

Core Evaluation Team Working Paper

Approach to handling the evaluation of the Paris Declaration in fragile situations

This working paper has been prepared by the Core Team for the Evaluation of the Paris Declaration as an internal tool (thus in English only) for the work of the second phase and the Synthesis of the Evaluation. Comments and suggestions from the participants in the Evaluation are invited to marika@iod.uk.com and bwoodcan@gmail.com. The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Secretariat for the Evaluation or the Evaluation's sponsors.

1. Background and purpose of this working paper

One of the “specific objectives” of the Evaluation, as confirmed in the Evaluation Framework, is:

“To strengthen the knowledge-base as to the ways in which development partnerships can most effectively and efficiently help maximize development results through aid in different development contexts – including various degrees of “fragility” in different countries and situations.”¹

There is no need to list here all the reasons for the importance of this objective, but they certainly include the following:

- i. “Fragile situations”² are numerous among aid-receiving countries and account for substantial volumes of aid;
- ii. Some of these situations attract high levels of public and political attention, and highlight calls for effective assistance;
- iii. By definition, some of the conditions in countries in fragile situations, and international responses to them, make it especially difficult to ensure effective assistance, and the record documents many problems and failings; and
- iv. The record also shows that the “normal” standards of good practice in development assistance (as found in the Paris Declaration) are often left aside in practice, and sometimes their applicability to these situations is even questioned in principle.

The aid effectiveness agenda, embodied since 2005 in the Paris Declaration, supplemented since 2008 by the Accra Agenda for Action, has attempted to take account of these situations of fragility. As the key sources, the direct references to these issues in both the Declaration and the Agenda for Action are reproduced in full in Annex 1 to this working paper.

¹ Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2, Evaluation Framework and Work Plan, p. 4

² The currently accepted working definition of “fragile situations” are those where “the state lacks either the will or the capacity to engage productively with its citizens to ensure security, prevent conflict, safeguard human rights and provide the basic functions for development.” International Network on Conflict and Fragility, OECD, DAC. Website. Many agencies are reluctant to publish lists of what they consider fragile situations, but the World Bank does produce a “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations” taking into account both IDA and ADB or AfDB scores on CPIA and the presence of peace-keeping missions. On this basis the FY 2011 list includes 32 countries or territories.

In parallel, a good deal of other international policy and analytical work on fragile situations has been proceeding, and giving attention to ways of improving the roles played by the international community, including the effectiveness of international assistance.

This paper will review the present approach to handling fragile situations in the Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, and the main sources of evidence now anticipated (with an eye to supplementing them if possible):

- a. The agreed Evaluation Framework and Work Plan, with its specification of the building blocks of the Evaluation, specifically the results of the Phase 1 Evaluation, targeted, thematic studies commissioned in both phases, donor/agency HQ studies from both phases, other relevant evaluative and analytical work, and , most centrally, the 21 detailed country evaluations being carried out in Phase 2. The detailed approach and methodology adopted is applied most directly to these country evaluations and the donor/agency HQ studies, as reflected in the evaluation matrix and the Evaluation's mapping of the complex pathways to change underlying the implicit programme theory of the Paris Declaration³
- b. The Thematic Study commissioned for Phase 1 of the Evaluation on "The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected situations." OPM/IDL (2008)
- c. The coverage of relevant situations expected in country evaluations and donor/agency headquarters studies, together with closely-related monitoring work on the implementation of the implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations; and
- d. Relevant inputs from other streams of international policy and analytical work.

The overall finding of this interim review is that the present Evaluation approach and expected evidence from a combination of sources will allow the Evaluation to strengthen the knowledge-base on the applicability of the Paris Declaration and ways of improving aid effectiveness in different development contexts – including various degrees of "fragility" in different countries and situations.⁴

2. Approach and methodology, as seen in the evaluation matrix and mapping of "pathways to change"

The Emphasis on Context

One of the most important features of the approach and methodology adopted for this Evaluation is the intensive focus being given to the role of context in determining the effectiveness of an agenda of reforms like the Paris Declaration, the effectiveness of aid itself, and more broadly the effectiveness of countries' performance in reaching development objectives. The approach is designed to go far beyond the more usual descriptive treatment of context, to recognize and take into account the strong hypotheses that:

- i. Aid is only one element, and often quite a small one, among many factors – positive and negative – shaping the possibilities and obstacles for development in a country;

³ Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2, Inception Report, June 2010, Diagram B: The Context for Implementing the Paris Declaration - Complex pathways to change

⁴ It should also be noted that this approach should generate quite direct answers to the three clearest questions on fragile situations referred to in the Approach Paper for the Evaluation, and help clarify and shed light on the other three.

