaluable input for first-time partners.

Questionnaire results show that CIDA had significant planning input in nearly 90% of TTF fund and well over 50% of PSSR fund sub-projects. During the evaluation, Brazilian partners expressed the need for more support in understanding how issues such as gender, equity and policy impact within the Brazilian context, and sub-project evaluations, can best be implemented. Nevertheless,

Canadian as well as Brazilian partners can benefit from a more systematic treatment of these issues.

The evaluation team suggests that the program staff assess these expressed needs and determine how they can best be met. DFID offers training in the area of policy influence, which might be useful for sub-project coordinators. Consultants could be contracted to prepare and present training in other areas. In all cases, CIDA staff should participate actively in this process so that they are able to reinforce the key concepts during contacts with partners.

**Proposal approval process.** Between 1996 and early 2003 CIDA has assessed and approved concept papers and proposals for 16 TTF fund sub-projects (12 in Phase I and four in Phase II). Another five have had concept papers approved and are at the planning stage. An unspecified number of requests have been assessed and turned down at various stages of development. A total of 50 PSSR sub-projects and five DRINK proposals have been approved. This activity takes up a significant amount of CIDA staff time.

The delay encountered in moving from concept paper to an approved project proposal for TTF fund sub-projects appears to be largely due to the difficulty partners encounter in deciding what to do and how to do it. At the November 2000 Steering Committee meeting, program staff took the positive step of establishing business standards for proposal approval by CIDA: 10 days for PSSR proposals and 18 weeks maximum for TTF fund proposals.

Nevertheless, a need to better understand the entire approval process and to determine the approval stage of a proposal once it has been submitted to ABC and CIDA was expressed by several partners. The next revision to the TTF fund guidelines could include a list of milestones in the approval process. This information could be supplemented through a contact by CIDA staff on a pre-determined schedule to advise of approval progress.

**Problem solving.** During sub-project implementation, problems frequently arise that require resolution. While many of these are resolved directly among the partners, CIDA and ABC are also periodically called upon to help. TTF fund questionnaire results indicate that 50% of Brazilian sub-project coordinators looked to CIDA for assistance while 30% sought assistance from ABC. CIDA staff is frequently requested for more time or money to complete sub-projects, requiring both good judgement and flexibility. Overall, CIDA staff received high marks by questionnaire respondents for its willingness and ability to resolve project-related problems.

**Monitoring, report review and accounting.** CIDA staff is responsible for monitoring visits to TTF fund sub-projects, review of project reports and processing of claims for TTF, PSSR and DRINK projects. Monitoring and reporting issues are discussed in greater detail in Item 4.3.

Reviewing sub-project financial statements and ensuring that documentation is complete proves to be time-

consuming, especially in the case of sub-projects where the Brazilian partner is reporting on expenses, as is true of PSSR and most of the newly approved DRINK sub-projects. The evaluation team suggests that the program consider contracting a qualified consultant to assume the Brazilian dimension of this task.

#### 4.3.2 Partner management of sub-projects

Coordinators of both the lead Brazilian and Canadian partners manage the TTF fund sub-projects. Where multiple partners are involved, the principal partners coordinate their input. All stages of sub-project planning are carried out jointly, with the Canadian partner assuming accounting and reporting responsibility to CIDA. Formal agreements are generally drawn up between the principal partners, establishing the responsibilities and roles of each. An annual sub-project Steering Committee is typically held in Brazil to review progress and plan future activities. The fact that secondary partners are generally not fully involved in sub-project decision-making has led to imperfect communications and unfulfilled expectations in some cases.

The evaluation team considers that progress has been quite satisfactory in the large majority of TTF fund and PSSR sub-projects, despite a series of challenges that partners face. Establishing a clear understanding of objectives and an effective working relationship between the partners is the first hurdle. Being able to maintain interest and momentum during the typically long planning period for TTF fund partners is the next. Partner staff must frequently work overtime during sub-project planning and not infrequently during implementation as well, to ensure project success.

**Sub-project budget issues.** The significant cost of planning of TTF fund sub-projects was recognized by CIDA early in Phase I, when the decision was made to provide advance funding (now approximately \$50,000) for partners with an approved concept paper. This can be used for travel and other approved costs, including salary supplements for Canadian partners in some cases.

During implementation, the sub-project budget provides for a management or overhead fee for the Canadian partner, that is sometimes used to top up Canadian project staff and consultant fees, but no similar provision is made for the Brazilian partner. While Brazilian partners understand the rationale for this funding anomaly, it does not pass unnoticed by them and was mentioned in discussions on the issue of equity.

PSSR sub-project budgets, CND\$18,000 on average, frequently cover only travel and related costs. DRINK budgets cover a range of in-Brazil costs associated with dissemination, including Brazilian fees and honoraria in some cases. While this practice is an example of flexibility on the part of program staff, it raises the issue of why this is possible for DRINK sub-projects and not for TTF and PSSR ones.

Program decisions on local costs tend to be discretionary. Big-ticket items such as simultaneous translation costs

and internal air travel in Brazil may be built into project budgets. Approximately 85% of Brazilian TTF fund and PSSR questionnaire respondents, including those from 'stronger' institutions, felt that the CIDA policy on local costs was inadequate. Observations by Canadian partners that Brazilian institutions have been unable to cover essential local costs in some cases highlight the problem. Given the rigidity of most Brazilian institutional budgets, part of the solution might be to clearly identify the volume, source and availability of resources for local costs at the project proposal stage, before activities begin, and plan a fund-raising strategy if institutional budgets are likely to be inadequate.

On rare occasions, CIDA and ABC have approved funding for Brazilian salaries (e.g. a contracted coordinator for the United Way/GETS sub-project), although ABC will not approve payment of salaries or salary supplements for persons of partner payrolls.

**Sub-project timeframes.** Achieving planned schedules for sub-project implementation is also a major challenge for sub-project coordinators given the vagaries of the Brazilian institutional milieu, sub-project staff changes, conflicting commitments of partner staff, etc. This results in the planned timeframe frequently being unrealistic. Fully 90% of TTF fund questionnaire respondents indicated that more time was needed to finish their sub-project. The majority of sub-projects have requested and were granted more time by CIDA. A much smaller proportion of PSSR sub-projects required a time extension.

Most TTF fund time extensions were carried out within the original budget, despite the fact that roughly one-half of respondents felt that funds proved inadequate once activities were under way, frequently because sub-project activities had been expanded or the Brazilian partner was unable to cover local costs adequately. In cases where the need for more funding has been clearly justified, CIDA has approved budget increases. From the program staff perspective, sub-project budgets are seen to have generally proven adequate, with project funds returned at the conclusion of activities or used to expand activities on several occasions.

**Language.** The important issue of language is resolved on an *ad hoc* basis in the program, with each set of partners finding their own solution. In a few cases, Canadian partner staff members are Brazilian, speak Portuguese or acquire a working vocabulary of the language over time. A number of Brazilians speak and/or understand English, or make an attempt to learn it. In other cases interpreters are used, sourced from inside the Brazilian institution whenever possible. In the case of conferences or large meetings in Brazil, simultaneous translation services are contracted.

While a number of spontaneous and innovative solutions have been developed for dealing with the language issue, it must be kept in mind that the success of technology transfer depends on high quality communication between the partners. To ensure that the language challenge is thought through adequately from the start, sub-project proposals could require a statement of how the language

issue will be dealt with, what costs this will imply and how these will be covered.

#### **4.4 Results-based management in the Brazil cooperation program**

Results-based management (RBM) was introduced in CIDA in 1996. This started a long process of training, tools development and trial and error, first at the project level, then the program level and now at the corporate level.

##### **4.4.1 RBM in a responsive mode**

In that context, some programs have faced added challenges. This is the case of the TTF program, where responsive programming has increased the difficulty of implementing a RBM approach. When asked to design and plan a conventional project, a CIDA officer may have little choice but to do it according to the rules and regulations. It is different when the role of the officer is more one of advice, and approval of projects is prepared by others. And the challenge is even greater when the program seeks to respect and promote local partnership.

The fact that CIDA requires that TTF fund partners use RBM principles in sub-project planning is seen by the evaluation team as positive, but this does place an added burden on those doing the planning. Between the project concept paper for a TTF fund sub-project and a full-fledged proposal ready for approval, the process may be a painful one, especially when dealing with organizations committed to working as equal partners, despite the fact that they are located 6,000 kilometres apart and working in fundamentally different institutional environments and cultures.

The evaluation team had some concern that the sub-project design and approval process might be so long that it negatively impacts on the effectiveness and efficiency of the program. In that context, some structural elements may have to be looked at, such as the project guidelines and requirements, the project approval process both at CIDA and ABC, the time availability of the partners themselves, and the communication and language issues, among others. These elements may have to be looked at in order to streamline the planning and approval process. Generally speaking, however, the evaluation team came to the conclusion that this hard and 'painful' process may bring with it fruits that surpass the 'pain.'

In response to the questionnaires most TTF Canadian and Brazilian partners expressed the idea that the RBM was an appropriate tool for the design of their projects and that the support received from CIDA was welcome and useful. PSSR project participants are not required by CIDA to use RBM in planning their activities, given the small volume of funds and the short duration of the sub-projects, a decision with which the evaluation team concurs.

