

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP



CAMEROON

**EVALUATION OF BANK GROUP ASSISTANCE TO
THE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
SECTOR 1996-2004**

**OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT
(OPEV)**

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
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABEDA:	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
ADB:	African Development Bank
ADF:	African Development Fund
ARD:	Agriculture and Rural Development
BD:	Bidding Documents
CAA:	Autonomous Sinking Fund
CAC:	<i>Crédit Agricole du Cameroun</i> (Agricultural Credit Bank of Cameroon)
CAMCCUL:	Cameroon Cooperative Credit Union League
CAPCOL:	Littoral Cooperative Credit Union
CCEY-CA :	Business Creation Center of Yaounde - <i>Consultants Associés</i>
CEMAC:	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CFA.F:	Franc of the African Financial Community
CIG:	Common Initiative Group
CSP:	Country Strategy Paper
CTS:	Technical Committee for Monitoring Economic Programs
DCET:	Department of Economic and Technical Cooperation
EDF:	European Development Fund
ESAF:	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
EU:	European Union
FAO:	Food and Agricultural Organization
FESP:	Forestry/Environment Sector Program
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
HIPC:	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IRAD:	Institute of Agricultural Research for Development
IRDPA:	Integrated Rural Development Project
LFDP:	Livestock and Fisheries Development Project
MDC:	Multi-Donor Committee
MIDENO:	North West Development Authority
MINADER:	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MINEFI:	Ministry of the Economy and Finance
MINEPIA:	Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries
MINFOF:	Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife
MINPROFF:	Ministry of Women's Affairs and the Family
MINRESI:	Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation
MTEF:	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
NRP:	National Reforestation Program
PAFRA:	Rural Forestry and Agro-forestry Support Project
PARFAR:	Rural Household Income Improvement Project
PIU:	Project Implementation Unit
PNRVA:	National Agricultural Research and Extension Program Support Project
PREPAFEN:	Poverty Reduction and Action in favour of Women Project for the Far North Province
PRR:	Portfolio Review Report
PRSP:	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RSDS:	Rural Sector Development Strategy
SAP:	Structural Adjustment Program

SME:	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SOWEDA:	South West Development Authority
SP-SFSP:	Support Project for the Special Food Security Program
TAF:	Technical Assistance Fund
UA:	Unit of Account
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
WB:	World Bank

Map of the Republic of Cameroon



Source: IZF Website

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Introduction

1.1 The objective of this study is to evaluate Bank Group assistance to Cameroon's agricultural sector and its impact on the country's development. This evaluation was conducted according to Bank directives in two areas, namely: (i) the Bank's strategies under the CSPs; and (ii) the results and impact of interventions/activities carried out. The evaluation criteria were: (i) relevance and quality at entry; (ii) efficacy (attainment of objectives); (iii) efficiency; (iv) impact on institutional development; (v) sustainability; (vi) performance of the Bank and the Borrower. The term "assistance" includes aid in the form of loans and non-lending activities such as: economic and sector studies, institutional development, technical assistance, policy advisory services and dialogue, portfolio reviews, aid coordination and resource mobilization. The study reviews the sectoral, intersectoral and crosscutting issues (poverty, gender, environment, regional integration, private sector, governance). The evaluation focused on the 1996-2004 period, while taking into account the experience gained from previous completed projects, as gleaned from project completion reports (PCRs).

1.2 The ultimate aim is to draw lessons that could be applied to improve the efficacy of future Bank support to actions initiated by the country to reduce poverty through economic growth. The study covers nine projects that are currently at different stages of implementation. Three have been completed, two will be completed by 30/06/2007, and two others by 31/12/2007. The implementation deadline for the last two has been extended to 31/12/2010.

2. Observations

2.1 Cameroon is an agricultural economy and the rural sector, which accounts for 30% of GDP, plays a leading role in the national economy. From 1987 to 1993, the Cameroonian economy suffered a sharp drop in export earnings because of the steady decline in the price of leading exports (oil, coffee, cocoa and cotton) and a fall in the GDP. After a series of successive macroeconomic stabilization programs, structural reforms and the gradual liberalization of agricultural activities from 1995, economic growth picked up again, at an average annual rate of 4.5%, driven mainly by the development of food crops, manufactured goods and, more recently, the implementation of major road infrastructure projects or the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project.

2.2 *The main constraints* on rural sector development are: (i) the low level of training for farmers and the limited number of training facilities; (ii) limited private sector participation; (iii) the insufficiency and poor state of rural infrastructure; (iv) limited access to farm inputs and products; (v) insufficient financing; (vi) seed production and marketing difficulties; (vii) the high incidence of diseases and pests; (viii) limited access to land and land tenure insecurity; (ix) inadequate consideration of the criterion of competence in recruiting management staff for the sector; (x) overcentralization of Government services; and (xi) complex and unwieldy administrative procedures that cause delays and sometimes lead to corruption.

2.3 *The Bank's assistance strategy* for the agricultural sector makes a distinction between lending operations, which are fully consistent with the country's priorities, and non-lending operations. In the first group of operations, the Bank's options are in line with those of the country. The non-lending aid instruments that have helped to improve the quality of dialogue between the Bank and the country are: (i) Country Strategy Papers (CSPs); (ii) portfolio reviews; (iii) supervision missions; and (iv) participation in various activities (studies, donor committee, etc.). There has been marked improvement in approach, which has become more participatory, with the involvement of the various stakeholders. The Bank's strategy was relevant.

2.4 Over the period under consideration, the nine reference projects in the study are fully consistent with poverty reduction strategies, as they improve output in the agriculture, stockbreeding, fisheries and forestry sub-sectors. An analysis of the various logical frameworks shows that sector objectives can be summed up into two points, as follows: (i) the improvement of incomes; and (ii) the promotion of food security in project areas. These objectives feature among Cameroon's agriculture and rural development priorities (NAP, RSDS). They are consistent with the Bank's goal of promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing poverty in Africa, mainly by investing in rural development.

2.5 However, project implementation has encountered enormous difficulties generated mainly by the Borrower. The sanctions imposed on the country and on projects for various shortcomings have led the Bank to extend nearly all its projects. Recurrent disbursement problems can be attributed to the Bank.

2.6 Despite the sheer size of the portfolio, and due to various reformulations and suspensions, the impact of the projects on the sector is not yet perceptible, except in research which has been revitalized thanks to the Bank.

3. Conclusion

The Bank's strategy over the period has been relevant, although the inefficient implementation of operations has undermined the attainment of set objectives. Assistance is deemed unsatisfactory over the 1996-2004 period.

4. Lessons

The main lessons drawn from this study are as follows:

1. The inconsistency in sector interventions (registration, or otherwise, in successive ADFs) reflects a rather short- and medium-term view of interventions. The issue of the duration of the CSP period is therefore pertinent.
2. The recurrent problem of disbursements at the Bank cited by the Borrower as one of the bottlenecks to project implementation reflects the inadequacy of the new measures adopted by the Bank. The extension of deadlines could also be attributed to the technical department responsible for project files. Task managers do not have enough prerogatives in project monitoring.

3. Large-scale projects (in a wide geographical area) without an adequate management mechanism have little chance of achieving satisfactory results because of implementation and supervision difficulties.
4. The inadequate involvement of Ministerial services in project management could undermine the sustainability of institutional development.
5. Projects with a high number of components have little chance of producing satisfactory results; the same applies to projects with very few components.
6. The search for cofinancing could enhance dialogue between partners and speed up the harmonization process.
7. The negative impacts of agricultural sector liberalization (export crops) have led farmers to revert to food crop cultivation, which has enormous processing potential. However, the weak link in the system remains the lack of storage and marketing infrastructure.
8. IRAD is an institution that enjoys sub-regional renown. Supporting its activities could reinforce sub-regional integration.
9. The SP-SFSP obtained results that can promote regional integration.
10. The inadequate formal dialogue between the Government and the private sector does not facilitate access to agricultural financing, and consequently does not promote the development of the sector.
11. Limited access to local financing is a constraint on the sustainability of project outputs.

5. Recommendations

5.1 For the Bank:

1. With regard to the harmonization of assistance, the Bank needs to address the issue of CSP periodicity by adopting a longer term vision.
2. Give priority to projects with a reduced number of components over a smaller geographical area.
3. Give more decision-making powers to task managers in order to improve communication between the Bank and the PIUs.
4. Initiate studies to identify viable sub-sectors of the agricultural private sector or use the existing project databanks (RSDS, NEPAD). The MTEF has identified projects to be financed that could revitalize the sector. Support could be given to programs that promote the competitiveness of agricultural products and the development of professional farmer organizations. Supporting the development of agricultural credit and contributing to the creation of specialized financial establishments are actions that could contribute to the development of economic activities in rural areas. The Bank's strategy of giving priority to infrastructures under the current CSP could promote the development of agricultural markets that generate private sector growth.

5. Prospect for possibilities of co-financing sub-regional projects (agricultural research, food security). The FAO pilots the sub-regional food security program. The Bank needs to participate in the consolidation of the pilot phase (SP-SFSP). The Bank launched an identification study for the Agricultural Research Regional Integration Project (PIRRA). Considering IRAD's achievements, this institution could be retained as the benchmark structure in the implementation of this project.

5.2 *For the Borrower:*

1. Establish a resource mobilization strategy that will lead to timely availability of counterpart funds;
2. Give priority to the sector during implementation of the donor-supported "Governance" program.
3. Create the conditions for sustained dialogue with the agricultural private sector in order to develop the existing potential.
4. Promote the development of the seed producer profession in rural areas.
5. Encourage sub-regional project development initiatives in the areas of research and food security.
6. Encourage the development of microfinance in Cameroon's rural areas for the agriculture and rural development sector.

1. CONTEXT

1.1 Objectives of the Evaluation

The main objective of this evaluation is to conduct a systematic assessment of Bank assistance to Cameroon's agriculture and rural development sector, in terms of Bank and national strategies and assistance through lending and non-lending operations. This evaluation focuses on the results obtained by the assistance program from 1996 to 2004. With regard to policies and strategies, it draws lessons that could be used in improving future interventions. Its conclusions will supplement similar studies conducted in other sectors, and be taken into account in the evaluation of Bank Group assistance in Cameroon.

1.2 Scope and Methodology

1.2.1 The study mainly covers the whole ARD sector portfolio approved between 1996 and 2004. Operations initiated before 1996 were implemented and completed during the period under consideration. Their performance is also considered because of their relationship with the projects of the period.

1.2.2 Assistance results are evaluated in accordance with the guidelines of the ADB's Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV) governing evaluation of Bank assistance, preparation of the evaluation rating for PCRs and PPARs, and on the basis of the combined action of four factors: (a) the Bank; (b) Cameroon (Borrower); (c) partners and stakeholders; and (d) exogenous forces (natural phenomena, economic crises, etc.).

1.2.3 The methodology adopted for the study focuses on two aspects. The first is the analysis of documents, which was supplemented by a field mission to Cameroon from 5 to 24 March 2007, during which: (i) additional data and information were collected and consultations/discussions held with the national authorities and heads of partner agencies; and (ii) visits to selected regions and project sites were organized in order to get better understanding of the implementation context and obtain the opinion of beneficiaries, project managers and partners on project performance. The preliminary conclusions of the field mission were forwarded to the Cameroonian authorities on 22 March 2007. The second aspect of the methodology is a detailed study of the information obtained through document analysis and the field mission, and individual project assessment using the criteria of relevance and quality at entry, efficacy, efficiency, impact on institutional development and sustainability. The rating awarded to each project is aggregated (using the simple arithmetic mean of marks awarded) to obtain the performance rating that is analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapters 5 and 6 present the lessons learnt and follow-up recommendations.

1.3 Socio-economic Context

1.3.1 From its geographical location between latitudes 2° and 13° North and longitudes 8° and 16° East, Cameroon, a Central African country, lies astride the tropical rainforest and the Sahel. Indeed, Cameroon is shaped like a triangle, rising to a height of about 1200 km from the South to the Lake Chad area, with a base of about 800 km from West to East. It shares a 420 km maritime boundary with the Atlantic Ocean on the South-West. It is bounded in the West by Nigeria, in the South by Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, in the East by the Central African Republic, and in the North East by Chad. Lastly, the tip of the triangle, in the North, is capped by Lake Chad.

1.3.2 As a result of such geographical diversity, the country abounds with great potential in areas as diverse as agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry, water supply, energy and mining. Cameroon's geographical diversity is determined by its three main agro-ecological areas, namely: the rainforest in the South, the highlands and the Sudano-Sahelian in the North. The rainforest in the South is ideal for growing cocoa, oil palm, banana, rubber, tobacco, etc. The highlands of the West (West and North-West Provinces), which stand at an average altitude of over 1100m, are rich in volcanic soil that is ideal for agriculture (coffee, vegetable farming, etc.). Its vegetation is not as dense as that of the rainforest in the South and its cool climate is suitable for many types of activities. The Sudano-Sahelian zone in the North (Adamaoua, North and Far North Provinces) is a region of vast grasslands and savannah, ideal for cattle rearing and the growing of cotton, onion, millet, sweet potato, white yam and groundnut.

1.3.3 Cameroon's population, as of 31 December 2005, was estimated at 17,531,000 inhabitants, representing an increase of 7,037,345 inhabitants, in absolute terms, over 18 years. Population density per km² rose from 23 inhabitants in 1987 to 37 inhabitants in 2005. Cameroon has an essentially youthful population, with more than half of the inhabitants (about 63.55%) aged below 25. The urbanization rate rose from 28.5% in 1976 to 37.8% in 1987. In 2005, this rate was estimated at 54.6%, which means that more than half of the population currently lives in urban areas.

1.3.4 Poverty, which is widespread in Cameroon, remains an essentially rural phenomenon. More than 50% of the households live below the poverty line; that is, on less than one dollar a day. According to the first Cameroon household survey of 1996, 51% of the population was poor and 23% lived in extreme poverty. The second survey conducted in 2001 revealed a decline in this phenomenon, putting the global figure of Cameroon's poor at 40%. However, this decline in poverty took place mainly in urban areas, where the poverty rate was 22.1% compared to 49.9% in rural areas¹.

1.3.5 The poverty profile, as established by a survey, shows that the phenomenon is widespread in all the provinces of Cameroon. In the affected areas of the Far North, the North West and the North, poverty has increased over the last ten years.

1.3.6 The secondary and tertiary sectors account for 28% and 50% of GDP respectively. However, Cameroon's economy remains dominated by the primary sector, which employs 60% of the labor force, accounts for 22% of GDP and represented 25% of exports in 2004. Subsistence agriculture is the dominant activity in the primary sector. The main crops are coffee, cocoa, banana and cotton, whose output has increased since the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. Nevertheless, the sharp drop in the world market prices of coffee and cocoa has forced the Government to depend more on oil and tax revenue to finance the economy. However, with the depletion of oil resources, oil production has declined steadily over the last five years, and the Government has started implementing policies aimed at boosting the competitiveness of other sectors, especially in industry.

1.3.7 Given its importance in the economy, the rural sector has enormous spillover effects on the other sectors, and so contributes to export diversification, food insecurity, job creation and poverty reduction. *The major constraints* on its development are: (i) the low

¹ INS ; Poverty Profile in Rural Areas: Second Cameroon Household Survey, December 2002

level of training for farmers and the limited number of training facilities; (ii) limited private sector participation; (iii) the insufficiency and poor state of rural infrastructure; (iv) limited access to farm inputs and products; (v) insufficient financing; (vi) seed production and marketing difficulties; (vii) the high incidence of diseases and pests; (viii) limited access to land and land tenure insecurity; (ix) poor consideration of the criterion of competence in recruiting management staff for the sector; (x) overcentralization of Government services; and (xi) complex and unwieldy administrative procedures that cause delays and sometimes lead to corruption.

1.4 History of Relations between the Bank Group and Cameroon

1.4.1 An assessment of Bank operations in Cameroon shows a total of 69 (sixty-nine) loans and grants since 1972. The total gross commitments stand at UA 844.4 million, of which UA 478.8 million are ADB resources, and UA 365.5 million are ADF resources. The sectoral distribution of projects shows the predominance of the transport sector, with 38.25% of operations, followed by policy-based lending (24.42%), agriculture (16.2%), social sector (9.23%), community facilities (8.05%), and industry (3.75%). Over the 1972-1996 and 1996-2004 periods, agricultural sector commitments stood at 16.96% and 26.1%, respectively.

1.4.2 The Bank financed 18 agricultural sector operations that boosted poverty reduction efforts by focusing on the development of various activities in forestry, integrated rural development, livestock, poultry farming, fisheries, SME and microfinance promotion, research and food security. The agricultural sector was not retained in the Bank's strategy for 2005-2009; consequently, no operation was prepared under ADF X.

1.4.3 Bank Group operations in Cameroon represented 2.31% of all operations during 1967-2005, in terms of number of operations for an amount representing 2.11% of the total budget. 1.9% of the total ARD sector portfolio over the period was granted to Cameroon's ARD sector as shown on the table below:

**Table 1:
Loans and grants to the agriculture and
rural development sector (1967 – 2005)**

AFRICA	Number	Amount (UA million)
Total for all sectors	2 988	36 691.19
ARD Sector	755	6 637.28
CAMEROON		
Total for all sectors	69	775.86
ARD Sector	18	126.02
Percentage ARD/all sectors in Cameroon	26.09	16.24
Percentage Cameroon/Africa	2.31	2.11
Percentage ARD Cameroon/ARD Africa	2.38	1.90

Source: ADB/Statistics Division, 2006

1.4.4 In addition to the suspension of disbursements to certain projects for poor management, Cameroon was hit by several sanctions for outstanding loan repayment arrears (1993 – July 1994, December 1994 – June 1995, October 1995 – April 1997). The country was relegated to eligibility to concessional (ADF) loans as from 1995.

1.4.5 The Boards of Directors of the African Development Bank (ADB) and the African Development Fund (ADF) confirmed on 26 July 2006 that Cameroon had fulfilled all the conditions for attainment of the completion point of the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Consequently, the ADB Group will extend a debt relief of about US\$ 78.84 million at net present value of end-1999 (or US\$ 100.51 million in nominal terms) to Cameroon, which represents about 24.5% of multilateral assistance.

2. GOVERNMENT AND BANK STRATEGIES IN THE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SECTOR

2.1 Trend of Cameroon's policies and strategies in the agriculture and rural development sector

2.1.1 The new agricultural policy prepared in 1990 is based on better development of the country's enormous production and marketing potential. It targets five objectives, namely: (i) modernization of the production apparatus; (ii) food security; (iii) export promotion and diversification; (iv) development of agricultural product processing; and (v) balance of production sectors.

2.1.2 Through the NAP, the Government is making efforts to create an enabling strategic framework for private initiative, and introduce deregulation and privatization measures to reduce wastage, rationalize resources, and improve management. Privatization of the capital management of parapublic corporations is aimed at mitigating the impacts of State divestment. Inefficient corporations have been liquidated, and struggling corporations have been rehabilitated.

2.1.3 In 1998, the NAP was assessed in the Ministry of Agriculture. Following that assessment, the objectives of the agricultural policy have been reviewed. Henceforth, the target is to attain a real annual average growth rate of about 4% for agricultural production in the next decade. - *For food products*, the growth rate should stand at about 3.2% per year. Efforts should mainly focus on cereals, cassava and plantain. The average growth of *export or agro-industrial crops* should attain 5% per year, and be sustained mainly by the major production sectors (banana, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, cotton, sugar, and rubber) whose diversity is a major asset in a period of world price instability.

2.1.4 Cameroon's admission into the enhanced HIPC Initiative in 2000 required the preparation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) with the contribution of the various sectors. The rural sector development strategy, prepared as a contribution to the PRSP, retained most of the NAP objectives while raising the target for some of them (new challenges). The sector strategy, as defined in the PRSP², focuses on the following four areas of intervention: (i) modernization of production systems; (ii) promotion of institutions; (iii) construction of an attractive framework; and (iv) sustainable management of natural resources. In each of these four areas of intervention, the rural strategy adopts three approaches, namely: (i) the promotion of sustainable income-generating activities for the most vulnerable people; (ii) participation of the beneficiaries; and (iii) consideration of the gender approach.

² Republic of Cameroon, Declaration: Rural Sector Development Strategy, April 2002.

