



Evaluation Study

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Education Sector in Bangladesh: What Worked Well and Why under the Sector-Wide Approach?

Operations Evaluation Department

Asian Development Bank

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit – Taka (Tk)

	1989	1993	1999	2005	2008 (as of 8 Nov 08)
Tk1.00 =	\$0.030372	\$0.025257	\$0.020378	\$0.015529	\$0.014563
\$1.00 =	Tk32.925	Tk39.593	Tk49.073	Tk64.394	Tk68.665

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	–	Asian Development Bank
ADTA	–	advisory technical assistance
BANBEIS	–	Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information System
B. Ed.	–	Bachelor of Education
BNFE	–	Bureau of Nonformal Education
BRM	–	Bangladesh Resident Mission
CAP	–	country assistance program
CAPE	–	country assistance program evaluation
CAS	–	country assistance strategy
COS	–	country operational strategy
CPS	–	country partnership strategy
CSP	–	country strategy and program
DFID	–	Department for International Development of the United Kingdom
DNFE	–	Directorate of Nonformal Education
DP	–	development partner
DPE	–	Directorate of Primary Education
DPEO	–	District Primary Education Office
DSHE	–	Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education
EA	–	executing agency
EFA	–	Education for All
EIRR	–	economic internal rate of return
ELCG	–	Education Local Consultative Group
EMIS	–	education management information system
GEP	–	General Education Project
GER	–	gross enrollment rate
GOB	–	Government of Bangladesh
GPS	–	government primary school
HRD	–	human resources development
IDA	–	International Development Association
JICA	–	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LGED	–	Local Government Engineering Department
M&E	–	monitoring and evaluation
MDG	–	Millennium Development Goal
M. Ed.	–	Master of Education

MOPME	–	Ministry of Primary and Mass Education
MOE	–	Ministry of Education
NAEM	–	National Academy of Education Management
NAPE	–	National Academy of Primary Education
NCTB	–	National Curriculum and Textbook Board
NER	–	net enrollment rate
NFE	–	nonformal education
NFEP	–	Nonformal Education Project
NGO	–	nongovernment organization
NORAD	–	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NPRS	–	National Poverty Reduction Strategy
OED	–	Operations Evaluation Department
OSP	–	operational strategy paper
PCR	–	project completion report
PE	–	primary education
PEDP-I	–	Primary Education Development Project
PEDP-II	–	Second Primary Education Development Program
PESP	–	Primary Education Sector Project
PIU	–	project implementation unit
PLCEP	–	Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Project
PLU	–	program liaison unit
PMU	–	program management unit
PPER	–	project performance evaluation report
PPTA	–	project preparatory technical assistance
PRSP	–	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSQL	–	primary standard quality level
PTA	–	parent-teacher association
PTI	–	primary teacher training institute
QAE	–	quality-at-entry
RNGPS	–	registered nongovernment primary school
SAPE	–	sector assistance program evaluation
SARD	–	South Asia Regional Department
SBA	–	school-based assessment
SBM	–	school-based management
SBPMS	–	school-based performance management system
SE	–	secondary education
SE-SDP	–	Secondary Education Sector Development Plan
SEDP	–	Secondary Education Development Project
SESDP	–	Secondary Education Sector Development Project and Program
SESIP	–	Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project
SIDA	–	Swedish International Development Agency
SLIP	–	school level improvement plan
SMC	–	school management committee
SPESP	–	Second Primary Education Sector Project
SSC	–	secondary school certificate

SWAp	–	subsector-wide approach
SWOT	–	strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
TA	–	technical assistance
TCR	–	technical assistance completion report
TEVT	–	technical education and vocational training
TQISEP	–	Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project
TTC	–	teacher training college
UNICEF	–	United Nations Children’s Fund
UPEO	–	Upazila/Subdistrict Primary Education Office
UPEP	–	upazila primary education plan
URC	–	Upazila Resource Center

NOTES

- (i) The fiscal year (FY) of the Government ends on 30 June.
- (ii) In this report, “\$” refers to US dollars.

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The guidelines formally adopted by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) on avoiding conflict of interest in its independent evaluations were observed in the preparation of this report. E. Breckner, T. Kabir, and S. Lohani were the international consultants employed to conduct necessary field work and prepare subsector assessments in their respective areas under the supervision of S. Hutaserani (Team Leader), who subsequently prepared this report based on the consultant drafts and other sources of materials. J. Simon (domestic consultant) provided research assistance. To the knowledge of the management of OED, there were no conflicts of interest of the persons preparing, reviewing, or approving this report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background. Economic growth, poverty reduction, and human resources development (HRD) have been key strategic thrusts of the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) over the past two decades. The GOB's HRD priorities were placed on basic education, covering primary education (PE) (grades 1–5) and nonformal education (NFE), and later extended to cover grades 6–8 in secondary education (SE). During the early 1990s, only 35% of the country's adult population was literate, and heavily skewed between males and females (44% versus 22%) as well as between urban and rural areas. The PE gross enrollment rate (GER) was only 68%, and the cycle dropout rate was as high as 60%. The GOB's commitment to improving basic education was reflected in its adoption of the Education for All (EFA) agenda in the early 1990s, which provided the basis for assistance from various development partners (DPs). The EFA was upgraded to a national action plan in 2003. The plan was derived from the GOB's long-term Perspective Development Plan (1980–2000), part of which aimed at eradicating illiteracy by 2000 (subsequently changed to 2006 and then to 2015). It is consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which aim to halve poverty and achieve substantial HRD improvements by 2015. With continued joint GOB and DP efforts, universal GER has almost been reached with gender balance, but the institutional capacity and quality aspects have not improved much (e.g., low adult literacy rate of 55% and high cycle dropout rate of about 50%). These aspects emerged as the key issues that need to be further addressed.

Objectives and Goals. To help in addressing these issues, this sector assistance program evaluation (SAPE) aims to (i) assess the combined performance of the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) and other key DPs' assistance in the Bangladesh education sector during 1989–2007, including the DPs' combined performance in the ongoing subsector-wide approach (SWAp) modality jointly adopted in the Second Primary Education Development Program (PEDP-II); and (ii) apply a *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats* (SWOT) analysis to identify positive and negative factors during the design and implementation stages—both within and beyond DPs' control—to explain the reasons behind what worked well and what did not work well. Based on these SWOT factors, the SAPE goals are to (i) provide findings to be used as an input in the preparation of the DPs' joint country assistance evaluation, (ii) derive lessons to guide DPs' future operations; and (iii) identify recommendations to be used in the preparation of ADB's next country partnership strategy for improving future ADB performance in Bangladesh's education sector.

Scope. The SAPE assesses the combined performance of four DPs' education strategies and assistance programs in Bangladesh—ADB, the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency of the Government of Japan—because they are the ones involved in preparing joint country strategies for Bangladesh for the period 2006–2009. The DPs' products and services evaluated in the SAPE are both education strategies and assistance programs for Bangladesh. The products and services included in the latter are loans; advisory technical assistance (ADTA) grants; policy dialogue; partnerships; and economic, thematic, and sector work. Since this is a sector-level evaluation, these products and services are assessed together as a package, rather than as individual projects.

Subsector Coverage. The SAPE focuses on assessing the combined performance of the four DPs' education strategies and programs in Bangladesh's PE subsector, because PE (i) is a major strategic priority of the GOB; (ii) exhibits strong cooperation among these four DPs and other DPs; and (iii) accounts for the largest investment by the GOB and DPs combined—almost \$2 billion for the ongoing PEDP-II SWAp. The SAPE also evaluates the performance of

ADB alone in the NFE and SE subsectors, because (i) coordination among DPs in these two subsectors is not as strong as that in PE; and (ii) most of the ADB assistance programs in these two subsectors were provided separately, like those of other DPs.

Time Coverage. The SAPE period starts from 1989 for education strategies and from 1990 for education programs until end-2007, so that it is long enough to trace the (i) historical evolution of the four DPs' education strategies for Bangladesh, and (ii) historical performance of their corresponding programs. The SAPE starting point of 1989 reflects the year in which ADB's first "official" country operational strategy (COS) for Bangladesh started. It provided strategic direction for ADB's country assistance program (CAP) for 1990–1993, during which ADB loans for Bangladesh's education sector accounted for almost a quarter (23%) of the total ADB loans for the sector from the beginning (1978) up to the planned 2011. During the SAPE period (1989–2007), ADB had four official country strategies—the 1989 COS, 1993 COS, 1999 COS, and 2005 country strategy and program—which guided subsequent periods of CAP loans and grants: 1990–1993, 1994–1999, 2000–2005, and 2006–2011, respectively.

Approach. The SAPE uses the "bottom-up (subsector/program level)" and "top-down (DPs' strategic and country level)" evaluation approach, with equal weights. The former consists of four criteria: (i) relevance; (ii) efficiency; (iii) effectiveness (achievement of outcomes or **bottom-up results**, inclusive of those related to institutional development, governance, and gender impacts); and (iv) sustainability. The latter consists of three criteria: (i) contributions of DPs' bottom-up sector outcomes to the country's achievement of long-term development results/impacts or MDGs (**top-down results**); (ii) strategic relevance of DPs' education strategies for Bangladesh, based on three subcriteria: (a) relevance to the country's education issues, (b) relevance to the GOB's education plans, and (c) consistencies among DPs' education strategies; and (iii) strategic positioning/coherence of DPs' education strategies, based on four subcriteria: (a) DPs' subsector focus and selectivity based on comparative advantage by component or geographical area, (b) DPs' partnerships through appropriate modalities to create synergies, (c) DPs' long-term continuity to create a critical mass of beneficiaries, and (d) client perceptions of DPs' performance in the education sector.

Top-Down Assessment. The SAPE rates the DPs' overall top-down combined performance as **successful** due to the combination of (i) **partly successful** contributions of their bottom-up sector outcomes to the country's long-term development results/impacts or MDGs (e.g., adult literacy and poverty reduction have not improved much); (ii) **strategic relevance** of their education strategies (e.g., in relation to the country's key education issues, the GOB's education subsector priorities, and consistencies among their own strategies); and (iii) **satisfactory positioning** of their education strategies (e.g., good focus and selectivity in the design of their education strategies, good partnerships to create synergies, long-term continuity to create a critical mass of beneficiaries, and good client perceptions of their performance). The **partly successful** rating of the country's achievement of development results indicates that while major bottom-up outcomes in terms of increased enrollment access have largely been achieved, they are not sufficient to contribute to substantial increase in adult literacy. This points to the need to focus more on improving the quality aspect of education. The **successful** rating of the DPs' education strategies implies that they provided good directions for their programs to follow.

Bottom-Up Assessment: PE Subsector. DPs' joint support to PE can be divided into three investment cycles. The first cycle started in 1990 (jointly supported by 10 DPs), with ADB and IDA as the major DPs. The DPs' focus was divided by component and geographical area. The DPs' investments included six subprojects, with separate project implementation units (PIUs). The second cycle started in 1997 (jointly supported by eight DPs), with ADB and IDA as

the major DPs. The DPs' focus was again divided by component and geographical area. Their investments consisted of eight subprojects, with separate PIUs. But this time, the DPs agreed to operate under the GOB's common policy framework. The third cycle (the PEDP-II, started in 2003), jointly supported by 11 DPs, uses a SWAp modality, with ADB taking the lead role. In this cycle, there is only one program management unit (PMU), the activities of which were designed to be integrated into the executing agency's (EA) normal operations. The SAPE rates the DPs' performance in the three cycles combined as **successful** (*relevant, less efficient, effective, and likely sustainable*). The **relevant** rating is due mainly to good design in terms of focus and selectivity, long-term continuity, and partnerships and synergies with appropriate choice of modalities evolving from the project type, to the project type with a common policy framework, and then to the SWAp. The **less efficient** rating is due mainly to long implementation delays in (i) the second cycle caused by delayed budget approval, underprocurement, and the lack of institutional diagnosis of EA capacity, thus shifting back to the use of the project-type modality instead of the SWAp as originally planned; and (ii) the ongoing PEDP-II cycle caused by too big a SWAp (\$1.815 billion) with too many DPs, resulting in difficulties in managing and harmonizing diverse expectations and requirements (e.g., many procurement procedures), hence high transaction costs among DPs. The **effective** rating is due to significant achievement of subsector outcomes, especially in terms of increased access and gender balance, resulting in almost universal PE and a large critical mass of beneficiaries. However, although institutional management capacity and quality of students have not improved much, many of the indicators are evolving with positive signs of progress under the ongoing PEDP-II. The **likely sustainable** rating is due to (i) the DPs' long-term continuity of support to facilitate further achievement of outcomes and consolidate whatever has been achieved in order to sustain the results; (ii) sufficient GOB budgetary support, particularly in terms of the high share of the total development budget for education allocated to PE (62.5%), although the corresponding recurrent budget share is much less (33.9%); and (iii) institutionalized PMU activities as part of the EA's normal operation system.

NFE Subsector. ADB provided two NFE projects. The first one was completed successfully, and the second one has just been resumed after several years of suspension due to the abolition of the EA by the GOB. The SAPE rates ADB's performance in the two projects combined as **partly successful** (*relevant, less efficient, less effective, and likely sustainable*) so far. The two projects had good design, but the SAPE rates them together as **relevant**, rather than highly relevant, in view of the discontinuity of the EA. The **less efficient** rating is due to long implementation delays associated with the suspension of the second project, hence delayed progress in the NFE subsector. The **less effective** rating is because some outcomes were not achieved during the first project, which would have been achieved under the second project had there not been discontinuity. The **likely sustainable** rating is mainly because the second project has already resumed (after the GOB's establishment of the new EA) and is likely to build on the achievement of the first project, with efforts putting to strengthen institutional capacity of the new EA through an ADTA.

SE Subsector. ADB has provided four SE projects. The first two were completed successfully, whereas the last two are ongoing, with the last one having just started. The SAPE rates ADB's performance in the four projects combined as **successful** (*relevant, less efficient, effective/evolving, and likely sustainable*). The **relevant** rating is because, despite the design drawbacks encountered by some SE projects, the first one helped GOB draft the Secondary Education Sector Development Plan, which is still in operation and provided the basis on which the subsequent projects were built, while the fourth (ongoing) one was designed to have an appropriate modality—a combination of project and policy-based loans—to address key policy and institutional reforms needed. The **less efficient** rating is due to implementation delays in

the past projects. The **effective/evolving** rating is due to some substantial outcomes achieved in terms of access and gender balance. Although the institutional capacity and quality aspects have not been improved much, they are evolving, with good prospects of being achieved under the two ongoing projects. The **likely sustainable** rating is due to (i) the long-term continuity of ADB successive investments; and (ii) sufficient GOB budgetary support, with a relatively high share of the total recurrent education budget allocated to SE (53.8%), although the institutional aspect of sustainability has not been achieved much due to high turnover of trained staff which is being addressed in the ongoing policy-based loan.

Overall Top-Down and Bottom-Up Assessment. Although ADB's bottom-up performance in the NFE subsector is rated as only *partly successful*, its *successful* performance in SE and the DPs' combined *successful* performance in PE have contributed to ADB's **successful bottom-up** performance. At the top-down level, while the contribution of the bottom-up sector outcomes to the country's achievement of long-term development results/impacts is rated as *partly successful*, the DPs' combined performance in the other two criteria (strategic relevance and positioning of their education strategies) are rated as *relevant* and *satisfactory*, respectively, rendering **successful top-down** performance and, in turn, **overall successful top-down and bottom-up performance combined**.

However, the rating scale of 1.8 for the overall **successful** performance is not considered high (borderline), implying that there remains scope for improvement, particularly in terms of education quality and institutional capacity. The DPs' combined performance in the PE subsector, together with ADB's performance in the NFE and SE subsectors, over the past two decades have worked well in terms of increased access and gender balance in enrollment, which did not require much time to achieve by their nature. The GOB's conducive policy and institutional environments (e.g., strong ownership/commitment to the EFA agenda) are found to be among the positive reasons (*opportunities*) supporting these achievements. By contrast, the DPs' combined performance did not work well in terms of improving education quality and institutional capacity, and to some extent equity in access (e.g., literacy rate, cycle completion rate, and enrollment rate by the poorest groups remained low). This was due partly to some *risks/threats* associated with the GOB's nonconductive policy and institutional environments (e.g., weak decentralization, rigid project proforma and regulations, lack of professional education cadre, lack of appropriate teacher development programs, and fragmentation of education management information system [EMIS] between PE and SE), which will take time to improve. On the DPs' side, the following factors are found to be key positive reasons (*strengths*) and negative reasons (*weaknesses*) affecting their overall performance in the education sector:

- (i) **DPs' Strengths or Value Addition.** Much of the success achieved to date has been the result of the DPs' good education strategies in terms of relevance and positioning/coherence, which provided appropriate directions for the DPs to design well-coordinated, focused, and long-term assistance programs. The DPs have, in turn, translated their education strategies into generally well-designed assistance programs, in partnership with GOB, by providing long-term continuity of support using appropriate modalities, with more focus and selectivity within a particular subsector to create synergies and a critical mass of beneficiaries. These are the DPs' key strengths or value addition of their education strategies and assistance programs over and above the financing provided.
- (ii) **DPs' Weaknesses.** While the overall sector rating is *successful*, the rating scale is not considered high, due mainly to the *less efficient* ratings in all three subsectors, associated with long implementation delays caused by the following

weaknesses of the DPs: (a) weak design of the EMIS and monitoring system; (b) lack of a sector analysis of issues and directions for improving the entire education sector, linking different subsectors in an integrated manner and suggesting effective mechanisms for close coordination; (c) ad hoc and inefficient use of ADTA grants, rather than using them at the early design stage to help address the EA's capacity gaps and the needed institutional and policy reforms; and (d) high transaction costs associated with complicated implementation arrangements, especially through the big SWAp introduced in the PEDP-II during the time when the EA's capacity was not sufficient to handle it and when initial necessary conditions for harmonization were not put in place. Questions thus arise as to whether or not the SWAp is the best modality and why.

Is SWAp the Best Modality? To answer this question, the SAPE synthesizes its key findings below:

- (i) **What Is a SWAp and Why Is It Expected to Be one of the Best Modalities?** A SWAp is a systematic approach allowing DPs to work together in partnership with a government by pooling resources to support sector/subsector-wide development in an integrated manner under the government's common policy framework. It requires good sector analysis, policy framework, and expenditure plan. Based on global experience, it is expected to be one of the best modalities when it is designed and implemented properly, as it should help increase efficiency in implementation by (a) avoiding duplicative and piecemeal efforts, thus increasing synergies in achieving outcomes; (b) increasing harmonization of DP and government implementation procedures (e.g., procurement; accounting; reporting; and a common PMU integrated into the EA's normal operations, rather than separate PIUs), thus reducing transaction costs on both sides; and (c) encouraging the government and DPs to coordinate closely through special mechanisms for policy dialogue and fiduciary risk management led by the government, thus reducing transaction costs among DPs, since it helps reduce program monitoring costs. Experiences in some countries showed that SWAps tended to have high transaction costs at the beginning, which became lower only after key priorities were identified jointly by DPs and the governments.
- (ii) **What Worked Well in the PEDP-II SWAp and Why?** While its overall rating is **successful**, there are areas in which the SWAp worked well and did not work well. It worked well in terms of being a **relevant** modality, because it evolved as a natural step, in the early 2000s, based on the DPs' long-term experience of having close coordination in PE, starting from the first investment cycle in 1990 through the project-type modality, and then in the second investment cycle in the late 1990s through the project-type modality within the GOB common policy framework. It is also an appropriate modality because it allowed the DPs to coordinate more closely using pooled funding resources and to engage the GOB to take the lead and drive the program for improving the PE subsector. It is also found to be an **effective** modality in achieving many access- and gender-related outcomes by jointly identifying key priorities to mainstream implementation arrangements, while some quality and institutional capacity outcomes are evolving with positive signs of progress. The PEDP-II SWAp's **strengths**, which are part of the reasons for making the program effective/evolving, are as follows: (a) it has a single PMU (rather than separate PIUs as in the first two investment cycles), the activities of which are integrated into the EA's normal operations to

ensure EA ownership and sustainable capacity after completion; (b) it enables the DPs to have stronger coordination during implementation (compared with the modalities used in the first two investment cycles) through consortium meetings, with the project liaison unit (PLU) playing an active role in facilitating the process; (c) it allows for regular joint reviews and monitoring; and (d) there is a consensus that the PEDP-II has enhanced GOB leadership and ownership and opened up many priority areas (e.g., inclusive education and decentralization) that have remained the country's big challenges to improving quality, institutional capacity, and equity in access for a long time.

- (iii) **What Did Not Work Well in the PEDP-II SWAp and Why?** Theoretically, while a SWAp is expected to help increase efficiency in implementation, the opposite is found for the PEDP-II SWAp, as it is rated as *less efficient* due to the long initial delays in implementation of about 2 years and high transaction costs among DPs (although it helped reduce transaction costs for the GOB). This is due to the following **weaknesses**: (a) the program size is too large to manage, with as many as 11 DPs and a wide extent of activities involved; (b) an institutional analysis was not provided at the design stage to diagnose the EA capacity areas that should be developed prior to SWAp implementation; (c) ADTA was provided alongside program implementation, rather than up front at the design stage to equip the EA with the necessary kinds of capacity to implement the complex SWAp; (d) DPs' and the GOB's procedures could not be fully harmonized, since different procedures had to be continued (e.g., procurement and funds flow) under the SWAp; (e) separation of the PLU from ADB's Bangladesh Resident Mission blurred the roles, responsibilities and expectations of the lead DP (ADB), the consortium chair, and other DPs; and (f) inclusion of the SWAp's consortium functions in the PLU blurred mutual accountability between the lead DP and the consortium, and also required BRM to get overly stretched with support to the consortium.
- (iv) **Lessons: How to Make SWAp Work Better.** While the PEDP-II SWAp has some weaknesses, it also has some strengths that have contributed to achieving many evolving outcomes, ensuring GOB leadership and ownership, and mainstreaming important priorities for long-term sustainability. Thus, it can be considered as the right modality for the PEDP-II despite its weak implementation efficiency due to its large program size (although there should have been economies of scale from large programs) and complicated implementation arrangements, hence high transaction costs among the DPs. Since high transaction costs among the DPs have emerged as a major weakness of the PEDP-II SWAp, the following lessons are drawn as a guidance for the DPs on how to reduce the transaction costs under their ongoing or future SWAps in order to make them work better: (a) design the program size to be manageable, with an appropriate number of DPs in relation to the extent of activities, depending on the DPs' availability of staff and resources, the extent of procedural harmonization, and the EA's initial institutional and staff capacities; (b) provide ADTA at the design stage to strengthen the EA institutional capacity prior to implementing a SWAp; (c) target ADTA for analytical studies and technical support to ensure efficient joint annual reviews; (d) focus on strengthening the EMIS for improving the results framework to monitor and report on progress; (e) collectively strengthen the results framework to meet all the DPs' reporting needs so that a single report can be prepared annually, not quarterly, to assess

progress and support policy dialogue; (f) adopt more stringent partnership agreements (including further harmonization of implementation procedures) among the participating DPs under GOB leadership; (g) set up the SWAp administrative unit (such as the PEDP-II PLU) within the resident mission of the lead DP, rather than outside, as in the PEDP-II case, in order to avoid any confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of the lead DP; (h) separate the consortium functions from the lead DP functions as a self-contained arrangement (as in the SWAp in the health sector) to enhance mutual accountability; and (i) include special arrangements to expeditiously address critical cases like corruption without jeopardizing regular implementation.

Other Lessons. In addition to the SWAp-related lessons drawn above, the following are generic lessons not related to the SWAp:

- (i) In designing future projects/programs, the choice among different modalities should depend on (a) the EA's institutional and staff capacities, (b) the DPs' availability of staff and resources, (c) the extent of project/program activities, and (d) the key situations or issues within that particular subsector (e.g., if the subsector is in need of many policy and institutional reforms, then a policy-based modality in combination with a project-type modality might be an appropriate choice; but if the EA has had good implementation experience and DPs have been coordinating closely before, then a SWAp of an appropriate size might be the proper choice to pool resources).
- (ii) Many of the achievements in the overall education sector have been the result of DP partnerships among themselves and with the GOB through long-term continuity of support using appropriate modalities, with more focus and selectivity in a particular subsector, to create synergies and a critical mass of beneficiaries. These strengths should be replicated in the design of future projects/programs.
- (iii) Lack of a comprehensive sector analysis of issues and directions for improving the entire education sector, linking different subsectors in an integrated manner, is found to lead to a lack of effective mechanisms for close coordination between the two ministries handling PE and SE to ensure smooth transition of the curriculum from one level to the next. Close coordination between PE and NFE is also needed, since the latter includes postliteracy and continuing education, some beneficiaries of which could enter the formal PE system later. This weakness should be addressed during the design of future projects/programs.
- (iv) While access and gender targets have been largely achieved, the quality and institutional capacity aspects, together with the equity in access by the poorest groups, have not improved much, with the following issues remaining: (a) lack of a common framework for curriculum, teacher development, financing, and management; (b) lack of practical partnership arrangements to engage nongovernment organizations in the provision of PE and NFE to meet the EFA targets and to increase more equity in access; (c) weak decentralization as reflected in weak capacities at the district, upazila, and school levels, and lack of direct financing to schools; (d) weak capacities of the two education ministries in results-based management, performance-based financing, monitoring, and reporting; (e) lack of professional cadre and a career path, with high vacancies;

and (f) fragmentation of EMIS functions between PE and SE and within PE. These issues should be addressed in the design of future projects/programs.

Recommendations. Based on both the SWAp and non-SWAp lessons identified above, the following are recommendations mainly for consideration by ADB Management:

Recommended Actions for ADB (Ongoing Projects)	Responsibility	Time Frame
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collectively strengthen the results framework to meet all the DPs' reporting needs so that a single report can be prepared for all DPs. Based on the results framework that is now evolving through the results-based management approach recently introduced by the EA (to report on PEDP-II progress and provide a basis for pursuing policy dialogue in the quarterly DP coordination meetings with MOPME), all the DPs should work together to strengthen such results framework to meet their reporting needs in order to avoid separate reporting. 	BRM in collaboration with the PEDP-II DPs and EA	Mid-2009
Recommended Actions for ADB (New Projects in the Pipeline)	Responsibility	Time Frame
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare a comprehensive sector analysis for improving the entire education sector, linking different subsectors in an integrated manner jointly with the GOB and other DPs. This sector analysis could be done through economic, thematic, and sector work or ADTA to develop a common framework for curriculum, professional development, financing, and management to ensure synergies across different subsectors, within a holistic and longer-term vision. It should be used as an input for the preparation of future projects/programs in the pipeline—see section (iii) under “other lessons.” Build on past success by focusing on issues related to quality, equity, and institutional capacity in the design of future projects/programs. Most of the six issues identified in section (iv) under “other lessons” should be addressed in the design of future projects/programs in the pipeline. Build on experience of the PEDP-II SWAp for the design of future SWAp programs. Most of the nine issues identified in section (iv) under “lessons related to SWAp” should be addressed in the design of future programs in the pipeline if the SWAp modality is chosen. 	<p>SARD and BRM, in collaboration with the PEDP-II DPs, EA, and ELCG</p> <p>SARD and BRM</p> <p>SARD and BRM</p>	<p>During the design stage of the new projects/programs for PE and SE in the pipeline</p> <p>During the design stage of the new projects/programs for PE and SE in the pipeline</p> <p>During the design stage of the new projects/programs for PE and SE in the pipeline</p>

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADTA= advisory technical assistance, BRM = Bangladesh Resident Mission, DP = development partner, EA = executing agency, ELCG = Education Local Consultative Group, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, PE = primary education, PEDP-II = Second Primary Education Development Program, SARD = South Asia Regional Department, SE = secondary education, SWAp = subsector-wide approach.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objectives and Goals

1. The objectives of this sector assistance program evaluation (SAPE) are to (i) assess the combined performance of the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) and other key development partners' (DPs) assistance in the Bangladesh education sector during 1989–2007, including the DPs' combined performance in the ongoing subsector-wide approach (SWAp) modality jointly adopted in the Second Primary Education Development Program (PEDP-II);¹ and (ii) apply a *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats* (SWOT) analysis to identify positive and negative factors during the design and implementation stages—both within and beyond DPs' control—to explain the reasons behind what worked well and what did not work well. Based on these SWOT factors, the SAPE goals are to (i) provide findings to be used as an input in the preparation of the DPs' joint country assistance evaluation, (ii) derive lessons to guide DPs' future operations; and (iii) identify recommendations to be used in the preparation of ADB's next country partnership strategy for improving future ADB performance in Bangladesh's education sector.

B. Scope and Coverage

2. **Scope.** The SAPE assesses the combined performance of four DPs' education strategies and assistance programs in Bangladesh—ADB, the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) of the Government of Japan—because they have been the DPs involved in preparing joint country strategies for Bangladesh for the period 2006–2009. The DPs' products and services evaluated in the SAPE are both education strategies and assistance programs for Bangladesh, because the former are supposed to provide strategic direction to guide the latter. The products and services included in the latter are project and program loans; advisory technical assistance (ADTA) grants;² policy dialogue; aid coordination and partnerships; and economic, thematic, and sector work. Since this is a sector-level evaluation, these products and services are assessed together as a package, rather than as individual projects.

3. **Subsector Coverage.** The SAPE focuses on assessing the combined performance of the four DPs' education strategies and assistance programs in Bangladesh's primary education (PE) subsector because this subsector (i) has been a major strategic development priority of the Government of Bangladesh (GOB); (ii) exhibits strong cooperation among these four DPs and other DPs; and (iii) accounts for the largest investment by the GOB and DPs combined—almost \$2 billion for the ongoing PEDP-II SWAp. The SAPE also evaluates the performance of ADB alone in the nonformal education (NFE) and secondary education (SE) subsectors, because (i) coordination among DPs in these two subsectors is not as strong as that in the PE subsectors; and (ii) most of the ADB assistance programs in these two subsectors were provided separately, as were those of other DPs.

¹ Although the PEDP-II has the word “program” in its name, it is a sector loan, rather than a program- or policy-based loan. It was approved in October 2003. The total project cost of \$1,815 million was planned over 6 years (2004–2009) and extended to 2010. It is contributed to by the GOB with \$1,161 million (64%) and 11 DPs, 4 of which are ADB, DFID, IDA, and JICA with \$100 million (5.5%), \$150 million (8.3%), \$150 million (8.3%), and \$3 million (0.2%), respectively.

² The SAPE does not assess project preparatory technical assistance grants, because most of them have resulted in loans.

4. **Time Coverage.** The SAPE period starts from 1989 for education strategies and from 1990 for education assistance programs until end-2007, so that it is a long enough period to trace the (i) historical evolution of the four DP education strategies for Bangladesh; and (ii) historical performance of their corresponding education programs. However, while the SAPE covers a long period of time, it focuses on recent DP assistance, especially the PEDP-II SWAp in the PE subsector, to derive more up-to-date lessons and recommendations.

5. For ADB alone, the SAPE starting point of 1989 reflects the year in which ADB's first "official" country operational strategy (COS) for Bangladesh started. The COS provided strategic direction for ADB's country assistance program (CAP) for 1990–1993, during which ADB loans for Bangladesh's education sector accounted for almost a quarter (23%) of the total ADB loans for Bangladesh's education sector from the beginning (1978) up to the planned 2011 (Figure A1.1, Appendix 1), whereas the corresponding proportions for project preparatory technical assistance (PPTA) and ADTA grants were 14% and 30%, respectively (Figures A1.2 and A1.3, Appendix 1).³ During the SAPE period (1989–2007), ADB had four official country strategies—1989 COS, 1993 COS, 1999 COS, and 2005 country strategy and program (CSP)—which guided subsequent CAPs' loans, PPTA grants, and ADTA grants: 1990–1993, 1994–1999, 2000–2005, and 2006–2011, respectively (Figures A1.1–A1.3, Appendix 1).

6. Tables A2.1–A2.3 (Appendix 2) show that ADB's overall CAPs for Bangladesh's education sector during the SAPE period (1989–2007) consisted of 14 loans⁴ for \$791 million (one of which is a program loan in the SE subsector), 16 PPTA grants for \$5.9 million, and 9 ADTA grants for \$2.8 million. Of the 14 education loans, 6 were cofinanced by other DPs (Tables A2.4, Appendix 2). In the ADB pipeline (2008–2011), there are three expected education loans in PE, SE, and technical education and vocational training (TEVT) for a total of \$240 million; two PPTA grants for \$1.6 million; and one ADTA grant for \$0.7 million (Tables A2.5–A2.7, Appendix 2). Appendix 3 provides project descriptions of the 14 loans during the SAPE period.

C. Organization of Chapters

7. Chapter II of this SAPE provides a background analysis of Bangladesh's development challenges and DPs' assistance in the education sector. Chapter III conceptualizes the evaluation methodology used in the SAPE, consisting of the evaluation framework, approach, and method. Chapter IV provides a bottom-up (subsector level) assessment of the combined DPs' performance in the PE subsector (including their SWAp performance), and ADB's performance in the NFE and SE subsectors. Chapter V provides a top-down (DPs' strategic and country level) assessment of the combined DPs' bottom-up contributions to Bangladesh's achievement of long-term development results/impacts, together with the strategic relevance

³ Prior to 1989, ADB had no official COS for Bangladesh. It had only an operational strategy paper (OSP) in 1986, under which the CAP's education loans (prior to 1990) accounted for just 5% of the total ADB loans for Bangladesh's education sector from the beginning (1978) up to the planned 2011 (Figure A1.1, Appendix 1), whereas the corresponding proportions for PPTA and ADTA grants were only 7% and 17%, respectively (Figures A1.2 and A1.3, Appendix 1).

⁴ Although there were 14 ADB loans in the SAPE period, not all of them are assessed by the SAPE. The criteria for selecting these loans to be assessed are as follows: (i) they should be normal loans, thus excluding the emergency loan; and (ii) they should belong to the key education subsectors in which ADB has been heavily involved (i.e., PE, NFE, and SE), thus excluding the only loan each in the senior secondary and higher education subsectors. However, there is one exception: although the SAPE assesses NFE loans, one of them (the Rural Training Project) is not assessed because (i) it was not really an education project (e.g., with no literacy or NFE components), but more like a rural development project; and (ii) it was not under the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, which is the agency responsible for NFE.

and positioning of their education strategies for Bangladesh. The DPs' and ADB's performance as well as the GOB's and EA's performance are then summarized in separate sections to provide more coherent findings. Chapter VI identifies SWOT factors affecting the combined DPs' performance in PE (including their SWAp performance), together with ADB's performance in NFE and SE, to provide a systematic framework to draw lessons and recommendations. Chapter VII draws conclusions by summarizing the overall top-down and bottom up findings, identifying both SWAp-related and non-SWAp lessons, and identifying recommendations.

II. BACKGROUND OF BANGLADESH'S DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES, AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' ASSISTANCE

A. Bangladesh's Development Challenges: Overall and Education Related

8. **Overall Socioeconomic Development Issues.** Over the past two decades, Bangladesh's socioeconomic achievements have been impressive despite poor initial conditions at the time of independence and frequent exposures to severe floods and other natural disasters. Comparable to most of the countries in South Asia, Bangladesh has achieved steady annual economic growth of 4–5% since the 1990s (6.7% in 2006), with single-digit inflation and fiscal imbalance contained at a manageable level of less than 5% (Appendix 4). The reasonably high private sector-led growth resulted from stable macroeconomic management and double-digit annual export growth with substantial employment generation, especially in the ready-made garment sector. Open labor markets gave rise to high remittances of about 6% of gross domestic product in the mid-2000s which, in turn, allowed the rural poor to purchase land and agriculture inputs as well as to improve human resources. Coupled with more liberal agriculture policies and pro-poor public expenditures toward rural infrastructure, both farm and related nonfarm incomes and employment increased substantially.

9. Rapid economic growth and pro-poor public expenditures toward social services have contributed to progress in poverty reduction—both income and nonincome sides. Despite such progress, Bangladesh is still one of the world's poorest countries, with a per capita gross domestic product of \$487 in 2007. While it is higher than that of Nepal, it is almost half those of India and Pakistan (Appendix 4). Its poverty incidence remains high (with about 40% of the population still living below the poverty line), and so does inequality as measured by the Gini index (32 in 2004). Similarly, while nonincome indicators showed significant improvements from the 1990s (some of which are better than those of neighboring countries), further improvements are needed. These include the infant mortality rate (66), maternal mortality rate (380), life expectancy (63 years), human development index (0.547), human poverty index (39%), access to improved water sources (75%), and adult literacy rate (55%). To sustain rapid economic growth and poverty reduction, the country needs to accelerate pro-poor growth and more-productive private investments. The key binding constraints to the expansion of such investments are inadequate infrastructure (e.g., ports and power), inadequate access to finance for small and medium enterprises, poor law and order, burdensome regulations, and corruption.

10. **Education-Related Issues.** The education system in Bangladesh consists of 5 years of PE (grades 1–5), 3 years of junior or lower SE (grades 6–8), 2 years of SE (grades 9–10), and 2 years of senior or higher SE (grades 11–12) (Figure A5.1, Appendix 5). The Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MOPME) is responsible for PE and NFE (Figure A5.2, Appendix 5), whereas the Ministry of Education (MOE) is responsible for SE (Figure A5.3, Appendix 5). For PE, there are 10 types of schools—including various types of government, community, nongovernment, and nongovernment organization (NGO) schools; religious organization schools (madrasahs); and kindergartens (Table A5.1, Appendix 5). The total number of students

enrolled in these schools was 16.3 million in 2007, of whom 82% were accounted for by four major types—government primary schools (GPSs), experimental schools attached to primary teacher training institutes (PTIs), registered nongovernment primary schools (RNGPSs), and community schools. The characteristics of different school types are provided in Table A5.2 (Appendix 5), which shows that the GOB provides almost as much support to RNGPSs as to GPSs. For SE, there are several types of schools, with a total student enrollment of 9.7 million in 2007, of whom 76% were accounted for by government and nongovernment schools.

11. In terms of education improvements, Bangladesh's improvements in enrollment access are generally in line with those of its South Asian neighbors (e.g., better than Pakistan, comparable to Nepal, and less than India). Its recent PE gross enrollment rate (GER) of 99% increased from 90% in the late 1990s (Appendix 4). Although its recent PE net enrollment rate (NER), SE GER, and SE NER (91%, 50%, and 39%, respectively) also increased substantially from the late 1990s levels (81%, 35%, and 29%, respectively), further improvements are needed. Bangladesh has done better than its neighbors in supporting gender balance, with its recent ratios of females to males in PE GER and SE GER of higher than 1. Appendix 4 also shows that, while access has improved, low quality and efficiency of education remain a formidable challenge faced by Bangladesh, with low adult literacy and female literacy (55% and 49%, respectively) like those in the neighboring countries, except for India. The recent ratios of students to teachers in Bangladesh's PE and SE remain high (49 and 31, respectively), reflecting low quality of the teaching and learning environment. Both PE and SE have been faced with high cycle dropout rates (50.5% and 75%, respectively) as well as low cycle completion and SSC pass rates (49.5% and 72%, respectively). These indicators reflect low quality and high wastage of education delivery related to a weak institutional management system, particularly at the basic education level.

B. Government Strategies: Overall and Education Related

12. Acceleration of economic growth and poverty reduction, together with human resources development (HRD), has been key strategic priorities of the GOB's medium-term, 5-year national development plans (including the Third Plan [1985–1990] to the Fifth Plan [1997–2002]). The emphasis of the GOB's HRD priorities under the past 5-year plans was normally placed on basic education—consisting of PE (grades 1–5), junior SE (grades 6–8), and NFE. This was consistent with the GOB's initiative on Education for All (EFA) started in 1992, and adopted as a national action plan in 2003. Along with economic growth and governance, human development is one of the three pillars of the GOB's current, long-term National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS; 2006–2015).⁵ Building on past achievements, the NPRS is fully consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as it aims to halve poverty by 2015 and to achieve substantial improvements in all aspects of human development. It is also consistent with Bangladesh's global commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, as it aims to increase efforts for aid harmonization, alignment, and managing for development results. The NPRS's education strategy focuses on increasing quality through improving community participation, delivery, management, finance, and assessment systems. Particular attention is given to skills development and basic education. The GOB also released the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), assisted by the DP community, as the medium-term strategic agenda to monitor the progress of the MDGs and NPRS.

⁵ GOB. 2005. *Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction*. Dhaka.

C. Development Partners' Assistance in Bangladesh: Overall and Education Related

13. **All Sectors.** Over a 10-fiscal year period (1996/97–2005/06), the GOB's cumulative disbursements of all DPs' lending and nonlending aid in all sectors totaled \$12.9 billion, of which 55.5% came from multilateral DPs, 24.4% from bilateral DPs, and 20.1% from NGOs (Table A6.1, Appendix 6). IDA-World Bank, ADB, Japan, and DFID have been the four major DPs, accounting for 60% (31%, 17%, 7%, and 5%, respectively) of the total cumulative disbursements in all sectors combined over the past decade. When the total cumulative disbursements are classified by sector, the biggest share went to the energy sector (22%), followed by transport (20%), education (10%), physical planning and housing (10%), agriculture and rural development (8%), health (8%), finance and industry (2%), and others (20%) (Table A6.2, Appendix 6).

14. **Education Sector.** With the spread of DPs' external aid in many sectors, the education share of 10% (about half that of the biggest sector) is considered relatively important. No data are available to further calculate each DP's cumulative disbursement share by sector. However, Table A6.3 (Appendix 6) provides basic information on each DP's role in the education sector in terms of the projects and amounts supported in different education subsectors. As shown, many DPs have been involved largely in PE and NFE, followed by SE. Close coordination (e.g., DPs' involvements in the same projects either through cofinancing or a SWAp) is found mostly in PE.

III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

A. Results-Based Evaluation Framework

15. The SAPE defines "evaluation methodology" as "a systematic set of procedures used to carry out the entire analysis, consisting of (i) framework (*essential structure of the analysis*), (ii) approach (*analytical tools or criteria applied to the analysis within the proposed framework*), and (iii) method (*process for using the analytical tool to accomplish the analysis within the proposed framework*)." The SAPE proposes a results-based evaluation framework as an essential structure for an integrated evaluation of various performance aspects of the DPs' combined education strategies and assistance programs for Bangladesh at different levels, including the program or sector, strategic, and country levels (Figure 1).


B. Evaluation Approach

16. Within the proposed evaluation framework in Figure 1, the SAPE uses "bottom-up" and "top-down" criteria⁶ as the evaluation approach⁷ to assess various performance aspects of DPs' combined education strategies and assistance programs for Bangladesh at different levels (as shown in Figure 1). The same weight (50% each) is applied to the bottom-up and top-down assessments, each of which consists of several criteria as described below (Figure 2).


⁶ Since the ADB's Operations Evaluation Department (OED) has produced no SAPE guidelines yet, this SAPE adapts the bottom-up and top-down evaluation criteria from the following sources: (i) ADB. 2006. *OED's Guidelines for the Preparation of Country Assistance Program Evaluation (CAPE) Reports*. Manila; (ii) ADB. 2006. *OED's Country Assistance Program Evaluation: The Lao People's Democratic Republic*. Manila (which made substantial adjustments of the CAPE guidelines); and (iii) Evaluation Cooperation Group. 2008. *Good Practice Standards for Country Strategy and Program Evaluations*.

⁷ The bottom-up and top-down criteria are a common approach used by ADB's CAPEs and IDA's country assistance evaluations, although detailed criteria identified under each of these two sets of criteria are different between ADB and IDA. This SAPE does not use exactly the same detailed criteria and weighted ratings as provided by ADB's CAPE guidelines, but makes some adaptations as appropriate.

Figure 1: Results-Based Evaluation Framework for SAPE



CP = Country Program; CS = Country Strategy; DP = development partner; ETSW = economic, thematic, and sector work; MDG = Millennium Development Goal; NGO = nongovernment organization; SAPE = sector assistance program evaluation; TA = technical assistance.
 Source: Adapted from ADB. 2006. *Country Assistance Program Evaluation for the Lao People's Democratic Republic*. Manila.



17. **Four Bottom-Up Criteria.** The SAPE uses a bottom-up assessment at the program or sector level to evaluate the performance of the DPs' combined lending and nonlending education assistance programs for Bangladesh by subsector, based on the following four criteria (as shown in both Figures 1 and 2):

- (i) *relevance* (i.e., doing the right things, or making the right choice) of the design of DPs' education projects and programs to the DPs' education strategies and to the GOB's education priorities;
- (ii) *efficiency* of DPs' education projects and programs in terms of portfolio and implementation performance, which affects resource utilization;⁸
- (iii) *effectiveness* (i.e., doing things right) of DPs' education projects and programs in contributing to intermediate sector outcomes (**bottom-up results**), **inclusive of assessing institutional capacity development and other cross-cutting impacts (e.g., gender and governance impacts)**, all of which are not actually "impacts" in themselves, but contributing to achieving sector outcomes; and
- (iv) *sustainability* prospects of the outcomes achieved in the sector.