During the course of the evaluation, in both partner interviews and focus groups, the Brazilian TTF fund partners, said that the sub-project planning process, while long, was most useful and that the results-based management approach was probably the first 'technology

transfer' that occurred during the course of the project. This learning process included the exchange of information between partners, the support provided by CIDA and some learning events such as the Lessons Learned Symposium held in Guarujá, Sao Paulo in 2000. As indicated during the symposium and in evaluation interviews, the major challenges that both Canadian and Brazilian partners face in relation to RBM are how to implement downstream components such as monitoring and evaluation.

It is important that CIDA clarify its expectations regarding internal sub-project monitoring and evaluation. The evaluation team is of the opinion that assisting Brazilian partners to internalize the RBM evaluation process, where appropriate, is a valuable part of technology transfer that can have wider application within the partner organization and its network partners.

#### 4.4.2 Monitoring and evaluation

A review of documentation such as end of project reports showed that these were primarily descriptive of activities undertaken, with little information on results. The main reason for this has to do with the challenges that measuring results pose. Furthermore, Brazilian partners are not receiving systematic support for conducting sub-project evaluations, despite the strong interest they expressed to the evaluation team in acquiring these skills.

The limited scope of most program interventions in Brazil, both in terms of time, value and coverage, makes an evaluation of results even more difficult. The fact that the objective of the different interventions and the program *per se* is to build the capacity of Brazilian institutions - by providing them with technologies or approaches that will help improve their efficiency and effectiveness - increases the challenge even further.

In the area of institutional development, available tools are limited, but a considerable volume of literature exists and various methodologies have been developed, but most of what is suggested has to do with 'qualitative approaches' based on participatory processes.

A number of examples of implementing RBM principles are available from within and outside of the Brazil Program. The United Way/GETS sub-project developed a multi-tiered methodology of monitoring and evaluation (see text box below). While the evaluation team hesitates to recommend such an intensive evaluation approach for all TTF fund sub-projects, a systematic approach may involve some of these elements.

DFID has recently undertaken major changes in how it monitors and evaluates projects and programs in Brazil. Highlights of these changes are summarized in the textbox below. CIDA may consider adapting some of the tools DFID has developed for its own purpose, such as the 'poverty strategy outcome matrices' that could be used as screening tools for the concept papers and proposals it receives.

A first step in developing a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework for the program, as recommended in the 1999 TTF evaluation, is to develop a Program Performance Framework, ideally with all four funds integrated into a single funding mechanism with different 'windows', depending on opportunities and needs.

#### **Voluntary Sector Development Support: An example of participatory M&E**

The United Way Canada-GETS project has been very innovative in terms of developing and implementing participatory monitoring and evaluation process. This includes the following elements:

- The elaboration of a logical framework for the project: according to participants this was insufficient to capture the richness of a participatory, dynamic process;
- A baseline study, constructed through a questionnaire sent to each organization;
- Participant assessment of each training or community activity;
- An e-mail questionnaire to assess individual and institutional learning and changes;
- Individual reports of participants sharing their personal experiences;
- Specific evaluation of the "Collaborative Model" developed in Curitiba;
- Evaluation of experience gained by translators and interpreters;
- Regular meetings and retreats of the GETS management group to assess the evolution of the project;
- Meeting of the International Advisory Committee.

Source: GETS 2003.

The evaluation team recognizes the efforts the program team is making to better publicize and communicate results achieved by the TTF and PSSR funds, using DRINK and Program Support Fund resources. A fundamental step in this process is to ensure that a systematic monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework is put in place and implemented on a continuous basis at the sub-project level. If this is done, the program's communication strategy will have much more solid information.

The sub-project M&E results will feed into the Program Performance Framework, which still needs to be developed, permitting assessment of performance at the program level. Tools being developed by CIDA's Performance Review Branch may be useful in this respect.

**Sharing M&E Experience with DFID**

The present evaluation of the TTF program has been undertaken as a collaborative process with ABC and particularly with DFID. In that context, it may be useful to analyse the approach to program and project evaluation of the latter organisation. In 2001 DFID introduced a new Project Reporting Information System for Management (PRISM), which now serves as the focus for reporting. The overall approach is to be 'participatory as far as possible'.

- **Project monitoring:** DFID require two visits per year for each project; the six-monthly monitoring visits look at annual plans based on LFAs and milestones (intermediate steps toward achieving outputs). The annual review also looks at broader issues.
- **Output & Purpose Review:** a one-off event undertaken approximately halfway through the life of the project, by a DFID team in collaboration with ABC, other key partners and consultants.
- **Tools and Approaches:** DFID has elaborated several matrixes that help assess impact and risks, project scoring including individual outputs and purposes, policy relevance and lessons learned.
- **Program level:** DFID is also developing an evaluation process for its entire program in Brazil, including its portfolio of projects but also other interventions (Funds, British Council, civil society interventions, etc).

CIDA may consider adapting some of these tools, such as the 'poverty strategy outcome matrices. The glossary of M&E terminology elaborated by DFID in both English and Portuguese, and the experience of its Brazilian partners with this M&E system, may be of help to the Canadian cooperation program in Brazil.

Information sources: DFID, 2003 and 2002b.

**5. Partnership**

Promoting partnerships is a fundamental development principle, but has received new impetus in recent years. OECD's 1996 document *Shaping the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* identified partnerships between donors and developing countries as essential for development. CIDA's *Aid Effectiveness* policy statement (2002) developed the concept of 'enhanced partnerships'.

The TTF Program in Brazil has, in its relationship with ABC and other government partners, certainly deepened the Canada-Brazil partnership. It has gone beyond that, however, to promote the formation of a large number of institutional partnerships between the two countries. These not only contribute to the larger country-to-country partnership, but also create dynamic institutional and personal relationships between the two countries.

Based on evaluation team observations and documented evidence, the success rate of these institutional partnerships appears to have been very high, despite the challenges and the risks involved, and partners interviewed expressed strong support for the program. This success has been due largely to commitment of the partners and support provided by CIDA and ABC. Of 16 TTF fund sub-projects approved, only one (Early Childhood Education), approved at an early stage in Phase I, had to be cancelled.

**5.1 Partner characteristics**

While CIDA does not select partners in the program, it does set out partner criteria. Brazilian partners must be strong institutions, able to 'mobilize resources for the project and to disseminate results. They should have the 'technical and financial capability' to make changes in the organization itself and to influence changes in the field. These criteria support the program principles of resource leverage and the promotion of change at both the institutional and policy levels. Brazilian partners can be public sector or private, non-profit organizations. Private for-profit (commercial) organizations can only participate in the TTF fund as secondary partners.

With the growing recognition of the importance of the private sector in creating some of the preconditions for development, CIDA has been encouraging ABC to review its position on this issue, something that could be discussed when a new Canada-Brazil Bilateral Agreement is negotiated.

Canadian partners must display 'a strong combination of organizational and managerial competence, technical leadership in Canada, experience in technology transfer, and the ability to bring to the proposed partnership the best that Canada has to offer'. Canadian partners can be private, commercial companies, but are encouraged to partner with an industry or professional association in Canada to provide the Brazilian partner with access to sector-wide expertise. Analysis of principal partners of the 15 completed or active TTF fund sub-projects shows the following distribution by institutional type:

<b>Principal TTF fund partners, by type of institution*</b>		
	<b>Canadian</b>	<b>Brazilian</b>
Public/parastatal	27%	60%
NGO/civil society	40%	7%
Academic	33%	33%
Private sector	0%	0%
* An analysis that included all secondary partners might show a somewhat different distribution.		



The predominance of public/parastatal partners in Brazil and the low proportion of NGO/civil society partners reflect the greater capacity of public institutions to meet partner requirements, as well as their superior access to information and capacity to prepare good funding proposals. It may also reflect the belief, on the part of ABC in particular, that public/parastatal partners are more appropriate recipients of bilateral program assistance.

The higher proportion of NGO/civil society (including professional associations) partners from Canada is an indication of their relatively greater strength in this society. Based on the questionnaire sample of Brazilian PSSR participants, NGO/civil society partners were as likely to be involved in a PSSR sub-project as a government institution (42% each), suggesting that this type of funding is reaching quite a different client group.

**Multiple partnerships.** TTF Fund Guidelines encourage the involvement of secondary partners in both Canada and Brazil. The rationale for this in Canada is to ensure Brazilian partners have access to a broad a spectrum of Canadian technology. It also has the effect of exposing a large number of Canadian partners to the Brazilian milieu. The rationale for multiple partners in Brazil is to ensure broad exposure to and dissemination of Canadian technology.

In some cases the partners represented an existing Brazilian network of related organizations (Migratory Fish Conservation, Secondary and Professional Education). CIDA, ABC or sub-project management promoted the participation of secondary partners in a number of other cases. (Northeast Groundwater Management, Mine Rehabilitation)

As many as 50 Canadian and 25 Brazilian institutions are listed as secondary partners in some individual sub-projects, but most of these partners have probably only participated in a single project event such as a conference. A much smaller group of both Canadian and Brazilian secondary partners are typically involved in direct technology transfer. Even in this latter case the sub-project coordinators, selected from the lead partner in each country, face a major challenge in coordinating activities and ensuring that secondary partners fully understand and respect partnership principles.