2.1.5 A review of about twenty past and current programs and projects was conducted in March 2005. That review revealed, in particular, that:

- only programs and projects funded with the contribution of external partners were subject to pre-appraisal studies; others funded with HIPC resources did not usually have a reference situation;
- the following principles, contained in the strategy paper, were respected more or less: (i) empowering of stakeholders; (ii) private sector promotion through contracting of activities; and (iii) (technical, organizational, management...) capacity-building;
- the institutional design of most projects and programs transforms them into parallel administrations with no functional relations with the Ministerial organs responsible for implementing their various components;
- there is no coordination body for these projects and programs (including those that work on the same strategic objective).

2.1.6 All these shortcomings look like poor governance indicators that lead to: (i) wastage of material, financial and human resources, such as duplication of structures and staff in the field³; (ii) weakening of traditional structures that have limited material and logistical resources, and hardly offer the right working conditions and staff motivation; (iii) the incapacity of certain stakeholders to play their assigned roles⁴ during implementation.

2.1.7 The new operational framework of the strategy updated in 2005 tries to correct some of these shortcomings. The objectives of the Agricultural and Rural Development component, as presented in the Rural Sector Development Strategy Paper updated in 2005, relate to: (i) *a sustainable increase in crop yields and agricultural supply*, in order to double current production levels by 2015; (ii) *the sustainable management of productive resources*; (iii) *the promotion of local and community development*; (iv) *the development of adapted financing mechanisms*; (v) *the development of employment and training*; (vi) *the management of food insecurity risks* in order to stave off the recurrent spectre of famine in ecologically fragile areas; and (vii) *the development of the institutional framework*.

2.2 Bank Group assistance strategies in the agriculture and rural development sector

2.2.1 The Bank's agriculture and rural development policy is a continuation of the agricultural sector policy of 1990 which has undergone thorough revision. Its specific objectives are to: (i) identify the main obstacles to growth in the agricultural sector and the rural economy, while focusing on those areas of activity in which the Bank can acquire a comparative advantage for its future activities; (ii) assess past operations in order to define a strategy that will enable the Bank's agricultural loans program to overcome the main obstacles; (iii) prepare a strategic framework to enrich and consolidate the Bank's dialogue

³ HIPC-funded projects, for example, use the same field staff as the support project for the National Agricultural Extension and Research Program (NAERP). Besides, these projects use different committees for selection and approval of the support to be given to beneficiaries, who are really the same persons.

⁴ Analysis of Cameroon's agricultural policies, OECD, 2006

on agriculture and rural development policies and development programming at country level, with its members, regional organizations and other donors; and (iv) help to improve the operational framework in order to increase the efficacy of investments in agricultural and rural development.

2.2.2 The *Bank's strategy* is based essentially on assistance programs for agriculture and rural development in the following areas: (i) construction of rural infrastructure; expansion of private sector agro-industrial activities; (ii) establishment and capitalization of more efficient private financial networks; (iii) better natural resource management; (iv) capacity-building; and (v) regional integration⁵.

2.2.3 The 1996-1998 CSP had established the need to speed up agricultural sector transformation by: (i) establishing an attractive institutional framework; (ii) developing production by reducing factor costs; (iii) improving infrastructure; (iv) enhancing environmental and, in particular forestry, management; and (v) improving the agricultural research and extension system. The Bank was expected to participate in actions that underpinned or accompanied reforms aimed at liberalizing the various agricultural sectors, regardless of whether such reforms relate to privatization of public enterprises or the establishment of a more attractive institutional framework. One way of consolidating the Bank's intervention in favor of agro-industrial SMEs was to supplement the scope of the credit line given to the Agricultural Credit Bank of Cameroon (CAC) by acquiring shares or granting loans to companies to be privatized, through its Private Sector Unit.

2.2.4 The *1999-2001 CSP*, like the previous CSPs, focused on poverty reduction. Considering the previous strategy from which lessons were drawn, the Bank's operations were expected to be guided by the conclusions of the Government's participatory poverty assessment conducted in 1994 which presents poverty perception by the poor, and on the guidelines of its poverty strategy statement adopted in December 1998. While focusing its 1999-2001 CSP strategy on poverty reduction, the Bank made no provision for a new operation to intervene directly in the sector. However, three projects were approved, namely: the Forestry and Agroforestry Support Project in 1999, the Special Food Security Program Support Project in 2000, and the Rural Household Income Improvement Program in 2001. The projects are fully consistent with the poverty reduction strategy, especially through income improvement identified as the leading priority objective by the 1998 study⁶.

2.2.5 The *2002-2004 CSP* actions in this sector were specifically aimed at: (i) diversifying and processing agricultural, pastoral and forestry exports; (ii) reconstituting a specific financing mechanism for rural activities; (iii) extending the national social security coverage to rural communities; (iv) raising agricultural output and income; (v) promoting environmental factors and an attractive framework by adapting funding and improving real estate and infrastructure management (rural roads, village water supply schemes, etc.). Two projects, the GRASSFIELD and RUMPI projects, were approved in 2003. The objectives and activities of these projects were fully consistent with the abovementioned objectives.

⁵ Bank Group policy on agricultural and rural sector development, ADB/ADF, January 2002

⁶ Analysis of Cameroon's agricultural policies, OECD 2006

2.2.6 Given that the main focus of the adopted strategy is poverty reduction, the lessons learnt from 2002-2004 CSP recommended that the Bank should continue to support reforms in collaboration with the Bretton Woods Institutions so as to consolidate the macroeconomic framework and promote good governance. It was also expected to support specific actions in the social, agricultural, and transport sectors, as well as multisectoral initiatives. The consolidation of governance in all its forms was also deemed crucial for improving the utilization of resources made available to the country.

2.3 Relevance of Bank intervention over the period and quality at entry

2.3.1 Relevance

2.3.1.1 A comparison of Bank strategies with those of the country reveals some consistency that reflects their shared concern for improving the production system, developing rural infrastructure in order to improve produce marketing, enhancing natural resource management, and improving the financing system for rural activities. Despite their relevance and consistency with the country's strategy which targets poverty reduction, the CSPs have been inconsistent over the period with regard to the sector. The 1996-1998 CSP called for limited intervention. The ARD sector was not taken into account in the 1999-2001 CSP. The 2002-2004 CSP, which clearly reflects the country's needs in the sector because of the more participatory approach adopted in its preparation, was followed by the 2005-2009 CSP (not covered in this study) which does not take the sector into account.

2.3.1.2 The Bank's strategy for Cameroon in 2005-2009 is based on the development targets set in the PRSP and on ADF X guidelines. It also takes into account the assistance programs of other donors and the operations that are underway in the country. The arguments in favor of such a mechanism are rooted in the need to conduct more efficient monitoring of ongoing operations (which are rather dated) in order to speed up implementation (1996-1998 CSP). The choice of actions was influenced by the country's poor management of certain projects. Reformulations of projects approved outside the study period did not always favor new actions. The decision to opt for operations that mainly favor the transport sector is motivated by the impact that transport sector activities have on the ARD sector. Road projects that open up access to farming areas will help to improve the performance of the produce marketing system, and consequently increase farmers' incomes and consumer access to products (food security).

2.3.1.3 The 1996-1998 CSP had recommended the financing of agricultural SMEs. However, the Bank's Private Sector Unit was not involved in the process, and even the credit line granted to CAC was cancelled, since CAC was liquidated in July 1997. Geographically speaking, the Bank did not intervene in the Littoral and East Provinces during this period. In the Centre Province, the semi-urban areas of Yaounde benefited from one operation in 2000-2004.

2.3.1.4 The nine reference projects in the study are fully consistent with poverty reduction strategies because they are aimed at improving output in the agricultural, stockbreeding, fisheries and forestry sub-sectors. An analysis of the various logical frameworks shows that sector objectives can be divided into two components as follows: (i) the improvement of incomes; and (ii) the promotion of food security in project areas. These objectives feature among Cameroon's agriculture and rural development priorities (NAP, RSDS). They are in line with the Bank's goal of promoting sustainable economic growth and

reducing poverty in Africa, mainly by investing in rural development. The members of the Bank, especially the regional and non-regional countries, share this objective which was also adopted by the international community through the Millennium Development Goals that should be achieved by 2015⁷ and whose No. 1 goal is to reduce extreme poverty and hunger. The three CSPs mentioned above clearly reflect this concern for Cameroon.

2.3.1.5 Despite the above shortcomings (geographical distribution of operations, contribution to the development of agricultural SMEs), the Bank's intervention strategy for the period is deemed relevant.

2.3.2 Quality at entry

2.3.2.1 On the whole, the quality at entry is satisfactory. Of the nine projects that make up the portfolio of the period under study, the design of five of them drew on experience from previous projects (funded or not funded by the Bank). The reformulated MIDENO II and IRDP learnt lessons from the experience of previous projects (MIDENO I and SOWEDA). The quantitative targets were scaled down. The Grassfield and Rumpi projects, which also have the same components as these two projects respectively in the same areas, were designed using a more participatory approach; hence, they are referred to as "the grassfields and Rumpi participatory development projects". Their objectives clearly reflect the needs of beneficiaries. The support project for the Special Food Security Program (SP-SFSP) was identified in 1998 by the FAO in collaboration with the UNDP. In May 1999, the preparation report was prepared by the FAO's Investment Centre after a preparation mission organized to Cameroon in February 1999. On the basis of this preparation report, an ADB mission, along with an expert from the FAO's Investment Centre, conducted a field appraisal of the project in January 2000. The appraised project addressed the objectives of the ADB's country strategy paper (CSP) for Cameroon.

2.3.2.2 Meanwhile, the difficulties of some projects arise partly from shortcomings in their design. This is the case with PARFAR, a major project in terms of its goals (reduction of community poverty) and its area of intervention (the country's three Northern provinces). Unfortunately, it is a hybrid project born of the fusion of two distinct priority projects presented by two different Ministries: the North and Far North Seed Project by MINADER; and the Support Project for Economic Activities of Adamaoua Women by MINPROFF. The project designers underestimated one major handicap, namely the size of the project area. The project's partners identified in the financing agreement have never been fully operational (PNRVA, in particular). The Community Forests component, on account of poor identification, was returned to the competent Ministry (MINFOF). In the same region, the Bank intervenes in the social sector through PREPAFEN, another project. It has determined a 23% contribution for PARFAR beneficiaries, and 10% for PREPAFEN beneficiaries for the procurement of storage warehouses. This arrangement is likely to demotivate the beneficiaries.

⁷ The Millennium Development Goals formulated by the UN in 2000 are aimed at: (a) reducing extreme poverty and hunger; (b) achieving universal primary education; (c) promoting gender equality and women's empowerment; (d) reducing child mortality; (e) improving maternal health; (f) combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (g) ensuring environmental sustainability; and (h) developing a global partnership for development.

2.3.2.3 The study on the Livestock and Fisheries project, initially conducted in 1992, was updated in 1998 at the expense of the Bank (80%) and the Government (20%). However, this reappraisal did not fully take population trends into account. Local communities are no longer much involved in fishing. In the case of PAFRA, the appraisal identified the eucalyptus tree as the species to be developed because of its economic potential. However, the project's mid-term review opted for diversification by introducing medicinal plants.

2.3.2.4 On the whole, there were many loan conditions, ranging from seven for the Grassfield and Rumpi projects to fifteen for PAFAR. The main risks anticipated by the appraisals concerned export prices, climate, the multiplicity of institutions intervening in the projects, insufficient counterpart funds, micro-credit management, endemic diseases and the construction of some infrastructures. Over the period, the prices of the major export products declined steadily and counterpart funds were usually not mobilized in time. The micro-credit system was plagued by various problems due to lack of professionalism in the sub-sector.

2.3.2.5 Apart from PAFRA, no project benefited from the input of an environmentalist at appraisal. In this project, several arrangements are made for its various phases to design and implement possible mitigating measures. Consequently, the diagnostic study was expected to conduct a general analysis of production systems and erosion risks in the various areas. During identification of the project's priority intervention areas and activities, environmental measures (monitoring of the impact of project activities on the environment) were taken into account. Similarly, sites for nurseries and forestry and agro-forestry plantations were jointly chosen by the operator and the TSMTs, and this made it possible to avoid sensitive areas (areas with high risk of erosion, springs, major watersheds for water supply, etc.). Agronomists and agricultural engineers have provided this expertise to other projects classified in Category II of the Bank's environmental guidelines. Any negative impact can therefore be reduced during project implementation by adopting the appropriate mitigating measures.

3. EVALUATION OF ASSISTANCE TO THE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SECTOR

3.1 Non-lending Assistance

3.1.1 Studies

3.1.1.1 As concerns studies, loan projects either had preparatory studies for a later phase (MIDENO, SOWEDA IRDP) or studies for a project component (the diagnostic study of PAFRA should lead to implementation of the operational component (processing) - marketing). SOWEDA IRDP had a livestock and fisheries development study, which could not be conducted within the set time frame. It was updated in 1998.

3.1.2 Policy Dialogue – Aid Coordination – Resource Mobilization

3.1.2.1 Over the period, the Bank channeled its dialogue with the country through its various CSPs (1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004) whose quality improved over the years with the inclusion of new aspects (gender, environment, private sector, etc.), sections which raise issues that require dialogue and a CSP matrix. The portfolio review reports objectively present the implementation of operations while drawing useful lessons for future CSPs and PRRs. Text Box 1 presents the consultation process on the strategy adopted by the Bank. It is characterized by the diversity and quality of participants.

Box 1: Consultation process on the strategy adopted by the Bank Group

Source : 2002 – 2004 CSP

This document was prepared through broadbased consultation with the civil society. The main components of civil society were met and their viewpoints reflected in the document. During these consultations, working sessions were organized with all sectors of the public administration involved in economic reform, executing agencies of projects funded by the Bank Group, NGOs and donors present in Yaounde. Discussions focused essentially on the interim and final PRSP and the poverty reduction strategy, actions contained in the national good governance mainly on the anti-corruption program, as well as the status of the Bank Group's portfolio. After these consultations, a seminar was jointly organized in Yaounde by the Bank and the Government on 17 and 18 July 2002 on Cameroon's development challenges for 2002-2004. The seminar was opened by the Vice-President of the Bank and the Secretary of State for Public Investments and Territorial Development. The seminar was attended by NGOs, embassies, professional organizations, representatives of administrative departments, multilateral organizations, women's associations, etc. The seminar broadly discussed Cameroon's development problems, as well as the performance of Bank operations in the country. The CSP was distributed to participants, and three panels were formed. Panel 1 discussed macroeconomic issues and sectoral problems. Panel 2 examined the performance of Bank operations, and Panel 3 was devoted to multisectoral issues and their role in the country's development. *The first panel* mainly focused on the need to boost growth in order to combat poverty. The various sectors of the economy were reviewed and discussed. The importance of the agricultural sector was underscored since most of the poor live in rural areas. Transport, education and health were also discussed as ways of improving the situation of the people, especially the poor. Participants stressed the need to promote sectors that create employment. Problems of availability of financing and regional disparity were discussed. The poor development of the private sector and limited capacity in the various sectors were also mentioned. *The second panel* discussed Bank operations in Cameroon. It noted that performance is not very satisfactory, and that several projects have not started satisfactorily, especially those approved under ADF VIII. Several problems were highlighted, such as delays in loan effectiveness, difficulties in the disbursement of local counterpart funds, and lack of familiarity with procurement and disbursement rules of procedure. *The third panel* looked at issues from several areas. The role of the private sector in Cameroon was highlighted and its constraints were identified, notably the lack of financing and judicial insecurity. Poverty and the gender problem were of much interest to the participants. Poverty was described as a problem that should influence the entire Government policy; and it was indicated that the gender dimension should be given consideration in all programs. On governance, participants discussed difficulties of access to justice, over-centralization, inadequate public finance control mechanisms, and corruption. Environmental problems stemmed from the poor application of adopted texts and lack of training for the people. Regional integration was deemed quite inadequate because of rising nationalism, few communication channels, as well as police and customs barriers. At the end of these consultations, the following areas were retained for the Bank's interventions: the consolidation of infrastructures, especially in the transport sector; human resource development; the development of agriculture, which is the main activity in the country; and support to the Government's economic and social reforms.

3.1.2.2 The generic problems noted in the implementation of sector projects relate to the signing and effectiveness of loan and grant agreements, the non-disbursement of counterpart funds, and contract award and performance difficulties. During the portfolio review of 2004, the Bank agreed with the Government on a certain number of measures to address these problems, such as: (i) the institution of a focal point as soon as the project is approved; (ii) a staff increase for the Autonomous Sinking Fund in order to improve the disbursement rate; (iii) suspension of disbursements in case audits are not conducted; and (iv) examination of the possibility of disbursing current counterpart funds from HIPC Initiative funds. The Bank also organized a video conference in June 2004 to discuss with the Cameroon Government the action plan for each operation. In February/March 2005, it also organized a seminar on procurement and disbursement procedures for project implementation units. Besides, the opening of the National Program Office in March 2004 made it possible to support the improvement of portfolio performance. Lastly, the Boards' decision to open a regional office in Cameroon in 2006, whose establishment agreement was signed in November 2004, should further enhance the implementation of Bank operations.

3.1.2.3 Cameroon's PRSP adopted in 2003 led to the preparation of sectoral strategies and a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), although poor inter-Ministerial coordination remained the weak point that undermined ownership and policy dialogue with partners. In 2003, the donor community set up the Multi-Donor Committee (CMB) for monitoring the PRSP. This committee meets regularly. The CMB mainly discusses economic and financial issues, as well as crosscutting issues (civil society, statistical monitoring of the PRSP,

monitoring of HIPC programs). Its objective is to share information, organize discussions on crosscutting issues, and adopt a common position. Apart from this general forum, there are sectoral consultation frameworks (forestry, health, rural sector) which do not always allow for regular dialogue with national authorities. While the PSFE allows for monthly meetings with all donors, the ongoing aquaculture/stockbreeding program does not yet have a consultation framework. In order to harmonize procedures, a coordination committee was set up, but its texts remain unapplied. The Bank participates in the CMB.

3.1.2.4 Pursuant to Bank recommendations, the CAA increased its staff and reviewed its structure in order to speed up the processing of disbursement files. Hence, the service in charge of multilateral institutions was split into two services, one of which is exclusively devoted to the processing of ADB and IsDB files. The CAA also computerized its services from registration right up to final processing, and this makes it easy to track files. However, shortcomings were noted with respect to the centralization of signature that causes some delay. The Bank, for its part, has a service that registers disbursement requests, which is not under the disbursements officer. Moreover, a maximum time-limit of 15 days has been set for response to all disbursement requests. This time-limit can be extended if the opinion of a Technical Department is solicited. These measures notwithstanding, project managers still note delays in the processing of disbursement files. The failure by the Bank to send disbursement notices, the shortcomings noted in the preparation of disbursement request documents and in the financial management of certain projects, the low qualification of accountants, as well as shortcomings in the preparation and justification of the operating capital are the problems noted in the practical management of aid coordination⁸.

3.1.2.5 The ADB, World Bank, UNDP, OECD and the French Government jointly financed a workshop held in Bamako, Mali, from 27 to 29 March 2006 on the implications and implementation of the Paris Declaration to discuss the effectiveness of development assistance. The workshop was attended by Central, West and North African countries, and it made the following recommendations: (i) adherence of countries to the Paris process; (ii) definition of a strategic framework for development (PRSP); (iii) collaboration with technical and financial partners (TFPs) to build institutional capacity; (iv) preparation of a national action plan on harmonization and alignment in consultation with the TFPs; (v) identification of appropriate local practices that favor joint learning with the TFPs, for the institution of results-based management of development.

3.1.2.6 An ADB overall portfolio review for 1996-2004 in Cameroon shows that the country signed four co-financing agreements with other donors during the period under consideration. One is a grant financing the SP-SFSP, whose management was entrusted to the FAO; the other concerns the Livestock and Fisheries Development Project in the South-West Province (SOWEDA) whose micro-credit component is funded by ABEDA. The third is the agricultural extension component of the PNRVA financed by IDA and IFAD. This third agreement made it possible to build synergy between research and agricultural extension. It should be noted, however, that the PNRVA had two autonomous components (research and agricultural extension). The Bank financed the research component.

