



2006 Survey on Monitoring The Paris Declaration

Country Chapters

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

The 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration was undertaken in 34 countries that receive aid. The results of the survey are presented in two volumes. **Volume 1** provides an overview of key findings across 34 countries. **Volume 2** presents the baseline and key findings in each of the 34 countries that have taken part in the survey. This chapter is based primarily on the data and findings communicated by government and donors to the OECD through the Paris Declaration monitoring process. A more detailed description of this process, how this chapter was drafted and what sources were used is included in Volume 1, Chapter 2.

Both Volume 1 (Overview) and Volume 2 (Country Chapters) of the 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration can be downloaded at the OECD website:

www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring

A second round of monitoring will be organised in the first quarter of 2008 and will be an important contribution to the Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in September 2008.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) has a per capita gross national income (GNI) of USD 120. About 75% of its 55 million population falls under the dollar-a-day international poverty line. DRC has endorsed the Paris Declaration. Large, very poor and conflict-affected, it is a country where the effectiveness of aid is a matter of high international concern. This chapter is based on information provided by the government and 10 donors that contributed around 86% of the aid provided to DRC.

Because of the conflicts that, until quite recently, have severely affected the normal processes of government in DRC, the country is not yet familiar with all of the dimensions of change targeted by the Paris Declaration. Achievements will no doubt be modest for some time ahead, especially in effective country leadership of development policies and co-ordination of development actions. Those partner commitments that depend on changes in country practices will be difficult to achieve if the political will is not present. However, by the same token, there should be scope to make rapid progress in those areas where being a newcomer is an advantage (because ineffective practices are less entrenched), and where improved donor practices do not depend on progress in country policies and systems. Taking this context into account, the findings from the 2006 baseline survey suggest some key achievements and bottlenecks of Paris Declaration implementation in DRC. These are summarised in Box 10.1.

DIMENSIONS	BASELINE	CHALLENGES	PRIORITY ACTIONS
Ownership	Low	Absence of an operational national development strategy.	Finalise and operationalise national development strategy.
Alignment	Moderate	Budget does not accurately capture many aid flows.	Donors to notify government of aid flows more comprehensively. Government to capture aid flows in budget. Set up a system for communicating aid statistics.
Harmonisation	Moderate	Absence of programme-based approaches.	Establish a common framework for programming and budgeting. Reinforce joint country analysis. Promote joint missions.
Managing for results	Low	Lack of common system for monitoring results.	Strengthen local capacity so that DRC can establish results-based management. Set up system for monitoring and evaluating progress. Prepare a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework.
Mutual accountability	Low	Absence of mechanisms for joint evaluation of aid effectiveness.	Revive the Committee for the Co-ordination of External Resources.

OVERVIEW
Box 10.1
Challenges
and priority
actions

OWNERSHIP

THE CURRENT PEACE IN DRC is tenuous and the capacity of state remains fragile. This places unusual handicaps on the country's ability to exercise effective leadership of its development policies. This applies particularly to all those public policies that go beyond the management of central macro-economic variables and call for the presence of provincial governmental authorities on the ground within the regions. The government is, as a consequence, in an unusually weak position to take a lead in co-ordinating aid to the country. The commitment of donors to respecting country leadership and helping to strengthen the capacity to exercise it needs to be understood, therefore, as a commitment to nurture at any cost the first shoots of what will likely remain a delicate plant.

In this context, Paris Declaration Indicator 1 – whether the country has an operational development strategy and how well-developed this is according to the World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework – provides one entry point for assessing the general position on "ownership". Other dimensions are also covered by the Aid Effectiveness Review (AER), which therefore provides a broader (if still incomplete) overview of what has been done and remains to be done to establish country ownership of the development agenda in DRC.