- ii. The ways in which development is pursued, and resources are used (including aid resources) is shaped by powerful interactions between political and economic interests and actors, internal and international; and
- iii. The recognized standards and good practices of aid effectiveness are not necessarily well-known, let alone compelling, to most of the powerful domestic and international actors at work in this political economy, especially when they are not seen to serve their interests and priorities.

If corroborated by the Evaluation findings, these hypotheses, so strongly evident in the Evaluation Matrix and mapping of pathways to change, will serve to answer many questions about what has been accomplished, and why or why not, by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Evaluation results should also help build a realistic perspective not only on how to improve such efforts in the future to improve aid, but even more broadly on the roles and limits of aid.

The Evaluation's major emphasis on the importance of context in aid effectiveness converges with the central findings, conclusions and recommendations of policy and analytical work on aid-effectiveness in fragile situations. The first of the Fragile States Principles is: "Take context as the starting-point."

A working hypothesis for the Evaluation can be that in fragile situations, contextual factors are usually even more critical than elsewhere in shaping the potential and limits of aid and many lie beyond the "normal" assumptions about aid management.⁵ These contextual factors can be expected to include not only lack of organized capacity, legitimacy or will on the partner country side, but a wider range of influential actors from international partners, such as defence and foreign ministries, international political and relief agencies and multiple humanitarian agencies, and high profile expectations for rapid "results."

It is worth noting that while the working definition of fragile situations emphasizes situations of conflict-related fragility it also often applies to situations around natural disasters and complex emergencies.

Targeted Questions for the Evaluation

The specific objective of the Evaluation relating to fragile situations, as cited above, will be carried forward in part by the application of the overall matrix to relevant country evaluations and donor/agency HQ studies.

Country Evaluations

The excerpts below from the country evaluation matrix clearly point to where answers on these issues will emerge most strongly, particularly in the two country evaluations in countries clearly identified as "fragile situations" – Afghanistan and Nepal. These findings and conclusions can be compared and contrasted both between themselves and with the evaluation results in other countries not classified as "fragile." The evidence base in the country evaluations should include specific recent evaluations bearing on issues of fragility.

⁵ While the definition of fragile situations emphasizes situations of conflict-related fragility it also applies to others (e.g. natural disasters and complex emergencies). It is also worth noting that the parameters of "the state lack[ing] either the will or the capacity to engage productively with its citizens to ensure security, prevent conflict, safeguard human rights and provide the basic functions for development" are not always clear-cut or fixed, and that these problems apply to some degree in many states, but do not cross the threshold into the category of fragile situations.

Core Q1. “What are the important factors that have affected the relevance and implementation of the Paris Declaration and its potential effects on aid effectiveness and development results?” (The Paris Declaration in context)
1a) What are the key characteristics of the country that have been most relevant to the implementation of the Paris Declaration?
1b) What are the most important national and international events that have affected [in the country] the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action priorities, and how?
1c) What is the place of aid subject to PD principles among all sources of development finance and resources? What have been the trends from early roots to 2005 and since?”
1d) Which are the key actors, in the country and among its development partners, who take major decisions on aid? What influence do the Paris Declaration and AAA commitments have on them, in relation to their other priorities and incentives?
Core Q 4. Framework for Overall Conclusions
i. What has been the relevance of the Paris Declaration and the ways it has been implemented to the challenges of aid effectiveness?
ii. To what extent has each of the five principles of the Paris Declaration been observed and implemented, and the Accra Agenda priorities reflected? Why? Have there been conflicts or trade-offs between them?
iii. What has the Paris Declaration achieved for aid effectiveness and development results? How significant are these contributions? How sustainable? Is there evidence of better ways to make aid more effective and contribute more to development results, for women and men and for those who are excluded?
iv. What effects has the implementation of the Declaration had on the respective burdens of aid management falling on the partner country and its respective donors, relative to the changing volumes and quality of aid and of the aid partnership itself? Are these effects likely to be transitional or long term?
v. What has been the added value of Paris Declaration-style development cooperation compared with the pre-PD situation, and seen alongside other drivers of development in the country, other sources of development finance and development cooperation partners beyond those so far endorsing the Declaration?
vi. What are the key messages for a) national stakeholders, and b) donor countries and agencies?
vii. What are the key implications for aid effectiveness in the future taking account of new challenges and opportunities (e.g. climate change) and new actors and relationships?