⁸ At the individual project level, "efficiency" refers to "outputs or outcomes achieved in relation to resources used." It can be measured by economic internal rates of return (EIRRs) or least costs of projects. For basic education projects, since EIRR or least cost calculations are generally not required, efficiency may be roughly measured by the extent to which project facilities have been utilized. At the sector/program level, the measures of efficiency may include factors related to portfolio and implementation performance (e.g., delayed implementation of overall projects in the sector due to delays in consultant recruitments, appointments of counterpart staff, release of counterpart funds, etc.), since these factors reflect how well resources—both financial and physical—have been utilized, which also affects achievements of outputs and outcomes.

18. The 50% weight of the overall bottom-up assessment is divided into 10%, 15%, 15%, and 10% for relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability, respectively (Figure 2).⁹

19. **Three Top-Down Criteria.** The SAPE uses a top-down assessment at the strategic and country levels to evaluate the combined performance of DPs, based on the following three criteria (as shown in both Figures 1 and 2):

- (i) *contributions of DPs' bottom-up sector outcomes to the country-level achievement of long-term development results/impacts or MDGs (top-down results);*
- (ii) *strategic relevance of DPs' education strategies for Bangladesh (i.e., doing the right things, or making the right choice), which is assessed using the following three subcriteria: (a) relevance to the country's education-related issues, (b) relevance to the GOB's development plans or strategies related to education; and (c) consistencies among their own DPs' country strategies related to education; and*
- (iii) *strategic positioning or coherence of DPs' education strategies and client perceptions of their performance in Bangladesh's education sector, which is assessed using four subcriteria: (a) DPs' subsector focus and selectivity based on comparative advantage by education component or geographical area; (b) DPs' partnerships with appropriate modalities to create synergies, (c) DPs' long-term continuity to create a critical mass of beneficiaries in the education sector, and (d) client perceptions of DPs' performance in the education sector.*

20. The 50% weight of the overall top-down assessment is divided equally (16.7%) among these three criteria (Figure 2).

C. Evaluation Method

21. The SAPE uses a triangulation evaluation method to draw together evidence or data from various sources to accomplish the analysis within the proposed framework, including (i) primary data sources (e.g., participatory workshops with stakeholder groups, focus group discussions, field visits, key informant interviews, and client perception interviews on DPs' performance); (ii) secondary data sources (e.g., literature or desk reviews of existing relevant reports prepared by DPs, GOB, etc.);¹⁰ and (iii) data analysis based on both qualitative and quantitative data from the above sources.

22. Under the effectiveness and impact criteria, the SAPE assesses the achievement of PE subsector outcomes in terms of key DPs' combined contributions (rather than attribution or segregation) due to the DPs' combined or joint efforts, using results matrixes to trace the results chain. The SAPE assesses the DPs' combined performance both during the ongoing PEDP-II

⁹ This breakdown in the overall bottom-up weight follows the same weighting system of individual projects provided in ADB. 2006. *OED's Guidelines for Preparing Performance Evaluation Reports of Public Sector Operations*. Manila. In those guidelines, the overall 100% weight for a project is divided into 20%, 30%, 30%, and 20% for relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability, respectively.

¹⁰ Including (i) DPs' relevant reports on loan and technical (TA) documents; CPS; economic, thematic, and sector work; and project and TA evaluations (e.g., ADB's project completion reports [PCRs], project performance evaluation reports [PPERs], TA completion reports, and back-to-office reports; DFID's project completion reports; and IDA's implementation completion reports); (ii) the GOB's relevant reports on project and TA evaluations; and (iii) other relevant data sources.

SWAp and its preceding non-SWAp situation. The latter can be roughly considered as a “counterfactual” situation compared with the DPs’ aggregate performance under the ongoing SWAp situation. As for the NFE and SE subsectors, in which DPs do not have as much coordination as in the PE subsector, the SAPE assesses only ADB performance alone. However, since other DPs have also been involved separately in these two subsectors, the SAPE assesses the achievement of results in these two subsectors in terms of ADB’s “contributions,” rather than “attribution.” The SAPE will not attempt to isolate the effects of ADB interventions from those of other DPs due to the lack of counterfactuals, which is the limitation of this study.¹¹

IV. BOTTOM-UP ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS’ PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

23. This chapter provides a synthesis of assessment and findings of the combined performance of the four major DPs—ADB, DFID, IDA, and Japan—in PE (including their SWAp performance); and the performance of ADB in NFE and SE. The assessment is based on the four bottom-up criteria: (i) relevance, (ii) efficiency, (iii) effectiveness, and (iv) sustainability as described in para. 17. Detailed assessment and findings of each subsector and all subsectors combined are given in Appendix 7, whereas the corresponding results matrixes are presented in Tables A7.1–A7.6 and the ratings in Table A7.7. Sustainability prospects data are in Appendix 8.

A. Primary Education Subsector: Tracing Historical Perspective and Assessment of DPs’ Joint Performance

24. Over the past two decades, the PE subsector has been the focus of a concerted and continuous effort by the GOB and the DPs. Joint investments in the subsector began in the late 1980s when ADB, IDA, and a number of other DPs began to provide coordinated assistance in support of the GOB’s policy of Universal Primary Education, later renamed EFA. This policy was derived from the GOB’s long-term Perspective Development Plan (1980–2000), part of which aimed at eradicating illiteracy by the year 2000 (subsequently changed to 2006 and then to 2015). At that time, only 35% of the country’s adult population was considered literate, but heavily skewed between males and females (44% versus 22%) as well as between urban and rural areas. In addition, the PE GER was only 68%, and the cycle dropout rate was 60%. The Perspective Development Plan was an ambitious nationwide approach, launched in full knowledge that achieving its aims would require more than one project cycle.

25. The DP community has, to date, provided combined support to Bangladesh’s PE subsector through three investment cycles. The first was a traditional project-based type, with parallel cofinancing by a number of DPs. The second was originally designed as a SWAp, but was eventually implemented as a separate series of parallel projects. The third uses a SWAp under ADB coordination. The three cycles are described and assessed below.¹²

¹¹ Counterfactuals are difficult to observe, particularly at the sector and country levels, and different DPs may have diverging views on what would have happened in the absence of their assistance. The counterfactual technique also has its own limitations: (i) it is difficult to do within a limited time and budget; and (ii) accessible “pure” controlled areas, which have not been influenced by assistance of other DPs, are difficult to find. Thus, although counterfactuals can be identified, there is no guarantee that they will correctly represent what would have happened had there not been ADB assistance.

¹² The names of the investment cycles used are based on the names given to the ADB and IDA projects, which formed the core investment in each cycle.

1. Characteristics of First Investment Cycle: ADB's Primary Education Sector Project (PESP) and IDA's General Education Project (GEP) with Other DPs

26. The first PESP/GEP investment cycle, starting in 1990, had the following characteristics: (i) its total investment cost of \$310 million was jointly supported by 10 DPs in partnership with the GOB, with ADB (providing \$68.3 million)¹³ and IDA (providing \$159.3 million) as the major DPs and 4 additional DPs providing support outside the umbrella (see list of loans, grants, and the DPs involved in this cycle in columns 4 and 5 of Table A7.1); (ii) it represented the bulk of investment expenditure during the GOB's Fourth Plan (1990–1995); (iii) it also fostered GOB and NGO linkages for NFE, including subventions for experimental schools; (iv) the DPs coordinated by dividing responsibilities by component, with ADB and IDA financing mostly the “hardware” side, and the others taking most of the “software” side;¹⁴ (v) the DPs also divided responsibilities by geographical area, with ADB covering the Chittagong and Sylhet Divisions, IDA covering the rest, and the other DPs providing supplementary and complementary assistance; (vi) it used the traditional type of project implementation units (PIUs), with different PIUs by different DPs; (vii) its objectives were to increase equitable access (especially for disadvantaged children) to PE, improve quality, and enhance institutional capacity development of concerned agencies, especially MOPME's Directorate of Primary Education (DPE)—the executing agency (EA); (viii) it consisted of six subprojects and seven components (e.g., construction and renovation of public primary schools and district primary education offices, satellite schools pilot program, teacher training, curriculum and textbook development, and strengthening subsector management) (see project descriptions in Appendix 3); and (ix) ADB provided associated ADTA¹⁵ to help strengthen DPE's capacity in managing PE at the central and local levels.

2. Characteristics of Second Investment Cycle: ADB's Second Primary Education Sector Project (SPESP) and IDA's Primary Education Development Project (PEDP-I) with Other DPs

27. The second SPESP/PEDP-I investment cycle, starting in 1997, had the following characteristics: (i) since both the DP community and the GOB felt that the first investment cycle had not achieved much in the way of outcomes or impacts, except for increasing access to PE, they tried to explore an alternative modality to coordinate more closely to achieve better results; (ii) a detailed policy framework for a two-phase Primary Education Development Program (1998–2008), in support of the GOB's Fifth Plan (1997–2002) was then developed to adopt a program-based SWAp; (iii) however, after a joint post-appraisal mission in 1996, the EA (DPE) still lacked capacity to adopt the SWAp, thus agreeing to subsequently implement discrete projects as in the first cycle, but this time linked to MOPME's common policy framework with joint annual review; (iv) the total investment cost of this second investment cycle (\$742 million) was jointly supported by eight DPs in partnership with the GOB, with ADB (contributing \$100 million)¹⁶ and IDA (contributing \$150 million) as the major DPs and eight additional DPs

¹³ Loan 1026-BAN(SF): Primary Education Sector Project, for \$68.3 million, approved on 21 August 1990, and completed on 17 June 1997 (with PCR and PPER ratings of successful).

¹⁴ For example, the components of other DPs included (i) the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation's (NORAD) textbook production, (ii) the Swedish International Development Agency's (SIDA) NFE, (iii) the United Nations Development Programme's and the United Nations Children's Fund's staff development and local training, and (iv) the United Nations Population Fund's family planning.

¹⁵ TA 1359: Institutional Strengthening of the Directorate of Primary Education, for \$400,000, approved on 21 August 1990 (with PCR rating of successful, but without a TCR rating).

¹⁶ Loan 1521-BAN(SF): Second Primary Education Sector Project, for \$100 million, approved on 22 May 1997, and completed on 29 July 2003 (with PCR rating of successful).

providing parallel funding (see list of loans, grants, and the DPs involved in this cycle in columns 4 and 5 of Table A7.2); (v) the DPs divided responsibilities by subproject, consisting of eight DP-funded subprojects and nine smaller GOB-funded projects; (vi) key DPs also divided responsibilities by geographical area, with ADB covering the Chittagong, Sylhet, and Barisal Divisions, and IDA covering the rest; (vii) it used the traditional type of PIUs, with different PIUs by different DPs; (viii) the objectives and components of this cycle were, more or less, the same as those in the first cycle (e.g., increasing equitable access, improving quality, and strengthening institutional management capacity of DPE and other concerned agencies); (ix) while ADB and IDA focused on the three components, other DPs focused on one of these components (e.g., DFID focused on the third)¹⁷ (see project descriptions in Appendix 3); and (x) some DPs provided associated ADTA¹⁸ to help strengthen DPE's capacity in managing school performance monitoring.

3. Characteristics of Third Investment Cycle: DPs' PEDP-II SWAp

28. The third, ongoing, PEDP-II¹⁹ SWAp investment cycle, starting in 2003, had the following characteristics: (i) again, since both the DP community and the GOB felt that not many results, particularly in terms of improvements in the PE quality and institutional development capacity, had been achieved from the first two investment cycles, they decided to jointly adopt the SWAp modality, aimed at improving harmonization of their procedures, enhancing coordination among themselves and with the GOB, reducing transaction costs on both sides, and finally increasing efficiency and effectiveness of their assistance programs; (ii) it is a huge SWAp, with a total project cost of \$1.8 billion, supported by 11 DPs,²⁰ mostly through pool resources funding, in partnership with the GOB (see column 5 of Table A7.3); (iii) the DPs formed a consortium to meet quarterly, with a chair elected every 2 years and ADB as the lead DP as well as the permanent vice chair; (iv) ADB's Bangladesh Resident Mission (BRM) set up a Program Liaison Unit (PLU)²¹ at the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) to provide logistic support to all matters related to administering the PEDP-II SWAp (e.g., coordinating the consortiums, reviewing procurement and disbursements, monitoring progress, providing oversight and guidance); and (v) the DPs tried to harmonize some of their procedures, though not completely, including the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework, reporting, annual operation plan, joint review, procurement, disbursement, and the same common withdrawal application form for ADB and IDA.

29. On the GOB side, the following are key characteristics: (i) a program management unit (PMU) was established as an integrated part of the EA's (DPE) normal operations, rather than as a separate PIU; (ii) the PMU is headed by the DPE's director general, who assumes the program director role, assisted by the joint program director, line directors, and a group of consultants; (iii) a Program Steering Committee, chaired by the MOPME secretary and

¹⁷ For example, the focuses of other DPs' projects or subprojects included (i) DFID's Effective Schools through Enhanced Education Management Project; (ii) Germany's Primary School and Cyclone Shelter Construction Project, and Comprehensive Primary Education Project; (iii) the Islamic Development Bank Cyclone Shelter Project; (iv) NORAD's Primary Education Development Project for Quality Improvement; and (v) UNICEF's Intensive District Approach to Education for All Project.

¹⁸ TA 2921 Primary School Performance Monitoring, for \$1.5 million, approved on 26 November 1997 (with TCR rating of successful). NORAD was the major TA provider.

¹⁹ Loan 2015-BAN(SF): Second Primary Education Development Program, for \$100 million, approved on 3 November 2003 (ongoing).

²⁰ Of the 11 DPs, JICA and UNICEF, together with the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), provided parallel cofinancing, while the rest (ADB, the Canadian International Development Agency, DFID, the EC, IDA, the Netherlands, NORAD, and SIDA) provided pooled funding resources.

²¹ The PLU is financed by funds charged by ADB to administer funds of six cofinanciers.

comprising representatives from concerned agencies, meets at least once every quarter, with a technical committee to review PEDP-II progress regularly; (iv) the MOPME secretary also meets quarterly with the DPs' consortium to discuss key policy and implementation issues; (v) while the DPE is the EA, other MOPME agencies involved in the PEDP-II implementation include the National Curriculum and Textbook Board (NCTB)²² and the National Academy of Primary Education (NAPE)²³ at the central level; and the 64 district primary education offices (DPEOs),²⁴ 491 upazila/subdistrict primary education offices (UPEOs), 53 primary teacher training institutes (PTIs), and 491 upazila resource centers (URCs) at the field level (Figure A5.2, Appendix 5).

30. The PEDP-II's objectives are similar to those in the first two cycles, but with more focus on the quality aspect (e.g., increasing equitable access to quality PE, improving quality, and strengthening the institutional capacity development of DPE and other concerned agencies). ADB provided associated ADTA²⁵ to help strengthen DPE's capacity in managing the SWAp as well as PE at the central and local levels. The PEDP-II has four components: (i) supporting equitable access to quality education, (ii) improving quality through infrastructure development, (iii) improving quality of schools and classrooms, and (iv) developing institutional capacity (see project descriptions in Appendix 3). However, the first two components can be combined and considered under the objective of increasing equitable access to quality PE. Thus, in general, the DPs' three investment cycles in PE can be said to have the same three basic objectives and components, but with the more recent cycles focusing increasingly more on the quality side.

4. Summary of Assessment in the PE Subsector

31. Based on the detailed assessment and findings of the DPs' three investment cycles in PE provided in Appendix 7, supported by the corresponding results matrixes (Tables A7.1–A7.3) and the trend table (Table A7.4), the SAPE rates the DPs' performance in the three cycles combined as **successful** (*relevant, less efficient, effective, and likely sustainable*). The **relevant** rating is due mainly to good design in terms of focus and selectivity, long-term continuity, and partnerships and synergies with appropriate choice of modalities evolving from the project type, to the project type with a common policy framework, and then to the SWAp. The **less efficient**²⁶ rating is due mainly to long implementation delays in (i) the second cycle caused by delayed budget approval, underprocurement, and the lack of institutional diagnosis of EA capacity, thus shifting back to the use of the project-type modality instead of the SWAp as originally planned; and (ii) the ongoing PEDP-II cycle caused by too big a SWAp (about \$1.8 million) with too many

²² NCTB is a MOPME central agency for developing curriculum; and for printing, publishing, and distributing textbooks.

²³ NAPE is a MOPME central agency for providing training for teacher trainers and other support to PTIs. PTIs are MOPME's local agencies for providing in-service teacher training to PE teachers (based on a 10-month certificate in education course), and for planning and implementing the teacher training program. There is no preservice teacher training institute for PE, nor is there any minimum requirement to become a PE teacher. URCs are MOPME's local agencies for providing short-term in-service teacher training to PE teachers on a recurrent basis.

²⁴ DPEOs and UPEOs are MOPME's local agencies under DPE for managing PE at the local level.

²⁵ TA 4065: Strengthening Primary Education Development Program, for \$250,000, approved on 9 December 2002 (with the TCR rating as successful).

²⁶ See footnote 8 on how to measure "efficiency" at the individual project level and subsector/sector level. At the former level, some quality indicators of education (e.g., dropout and repetition rates) may also be treated as efficiency indicators since they reflect internal efficiency of education in terms of wastage. However, if they are treated as efficiency indicators, they should not be classified as quality indicators in order to avoid double counting. This SAPE classifies these indicators under the quality aspect, and assesses efficiency at the subsector level based on implementation performance (e.g., delayed implementation of projects in the subsector due to delays in various activities, project cost overrun, high transaction costs, and underutilization of project facilities), which affect how well resources—both financial and physical—have been utilized and, in turn, affect achievements of outputs and outcomes.

DPs, resulting in difficulties in managing and harmonizing many procurement procedures, hence high transaction costs among DPs (although there were some project cost savings in the first investment cycle and good utilization of project facilities in the first two cycles). The **effective** rating is due to significant achievement of subsector outcomes, especially in terms of increased access and gender balance, resulting in almost universal PE and a large critical mass of beneficiaries. However, although institutional management capacity and quality of students have not improved much, many of the indicators are evolving with positive signs of progress under the ongoing PEDP-II. The **likely sustainable** rating is due to (i) the DPs' long-term continuity of support to facilitate further achievement of outcomes and consolidate whatever has been achieved in order to sustain the results; (ii) sufficient GOB budgetary support, particularly in terms of the high share of the total development budget for education allocated to PE (62.5%), although the corresponding recurrent budget share is much less (33.9%); and (iii) institutionalized PMU activities as part of the EA's normal operation system.

B. Nonformal Education Subsector: Assessment of ADB's Performance

32. The move by the GOB and DPs in the early 1990s to provide support to NFE alongside PE was part of the thrust of the EFA National Plan of Action, initiated in 1992, which was derived from the GOB's long-term Perspective Development Plan (1980–2000). Part of this long-term plan was to eradicate illiteracy by the year 2000 (subsequently changed to 2006 and then to 2015). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the adult literacy rate was merely 35% (22% for females versus 44% for males). While much of the GOB's prior effort was directed at increasing access to formal PE, 10 million young adults in the 15–24 year age group were illiterate and beyond the reach of the formal PE system. At the same time, about 2.3 million learners were benefited in NFE programs of some kind, mostly run by NGOs. Support in setting up a program for NFE aimed at fostering literacy was also provided by the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund in the early 1990s.

1. Background of ADB's Investments in the NFE Subsector

33. ADB's support for the nonformal education subsector consisted of two projects. The first project—the Nonformal Education Project²⁷ (NFEP)—had two components: expanding and improving NFE delivery; and (ii) establishing the Directorate of non formal education (DNFE)²⁸ as the permanent government department responsible for NFE (and the EA), and strengthening its institutional capacity related to NFE management (e.g., planning, delivering, training, and M&E) with the help of the associated ADTA.²⁹ The project was completed in December 2001 with a successful rating by the project completion report (PCR).³⁰ The second project—the Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Project³¹ (PLCEP)—had four components: (i) developing a decentralized NFE policy framework, with learners' participation in planning; (ii)

²⁷ Loan 1390-BAN(SF): Nonformal Education Project, for \$26.7 million, approved on 29 September 1995, and completed on 3 December 2001 (with PCR rating of successful).

²⁸ The GOB had initially set up the Integrated Nonformal Education Program as a temporary agency under the Primary and Mass Education Division (PMED) of MOE. During that time, MOE was the only ministry responsible for education. In the early 2000s, PMED was separated from MOE to become MOPME, responsible for PE and NFE, leaving SE to be the responsibility of MOE.

²⁹ TA 2534: Institutional Development of the Directorate of Nonformal Education, for \$3.8 million, approved on 11 July 1996 (with TCR rating of successful). The funding for the TA was supported by the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation.

³⁰ At the project level, the SAPE agrees with the successful ratings of the NFEP by the PCR and of its associated ADTA by the TCR.

³¹ Loan 1881-BAN(SF): Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Project, for \$65 million, approved on 13 December 2001 (ongoing).

developing and disseminating curricula and materials; (iii) strengthening the institutional capacity of the GOB in the regulatory and supervisory functions and of agencies involved in project implementation; and (iv) delivering postliteracy and continuing education courses extensively (see project descriptions in Appendix 3).

2. Summary of Assessment in the NFE Subsector

34. Based on the detailed assessment and findings of ADB's performance in NFE provided in Appendix 7, supported by the corresponding results matrix (Tables A7.5), the SAPE finds that the first project was completed successfully, and the second project has just been resumed after several years of suspension due to the abolition of the EA by the GOB. The SAPE rates ADB's performance in the two projects combined as **partly successful** (*relevant, less efficient, less effective, and likely sustainable*) so far. The two projects had good design, but the SAPE rates them together as **relevant**, rather than highly relevant, in view of the discontinuity of the EA. The **less efficient** rating is due to long implementation delays associated with the suspension of the second project, hence delayed progress in the NFE subsector. The **less effective** rating is because some outcomes were not achieved during the first project, which would have been achieved under the second project had there not been discontinuity. The **likely sustainable** rating is mainly because the second project has already resumed (after the GOB's establishment of the new EA) and is likely to build on the achievement of the first project, with efforts putting to strengthen institutional capacity of the new EA through an ADTA.

C. Secondary Education Subsector: Assessment of ADB's Performance

35. In the early 1990s, while the EFA initiative was being started in the PE subsector, the GOB and its DPs also turned their attention to the SE subsector at the same time. This was a logical step, since one of the goals of the investment in PE was to increase the transition rate to SE. The availability and quality of SE would need to improve in order to absorb this expected higher transition rate. Moreover, it was becoming clear that to promote economic development and eradicate poverty, the country would need a well-trained population with employable skills. The situation of the Bangladesh's SE subsector in the early 1990s was not encouraging, with outdated curriculum last revised in 1977 and textbooks developed in 1983, both of which had no relevance to employment needs. The situation was reflected in the low GER of 23%, cohort survival rate from grade 6 to 10 of 40%, cohort survival rate from grade 1 to completing grade 12 of 4%, and female teachers at 10%. Given the GOB's thrust towards EFA at the PE level, the demand for quantity and quality improvements in SE would increase substantially.

1. Background of ADB's Investments in the SE Subsector

36. To address this situation, ADB and other DPs embarked on a series of separate and cofinanced projects aimed at increasing equitable access to and improving quality and institutional management capacity of the SE subsector. ADB's SE projects during the SAPE period included the (i) Secondary Education Development Project (SEDP),³² approved in 1993, along with an associated ADTA³³ to strengthen institutional capacity of the Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education (DSHE), which has been the EA for all ADB's SE projects; (ii)

³² Loan 1268-BAN(SF): Secondary Education Development Project, for \$72 million, approved on 23 November 1993, and completed on 19 December 2002 (with PCR rating of successful).

³³ TA 1991: Institutional Strengthening of the Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education, for \$490,000, approved on 23 November 1993 (with TCR rating of partly successful—see footnote 11 of the text in Appendix 7).

Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project (SESIP),³⁴ approved in 1999; (iii) Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project (TQISEP),³⁵ approved in 2004; and (iv) Secondary Education Sector Development Project and Program (SESDP),³⁶ approved in 2006. The first two were completed and rated by the PCRs as successful,³⁷ whereas the latter two are still ongoing (see project descriptions in Appendix 3).

2. Summary of Assessment in the SE Subsector

37. Based on the detailed assessment and findings of ADB's performance in SE provided in Appendix 7, supported by the corresponding results matrix (Tables A7.6), the SAPE finds that the first two projects were completed successfully, whereas the last two are ongoing, with the last one having just started. At the subsector level, the SAPE rates ADB's performance in the four projects combined as **successful** (*relevant, less efficient, effective/evolving, and likely sustainable*). The **relevant** rating is because, despite the design drawbacks encountered by some SE projects, the first one helped the GOB draft the Secondary Education Sector Development Plan (SE-SDP), which is still in operation and has provided the basis on which the subsequent projects were built, while the fourth (ongoing) one (the SESDP) was designed to have an appropriate modality—a combination of project and policy-based loans—to address key policy and institutional reforms needed. The **less efficient** rating is due to implementation delays in the past projects. The **effective/evolving** rating is due to some substantial outcomes achieved in terms of access and gender balance. Although the institutional capacity and quality aspects have not been improved much, they are evolving, with good prospects of being achieved under the two ongoing projects. The **likely sustainable** rating is due to (i) the long-term continuity of successive ADB investments; and (ii) sufficient GOB budgetary support, with a relatively high share of the total recurrent education budget allocated to SE (53.8%), although the institutional aspect of sustainability has not been achieved much due to high turnover of trained staff which is being addressed in the ongoing SESDP.

D. Summary of Overall Bottom-Up Performance Rating

38. Although ADB's bottom-up performance in the NFE subsector is rated as *partly successful*, its *successful* performance in SE and the DPs' combined *successful* performance in PE have contributed to ADB's overall **successful** bottom-up performance in Bangladesh's education sector. The low rating scale of 1.7 (Table A7.7) implies scope for improving education quality and institutional capacity and reducing transaction costs of the SWAp implementation.

V. TOP-DOWN ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE AND PROGRAM CONTRIBUTIONS TO BANGLADESH'S ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

39. This chapter assesses the combined performance of the major four DPs (ADB, DFID, IDA, and Japan) in Bangladesh's education sector at the country and strategic levels, based on the three top-down criteria as described in para. 19: (i) contributions of the DPs' bottom-up achievement of outcomes to the country-level achievement of long-term development

³⁴ Loan 1690-BAN(SF): Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project, for \$60 million, approved on 22 June 1999, and completed on 30 June 2006 (with the PCR rating as successful).

³⁵ Loan 2101-BAN(SF): Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project, for \$68.9 million, approved on 9 November 2004 (ongoing).

³⁶ Loans 2266/2267-BAN(SF): Secondary Education Sector Development Project and Program, for \$115 million, approved on 26 October 2006 (ongoing).

³⁷ At the project level, the SAPE agrees with the PCRs' successful ratings of the two completed projects.

results/impacts or MDGs, (ii) strategic relevance of the DPs' education strategies for Bangladesh, and (iii) strategic positioning/coherence of the DPs' education strategies and client perceptions of their performance in Bangladesh's education sector. While the performance based on the first criterion is assessed in section A below, the performance based on the remaining two criteria is assessed in detailed in Appendix 9 and its summary of findings and ratings are presented with those of the first criterion in section B of this chapter. Section C summarizes the overall bottom-up and top-down performance rating combined. Overall performance of the DPs and that of ADB are then summarized separately in section D, whereas that of the GOB and EA summarized in section E to provide more coherent findings.

A. Contributions of Development Partners' Programs to Bangladesh's Achievement of Long-Term Development Results/Impacts

40. While the DPs' combined bottom-up performance of their education assistance programs is rated as *successful* in achieving sector outcomes that are likely sustainable, the SAPE rates the contributions of such bottom-up outcomes to Bangladesh's achievement of long-term development results/impacts or MDGs³⁸ as *partly successful*. The reasons (deterrence factors) are that although some access- and gender-related MDGs have been progressing toward achieving the 2015 targets, such as the PE NER (91% in 2007 versus 100%) and proportions of girls in the PE and SE GERs (more than 50% in 2007 versus 50%), quality-related MDGs have progressed slowly and seem difficult to achieve the 2015 targets (Appendix 10). These include cohort survival rate from grade 1 to grade 5 (52% in 2007 versus 95%), adult literacy rate (55% in 2007 versus 90%), and female literacy rate (49% in 2007). The first column of the results matrixes (Tables A7.1–A7.3 and Tables A7.5–A7.6, Appendix 7) also show some of these *partly achieved* impacts (e.g., adult literacy and female literacy rates). These results imply that future DPs' assistance should focus more on improving education quality. On the poverty reduction impact, it can be achieved through substantially improved education and many other factors outside the education sector. However, consistent with the education-related impacts, poverty reduction has been slow, as the poverty incidence decreased from 57% to 40% over the past two decades (1990–2007) (Table A7.4).

B. Summary of Overall Top-Down Performance Rating

41. Based on the assessments in section A above and in Appendix 9, The SAPE rates the DPs' overall top-down combined performance as *successful* due to the combination of (i) *partly successful* contributions of their bottom-up sector outcomes achievement to the country's long-term development results/impacts or MDGs (e.g., adult literacy and poverty reduction have not improved much over the past two decades); (ii) *strategic relevance* of their education strategies (e.g., in relation to the country's key education issues, the GOB's education subsector priorities, and consistencies among their own strategies); and (iii) *satisfactory positioning* of their education strategies (e.g., good focus and selectivity, good partnerships to create synergies, long-term continuity to create a critical mass of beneficiaries, and good client perceptions of their performance). This implies that the DPs have designed good education strategies in terms of relevance and positioning to provide directions for designing assistance

³⁸ Due to the overlapping nature of the outcome and impact indicators, some studies may treat some of the MDG indicators as outcomes and some as impacts. For example, this SAPE classifies the access- and gender-related MDGs (e.g., NER and proportion of female enrollment) as outcome indicators in the results matrixes (Appendix 7), but quality-related MDGs (e.g., cohort survival, adult literacy, and female literacy rates) as long-term impact indicators. The reason for this classification is that since outcomes are intermediate objectives and impacts are ultimate/long-term goals, the latter will naturally take more time to achieve than the former and will normally depend on the achievement of the former first.

programs. The DPs have also translated their strategies into generally well-designed programs, in partnership with the GOB. However, the top-down rating scale of 1.8 (Table A9.1) is not high because the country's long-term development results/impacts have not been achieved much.

C. Summary of Overall Top-Down and Bottom-Up Performance Rating

42. Given ADB's and DPs' *successful* top-down and bottom-up performance ratings, the overall DPs' combined performance rating in Bangladesh's education sector as a whole is rated as *successful*. The overall rating scale of 1.8 (Table A9.2) is not considered high, implying that there is scope for improvement, particularly in terms of improving quality and institutional capacity of the education system and reducing transaction costs of the SWAp implementation.

D. Performance of Development Partners and ADB

43. **DPs' Combined Performance.** This section summarizes the assessment of the four DPs' (inclusive of ADB's) overall performance in Bangladesh's education sector which has been rated in the four periods combined in Appendix 9 as *satisfactory* (Table A9.1). The DPs' overall *satisfactory* performance had some weaknesses in the first two periods, mainly due to the lack of education strategies of two DPs to provide an integrated strategic direction for well-coordinated education assistance programs. Their performance improved in the third period and continued into the fourth period, mainly due to the availability of education strategies of the four DPs and systematic cooperative efforts among themselves and with other DPs in providing the PEDP-II SWAp, although they did not provide sufficient institutional assessment of the EA during the design stage to improve its capacity for more efficient implementation of the SWAp. However, since the SWAp, in itself, is not found to be easy to implement as originally expected due to high transaction costs involved among DPs (e.g., consensus in various matters took time to reach, and many accounts and procurement procedures have to be followed), the DPs should be given substantial credit for trying to resolve some of the issues through the PLU, led by ADB.

44. **ADB's Performance.**³⁹ The performance of ADB alone is also found to be *satisfactory*, based on a combination of the following: (i) ADB's performance in PE, as part of the DPs' combined performance, is *successful* as per the reasons discussed in the preceding section; (ii) ADB's performance in NFE is *partly successful*, because the former EA of the ongoing PLCEP was abolished due to an alleged governance-related problem related to nontransparency in the selection of NGOs in other government projects, and the new EA has recently been established; (iii) ADB's performance in SE is *successful*, because, although ADB had some weaknesses in the design of some recent projects (e.g., the SESDP which was complex and strayed into areas not easily influenced by time-bound internally funded projects), the use of the program- or policy-based modality seems to be more efficient than the SWAp adopted in PE; (iv) ADB's performance in overall education project implementation is *satisfactory*, because full support has generally been given to the respective EAs, and BRM has always helped with difficult procurement and procedural issues; some DPs noted that the PEDP-II's PLU, led by BRM, did not initially meet expectations in the level of support provided to the project, but this was more of a defect of the PLU design and mandate, rather than of the effectiveness of the PLU itself; this issue has been resolved, with the role of the PLU clarified and a wider remit provided to it; and

³⁹ The GOB's performance is assessed separately in section E as part of the SWOT factors under the "opportunities" and/or "threats" categories, which are generally external to the DPs' control (although they could be indirectly influenced by the DPs through policy dialogue and/or loan covenants). The performance of other stakeholders, such as NGOs, is not assessed in this SAPE, because in Bangladesh, the role of NGOs in providing education is distinct, with a big network running their own primary schools (see Tables A5.1 and A5.2, Appendix 5). Their roles can constitute an entirely different topic for evaluation.

(v) ADB's performance in translating its education strategies into assistance programs is *satisfactory*, as the program in each of the subperiods under the SAPE has generally followed the corresponding strategy in terms of focus, partnerships, and long-term continuity, particularly in PE and SE, with coordination and synergies with other DPs (paras. 3 and 5 in Appendix 11). The only exception is in the first SAPE subperiod, during which ADB's education program diverted from its corresponding strategy to support senior SE and higher education as well.

45. While the DPs' combined performance and ADB's separate performance are found to be *satisfactory*, the GOB provided some views on how to improve the DPs' (inclusive of ADB's) performance below (Box 1).

Box 1: GOB's Views of How ADB and Other DPs Can Improve Performance

- **More Careful Consideration in Selecting Investment Modalities.** It was clear from its reluctance to accept a SWAp for the second investment cycle in the PE subsector that the GOB had doubts about the workability of the SWAp for Bangladesh. Experience in the third investment cycle (the PEDP-II) showed that some of these concerns were valid because of (i) difficulties with procurement, since there are five different procedures to follow; (ii) difficulties with disbursements, since three different dollar accounts are needed; (iii) inadequate DPE capacity to implement the SWAp as an integral part of its operations; (iv) slow reactions to problems and issues, since they are really tackled only during the annual reviews and require a consensus response to be resolved; and (v) high transaction costs for DPs. On the other hand, experience in the SE subsector has been better. ADB works in concert with other DPs, but not necessarily packaging all investments into one superintervention. The sector development program modality has proven particularly effective in this context.
- **Better Project Preparation.** One of the weaknesses with the PEDP-II was the lack of sufficient preparation prior to project approval. A thorough institutional capacity analysis was not undertaken. As a result, a very ambitious project was designed with complicated implementation arrangements, without the necessary understanding of the steps needed to bring about institutional capacity changes to support the project. In the SE subsector, the design of the SESDP would have benefited from a greater degree of focus and specificity. A clearer description and definition of the project scope, expected outputs, and implementation arrangements would have made implementation easier and more manageable.
- **Better Understanding of Local Constraints.** While not necessarily disagreeing with the need for the institutional changes promoted by the DPs in both the PE and SE subsectors, the EAs would appreciate a better understanding on the part of ADB and other DPs as to how difficult it is to attain policy and institutional changes for the enabling environments within the government system. This relates to issues such as decentralizing the management of the sector, transferring expenditures to the revenue budget, and forming a cadre of professional staff in education. Additional guidance and support to help bring about these covenanted changes on a gradual and constructive basis would be appreciated.
- **Additional Technical Assistance (TA) Grant Support.** A general consensus is that TA grants provided by DPs have not been enough to deal with the policy, institutional, and implementation issues with which the EAs have been faced. It is perceived that a greater level of TA would help make implementation more efficient and effective, especially in the case of the PEDP-II, in view of its importance and technical complexities.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

E. Performance of the Government and Executing Agencies

46. Since the extent of the success of the DPs' combined performance also depends on the performance of the GOB and its EAs,⁴⁰ this section assesses the latter's performance in the education sector during the SAPE period, but will not include it in the overall top-down assessment and ratings.

47. The performance of the GOB and its EAs in the education sector over the past two decades has been mixed. In PE in particular, and also in SE, a great amount has been achieved, especially in improving equitable access to education (most notably for girls) and, to a lesser extent, in improving quality. This has required strong commitment from the GOB and also from the various EAs as well as the implementing agencies, such as LGED, which was instrumental in providing civil works for increasing access. Credit should also be given to the GOB and EAs, particularly for PE and SE, in formulating strategies for their subsectors in the early 1990s and sticking with them through a series of administrations with varying political affiliations to the point that dramatic improvements have been realized. Similarly, credit should also be given to DPE for the way that they have adapted to the complications of the SWAp during both the formulation and implementation phases.

48. However, there have been a number of shortcomings as well. The GOB has still not met its commitments under the PEDP-II regarding the percentage of recurrent budget for PE and several structural measures required under the PEDP-II and SESDP. These include the decentralization of the management of the subsectors, the establishment of a permanent education cadre in the two main EAs (DPE and DSHE), and the establishment of a working and integrated EMIS for PE and SE. In addition, most projects suffered from an array of implementation problems that rendered the efficiency ratings either on the borderline of being efficient or actually less efficient. These reflect problems of weak institutional capacity and governance within the EAs, including late recruitment of consultants, start-up delays, delays in compliance or noncompliance with loan covenants, delays and irregularities in procurement, and the alleged nontransparency in the selection of NGOs in the NFE subsector.

49. On balance, in view of the achievements of the GOB and its EAs in the PE and SE subsectors, the SAPE considers their overall performance as **satisfactory**. Since the EA for the NFE subsector has recently been changed and a new agency established, it is not yet possible to provide an assessment of its performance so far.

VI. FACTORS AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' PERFORMANCE

50. This chapter identifies success drivers (positive factors) and deterrence factors (negative factors) affecting the DPs' combined performance in PE and ADB's performance in NFE and SE, and classifies them into four categories: (i) design/quality-at-entry (QAE) factors within DPs' control, (ii) design/QAE factors beyond or external to DPs' control, (iii) implementation factors within DPs' control, and (iv) implementation factors external to DPs' control. Subsequently, a SWOT analysis is applied to these four categories to further classify the factors into "*strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats*." A detailed SWOT analysis is provided in Appendix 12, whereas a summary version is simplified in a SWOT table below. The reason for doing this is to provide a systematic framework for identifying key lessons and recommendations for improvements in the design and implementation of DPs' future operations. It should be noted

⁴⁰ "Exogenous" factors are not analyzed separately as a standalone entity in this SAPE, but as part of the SWOT analysis under "*opportunities*" and "*threats*" which are beyond or external to DPs' control (Appendix 12).

that although some of the deterrence factors are external to DPs' control, the DPs could indirectly influence them through loan covenants/conditionalities and collective policy dialogue.

SWOT Factors Affecting DPs' Performance in the Education Sector

1. Design/QAE Factors within DPs' Control	2. Design/QAE Factors External to DPs Control
<p>Success Drivers or Value Addition (<i>Strengths</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DPs' collective focus on PE, with selectivity based on comparative advantage by geographical area or component • DPs' partnerships through appropriate modalities to create synergies • DPs' long-term continuity, with adequate financial resources to create a critical mass of beneficiaries • DPs' design of PMU activities mainstreamed into the EA's normal operations (especially in the PEDP-II) • DP's engagement of the GOB and EA to be involved in the design stage in a participatory manner <p>Deterrence Factors (<i>Weaknesses</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DPs' weak design of the EMIS and M&E system, despite generally adequate evaluability through results frameworks • DP's inadequate background analysis at the design stage about overall issues in the entire education sector (including key policy issues in each subsector), hence lack of a good strategic direction to address the issues in all subsectors in an integrated manner • DPs' inadequate background analysis at the design stage of the EA's institutional capacity to implement complex projects/programs and of the initial necessary conditions for harmonization required to implement the PEDP-II SWAp efficiently, hence delayed implementation and high transaction costs • DPs' ad hoc provision of ADTA grants, rather than designing them to be strategically integrated with ensuing projects in the early stage 	<p>Success Drivers (<i>Opportunities</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducive government policy and institutional environments, and other exogenous factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GOB's and EA's strong ownership and commitment to increasing PE enrollment, NFE literacy, and gender balance (as reflected in the adoptions of the EFA National Plan of Action to achieve the universal PE targets, the Perspective Development Plan to achieve gender balance in the recruitment of PE teachers, and the MDGs to achieve various goals) - GOB's and EA's strong ownership and commitment to improving SE (as reflected in the adoption of the Secondary Education Sector Development Plan to provide strategic direction for improving SE) <p>Deterrence Factors (<i>Threats/Risks</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nonconducive government policy and institutional environments, and other exogenous factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weak decentralization and high PE teacher absenteeism, which reflects low governance due to weak SBM (weak role of SMC and PTA to monitor teacher performance) - Lack of flexibility in adjusting project proforma and other regulations - Lack of professional education cadre or career path, since MOPME staff are appointed by the Ministry of Establishment - Fragmentation of EMIS functions to integrate data on basic education from MOPME's PE and MOE's SE - Lack of appropriate preservice teacher education program for PE to produce adequate number of qualified teachers to accommodate the increasing enrollment - Weak in-service teacher training programs and inadequate teacher trainers to provide recurrent training

3. Implementation Factors within DPs' Control	4. Implementation Factors External to DPs' Control
<p>Success Drivers or Value Addition (<i>Strengths</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DPs' strong coordination during implementation through consortium meetings, with the PLU active role in solving various logistic issues (especially in the PEDP-II) • DPs' sufficient supervision through regular joint reviews and monitoring • DPs' strong involvement and utilization of resident missions (e.g., ADB's BRM acts as the lead for the PEDP-II SWAp, and ADB's education projects are delegated to BRM for implementation) • Selection of generally good consultants <p>Deterrence Factors (<i>Weaknesses</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DPs' long implementation delays (particularly at the initial stage of the PEDP-II, and in some other ADB projects) • DPs' weak harmonization in certain procedures (e.g., procurement and funds flow in the PEDP-II), despite the efforts to harmonize them • DPs' high transaction costs, particularly in the PEDP-II's huge SWAp with many DPs involved and complicated implementation arrangements • Weak and fragmented EMIS to collect reliable data in time and monitor progress of various performance indicators during implementation (due partly to the nonconductive government policy of separating basic education and the EMIS functions between MOPME and MOE, and to DPs' less attention to strengthening MOPME's EMIS during the design stage) 	<p>Success Drivers (<i>Opportunities</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued conducive government policy and institutional environments from the design stage, and other exogenous factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Continued GOB and EA strong ownership and long-term commitment to implementing the key strategic and action plans to improve PE, NFE, and SE (e.g., the EFA Plan, Perspective Development Plan, MDGs, and SE-SDP) - GOB's strong commitment through, the LGED to provide good quality civil works in school construction and rehabilitation - GOB's strong commitment to improve PE quality, particularly in revising the teacher recruitment and transfer system to be more transparent and merit based, reflecting good governance <p>Deterrence Factors (<i>Threats/Risks</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued nonconductive government policy and institutional environments from the design stage, and other exogenous factors

ADB = Asian Development Bank; ADTA= advisory technical assistance; BRM = Bangladesh Resident Mission; DP = development partner; EA = executing agency; EFA= Education For All; GOB = government of Bangladesh; EMIS = education management information system; LGED = Local Government Engineering Department; M&E = monitoring and evaluation; MDG = Millennium Development Goal; MOE = Ministry of Education; MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education; NFE = nonformal education; PE = program education; PEDP-II = Second Primary Education Development Program; PLU = program liaison unit; PMU = program management unit; PTA = parent-teacher association; QAE = quality-at-entry; SARD = South Asia Regional Department; SBM = school-based management; SE = secondary education; SE-SDP = Secondary Education Sector Development Plan; SMC = school management committee; SWAp = subsector-wide approach; SWOT = strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

51. This chapter (i) presents the overall findings of the ADB's and DPs' combined performance in the education sector to identify what worked well and did not work well and why; (ii) presents the overall findings of the DPs' SWAp performance in the PEDP-II to identify what worked well and did not work well and why; (iii) draws SWAp-related lessons as a guidance to improve the DPs' performance in the ongoing PEDP-II and in future operations if the SWAp modality is chosen; (iv) draws non-SWAp lessons as a guidance to improve the DPs' future performance in the education sector in general; and (v) identifies specific recommendations to be undertaken by ADB, in collaboration with other DPs and GOB to some extent, to improve both ongoing and future operations.