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

INDICATOR 1

Along with 91% of the countries covered by the Comprehensive Development Framework, DRC does not have an operational development strategy – that is, a coherent long-term vision and a medium-term strategy derived from it; specific targets serving a holistic, balanced and well-sequenced development strategy; and capacity and resources for its implementation. In fact, DRC finds itself in category D of a descending A-E scale. This describes the position in 2005. However, the government has been taking steps to provide some of the necessary building blocks, including a medium-term strategy in the form of a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

A Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (*Document de stratégie de croissance et de réduction de la pauvreté*, or DSCR) embedding a long-term vision was due to be finalised in July 2006. This builds on a short-term programme for transition and recovery (*Programme minimum de partenariat pour la transition et la relance*, or PMPTR) prepared with assistance from the World Bank and UNDP, then adopted by a Consultative Group meeting in 2004. It also draws on strategies that have been developed by sector working groups for health, education and rural development, and on provincial medium-term strategies formulated on the basis of participatory consultations in the provinces.

In setting targets, the DRC's strategy does not work directly from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which the government considers to be very ambitious objectives for the medium term. Instead, it focuses principally on the restoration of macro-economic stability, maintaining peace, fighting corruption and improving public service delivery benefiting the poor. In this sense, it represents a continuation of the PMPTR, which placed a strong emphasis on consolidating political reconciliation and creating conditions for a sustainable economic recovery. UNDP's offer to assist the government to undertake a MDG-based needs assessment may lead to some moderation of this stance. However, the DRC government is committed to using the DSCR to attain the Millennium Development Goals by 2030.

Providing resources for the implementation of the DSCR is proving to be a major challenge, given the high priority still given to military and security expenditures. Links from the strategy to the national budget are in the form of targets for pro-poor public expenditure in relation to gross domestic product; these targets have yet to be met. The Aid Effectiveness Review suggests that the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and associated budget reforms will bring increased pro-poor allocations and outturns, if and only if there is political support for an overall reallocation of resources.

Outside the Ministries of Planning, Finance and Budget and the central bank, there is a need for strengthening policy-making and programme-implementation capacity across government. The sector working groups that have been formulating strategies are essentially made up of donors and beneficiaries. As elsewhere in the region, but to a more marked degree, capacity constraints are due to weak performance incentives as well as shortage of technical skills, recognised by the government. These factors are compounded by an extremely weak infrastructure that hinders implementation and poses security problems.

OTHER ASPECTS OF OWNERSHIP

The preparation of the DSCR and the arrangements for its implementation and monitoring are assigned to an inter-ministerial committee, a technical committee and a technical unit within the Ministry of Planning. However, as elsewhere, the formal arrangements do not provide direct evidence of the degree to which the strategy reflects the true priorities of political leadership of the country, or whether inter-ministerial co-ordination is effective. There are similar difficulties in gauging the degree of high-level political interest in co-ordinating aid to the country. The Aid Effectiveness Review describes how the government is working to overcome its limited experience and capacity to lead the co-ordination of development assistance. The government co-chairs Consultative Group meetings and adopts a leadership role. On the other hand, the Committee for the Co-ordination of External Resources in the Ministry of Planning is not operational, and government staff are hampered by lack of knowledge of donor procedures. Sectoral and thematic working groups are generally chaired by external partners, with the government sometimes invited to participate.

ALIGNMENT

DRC AND ITS DONORS have a considerable way to go before the alignment of aid to country policies and systems will reach the standards found in a number of the country's neighbours. The immediate obstacles to be overcome include the weaknesses in policy ownership noted above and corresponding weaknesses in country systems, discussed below. However, in a number of areas, there seems to be scope for donors to respond constructively to imperfections in country systems along the lines of the Paris Declaration's section on effective aid in fragile states.

BUILDING RELIABLE COUNTRY SYSTEMS

DRC's systems for public financial management (PFM) are currently undergoing an ambitious set of technical and administrative reforms, following years of neglect. The reforms include a revision of expenditure classifications in line with international standards, computerisation of information exchange between the Treasury and central bank, and efforts to reintroduce timely and accurate reporting on budget execution. The national audit authority (*Cour des Comptes*) has been reinforced, and in 2004 its reports resulted in some action against ministers and heads of companies on grounds of mismanagement of public assets. A new code on procurement is due to be formulated along with its principal application decrees by the end of 2006. The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment scale measuring the quality of budgetary and financial management places DRC at 2.5 on a scale of 1-6, well below the average of 3.2 for all International Development Association (IDA) borrowers.