While, the evaluation team recognizes that in certain circumstance a greater number of partners may lead to stimulating and innovative results and a base for potential dissemination of the technology, this frequently constitutes a trade-off in terms of increased demands on sub-project management and financial resources. Broad partnerships that break the barriers of institutional isolation can also be a valuable sub-project outcome. Nevertheless, careful attention must be given to analyzing the institutional fabric of different proposals.

## 5.2 Partnership building

Cross-cultural partnership building is a process of trial and error. The program would make a contribution to development literature and to the formation of future

partnerships by documenting some of the successes, challenges and lessons learned.

**Starting the partnership.** Many of the TTF fund partners knew each other prior to the sub-project, often having met at international conferences. Some had a history of working together prior to the sub-project. Having a language in common was mentioned as a major advantage in partnership building. If partner staff share the same culture, as was the case in the Health Promotion in Action and the Santo Andre Community Based Watershed Management sub-projects, trust is more easily established and the partnership tends to grow quickly.

Even when principal and secondary partners are from the same country, if they have no tradition of working together, a long process of trial and error may be necessary, as was the case with the Voluntary Sector Development sub-project, The strong support of CIDA staff to partners who initially struggle in creating partnerships has been important to the overall success of the program.

Despite the small volume of resources and rapid initial contact, a number of the PSSR sub-projects have evolved into strong partnership relationships. The Training Guide Dogs for the Blind sub-project, which the evaluation team visited, was one of the more interesting examples. In a few cases these relationships have evolved into a TTF fund sub-project, as was the case with the Public Sector Management Training sub-project and the Distance Education sub-project.

In the case of the few DRINK sub-projects approved to date, the Brazilian partner has been previously involved in a successful sub-project and assumes the leading role in the new one. These sub-projects do not necessarily require a Canadian partner, although there is frequently some continuing contact with the original partner for technical assistance.

### Important characteristics that contribute to partnership-building

- High level of trust
- Strong personal relationships
- Complementarity of interests
- High priority given to activities
- Technical competence of partners
- Respect for each others' expertise
- Communication & information exchange
- Attention to the language issue
- Transparency; shared decision-making; equal partnership
- Flexibility and willingness to adapt to changes
- Signed agreement between partners
- Joint annual work planning; continual monitoring
- Willingness to network and disseminate results

Source: TTF evaluation questionnaires

**Equality in the partnership.** Shared decision-making and a sense of equality in the partnership are essential. This is not easy to attain if 'technology transfer' is understood as transferring knowledge from 'those who know' to 'those who don't know'. Analysis of TTF fund questionnaire answers concerning participation in sub-project planning suggests a high level of involvement of both partners.

Equality in PSSR sub-project partnerships, as measured by participation in planning, was somewhat different. One half of the Brazilian respondents felt there had been equal participation and one third felt they had planned the sub-project.

With PSSR sub-projects, partnership is frequently incipient and strong partnerships may not always emerge from the activity. Nevertheless, the evaluation team sees very positively the fact that Brazilian partners take the lead in a majority of the PSSR sub-projects, indicating strong local ownership.

**Resolving challenges.** TTF fund partnerships are faced with a number of challenges. One of the first is understanding the institutional environment in which each operates. Canadian partners may tend to make assumptions about the institutional structure, strength and autonomy of the Brazilian partner institution based on Canadian experience, which can prove unrealistic.

Excessive expectations in this respect are partly fostered by the fact that program directives indicate that the program does not fund institutional strengthening activities for the Brazilian partner, on the assumption that these are strong partners not needing this type of assistance. Lack of clear definitions of terms, such as institutional strengthening and capacity building, can create confusion. The program might consider clarifying these terms in the documentation it provides to its partners.

In the case of the Electrical Energy Efficiency sub-project, the decision was made to conduct an institutional assessment of the Brazilian partner well into the project, when the need to better understand and identify institutional challenges within the partner organization and in its relationship with others became evident to all.

This type of problem might be significantly reduced if each of the two lead partner institutions were to conduct a simplified self-assessment during the planning phase, from somewhat different perspectives perhaps, to determine what changes might be necessary to optimize sub-project implementation and to strengthen the Brazilian partner so that sub-project impact would be optimized. A suggested format for such an assessment could be included in the TTF Fund Guidelines. Resources to promote necessary changes, where needed, could be provided by the partners, built into sub-project budgets or accessed from other sources.

Money management in the TTF fund, in which the Canadian partner manages the budget and reports to CIDA on fund use, can be a source of irritation in the relationship unless a high level of trust and transparency is present. The evaluation team found few indications that

this is a problem in the program, although Brazilian discretion in this matter made the issue hard to assess. The practice of joint budgeting and decision-making within the partnership, and acceptance by the Brazilian partner that certain aspects of international cooperation must be taken as given, probably minimizes the level of friction in this area.

Other challenges facing program partners include: sudden changes of key staff (as happened in a number of cases following the recent presidential elections); conflicting work schedules of Canadian and Brazilian partners; diverging expectations; and the inability of the Brazilian institution to meet local cost commitments. Within the program these issues have generally been resolved among the partners themselves, but this has frequently led to implementation delays and the need to request more time to complete activities. With respect to both assistance in problem resolution and flexibility of the sub-project timeframe, CIDA staff received high marks from program participants interviewed by the evaluation team.

**The future of TTF partnerships.** Not enough time has elapsed since the termination of TTF fund projects to be able to comment on the durability of these partnerships. To be sure, a number of partners have applied for or have hopes of being awarded CIDA funding for a second phase sub-project. In some other cases the partners are seeking alternative funding sources, including the World Bank. In one case a trilateral project is being planned with a Bolivian partner. There is also evidence of some visits to Brazil by Canadian partner staff after project termination, using other funding sources. Where strong personal relationships have formed, it is likely that communications will continue over time.

Significant future technical exchange at the institutional level is likely to depend on the availability of funding, but with the information revolution, various forms of communication could be pursued in addition to staff exchange visits. Exploring what these avenues of communication might be could become part of the termination phase of each sub-project.

## 6. Technology Transfer

In the result chain elaborated for this evaluation, the 'technology transfer' process and the partnership approach constitute outputs. These outputs are the key program elements that promote change in Brazilian institutions (outcome), which in turn will potentially improve equity within the Brazilian society (impact).

### 6.1 Social versus technological

Within the context of this evaluation, the term technology transfer, while being the title of the main mechanism of the program, has often been used in parenthesis. Why is this? Through different sources of information (questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, literature review) it became clear to the evaluation team that the concept of technology transfer is rather outdated and that neither 'technology' nor

'transfer' properly reflect the principal characteristics of the TTF Program.

While the term 'technology' may have been appropriate for earlier phases of CIDA's technical assistance program in Brazil, and even for the first phase of the present program, it does not seem appropriate for the current phase. Thinking has evolved but the name has remained.

Early TTF sub-projects appear to have been based on the rationale that Brazil was a middle-income country about to graduate into the group of industrialized countries. Providing 'technology' would help them make that extra step. Sub-projects supported in this first generation would supposedly help the country substitute for or accelerate the import of technology, providing the country with a better and more solid base for development.

The first generation of TTF sub-projects had some elements in common with this model: watershed management, migratory fish conservation, electrical energy efficiency, mine rehabilitation, groundwater and geological survey and gas technology. Each has a distinct 'technology' component.

Progressively, the program has evolved towards initiatives that are less focused on physical technology: health promotion, capacity development of the voluntary sector, fiscal policies, secondary and technical education reforms, and public sector management. Of the 10 sub-projects approved or at an advanced stage of planning of Phase II of the TTF fund, only two have strong 'technology' elements and one of these has a significant community development dimension.

Even in the case of sub-projects with high technological components, the participants involved frequently considered that the 'social and institutional dimensions' (working with the community for environmental protection, conflict mitigation, etc.) were the predominant elements of the technology transfer. When asked in the questionnaire for the principal elements of the technology transfer that contributed to the success of the project, few (Canadians or Brazilians) mentioned 'technological' aspects.

#### Key elements in technology transfer

- Interactive/participatory learning
- Integrated institutional approach
- Identification of needs by Brazilians
- Multidisciplinary training/training of trainers
- Appropriateness of the technology
- Linking academic, public and private sector
- Conflict resolution
- Adaptability of technology
- Communications with decision-makers
- Evaluation-based approaches
- Marketing skills

Source: TTF Questionnaires

It is reasonable to conclude, then, that the term 'technology' is not the most appropriate for the present program.

## 6.2 Transfers or Exchanges

The term 'transfer' suggests that in the relationship between Canadian and Brazilian institutions, the former delivers the technology and the latter receives it. Unlike the active/passive relationship that this suggests, the evaluation team observed strong and equal partnerships, based on trust and joint decision-making. Terms such as 'exchange', 'cooperation' or simply 'partnership' seem to correspond better to what actually takes place in the program. 'Institutional collaboration' also expresses an essential dimension of this process.

#### The "collaborative model": A Canadian approach to development?

One key element in TTF sub-projects that was identified by a number of Brazilian respondents was the Canadian approach to working collaboratively across different types of organizations: federal, provincial, municipal, private, non-governmental and community level.

This approach was readily evident in sub-projects such as Mine Rehabilitation (working with the coal industry and communities in Santa Catarina), Health Promotion in action (work in the favelas of Rio), both Watershed Management sub-projects, Voluntary Sector Development (especially activities in Curitiba), among others.