A. Overall Top-Down and Bottom-Up Findings of Development Partners' Performance

52. Although ADB's bottom-up performance in the NFE subsector is rated as only *partly successful*, its *successful* performance in SE and the DPs' combined *successful* performance in PE have contributed to ADB's **successful bottom-up** performance. At the top-down level, while the contribution of the bottom-up sector outcomes to the country's achievement of long-term development results/impacts is rated as *partly successful*, the DPs' combined performance in the other two criteria (strategic relevance and positioning of their education strategies) are rated as *relevant* and *satisfactory*, respectively, rendering **successful top-down** performance and, in turn, **overall successful top-down and bottom-up performance combined**.

53. However, the rating scale of 1.8 for the overall **successful** performance is not considered high (borderline), implying that there remains scope for improvement, particularly in terms of education quality and institutional capacity. The DPs' combined performance in the PE subsector, together with ADB's performance in the NFE and SE subsectors, over the past two decades have worked well in terms of increased access and gender balance in enrollment, which did not require much time to achieve by their nature. The GOB's conducive policy and institutional environments (e.g., strong ownership/commitment to the EFA agenda) are found to be among the positive reasons (*opportunities*) supporting these achievements. By contrast, the DPs' combined performance did not work well in terms of improving education quality and institutional capacity, and to some extent equity in access (e.g., literacy rate, cycle completion rate, and enrollment rate by the poorest groups remained low). This was due partly to some *risks/threats* associated with the GOB's nonconductive policy and institutional environments (e.g., weak decentralization, rigid project proforma and regulations, lack of professional education cadre, lack of appropriate teacher development programs, and fragmentation of EMIS between PE and SE), which will take time to improve. On the DPs' side, the following factors are found to be key positive reasons (*strengths*) and negative reasons (*weaknesses*) affecting their overall performance in the education sector:

- (i) **DPs' Strengths or Value Addition.** Much of the success achieved to date has been the result of the DPs' good education strategies in terms of relevance and positioning/coherence, which provided appropriate directions for the DPs to design well-coordinated, focused, and long-term assistance programs. The DPs have, in turn, translated their education strategies into generally well-designed assistance programs, in partnership with GOB, by providing long-term continuity of support using appropriate modalities, with more focus and selectivity within a particular subsector to create synergies and a critical mass of beneficiaries.

These are considered the DPs' key strengths or value addition of their education strategies and assistance programs over and above the financing provided.

- (ii) **DPs' Weaknesses.** While the overall sector rating is *successful*, the rating scale is not considered high, due mainly to the *less efficient* ratings in all three subsectors, associated with long implementation delays caused by the following weaknesses of the DPs: (a) weak design of the EMIS and monitoring system; (b) lack of a sector analysis of issues and directions for improving the entire education sector, linking different subsectors in an integrated manner and suggesting effective mechanisms for close coordination; (c) ad hoc and inefficient use of ADTA grants, rather than using them at the early design stage to help address the EA's capacity gaps and the needed institutional and policy reforms; and (d) high transaction costs associated with complicated implementation arrangements, especially through the big SWAp introduced in the PEDP-II during the time when the EA's capacity was not sufficient to handle it and when the initial necessary conditions for harmonization were not put in place. Questions thus arise as to whether or not the SWAp is the best modality and why.

B. Overall Findings of Development Partners' SWAp Performance: Is SWAp the Best Modality?

54. To answer this question, the SAPE synthesizes its key findings below:

- (i) **What Is a SWAp and Why Is It Expected to Be one of the Best Modalities?** A SWAp is a systematic approach allowing DPs to work together in partnership with a government by pooling resources to support sector/subsector-wide development in an integrated manner under the government's common policy framework. It requires good sector analysis, policy framework, and expenditure plan. Based on global experience, it is expected to be one of the best modalities when it is designed and implemented properly, as it should help increase efficiency in implementation by (a) avoiding duplicative and piecemeal efforts, thus increasing synergies in achieving outcomes; (b) increasing harmonization of DP and government implementation procedures (e.g., procurement; accounting; reporting; and a common PMU integrated into the EA's normal operations, rather than separate PIUs), thus reducing transaction costs on both sides; and (c) encouraging the government and DPs to coordinate closely through special mechanisms for policy dialogue and fiduciary risk management led by the government, thus reducing transaction costs among DPs, since it helps reduce program monitoring costs. Experiences in some countries showed that SWAps tended to have high transaction costs at the beginning, which became lower only after key priorities were identified jointly by DPs and the governments.
- (ii) **What Worked Well in the PEDP-II SWAp and Why?** While its overall rating is *successful*, there are areas in which the SWAp worked well and did not work well. It worked well in terms of being a *relevant* modality, because it evolved as a natural step, in the early 2000s, based on the DPs' long-term experience of having close coordination in PE, starting from the first investment cycle in 1990 through the project-type modality, and then in the second investment cycle in the late 1990s through the project-type modality within the GOB common policy framework. It is also an appropriate modality because it allowed the DPs to coordinate more closely using pooled funding resources and to engage the GOB

to take the lead and drive the program for improving the PE subsector. It is also found to be an **effective** modality in achieving many access- and gender-related outcomes by jointly identifying key priorities to mainstream implementation arrangements, while some quality and institutional capacity outcomes are evolving with positive signs of progress. The PEDP-II SWAp's **strengths**, which are part of the reasons for making the program effective/evolving, are as follows: (a) it has a single PMU (rather than separate PIUs as in the first two investment cycles), the activities of which are integrated into the EA's normal operations to ensure EA ownership and sustainable capacity after completion; (b) it enables the DPs to have stronger coordination during implementation (compared with the modalities used in the first two investment cycles) through consortium meetings, with the project liaison unit (PLU) playing an active role in facilitating the process; (c) it allows for regular joint reviews and monitoring; and (d) there is a consensus that the PEDP-II has enhanced GOB leadership and ownership and opened up many priority areas (e.g., inclusive education and decentralization) that have remained the country's big challenges to improving quality, institutional capacity, and equity in access for a long time.

- (iii) **What Did Not Work Well in the PEDP-II SWAp and Why?** Theoretically, while a SWAp is expected to help increase efficiency in implementation, the opposite is found for the PEDP-II SWAp, as it is rated as **less efficient** due to the long initial delays in implementation of about 2 years and high transaction costs among DPs (although it helped reduce transaction costs for the GOB). This is due to the following **weaknesses**: (a) the program size is too large to manage, with as many as 11 DPs and a wide extent of activities involved; (b) an institutional analysis was not provided at the design stage to diagnose the EA capacity areas that should be developed prior to SWAp implementation; (c) ADTA was provided alongside program implementation, rather than up front at the design stage to equip the EA with the necessary kinds of capacity to implement the complex SWAp; (d) DPs' and the GOB's procedures could not be fully harmonized, since different procedures had to be continued (e.g., procurement and funds flow) under the SWAp; (e) separation of the PLU from ADB's Bangladesh Resident Mission blurred the roles, responsibilities and expectations of the lead DP (ADB), the consortium chair, and other DPs; and (f) inclusion of the SWAp's consortium functions in the PLU blurred mutual accountability between the lead DP and the consortium, and also required BRM to get overly stretched with support to the consortium.

C. Lessons: How to Make SWAp Work Better

55. While the PEDP-II SWAp has some weaknesses, it also has some strengths that have contributed to achieving many evolving outcomes, ensuring GOB leadership and ownership, and mainstreaming important priorities for long-term sustainability. Thus, it can be considered as the right modality for the PEDP-II despite its weak implementation efficiency due to its large program size (although there should have been economies of scale from large programs) and complicated implementation arrangements, hence high transaction costs among the DPs. Since high transaction costs among the DPs have emerged as a major weakness of the PEDP-II SWAp, the following lessons are drawn as guidance for the DPs on how to reduce the transaction costs under their ongoing or future SWAps in order to make them work better:

- (i) design the SWAp size to be manageable, with an appropriate number of DPs in relation to the extent of activities, depending on the DPs' availability of staff and resources, the extent of procedural harmonization, and the EA's initial institutional and staff capacities;
- (ii) provide ADTA at the design stage to strengthen the EA institutional capacity prior to implementing a SWAp;
- (iii) target ADTA for analytical studies and technical support to ensure efficient joint annual reviews;
- (iv) focus on strengthening the EMIS for improving the results framework to monitor and report on progress;
- (v) collectively strengthen the results framework to meet all the DPs' reporting needs so that a single report can be prepared annually, not quarterly, to assess progress and support policy dialogue;
- (vi) adopt more stringent partnership agreements (including further harmonization of implementation procedures) among the participating DPs under GOB leadership;
- (vii) set up the SWAp administrative unit (such as the PEDP-II PLU) within the resident mission of the lead DP, rather than outside, as in the PEDP-II case, in order to avoid any confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of the lead DP;
- (viii) separate the consortium functions from the lead DP functions as a self-contained arrangement (as in the health SWAp) to enhance mutual accountability; and
- (ix) include special arrangements to expeditiously address critical cases like corruption without jeopardizing regular implementation.

D. Other Lessons

56. In addition to the SWAp-related lessons drawn above, the following are generic lessons not related to the SWAp:

- (i) In designing future projects/programs, the choice among different modalities should depend on (a) the EA's institutional and staff capacities, (b) the DPs' availability of staff and resources, (c) the extent of project/program activities, and (d) the key situations or issues within that particular subsector (e.g., if the subsector is in need of many policy and institutional reforms, then a policy-based modality in combination with a project-type modality might be an appropriate choice; but if the EA has had good implementation experience and DPs have been coordinating closely before, then a SWAp of an appropriate size might be the proper choice to pool resources).
- (ii) Many of the achievements in the overall education sector have been the result of DP partnerships among themselves and with the GOB through long-term continuity of support, with more focus and selectivity in a particular subsector, to create synergies and a critical mass of beneficiaries. These strengths should be replicated in the design of future projects/programs.

- (iii) Lack of a comprehensive sector analysis of issues and directions for improving the entire education sector, linking different subsectors in an integrated manner, is found to lead to a lack of effective mechanisms for close coordination between the two ministries handling PE and SE to ensure smooth transition of the curriculum from one level to the next. Close coordination between PE and NFE is also needed, since the latter includes postliteracy and continuing education, some beneficiaries of which could enter the formal PE system later. This weakness should be addressed during the design of future projects/programs.
- (iv) While access and gender targets have been largely achieved, the quality and institutional capacity aspects, together with the equity in access by the poorest groups, have not improved much, with the following issues remaining: (a) lack of a common framework for curriculum, teacher development, financing, and management; (b) lack of practical partnership arrangements to engage nongovernment organizations in the provision of PE and NFE to meet the EFA targets and to increase more equity in access; (c) weak decentralization as reflected in weak capacities at the district, upazila, and school levels, and lack of direct financing to schools; (d) weak capacities of the two education ministries in results-based management, performance-based financing, monitoring, and reporting; (e) lack of professional cadre and a career path, with high vacancies; and (f) fragmentation of EMIS functions between PE and SE and within PE. These issues should be addressed in the design of future projects/programs.

E. Recommendations

57. Based on both the SWAp and non-SWAp lessons identified above, the following are recommendations mainly for consideration by ADB Management:

Recommended Actions for ADB (Ongoing Projects)	Responsibility	Time Frame
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collectively strengthen the results framework to meet all the DPs' reporting needs so that a single report can be prepared for all DPs. Based on the results framework that is now evolving through the results-based management approach recently introduced by the EA (to report on PEDP-II progress and provide a basis for pursuing policy dialogue in the quarterly DP coordination meetings with MOPME), all the DPs should work together to strengthen such results framework to meet their reporting needs in order to avoid separate reporting. 	BRM in collaboration with the PEDP-II DPs and EA	Mid-2009
Recommended Actions for ADB (New Projects in the Pipeline)	Responsibility	Time Frame
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare a comprehensive sector analysis for improving the entire education sector, linking different subsectors in an integrated manner jointly with the GOB and other DPs. This sector analysis could be done through economic, thematic, and sector work or ADTA to develop a common framework for curriculum, professional development, financing, and management to ensure synergies across different subsectors, within a holistic and longer-term vision. It should be used as an input for the preparation of future projects/programs in the pipeline—see section (iii) under “other lessons.” 	SARD and BRM, in collaboration with the PEDP-II DPs, EA, and ELCG	During the design stage of the new projects/programs for PE and SE in the pipeline

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build on past success by focusing on issues related to quality, equity, and institutional capacity in the design of future projects/programs. 	SARD and BRM	During the design stage of the new projects/programs for PE and SE in the pipeline
<p>Most of the six issues identified in section (iv) under “other lessons” should be addressed in the design of future projects/programs in the pipeline.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build on experience of the PEDP-II SWAp for the design of future SWAp programs. 	SARD and BRM	During the design stage of the new projects/programs for PE and SE in the pipeline
<p>Most of the nine issues identified in section (iv) under “lessons related to SWAp” should be addressed in the design of future programs in the pipeline if the SWAp modality is chosen.</p>		

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADTA= advisory technical assistance, BRM = Bangladesh Resident Mission, DP = development partner, EA = executing agency, ELCG = Education Local Consultative Group, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, PE = primary education, PEDP-II = Second Primary Education Development Program, SARD = South Asia Regional Department, SE = secondary education, SWAp = subsector-wide approach.

COMPOSITION OF ADB'S EDUCATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR BANGLADESH BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

Figure A1.1: Composition of ADB's Education Loans for Bangladesh by Strategic Objective

1986 OSP = Poverty Reduction and Laying the Foundation for Sustained Growth Ed. Strategy = Skills Dev. (SE and NFE) Ed. CAP (Prior to 1990)	1989 COS = Accelerated Growth and Targeted Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE and PE (Formal and NFE) Ed. CAP (1990–1993)	1993 COS = Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE and Better Targeted PE (Formal and NFE) Ed. CAP (1994–1999)	1999 COS = Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE, PE, and NFE Ed. CAP (2000–2005)	2005 CSP = Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE, PE, and TEVT Ed. CAP (2006–2011)
↓ 5.1%	↓ 23.0%	↓ 16.9%	↓ 21.1%	↓ 33.9%
Secondary Education (3.9%) - Educational Equipment Development (\$6 million, 1978) - Secondary Science Education Sector (\$37 million, 1984) Nonformal Education (1.2%) - Community Schools (\$14 million, 1981)	Primary Education (7.5%) - Primary Education Sector (\$68 million, 1990) - Rehabilitation of Damaged School Facilities (\$15 million, 1992) Secondary Education (6.5%) - Secondary Education Development (\$72 million, 1993) Nonformal Education (1.5%) - Rural Training (\$16 million, 1990) Senior Secondary and Higher Education (7.5%) - Higher Secondary Education (\$49 million, 1991) - Bangladesh Open University (\$34 million, 1992)	Primary Education (9.0%) - Second Primary Education Sector (\$100 million, 1997) Secondary Education (5.4%) - Secondary Education Sector Improvement (\$60 million, 1999) Nonformal Education (2.4%) - Nonformal Education (\$27 million, 1995)	Primary Education (9.0%) - Second Primary Education Development Program (\$100 million, 2003) Secondary Education (6.2%) - Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education (\$69 million, 2004) Nonformal Education (5.9%) - Post-Literacy and Continuing Education (\$65 million, 2001)	Primary Education (10.8%) - Primary Education Sector Development Program (\$100 million, 2009) ^a Secondary Education (18.5%) - Secondary Education Sector Development Project (\$85 million, 2006) - Secondary Education Sector Development Program (\$30 million, 2006) - Secondary Education Sector Development Program II (\$90 million, 2011) ^a Technical, Vocational Training, and Skills Development (4.5%) - Skills Development (\$50 million, 2008) ^a

ADB = Asian Development Bank, CAP = country assistance plan, COS = country operational strategy, CSP = country strategy and program, Dev. = development, Ed. = education, NFE = nonformal education, OSP = operational strategy paper, PE = primary education, SE = secondary education, TEVT = technical education and vocational training.

^a Classified as belonging to the pipeline.

Sources: Regrouped from relevant ADB databases.

Figure A1.2: Composition of ADB's PPTA Grants in Education for Bangladesh by Strategic Objective

1986 OSP = Poverty Reduction and Laying the Foundation for Sustained Growth Ed. Strategy = Skills Dev. (SE and NFE) PPTA Grants for Ed. CAP Loans (Prior to 1990)	1989 COS = Accelerated Growth and Targeted Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE and PE (Formal and NFE) PPTA Grants for Ed. CAP Loans (1990–1993)	1993 COS = Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE and Better Targeted PE (Formal and NFE) PPTA Grants for Ed. CAP Loans (1994–1999)	1999 COS = Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE, PE, and NFE) PPTA Grants for Ed. CAP Loans (2000–2005)	2005 CSP = Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE, PE, and TEVT PPTA Grants for Ed. CAP Loans (2006–2011)
↓ 6.6%	↓ 13.5%	↓ 19.5%	↓ 25.1%	↓ 35.3%
<p>Primary Education (2.9%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Educational Equipment Development (\$80,000, 1977) - Secondary Schools Science Education (\$150,000, 1983) <p>Secondary Education (1.9%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Post-Secondary Science Education (\$150,000, 1987) <p>Technical, Vocational Training, and Skills Development (1.8%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rural Vocational Training Institutes (\$147,000, 1977) 	<p>Primary Education (1.3%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Primary Education Sector (\$100,000, 1989) <p>Secondary Education (3.7%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Secondary Education (\$297,000, 1991) <p>Nonformal Education (4.1%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Non-Farm Employment Creation for Rural Women (\$99,000, 1989) - Rural Training (\$230,000, 1989) <p>Senior Secondary and Higher Education (4.4%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Open University (\$250,000, 1989) - Higher Secondary Education (\$100,000, 1990) 	<p>Primary Education (2.1%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Second Primary Education Sector (\$170,000, 1995) <p>Secondary Education (9.3%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Secondary Education Sector Development (\$740,000, 1997) <p>Nonformal Education (3.1%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nonformal Education (\$250,000, 1993) <p>Technical, Vocational Training, and Skills Development (5.0%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vocational Training (\$400,000, 1994) 	<p>Primary Education (10.0%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Primary Education Sector Improvement (\$800,000, 2001) <p>Secondary Education (7.5%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education (\$600,000, 2002) <p>Nonformal Education (7.5%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Second Nonformal Education (\$600,000, 2000) 	<p>Primary Education (7.5%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Primary Education Sector Development Program (\$600,000, 2008)^a <p>Secondary Education (15.3%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Secondary Education Sector Improvement II (\$600,000, 2004)^b - Secondary Education Sector Improvement II (Supp.) (\$120,000, 2005)^b - Secondary Education Sector Development Program II (\$500,000, 2009)^a <p>Technical, Vocational Training, and Skills Development (12.5%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Skills Development (\$500,000, 2006) - Skills Development II (\$500,000, 2011)^a

ADB = Asian Development Bank, CAP = country assistance plan, COS = country operational strategy, CSP = country strategy and program, Dev. = development, Ed. = education, NFE = nonformal education, OSP = operational strategy paper, PE = primary education, SE = secondary education, TEVT = technical education and vocational training.

^a Classified as belonging to the pipeline.

^b This PPTA is for loan approval in 2006.

Sources: Regrouped from relevant ADB databases.

Figure A1.3: Composition of ADB's ADTA Grants in Education for Bangladesh by Strategic Objective

1986 OSP = Poverty Reduction and Laying the Foundation for Sustained Growth Ed. Strategy = Skills Dev. (SE and NFE) Ed. CAP (Prior to 1990)	1989 COS = Accelerated Growth and Targeted Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE and PE (Formal and NFE) Ed. CAP (1990–1993)	1993 COS = Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE and Better Targeted PE (Formal and NFE) Ed. CAP (1994–1999)	1999 COS = Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE, PE, and NFE Ed. CAP (2000–2005)	2005 CSP = Poverty Reduction Ed. Strategy = SE, PE, and TEVT Ed. CAP (2006–2011)
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
17.3%	29.6%	45.0%	2.1%	6.0%
<p>Secondary Education (17.3%) - Secondary Science Education Sector (\$2,020,000, 1987)</p>	<p>Primary Education (3.4%) - Institutional Strengthening of the Directorate of Primary Education (\$400,000, 1990)</p> <p>Secondary Education (4.2%) - Institutional Strengthening of the Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education (\$490,000, 1993)</p> <p>Nonformal Education (20.2%) - Staff Development and Training Materials (\$776,000, 1990) - Research and Development (\$879,000, 1990) - Institutional Strengthening of the Department of Women's Affairs (\$700,000, 1990)</p> <p>Senior Secondary and Higher Education (1.8%) - A Survey of Higher Secondary Education Institutions (\$210,000, 1991)</p>	<p>Primary Education (12.8%) - Primary School Performance Monitoring (\$1,500,000, 1997)</p> <p>Nonformal Education (32.2%) - Institutional Development of the Directorate of Nonformal Education (\$3,768,000, 1996)</p>	<p>Primary Education (2.1%) - Strengthening Primary Education Development Program (\$250,000, 2002)</p>	<p>Primary Education (6.0%) - Support for Capacity Building in Madrasah (\$700,000, 2009)^a</p>

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADTA = advisory technical assistance, CAP = country assistance plan, COS = country operational strategy, CSP = country strategy and program, Dev. = development, Ed. = education, NFE = nonformal education, OSP = operational strategy paper, PE = primary education, SE = secondary education, TEVT = technical education and vocational training.

^a Classified as belonging to the pipeline.

Sources: Regrouped from relevant ADB databases.

ADB'S EDUCATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR BANGLADESH BY SUBSECTOR

Table A2.1: ADB's Approved Education Loans for Bangladesh by Subsector (1990–2007)

Subsector/ Loan No.	Title	Poverty/ Thematic Targeting Classification and Thematic Priority	Approved Amount		Approval Date	Completion Date	Rating	
			\$ million	%			PCR	PPER
Primary Education								
1026(SF)	Primary Education Sector		68.30		21-Aug-90	17-Jun-97	GS	S
1182(SF)	Rehabilitation of Damaged School		15.00		27-Oct-92	30-Oct-95	GS	
1521(SF)	Second Primary Education Sector	HD/WID	100.00		22-May-97	29-Jul-03	S	
2015(SF)	Second Primary Education Development Program (Sector Loan)	PI/HD/GD	100.00		03-Nov-03	Ongoing (expected completion Dec 2010)		
Subsector Total			283.30	35.8				
Secondary Education								
1268(SF)	Secondary Education Development	HD	72.00		23-Nov-93	19-Dec-02	S	
1690(SF)	Secondary Education Sector	PI/HD/GD	60.00		22-Jun-99	30-Jun-06	S	
2101(SF)	Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education	GI/ISD/ GD/HD	68.91		09-Nov-04	Ongoing (expected completion Mar 2011)		
2266(SF)	Secondary Education Sector Development Project	GI/ISD/ GOV/HD	85.00		26-Oct-06	Ongoing (expected completion Dec 2012)		
2267(SF)	Secondary Education Sector Development Program	GI/ISD/ GOV/HD	30.00		26-Oct-06	Ongoing (expected completion Sep 2009)		
Subsector Total			315.91	40.0				
Nonformal Education								
1066(SF)	Rural Training		16.25		13-Dec-90	22-Jun-98	GS	S
1390(SF)	Nonformal Education	PR/WID	26.70		29-Sep-95	03-Dec-01	S	
1881(SF)	Post-Literacy and Continuing Education	PI/HD/GD	65.00		13-Dec-01	Ongoing (expected completion Dec 2008)		
Subsector Total			107.95	13.7				
Senior Secondary and Higher Education								
1123(SF)	Higher Secondary Education		49.20		21-Nov-91	20-Jul-99	PS	
1173(SF)	Bangladesh Open University		34.30		04-Aug-92	28-Sep-99	GS	S
Subsector Total			83.50	10.6				
Total			790.66	100.0				

ADB = Asian Development Bank, GD = gender and development, GI = general intervention, GOV = governance, GS = generally successful, HD = human development, ISD = inclusive social development, No. = number, PCR = project completion report, PI = poverty inte

Sources: Loan and TA databases, PCRs, PPERs.

**Table A2.2: ADB's Approved Education PPTA Grants for Bangladesh by Subsector
(PPTA Grants for ADB's Loans Approved during 1990–2007)**

Subsector/ PPTA No.	Title	Total ADB Amount		Approval Date
		\$	%	
Primary Education				
1136	Primary Education Sector	100,000		3-Mar-89
2469	Second Primary Education Sector	170,000		12-Dec-95
3766	Primary Education Sector Improvement	800,000		13-Nov-01
	Subsector Total	1,070,000	18.3	
Secondary Education				
1562	Secondary Education	297,000		10-Sep-91
2908	Secondary Education Sector Development	740,000		4-Nov-97
3901	Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education	600,000		19-Aug-02
4532	Secondary Education Sector Improvement II	600,000		23-Dec-04
4532	Secondary Education Sector Improvement II (Supplementary)	120,000		14-Dec-05
	Subsector Total	2,357,000	40.2	
Nonformal Education				
1155	Non-Farm Employment Creation for Rural Women	99,000		26-Apr-89
1159	Rural Training	230,000		29-May-89
2013	Nonformal Education	250,000		14-Dec-93
3465	Second Nonformal Education	600,000		5-Jul-00
	Subsector Total	1,179,000	20.1	
Senior Secondary and Higher Education				
1222	Open University	250,000		16-Nov-89
1294	Higher Secondary Education	100,000		26-Apr-90
	Subsector Total	350,000	6.0	
Technical, Vocational Training, and Skills Development				
2130	Vocational Training	400,000		5-Aug-94
4799	Skills Development	500,000		15-Jun-06
	Subsector Total	900,000	15.4	
Total		5,856,000	100.0	

ADB = Asian Development Bank, No. = number, PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance, TA = technical assistance.
Source: loan and TA database.

Table A2.3: ADB's Approved Education ADTA Grants for Bangladesh by Subsector (1990–2007)

ADTA No.	Title	Total Amount								Approval Date	Rating TCR
		ADB		JSF		Others ^a		Total			
		\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%		
Primary Education											
1359	Institutional Strengthening of the Directorate of Primary Education	400,000		0		0		400,000		21-Aug-90	GS
2921	Primary School Performance Monitoring	0		500,000		1,000,000		1,500,000		26-Nov-97	GS
4065	Strengthening Primary Education Development Program	250,000						250,000		19-Dec-02	GS
	Subsector Total	650,000	23.3	500,000	35.5	1,000,000	21.0	2,150,000	24.0		
Secondary Education											
1991	Institutional Strengthening of the Directorate of Secondary and Higher	490,000		0		0		490,000		23-Nov-93	PS
	Subsector Total	490,000	17.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	490,000	5.5		
Nonformal Education											
1439	Staff Development and Training	776,000		0		0		776,000		13-Dec-90	
1440	Research and Development	879,000		0		0		879,000		13-Dec-90	
1441	Institutional Strengthening of the Department of Women's Affairs	0		700,000				700,000		13-Dec-90	
2534	Institutional Development of the Directorate of Nonformal Education	0		0		3,768,500		3,768,500		11-Jul-96	GS
	Subsector Total	1,655,000	59.2	700,000	49.6	3,768,500	79.0	6,123,500	68.2		
Senior Secondary and Higher Education^b											
1489	A Survey of Higher Secondary Educational Institutions	0		210,000		0		210,000		04-Mar-91	
	Subsector Total	0	0.0	210,000	14.9	0	0.0	210,000	2.3		
	Total	2,795,000	100.0	1,410,000	100.0	4,768,500	100.0	8,973,500	100.0		

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADTA = advisory technical assistance, GS = generally successful, JSF = Japan Special Fund, No.= number, PS = partly successful, TCR = technical assistance completion report, TA = technical assistance, TPER = technical assistance

^a Includes \$1,000,000 share from Norway for TA 2921 and 3,768,500 share from Switzerland for TA 2534.

^b ADTA 1608 - Higher Secondary Education was approved on 21 November 1991, but cancelled as of 21 April 1998.

Sources: Loan and TA databases, TCRs, TPERs.

Table A2.4: ADB's Approved Education Loans for Bangladesh with Cofinancing (1990–2007)

Subsector/ Loan No.	Title	ADB Loan (\$ million)	Cofinancing		Government (\$ million)	Total		
			Amount (\$ million)	DPs		Project Cost (\$ million)	Approve Year	
Primary Education								
1026(SF)	Primary Education Sector	68.30			13.34	81.64	1990	
1182(SF)	Rehabilitation of Damaged School	15.00			2.30	17.30	1992	
1521(SF)	Second Primary Education Sector	100.00	17.00	DFID	43.00	160.00	1997	
2015(SF)	Second Primary Education Development Program (Sector Loan)	100.00	554.00	CIDA, DFID, EC, IDA, Government of Japan (JICA), Government of the Netherlands,	1,161.00	1,815.00	2003	
Subsector Total		283.30	571.00		1,219.64	2,073.94		
Secondary Education								
1268(SF)	Secondary Education Development	72.00			18.00	90.00	1993	
1690(SF)	Secondary Education Sector Improvement	60.00			26.00	86.00	1999	
2101(SF)	Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education	68.91	18.00	CIDA	21.74	108.65	2004	
2266(SF)	Secondary Education Sector Dev.	85.00			28.33	113.33	2006	
2267(SF)	Secondary Education Sector Dev.	30.00				30.00	2006	
Subsector Total		315.91	18.00		94.07	427.98		
Nonformal Education								
1066(SF)	Rural Training	16.25			3.10	19.35	1990	
1390(SF)	Nonformal Education	26.70 ^a	10.50 ^a	IDA, SDC	10.03 ^a	47.23	1995	
1881(SF)	Post-Literacy and Continuing	65.00	12.00	DFID	22.70 ^b	99.70	2001	
Subsector Total		107.95	22.50		35.83	166.28		
Senior Secondary and Higher Education								
1123(SF)	Higher Secondary Education	49.17 ^a	2.85 ^a	UNDP	8.83 ^a	60.85	1991	
1173(SF)	Bangladesh Open University	34.33 ^a			8.67 ^a	43.00	1992	
Subsector Total		83.50	2.85		17.50	103.85		
Sector Total		790.66	614.35		1,367.04	2,772.05		
% of Total Project Cost		28.52	22.16		49.32	100.00		

ADB = Asian Development Bank, AusAID = Australian Agency for International Development, CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency, Dev. = development, DFID = Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, DP = development partner,

^a Based on appraisal estimates listed in the project completion reports.

^b Sum of government local currency (\$20,000,000) and beneficiary local currency (\$2,700,000).

Sources: Regrouped from relevant ADB databases.

Table A2.5: ADB's Expected Loans by Sector in the Pipeline for Bangladesh (2008–2011)

Year/Sector	Title	Poverty/ Thematic Targeting Classification and Thematic Priority	Planned Amount		Year of PPTA
			\$ million	%	
2008					
Education					
	Skills Development ^a	GI/ISD/GAD	50.00		2006
Energy					
	Gas Sector Development Program	GI/ECG/GOV	310.00		2007
Transport and Communications					
	Development of Transport Corridor for Trade Facilitation	GI/ECG/REG	150.00		2006
Multisector					
	Public-Private Infrastructure Development Facility ^b	GI/ECG/PSD	165.00		2007
	Second Urban Governance and Infrastructure Improvement (Sector) ^c	TI/ENV/ISD/GOV	87.00		2006
	Emergency Disaster Damage Rehabilitation (Sector) Project ^d	GI/ECG	120.00		-
	Emergency Assistance for Food Security ^e	TI/ISD/ECG	170.00		-
	Subtotal		1,052.00	31.7	
2009					
Agriculture and Natural Resources					
	Participatory Small-Small Scale Water Resources Development	TI/ECG/GOV	50.00		2007
Education					
	Primary Education Sector Development Program	TI/GAD/ISD	100.00		2008
Energy					
	Clean Fuel Sector Development Program	GI/ECG/GOV	210.00		2007
Industry and Trade					
	SME Sector Development Program II	GI/ECG/GOV/ PSD/GAD	50.00		2008
Transport and Communications					
	Development of Transport Corridor for Trade Facilitation	GI/ECG/REG	120.00		2006
Multisector					
	Urban Public and Environmental Health Sector Development Program	TI/ECG/GAD	86.00		2007
Multitranchise Financing Facility					
	Railway Sector Investment Program	GI/ECG	150.00		-
Regional Cooperation and Integration					
	South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation Tourism Development Project	GI/ECG	12.00		2007
	Subtotal		778.00	23.5	

2010				
Agriculture and Natural Resources				
Command Area Development II	TI/ECG/GAD	40.00		2005
Crop Diversification II	TI/ECG/GOV	40.00		2008
Sustainable Rural Infrastructure Improvement	TI/GAD/ISD	60.00		2009
Energy				
Energy Efficiency Improvement Project ^f	GI/ECG/GOV	220.00		2008
Law, Economic Management, and Public Policy				
Governance Management	TI/ENV/ ISD/GOV	39.00		2009
Transport and Communications				
Transport Sector Preparatory Facility TA Loan	GI/ECG/REG	15.00		-
Padma Multipurpose Bridge ^f	GI/ECG/REG	265.00		2005
Multisector				
City Corporations Development Project	TI/ENV/ ISD/GOV	50.00		2008
Regional Cooperation and Integration				
South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation Transport Logistic and Trade Facilitation	TI/ECG	18.00		2007
Subtotal		747.00	22.5	
2011				
Agriculture and Natural Resources				
National Disaster Risk Management Technical Assistance Loan	TI/ENV/ECG	15.00		2010
Sustainable Participatory Livestock Development	TI/ECG	30.00		2010
Education				
Secondary Education Sector Development Program II	TI/ISD/GAD	90.00		2009
Transport and Communications				
Priority Road Project	GI/ECG/REG	80.00		2009
Water Supply, Sanitation, and Waste Management				
Dhaka Water Supply II ^g	TI/ENV/ISD/	125.00		2010
Multisector				
Public-Private Infrastructure Development Facility II ^g	GI/ECG/GOV	250.00		2010
Multitranchise Financing Facility				
Railway Sector Investment Program	GI/ECG	150.00		-
Subtotal		740.00	22.3	
Total		3,317.00	100.0	

ADB = Asian Development Bank, DESCO = Dhaka Electric Supply Company Ltd., ECG = sustainable economic growth, ENV = environmental sustainability, GAD = gender and development, GI = general intervention, GOV = governance, ISD = inclusive social development,

^a This loan (2425) was approved on 6 January 2008.

^b These loans (2453/2454) were approved on 1 October 2008.

^c This loan (2462) was approved on 29 October 2008.

^d This loan (2409) was approved on 31 January 2008.

^e This loan (2430) was approved on 22 July 2008.

^f The Padma Multipurpose Bridge Project (with adjusted OCR amounts) or the Energy Efficiency Improvement Project to get priority, if the OCR 'contingency' scenario will need to be applied.

^g The Dhaka Water Supply II, and the Railway Sector Investment Program (or the Public-Private Infrastructure Development Facility II) to get priority, if the OCR "contingency" scenario will need to be applied.

Sources: ADB. 2007. *Bangladesh Country Operations Business Plan 2008–2010*. Manila; ADB. 2008. *Bangladesh Country Operations Business Plan 2009–2011*. Manila.

Table A2.6: ADB's Expected PPTA Grants by Sector in the Pipeline for Bangladesh (2008–2011)

Year/Sector	PPTA Title	Responsible Division	Planned Amount	
			\$('000)	%
2008				
Agriculture and Natural Resources				
	Crop Diversification	SANS	500.0	
Education				
	Primary Education Sector Development Program	SANS	600.0	
Energy				
	Sustainable Power Sector Development Program II	SAEN	800.0	
Industry and Trade				
	SME Sector Development Program II	SAGF	600.0	
Multisector				
	Megacities Development Project	SAUD	600.0	
	Subtotal		3,100.0	21.0
2009				
Agriculture and Natural Resources				
	Sustainable Rural Infrastructure Improvement	SANS	500.0	
	Command Area Development II	SANS	250.0	
Education				
	Secondary Education Sector Development Program II	SANS	500.0	
Law, Economic Management, and Public Policy				
	Governance Management Program	SAGF	600.0	
Transport and Communications				
	Priority Road Project	SATC	800.0	
Multisector				
	Chittagong Hill Tracts Rural Development II	SANS	500.0	
	Integrated City Transport Project	SAUD	1,000.0	
	Subtotal		4,150.0	28.1
2010				
Agriculture and Natural Resources				
	National Disaster Risk Management	SANS	400.0	
	Sustainable Participatory Livestock Development	SANS	500.0	
Energy				
	Sustainable Clean Fuel Sector Development	SAEN	500.0	
Water Supply, Sanitation, and Waste Management				
	Khulna Water Supply	SAUD	800.0	
	Dhaka Water Supply II	SAUD	800.0	
Multisector				
	Public-Private Infrastructure Development Facility II	SAGF	700.0	
	Urban Governance and Infrastructure III	SAUD	700.0	
	Subtotal		4,400.0	29.8
2011				
Education				
	Skills Development II	SANS	500.0	
Energy				
	Energy Efficiency Improvement II	SAEN	500.0	
Health, Nutrition, and Social Protection				
	Sustainable Urban Primary Health Sector Development Program II	SAUD	600.0	
Transport and Communications				
	Development of Transport Corridors for Trade Facilitation II	SATC	700.0	
Multisector				
	City Corporations Development Project II	SAUD	800.0	
	Subtotal		3,100.0	21.0
	Total		14,750.0	100.0

ADB = Asian Development Bank; PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance; SAEN = South Asia Energy Division; SAGF = South Asia Governance, Finance and Trade Division; SANS = South Asia Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Social Services Division; SATC = South Asia Transport and Communication Division, SAUD = South Asia urban Development Division, SME = small and medium-sized enterprise.

Sources: ADB. 2007. *Bangladesh Country Operations Business Plan, 2008–2010*. Manila; ADB. 2008. *Bangladesh Country Operations Business Plan 2009–2011*. Manila.

Table A2.7: ADB's Expected ADTA Grants by Sector in the Pipeline for Bangladesh (2008–2011)

Year/Sector	ADTA Title	Responsible Division	Planned Amount	
			\$('000)	%
2008				
Multisector				
	Capacity Development for the Infrastructure Development Company Limited ^a	SAGF	500.0	
	Financial Management and Monitoring ^b	BRM	200.0	
	Strengthening the Government's Institutional Capacity for Improving Food Security ^c	BRM	600.0	
	Subtotal		1,300.0	14.8
2009				
Education				
	Capacity Development for Madrasah Education	SANS	700.0	
Law, Economic Management, and Public Policy				
	Capacity Building for Results-Based Management	BRM	800.0	
Transport and Communications				
	Port and Logistics Efficiency Improvement	SATC	800.0	
	Support to Transport Sector Coordination Wing of Planning Commission	SATC	500.0	
Water Supply, Sanitation, and Waste Management				
	Public–Private Partnership Option Study for Bulk Water Supply System	SAUD	400.0	
Multisector				
	Urban Public and Environmental Health Sector Development Program	SAUD	500.0	
	Subtotal		3,700.0	42.0
2010				
Law, Economic Management, and Public Policy				
	Governance Management Program	SAGF	800.0	
Multisector				
	Support for Integrated Urban Infrastructure Program	SAUD	500.0	
	Subtotal		1,300.0	14.8
2011				
Energy				
	Support for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency	SAEN	500.0	
Law, Economic Management, and Public Policy				
	Support for Anticorruption Commission	SAGF	800.0	
Multisector				
	Innovative Municipal Financing	SAUD	550.0	
	Urban Renewal Project (Slum Improvement)	SAUD	650.0	
	Subtotal		2,500.0	28.4
	Total		8,800.0	100.0

ADB = Asian Development Bank; ADTA = advisory technical assistance; BRM = Bangladesh Resident Mission; PPP = public-private partnership; SAEN = South Asia Energy Division; SAGF = South Asia Governance, Finance and Trade Division; SANS = South Asia Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Social Services Division; SATC = South Asia Transport and Communications Division; SAUD = South Asia Urban Development Division.

^a ADTA 7143 was approved on October 2, 2008.

^b ADTA 7101 was approved on July 22, 2008.

^c ADTA 7057 was approved on January 31, 2008.

Sources: ADB. 2007. *Bangladesh Country Operations Business Plan 2008–2010*. Manila; ADB. 2008. *Bangladesh Country Operations*.

Business Plan 2009–2011. Manila.