INDICATOR 2a

INDICATOR 2b

Even without the more ambitious PFM reforms being considered (MTEFs, programme budgeting), this represents a challenging programme of work. Progress will be watched closely, while recognising that equivalent technical and administrative improvements do not have a strong record of success in low-income countries unless there is a substantial and consistent drive, with high-level political backing, to improve the substance of PFM – that is to ensure that money is increasingly spent on meeting public objectives, and subject to decreasing degrees of private appropriation or “leakage”. At present, DRC receives a score of 2.1 out of 10 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, indicating that corruption is perceived to be widespread.

ALIGNING AID FLOWS ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES

Very little aid to DRC may be said to be aligned with partner strategies. The government recognises that this is partly due to the fact that national priorities are not yet very clearly defined and that key government bodies are not operational. This may change now that a national PRSP has been finalised. Most of the larger donors maintain that their assistance strategies are in line with the I-PRSP, PMPTR and/or DSCR, and there is an initiative led by the World Bank and the UN to undertake joint country assistance programming in line with the DSCR.

However, achieving broad consistency between country assistance strategies and a national strategy document is recognised to be only a first step. Seen from the government side, it remains

INDICATOR 3 Table 10.1

Are government budget estimates comprehensive and realistic?

	Government's budget estimates of aid flows for FY05 (USD m) a	Aid disbursed by donors for government sector in FY05 (USD m) b	Baseline ratio* (%) c=a/b c=b/a
African Dev. Bank	57	23	41%
Belgium	12	24	51%
Canada	9	7	80%
European Commission	162	74	46%
France	19	14	76%
GAVI Alliance	0	8	0%
Germany	8	34	25%
Global Fund	--	0	
IMF	0	--	
Italy	1	6	10%
Japan	0	22	0%
Sweden	0	12	0%
United Kingdom	9	1	10%
United Nations	0	6	0%
United States	0	0	
World Bank	529	420	79%
Total	804	651	81%

* Baseline ratio is $c = a / b$ except where government's budget estimates are greater than disbursements ($c = b / a$).

the case that national stakeholders are insufficiently involved in the identification, commissioning and implementation of aid-funded projects; information is provided by donors in a form that is not compatible with DRC budget classifications; and project implementation units are not only parallel to government systems but do not communicate information easily.

The table provides government's budget estimates of aid flows for fiscal year 2005 (numerator) as a percentage of aid disbursed by donors for the government sector for the same period (denominator). This ratio tells us the degree to which there is a discrepancy between budget estimates and actual disbursements. The discrepancy can be in two directions: indeed budget estimates can be either higher or lower than disbursements. In order to have a single measure of discrepancy that is always less than 100%, the ratio is flipped when budget estimates are higher than disbursements.

The measure of alignment used by the baseline survey is the proportion of aid to the government sector that is reported in the national budget (Indicator 3). The targeted minimum of 90% for this indicator calls for a high level of budget realism on the part of the country authorities and a high degree of willingness and ability of donors to provide information in a timely fashion and in a suitable form. The number generated by the survey for this indicator is 81%. However, this is very likely the combined result of a relatively high level of over-estimation of likely disbursements on the part of the government and a failure by some donors to report their planned disbursements on time in a suitable form. Both problems need to be addressed.

In general, the gap may be due to: differences in exchange rates, as Special Drawing Rights are calculated in U.S. dollars; the fact that many countries have not integrated special funds for elections; the fact that donors may not have adequately defined the specific scope of the government sector; and that donors often have different fiscal year calendars (the African Development Bank is an example here).

CO-ORDINATING SUPPORT TO STRENGTHEN CAPACITY

The survey findings suggest that as little as 11% of support to capacity development is provided by means of co-ordinated programmes. There is just one co-ordinated general programme under the *Secrétariat national pour le renforcement des capacités* (supported by UNDP, the African Development Bank and the African Capacity Building Foundation), designed to strengthen the co-ordination of donor capacity-development initiatives. Apart from joint support to specific activities around the poverty reduction strategy, fragmented capacity development is the norm. Government and donors will need to make a substantial and concerted effort if DRC is to achieve the target for Indicator 4 of 50% of co-ordinated technical co-operation by 2010.