Developing the practice of working inter-institutionally appears to be an important innovation that the Brazilian organizations have 'discovered' while working with Canadian partners. Solving problems and addressing issues in cooperation with non-traditional partners seems to be a very positive contribution to the Brazilian institutional and social fabric.

The evaluation scope and timeframe did not permit assessing individual sub-projects to determine the value of the technology transfer that has taken place, but there are indications that it is substantial. The fact that the Brazilian partner participates actively in selecting the technology is a strong indicator that it meets a need. A further indicator of value is the willingness of partner institutions to contribute to project implementation, in a number of cases with several times the volume of CIDA funding. One concern of the evaluation team relates to whether or not the technology being transferred already exists in Brazil. Most answers to this question indicate one of the following situations: the technology did not exist; its introduction and use in Brazil was incipient at the time the sub-project started; or, if available in Brazil, it was not readily available in the form offered by the Canadian partner.

### 6.3 Symmetry or Similarity

The evaluation team analyzed the degree of similarity or difference between partners to assess how this could influence the relationship. Of the twelve sub-projects visited by the evaluation team and for which an analysis was relevant, five represented partnerships between similar organizations and seven between partners of a different organization structure. Categories of organizations include: federal ministries, state government agencies, private groups, non-governmental organizations, etc.

The team wanted to know whether a relationship between dissimilar organizations would be less successful or less sustainable. No clear evidence was found to support this thesis. Lack of symmetry in the relationship (i.e. a private group from Canada partnering with a state agency in Brazil) did not imply greater difficulty in the relationship. However, there was some indication that partnerships between similar organizations have a better chance of establishing a long-term sustainable relationship.

Seven of the twelve partnerships analyzed were between individual partners while five involved multiple partners. Information provided to the evaluation team indicated that management and coordination of multiple partner sub-projects required more time and resources. This was particularly evident for the Voluntary Sector Support and the Secondary and Technical Education Reform sub-projects.

A number of factors were mentioned as key to fostering good relations between partners:

- Similarity of interest
- Recognized competency
- Support from key policymakers and senior management
- Flexibility in the implementation
- Shared decision-making and sense of respect
- Transparency

Factors mentioned as creating challenges in the relationship included:

- Lack of resources for local costs
- Turnover of key personnel
- Limited language ability and costs of translation

Although sub-projects can experience periodic difficulties and delays, there are strong indications that, on average, positive factors in the relationship outweigh the challenges for partners in the program.

The exchange of ideas, teaching methods and participatory models has become the norm in the TTF Program. In that context we recommend that the Canadian cooperation program in Brazil consider the following:

CIDA should consider changing the term 'technology transfer' to adjust it to the new reality of the program; various options have emerged as a result of the discussion on the issue during the course of the evaluation. Suggestions for a name change include:

Knowledge & Experience Exchange Partnership (KEEP) Program; Canada-Brazil Knowledge Sharing Program; Canada-Brazil Knowledge for Equity.

### 7. Program outcome: the institutional dimensions

The results chain and framework developed for the evaluation work plan identifies institutional dimensions as the main program outcome. This is the level at which the program has chosen to operate in the belief that by assisting Brazilian institutions to adopt and adapt new knowledge, they will be better equipped to address the equity issue, thus helping to achieve program impact. While this is not the only approach that could have been chosen, it is judged by the evaluation team to be fully valid for the Brazilian situation. To attain program impact, however, Brazilian partners must move beyond capacity development to addressing equity issues at a new level of effectiveness.

The term 'institutional dimensions' may raise some questions and preoccupations, but it has been chosen purposefully. The design of the TTF Program, partly based on the fact that Brazil is a middle-income country, led to the assumption that the program would be working with 'strong' Brazilian institutions, able to absorb Canadian technology, adapt it to the local situation, and replicate and disseminate it at regional or national levels. In that context, the Brazilian partners had to be the 'champions' of their area of activities.

Given that conceptual framework, Canadian cooperation would only pay for the participation of Canadian institutions and individuals involved in the 'technology transfer' process while Brazilian institutions would assume their own costs. The Canadian institution was tasked with providing the one element – 'technology' -- that would eventually lead to development.

Within this model it can be assumed, in most cases at least, that there is no need to strengthen the Brazilian partner organization. This is why the term 'institutional strengthening' is not used within the context of the program. It is also the reason the term 'institutional dimensions' is used to analyze program outcome.

It is the evaluation team's opinion that the reluctance to include the concept of 'institutional strengthening' in the program may have to be reconsidered. But first let us see what we are talking about. What types of organizations are involved, at what level? What kind of activities are they undertaking? Will these be sustainable?

Assessing the institutional dimensions of the program is a complex process implying triangulation of information coming from different sources. In this case, the evaluators have relied on questionnaire respondents, individual and group interviews, focus groups and document analysis. Given this, the evaluation team considers that the information base is highly diversified and reliable. However, the monitoring and evaluation of this component of the program could and should be strengthened. When

presenting a proposal, the proponents should provide a profile of the institutions involved, indicate how the project will eventually increase the capacity of such institutions to address the equity issue in Brazil and how this capacity enhancement will be measured.

### 7.1 What type of organizations?

A review of the twelve sub-projects that the evaluation team selected for focused analysis, which included both TTF fund and PSSR sub-projects, shows that in only three cases, both were lead partner public institution organizations. In two cases they were non-governmental organizations and in seven cases, two different types of organizations were involved.

Quite diversified forms of partnership arrangements are observed: in the case of the Technical and Secondary Education sub-project, a Canadian non-governmental organization is working with the Federal Ministry of Education; in the Northeast Groundwater sub-project, a mix of government, non-governmental and academic institutions constitute the Brazilian partnership; in the Human Resources Development (S.P.) sub-project, a private Canadian group is working with a state government institution; in the Santo André Community Based Watershed Management sub-project, a Canadian academic institution is working with municipal government.

In terms of the level or scope of their work, seven sub-projects have interventions at the federal level, eight at the state level, eight at the municipal level and three at the community level. The large number of interventions indicates that many sub-projects are intervening at various levels. SEMTEC is a federal ministry supporting technical colleges at the state level, which in turn are active, to some degree, at the community level. CETEM is a federal research centre doing some work through the sub-project at the municipal and community levels, as does FIOCRUZ.

Within that context the following question was asked in the course of the evaluation: should the program focus on a particular level? Is there an approach or mix of interventions that would be more successful or promising? DFID, for instance, has chosen to focus considerable effort at the municipal level, the argument being that in a country the size of Brazil it is necessary to choose a level of organization that can make a difference in people's lives.

The evaluation team concluded that it was unable to make a clear recommendation for the program on this issue, since success stories can be found in the various institutional arrangements. However, based on findings concerning the issue of 'technology transfer' and the 'Canadian collaborative model,' it seems that bridging different types of institutions (governmental, non-governmental and private) through partnerships is a characteristic that the Brazil program should keep. The question of whether or not there should be a common 'entry point' at the federal, state or municipal levels remains open.

This question could be discussed with ABC, which has apparently had some concern regarding Canadian bilateral cooperation working directly with non-governmental organizations (e.g. the Voluntary Sector Development sub-project). At issue for CIDA is the value-added that the bilateral program can bring to programming at this level. While CIDA's Partnership Branch does intervene more directly with non-governmental organizations, and with the private sector through its Industrial Cooperation Program, the team has too little information on the role and activities of Partnership Branch in Brazil to answer that question.

### 7.2 What level of interventions?

One other question the evaluation team was asked to consider has to do with the level of the interventions. Given the limitation of resources and the scope of the country, does it make sense to intervene at the community level? Would Canadian cooperation not have a broader impact by intervening at the policy level? Or should we concentrate interventions on strengthening the capacity of the partner institutions? It is helpful to distinguish between three levels in this discussion, based on a framework developed some years ago. (Beaulieu: The Institutional Contribution to Sustainable Development)

- **Macro level:** interventions at the policy level which could have a national or regional (state level) scope;
- **Meso level:** interventions aimed at strengthening key institutions;
- **Micro level:** interventions at the community level that can have a direct impact on the living conditions of the poor.

Experience suggests that all three levels are necessary to ensure a sustainable development process. However, the level of effort may vary in various circumstances.

**Macro policy level.** DFID has made the choice of trying to have a policy influence that can contribute to poverty reduction in Brazil. Should Canada do the same? When squarely asking the question in the context of a focus group, the response was clear: "Given the highly volatile political environment in Brazil and considering the forces and interests at stake, it may be presumptuous and risky to consider having an influence at the policy level." In that context, policy changes can hardly be considered, planned or implemented.

However, "if an appropriate mix of partners existed and if these got mutually involved in a process of reform in an area where there are a number of favourable conditions, policy changes may well happen and could have a significant impact."

One of the issues arising when considering interventions at the policy level is whether the new policy will be implemented. A number of articles were published and speeches delivered by the new government during the time of the mission concerning 'the law on paper' (*lei de papel*) which had been approved by various levels of governments but were never implemented. A policy or law does not, in and of itself, have the capacity to transform or

improve the lives of people unless other conditions are met. These have to do with institutional capacity, and technical and financial resources to move from policy to implementation.