3. The Thematic Study commissioned for Phase 1 of the Evaluation: “The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected situations” OPM/IDL (2008)

This study was jointly commissioned for the Paris Declaration Evaluation Phase 1 and the Fragile States Group in the DAC. It was released in August 2008, just before the Accra High Level Forum. It aimed to provide evidence to inform discussions on the challenges of applying the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected situations by:

- Synthesising existing evidence on the aid effectiveness and state-building challenges faced in fragile and conflict-affected situations;
- Exploring the relevance and application of the Paris Declaration and the Fragile States principles in different contexts of fragility and conflict; and
- Setting out the key challenges to improving effective engagement by development partners in fragile situations.

The paper was based on an extensive review of the primary and secondary literature in English. As part of the review, four desk-based country case studies (Afghanistan, Burundi, the DRC and Nepal) were carried out.

The study began by depicting a Paris Declaration “model” of country led development, and its cumulative assumptions about country ownership providing a basis for alignment and harmonization of donor activities, and in turn the basis for agreed frameworks of results around which mutual accountability can be maintained. The study then asserts that:

“Concern about aid and effective engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations fundamentally relates to situations where one or more of the assumptions about national government capacity, objectives, effective control and legitimacy do not hold.”⁶

It then went on to set up a broad typology of different fragile situations relating to conflict and governance, namely:

- deteriorating development partnerships and increasing risk of conflict;
- prolonged crisis or impasse; situations of ongoing conflict; and
- “hopeful partnerships” [specified as “transitional or post-conflict settings” and “gradually improving situations”].

It generally suggests that the potential for implementing the Paris Declaration “model” is very limited in the first three types of cases, but expands and offers rising promise in the final category.

Most importantly (bearing in mind that this study preceded the work launched in Accra in 2008 on monitoring the implementation of the Fragile States Principles) the study’s findings “reinforce[d] the emphasis of those Principles on:

- A joint understanding among development partners of each specific context, including adequate political economy, conflict and risk analysis;
- The state-building agenda (understood as involving not just the capacity of the state but its legitimacy and accountability);
- A whole of government approach;
- A “do no harm” approach; and
- Harmonised approaches from development partners.”⁷

Finally, the report identified four main lessons and shortcomings on implementing the Paris Declaration in fragile situations to be drawn from the experience documented. All but one of these (some on very practical issues) were related mainly to transitional or post-conflict settings.

This study can be taken by the Evaluation as a useful and solid review up to 2008 of much of the existing policy and analytical work around its topic, and some important efforts to analyse the applicability of the Paris Declaration in different types of fragile situation. Its findings and lessons can be re-visited and triangulated with the other inputs that will now be available for the Evaluation.

⁶ OPM/IDL “The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected situations” (2008) p.iii

⁷ Ibid

4. Inputs from monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

As seen from the excerpts in Annex 1, both the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action made specific reference to the complementary Fragile States Principles, also laid out in 2005 and refined and formally adopted in 2007, as a key guide to applying the principles of aid effectiveness (alongside policy themes such as security, governance and policy coherence) in these special situations.