DESCRIPTIONS OF ADB'S PROJECT AND PROGRAM LOANS FOR BANGLADESH

Objectives	Components	Location
Primary Education		
Loan 1026(SF)–BAN: Primary Education Sector		
(i) Increase equitable distribution of access to PE, especially for disadvantaged rural children and girls; (ii) improve the quality and relevance of PE and raise internal efficiency; (iii) enhance management capability and standards; and (iv) strengthen the teaching of population, family life, and environmental education in primary schools.	(i) Construction of an office complex to accommodate the Project Implementation Management Unit office along with offices of the DPE and Facilities Department; (ii) production and distribution of textbooks and basic teaching aid packages to selected government primary schools, nonformal PE learning centers, rural residential schools, and rural primary schools; (iii) local fellowships for in-service training, as well as for attending recurrent in-service training and upgrading programs; (iv) local fellowships to attend in-service training programs in educational management and administration; (v) upgrading of 14 PTIs; (vi) dissemination of population education including personal hygiene to pupils and their parents, as well as promotion of environmental consciousness; and (vii) provision of financing for incremental operational expenditures and recurrent costs arising from establishment and sustaining of project facilities.	Chittagong Division
Loan 1182(SF)–BAN: Rehabilitation of Damaged School Facilities		
Reconstruct and provide replacement furniture, equipment and instructional materials for government primary and secondary schools in Chittagong and Khulna divisions that were destroyed during the 29 April 1999 cyclone.	(i) Part A – construction of about 465 cyclone-resistant rural primary schools in Chittagong and Khulna Divisions and the provision of furniture; (ii) Part B – construction of about 40 cyclone-resistant buildings for the secondary schools in Chittagong and Khulna Divisions and the provision of furniture, equipment, and instructional materials.	Chittagong and Khulna divisions
Loan 1521(SF)–BAN: Second Primary Education		
Increase equitable access, improve education quality and efficiency, and strengthen institutional and management capacity.	(i) Develop PE facilities in underserved areas in Barisal, Chittagong, and Sylhet divisions, particularly the construction of new primary schools, reconstruction of dilapidated primary schools, construction of additional classrooms, repair of old primary schools, construction of additional latrines and tube wells, construction of blackboards, supply of furniture, establishment of a pilot community-based preventive maintenance system, and targeted assistance for school supplies of stationery for poor students; (ii) develop institutional capacity of NCTB to review and update the curriculum, and provide quality textbooks more cost effectively to all primary school students; (iii) provide textbooks and teaching and learning materials to students and teachers in Barisal, Chittagong, and Sylhet divisions; (iv) support in-service teacher training and improve student assessment; and (v) develop a better managed PE system by strengthening management capacity and information, monitoring, and evaluation systems at the DPE.	Barisal, Chittagong, and Sylhet divisions
Loan 2015(SF)–BAN: Second Primary Education Development Program		
Provide quality PE to all eligible children in Bangladesh.	(i) Quality improvement through organizational development and capacity building consisting of a comprehensive organizational and institutional review and analysis, capacity needs assessment of all PE institutions at all other levels, and support for further decentralization and devolution including strengthening of local-level PE institutions; (ii) quality improvement in	

Objectives	Components	Location
	<p>schools</p> <p>and classrooms consisting of provision of quality textbooks and materials, promotion of SBM, and provision of support for the improvement of teacher quality; (iii) quality improvement through infrastructure development including new infrastructure, facilities, furnishings, and equipment as necessary, and provision of infrastructure facilities; and (iv) improving and supporting equitable access to quality schooling consisting of provision of stipends and support for mainstreaming children with special needs into primary schools.</p>	
<p>Secondary Education</p>		
<p>Loan 1268(SF)–BAN: Secondary Education Development</p>		
<p>(i) Improve the quality of SE, (ii) expand access on a selective basis, (iii) strengthen management and planning capacity, and (iv) enhance resource mobilization and utilization.</p>	<p>(i) Part A: Quality Improvement – secondary school curriculum reforms, instructional materials management, and teacher training; (ii) Part B: Expanded Access – construction and/or rehabilitation of classrooms, equipment, and furniture for about 1 ,840 secondary schools comprising female schools, rural nongovernment schools, and madrasah schools; materials including school administration handbooks; and a stipend program for female students in about 53 thanas; (iii) Part C: Capacity Building for Planning and Management – strengthening the technical and administrative capability of the Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education; and (iv) Part D: Project Implementation –provision of consulting services, equipment, vehicles, training, and workshops for Project staff, and incremental recurrent costs for Project implementation.</p>	
<p>Loan 1690(SF)–BAN: Secondary Education Sector</p>		
<p>(i) Strengthen institutional capacity of MOE to plan, manage, and monitor the SE system and to improve the use of scarce educational resources; (ii) build support systems for improved quality; and (iii) expand equitable access to SE.</p>	<p>(i) Strengthening management systems and capacity; (ii) improving quality support systems by improving curriculum development, privatizing secondary textbooks, reforming student assessment and public examinations, reforming secondary teacher education, strengthening school management and supervision, and establishing School Improvement Fund; and (iii) ensuring equitable access through facilities development and provision of stipends for females.</p>	
<p>Loan 2101(SF)–BAN: Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education</p>		
<p>Enhance the quality of SE in secondary schools by improving the quality of teaching.</p>	<p>(i) Improving teaching quality through organizational development and capacity building, (ii) improving teacher training facilities, (iii) strengthening in-service and preservice teacher training, and (iv) increasing equitable access and improving community involvement.</p>	
<p>Loan 2266(SF)–BAN: Secondary Education Sector Development Project</p>		
<p>Improve the efficiency and quality of SE, while enhancing access.</p>	<p>(i) Strengthening management of, and transparency in, SE; (ii) improving the quality of SE by revising curricula, supporting reforms of national examinations, strengthening student assessment, and strengthening school management committees; and (iii) improving equitable access to SE.</p>	

Objectives	Components	Location
<p>Loan 2267(SF)–BAN: Secondary Education Sector (i) Strengthen management and governance of SE, (ii) improve the quality of SE learning, and (iii) make access to SE more equitable.</p>	<p>Development Program (i) Decentralization of SE management, (ii) national implementation of a decentralized EMIS, (iii) national implementation of SPBMS, (iv) functional specialization of the education cadre, (v) revision of curricula in grades 9–10, (vi) reform of the SSC examinations, (vii) introduction of school-based assessment for grades 6–9, and (viii) review of the female secondary stipends program.</p>	
Nonformal Education		
<p>Loan 1066(SF)–BAN: Rural Training (i) Provide effective livelihood training and micro-credits to the landless rural poor, (ii) improve the overall socioeconomic status of beneficiaries through self-employment and increased participation in community development, and (iii) strengthen Ministry of Youth and Sports' capacity to provide training and supervise microcredit programs.</p>	<p>(i) Part A – training of beneficiaries in livelihood activities; (ii) Part B – micro-credit for beneficiaries for investment in livelihood activities; and (iii) Part C – Ministry of Youth and Sports institution building, including the provision of facilities, training equipment, vehicles, and incremental staff.</p>	
<p>Loan 1390(SF)–BAN: Nonformal Education Improve and expand NFE to reach illiterate young adults (15–24 years), particularly females.</p>	<p>(i) Institutionalizing Integrated NFE Program into a Directorate of Nonformal Education staffed by qualified personnel able to function in related tasks such as planning, training, monitoring, and evaluation; and (ii) expanding and improving NFE programs to reach, through nongovernment organizations and through the local district administration, an estimated 2.5 million adult learners, of whom at least 1.3 million are expected to be women.</p>	
<p>Loan 1881(SF)–BAN: Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Establish a community-based and needs-oriented PLCE course program and a supporting organizational framework for 1.6 million neo-literates in 29 districts.</p>	<p>(i) Policy framework development for NFE based on decentralized implementation and learners' participation in planning, (ii) curricula and materials development and dissemination for PLCE programs to lay the groundwork for the Project and for similar future activities, (iii) capacity building for organizations involved in project implementation and strengthening the regulatory and supervisory functions of Government, (iv) delivery of PLCE courses targeting more than 1.6 million learners who will participate in courses organized by the Project in 29 districts of Bangladesh</p>	<p>Bagerhat, Barisal, Bhola, Brahmanbaria, Chandpur, Chittagong, Faridpur, Feni, Jhenaidah, Kurigran, Kushtia, Manikganj, Meherpur, Moulbivazar, Munshiganj, Narayanganj, Natore, Nilphamari, Nowabganj, Panchagarh, Patuakhali, Rangpur, Satkhira, Sherpur, Sunamganj, Sylhet, and Tangail districts.</p>
Senior Secondary and Higher Education		
<p>Loan 1123(SF)–BAN: Higher Secondary Education Assist the Government in initiating reforms in higher SE aiming at the improvement of its relevance, quality, efficiency, and costeffectiveness.</p>	<p>(i) Curriculum development and textbook improvement, (ii) teacher training, (iii) infrastructure development, and (iv) education management improvement.</p>	
<p>Loan 1173(SF)–BAN: Bangladesh Open University (i) Increasing the access to education and training in rural areas including basic education, SE, and</p>	<p>(i) Construction of infrastructure facilities on the BOU main campus and for the 10 RRCs; (ii) procurement of equipment, furniture, and service vehicles</p>	

Objectives	Components	Location
vocational training; (ii) providing a mechanism to meet the emergent higher education and professional training needs in selected areas such as agriculture, health, teacher education, and technical and vocational education; (iii) enhancing the quality and relevance of the education and training system; and (iv) strengthening informal and NFE programs for the general population in such areas as environmental protection, family planning, and basic skills.	for the schools and divisions of BOU, the RRCs, and the LSCs; (iii) development of course materials including printed self-instruction materials, audio and video cassettes; (iv) staff development through domestic fellowships and international fellowships; (v) consultant services for project implementation; and (vi) benefit monitoring and evaluation.	

ADB = Asian Development Bank, BOU = Bangladesh Open University, DPE = Directorate for Primary Education, DPEO = district primary education office, EMIS = education management information system, LSC = local study center, MOE = Ministry of Education, NA = not applicable, NAPE = National Academy of Primary Education, NCTB = National Curriculum and Textbook Board, NFE = nonformal education, PE = primary education, PEDP-II = Second Primary Education Development Project, PLCE = post-literacy and continuing education, PTI = primary training institute, RRC = regional resource center, RRP = report and recommendation of the President, SBM = school-based management, SE = secondary education, SPBMS = secondary performance-based management system.

Sources: Relevant ADB RRP for Bangladesh.

SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS OF BANGLADESH COMPARED WITH OTHER SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

Item	Bangladesh		India		Nepal		Pakistan	
	Early to Late		Early to Late		Early to Late		Early to Late	
	1990s	Latest Year	1990s	Latest Year	1990s	Latest Year	1990s	Latest Year
Economic Indicators								
GDP Growth (% , constant)	4.9 (1995)	6.0 (2007)	7.3 (1995)	9.0 (2007)	2.7 (1995)	2.6 (2007)	4.7 (1995)	6.8 (2007)
GDP per Capita (\$, current)	337 (1997)	487 (2007)	396 (1995)	1,170 (2007)	211 (1995)	390 (2007)	438 (1995)	910 (2007)
Average Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)	-5.4 (1990s)	-3.2 (2007)	-4.8 (1990s)	-5.4 (2007)	-6.3 (1990s)	-2.0 (2007)	-6.9 (1990s)	-4.3 (2007)
Average Inflation Rate (%)	5.9 (1990s)	7.2 (2007)	7.5 (1990s)	4.7 (2007)	10.7 (1990s)	6.4 (2007)	9.9 (1990s)	7.8 (2007)
Export Growth (%)	15.4 (1990s)	15.0 (2007)	8.6 (1990s)	23.7 (2007)	18.0 (1990s)	4.2 (2007)	5.8 (1990s)	4.4 (2007)
Social Indicators								
Population (million)	120 (1995)	141 (2007)	923 (1995)	1,138 (2007)	20 (1995)	26 (2007)	124 (1995)	158 (2007)
Population Growth (%)	2.1 (1995)	1.3 (2007)	2.1 (1995)	1.4 (2007)	2.1 (1995)	2.2 (2007)	2.5 (1995)	1.7 (2007)
Infant Mortality Rate (below 1 year per 1,000 live births)	94 (1992)	44 (2006)	77 (1991)	57 (2006)	102 (1990)	56 (2006)	102 (1990)	69 (2007)
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live births)	480 (1997)	320 (2005)	540 (1995)	450 (2005)	850 (1991)	415 (2000)	550 (1991)	400 (2003)
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)	59.0 (1999)	65.4 (2006)		63.7 (2005)	53.6 (1990)	62.9 (2005)	62.9 (1999)	64.6 (2005)
Human Development Index	0.453 (1995)	0.547 (2005)	0.551 (1995)	0.619 (2005)	0.469 (1995)	0.534 (2005)	0.497 (1995)	0.551 (2005)
Human Poverty Index (%)	42.8 (2001)	39.3 (2004)	53.0 (2001)		41.9 (2001)	38.1 (2005)	17.7 (1995)	15.3 (2004)
Poverty Incidence (%)	50.0 (1997)	40.0 (2007)	39.9 (1991)	29.0 (2004)	50.0 (1996)	31.0 (2004)	26.8 (1993)	32.1 (2004)
Gini Index		32.0 (2004)		33.0 (2004)		37.0 (2004)		33.0 (2004)
Access to Improved Water Sources (%)		75.0 (2004)		86.0 (2004)		81.8 (2006)		90.0 (2004)
Education Indicators								
Education Expenditure (% of GDP)	2.2 (1997)	2.3 (2007)	3.9 (1990)	4.1 (2002)	2.3 (1995)	3.3 (2006)	2.2 (1990)	1.7 (2003)
GER of PE (%)	90.0 (1997)	98.8 (2007)	98.0 (1990)	108.0 (2002)	63.0 (1990)	119.0 (2002)	46.0 (1990)	68.1 (2002)
NER of PE (%)	80.9 (1997)	91.1 (2007)	71.0 (1990)	94.6 (2005)	61.0 (1990)	79.7 (2005)	38.0 (1990)	68.0 (2004)
GER of SE (%)	35.0 (1997)	50.0 (2007)	44.2 (1990)	48.7 (2000)	34.2 (1990)	50.6 (2000)	24.5 (1990)	25.3 (2000)
NER of SE (%)	28.7 (1997)	39.0 (2007)						
Female:Male Ratio in PE GER	0.97 (1997)	1.04 (2007)		0.94 (2005)		0.91 (2005)		0.76 (2005)
Female:Male Ratio in SE GER	0.54 (1997)	1.08 (2007)		0.80 (2005)		0.86 (2005)		0.74 (2005)
Adult Literacy Rate (%)	47.0 (1997)	54.8 (2007)	49.3 (1990)	61.0 (2003)	30.5 (1990)	52.0 (2006)	36.3 (1991)	53.0 (2005)
Female Adult Literacy Rate (%)	38.0 (1997)	48.9 (2007)	35.9 (1990)	75.0 (2005)	14.0 (1990)	54.5 (2006)	28.0 (1998)	35.0 (2004)
Student:Teacher Ratio in PE	62 (2001)	49 (2007)						
Student:Teacher Ratio in SE	43 (2001)	31 (2007)						
Cycle Dropout Rate of PE (%)	51.0 (1997)	50.5 (2007)						
Cycle Dropout Rate of SE (%)	79.0 (1997)	75.0 (2003)						
Cycle Completion Rate of PE (%)	49.0 (1997)	49.5 (2007)						
Pass Rate of SSC (%)	51.5 (1997)	72.0 (2007)						

ADB = Asian Development Bank, EMIS = education management information system, GDP = gross domestic product, GER = gross enrollment rate, NER = net enrollment rate, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, PE = primary education, SE = secondary education, SSC = secondary school certificate, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme.

Sources: ADB. 2005. *India Country Strategy and Program Update 2006–2008*. Manila; ADB. 2005. *Pakistan Country Strategy and Program Update 2006–2008*. Manila; ADB. 2008. *Nepal Country Partnership Strategy Midterm Review 2005–2009*. Manila; ADB. 2006. *Bangladesh Country Operations Business Plan 2007-2009*. Manila; ADB. 2008. *Key Indicators: Comparing Poverty Across Countries—The Role of Purchasing Power Parities*. Manila; ADB. 2008. *Asian Development Bank Outlook Update*. Manila; MOE and MOPMe. 2007. *EMIS Database*. Dhaka. UNDP. 2007/08. *Human Development Report*. New York.

BASIC DATA AND INFORMATION ON BANGLADESH'S EDUCATION SECTOR

Figure A5.1: Education System in Bangladesh


Age	Grade													
26+	XX													
25+	XIX	Ph.D.	Ph.D.	Post MBBS Dipl. M. Phil. (Medical)		Ph.D. (Engr.)	Ph.D. (Medical)							
24+	XVIII	M.Phil.							Ph.D. (Education)					
23+	XVII			LLM		M.Sc. (Engr.)	M Sc. (Agri.)		MBA					
22+	XVI	MA/M.Sc./ M.Com./MSS/MBA		LLB (Hons.)	MBBS	B.Sc. Engr. BDS B.Sc. Agri. B.Sc. Text. B.Sc. Leath.	B.Sc. Engr.	B.Sc. (Technical Ed.)	BBA	M.Ed. and MA (Ed.)		MA (LSc)	Kamil	
21+	XV	Bachelor (Hons.)	Masters (Prelim.)											
20+	XIV		Bachelor (Pass)									Dipl. In Nursing	Fazil	
19+	XIII													
18+	XII	SECONDARY	Higher Secondary Education (HSC Examination)				Diploma (Engineering)			Cert. in Ed.	Cert. in Agri.	Dipl. in Com.	Dipl. In Nursing	Alim
16+	XI		Secondary Education (SSC Examination)				Trade (Certificate)		Artisan Course (e.g., Ceramics)					
15+	X													
14+	IX													
13+	VIII													
12+	VII		JUNIOR SECONDARY EDUCATION											
11+	VI													
10+	V	PRIMARY EDUCATION												
9+	IV													
8+	III													
7+	II													
												Ebtedayee		

6+	I	
5+	PREPRIMARY EDUCATION	
4+		
3+		

Agri. = agriculture, BANBEIS = Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information System, BBA = bachelor of business administration, BDS = bachelor of dental surgery, BP. Ed. = bachelor of primary education, B.Sc. = bachelor of science, Cert. = certificate, Com. = commerce, Dipl. = diploma, Ed. = education, Engr. = engineering, Hons. = honors, HSC = high school certificate, Leath. = leather, LLB = bachelor of law, LLM = masters of law, LSc = library science, MA = master of arts, MBA = master of business administration, MBBS = bachelor of medicine and bachelor of surgery, M. Com. = master of commerce, M.Ed. = master of education, M.Phil. = master of philosophy, M.Sc. = master of science, MSS = master of social science, Ph.D. = doctor of philosophy, Prelim. = preliminary, SSC = secondary school certificate, Text. = textile.


Source: BANBEIS.

Figure A5.2 Organizational Structure of Bangladesh's Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MOPME)



ADMIN = Administration; AFLT&I = Administration, Finance, Logistics, Training, and Implementation; BNFE = Bureau of Nonformal education; CPEIMU = Compulsory Primary Education Implementation Monitoring Unit; DBNFE = district bureau of nonformal education; Div-PEO = divisional primary education office; DPE = directorate of primary education; DPEO = district primary education office; EMIS = Education Management Information System; F&P = Finance and Procurement; IEC = Inclusive Education Cell; LC = Learning Center; M&E = Monitoring and Evaluation; MOPME= Ministry of Primary and Mass Education; NAC = National Assessment Cell; NAPE = National Academy of Primary Education; NCTB = National Curriculum and Textbook Board; PME&MIS = Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Management Information System; UPEO = upazila primary education office, P&O = Policy and Operation;
Source: MOPME.

Figure A5.3 Organizational Structure of Bangladesh’s Ministry of Education (MOE)



Admin. = Administration; BANBEIS = Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information and Statistics; BNCU = Bangladesh National United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Commission; BSHE = Board of Secondary and Higher Education; BTEB = Bangladesh Technical Education Board; CGAW = College and General Administration Wing; Dev. = Development; DIA = Directorate of Audit and Inspection; DSHE = Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education; DTE = Directorate of Technical Education; EED = Education Engineering Department; EMIS = Education Management Information System; MEB = Madrasah Education Board; MOE = Ministry of Education; MTTI = Madrasah Teachers Training Institute; NACTAR = National Academy for Computer Training and Research; NAEM = National Academy for Education Management; NCTB = National Curriculum and Textbook Board; NTRCA = Nongovernment Teachers' Registration and Certification Authority; PIU = Project Implementation Unit; PIW = Program Inspection Wing; SEW = Secondary Education Wing; UGC = University Grants Commission; VOC = Vocational Education.
 Source: MOE.

Table A5.1: Past and Current Data on Students and Teachers by School Type and Education Subsector in Bangladesh

Subsector/Type of School	2001				2007			
	No. of Schools	No. of Teachers	No. of Students	Student: Teacher Ratio	No. of Schools	No. of Teachers	No. of Students	Student: Teacher Ratio
Primary Education (Grades 1–5)								
Government Primary School	37,671	162,090	10,830,742	67	37,672	182,374	9,377,814	51
Experimental School Attached to PTI	53	255	11,513	45	54	210	10,097	48
Registered Nongovernment Primary School	19,428	77,233	4,163,873	54	20,107	79,085	3,538,708	45
Community School	3,268	9,162	490,456	54	3,186	10,060	436,072	43
Primary Section Attached to High School	1,576	10,515	337,543	32	1,314	2,937	450,771	153
NonRegistered Nongovernment Primary School	1,971	7,888	299,345	38	973	3,914	164,535	42
Ebtedayee Madrasah	3,843	15,744	438,957	28	6,726	28,227	947,744	34
Ebtedayee Madrasah Attached to Dakhil Madrasah	3,574	14,855	417,383	28	8,920	35,707	1,099,463	31
NGO-Run Full Primary School	170	676	28,864	43	229	1,106	32,721	30
Kindergarten	2,477	15,052	364,196	24	2,253	20,874	254,982	12
Satellite School	4,095	7,224	276,348	38		Phasedout		
Subtotal	78,126	320,694	17,659,220	55	81,434	364,494	16,312,907	45
Secondary Education (Grades 6–10)								
Government Secondary School	317	6,913	221,215	32	317	7,452	221,887	30
Nongovernment Junior Secondary School	3,245	21,311	732,298	34	4,322	36,122	910,914	25
Nongovernment Secondary School	12,604	155,053	6,933,497	45	13,861	194,584	6,265,751	32
School/College Section	1,485	27,654	330,686	12	638	9,753	64,152	7
Dakhil Madrasah	5,391	67,026	2,058,700	31	6,685	98,123	2,236,025	23
Subtotal	22,725	271,044	10,055,181	37	25,506	338,582	9,476,842	28
Technical Education and Vocational Training								
Secondary Vocational School (Private)	801	3,048	52,264	17	1,224	7,511	95,458	13
Government Technical School	–	–	–	–	41	690	9,964	14
Commercial Institute	16	189	3,703	20	16	68	3,683	54
Technical Training Center	13	356	4,857	14	13	359	4,867	14
Vocational Training Institute	51	463	7,485	16	64	792	8,548	11
Polytechnical or Monotechnic School	30	846	20,245	24	137	181	27,518	152
Degree College or University	1,026	37,066	1,204,147	32	1,414	65,654	1,380,485	21
Subtotal	1,937	41,968	1,292,701	31	2,909	75,255	1,530,523	20
Total	102,788	633,706	29,007,102		109,849	778,331	27,320,272	

– = not available, EMIS = education management information system, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, NGO = nongovernment organization, No. = number, PTI = primary teacher training institute.

Sources: Recalculated from EMIS databases of MOE and MOPME.

Table A5.2: Characteristics of Different School Types in Bangladesh

Subsector/ School Type	Support Provided by		
	Government	Community	Parents
Primary Education			
1. Government Primary School	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • school buildings, classrooms, and furniture • teacher salaries and allowances • appointment of teachers • short-term and long-term teacher training • free textbooks for all grades • stipends for students (up to 40% of enrollment) • contingencies (Tk1,800 per year) 	insignificant	examination fees
2. Experimental School Attached to PTI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • as in government primary schools, but budget as part of PTI budget 	insignificant	insignificant
3. Registered Nongovernment Primary School	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 90% support to meet teachers monthly salaries and limited allowances (house rent, medical, head teacher, and 0.25 months festivals, and pension) • Short-term and long-term teacher training • free textbooks for all grades • stipends for students (up to 40% of enrollment) • miscellaneous (repairs and extension) 	some contributions	fees (e.g., admission, registration, examination, tuition)
4. Community School	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • up to Tk 750 for teacher salaries per teacher per month • short-term and long-term teacher training • free textbooks • stipends for students (up to 40% of enrollment) 	some contributions	fees (e.g., admission and examination)
5. Primary Section Attached to High School	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • free textbooks for all grades 		
6. Non-Registered Nongovernment Primary School	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • currently awaiting GOB registration and financial support • short-term and long-term teacher training 	some contributions	fees (e.g., admission, registration, examination, tuition)
7. Ebtedayee Madrasah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • up to Tk 750 per month for teacher salaries • short-term teacher training • free textbooks for all grades • stipends for students (up to 40% of enrollment) 	significant amount collected as subscription from community members	fees (e.g., admission, registration, examination, tuition)
8. Ebtedayee Madrasahs Attached to Dakhil Madrasah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • up to Tk 750 for monthly salary per teacher • short-term teacher training • free textbooks for all grades 	significant amount collected as subscription from community members	fees (e.g., admission, registration, examination, tuition)

Subsector/ School Type	Support Provided by		
	Government	Community	Parents
9. NGO-Run Full Primary School	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no direct funding free textbooks if national curriculum is followed 		
10. Kindergarten	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no direct government funding free textbooks if national curriculum is followed 	insignificant	fees
Secondary Education			
1. Government Secondary School	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> fully GOB-funded 	insignificant	exam fees
2. Nongovernment Junior Secondary School or Secondary School	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 90% support for teachers' monthly salaries and limited allowances (house rent, medical, and 0.25 months festivals and pension) short-term teacher training 	significant amount collected as subscription from community members	
3. Dakhil Madrasah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 90% support for teachers' monthly salaries and limited allowances (house rent, medical, and 0.25 months festivals and pension) short-term teacher training 	significant amount collected as subscription from community members	

GOB = Government of Bangladesh, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, NGO = nongovernment organization, PTI = primary teacher training institute.

Sources: MOE and MOPME.

DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR BANGLADESH

Table A6.1: Cumulative Aid Disbursements of All Sectors Combined by Aid Agency and Year (1996–2006)

Aid Agency	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	Cumulative Disbursements (1996–2006)		
											\$ million	%	
Multilateral Agencies													
ADB	254.90	201.30	217.50	283.20	196.50	182.00	207.10	172.00	208.00	264.60	2,187.10	16.96	
European Union	25.70	27.80	16.60	5.30	18.40	80.20	6.20	18.40	7.90	55.50	262.00	2.03	
IDA-World Bank	313.80	331.60	274.60	354.10	298.80	323.40	560.90	225.20	696.30	635.30	4,014.00	31.12	
IFAD	9.30	12.90	10.90	14.80	9.90	12.10	21.10	15.30	9.30	14.30	129.90	1.01	
UNICEF	60.20	21.90	19.20	27.30	49.20	46.40	38.70	29.60	25.20	–	317.70	2.46	
Other UN Agencies	3.30	26.40	35.50	14.00	21.80	21.80	21.50	22.40	15.00	67.40	249.10	1.93	
Subtotal	667.20	621.90	574.30	698.70	594.60	665.90	855.50	482.90	961.70	1,037.10	7,159.80	55.52	
Bilateral Agencies													
Australia	3.90	0.30	–	0.20	0.10	–	–	–	–	–	4.50	0.03	
Belgium	–	–	–	–	0.90	3.00	–	0.30	–	–	4.20	0.03	
Canada	14.20	8.10	10.90	13.00	18.80	0.20	13.20	12.00	–	54.30	144.70	1.12	
Denmark	22.70	18.60	32.60	29.20	4.80	29.40	46.50	19.50	5.30	14.30	222.90	1.73	
Finland	3.20	0.20	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3.40	0.03	
France	21.90	26.30	5.90	0.90	2.90	20.20	1.10	7.40	0.10	–	86.70	0.67	
Germany	33.80	48.60	36.70	21.40	43.00	20.80	6.30	26.40	23.60	15.30	275.90	2.14	
Japan	10.60	95.50	109.60	109.10	163.60	145.40	82.00	79.40	45.00	31.00	871.20	6.76	
Netherlands	71.90	20.50	43.10	28.00	19.10	1.20	9.40	40.90	4.60	12.60	251.30	1.95	
Norway	14.40	18.70	9.50	18.70	16.90	9.20	49.70	6.30	3.90	10.80	158.10	1.23	
Sweden	22.10	26.50	22.20	20.30	15.60	7.20	15.20	10.60	0.30	1.80	141.80	1.10	
Switzerland	2.50	2.10	9.30	4.20	6.60	1.90	3.70	4.70	–	2.10	37.10	0.29	
UK (DFID)	20.60	34.80	51.60	60.50	53.30	20.80	40.50	93.80	85.20	156.80	617.90	4.79	
USA	29.00	26.30	29.50	39.30	21.60	6.60	20.80	12.00	7.80	3.90	196.80	1.53	
Others					0.10	111.32		0.20	22.38	0.10	134.10	1.04	
Subtotal	270.80	326.50	360.90	344.80	367.30	377.22	288.40	313.50	198.18	303.00	3,150.60	24.43	
NGOs (Core Resources Only)	250.14	206.87	273.50	182.35	250.90	208.28	279.64	313.07	274.02	347.53	2,586.30	20.05	
Total	1,188.14	1,155.27	1,208.70	1,225.85	1,212.80	1,251.40	1,423.54	1,109.47	1,433.90	1,687.63	12,896.70	100.00	

– = not applicable, ADB = Asian Development Bank, DFID = Department for International Development of the UK, IDA = International Development Association, IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development, NGO = nongovernment organization, UK = United Kingdom, UN = United Nations, UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund.

Source: Recalculated from data from the Ministry of Finance.

Table A6.2: Cumulative Disbursements of All Aid Agencies Combined by Sector and Year (1996–2006)

Sector	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	Cumulative Disbursements (1996–2006)	
											\$ million	%
Agriculture and Rural Dev.	115.70	96.40	109.70	111.60	127.80	97.00	128.80	118.70	82.40	99.40	1,087.50	8.43
Energy	283.20	272.00	277.50	333.60	190.80	262.10	293.20	296.70	337.20	266.00	2,812.30	21.81
Finance, Industry and Trade	3.50	3.00	4.50	22.30	44.70	22.00	21.20	13.90	47.90	62.30	245.30	1.90
Transport and Communications	325.80	244.50	202.00	289.30	332.70	402.30	231.10	231.20	242.30	76.80	2,578.00	19.99
Education	103.70	100.50	91.90	85.20	110.20	117.40	107.50	82.80	176.10	316.70	1,292.00	10.02
Health	50.10	46.80	152.00	128.20	137.50	117.60	90.50	77.80	56.70	173.90	1,031.10	8.00
Physical Planning and Housing	107.00	103.40	130.60	128.80	113.30	103.40	383.10	63.00	68.70	118.20	1,319.50	10.23
Others ^a	199.14	288.67	240.50	126.85	155.80	129.60	168.14	225.37	422.60	574.33	2,531.00	19.63
Total	1,188.14	1,155.27	1,208.70	1,225.85	1,212.80	1,251.40	1,423.54	1,109.47	1,433.90	1,687.63	12,896.70	100.00

Dev. = development.

^a Including family welfare, social welfare, public administration, cyclone reconstruction, and private sector .

Source: Recalculated from data from the Ministry of Finance.

Table A6.3: Development Partners' Assistance Programs in Bangladesh's Education Sector

Name of DP	Projects and Support Areas
A. Multilateral Agencies	
ADB	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Education Sector Project (PESP/GEP) (cofinanced by many DPs) (ADB amount: \$68.3 million) • Second Primary Education Sector Project (SPESP/PEDP-I) (cofinanced by many DPs) (ADB amount: \$100 million) • Nonformal Education Project (NFEP) (cofinanced by IDA-WB and SDC) (ADB amount: \$26.7 million) • Secondary Education Development Project (SEDP) (\$72 million) • Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project (SESIP) (\$60 million) • Higher Secondary Education Project (cofinanced by UNDP) (ADB amount: \$49.2 million) • Bangladesh Open University Project (\$34.3 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Second Primary Education Development Program (PEDP-II) (SWAP with many DPs) (ADB amount: \$100 million) • Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Project (PLCEP) (cofinanced by DFID and SDC) (ADB amount: \$65 million) • Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project (TQISEP) (cofinanced by CIDA) (ADB amount: \$68.9 million) • SE Sector Development Project (\$85 million) • SE Sector Development Program (\$30 million) • Skills Development Project (cofinanced by SDC) (ADB amount: \$50 million)
IDA-World Bank	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PESP/GEP (cofinanced by many DPs) (IDA-WB amount: \$159.3 million) • SPESP/PEDP-I (cofinanced by many DPs) (IDA-WB amount: \$150 million) • NFEP (cofinanced by ADB and SDC) (IDA-WB amount: \$10.5 million) • Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Project (cofinanced by SDC) (IDA-WB amount: \$53 million) • Second Female Secondary School Assistance Project (\$120.9 million) • Programmatic Education Sector Adjustment Credit Phases I-III (Phase I: \$100 million; Phase II [IDA amount]: \$100 million; Phase III [IBRD amount]: \$100 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PEDP-II (SWAp with many DPs) (IDA-WB amount: \$150 million) • Reaching Out of Schools Children Project (cofinanced by SDC) (WB amount: \$51 million) • Secondary Education Quality and Access Enhancement Project (\$130.7 million) <p>Proposed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Higher Education Project • Technical and Vocational Education and Training Project
European Commission	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary Education Female Teacher Promotion (€29.2 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PEDP-II (SWAp with many DPs) (EC amount: \$100 million) • Nonformal Primary Education through BRAC (cofinanced by DAM and SCF-US) (EC amount: \$30 million) • Asia-Link Program (cooperation for better programming skills, development of curriculum, professional training, knowledge transfer, and development of modules in intellectual communication) • Technical and Vocational Education and Training Project (implemented through ILO)

Name of DP	Projects and Support Areas
United Nations	
UNDP	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PESP/GEP (cofinanced by many DPs) (UNDP amount: \$5 million) • Higher Secondary Education Project (cofinanced by ADB) (UNDP amount: \$2.85 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nonformal Education in CHT • Preformal and nonformal education for street children; schooling and full boarding facilities for children of commercial sex workers
WFP	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WFP School Feeding Program (also supported by AusAid, USAID, WFP multilateral, and Saudi Arabia) (WFP amount: \$3.2 million plus in-kind support) • Food for Education under SPESP/PEDP-I <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nutrition for education component under the country program for primary school children in high food insecure areas
UNICEF	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PESP/GEP (cofinanced by many DPs) (UNICEF amount: \$10 million) • Intensive District Approach to Education for All under SPESP/PEDP-I (cofinanced by SIDA WB, Government of Japan) (UNICEF amount: \$15.5 million) • Basic Education for Hard to Reach Working Children Project Phase I (cofinanced by DFID and SIDA) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parallel cofinancing for PEDP-II (in partnership with AusAid) (UNICEF/AusAID amount: \$12 million) • Basic Education for Hard to Reach Working Children Project Phase II (cofinanced by SIDA and CIDA) (UNICEF amount: \$2.1 million) • Early Learning for Child Development Project (support to MOWCA)
UNESCO	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empowering Adolescent Girls to Become Agents of Social Transformation (supported through DAM and Nari Maitree) (\$44,000) • Capacity Building on HIV/AIDS Prevention Education (\$250,000) • Training of teachers of TVE (also supported by the Government of Japan) (\$298,000) • Strategic capacity building of NGO and GOB mid-level staff (\$198,000) • Statistical Capacity Building
ILO	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eliminating the Worst Form of Child Labor in Bangladesh (Time Bound Program) (also supported by DFID, Norway, and USAID in partnership with UNICEF and ADB) (ILO amount: \$2.5 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TA with funding from EC) (\$22 million) • Nonformal Education (a component of child labor program)
UNFPA	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PESP/GEP (cofinanced by many DPs) (UNFPA amount: \$2.4 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Life Skills Education for School Youth and Adolescents at Secondary Level (\$ 1 million) • Nonformal Education for Youths through Youth Clubs

Name of DP	Projects and Support Areas
B. Bilateral Agencies	
Australia (AusAID)	<p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parallel funding support to PEDP-II (in partnership with UNICEF) (UNICEF/AusAID amount: \$12 million) • Nonformal Primary Education through BRAC (\$8.69 million) • Graduation and post-graduation courses in human resources development for public and private sector people, including indigenous candidates of CHT
Belgium (DGIS)	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PESP/GEP (cofinanced by many DPs) (DGIS amount: \$14 million)
Canada (CIDA)	<p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PEDP-II (CIDA amount: \$20 million) • Basic Education for Hard to Reach Urban Working Children Phase II (cofinanced by SIDA and UNICEF) (CIDA amount: \$ 10.28 million) • BRAC Education Program (cofinanced by DFID, Netherlands, Norway, NOVIB) (CIDA amount: \$18.90 million) • Livelihood Education for Adolescents Development (\$5 million) • TQISEP (cofinanced by ADB) (CIDA amount: \$18 million) • Complementary Sector Reform by Canadian Executing Agency (\$ 2.5 million) • Aga Khan Foundation–Early Childhood Development (\$ 8.25 million)
Denmark (DANIDA)	<p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to Underprivileged Children’s Education Program (UCEP) (\$9.8 million from DPs) (DANIDA amount: \$3.7 million)
UK (DFID)	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPESP (cofinanced by ODA-UK) (ODA amount: \$17 million) • Effective Schools through Enhanced Educational Management under SPESP/PEPD-I (DFID amount: \$30 million) • Basic Education for Hard to Reach Urban Children Phase I (cofinanced by UNICEF) • Support to UCEP Phases II–IV (cofinanced with DANIDA, NORAD, SDC) • Active Learning Core Project implemented by FIVDB (£ 2.11 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PEDP-II (SWAp with many DPs) (DFID amount: \$150 million) • BRAC Education Program (cofinanced by DFID, Netherlands, NORAD, NOVIP) (DFID amount: \$56.7 million) • PLCEP (cofinanced by ADB) (DFID amount: \$12 million) • Active learning education and English teaching (£ million) • Support to Campaign for Popular Education • Support to UCEP Phases V (cofinanced by DANIDA, NORAD, SDC)
Germany (KfW and GTZ)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary School and Cyclone Shelter Construction Project and Comprehensive Primary Education Project under SPESP/PEPD-I (\$30 million) • SME promotion (support to vocational training service market for SMEs)
Islamic Development Bank	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parallel funding support to PEDP-I (\$10.3 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Construction of Madrasah Project (\$ 9.87 million) • Construction of annex building of IDB • Establishment of three girls polytechnic institutes as part of the GOB-funded modernization of 20 polytechnic institutes and establishment of 18 new polytechnic institutes (\$ 0.63 million)

Name of DP	Projects and Support Areas
	<p>million)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduction of computer science in selected madrasahs in strengthening of the same course in selected secondary school project • Introduction of dakhil vocational training into madrasahs (\$ 7.56 million) • Illiteracy eradication support (TA project) • Construction of second academic building of Islamic University of Technology • Construction of primary school (Phase II) (\$ 9.3 million)
Japan (JICA)	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assistance to training for secondary-level science and math <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality Improvement of Teacher Training on Science and Mathematics under PEDP-II (\$6.8million) • Support for nonformal education (JOCV)
The Netherlands	<p>Completed</p> <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PEDP-II (SWAp with many DPs) (\$50 million) • Nonformal Education Project through BRAC Phase III and BRAC Education Program 2004–2009 (cofinanced by DFID, Netherlands, Norway, NOVIB) (Netherlands amount: \$ 63.24 million) • Support to Campaign for Popular Education • Support to BRAC University Institute of Education • Elimination of Child Labor (implemented through ILO) (\$10.2 million)
Norway (NORAD)	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Education Development Project for Quality Improvement under SPESP/PEDP-I (NORAD amount: \$40 million) • Female Education Stipend Program Phase 3 (NOK 25.0 million) • Support to mobile libraries, World Literature Centre, 2002–2005 • Support to UCEP • Education for Indigenous Children through BRAC (NOK \$15 million) • Education Puppet Development Program through national NGO (NOK 1.25 million) • Democratizing Culture and Human Development (Mobile Library) (NOK 2 million) • NFE 2 (cofinanced with NORAD) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PEDP-II (NORAD amount: \$40 million) • BRAC Education Program (cofinanced by DFID, Netherlands, NORAD, NOVIB) (NORAD amount: \$ 16.6 million)
Switzerland (SDC)	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NFEP (cofinanced by ADB and IDA-WB) (SDC amount: \$3.8 million) • Post-Literacy and Continuing Education (cofinanced by WB) (SDC amount: \$7 million) • Participatory learning and empowerment of adivashis through sustainable education (implemented through ASHRAI) (\$1.2 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reaching Out of School Children Project (cofinanced by WB) (SDC amount: \$1.5 million) • Ensuring equitable access to quality education for all; supporting quality improvement in education; promoting reforms in education policy, exploring innovations in skills development, through the GOB, NGOs, and other institutions (BU-IED, CAMPE, UCEP, CMES and ASHRAI) • PLCEP (cofinanced by ADB and DFID) (SDC amount: \$4 million)

Name of DP	Projects and Support Areas
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skill Development Project (cofinanced by ADB) (SDC amount: \$6 million)
Sweden (SIDA)	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PESP/GEP (cofinanced by many DPs) (SIDA amount: 14 million) • Intensive District Approach to Education for All under SPESP/PEDP-I (cofinanced by UNICEF) (SIDA amount: \$ million) • Basic School System and Adolescent Girls Program (cofinanced by SDC) (SIDA amount: \$1.9 million) • NFE 2 (cofinanced by NORAD) • NFE 3 (cofinanced by UNICEF and DFID) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PEDP-II (SWAp with many DPs) (SIDA amount: \$29 million) • Support to NFE • Basic Education for Hard to Reach Urban Working Children Project Phase II (cofinanced by CIDA and UNICEF) (SIDA amount: \$ 21.85 million) • Support to CMES (cofinanced with NORAD) (SIDA amount: \$1.9 million)
US (USAID)	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHT Children Opportunity for Learning Enhanced Project Phase II (implemented through CARE and 5 national NGOs) (\$591,086) • Dirha Suchana–Strong Beginning (implemented through SCF-US and FIVDB) (\$752,138) • Child Friendly Learning Community Leading to Improved Quality Education Project (implemented through PLAN and Dhaka Ahsania Mission) (\$891,161) • Sesame Street Bangladesh (\$6.26 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving early childhood education and primary education through innovative learning models to include a mass media approach with Sesame television program (Sesame Street Bangladesh) (\$6.3 million) • Early Learning for School Success Program (implemented through SCF-US and national NGOs) (\$12 million)
C. International NGOs	
SCF-US	<p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early Learning for School Success Program (funded by USAID) • Learner Alternatives for Vulnerable Children (Shikhon) Program (NFPE program funded by EC) • Core Program (310,000 million)
Concern World Wide	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community-Owned Primary Education <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amader School Project
SCF-UK	<p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learner Alternatives for vulnerable children (Shikhon) program (NFPE funded by EC) (implemented with SCF-US) • Community-Based EMIS • Children Participation through Education
D. National NGOs	
BRAC	<p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BRAC Education Program (supported by CIDA, DFID, Netherlands, Norway, and NOVIB) (\$133.26 million) (DPs: \$128.49 million)

Name of DP	Projects and Support Areas
Campaign for Popular Education	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quality Education for All (supported by SDC, Norway, and NOVIB) (Tk 159.7 million)
CMES	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Basic School System and Adolescent Girls Program Phase III (funded by SIDA and SDC)
FIVDB	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Active Learning Core Project (funded by DFID) (£ 2.11 million) <p>Ongoing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Basic Education (supported by SCF-UK)
UCEP	<p>Completed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Underprivileged Children's Program–Phase V (funded by DANIDA, DFID, Norway, SDC, SCF-Denmark, and Sweden)

ADB = Asian Development Bank; AusAID = Australia Agency for International Development; BRAC = Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee; CAMPE = Campaign for Popular Education; CHT = Chittagong Hill Tract; CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency; CMES = Centre for Mass Education and Science; dakhil = secondary level madrasah institution; DANIDA = Danish International Development Agency; DFID = Department for International Development; DP = development partner; EC = European Commission; EMIS = education management information system; FIVDB = Friends in Village Development in Bangladesh; GEP = General Education Project; GOB = Government of Bangladesh; GTZ = Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit; IDA = International Development Association; JICA = Japan International Cooperation Agency; JOCV = Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer; ILO = International Labor Organization, KfW = Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau; NFE = nonformal education; NFEP = Nonformal Education Project; NFPE = nonformal primary education; NGO = nongovernment organization; NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation; NOVIB = Nederlandse Organisatie Voor Internationale Bijstand; ODA = Overseas Development Authority; PE = primary education; PEDP-I = Primary Education Development Project; PEDP-II = Second Primary Education Development Project; PESP = Primary Education Sector Project; PLCEP = Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Project; SCF = Save the Children Foundation; SDC = Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation; SE = secondary education; SEDP = Secondary Education Development Project; SESIP = Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project; SIDA = Swedish International Development Agency; SME = small and medium enterprise; SPESP = Second Primary Education Sector Project; SWAp = subsector-wide approach; TA = technical assistance; TQISEP = Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project; TVE = technical and vocational education; UCEP = Underprivileged Children's Program; UK = United Kingdom; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNESCO = United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; UNFPA = United Nations Population Fund; UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund; US = United States; USAID = United States Agency for International Development; WB = World Bank; WFP = World Food Program.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

DETAILED BOTTOM-UP ASSESSMENT AND RESULTS MATRIXES OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

1. This appendix provides detailed bottom-up assessment, together with results matrixes (Tables A7.1–A7.3 and A7.5–A7.6), of (i) the combined performance in the primary education (PE) subsector of the four major development partners (DPs), including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) of the Government of Japan; and (ii) the performance of ADB in the nonformal education (NFE) and secondary education (SE) subsectors. The assessment in each subsector is based on the four bottom-up criteria: (i) relevance, (ii) efficiency, (iii) effectiveness, and (iv) sustainability. The performance and ratings in the three subsectors are subsequently combined to arrive at the overall performance and rating in the entire education sector (Table A7.7).

A. Primary Education Subsector

1. Assessment of Relevance in the Three Investment Cycles

2. **Three Investment Cycles Combined.** This sector assistance program evaluation (SAPE) considers the three cycles of the combined DPs' projects and associated advisory technical assistance (ADTA) grants as *relevant* in relation to the policies and plans of the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) and DPs due to the same emphasis on PE. These included the GOB's Perspective Development Plan (1980–2000), Compulsory Primary Education Act (1992), first Education for All (EFA) National Plan of Action launched in 1992, second EFA National Plan of Action (2003–2015), and National Poverty Reduction Strategy (2006–2015). In terms of the DPs' plans and strategies, PE has been a priority area in the ADB, DFID, IDA, and JICA country strategies from the beginning to the present. The three investment cycles in PE were also in line with ADB's two corporate-level education strategies (1988 and 2002),¹ both of which emphasized basic education.²

3. **First Investment Cycle—ADB's Primary Education Sector Project (PESP) and IDA's General Education Project (GEP) with Other DPs.** With regard to the relevance of design, the picture is more mixed. The design of the first cycle, which consisted of a series of parallel-financed projects, with ADB and IDA taking up different geographical parts of the country, was probably appropriate at the time, since the concept of a jointly implemented subsector-wide approach (SWAp) had yet to be fully conceived in the late 1980s or early 1990s. In terms of DP coordination, it may be considered sufficient that the DPs were not working at cross purposes, but had agreed on a joint approach with similar investment components and mutual support from participating bilateral and the United Nations agencies. The focus on access as opposed to quality and institutional capacity development was also appropriate at that time, in view of the tremendous challenge facing the country in simply providing enough classrooms for the primary student population. Thus, the SAPE rates the design of the first cycle as *relevant*.