**Meso institutional level.** When asked “At the beginning of the project did your Brazilian partners require institutional strengthening”, Canadian TTF fund partner questionnaire replies were split 50/50, while the responses were 80% negative in the case of the PSSR projects.

This question was not asked to the Brazilian respondents. However, when asked if they needed support to address constraints arising in the course of the project, the response was 90% positive. Furthermore, 70% of Brazilian partners reported that solutions to these problems were adequate and immediate. Brazilian partners were also asked if they would have been in a position to pursue the project if they had been required to cover more of the costs: 80% indicated they would have been unable to do so.

When asked if the project had the potential to bring about major institutional changes, 80% of Canadian TTF fund partners and 60% of PSSR partners responded positively. Brazilian partners responded positively in the same proportions. When asked if in fact their sub-project had already resulted in institutional changes, a great majority of both TTF and PSSR partners responded positively.

The evaluation team concluded that institutional support and strengthening should be available on an as-needed basis, with clear criteria for deciding on each case. Not all partners will need it and others may be able to source alternative funding, but a sub-set of partners will need program support. How the requirements and regulations of the program will need to be modified to address that issue, and whether this implies renegotiation of the Technical Cooperation Agreement with ABC remains to be determined, but the evaluation team is of the opinion that this is the direction that Canadian cooperation in Brazil should take.

**Micro or community level.** Some sub-projects were designed to intervene at the local level to provide a service to the community. The PSSR Guide Dogs for the Blind sub-project established a new service of training guide dogs for individuals. The social component of the TTF fund sub-project Northeast Groundwater provided direct training and sensitization to local communities on water-related issues. The Community-based Watershed Management sub-project in Santo André and the Human Resources Development sub-project in Sao Paulo provided training and employment facilities to direct beneficiaries.

In most other cases, the community intervention consisted of a focused pilot model that was designed for replication. This is the case of the Curitiba collaborative model interventions through the Voluntary Sector Capacity Development sub-project, the five community groups in Manguinhos supported by the Health Promotion in Action sub-project, and the interventions in Santa Catarina by the Mine Rehabilitation sub-project.

Both approaches seem to have some value. However, the real issue is whether the Brazilian institutions have the capacity to replicate and disseminate the experience on a sustainable basis, and attain some ‘critical mass’ in terms of impact. This issue will be addressed in the following chapters.

**A strategic approach to optimizing program outcome.** Up to now, the program has emphasized responsiveness, accepting proposals from various sources on a great variety of topics. This has created a certain dispersion of activities and resources.

The responsive dimension of the program is, however, a positive quality that should be maintained. In suggesting that the program become more strategic, we are not recommending that the program team start designing projects. However, a more strategic approach can be developed that creates a balance between responsiveness on the one hand and total direction on the other. This approach permits focus on areas of high potential impact from an equity perspective, considering Brazilian development opportunities and Canadian resources and experience.

The triple M approach (macro-meso-micro) is a useful tool to help understand the dynamics of the program and to determine where the major emphasis should be put.

The conceptual framework of the program was elaborated to highlight the importance of the ‘institutional dimension’. Partner institutions were selected with capacity to both influence policy and deliver improved services for the communities. This is probably the most important challenge that development agencies are facing. Working on an enabling policy environment will help make the interventions more sustainable, but strong institutions and policies that do not translate into improved opportunities for the poor will be meaningless. Within the macro-meso-micro context, the most appropriate entry point for the Program appears to be the **meso** (institutional) level. Selecting key institutions able to influence the policy level and to deliver, directly or indirectly, improved services to the poor becomes crucial.

## 8. Program impact

The overall objective of the Brazil Program is to promote greater equity. In terms of the results chain developed by the evaluators, this suggests that the impact of the program should be measured in relation to improvement of the socio-economic conditions and participation of those Brazilians suffering some form of inequity.

### 8.1 Equity in the Americas

The issue of addressing inequity or improving equity or equality has been a long-standing objective of many international organizations in the Americas. CIDA’s Americas Branch adopted this as a goal in the mid 1990s, while the Brazil Program made it its overall objective at the end of the decade.

Despite the consensus, there are still a number of aspects that require discussion and clarification, including the scope of the concept, and its definition, formulation and application. It is hoped that the following comments, within the context of the present evaluation, will provide the program with some guidance.

Within the Latin American context, Brazil rates poorly: using the GINI coefficient, Brazil has the highest level of inequality in terms of income distribution in the continent. Regardless of the indicator used -- urban vs. rural income concentration, the income gap, level of education between rich and poor families, social security systems, etc., Brazil is at the top, or at least among the top three in the Americas (sometime sharing this dubious honour with Paraguay or Guatemala) in terms of inequity.

Since the election of Luiz Ignacio "Lula" da Silva as President of Brazil in 2002, the issue of equity has been placed at the top of the political and development agenda. Coming from a poor family in the Northeast and with a long history of defending workers rights, the President looks at the world and the situation in Brazil in terms of those that have and those that do not.

## 8.2 Equity at CIDA & within the Brazil Program

When Canada adopted its new foreign policy "Canada in the World" in 1995, the objective set for Canadian international assistance was to "support sustainable development in developing countries in order to reduce poverty, and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world". This placed the concept of equity at the centre of CIDA's mandate, but unfortunately the policy statement did not propose a definition of the concept nor a specific strategy to address it.

The 1997 policy framework for the Americas (CIDA 1997) put equity at the forefront of the agenda by stating: "Thus the great challenge for the Americas is to create greater social equity while pursuing structural reform and economic growth". The 2001 CIDA document "*Closing the Gap: A Strategy for CIDA in the Americas*" stated that "CIDA's overarching goal in the region will continue to be to reduce poverty and improve equity". This document does not provide a definition of either poverty or equity, but suggests that "inequality is evident in the gap between the rich and poor, men and women, indigenous or, African and Europeans, between rural and urban, young and old, and between sub-regions".

The document does suggest a number of strategies to address these issues such as: extending the benefits of growth, reducing instability and vulnerability, and strengthening human resources and institutions.

The overall objective of the Canada-Brazil cooperation program since 1999 is to "promote greater equity in Brazil".

At the first Canada-Brazil Lessons Learned Symposium (Guarujá, May 2000), equity was one of the major issues discussed. Jane Touzel made a presentation, which

provided a definition of equity: "The measure of relative ownership, access to wealth, opportunity and participation within society". She explained that equity could be measured by comparing the situation of different groups within society. Access to services such as health, education, water, transportation, credit, technology and training are important in determining the level of equity in a society.

Despite an apparently high level of consensus on the equity issue, the evaluation team sensed a certain level of discomfort in relation to the issue, its definition and its application. During one focus group meeting, the team was asked what was meant by equity. One respondent to the questionnaire wrote: "I do not really know what CIDA means by equity. Is this about equal access to resources for men and women, rich and poor? Or is it about equity between Canadian and Brazilian institutions?"

### Equity: Different concepts, different realities

A number of different concepts are used in relation to equity, representing very different realities.

- **Equity/Inequity:** Fairness in terms of wealth, race, gender and regions. Inequity is a situation of discrimination or the absence of equity. This concept of inequity is broader than the concept of poverty.
- **Inequality:** A concept more related to the formal and legal status of persons; women have argued that they should be treated as equal and that their rights should be respected.
- **Citizenship:** (*cidadania*) relates to the socio-political dimensions of equity, to participation in society and public life. The millions of people in Brazil without documents are considered deprived of their basic rights as citizens.
- **Poverty:** relates to the situation of persons with inadequate resources to permit them to fulfill their basic needs; there are various ways of measuring poverty based on income, access to basic social services or a basket of consumption products; the international community has adopted US\$2.00/day as the indicator to measure poverty, which in April 2003 represented three times the minimum salary in Brazil.
- **Extreme poverty:** refers to the most disadvantaged in society, often without home, land, access to basic social services or sustainable income; found mostly in rural areas, in large metropolitan *favelas* but also as homeless in downtown areas. The international community has adopted the US\$1.00/day indicator to measure extreme poverty.

Of the twelve sub-projects that were subject to more thorough review, including field visits, interviews, focus groups and document analysis, three were considered by the evaluation team as having a strong relation to gender equity, four to some degree and five (42%) not directly related. Of the same group of projects, five were considered to be strongly related to socio-economic equity of the poor, five were somewhat related and two were not directly related to the issue. One factor to keep in mind is

that in the first phase of TTF fund sub-projects, equity was not a specific objective of the fund.

**Partners' comments on equity**

- The issue of equity needs to be part of the planning stage, not an afterthought.
- In some cases, avoiding inequitable treatment may help improve gender and class inequity.
- Brazilian partners are ahead of Canada in terms of gender issues.
- I do not know enough about gender equity in Brazil to answer the question.
- The impact on equity is likely to be small considering the project scope, size and duration.
- I don't think that adding a gender equity component to a technological project would help the issue.

Some of the issues mentioned in the questionnaire and focus group meetings concerning the issue of equity that need to be addressed are:

- The need to clarify what equity means
- The time needed to reach any impact
- The need to change thinking and culture
- The need to clarify the issue of attribution given the limited scope of the projects
- The need to focus in some area, sector or region to expect a noticeable impact

**8.3 Program impact on equity**

When asked to provide examples on how their sub-project addresses the issue of equity, responses were mixed but mainly focused on two different types of activities:

**Community activities (micro level):** assistance to small-scale fishermen; working with community groups; helping the poor; improving women's participation; community participation in health centres; expanding jobs for the physically handicapped; improving water quality of poor communities; helping the poor to become co-responsible for their development; and employment-generating activities.