More specifically, at the Accra High Level Forum in Accra in September 2008, ministers from six fragile states and their international partners committed to monitor the implementation of the Fragile States Principles (FSPs) through a voluntary survey (in 2009 and 2011) relying on national consultations. The first Monitoring Survey of the Fragile States Principles provides evidence of the quality of international engagement based on national consultations with Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste across the areas of diplomacy, development and security. Published in six Country Reports and a Global Report, the 2009 survey results were released in February 2010.

As can be seen from Annex 2 – which sets out the List of 10 Principles, together with the summary 2009 findings on implementation of each – many of the issues and findings from six countries are directly linked to key areas of this Evaluation, and can be drawn upon extensively.⁸ Although the Fragile States Principles have not themselves been evaluated, these monitoring results, ranged alongside findings emerging in this Evaluation, should yield considerable new insights, particularly on the relevance and effectiveness of Paris Declaration in these situations.

The fact that one of the six FSP survey countries – Afghanistan – is also carrying out a Paris Declaration evaluation also offers some opportunity to cross-check and validate findings from the two exercises, although it is probably to be expected that the FSP survey will be used as a source in the country evaluation as well. Additional opportunities for insights and validation may be drawn from the additional sources listed in this paper and other solid resources that can be identified.

Significantly, this monitoring commitment is paralleled with a continuing International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, building on major dialogue events in Kinshas (July 2008) Accra (September 2008) Dili (April 2010) and Accra (July 2010). The last event was focussed on ‘Achieving the MDGs in Crisis Settings’ with 12 crisis-affected countries participating: Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Timor Leste. Seven multi-stakeholder national consultations have also been held around “Priorities and Challenges for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding” and substantial reports produced leading up to the Dili consultation⁹.

5. Donor/Agency HQ studies

The basic framework for donor/agency HQ studies, in both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the Evaluation – organized around their commitment, capacities and incentives to implement the Paris Declaration principles – yields a significant number of insights into the specific application or adaptation in fragile

⁸ The 2011 findings of the Monitoring of the Fragile States Principles are unlikely to be available in time to be taken into account in the Evaluation.

⁹ “Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities and Challenges, OECD, 2010.

situations, although this is not systematically treated. The evidence base in the donor/agency studies should include specific recent evaluations bearing on issues of fragility.

Available data can be culled from these sources and in some cases may allow for triangulation with data and findings from country sources. Moreover, to the extent that donor/agency HQ studies in Phase 2, and updates by Phase 1 donors, are able to respond to some of the additional questions suggested to mirror the Country evaluation questions, findings on donor/agency action in fragile situations should be considerably deepened. The following questions from the suggested donor matrix may be particularly fertile sources:

Core Q1. The Paris Declaration in context [Country evaluation: “What are the important factors that have affected the relevance and implementation of the Paris Declaration and its potential effects on aid effectiveness and development results?”]

1b) Are donor/agency policies coherent in their view on and approach to the PD?

1c) What is the range and sphere of direct influence of the Paris Declaration on government policies with implications for developing countries? *[what is the place of aid subject to PD principles among all sources of finance and resources? What have been trends from early roots to 2005 and since? Aid along side other policies such as policies affecting trade, climate change, global food security, environment, migration, security etc. What have been the trends since 2005?*

1d) Who are the key actors, in the donor country (or within the Board or management of agencies) who take major decisions affecting aid, including decisions on priorities, activities, programmes and projects?

What influence do the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action commitments have on the key actors in the donor country, in relation to their priorities and incentives?

2c). Are donor/agencies content that they are fulfilling their Paris Declaration commitments, including implementation of the DAC Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States? (Explain possible concerns and reasons for these.) Are there concerns about relevance and coherence of the Paris Declaration commitments and indicators? Are there ways in which these might be overcome?

6. Relationships between the Principles for Aid Effectiveness and Humanitarian Action

Since many situations of fragility involve humanitarian emergencies and relief requirements, it is important to take account of the possible relevance to this Evaluation of experience with the application of agreed international principles in humanitarian action as well. The Principles and good practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship provide a key point of reference. (See Annex 3 for text) This is backed up by considerable resources from a source such as the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).