⁸ Portfolio Review, February 2007

Table 2:
Cofinancing (UA million)

	Project	Type	Co-financier	ADB amount	Co-financier amnt	Gov't
1	SP-SFSP	TAF grant	FAO	0.76	0.065	0.15
2	LFDP	Loan	ABEDA	4.59	4.97	1.06
3	PNRVA ⁹	Loan	IDA/IFAD	7.00	11.92/ 5.87	12.60

3.1.2.7 The co-financing strategy, which should reinforce synergies between donors and facilitate dialogue on harmonization and which was recommended by the CSP, was not adequately applied in the sector. Not only is the number of co-financed operations low, but the Bank's contribution remains high. In the case of SP-SFSP (grant), it provided 78% of the project costs and contributed 41% to the LFDP. Although the Bank's contribution to the total financing of the PNRVA is 18%, it is actually 78% for the research component that it funded, with agricultural extension being financed by IFAD and IDA.

3.2 Lending Operations

3.2.1 Description of Operations

3.2.1.1 The table below presents the projects targeted by this study. Two projects approved outside the study period (MIDENO II and SOWEDA IRDP) are included because they come under the 1996-1998 CSP aimed at speeding up the implementation of uncompleted projects.

⁹ This is co-financing, but for two autonomous projects (research for the ADB Group and agricultural extension for the World Bank)

Table 3:
ARD Sector Projects (1996-2004)

PROJECTS	Approval Date	Amount Approved	% Disb'ment	Status
Sector: Agriculture and rural development				
SUPPORT TO NAT. AGRIC. RESEARCH & EXT. PROJECTS (P.N.V.A) End of project: 30/06/2007	15.07.1998	7000000	88.99	Active
LIVESTOCK AND FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT End of project 31/12/2007	16.12.1998	4590000	65.36	Active
SUPPORT TO RURAL FORESTRY AND AGROFORESTRY End of project: 30/06/2007	10.02.1999	780000	99.68	Active
	10.02.1999	4130000	84.96	
HOUSEHOLD INCOME IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM End of project: 30/12/2007	28.06.2001	14000000	28.38	Active
PARTICIPATORY AND DECENTRALIZED RURAL DEVELOPMENT GRASSFIELD End of project: 31/12/2010	26.05.2003	15000000	4.42	Active
RUMPI PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT End of project: 31/12/2010	13.05.2003	15000000	1.50	Active
	13.05.2003	1500000	9.27	
RURAL DEV'T IN SOUTH WEST PROVINCE reformulated in 1998	22.09.1986	21890000	38.18	Completed balance cancelled
	22.09.1986	15003937	26.61	
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH WEST PROVINCE relaunched in 1994	19.12.1989	4550000	97.69	Completed balance cancelled
	19.12.1989	9210520	97.63	
SPECIAL FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM	19.06.2000	760000	99.89	Completed


Source: OPEV/ADB

3.2.1.2 The portfolio review (1997) identified five operations in the agricultural sector that had been shelved because of recurrent sanctions and difficulties in re-starting after the lifting of sanctions. These were: (i) the Haute Sanaga rural development project (SODECAO); (ii) the North-West Province Integrated Rural Development Project (MIDENO); (iii) the South-West Province rural development project (SOWEDA); (iv) the credit line to *Crédit agricole du Cameroun* (CAC) for the development of agricultural SMEs; and (v) the study on the livestock and fisheries component of the South-West Province Integrated Rural Development Project.

3.2.1.3 In practice, MIDENO which was supposed to have been financed by the Bank, IFAD, KFW, IsBD and the Government before its suspension for institutional, financial and managerial reasons, was subject to a mid-term review in May/June 1994 which recommended downsizing. Moreover, after the donors' meeting of September 1993 and management of the social impacts of MIDENO staff reduction by the European Union (EU), a project reformulation report was prepared and adopted by the authorities in 1995. The project was reformulated in 1998 and titled Reformulated MIDENO II (UA 3.8 million, being ADB, ADF and Government financing). SOWEDA IRDP, revitalized in 1994 with an initial closing date of 1999, was completed after a second extension in 2002. The credit line to CAC was simply cancelled. The livestock development study was completed in 1994, but was subjected to an update process financed with the balance available in 1998. Two projects were approved in 1998: (i) the National Agricultural Research and Extension Support Project (PNRVA); and (ii) the Livestock and Fisheries Development Project (LFDP-SOWEDA) which was an outcome of the completed study.

Diagram 1: Portfolio Implementation Status (loan operations)

Evaluation of the Agricultural Sector in Cameroon 1996-2004



Source: OPEV/ADB

3.2.4 Efficacy

3.2.4.1 The intermediate results and outputs expected from Bank assistance to the sector, as stipulated in the CSP matrices (Annex 3) are summed up as follows: (i) the Bank's action should help to accelerate sector transformation by creating an attractive institutional framework, boosting production through cutting factor costs, improving infrastructures, enhancing environmental management and improving the research system, generating an average agricultural GDP (AGDP) growth rate of 4% to 5% as from 1996/97 for the 1996/1998 CSP; and (ii) agricultural yields were expected to rise above the 2000/2001 levels; and (iii) the incomes of the populations were expected to rise in 2002/2003 for the 2002/2004 CSP.

3.2.4.2 The poverty survey in Cameroon showed that at the national level, the poverty index declined from 53.3% to 40.2% from 1996 to 2001. This ratio fell from 59.6% to 49.9% in rural areas and from 41.4% to 22.1% in urban areas. The figures indicate that poverty declined in Cameroon from 1996 to 2001.

3.2.4.3 Although the ARD sector made a positive contribution to GDP growth in 1996-2004, its contribution is lower than that of the other sectors of the economy (Table 4). In 1996-2001, Cameroon liberalized its export crop sectors (coffee and cocoa). Consequently, output has closely followed price trends, and price volatility has led to a relative loss of

interest in certain products, a fact that has affected quantity and quality of produce (e.g. cocoa and coffee). The volume and value of agricultural exports, in relation to non-oil exports, rose from 29% and 43% in 2000 to 45% and 50% in 2004 respectively. However, the GDP, and the agricultural GDP, rose by more than 4% over the 1996–2004 period. Annex 1 shows that the annual AGDP growth rate for 1994–2004 was 5.6%, which is above the 1996–1998 CSP targets.

Table 4:
Contributions to GDP Growth (%)

Item	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Primary sector	2.3	-0.9	0.7	2.1	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.5	1.2
Secondary sector	-2.0	-0.1	0.2	1.3	3.4	1.5	1.5	1.2	0.2	0.5
Tertiary sector	2.4	3.1	3.7	0.7	-0.6	2.1	2.4	1.9	2.7	2.7
GDP	2.3	4.8	5.2	5.5	5.1	4.3	4.6	4.5	4.0	5.0

Source: Analysis of Cameroon's agricultural policy, OECD, 2006

Plant Products

3.2.4.4 According to the FAO¹⁰, the average annual rate of variation in the growth of food production was 3.3% from 1990 -1992 to 1995 – 1997. This rate inched up to 3.4% between 1995/97 and 2001–2003, due to high demand driven by rapid urbanization and neighboring countries. The following results were obtained for the three major products in 1995-2005: (i) sorghum: (12% of production, 1.9% of yield increase); (ii) maize: (12% of production, 2% of surface area increase); (iii) cassava (11% of production and 3% of surface area increase). Food production benefitted from the return of farmers to this sector when they suffered a fall in their purchasing power. Output therefore increased, although it still does not satisfy local food needs and also has to compete with subsidized foreign products. Meanwhile, the population presents a rate that has declined from 2.7 to 2.2 over the period.

3.2.4.5 While the Bank's contribution to the country's macroeconomic performance cannot be stated in clear terms, some assessment can be made based on the results of the various projects (Annex 5). The PNRVA implementation rate shows that the agricultural research system was revitalized through infrastructures and capacity building for research staff. Sixty-two (62) of the current 64 research programs were validated by the Bank. Ultimately, the results of these programs will be used in agricultural extension to improve the yield and quality of agricultural, animal, fishery and forestry products. A good marketing policy should make it possible to increase farmers' incomes. Although it is a pilot project, the SP-SFSP has also produced similar results which, when applied to a larger area, would contribute to food security. The PARFAR seed component obtained results that were sometimes very satisfactory among fruit growers. The problem of seed protection was raised by the PIU. The Government will have to enforce the current seed law in order to guarantee adequate marketing of seeds. This project, which ends in December 2007, has little chance of attaining a satisfactory level of implementation at completion. Start-up difficulties could justify an extension, considering the project's potential.

¹⁰ FAO, FAOSTAT : Food security statistics – Cameroon

3.2.4.6 For food crops, despite the IRDP's low seed production rates (26.7% for maize and 2.18% for rice), plantain registered a significant increase, due to high demand in urban areas and neighboring countries.

Fishery and animal products

3.2.4.7 Sector statistics show an overall downward trend. The main livestock populations rose steadily until 2002 when a reversal set in. For example, the cattle population rose from 3,400,000 in 2000/2001 to 3,499,000 in 2001/2002. In 2003/2004, it fell below 2,400,000. Such poor performance in the livestock sector stems from a relaxation of the health measures previously adopted by sector authorities to protect animals against various diseases¹¹.

3.2.4.8 Between 1996 and 2003, Cameroon's imports of frozen chicken or chicken portions rose by more than 2000%. The imports came predominantly from the European Union (EU).

3.2.4.9 Fish production has been on the decline since 2002. For small-scale fishing, most of the catch is exported fraudulently, especially to the countries of origin of the expatriate fishermen who make up more than 80% of small-scale fishermen. In 2002, the country imported 82,017 tonnes of fish valued at nearly CFAF 16 billion¹².

3.2.4.10 Available statistics do not allow for direct measurement of the contribution of projects to the above trends. However, the volume of credits allocated to cattle grazing, pig rearing and fish-farming reflect the impact of such projects. About CFAF 62 million was granted to PARFAR (cattle and pig rearing), an amount that is small compared to sector needs. The activities of the Livestock and Fisheries Development Project focused on the technical supervision of 2,750 operators and the training of 395 fishermen, fish-farmers and fishmongers. As at 31 December 2006, the sum of CFA.F 150,442,000 was loaned to 194 beneficiaries for poultry farming, stockbreeding (small livestock), the rearing of monogastric animals, fish-farming and traditional stockbreeding. Impact assessments will make it possible to evaluate the impact of this form of contribution.

Forestry products and natural resource protection

3.2.4.11 The PSFE provides for reforestation of 5,000 ha per year, which will ultimately yield an output of one million to 1½ million m³ per year, after a thirty year period¹³. By the end of the seventh year (2006), PAFRA had developed 2958 hectares of forest plantations (70% of objectives), which is an 8% contribution to the national target, although interventions in existing forests (bushfire and termite control) represented only 4.5% of objectives (177. 50 ha out of 4 000 ha targeted).

¹¹ Statistical Yearbook, 2006 .

¹² Statistical Yearbook 2006

¹³ National Reforestation Program, June 2006

Rural infrastructures

3.2.4.12 *Roads* are the main means of transport for goods and persons. They handle close to 90% of the domestic passenger traffic and almost 75% of the freight transport. Over the past ten years, there has been very robust growth in road traffic of 9% on paved roads and 6% on unpaved roads. The network is characterized by uneven regional distribution and poor maintenance¹⁴.

3.2.4.13 The marketing of sector produce is undermined by major constraints such as the high cost of transport, and consequently of products, the inaccessibility of certain areas, and limited access to food markets. These constraints stem from the poor quality (climate, maintenance) and limited size of the road network, the high proportion of old and poorly maintained vehicles, and arbitrary controls by the police who extort money (up to 30% of the total value of food crops).

3.2.4.14 The outputs of the Bank's rural roads projects over the period barely address the sector needs. In PARFAR, no road has been rehabilitated 6 months to the end of the project. Under LFDP, 27 km of roads have been maintained (84% of the target). Considering the rehabilitation needs, it is hard to understand why only 32 km of roads have been retained in this project.

3.2.4.15 As for the other marketing infrastructures, the Bank has facilitated procurement of storage facilities under PAFAR. The loan conditions could account for the fact that only 45% of storage warehouses¹⁵ and 85% of sale points have been constructed. LFDP and the reformulated MIDENO II have supplied fishmonger groups/associations with cold stores and ice-making plants. Stalls have been constructed for fish vendors in Limbe.

Microfinance

3.2.4.16 Microfinance is an important pillar of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) prepared by the Cameroon Government. To facilitate access to appropriate financial services for the marginalized, the Government opted to encourage bottom-up grassroots initiatives. Accordingly, it published a *microfinance national policy statement*, whose strategy is to: (i) improve interaction between microfinance institutions, and between such institutions and their local environment; (ii) create and develop an administrative, legal and judicial framework that is conducive to the development of microfinance institutions; (iii) promote professionalism and transparency in the management of microfinance institutions; (iv) consolidate and extend the harmonious development of microfinance institutions all over the national territory; (v) encourage partnership agreements between development projects, NGOs, microfinance institutions and the banking system; and (vi) bring together microfinance institutions and socio-professional farmers organizations.

3.2.4.17 In the same light, the Government has negotiated and launched, with the help of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), a microfinance sector consolidation and development project in Cameroon known as the National Microfinance Program Support Project (PPMF). The goal of this Government project is to facilitate access

¹⁴ CSP 2005 - 2009

¹⁵ Contribution of beneficiaries was 25%, compared to 10% for PREPAFEN .

to community financial services for the marginalized, with special emphasis on rural areas¹⁶. An OECD study shows that the sector receives only 6% of bank credits, indicating that there is insufficient rural financing¹⁷.

3.2.4.18 Microcredit is one of the components of farmers' income improvement projects. A selected number of microfinance institutions were refinanced to manage microcredits. This component was part of the strategy for developing a special mechanism to finance rural activities (CSP 2002-2004). This action has become sensitive because of recovery difficulties in certain projects, and therefore calls for new measures. The closing of FONADER did not make it possible for the two structures set up under SOWEDA IRDP to manage this component. Despite its huge number of beneficiaries, PARFAR has a recovery rate of 31%. LFDP (cofinanced with ABEDA) has a better rate of 87% for 194 loans. PAFRA obtained a rate of 98%. About CFA.F 212,442,000 were distributed through PARFAR and LFDP over the last five years. These fairly acceptable results should not conceal practical difficulties in the microfinance sub-sector where certain MFIs need capacity building in credit management and MFI governance and where customers also need to be sensitized on the importance of recovery.

3.2.4.19 Considering the size of the portfolio and despite the few satisfactory results, the implementation rate of operations was not satisfactory enough to significantly influence sector performance. Such poor performance is mainly due to inefficiency observed in the different operations (below). Other factors include the implementation of large-scale projects without an adequate management mechanism (e.g. PARFAR), and the introduction of sub-components with no noticeable long-term impact (LFDP). The first projects (MIDENO and SOWEDA) had unimplemented components that had to be transferred to subsequent projects (Grassfield and Rumpi). Insufficient and/or incompetent technical assistance made it difficult to implement certain components (case of PARFAR). *On the whole, efficacy is deemed unsatisfactory.*

3.2.5 Efficiency

3.2.5.1 In the absence of calculated ERRs for completed projects, implementation deadlines are used in evaluating efficiency in project implementation. An examination of the table below shows that the number of days between approval and first disbursement ranges from 562 for SP-SFSP (grant) to 848 for PARFAR. The average for the 7 operations approved over the 1996-2004 period is 658 days, or more than twenty months.

3.2.5.2 Such poor performance stems from the number and complexity of some conditions, and from the sanction of suspension imposed on most of the projects (PAFRA, Livestock and Fisheries, PNRVA, Grassfield, Rumpi). These suspensions, which lasted for up to two years for certain projects, were due mainly to problems of governance (lack of familiarity with Bank procedures, difficulties in setting up a competent management team, dubious financial management) noted by supervision missions.

¹⁶ Anne-Claude CREUSOT : Status of Microfinance in Cameroon, BIM No. - 09 May 2006.

¹⁷ Analysis of macroeconomic and agricultural development policy interaction in Cameroon, Study initiated by the OECD /Division of Economic Policies in non-member economies, in collaboration with MINADER; Conducted by Jean Pascal NKOU, 2006

Table 4:
Number of days between approval and various project stages

PROJECTS	No. of days b/w approval and signature	No. of days b/w approval and loan effectiveness	No. of days b/w approval and first disbursement	No. of days b/w approval and initial date of project completion	No. of days b/w approval and date of first report	No. of days b/w approval and date of 2nd report
MIDENO II (REF)	373	568	654	4395		
SOWEDA IRDP	133	781	2784	4848	5214	5669
PNRVA	146	443	663	2726	2907	3272
SP-SFSP	77	581	562	1656		
PAFRA	23	252	365	2881	3062	
PARFAR	141	259	848	2377		
LFDP	51	465	614	2572	3302	
GRASSFIELD	288	700	700	2472	2837	
RUMPI	240	652	730	2059	2789	
Average	164	522	880	2887	3352	4471

Source: Based on data from the project list table (1996-2004)

3.2.5.3 Another source of inefficiency was difficult communication between the structures involved in the management of certain projects: the PIU and the FAO had to resort to Bank arbitration for clarification on the method of financial management for the SP-SFSP. PAFRA's defaulting coordinator was replaced with difficulty because of non-conformity with Bank procedures. Projects placed under SOWEDA (Rumpi and PEDEP) were plagued by internal conflict between the official responsible for the financial services and SOWEDA management.

3.2.5.4 Project reformulations (MIDENO II and SOWEDA IRDP) made the country lose available funds. The initial cost of SOWEDA IRDP (1985) was UA 70.42 million for ADB financing, and UA 76.48 million for ADF financing. The reevaluation of 1991 showed the figures UA 38.3 million and UA 41.57 million respectively. With the harmonization of ADB and ADF units of account, the loan came to UA 32,563,937. MIDENO II, which amounted to CFA.F 21.544 billion, was scaled down to CFA.F 3.8 billion. Funds for the IRDP study (financed 80% by the Bank and 20% by the country) could have been diverted to concrete activities. This loss of funds reflects the poor governance that led to the sanction of suspension imposed on the country for several years. *The efficiency of the operations is very unsatisfactory.*

3.2.6 Impact on institutional development

3.2.6.1 Bank Group support to project design and management helped to enhance the competence of project management/implementation units responsible for daily project monitoring. MIDENO II benefitted from a training seminar on project planning, monitoring/evaluation and on microfinance in Swaziland¹⁸. The Bank organized three training seminars on procurement procedures for SOWEDA IRDP¹⁹. As part of training

¹⁸ Project completion report, second NWRDP, 2002, P.75

¹⁹ Project completion report, SWIRDP, 2001, P.25

activities to build IRAD's institutional capacity, a training course was organized on ADB procurement procedures for employed accountants and new recruits, and a refresher course for managers²⁰. The training focused on project planning, implementation and control, performance indicators, and the monitoring/evaluation system. The positive impact is visible in improvement in management over the past few years, as compared to start-up difficulties due to staff shortcomings (1997-2007 portfolio reviews). The GRASSFIELD monitoring/evaluation system has been validated, and the developed tools are ready for use²¹. The impact on institutional development is deemed satisfactory. However, the status of PIU staff could be a handicap to the sustainability of Government structures. If staff members are civil servants who will return to their services at the end of the project, their skills will remain available to the Ministry; however, if they are temporary staff who will seek employment outside the public service, then there will be the risk of losing skilled labor. Training, open to PIUs and senior staff from Ministries, who are likely to continue working, should be envisaged.

3.2.7 Sustainability

3.2.7.1 Cameroon reached the decision point of the enhanced HIPC Initiative in October 2001. On 17 June 2006, the Paris Club decided to reduce Cameroon's public debt by €2.7 billion or 99% of total loans owed to the 19 creditors of the Paris Club. This debt relief followed an IMF and World Bank report of 28 April 2006, which confirmed that Cameroon had reached the "Completion Point", meaning that it had complied with the macroeconomic criteria of good governance, which opens the way to debt reduction under the IMF/WB HIPC Initiative. For example, the Completion Point enabled France, Cameroon's leading partner, to commit assistance of €18 million over 5 years, including 63 million for agricultural development. Total debt relief expected from the ADF under this arrangement is estimated at US\$ 229 million for the duration of the initiative, which is fifty years (2006-2054). Cameroon prepared its PRSP based, in part, on the availability of HIPC funds.