**Institutional activities (meso level):** dissemination of knowledge in academic institutions; strengthening the capacity of public institutions; strengthening of local organizations; reducing discriminatory policies; reducing impunity; promotion of human rights.

The two levels are interrelated. It is necessary to transform organizations so that they can provide target groups with support at the socio-economic level. If one happens without the other, there is a risk that the activity will not be sustainable. If the institution is transformed, adopts a new method but is unable to apply or replicate it, there is no local impact. If an organization promotes development activities in a few communities without the institutional capacity to sustain and replicate it, futility may be the result.

**The case of support for voluntary sector development**

In 1997 United Way Canada initiated a project aimed at strengthening the capacity of Brazilian non-governmental organizations. Seven organisations and networks were part of the GETS network of this initiative.

The project included various components such as: management of the voluntary sector, fund-raising, training of trainers, and development of a collaborative model. The various components of the program may have an impact on equity given the fact that most of the NGOs involved are working with disadvantaged groups.

For example:

a. Strengthening the Fala Preta group may help to improve the status of black women that are the specific clientele of the organization. Helping them improve their capacity to fund-raise, or training their management or technical staff would certainly help them better help the poor;

b. Developing a collaborative model at the community level in Curitiba is probably the most direct impact initiative that the project has developed to improve the socio-economic situation of the poor in a peripheral municipal environment. Close to five hundred persons belonging to more than 100 organizations participated to the various activities of this initiative.

Despite the positive and concrete examples of results mentioned, one must ask if these results will be sustainable. Is there institutional capacity in one or other partner organization to continue providing leadership in the type of work initiated by United Way? A large number of persons were trained and excellent publications produced. But will these people have the support to continue their work and extend it? This example demonstrates the strong link between strengthening local institutions and the impact they can have at the community level.

Among the issues that need to be addressed is the capacity of the program to generate a sustainable approach to address equity and to assess progress in achieving that goal.

Measuring the impact. The issue of monitoring and evaluation was discussed in Chapter 4. Here we would like to stress the implications of monitoring and evaluation within an equity perspective. Most sub-project reports reviewed by the evaluators provided a good description of activities, but little measurement of changes that have taken place at the community or institutional level. What kind of methodology can be put in place to achieve this? How can we measure the impact of small sub-projects executed in a short period of time, as is typical of most PSSR sub-projects?



If the institutions supported by the program are not in a position to report on results, it may require an act of faith to believe that replication and impact will eventually take place.

The capacity of the program to have an impact on the equity issue in Brazil is a complex one. One needs to address various issues such as the nature of the program, its evolution, the monitoring and evaluation methods, and finally the presence of a critical mass necessary for impact to take place.

The first generation of TTF fund sub-projects were not developed to address equity, but rather 'a development problem' that the country was facing at the time. The scope and relative dispersion of program activities (different sectors and geographic regions), due to the responsive nature of the program, also dilute the program's impact.

**Impact at the program level:** A program evaluation, such as the present one, is based on information that is readily available, gathered through interviews of key informants (individually or in groups), document review (monitoring and end of project reports and evaluations), questionnaires, and brief sites visits.

A program evaluation cannot undertake the type of intensive field visits and surveys necessary to estimate impact. Sub-project evaluations, which could have served to estimate program impact, were also not available. Since Phase I of the TTF fund did not address the equity issue, most relevant projects, from an impact measurement perspective, are either still active or have been terminated too recently to generate significant impact. Thus it was not possible to document and assess how the program has impacted on or changed the lives of direct beneficiaries in the different areas of intervention.

**A critical mass.** However, it is the opinion of the evaluators that even if this information was available, the equity impact of the program would be rather limited, given the dispersion of the different initiatives. This dispersion does not permit the formation of a critical mass of new knowledge, livelihood opportunities or services for the poor to trigger significant impact.

Brazil is an immense country - a sub-continent – comprised of a developed country in the south, a developing country in the centre, and an under-developed country in the north and northeast. For the program to have an impact on any important aspect of equity in such a large country requires an explicit geographic strategy, mobilization of a critical mass of capable institutional partners, human and financial resources and activities around a limited number of strategic issues, and monitoring and evaluating progress carefully.

There is no doubt that the focus and priority given to the issue of equity within the Brazil program are in line with CIDA's priorities and the current Brazilian development agenda. With the focus of the new administration in Brazil on reducing inequity, the coincidence of Canada-Brazil

objectives is substantial. This may constitute a 'golden opportunity' for CIDA to refine its strategy and approach.

The evaluation has shown that there is strong support for the Canada-Brazil cooperation program to address various dimensions of equity, in a country where the issue is gigantic in scope. This is the real challenge: how can Canada make a difference, while being and remaining a small player? How is it possible to become strategic in a responsive mode? How is it possible to do more and have a greater impact? How is it possible to contribute to closing the gap? Without attempting to be exhaustive, the evaluation team suggests the following:

**Clarifying the concept and objectives of equity.** The various program policy documents, fund LFAs and guidelines have been developed at different stages of program development, representing different interpretations of the context and suggesting different approaches. CIDA and ABC staff, Canadian and Brazilian partners, all have somewhat different interpretations. Adopting a common definition of equity for all funds and their guidelines is a step in the right direction, but it may not be sufficient.

**Sharing a common understanding.** Even the best definition may be interpreted in various ways. This can be positive, but divergent interpretations may lead the program in directions that are too far apart. There is a need to share views and come to a common understanding. CIDA and ABC, in collaboration with Canadian and Brazilian partners, may wish to organize opportunities, such as seminars, roundtables and so on, to develop a common language and adapt the concept to the Brazilian reality.

**Developing tools.** CIDA and ABC may want to develop tools for the program to help define, apply and assess the concept. A grid of one or two pages could help CIDA and ABC officers in screening proposals, within which the equity issue would be clearly highlighted. This grid could be included in the fund guidelines as an annex.

**Planning for impact at the program level.** Given the current nature of the program, it may not be appropriate to attempt to measure impact on equity in Brazil. Sub-projects and initiatives are scattered in different sectors and regions, offering little potential for cumulative effects. To make a difference in Brazil, strategic planning at the program level will be necessary, identifying areas of high potential impact where Canada can make a difference, building on successes and actively seeking synergies between sub-projects. Unless the program pursues the equity objective in a focused manner, it runs the risk of remaining insignificant relative to the magnitude of the issues at stake.

**Measuring the results.** Impact will be easier to measure at the sub-project than at the fund or program level. Aggregating sub-project impact evidence and assessing the impact of program-level activities such as policy influence will remain a challenge. At all levels, however, performance frameworks must be put in place and some form of baseline information collected. Monitoring and

evaluation at all levels must become more systematic, without becoming onerous. Addressing a crosscutting equity issue such as gender is certainly important, but the challenge here, as in other areas, is to make a measurable difference.

The following chapter will analyse how replication and long-term sustainability of interventions are a necessary condition for improving the impact of the program on equity in Brazil.

## 9. Sustainability

The sustainability of positive change is a goal of most development endeavours. Yet it is not only hard to define and measure, it is even harder to predict, since it depends on a broad set of factors, not all of which are under the control of development agents.

For the purposes of the present discussion, sustainability is understood to be the persistence and spontaneous expansion of positive change over time and space. Persistence requires the full integration or naturalization of these changes within institutional structures. The concept of spontaneous expansion should not be interpreted as suggesting that change is effortless, but rather as an indication that it makes sense, that it is 'profitable' within the given socio-economic setting.

### 9.1 Program-level sustainability

For the program to persist over time it must be seen by both CIDA and ABC decision-makers as appropriate and relevant to the Canada-Brazil bilateral relationship and to development issues in the country. It must also be consistent with Canada's overall interests in Brazil and supportive of Canada's other initiatives there. Evidence from interviews and other sources suggests that the program is successfully achieving these preconditions for sustainability.

The TTF fund is the centrepiece of the cooperation program, receiving strong support from both CIDA and ABC. The PSSR fund is more vulnerable from a political sustainability point of view, addressing as it does a broad range of individual and institutional initiatives based on CIDA's assessment of need but without full commitment by ABC. The DRINK fund was designed as a pilot initiative to ensure greater dissemination and replication of program results, but may be transformed into a more permanent form over time. Wider dissemination of sub-project success stories, as is now planned through the PSF, can be an effective means of developing greater support and sustainability at the program level.

### 9.2 Sub-project level sustainability

When TTF fund partners were asked in the questionnaire how confident they felt that the results of their sub-projects would be sustainable over time, a large majority answered in the affirmative. The level of confidence and the general agreement between partners, confirmed in focus group

meetings and interviews, is seen as a very positive indicator.

**Sustainability of the partnership.** Within the program, the dissolution of partnerships during project implementation has been very rare and the great majority of partners see their relationship as productive and important. The continuation of the partnership after sub-project completion could be seen as a desirable outcome from the perspective of sustainability. Within the TTF fund, project termination has been recent, for the most part, and is sometimes followed by new CIDA funding. A few PSSR sub-projects have also evolved into TTF sub-projects, but a significant number have now been terminated for several years.