¹ ADB. 1988. *Education and Development in Asia and the Pacific Sector Paper*. Manila; ADB. 2002. *Education Policies and Strategies*. Manila.

² The latter, however, also emphasized other education subsectors (e.g., technical education and vocational training or skills development) as long as they were relevant to the country's education issues at that time and expected to contribute to poverty reduction.

4. **Second Investment Cycle—ADB's Second Primary Education Sector Project (SPESP) and IDA's Primary Education Development Project (PEDP-I) with Other DPs.** For the second cycle, however, there is room to question the preparation and design process. While the DPs seemed ready to provide a SWAp, it appears that (i) not enough consultation took place with the GOB as to what a SWAp entailed and the responsibilities it would place on the executing agency (EA), which was the Directorate of Primary Education (DPE) of the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MOPME); (ii) insufficient institutional capacity analysis of MOPME was undertaken such that capacity problems (e.g., the many staff vacancies and the low level of expertise of incumbent staff) were not clearly identified, nor were provisions made to deal with them; and (iii) lack of provision of ADTA during project design to help strengthen the EA capacity to prepare for SWAp implementation, as the ADTA was approved during implementation. The EA and DPs thus agreed to go back to using the discrete project-type modality as in the first cycle, with the exception that the participating DPs had agreed to operate under MOPME's common policy framework. Given that the EA was not ready for the SWAp, and that the DPs agreed to go a step forward toward a common policy framework, the SAPE rates the design of the second cycle as *relevant*.

5. **Third Investment Cycle—DPs' Second Primary Education Development Program (PEDP-II) Using SWAp.** By the time of the third cycle, the DPs were well aware of the institutional capacity constraints affecting the PE subsector in view of their past experiences. However, even though the third cycle was designed as a complex, multi-DP SWAp with DPE responsible for implementation through its line departments, no prior organizational or institutional analysis was undertaken. Instead, these activities, together with some parts of institutional strengthening, were to be undertaken through ADTA during the SWAp implementation period. This meant that for the first few years of the SWAp, no significant action was undertaken to address major institutional capacity issues that affected the efficiency of implementation. Even at the present time, several of these structural issues are, as yet, unresolved (e.g., the lack of a professional education cadre). Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, the use of a SWAp approach in this cycle is considered appropriate given the need to involve most DPs along with the GOB in a common program and the DPs' experiences in the past two cycles, which evolved from the discrete project-type coordination, followed by a similar kind of coordination but under a common policy framework, rather than jumping directly into the SWAp. Coupled with the focus on PE quality improvement, the SAPE rates the design of the third cycle as *relevant*.

6. **Overall Rating on Relevance.** Given the *relevant* ratings on various aspects assessed above, the three investment cycles combined are rated as *relevant* (Table A7.7).

2. Assessment of Efficiency in the Three Investment Cycles

7. **First Investment Cycle (PESP/GEP).** While both the ADB's PESP and IDA's GEP encountered initial start-up delays, they achieved and even exceeded the physical targets set at appraisal. For the PESP, the targets were achieved at a savings of 20% below the original cost estimate, while providing 17% more student places than originally planned. Measures aimed at improving access, quality, gender balance, and environmental awareness were all efficiently implemented, although targets for quality improvement were modest compared with those aimed at improving access. Coupled with good utilization of project facilities, the SAPE thus rates the first investment cycle as *efficient*.

8. **Second Investment Cycle (SPESP/PEDP-I).** While many of the targets were achieved, again at a significantly reduced cost, the implementation of several components was less than

efficient. The initial decision to use the SWAp modality was changed to the traditional project-type modality, causing implementation delays. Under the PEDP-I, due to procurement issues, 6 million teacher's guides could not be printed, 686,000 copies of supplementary reading materials could not be provided, and planned teaching aids could not be procured. Because of delayed budget approval, a planned assessment of grade 3 and 5 learning achievements could not be undertaken. Moreover, DFID's evaluation report noted that most of the persons receiving overseas training with DFID funding were not from suitable positions, and many of the persons receiving training did not remain in their positions afterwards. Since during this investment cycle there was a greater focus on improvements in quality and institutional management capacity than under the first cycle, these shortcomings cause the SAPE to rate the second cycle as **less efficient**, although project facilities had generally been well utilized.

9. **Third Investment Cycle (PEDP-II SWAp).** The PEDP-II (approved in 2003) had a long initial delay, with activities starting mostly in 2005. The midterm review conducted in late 2007 covered only 2.5 years of implementation. The initial delays were in the areas of (i) consultant recruitment and deployment, (ii) initial difficulty in financial management, (iii) filling of vacant posts, (iv) retaining of qualified and appropriate staff in key positions, and (v) transfer of the staff created from the second investment cycle into the DPE's revenue budget. These, in turn, caused subsequent delays in many activities, such as (i) completion of baseline survey; (ii) approval of the devolution policy, and piloting of the upazila primary education plan (UPEP) and school level improvement plan (SLIP); and (iii) establishment of PE professional cadre at MOPME's various agencies to improve the quality and career paths of MOPME staff, since many of them have been deputed from outside by the Ministry of Establishment.

10. The reasons for the long initial delays (**deterrence factors**) are (i) it was the first time to experiment on the SWAp in the education sector, while the DPs had not prepared the EA, through prior ADTA, to develop its capacity to manage this kind of aid modality; (ii) the consultant team fielded initially could not manage the transition effectively; (iii) nonconducive government policy and institutional environments in terms inflexibilities in the project proforma constrained the implementation of the agreed upon annual operation plan (e.g., in providing budget heads for UPEP and SLIP implementation); (iv) since there are as many as 11 DPs involved in this SWAp, coordination is not easy, and agreements can take time to reach through various consortium meetings with assistance by the program liaison unit (PLU), thus resulting in high transaction costs among DPs and lowering those of the EA; (v) DPs' funds were not available until early 2005 due to complicated arrangements (i.e., three separate dollar accounts are held—the ADB fund, ADB-administered bilateral grants, and the IDA fund, in addition to the GOB fund, which is routed through the accountant general's office in a commercial bank); and (vi) inflexibilities of DPs' procedures reduced harmonization in some of their activities.

11. On the inflexibilities of DPs' procedures, although 80% of international procurements have been harmonized using the GOB's own procurement procedure (2003), more is needed, since four guidelines³ are still being used.⁴ Procurement of goods and services is done through five distinct systems: (i) all local procurements financed by pool funding follow the GOB system (2003), (ii) international competitive bidding goods financed by IDA follow its guidelines, (iii) international competitive bidding goods financed by ADB and other DPs follow ADB guidelines, (iv) international consultants are recruited mostly under ADB guidelines, and (v) other consultants financed by parallel funding are recruited under the respective DP guidelines.

³ Including ADB, IDA, JICA, and the United Nations Children's Fund.

⁴ Harmonization on local procurements has been established. Parallel financiers are yet to harmonize with government procedures. As for auditing, a common procedure is used.

12. However, many constraints causing the long initial delays have been resolved and the SWAp implementation is picking up due to the following reasons (**success drivers**): (i) the role of the program management unit (PMU) in the line divisions of the EA's normal operations system has been clarified and strengthened with the abolition of the project coordination unit (originally led by an international consultant) and the fielding of technical support team consultants; (ii) the role of the PLU has been clarified as part of ADB's Bangladesh Resident Mission (BRM) to help coordinate DPs' concerns and communications with the PMU; (iii) the implementation guidelines of different innovative activities (e.g., the UPEP, SLIP, and the innovative fund) have been approved and piloting activities initiated; (iv) some financial and procurement issues have been sorted out; and (v) the Planning Commission has agreed to provide flexibilities in the government project proforma.

13. Due to the positive and negative reasons above, particularly the long initial delays and high transaction costs among the DPs, the SAPE rates the implementation of the **PEDP-II** SWAp as **less efficient** but with many positive signs of improvement recently. The high transaction costs were mainly caused by (i) initial lack of institutional capacity of the EA to handle the SWAp implementation since technical support was not provided to develop the necessary capacity during the early design stage; (ii) lack of full harmonization of key government and DPs' procedures (e.g., procurement and fund flow systems); (iii) nonconductive government policy and institutional environments (e.g., rigid project proforma and other regulations); (iv) complications of the SWAp due to the involvement of a large number of DPs which are difficult to manage; and (v) complicated implementation arrangements (e.g., the PLU is located outside BRM, and the consortium functions are included as part of PLU activities). ADB, as the lead DP, has efficiently helped enhance coordination among DPs.

14. **Overall Rating on Efficiency.** Given the efficiency rating of each of the three investment cycles assessed above, the overall efficiency of the three investment cycles combined is rated as **less efficient** in view of the long start-up delays, the delays in carrying out major policy and institutional reforms, and the high transaction costs among the DPs in implementing the PEDP-II SWAp (Table A7.7).

3. Assessment of Achievement of Outputs in the Three Investment Cycles

15. This section assesses the achievement of outputs of the DPs' three investment cycles, classified under the components of increasing access, improving quality, and strengthening institutional management capacity of the PE subsector. The outputs discussed in this section are only key outputs. Detailed outputs of each of the three cycles are shown in column 3 of the corresponding results matrixes in Tables A7.1–A7.3. Since the achievement of outputs contributed to the achievement of outcomes, only the latter is rated in the section on effectiveness.

16. **Increasing Equitable Access.** The key access-related outputs produced by the first two investment cycles included (i) thousands of new schools and classrooms constructed, (ii) thousands of existing schools and classrooms upgraded, (iii) school environments and facilities improved and provided (e.g., furniture, electrical connections, sewerage, and latrines) (Tables A7.1–A7.2). For the **PEDP-II** alone, its key outputs are (i) 20,644 classrooms in 10,322 schools constructed out of 29,847 approved, and 4,340 classrooms being constructed; (ii) the number of GPSs provided with arsenic-free water, tubewells, and separate toilet facilities for girls increased from 50%, 44%, and 36% to 63%, 63%, and 59%, respectively (during 2003–2007); (iii) communication package developed and implemented; (iv) four strategies and action plans

(gender, tribal, vulnerable group, and special needs) approved and being implemented; (v) the number of disabled children enrolled increased from 47,570 to 53,303 (2003–2007); (vi) 10 innovation grants approved and provided to nongovernment organizations (NGOs); (vii) 4.5 million poor students provided with stipends annually (about 34% of PE students enrolled in government primary schools [GPSs] and registered nongovernment primary schools [RNGPSs]⁵ covered by the PEDP-II); and (viii) a total of 13.4 million children provided with opportunities to enroll in the four types of PE schools by 2007, as a result of the DPs' three investment cycles combined (Tables A7.3).

17. **Strengthening Institutional Capacity.** The key capacity-related outputs produced by both the loans and grants of the first two investment cycles included (i) DPE offices at the central, district, and upazila levels constructed, upgraded, and expanded; (ii) the National Academy of Primary Education (NAPE) and the National Curriculum and Textbook Board (NCTB) facilities improved; (iii) DPE staff provided with educational management training at NAPE, the National Academy of Education Management (NAEM), and overseas; (iv) NAEM improved through training and revision of courses; (v) NCTB staff provided with training on curriculum and textbook development, editing, and publishing; (vi) education management information system (EMIS) established; (vii) EMIS computerized and training provided to strengthen DPE's monitoring and evaluation (M&E); (viii) officers of the District Primary Education Offices (DPEOs) and Upazila Primary Education Offices (UPEOs) and members of school management committees (SMCs) provided with training in school management, planning, supervision, and monitoring; and (ix) new job descriptions for DPEO and UPEO staff approved and implemented (Tables A7.1–A7.2).

18. For the **PEDP-II** alone, the key capacity-related outputs produced by both the loan and ADTA are (i) the Financial and Procurement Management Division and some units (e.g., for inclusive education, national assessment, and teacher recruitment) established at DPE; (ii) the governance review committee formed at DPE; (iii) governance-related reports (in the areas of financial management, risk mitigation strategy, procurement, and administrative and devolving responsibilities) prepared and approved; (iv) organizational development plan, and human resources development strategy and action plan prepared and approved; (v) DPE staff provided with project-related management training to implement the SWAp; (vi) NAPE provided with autonomy as an apex body, and its staff trained to deliver better training to teachers; (vii) NCTB staff provided with training related to curriculum and textbook development and production, publishing, and printing; (viii) DPs' harmonization plan implemented; (ix) devolution plan being considered by MOPME for approval; (x) the UPEP and SLIP piloted; (xi) 18,000 head teachers and 60,000 SMC members in 20,000 schools provided with training in school management, planning, supervision, and monitoring; (xii) proposal for the formation of PE cadre submitted to the Ministry of Establishment; (xiii) key performance indicators and primary standard quality level approved; and (xiv) baseline data report for 2005 and annual reports for 2006 and 2007 printed and distributed (Table A7.3).

19. **Improving Quality.** The key quality-related outputs produced by the first two investment cycles included (i) curriculum revised, (ii) millions of new textbooks developed and distributed, (iii) hundreds of thousands of teaching and learning materials provided, (iv) in-service teacher training curriculum revised and disseminated, (v) hundreds of thousands of teachers provided

⁵ Of the 10 types of PE schools in Bangladesh, four are covered in the three investment cycles (GPSs, RNGPSs, experimental schools attached to primary teacher training institutes (PTIs), and community schools). While enrollment in these four types of schools account for 82%, that in the first two account for 79% (see enrollment by school type in Table A5.1, Appendix 5).

with in-service teacher training on the new curriculum, and (vi) 14 primary teacher training institutes (PTIs) upgraded (Tables A7.1–A7.2). For the **PEDP-II** alone, its key outputs are (i) the teacher recruitment and transfer system revised to be more transparent and merit based; (ii) 19,910 new teachers recruited under the development budget and an additional 15,000 recruited under the revenue budget, against the 2009/10 target of 35,000; (iii) PTI's certificate in education training program revised and approved by MOPME; (iv) 65,000 new and existing teachers provided with 1-year certificate in education training, against the target of 90,000; (v) 245,330 teachers provided with sub cluster training annually; (vi) more than 13,000 teachers provided with subject-based training; (vii) more than 2,000 newly recruited teachers provided with management training; (viii) the first-round of national student assessment completed and the second round expected in 2008; (ix) public-private partnership created in printing, production, and distribution of textbooks; (x) more than 40 million textbooks distributed annually free of charge; and (xi) early childhood education framework prepared and approved (Table A7.3).

4. Assessment of Effectiveness (Achievement of Outcomes) in the Three Investment Cycles

20. This section assesses the effectiveness in terms of achievement of subsector outcomes by the DPs' three investment cycles, classified under the components of increasing equitable access, improving quality, and strengthening institutional management capacity of the PE subsector. The SAPE encountered some difficulties in collecting outcome data because (i) not all outcome indicators were clearly identified during the design of the past two investment cycles; (ii) for the PEDP-II, which is the *ex ante* cycle, many outcomes are still evolving and have not yet been achieved; and (iii) the DPE's EMIS is not fully functional, hence dependable data are lacking. However, the SAPE collected data from various primary and secondary sources and verified them with key EMIS staff to make them consistent for comparison. The SAPE then used these data to retrofit the outcome column (column 2) in the results matrixes of the three investment cycles (Tables A7.1–A7.3) so as to trace the historical evolution or progress of various outcomes from the first cycle to present, linked to the DPs' provision of outputs in each of these cycles. The outcome indicators from the three periods shown in the three results matrixes are also presented together in a trend table to show these indicators from the past up to the present (Table A7.4).

21. Since the PEDP-II is still ongoing, it has largely achieved access-related outcomes but has not yet achieved many of the quality- and capacity-related outcomes, since these two components normally take time to achieve. Some of them are still evolving, with positive signs of progress, while some others appear difficult to be achieved by the end of the PEDP-II. Given the *ex ante* nature of the PEDP-II, this SAPE introduces a technique for doing real-time evaluation by dividing the outcome indicators of each of the components into three categories in order to assess the extent of outcomes achievement at different stages: (i) successfully achieved; (ii) evolving or likely to be achieved; and (iii) partly or unlikely to be achieved by the end of the PEDP-II, which has been extended from 2009 to 2010.

22. In this SAPE, the performance of some cross-cutting aspects (e.g., institutional capacity, gender, and governance), is assessed in terms of "outcomes" under the bottom-up effectiveness criterion. The SAPE does not treat them as "impacts" because (i) they are not really impacts, but are intermediated outcomes since they generally contribute to achieving overall subsector/sector outcomes; (ii) if they are called "impacts," confusions may arise since "impacts" refers to long-term, ultimate goals in terms of development results under the top-down assessment, which are normally contributed to by the achievement of bottom-up

subsector/sector outcomes. Specifically, the reasons for treating these cross-cutting aspects as “outcomes,” rather than “impacts” are as follows:

- (i) for “strengthening institutional capacity,” it is one of the three components in the three investment cycles, along with the increasing access and improving quality components;
- (ii) for “improving gender balance,” it is part of the increasing access component; and
- (iii) for “improving governance,” it is part of the improving quality and/or strengthening institutional capacity components.

23. Increasing Equitable Access (Successfully Achieved Outcomes). The improvements in the key access outcomes in the first investment cycle (during 1990–1997) were (i) increased gross enrollment rate (GER) from 67.5% to 90%, and (ii) increased net enrollment rate (NER) from 60.5% to 80.9%. In terms of gender balance, the females-males ratio in GER increased from 0.89 to 0.97. (Table A7.1). In the second investment cycle (1997–2003), these access and gender indicators improved further, with additional indicators: (i) increased GER from 90% to 93%, (ii) increased NER from 80.9% to 87%, (iii) increased physically adequate GPSs from 68% to 76%, (iv) increased females-males ratio in GER from 0.97 to 1.03, and (v) increased female teachers from 28% to 42% (Table A7.2). Similarly, in the third investment cycle (the ongoing **PEDP-II**, 2003–2007), the access and gender indicators further improved as follows: (i) increased GER from 93% to 98.8%, against the 2009/10 target of 100%,⁶ (ii) increased NER from 87% to 91.1%, against the target of 92%; and (iii) gender balance achieved in terms of (a) increased females-males ratio in GER from 1.03 to 1.04, against the target of 1.10; (b) increased female teachers from 42% to 50%; and (c) 60% of newly recruited teachers are females (Table A7.3) (see also the trend of these improvements in Table A7.4).

24. The reasons for the achievement of such outcomes (**success drivers**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.3, are (i) DPs’ collective focus on PE, with selectivity based on their comparative advantage by component and geographical area; (ii) DPs’ coordination and partnerships through appropriate modalities of joint support, which helped create harmonization and synergies; (iii) DPs’ long-term continuity of joint support with adequate financial resources, which helped create a critical mass of beneficiaries; (iv) DPs’ engagement of GOB and EA to be involved in the design stage in a participatory manner; (v) continued DPs’ strong coordination during implementation through consortium meetings, with PLU’s active role in solving various logistic issues;⁷ (vi) DPs’ sufficient supervision through regular reviews, monitoring, and discussions with the EA; (vii) DPs’ strong involvement and utilization of resident missions, particularly ADB’s BRM, which is the lead for the PEDP-II, though more delegation of authority; (viii) selection of generally good consultants and suppliers; (ix) continued GOB’s and EA’s strong ownership and long-term commitment during implementation to meet the enrollment targets under the EFA National Plan of Action, and to achieve gender balance in teacher recruitment under the Perspective Development Plan; (x) technically capable government agency (the Local Government Engineering Department) responsible for school construction and rehabilitation; (xi) heavy civil works investments for expansion and improvement of schools, classrooms, and facilities; (xii) support to alternative PE providers, such as the community and

⁶ The targets are based on the PEDP-II’s revised program framework for 2010.

⁷ An international consultant has been hired full-time to support the PLU.

NGOs; and (xiii) EA's commitment to increasing access (by implementing a stipend program from its own fund outside the PEDP-II SWAp), and to promoting more female enrollment.

25. **Increasing Equitable Access (Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved Outcomes).** Despite the impressive achievement in PE enrollment and gender balance resulting from the DPs' three investment cycles, some access-related outcomes were only partly achieved during the first two cycles (Tables A7.1 and A7.2), as indicated by the existing overcrowded classrooms, and low enrollment and scholarship recipients of some deprived groups. However, column 2 of Table A7.3 shows that the targets of these indicators seem unlikely to be achieved by the end of the **PEDP-II** period, which was extended from 2009 to 2010. These include slow improvements during 2003–2007 as follows: (i) class size reduced only slightly from 70 to 62 students per class, against the target of 48; (ii) single shift in GPSs and RNGPSs increased only slightly from 9.1% to 9.9%, against the target of 28%; (iii) grade-5 pupils receiving scholarships remained low, increasing from 4% to 10%; and (iv) disabled children enrolled in schools remained less than 1% of total enrollment.

26. The reasons for the partial achievement or nonachievement of the outcomes (**deterrence factors**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.3, include (i) weak decentralization, with inadequate DPE staff at the local level (DPEOs and UPEOs) to monitor progress, especially given the physical isolation of some areas where the proportions of ethnic minorities and poverty are high; and (ii) still inadequate classrooms to accommodate the increasing student enrollment despite the substantial investments in civil works.

27. **Strengthening Institutional Capacity (Successfully Achieved Outcomes).** Some institutional capacity development outcomes of key agencies (e.g., DPE, NAPE, and NCTB) not achieved under the first two investment cycles (Tables A7.1 and A7.2) have been achieved under the **PEDP-II** cycle (2003–2007). These include (i) staff positions created under the previous cycle institutionalized (as reflected in the transfer of the 12,000 positions created under the SPESP/PEDP-I to be regularized under the revenue budget); (ii) DPE's capacity institutionalized (as reflected in the integration of the PEDP-II's PMU functions within DPE's regular planning and implementation operations, and in DPE's subsequent ability to adopt the SWAp and be in the driver's seat in managing it); (iii) NCTB's capacity institutionalized (as reflected in its ability to produce and distribute textbooks and teacher guides on a sustainable basis); and (iv) key institutional reform to increase governance or transparency of teacher recruitment and transfer system implemented (Table A7.3).

28. The reasons for the achievement of the outcomes (**success drivers**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.3, are (i) the same first eight success drivers as identified under the successfully achieved access-related outcomes, and (ii) DPs' design of PMU activities mainstreamed into the EA's (DPE's) normal operations.

29. **Strengthening Institutional Capacity (Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved Outcomes).** Most of the capacity-related outcomes that have been partly achieved under the first two cycles (Tables A7.1 and A7.2) and continued to be strengthened under the PEDP-II cycle (2003–2007) but seem unlikely to be fully achieved by the end of the **PEDP-II** are (i) extensive decentralization of MOPME's PE management, as reflected in the delay in the approval of the devolution policy⁸ (although the UPEP and SLIP have been piloted and expanded somewhat, much wider coverage is needed to extensively improve school-based management (SBM), and

⁸ Although the devolution policy is yet to be approved, the SLIP and UPEP exercises have been initiated in 40 selected upazilas in addition to 26 existing upazilas to develop SBM capacity at the upazila and school levels.

in turn improve the teaching and learning environment as well as the performance of both teachers and students), (ii) establishment of PE professional cadre in MOPME's various agencies to improve the career path and quality of MOPME staff (as MOPME is still awaiting the decision from the Ministry of Establishment), (iii) institutionalization of NAPE's capacity to plan and implement an in-service teacher training program (since much of its staff was deputed from administration cadre, rather than professional cadre), and (iv) effective operationalization of the EMIS to support the M&E and planning functions of DPE, as the EMIS remains weak and fragmented (Table A7.3).

30. The reasons for the partial/unlikely achievement of the outcomes (**deterrence factors**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.3, are (i) nonconducive government policy and institutional environments in terms of (a) delayed implementation of decentralization, hence limited authority of DPEOs and UPEOs as well as weak SBM with lack of the clarity in the roles of SMCs and parent-teacher associations (PTAs);⁹ (b) lack of flexibility in adjusting the original GOB project proforma to allow for budget heads for the UPEP and SLIP; (c) lack of PE professional cadre and career path, since MOPME professional staff are appointed from outside by the Ministry of Establishment; and (d) fragmentation of EMIS functions for basic education since the main EMIS for basic education is located at MOE's Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information System (BANBEIS), which focuses more on SE data; (ii) DPs' weak design of EMIS and M&E system (despite generally adequate evaluability through identification of various performance indicators in the results framework), hence weak and fragmented MOPME's EMIS for PE from that of MOE for SE to collect reliable data in time; (iii) DPs' inadequate background analysis at the design stage about overall issues in the entire education sector (including key policy issues in the PE subsector), hence lack of a good strategic direction to address the issues in all subsectors in an integrated manner; (iv) DPs' inadequate background analysis at the design stage about the EA's capacity to implement the complex PEDP-II SWAp, hence the long initial delays in implementation; and (v) DPs' ad hoc provision of ADTA grants, rather than designing them to be strategically integrated with the program early on to address the issue of the EA's inadequate institutional management capacity prior to implementation.

31. **Improving Quality (Successfully Achieved Outcomes).** The key quality-related outcomes achieved from the first two investment cycles were improvements in some aspects of student performance (Tables A7.1 and A7.2), some of which have continued to improve further in the ongoing **PEDP-II** cycle (2003–2007). These include (i) decreased grade-5 repetition rate from 7% to 2%, against the 2009/10 target of below 5%; (ii) increased grade-5 pass rate in scholarship examinations from 47% to 80%; (iii) increased grade-5 national assessment scores in mathematics from 38% to 47%, in science from 43% to 63%, in social science from 53% to 62%, and in Bangla from 53% to 56%; and (iv) increased transition rate to SE from 90% to 95.6%, against the target of 96% (Tables A7.3 and A7.4).

32. **Improving Quality (Evolving/Likely to Be Achieved Outcomes).** The **PEDP-II** has some evolving outcomes (2003–2007) that are likely to be fully/largely achieved, with increased efforts, by the end of the program period. These include (i) increased proportion of newly recruited teachers with qualifications higher than the requirement (certificate in education) to about 50% (with bachelors' degree or more); (ii) decreased student-teacher ratio from 62 to 49

⁹ The role of SMCs has so far been limited to mobilization of communities (including PTAs), rather than decision making. SMCs do not feel accountable because (i) the current financial regulation does not allow allocation of revenue budget directly to schools; and (ii) since teachers are accountable to the UPEOs, especially in GPSs, the monitoring of teachers' performance through SMCs and PTAs is also limited. However, some important initiatives have been taken recently to reconstitute SMCs (i.e., DPE has submitted a proposal to MOPME to make the SMC tasks more specific, to allow for resource mobilization, and to have more female members).

students per teacher, against the 2009/10 target of 45; (iii) decreased grade-5 student absenteeism rate from 22% to 19%, against the target of 18%; and (iv) decreased grades 1–4 repetition rate, against the target of 10%, as grade-5 repetition rate has already decreased well beyond the target of below 5% (Tables A7.3 and A7.4).

33. The reasons for the achievement and likely achievement of the outcomes (**success drivers**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.3, are (i) the same first eight success drivers as identified under the successfully achieved access-related outcomes; (ii) GOB's strong commitment to improving PE quality, particularly in revising the teacher recruitment and transfer system to be more transparent and merit based, reflecting good governance; (iii) improvement in the in-service teacher training program and provision of relevant training to teachers; (iv) development of new curriculum and textbooks; and (v) wide distribution of free textbooks and other learning materials. It is interesting to note that most of the quality improvements have been achieved mostly among grade-5 students. This is probably because (i) GOB and MOPME put greater efforts on improving student performance at grade 5, which is the last grade of PE; and (ii) the students who have been able to survive up to grade 5 normally belong to a self-selected cohort, more disciplined and determined than those who failed or dropped out.

34. **Improving Quality (Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved Outcomes).** Most of the quality-related outcomes that have been partly achieved during the first two cycles (Tables A7.1 and A7.2) and continued into the PEDP-II cycle (2003–2007), but seem unlikely to be fully achieved by the end of the **PEDP-II** are (i) student learning achievement (grade-5 numeracy rate) increased only slightly from 44% to 45%, against the 2009/10 target of 65%; (ii) cohort survival rate of grade 1 to 5 decreased (rather than increased) from 54% to 52%, against the target of 60%; (iii) cycle dropout rate increased (rather than decreased) from 49.4% to 50.5%, against the target of 45%; (iv) grade dropout rate unlikely to decrease by 2% every year, as the cycle dropout rate did not decrease; (v) cycle completion rate decreased (rather than increased) from 50.6% to 49.5%, against the target of 55%; and (vi) average number of years required to complete PE increased (rather than decreased) from 8 to 8.5 years, against the target of 7.5 years (Tables A 7.3 and A7.4).

35. The reasons for the partial/unlikely achievement of the outcomes (**deterrence factors**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.3, are (i) the same five deterrence factors as identified under the partly/unlikely to be achieved capacity-related outcomes; (ii) nonconductive government policy and institutional environments in terms of (a) high teacher absenteeism, which reflects low governance due to weak decentralization, hence weak role of SBM (SMCs and PTAs) to monitor teacher performance; (b) lack of an appropriate preservice teacher training program to produce an adequate number of qualified teachers to accommodate the increasing student enrollment; and (c) weak in-service teacher training program and inadequate teacher trainers to provide recurrent training; (iii) high student dropouts due to poverty, since children are needed to help work on farms and do household chores; and (iv) poor student performance due to poverty, hence lack of time and poor concentration on schooling.

36. **Overall Rating on Effectiveness.** The overall findings above reveal impressive increases in access-related outcomes (including gender balance) achieved under the three investment cycles. Although the institutional capacity in managing the PE subsector and the quality of teachers and students did not improve much in the first two cycles, the indicators of these two components have continued to improve under the ongoing PEDP-II cycle, some of which have successfully achieved the targets, while some are still evolving, and some seem unlikely to achieve the targets by the end of the PEDP-II period. It is understandable that in the early development period, the problem of low equitable access to PE has to be resolved first as

a prerequisite for quality and institutional capacity improvements, both of which take a longer time to achieve compared with increases in access. Since the three investment cycles were designed to address these three key PE issues in a continuous process and have achieved substantial access-related outcomes (with barely sufficient outcomes related to quality and institutional capacity improvements), the SAPE rates (i) each of the first two cycles separately as **effective**; (ii) the ongoing PEDP-II cycle as **evolving with positive signs of progress**, which is roughly equivalent to **effective**; and (iii) the three cycles combined as **effective** (Table A7.7).

5. Assessment of Sustainability in the Three Investment Cycles

37. Sustainability covers both institutional and financial aspects. The adoption of the SWAp in the ongoing PEDP-II cycle and subsequent ADTA (though it should have been provided prior to the start of PEDP-II implementation) helped improve the institutional capacity (e.g., in education management, planning, and project/program implementation and monitoring) of DPE, which is the EA of all three investment cycles. Coupled with the integration of the PMU activities into the EA's normal operations system, the capacity developed is expected to be sustained after PEDP-II completion.

38. On the financial side, the long-term sustainability prospects of education projects depend on government commitment to provide adequate recurrent budget for continuing operations after project completion. Such prospects do not appear good, because the share of the recurrent education budget allocated to PE decreased from 37% to 34% during 2003–2007 (Appendix 8), against the target of 45%. However, the total development education budget share allocated to PE has been sufficiently high (62.5%). Another important factor determining sustainability is the DPs' long-term commitment to continue providing financial support to the PE subsector, which has helped create a critical mass of beneficiaries and ensure the **likely** sustainability of the first two investment cycles. For example, the new positions for teachers and other staff created in the second cycle have already been transferred to be under the recurrent budget by the ongoing PEDP-II cycle, although the actual financing during the project period is shared between the GOB and DPs. This way, the GOB can take over the financing after the project completion, and sustainability will be likely provided the GOB can sufficiently increase the share of recurrent education budget allocated to PE by that time. In case it cannot, the sustainability of the PEDP-II can still be considered as **likely**, because some DPs (e.g., ADB) have already decided in the pipeline to continue providing financial support for the PE subsector. The GOB could also seek external funding under a policy-based or budget support approach to enhance its recurrent budget.

39. **Overall Rating on Sustainability.** Based on the likely sustainable rating for each of the three investment cycles assessed above, the sustainability prospect of the three investment cycles combined is rated as **likely** (Table A7.7).

6. Overall Rating of the DPs' Performance in the Three Investment Cycles Combined in the PE Subsector

40. Given the ratings of the three investment cycles combined on the four criteria as *relevant*, *less efficient*, *effective* (or *evolving with positive signs of progress* for the PEDP-II), and *likely sustainable*, the overall rating of the three cycles combined in PE based on these four criteria is **successful** (Table A7.7). The implications of this rating are given in the main text.

B. Nonformal Education Subsector

1. Assessment of Relevance

41. The project completion report considered the Nonformal Education Project (NFEP) to be highly relevant to the objectives of the GOB's Perspective Development Plan and the EFA National Plan of Action, and to ADB's education strategy for Bangladesh and corporate education strategy at that time, which focused on basic education (part of which is NFE). The SAPE notes that this can still be considered the case. The project and the associated ADTA were designed to meet the real need in reducing illiteracy of the people outside the formal PE system, and to establish and strengthen the Directorate of Nonformal Education (DNFE), which was intended to be a permanent agency for improving NFE. As for the Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Project (PLCEP), it was design to build on the success of the NFEP to further EFA, which is expected to reduce poverty.

42. However, the PLCEP (approved in December 2001) was suspended by ADB due to the absence of DNFE (the EA), since it had been abolished by the GOB in 2003 and replaced with the Bureau of Nonformal Education (BNFE), also under MOPME, in 2005. Although ADB has resumed the PLCEP implementation as of mid-2008, the SAPE rates the combined NFEP and PLCEP as **relevant**, rather than highly relevant, due to the discontinuity of the EA (Table A7.7).

2. Assessment of Efficiency

43. Under the NFEP, there were some weaknesses in implementation efficiency, including (i) delays in the construction of facilities and the recruitment of trained staff, (ii) frequent staff turnovers, and (iii) slippage in the completion of several studies for their results to be used. Despite some weaknesses, the NFEP-created DNFE was able to implement the NFEP generally well, with some outputs and outcomes exceeding the targets and without cost overrun.

44. However, the SAPE rates the combined NFEP and PLCEP as **less efficient**, rather than efficient. This is due to the suspension of the PLCEP after the GOB had abolished DNFE (which was also the EA for the PLCEP), though later replaced by a newly created BNFE as the EA. This caused long implementation delays and discontinuity of progress in the NFE subsector (Table A7.7).

3. Assessment of Achievement of Outputs

45. Since the PLCEP was suspended and has just been resumed, no outputs have been achieved yet. This section assesses the achievement of the NFEP's outputs classified under the components of expanding and improving NFE delivery, and strengthening the institutional capacity of DNFE. The outputs discussed here are key outputs. Detailed outputs are shown in column 3 of the results matrix for NFE in Table A7.5. Since the achievement of outputs contributed to the achievement of outcomes, only the latter is rated in the section on effectiveness.

46. **Expanding Access and Improving Quality.** The key access-related output was a critical mass of 2.9 million beneficiaries provided with NFE literacy and numeracy training, against the target of 2.5 million. The key quality-related outputs were (i) 385 NGOs contracted to assist in NFE delivery; (ii) 5,749 supervisors, 82,185 teachers, and 147 field workers from the participating NGOs trained in NFE delivery; (iii) core competencies for learners' learning outcomes identified and validated; (iv) NFE curriculum and standard achievement test

developed; (v) teacher guides and teaching aids developed; (vi) postliteracy and continuing education programs piloted; (vii) alternative NFE models developed and piloted; and (viii) studies prepared to evaluate learners' achievement, teaching methods, socioeconomic impacts of the NFE program, and various alternative teaching methods (Table A7.5).

47. **Strengthening Institutional Capacity.** The key capacity-related outputs were (i) DNFE established as an agency responsible for NFE; (ii) DNFE staff provided with training on NFE approaches; (iii) DNFE senior staff provided with training on planning, management, delivery, and monitoring of NFE programs; (iv) NFE strategic framework chart prepared, and (v) DNFE's EMIS and M&E system established (Table A7.5).

4. Assessment of Effectiveness (Achievement of Outcomes)

48. This section assesses the NFEP's achievement of subsector outcomes under the same components as those of the outputs, with details in column 2 of the results matrix (Tables A7.5).

49. **Expanding Access and Improving Quality (Successfully Achieved Outcomes).** The key access-related outcomes were (i) a critical mass of 74% of the newly literate beneficiaries retaining reasonably good reading and writing skills; and (ii) 50% of the beneficiaries knowing simple arithmetics. The gender-related outcome was achieved, as 57% of the beneficiaries were females, against the target of 50%. The key quality-related outcomes were (i) public-private partnership model through the contracting of NGOs widely operationalized, and (ii) basic literacy, postliteracy, and continuing education programs extensively replicated (Table A7.5).

50. The reasons for the achievement of the outcomes (**success drivers**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.5, include (i) conducive government policy or institutional environments, especially through its commitment to the EFA National Plan of Action; (ii) ADB's engagement of GOB and EA to be involved in the design stage in a participatory manner; (iii) priority placed on the establishment of DNFE, based on the Integrated Nonformal Education Program which was a government temporary agency with several years of exposure for promoting NFE; and (iv) NGOs' involvement in the design, testing, and implementation of the NFE programs, and commitment to integrating them into their regular programs.

51. **Strengthening Institutional Capacity (Non-Achieved Outcomes).** The expected capacity-related outcomes not achieved were (i) DNFE not institutionalized under the revenue budget during the NFEP period, but under the development budget; and (ii) the NFE strategic framework chart not developed into an NFE policy framework for approval during the NFEP period. During the early PLCEP period, DNFE was abolished by the GOB (due to the alleged nontransparency in the selection of NGOs in other government projects), though later replaced by a newly created BNFE (also under MOPME) on a permanent basis as the new EA (Table A7.5).

52. The reasons for the non-achievement of the outcomes (**deterrence factors**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.5, were (i) GOB's and EA's inadequate commitment during implementation; (ii) ADB's ad hoc provision of ADTA, rather than being strategically provided at an early stage; (iii) ADB's inadequate background analysis at the design stage about overall issues in the entire education sector, although sufficient analysis had been undertaken at the subsector level, hence lack of a good strategic policy framework to address NFE subsector issues linked to formal PE subsector issues; and (iv) ADB's lack of strong coordination with other DPs in the NFE subsector to pursue necessary policy dialogue with the GOB and EA in

the governance issue related to the alleged nontransparency in the selection of NGOs and abolition of DNFE.

53. **Overall Rating on Effectiveness.** While the access- and quality-related outcomes have been substantially achieved, the expected capacity-related outcomes have not been achieved during the NFEP period. Coupled with the suspension of the PLCEP, the SAPE rates the combined NFEP and PLCEP as **less effective**, rather than effective (Table A7.7).

5. Assessment of Sustainability

54. The access-related outcome achieved under the NFEP (74% of the 2.9 million beneficiaries have been able to retain their literacy skills) is likely to be sustainable. However, since DNFE (which was also the EA for the PLCEP) was abolished during the early PLCEP period due to the alleged governance issue, subsector progress was discontinued until recently.

55. Since the GOB has tried to solve the above problems by (i) replacing the defunct DNFE with the newly created BNFE (as the new EA for the PLCEP) on a permanent basis funded by the revenue budget; (ii) formulating and approving the pending NFE policy framework, while ADB has started resuming the PLCEP; and (iii) putting initial efforts to develop institutional capacity of the new EA through an ADTA, the SAPE rates the long-term sustainability prospects of the NFEP and PLCEP combined as **likely** (Table A7.7).

6. Overall Rating of ADB's Performance in the NFE Subsector

56. Given the ratings on the four criteria as *relevant*, *less efficient*, *less effective*, and *likely sustainable*, the overall rating of ADB's performance in NFE based on these four criteria is **partly successful** (Table A7.7). The implications of this rating are given in the main text.

C. Secondary Education Subsector

2. Assessment of Relevance

57. ADB's four SE projects were highly consistent with (i) GOB's strategies and plans related to education, (ii) ADB's education strategies in its four country operational strategy periods, and (iii) ADB's corporate education strategy, all of which focused on basic education (including PE, junior SE, and NFE). Of particular importance is that the Secondary Education Development Project (SEDP) assisted the GOB in drafting the Secondary Education Sector Development Plan (SE-SDP, 2000–2010) in 1998. The SE-SDP addressed the consequences of the rising demand for SE following the rapid increase in PE enrollment; provided a strategic vision; and stated that change could occur with continuity of policy, commitment, and political will among decision makers. The strategic objectives of the SE-SDP were to extend basic education to 8 years, and to restructure and improve SE. ADB's subsequent SE projects (the Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project [SESIP], the Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project [TQISEP], and the Secondary Education Sector Development Project and Program [SESDP]) were all designed and implemented within the context of the SE-SDP, which was updated in 2006 and extended to 2013.

58. In terms of project design, while all ADB's SE projects were designed within the context of the SE-SDP, certain weaknesses were noted in some projects: (i) little effort was made to coordinate with other DPs, except for the TQISEP, which was cofinanced by the Canadian International Development Agency; (ii) the SE-SDP does not seem to have been well integrated

into the overall education system (e.g., while it aims to extend basic education from grade 5 of PE to grade 8 of junior SE, there have not been any concrete actions among government agencies within the SE system to coordinate this goal with their counterparts in the PE system to ensure a continuity of curriculum); and (iii) the design of the TQISEP and SESDP appears to be complex, with a large number of subcomponents.

59. **Overall Rating on Relevance.** Despite the design drawbacks encountered by some SE projects, the first one helped the GOB draft the SE-SDP, which is still in operation and has provided the basis on which the subsequent projects were built, while the fourth (ongoing) one (the SESDP) was designed to have an appropriate modality—a combination of project and policy-based loans—to address key policy and institutional reforms needed. As such, the SAPE rates ADB's four SE projects combined as **relevant**, but at the lower end of the range (Table A7.7).

2. Assessment of Efficiency

60. Implementation of ADB's projects in the SE subsector had long delays, especially in (i) consultant recruitment and deployment;¹⁰ (ii) procurement; (iii) establishment of institutions, especially those that require introduction or revision of Acts (e.g., establishment of an apex body for secondary school teacher education); (iv) operationalization of newly established institutions; (v) establishment of information systems (EMIS, teacher registration information system, secondary teacher information system); (vi) transfer of staff from the completed projects to new projects or under the revenue budget; (vii) filling of vacant posts, and recruitment and retention of qualified staff for key positions; and (viii) compliance with covenants that required policy changes, such as approval and implementation of the decentralization policy and plan. For example, 9 of the 68 SESIP covenants that were complied with with delays were related to the establishment of new institutions, amendments and approval of policies, and recruitment of new staff. The reasons for these delays (**deterrence factors**) were (i) ADB's complex project design and ambitious targets, which made some covenants difficult to implement and monitor; (ii) ADB's ad hoc provision of ADTA, rather than making it an integral part of project design to help address key policy and institutional constraints early on (e.g., only one of the four SE projects had associated ADTA); and (iii) nonconducive government policy and institutional environment (e.g., lack of flexibility in many regulations, including difficulties in transferring newly created positions from the development budget to the revenue budget, the lengthy bureaucratic decision-making process, a culture of highly centralized education management, lack of understanding in some quarters of the need for reforms, and high turnover of trained staff). However, the use of the program- or policy-based modality in the SESDP seems to be more efficient to implement, compared with the big multi-DP SWAp package adopted in the PEDP-II. This modality is expected to necessitate policy changes required for subsector improvements.

61. Due to the long implementation delays, the SAPE rates ADB's four SE projects combined as **less efficient** (Table A7.7).

3. Assessment of Achievement of Outputs

62. This section assesses the outputs achieved under the two completed SE projects and some achieved so far under the two ongoing projects. The outputs discussed here are key outputs classified under three components (viz., increasing equitable access, strengthening

¹⁰ There were long delays in engaging consultants in the SEDP (by about 2 years) and the TQISEP.

institutional capacity, and improving quality). Detailed outputs are shown in column 3 of the results matrix for SE in Table A7.6. Since the achievement of outputs contributed to the achievement of outcomes, only the latter is rated in the section on effectiveness.

63. Increasing Equitable Access. Except for the TQISEP, which focuses on quality, the key access-related outputs produced under ADB's other three SE projects combined were (i) new buildings with facilities constructed in 1,824 schools to provide more access to 273,600 students; (ii) 1.45 million female students (grades 6–10) provided with stipends; (iii) 59 new schools established, with additional classrooms constructed in 111 overcrowded schools; and (iv) 164,852 poor students provided with stipends (Table A7.6).