3.2.7.2 As concerns agricultural research, IRAD submitted a program financing request to the Government for 2007-2011. The request highlights the benefits of Bank assistance and requests for registration in ADF X. Unfortunately Cameroon's ARD sector was not retained in ADF X. Considering the number of results obtained, if no other alternative is found, demotivation may force researchers to seek employment in NGOs or in other countries.

3.2.7.3 An analysis of the RSDS calls for some observations based on the MTEF. In the various sectoral strategies presented, ongoing projects or those whose budgets have been validated can promote the sustainability of outputs of Bank projects: (i) the plantain sector revival project, (ii) the development program for village palm plantations, (iii) the protection of coffee/cocoa farms, (iv) the marketing and infrastructure components of the PNDRT, (v) swamp valley development projects, (vi) program for providing financial support to the agricultural sector through MC2s (community mutual funds) and MUFFA (African Women's Mutual Funds).

3.2.7.4 Projects without financing (which are being prepared or still searching for funds) can ensure the sustainability of certain outputs if financing is obtained in the short-term. Several projects have thus been retained to improve agricultural competitiveness, the

²⁰ Project completion report PNRVA, 2006, p.30

²¹ GP-DERUDEP, Progress report, 2006, P.7

development of farmers' organizations, agricultural extension, water supply, community development, improved living standards, and sector financing. Renovation of the statutory framework is also part of this objective. Hence, technical viability will depend on obtaining financing.

3.2.7.5 As concerns forestry, it is a continuous activity that should be funded with domestic resources. External assistance should only come as support. A special forestry development fund was set up by Decree No. 96-237-PM of 10 April 1996 to finance the management, conservation and rural development of forestry resources. Delays in making transfers from this fund could slow the pace of reforestation. Projects could be submitted to ITTO and donors (multilateral and bilateral), including the Bank, that have credits for reforestation and desert control. Local councils and communities could be co-opted into the process so long as they are sufficiently sensitized. This existing, albeit unproven, potential does not make it possible to consider the sustainability of outputs as satisfactory. *Rather, it is unsatisfactory.*

3.3 Contribution to Development

3.3.1 Social Development and Gender

3.3.1.1 The individual beneficiaries of the PAFRA, who established agroforestry and forest plantations, represented 25%, 16.5% and 1.4% in the North-West, West and Adamaoua provinces respectively in 2005. These figures reflect the cultural dimension of women's autonomy in the various regions²². Under the PARFAR, nearly half of the 434 seed producers are women's or predominantly women's CIGs. Women constitute 58.51% of credit beneficiaries²³. Microprojects enabled these women to increase their incomes, and consequently improve their family well-being. The PARFAR notes with satisfaction the decline in HIV/AIDS prevalence, especially among women, thanks to sensitization on the pandemic. The concept of advocacy has developed more among women due to educational discussions and training. In 2002, 30% of the 130 researchers recruited by IRAD were women²⁴. About 49% of the 4,963 credit beneficiaries under the Reformulated MIDENO project were women²⁵. The long-lasting result is the greater capacity of association observed in the various projects. The main criteria for sustainability remains access to financing sources for programmed activities. The women's associations in Bamenda, who are beneficiaries of reformulated MIDENO II microcredits, still have no access to financing five years after the closure of the project. This situation raises two issues: (i) the refinancing of MFIs that grant loans to farmers, and (ii) income stability for such farmers, that is financial viability for them. *Women's contribution to development is satisfactory.*

3.3.2 Environment

3.3.2.1 All the projects were classified in Category II of the Bank's guidelines on the environment. This means that the negative impacts can be mitigated during project implementation by adopting appropriate mitigating measures.

²² Annual Work Report (from 1st January to 31 December 2005), PAFRA

²³ PARFAR progress report, March 2007

²⁴ PNRVA Completion report, July 2006

²⁵ Project completion report, second north west development project (21/06/1991 TO 30/06/2002)

3.3.2.2 The various projects provide for: (i) the establishment of an environmental management plan; (ii) monitoring and implementation of this plan by the monitoring/evaluation service in collaboration with the provincial delegations for the environment, and (iii) the inclusion of environmental protection measures in works specifications and the terms of reference of control offices.

3.3.2.3 Provincial Delegations for the Environment and Forestry were charged with the environmental monitoring and management of the projects through appropriate implementation of the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP). They regularly monitor environmental parameters on the Grassfield and Rumpi project sites, and forward the results to the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry (MINEF).

3.3.2.4 Cameroon is a signatory of the Yaounde declaration made during the donors' roundtable of July 2003, which aims at sustainable forest and wildlife development to promote biodiversity conservation and food security in the Congo Basin. This declaration is part of the American initiative launched during the Rio+10 Conference called the "*Congo Basin Forest Partnership Initiative*". The goal of the program is to support the management of 10 million ha of national parks and protected areas, as well as the integrated management of 20 million ha of productive forests.

3.3.2.5 Positive impacts on the environment come from PAFRA and concern: (i) the easing of pressure on natural resources. Indeed, by promoting the development of small forest and tree plantations, the project has helped to address the demand for fuelwood and timber, which is currently driven by population growth and rapid urbanization; furthermore, the project helped to preserve biodiversity through the maintenance of natural ecosystems and habitats; (ii) the development of agroforestry techniques (hedges, windbreaks, fruit or forest trees, leguminous plants, contour farming, etc.), given the current pressure on farmland, helped to reduce the risk of erosion in many areas and promoted soil protection and fertility through better vegetation cover; (iii) better development of species through more efficient processing of resources; (iv) the reduction of wind, which will have a catalytic effect on rains and CO₂ absorption (a microclimate that is more humid and more favorable to plant growth).

3.3.2.6 Cameroon's National Reforestation Program (NRP) has adopted the forestry policy measures identified under the Forestry/Environment Sector Program (FESP)²⁶. Bank interventions under the PAFRA contribute to this action. On the whole, 1900 ha of forest and agro-forestry plantations were developed (eucalyptus and medicinal plants). The technical approaches to seed production under the PARFAR advocate erosion control and promote soil fertility (introduction to mixed fertilization (chemical fertilizer and farm manure) and separate fertilization (sub-surface and broadcast), row seeding, weeding and earthing-up). The same applies to plant production technologies developed under the PNRVA; they concern the development of improved farming practices to improve yields and conserve soil fertility, and the protection of plants against disease, parasites and pests. The surveillance committee set up under the Livestock and Fisheries Project in the South-West Province will control overgrazing and fraudulent fishing. The construction of a new slaughterhouse that complies with hygienic standards under this project will help to enhance community health protection. The same applies to the construction of latrines under the PARFAR. The Bank's intervention in *environmental protection is satisfactory*.

²⁶ National Reforestation Program, MINFOF, June 2006

3.3.3 Community Participation

3.3.3.1 With World Bank support, Cameroon conducted the agricultural sector program prioritization study in 1996 and 1997, which led to a participatory survey in the country's 10 provinces. Participants at the provincial level were chosen depending on their knowledge of sector problems in their region. 50% of them were rural farmers and the rest were experts from public, private and denominational bodies, and representatives of NGOs and farmer organizations²⁷. The Bank used the results of this study to prepare the 1999-2001 CSP. Over the years, the Bank has improved its project identification and formulation approach. The participatory approach adopted by projects (e.g. the participatory development and decentralized projects such as the Grassfield and Rumpi projects, the special food security program support project) makes it possible to examine the needs of the poorest farmers, especially women. This approach enables beneficiaries to improve their capacity in conducting technical, financial and commercial operations professionally in order to ensure the viability of their interventions.

3.3.3.2 The consultative process was widely used to prepare the PRSP. Piloted by the technical monitoring committee for economic reforms, the PRSP preparation underwent several stages as follows: (i) a discussion workshop on the key factors of poverty and organization methodology held in January 2000; (ii) participatory consultations in the country with the civil society and economic operators in March/April 2000 and in November/December 2001; (iii) a workshop for the presentation of the document in May 2000; (iv) the organization of a national workshop in June 2001; and (v) seminars to provide feedback on the results of the March/April 2002 consultations. Cameroon's development partners show a willingness to fund the activities selected in the PRSP²⁸. *The Bank's intervention in community participation is deemed satisfactory.*

3.3.4 Private Sector Development

3.3.4.1 The 1996-1998 CSP identified the main constraints on private sector development that the Government has to address; these are: (i) the financial sector crisis; (ii) the accumulation of payments arrears by the Government; (iii) limited infrastructure; and (iv) a deficient statutory and legal framework. The 2002-2004 CSP highlighted many possible interventions that exist in Cameroon's private sector, notably in food-processing, timber, off-season vegetables, flowers and tropical fruits, cotton processing and seafood processing. However, apart from PAFRA's processing component on the felling of natural forests by technical support mobile teams (TSMTs), no action was identified in the abovementioned sectors.

The Bank's contribution over the period was limited to the financing of MFIs that are partners in projects with a microcredit component, and to consultants that intervene in project implementation (training firms, agricultural engineering firms, construction companies, etc.). Under the PAFRA, the MFI Capcol was able to extend its network to areas that were not previously covered, thanks to the Bank. All the construction works (dams, rural roads, markets, etc.) created temporary jobs in project areas.

²⁷ Analysis of Cameroon's agricultural policies, OECD, May 2006

²⁸ 2002 - 2004 CSP

3.3.4.2 The Government offers many opportunities for interaction with private organizations; however, public-private dialogue (PPD) is not systematic and institutionalized, and is dominated by informal consultative frameworks; (ii) the consultation frameworks are multipolar and uncoordinated; (iii) farmer organizations (FOs) have difficulties speaking with one voice; (iv) it is not easy to prove the operational existence of most FOs or the professional status of FO members; and (v) FOs have little capacity to influence agricultural policies in Cameroon²⁹. The Government should speed up the sector consolidation process to create intervention conditions for donors.

3.3.4.3 The efficiency of interventions is deemed very unsatisfactory.

3.3.5 Regional Integration

3.3.5.1 Cameroon's geographical position and economic weight within CEMAC predisposes it to regional integration. IRAD is the partner of many research and development support bodies at the regional (PRASAC, CARBAF, CORAF, ADRAO, CNRA, OAPI, CPI) and international (IITA, ICRAF, CIFOR, IRD, CIRAD, World Fish Center, etc.) levels. At the national level, MINRESI plans to organize the first forum of national agricultural research partners for the mobilization of political, technical and financial support. The outputs of the project will help to enhance this partnership. The Cameroon Government perceived the PNRVA as the first phase of a process that would be extended to the sub-region in the second phase. However, since there is no integration strategy within ECCAS, the request sent to donors has not yet received any positive feedback. However, consolidating the outputs remains a priority.

3.3.5.2 The Special Food Security Program (SFSP) is consistent with the regional food security strategy adopted by ECCAS member-countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad). Apart from Gabon and the Republic of Congo, the SFSP is operational in the other four countries (Cameroon, CAR, Equatorial Guinea and Chad). SFSP formulation has been completed in the Republic of Congo, and is underway in Gabon. Phase I started in 1998 in the CAR, in 1999 in Equatorial Guinea and Chad, and in 2000 in Cameroon.

3.3.5.3 Food crops from the MIDENO and SOWEDA project areas, especially plantains and cassava, are sold through crossborder trade with Gabon. The outputs of the Bank-financed projects thus help to consolidate such integration. However, despite this opportunity, the Bank's intervention in regional integration in the sector is marginal. The impact would be greater if the outputs of the PNRVA and SP-SFSP were consolidated. The development of sub-regional projects could speed up the regional integration process. *Contribution to regional integration is deemed unsatisfactory.*

²⁹ Study on "the structuring of farmer organizations with a view to institutionalizing public-private dialogue for agricultural development in Cameroon, Presented by Norbert Monkam, President AGRO – PME Fondation

4. PERFORMANCE OF PARTNERS

4.1 The Government and Executing Agencies

4.1.1 Considering the entire process, from the preparation of the NAP right up to the RSDS, the Government has always preferred a participatory approach, which helps to identify the real needs of the people. Appropriate strategies and programs have been prepared with the support of development partners. The Government's real problem was translating these commitments into effective budget allocations. The recurrent problem blamed on the Government is the non-availability of counterpart funds on time and in the right amount. While highlighting this difficulty, the portfolio reviews have recommended measures that the Borrower needs to implement.

4.1.2 Although the Government has had some relative success in establishing project coordination and monitoring departments and units (DCET, CTS, CAA), the PIUs on the field were set up with some difficulty. Almost all the projects had start-up problems due to difficulties in appointing a competent managerial team acceptable to all. Six of the nine projects encountered problems in installing the coordinator. However, after the various supervision missions, the mechanism has substantially improved owing to new recruitments and capacity building. Over the 1996-2004 period, the performance of the Government and executing agencies can be deemed unsatisfactory because of good governance shortcomings. However, there have been improvements within the PIUs since 2006. There is a high probability that satisfactory results will be obtained (Portfolio review 2004, 2007).

4.2 The Bank Group

The Bank's procurement and disbursement systems have been a major source of difficulty for executing agencies. Ignorance or poor mastery of procedures were partly responsible for the poor performance of a number of projects. However, it is difficult to blame the Bank's general performance on the complexity of its procedures. The responsibility has to be shared with the Borrower. Although inefficiency in procurement and disbursement was a major factor, implementation difficulties persisted despite the supervisions conducted. The Bank attained a rate of 1.5 supervision missions per year over the period. In the case of MIDENO II, after the withdrawal of KFW and IsDB, which initially cofinanced the project, the Bank, driven by its concern to complete initiated projects, accepted to reformulate the project. The Bank also demonstrated its flexibility by accepting extensions that were necessary for project finalization. It organized training for PIUs (1998, 2001). During the PRSP and RSDS preparation, it jointly conducted additional studies with IFAD as part of a rural sector review in May 2002. These studies facilitated discussions with several categories of operators on special topics such as: (i) the improvement of agricultural productivity; (ii) improvement of the efficiency of the competitiveness of agricultural products (discussed with IRAD researchers, the exporters' group GEX, the Competitiveness Committee, federations of farmer organizations); (iii) the institutional diagnosis of farmer organizations; (iv) the institutional restructuring of development companies and private agro-industrial companies; (v) the diagnosis of real estate constraints; (vi) the marketing of non-wood forestry products; and (vii) the revitalization of the rubber and oil palm sub-sectors.

After opening a Country Program Office in 2004, the Bank opened its Resident Regional Office in Cameroon in 2006. The Bank's performance over the period is satisfactory.

4.3 Other Donors

4.3.1 Several multilateral and bilateral partners intervene in Cameroon. In addition to the PNVRA, the World Bank participated in 2002 in the RSR and in the formulation of DSDSR strategic guidelines. Its *Country Assistance Strategy* (CAS) for 2004-2006 was adopted in 2003. This strategy addresses the Government's long-term goals of poverty reduction by focusing on two main pillars: (i) consolidation of the institutional framework in order to improve the effectiveness of poverty reduction measures; and (ii) support to private sector development in order to diversify the economy and boost growth. Future World Bank interventions will essentially focus on participatory and community development, the environment, forestry and transport.

4.3.2 *The European Union (EU)* intervenes through a strategy based on the general framework of the PRSP process and the HIPC Initiative, and aimed at supporting the Government's economic and structural reforms as well as sectoral policies on crop sector support (STABEX) and poverty reduction. Assistance provided under the 9th EDF focuses on two priority areas: the transport sector, and macroeconomic and institutional support to PRS implementation. In addition to its focus areas, the EC will provide specific support in crosscutting sectors, such as environmental protection and institutional capacity building.

4.3.3 *International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)*: IFAD currently intervenes through a *Community Development Support Program* (CDSP) and a *Root and Tuber Crop Development Program* (RTCDP).

4.3.4 *The United Nations* prepared a *UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)* to highlight the role that the UN System can play in helping countries achieve the MDGs. This plan focuses mainly on combating poverty and hunger, curbing endemic diseases and perinatal and infant mortality, promoting women's rights and access to education, increasing access to information and improving employment prospects for the young. The rural development sector needs to play a key role in achieving the objectives of food security, hunger reduction and environmental protection.

4.3.5 The *FAO*, in addition to supporting the implementation of the PRSA and SFSP, revised the *Agricultural Development Strategy - by 2010* to extend it to 2015. This document is the preliminary stage in preparing the national strategy for monitoring the recommendations of the World Food Summit. Under NEPAD, the FAO provides its support and experience in the areas of agriculture and forestry sector development programs.

4.3.6 *German Cooperation*: The projects implemented by the German Cooperation (GTZ) are in four priority areas, namely (i) the environment; (ii) health; (iii) transport; and (iv) decentralization, community development and governance. In the rural sector, Germany supports several projects on sustainable forest ecosystems and natural resource protection, self-reliance for farmer organizations, community development and the reorganization of the pest-control strategy.

4.3.7 *French Cooperation:* The current key French operations in the rural sector relate to: (i) farming strategies and the professionalization of agriculture; (ii) decentralization and consolidation of rural infrastructure; (iii) capacity building in agronomic research; and (iv) institutional development of MINADER, MINEPIA and MINFOF. HIPC funds will be used in funding poverty reduction programs and projects under the *Three-Year Debt Reduction-Development Contracts* (C2Ds) negotiated between the two countries.

5. OVERALL PERFORMANCE

5.1 Despite the Bank's involvement in the preparation of sector development strategies and in the financing and supervision of operations, its assistance to the agriculture and rural development sector has not really helped Cameroon to meaningfully address sector constraints over the period under study. A poor record of bad governance, previous to this period, translated into Bank strategies that were relevant in theory but incoherent in practice. The extension of project deadlines made it impossible to intervene in a sustained and diversified manner in the sector.

5.2 Only one out of the nine operations considered in the study was not declared a problem or potentially problem project. This project, which is a grant (SP-SFSP), was not subject to any long extension. All the others were extended at least once. The induced inefficiency made it impossible to obtain positive results. However, mention should be made of achievements in agricultural research, which was boosted and deserves to be consolidated, the IGAs of the different projects which need to be made sustainable through local financing, and its contribution to environmental protection.

5.3 Supervision missions were undertaken at a satisfactory annual rate of 1.5 per project. However, the quality of missions could be improved in terms of composition and duration. This poor performance partly stems from centralization at the Bank, a constraint which has now been addressed through the opening of a resident regional office. Its participation in the CMB reinforces this dialogue. Over the period, the co-financing strategy was not very successful within the sector. *The Bank's overall assistance is deemed unsatisfactory.*

6. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Lessons

The main lessons drawn from this study are as follows:

1. The inconsistency in sector interventions (registration, or otherwise, in successive ADFs) reflects a rather short- and medium-term view of interventions. The issue of the duration of the CSP period is therefore pertinent.
2. The recurrent problem of disbursements at the Bank cited by the Borrower as one of the bottlenecks to project implementation reflects the inadequacy of the new measures adopted by the Bank. The extension of deadlines could also be attributed to the technical department responsible for project files. Task managers do not have enough prerogatives in project monitoring.

3. Large-scale projects (in a wide geographical area) without an adequate management mechanism have little chance of achieving satisfactory results because of implementation and supervision difficulties.
4. The inadequate involvement of Ministerial services in project management could undermine the sustainability of institutional development.
5. Projects with a high number of components have little chance of producing satisfactory results; the same applies to projects with very few components.
6. The search for cofinancing could enhance dialogue between partners and speed up the harmonization process.
7. The negative impacts of agricultural sector liberalization (export crops) have led farmers to revert to food crop cultivation, which has enormous processing potential. However, the weak link in the system remains the lack of storage and marketing infrastructure.
8. IRAD is an institution that enjoys sub-regional renown. Supporting its activities could reinforce sub-regional integration.
9. The SP-SFSP obtained results that can promote regional integration.
10. The inadequate formal dialogue between the Government and the private sector does not facilitate access to agricultural financing, and consequently does not promote the development of the sector.
11. Limited access to local financing is a constraint on the sustainability of project outputs.