Contacts between partners of terminated sub-projects			
Partners	Frequency of contact		
	Monthly	2 times/ yearly	Rare / none
Cdn. TTF	83%	0	17%
Brz. TTF	83%	17%	0
Cdn. PSSR	14%	57%	29%
Brz. PSSR	28%	28%	44%

Since a number of the sub-projects with positive responses regarding contacts have received or are hoping to receive further CIDA funding, it will be necessary to monitor the level of contact of other partners over time to determine the degree of partnership sustainability and the conditions that promote this.

**Sustainability of technology.** Nearly all of the technology offered through the program is adapted and modified by the partners, in some cases substantially, before it can be integrated into the Brazilian institution. Thus the technology quickly loses its 'nationality' and is combined with other knowledge in new modalities. This greatly complicates tracking sustainability over time.

There are strong indications that Brazilian partners do integrate and use the technology, principally because they have sought it out, which in itself is an important precondition for sustainability. What the program is not documenting to date -- and an area that the evaluation team did not have conditions to pursue -- is the spontaneous reach of this modified technology. This would be a powerful indicator of viability and sustainability that should be measurable, for some sub-projects at least.

**Sustainability of institutional change.** Much of the technology transferred under the program is focused on capacity building at the institutional level. This frequently requires structural and cultural changes within the partner institution to ensure integration of the technology or the development of new linkages with other institutions to promote spread of the technology.

In the Mine Rehabilitation sub-project, for example, a multi-stakeholder project management committee was formed in its Santa Catarina operations. A new unit was organized in FIOCRUZ through the Health Promotion in Action Program. Networks of Brazilian partners were created through a number of sub-projects, but there is insufficient evidence to date to determine whether or not these linkages will persist over time. In the case of the Voluntary Sector Capacity Development sub-project, individual members of the original network are disseminating project results, a number using DRINK funding, but linkages within the network are not central to this activity.

There are strong indications that many of the results generated by the program will be sustainable, frequently in a form that evolves over time, although this would have to be confirmed by documentation that tracks this phenomenon. Sustainability at the program level will require involvement and commitment by ABC in all program components, as well as development of a strategy to measure and disseminate results.

## 10. Conclusions and recommendations

### 10.1 Conclusions

Following the logic of the evaluation matrix, the conclusions of the evaluation can be summarized as follows:

**Appropriateness of design.** The equity focus of CIDA's TTF Program in Brazil coincides with the present government's concern with 'untying the knots' that keep poor people poor in Brazilian society. The program is flexible and responsive, providing Brazilian institutions with the opportunity to assume initiative and leadership, while simultaneously forging strong partnerships with Canadian institutions. The program has evolved over time, demonstrating creativity in the face of challenges. On the other hand, this has resulted in less than ideal integration between funds, in limited synergy between sub-projects and only partial cooperation with ABC in program decision-making.

It is important to point out that this program is not designed to provide major financial resources directly to Brazilian institutions or groups to implement equity initiatives, nor is it designed to address equity issue of populations that are not represented by relatively strong institutions.

**Program management.** As presently structured, the TTF Program is demanding and labour-intensive to manage. Management of the funds has been successful, due to committed and hard-working CIDA staff, support from ABC in TTF fund management and enthusiastic partner cooperation at the sub-project level.

Given the limited volume of both human and financial resources available in the CIDA program, a more strategic management approach may be warranted. Opportunities exist to create more focus and integration in program

activities, while maintaining the responsive nature of the program. One approach could be to identify high priority, emerging development issues or opportunities, plan a strategy (together with leading institutions in these areas) for promoting needed changes and focus program resources on these areas. Northeast Brazil is under-represented in the program, due to a number of factors including limited marketing of the program in that region and the difficulty of institutions there to meet local cost requirements.

**Partnership building.** Strong Canada-Brazil partnerships have been created through the program, despite societal and institutional cultural differences. Equality between the partners has been achieved to a great extent. Strong TTF fund partnerships have facilitated technology exchange in the program and a few PSSR sub-projects have resulted in partnerships strong enough to qualify for TTF funding. Creating additional opportunities for ABC to participate in program management will strengthen the CIDA/ABC partnership.

**Program results.** Principal program **outputs** are seen to be the transfer of technology and the formation or strengthening of institutional partnerships. Both have taken place successfully within the program, although the dispersed nature of technological change makes aggregated measurement difficult. The program has moved past the one-way exchange of technology to a situation of mutual knowledge exchange, suggesting that a name change is in order.

The primary program **outcome** is pro-equity institutional change, an expanded vision of how inequity and poverty can be addressed by the institution through policy input and improved service delivery. Various partners demonstrated an awakened understanding of what this means in their institution. Working on an improved policy environment (for which partners need additional mentoring) will help make the interventions more sustainable, but strong institutions and policies that do not translate into improved opportunities for the poor are meaningless.

**Program impact.** The program goal of promoting greater equity is consistent with world development trends and with the key policy of Brazil's new government. For a program that functions primarily at the institutional (meso) level rather than the local community (micro) level, measuring impact in terms of equity presents a number of challenges. Perhaps the simplest and most encouraging indicator that the program is creating impact is the strong belief, expressed by a majority of partners, that their project is making a difference. More systematic measurement of change at the sub-project level, by applying RBM principles to monitoring and evaluation and devising methods to incorporate unexpected outcomes, will be necessary to confirm these findings.

**Sustainability.** There are strong indications that many of the results generated by the program will be sustainable at the level of the partner institution, although the introduced 'technology' is generally adapted and modified to the point where it quickly loses its 'nationality'. This, itself, is an

indicator of sustainability. The degree of autonomous spread of this technology, a powerful indicator of the appropriateness and probable sustainability over time, is more difficult to measure.

## 10.2 Recommendations

Various recommendations have been formulated in the report. The areas which the evaluation team considers have high priority for consideration by CIDA and ABC are given below:

**Recommendation 1: CIDA is encouraged to replenish funding for the TTF Program in Brazil, providing steps are taken to more clearly focus activities on the goal of reducing inequity.**

Given the strong convergence between CIDA's bilateral goal of improving equity in Brazil and the desire by that country's new administration to seriously address deep poverty, as expressed in programs such as *Fome Zero*, CIDA should explore all opportunities to strengthen Canada-Brazil cooperation, including reorienting the TTF program and/or considering other potential cooperation mechanisms.

**Recommendation 2. It is recommended that program staff review the process of development theme selection, in order to reflect recent changes in CIDA policy and incorporate a greater degree of local program ownership.**

Given the mature technical assistance relationship that exists between Canada and Brazil, the development focus of the program would ideally be guided by greater input from the Brazilian government and civil society.

**Recommendation 3. Canada is encouraged to begin negotiations on a new Cooperation Agreement with Brazil in the near future.**

The present agreement no longer adequately reflects the Brazilian government's new focus on inequity, nor the Millennium Goals for reducing poverty and inequality to which CIDA and global development partners are committed.

**Recommendation 4. More integration between the various component funds of the Program is desirable. Consideration should be given to creating a single, flexible fund.**

At the present time, the PSSR fund has limited interface with the other funds, management of the multiple mechanisms is complex and participation by ABC is limited to the TTF fund. Integration of funds will contribute to strengthening the concept of 'program' for CIDA's activities in Brazil and permit more effective participation by ABC. An integrated funding mechanism will also be easier to negotiate within a new bilateral agreement.

**Recommendation 5. A more strategic approach in program management would permit creating a sharper**

**focus for the program while at the same time retaining its responsiveness.**

Given the size of Brazil and the limited financial resources of the program, it is necessary to more clearly focus resources on strategic development issues in Brazil, actively promoting synergy between sub-projects and with other development initiatives. This will not only strengthen the program approach, but also create greater likelihood of measurable impact.

**Recommendation 6. As recommended in the 1999 evaluation of the Southern Cone TTF program, the evaluation team encourages CIDA to design and implement a monitoring and evaluation strategy for the program.**

This strategy will include the development of a Program Performance Framework. Expanding the use of RBM principles in sub-project development from planning to monitoring and evaluation will also be an essential part of this strategy. Assisting partners to more fully understand and utilize RBM principles throughout the project cycle can be seen as an important part of technology transfer.

**Recommendation 7. The program is encouraged to act more decisively in following existing program directions to expand activities in Northeast Brazil.**

The program may need to develop a specific geographic strategy, based on inequality mapping and identification of development opportunities for that region. A marketing effort to promote the program in the Northeast, combined with the formulation of a clear CIDA policy on providing support for local costs, will likely be necessary.

**Recommendation 8. The program is encouraged to continue efforts to build a corporate approach to cooperation assistance in Brazil, creating information and programming bridges between the various channels of Canadian assistance.**

Success in this area will provide useful lessons for other country programs within CIDA. Strengthening coordination with other bilateral and multilateral partners in Brazil, as well as with ABC, will further increase the profile and the impact of the program.

## 11. Lessons from the program

This chapter contains a number of lessons, drawn from the evaluation process, which may contribute to strengthening CIDA funding mechanisms, projects and programs. CIDA's Performance Review Branch is currently undertaking a broad corporate evaluation process in order to draw lessons from such projects and programs. The evaluation team considers that the experience of the Brazil program can be highly valuable in such a context. The lessons are presented within the same structure as CIDA's recent policy statement on the principles of development effectiveness (CIDA 2002).