64. Strengthening Institutional Capacity. The key capacity-related outputs of ADB's four SE projects combined were (i) the SE-SDP drafted; (ii) DSHE senior staff trained in education management; (iii) 10,000 school principals trained in school management and supervision; (iv) policy studies to strengthen institutional capacity of DSHE undertaken; (v) the Policy Support and Planning Unit and EMIS established within DSHE; (vi) policy paper for decentralization functional job specifications approved; (vii) Human Resources Management Unit established at DSHE to support decentralization; (viii) decision to pilot the decentralized management system in three zones approved; and (ix) extension of school-based performance management system and EMIS to all schools notified (Table A7.6).

65. Improving Quality. The key quality-related outputs of ADB's four SE projects combined basically included (i) student curriculum and textbooks for grades 6–10 revised and distributed; (ii) preservice teacher training curriculum (at teacher training colleges [TTCs]) and teaching materials revised and distributed; (iii) many teachers and head teachers trained in the new student curriculum; (iv) many teachers trained at the bachelor of education (B.Ed.) and master of education (M.Ed.) levels; and (v) many TTCs upgraded. Specifically, under the ongoing TQISEP and SESDP, the key quality-related outputs produced so far include (i) gender-integrated materials developed in accordance with the gender action plan; (ii) modern skills-based curriculum for grades 9–10 developed under the SESIP to be discussed for consensus and direction for revising the curriculum of the remaining SE grades under the SESDP; (iii) detailed proposal for secondary school certificate examination reform developed and approved after pilot test, with a schedule of introducing it in 2010; (iv) 140,000 teachers and head teachers trained in SSC examination reform and in implementing the school-based assessment (SBA) system; and (v) local Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education (DSHE) staff trained to monitor the SBA system (Table A7.6).

4. Assessment of Effectiveness (Achievement of Outcomes)

66. This section assesses the achievement of subsector outcomes under the same components as those of the outputs, with details in column 2 of the results matrix (Tables A7.6).

67. Increasing Equitable Access (Successfully Achieved Outcomes). The outputs of ADB's four SE projects combined have contributed to achieving the following subsector outcomes (though these outcomes did not result solely from ADB's contributions): (i) increased GER from 23% to 35% (during 1990–1997), to 41.2% (2003), and to 50% (2007), against the 2009/10 target of 55%; and (ii) increased NER from 19.1% to 28.7% (1990–1997), to 37.6% (2003), and to 39% (2007), against the 2009/10 target of 45%. Gender balance was also achieved in terms of (i) increased female-male ratio in GER from 0.54 to 1.1 (1990–1997), which remained at 1.1 (2007); (ii) female students provided with stipends exceeding the target by 57% (under the SEDP); (iii) 39% and 53% of teachers achieving with B.Ed. and M.Ed., respectively,

being females (under the SEDP); and (iv) 75% of poor students receiving stipends being females (under the SESDP) (Tables A7.6 and A7.4).

68. The reasons for the achievement of the outcomes (**success drivers**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.6, included (i) ADB's long-term continuity of support to the subsector, with adequate financial resources to create a critical mass of beneficiaries; (ii) ADB's adequate diagnosis of the problems facing the subsector, with early support to the GOB's formulation of the SE-SDP and subsequent assistance through individual projects within the SE-SDP framework; (iii) ADB's appropriate mix of modalities, especially recently through a program loan mixed with a project loan (the SESDP) to encourage the GOB to undertake difficult reforms; (iv) ADB's adequate supervision and monitoring through delegation of implementation of the SE projects to BRM; (v) ADB's engagement of GOB and EA to be involved during the design stage in a participatory manner; (vi) generally good consultants and suppliers; and (vii) conducive policy and institutional environments, as reflected in the GOB's and EA's commitment to implementing the SE-SDP, which was updated and extended to 2013.

69. **Strengthening Institutional Capacity (Achieved Outcomes).** The key capacity-related outcomes of ADB's four SE projects combined included (i) the SE-SDP operationalized; and (ii) NCTB's activities partly privatized (e.g., publishing of textbooks on 19 subjects out of 33) (Table A7.6). The reasons for the achievement of the outcomes (**success drivers**) are basically the same as those for the access-related outcomes.

70. **Strengthening Institutional Capacity (Not Yet Achieved Outcomes).** The expected capacity-related outcomes of ADB's four SE projects combined that have not yet been achieved include (i) DSHE's institutional capacity not improved much, since many of the recommendations resulting from the policy studies carried out during the SEDP to strengthen the institutional capacity of DSHE were not implemented;¹¹ (ii) many reforms carried out in subsequent projects for institutional development and quality improvement not yet institutionalized or widely implemented (e.g., curriculum and examination reforms, and decentralized implementation of SBM, EMIS, and SBA) (Table A7.6). These are expected to be achieved under the ongoing SESDP.

71. The reasons that deterred the achievement of the outcomes (**deterrence factors**), as shown in the last column of Table A7.6, were (i) ADB's complex project design, which made them difficult to implement and monitor; (ii) ADB's ad hoc provision of ADTA, rather than making it an integral part of project design to help address key policy and institutional constraints early on (e.g., only one of the four SE projects had associated ADTA); (iii) ADB's inadequate background analysis at the design stage about overall issues in the entire education sector (though sufficient analysis had been undertaken at the SE subsector level), hence lack of a good strategic direction linked to the PE subsector for smooth transition from PE to SE and for well-integrated MOE and MOPME EMIS functions; (iv) lack of strong coordination among DPs in the SE subsector to pursue necessary policy dialogue with the GOB and EA; and (v) nonconductive government policy and institutional environments (e.g., lack of flexibility in project proforma and other regulations, including difficulties in transferring newly created positions from the development budget to the revenue budget, the lengthy bureaucratic decision-making process, the culture of highly centralized education management, lack of understanding in some quarters of the need for reforms, and high turnover of trained staff).

¹¹ This is the main reason why the ADTA associated with the SEDP was rated by the TCR as only *partly successful*.

72. **Improving Quality (Achieved Outcomes).** The outputs of ADB's four SE projects combined have contributed to achieving the following subsector outcomes (though these outcomes did not result solely from ADB's contributions): (i) student-teacher ratio decreased from 39 to 31 students per teacher (during 1997–2007); (ii) attendance rate increased from 60% to 65% (1997–2007); (iii) grades 6–9 repetition rate remained low at 5% (2007) (Tables A7.6 and A7.4). The reasons for the achievement of the outcomes (**success drivers**) are basically the same as those for the access-related outcomes.

73. **Improving Quality (Partly Achieved Outcomes).** The outputs of ADB's four SE projects combined have partly contributed to achieving the following subsector outcomes (though they need further improvements and did not result solely from ADB's contributions): (i) grade 10 repetition rate decreased only slightly from 16.9% to 16.7% (during 1997–2003), (ii) cycle dropout rate decreased only slightly from 44% to 42% (1997–2007), and (iii) SSC pass rate increased only slightly from 51.5% to 55% (1997–2007) (Tables A7.6 and A7.4). The reasons for the only partial achievement of the outcomes (**deterrence factors**) are basically the same as those for the capacity-related outcomes. These outcomes are expected to progress further under the ongoing TQISEP and SESDP, particularly if the key deterrence factors (in terms of nonconducive policy and institutional constraints) can be addressed under the policy component of the SESDP. At present, it is too early to assess the SESDP's policy progress.

74. **Overall Rating on Effectiveness.** In view of the key outcomes achieved so far, with good prospects to achieve further outcomes, especially under the SESDP, the SAPE rates the performance of ADB's four SE projects combined as **effective/evolving** (Table 7.7).

5. Assessment of Sustainability

75. Sustainability covers both institutional and financial aspects. Factors that could affect institutional sustainability include (i) high turnover of trained staff, and (ii) lack of understanding in some quarters of the need for reforms. Although the institutional aspect of sustainability has not been achieved much so far, it is being addressed in the ongoing policy-based loan (the SESDP) and expected to be improved.

76. On the financial side, long-term sustainability prospects of education projects depend on government commitment to provide adequate recurrent budget for continuing operations after project completion. Such prospects appear positive for the SE subsector, since the share of the recurrent education budget allocated to SE has been relatively high, increasing from 48% to 54% during 2003–2007 (Appendix 8). Moreover, the majority of secondary schools (excluding madrasahs) in Bangladesh (about 96%) are operated by nongovernment entities (Table A5.1, Appendix 5). The GOB does not have to provide full financial support to them, but only subventions for teacher salaries. Nonetheless, there has been limited success in transferring the newly created institutions and staff under the SEDP to the revenue budget. The follow-up SESIP has financed much of this, but the same situation happened after the end of the SESIP, so it had to be extended by 1 year. ADB's long-term continuity in the SE subsector, through the ongoing TQISEP and SESDP, is expected to help achieve further outcomes and sustain them. ADB has also decided to continue providing another program loan in SE (SESDP-II) in the pipeline.

77. Due to the reasons above, the SAPE rates the sustainability prospects of ADB's four SE projects combined as **likely** (Table A7.7).

6. Overall Rating of ADB's Performance in the SE Subsector

78. Given the ratings on the four criteria as *relevant*, *less efficient*, *effective/evolving*, and *likely sustainable*, the overall rating of ADB's performance in SE based on these four criteria is **successful** (Table A7.7). The implications of this rating are given in the main text.

F. Summary of Bottom-Up Assessment and Ratings

79. Although ADB's bottom-up performance in the NFE subsector is rated as *partly successful*, its *successful* performance in the SE subsector and the DPs' combined *successful* performance in the PE subsector have contributed to ADB's overall **successful** bottom-up performance in Bangladesh's education sector. The successful rating scale of 1.7 (Table A7.7) is on the low side, implying scope for improvement, particularly in terms of improving quality and institutional capacity of the education system and reducing transaction costs of the SWAp implementation. The implications of this rating are given in the main text.

Table A7.1: Results Matrix of Combined Development Partners' Assistance in Bangladesh's Primary Education Subsector (First Investment Cycle—PESP/GEP)

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
<p>Partly Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased adult literacy rate from 35% to 47% (during 1990–1997) increased female literacy rate from 22% to 38% (1990–1997) reduced poverty incidence from 57% to 50% (1990–1997) 	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased GER from 67.5% to 90.0% (during 1990–1997) increased NER from 60.5% to 80.9% (1990–1997) gender balance achieved in terms of increased female-male ratio in GER from 0.89 to 0.97 (1990–1997) 	<p>Loan 1026: PESP (ADB)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 9,958 classrooms constructed/renovated in 3,181 schools (against the target of 2,781 schools) to provide access to 844,450 students <p>GEP^a (IDA-World Bank)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 16,722 conventional classrooms and 5,530 low cost/community classrooms constructed/renovated to provide access to 855,700 students 197 community-run satellite schools established 3,136 NFE centers established through provision of grants to 17 NGOs 192,000 girls provided with stipends 689 schools provided with grants to make schools attractive 	<p>ADB ADTA (for Loan 1026)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA 1359: Strengthening of the Directorate of Primary Education (August 1990) <p>ADB Loan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loan 1026: Primary Education Sector Project (PESP) (August 1990) <p>IDA-World Bank</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> General Education Project (GEP) (March 1990) 	<p>ADB, DGIS, IDA, the Netherlands, NORAD, SIDA, UK (DFID), UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF</p> <p>Outside the Umbrella Projects: EC, IDB, Italy, OPEC</p>	<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DPs' collective focus on PE, with selectivity based on their comparative advantage by component and geographical area DPs' coordination and partnerships through appropriate modalities of joint support, which helped create harmonization and synergies DPs' engagement of GOB and EA to be involved in the design stage in a participatory manner DPs' sufficient supervision through regular joint reviews, monitoring, and discussions with the EA selection of generally good consultants and suppliers continued GOB's and EA's strong ownership and long-term commitment during implementation to meet the enrollment targets under the EFA National Plan of Action technically capable government agency (LGED) responsible for school construction and rehabilitation heavy civil works investments for expansion and improvement of schools, classrooms, and facilities involvement of NGOs, communities, and religious organizations in the provision of PE implementation of a stipend program for students enrolled in GPSs and RINGPSS promotion of more female enrollment

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
	<p>Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> class size reduced only slightly from 75 to 72 students per class (during 1990–1997) access to PE of ethnic minority group in Chittagong remained low (literacy rate was 22.3% for females and 38.4% for males, and NER of ethnic minority group was around 57% in 1998) 				<p>Deterrence Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> inadequate DPE staff at the local level (DPEOs and UPEOs) to monitor progress, especially given the physical isolation of some areas where the proportions of ethnic minorities and poverty are high still inadequate classrooms to accommodate the increasing student enrollment despite the substantial investments in civil works lack of coordination with projects and programs in other subsectors that had complementary objectives (e.g., food for education, early childhood development, literacy, and social mobilization) nonparticipation of poorer segments of society in underserved and hard-to-reach areas conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts area until 1998
	<p>Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> institutionalizing DPE's capacity to plan, manage, monitor, and evaluate the primary education system institutionalizing DPE's EMIS to support its M&E and planning functions institutionalizing NCTB's capacity of for cost-effective textbook production and timely distribution institutionalizing local level capacity to plan, manage, monitor, and evaluate the primary education system and allocate resources efficiently 	<p>Loan 1026: PESP (ADB)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11 additional DPE offices constructed, 2 repaired, and 3 upazila education offices constructed 745 education officers at various levels received management training from NAPE, and a further 28 education officers attended management programs at the Bangladesh Management and Development Center (with grant financing from UNDP and UNICEF) 	<p>GEP (IDA-World Bank)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Directorate of Training established at DPE NCTB staff provided with training on textbook development (40 persons), curriculum development (21 persons), 		<p>Deterrence Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> nonconductive government policy and institutional environments in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> delayed implementation of decentralization, hence limited authority of DPEOs and UPEOs as well as weak SBM lack of clarity of roles of SMCs and PTAs lack of PE professional cadre and career path, since MOPME professional staff is appointed from outside by the Ministry of Establishment fragmentation of EMIS functions for basic education, since the main EMIS for basic education is located at MOE's

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
		<p>and population education (14 persons)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 378 education supervisors provided with training at NAPE, and 166 primary education administrators provided with training at NAEM facilities at PTIs and NAPE improved policy studies on primary school textbook reuse and post-primary education completed NAEM improved through training and revision of courses EMIS established 			<p>BANBEIS, which focuses more on SE data</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DPs' inadequate background analysis at the design stage about overall issues in the entire education sector (including key policy issues in the PE subsector), hence lack of a good strategic direction to address the issues in all subsectors in an integrated manner DPs' ad hoc provision of ADTA grants, rather than designing them to be strategically integrated with the projects early on to address the issue of the EA's inadequate institutional management capacity prior to implementation
	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> decreased student:teacher ratio from 70:1 to 66:1 (during 1990–1997) increased cohort survival rate of grade 1 to grade 5 from 49% to 60.6% (1990–1997) decreased cycle dropout rate from 60% to 51% (1990–1997) increased cycle completion rate from 40% to 49% (1990–1997) increased transition rate to SE from 57.5% to 83.0% (1990–1997) <p>Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> grade-5 absenteeism rate reduced only slightly from 42% to 40% (during 1990–1997) grade-5 repetition rate remained high and unchanged at 8% (1990–1997) student learning achievement in terms of subject mastery increased only slightly, as about 50% of grade-4 students 	<p>Loan 1026: PESP (ADB)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 27.7 million sets of textbooks printed and distributed against the target of 16.4 million sets 164,000 person-days of training on the new primary education curriculum provided to teachers and primary education officers at various levels (with grant financing from UNDP and UNICEF) 240,000 primary school teachers trained in population, family life, and environmental education against the target of 220,000 (with grant financing from UNFPA) 14 PTIs upgraded <p>GEP (IDA-World Bank)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> new primary curriculum for grades 1–5 introduced and 53.3 million textbooks based in new curriculum distributed 211,000 teachers provided with in-service training in the new curriculum teacher education curriculum revised and disseminated 			<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> same as the first five success drivers for the successfully achieved outcomes under the access component larger numbers and better quality of teachers, including more female teachers better school facilities better availability of textbooks and teaching materials <p>Deterrence Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> nonconductive government policy and institutional environments in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> high teacher absenteeism (which reflects low governance) due to weak decentralization, hence weak role of SBM (SMCs and PTAs) to monitor teacher performance lack of appropriate preservice teacher training program to

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
	<p>were considered to have achieved basic literacy and numeracy competence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • average number of years required to complete PE reduced only slightly from 9.3 to 8.3 years (1990–1997) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 481 head teachers (one in each upazila) provided with school cluster based in-service training 			<p>produce adequate number of qualified teachers to accommodate the increasing enrollment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - weak in-service teacher training program and inadequate teacher trainers to provide recurrent training • high student dropouts due to poverty since children are needed to help work on farms and do household chores • poor student performance due to poverty, hence lack of time and concentration on schooling • difficulty of addressing quality issues while rapidly expanding access

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADTA = advisory technical assistance, BANBEIS = Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information System, DFID = Department for International Development, DGIS = Directorate General for Development Cooperation of Belgium, DP = development partner, DPE = Directorate of Primary Education, DPEO = district primary education office, EA = executing agency, EC = European Commission, EFA = Education for All, EMIS = education management information system, GEP = General Education Project, GER = gross enrollment rate, GOB = Government of Bangladesh, GPS = government primary school, IDA = International Development Association, IDB = Islamic Development Bank, LGED = Local Government Engineering Department, M&E = monitoring and evaluation, MDG = Millennium Development Goal, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, NAEM = National Academy of Education Management, NAPE = National Academy of Primary Education, NCTB = National Curriculum and Textbook Board, NER = net enrollment rate, NFE = nonformal education, NGO = nongovernment organization, NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, PE = primary education, PESP = Primary Education Sector Project, PMED = Primary and Mass Education Department, PTA = parent-teacher association, PTI = primary teacher training institute, RNGPS = registered nongovernment primary school, SBM = school-based management, SE = secondary education, SIDA= Swedish International Development Agency, SMC = school management committee, TA = technical assistance, UK = United Kingdom, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme, UNFPA = United Nations Population Fund, UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund, UPEO = upazila primary education office.

^aGEP also supported activities under MOE. These outputs are not presented here.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

Table A7.2: Results Matrix of Combined Development Partners' Assistance in Bangladesh's Primary Education Subsector (Second Investment Cycle—SPESP/PEDP-I)

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
<p>Partly Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased adult literacy rate from 47% to 50% (during 1997–2003) increased female literacy rate from 38% to 44% (1997–2003) reduced poverty incidence from 50% to 49.8% (1997–2003) 	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased GER from 90% to 93% (during 1997–2003) increased NER from 80.9% to 87.0% (1997–2003) increased proportion of physically adequate GPSs from 68% to 76% (1996–2001) gender balance achieved in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased female-male ratio in GER from 0.97 to 1.03 (1997–2003) increased female teachers from 28% to 42% (1996–2003) 	<p>Loan 1521: SPESP (ADB)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 329 new community primary schools and additional classrooms in 3,561 GPSs constructed 1,338 GPSs and 726 community schools repaired (including 904 schools damaged by floods in 1998) 1,521 schools reconstructed (1,266 with provisions of latrines and tubewells, and 255 with water supply, sewerage, and electricity connections) blackboards in 6,868 schools and electric connections in 361 schools installed 157,504 pairs of benches for students procured stationery provided to 220,560 poor students 11,693 chairs and tables for teachers, 31,118 steel almirahs, 140 packages of office furniture procured <p>PEDP-I (IDA-World Bank)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 160 community schools and 6,000 additional classrooms constructed 2,000 GPSs repaired (including 303 damaged by floods in 1998) and 1,560 GPSs reconstructed 10,070 toilets, 4,840 tubewells, and 23,240 blackboards installed furniture for 2,964 additional classrooms and 2,336 one-shift GPSs procured school supplies (school bags, instruments, and exercise books) provided to 1.5 million poorest children 	<p>ADB ADTA (for Loan 1521)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA 2921: Primary School Performance (Nov 1997) <p>ADB Loan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loan 1521: Second Primary Education Sector Project (SPESP) (May 1997) <p>IDA-World Bank</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Primary Education Development Project (PEDP-I) (April 1998) <p>DFID</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effective Schools through Enhanced Education Management (ESTEEM) <p>Germany</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Primary School and Cyclone Shelter Construction Project Comprehensive Primary Education 	<p>ADB, DFID, Germany (GTZ, KfW), IDA, IDB, NORAD, UNICEF</p> <p>Outside the Umbrella Projects: AusAID, CIDA, EC, the Netherlands, SIDA, UNDP, UNFPA, WFP</p>	<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DPs' collective focus on PE, with selectivity based on their comparative advantage by component and geographical area DPs' coordination and partnerships through appropriate modalities of joint support which helped create harmonization and synergies DP's engagement of GOB and EA to be involved in the design stage in a participatory manner DPs' sufficient supervision through regular joint reviews, monitoring, and discussions with the EA selection of generally good consultants and suppliers continued GOB's and EA's strong ownership and long-term commitment during implementation to meet the enrollment targets under the EFA National Plan of Action technically capable government agency (LGED) responsible for school construction and rehabilitation heavy civil works investments for expansion and improvement of schools, classrooms, and facilities support to alternative PE providers, such as the community and NGOs implementation of a stipend program for students enrolled in GPSs and RINGPSs promotion of more female enrollment

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
	<p>Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> class size reduced only slightly from 72 to 70 students per class (during 1997–2003) access to PE of children from the poorest households remained low grade-5 students receiving scholarships remained low, increasing from 3% to 4% (1997–2003) 		<p>Project</p> <p>IDB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cyclone Shelter Project <p>NORAD</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Primary Education Development Project for Quality Improvement (PEDPQI) <p>UNFPA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food for Education <p>UNICEF</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intensive District Approach to Education for All (IDEAL) 		<p>Deterrence Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> inadequate DPE staff at the local level (DPEOs and UPEOs) to monitor progress, especially given the physical isolation of some areas where the proportions of ethnic minorities and poverty were high still inadequate classrooms to accommodate the increasing student enrollment despite the substantial investments in civil works lack of coordination with projects and programs in other subsectors that had complementary objectives (e.g., food for education, early childhood development, literacy, and social mobilization) nonparticipation of poorer segments of society in underserved and hard-to-reach areas
	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> policy actions to (i) increase opportunities for serving teachers to participate in the certificate in education program, (ii) provide subventions to RNGPSs for teacher salaries and supplementary needs, and (iii) provide additional facilities on a need-based criteria <p>Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> institutionalizing DPE's capacity to plan, manage, monitor, and evaluate the PE system institutionalizing NCTB institutionalizing NAPE and 	<p>Loan 1521: SPESP (ADB)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> additional floors at DPE headquarters, and offices of deputy directors in Barisal, Chittagong, and Sylhet constructed in-country and hands-on training, overseas fellowships, and training workshops and seminars provided to DPE staff to improve its capacity in educational management, including academic supervision domestic and international training to improve editing and publishing capacity and textbook procurement capacity provided to NCTB staff computerized financial management and costing system introduced at NCTB, and coordination system for DPE and NCTB established 			<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> same as the first five success drivers for the successfully achieved outcomes under the access component readiness at the GOB high level to incorporate lessons learned from past projects <p>Deterrence Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> nonconductive government policy and institutional environments in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> delayed implementation of decentralization, hence limited authority of DPEOs

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
	<p>PTIs (as reflected in the mismatch between training program content and responsibilities and functions of the training participants)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> operationalizing EMIS to support the M&E and planning functions of DPE institutionalizing local level capacity to plan, manage, monitor, and evaluate the PE system and allocate resources efficiently 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 13 textbook warehouses constructed and 8 others repaired computerized EMIS introduced, and training provided to strengthen DPE's M&E training provided to DPE's relevant staff, teachers, and SMC members on school management, planning, supervision, and monitoring <p>PEDP-I (IDA-World Bank)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> in-service training provided to staff from MOPME, DPE, and district/upazila offices on basic strategies in teacher supervision and support services, computer, procurement, and general management 15 study visit programs in 11 countries provided to 44 senior officers from DPE and MOPME training in decentralized planning, management, and monitoring tools provided in selected upazilas in 15 districts (from UNICEF-IDEAL) 41 district-level social mobilization workshops involving head teachers, SMC and PTA chairpersons and members conducted <p>ESTEEM (DFID)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy and Operation Division and documentation center in DPE established new job descriptions for district/upazila/assistant upazila PE officers approved and implemented local and foreign study visit programs provided to staff at central and field levels on management, academic supervision, teacher training, policy/research, EMIS, planning, finance and accounts, and M&E district education offices equipped with computers and relevant staff trained 			<p>and UPEOs as well as weak SBM with lack of clarity of roles of SMCs and PTAs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> lack of PE professional cadre and career path, since MOPME professional staff is appointed from outside by the Ministry of Establishment fragmentation of EMIS functions for basic education, since the main EMIS for basic education is located at MOE's BANBEIS, which focuses more on SE data DPs' inadequate background analysis at the design stage about overall issues in the entire education sector (including key policy issues in the PE subsector), hence lack of a good strategic direction to address the issues in all subsectors in an integrated manner DPs' inadequate background analysis at the design stage about the EA's capacity to implement a SWAP, hence the shift back to a discrete project-based type of assistance, which resulted in long initial delays in implementation DPs' ad hoc provision of ADTA grants, rather than designing them to be strategically integrated with the projects early on to address the issue of the EA's inadequate institutional management capacity prior to implementation

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
for decentralized EMIS					
	<p><u>Achieved</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • decreased student:teacher ratio from 66:1 to 62:1 (during 1997–2003) • reduced grade-5 absenteeism rate from 40% to 22% (1997–2003) • increased grade-5 pass rate in scholarship exam from 31% to 47% (2001–2003) • increased transition rate to SE from 83.0% to 90.0% (1997–2003) <p><u>Partly/Unlikely to be Achieved</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • grade-5 repetition rate reduced only slightly from 8% to 7% (during 1997–2003) • student learning achievement (grade-5 numeracy rate) increased only slightly from 40% to 44% (1997–2003), and about 50% of grade-4 students did not achieve basic numeracy • cohort survival rate of grade 1 to grade 5 decreased (rather than increased) from 60.6% to 54% (1997–2003) • cycle dropout rate decreased only slightly from 51% to 49.4% (1997–2003) • cycle completion rate increased only slightly from 49.0% to 50.6% (1997–2003) • average number of years required to complete PE reduced only slightly from 8.3 to 8.0 years (1997–2003) 	<p><u>Loan 1521: SPESP (ADB)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • curricula of grades 1-4 revised and redesigned, and new textbooks based on revised curricula developed and introduced by NCTB to grades 1–2 pupils in 2003, and grades 3–4 in 2004 • 15,000 metric tons of paper procured for printing textbooks, and policy and program for textbook reuse developed • 82,072 packages of textbook repair kits, and 75,000 packages of teaching and learning materials procured • 80,000 teachers (349,528 person-days) provided with local subcluster training • sample-based national student learning assessment conducted in 2002 by NCTB <p><u>PEDP-I (IDA-World Bank)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 26,267 RNGPS teachers (30% female) provided with certificate in education training • 22,000 metric tons of paper provided for textbook production (against the target of 22,152 metric tons) • 1.7 million teachers' guides, 662,000 units of supplementary reading materials, and 56,940 units of teaching and learning aids provided <p><u>ESTEEM (DFID)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 85,000 teachers provided with certificate in education training <p><u>PEDPQI (NORAD)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 716,000 students provided with learning materials • 3,568 teachers provided with certificate in education training 		<p><u>Success Drivers</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • same as the first five success drivers for the successfully achieved outcomes under the access component • increased number of adequately trained teachers in GPSs and RNGPSs • improved school curriculum along with the provision of textbooks • improved school facilities and materials (including stipends and stationery), which enhanced learning environment for students <p><u>Deterrence Factors</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • nonconducive government policy and institutional environments in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - high teacher absenteeism (which reflects low governance) due to weak decentralization, hence weak role of SBM (SMCs and PTAs) to monitor teacher performance - lack of appropriate pre-service teacher training program to produce adequate number of qualified teachers to accommodate the increasing enrollment - weak in-service teacher training program and inadequate teacher trainers to provide recurrent training • high student dropouts due to poverty, since children are needed to help work on farms and do household chores • poor student performance due 	

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
		<p>IDEAL (UNICEF)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6.6 million sets of learning materials provided • 18,500 teachers provided with training in English teaching • “multiple ways of teaching and learning” approach introduced to 32 upazilas • 15,000 primary school teachers provided with training in interactive teaching methods 			<p>to poverty, hence lack of time and concentration on schooling</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • difficulty of addressing quality issues, while rapidly expanding access

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADTA = advisory technical assistance, AusAID = Australian Agency for International Development, BANBEIS = Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information System, CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency, DFID = Department for International Development, DP = development partner, DPE = Directorate of Primary Education, DPEO = district primary education office, EA = executing agency, EC = European Commission, EFA = Education for All, EMIS = education management information system, ESTEEM = Effective Schools through Enhanced Education Management, GER = gross enrollment rate, GOB = Government of Bangladesh, GPS = government primary school, GTZ = Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, IDA = International Development Association, IDB = Islamic Development Bank, IDEAL = Intensive District Approach to Education for All, KfW = Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, LGED = Local Government Engineering Department, M&E = monitoring and evaluation, MDG = Millennium Development Goal, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, NAPE = National Academy of Primary Education, NCTB = National Curriculum and Textbook Board, NER = net enrollment rate, NGO = nongovernment organization, NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, PE = primary education, PEDP-I = Primary Education Development Project, PEDPQI = Primary Education Development Project for Quality Improvement, PTA = parent-teacher association, PTI = primary teacher training institute, RNGPS = registered nongovernment primary school, SBM = school-based management, SE = secondary education, SIDA = Swedish International Development Agency, SMC = school management committee, SPESP = Second Primary Education Sector Project, SWAp = subsector-wide approach, TA = technical assistance, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme, UNFPA = United Nations Population Fund, UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund, UPEO = upazila primary education office, WFP = World Food Program.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

Table A7.3: Results Matrix of Combined Development Partners' Assistance in Bangladesh's Primary Education Subsector (Third Investment Cycle—PEDP-II SWAp)

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
<p>Partly Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased adult literacy rate from 50% to 54.8% (during 2003–2007), against the 2009/10 target of 75% increased female literacy rate from 44% to 48.9% (2003–2007) reduced poverty incidence from 49.8% to 40% (2003–2007) 	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased GER from 93% to 98.8% (during 2003–2007), against the 2009/10 target of 100% increased NER from 87% to 91.1% (2003–2007), against the target of 92% gender balance achieved in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased female-male ratio in GER from 1.03 to 1.04 (2003–2007), against the target of 1.10 increased female teachers from 42% to 50% 60% of newly-recruited teachers are females 	<p>PEDP-II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 20,644 classrooms in 10,322 schools constructed out of 29,847 approved, and 4,340 classrooms being constructed the number of GPSs provided with arsenic-free water, tubewells, and separate toilet facilities for girls increased from 50%, 44%, and 36% to 63%, 63%, and 59%, respectively (during 2003–2007) communication package developed and implemented four strategies and action plans (gender, tribal, vulnerable group, and special needs) approved and being implemented number of disabled children enrolled increased from 47,570 to 53,303 (2003–2007) 10 innovation grants approved and provided to NGOs 4.5 million poor students provided with stipends annually (about 34% of PE students enrolled in GPSs and RNGPSs) a total of 13.4 million children provided with opportunities to enroll in the four types of PE schools by 2007, as a result of the access-related investments in the DPs' three investment cycles combined 	<p>ADB ADTA (for Loan 2015)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA 4065: Strengthening Primary Education Development Program (Dec 2002) <p>DPs' Program</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loan 2015: Second Primary Education Development Program (PEDP-II) (Nov 2003) 	<p>ADB, AusAID, CIDA, DFID, EC, IDA, Japan, the Netherlands, NORAD, SIDA, UNICEF</p>	<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DPs' collective focus on PE, with selectivity based on their comparative advantage by component and geographical area DPs' coordination and partnerships through appropriate modalities of joint support, which helped create harmonization and synergies DPs' long-term continuity of joint support with adequate financial resources, which helped create a critical mass of beneficiaries DPs' engagement of GOB and EA to be involved in the design stage in a participatory manner continued DPs' strong coordination during implementation through consortium meetings, with PLU's active role in solving various logistic issues DPs' sufficient supervision through regular reviews, monitoring, and discussions with the EA strong involvement and utilization of the DPs' RMs, particularly ADB's BRM, which is the lead for the PEDP-II, though more delegation of authorities needed selection of generally good consultants and suppliers continued GOB's and EA's strong ownership and long-term commitment during implementation to meet the enrollment targets under the

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
	<p><u>Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> class size reduced only slightly from 70 to 62 students per class (during 2003–2007), against the 2009/10 target of 48 single-shift GPSs and RNGPSs increased only slightly from 9.1% to 9.9% (2003–2007), against the target of 28% grade-5 students receiving scholarships remained low, increasing from 4% to 10% (2003–2007) disabled children enrolled in schools remained less than 1% of total enrollment (2003–2007) 				<p>EFA National Plan of Action, and to achieve gender balance in teachers recruitment under the Perspective Development Plan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> technically capable government agency (LGED) responsible for school construction and rehabilitation heavy civil work investments for expansion and improvement of schools, classrooms, and facilities support to alternative PE providers, such as the community and NGOs EA's commitment to increasing access (by implementing a stipend program from its own fund outside the PEDP-II SWAp) and to promoting more female enrollment <p><u>Deterrence Factors</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> weak decentralization, with inadequate DPE staff at the local level (DPEOs and UPEOs) to monitor progress, especially given the physical isolation of some areas where the proportions of ethnic minorities and poverty are high still inadequate classrooms to accommodate the increasing student enrollment despite the substantial investments in civil works
	<p><u>Achieved</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> staff positions created under the previous cycle institutionalized (as reflected 	<p><u>PEDP-II</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the Financial and Procurement Management Division and some units (e.g., for inclusive education, national 			<p><u>Success Drivers</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> same as the first eight success drivers for the successfully achieved outcomes under the

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
	<p>in the transfer of the 12,000 positions created under the SPESP/PEDP-I to be regularized under the revenue budget)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DPE's capacity institutionalized (as reflected in the integration of the PEDP-II's PMU functions within DPE's regular planning and implementation operations and in DPE's subsequent ability to adopt the SWAp and be in the driver's seat in managing it) • NCTB's capacity institutionalized (as reflected in its ability to produce and distribute textbooks and teacher guides on a sustainable basis) • key institutional reform to increase governance or transparency of teacher recruitment and transfer system implemented <p><u>Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • extensive decentralization of MOPME's PE management, as reflected in the delay in the approval of the devolution policy (although the UPEP and SLIP have been piloted and expanded somewhat, much wider coverage is needed to extensively improve SBM, and in turn improve the teaching and learning environment as well as the performance of both teachers and students) • establishment of PE professional cadre in MOPME's various agencies to 	<p>assessment, and teacher recruitment) established at DPE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the governance review committee formed at DPE • governance-related reports (in the areas of financial management, risk mitigation strategy, procurement, and administrative and devolving responsibilities) prepared and approved • organizational development plan, and HRD strategy and action plan prepared and approved • DPE staff provided with project-related management training to implement the SWAp • NAPE provided with autonomy as an apex body and its staff trained to deliver better training to teachers • NCTB staff provided with training related to curriculum and textbook development and production, publishing, and printing • DPs' harmonization plan implemented • devolution plan being considered by MOPME for approval • SLIP and UPEP piloted • 18,000 head teachers and 60,000 SMC members in 20,000 schools provided with training in school management, planning, supervision, and monitoring • proposal for the formation of PE cadre submitted to the Ministry of Establishment • key performance indicators and PSQL approved • baseline data report for 2005 and annual reports for 2006 and 2007 printed and distributed 			<p>access component</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DP's design of PMU activities mainstreamed into the EA's (DPE's) normal operations <p><u>Deterrence Factors</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • nonconductive government policy and institutional environments in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - delayed implementation of decentralization, hence limited authority of DPEOs and UPEOs as well as weak SBM with lack of clarity of roles of SMCs and PTAs - lack of flexibility in adjusting the original GOB's project proforma to allow for budget heads for UPEP and SLIP - lack of PE professional cadre and career path since MOPME professional staff is appointed from outside by

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
	<p>improve the career path and quality of MOPME staff (as MOPME is still awaiting the decision from the Ministry of Establishment)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • institutionalization of NAPE's capacity to plan and implement in-service teacher training program (since much of its staff was deputed from administration cadre, rather than professional cadre) • effective operationalization of EMIS to support the M&E and planning functions of DPE (as the EMIS remains weak and fragmented) 				<p>the Ministry of Establishment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - fragmentation of EMIS functions for basic education, since the main EMIS for basic education is located at MOE's BANBEIS, which focuses more on SE data • DPs' weak design of EMIS and M&E system (despite generally adequate evaluability through identification of various performance indicators in the results framework), hence weak and fragmented MOPME's EMIS for PE from that of MOE for SE to collect reliable data in time during implementation • DPs' inadequate background analysis at the design stage about overall issues in the entire education sector (including key policy issues in the PE subsector), hence lack of a good strategic direction to address the issues in all subsectors in an integrated manner • DPs' inadequate background analysis at the design stage about the EA's capacity to implement the complex PEDP-II SWAp, hence long initial delays in implementation • DPs' ad hoc provision of ADTA grants, rather than designing them to be strategically integrated with the program early on to address the issue of the EA's inadequate institutional management capacity prior to implementation

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • decreased grade-5 repetition rate from 7% to 2% (during 2003–2007), against the 2009/10 target of below 5% • increased grade-5 pass rate in scholarship exam from 47% to 80% (2003–2007) • increased grade-5 National Assessment scores in mathematics from 38% to 47% (2003–2007) • increased grade-5 National Assessment scores in science from 43% to 63% (2003–2007) • increased grade-5 National Assessment scores in social science from 53% to 62% (2003–2007) • increased grade-5 National Assessment scores in Bangla from 53% to 56% (2003–2007) • increased transition rate to SE from 90% to 95.6% (2003–2007), against the target of 96% <p><u>Evolving/Likely to Be Achieved</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • increased proportion of newly recruited teachers with qualifications higher than the requirement (certificate in education) to about 50% (with bachelors' degree or more) • decreased student-teacher ratio from 62 to 49 students per teacher (during 2003–2007), against the 2009/10 target of 45 • decreased grade-5 student absenteeism rate from 22% to 19% (2003–2007), against the target of 18% 	<p>PEDP-II</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • teacher recruitment and transfer system revised to be more transparent and merit based • 19,910 new teachers recruited under the development budget and additional 15,000 recruited under the revenue budget, against the 2009/10 target of 35,000 • PTI's certificate in education training program revised and approved by MOPME • 65,000 new and existing teachers provided with 1-year certificate in education training, against the target of 90,000 • 245,330 teachers provided with subcluster training annually • more than 13,000 teachers provided with subject-based training • more than 2,000 newly-recruited teachers provided with management training • the first-round of national students assessment completed and the second round expected in 2008 • public-private partnership created in printing, production, and distribution of textbooks • more than 40 million textbooks distributed annually free of charge • early childhood education framework prepared and approved 			<p><u>Success Drivers</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • same as the first eight success drivers for the successfully achieved outcomes under the access component • GOB's strong commitment to improving PE quality, particularly in revising the teacher recruitment and transfer system to be more transparent and merit based, reflecting good governance • improvement in in-service teacher training program and provision of relevant training to teachers • development of new curriculum and textbooks • wide distribution of free textbooks and other learning materials

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	DPs' Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of DPs' Interventions	Subsector Inputs of DPs' Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting DPs' Outputs and Outcomes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • decreased grades 1–4 repetition rate (2003–2007), against the target of 10%, as grade-5 repetition rate has already decreased well beyond the target of below 5% <p><u>Partly/Unlikely to Be Achieved</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • student learning achievement (grade-5 numeracy rate) increased only slightly from 44% to 45% (during 2003–2007), against the 2009/10 target of 65% • cohort survival rate of grade 1 to 5 decreased (rather than increased) from 54% to 52% (2003–2007), against the target of 60% • cycle dropout rate increased (rather than decreased) from 49.4% to 50.5% (2003–2007), against the target of 45% • grade dropout rate unlikely to decrease by 2% every year, as the cycle dropout rate did not decrease (2003–2007) • cycle completion rate decreased (rather than increased) from 50.6% to 49.5% (2003–2007), against the target of 55% • average number of years required to complete PE increased (rather than decreased) from 8 to 8.5 years (2003–2007), against the target of 7.5 years 				<p><u>Deterrence Factors</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • same as the five deterrence factors for the partly/unlikely to be achieved outcomes under the institutional capacity component • nonconductive government policy and institutional environments in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - high teacher absenteeism, which reflects low governance due to weak decentralization, hence weak role of SBM (SMCs and PTAs) to monitor teacher performance - lack of appropriate pre-service teacher training program to produce adequate number of qualified teachers to accommodate the increasing student enrollment - weak in-service teacher training program and inadequate teacher trainers to provide recurrent training • high student dropouts due to poverty, since children are needed to help work on farms and do household chores • poor student performance due to poverty, hence lack of time and concentration on schooling

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADTA = advisory technical assistance, AusAID = Australian Agency for International Development, BANBEIS = Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information System, BRM = Bangladesh Resident Mission, CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency, DFID = Department for International Development, DP = development partner, DPE = Directorate of Primary Education, DPEO = district primary education office, EA= executing agency, EC = European Commission, EFA = Education for All, EMIS = education management information system, GER = gross enrollment rate, GOB = Government of Bangladesh, GPS = government primary school, HRD = human resources development, IDA = International Development Association, LGED = Local Government Engineering Department, M&E = monitoring and evaluation, MDG = Millennium Development Goal, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, NAPE = National Academy of Primary Education, NCTB = National Curriculum and Textbook Board, NER = net enrollment rate, NGO = nongovernment organization, NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, PE = primary education, PEDP-I = Primary Education Development Project, PEDP-II = Second Primary Education Development Program, PLU = Project Liaison Unit, PMU = program management unit, PSQL = primary standard quality level, PTA = parent-teacher association, PTI = primary teacher training institute, RM = resident mission, RNGPS = registered nongovernment primary school, SBM = school-based management, SE = secondary education, SIDA = Swedish International Development Agency, SLIP = school-level improvement plan, SMC = school management committee, SPESP = Second Primary Education Sector Project. SWAp= subsector-wide approach, UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund, UPE = Universal Primary Education, UPEP = upazila primary education plan, UPEO = upazila primary education office.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

Table A7.4: Trends of Poverty and Education Indicators by Education Subsector

Indicator	Unit	Prior to	Prior to	Prior to	2007	2009/10
		PESP/ GEP 1990	SPESP/ PEDP-I 1997	PEDP-II 2003		
		(Late 1980s)	(Late 1990s)	(Early 2000s)		
Poverty-Related						
Poverty Incidence	%	57.0	50.0	49.8	40.0	n.a.
GDP per Capita	\$	200	337	389	487	n.a.
Recurrent Education Expenditure						
Total Recurrent Education Expenditure relative to GDP	%	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	2.8
Total Recurrent Education Expenditure relative to Overall Government Recurrent Expenditure	%	17.5	18.3	16.3	15.6	n.a.
Recurrent PE Education Expenditure relative to Total Recurrent Education Expenditure	%	48.2	43.5	37.1	33.9	45.0
Literacy						
Adult Literacy Rate	%	35.0	47.0	50.0	54.8	75.0
Female Literacy Rate	%	22.0	38.0	44.0	48.9	n.a.
Primary Education						
Access:						
GER	%	67.5	90.0	93.0	98.8	100.0
NER	%	60.5	80.9	87.0	91.1	92.0
Class Size	No.	75	72	70	62	48
Single Shift Schools (GPSs and RNGPSs)	%	n.a.	n.a.	9.1	9.9	28.0
Grade-5 Pupils Receiving Scholarships	%	n.a.	2.7	4.0	10.0	n.a.
Female-Male Ratio in GER	Ratio	0.89	0.97	1.03	1.04	1.10
Female Teachers	%	n.a.	28.0	42.0	50.0	n.a.
Quality:						
Qualified Teachers with Certificate in Education	%	n.a.	n.a.	69.0	71.0	n.a.
Student-Teacher Ratio	Ratio	70	66	62	49	45
Grade-5 Absenteeism Rate	%	42.0	40.0	22.0	19.0	18.0
Grade-5 Repetition Rate	%	8.0	8.0	7.0	2.0	<5.0
Grade-5 Pass Rate in Scholarship Examination	%	n.a.	31.1	47.0	79.5	n.a.
Grade-5 National Assessment Scores (Math)	%	n.a.	n.a.	38.2	46.7	n.a.
Grade-5 National Assessment Scores (Science)	%	n.a.	n.a.	43.0	63.2	n.a.
Grade-5 National Assessment Scores (Social Science)	%	n.a.	n.a.	52.6	61.7	n.a.
Grade-5 National Assessment Scores (Bangla)	%	n.a.	n.a.	52.6	56.2	n.a.
Grade-5 Numeracy Rate	%	n.a.	40.0	44.1	45.0	65.0
Cohort Survival Rate from Grade 1 to Grade 5	%	49.0	60.6	54.0	52.0	60.0
Cycle Dropout Rate	%	60.0	51.0	49.4	50.5	45.0
Cycle Completion Rate	%	40.0	49.0	50.6	49.5	55.0
Average No. of Years Required to Complete PE	No.	9.3	8.3	8.0	8.5	7.5
Transition Rate to SE (from Grade 5 to Grade 6)	%	57.5	83.0	90.0	95.6	96.0
Secondary Education						
Access:						
GER	%	23.0	35.0	41.2	50.0	55.0
NER	%	19.1	28.7	37.6	39.0	45.0
Female-Male Ratio in GER	Ratio	0.54	1.1	1.1	1.1	n.a.
Quality:						
Student-Teacher Ratio	Ratio	n.a.	39	43	31	n.a.
Attendance Rate	%	n.a.	60.0	n.a.	65.0	n.a.
Grades 6–9 Repetition Rate	%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5.0	n.a.
Grade 10 Repetition Rate	%	13.0	16.9	16.7	n.a.	n.a.
Cycle Dropout Rate	%	n.a.	44.0	43.0	42.0	n.a.
SSC Pass Rate (at the End of Grade 10)	%	31.7	51.5	35.9	55.0	n.a.
Transition Rate to Higher Secondary Education	%	89.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Higher Secondary Education						
Access:						
GER	%	n.a.	16.1	18.1	n.a.	30.0
Quality:						
Cycle Dropout Rate	%	n.a.	38.0	41.0	n.a.	30.0
HSC Pass Rate (at the End of Grade 12)	%	29.7	39.3	38.4	64.0	55.0

Indicators	Unit	Prior to	Prior to	Prior to	2007	2009/10
		PESP/ GEP 1990 (Late 1980s)	SPESP/ PEDP-I 1997 (Late 1990s)	PEDP-II 2003 (Early 2000s)		
Technical Education and Vocational Training						
Access:						
Intakes (Certificate Courses)	No.	n.a.	37,200	48,000	n.a.	80,000
Intakes (Diploma Courses)	No.	n.a.	7,500	35,000	n.a.	80,000
Quality:						
Pass Rate (Certificate Courses)	%	n.a.	n.a.	60.0	n.a.	70.0
Pass Rate (Diploma Courses)	%	n.a.	n.a.	60.0	n.a.	70.0

ADB = Asian Development Bank, DPE = Directorate of Primary Education, EMIS = education management information system, GDP = gross domestic product, GEP = General Education Project, GER = gross enrolment rate, GPS = government primary school, HSC = high school certificate, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, n.a. = not available, NER = net enrollment rate, No. = number, PE = primary education, PEDP-I = Primary Education Development Project, PEDP-II = Second Primary Education Development Program, PESP = Primary Education Sector Project, RNGPS = registered nongovernment primary school, SAPE = sector assistance program evaluation, SE = secondary education, SSC = secondary school certificates, SPESP = Second Primary Education Sector Project, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund.