6.2 Recommendations

For the Bank:

1. With regard to the harmonization of assistance, the Bank needs to address the issue of CSP periodicity by adopting a longer term vision;
2. Give preference to projects with a reduced number of components over a smaller geographical area;
3. Give more decision-making powers to task managers in order to improve communication between the Bank and the PIUs;
4. Initiate studies to identify viable sub-sectors of the agricultural private sector or use the existing project databanks (RSDS, NEPAD). The MTEF has identified projects to be financed that could revitalize the sector. Support could be given to programs that promote the competitiveness of agricultural products and the development of professional farmer organizations. Supporting the development of agricultural credit and contributing to the creation of specialized financial establishments are actions that could contribute to the development of economic activities in

rural areas. The Bank's strategy of giving priority to infrastructures under the current CSP could promote the development of agricultural markets that generate private sector growth;

5. Prospect for possibilities of co-financing sub-regional projects (agricultural research, food security). The FAO pilots the sub-regional food security program. The Bank needs to participate in the consolidation of the pilot phase (SP-SFSP). The Bank launched an identification study for the Agricultural Research Regional Integration Project (PIRRA). Considering IRAD's achievements, this institution could be retained as the benchmark structure in the implementation of this project.

For the Borrower:

1. Establish a resource mobilization strategy that will lead to timely availability of counterpart funds;
2. Give priority to the sector during implementation of the donor-supported "Governance" program;
3. Create the conditions for sustained dialogue with the agricultural private sector in order to develop the existing potential;
4. Promote the development of the seed producer profession in rural areas;
5. Encourage sub-regional project development initiatives in the areas of research and food security;
6. Encourage the development of microfinance in Cameroon's rural areas for the agriculture and rural development sector.

BASIC INDICATORS ON CAMEROON'S AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY

INDICATORS	UNIT	1979-1981	1989-1991	1999-2001	2002	2003	2004
Population and agricultural labour							
Population	1000 persons	8754	11663	15113	15729	16018	16296
Rural population/total	percentage	69	60	51	49	49	48
Population density	persons/km2	19	25	32	34	34	...
Agricultural labor	1000 persons	73	69	59	57	56	55
Agricultural labor - Total labor	percentage	2694	3253	3691	3723	3729	3728
Land use							
Area of land	1000 ha	49540	46540	46540	46540	46540	...
Arable land and permanent crops	1000 ha	6934	7170	7160	7160	7160	...
Arable land	1000 ha	5906	5943	5960	5960	5960	...
Irrigation	1000 ha	15	23	26	26	28	...
Agricultural production - major products							
Plantains	1000 tonnes	1022	988	1169	1237	1275	1315
Indigenous bonin meat	1000 tonnes	40	72	89	83	83	84
Cotton fibres	1000 tonnes	31	46	87	103	95	100
Indices de la nourriture							
Food	199-01=100	60	72	100	105	108	109
Food per capita	199-01=100	104	94	100	101	102	101
International trade - Exports							
Total	US\$ million	1190.7	1707.6	1789	1900	2300	2600
Agriculture	US\$ million	592.6	512.3	292.5	479.6	587.5	654
Major exports (proportion in agriculture)							
Cocoa beans	percentage	30.6	23.5	21.7	39.1	30.5	35.2
Cotton fibres	percentage	6.1	14	19.4	19.2	18.5	22.1
Green coffee	percentage	43.8	36	19.8	10.9	11.8	11.7
International trade - Imports							
Total	US\$ million	1433.4	1392	1511.7	1900	2200	2400
Agriculture	US\$ million	124.7	209.2	240.4	173	345.5	400.7
Major imports (proportion in agriculture)							
Hulled rice	percentage	6	7.6	15.8	23.1	16.3	21.2
Wheat	percentage	12.2	2	20.1	15.1	17.7	17.2
Barley maize	percentage	15.4	15.9	9.3	9.5	10.5	9.1
Agricultural balance of trade							
Exports - Imports	US\$ million	467.8	303.1	52.2	306.7	241.9	253.3
Inputs							
Total population/Arable land	person/ha	1	2	3	3	3	...
Use of fertilizers/Arable land	kg nutr/ha	6	4	8	6
Service tractor/Arable land	no./1000ha	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	...
Food consumption							
Food energy availability per capita	kcal/day	2090	2090	2270			
Food protein availability per capita	g/day	57	50	59			

INDICATEURS	UNITE	2004	INDICATEURS	UNITE	1994-2004
PRODUIT INTERIEUR BRUT	Millions US\$	15800	Taux de croissance annuel		
Part du PIB agricole dans le PIB total	pourcentage	41.1	PIB	pourcentage	
Produit National Brut par habitant	US\$	890	PIB agricole	pourcentage	

Notes: la valeur ajoutée de l'agriculture et la main d'œuvre agricole incluent les pêches, les forêts et chasse. Production et commerce agricole incluent cultures et élevage.

Sources: FAOSTAT: banque Mondiale - Site Web

CSP MATRIX

TABLE: 2002 - 2004 CSP

Item/Sector Vision/Structural Reforms	Government Strategy and Measures	Bank Assistance Strategy: Overall Goals	Intermediate Results and Outputs expected from Bank Assistance	Key Success Factors/ Risks and Assumptions	Performance Indicators Risks and Evaluation of Outputs
<u>Development of rural activities</u>	<p>Diversification and processing of agricultural, pastoral and forestry exports;</p> <p>Development of a special mechanism for financing rural activities;</p> <p>Extension of the coverage of the national social security system to rural communities;</p> <p>Increase in output and farmers' incomes;</p> <p>Improvement of environmental factors and an attractive framework through adaptation of financing, the improvement of real estate resources, infrastructure (rural roads, village water supply, etc.);</p>	<p>Increase sector production and competitiveness and promote activities that increase the incomes of rural communities.</p>	<p>Increase in agricultural production as compared to 2000/2001. Incomes of rural communities increased in 2002/2003.</p>	<p>Government's determination to implement prescribed measures and adherence of rural communities</p>	<p>Share of agricultural production in GDP and percentage of increase in agricultural exports. Reduction in the number of poor people.</p>

TABLE (continued) °
1996-1998 CSP

Item/Sector Vision/Structural Reforms	Government Strategy and Measures	Bank Assistance Strategy: Overall Goals	Intermediate Results and Outputs expected from Bank Assistance	Key Success Factors/ Risks and Assumptions	Performance Indicators Risks and Evaluation of Outputs
<u>Development of rural activities</u>	<p>In order to improve agricultural sector performance from an annual growth rate of 4% to 5% as from 1996/1997, the Government decided to apply a strategy based on the following guidelines, in accordance with its Agricultural Development Policy Letter (ADPL) of April 1996:</p> <p>(j) establishment of a more attractive framework through price liberalization and the marketing of agricultural products and inputs, and revision of the statutory framework to reduce the administrative barriers to the circulation of goods;</p> <p>(ii) improvement of the institutional framework and restructuring/privatization of public enterprises. By so doing, the Government hopes to withdraw from about fifteen public enterprises;</p> <p>(iii) better natural resource management through implementation of the National Environmental Management Plan.</p>				<p>To ensure total and sustainable improvement of the situation, there is need to accelerate: (i) agricultural sector transformation by setting up an attractive institutional framework; (ii) the development of production by cutting factor costs; (iii) improvement of infrastructure; (iv) better environmental and forestry management; and (v) improvement of the agricultural research and extension system. That is why the Bank is expected to participate in actions that underpin or accompany reforms aimed at liberalizing the various agricultural sectors, regardless of whether such reforms relate to privatization of public enterprises or the establishment of a more attractive institutional framework. The Bank could step up its current intervention in favor of agro-industrial small and medium-sized enterprises, by supplementing the scope of action of the line of credit granted to the CAC (<i>Crédit Agricole</i> - Agricultural Credit Bank of Cameroon) by acquiring shares or granting loans to the companies to be privatized, through its Private Sector Unit.</p>

BASIC PROJECT DATA

PROJECTS	Approval Date	Date of Signature	Effectiveness Date	Amount Approved	Undisbursed Amount	Total Disbursed	% Disb'ment	Status	Window
Sector: Agriculture and rural development									
SUPPORT TO NAT. AGRIC. RESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (P.N.R.V.A) Project completion: 30/06/2007	15.07.1998	08.12.1998	03.05.2000	7000000.00	572893.21	6229243.97	88.99	Active	ADF
LIVESTOCK AND FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Project completion: 31/12/2007	16.12.1998	05.02.1999	21.08.2000	4590000	1555938.43	3000214.91	65.36	Active	ADF
SUPPORT TO RURAL FORESTRY AND AGROFORESTRY Project completion: 30/06/2007	10.02.1999	05.03.1999	19.06.2002	780000	2513.76	777486.24	99.68	Active	ADF
	10.02.1999	05.03.1999	10.05.2000	4130000	621069.61	3508930.39	84.96		ADF
HOUSEHOLD INCOME IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM Project completion: 30/12/2007	28.06.2001	16.11.2001	28.04.2003	14000000	9977085.34	3973027	28.38	Active	ADF
PARTICIPATORY AND DECENTRALIZED RURAL DEVELOPMENT GRASSFIELD Project completion: 31/12/2010	26.05.2003	08.01.2004	23.02.2005	15000000	14318793.68	663133.18	4.42	Active	ADF
RUMPI PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Project completion: 31/12/2010	13.05.2003	08.01.2004	23.02.2005	15000000	14775425.42	224574.58	1.50	Active	ADF
	13.05.2003	08.01.2004	23.02.2005	1500000	1360982.28	139017.72	9.27		ADF
F.E. RURAL DEV'T IN SOUTH-WEST PROVINCE reformulated in 1998	22.09.1986	02.02.1987	05.07.1994	21890000	0	8357575.95	38.18	Completed Balance cancelled	ADB
	22.09.1986	02.02.1987	05.07.1994	15003937	0	3992580.44	26.61		ADF
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH-WEST PROVINCE relaunched in 1994	19.12.1989	27.12.1990	27.09.1991	4550000	0	4444840.38	97.69	Completed Balance cancelled	ADB
	19.12.1989	27.12.1990	04.10.1991	9210520	0	8992651.16	97.63		ADF
SPECIAL FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM	19.06.2000	04.09.2000	01.02.2002	760000	0	759138.47	99.89	Completed	ADF

Source: ADB

(1):

PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY SUPERVISION MISSIONS

Projects	Number of Supervision Missions	Problems attributable to the Bank	Problems attributable to the Country	Comments
PNRVA	Audit : Supervisions:	Strict compliance with procurement rules and procedures; Delays in giving approvals and no-objection opinion Disbursement delays	Lack of familiarity with procurement procedures; Limited mobilization of counterpart funds; Inadequate development of results; Delays in mobilizing counterpart funds;	To procure an item that requires a no-objection opinion, there are 18 activities to be implemented over a period of 14 months, from preparation of the draft BDs to authorization of the start of works by the ADB. Funds sometimes arrive at a time when the crop season is already well advanced.
PAFRA	Audit : Supervisions		Suspension of disbursements for a total period of two years, due to inadequacies noted during auditing of accounts for 2000-2003, and to a dispute related to irregularities in the appointment of a new Coordinator; Delays in disbursing Government counterpart funds;	
PARFAR	Audit : Supervisions	Technical assistance started 4 years after implementation of the program; Low ADF disbursement rate: 28.38% at 12 months from the date of last disbursement;	Several rejections of the BDs, bid evaluation reports, and disbursement requests in the first two years; Late disbursement of counterpart funds	The first disbursement was made on 24/10/2004; i.e. 19 months after signature and 28 months after approval
LFDP-SO	Audit : Supervisions			Suspension of disbursement from May 2005 to November 2006
SP-SFSP	Audit : Supervisions : 5	Lengthy and unwieldy project fund management procedures;		
RUMPI	Audit : Supervisions	Delay in processing files	Little involvement of government services in project implementation; Slow implementation of projects Delays in the recruitment of members of the S-E-P Unit of SOWEDA	
GRASSFIELD	Audit : Supervisions		The project experienced substantial delays in the preparation of BDs for want of a detailed procurement plan Poor mastery of Bank procedures; Delays in the disbursement of counterpart funds; Disbursement requests submitted at an improper pace;	

ANALYSIS OF PROJECT OUTPUTS

National Agricultural Research and Extension Project

The operationality of IRAD should produce research results that would be put at the disposal of farmers through agricultural extension. The use of research findings will increase yields and farmers' incomes in a favorable market situation.

The major outputs are the development of institutional research capacity at the national, regional and international levels, especially in the areas of scientific, administrative, financial and accounting management of research projects and programs. The Bank's assistance also helped to computerize IRAD, procure laboratory and research equipment, vehicles, office equipment and furniture, rehabilitate infrastructure, and revitalize the training of researchers and technicians. This has transformed the Institute into a national and sub-regional pole of competence.

More concretely, under the PNRVA and after a new programming approach, 62 projects were implemented by nearly 275 researchers in the operational research structures of IRAD all over the national territory. The programmed activities were executed 100%. The scientific output of IRAD researchers has increased considerably. From 1996 to 2006, there were 510 articles in editing committee reviews; 30 publications, chapters of publications and reports of IRAD, and 52 *doctorat* and PhD theses defended. In addition to this scientific output, there were papers presented at congresses, colloquiums, and national and international workshops, as well as the internal summary and progress reports of IRAD. The publication of five volumes of fact sheets for rural farmers and operators, one volume for each of Cameroon's agro-ecological zones, is underway.

IRAD has acquired a great amount of new equipment with ADF financing; 33 vehicles and 36 motorcycles have been procured. This equipment has increased the mobility of researchers and enhanced efficiency in the conduct of their fieldwork all over the national territory. Similarly, new scientific equipment has been procured for the 10 main laboratories. Equipping IRAD laboratories has transformed the Institute into a benchmark centre in agricultural sciences for researchers, universities, national and international students, as well as the private sector and industry.

The main library at IRAD headquarters procured 109 books, 120 brochures and subscription to 3 periodicals. The supply of documentation worth 20 million francs is expected in the days ahead. Subscriptions have been made to about forty major scientific reviews for the sum of 12 million CFA francs. To date, the total documentation amounts to about 9,500 volumes and 643 titles of periodicals. Investments in IT and internet communication, and the procurement of office equipment have accelerated information transfer and organizational capacity building in accounting and financial management.

IRAD's training activities are given pride of place; they concern IRAD staff, as well as national and international students and trainees. No provision was made for a component on certified training in the appraisal report of the PNRVA project. After the project's mid-term review and given the need to specialize the young researchers recruited in 2002, the ADF accepted to support certificate training for a Master of Science degree for about twelve researchers in various specialties in the University of Dschang.

Accordingly, from 1996 to 2006, IRAD researchers received 603 students and trainees (including 134 girls, or 22 %), from 19 different African and European countries. Most of the training is offered as part of a certificate training program (*Doctorat*, Ph.D, DEA, M.Sc, Engineering and *Maîtrise* diplomas, Technician's certificate).

As at 13 September 2006, the implementation rates of the various components were as follows: consolidation of IRAD services (90%), on-station research (100%), and staff training (85%). Since the project is scheduled to end on 30 June 2007, there is a high probability that it will be completed. Performance is deemed satisfactory.

Rural Family Income Improvement Project

This project has a very low disbursement rate (36.17% for ADF and 38.87% for counterpart funds as at 20 March 2007), which means that it was even lower as at 31 December 2004. This notwithstanding, implementation was somehow satisfactory: 2.91 tonnes of pre-basic seeds, representing 107% of project targets; 67 tonnes of basic seeds (149.5%); and 3611 tonnes of certified seeds (53.9%) were produced. These results help to increase yields, and consequently the output of the area. On the other hand, the specialized sales points (85%) and 7 storage warehouses will improve produce marketing. The 8 women's centers (70%), the day-care center and the 3 multi-purpose units are contributions to family welfare. The improved latrines (80%) help to improve living conditions and environmental hygiene.

The mixed results concern the training of 900 women (25.7%), 150 associations and CIGs, and the sensitization of 5,892 households (29.4%). 2923 persons received microcredits (14.6%); although the rate is low, the impact could be appreciable. The low recovery rate led the Bank to suspend disbursements for the microcredit component until the rate of 100% is attained. This situation stems from the credit system put in place. The MFI involved had not deemed it necessary to define an efficient recovery policy and beneficiaries had the possibility of opening accounts in other structures since there was no free flow of information between decentralized financial establishments.

Implementation inadequacies concern certain infrastructures. The rehabilitation of rural roads, the construction of mini water-reservoirs and natron-bearing spring water, the construction of livestock markets, the development of small irrigation areas and management of community forests were not implemented. The Community Forests component, on account of poor identification, was transferred to the competent Ministry (MINPROFF).

PARFAR is a very big project, in terms of its objectives (community poverty reduction), scope (the three northern provinces of Cameroon) and budget (UA 17.4 million, or about CFA.F 16 billion) Unfortunately, it is a hybrid project born of the fusion of two distinct projects by two different Ministries (MINADER and MINPROFF). The Bank's conditions were too many (15 of which 12 were precedent to first disbursement) and required a long time to be fulfilled. Having too many conditions is an indication that the project's design was not fully thought out. Right from the beginning, there were many problems that could have been avoided, for example the adoption of the seed legislation, construction of the national control, homologation and certification laboratory in Yaounde, and the different protocols to be signed with the major partners.

One major achievement was the institution of a participatory process in the pole and pilot villages, which gives the local peoples and their communities the capacity to diagnose, plan and implement their own development process and plan.

Since the program was delayed for two years, it will be objectively impossible to meet the prescribed completion deadline. The project's design hampered implementation.

Rural Forestry and Agroforestry Support Project

The rural forestry and agroforestry project is a priority for the Government, for it has been in the national investment program since 1992. It was only for want of a favorable economic situation that the project was not financed by the ADB. The project, which maintained all its relevance, was reformulated in 1998.

The mid-term review led to a diversification of the species retained for reforestation. Soil conservation species and medicinal plants were introduced. The physical implementation rates are 95% (rural forestry and agro-forestry development component); 65% (research promotion component); 70% (marketing support component) and 85% (management organization component). The resource disbursement rate is 85% for the ADF, 100% for the TAF, and 94% for the Government. Although these rates are satisfactory, project targets will not be attained 100% by its completion date (30/06/2007). Research, a major focus area of this project, benefited from capacity building, but could not attain the expected results for want of adequate and timely financing. A disbursement request submitted on 26 December 2006 had not yet been processed by 30 March 2007. It is not certain that physical implementation will attain 100% by completion date.

The delay in conducting diagnostic studies to estimate forest availability for the processing component did not allow for satisfactory implementation of the marketing component.

However, the project's contribution to the national strategy was reflected in the amount of reforestation done. The PSFE plans to reforest 5,000 ha per year, which will ultimately give an output of one million to 1½ million m³ per year, after a thirty year period³⁰.

By the end of the seventh year (2006), the PAFRA helped to develop 2958 hectares of forest plantations (70% of objectives) or an 8% contribution to the national target, although interventions in existing forests (bushfire and termite control) represented only 4.5% of objectives (177.5 ha out of 4 000 ha targeted).

164 nursery farmers, of whom 117 received micro-credits, are facing growing demand for seedlings. If this trend continues, they could see their incomes increase substantially.

Special Food Security Program Support Project

For the Water Control and Management Component, 20 of the 49 planned demonstrations (6 peri-urban mud flats, 13 rural mud flats and 1 area for water and soil conservation) were reconsidered, taking into account the difficulty of the works to be done in the mud flats and various areas, works that require the full participation of the beneficiary groups who are often difficult to mobilize. With regard to the reviewed objectives, 15 mud flats and 1 area were effectively developed, representing implementation rates of 78.75% and 100% respectively.

³⁰ National Reforestation Program, June 2006

The remaining 4 demonstrations of this pilot phase were programmed for the transitional phase of the project.

As concerns the Agricultural Development Component, under agricultural intensification, 64 of the 65 maize production demonstrations were implemented, giving an implementation rate of 98.5%. All the 10 village storage warehouses for maize were constructed and are operational. The members have been trained in the various stock treatment and management techniques, which limit post-harvest losses in the short-term and spread food availability over time. The implementation rate in the cassava sub-sector is 100% (37 activities out of 37). All the 11 cassava processing units were procured; 10 of them have been installed and are operational, while the 11th is awaiting the completion of its building. The communities have been trained in the management of these units so that they can maintain the equipment themselves and increase their incomes from farming. As concerns the diversification of production systems, poultry farmers are assisted in the rearing of table birds indoors in cheaply constructed poultry houses.