How much technical assistance is co-ordinated with country programmes?

	Co-ordinated technical co-operation (USD m) a	Total technical co-operation (USD m) b	Baseline ratio* (%) c=a/b
African Dev. Bank	2	2	82%
Belgium	0	24	0%
Canada	0	14	0%
European Commission	0	18	2%
France	3	3	100%
GAVI Alliance	0	0	--
Germany	0	7	0%
Global Fund	0	0	--
IMF	0	1	0%
Italy	0	4	11%
Japan	0	19	0%
Sweden	0	5	0%
United Kingdom	3	5	53%
United Nations	4	6	61%
United States	0	0	--
World Bank	0	0	--
Total	12	109	11%

INDICATOR 4
Table 10.2

INDICATOR 5
Table 10.3

How much aid for the government sectors uses country systems?

	Aid disbursed by donors for government sector (USD m) a	Public financial management				Procurement	
		Budget execution (USD m) b	Financial reporting (USD m) c	Auditing (USD m) d	Baseline ratio (%) avg (b,c,d) / a	Procurement systems (USD m) e	Baseline ratio (%) e / a
African Dev. Bank	23	21	21	21	90%	21	90%
Belgium	24	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
Canada	7	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
European Commission	74	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
France	14	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
GAVI Alliance	8	0	0	8	33%	0	0%
Germany	34	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
Global Fund	0	--	--	--	--	--	--
IMF	--	0	0	0	--	0	--
Italy	6	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
Japan	22	1	1	1	5%	1	5%
Sweden	12	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
United Kingdom	1	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
United Nations	6	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
United States	0	0	0	0	--	0	--
World Bank	420	178	0	0	14%	178	42%
Total	651	200	22	30	13%	200	31%

USING COUNTRY SYSTEMS

Indicator 5a is a measure of the use of three components of country public financial management systems by donors. The average utilisation across the three components is 13%.

There are initiatives in the social sectors that may result in greater use of country systems in due course. However, there are major obstacles to be overcome on both sides of the aid relationship. Improvements in budget execution are occurring slowly, providing some justification for the frequent use by donors of parallel executing agencies with special bank accounts and the ability to disburse directly to beneficiaries. At best, and in fact only for a few of the larger executing agencies, project aid data are incorporated as an afterthought in the country's financial reports. Although the national audit system is being strengthened, for the time being this mainly affects the use of domestic resources. External resources are audited by the donors themselves.

The African Development Bank and some other donors report that they use the country procurement systems to some degree. In aggregate, this involves 31% of aid to the government sector according to the survey returns. As noted above, procurement reforms are under way. However, at this point the government sees itself as very little involved in procurement decisions.

AVOIDING PARALLEL IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURES

The baseline survey provides a list of 36 parallel project implementation units (PIUs), apparently several times the number of which the government is fully aware. All partners recognise that the use of parallel structures is a response to shortcomings in capacity and methods of working, in ministries and departments. For this reason, a substantial reduction in the number of dedicated PIUs may not be possible in the short term. On the other hand, steps are being taken by some donors to reduce the number of such units that are parallel in the sense of being entirely outside

the institutional structures of the country, with appointment decisions and accounting relationships to the donor alone. The location of a small unit within the Ministry of Planning to manage the Emergency Economic and Social Reunification Support Project, financed by the World Bank, is an example.

Steps by other donors to phase out parallel units and phase in such embedded units ought to result in a progressive reduction in the current total of parallel PIUs over the coming years. A small unit of four consultants (two international) has been set up in the Ministry of Planning to oversee the Multi-sectoral Institutional Support Project, funded by the African Development Bank. This is an excellent example of improving relations between the unit and the ministry or agency, especially concerning human relations and training.

However, it is recognised that there are substantial obstacles to fully embedding such structures within a poorly paid and under-motivated civil service, including the material and non-material advantages enjoyed by PIU employees.