In March 2009, the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI published a “Study on the Relevance and applicability of the Paris Declaration in humanitarian assistance.”¹⁰ This study usefully analyses the distinct origins, purposes and intended users for the principles and standards for aid effectiveness and good humanitarian donorship. The summary emphasizes the following points:

“The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative might ... seem, at first glance, to have little in common. There are significant areas of difference between them. Affected state ownership, alignment to host state policy priorities, as well as alignment to financing and procurements systems in order to disburse aid, are principles that in many cases are not applicable to the good donorship agenda.

Yet there are also areas of complementarity between the two agendas. They both aim to achieve long-term changes in donor behaviour, and some of the means to do this simply reflect good practice in aid management, a preoccupation which both agendas share. This includes harmonising policies and financing objectives amongst donors, undertaking or supporting joint assessments and joint evaluations, standardising reporting requirements, the need for collective lesson learning, accountability to partners and the importance of measuring results.

The study also finds that there is scope for interaction between the Paris Declaration and Good Humanitarian Donorship in natural disaster settings, and that a more differentiated approach is warranted between these contexts and complex emergencies. ...”¹¹

While the Evaluation Framework does not envisage specific examination of these issues and relationships around humanitarian assistance, there are several points that will need to be considered in answering several of the Evaluation questions, and relevant evidence will be generated. The study also concludes that “the ‘aid principles’ landscape has become increasingly crowded in recent years.” This highlights a further issue for consideration, both in the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Declaration, and in thinking about future approaches to improvement.

7. Relevant inputs from other streams of evaluation and international policy and analytical work

As in other areas, the Evaluation’s work on issues of aid effectiveness in fragile situations will have the country evaluations and donor/agency HQ studies as its main original inputs. Beyond this base, it will largely have to depend on synthesizing solid and relevant evaluation results, policy and analytical work from other sources. In the area of aid effectiveness in fragile situations, the following are some of the main sources anticipated.

The DAC Evaluation Resource Centre lists 85 evaluations under the sector of “Conflict, peace and security” and 43 under “Humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.” A number of relevant evaluations are also likely to be found under areas such as Governance. Many of these evaluations are too narrow, dated or otherwise of limited relevance to the Evaluation’s work, with its limited resources. It will therefore look particularly for a few key sources of evaluative work of landmark importance or broader relevance, often itself synthesizing different evaluations, case-studies and the like. A good example is found in a

¹⁰ Adele Harmer and Deepayan Basu Ray, “Study on the Relevance and applicability of the Paris Declaration in humanitarian assistance.” HPG/ODI. Commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2009

¹¹ Ibid, p.1

February 2010 DFID synthesis of Country Programme Evaluations conducted in nine fragile states between 2002-2009.¹²

A similar kind of screening will be used to take account of key inputs from other analytical work related to aid effectiveness in fragile situations. The 2008 thematic study, and a number of other sources cited in this paper have themselves included literature reviews from which the Evaluation can draw, and we have identified several additional sources.

N.B. DAC Special note on capacity development.

¹² Nick Chapman and Charlotte Vaillant, Synthesis of Country Programme Evaluations conducted in Fragile States, DFID 2010.

Annex 1:

Direct references to situations of fragility in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action

Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (March, 2005)

Adapt and apply to differing country situations

7. Enhancing the effectiveness of aid is also necessary in challenging and complex situations, such as the tsunami disaster that struck countries of the Indian Ocean rim on 26 December 2004. In such situations, worldwide humanitarian and development assistance must be harmonised within the growth and poverty reduction agendas of partner countries.

In fragile states, as we support state-building and delivery of basic services, we will ensure that the principles of harmonisation, alignment and managing for results are adapted to environments of weak governance and capacity. Overall, we will give increased attention to such complex situations as we work toward greater aid effectiveness.

Delivering effective aid in fragile states¹³

37. The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to build legitimate, effective and resilient state and other country institutions. While the guiding principles of effective aid apply equally to fragile states, they need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for basic service delivery.

38. **Partner countries** commit to:

- Make progress towards building institutions and establishing governance structures that deliver effective governance, public safety, security, and equitable access to basic social services for their citizens.
- Engage in dialogue with donors on developing simple planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, where national development strategies are not yet in place.
- Encourage broad participation of a range of national actors in setting development priorities.

39. **Donors** commit to:

- Harmonise their activities. Harmonisation is all the more crucial in the absence of strong government leadership. It should focus on upstream analysis, joint assessments, joint strategies, co-ordination of political engagement; and practical initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offices.
- Align to the maximum extent possible behind central government-led strategies or, if that is not possible, donors should make maximum use of country, regional, sector or non-government systems.
- Avoid activities that undermine national institution building, such as bypassing national budget processes or setting high salaries for local staff.
- Use an appropriate mix of aid instruments, including support for recurrent financing, particularly for countries in promising but high-risk transitions.

¹³ The following section draws on the draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, which emerged from the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States (London, January 2005).

Accra Agenda for Action (September, 2008)

We will adapt aid policies for countries in fragile situations

21. In the Paris Declaration, we agreed that aid effectiveness principles apply equally to development co-operation in situations of fragility, including countries emerging from conflict, but that these principles need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership or capacity. Since then, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations have been agreed. To further improve aid effectiveness in these environments, we will take the following actions:

- a) Donors will conduct joint assessments of governance and capacity and examine the causes of conflict, fragility and insecurity, engaging developing country authorities and other relevant stake holders to the maximum extent possible.
- b) At country level, donors and developing countries will work and agree on a set of realistic peace- and state-building objectives that address the root causes of conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and participation of women. This process will be informed by international dialogue between partners and donors on these objectives as prerequisites for development.
- c) Donors will provide demand-driven, tailored and co-ordinated capacity-development support for core state functions and for early and sustained recovery. They will work with developing countries to design interim measures that are appropriately sequenced and that lead to sustainable local institutions.
- d) Donors will work on flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities, on a pooled basis where appropriate, to
 - i) bridge humanitarian, recovery and longer-term development phases, and
 - ii) support stabilisation, inclusive peace building, and the building of capable, accountable and responsive states.

In collaboration with developing countries, donors will foster partnerships with the UN System, international financial institutions and other donors.

- e) At country level and on a voluntary basis, donors and developing countries will monitor implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, and will share results as part of progress reports on implementing the Paris Declaration.

Annex 2

PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTING THE 10 FRAGILE STATES PRINCIPLES

Principle 1: Take context as the starting point. The implementation of this Principle is judged in most countries to be mixed. While the importance of context is clearly recognised, the analytical effort required to understand the country context has not always been shared (Afghanistan; CAR; Haiti) or sustained (CAR; Haiti). Moreover, actual programming has not always been adequately rooted in an understanding of the country context (Afghanistan).

Principle 2: Do no harm. The implementation of this Principle is judged to be moderate. In most cases international intervention has had a positive effect on balance, but the country consultations drew attention to many examples of harm, mainly where international presence leads to the weakening of state capacity and/or legitimacy and where the uneven distribution of aid funds leads to an unintentional widening of social disparities. There is little evidence that international actors have attempted to assess these risks in a systematic way.

Principle 3: Focus on statebuilding as the central objective. The implementation of this Principle is judged to be moderate. There is a clear and increasing focus on statebuilding (e.g. massive investment in censuses, elections and technical assistance) and recognition of the multiple dimensions of this task – including capacity, accountability and legitimacy. However, the results of statebuilding efforts have been variable between countries. There has tended to be a technical focus on institutional development within the executive, with less attention to the other arms of government and to fostering constructive state-society relations. Certain aspects of donor practice, in particular the use of parallel implementation structures and salary top-ups, have been harmful to capacity development.

Principle 4: Prioritise prevention. The implementation of this Principle is judged to be moderate. International actors have engaged in specific initiatives which are relevant to crisis prevention, but their coverage has been patchy, effectiveness has been mixed, and they have not been planned within an overall strategy for crisis prevention. First, there was little evidence that international and national actors have analysed risks within the six countries in a systematic or sustained manner. Second, international actors have not developed comprehensive and shared crisis prevention strategies centring on such an analysis. Thirdly, rapid response capacity has been deemed adequate in most countries with a large peace-keeping mission, but limited in others.