Note: The data for PE in this table and in the corresponding results matrixes (Tables A7.1–A7.3) were obtained from the EMIS data base of MOPME's DPE. The data on certain indicators (e.g., dropout rate) appeared to be rather high. These are national data for the four types of schools (GPSs, RNGPSs, experimental schools, and community schools) covered by the PEDP-II, which accounted for 82% of the total enrollment in all 10 school types (see Table A5.1, Appendix 5). Another data set from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey supported by UNICEF (2006) estimated PE dropout rate in the sample to be around 20%. However, DPE is commissioning a study, supported by UNICEF, on student dropouts in early 2009 to clarify the picture. The SAPE uses existing DPE's EMIS data for consistencies in comparison over the past two decades.

Sources: ADB. 2007. *Key Indicators 2007: Inequality in Asia*. Manila; ADB. 2005. *Bangladesh Country Strategy and Program 2006–2009*. Manila; MOE and MOPME. 2007. *EMIS Databases*. Dhaka; UNDP. 2007/08. *Human Development Report*. New York.

Table A7.5: Results Matrix of ADB's Assistance in Bangladesh's Nonformal Education Subsector

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	ADB's Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of ADB's Interventions	Subsector Inputs of ADB's Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting ADB's Outputs and Outcomes
<p>Partly Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased adult literacy rate from 35% to 47% (during 1990–1997), to 50% (2003), and to 54.8% (2007), against the 2009/10 target of 75% increased female literacy rate from 22% to 38% (1990–1997), to 44% (2003), and to 48.9% (2007) reduced poverty incidence from 57% to 50% (1990–1997), to 49.8% (2003), and to 40% (2007) 	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a critical mass of 74% of the newly literate beneficiaries retained reasonably good reading and writing skills 50% of the beneficiaries knew simple arithmetic gender balance achieved as 57% of the beneficiaries were females, against the target of 50% 	<p>Loan 1390: NFEP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a critical mass of 2.9 million learners (beneficiaries) provided with NFE literacy and numeracy training, against the target of 2.5 million 	<p>ADTA (for Loan 1390)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA 2534: Institutional Development of DNFE (July 1996) <p>Loans</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loan 1390: Nonformal Education Project (NFEP) (Sept 1995) Loan 1881: Post-Literacy and Continuing Education (PLCEP) (Dec 2001) 	<p>ADB, AusAID, CIDA, DFID, EC, IDA, JICA, the Netherlands, NORAD, SDC, SIDA, UNDP, UNICEF</p>	<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> conducive government policy and institutional environments, especially through its commitment to the EFA National Plan of Action ADB's engagement of GOB and EA to be involved in the design stage in a participatory manner priority placed on the establishment of DNFE, based on INFEP, which was a government temporary agency with several years of exposure in promoting NFE NGOs' involvement in the design, testing, and implementation of the NFE programs, and commitment to integrating them into their regular programs
	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> public-private partnership model through the contracting of NGOs widely operationalized basic literacy, postliteracy, and continuing education program extensively replicated 	<p>Loan 1390: NFEP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 385 NGOs contracted to assist in the delivery of NFE 5,749 supervisors, 82,185 teachers, and 147 field workers (from the participating NGOs) trained in the NFE delivery core competencies for learners' learning outcomes covering four broad skill areas (reading, writing, arithmetic, and life skills) identified and validated NFE curriculum and standard achievement test developed teachers' guides and teaching aids developed postliteracy and continuing education programs piloted 			<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> same success drivers as those for the access component

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	ADB's Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of ADB's Interventions	Subsector Inputs of ADB's Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting ADB's Outputs and Outcomes
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • alternative NFE models (e.g., TLM) developed and piloted • studies prepared to evaluate learners' achievement, teaching methods, socioeconomic impacts of the NFE program, and various alternative teaching methods 			
	<p><u>Not Achieved</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DNFE not institutionalized under the revenue budget during the NFEP period, but under the development budget • NFE strategic framework chart not developed into NFE Policy Framework for approval during the NFEP period 	<p>Loan 1390: NFEF</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DNFE established (based on a former temporary agency, INFEP) as an agency responsible for NFE • DNFE staff provided with training in NFE approaches (e.g., curriculum and program development, financial management system development, computer literacy, and skills development) • DNFE senior staff provided with overseas and in-country training in management, planning, delivering, and monitoring NFE programs • NFE strategic framework chart prepared; and systems for planning, organization, management, and administration of NFE programs developed • DNFE's EMIS and M&E system established • physical facilities, including the DNFE headquarters building, constructed and equipped <p>Loan 1881: PLCEP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DNFE abolished by GOB during the early stage of the PLCEP (due to the alleged nontransparency in the selection of NGOs in other government projects) • DNFE replaced by newly created BNFE (also under MOPME) on a 			<p><u>Deterrence Factors</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GOB's and EA's inadequate commitment during implementation • ADB's ad hoc provision of ADTA, rather than strategically provided at an early stage • ADB's inadequate background analysis at the design stage about overall issues in the entire education sector, although sufficient analysis had been undertaken at the subsector level, hence lack of a good strategic policy framework to address NFE subsector issues linked to formal PE subsector issues • ADB's lack of strong coordination with other DPs in the NFE subsector to pursue necessary policy dialogue with GOB and EA in the governance issue related to alleged non-transparency in the selection of NGOs and subsequent abolition of DNFE

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	ADB's Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of ADB's Interventions	Subsector Inputs of ADB's Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting ADB's Outputs and Outcomes
		permanent basis as the new EA for the PLCEP			

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADTA = advisory technical assistance, AusAID = Australian Agency for International Development, BNFE = Bureau of Nonformal Education, CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency, DFID = Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, DNFE = Directorate of Nonformal Education, DP = development partner, EA = executing agency, EC = European Commission, EFA = Education for All, EMIS = education management information system, GER = gross enrollment rate, GOB = Government of Bangladesh, IDA = International Development Association, INFEP = Integrated Nonformal Education Program, JICA = Japan International Cooperation Agency, M&E = monitoring and evaluation, MDG = Millennium Development Goal, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, NCPME = National Council for Primary and Mass Education, NCTB = National Curriculum and Textbook Board, NER = net enrollment rate, NFE = nonformal education, NFEP = Nonformal Education Project, NGO = nongovernment organization, NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, PLCEP = Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Project, PPMS = project performance management system, SDC = Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, SIDA = Swedish International Development Agency, TA = technical assistance, TLM = Total Literacy Movement, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

Table A7.6: Results Matrix of ADB's Assistance in Bangladesh's Secondary Education Subsector

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	ADB's Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of ADB's Interventions	Subsector Inputs of ADB's Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting ADB's Outputs and Outcomes
<p>Partly Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased adult literacy rate from 35% to 47% (during 1990–1997), to 50% (2003), and to 54.8% (2007), against the 2009/10 target of 75% increased female literacy rate from 22% to 38% (1990–1997), to 44% (2003), and to 48.9% (2007) reduced poverty incidence from 57% to 50% (1990–1997), to 49.8% (2003), and to 40% (2007) 	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased GER from 23% to 35% (during 1990–1997), to 41.2% (2003), and to 50% (2007), against the 2009/10 target of 55% increased NER from 19.1% to 28.7% (1990–1997), to 37.6% (2003), and to 39% (2007), against the 2009/10 target of 45% gender balance achieved in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increased female-male ratio in GER from 0.54 to 1.1 (1990–1997), which remained at 1.1 (2007) female students provided with stipends exceeded the target by 57% (under the SEDP) 39% and 53% of teachers provided with B. Ed. and M.Ed. training, respectively, were females (under the SEDP) 75% of poor students receiving stipends were females (under the SESDP) 	<p>Loan 1268: SEDP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3-room buildings with tubewell and sanitary latrines constructed in 1,824 secondary schools (against the target of 1,840) to provide more access to 273,600 students 1,448,278 female students (grades 6–10) provided with stipends, against the target of 920,000 <p>Loan 1690: SESIP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 59 new secondary schools established, against the target of 115 2–3 additional classrooms constructed in 111 overcrowded schools, against the target of 115 20 damaged schools during the 1988 flood reconstructed 96 flood-damaged schools repaired, against the target of 120 stipends for 4,408,219 person-years of education provided, against the target of 765,000 <p>Loans 2266/67: SESDP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 164,852 poor students provided with stipends, with good monitoring system developed to prevent misuse of funds 	<p>ADTA (for Loan 1268)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA 1991: Institutional Strengthening of DSHE (Nov 1993) <p>Loans</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loan 1268: Secondary Education Dev. Project (SEDP) (Nov 1993) Loan 1690: Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project (SESIP) (June 1999) Loan 2101: Teacher Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project (TQISEP) (Nov 2004) Loans 2266/67: Secondary Education Sector Development Project/Program (SESDP) (Oct 2006) 	<p>ADB, CIDA, DFID, EC, IDA, NORAD</p>	<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ADB's long-term continuity of support to the subsector with adequate financial resources to create a critical mass of beneficiaries ADB's adequate diagnosis of the problems facing the subsector, with early support to the GOB's formulation of SE-SDP and subsequent assistance through individual projects within the SE-SDP framework ADB's appropriate mix of modalities, especially recently through a program loan mixed with a project loan (the SESDP) to encourage GOB to make difficult reforms ADB's adequate supervision and monitoring through delegation of implementation of the SE projects to BRM ADB's engagement of GOB and EA to be involved in the design stage in a participatory manner selection of generally good consultants and suppliers conducive government policy and institutional environments, as reflected in GOB's and EA's strong commitment to implementing the SE-SDP which was updated and extended to 2013 strong support within the country among politicians, civil servants, and the general populace for education improvements.

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	ADB's Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of ADB's Interventions	Subsector Inputs of ADB's Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting ADB's Outputs and Outcomes
	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SE-SDP operationalized NCTB's activities partly privatized (e.g., publishing of textbooks on 19 subjects out of 33) <p>Not Yet Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DSHE's institutional capacity not improved much, since many of the recommendations resulting from the policy studies carried out (during the SEDP) to strengthen institutional capacity of DSHE were not implemented many reforms carried out in subsequent projects for institutional development and quality improvement not yet institutionalized or widely implemented (e.g., curriculum and examination reforms, and decentralized implementation of SBPMS, EMIS, and SBA) 	<p>Loan 1268: SEDP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SE-SDP drafted training unit established for strategic planning, and management training DSHE senior staff provided with overseas study visits and in-country training in education management 10,000 school principals provided with training on school management and supervision policy studies to strengthen institutional capacity of DSHE undertaken, with funding from ADTA 63 district education offices, 8 zonal offices of DSHE, and 11 TTCs provided with transport vehicles <p>Loan 1690: SESIP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PSPU and EMIS established within DSHE BEDU established a phased decentralized management model (based on SBPMS) developed and approved SBPMS piloted for monitoring teacher salary subventions, by linking the subventions to the fulfillment of agreed upon quality standard additional DSHE staff recruited and trained to manage teacher salary subventions additional NCTB staff recruited and trained, overseas and in-country, in needs-based curriculum development, and production of teaching materials infrastructure facilities enhanced for implementation of the pilot decentralized management system 			<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> same success drivers as those for the access component <p>Deterrence Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ADB's complex project design, which made it difficult to implement and monitor ADB's ad hoc provision of ADTA, rather than making it an integral part of project design to help address key policy and institutional constraints early on (e.g., only one of the four SE projects had associated ADTA) ADB's inadequate background analysis at the design stage about overall issues in the entire education sector (though sufficient analysis had been undertaken at the SE subsector level), hence lack of a good strategic direction linked to the PE subsector for smooth transition from PE to SE and for well-integrated MOE and MOPME EMIS functions lack of strong coordination among DPs in the SE subsector to pursue necessary policy dialogue with GOB and EA nonconductive government policy and institutional environments (e.g., lack of flexibility in project proforma and other regulations, including difficulties in
		<p>Loan 2101: TQISEP Achieved to Date</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 13,121 head teachers provided with a 3-week professional development training 			

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	ADB's Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of ADB's Interventions	Subsector Inputs of ADB's Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting ADB's Outputs and Outcomes
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 109 upazila officers, research officers, school inspectors, academic supervisors, and 27 district education and assistant education officers provided with professional development training <p>Loans 2266/67: SESDP Achieved to Date</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> national extension of SBPMS and EMIS to all schools notified by MOE in July 2005 policy papers for decentralization and functional job specifications approved by MOE in July 2006 HRMU established in DSHE to support decentralization decision to pilot the decentralized management system in 3 zones approved 			<p>transferring newly created positions from the development budget to the revenue budget, lengthy bureaucratic decision-making process, culture of highly centralized education management, lack of understanding in some quarters of the needs for reforms, and high turnover of trained staff)</p>
	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> student-teacher ratio decreased from 39 to 31 (during 1997–2007) attendance rate increased from 60% to 65% (1997–2007) grades 6–9 repetition rate remained low at 5% (2007) <p>Partly Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> grade 10 repetition rate decreased only slightly from 16.9% to 16.7 % (during 1997–2003) cycle dropout rate decreased only slightly from 44% to 42% (1997–2007) SSC pass rate increased only slightly from 51.5% to 55% (1997–2007) 	<p>Loan 1268: SEDP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a new TTC established in Barisal division and 10 TTCs upgraded through expansion of physical facilities, additional staffing, and construction of dormitories curriculum of grades 6–10 revised and redesigned and textbooks developed and distributed teacher education curriculum redesigned and a total of 15 textbooks (100 sets) for the teacher education program developed, printed, and distributed to all TTCs 134,000 teachers trained in the revised and modified curriculum covering 19 subjects 12,535 teachers provided with B.Ed. training 657 teachers provided with M.Ed. training educational charts and supplementary reading materials provided to 1,824 schools 			<p>Success Drivers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> same success drivers as those for the access component <p>Deterrence Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> same deterrence factors as those for the institutional capacity component

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	ADB's Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of ADB's Interventions	Subsector Inputs of ADB's Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting ADB's Outputs and Outcomes
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • science kits provided to 1,410 schools (with 1-day training provided to teachers on the use of the kits) <p>Loan 1690: SESIP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • modern skills-based or unitrack curriculum for grades 9–10 developed • teaching materials developed and disseminated to over 70,000 teachers • detailed proposal for SSC examination reform developed and approved after pilot test, with a schedule for introducing the new examination in 2010 • 20 recommendations for teacher education reform approved • revised teacher education curriculum developed, approved, and introduced • 67 educators provided with overseas training in teacher education development • 92 educators provided with in-country training in teacher education development • 1,700 teachers provided with in-service teacher training • 350 poorly-performing schools provided with school improvement funds • 50 head teachers trained overseas and in-country in developing the SBA system • 61,468 teachers from 14,000 schools trained in-country in implementing the SBA system • SBPMS for five subjects (Bangla, English, mathematics, science, and social science) developed, piloted, and introduced in about 9,000 schools <p>Loan 2101: TQISEP</p> <p><u>Achieved to Date</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gender integrated materials developed in accordance with the gender action plan 			

Country's Achievement of Impacts/MDGs	ADB's Contributions to Intermediate Subsector Outcomes	Subsector Outputs of ADB's Interventions	Subsector Inputs of ADB's Interventions	Key DPs in the Subsector	Success Drivers and Deterrence Factors Affecting ADB's Outputs and Outcomes
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 24 packages of civil works provided to improve teacher training facilities • 1,671 teacher educators, teachers, and other education officers provided with customized teacher training • 23,332 untrained teachers provided with new B. Ed. training from different government TTCs (BOU introduced the course in distance mode in July 2008) • 3-month nationally standardized STTC developed and introduced • 6,648 teachers provided with STTC level training • 86,670 teachers provided with CPD training • teaching and training materials for both STTC and B.Ed. training revised and piloted • IDF introduced and established to support innovative schemes for improving teaching quality 			
		<p>Loans 2266/67: SESDP <u>Achieved to Date</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • curriculum for grades 9–10 revised under the SESIP to be discussed for consensus and direction for revising the curriculum of the remaining SE grades • 140,000 teachers and head teachers provided with training on SSC examination reform system (called CQ) and implementation of the SBA system • local DSHE staff trained in monitoring of the SBA system • new B.Ed. curriculum adopted by the National University in January 2005 			

ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADB = advisory technical assistance, B.Ed. = bachelor of education, BEDU = Bangladesh Examination Development Unit, BOU = Bangladesh Open University, BRM = Bangladesh Resident Mission, CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency, CPD = continuing professional development, CQ = creative questions, Dev. = development, DFID = Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, DP = development partner, DSHE = Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education, EC = European Commission, EMIS = education management information system, GER = gross enrollment rate, GOB = Government of Bangladesh, HSC = high school certificate, IDA = International Development Association, IDF = Innovation and Development Fund, M.Ed. = master of education, MDG = Millennium Development Goal, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, NCTB = National Curriculum and Textbook Board, NER = net enrollment rate, NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, PE = primary education, PSPU = Policy Support and Planning Unit, SBA = school-based assessment,

SBPMS = school-based performance management system, SE = secondary education, SEDP = Secondary Education Development Project, SE-SDP = Secondary Education Sector Development Plan, SESDP = Secondary Education Sector Development Program, SESIP = Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project, SMC = school management committee, SSC = secondary school certificate, STTC = secondary teacher training certificate, TQISEP = Teacher Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project, TTC = teacher training college.
Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

Table A7.7: All Bottom-Up Evaluation Criteria and Ratings of the Four DPs' Combined Performance^a in Bangladesh Education Sector

Criteria	Weight ^b	Primary Ed.						Nonformal Ed.	Secondary Ed.	All Ed. Subsectors Combined			
		1 st Inv. Cycle (PESP/GEP)		2 nd Inv. Cycle (SPESP/PEDP-I)		3 rd Inv. Cycle (PEDP-II SWAP)				All Three Inv. Cycles Combined		Overall Combined Rating ^c	WA of All Bottom-Up Criteria ^d
		Rating	WA	Rating	WA	Rating	WA			Rating	WA		
Relevance	0.2	2 (R)	0.4	2 (R)	0.4	2 (R)	0.4	2 (R)	0.4	2.0 (R)	0.4		
Efficiency	0.3	2 (E)	0.6	1 (LE)	0.3	1 (LE)	0.3	1 (LE)	0.3	1.2 (LE)	0.4		
Effectiveness	0.3	2 (E)	0.6	2 (E)	0.6	2 (E)	0.6	1 (LE)	0.3	1.9 (E)	0.6		
Sustainability	0.2	2 (L)	0.4	2 (L)	0.4	2 (L)	0.4	2 (L)	0.4	2.0 (L)	0.4		
WA of Bottom-Up Criteria^e	1.0	2.0 (S)		1.7 (S)		1.7 (S)		1.8 (S)		1.4 (PS)		1.7 (S)	

ADB = Asian Development Bank, DFID = Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, DP = development partner, E = efficient or effective, Ed. = education, GEP = General Education Project, HE = highly efficient or highly effective, HL = highly likely, HR = highly relevant, HS = highly successful, IDA = International Development Association of the World Bank, IE = inefficient or ineffective, Inv. = investment, IR = irrelevant, L = likely, LE = less efficient or less effective, LL = less likely, LR = less relevant, NFE = nonformal education, OED = Operations Evaluation Department of ADB, PE = primary education, PEDP-I = Primary Education Development Project, PEDP-II = Second Primary Education Development Program, PESP = Primary Education Sector Project, PPER = project performance evaluation report of OED, PS = partly successful, R = relevant, S = successful, SAPE = sector assistance program evaluation, SE = secondary education, SPESP = Second Primary Education Sector Project, SWAP = subsector-wide approach, UL = unlikely, US = unsuccessful, WA = weightier average.

^a For the bottom-up assessment, the SAPE assesses the combined performance of the four DPs (ADB, DFID, IDA, and Japan) only in the PE subsector. As for the SE and NFE subsectors, only ADB performance is assessed.

^b The weights for the four bottom-up criteria used by the SAPE follow those provided in OED's PPER Guidelines (i.e., 20% each for relevance and sustainability, and 30% each for efficiency and effectiveness).

^c Given the importance of the PE subsector in terms of the DPs' financial involvement, followed by the SE subsector for ADB, the SAPE calculates the overall rating of ADB's performance in the three education subsectors combined by using a 50% weight for PE, a 37.5% weight for SE, and a 12.5% weight for NFE.

^d The SAPE uses the four rating scales from the PPER Guidelines: (i) HE, HL, HR, and HS = 3; (ii) E, L, R, and S = 2; (iii) LE, LL, LR, and PS = 1; and (iv) IE, UL, IR, and US = 0.

^e The overall rating scale for each of the four bottom-up criteria and for all the four criteria combined follow the standard rating scales as per the PPER Guidelines as follows:

(i) HS ≥ 2.7, (ii) 2.7 > S ≥ 1.6, (iii) 1.6 > PS ≥ 0.8, and (iv) 0.8 > US.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY PROSPECTS OF EDUCATION PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS IN BANGLADESH

Item	FY91/92	FY92/93	FY93/94	FY94/95	FY95/96	FY96/97	FY97/98	FY98/99	FY99/00	FY00/01	FY01/02	FY02/03	FY03/04	FY04/05	FY05/06	FY06/07
GDP (current price, Tk billion)	1,195	1,254	1,354	1,525	1,663	1,807	2,002	2,197	2,371	2,536	2,732	3,006	3,330	3,707	4,157	4,675
Overall Recurrent Exp. (Tk billion)	79	85	92	103	118	125	145	168	184	207	227	243	288	368	381	455
Total Recurrent Ed. Exp. (Tk billion)	14	17	18	20	21	23	27	30	33	36	37	40	45	51	63	71
Overall Recurrent Exp./GDP (%)	6.6	6.8	6.8	6.8	7.1	6.9	7.2	7.6	7.8	8.1	8.3	8.1	8.6	9.9	9.2	9.7
Total Recurrent Ed. Exp./GDP (%)	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5
Overall Recurrent Exp. (Tk million)	79,000	85,100	91,500	103,000	118,140	125,349	145,000	167,650	184,440	206,620	226,920	243,180	287,830	368,244	380,700	455,020
Total Recurrent Ed. Exp. (Tk million)	13,816	16,744	17,560	20,077	21,480	22,955	26,890	29,680	32,570	35,870	37,390	39,627	44,740	50,814	63,470	71,205
- MOPME-PE ^a	6654	7472	7979	8560	9404	9990	11,450	11,990	13,120	13,780	14,280	14,690	16,300	18,040	21,240	24,145
- MOE	7,162	9,272	9,581	11,518	12,076	12,966	15,440	17,690	19,450	22,090	23,110	24,937	28,440	32,774	42,230	47,060
SE	5,089	6,803	7,423	8,817	9,294	9,855	12,398	14,349	15,593	17,871	18,823	18,986	20,878	22,231	33,332	38,316
TEVT	334	377	400	418	449	476	398	436	449	465	437	402	460	465	775	701
HE	1,171	1,330	1,434	1,533	1,714	1,817	1,962	2,178	2,560	2,919	2,936	2,912	3,187	3,362	4,999	4,919
Others	568	762	325	750	619	818	682	728	848	836	914	2,637	3,915	6,716	3,124	3,124
Total Rec. Ed. Exp./Overall Rec. Exp. (%)	17.5	19.7	19.2	19.5	18.2	18.3	18.5	17.7	17.7	17.4	16.5	16.3	15.5	13.8	16.7	15.6
- PE Rec. Exp./Total Rec. Ed. Exp. (%)	48.2	44.6	45.4	42.6	43.8	43.5	42.6	40.4	40.3	38.4	38.2	37.1	36.4	35.5	33.5	33.9
- MOE Rec. Exp./Total Rec. Ed. Exp. (%)	51.8	55.4	54.6	57.4	56.2	56.5	57.4	59.6	59.7	61.6	61.8	62.9	63.6	64.5	66.5	66.1
SE Rec. Exp./Total Rec. Ed. Exp. (%)	36.8	40.6	42.3	43.9	43.3	42.9	46.1	48.3	47.9	49.8	50.3	47.9	46.7	43.7	52.5	53.8
TEVT Rec. Exp./Total Rec. Ed. Exp. (%)	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.2	1.0
HE Rec. Exp./Total Rec. Ed. Exp. (%)	8.5	7.9	8.2	7.6	8.0	7.9	7.3	7.3	7.9	8.1	7.9	7.3	7.1	6.6	7.9	6.9
Others' Rec. Exp./Total Rec. Ed. Exp. (%)	4.1	4.6	1.8	3.7	2.9	3.6	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.4	6.7	8.8	13.2	4.9	4.4

Ed. = education, Exp. = expenditure, FY = fiscal year, GDP = gross domestic product, HE = higher education, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, PE = primary education, Rec. = recurrent, SE = secondary education, TEVT = technical education and vocational training.

^a Primary education was under MOE until FY1992. In FY1992, a separate ministry (MOPME) was formed.

Sources: Ministry of Finance, staff estimates.

DETAILED TOP-DOWN ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE AND PROGRAM CONTRIBUTIONS TO BANGLADESH'S ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

1. This appendix provides a detailed assessment of the combined performance of the major four DPs—the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom, the International Development Association (IDA), and Japan—in Bangladesh's education sector at the strategic and country levels, based on the three top-down criteria, as described in para. 19 of the main text: (i) contributions of the DPs' bottom-up achievement of sector outcomes to the country-level achievement of long-term development results/impacts or Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), (ii) strategic relevance of the development partners' (DPs) education strategies for Bangladesh, and (iii) strategic positioning/coherence of the DPs' education strategies and client perceptions of their performance in the education sector.

A. Contributions of Development Partners' Programs to Bangladesh's Achievement of Long-Term Impacts

2. While the DPs' combined bottom-up performance of their education assistance programs is rated as *successful* in achieving sector outcomes that are likely sustainable, the sector assistance program evaluation (SAPE) rates the contributions of such outcomes to Bangladesh's achievement of long-term development impacts or MDGs as ***partly successful***. The reasons (**deterrence factors**) are that although some access- and gender-related MDGs have been progressing toward achieving the 2015 targets, such as the primary education (PE) net enrollment rate (NER) (91% in 2007 versus 100%) and proportions of girls in the PE and secondary education (SE) gross enrollment rates (GERs) (more than 50% in 2007 versus 50%), quality-related MDGs have progressed slowly and seem difficult to achieve the 2015 targets (Appendix 10). These include cohort survival rate from grade 1 to grade 5 (52% in 2007 versus 95%), adult literacy rate (55% in 2007 versus 90%), and female literacy rate (49% in 2007). The first column of the results matrixes (Tables A7.1–A7.3 and Tables A7.5–A7.6, Appendix 7) also show some of these *partly achieved* impacts (e.g., adult literacy and female literacy rates).¹ These results imply the need to focus more on the quality aspect of education. On the poverty reduction impact, it can be achieved through substantially improved education and many other factors outside the education sector. However, consistent with the education-related impacts, poverty reduction has been slow, as the poverty incidence decreased from 57% to 40% over the past two decades (1990–2007) (Table A7.4).

B. Relevance of Development Partners' Education Strategies for Bangladesh

3. The SAPE period (1989–2007) covers ADB's four "official" country strategies for Bangladesh—the 1989 country operational strategy (COS), 1993 COS, 1999 COS, and 2005 country strategy and program (CSP) (Figure A1.1, Appendix 1). The country strategies of IDA that roughly corresponded to these ADB's four periods of country strategies include the country assistance strategies for 1986–1990, 1995–1998, 1998–2001, and 2006–2009, respectively.

¹ Due to the overlapping nature of the outcome and impact indicators, some studies may treat some of the MDG indicators as outcomes and some as impacts. For example, this SAPE classifies the access- and gender-related MDGs (e.g., NER and proportion of female enrollment) as outcome indicators in the results matrixes (Appendix 7), but quality-related MDGs (e.g., cohort survival, adult literacy, and female literacy rates) as impact indicators. The reason for this classification is that since outcomes are intermediate objectives and impacts are ultimate goal, the latter will naturally take longer to achieve than the former and will normally depend on the achievement of former first.

DFID and Japan did not have country strategies corresponding to these first two periods, but had ones corresponding to the last two periods. These included DFID's CSP for 1998–2002 and country assistance program (CAP) for 2006–2010, and Japan's 2000 CAP and 2006 CAP. During the first two periods, although DFID and Japan had no country strategies, DFID provided some assistance programs in the education sector, whereas Japan began to provide assistance programs in education in 2004.

4. Under each of the DPs' country strategies, the corresponding education strategy (i.e., education strategic priorities) was identified. In this section, the SAPE assesses the quality-entry (QAE) performance in terms of relevance of the four DPs' education strategic priorities for Bangladesh combined in each of the four periods against the three subcriteria as listed in para. 19 (ii) of the main text: (i) relevance to Bangladesh's education-related issues during that period, (ii) relevance to the GOB's development plans/strategies related to education during that period, and (iii) consistencies among themselves during that period.

5. **First Period (Corresponding to ADB's 1989 COS).** Figure A9.1 shows that the overall strategic thrusts of ADB's 1989 COS for Bangladesh were acceleration of economic growth, policy and institutional reforms, and targeted poverty reduction—mainly through the social sector, including education. These strategic thrusts were similar to those of IDA's country assistance strategy (CAS) in the corresponding period.

6. The education strategy of ADB's 1989 COS started to venture into PE (with formal PE as a priority and nonformal education [NFE] as a supplementary) while retaining SE.² When ADB started to emphasize PE, IDA had already been a major DP in this subsector.

7. The SAPE assesses and rates the combined ADB and IDA education strategies in the first period as *relevant* (Table A9.1) because of their focus on PE, and to some extent NFE, both of which were relevant to (i) the country's key education issues at that time as characterized by an extremely low literacy rate and low PE GER and NER (35%, 67.5%, and 60.5%, respectively); and high PE dropout and repetition rates (60% and 8%, respectively); (ii) the Government of Bangladesh's (GOB) education strategic priorities under the GOB's Third Plan (1985–1990), emphasizing PE and NFE; and (iii) each other DP's education strategic priorities. The DPs' education strategies would have been rated as highly relevant had they paid more attention to NFE to accelerate the increase in the extremely low literacy rate.

8. **Second Period (Corresponding to ADB's 1993 COS).** Figure A9.2 shows that the overall strategic thrust of ADB's 1993 COS for Bangladesh was poverty reduction, through three priority areas—efficient growth, access of the poor to growth benefits (through human resources development [HRD]), and environmental protection. Some of these strategic thrusts were overlapping with those of IDA's corresponding CAS (e.g., poverty reduction and private sector-led growth). Systematic coordination among DPs started during this period, since DPs' assistance had to be within the GOB's core investment program, which was the 3-year rolling framework to prioritize the public investment portfolio supported by the International Monetary Fund's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility.

² Prior to ADB's first official COS in 1989, ADB had a 1986 operational strategy paper (OSP) (footnote 3 of the main text). While the overall strategic thrusts of ADB's 1986 OSP were poverty reduction and laying the foundation for sustained growth, its education strategic priorities were skills development—in both the SE and NFE subsectors.

9. In the education sector, the education strategy of the ADB's 1993 COS continued to emphasize basic education (PE and SE), with better targeted PE—both formal and NFE, especially for females. These priorities were similar to those of IDA.

10. The SAPE assesses and rates the combined ADB and IDA education strategies in the second period as **relevant** (Table A9.1) due to their continued focus on PE, and to some extent NFE and SE, all of which were relevant to (i) the country's key education issues at that time as characterized by the remaining low literacy rate and low PE GER and NER (40%, 75%, and 68%, respectively); and high PE dropout and repetition rates (55% and 8%, respectively); (ii) the GOB's education strategic priorities under its Fourth Plan (1990–1995), emphasizing PE, NFE, and SE; and (iii) each other DP's education strategic priorities. Again, the DPs' education strategies would have been rated as highly relevant had they paid more attention to NFE to facilitate the increase in the existing low literacy rate, in accordance with the GOB's EFA effort.

11. **Third Period (Corresponding to ADB's 1999 COS).** Figure A9.3 shows that the overall strategic thrust of ADB's 1999 COS was again poverty reduction, through four priority areas—faster private sector-led growth, better development opportunities for the poor, HRD, and environmental protection. Most of these strategic thrusts were overlapping with those of IDA's corresponding CAS, though phrased differently. During this period, both DFID and Japan started to prepare country strategies for Bangladesh. Some of their strategic thrusts were similar to those of ADB and IDA (e.g., poverty reduction and HRD).

12. In the education sector, the education strategy of ADB's 1999 COS continued to emphasize PE (including the quality aspect), together with NFE and SE.³ These priorities were highly consistent with those of IDA, DFID, and Japan.

13. The SAPE assesses and rates the combined four DPs' education strategies in the third period as **highly relevant** (Table A9.1) due to their focus on PE (with the quality aspect) and NFE, and to some extent SE, all of which were highly relevant to (i) the country's key education issues at that time (e.g., access to PE had increased satisfactorily to 90% for GER and 81% for NER, but the quality aspect remained low, with high dropout and repetition rates [51% and 8%, respectively], and the literacy rate also remained low [47%] despite the relatively high formal PE enrollment rates; whereas SE GER and NER were also low [35% and 29%, respectively]); (ii) the GOB's education strategic priorities under its Fifth Plan (1997–2002), emphasizing PE, SE, and NFE with the EFA continuation; and (iii) each other DP's education strategic priorities.

14. **Fourth Period (Corresponding to ADB's 2005 CSP).** Figure A9.4 shows that the overall strategic thrust of ADB's current 2005 CSP is again poverty reduction, through three priority areas—improving investment climate for private sector-led growth, advancing the social development agenda to empower the poor, and addressing key governance issues. These are overlapping with those of IDA, DFID, and Japan in the corresponding period, though phrased differently. During this period, the DPs' assistance has become systematically well coordinated among themselves and with the GOB, as reflected in the following efforts: (i) the GOB's endorsement of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2005, assisted by the DP community, as a medium-term agenda to follow up on the progress of its long-term National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) (2006–2015) and MDGs; and (ii) the four key DPs (ADB, IDA, DFID, and Japan) jointly prepared their country strategies and programs.

³ ADB's education strategies for Bangladesh in its 1989, 1993, and 1999 COSs were also relevant to or consistent with ADB's 1988 corporate-level education strategy, which also focused on basic education—consisting of PE, NFE, and junior SE (see ADB. 1988. *Education and Development in Asia and the Pacific: Sector Paper*. Manila).

15. The same was true in the education sector, since 11 DPs joined force, in 2003, to partner the Second Primary Education Development Program (PEDP-II) under a subsector-wide approach (SWAp), mostly through pooled resource funding. During this period, ADB's education strategy in its 2005 CSP emphasizes the quality of basic education (not only PE, but also SE), while facilitating access for disadvantaged groups and starting to build the skills base of the next generation.⁴ These priorities are highly consistent with those of IDA, DFID, and Japan.

16. The SAPE assesses and rates the combined four DPs' education strategies in the fourth period as **highly relevant** (Table A9.1) due to their continued focus on the quality aspect of PE, and to some extent SE, while starting to improve skills for the future knowledge base, all of which are highly relevant to (i) the country's key education issues (e.g., access to PE had increased further to 93% for GER and 87% for NER, but the quality aspect remains low, with high dropout and repetition rates [49% and 7%, respectively], while the literacy rate also remains low [50%] despite the relatively high formal PE enrollment rates; whereas SE GER and NER are also low [41% and 38%, respectively]); (ii) the GOB's education strategic priorities under the PRSP and NPRS, emphasizing quality PE and SE, skills development, and the Education for All (EFA) continuation as a national action plan; and (iii) each other DP's education strategic priorities, including DPs' partnership through the PEDP-II SWAp.

C. Positioning of Development Partners' Education Strategies and Client Perceptions of Their Performance in Bangladesh's Education Sector

17. In this section, the SAPE assesses the strategic positioning or coherence of the four DPs' education strategies and their overall combined performance in Bangladesh's education sector in each of the four periods against the four subcriteria as listed in para. 19 (iii) of the main text: (i) DPs' subsector focus and selectivity based on comparative advantage by education component or geographical area; (ii) DPs' partnerships through appropriate modalities to create synergies in the education sector; (iii) DPs' long-term continuity to create a critical mass of beneficiaries in the education sector; and (iv) client perceptions of DPs' performance in the education sector. The first three subcriteria are to assess the QAE performance in terms of positioning or coherence of the DPs' country strategies combined,⁵ while the fourth subcriterion is to assess the DPs' combined performance based on client perceptions.

18. **First Period (Corresponding to ADB's 1989 COS).** Prior to its first official 1989 COS for Bangladesh, ADB had an informal 1986 Operational Strategy Paper in which the education strategy emphasized skills development through SE and NFE. ADB then provided two SE projects and one NFE project for Bangladesh, all of which were assessed by the project performance evaluation reports⁶ as *partly successful*. This implied that ADB did not seem to have a comparative advantage in the SE and NFE subsectors in those days.

⁴ ADB's education strategy for Bangladesh in its 2005 CSP are also relevant to or consistent with ADB's 2002 corporate-level education strategy, which focuses on improving access, quality, and management in all education subsectors (depending on circumstances in each country) for greater impacts on poverty reduction (see ADB. 2002. *Education Policies and Strategies*. Manila).

⁵ Additional criteria for assessing the QAE performance of education strategies can include (i) sufficient background analyses on education issues and EA's absorptive capacity, and (ii) evaluability (clear results framework or sector roadmap) in the education strategies. However, the SAPE does not use these two additional criteria to assess the QAE performance at the strategic level due to information limitation on these two criteria in the education strategies of the other DPs.

⁶ ADB's project performance audit reports were renamed PPERs in January 2006 (see ADB. 2006. *Guidelines for Preparing Performance Evaluation Reports for Public Sector Operations*. Manila.)

19. Subsequently, in the first SAPE period corresponding to the ADB's first official 1989 COS, ADB's education strategy for Bangladesh started to venture into PE, while keeping NFE and SE. The IDA's education strategy, as provided in its CAS for 1986–1990, had been focusing on PE, particularly for disadvantaged groups (Figure A9.1). Thus, in this period, the SAPE's assessment and ratings of the four subcriteria under the DPs' strategic positioning and overall performance in Bangladesh's education sector are as follows (Table A9.1):

- (i) The combined DPs' focus and selectivity based on comparative advantage in their education strategies are considered **partly satisfactory**, because only two of the four DPs had education strategies, and ADB had not really selected priority subsectors to focus on yet, as it included three subsectors—PE, NFE, and SE—though with varying degrees.
- (ii) The DPs' partnerships and synergies in their education strategies are considered **partly satisfactory**, because, except for IDA, the other three DPs did not seem to have their own niche subsectors in education yet, particularly when DFID and Japan had not yet developed their country strategies at that time, thus lacking strategic directions for close coordination to create synergies.
- (iii) The combined DPs' long-term continuity in their education strategies is considered **partly satisfactory**, because only two of the four DPs had education strategies, and these DPs had started to provide assistance in the education sector not so long ago.
- (iv) The client perceptions of the DPs' combined performance in the education sector is considered **partly satisfactory** in the first period due to the lack of education strategies of some DPs to provide an integrated systematic direction for education assistance programs among the DPs themselves (and with GOB and other stakeholders), although a number of key DPs had started to cooperate in providing PE assistance programs through a discrete type of project cofinancing under the first investment cycle.

20. **Second Period (Corresponding to ADB's 1993 COS).** ADB's education strategy for Bangladesh continued with PE (but better targeted), together with NFE and SE. These priorities were similar to those of IDA, while DFID and Japan were yet to have country strategies (Figure A9.2). The DPs' education strategies started to realize that overlapping efforts among them could be avoided by resorting to geographical concentration, particularly for PE. In this period, the SAPE's assessment and ratings of the four subcriteria under the DPs' strategic positioning and overall performance in Bangladesh's education sector are as follows (Table A9.1):

- (i) The combined DPs' focus and selectivity based on comparative advantage in their education strategies are considered **satisfactory**, since most of them focused on the PE and NFE subsectors based on the country's urgent needs at that time (i.e., to accelerate enrollment and literacy), while being selective by working in different geographical areas to avoid duplication.
- (ii) The DPs' partnerships and synergies in their education strategies are considered **satisfactory**, because they started to realize the need to coordinate closely to create synergies and reinforce each other's assistance, particularly in PE. Although DFID and Japan did not have country strategies at that time, the former had provided assistance programs, mostly in PE and NFE.

- (iii) The combined DPs' long-term continuity in their education strategies is considered **partly satisfactory**, because DFID and Japan did not have country strategies at the time to signify long-term continuation in education strategic priorities, although the former started to provide assistance programs mostly in PE and NFE.
- (iv) The client perceptions of the DPs' combined performance in the education sector is considered **partly satisfactory** in the second period due to the following: (a) DFID and Japan continued to lack education strategies to provide an integrated systematic direction for education assistance programs; and (b) although key DPs had continued to cooperate in providing PE assistance programs through the second investment cycle, the projects were not well conceived enough to address the GOB's limited institutional capacity at that time, thus resulting in confusions and changes in the intended assistance modality from a series of discrete projects to a SWAp and then back to the original modality.