In pig rearing, the project provided technical expertise in the construction of low-cost modern pigsties, feeding and veterinary monitoring. The project also provided sires. All the 5 scheduled demonstrations were carried out. For small ruminants, groups of herders were introduced to the practice of semi-intensive stockbreeding, comprising a night shelter, additional feed and veterinary monitoring for animals from individual herds of beneficiary group members. All the 12 scheduled demonstrations were carried out. In fish farming, 14 ponds of 400m² were constructed, instead of the scheduled 12, due to very high demand and the high involvement of beneficiary groups who provided labor and land, generating an implementation rate of 116.7%. Technical assistance focused on the shape of ponds, water retention and drainage techniques, feeding and monitoring of pond fertilization.

For the Component on farmer organization and the analysis of constraints, a participatory diagnosis of the food situation was conducted in the 10 pilot sites, and this led to the preparation of modules adapted to the three agro-ecological regions.

This project was satisfactorily implemented. The application of its results to a larger geographical area will help to improve yields, and consequently plant and animal production. The food security and income improvement targets could be attained in the long-run.

Livestock and Fisheries Development Project

Initially planned to cover 5 years (2000-2005), the project was extended for 2 additional years to 31 December 2007 after the commitments made by the Government.

Governance problems led to project implementation difficulties. In May 2005, the Bank suspended its disbursements. The project's accounting system was improved and completely computerized. The financial controller and chief accountant of SOWEDA were directly involved in the project's financial and accounting management. The Project Implementation Unit implemented all the recommendations made by the Bank after the various audit and supervision missions. The recruitment of a qualified accountant made for better use of existing data to prepare accounting documents. The results yielded by these efforts led the Bank to lift the suspension. The physical implementation rate is about 85%, with a financial rate of 67% for the project as at 31 December 2006.

Its activities focused on the technical training of 2,720 operators, the training of 395 fishermen, fish farmers and fishmongers, and the constitution and empowerment of 225 socio-professional groups as at 31/12/06. The implementation rate is 82%. More than 500 operators received credits. On the whole, the implementation rate for this component is estimated at 62%, thanks to the setting up of an efficient credit mechanism and an estimated average reimbursement rate of about 84.5% (still insufficient but rising steadily).

As regards the infrastructures, activities focused on the construction of several infrastructure items, the procurement of various equipment (supervision boats, canoes with outboard motors, radios, GPS, radars, motorcycles, IT and office automation equipment) and the recruitment of a technical assistant (AGRER). On the whole, the implementation rate for this component is estimated at 95%. The construction of the Barombi Kang Fish-farming Center is well advanced, and it will certainly go operational at the end of the project. The fish market stalls have already been supplied. Two cold stores and two ice plants have already been procured. On the whole, the implementation rate for this component was estimated at 82.5% as at 31/12/2006.

While its institutional impact is reflected in the grouping of beneficiaries (fish smokers, fishermen), capacity building for beneficiaries, the management unit and MINEPIA officials, and the setting up of a water monitoring body, the sustainability of project outputs is threatened by the fisheries/fish farming and microcredit components. Although it is not under ADF financing, the micro-credit system is the weak link that could affect future performance and impact. Although the recovery rate is rising steadily owing to the recommendations of supervision missions and decisions taken during credit commission meetings, the unbalanced geographical distribution of customers remains a constraint that needs to be addressed. The results of an ongoing study will lead to the setting up of a monitoring unit for this component within SOWEDA.

A few months to the end of the project, the ongoing construction work on the fish-farming station also raises some doubts as to its operational capacity after the project comes to an end. Profound reflection should be conducted on the development of a transition strategy. With regard to nature conservation, the dissemination of improved fish-drying kilns will reduce the amount of natural resources used in the process. This project takes gender issues into account.

Stalls have been constructed for fish vendors in Limbe. 27km of rural roads have been rehabilitated, representing 84% of the target. Considering the rehabilitation requirements, it is hard to understand why only 32 km of road have been retained in this project. However, transport sector development projects in the region could justify such a poor result. The project has obtained satisfactory results.

North-West Province Development Project

Compared to the other provinces, the North-West Province, which is sorely lacking in industries, forests and mineral resources, is penalized by nature. The Government's policy of regional balance has led to the identification, evaluation and implementation of IRDP I (MIDENO I). The impact of this project facilitated the design of IRDP II, which had to be reformulated. Reformulated MIDENO II is the subject of this evaluation. The reformulation, which started in 1993, was finalized in 1998. The proposed objectives were poverty reduction

and food security. The identified activities concerned: (i) seed production; (ii) training of farmers on the multiplication of plant material; (iii) literacy and HIV/AIDS control campaigns.

This reduction stemmed from the fact that the Bank had accepted to fund the project whose duration was reduced from five to three years. The cost of the project was reduced, and activities were cancelled.

Despite an unfavorable economic context and implementation delays, the project was able to produce appreciable results: (i) improvement of basic seeds; (ii) dissemination of adapted technological packages; (iii) establishment of a micro-credit system; (iv) maintenance of rural roads; and (v) rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure. Quantitatively, these results translated into: (i) the production of basic seeds (32 tonnes of maize (27%), 175 tonnes of rice (2.75%), 387,045 plantain suckers (97%), 2.8 million yam seeds (79%), 14 tonnes of beans (58%), 585 tonnes of potatoes (58%) and 6,250 papaw seedlings (100%); (ii) the installation of a seed certification unit; (iii) the financing of 1,000 sub-projects through NGOs; (iv) the implementation of 20 training programs; (v) the maintenance of 375 km of road (83.3%); and (vi) the construction/rehabilitation of 7 culverts (100%), 14 water supply systems, 7 classrooms (100%), 3 community centers (100) and 4 health centers (100%). The micro-credit component did not produce satisfactory results. The recovery rate at project completion was 31.83%. During project identification, beneficiaries were not adequately consulted; this shortcoming was reflected in the project outputs, which were taken into account and corrected during design of the Grassfield project.

The project's institutional impact was noticeable in the NGOs operating thanks to the project. Functional literacy enabled women to monitor transactions in their savings booklets; they are able to correspond with relatives in writing. Farmers were trained in seed production. Plantain, which used to be imported into the region, is now being exported to Gabon. Animal traction has substantially increased the average cultivated surface area. The nomadic Fulanis have been made to settle down. The refinanced MFIs have been able to extend their scope of action.

The poor organization of markets remains a constraint on the sustainability of outputs. Micro-credits ended with the project. Beneficiary women's groups engaged in small-scale stockbreeding suffered severely from this suspension of micro-credits. The lack of professionalism in microfinance shown by certain NGOs also had a negative impact on the outputs and their sustainability.

The following shortcomings undermined project performance: (i) low participation of beneficiaries in project design and management; (ii) insufficient accounting management staff; and (iii) the poor performance of NGOs responsible for managing the credit component, due mainly to high management costs.

The project is fully consistent with the poverty reduction strategy in this region. It experienced substantial delays in the preparation of BDs for want of a detailed procurement plan. Lack of familiarity with Bank rules and procedures led to several file rejections by the Bank.

Most of the recommendations of supervision missions were implemented; they mainly concerned the recruitment of qualified staff for the financial and accounting services, the preparation of a procedures manual, the preparation of 2005 financial statements, updating of the procurement plan, and the involvement of private and public partners in project implementation and monitoring.

The main difficulty concerned the former financial department. The recruitment of a qualified accountant in January 2007 led to the production, within two months, of accounting documents that previous staff had not been able to produce in five years. This recruitment ushered in a more serene atmosphere.

The implementation rate remains low. Although the project's impact is not noticeable at this stage, it is important to look forward to sustainability measures to be implemented at the end of the project in 2010, especially the marketing of produce.

Integrated Development Project for the South-West Province - SOWEDA

Despite the hopes it raised during its design, this project experienced difficulties at the start of implementation. Several sanctions are spread over the 1992-2001 period. Some relate to the general decision taken against the country (1992-1994), while others relate to the bankruptcy of Méridien BIAO Bank, which had project fund accounts (1995-1997). Other causes are the lack of familiarity with the rules and procedures and delays in submitting audit reports.

Poor management in the financial service and the abovementioned sanctions, coupled with a disbursement rate of less than 35% for available credit, made it impossible to attain a high level of implementation. The project benefitted from a transition period, which still did not suffice for the implementation of the social infrastructure. This component was transferred to the Rumpi Project.

Rumpi Project

The project is fully consistent with the poverty reduction strategy in this region. The project experienced substantial delays in the preparation of BDs for want of a detailed procurement plan. Lack of familiarity with Bank rules and procedures led to several file rejections by the Bank.

Most of the recommendations of supervision missions were implemented; they mainly concerned the recruitment of qualified staff for the financial and accounting services, the preparation of a procedures manual, the preparation of 2005 financial statements, updating of the procurement plan, and the involvement of private and public partners in project implementation and monitoring.

The main difficulty concerned the former financial department. The recruitment of a qualified accountant in January 2007 led to the production, within two months, of accounting documents that previous staff had not been able to produce in five years. This recruitment ushered in a more serene atmosphere.

The implementation rate remains low. Although the project's impact is not noticeable at this stage, it is important to look forward to sustainability measures to be implemented at the end of the project in 2010, especially the marketing of produce.

Grassfield Project

The findings of the Benchmark Situation study conducted in 1999 in the North-West Province (NWP) of Cameroon, and those of ensuing seminars and workshops on participatory diagnosis revealed that the province has a huge potential for agricultural development. However, more than 70% of the rural population still lives below the poverty line. To address this situation, the Government deemed it necessary to initiate a project in which the population segment concerned is involved in the identification and planning of development actions. Accordingly, workshops were organized in the seven administrative divisions of the North-West Province in November and December 2000 and at the provincial level in December 2000, which led to the identification of the Grassfield Participatory Decentralized Rural Development Project.

The project is based on agriculture and the promotion of small farmers through decentralized development of grassroots communities, as the catalyst of poverty reduction in the rural areas of the province. It is in continuation of the reformulated MIDENO II. Its low disbursement rate as at 31/12/2006 (4.42%) made it possible to implement a sufficient number of activities for evaluation.

The project experienced a substantial delay at start-up, and its previous implementation schedule may not be respected. The management unit is placed under MIDENO, whose longstanding experience should be enough to forestall any difficulties.

On the whole, despite certain areas of satisfaction, the efficiency of operations is unsatisfactory.

RATING OF PROJECTS
National Agricultural Research and Extension Program (PNRVA)
Assessment Criteria

No	Indicators	Rating	Comments
1.	Relevance and quality at entry	3	
1.1	Coherence with the country's overall development strategy		<u>Very satisfactory</u> For 1999-2001, the Government intends to continue implementing the actions included in the guidelines of its agricultural development letter, whose second focus point was consolidation of agronomic research and agricultural extension.
1.2	Coherence with the Bank's assistance strategy		<u>Very satisfactory</u> To ensure total and lasting improvement of the situation, the 1996-1998 CSP established the need to accelerate <i>the improvement of the agricultural research and extension system</i>
1.3	Macroeconomic/sectoral policy		<u>Very satisfactory</u> The rural sector remains the cornerstone of the national economy for its contribution to GDP and its spillover effects on other sectors.
1.4	Reduction of poverty/social equality		<u>Very satisfactory</u> The main goal of the project was to improve farm productivity through operational agricultural research and efficient extension activities. Such improvement in productivity was expected to increase farmers' incomes, a key factor in poverty reduction.
1.5	Human resource development		<u>Very satisfactory</u> One of the program's components was the training of IRAD staff
1.6	Institutional/private sector development		The project helped to rehabilitate IRAD and build the capacities of researchers.
1.7	Quality at entry		<u>Unsatisfactory</u> The evaluation had anticipated the possibility of insufficient counterpart funds constituting a constraint on the project. However, the assumption that the restructuring of agricultural extension and research services would lead to a reduction in agricultural spending and generate sufficient gains which the Government could allocate to the operation and maintenance of agricultural research and extension services was unrealistic.
2.	Attainment of objectives and results (Efficacy)	3	Satisfactory.
2.1	Agricultural policy objective		In the first instance, research is boosted to promote agricultural extension, and consequently boost agricultural production
2.2	Social objectives		
2.3	Institutional development objectives		IRAD management is better equipped to perform its duties. Research staff trained
2.4	Private sector development		The different infrastructure rehabilitation contracts enabled several enterprises to stay operational
2.5	Financial objectives		
2.6	Physical objectives		At six months from the end of the project, the implementation rate is satisfactory
2.7	Environmental objectives		Satisfactory: The research programs designed under the project have environmental protection components
3.	Efficiency	2	Unsatisfactory:
3.1	Efficiency (ERR/FRR)		
3.2	Cost effectiveness (cost and time difference)		Unsatisfactory: project management problems caused implementation delays.

4.	Impact on institutional development	3	Satisfactory
4.1	Government's planning and management capacity		<u>Very satisfactory</u> The training received by researchers and managers led to the identification and implementation of 64 research programs. Several publications have been produced.
4.3	Financial system		The project led to the organization of IRAD's accounting service. The staff received relevant training.
5.	Sustainability	2	
5.1	Institutional support/viability (Government's financial and legal support)		The Government did not clearly define its strategy for ensuring the sustainability of project outputs (motivation of researchers, increase of the operating budget). HIPC hopes could be dashed considering the high demand from all sectors.
6.	Crosscutting impact	4	
7.1	Poverty		The results of revitalized research could help to improve yields, and consequently incomes if prices are attractive.
7.2	Food security		The improvement of yields contributes to food security.
7.3	Gender		The project has led to the recruitment of women and young researchers.
7.4	Environment		Certain components of the research program are environmental programs.
7.5	Regional integration		IRAD enjoys sub-regional renown. The improvement of its scope of activity will contribute to regional integration.
	Overall performance	2.83	Satisfactory

Special Food Security Program Support Project

No	Indicators	Rating	Comments
1.	Relevance and quality at entry	4	
1.1	Coherence with the country's overall development strategy		<u>Very satisfactory</u> The DSDR had identified food self-sufficiency as a challenge The improvement of yields was defined as a strategic objective
1.2	Coherence with the Bank's assistance strategy		<u>Very satisfactory</u> The 3 CSPs had underscored the importance of food security.
1.3	Macroeconomic/sectoral policy		<u>Very satisfactory</u> The rural sector remains the cornerstone of the national economy for its contribution to GDP and its spillover effects on other sectors. Food security was expected to contribute to AGDP and consequently to national GDP
1.4	Reduction of poverty/social equality		<u>Very satisfactory</u> The main goal of the project was to provide the sector with outputs to disseminate over a larger area, taking into account the country's regional diversity.
1.5	Human resource development		The analysis of development constraints is one component that was expected to promote HR development.
1.6	Institutional/private sector development		
1.7	Quality at entry		During the World Food Summit of 1996, the Multilateral Banks and bilateral development institutions adopted an action plan based on this program to reduce food insecurity in 86 low-income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs). However, to minimize the risk of failure of these major investments, the said action plan was designed in two phases: a short pilot phase followed by a large-scale phase in which the biggest investments will be implemented. The pilot phase, which is the focus of this project,

			<p>will be used to test the various development models on which the second phase (on investment extension) will be based.</p> <p>Cameroon, as one of the LIFDCs that should benefit from the SFSP, presented a financing request for a SFSP support project for the pilot phase.</p>
2.	Attainment of objectives and results (Efficacy)	3	
2.1	Agricultural policy objective		
2.2	Social objectives		<p>For the Component on farmer organization and the analysis of constraints, a participatory diagnosis of the food situation was done in the 10 pilot sites, and this led to the preparation of modules adapted to the three agro-ecological regions. A methodology for collecting data on constraints and project monitoring/evaluation was prepared in a participatory manner and adopted. Beneficiary groups keep registers for monitoring operations, and the village coordinators regularly fill the information sheets for their sites and forward them to the provincial coordinators every two weeks, in addition to the monthly progress report.</p> <p>During this pilot phase, the project trained 167 farmer groups with more than 2590 members.</p>
2.3	Institutional development objectives		<p>The proposed development models were tested and evaluated in a participatory manner with the communities. This led to the formulation of recommendations for a large-scale food security program based on the results of the different project activities.</p>
2.4	Private sector development		
2.5	Financial objectives		
2.6	Physical objectives		<p>15 of the 49 scheduled demonstrations (31 peri-urban and rural mud flats and 18 areas), 15 mud flats and 1 area were reconsidered, considering the difficulty of the works to be done. These demonstrations led to the effective development of 14 mud flats over a total surface area of about 35.5 ha and the development of 6 ha of land, or an implementation rate of 93.33% and 100% respectively.</p> <p>Under the agricultural intensification component, 64 of the 65 maize production demonstrations were implemented, making an implementation rate of 98.5%. Technical assistance entailed the use of improved seed varieties as base (production) or pre-base (sowing) seeds, the introduction of mixed (chemical fertilizer and farm manure) and separate (sub-surface and broadcast) fertilization, row seeding, weeding and earthing-up, and the construction of cribs for conservation of harvests).</p> <p>For the maize sub-sector, 79 demonstrations were planned and 80 executed making an implementation rate of more than 101%.</p> <p>As concerns the cassava sector, all the 48 scheduled demonstrations were realized, making an implementation rate of 100%. As concerns horticulture in the mud flats, 31 demonstrations were scheduled for the pilot phase. During revision of the objectives of this phase, the number was reduced to 15 and 14 demonstrations were implemented, making an implementation rate of more than 93%. The results obtained were sometimes spectacular, especially for maize production which showed yield improvements of up to 50%, compared to the baseline situation.</p> <p>All the 10 village maize storage warehouses were constructed and are operational.</p>

			Implementation rates range between 83.5% and 93.75%.
2.7	Environmental objectives		
3.	Efficiency	3	
3.2	Cost effectiveness (cost and time difference)		
4.	Impact on institutional development	3	
4.1	Government's planning and management capacity		The project was implemented by a project implementation unit (PIU) placed under the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) and attached to the Agricultural Studies and Projects Division (DEPA). It received support from FAO experts and national consultants recruited for the implementation of certain components. Participants in the constraint analysis were able to take ownership of the relevant tools
4.3	Financial system		
5.	Sustainability	3	
5.1	Institutional support/viability (Government's financial and legal support)		Given the project's regional character, its financing chances are higher.
6.	Crosscutting impact	4	
7.1	Poverty		The project was designed to promote sub-regional food security.
7.2	Food security		
7.3	Gender		
7.4	Environment		
7.5	Regional integration		
	Overall performance	3.3	Satisfactory