PROVIDING MORE PREDICTABLE AID

Improving the predictability of support is a challenge, and so is the measurement of performance in this regard. Indicator 7 focuses on the government's ability to record disbursements in its accounting system for the appropriate year (see table).

These differences come from a lack of: a coherent national development strategy for funders; attention to national priorities; involvement of the national party in the identification and implementation of projects; co-ordinated donor action (the Committee for the Co-ordination of External Resources was not operationalised and the national party is unfamiliar with donor procedures); donor information compatible with DRC budget language (making it difficult to distinguish public-sector aid from total aid); and information flow from PIUs (making it difficult to adapt information for budget purposes). These are compounded by the gap between information provided by donors and that included in the budget, as discussed earlier.

How many PIUs are parallel to country structures?

	Parallel PIUs (units)
African Dev. Bank	0
Belgium	11
Canada	8
European Commission	5
France	0
GAVI Alliance	0
Germany	0
Global Fund	1
IMF	0
Italy	0
Japan	0
Sweden	0
United Kingdom	0
United Nations	0
United States	0
World Bank	9
Total	34

INDICATOR 6
Table 10.4

The table looks at predictability from two different angles. The first angle is donors' and government's combined ability to disburse aid on schedule. In Congo, donors scheduled USD 622 million for disbursement in 2005 and actually disbursed – according to their own records – slightly more than expected (USD 651 million). The discrepancy varies considerably among donors and is mainly due to late disbursements carried over to 2005 and to delays in implementing programmes. The second angle is donors' and government's ability to record comprehensively disbursements made by donors for the government sector. In Congo, government systems recorded USD 516 million out of the USD 651 million notified as disbursed by donors (79%), indicating that a significant proportion of disbursements were not captured, either because they were not appropriately notified by donors or because they were inaccurately recorded by government.

INDICATOR 7
Table 10.5

Are disbursements on schedule and recorded by government?

	Disbursements recorded by government in FY05 (USD m) a	Aid scheduled by donors for disbursement in FY05 (USD m) b	Aid actually disbursed by donors in FY05 (USD m) b	Baseline ratio* (%) c=a/b c=b/a
African Dev. Bank	31	30	23	95%
Belgium	12	30	24	40%
Canada	9	7	7	80%
European Commission	108	0	74	0%
France	5	13	14	36%
GAVI Alliance	0	9	8	0%
Germany	8	4	34	51%
Global Fund	--	--	0	
IMF	0	0	--	
Italy	1	0	6	0%
Japan	0	22	22	0%
Sweden	0	0	12	
United Kingdom	10	1	1	9%
United Nations	0	7	6	0%
United States	0	0	0	
World Bank	333	500	420	67%
Total	516	622	651	83%

* Baseline ratio is $c = a / b$ except where disbursements recorded by government are greater than aid scheduled for disbursement ($c = b / a$).

Indicator 7 on predictability has been designed to encourage progress against both of these angles so as to gradually close the predictability gap by half by 2010. In other words, it seeks to improve not only the predictability of actual disbursements but also the accuracy of how they are recorded in government systems – an important feature of ownership, accountability and transparency. In Congo, this combined predictability gap amounts to USD 106 million (17% of aid scheduled for disbursement). Closing this predictability gap will require donors and government to work increasingly together on various fronts at the same time. They might work at improving:

- the realism of predictions on volume and timing of expected disbursements;
- the way donors notify their disbursements to government;
- the comprehensiveness of government's records of disbursements made by donors.

The Aid Effectiveness Review reports that budget support donors (providing around 13% of the budget) are making efforts to align decisions with the annual budget cycle, and thereby enhance predictability. This is welcome, but it will not rectify the forms of unpredictability that arise from conditionality that has not been met.

UNTYING AID

INDICATOR 8

According to OECD data for 2004 commitments, 90% of aid to DRC is untied, with less than 1% reported as tied, and 9% unreported. This is a relatively encouraging proportion, especially in view of the Aid Effectiveness Review's assessment that untied aid to DRC is "not substantial". The future challenge will be to at least maintain this level of untying.