21. **Third Period (Corresponding to ADB's 1999 COS).** ADB's education strategy continued with PE, together with NFE and SE, but started to emphasize the quality aspect. These priorities were similar to those of IDA, particularly the quality aspect of PE and life survival skills of NFE (Figure A9.3). DFID and Japan started to have country strategies, in which their education strategies also emphasized PE (including quality) and NFE. Thus, in this period, the SAPE's assessment and ratings of the four subcriteria under the DPs' strategic positioning and overall performance in Bangladesh's education sector are as follows (Table A9.1):

- (i) The combined DPs' focus and selectivity based on comparative advantage in their education strategies are considered **satisfactory**, because most of them focused on the PE and NFE subsectors, with the quality aspect of PE, since access or enrollment had improved satisfactorily in the past.
- (ii) The DPs' partnerships and synergies in their education strategies are considered **satisfactory**, because DFID and Japan started to have country strategies, and hence education strategies that also provided directions to build partnerships among DPs to create synergies, including through a SWAp modality.
- (iii) The combined DPs' long-term continuity in their education strategies is considered **satisfactory**, because ADB and IDA continued their assistance in PE, particularly in increasing access among the disadvantaged and improving quality. Although DFID and Japan had just started to have education strategies during this period, the former had been providing continued assistance programs, especially in PE and NFE.
- (iv) Client perceptions of the DPs' combined performance in the education sector are considered **satisfactory** in the third period, because (a) DFID and Japan had started to have their education strategies to provide an integrated systematic direction for their education assistance programs; and (b) the partnerships among the four DPs, as well as with other DPs and the GOB, had been strengthened through the adoption of the SWAp modality in the DPs' third investment cycle (the PEDP-II) in the PE subsector, although the improvement of the EA's institutional capacity was not sufficient during the design stage for the SWAp to be efficiently implemented.


22. **Fourth Period (Corresponding to ADB's 2005 CSP).** ADB's education strategy has continued with quality PE and SE, but now with an addition of skills development. The emphasis on quality PE and SE is similar to that of the IDA and Japan, while DFID still emphasizes PE through the SWAp and NFE (Figure A9.4). Thus, in this fourth period, the SAPE's assessment and ratings of the four subcriteria under the DPs' strategic positioning and overall performance in Bangladesh's education sector are as follows (Table A9.1):

- (i) The combined DPs' focus and selectivity based on comparative advantage in their education strategies are considered **highly satisfactory**, because most of them focus on the PE and NFE subsectors, and to some extent SE, while being selective in terms of improving the quality of PE and increasing access, particularly by disadvantaged groups, since overall PE enrollment has already increased substantially.
- (ii) The DPs' partnerships and synergies in their education strategies are considered **highly satisfactory**, since their strategies continue to give priority to the subsectors and areas that have been done well (e.g., PE and NFE, and to some extent SE). At the same time, the partnerships among themselves, as well as with other DPs and the GOB, have been strengthened in all sectors in general (e.g., through their efforts in preparing joint country strategies and programs and assisting the GOB to prepare the PRSP and NPRS), and in the education sector in particular (e.g., with the emphasis on the PE SWAp to create synergies).
- (iii) The combined DPs' long-term continuity in their education strategies is considered **highly satisfactory**, because they have provided long-term continuity in PE and NFE, and to some extent SE, to build on the success of the past and consolidate further achievements, such as the substantial increase in overall access to PE, which helps create a critical mass of beneficiaries.
- (iv) Client perceptions of the DPs' combined performance in the education sector are considered **highly satisfactory** in the fourth period because (a) the DPs coordinate closely among themselves, as well as with the GOB and other DPs, to build strong partnerships in all sectors (e.g., by preparing the joint country strategies and programs) and in particular in the education sector (e.g., by trying to improve the implementation efficiency of the PEDP-II SWAp); and (b) the PE subsector has achieved substantial results in terms of improving overall access.

D. Summary of Top-Down Assessment and Ratings

23. Based on the assessments in sections A–C, although the DP's combined program contributions to Bangladesh's achievement of long-term education impacts is rated as *partly successful*, their combined performance in the other two top-down criteria (i.e., strategic relevance, and positioning with client perceptions of their performance in the education sector) is rated as *relevant* and *satisfactory*. These have contributed to their overall **successful** top-down performance rating in Bangladesh's education sector. The successful rating scale of 1.8 (Table A9.1) is on the low side, implying scope for improvement in education quality and institutional capacity in contributing to long-term impacts. However, the DPs' education strategies are found to be well designed, providing good directions for their assistance programs.


Figure A9.1: Assessment and Ratings of Relevance of DPs' Education Strategies for Bangladesh in the Late 1980s



ADB = Asian Development Bank, CAS = country assistance strategy of IDA, COS = country operational strategy of ADB, DP = development partner, EFA = Education for All, GDP = gross domestic product, GER = gross enrollment rate, HRD = human resources development, IDA = International Development Association, NER = net enrollment rate, NFE = nonformal education, PE = primary education, R = relevant, SE = secondary education.

Sources: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team, based on various issues of ADB's and IDA's country strategies.


Figure A9.2: Assessment and Ratings of Relevance of DPs' Education Strategies for Bangladesh in the Early to Mid-1990s



ADB = Asian Development Bank, CAS = country assistance strategy of IDA, CIP = Core Investment Program, COS = country operational strategy of ADB, DP = development partner, EFA = Education for All, ESAF = Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, GDP = gross domestic product, GER = gross enrollment rate, HRD = human resource development, IDA = International Development Association, IMF = International Monetary Fund, NER = net enrollment rate, NFE = nonformal education, PE = primary education, R = relevant, SE = secondary education.

Sources: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team, based on various issues of ADB's and IDA's country strategies.


Figure A9.3: Assessment and Ratings of Relevance of DPs' Education Strategies for Bangladesh in the Late 1990s and Early 2000s



ADB = Asian Development Bank, CAP = country assistance program of Japan, CAS = country assistance strategy of IDA, COS = country operational strategy of ADB, CSP = country strategy and program of DFID, dev. = development, DFID = Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, DP = development partner, Ed. = education, EFA = Education for All, ESAF = Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, GDP = gross domestic product, GER = gross enrollment rate, HR = highly relevant, HRD = human resources development, IDA = International Development Association, IMF = International Monetary Fund, NER = net enrollment rate, NFE = nonformal education, PE = primary education, PSD = private sector development, SE = secondary education.

Sources: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team, based on various issues of ADB's, DFID's, IDA's, and Japan's country strategies.

Figure A9.4: Assessment and Ratings of Relevance of DPs' Education Strategies for Bangladesh in the Mid-2000s



ADB = Asian Development Bank, CAP = country assistance program of DFID and Japan, CAS = country assistance strategy of IDA, CSP = country strategy and program of ADB, dev. = development, DFID = Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, Ed. = education, EFA = Education for All, GDP = gross domestic product, GER = gross enrollment rate, HR = highly relevant, HRD = human resource development, IDA = International Development Association, MDG = Millennium Development Goal, NER = net enrollment rate, NGO = nongovernment organization, NFE = nonformal education, NPRS = National Poverty Reduction Strategy, PE = primary education, PRSP = Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, PSD = private sector development, SE = secondary education, SWAp = subsector-wide approach.
Sources: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team, based on various issues of ADB's, DFID's, IDA's, and Japan's country strategies.

Table A9.1: All Top-Down Evaluation Criteria and Ratings of the Four DPs' Combined Performance^a in Bangladesh's Education Sector

DPs' Ed. Strategies as Identified in Their Country Strategies for Bangladesh ^b	Criteria for LT Impacts		Criteria for DPs' Strategic Relevance						Criteria for DPs' Strategic Positioning and Their Overall Performance								WA of All Top-Down Criteria ^d
	WA ^c		Country's Key Ed. Issues	GOB's Plans/ Strategies related to Ed.	DPs' Ed. Strategic Priorities	WA ^c	DPs' Focus and Selectivity based on CA in the Design of Ed. Strategies	DPs' Partnerships through Appropriate Modalities to Create Synergies	DPs' Long-Term Continuity to Create a Critical Mass of Beneficiaries	Client Perceptions of DPs' Overall Performance in the Ed. Sector	WA ^c						
1 st CS Period	1	1.0	2 (R)	2 (R)	2 (R)	2.0	1 (PS)	1 (PS)	1 (PS)	1 (PS)	1.0	1.3					
2 nd CS Period	1	1.0	2 (R)	2 (R)	2 (R)	2.0	2 (S)	2 (S)	1 (PS)	1 (PS)	1.5	1.5					
3 rd CS Period	1	1.0	3 (HR)	3 (HR)	3 (HR)	3.0	2 (S)	2 (S)	2 (S)	2 (S)	2.0	2.0					
4 th CS Period	1	1.0	3 (HR)	3 (HR)	3 (HR)	3.0	3 (HS)	3 (HS)	3 (HS)	3 (HS)	3.0	2.3					
Overall Rating^e	1.0	1.0 (PS)	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5 (R)	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.9 (S)	1.8 (S)					

ADB = Asian Development Bank, CA = comparative advantage, COS = country operational strategy of ADB, CS = country strategy, CSP = country strategy and program of ADB, DFID = Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, DP = development partner, Ed. = education, GOB = Government of Bangladesh, HR = highly relevant, HS = highly satisfactory or highly successful, IDA = International Development Association of the World Bank, IR = irrelevant, LR = less relevant, LT = long-term, OED = Operations Evaluation Department, PPER = project performance evaluation report of OED, PS = partly satisfactory or partly successful, R = relevant, S = satisfactory or successful, SAPE = sector assistance program evaluation, US = unsatisfactory or unsuccessful, WA = weighted average.

^a The four DPs include ADB, DFID, IDA, and Japan.

^b The SAPE classifies DPs' country strategies into four periods, corresponding to the ADB's 1989 COS, 1993 COS, 1999 COS, and 2005 CSP, respectively.

^c The SAPE applies an equal weight to each subcriterion under each of the three top-down criteria: (i) the DPs' program contributions to the country's achievement of LT impacts, (ii) the DPs' strategic relevance, and (iii) the DPs' strategic positioning/coherence. Each of these three top-down criteria also has an equal weight among themselves.

^d The SAPE uses OED's four-rating scales as per the PPER Guidelines: (i) HR or HS = 3, (ii) R or S = 2, (iii) LR or PS = 1, and (iv) IR or US = 0.

^e The overall rating scale for each of the three top-down criteria and for all the three criteria combined follow the standard rating scales as per the PPER Guidelines as follows:

(i) HS >= 2.7, (ii) 2.7 > S >= 1.6, (iii) 1.6 > PS >= 0.8, and (iv) 0.8 > US.

(ii) the DPs' strategic relevance, and (iii) the DPs' strategic positioning/coherence. Each of these three top-down criteria also has an equal weight among themselves.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

Table A9.2: Overall WA Rating of Bottom-Up and Top-Down Combined

	Bottom-Up Rating from Table A7.7 (Appendix 7)	Top-Down Rating from Table A9.1	WA Rating of Bottom-Up and Top-Down Criteria ^a
Overall WA Combined Rating^b	1.7	1.8	1.8 (S)

WA = weighted average.

^a Equal weight is applied to the bottom-up and top-down ratings to calculate the WA rating.

^b Same as footnote e in Table A9.1 above.

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Mission Team.

BANGLADESH'S MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Goal	Targets	Indicators	Bangladesh's Baselines and Most Recent Status	Bangladesh's Targets
Goal 1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Target 1 Halve, between 1990–2015, the proportion of people living in poverty	1. Proportion of people living below the national poverty line (\$1 per day-PPP)	1. 57.0% in 1990 50.0% in 1997 49.8% in 2003 40.0% in 2007	1. 29.4% in 2015
		2. Poverty gap ratio (incidence times depth of poverty)	2. 17.2% in 1991 12.9% in 2000 9.0% in 2005	2. 14% in 2015
		3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption	3. 9.0% in 2000	3. NA
	Target 2 Halve, between 1990–2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	4. Prevalence of underweight in children under 5 years of age	4. 67% in 1990 51% in 2000	4. NA
		5. Proportion of population having below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption	5. NA	5. NA
Goal 2 Achieve universal primary education	Target 3 Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	6. Net enrolment in primary school	6. 61% in 1991 81% in 1997 87% in 2003 91% in 2007	6. 100% in 2015
		7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5	7. 49% in 1990 54% in 2003 52% in 2007	7. 95% in 2015
		8. Adult literacy rate, 15–24 year olds	8. 35% in 1990 47% in 1997 50% in 2003 55% in 2007	8. 90% in 2015
Goal 3 Promote gender equality and empower women	Target 4 Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all	9. Proportion of girls in primary, secondary, and tertiary education	9. 1990 Primary: 47% Secondary: 35% Tertiary: 26%	9. 2015 50% 50% 50%

Goal	Targets	Indicators	Bangladesh's Baselines and Most Recent Status	Bangladesh's Targets
	levels of education no later than 2015		2005 Primary: 51% ('07) Secondary: 52% Tertiary: 24%	
		10. Female adult literacy rate, 15–24 years old	10. 38% in 1997 44% in 2003 49% in 2007	10. NA
		11. Proportion of females in wage employment in the nonagriculture sector	11. 22% in 2000	11. NA
		12. Proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament	12. 2% in 2000	12. NA
Goal 4 Reduce child mortality	Target 5 Reduce by two thirds, between 1990–2015, the under-5 mortality rate	13. Under-5 mortality rate (deaths/1,000 live births)	13. 151 in 1990 82 in 2000	13. 50 in 2015
		14. Infant mortality rate (deaths/1,000 live births)	14. 94 in 1990 56 in 2000	14. NA
		15. Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles	15. 54% in 1990 69% in 2000	15. 100% in 2015
Goal 5 Improve maternal health	Target 6 Reduce by three quarters, between 1990–2015, the maternal mortality ratio	16. Maternal mortality ratio (deaths/100,000 births)	16. 570 in 1990 320–400 in 2000	16. 143 in 2015
		16a. Contraceptive prevalence rate	16a. NA	16a. NA
		17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel	17. 5% in 1990 12% in 2000	17. 50% in 2010
		17a. Total fertility rate	17a. 3.3 in 1990 3.3 in 2000	17a. 2.2 in 2010
		17b. Proportion of mothers who are malnourished	17b. 45% in 2000	17b. less than 20% in 2015
		17c. Legally stipulated age at girl's first	17c. 18 years in 2000	17c. 20 years in 2015

Goal	Targets	Indicators	Bangladesh's Baselines and Most Recent Status	Bangladesh's Targets
		marriage		
		17d. Proportion of maternal deaths caused by violence	17d. 14% in 2000	17d. 0% in 2015
Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases	Target 7 Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	18. HIV positive among: - injecting drug users (IDUs) - female sex workers - men who have sex with men	18. 4% in 2000 0.2–0.7% in 2000 0.2% in 2000	18. NA
		19a. Condom use rate among: - female sex workers - rickshaw pullers - truck pullers	19a. 2–4% in 2000 2% in 2000 25% in 2000	19a. NA
		19b. Needle sharing among IDUs	19b. 25–75% in 2000	19b. NA
		20a. Blood screened before transfusion	20a. NA	20a. NA
		20b. Health facilities with adequate equipment for screening HIV-infected blood	20b. NA	20b. NA
	Target 8 Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	21. Prevalence of malaria (million cases annually)	21. 1 in 2000	21. 0.5 in 2015
		21a. Death rate associated with malaria	21a. 1% in 2000	21a. 0.05% in 2015
		22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures	22. NA	22. NA
		23. Deaths associated with tuberculosis (annually)	23. 70,000 in 2000	23. NA
		24. Prevalence rate associated with tuberculosis (per 100,000)	24. 233 in 2000	24. NA
		24a. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected under directly observed	24a.	24a. NA

Goal	Targets	Indicators	Bangladesh's Baselines and Most Recent Status	Bangladesh's Targets
		treatment, short-course - detected - cured	34% in 2000 84% in 2000	
Goal 7 Ensure environmental sustainability	Target 9 Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources	25. Proportion of land forest cover	25. 9% in 1990 10.2% in 2000	25. 20% in 2015
		26. Area protected to maintain biological diversity as proportion of total surface area	26. 0.01% in 2000	26. NA
		27. Energy use (kilograms of oil equivalent) per \$1000 GDP (PPP)	27. 123.18 in 1990 92.36 in 2000	27. NA
		27a. Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels (metric tons/capita)	27a. 0.141 in 1990 0.189 in 2000	27a. NA
	Target 10 Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water	28. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source: - urban - rural	28. 82% in 1990 72% in 1990	28. 100% in 2015 96.5% in 2015
		29. Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation: - urban - rural	29. 56% in 2000 29% in 2000	29. 85.5% in 2015 55.5% in 2015
	Target 11 By 2020, have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers	30. Proportion of urban poor: - owning dwelling - owning land	30. 26% in 2000 18% in 2000	30. NA

AIDS = acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, EMIS = education management information system, GDP = gross domestic product, HIV = human immunodeficiency virus, IDU = injecting drug user, MOE = Ministry of Education, MOPME = Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, NA = not available, PPP = purchasing power parity, UNDP = United Nations Development Programme.

Sources: UNDP. 2005. *Millennium Development Goals: Bangladesh Progress Report*. Dhaka; MOPME and MOE. 2007. *EMIS Databases*. Dhaka.

ASSESSMENT OF POSITIONING OF ADB'S EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN RELATION TO ITS EDUCATION STRATEGIES FOR BANGLADESH

1. This appendix assesses the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) performance in terms of program positioning, i.e., how well ADB has translated its education strategies identified under the four country operational strategies (COSs) for Bangladesh (the 1989, 1993, 1999, and 2005 COSs) during the period covered by this sector assistance program evaluation (SAPE) into a coherent program. The assessment of positioning is done for the entire SAPE period (1989–2007) in section A, and for the four SAPE subperiods (1990–1993, 1994–1999, 2000–2005, and 2006–2007) under the corresponding four COSs in section B.

A. Overall SAPE Period

2. Bangladesh became an ADB member in 1973. Prior to ADB's first formal COS for Bangladesh in 1989, ADB provided Bangladesh with three education loans approved in 1978,¹ 1984,² and 1981.³ The first two were for the secondary education (SE) subsector, and the third for the nonformal education (NFE) subsector. Since the period covered by this SAPE starts from 1989 for assessing education strategies and from 1990 for assessing education programs, these three loans (which account for only 5% of the amount of ADB's total education loans for Bangladesh from the beginning until 2011 [Figure A1.1, Appendix 1]) are not covered by the SAPE. ADB's overall education assistance programs during the SAPE period (1990–2007) thus consist of 14 loans for \$791 million, 16 project preparatory technical assistance (PPTA) grants for \$5.9 million,⁴ and 9 advisory technical assistance (ADTA) grants for \$2.8 million (Tables A2.1–A2.3, Appendix 2).

3. During the overall SAPE period, Figure A11.1 shows that three quarters of ADB's education loan amount has been concentrated in basic education—39% in SE and 36% in primary education (PE)—with the remaining 14% in NFE and 11% in senior secondary education (SSE) and higher education (HE). This lending composition is generally consistent with or responsive to ADB's education strategies under its four COSs (1989, 1993, 1999, and 2005), which have focused mostly on basic education. If NFE is considered as part of basic education, the share of ADB's lending in basic education would be almost 90%. Figure A11.2 shows that ADB's nonlending PPTA share in PE is about half that of SE (18% versus 40%), because there are fewer PPTA grants in the former than in the latter (three versus five), as one loan in the former is an emergency loan which did not require a PPTA, and two of the three PPTA grants under the former are of small amounts. For all the PPTA grants, about 80% went to basic education (PE, SE, and NFE). Figure A11.3 shows that ADB's nonlending ADTA share in NFE is the largest (68%), compared with those of PE (24%) and SE (6%), since not all PE and SE loans had associated ADTA, whereas one NFE loan had more than one ADTA grants of much higher amounts. For all the ADTA grant, about 98% went to basic education. Based on these lending and nonlending compositions by subsector combined, the SAPE rates the positioning of ADB's education programs in relation to its strategies as **satisfactory**, because they generally focused on basic education (particularly PE and SE), with long-term continuous

¹ ADB. 1978. *Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the People's Republic of Bangladesh for the Education Equipment Development Project*. Manila.

² ADB. 1984. *Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the People's Republic of Bangladesh for the Secondary Science Education Sector Project*. Manila.

³ ADB. 1981. *Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the People's Republic of Bangladesh for the Community Schools Project*. Manila.

⁴ Two PPTA grants (one in NFE and the other in technical education and vocational training) did not lead to loans. These include TA1155-BAN: *Non-Farm Employment Creation for Rural Women*, approved in 1989, for \$99,000; and TA2130-BAN: *Vocational Training*, approved in 1994, for \$400,000.


support. It is not considered highly satisfactory, because about 11% of the lending share went to the SSE and HE subsectors rather than to basic education.

B. Four SAPE Subperiods

4. Figure A11.4 divides ADB's education lending programs into five subperiods. The first bar represents the subperiod prior to the overall SAPE period (prior to 1990) in order to show that, prior to the SAPE period, ADB focused on SE, which accounted for 76% of its total education lending amount at that time. The SAPE period (1990–2007) is divided into four subperiods of ADB's programs (1990–1993, 1994–1999, 2000–2005, and 2006–2007), represented by the second to fifth bars, corresponding to ADB's four COSs (1989, 1993, 1999, and 2005). ADB's lending compositions in these four subperiods are shown in Figure A11.4 to compare with its entire lending composition in the whole SAPE period in Figure A11.1.

5. While Figure A11.1 shows almost equal amounts of ADB's lending programs in PE and SE over the entire SAPE period, Figure A11.4 reveals that lending to PE dominated the first three subperiods (in the second to fourth bars) and that to SE dominated the fourth subperiod (in the fifth bar). As for ADB's nonlending PPTA programs, Figure A11.5 shows a different pattern from that of the lending programs, particularly in the fourth subperiod (in the fifth bar). About 41% of the PPTA amounts in that subperiod went to technical education and vocational training (TEVT), including skills development, in order to design a TEVT project, which was identified in the pipeline for 2008 and has recently been approved. The pattern of ADB's nonlending ADTA programs in Figure A11.6 does not differ much from that of the lending programs (Figure A11.4), since the former were normally designed to accompany the latter. Based on these lending and nonlending compositions by subsector in the four periods combined, the SAPE rates ADB's performance in translating its education strategies into the lending programs as **satisfactory**, because the program in each of the subperiods generally followed the corresponding strategy in terms of focus, selectivity, and long-term continuity, particularly in the PE and SE subsectors, with coordination and synergies with other development partners. The only deviation is shown in the first subperiod (in the second bar), during which 33% of its lending went out of the way to SSE and HE, rather than to basic education.


Figure A11.1: Composition of ADB's Approved Education Loans by Subsector for Bangladesh (1990–2007)



ADB = Asian Development Bank.

Source: Calculated by the Evaluation Mission Team.


Figure A11.2: Composition of ADB's Approved Education PPTA Grants by Subsector for Bangladesh (for Loans Approved during 1990–2007)



ADB = Asian Development Bank, PPTA = project preparatory technical assistance, TEVT = technical education and vocational Training.


Source: Calculated by the Evaluation Mission Team.

Figure A11.3: Composition of ADB's Approved Education ADTA Grants by Subsector for Bangladesh (1990–2007)




ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADTA = advisory technical assistance.


Source: Calculated by the Evaluation Mission Team.



Source: Calculated by the Evaluation Mission Team.



Source: Calculated by the Evaluation Mission Team.



Source: Calculated by the Evaluation Mission Team.

DETAILED SWOT ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' PERFORMANCE

1. This appendix provides detailed analysis of the “*strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats*” (SWOT) factors affecting the development partners’ (DPs) performance in Bangladesh’s education sector, including their performance in the subsector-wide approach (SWAp) modality, based on the four categories of classification in the SWOT table presented in the main text: (i) design factors within DPs’ control; (ii) design factors beyond DPs’ control; (iii) implementation factors within DPs’ control; and (iv) implementation factors beyond DPs’ control. These four groups of factors are further classified into the SWOT factors to provide a systematic framework to draw lessons and recommendations for improving DPs’ future operations.

A. Design Factors within DPs’ Control (*Success Drivers or Strengths*)

1. DPs’ Collective Focus on Primary Education (PE), with Selectivity Based on Comparative Advantage

2. In recognition of the importance of basic education, considerable attention has been given to PE by both the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) and its DPs. The education strategies of key DPs for Bangladesh since the late 1980s to the present have consistently identified PE as a priority investment area. This collective focus on PE has been an important success driver, as it has provided the platform for a concerted development effort in the subsector. This has also provided the impetus for effective collaboration of the DPs’ programs, with assistance provided in accordance with their comparative advantage. For example, during the first and second investment cycles in PE, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Development Association (IDA) mostly provided the “hardware” component, while other DPs took most of the “software” side. Also in terms of area-slice distribution of assistance, ADB covered two divisions during the first investment cycle, then three divisions during the second investment cycle, while IDA covered the rest of the country. It was demonstrated that focusing on a specific component or geographical area, rather spreading assistance to cover too many components, is more likely to enhance results achieved.

2. DPs’ Partnerships through Appropriate Modalities

3. As stressed in the DPs’ education strategies and translated into subsequent assistance programs, effective partnerships between the GOB and DPs or among the DPs themselves were an important success driver, as they helped create synergies, thereby increasing the likelihood of success. In Bangladesh’s PE subsector, sufficient coordination among DPs has been strengthened over time since their joint investments began in the late 1980s. In the second investment cycle, their agreement to provide complementary investments under a common policy framework was instrumental in consolidating DPs’ and the GOB’s efforts to bring about PE improvements. Also, the adoption of the SWAp in the third investment cycle, while not perfect due to drawbacks that were later realized during implementation, represents a major progression in DPs’ cooperation from a piecemeal, project-by-project approach to a more strategic approach. Similarly in the secondary education (SE) subsector, appropriate use of modalities (e.g., sector loan for the Secondary Education Sector Improvement Project [SESIP] and the combination of a policy-based element with a project loan for the Secondary Education Sector Development Project and Program [SESDP]), as opposed to a project-type approach proved to be more useful, particularly in terms of facilitating dialogue with the GOB on key policy and institutional reforms in the subsector. In the nonformal education (NFE) subsector, however, there did not seem to be much effort among DPs to harmonize and coordinate activities.

3. DPs' Long-Term Continuity with Adequate Financial Resources

4. Having a long-term perspective both in the DPs' education strategies and assistance programs are shown to increase the likelihood of sustaining results. The DPs' sustained engagement in PE, with adequate financial backing, created a critical mass of beneficiaries, as reflected in the sustained increase in the PE gross enrollment rate (GER) from 67.5% to 98.8% during 1990–2007. In fact, Bangladesh is now close to achieving universal PE, owing to more than 20 years of continued development assistance to the subsector. Likewise for SE, ADB has provided continued assistance to the subsector since the early 1990s, which helped double the SE GER from 23% to 50% during 1990–2007. Moreover, systemic issues related to improving education quality and capacity development, which do not respond to one-shot provision of assistance, were progressively tackled. Meanwhile in the NFE subsector, continued engagement by ADB is not as strongly demonstrated as in the PE and SE subsectors.

4. DPs' Design of Program Management Unit (PMU) Activities Mainstreamed into the Executing Agency's (EA) Normal Operations

5. It is widely acknowledged that while having a separate project implementation unit (PIU) is useful for efficient project implementation, mainstreaming project activities into the regular operations of EAs is more likely to ensure that capacity is developed and sustained within the organization. Moreover, putting EAs in the driver's seat bolsters project ownership and commitment. In Bangladesh's PE subsector, experiences from the first and second investment cycles show that having separate PIUs, especially with a multiplicity of DPs involved, not only leads to serious coordination problems but also to lost capacity. Due to the way implementation arrangements were designed, knowledge and skills were not transferred to the EA but rather lost as the PIUs were dissolved after project completion. By setting up a PMU that is properly integrated with DPE's regular operations under the Second Primary Education Development Program (PEDP-II) SWAp, it is more likely that institutional impacts will be realized in terms of knowledge and skills transferred and acquired. Meanwhile, in the SE subsector, although PIU activities were not technically mainstreamed into EA's normal functions, PIUs were retained and continued from one project to another to ensure that capacity is kept within the organization. For example, the structure of the PIU of the SESIP was retained and continued in the same role for the SESDP, and most of the recruited staff were those who worked for similar types of projects, such as the SESIP.

5. DPs' Engagement of GOB and EA to be Involved in the Design Stage in a Participatory Manner

6. Another important success driver in Bangladesh's education sector was the strong partnerships forged between the DPs and the GOB/EAs. Because of the staunch commitment of GOB to the Education for All and its poverty reduction agenda, it consistently demonstrated full participation in the preparation of the DPs' initiatives in the PE subsector, as well as ADB's initiatives in the NFE and SE subsectors, by providing adequate staff time and preparatory work during the design stage. For example, GOB's strong involvement during the design of the PEDP-II was illustrated by its initiation of the medium-term budgetary framework, which placed the working budget for the PEDP-II within the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education's (MOPME) overall budgetary framework. Key instruments for demand-side financing were also made available at the school level.

B. Design Factors External to DPs' Control (*Success Drivers or Opportunities*)

7. Conducive government policy and institutional environments are reflected in the GOB's and EA's strong ownership and commitment to improving NFE, PE, and gender balance in enrollment through their adoption of the (i) Perspective Development Plan (1980–2000); (ii) EFA initiative (1990) and National Plan of Action (2003–2015); (iii) Compulsory Primary Education Act (1992); and (iv) Millennium Development Goals agenda, many targets of which are related to education. These had been a critical success driver in achieving subsector outcomes. Despite changes in the government, these policies and plans were carried on for more than 20 years, thereby ensuring continuity and sustainability. This also provided the DPs with an opportunity to plan development assistance in a more strategic manner, without or with only limited risk of major policy reversals. Likewise in the SE subsector, the GOB's and EA's commitment to SE has been increasing in response to the expected higher transition rate resulting from the significant efforts being given to PE. Of particular importance is the development of the Secondary Education Sector Development Plan (SE-SDP) (2000–2010) in 1998 with ADB assistance. The SE-SDP provided a strategic vision, within the context of which ADB's subsequent SE projects were all designed and implemented.

C. Design Factors within DPs' Control (*Deterrence Factors or Weaknesses*)

1. Weak Design of Education Management Information System (EMIS), though Adequate Evaluability with Clear Results Frameworks

8. A clear results framework identifying key performance targets is important in monitoring and measuring project achievements. DPs' project designs for Bangladesh's education sector generally have clear frameworks. However, project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is constrained by the GOB's weak EMIS due to institutional fragmentation, with EMIS functions split up between MOPME and the Ministry of Education (MOE). While the root of this weakness is systemic by nature, DPs' could have dealt with this problem early on during the preparation stage by designing a system that would enable MOPME's EMIS cell to function better and for it to be more integrated with MOE's EMIS at the Bangladesh Bureau of Education Information System (BANBEIS).

2. DPs' Inadequate Background Analysis of Issues in the Entire Education Sector

9. To be able to design a project that is responsive to overall sector needs, a better understanding of issues affecting the entire education sector, together with key subsector issues, and how these problems link with each other is crucial. DPs' project designs in Bangladesh's education sector have a tendency to be short-sighted, with focus generally limited to the subsector in question, thus limiting the achievement of desired outcomes and impacts. This shortcoming is largely due to the lack of sufficient background analysis during project preparation, which in turn also hampers the development of a comprehensive education strategy that will guide more integrated development planning. Meanwhile, in the SE subsector, adequate analysis of subsector issues have been undertaken, which has been the basis for the formulation of the GOB's SE-SDP. However, the SE-SDP did not seem to have been well integrated into the overall education system. For example, while it aims to extend basic education from the current graduation level of grade 5 in the PE system to grade 8 in the SE system, there does not seem to have been any concrete action among the agencies and authorities within the SE system to coordinate this goal with their counterparts in the PE system.

3. **DPs' Inadequate Analysis of the EA's Capacity to Implement Complex Projects/Programs and of the Initial Necessary Conditions for Harmonization Required to Implement the SWAp**

10. Sufficient sector capacity is an important prerequisite for successful project/program implementation. In many cases, however, capacity is weak or lacking in implementing complex projects/programs or new modalities (such as SWAp). To be able to set a more realistic expectation of what institutions are capable of achieving, baseline assessments of the EA's institutional capacity and the initial necessary conditions required for harmonization (if SWAp is chosen as the modality) should be undertaken during the design stage. In Bangladesh, full institutional capacity diagnoses were often not sufficiently carried out during project preparation, thus leading to difficulties and inefficiencies during implementation. For example, during the preparation of the second investment cycle in PE, the DPs agreed to adopt a SWAp without first analyzing whether the EA was capable of managing such a complex arrangement. It was only after the joint post-appraisal mission that they acknowledged that the GOB was still not ready to adopt the SWAp, thus the eventual decision to revert back to a project-based modality. Even during the preparation of the PEDP-II, such institutional analysis was not prepared in advance, which then led to long initial delays. Similarly, since no analysis was prepared to identify initial necessary conditions required for harmonizing various DPs' procedures, the PEDP-II has to follow different procedures in procurement and funds flow, hence high transaction costs.

4. **DPs' Ad Hoc Provision of Advisory Technical Assistance (ADTA) Grants**

11. Although most ADTA operations in Bangladesh's education sector have been successful at completion, they were generally not designed in a strategic manner. Their specific objectives, though relevant to the broader sector goals, were not focused on critical areas where capacity is actually needed. For example, prior to the implementation of the PEDP-II, ADTA was provided to assist the GOB in facilitating the transition from a project-mode to a SWAp-mode of working. Although the ADTA outputs have been useful in the timely implementation of the ensuing project, less attention has been paid to actual diagnostics of organizational, institutional, and individual capacity constraints in order to equip the EA with the necessary capacities to manage a complex SWAp. Instead, these activities were designed to be undertaken during SWAp implementation. In both the NFE and SE subsectors, ADTA grants were also administered in an ad hoc fashion, thus limiting their contributions to project success. For example, the associated ADTA for the Nonformal Education Project (NFEP) was approved long after the project had started, rather than being planned up front. For SE, the ADTA role is rather limited, as only one ADTA has been provided so far.

D. **Design Factors External to DPs' Control (*Deterrence Factors or Threats*)**

12. To bring about sustainable sector development, necessary improvements not only in the quality of education delivered to students, but also in the management of the sector must be ensured. However, the overall policy and institutional environments in Bangladesh, especially for PE, is not conducive to change, particularly with respect to the following issues:

- (i) **Weak Decentralization and High Teacher Absenteeism.** Decentralization of PE subsector management remains weak due to some nonconductive government policy or institutional environments, including the following (a) there has been weak school-based management (SBM), since the role of school management committees has so far been limited to mobilization of communities

(including parent-teacher associations), rather than decision making; (b) since teachers are accountable to the Upazila Primary Education Offices (UPEOs), the role of SMCs and PTAs in monitoring teachers in order to reduce their absenteeism and improve their performance is thus limited; and (c) although the upazila primary education plan (UPEP) and school level improvement plan (SLIP) exercises have been initiated in 40 selected upazilas in addition to the 26 originally piloted ones to develop SBM capacity at the upazila and school levels, such piloting is not extensive enough to really strengthen SBM.

- (ii) **Lack of Flexibility in Adjusting Project Proforma and Other Regulations.** Rigid government rules and regulations also acted as a deterrence factor, delaying or inhibiting project success. These include (a) inflexibilities in adjusting the original GOB's project proforma to allow for budget heads for the UPEP and SLIP, which were piloted under the PEDP-II, though this has finally been adjusted; (b) difficulties in transferring the newly created staff positions to be under the revenue budget; and (c) government rules which do not allow allocation of the revenue budget directly to schools, etc. Although DPE has proposed to the GOB via (the Ministry of Finance) to provide such allocation, no decision has been made. Thus, extensive replication of the UPEP and SLIP can be done only through DPs' financial support.
- (iii) **Lack of a Professional Cadre of Education Specialists.** The absence of PE cadre prevents the achievement of many expected outcomes, particularly those related to management capacity. Due to the lack of a PE cadre, an appropriate career and promotion structure for permanently recruited officials, including PE teachers, cannot be provided. Many senior staff at various MOPME agencies have been deputed from outside by the Ministry of Establishment. This resulted in (a) considerable staff turnover, especially of trained staff; and (b) lack of professionalism of officials and teachers, which greatly weakens various education agencies associated with MOPME. So far, The Ministry of Establishment has agreed in principle to MOPME's proposal of establishing an education cadre. However, the approval process is slow and arduous, thus further delaying the implementation of capacity development under the PEDP-II.
- (iv) **Fragmentation of Institutions Responsible for EMIS.** With separate ministries responsible for EMIS (MOPME for PE and MOE for SE), an integrated school database cannot not be developed. In particular, EMIS for PE is weak and not fully functional because the EMIS function of DPE is yet to be decentralized, to enable UPEOs to collect and process data at the upazila level. In addition, the limited EMIS support provided by the GOB is constraining the development of the existing EMIS units. For example, MOE's BANBEIS and MOPME's EMIS cell cannot perform their mandated functions due to inadequate staff and insufficient budget for field activities and for maintenance of computer hardware and software.
- (v) **Lack of Appropriate Preservice Teacher Training Program for PE.** The lack of a relevant preservice teacher training program is a major institutional constraint to the achievement of expected quality outcomes. In particular, due to the absence of formal preservice teacher training institutes for PE, compounded by the lack of a comprehensive quality-based requirement for PE teachers'

minimum competencies, teachers who are recruited often do not have the necessary teaching skills, which in turn lead to poor student performance.

- (vi) **Weak In-Service Teacher Training Programs.** On top of the low quality of teachers recruited due to lack of a preservice teacher training program, the low quality of in-service teacher training programs further exacerbates the problem. Specifically, the (a) outdated and less relevant certificate in education program; (b) inadequate capacity of primary teacher training institutes, Upazila Resource Centers, and UPEOs to deliver training effectively; (c) lack of interest among teachers to receive training; and (d) absence of follow-up support to trained teachers are all contributing to the low quality of education provided to students. Also, the current in-service teacher training practices take many teachers away from the classroom without provision for substitute teachers, thus further reducing student-teacher contact hours.

E. Implementation Factors within DPs' Control (*Success Drivers or Strengths*)

1. Continued DPs' Strong Coordination

13. Strong DP partnerships in Bangladesh's education sector not only during the design stage but all through implementation is an important success driver. Sustained cooperation helps ensure that DPs are working on a common thrust, thus reducing overlaps and inconsistencies in their assistance programs. Initially during the first two investment cycles in PE, regular DP consultations were held, though in a more ad hoc fashion. However, during the PEDP-II cycle, 11 DPs have been coordinating closely by forming a consortium to provide a more formal venue for regular discussions during implementation. Also to assist in the activities of the consortium, a program liaison unit (PLU) was set up by ADB's Bangladesh Resident Mission (BRM), with support from the DPs, at the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), to provide logistics assistance.

2. DPs' Sufficient Supervision

14. In terms of project supervision, systems have been created to ensure that regular DP project and program reviews are carried out. For example, during the second investment cycle, DPs adopted a mechanism of joint semiannual reviews to ensure that requested policy actions were followed up. Similarly, during the PEDP-II, joint annual review missions and thematic review mission are provisioned. Regular meetings with the EA are also organized through the consortium to discuss key policies and implementation issues. Regular monitoring is also carried out to update the status of key policy areas included in the policy matrix; the set of actions identified during the joint missions; and the status of the implementation of the annual operation plan, which indicates progress by component. Likewise, in the SE and NFE subsectors, ADB fielded regular missions as needed to closely review and assess progress and identify implementation problems and constraints through field visits and discussions with the GOB, the EAs, consultants, and other stakeholders, including the beneficiaries.

3. Strong Involvement and Utilization of DPs' Resident Missions

15. The DPs' resident missions often play an important role in project and program administration. For example, under the PEDP-II SWAp, ADB, being the lead DP, has mobilized support from BRM to enable the PLU to do its functions. Apart from providing logistics assistance to the DPs' consortium, the PLU also assists in other tasks, including reviewing

procurement and disbursement, monitoring progress, and providing oversight. However, since there are as many as 11 DPs involved in the SWAp, coordination is not easy, and agreements on operational matters generally take time. In the SE and NFE subsectors, since all the projects are already delegated to BRM, the role of BRM has become more crucial, particularly in monitoring project progress and acting upon requests for approval, disbursement, and modifications.

4. Selection of Generally Good Performance of Consultants

16. The selection of generally good quality of consulting services has also been contributory to successful project implementation in all subsectors. Good consultants have been useful mainly in carrying out PIU and PMU activities, developing curricula, preparing policy papers and training courses, and training. Moreover, by working alongside EA staff, they have been able to transfer knowledge and skills that are important to institutional development.

F. Implementation Factors External to DPs' Control (*Success Drivers or Opportunities*)

17. Another important success driver is the continued enabling government policy and institutional environments. Generally, the GOB had demonstrated continued support in all subsectors during implementation by providing counterpart funds on time and has responded quickly and positively to recommendations for accelerating project implementation. For example, favorable conditions for PE, which included (i) continued GOB and EA strong ownership and commitment to implementing various education subsector policies and action plans; (ii) existence of a technically capable government agency (LGED), which was responsible for the provision of good quality civil works in school construction and rehabilitation; and (iii) continued GOB efforts to adopt sound practices to improve governance, such as the implementation of a transparent and merit-based teacher recruitment and transfer system, have been instrumental in facilitating many project activities and achieving a number of outputs and outcomes.

18. The performance of the EAs (including the PIUs) in both PE and SE were also satisfactory, as they generally implemented all the project components. The EAs implemented their respective projects with the necessary cooperation and assistance from their respective mother agencies (MOPME for PE and MOE for SE), and also from other related agencies. Perhaps, another critical factor that helped during implementation was the support provided by other stakeholders (e.g., politicians, civil servants, nongovernment organizations, and the general populace to achieving overall education improvements).

G. Implementation Factors within DPs' Control (*Deterrence Factors or Weaknesses*)

1. Complexities of Project Design and SWAp Modality

19. Long implementation delays are caused by a number of factors. In some cases, implementation difficulties may arise simply because project design or the chosen assistance modality is too complex to carry out. During the PEDP-II cycle, apart from the EA's lack of past experience and appropriate training to manage a SWAp, the arrangement of the SWAp funds was complex in itself due to the use of separate fund accounts for some DPs. Similarly, in the SE subsector, project scope tended to be complex, particularly in the ongoing SESDP and Teacher Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project. The scope of these projects

seems to have become broader with a large number of subcomponents and little indication of how such a broad range of activities will be supervised or monitored.

2. Insufficient Harmonization of DPs' Procedures

20. Complex DP procedures also often contribute to delays, especially when one has to work with a number of DPs with differing procedures. Experience from the first two investment cycles in PE illustrated the difficulties arising from such a scenario; thus it was decided that DP procedures need to be harmonized. Under the ongoing PEDP-II cycle, while harmonization has been initiated in the some areas (e.g., M&E and financial reporting). In the areas of procurement and funds flow, harmonization remains problematic because five procurement procedures and several accounts are still used.

3. High Transaction Costs among DPs

21. Theoretically, the SWAp modality is expected to help reduce transaction costs among DPs and the EA due to harmonization of their various procedures and to efficient implementation arrangements achieved through close coordination. In the PEDP-II SWAp, however, only transaction costs on the part of the EA have been significantly reduced, while those on the DP side appear to be high. This is largely due to inadequate harmonization as five procurement procedures and four accounts are being followed. At the same time, while the DPs have been trying to coordinate closely by establishing the PLU (led by BRM) and the consortium, the arrangements remain complicated. For example, the separation of the PLU from BRM tended to blur the roles of the lead DP (ADB), the consortium chair, and other DPs; whereas the inclusion of the consortium functions in the PLU tended to blur mutual accountability between the lead DP and the consortium, and also required BRM to get overly stretched with support to the consortium. The consortium functions in the SWAp of the health sector are separate from the lead DP functions as a self-contained arrangement. Moreover, with the many DPs involved in the SWAp, meetings beyond the regular quarterly meetings are usually organized. Coupled with a number of other related implementation issues that need to go through the PLU for review, transaction costs (including time costs), could easily escalate.

4. Weak and Fragmented EMIS

22. A functioning EMIS is an important tool to effectively monitor progress of various performance indicators during implementation. However, due to the continuing fragmentation of the EMIS for PE and SE, no sound baseline study can be undertaken, nor can quality achievement factors be measured with any degree of precision.

H. Implementation Factors External to DPs' Control (*Deterrence Factors or Threats*)

23. Due to the continued nonconducive policy and institutional environments, many of the expected outcomes, particularly those related to quality improvement and management capacity development, were only partly or not at all achieved. Even under the PEDP-II, many quality- and capacity-related outcomes are now considered unlikely to be achieved by the end of the project due to systemic difficulties. Also in the NFE subsector, the institutional environment for efficient implementation was not as conducive due to the abolition of the EA after the completion of the NFEP, which then resulted in the suspension of the succeeding Post-Literacy and Continuing Education Project. Nonetheless, some milestones in all projects in the entire education sector have already been achieved in some important areas, albeit with considerable effort, time, and resources from both the GOB and its DPs.