Principle 5: Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives. The implementation of this Principle by international actors varies between countries and is overall judged to be moderate and improving. There is broad recognition of the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach, as reflected in the six countries' main strategic frameworks. However, in operational terms, a modus operandi has been hard to agree, and political, security and development objectives have often proven to be more contradictory than complementary. Afghanistan, where the security agenda was deemed to dominate and undermine development objectives, is a case in point. Integrated, whole-of-government country strategies (i.e. agreed across foreign affairs, defence, aid and beyond) from donor countries are still an exception.

Principle 6: Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies. The implementation of this Principle by international actors is judged to be good. International actors are usually highly aware of the importance of non-discrimination and have been vocal in criticising discriminatory practices and encouraging more inclusive policies, particularly in the area of gender.

However, many forms of discrimination are deep seated and difficult to tackle, and advocacy efforts have not always been translated into results.

Principle 7: Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts. The implementation of this Principle was judged to be moderate and improving. International actors have supported partner countries in developing national strategies, although many of these need further strengthening. Donor country strategies are aligned in all countries where national priorities are well defined – less so when strategies are insufficiently prioritised. However, efforts are needed to deepen alignment in operational terms: use of country systems; alignment on sector-wide approaches; alignment on sub-national priorities and planning. Too many parallel project implementation units (PIUs) continue to be set up and used for too long.

Principle 8: Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors.

Implementation of this Principle is moderate and improving. Several countries report that fragmentation of donor activities (particularly in Afghanistan, DRC and Haiti) is a challenge, and actions that may be rational for individual donors can cause systemic harm. Most countries have active donor co-ordination arrangements that work reasonably well for the exchange of information and to some extent for harmonising activities – notably multi-donor trust funds (Afghanistan, DRC), budget support donor groups (Sierra Leone) and delegated co-operation arrangements. However, while sector-wide approaches exist (e.g. DRC and Haiti), in none of the countries are formal arrangements reported for dividing labour among donors.

Principle 9: Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. Implementation of this Principle is moderate and improving. Several countries are perceived to have rapid response mechanisms that are in place and effective, especially for humanitarian action; while in others the rapid reaction capacity was considered low (see also Principle 4). As for staying engaged, the record is mixed. It is not enough to stay engaged: international actors need also to signal their intent to do so, including through improving the medium-term predictability of aid. There are examples of good practice, for example ten-year partnership agreements based on jointly agreed benchmarks. Except for CAR where the shift from emergency to longer-term development can be difficult and development does not compensate for a decline in humanitarian aid, trends since 2000 show no clear signs of disengagement. However, aid remains volatile (DRC, Timor-Leste) and in the case of Timor-Leste peacekeeping efforts too. A premature shift away from security concerns is seen as a danger in several countries (Haiti, DRC).

Principle 10: Avoid pockets of exclusion. The implementation of this Principle is judged to be weak – the poorest among all ten Principles. The country consultations point to numerous imbalances in the provision of aid between countries (CAR was characterised as an “aid orphan”), between provinces (Afghanistan, DRC, Haiti) and between social groups (Haiti). International actors are not sufficiently attuned to the risk that the uneven provision of aid (DRC) or widely different modes of engagement (Afghanistan) could worsen existing pockets of exclusion, and have not developed strategies to address this risk.

Source: Fragile States Principles 2009 Monitoring Survey: Global Report, OECD DAC

Objectives and definition of humanitarian action

1. The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.
2. Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of *humanity*, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; *impartiality*, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; *neutrality*, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and *independence*, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.
3. Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.

General principles

4. Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.
5. While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.
6. Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.
7. Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.
8. Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.
9. Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.
10. Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action.

Good practices in donor financing, management and accountability

(a) Funding

11. Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.
12. Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations.
13. While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.
14. Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

(b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation

15. Request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.
16. Promote the use of Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.
17. Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.
18. Support mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response.
19. Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.
20. Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

(c) Learning and accountability

21. Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.
22. Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.
23. Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.