HARMONISATION

IN A NUMBER OF RESPECTS, the DRC picture is one of significant and possibly growing harmonisation despite very limited alignment, reflecting in part the weakness of government ownership of a development agenda. This applies, at least, to the use of programme-based approaches (PBAs) and sharing of missions and analytical work. To the extent it is accurate, it should provide a platform for actions to reduce aid fragmentation through specialisation and delegation, and to improve internal incentives to collaborative behaviour, both important Paris Declaration commitments not directly covered by the survey.

USING COMMON ARRANGEMENTS

With as much as 54% of the reported aid using programme-based approaches and a substantial proportion of this consisting of direct budget support, the use of common procedures among donors is comparatively advanced. As already noted, joint sector working groups have made significant headway. Neither the procedures nor the working groups benefit from significant inputs from the government, however.

How much aid is programme based?

	Budget support (USD m) a	Other PBAs (USD m) b	Total (USD m) c=a+b	Total disbursed (USD m) d	Baseline ratio (%) e=c/d
African Dev. Bank	21	2	23	23	100%
Belgium	0	0	0	26	0%
Canada	0	0	0	14	0%
European Commission	0	0	0	104	0%
France	6	6	13	16	78%
GAVI Alliance	0	4	4	8	51%
Germany	0	10	10	42	24%
Global Fund	--	--	--	38	--
IMF	0	0	0	0	--
Italy	0	0	0	7	0%
Japan	0	0	0	22	0%
Sweden	0	0	0	12	0%
United Kingdom	0	25	25	75	34%
United Nations	0	5	5	15	32%
United States	0	3	3	112	2%
World Bank	178	242	420	420	100%
Total	206	297	503	934	54%

INDICATOR 9
Table 10.6

INDICATOR 10a
Table 10.7

How many donor missions are co-ordinated?

	Co-ordinated donor missions (missions) a	Total donor missions (missions) b	Baseline ratio (%) c=a/b
African Dev. Bank	2	7	29%
Belgium	0	7	0%
Canada	0	13	0%
European Commission	75	88	85%
France	0	0	--
GAVI Alliance	0	0	--
Germany	1	1	100%
Global Fund	0	2	0%
IMF	0	14	0%
Italy	1	1	100%
Japan	0	1	0%
Sweden	0	0	--
United Kingdom	3	10	30%
United Nations	1	3	33%
United States	0	6	0%
World Bank	40	55	73%
Total (discounted*)	80	208	38%

* The total of co-ordinated missions has been adjusted to avoid double counting. A discount factor of 35% has been applied.

CONDUCTING JOINT MISSIONS
AND SHARING ANALYSIS

The AER reports that some missions are being conducted jointly, but estimates that the decentralisation of donor offices to the country is not yet helping noticeably to reduce the number of missions. The World Bank and European Commission report especially high proportions.

The position is similar with respect to joint analytical work. The indicator of 35% is encouraging, although the government notes that this implies that a majority of donors appear to insist on working alone.

INDICATOR 10b
Table 10.8

How much country analysis is co-ordinated?

	Co-ordinated donor analytical work (units) a	Total donor analytical work (units) b	Baseline ratio (%) c=a/b
African Dev. Bank	1	2	50%
Belgium	1	7	14%
Canada	0	6	0%
European Commission	40	100	40%
France	15	15	100%
GAVI Alliance	0	0	--
Germany	1	1	100%
Global Fund	0	0	--
IMF	0	4	0%
Italy	0	0	--
Japan	0	0	--
Sweden	0	0	--
United Kingdom	2	2	100%
United Nations	2	3	67%
United States	0	1	0%
World Bank	8	8	100%
Total (discounted*)	53	149	35%

* The total of co-ordinated analysis has been adjusted to avoid double counting. A discount factor of 25% has been applied.

MANAGING FOR RESULTS

THE PARIS DECLARATION calls for partner countries and donors to work together to manage resources on the basis of desired results and use information to improve decision making. This means both strengthening the capacity to undertake such management and helping to increase the demand for a focus on results. Indicator 11 focuses on one component of this effort: the establishment of cost-effective results-oriented reporting and assessment systems by the country.