### Lesson 1. Local ownership

*Responsive programming can promote strong local ownership, providing that organizations in the developing country participate as equals in planning and implementing the project.*

There is no doubt that responsive mechanisms, such as those used in the Canada-Brazil cooperation program, encourage local ownership of the development process. Responsive programming is sometimes interpreted as responding to requests from Canadian groups and institutions, but in this case, it has created a strong sense of ownership by the Brazilian institutions. They see themselves as equal partners in the process. Program partners provided the evaluation team with a number of recommendations for improving the program, including the need for a name change to better reflect the reality of this mutual partnership arrangement.

### Lesson 2. Improved donor coordination

*Donor coordination starts with donor cooperation, based on common interests and mutual trust. It can serve as a valuable learning tool for all, but requires mutually defined expectations.*

The program team has made significant efforts to strengthen donor coordination directly, with other donors, and indirectly through support to ABC. Coordination with DFID is the most developed, including information exchange and joint participation in reviews and evaluations such as the present one. CIDA is likely to be able to advance its donor coordination agenda most in Brazil by developing a strategic approach based on a mutually agreed upon agenda with like-minded bilateral and multilateral institutions.

### Lesson 3. Strong partnerships

*Strong partnerships between two institutions, based on mutual trust and shared decision-making, are an essential but insufficient condition for creating significant development impact. Promoting synergy between multiple initiatives in a given area has potential for impact that is larger than the sum of the individual contributions.*

The current Canadian cooperation program in Brazil contributes to developing strong institutional partnerships, but the dispersion of the individual activities results in

dispersion of impact as well. The potential impact can be strengthened by promoting exchanges and linkages between sub-projects and by focussing on key areas where success has been achieved or is highly likely to. Encouraging partner networks, as the program has done, is a useful first step in that direction, although network coordination can also be a challenge.

### Lesson 4. A results-based approach

*With adequate assistance, local partners can successfully incorporate results-based management principles into project planning. But this assistance is unlikely to be sustainable unless accompanied by support for monitoring and evaluation.*

The results-based approach has been an important concern of the Canadian cooperation program in Brazil during the period covered by this evaluation. Some TTF fund partners mentioned that planning the project using RBM tools was the first 'technology transfer' that took place. There is strong evidence, however, that Brazilian partners had difficulty institutionalizing these tools during the project cycle, leading the evaluation team to conclude that additional assistance is required to make RBM operational at the level of monitoring, evaluating and reporting.

### Lesson 5. Greater policy coherence

*Promoting coherence between CIDA programming and the policies of other Canadian government departments is a complex issue. Promoting effective coordination between CIDA's programs, a seemingly easier task, is still to be achieved in Brazil and in most countries where CIDA works.*

The issue of Canadian policy coherence is a recurring theme in Canadian cooperation in Brazil. Is the rationale of the program to promote good bilateral relationships, to compensate in part for irritants such as trade disputes in the Canada-Brazil relationship? What, then, is the relative importance of promoting strong institutional linkages between the two countries and reducing inequality in Brazil, as the TTF Program proposes? In reality, both objectives are essential and to a large extent inseparable.

Coordination between the programs of different CIDA branches in Brazil, even at the level of substantial information exchange, is still an elusive target despite efforts by the Head of Aid to promote this.

### Lesson 6. Program approach

*Transforming a number of funds (projects) and sub-projects into an integrated program requires more than a name change. It will require critical thinking on what the program is to achieve and what elements are necessary, including the linkages between them, to achieve this.*

Developing a program approach in Brazil within the context of multiple, responsive funds (TTF, PSSR, DRINK) constitutes a major challenge. The challenge is magnified when the many sub-projects of each fund are taken into

consideration. The size and diversity of Brazil doesn't make the task any easier. The sub-projects assessed in this evaluation are predominantly sound and relevant. Can they collectively be considered to constitute a program? If responsiveness is good, is this not a sufficient common element to form a program? The answer, of course, is no to both. Balancing the responsiveness of the present funding mechanisms with a strategic, program approach that permits somewhat greater direction is the fundamental challenge that the program team is faced with.

### **Lesson 7. Building capacity**

*The hypothesis that institutions in middle-income countries do not require institutional strengthening and can adequately provide counterpart funding for development projects may be valid for large government institutions or otherwise well-funded organizations, but not for many other potential partners, including civil society organizations.*

The initial concept of the TTF program was to provide new technology and approaches to institutions that were professionally strong and sufficiently well financed to provide adequate counterpart funding for the sub-project. This approach did identify strong institutions that had the capacity to implement, sustain and replicate activities, but created a bias in favour of organizations in South-Central Brazil. Selecting institutions with a strong potential for addressing the equity issue and/or providing input to policy formulation may require that CIDA be prepared to offer institutional support, something that has been done unsystematically in the past. Creating a policy on this issue is urgent if the CIDA program is to become relevant for regions such as Northeast Brazil, where inequity and poverty are rampant.

### **Lesson 8. Engaging civil society**

Promoting change at the institutional level does not guarantee that civil society, especially individual members of it, benefit from this change, but mechanisms can (and should) be put in place to help ensure that this takes place.

Among the principles of development effectiveness, CIDA's 2002 policy statement emphasizes the participation of civil society, "especially those expected to benefit". The Brazil program has done this through a number of different approaches, including the funding of pilot activities in rural areas and *favelas* where project partners could develop service delivery skills. Mobilizing stakeholder groups to plan and implement project activities was another form used. In a somewhat atypical case, a sub-project (PSSR in this case) is working directly with a group of disabled persons, end-users of the technology.

While the program does not operate at the community (micro) level, it is designed to help Brazilian institutional partners improve their impact on equity of individuals in society. It is this collective impact that can make a difference, even in a country as large as Brazil.

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Appendix 1: RBM results chain for the TTF Program		
Level of Result	Results Statement	Attribution & Accountability
<b>Impact</b> (Long term) (Mid Term)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Equity and poverty issues addressed in a sustainable way</li> <li>Brazilian partners able to influence their policy environment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brazilian partners</li> <li>Other partners</li> <li>Networks</li> </ul>
<b>Outcomes</b> (Mid Term)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brazilian partners are more effective and efficient in the context of their interventions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brazilian partners</li> <li>Networks /Canadian partners</li> </ul>
<b>Outputs</b> (Short term)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Appropriate and effective partnerships</li> <li>Relevant and effective development activities</li> <li>Partners' organizational capacities strengthened</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brazilian partners</li> <li>Canadian partners</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b> (Short term)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TTF and PSSR offers appropriate funding conditions</li> <li>Human and financial resources managed effectively according to the RBM approach</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Canadian partners</li> <li>CIDA</li> </ul>

Appendix 2: Characteristics of TTF program funds					
	TTF Phase I	PSSR	TTF Phase II	DRINK	PSF
<b>Approval date</b>	February 1996	Sept. 1998	August 2000	June 2002	April 2003
<b>Fund approval total<sup>a</sup></b>	CDN\$15m +\$3m= \$18m	CDN\$1m	CDN\$15m +\$5m= \$20m	CDN\$.485m	CDN\$.5m
<b>No. of sub-projects<sup>b</sup></b>	11	50	4	5	<sup>c</sup>
<b>Average value<sup>b</sup></b>	CDN\$1.6m	CDN\$18,000	CDN\$2.25m	CDN\$46,200	<sup>c</sup>
<b>Sub-project length</b>	3-4 years	a few days to a few months	3-4 years	one to three years <sup>d</sup>	<sup>c</sup>
<p><sup>a</sup> Second figure represents amendment to increase fund budget.  <sup>b</sup> Projects in implementation as of May 2003.  <sup>c</sup> No information on sub-projects approved to date.  <sup>d</sup> Fund too recent to have an accurate history of project duration.</p> <p><b>Source:</b> Evaluation team calculation based on CIDA program statistics.</p>					



<b>Appendix 3: Distribution of TTF Fund sub-projects by region and development theme</b> (percentage number of sub-projects and of sub-project budget)						
<b>Fund</b>	<b>Geographic distribution</b>			<b>Development theme</b>		
	<b>South (Rio/S.P.)</b>	<b>Central (Brasilia) (1)</b>	<b>North/ Northeast (2)</b>	<b>Social Development</b>	<b>Environment</b>	<b>Public Sector Reform</b>
<b>TTF I</b>						
Number	77 %	5 %	18 %	36 %	64 %	0 %
Budget	82 %	2 %	16 %	31 %	69 %	0 %
<b>TTF II</b>						
Number	25 %	75 %	0 %	25 %	25 %	50 %
Budget	33 %	67 %	0 %	33 %	33 %	34 %
<b>TTF Total</b>						
Number	63 %	23 %	14 %	33 %	53 %	14 %
Budget	65 %	25 %	10 %	31 %	57 %	12 %
<b>PSSR</b>						
Number	43 %	38 %	19 %	64 %	8 %	28 %
Budget	37 %	42 %	21 %	62 %	9 %	29 %
<p>(1) Given lack of information to make a further breakdown, national level sub-projects have been assigned to the Central Brazil region, artificially increasing the weight of programming in that region.</p> <p>(2) Values in this column would be somewhat larger if activities of all secondary sub-project partners were included.</p> <p>Source: Calculations by the evaluation team based on TTF program documents.</p>						