Rural Forestry and Agroforestry Support Project

No	Indicators	Rating	Comments
1.	Relevance and quality at entry	3	Satisfactory
1.1	Coherence with the country's overall development strategy		The environmental problems identified in Cameroon relate to the deforestation and degradation of arable land. Over the period, the national strategy has stressed the need for efficient natural resource management
1.2	Coherence with the Bank's assistance strategy		CSP 1996-1998 recommended better environmental and especially forestry management.
1.3	Macroeconomic/sectoral policy		
1.4	Reduction of poverty/social equality		The project was expected to generate direct and indirect employment, especially for the most marginalized (rural dwellers, women). By instituting an appropriate training program, the efficient training of farmers and the financing of private nurseries and mobile saw-mills, the project offers the possibility of creating profitable and autonomous enterprises. Better plantation management will expand the supply of products (fuelwood, poles and planks) and lead to the diversification and protection of community incomes. The additional wood produced will increase household income that will be used to satisfy other needs
1.5	Human resource development		The project was expected to introduce and promote the profession of nursery farmer.
1.6	Institutional/private sector development		A processing component was expected to contribute to private sector development. The micro-credit component implemented

			in partnership with MFIs was expected to contribute to the development of microfinance activities in the country.
1.7	Quality at entry		The project overestimated the size of the forest in the region. 6 TSMTs had been retained, but the mid-term review reduced them to 3. A scheduled marketing study was not conducted in time.
2.	Attainment of objectives and results (Efficacy)	3	Satisfactory
2.1	Agricultural policy objective		PAFRA activities contribute 8%, on average, to the country's reforestation target which is 5000 ha. It should be noted, however, that the project has no system for monitoring the operation of plantations to assess their contribution to national activity.
2.2	Social objectives		
2.3	Institutional development objectives		
2.4	Private sector development		Two enterprises were partners in the processing component; one MFI was awarded the microfinance contract and was able to expand its network in the region by opening new branches.
2.5	Financial objectives		
2.6	Physical objectives		70% implementation rate
2.7	Environmental objectives		Eucalyptus plantations are developed for forestry products, as windbreaks or for slope protection. Schools developed seedlings.
3.	Efficiency	1	Very unsatisfactory
3.2	Cost effectiveness (cost and time difference)		The project started late and experienced two disbursement suspensions (making a total of two years). Too much delay in the conduct of studies on available forestry and agro-forestry products in the 2nd and 3 rd years respectively. The data that could have oriented the activities of the mobile saw-mills component was only available at the end of 2006.
4.	Impact on institutional development	3	.
4.1	Government's planning and management capacity		The PIU was trained in project management. MINFOF technicians also received training. The project experienced start-up difficulties; however, thanks to training, there has been a marked improvement in management over the last 3 years.
4.3	Financial system		
5.	Sustainability	2	
5.1	Institutional support/viability (Government's financial and legal support)		The PNGE, PNR and PSFE under MINFOF are Government programs that should continue with the technical activities of the project. However, no transfer strategy has been studied yet.
6.	Crosscutting impact	3	
7.1	Poverty		The project led to the development of the profession of nursery farmer. The high demand in nurseries gives promise of a large market that should boost the expansion of activities and therefore an increase in incomes and jobs in rural areas.
7.2	Food security		
7.3	Gender		Women constitute about 65% of Cameroon's agricultural labor force. This percentage even rises to 80-90% for food crop farming. In forestry, planting and maintenance is the preserve of men, while women are responsible for fetching firewood. In agro-forestry, women engage in food crop and fruit cultivation. The project had several positive effects on women's activities which include: (i) the improved fertilization of food crop or vegetable farms, which will help to protect and diversify food protection and/or increase women's incomes; (ii) the reduction of time spent in fetching wood, by increasing the supply of products, will generate time gains that can be used for income-

			generating activities; (iii) job creation. Women benefited from this program (nursery farmers, eucalyptus plantations, micro-credits)
7.4	Environment		The seedlings grown in schools are used to teach courses on the environment since the pupils take care of them. Hillside plantations help to protect against erosion.
7.5	Regional integration		
	Overall performance	2.5	

Rural Family Income Improvement Project

No	Indicators	Rating	Comments
1.	Relevance and quality at entry	3	Satisfactory
1.1	Coherence with the country's overall development strategy		The title of the project reflects the strategy defined by the Government
1.2	Coherence with the Bank's assistance strategy		This project is in line with the Bank's strategy (1996-1998 CSP): improvement of agricultural production, rural infrastructure,
1.3	Macroeconomic/sectoral policy		The project was supposed to boost AGDP
1.4	Reduction of poverty/social equality		Project outputs should lead to an increase in incomes, and consequently poverty reduction. Men and women had equal access to activities.
1.5	Human resource development		The project helped to consolidate the organization of rural areas (farmer organizations, SMEs intervening in rural areas).
1.6	Institutional/private sector development		The project was expected to promote the organization of groups. Training was expected to help them develop expertise in seed production and rural infrastructure management.
1.7	Quality at entry		The project stems from a combination of two projects. This operation on a very wide geographical area did not allow for efficient project management. Technical assistance came late (one year after the installation of the PIU); the engineer responsible for monitoring development works was working alone on more than 300 work sites.
2.	Attainment of objectives and results (Efficacy)	2	Unsatisfactory
2.1	Agricultural policy objective		
2.2	Social objectives		The project promoted the organization of CIGs.
2.3	Institutional development objectives		
2.4	Private sector development		The SMEs responsible for the execution of infrastructure development and construction works were able to create permanent and temporary jobs.
2.5	Financial objectives		This project has a very low disbursement rate (36.17% for ADF and 38.87% for counterpart funds as at 20 March 2007, meaning that it was even lower as at 31 December 2004).
2.6	Physical objectives		The physical implantation rate is 57.45%, at 9 months to the end of the project. Several infrastructure items could not be constructed at 6 months to the end of the project. One component (community forests) was returned to the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife.
2.7	Environmental objectives		An environmental impact assessment has not yet been conducted on completed infrastructure works. Technical studies are being conducted on the rehabilitation of 240 km of rural roads that could have an impact on the environment.
3.	Efficiency	2	Unsatisfactory

3.2	Cost effectiveness (cost and time difference)		The project started late due to lack of technical assistance. The wide project area led to inefficient utilization of human resources. The low reimbursement rates for micro-credits led to suspension of financing. Late disbursement of counterpart funds (MINADER and MINPROFF).
4.	Impact on institutional development	3	
4.1	Government's planning and management capacity		
4.3	Financial system		
5.	Sustainability	2	Unsatisfactory
5.1	Institutional support/viability (Government's financial and legal support)		This project is technically sustainable given the expertise acquired and the infrastructures developed. However, financial viability in terms of Government commitment to support activities has not yet been established. The low credit reimbursement rate indicates a limited inclination to ensure the sustainability of the micro-credit system that has been set up.
6.	Crosscutting impact	3	Satisfactory
7.1	Poverty		The revitalization of the seed sector enabled 434 seed operators (multipliers and distributors of seeds and inputs) to boost their activities: 3611 tonnes of seeds certified in 3 crop seasons that have led to a 20-45% increase in yields. This increase had a positive impact on farmers' incomes.
7.2	Food security		The seeds and storage warehouses contribute to food security (better yields and possibility of managing cereal stocks over long periods).
7.3	Gender		Support to women's economic activities and sensitization on HIV/AIDS; these activities are: (i) the construction of 12 women's centers; (ii) support to micro-projects initiated by women through appropriate lines of credit; (iii) the creation of multi-purpose pilot units for processing, conservation and packaging of basic foodstuffs; (iv) support to the monitoring of social mobilization activities conducted by the provincial delegations of MINPROFF; (v) the construction and equipment of a pilot daycare center for the children of women who are market traders and vendors; and (vi) sensitization of rural communities on the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
7.4	Environment		Improved latrines, farming techniques using anti-erosion methods enhance drainage and environmental protection.
7.5	Regional integration		The seeds produced under the project are solicited by French farmers (exported to France) and farmers of the sub-region.
	Overall performance	2.5	

Livestock and Fisheries Development Project

No	Indicators	Rating	Comments
1.	Relevance and quality at entry	3	
1.1	Coherence with the country's overall development strategy		The specific goal of the project is to increase livestock and fish production, and consequently increase the people's incomes
1.2	Coherence with the Bank's assistance strategy		The actions defined by the 200-2004 CSP are aimed mainly at increasing output and farmers' incomes
1.3	Macroeconomic/sectoral policy		The increase of farmers' incomes will boost AGDP, and increase its share in national GDP.

1.4	Reduction of poverty/social equality		The increase in farmers' incomes will help to improve the conditions of the rural populations, who constitute the poorest agricultural community.
1.5	Human resource development		
1.6	Institutional/private sector development		One of the objectives was to contribute to capacity building for the administration
1.7	Quality at entry		The project was evaluated after a study conducted in 1998.
2.	Attainment of objectives and results (Efficacy)	3	
2.1	Agricultural policy objective		
2.2	Social objectives		<p>Its activities focused on the technical training of 2,720 operators, the training of 395 fishermen, fish farmers and fishmongers, the constitution and empowerment of 225 socio-professional groups as of 31/12/06. The implementation rate is 82%.</p> <p>More than 500 operators received credits. On the whole, the implementation rate for this component is estimated at 62%, thanks to the setting up of an efficient credit mechanism and an estimated average reimbursement rate of about 84.5% (still insufficient but rising steadily).</p>
2.3	Institutional development objectives		<p>The activities conducted focused on the construction of several infrastructure items, the procurement of various equipment (supervision boats, canoes with outboard motors, radios, GPS, radars, motorcycles, IT and office automation equipment) and the recruitment of a technical assistant (the firm AGRER). On the whole, the implementation rate for this component is estimated at 95% as at 31/12/2006.</p> <p>The project is managed by an implementation unit set up within SOWEDA. It has two branches: one in Limbe for all aspects relating to fishing and fish farming, and another in Kumba for livestock activities. Project staff was readjusted to readapt it to project missions. The current staff of the PIU is dynamic, and does its work efficiently.</p> <p>The accounting was consolidated by an accounting firm, and all the recommendations made by the internal audit mission of 2004 were implemented. Similarly, the recommendations of supervision missions were implemented.</p>
2.4	Private sector development		
2.5	Financial objectives		
2.6	Physical objectives		<p>The construction of the Barombi Kang Fish-farming Center is well advanced, and it will certainly go operational at the end of the project. The fish market stalls have already been supplied. Two cold stores and two ice-making plants have been procured. On the whole, the implementation rate for this component is estimated at 82.5% as at 31/12/2006.</p>
2.7	Environmental objectives		The supervision committee was set up.
3.	Efficiency	2	
3.2	Cost effectiveness (cost and time difference)		<p>From 3 May 2005 to the end of November 2006, disbursements from the special account and the ADF fund were suspended after an ADB internal audit mission. However, since the Government has implemented all the recommendations made by the Bank, the sanction of suspension has been lifted.</p>
4.	Impact on institutional development	3	
4.1	Government's planning and management capacity		
4.3	Financial system		

5.	Sustainability	2	
5.1	Institutional support/viability (Government's financial and legal support)		Technically, MINEPIA has structures (regional delegation) capable of monitoring activities at the end of the project. However, the Government does not guarantee the availability of material (vehicles) and financial resources.
6.	Crosscutting impact	3	
7.1	Poverty		
7.2	Food security		
7.3	Gender		Women, who constitute 70% of the target population, are very active in small-scale stockbreeding, and in processing and distribution of fish. Through the women's development program, the project directly monitored 690 fishmongers out of the projected 85 (811.8%) and set up and provided guidance to 70 groups of fishmongers and fish smokers, instead of the projected 15 (466%) as at 31/12/2006.
7.4	Environment		The supervision committee was set up and trained. Its activities will help to control fish catches. Its presence will discourage unscrupulous fishermen from using unconventional nets (with small holes).
7.5	Regional integration		
	Overall performance	2.69	

GRASSFIELD Project

No	Indicators	Rating	Comments
1.	Relevance and quality at entry	3	Satisfactory
1.1	Coherence with the country's overall development strategy		The specific goal of the project is to increase the household incomes for peasant farmers in the North-West Province by boosting farm yields and improving their socio-economic environment. The Government's strategy and measures focus on increasing output and farmers' incomes (CSP 2002-2004).
1.2	Coherence with the Bank's assistance strategy		Increasing output and farmers' incomes is one of the strategies defined by the Bank (CSP 2002-2004).
1.3	Macroeconomic/sectoral policy		
1.4	Reduction of poverty/social equality		Increasing incomes is a poverty reduction strategy. The actions envisaged under the project will lead to: (i) an increase in the incomes of trained farmers (additional annual income ranging from CFAF 91,000 to CFAF 180,650 per person); (ii) the creation of 29,300 permanent and temporary jobs; (iii) capacity building for self-reliant rural development operations by beneficiaries; (iv) greater empowerment of farmers and development of human resources in general, leading to better organization of rural areas; and (v) the promotion of small operators (laborers, craftsmen, hired farm laborers, micro-enterprises, NGOs) through experience acquired from the involvement of associations in the conduct of community works. The main social impact of this project is the improvement of farm yields through the adoption of better farm equipment and modern farming practices. The project will increase the possibility of active farmer participation through the adoption of integrated farming practices. The rehabilitation/construction of rural roads will facilitate and speed up transportation of produce to the nearest markets.
1.5	Human resource development		

1.6	Institutional/private sector development		
	Environmental objectives		<p>The rehabilitation of safe water supply systems will reduce the incidence of water-borne diseases and the hardship of fetching water for women. The repair of rural roads will improve access to markets. Other positive impacts include protection of degradation-prone areas (springs, slopes) as well as water and soil conservation.</p> <p>An environmental and social management plan (ESMP) was drawn up during project preparation. This plan, which will be implemented and monitored by the PIU environmentalist in conjunction with provincial delegation for the environment, provides for the inclusion of environmental protection measures in works specifications and in the terms of reference of control firms.</p> <p>. The main negative impacts include soil erosion, land clearing, deforestation and environmental pollution by various human activities.</p> <p>. Sensitization and training programs will be encouraged in rural communities on environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources.</p>
1.7	Quality at entry		<p>This project benefits from the management experience of MIDENO I and II.</p> <p>The results of the study in the region showed that despite an increase in agricultural output as a result of previous actions implemented under the North-West rural development project funded by the ADF, more than 70% of the rural population still live below the poverty line. To address this situation, consolidate outputs and correct the shortcomings noted during implementation of the abovementioned project, the Government and the ADF deemed it necessary to design a project in which the beneficiaries will be involved in the identification of development action planning needs. Accordingly, workshops were organized in the seven administrative divisions of the NWP in November and December 2000 and at the provincial level in December 2000, which led to the identification of the Grassfield Participatory Decentralized Rural Development Project. This was the subject of a preparation report in 2002.</p>
2.	Attainment of objectives and results (Efficacy)		Although approved in 2003, the project was effectively launched only in 2005. Hence, none of its results can be appreciated today. Extension to 31/12/2010 could produce a satisfactory implementation rate if the supervision mission recommendations are well implemented.
3.	Efficiency	2	Unsatisfactory
3.2	Cost effectiveness (cost and time difference)		700 days elapsed between approval and first disbursement (about two years).
4.	Impact on institutional development		
5.	Sustainability		
5.1	Institutional support/viability (Government's financial and legal support)		
6.	Crosscutting impact		
	Overall performance	2.5	

RUMPI Project

No	Indicators	Rating	Comments
1.	Relevance and quality at entry	3	
1.1	Coherence with the country's overall development strategy		The specific objective of the project is to sustainably increase the incomes of small farmers in the project area.
1.2	Coherence with the Bank's Assistance strategy		The 2002-2004 CSP was aimed at increasing output in order to raise incomes.
1.3	Macroeconomic/sectoral policy		
1.4	Reduction of poverty/social equality		Implementation of the project will have a positive social impact on the men, women and youths of the project area in three areas, namely capacity building, improvement of the road network and marketing infrastructure, and increase in agricultural output through improvement of productivity. Increased production will create more jobs in rural and urban areas, and increase the incomes of small farmers, male and female. All these improvements will contribute to poverty reduction.
1.5	Human resource development		
1.6	Institutional/private sector development		The structures, training and procedures of the project will encourage beneficiaries to conduct and develop the activities initiated and preserve the infrastructures constructed.
1.7	Quality at entry		The project was designed through a participatory approach that led to the identification of relevant activities. However, its implementation was delayed by several shortcomings: (i) the weakness of SOWEDA's accounting and financial management; and (ii) delays in the processing of several files (contracts, implementation of signed agreements, recruitment of members of the PIU, etc).
2.	Attainment of objectives and results (Efficacy)		Extension to 31/12/2010 could produce a satisfactory implementation rate if the supervision mission recommendations are well implemented.
3.	Efficiency	2	Unsatisfactory
3.2	Cost effectiveness (cost and time difference)		The many delays could lead to inefficiency in the long-run: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • weakness of the accounting and financial system and procurement; • delay in implementing agreements signed with partners; • delay in the recruitment of staff for the monitoring/evaluation and planning unit of SOWEDA; • suspension of disbursement; Indeed, 730 days elapsed between approval and first disbursement.
4.	Impact on institutional development		
4.1	Government's planning and management capacity		
4.3	Financial system		
5.	Sustainability		
5.1	Institutional support/viability (Government's financial and legal support)		
6.	Crosscutting impact		
	Overall performance	2.5	

MIDENO II REFORMULATED PROJECT

No	Indicators	Rating	Comments
1.	Relevance and quality at entry	3	
1.1	Coherence with the country's overall development strategy		In accordance with Government priorities, the main objectives were to: (i) increase agricultural output and the agricultural incomes of 33,700 farmers, representing 26% of farming households in the division; (ii) reinforce MIDENO, the executing agency; and (iii) enhance socio-economic conditions by improving rural infrastructure.
1.2	Coherence with the Bank's assistance strategy		Combating poverty by increasing farmers' incomes is one of the targets in the Bank's strategy for the period. However, the strategy focuses more on the completion of past projects. This project was already 5 years old at the beginning of the 1996-2004 period. The Bank decided to streamline and complete the projects.
1.3	Macroeconomic/sectoral policy		
1.4	Reduction of poverty/social equality		The project was intended to improve production, marketing and the incomes of farmers. The opening of roads was intended to promote this last activity.
1.5	Human resource development		
1.6	Institutional/private sector development		
1.7	Quality at entry		MIDENO I was implemented in 1982–1989. The lessons learnt were useful for the identification and appraisal of MIDENO II. However, the participatory approach was not followed. The country's political difficulties and unattractive coffee and cocoa prices during the period undermined project implementation.
2.	Attainment of objectives and results (Efficacy)	2	
2.1	Agricultural policy objective		
2.2	Social objectives		
2.3	Institutional development objectives		The project led to the rehabilitation of 375 km of road (83%) and 7 culverts (100%), 7 water supply systems (100%), classrooms, health posts and community halls (100%).
2.4	Private sector development		
2.5	Financial objectives		The micro-credit system did not produce satisfactory results (recovery rate of 31.83%).
2.6	Physical objectives		The agricultural extension component led to achievement of the 27% and 2.17% of seed production targets for maize and rice respectively. These results are rather low, considering the duration of the project. Meanwhile, satisfactory results were obtained for plantain suckers (96.7%), seed yam (79.2), bean seeds (58.3%), potato (58.5), and pawpaw (100%). Animal production results were deemed insufficient: sheep/goats (0%), pigs (20%), rabbits (49.6%), young fish (0%), and chicks (45%)
2.7	Environmental objectives		
3.	Efficiency	1	
3.2	Cost effectiveness (cost and time difference)		It took 4,395 days, or 12 years, to complete the project from its initial formulation date.
4.	Impact on institutional development	3	

4.1	Government's planning and management capacity		The project built MIDENO's capacity.
4.3	Financial system		The project did not significantly improve microfinance activity in the region.
5.	Sustainability	2	
5.1	Institutional support/viability (Government's financial and legal support)		MIDENO's presence in the region will ensure institutional viability given its experience in rural development. The constraint remains the availability of a sizeable budget. There is a system for refinancing MFIs that participated in the micro-credit component. The achievements of participants are threatened.
6.	Crosscutting impact	3	
7.1	Poverty		
7.2	Food security		
7.3	Gender		High demand led to the training of women at a rate of 107%. Women were sensitized on HIV/AIDS. 49% of micro-credit beneficiaries were women, who were able to carry out activities in food crop production (production, marketing) and animal production (poultry farming, pig rearing, sheep raising, etc.)
7.4	Environment		
7.5	Regional integration		The surplus production of plantain led to a reversal of the trend whereby most of the produce was exported to other regions and even to neighboring countries.
	Overall performance	2.3	

PROJET SOWEDA IRDP

No	Indicators	Rating	Comments
1.	Relevance and quality at entry	3	
1.1	Coherence with the country's overall development strategy		The goal of the project was to increase the incomes of farmers in the South-West Province, curb rural exodus, and increase supply to urban centers (e.g. Douala). This goal is consistent with the sector development strategy defined in the 6 th five-year development plan and in the new agricultural policy (NAP) of 1990.
1.2	Coherence with the Bank's assistance strategy		Combating poverty by increasing farmers' incomes is one of the targets in the Bank's strategy for the period. However, the strategy focuses more on the completion of past projects. This project was already 10 years old at the beginning of the 1996-2004 period. The Bank decided to streamline and complete these projects.
1.3	Macroeconomic/sectoral policy		
1.4	Reduction of poverty/social equality		The project was intended to improve production, marketing and the incomes of farmers. The opening of roads was intended to promote this last activity.
1.5	Human resource development		
1.6	Institutional/private sector development		The project was intended to enhance the productivity and efficiency of all participating institutions.
1.7	Quality at entry		The Cameroon Government did not disburse its counterpart contributions in 1987. It requested for a re-appraisal of the project with a view to reducing its cost.
2.	Attainment of objectives and results (Efficacy)	2	

2.1	Agricultural policy objective		
2.2	Social objectives		Equipment was provided to health centers (80%), support given to health programs (50%), but very few health centers were rehabilitated (5%).
2.3	Institutional development objectives		There was no substantial improvement in marketing due to suspension of data collection on 48 products in 13 markets, 15 months after start-up. The introduction of the BENOR method made it possible to reach out to 15000 farmers. The national agricultural extension service assumed ownership of a new rural intervention tool.
2.4	Private sector development		
2.5	Financial objectives		The operation of the credit system was jeopardized by the demise of FONADER and SOWEFCU. The inexperience of NGOs in financial management also affected the performance of the system. The recovery rate is 50% compared to the target of 95%.
2.6	Physical objectives		The creation of new plantations made it possible to attain rates of 46% to 100%, depending on the sector. When they started producing, they contributed to increasing incomes when prices were attractive. Unfortunately, coffee and cocoa prices collapsed during this period. Meanwhile, there was more success with the oil palm. Applied research developed only 6 types of equipment, representing 20% of the target for new technologies for cassava, cocoa, cereals and oil palm. The quality of cocoa was improved through the construction of 714 kilns (90%). No road was rehabilitated or developed.
2.7	Environmental objectives		The agricultural activities were rural development actions that have no impact on the ecosystem. The pest control products were had to comply with international standards.
3.	Efficiency	1	
3.2	Cost effectiveness (cost and time difference)		The loan only became effective in 1992. The first closing date (31/12/99) was extended to 31/12/2000, and then to 31/03/2002. The project was plague by several disbursement sanctions: 3 are attributable to the country for non-payment of arrears and 2 are attributable to the project for poor management. The duration of the sanctions is estimated at 70% of project implementation time. The Government did not regularly disburse the counterpart funds. The SOWEDA General Manager, who died in 1994, was replaced only after a period of more than one year. This slowed down the activities. Technical assistance was interrupted several times for various reasons. Political upheaval in the early 1990s delayed the start-up of the project.
4.	Impact on institutional development	3	
4.1	Government's planning and management capacity		

4.3	Financial system		
5.	Sustainability	2	
5.1	Institutional support/viability (Government's financial and legal support)		SOWEDA is a regional authority with technical capacity and experience. The provincial delegations of agriculture and animal production constitute resources that will ensure the sustainability of project outputs. However, Government supervision was very limited during the project because of insufficient means. This raises the issue of a bigger budget for SOWEDA or the provincial delegations.
6.	Crosscutting impact	3	
7.1	Poverty		
7.2	Food security		
7.3	Gender		<p>The participatory methods used to identify women's needs, made it possible to contact 222 groups comprising 5520 women.</p> <p>21 of the 39 training and sensitization sessions (54%) were organized. The various training modules for the women included group dynamics, leadership, project management, health, etc.</p> <p>The credit component was implemented 50%, of which 40% of the loans were awarded for women's activities.</p>
7.4	Environment		
7.5	Regional integration		
	Overall performance	2.3	

GLOBAL PERFORMANCE OF BANK ASSISTANCE

1 – Summary of Rating for lending operations

Mark: 1 (Very Unsatisfactory); 2 (Unsatisfactory); 3 (Satisfactory); 4 (Very Satisfactory)

N°	Projects	Relevance and Quality	Efficacy	Efficiency	Impact on inst'l development	Sustainability	Crosscutting Issues	Average
1	MIDENO II REFORMULATED	3	2	1	3	2	3	2.33
2	SOWEDA IRDP	3	2	1	3	2	3	2.33
3	SP-SFSP	3	3	3	3	3	4	3.17
4	PNRVA	4	3	2	4	3	4	3.33
5	PAFRA	3	2	2	3	2	3	2.50
6	PARFAR	3	2	2	3	3	3	2.67
7	LFDP	3	3	2	2	2	3	2.5
8	GRASSFIELD	3	2	2				2.3
9	RUMPI	3	2	2				2.3
Average		3.1	2.3	1.9	3.00	2.4	3.3	2.65

2- Relevance of Strategy

	Rating	Remarks
(Conformity with country strategy)	3	Satisfactory performance

3 - Performance of Operations

	Rating	Remarks
Non-lending Operations (Preparation; contribution to sectoral policy; CSP priority; Bank's role in dialogue; Identification of projects; Adaptation of instruments; Contribution to institutional reforms; PRR)	3	Satisfactory performance
Lending Operations (Relevance; Quality at entry; Efficacy; Efficiency; Institutional impact; Sustainability; Crosscutting impact)	2.7	Satisfactory performance
AVERAGE	2.8	Satisfactory performance

4 - Borrower Performance

	Rating	Remarks
(Implementation; Compliance with procedures)	2	Unsatisfactory performance

5 - Bank Performance

	Rating	Remarks
(Identification; Studies; Appraisal; Adequacy of instruments; Coordination with donors; Frequency and quality of supervision; Monitoring of files; Completion report)	3	Satisfactory performance

OVERALL PERFORMANCE (Weighted average of partial rating)	2.6	UNSATISFACTORY
--------------------------------------------------------------------	------------	-----------------------

MATRIX OF KEY LESSONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND MONITORING RESPONSIBILITIES

Key Lessons	Key Recommendations
<p>The main lessons drawn from this study are as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The inconsistency in sector interventions (registration, or otherwise, in successive ADFs) reflects a rather short- and medium-term view of interventions. The issue of the duration of the CSP period is therefore pertinent. 2. The recurrent problem of disbursements at the Bank cited by the Borrower as one of the bottlenecks to project implementation reflects the inadequacy of the new measures adopted by the Bank. The extension of deadlines could also be attributed to the technical department responsible for project files. Task managers do not have enough prerogatives in project monitoring. 3. Large-scale projects (in a wide geographical area) without an adequate management mechanism have little chance of achieving satisfactory results because of implementation and supervision difficulties. 4. The inadequate involvement of Ministerial services in project management could undermine the sustainability of institutional development. 5. Projects with a high number of components have little chance of producing satisfactory results; the same applies to projects with very few components. 6. The search for cofinancing could enhance dialogue between partners, and speed up the harmonization process. 7. The negative impacts of agricultural sector liberalization (export crops) have led farmers to revert to food crop cultivation, which has enormous processing potential. However, the weak link in the system remains the lack of storage and marketing infrastructure. 8. IRAD is an institution that enjoys sub-regional renown. Supporting its activities could reinforce sub-regional integration. 9. The SP-SFSP could promote regional integration. 10. The inadequate formal dialogue between the Government and the private sector does not facilitate access to agricultural financing, and consequently does not promote sector development. 11. Limited access to local financing is a constraint on the sustainability of project outputs. 	<p>For the Bank:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. With regard to the harmonization of assistance, the Bank needs to address the issue of CSP periodicity by adopting a longer term vision. 7. Give priority to projects with a reduced number of components over a smaller geographical area. 8. Give more decision-making powers to task managers in order to improve communication between the Bank and the PIUs. 9. Initiate studies to identify viable sub-sectors of the agricultural private sector or use the existing project databanks (RSDS, NEPAD). The MTEF has identified projects to be financed that could revitalize the sector. Support could be given to programs that promote agricultural competitiveness and the development of professional farmer organizations. Supporting the development of agricultural credit and contributing to the creation of specialized financial establishment are actions that could contribute to the development of economic activities in rural areas. The Bank's strategy of giving priority to infrastructures under the current CSP could promote the development of agricultural markets that generate private sector growth. 10. Prospect for possibilities of co-financing sub-regional projects (agricultural research, food security). The FAO pilots the sub-regional food security program. The Bank needs to participate in the consolidation of the pilot phase (SP-SFSP). The Bank launched an identification study for the Agricultural Research Regional Integration Project (PIRRA). Considering IRAD's achievements, this institution could be retained as the benchmark structure in the implementation of this project. <p>For the Borrower:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Establish a resource mobilization strategy that will lead to timely availability of counterpart funds; 8. Give priority to the sector during implementation of the donor-supported "Governance" program. 9. Create the conditions for sustained dialogue with the agricultural private sector in order to develop the existing potential. 10. Promote the development of the seed producer profession in rural areas. 11. Encourage sub-regional project development initiatives in the areas of research and food security. 12. Encourage the development of microfinance in Cameroon's rural areas for the agriculture and rural development sector.

LIST OF MAIN DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Bank Group documents

1. Cameroon – Country Strategy Paper 1996 - 1998
2. Cameroon – Country Strategy Paper 1999 - 2001
3. Cameroon – Country Strategy Paper 2002 - 2004
4. Cameroon – Country Strategy Paper 2005 - 2009
5. Cameroon – Portfolio Review Report, March 2004
6. Cameroon – Portfolio Review Report, February 2007
7. Cameroon – Portfolio Review Report, October 2000
8. Support to the National Agricultural Research and Extension Program, Appraisal Report, June 1998.
9. Forestry and Agro-forestry Support Project, July 1998
10. Program to Improve Rural Household Incomes in the Northern Provinces, Appraisal Report, April 2001.
11. Special Food Security Program Support Project, Appraisal Report, March 2000
12. Livestock and Fisheries Development Project for the South West Province, Appraisal Report, 1999.
13. Rumpi Participatory Development Project, Appraisal Report, October 2002
14. Grassfield Participatory and Decentralized Rural Development Project, April 2003.
15. South West province Integrated Rural Development Project, Appraisal report, 1985
16. Second North West rural development project, Appraisal Report, November 1989
17. Cameroon – Supervision Summary, Rural Forestry and Agro-Forestry Support Project
18. Cameroon – Supervision Summary, Project for Improvement of Rural Household Incomes in the Northern Provinces (PARFAR)
19. Cameroon – Project data, South West Livestock and Fisheries Development Project.
20. ADB/ERWP N°86. A Review of Ex-ante Poverty Impact Assessments of Macroeconomic Policies in Cameroon and Ghana, July 2006.
21. CD: Selected statistics on African countries. ADB/Development Research Department, 2004.

22. CD: Gender, Poverty and Environment Indicators on African Countries
23. Compendium of statistics on Bank Group operations. ADB/Statistics Division/Development Research Department
24. ADB/ADF. Bank Group Policy on Agricultural and Rural Development, OCOD January 2002.

Documents of the Government of Cameroon

25. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Rural Sector Development Strategy (RSDS): Summary of the Agriculture and Rural Development Component), January 2006
26. Republic of Cameroon, Ministry of Agriculture, South West Province Integrated rural Development Project, Project Completion Report, August 2001
27. Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, National Reforestation Program, June 2006
28. Ministry of Agriculture, Second North West Rural Development Project, Project Completion Report, 2002
29. Ministry of Agriculture and rural development, Grassfield Participatory and decentralized Rural development project, Progress Report, December 2006
30. Ministry of Research and Innovation, Institute of Agricultural Research for Development, PNRVA Completion Report, July 2006
31. Ministry of Research and Innovation, Institute of Agricultural Research for Development, Report of Scientific, Development and Innovation Activities, 2006
32. Ministry of Research and Innovation, Institute of Agricultural Research for Development, Monitoring data, as of 22 February 2007
33. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Progress Report of the Rural Household Income Improvement Program (PARFAR), March 2007
34. Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, Rural Forestry and Agro-forestry Support Project, Implementation Status of Supervision Mission Recommendations, 6 to 21 November 2006, February 2007
35. Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, Rural Forestry and Agro-forestry Support Project, Annual work report (1st January to 31st December 2005), February 2006
36. Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, Rural Forestry and Agro-forestry Support Project, Project progress report – technical implementation status (January 2000 – December 2006)
37. Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, Rural Forestry and Agro-forestry Support Project, Report of the 11th session of the PAFRA Steering Committee held on 16 December 2006.

38. Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, Rural Forestry and Agro-forestry Support Project, Quarterly progress report (1st April - 30 June 2006), July 2006
39. INS; Rural poverty profile 2nd Cameroon Household Survey, December 2002
40. Republic of Cameroon Millennium Development Goals 2nd Progress Report December 2002
41. INS. Statistical Yearbook 2006.

Other documents

42. Presse de l'UCAC, *Le retournement de l'Etat Forestier : l'Endroit et l'Envers des processus de gestion forestière au Cameroun*, 2004
43. Press de l'UCAC, *Understanding Poverty in Cameroon*, 2004
44. World Commissions on Forests and sustainable development, EU/AfDB, forest conservation and development policy dialogue in African region,: A regional hearing, Yaoundé 5-6 may 1997
45. CERI/CIRAD, *International Agricultural Product Price Dynamics: Summary of presentations and discussions of the seminar of 7 June 2005*, Document prepared by the steering group of the project on the regulation of international agricultural markets.
46. France. *Framework Document on Partnership between the Republic of Cameroon and the French Republic 2006 - 2010*.
47. *Interactive Atlas of Cameroon version 1.0 : Summary document*, a report by Global Forest Watch, 2005

SCHEDULE OF VISITS, 5 – 24 MARCH 2007

DATE	TIME	INSTITUTION/PROJET
Monday, 5 March	8:30 – 12:00	DCET/MINEFI
Tuesday, 6 March	9:00	DCET/MINEFI
	14:30	PARFAR/ Coordinator
Wednesday, 7 March	9:00	MINADER/DEPC
	15:00	PNRVA: Coordinator and PIU
Thursday, 8 March		
	21:00	Microfinance network Sub-Department of Microfinance/MINEFI
Friday, 9 March	8:00	Departure to Bafoussam: PAFRA
	15:00	PAFRA: Visit of developed land (Eucalyptus) nurseries Meet with PIU, partners
Saturday, 10 March	8:00	PAFRA: Visit of farms, nurseries
	16:00	Departure to Bamenda
	20:00	Manager of Grassfield Project
Sunday, 11 March	9:00	Bamenda: GM-MIDENO- North West Rural Development Project
	15:00	Bamenda: MIDENO- North West Rural Development Project
Monday, 12 March	8:00-14:00	Visit to women beneficiaries / uncompleted project site Departure to BUEA
	19:00	Meeting with Rumpi Coordinator
Tuesday, 13 March	8:00-10:00	Meeting with GM-SOWEDA Ekona: PNRVA
	14 :00	Kumba: Fishponds
Wednesday, 14 March	9:00-11:00	Meeting with PIU of Livestock and Fisheries Project Limbe: SOWEDA Livestock and Fisheries Development Project. Visit to project sites
Thursday, 15 March	9:00-14:00	PRO-PME Return to Yaounde
Friday, 16 March	10:00	GTZ
Saturday, 17 March – Sunday, 18 March		
Monday, 19 March	13:00	FAO
Tuesday, 20 March	10:00-12:00	MINEP MINEPROFF
	15:30	MINRESI
Wednesday, 21 March	14:30	MINEFOF
Thursday, 22 March	9:00	DCET: Presentation of mission report
Friday, 23 March		
Saturday, 24 March		RETURN TO TUNIS

INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONS MET

I –AT THE BANK

N°	FULL NAME	DEPARTMENT	FUNCTION	CONTACT
1	KEITA DOUGOU	OSAN 3	Chief Agronomist	Ext. 2086
2	AYACHI MOULDI	OSAN 3	Task Manager	
3	DAGAIMASSA Abdoulaye	OSAN 3	Forestry expert	Ext. 2495
4	TOUNKARA SAMBA Bocary	OSAN 3	Principal expert	Ext. 2330
5	DIGUIMBAYE CHRISTIAN		Disbursements Officer	
6	DIAW	OSAN 3	Expert	
7	NZEYIMANA JEANNE		Microfinance expert	

II - IN CAMEROUN

N°	FULL NAME	INSTITUTION	FUNCTION	CONTACT
Introduction to the ADB Country Office in Cameroon, 5 March, 8:30 a.m.				
1	GALIBAKA Gilbert	ADB Country Office	Acting Resident Representative	220 27 61/65
Contact meeting with Cameroonian authorities in MINEFI, 5 March, 9:30 – 11:00				
1	BOULLEYS Robert	DCET/MINEFI	Director of Cooperation	982 89 00
2	GALIBAKA Gilbert	ADB Country Office	Acting Resident Representative	220 27 61/65
Meeting to validate schedule of visits, MINEFI, 6 March 9:00 – 12:00				
1	BOULLEYS Robert	DCET/MINEFI	Director of Cooperation	982 89 00
2	Project representatives			
PARFAR PROJECT, 6 March				
1	LOU ISSA JOSEPH	PARFAR	Coordinator	
PIU of PNRVA PROJECT, 07/03/07				
1	NJOJAH Aboubakar	IRAD	AGM/Coordinator PNRVA	970 52 91
	PIU PNRVA			
PAFRA PROJECT, 08 – 09 March				
1	BOULLEYS B. Robert			
2	TANYI TIKU Barua	PAFRA	Coordinator	
	Project partners (microfinance, wood industries)			
15	Visit of nursery farms, eucalyptus plantations			
16	Meeting with a beneficiary, a nursery farmer			
17	Visit of a beneficiary owner of a eucalyptus plantation			
REFORMULATED MIDENO PROJECT II (North-West Province Rural Development Project) 11 March				

1	NDEH B. John	MIDENO	GM	
2	BOULLEYS B. Robert	MINEFI/DCET	Director of Cooperation	
3	MULUH N. Gregory	GP-DREUDEP	Coordinator	
	Management of MIDENO			
12	Visit to a group of women who are members of FANBROS Association and beneficiaries of various Reformulated MIDENO Project II (stockbreeding)			
13	Visit to a beneficiary owner of a cattle ranch (TOBO Group) United Saving and Ag Credit			
GRASSFIELD PROJECT, 12 March				
1	MULUH NGUH Gregory	GP-DERUDEP	Coordinator	
2	PIU GRASSFIELD			
SOWEDA IRDP Project, 13 March				
1	ENEME Andrew N	SOWEDA	DG	
3	EKUE Fabian	RUMPI	Coordinator	
LIVESTOCK AND FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, 14 March				
1	YOUMBI Joseph	LFDP	Coordinator	
	PIU LFDP			
5	Visit to fishpond construction sites,			
6	Meeting with women beneficiaries (fish smokers), meeting with fish vendors)			
PRO PME Meeting				
1	Le GUERRIER Luc		General Manager	342 31 03
Meeting at UNDP				
	Mme EKUE	UNDP		
Meeting at FAO				
	ATANGA Flélicitas	FAO	Assistant Representative	220 28 45
Meeting at the GTZ, 16 March				
	Ms HOEFS Susann	GTZ		900 60 05
	MVAMVA Jonas	MINADER		678 33 84
Meeting at MINRESI				
	Mme Minister			
	DJOURMBE Maurice	Secretary-General		
		IRAD	General Manager	
	ABA	IRAD	Head of the Research Policy Division	
	DIKELE Boubacar	MINRESI	International cooperation	
Meeting at MINADER				
	TCHOKAM	MINADER/DEPC	Director of Cooperation	
Meeting at MINFOF				
	MADI ALAIN	MINFOF	Secretary General	
	TANYI TIKU Baua	PAFRA	Coordinator	

Meeting at MINPROFF				
	KOAH Jean Baptiste	MINPROFF	DPSF	
	MATIP Alain	MINPROFF	DEPC	
Feedback Meeting of 22 March				
1	BOULLEYS Robert	MINEFI/DCET	Director of Cooperation	982 89 00
6	NGALANI Joseph	IRAD/ PNRVA		222 59 24
7	EKUE M. Fabian	RUMPI PROJECT	Coordinator	961 68 35
8	TANYI TIKU B.	PAFRA PROJECT	Coordinator	990 69 98
9	MULUH Gregory	GRASSFIELD	Coordinator	742 93 98
10	YOUMBI Joseph	LFDP PROJECT	Coordinator	997 66 25
11	NDEH B. John	MIDENO	GM	770 43 25
12	FEZEU Jules	MINPLADAT/DPD/CEA3		222 15 63
13	YUNIWO Edison	GP-DERUDEP		768 0062
14	ZOUZOU Hervé	ADB/OPEV	Assistant	
15	MBOM Emmanuel	MINADER/DEPC	Head M/E Unit	708 97 53