DRC is not among the very few countries judged to have a largely developed results monitoring system according to the Comprehensive Development Framework. In fact, it falls in category D of this assessment along with the 54% of the sample that have only the most basic elements of such a system.

This reflects in particular the inadequacy of the survey data for measuring poverty impacts and related outcomes. This is now beginning to be addressed, with household surveys taking place since 2004 in those parts of the country accessible to the National Statistical Institute, a first Poverty Assessment drafted in 2005 and a census now under way with South African support. The Aid Effectiveness Review focuses on surveys and censuses, although the DSCR includes a select

list of intermediate progress indicators. It has to be assumed that administrative reporting of intermediate measures of policy implementation is in a poor state, paralleling the recognised weakness of reporting on budget execution.

Stakeholder access to and interest in the available data may influence to some degree the demand for results. The PRSP preparation process has been publicised with poster and media campaigns, and the press are becoming more interested in the budget, as reporting on execution is in the early stages. Since 2005, the government has been making efforts to disseminate information on health sector budget allocation information to the provinces to improve local knowledge about available resources.

In these and other respects, few elements of a co-ordinated country monitoring and evaluation system are in place. Judging by the rate of progress elsewhere within the region, stakeholders should prepare for a long, slow process of building up simultaneously local demand and capacity to deliver and analyse relevant data. Cost-effective measures and quick wins in a results-oriented spirit will need to be prioritised over sophisticated practices at least in the medium term.

INDICATOR 11

MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

THE PARIS DECLARATION invites donors and partner countries to be accountable to each other for the use of development resources, and in a way that tends to strengthen public support for national policies and development assistance. This in turn requires governments to take steps to improve country accountability systems and donors to help by being transparent about their own contributions. The specific indicator looks at whether there is a country-level mechanism permitting joint assessment of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including those in the Declaration itself.

Such a mechanism does not yet exist in DRC. The survey report emphasises the limited degree to which project evaluations and reviews involve the government side, a different although obviously related issue. This may be about to change, however. The Ministry of Planning and a donor group (including the World Bank and UNDP) have opened discussions about the formulation of a Harmonisation and Alignment Action Plan. The workshop organised by the National Co-ordinator of the 2006 baseline survey has contributed to a process that should eventually lead to some form of joint monitoring, focused on a suitably localised version of the Paris Declaration commitments and targets.

INDICATOR 12

BASELINES AND TARGETS

THE TABLE BELOW presents the 2005 baselines and the targets for DRC. The baseline values are taken from the discussion above, which draws on various sources of information. The main source is the baseline survey undertaken in DRC under the aegis of the National Co-ordinator (Benjamin Bonge Gibende).

Table 10.9
Baselines
and targets

INDICATORS	2005 BASELINE	2010 TARGET
1 Ownership – Operational PRS	D	B or A
2a Quality of PFM systems	2.5	3.0
2b Quality procurement systems	Not available	Not applicable
3 Aid reported on budget	81%	90%
4 Co-ordinated capacity development	11%	50%
5a Use of country PFM systems (aid flows)	13%	No target
5b Use of country procurement systems (aid flows)	31%	Not applicable
6 Parallel PIUs	34	11
7 In-year predictability	83%	91%
8 Untied aid	90%	More than 90%
9 Use of programme-based approaches	54%	66%
10a Co-ordinated missions	38%	40%
10b Co-ordinated country analytic work	35%	66%
11 Sound performance assessment framework	D	B or A
12 Reviews of mutual accountability	No	Yes

ACRONYMS

AER	Aid Effectiveness Review
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSCR	<i>Document de stratégie de croissance et de réduction de la pauvreté</i> (Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper)
GNI	gross national income
IDA	International Development Association
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
PBA	programme-based approach
PFM	public financial management
PIU	project implementation unit
PMPTR	<i>Programme minimum de partenariat pour la transition et la relance</i> (short-term programme for transition and recovery)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper