EVALUATION 2008/1

SDC HUMANITARIAN AID IN ANGOLA 1995–2006

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Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC

Independent Evaluation of

SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola 1995–2006

Commissioned by the Evaluation + Controlling Division
of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

Contents:

Bern, April 2008

Independent Evaluation Process

Independent Evaluations were introduced in SDC in 2002 with the aim of providing a more critical and independent assessment of SDC activities. Joint SDC/SECO programs are evaluated jointly. Independent Evaluations are conducted according to DAC Evaluation Standards and are part of SDC's concept for implementing Article 170 of the Swiss Constitution which requires Swiss Federal Offices to analyse the effectiveness of their activities. SDC's **Comité Stratégique (COSTRA)**, which consists of the Director General, the Deputy Director General and the heads of SDC's six departments, approves the Evaluation Program. The **Evaluation + Controlling Division (E+C Division)**, which is outside of line management and reports directly to the Office of the Director General, commissions the evaluation, taking care to recruit evaluators with a critical distance from SDC.

The E+C Division identifies the primary intended users of the evaluation and invites them to participate in a **Core Learning Partnership (CLP)**. The CLP actively accompanies the evaluation process. It comments on the evaluation design (Approach Paper). It provides feedback to the evaluation team on their preliminary findings and on the draft report.

The CLP also discusses the evaluation results and recommendations. In an **Agreement at Completion Point (ACP)** it takes a stand with regard to the evaluation recommendations indicating whether it agrees or disagrees and, if appropriate, indicates follow-up intentions. In a COSTRA meeting, SDC's Senior Management discusses the evaluation findings. In a **Senior Management Response**, it expresses its opinion and final decisions for SDC. The Stand of the CLP and the Senior Management Response are published with the Final Evaluators' Report. The Senior Management Response forms the basis for future rendering of accountability.

For further details regarding the evaluation process see the Approach Paper in the Annex.

Timetable

Step	**When**
Evaluation Programme approved by COSTRA	September 2006
Approach Paper finalized	Mai 2007
Implementation of the evaluation	Mai 2007 to December 2007
Agreement at Completion	January 2008
Senior Management Response in COSTRA (SDC)	March 2008

I Evaluation Abstract

Donor	SDC
Report Title	Independent Evaluation – SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola 1995-2006
Geographic Area	Angola
Sector	Emergency assistance and reconstruction; Emergency food aid; Conflict, Peace and Security; Social infrastructure and services
Language	English
Date	Submitted January 4, 2008
Authors	Danish Institute for International Studies (Steen Folke, Finn Stepputat, Lars Buur, Helene Kyed, Paulo Inglês, Jacinto Pio Wacussanga)

Subject Description

The evaluation assesses SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola over a period of 11 years – with a special focus on the Huambo Province, which throughout the entire period remained an area of concentration for SDC's aid. It covers both directly implemented (by SDC) aid programmes, programmes implemented through international and national NGOs, and aid provided through international humanitarian agencies, notably WFP, ICRC, OCHA and UNHCR.

Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation deals with all the main evaluation criteria for humanitarian aid, viz. coverage, relevance and appropriateness, coherence and coordination, effectiveness and efficiency, connectedness and sustainability and finally outcome and impact.

The methodology applies a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods, based on the belief that the perspectives offered by the two types of method can be complementary as well as providing an element of triangulation. It puts emphasis on studying an intervention in its context because contextual factors are important for aid impact.

In more concrete terms the methodology has comprised the following main elements:

- Documentary studies
- Quantitative analysis of project monitoring data
- Questionnaire survey with former SDC staff
- Stakeholder interviews in Luanda, Huambo and Switzerland
- Interviews with partners and collaborating humanitarian agencies and NGOs
- Interviews with government officials in Luanda and Huambo
- Contextual studies, Angola and Huambo Province with sub-regions
- Survey of a large sample of roads, bridges, health clinics, schools, water pumps and community kitchens in Huambo province
- Survey of a small sample of schools in Luanda constructed with SDC funding
- Assessment of MUBELA enterprise
- Interviews with village community leaders/chiefs (*Sobas*)
- Rapid Rural Appraisal of socio-economic impact
- Beneficiary interviews I: Small sample of workers in construction teams
- Beneficiary interviews II: Survey of large sample of IDPs and villagers assisted

Major Findings

In a sense SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola was a drop in the sea of misery. But together with aid from other donors and humanitarian agencies, SDC's aid provided much needed assistance to thousands of victims of the civil war. In the context of huge needs and limited aid resources, SDC's humanitarian aid was generally relevant and often appropriate. Viewed over the different phases, the programme had many twists and turns, in fact quite a zig-zag course. This was partly in response to the changes in the context, primarily brought about by the civil war and its aftermath.

The Swiss engagement in Angola has overall been characterized by a satisfactory level of coherence and even of synergy between the programmes of different entities. However, the substantial donations of Swiss milk products go against the grain of general Swiss standards for food aid. The fact that SDC financed a vast range of very different activities reduced the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of the programme. The ambitious 'Bridges for Peace' programme accomplished only a fraction of its goals, the rehabilitation of a few stretches of road and construction of 3 UNIDO type bridges. The whole first phase of the programme was far from being effective or efficient. Other construction activities, notably the schools, the health posts and the water pumps, were both effective (functionally) and efficient (in terms of the relation between costs and benefits).

On the whole, SDC could have been better at addressing the transition from emergency humanitarian aid to rehabilitation and development with a longer perspective. The last phase strategy in principle had that aim, but this was only accomplished in a limited sense. The outcome and impact of SDC's humanitarian aid over the period 1995-2006 is found at different levels. There is no doubt that SDC's aid has provided relief covering basic needs for thousands of war victims, primarily through the funding of other agencies' programmes, notably WFP, ICRC and UNHCR. The interviews with former beneficiaries of these activities have brought to light their appreciation of the effort but also their view that the emergency aid was insufficient and sometimes came too late.

Recommendations

It is recommended that SDC more generally should:

1) Rely less on expatriate staff. 2) Ensure a proper balance between 'hard' and 'soft' interventions. 3) Aspire to procure necessary food aid locally or in the same region. 4) Do No Harm. 5) Ensure coherence between humanitarian aid and diplomatic representation in countries of operation. 6) Clarify objectives of humanitarian aid programmes and develop indicators of desired impact. 7) Develop capacities and reserve resources for working with national NGOs and governmental entities. 8) Avoid being caught up in direct implementation of major infrastructure projects. 9) Promote a community-based approach to humanitarian aid. 10) Continue supporting coordinating mechanisms at national as well as provincial levels. 11) Promote an understanding and practice of the 'relief-development continuum' that goes beyond the linear and the binary. 12) Support attempts of international agencies at launching medium term projects for rehabilitation and recovery when sudden shifts in conditions permit the launching of such projects. 13) Support rapid response mechanisms similar to the UN Emergency Response Fund in Angola. 14) Advocate for the respect of the UN guidelines for IDPs but provide support in terms of needs rather than classification. 15) Support international attempts at developing approaches to support of sudden, large scale population returns/dispersals which seem to represent a particular challenge to humanitarian operations in areas of armed conflict.

II Lessons Learned

Below is a list of lessons learned and challenges drawn out by the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) during the Agreement at Completion Point meeting on January 15th 2008 that are worth considering when dealing with humanitarian aid modalities. HA-Africa Division, HA-controller and COPRET will collaborate to strengthening the issues expressed through the lessons learned among SDC-HA.

Intervention approaches

1. **Context analysis:**
   a. Undertake systematic context analysis, with special emphasis in case of context change.
   b. Prerequisite: organise risk analysis with different scenarios at the beginning of an emergency intervention and a profound context analysis just after the relief phase.
   c. Base implementation of emergency and post emergency programmes on conflict analysis.
   d. Ensure the appropriate use of assessment tools, particularly in the field.
2. Improve software approaches (please refer to 23).
3. **Continuum/contiguum:**
   a. SDC should continue defining at the beginning of a humanitarian aid programme the scope of its geographical and sectorial engagement[1].
   b. SDC approach to fragile states (i.e. Chad and Zimbabwe) should be further refined and implemented.
   c. In after-war situations, humanitarian aid is often confronted with a transition gap reflected in a funding shortfall for recovery programmes and reconstruction projects. Therefore SDC HA should: i) support early recovery approaches which include peace building and reconciliation elements, ii) discuss about the possibilities for transition funding, iii) undertake international and national advocacy for a development perspective and stay engaged through attracting development partners.
4. Take into consideration aspects of good governance (before and during the intervention).
5. Invest more efforts in the donors coordination and harmonization.
6. Continue discussing policy approaches that cover recovery.
7. Better use the synergies between humanitarian and development approaches as well as between bilateral and multilateral approaches.

Intervention focus

8. Continue focussing on the most vulnerable people by improving humanitarian needs assessments.
9. Support large and high risk projects/programmes (i.e. major infrastructures) rather through or in cooperation with large organisations than direct implementation.
10. Work on those areas where SDC has a comparative advantage and avoid too broad approaches.

[1] For example, when engaging in relief it is essential to have in mind a longer term approach and plan as soon as possible the next steps like repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and transition.

Ensure continuity of programmes

11. Increase medium-term planning and strategies.
12. Maintain coherence in the programme through desk officers (i.e. change in country directors).
13. Improve PCM (incl. logframes) and monitoring competencies.
14. Be realistic in terms of timeframe and risks of failures.
15. Better define and consider impact of humanitarian aid activities.
16. Relate systematically the PCM to the DAC criteria.
17. Plan mid-term evaluation in order to improve and change elements of the programme.

Partners of humanitarian interventions and capacity building

18. Take advantage from the knowledge and the skills of other SDC divisions, COOF, competences centres such as Swisspeace or local Universities and local and international organisations.
19. Consider the phasing out strategies as soon as possible, i.e. potential partners for further funding after SDC departure
20. Capitalize the network of local partners (such as international and national NGOs, diplomatic representations as resource persons).
21. Strengthen the involvement of local communities in projects/programmes as a value for any intervention.
22. Strengthen the structure of COOFs with internal capacity building.
23. Work more consequently on local capacity building where there is an involvement from the local communities you work with, even through organisational capacity building, if context allows it.
24. Develop a guideline to better define criteria to recruit people in the field.
25. Capitalize SDC-HA knowledge in hardware approaches and competences to react in emergency situation.

III Agreement at Completion Point Stand of the Core Learning Partnership and of Senior Management Response regarding Main Recommendations

A. Overall Appreciation

Stand of CLP

The Core Learning Partnership (CLP) welcomes the comprehensive approach of the evaluation. Generally, the CLP appreciates the approach and the methodology which had an appropriate mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches, context analysis and social dimension.

The context in Angola is not completely reflected in the report and consequently its influence has not been sufficiently taken into account in the analysis.

The CLP finds that the evaluation does not sufficiently take into consideration the role of the programme and experts involved in the policy dialogue with multilateral agencies working in Angola (mainly Luanda and Huambo) and with the other donors and therefore does not analyse the potential of synergies between SDC presence in Angola and the multilateral dialogue concerning Angola.

The CLP considers that aspects of governance are not well addressed in the report. From the CLP perspective, the evaluators overestimated clearly the capacities of local communities and governmental institutions in Angola, and underestimated the dramatic and precarious conditions and environment caused by war. Therefore, the CLP was surprised about the appeal for more reliance on local resources in a context well-known for armed conflict and weak public institutions. For example, in Angola authorities could not give adequate support to the efforts of international agencies.

The CLP further notes that recommendations are very general. They do not express the Angolan specificities, the unusual “long-term” emergency situation faced by HA in Angola and the four different phases of the SDC Angolan engagement. For example, the CLP agrees that the context analysis was weak, although during the 10 years in Angola, SDC has tried to integrate, through different tools like PCIA and MERV, some of the elements mentioned in the recommendations.

The CLP notes the existing difference between development approaches and humanitarian approaches and considers that generally the evaluation does not take sufficiently into account humanitarian aid aspects in a conflict or post-conflict environment which were characterizer by chaos and questions of bare survival.

Finally gender issues have been taken into consideration in the report but not in the recommendations. The CLP underlines that gender issues are important and that new guidelines about gender in humanitarian aid will be introduced in 2008.

Senior Management Response

COSTRA, SDC Senior Management's Comité Stratégique, particularly welcomes the results of the evaluation report as they raised fundamental issues for the Swiss Humanitarian Aid. COSTRA appreciates that the analysis considers elements that are relevant for other countries where the SDC engagement may be similar to the situation faced in Angola, like Chad and Sudan. In order to improve its engagement in other countries, SDC should learn from the experience in Angola.

COSTRA adds that the evaluation recommendations are generally relevant for the Angola case as well as the overall humanitarian portfolio and raise political questions about past and future SDC engagement. COSTRA further notes that the 10-year SDC engagement in Angola was in one of the most difficult countries in Africa. The humanitarian engagement has been influenced a lot by political considerations in Switzerland during that period.

COSTRA acknowledges that there is a need to discuss the continuum dimension. It is of particular importance to consider the issue related to the engagement of the development cooperation after the humanitarian aid engagement in order to strengthen the peace situation in a country. The discussions generated by the evaluation recommendations are valuable for discussing continuum processes. Therefore SDC should learn from this evaluation when determining SDC's future course of action in that field. COSTRA underlines the need for SDC Management to engage in deeper reflection on humanitarian aid.

Finally, COSTRA finds that the evaluation does not take aspects of security sufficiently into consideration.

B. Specific Recommendations

Recommendation 1
Rely less on expatriate staff. In emergency situations, it can be very difficult to find qualified local (national) staff, and hence the use of expatriates can be unavoidable. But in humanitarian aid with a longer time horizon it should be possible to recruit and maybe train local staff who can replace expatriates.

Stand of CLP
The CLP partly agrees with this general recommendation. The CLP points out that, although capacity building takes time, it is necessary for HA to invest in it. During an emergency phase, when everybody is under pressure for effective and quick results, it is more appropriate to rely on expatriates and highly qualified technical staff used to emergency situations. Nevertheless, the CLP recommends periodic review of staff structure and suggests to developing a comprehensive human resources policy or concept in order to support HA coordinators working in difficult environments.

Senior Management Reponse
Senior Management agrees that capacity building for local staff is an important issue and SDC should rely as much as possible on local expertise when available. This principle has to be increasingly taken into account and it has to be assessed if local expertise can be mobilized in the domains of context analysis and/or technical expertise.

Recommendation 2
Ensure a proper balance between 'hard' and 'soft' interventions. In emergency situations, the relief provided in cooperation among a number of humanitarian agencies can build on the comparative advantage of each agency. But in humanitarian aid with a longer time horizon, it is important to strike a proper balance between hard and soft interventions. The 'soft' parts can both reduce the risk of creating lasting aid dependency and contribute to sustainability.

Stand of CLP
Generally, the CLP agrees with this recommendation. However, the CLP is of the opinion that in the case of Angola, there was a balance between “hard” and “soft” components but that there was an incompatibility between the approach (long term planification of a demanding bridges and roads reconstruction programme) and the context (unstable country situation).

Senior Management Reponse
COSTRA mandates the HA to capitalize its experience with its “hard” interventions in order to implement the lessons in its future activities.

Recommendation 3
Aspire to procure necessary food aid locally or in the same region. Food aid (e.g. milk products) from Switzerland can serve the dietary purpose but will often be subject to cumbersome procedures. Usually food procured nearby will be a cheaper and faster alternative – as well as supporting agricultural development in a developing country.

Stand of CLP
The CLP partly agrees with this recommendation. Generally the CLP agrees with this concept and policy as it is also stated in the “Standards Governing the Use of Dairy Products in the Context of Food Aid”. However, with regard to the context in Angola, the needed/requested food was not available locally and the procedures for dairy products purchased in the region would have been as cumbersome as the import from Switzerland.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the CLP standpoint.

Recommendation 4
Do No Harm. While the fear of doing harm should not discourage donors from engaging in emergencies and their aftermath, they need to place more emphasis on context-analysis and appraisal-practices. This includes appropriate forms of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment as a standard

Stand of CLP
The CLP agrees with this recommendation and emphasizes that SDC HA needs to improve, also through existing experiences (i.e. PCIA in Angola in 2002), the understanding and the application of context analysis tools.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the standpoint of the CLP. The consequences of humanitarian aid actions on a conflict situation need to be considered and anticipated. Moreover, to guarantee the impartiality and the universality of humanitarian aid, COSTRA adds that it is important to improve the understanding and the periodic application of context analysis tools (Risk analysis at the beginning of emergency interventions, context analysis just after the relief phases and at any context change). The instruments developed by COPRET should consistently be applied in humanitarian aid situations. Generally capacities in context analysis have to be improved. This would mean that it is important to combine more technical experts with experts specialized in context analysis and software approaches.

Recommendation 5
Ensure coherence between humanitarian aid and diplomatic representation in countries of operation. Diplomatic representation increases the possibility for having a political impact, including improved protection of vulnerable populations. In countries without representation, humanitarian aid should mainly be channelled through international organizations.

Stand of CLP
The CLP disagrees with this recommendation. In the Swiss context, COOFs take an active role in the political dialogue in a given country and do participate in international advocacy efforts.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the CLP standpoint.

Recommendation 6
Clarify objectives of humanitarian aid programmes and develop indicators of desired impact. Impact indicators can take many different forms, but the process of developing the indicators can help clarifying objectives and consider to which extent they are realistic. However, care must be taken that hard-to-measure aspects of humanitarian aid, such as protection, are not sidelined in the process.

Stand of CLP
The CLP fully agrees with this recommendation. For several years, logframes have been institutionalized in project cycle management. However, the CLP recommends improving the common understanding of logframes and related concepts (i.e. impacts within SDC). The CLP specifically stresses the need to pay more attention in regular monitoring.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the CLP. The quality of logframes must be improved. In order to ensure continuity, medium-term planning and strategies should be developed where relevant.

Recommendation 7
Develop capacities and reserve resources for working with national NGOs and governmental entities. National NGOs and state institutions often have limited capacity, but they are the ones that stay back and they are the first to respond to emergencies. Hence they need investment in terms of training and organizational development.

Stand of CLP
The CLP partly agrees with the recommendation. In general it is relevant to work with national NGOs and develop their capacities, as it was done in Angola during some phases of SDC-HA engagement. However, in certain contexts during the phase of conflict, especially in Angola, it is very difficult to reach meaningful results. In the future, SDC-HA should consider how better to approach local capacity building, particularly in fragile States.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the CLP and encourages the HA to develop and implement proposals on how local capacities building in Fragile States can be enhanced.

Recommendation 8
Avoid being caught up in direct implementation of major infrastructure projects. Because of the complexities of such projects and the contextual challenges, such projects should be left to the specialised humanitarian agencies or the government, if and when the latter has the capacity. Small infrastructure projects may be relevant and feasible, but they should then use simple, appropriate technologies and build on community involvement to the extent possible.

Stand of CLP
The CLP agrees with this recommendation. In addition, the CLP considers that direct implementation is relevant only when there is limited local capacity. SDC-HA should enhance community know-how. Furthermore, the CLP recommends that SDC should invest more in community development. When SDC undertakes major infrastructure projects, SDC should work through international organisations (by funding or secondments) or large NGOs (by funding or technical support). In the case of Angola there was no such organisation.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the CLP, meaningful task sharing in emergency situations is important.

Recommendation 9
Promote a community-based approach to humanitarian aid. This should include consultations with intended beneficiaries about their prioritised needs as well as supporting attempts to build institutions at community level that may gradually enable people to survive and develop without aid.

Stand of CLP
The CLP agrees with this recommendation. However, the CLP points out that this recommendation is particularly relevant in early recovery settings and during post-emergency situations.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the CLP standpoint.

Recommendation 10
Continue supporting coordinating mechanisms at national as well as provincial levels. The experience of decentralizing the coordination of humanitarian aid was very positive in Angola and should be encouraged in other emergencies.

Stand of CLP
The CLP fully agrees with this recommendation.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the CLP. SDC has a comparative advantage in decentralized coordination.

Recommendation 11
Promote an understanding and practice of the 'relief-development continuum' that goes beyond the linear and the binary. Conflict transformation, peace-building, security, and other forms of international intervention and aid are complementary to relief as well as development aid, and longer-term considerations of reduction of vulnerabilities, building peace constituencies, strengthening government structures etcetera should be incorporated in some form at an early point in all emergencies.

Stand of CLP
The CLP fully agrees with this recommendation. Although it is probably easier to apply when Departments E or O take over the programme, the CLP notes that it is necessary to further strengthen the cooperation among SDC Departments (thematic desks and operational desks), with the PD of the DFAE, as well as strengthening both the coordination with other donors and partners and the synergies with local authorities. The CLP also points out that this holistic approach is not an easy task because the interests of all the actors involved in the field of international cooperation are often different.

Senior Management Response
Please see below recommendation 12.

Recommendation 12
Support attempts of international agencies at launching medium term projects for rehabilitation and recovery when sudden shifts in conditions permit the launching of such projects. In the case of Angola it was difficult to have rehabilitation projects funded in the immediate aftermath of war when they were most urgently needed. This is a recurrent problem which calls for the attention of donors and international agencies.

Stand of CLP
The CLP agrees with the recommendation but with the following modification *"after the end of the transition phase"* instead of *"in the immediate aftermath of war"*. The CLP also considers that national organisations should also be mentioned in the recommendation. CLP suggests that, depending on the context, SDC-HA could allow special funds for specific medium-term projects, even though there exists the relevant risk of blocking budgets that are not any more available for new emergencies. For instance in Angola, after the end of the transition phase, donors were reluctant to fund development activities due to lack of transparency of oil income. Furthermore, to optimize the recommendation, it is necessary to improve the cooperation with development agencies.

Senior Management Response on recommendations 11 and 12
COSTRA agrees with the recommendations 11 and 12 and the modification proposed by the CLP.

COSTRA acknowledges that there is a gap between humanitarian aid and development cooperation (the continuum dimension). The central and relevant issue of planning the transition from humanitarian aid to development cooperation needs to be considered and institutionally improved. The same applies for disaster prevention in the development context. SDC (headquarters and field) must analyze short-comings and improve its performance by identifying opportunities to fill the gaps.

Generally COSTRA emphasizes the need for improving continuum mechanisms through task sharing and, depending on the context and the problem, through harmonization between actors (multilateral, bilateral and national actors).

COSTRA recognizes that transitional funding has to be ensured. Therefore it is necessary to assess, as soon as the situation improves, the availability of transitional funding (i.e. via Development Banks and other partners).

COSTRA agrees that exit strategies should be developed and planned more systematically and that, in the recovery phase, longer term projects should be considered.

Recommendation 13
Support rapid response mechanisms similar to the UN Emergency Response Fund in Angola. Such mechanisms ensure the ability of national and international organizations to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to sudden changes in the context, in particular to the difficult post-conflict transition.

Stand of CLP
The CLP agrees with the recommendation and acknowledges that, depending on the context and availability of funds, such mechanisms can be useful for a quick and coherent response from the international community. This implies engagement in multilateral policy dialogue and coordination of donors.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the recommendation and the CLP standpoint.

Recommendation 14
Advocate for the respect of the UN guidelines for IDPs but provide support in terms of needs rather than classification. While IDPs have special protection needs which for example calls for programmes in support of issuing of ID cards, IDPs make up a very diverse group of differently endowed households. Support should be given on the basis of needs assessment rather than membership of a category of beneficiaries.

Stand of CLP
In principle CLP agrees with this recommendation and further highlights the importance of including the local population in the recommendation. The CLP emphasises that SDC does not distinguish between IDPs and the local population, if equally in need. Therefore, needs assessments approaches require consideration of both groups and should focus on most vulnerable. In order to balance the support to target groups, the CLP insists on the relevance of strengthening needs assessments and context analysis in humanitarian aid programmes.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the recommendation and the CLP standpoint.

Recommendation 15
Support international attempts at developing approaches to support of sudden, large scale population returns/dispersals which seem to represent a particular challenge to humanitarian operations in areas of armed conflict. Such initiatives should focus on the coordination and linkages between security, emergency and development aid, the re-establishment of local government and the de-concentration of social services, the recognition of emerging patterns of mobility and mobile livelihoods, including ‘staggered returns’, split households and double residence, as well as the special problems of vulnerable households unable to move without support.

Stand of CLP
The CLP agrees with the recommendation. The “stay engaged” principle is difficult to apply systematically. The different humanitarian actors in Angola were implementing the exit strategy and diminishing their funding progressively after the transition phase was declared over by the government of Angola in the end of 2004. The CLP considers that SDC-HA could stay engaged in such contexts through funding international organisations.

Senior Management Response
COSTRA agrees with the CLP standpoint.

IV Evaluators' Final Report

Independent Evaluation of

SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola 1995-2006

Commissioned by the Evaluation + Controlling Division
of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

Copenhagen, Denmark January 1st 2008

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List of Acronyms

ADRA-A	Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (Angola NGO – rural development and environment)
ADRA-I	Adventist Development & Relief Agency International (NGO)
APOLO	Apoio para Organizações Locais (SDC assistance to local organizations)
ASCA	Associação para o Sorriso da Criança (Angolan NGO – help to children)
CAD	Corpo de Apoio aos Deslocados (Angolan NGO – assistance to displaced people)
CARITAS	Caritas International
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCG	Centre for Common Ground
COIEPA	Inter-eclesiastic Committee for Peace in Angola
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DHA	UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
DW	Development Workshop
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
ERRP	Emergency Resettlement and Retun Programme
EURONAID	A European network of NGOs in humanitarian aid
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FNLA	Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola
GAC	Grupo de Apoio a Criança (Angolan NGO – help to children)
GAS	Grupos de Agua e Saneamento (Water and Sanitation Groups)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoA	Government of Angola
HH/SKH	Humanitäre Hilfe/Schweizeriches Korps für Humanitärhilfe
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee for Red Cross
ID	Identity
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INEA	nstituto Nacional de Estradas em Angola (National Institute for Roads in Angola)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JPO	Junior Professional Officer (in the UN system)
LED	The Students League for Development (Angola)
MINARS	The Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (Angola)
MINSA	Ministério de Salud de Angola
MLA	Multilateral Agencies
MOLISV	Movimento Liberazione e Sviluppo (Italian NGO)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	Movimento Popular de libertação de Angola (ruling party in Angola)
MSF	Médecines sans Frontières
NFI	Non Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOVIB	Sister Organisation of Oxfam located in the Netherlands

OCHA	United Nation's Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OIKOS	Portuguese NGO for development and cooperation
OISC	Fundação Obra de Inserção Social da Crianças (Angolan NGO – help to children)
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
OKUTIUKA	Acção para a Vida (Angolan NGO – 'return' and help to life)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RC-F	The National Red Cross Society - France
RISC	Reabilitação de Infraestruturas Comunitárias (SDC assistance to rehabilitation of community infrastructure)
SCF	Save the Children's Fund
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SHA	Swiss Humanitarian Aid
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SOLE	Solidaridad Evangelica
UCAH	United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nation's Development Programme
UNHCR	Uniterd Nation's High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência total de Angola (Angolan opposition party)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UTCAH	Unidade técnico para a Coordenação de Ajuda Humanitária (Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Angola)
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis Mapping (WHO-instrument)
VLOM	Village Level Operation and Maintenance
WATSAN	Water and sanitation project
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

1 Executive Summary

1.1 SDC's humanitarian aid

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) has provided humanitarian aid to Angola since the early 1990s. In the first years the assistance was limited. In the period 1995-2006, SDC funded and implemented a major programme with a number of different components. The evaluation covers this period. The assistance changed over the years, marked by the different phases of civil war and its aftermath. At the end of 2006 SDC's humanitarian aid was terminated.

In cooperation with other agencies humanitarian assistance was given in different parts of the country to victims of the war, notably internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, throughout the programme there was a special emphasis on assisting parts of the Huambo province, where a number of projects and programmes were implemented through direct interventions and in collaboration with other agencies and NGOs. The main activities focused on physical infrastructure, rehabilitation of roads and bridges, servicing IDP camps, building of schools and health centres and -posts, provision of water and sanitation and establishment of community kitchens. Along with this, the programme sought to achieve some skill-based capacity building as well as peace-building initiatives. A relatively large part of the programme consisted of funding some of the activities of major international humanitarian agencies in Angola, in particular the World Food Programme (WFP), International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The total expenses 1995-2006 were 86,956,403 CHF.

SDC's humanitarian programme in Angola can be divided into four distinct phases. These reflect the changing context nationally and locally (in Huambo), and first of all the shifts in the civil war and its aftermath. The first phase, 1995-1998, a period of relative peace, concentrated on a directly implemented programme in Huambo province, "Bridges for Peace", focusing on construction of bridges and rehabilitation of roads. The second phase, 1999-2000, after the resumption of the civil war, was dominated by emergency assistance to the huge numbers of IDPs in Huambo province and elsewhere. In the third phase, 2001-2003, emergency aid was supplemented with reconstruction, especially after the Luena peace agreement in April 2002. Finally, the fourth phase, 2004-2006, was characterized by transitional humanitarian rehabilitation with a development perspective.

1.2 The evaluation approach

The evaluation deals with the coverage, relevance and appropriateness, coherence and coordination, effectiveness and efficiency, connectedness and sustainability, and outcome and impact of SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola 1995-2006. SDC has over the years financed a vast range of activities in many different sectors and in cooperation with or through a large number of partners. It has been impossible to evaluate everything.

The main priority has been accorded to the SDC financed activities in Huambo province. The directly implemented (first phase) programme has received maximum attention in the evaluation. In the last phases of the programme a range of activities was implemented in cooperation with or through NGOs, primarily international (including Swiss) NGOs, but also to a more limited extent Angolan NGOs. A substantial part of this was implemented in Huambo province, but there were also SDC funded NGO activities in other parts of Angola. In the evaluation priority has been accorded to the activities in Huambo, whereas assessments of NGO activities elsewhere are based only on documentary study and a limited number of interviews. The very substantial funding of international humanitarian agencies such as World Food Programme (WFP), International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has only been subjected to a very superficial evaluation based on a few interviews and documentary studies. More substantive assessments of these organisations' humanitarian aid in Angola would require independent evaluations. A special emphasis has been put on assessing the immediate and longer-term (until September 2007) impact of SDC's humanitarian aid on its intended primary beneficiaries, notably the IDPs.

The methodology applies a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods, based on a belief that the perspectives offered by the two types of methods can be complementary as well as providing an element of triangulation. It puts emphasis on studying an intervention in its context because contextual factors are important for aid impact.

1.3 The findings

The evaluation has dealt with the coverage, relevance and appropriateness, coherence and coordination, effectiveness and efficiency, connectedness and sustainability, and outcome and impact of SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola 1995-2006.

1.3.1 Coverage

In a sense SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola was a drop in the sea of misery. But together with aid from other donors and humanitarian agencies, SDC's aid provided much needed assistance to thousands of victims of the civil war. Around half of the money spent was channeled through the big humanitarian agencies, particularly WFP, ICRC and UNHCR. This contributed to cover the immediate needs of large numbers of war victims, notably IDPs.

In the initial phase SDC tried to include UNITA controlled territory in Huambo province in the directly implemented programme. This, however, proved to be impossible, and as a consequence almost all activities in Huambo province were carried out in government (MPLA) controlled areas or on the perimeters of the "safe" zones. It was unfortunate but most likely unaviodable.

1.3.2 Relevance and appropriateness

In the context of huge needs and limited aid resources, SDC's humanitarian aid was generally relevant and often appropriate. The programme's special emphasis on construction of infrastructure in Huambo province gave SDC a special niche role among the humanitarian agencies, and this was appreciated by other agencies as well as by the GoA. If SDC's activities are assessed on their own, it may be questioned whether there was the right balance between

"hard" and "soft" interventions. Almost all SDC staff (apart from those in administration) were engineers and technicians. The approach was very technical and "hands on", and this did produce significant results, e.g. in the form of a few bridges and numerous schools, health posts and water pumps. Cross-cutting issues such as gender and environment were not really addressed, although gender was explicitly introduced as such in the last phase strategy. Capacity building was limited, and so were efforts to create or support institutions around the physical infrastructure. The important NGO partner Development Workshop, however, did precisely that – with SDC funding.

Viewed over the different phases, the programme had many twists and turns, in fact quite a zig-zag course. This was partly in response to the changes in the context, primarily brought about by the civil war and its aftermath. SDC was praised by many for its flexibility and ability to adjust to the changing circumstances. But the zig-zag course also reflects an approach characterized by trial and error as well as the shifting priorities of the SDC mission heads in Luanda.

It is surprising that very little was done to support returning IDPs after the war ended. A bigger effort here – by SDC and the major humanitarian agencies – could have been very relevant and much needed.

1.3.3 Coherence and coordination

The Swiss engagement in Angola has overall been characterized by a satisfactory level of coherence and even of synergy between the programmes of different entities, in particular SDC and Political Division IV in terms of peace building. However, the evaluation team has come across two incoherencies: One is the fact that a Swiss embassy was closed at the time SDC started its operation, a fact which reduces the potential political impact of a technical programme considerably. The other is the massive donations of Swiss milk products which goes against the grain of general Swiss standards for food aid.

1.3.4 Effectiveness and efficiency

The fact that SDC financed a vast range of very different activities reduced the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of the programme. In humanitarian aid generally there is little time for strategic planning and preparation or for follow-up activities, but even so a stronger effort to analyse the context (especially in Huambo) could have contributed to better results. SDC's aid was characterized by *ad hoc* decisions as well as many twists and turns. In the first phases the programme concentrated on physical road and bridge infrastructure, but later this was completely given up. It was notably not resumed after the civil war ended. Concomitantly, the programme shifted from a strong emphasis on direct implementation to working primarily through a large number of partners. Where the resources initially were used focused on physical infrastructure, they were later spread thin.

The ambitious "Bridges for Peace" programme accomplished only a fraction of its goals, the rehabilitation of a few stretches of road and construction of 3 UNIDO type bridges. While the main reason for this was the resumption of the civil war, clearly the approach adopted contributed to the meagre outcome. The approach involved a heavy investment – both in machinery, local staff and expatriate staff. The UNIDO bridge type was complicated to manufacture locally under the existing conditions, and technical problems, lacking capacity, weak management (of the MUBELA factory) and delays resulted in a huge discrepancy between

the resources used and the results. The whole first phase of the programme was far from being effective or efficient.

Other construction activities, notably schools, health posts and water pumps, were both effective (functionally) and efficient (in terms of the relation between costs and benefits). They served their purpose in the emergency phase and they remain functioning today.

1.3.5 Connectedness and sustainability

Despite its limited mandate as a humanitarian programme, SDC Angola has in many ways transcended the traditional short-sightedness of emergency operations. SDC's funding horizons for multilateral agencies and international NGOs have often been longer than the typical 6-12 months, and the emergency constructions in Huambo have had a considerable afterlife beyond the end of the emergency. It may not always be the outcome of an elaborate plan or strategy, but the quality of constructions, the pervasive needs for health, education, water, roads and bridges, and the fact that the GoA in Huambo, sooner or later, has taken over the responsibility, means that most of SDCs constructions still serve their purpose. Less convincing is the sustainability of the "software", the community based organizations, local NGOs, and micro-enterprises involved in SDC's direct operation.

On the whole, SDC could have been better at addressing the transition from emergency humanitarian aid to rehabilitation and development with a longer perspective. The last phase strategy in principle had that aim, but this was only accomplished in a limited sense.

The late and feeble response to the return of more than 3 million IDPs to the rural areas represents the most serious problem of connectedness and sustainability in SDCs programme and in the humanitarian operation in general in Angola. This is a sign of continuing problems of reorientation from emergency to rehabilitation, but is probably also a symptom of the donors' eagerness to disengage from a long-lasting complex emergency in a country that became politically incorrect in the context of larger geopolitical changes.

1.3.6 Outcome and impact

The outcome and impact of SDC's humanitarian aid over the period 1995-2006 is found at different levels. There is no doubt that SDC's aid has provided relief covering basic needs for thousands of war victims, primarily through the funding of other agencies' programmes, notably WFP, ICRC and UNHCR. In the emergency phase SDC played an important role in setting up and servicing the camps for IDPs in and around Huambo and Caála. The interviews with former beneficiaries of these activities have brought to light their appreciation of the effort but also their view that the emergency aid was insufficient and sometimes came too late. Some of the IDPs remain in resettlement camps where they live under appalling conditions with limited access to land and other means of sustenance. However, SDC funded schools, health posts and water pumps continue to provide relevant assistance to these beneficiaries, who are among the most vulnerable groups today. At a more general level it can be said that SDC's support to physical infrastructure in Huambo province has given a relatively large number of people -IDPs as well as permanently settled – continued benefits during the emergency as well as afterwards.

Inadvertently, SDC's programme in Huambo strengthened one part in the conflict, GoA/MPLA, in spite of good intentions and attempts to target aid to UNITA controlled territory. Thus it is only the population in the GoA controlled areas who enjoyed the benefits of the programme (except in the last phase). There are indications that those who lived in UNITA territory suffered more but they were out of reach. It can be argued that SDC initially had a rather unrealistic view of the possibilities of linking the two arch enemies with the "bridges for peace". Only after UNITA's military defeat did it become possible to target assistance to former UNITA territory, e.g. around Bailundo. This was included in the peace building and reconciliation programme. The activities under this programme at a more general level have contributed to a much needed strengthening of independent and conciliatory voices in civil society. This in itself is an important form of impact.

1.4 Recommendations

On the basis of the evaluation of SDC's humanitarian aid programme in Angola 1995-2006, it is recommended that SDC more generally should:

- Rely less on expatriate staff.
- Ensure a proper balance between "hard" and "soft" interventions.
- Aspire to procure necessary food aid locally or in the same region.
- Do No Harm.
- Ensure coherence between humanitarian aid and diplomatic representation in countries of operation.
- Clarify objectives of humanitarian aid programmes and develop indicators of desired impact.
- Develop capacities and reserve resources for working with national NGOs and governmental entities.
- Avoid being caught up in direct implementation of major infrastructure projects.
- Promote a community-based approach to humanitarian aid.
- Continue supporting coordinating mechanisms at national as well as provincial levels.
- Promote an understanding and practice of the "relief-development continuum" that goes beyond the linear and the binary.
- Support attempts of international agencies at launching medium term projects for rehabilitation and recovery when sudden shifts in conditions permit the launching of such projects.
- Support rapid response mechanisms similar to the UN Emergency Response Fund in Angola.
- Advocate for the respect of the UN guidelines for IDPs but provide support in terms of needs rather than classification.
- Support international attempts at developing approaches to support of sudden, large scale population returns/dispersals which seem to represent a particular challenge to humanitarian operations in areas of armed conflict.

2 Introduction

Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) has entrusted the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) with the task to evaluate SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola 1995-2006. After extensive consultations with SDC's evaluation office, DIIS produced a comprehensive Evaluation Proposal which outlined approach and methodology and presented an evaluation framework. Based on this and further dialogue, SDC's evaluation division produced an Approach Paper that incorporates the main elements of the DIIS proposal. The Approach Paper is found in annex A.

The evaluation team comprised four Danish consultants, three senior researchers and a researcher, plus two Angolan consultants. During fieldwork the team was assisted by three Angolan field assistants and an Angolan construction engineer who took part in the assessment of physical infrastructures constructed by SDC. Finally, a former SDC staff member, who has worked with humanitarian assistance in Angola through most of the period 1995-2006, assisted the team as resource person. Annex B presents the evaluation team. The fieldwork in Angola was carried out in the period August 21 – September 21 2007.

The evaluation report is divided in two volumes. This is the main report which deals with all aspects of SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola. The second volume is a comprehensive and detailed case study of SDC's humanitarian assistance in Huambo province where a large part of SDC's programme was implemented.

The structure of this main report is quite straightforward. Chapter 2 outlines the approach and methodology. In comparison with most such evaluations, this one is distinguished by the extensive fieldwork, primarily in Huambo province. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the changing national and local (Huambo) contexts for SDC's humanitarian assistance. A more comprehensive account of the changing local context is brought in the case study of Huambo province. Chapter 4 presents an overview of SDC's programme 1995-2006, focusing on the allocation of financial resources in different phases, for different sectors, and for different partners as well as direct implementation. Annex C provides detailed figures on budget and expenditure according to years, sectors and partners.

The main findings are presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 5 reviews the modalities of SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola. These changed a lot from phase to phase over the 11 year period. This was partly in response to changes in the context – notably the intensity of the civil war and its aftermath – but the changing modalities also reflect a learning process with elements of trial and error. Chapter 6 gives an assessment of the main components of SDC's programme. Overall, the programme had a special emphasis on construction of physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, schools, health clinics, water posts, etc.), but it also included some capacity building and in the last phase activities aimed at peace building and reconciliation. A much more comprehensive and detailed assessment of those activities that were implemented in Huambo province is found in the case study report.

Chapter 7 deals with the impact of SDC's humanitarian aid on its ultimate beneficiaries. Prominent among these are thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) but also other vulnerable men, women and children. Some of them still live in IDP settlement camps under miserable conditions, but the majority has returned to their homes after the civil war came to an end. It was a great challenge to search for and identify these beneficiaries. The evaluation team succeeded in finding and interviewing around one hundred of them. The case study on Huambo province contains an elaborate account of their views on the aid they have received from SDC and other humanitarian agencies as well as their present day living conditions and livelihoods.

Finally, chapters 8 and 9 present conclusions and recommendations.

Among the annexes is a report on a questionnaire-based (electronic) survey among former and present SDC staff members (annex D and E). This was carried out before the fieldwork and had a dual purpose. Soliciting the views of those who have had a primary role in implementing the programme, in itself can be seen as an important part of such an evaluation. At the same time the responses helped the evaluation team in planning the subsequent fieldwork.

The list of persons consulted (annex G) is selective and does not include the names of the ultimate beneficiaries interviewed. The case study report contains a more comprehensive list. The references given in annex H are only those that are directly referred to in the main report. The case study report has a much more detailed bibliography of all the documents that have been consulted for the evaluation.

The evaluation team is grateful to all those who have contributed to this evaluation. Among them are numerous former and present staff members of SDC, representatives of the Government of Angola in both Luanda and Huambo, staff members of humanitarian agencies, international and Angolan NGOs and last but not least the interviewed ultimate beneficiaries, IDPs as well as others.

3 Approach and methodology

3.1 Introduction

It has not been an easy task to evaluate SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola over a period of 11 years from 1995 to 2006. As can be seen in annex C, SDC has over the years financed a vast range of activities in many different sectors and in cooperation with or through a large number of partners. Needless to say, within the given time frame and resources, it has been impossible to evaluate everything. Some choices had to be made as shown in the following:

- The main priority has been accorded to the SDC financed activities in Huambo province. Through all phases of SDC's programme there was a concentration of activities in this province. In the first phases this was mainly in the form of a directly implemented programme, which has received maximum attention in the evaluation.
- In the last phases of the programme a range of activities was implemented in cooperation with or through NGOs, primarily international (including Swiss) NGOs, but also to a more limited extent Angolan NGOs. A substantial part of this was implemented in Huambo province, but there were also SDC funded NGO activities in other parts of Angola. In the evaluation priority has been accorded to the activities in Huambo, whereas assessments of NGO activities elsewhere are based only on documentary study and a limited number of interviews.
- The very substantial funding of international humanitarian agencies such as World Food Programme (WFP), International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has only been subjected to a very superficial evaluation based on a few interviews and documentary studies. More substantive assessments of these organisations' humanitarian aid in Angola would require independent evaluations.
- A special emphasis has been put on assessing the immediate and longer-term (until September 2007) impact of SDC's humanitarian aid on its intended primary beneficiaries, notably the IDPs.

3.2 Methodology

In the evaluation proposal an evaluation framework was developed with focus on the important dimensions of humanitarian aid, namely coverage, relevance and appropriateness, coherence and coordination, effectiveness and efficiency, connectedness and sustainability and finally outcome and impact (cfr. the Approach Paper, annex A).

Coverage looks into the degree to which needs have been covered for different groups and regions, in this case by SDC as part of the encompassing humanitarian operation. Relevance and appropriateness determines if aid was useful to the beneficiaries and relevant institutions, which to some extent is indicated by their participation and ownership. Whereas sustainability pertains to the long term perspectives of rehabilitation and development aid, connectedness similarly deals with what happens when humanitarian agencies stop providing aid.

Coherence deals with the level of policies and the way in which different forms of aid, diplomacy and military actions relate to each other, "internally" in regard to Swiss engagement in Angola, and "externally" in regard to the overall international response to the civil war in Angola. Similarly, coordination refers to relations at the operational level.

The effectiveness of the SDC programme is determined by the degree to which goals and objectives have been fulfilled, whereas the efficiency refers to the management of the programme as well as the relation between costs and results.

Finally, impact refers to the overall effects of the programme in the regions of operation, for intended beneficiaries as well as non-beneficiaries. We apply a broad definition of impact comprising any significant changes – particularly in the lives of the intended beneficiaries - brought about by the intervention, short-term as well as long-term. In humanitarian aid the focus is necessarily on short-term impact, e.g. protection, shelter and survival, but many SDC financed activities have had more long-lasting impact (until the time of fieldwork, September 2007), and hence the evaluation considers this kind of impact as well (which is closely linked to sustainability, and which in some definitions is synonymous with impact in contrast to short-term effects).

An important methodological problem in studying the impact of aid is the problem of attribution. We can register that certain events take place, and we can observe that changes occur. But to what extent the changes are a result of the intervention will always to some extent be a matter for interpretation. There are always other factors at play, for example other interventions in the same area[1] In the concrete case of SDC's humanitarian aid in Huambo province it proved difficult to separate the impact of parts of SDC's aid – e.g. emergency aid to IDP camps - from that of other agencies with which SDC collaborated closely, notably WFP and ICRC.

Impact also crucially depends on how the "target group" responds to a particular intervention, which in turns depends on a variety of factors. So it is not easy to establish a direct causal relationship. Indeed we believe it is untenable to view the impact produced by an intervention as a simple cause-and-effect relation.

Let it be strongly emphasized that this is not an impact evaluation as such. An impact evaluation would have required much more time and more resources as well as a bigger sample of ultimate beneficiaries. But within the scope of a general evaluation of humanitarian aid we have put a particular emphasis on trying to assess impact in the sense it is defined above.

The methodology applies a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods, based on a belief that the perspectives offered by the two types of methods can be complementary as well as providing an element of triangulation. It puts emphasis on studying an intervention in its context because contextual factors are important for aid impact.

[1] For elaboration of these points see Steen Folke & Henrik Nielsen, eds.: Aid Impact and Poverty Reduction. Palgrave, New York 2006, p. 13-14

In more concrete terms the methodology has comprised the following main elements:

- Documentary studies
- Quantitative analysis of project monitoring data
- Questionnaire survey with former SDC staff
- Stakeholder interviews in Luanda, Huambo and Switzerland (plus phone interviews with key actors, now elsewhere)
- Interviews with partners and collaborating humanitarian agencies and NGOs (international, national, local) in Luanda and Huambo
- Interviews with government officials in Luanda and Huambo
- Contextual studies, Angola and Huambo Province with sub-regions
- Survey of a large sample of roads, bridges, health clinics, schools, water pumps and community kitchens in Huambo province constructed with SDC assistance (appropriateness, functionality, maintenance status, use then, now and in future) – interviews with health staff, teachers etc.
- Survey of a small sample of schools in Luanda constructed with SDC funding
- Assessment of MUBELA enterprise, its appropriateness then, now and in future – interviews
- Interviews with village community leaders/chiefs (*Sobas*)
- Rapid Rural Appraisal of socio-economic impact (household/community level)
- Beneficiary interviews I: Small sample of workers in construction teams (individual and group interviews)
- Beneficiary interviews II: Survey of large sample of IDPs and villagers assisted (individual and group interviews)

3.3 Fieldwork

As already mentioned, a questionnaire-based survey among former SDC staff was carried out prior to the fieldwork in Angola. In spite of several reminders, only 13 of the 23 persons who received the questionnaire responded. Neither any of the few Angolans, nor any of the few women, who received the questionnaire, responded. All the respondents were male expatriates (almost all Swiss).

The fieldwork in Angola in August-September 2007 took place over a little less than one week in Luanda (including an end-of-mission workshop) and almost four weeks in Huambo. In Luanda a number of interviews were held with SDC staff, with Government representatives (UTCAH) and with staff from a number of the humanitarian agencies and NGOs.

In Huambo, similarly, a number of interviews were conducted with representatives from the provincial government, humanitarian agencies and NGOs. Alongside with this, contextual studies were undertaken through a combination of interviews and documentary compilation and analysis. Moreover, a number of NGO projects were investigated through visits, interviews and documentary studies. But by far most resources were used for the two major tasks, namely 1) the survey of infrastructure constructed or rehabilitated under the SDC programme and 2) the survey of a large sample of beneficiaries.

1) Survey of infrastructure

Most of the exisiting/functioning roads and all existing bridges (3 large and 1 small), that were constructed or rehabilitated under the programme, were inspected by the team, including the Angolan construction engineer. In addition to assessing the appropriateness and maintenance, the team conducted interviews with some of the former workers on these projects. The team also visited 13 out of 30 existing schools, constructed under the programme, and inspected the maintenance standard and functioning as well as interviewed teachers and parents. Similarly 7 of 9 existing health posts were visited, and besides physical inspection, interviews were held with health staff and patients. 5 food centres were visited (out of 8 supported by SDC). Finally, a 10% sample of the water pumps installed, namely 59 out of around 600, were visited by the team. For more information about this, see the case study report (section 1.1).

2) Survey of beneficiaries

The aim of this survey was to analyse the experience of former SDC beneficiaries, mainly IDPs but also some permanent residents, during the emergency phase as well as their living conditions today.

Some have remained in IDP resettlement camps while others have returned to their villages. A sample was designed with 10 case study areas. These were studied with a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, viz. 1) a rapid appraisal, 2) a mini-survey with questionnaires, 3) in-depth interviews and 4) a mini-study of SDC funded infrastructure (schools, health posts, water pumps). A total of 95 households were surveyed. In addition to the questionnaire-based interviews, 32 in-depth interviews were conducted (50% with women, 50% with men). The combined approach was tailored to the conditions in the particular case study area. By including elements of random sampling it was ensured that the survey can be viewed as reasonably representative. Annex F is a methodology note for this part of the fieldwork which was used as a paradigm. More details about the methodology can be found in the case study report (section 4.2).

On the whole the fieldwork went well. Within the given time and resources it was possible to cover all the major parts of SDC's programme in Huambo province.

4 Angola and Huambo: National and Local Context[2]

4.1 Angola 1995-2006: The Changing National Context

4.1.1 Introduction

Angola is a country with a high development potential. With a population estimated to be around 16 million on a territory of 1.25 million sq.km, it is sparsely populated. In many parts of the country the climate is relatively favourable for agriculture. Moreover, Angola is endowed with mineral wealth, particularly oil and diamonds. At 2,180 USD (PPP, 2004), its per capita GDP is much higher that that of many other African countries due to the oil economy. However, the income is extremely unevenly distributed between a rich elite in Luanda and other parts of the coastal regions and a vast majority of very poor people in the rest of the country.

In spite of its potential, Angola ranks low in human development. In 2004 Angola was ranked among the countries with low human development (0.439) as No. 161 of 177 countries[3]. Life expectancy is just 41 years and the school enrolment rate, estimated to be 26%, is one of the lowest in the world. There are three main reasons for this: the Portuguese colonization, the long civil war (1975-2002), and the uneven and polarised development associated with Angola's oil-driven economy and the elite's politics.

After a long and brutal Portuguese colonization Angola became independent in 1975[4]. But Independence was marred by the civil war that broke out between the three main liberation movements, FNLA, UNITA and MPLA. FNLA had a strong base in northern Angola and especially among the Bakongo ethnic group. UNITA had its main base in the central and southern parts of the country and especially among the Ovimbundu people. MPLA had its main base in the capital Luanda and in the coastal region. It comprised people of more mixed ethnic backgrounds, including many Portuguese speaking a*ssimilados.* With ups and downs in intensity, the war lasted from 1975 to 2002. In the initial phases MPLA was backed by Cuba (with up to 50,000 soldiers) and the Soviet Union, whereas UNITA was backed by South Africa and the US government. FNLA was backed by Mobuto's Zaire and the US. The civil war in Angola thus became part of the Cold War.

After more than 15 years of civil war, the warring parties signed the "Bicesse accords" in 1991 which among other things stipulated general elections. These were held in September 1992 and gave MPLA a clear majority but UNITA a significant minority. However, the leader of UNITA Jonas Savimbi would not recognize his electoral defeat and this led to the resumption of civil war. After two years of heavy fighting, UNITA was ousted from its headquarters in Huambo city and generally on the retreat. This set the stage for new negotiations that resulted in the "Lusaka Protocol" in November 1994. The protocol had some provisions for power sharing and for deployment of a UN Peace-keeping force (UNAVEM III).

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[2] This chapter is to a large extent based on contributions from the evaluation team member Jacinto Pio Wacussanga.
[3] These and the following figures are from the Human Development Report 2006 (UNDP, New York 2006).
[4] The following is primarily based on Tony Hodges: Angola – Anatomy of an Oil State (2nd Edition, Fridtjof Nansen Institute 2004) and Michael G. Comerford: The Peaceful Face of Angola – Biography of a Peace Process 1991-2002 (Luanda 2005).

After 1995 three distinct phases can be indentified: 1) Relative peace 1995-98; 2) Renewed civil war 1999-2002; 3) Gradual peace and slow recovery 2003-2006.

4.1.2 1995-1998: Relative peace

The Lusaka Protocol brought about a period of relative peace, although it was viewed as a bad omen that Jonas Savimbi had stayed away from the signing ceremony in Lusaka. The power-sharing provisions included the nomination of UNITA representatives as ministers, deputy ministers and provincial governors as well as a special status to be granted to the president of UNITA. A Government of Unity and National Reconciliation was constituted in April 1997, dominated by MPLA but also with significant UNITA participation. But UNITA refused to give up the arms and the territory they controlled. This included diamond-rich areas in the eastern part of Angola. Diamonds had in fact to a large extent financed UNITA's warfare while that of MPLA primarily was financed by oil revenue.

Between 1995 and December 1998 three core tasks of the Lusaka protocol were not implemented, demobilization, demilitarization and restoration of state administration[5]. In addition the United Nation's role was disputed by the warring parties, and the UN was unable to implement the embargos it had adopted. Inconsistent UN policies contributed to the unofficial abandonment of the peace process. UN agencies ceased delivering humanitarian aid to the UNITA controlled areas. This resulted in a tragedy claiming thousands of lives; people died of diseases and famine.

4.1.3 1999-2002 Renewed civil war

From December 1998 the Angolan government launched a military campaign under the slogan "waging war in order to achieve peace". This last and extremely violent war had terrible impact on the lives of millions of Angolans. It is estimated that more than 1.5 million people died in the 27 years of civil war, more than half of these in the last phase, 1999-2002. The deaths were either directly result of the fighting or of war-related causes like diseases and starvation. Brutal war crimes and crimes against humanity were perpetrated by both sides. War strategies such as forced displacement, the use of land mines and wanton cleansing of enemies were used by both sides. The last phase of the war produced the highest number of IDPs ever seen in Angola. Around 4.1 million people left their homes in search for protection and safety. Many moved from the rural parts to towns and cities where they stayed in emergency camps under appalling conditions or lived with relatives or friends[6]. There was a very limited government response to the acute humanitarian crisis, which resulted in towering malnutrition and mortality rates[7].

[5] Paul Robson: Angola From the Lusaka Agreement to the Fourth War, in Robson 2006
[6] Andrea Lari: Internally-Displaced People in the Post-War Angola, p. 1
[7] Negligence by Warring Parties Contributes Significantly to Humanitarian Emergencies (Médecins Sans Frontières Briefing Paper, July 2001)

4.1.4 2003-2006 Gradual peace and slow recovery

On 22 February 2002 Jonas Savimbi was killed by the Angolan army in the province of Moxico. This proved to be a death blow to UNITA's warfare. A ceasefire came into effect on March 13, and on 4 April a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in Luena, the capital of Moxico province. Afterwards more than 100,000 UNITA troops with their families made their way to one of 38 quartering areas across the country[8]. The Luena MoU aimed at accomplishing unfinished tasks of the Lusaka Protocol, especially the demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and the extension of state administration.

With the Luena MoU the civil war had finally come to an end. Soon after, vast numbers of IDPs started returning home. Within the next two years nearly 3.7 million out of the estimated 4.1 million IDPs had returned home, and more than 220,000 refugees came back from Namibia, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. A new phase of gradual peace and reconciliation had started. But there were huge challenges ahead. Large parts of the country were devastated by the war, the IDPs had to reestablish their livelihoods from scratch, and the ex-combatants had to be socially reintegrated. International donors and humanitarian agencies initially supported some of these activities, but after a couple of years they started to phase out, claiming that the Angolan government had sufficient revenue (from the oil exports) and capacity to tackle the challenges.

4.2 Huambo 1995-2006: The Changing Local Context

4.2.1 Introduction

Huambo province in the central part of Angola has an area of 35,771 sq.km and a population estimated to be around 2.3 million. With around 64 inhabitants per sq.km it has one of the highest population densities among Angola's provinces. The *Planalto* (High Plateau) which forms the central part of the province had a large Portuguese settler population during colonial times, but almost all of them left after Independence in 1975. The capital, Huambo city, was renamed Nova Lisboa by the Portuguese, indicating never realized intentions of making this the capital of Angola. The region has sometimes been referred to as the breadbasket of Angola, and the climate is quite conducive to agriculture, but the soils are not very fertile.

The area is the historical centre of the *Ovimbundu* people speaking the *Umbundu* language. It became strategically and symbolically important during the civil war[9]. During the years of authoritarian MPLA rule (1975-91), Huambo province was regarded as an opposition stronghold and a breeding hide-out of UNITA guerillas, and right from 1975 it became one of the main battle grounds of the civil war. Until 1981 the government had control over most of the region, afterwards UNITA gradually took control of the rural parts of the province[10]. Only some of the main cities and towns and narrow strips of land around them were controlled by the government, including Huambo and the neighbouring Caála, both located on the Benguela railway line (which was defunct from the early 1980s). The civil war created huge flows of IDPs from the countryside to the relative safety of the towns and cities. In 1970 the population of Huambo city was 98,600,

[8] Comerford, op. cit. p. 17
[9] Fernando Pacheco: Rural Communities in Huambo. In Robson 2006, p. 60
[10] Ibidem, p. 66

by 1991 it had swelled to an estimated 750,000. Similarly the population of Caála had grown from 65,000 to around 232,000[11].

UNITA won a landslide victory in Huambo during the 1992 general elections, but local expectations got shattered after UNITA refused to accept the electoral results and the war resumed. In 1993, after 55 days of heavy fighting, UNITA came to occupy Huambo city. In late 1994 UNITA was dislodged from Huambo city and instead set up its military headquarters in Bailundo, located just 65 km North of Huambo.

4.2.2 1995-1998 No war – no peace

After the signing of the Lusaka peace protocol in November 1994 and the ensuing cease-fire, Huambo entered a period that can be described as "no war – no peace". UNITA continued to control most of the rural parts of the province, and an unofficial "line of control" ran parallel to the railway line somewhere between Huambo and Bailundo. Movements to and from UNITA-occupied areas were limited to UN agencies, NGOs and the churches. Some roads were being mined. There were armed robberies, deaths and kidnapping. Armed soldiers looted villages, leading people to abandon their homes and leaving the villages by night.

From late 1997 until November 1998 the situation deteriorated, and there were rumors of heavy weapons being transported to Bailundo. This contributed to increasing fears and mistrust in the Lusaka protocol. At the same time, systematic failures to restore state administration, both in Huambo province and elsewhere, gave a final blow to the fragile peace process. Accompanying the opening session of the MPLA Party Congress on December 5th 1998, two UNITA strongholds in Huambo – Bailundo and Mungo – were the first to be attacked by government forces in order to crush UNITA's central command and restore state administration by force.

4.2.3 1999-2002 Full-scale civil war

After the war resumed in December 1998, Huambo city was heavily shelled by UNITA, and the guerrilla managed to attack and occupy most of the countryside municipalities. Due to heavy attacks and fighting, the influx of a new wave of IDPs started flowing from the countryside to Huambo city. In the meantime, the Angolan military in their struggle against UNITA's guerrillas started driving thousands of families from their rural homes to cities, as part of the scorched-earth policy, in order to cut off the food supplies and young males for conscription. For the first time, the number of IDPs shot up to around 350,000 people, of whom around 75% were women and children. Many adult and young men were either waging war or they had been killed during the war.

Humanitarian aid was confined to Government-controlled areas, which led people from UNITA-controlled areas to flee and seek help in the cities, given the level of human starvation and famine. International and national NGOs turned to an emergency approach by providing food and shelter at the main IDP camps scattered around Huambo city.

To lessen the pressure of IDPs on land for cultivation, the Huambo Government started a resettlement from the so-called "inadequate" transit centres to locations in the vicinity of Huambo and Caála. This relocation programme brought controversy between the Provincial Government and UN agencies and international NGOs, given that the places where people should be moved

[11] Ibidem, p. 67

to were lacking basic facilities like water, shelter and firewood as well as security and military protection. But the programme was implemented and donors had to contribute with humanitarian aid in form of food, shelter, latrines, schools and health posts.

Many IDPs lived in camps, while others settled with relatives and friends in the Government controlled areas. The death toll in IDP camps was high, given the shortage of clean water, shelter and sanitation conditions. According to some observers, every day 10 to 20 people were dying due to the appalling conditions. Given the shortage of food supplies from international agencies, people would go back to their fields in long journeys and most of the time walking at night. Some were caught in between combats or in ambushes from both sides.

The setting was characterised by desperation, and many IDPs felt a sense of relief when the Bailundo and Andulo UNITA strongholds fell to the Angolan Army. Locally, the military cordon was extended beyond Caála and Ekunha municipalities. It meant that IDPs could go further in search of means for their subsistence.

4.2.4 2002-2006 Peace agreement and reconstruction

After Jonas Savimbi's death in February 2002 and the Luena MoU in April, the vast majority of IDPs on their own started a slow movement towards their areas of origin, without an emergency plan on the side of the Angolan government or the major international NGOs and humanitarian agencies. In fact there was no contingency plan for the immediate aftermath of the civil war. The state of Huambo province in the aftermath could be summarised along the following lines:

- Acute malnutrition amongst population under UNITA control;
- Widespread destruction of social infrastructures such as schools, health posts, water points;
- Quasi total absence of the state administrative infra-structures and services which would help the resettlement of IDPs;
- Entire villages wiped out due to the scorched-earth policy;
- Landmines disseminated across rural areas, which represented a real danger for the returning IDPs;
- Damaged roads due to lack of maintenance and landmines;
- Destroyed bridges making difficult the freedom of movement for the returning population to areas of origin;
- Lack of basic food supply to the returning population.

The magnitude of all these above presented problems, posed an insurmountable challenge to the Angolan government (GoA).

In fact, the GoA, in general and specifically of Huambo failed to conduct a rapid and extensive assessment of the resettlement programme for IDPs. Most IDPs reached their areas of origin on foot. They reached home in a pitiful state, with malnutrition contributing to a high death tool. IDPs were joined by UNITA ex-combatants and their dependents from quartering camps to the areas of origin.

After the Tripartite Agreements between the GoA, UNHCR and host countries, Angolan ex-refugees started flowing to Huambo, from Zambia, Congo and Namibia. By September 2007, Huambo province had received a total of 14,000 returnees, with more than 50% accounted as Spontaneous Returnees, without any assistance. They are still facing social exclusion, political and social prejudices, without supportive long-term projects.

In short, the Angolan government has been faced with a triple reintegration challenge: IDPs, ex-refugees and ex-combatants. At the national level, the GoA came up with the Emergency Resettlement and Return Programme (ERRP), aimed at responding to the national crisis of IDPs, ex-refugees and ex-combatants, but this did not reach the IDPs who got resettled in their own areas of origin.

5 Overview of SDC's humanitarian aid 1995-2006

5.1 Introduction

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) has provided humanitarian aid to Angola since the early 1990s. In the first years the assistance was limited. In the period 1995-2006, SDC funded and implemented a major programme with a number of different components. The evaluation covers this period. The assistance changed over the years, marked by the different phases of civil war and its aftermath. Initially there was an emphasis on rehabilitation of physical infrastructure. During the intensified civil war the focus was on emergency aid. After the war ended in 2002, the assistance gradually changed from relief to rehabilitation and development. At the end of 2006 SDC's humanitarian aid was terminated.

In cooperation with other agencies humanitarian assistance was given in different parts of the country to victims of the war, notably internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, throughout the programme there was a special emphasis on assisting parts of the Huambo province, where a number of projects and programmes were implemented through direct interventions and in collaboration with other agencies and NGOs. The main activities focused on physical infrastructure, rehabilitation of roads and bridges, servicing IDP camps, building of schools and health centres and -posts, provision of water and sanitation and establishment of community kitchens. Along with this, the programme sought to achieve some skill-based capacity building as well as peace-building initiatives. A relatively large part of the programme consisted of funding some of the activities of major international humanitarian agencies in Angola, in particular the World Food Programme (WFP), International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Table 1 SDC's programme 1995-2006, annual expenditure (CHF)[12]

1995	7,590,547
1996	9,413,600
1997	9,070,900
1998	7,488,200
1999	8,642,000
2000	5,859,000
2001	7,128,000
2002	8,167,200
2003	7,804,500
2004	7,774,104
2005	5,325,352
2006	2,693,000
Total	86,956,403

[12] The figures in this and the following tables have been obtained from SDC-Berne. A more comprehensive account of the expenses and budget lines is found in annex 3.

It can be seen that the expenditure on the programme remained at a level around 7-9 million CHF per year throughout the period, except in the two last years where the amounts were reduced, reflecting the phasing out. The highest expenditure was in 1997 and 1998, a period where the main feature was an ambitious, directly implemented physical infrastructure programme in Huambo. In the year 2000 the expenditure was somewhat less than the other years, which is surprising since this was a peak year of intensive civil war, population displacement and human suffering.

5.2 Phases in SDC's programme 1995-2006[13]

SDC's humanitarian programme in Angola can be divided into four distinct phases. These reflect the changing context nationally and locally (in Huambo), and first of all the shifts in the civil war and its aftermath. In the period 1995-98 there was "neither war, nor peace". In 1999-2002 the war intensified and with it population displacement and misery. After Savimbi's death in February 2002, gradually more peaceful conditions were reestablished. The four phases in SDC's programme are outlined below.

1) Direct implementation 1995-98

At a Round Table conference in Brussels in September 1995 between the Angolan government and a number of donor agencies, SDC pledged to fund a humanitarian aid programme over several years. Initially the main components were intended to be:

- Food assistance
- Reconstruction of health infrastructure
- Basic medical supplies
- Drinking water and sanitation

However, after a field visit it was decided to focus the direct interventions on:

- Rehabilitation of secondary roads and bridges

The primary aim was to support agriculture and trade in the central highland (Planalto) of Huambo – also in order to substitute locally produced for imported food. In practice the main emphasis was on reconstruction of bridges, and hence the programme was named "Bridges for Peace". Besides its main office in Luanda, SDC established an office in Huambo, and a fairly large number of expatriate as well as local staff was employed. In order to live up to the humanitarian principle of neutrality, SDC tried to implement part of the programme in the territory dominated by UNITA, but after some initial negotiations this was given up. The entire programme was seriously delayed by a number of factors, and towards the end of 1998 the security situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the construction activities had to be terminated. Thus in practice only a few roads and bridges were rehabilitated. In addition to the roads and bridges programme, some activities were carried out in the other areas mentioned above. These included micro-projects (such as school rehabilitations), milk powder donations, rehabilitation of the central hospital in Huambo and a large water & sanitation programme in Huambo province. The latter was implemented by the international (Canadian) NGO Development Workshop (DW).

[13] This section is primarily based on Arnold Furrer: '10 Jahre Humanitäre Hilfe der DEZA in Angola' (SDC, 2005), 'Programme Annuel 2004 Angola' (SDC, 2004) and the 'Approach Paper' (SDC, 2007) for this evaluation. During fieldwork and through documentary studies a more comprehensive and correct picture was obtained. See also the case study report.

2) Emergency assistance 1999-2000

The intensified civil war created massive movements of IDPs all over the country and in particular in the Huambo region. A narrow corridor along the old, defunct railway line with the main cities Huambo and Caála was held by the government/MPLA forces, whereas most of the surrounding territory was held by UNITA. More than 300,000 IDPs moved into the Huambo-Caála area in search of security and survival. Many lived in huge, make-shift IDP camps under appalling conditions. In collaboration with ICRC, WFP and other agencies, SDC provided support to the IDPs. This included provision of drinking water and shelters as well as construction of emergency schools and community kitchens. The number of directly employed expatriate and local staff was gradually reduced.

3) Emergency assistance and reconstruction 2001-2003

SDC continued its humanitarian assistance in Huambo province – e.g. construction of emergency schools and health centres/posts - and funded activities of other agencies, notably ICRC and WFP. It also collaborated with and built capacity in a number of NGOs. In addition to the emergency relief, SDC supported promotion of peace and reconciliation through two NGOs. After Savimbi's death and the Luena agreement in 2002, peace was gradually restored and the majority of IDPs returned to their homes. This called for a new strategy in the transition from humanitarian aid to rehabilitation and development. During this phase a special programme aimed at transferring operational assets and capacities from SDC to NGOs in the so-called APOLO programme (Apoio Para Organizações Locais) was carried out. APOLO centred predominantly on the construction of health posts and schools in rural villages in the first phase and on construction of health posts in the second phase. Another programme, RISC (Rehabilitation of Public and Community Infrastructure) was set up in order to assist local former SDC staff in establishing micro enterprises that could continue construction activities after SDC's withdrawal.

4) Transitional humanitarian rehabilitation 2004-2006

A completely new strategy was adopted aiming at contributing to the "normalization" in Angola while at the same time preparing phasing out by the end of 2006. The focus was on transitional humanitarian rehabilitation with a continued emphasis on assisting Huambo province. However, the SDC office in Huambo was closed down in 2005. Most activities were implemented through other humanitarian agencies and NGOs – Swiss, other international and Angolan. More specifically, the programme had three main components:

- Basic health
- Food security
- Promotion of peace and reconciliation

In addition, advocacy and empowerment were pursued as cross-cutting themes. The concrete activities included delivery of milk products, primary health, HIV/AIDS efforts, assistance to returnees, and strengthening of civil society for peace building and reconciliation.

5.3 Main sectors and partners

The presentation of the four phases shows that there were many twists and turns in SDC's programme. These were primarily reflections of the changes in the national and local context and the associated changing humanitarian needs, but they also testify to a learning process with elements of trial and error.

Over the years SDC funded and in some cases implemented a vast number of different humanitarian activities, spanning the whole range from construction of "hard" infrastructure over provision of food to "soft" capacity development in the Angolan civil society.

The programme employed a fairly large number of expatriates, most of them Swiss. Over the years around 60 expatriates were involved in various capacities. 19 of these were secondments to other humanitarian agencies, mainly WFP, UNHCR and other UN agencies (including 7 evaluation missions). Around 40 were directly employed by SDC for shorter or longer time. The leading positions in the programme were manned by expatriates from the beginning to the end.

Table 2 Expenditure by sectors 1995-2006 (CHF and per cent)

General	17,537,574	20 %
Food & non-food items	23,650,803	27%
Logistics & infrastructure	14,342,619	16%
Health	5,537,791	6%
Water & sanitation	3,762,973	4%
Education	448,680	<1%
Livelihoods	1,925,221	2%
Peace & reconciliation	4,811,205	6%
Prog. coordination costs	7,917,954	9%
Administration	7,021,582	8%
Grand total	86,956,403	100%

Under "general" are a number of unspecified, sector-wide contributions to other humanitarian agencies, notably ICRC. Most of the "food & non-food items" were purchased and distributed by WFP with funding from SDC. But in the first and last phases of the programme, Swiss milk products were also provided (total expenditure 5.4 million CHF), mainly distributed through NGOs, particularly CARITAS and "Solidaridad Evangelica" (SOLE). The expenditure on "logistics & infrastructure" can be divided in two, one is costs under the first phase infrastructure programme, the other contributions to other agencies, partly in the form of secondments to WFP, UNHCR, UNDP, IOM and UTCAH. The health activities have been implemented in different parts of Angola, mainly by NGOs, including two Swiss NGOs, Medair and "Médecins Sans Frontières" (MSF-CH). The activities have comprised support to hospitals, cholera prevention, Meningitis inoculation, combating HIV/AIDS and training of traditional birth attendants.

Most of the water and sanitation expenditure has been accounted for by the international/Canadian NGO "Development Workshop" (DW), which has implemented a large community-based drinking water supply (and sanitation) programme in Huambo province. DW has also been implementing agency for about half of the small expenditure on education, with an emergency school programme in Huambo. Even the "livelihoods" activities have primarily been implemented through DW, which has administered the "Mubela" factory in Huambo (used for construction of bridge elements and other wooden products) as well as a "microproject" programme in Luanda that has funded a vast range of varied livelihood activities.

In the last phase of the programme, SDC funded a number of initiatives in the area of "peace & reconciliation", partly in Huambo province, partly elsewhere. These were mainly implemented by OCHA, ICRC and three international NGOs. OCHA led a programme of demobilization of ex-combatants and ICRC ran a programme that included locating disappeared family members. Handicap International carried out mine risk education. The International (American) NGO "Search for Common Ground" provided training in conflict resolution and set up a civil society forum aiming at bringing together leaders with different – particulary MPLA and UNITA – backgrounds. Finally, DW has implemented a still ongoing "Voices of Peace" project that publishes a monthly newspaper in Huambo in both Portuguese and Umbundo.

The last budget lines are programme coordination costs and administration, together accounting for 17% of the expenses, i.e. a relatively high share of the total. They include salaries, renting costs for the offices and houses for expatriates, transport costs, per diems, audit costs, consultancy coasts, costs for the purchase of equipment (cars, machines, computers), etc. During most of the programme SDC has had two offices, one in Luanda and one in Huambo, and this has obviously increased the costs. The first phase emphasis on direct implementation – with a large staff of expatriates and Angolans – has also inflated the costs. Finally, it must be mentioned that Angola has been and remains a very expensive country to live and work in, due to the civil war and the necessity to import most goods as well as to the distortions brought about by the oil export-driven economy.

Table 3 Expenditure by partners (CHF and per cent)

Government	1,289,372	1%
National NGOs	1,966,319	2%
Swiss NGOs	2,438,074	3%
International NGOs	12,454,505	14%
UN institutions + IOM	30,091,550	35%
Red Cross organizations	11,571,750	13%
Direct project costs	12,205,297	14%
Prog. coord. Costs	7,917,954	9%
Administration	7,021,582	8%
Grand total	86,956,403	100%

It can be seen that the United Nations agencies and the Red Cross organizations have accounted for almost 50% of the total expenditure – over 60%, if we disregard the expenses for administration and programme coordination. WFP has been the most important partner with around 20 million CHF or almost one fourth of the total. ICRC and UNHCR have been in second and third place with around 11 million CHF and 6 million CHF respectively.

The only other big partner category is the international NGOs with 14% of the expenditure. The important ones among these have all been mentioned above. DW has been by far the most important NGO partner with a range of different activities, accounting for more than 5 million CHF. CARITAS comes second with 2.4 million CHF but has mainly been used for distribution of milk products. The Swiss NGOs are MSF-CH and Medair.

In contrast to the international NGOs, the Angolan NGOs have only been included in the programme in a very limited way. In fact the most important "national" NGO (in terms of the expenditure), namely SOLE, which is registered in Angola, has for many years been led by a dedicated Swiss couple who have acquired dual Swiss/Angolan nationality. It accounts for over 70% of the expenses under "national NGOs". However, a number of small Angolan NGOs have received limited funds from the micro-projects programme administered by DW as well as from the directly implemented programme, e.g. APOLO (mentioned above).

The Angolan government has only been an extremely small partner, viewed from the financial side, but a number of activities have been carried out in cooperation with the government. The limited funding has accrued to UTCAH, the government institution coordinating the humanitarian aid.

The direct implementation project costs mainly cover the massive physical infrastructure programme in Huambo that dominated SDC's assistance in the first phase. To these project costs must be added a substantial part of the costs of programme coordination in order to estimate the weight of the directly implemented projects in the total programme finances.

6 Modalities of SDC Aid

6.1 Introduction

In order to assess how SDC's humanitarian programme interacted with the evolving institutional context in which it operated, this chapter will analyse the most important modalities of operation of SDC in Angola. These comprise the direct operation that characterized the first half of the programme (5.2), the relations with multilateral organizations which remained more or less constant throughout the lifetime of the programme (5.3), the relationship with international and Angolan NGOs (5.4), and finally the important but difficult relationship with the Government of Angola (GoA)(5.5).

6.2 Direct Action: "*A SHA"* or the "White Cross" in Huambo

SDC's choice as a donor to become directly engaged in operation in Huambo was a defining feature of the programme for humanitarian assistance in Angola until 2002 when the budget for the "*direkt-aktion"* suddenly was cut back by 80%. The choice brought SHA into play, the "militia" corps of professionals that staffs SDC's direct, humanitarian operations. During the life-time of the program, SHA sent 37 professionals to Angola for longer periods, of which 18 worked directly for the SDC programme, typically in logistics, construction and administration, for a total of 480 months[14].

Until mid 2001, SHA was the official name of the SDC programme in Angola and the one that has stuck in the memory of the population in Huambo. "A SHA" (in Portuguese) was also known as "*Cruz Branca"*, the White Cross, seen as a close kin to the Red Cross, "*Cruz Vermelha*". This may not be a coincidence.

The close relationship with ICRC was a very important factor in bringing SHA to Huambo. The in-depth knowledge, networks (including contacts to UNITA), and operational resources of ICRC were a huge asset for the operationalization of SHA's programme. SHA furthermore took over staff being laid off in the attempt of ICRC to phase out its large emergency operation. The synergy with ICRC was emphasized as a very positive element of the programme in later documents and the SHA HQ suggested that also on the Swiss side, the "Bern-Geneva axis" should be further strengthened.

The direct action entailed huge investments in terms of time, money, and effort in an environment fraught with the practical and political problems of a complex emergency. The "Lessons learned" exercise at the end of 1998 suggested that SHA seriously had underestimated the challenges of this kind of operation. The procurement and import of materials and machinery from abroad was extremely difficult and time-consuming. Communication was difficult and caused SHA to close a small office in the harbour of Lobito, which was set up to smoothen imports and function as a centre of the practical programme administration.

[14] Furrer 2005. 10 Jahre. 19 SHA professionals were seconded to mostly international agencies.

Furthermore, training and management of the Angolan staff of 80-90 persons in Huambo represented a major problem for SHA. The relationship between the Swiss management and Angolan staff, workers, and occasionally even Angolan partner-organizations, has at times been difficult, troubled by misunderstandings, mistrust, and diverging interpretations[15]. Furthermore, the low level of education made it difficult or extremely expensive to find qualified and experienced employees, which made investment in training necessary in order to follow SDC/SHA's ways of operating[16]. The extensive interface of a direct operation magnifies these problems.

Finally, the direct operation was also vulnerable to deteriorating security conditions in particular related to the strategic importance of the road/bridge rehabilitation. In early 1998, SDC/HQ wanted to phase out the programme as soon as possible, but the Huambo office insisted and finished the last bridge after they organized "time-outs", scenario-planning and active reprogramming in July and August. In December 1998, expatriates left Huambo, and the programme was rapidly reoriented towards support of emergency relief. The direct operation was cut back from 3.8 mill. CHF in 1998 to 1 mill. CHF in 2000, which accounts for the (surprisingly) low overall budget this year[17].

The 1998 "lessons learned" exercise concluded that SHA should have been more realistic in its initial time-planning, defined intermediate aims and indicators, and focussed less on long-term sustainability[18]. It seems that the programming and implementation to some extent copied the previous Swiss programme for reconstruction in Mozambique where the implementation went well and where peace prevailed. Thus, the programme illustrates the problems of conceptualizing and designing programmes in the grey-zone between short-term relief and long-tern development considerations. The time-perspective envisioned for the bridge- and road rehabilitation was three years, 1996-98, with phasing out in 1999, which is much longer than the 12 month perspective common to ordinary relief programmes. Furthermore, the heaviest component of the programme, the direct implementation in Huambo, had clearly development-oriented aims (opening up for markets and substitution of food-imports, see section 6.2). Yet, at the donor round table in 1995, the Swiss government pledged the programme under the rubric of "humanitarian assistance" and not as "reconstruction" which was the other rubric at the round table[19].

The problem of the "continuum", the relief-development relation, was dealt with explicitly through the collaboration with development organizations, such as DW and local NGOs, according to the 1997-99 concept paper[20]. In the concept paper for 2001-02, the continuum problematic was dealt with by means of the so-called "nationalization" of the direct programme. The notion appeared in 1999 after the siege of Huambo and temporary evacuation of expatriates, and planning started for education and training of local staff and partners and the progressive hand-over of responsibilities, which took off in 2000, but soon had to be reversed due to managerial problems. Institutionally, the RISC and APOLO programmes (2001-3) illustrated the changing concept of the direct operation (see section 6.5).

[15] See for example HH/SKA 1998. Bericht über die Dienstreise von Rolf Engist nach Angola, 1998.
[16] Steffen 1998 'Re. Lessons learned', which also contains a critique of SHA's often administratively un-experienced Swiss staff.
[17] HH/SLH, Sektion Afrika 1998.Konzept der Humanitäre Hilfe des bundes für Angola 1999-2000. See also chapter 4.
[18] HH/SKH, Sektion Afrika 1998. Angola: Lessons learned 1996 bis 1998.
[19] Donors pledged 775 mill. USD for 'reconstruction' and 212 mill. for 'humanitarian assistance'
[20] HH/SKA Sektion Afrika 1996. Angola. Länderkonzept der humanitären hilfe des Bundes 1997-99

A crucial question in hindsight is whether SHA "did harm" to the development of commercial and public enterprises by taking the operational role as the major constructor in Huambo and by setting up and supporting the MUBELA enterprise, Huambo's only large enterprise during the war. The attempts to build capacity through RISC micro-enterprises, working with public servants, and disengaging from MUBELA indicate that SHA/SDC was aware of this risk. But the analyses of RISC and MUBELA suggest that SDC to some extent hampered or skewed the development of these enterprises by binding them to its own priority sectors and work plans. While this was meant as start-up assistance, the enterprises were not fit for the (relatively) free market conditions that hit Huambo after the end of the war.

On the positive side, the focussed and sustained presence in Huambo from the rehabilitation phase and throughout the emergency 1999-2002 was much appreciated by the partners at provincial level, including the Provincial government. The operational presence as the largest construction firm in Huambo, as a flexible and reliable partner, and as an active participant in the coordinating sectoral commissions during the emergency, won the agency recognition and a good reputation. Evaluation reports in 1997 deplored that the massive presence was not reflected in a public image of SHA, but after the emergency "*a SHA*" had become a well known brand in and around the town. This confirms the impression that international presence in conflict areas in general is valued as a sign that the world has not forgotten the inhabitants living under siege.

Seen in this perspective, the cut back of the direct programme in 2002 destroyed the opportunity for benefiting from the accumulated and hard-won image, local knowledge, and personal and organizational networks, which could have helped SDC to obtain more and even decisive leverage in the Province in the aftermath of the war.

6.3 Multilateral cooperation

From 1995 to 2006, SDC channelled 35% of the funds for the humanitarian programme through international agencies, mainly the WFP, ICRC and UNHCR, and to a lesser extent OCHA, UNICEF, IOM, UNDP and WHO. Whereas some contributions were unmarked and therefore easy to handle and much appreciated by the receivers (but hard to monitor and evaluate for the donor), other contributions were earmarked for particular operations (personnel transport, preparation of gathering areas for demobilisation, etcetera) or to particular projects as described in chapter 6. In the case of WFP, the support to personnel flights and air-transport was much appreciated because these necessary components of relief operations were hard to fund since they weighed significantly as transaction costs in comparison with the provision of food and non-food items (NFI) as such.

Finally, SDC gave support in the form of secondments to international agencies (WFP, UNHCR, WHO, IOM and UCAH). The process leading to the definition and accord on specific secondments is hard to asses, but the experience is assessed positively by the involved persons and agencies[21]. In the cases of WFP and UNHCR the secondments contributed to strengthen engineering and construction (for access to return areas or newly opened territories) which were considered fields in which the agencies in question had weak capacities. SDC on the other hand has benefited from having insider perspectives on the work and problems of the international

[21] This was identified as the most successful component of SDC/SHA programme in Angola by most of the respondents in the questionnaire analysis. Interviewees WFP and UNCHR were also positive in this regard.

agencies, information which has fed into the Swiss participation in the annual board meetings at the agency head quarters.

In general, the international agencies interviewed by the evaluation team were satisfied with their collaboration with SDC, the agency's flexibility in terms of re-posting or postponing budgeted expenses, and its not-too-burdensome reporting formats. For SDC, the multilaterals represent an option devoid of all the problems and costs of direct operation under volatile conditions, even though the multilateral agencies are known as using larger overheads than most other organizations.

SDC took part in donor coordination meetings but it is the impression that the agency was more engaged in the technical coordination than in the political work which to some extent was left to "the five Ambassadors" of the US, UK, Holland, Norway, and Sweden. Due to a general reorganization of the diplomatic representation in Africa, Switzerland closed its embassy in Angola in 1996 when the humanitarian programme started and the technical office was established, and Angola never became a priority country neither for foreign policy considerations nor for development cooperation.

6.4 Cooperation with NGOs

Non-governmental organizations channelled some 19% of the general budget for SDC's humanitarian programme. Swiss NGOs always had a close relationship with SDC as receiver of funds or as co-funder of projects, but also on an informal level of exchange. One Swiss NGO emphasized SDC's willingness to fund projects, such as the Luena health project, that were low-profile and therefore harder to get funded than support for repatriation or demobilization.

Of the international NGOs that received SDC funding - mainly SFCG and DW - the latter has had a very special partnership of trust and long-term accompaniment since 1995. It took DW some time to adapt itself to "the rigours" of SDC's reporting formats, but the effort paid off and facilitated a stable flow of project funds until 2004. In the 2003 review, DW received some criticism for excessive overheads and expensive projects.

DW has a diversified range of funding partners and has through many years of collaboration with the state positioned itself as an important GoA partner in the development of new concepts for decentralized service provision and municipal development. The steady funding, overheads, and good contacts of DW have enabled the development of innovative approaches and a position which is envied by many Angolan NGOs. The conditions of their development have been very different.

Viewed upon with suspicion by the GoA because of their assumed links to UNITA and the Churches, but seen as a valuable alternative to the state by the international community, the existence of Angolan NGOs is closely related to the increased presence of international donors and organizations after 1990. However, as in the case of SDC's relation to Angolan NGOs, they have mainly been involved in order to manage the interface with communities. In Huambo, the direct operation depended on local NGOs, which mobilized communities and workers and functioned as trouble-shooters when SHA professionals got into trouble. As stated in the "Länderkonzept" for 1997-99, SHA stayed in control of engineering and financial administration.

The "nationalization" of the direct operation in 2000-2, changed the perception of partnership somewhat with the introduction of targeted capacity building and provision of overheads. But local and national NGOs were not involved in the SDC programme independently of the direct operation and never reached the level of collaboration which characterized SDC's relations to international NGOs. Angolan NGOs deplored what they perceived as a lack of trust, and GoA representatives would have liked to see more transparent criteria for the choice of partners since the donors "tend to give priority to their own". The problem was in no way unique to the Swiss programme and was generally explained by the agencies in terms of the lack of capacity of Angolan NGOs.

The general withdrawal of international funds and organizations from Angola and the recent inclination of donors to give direct budget support for the government, has left the Angolan NGOs in a no-man's land where they have trouble adjusting to the changing environment and risk loosing the accumulated experience and capacity for community mobilization[22]. They have to create capacity for development rather than emergency projects, but they also have to get used to work with the government and move from the confrontational stands cultivated by many international organizations to a more pragmatic, collaborative engagement with the state if they want to exist. And on top of this, the Angolan NGOs have lost a lot of qualified and experienced personnel to international agencies, oil companies and the state[23].

In sum, SDC has contributed to the development of civil society by supporting Angolan NGOs, Churches and Missions, but a focussed, sustained and more conscious policy and strategy on the issue could have increased the impact significantly and prepared the Angolan partner NGOs better for surviving and gaining influence in the post-war context. Probably the most palpable impact has been achieved through the support of international NGOs (notably DW and SFCG) with an extensive network of local and national partners.

6.5 Cooperation with the Government of Angola

The GoA has received and channelled only 1% of SDC's budget in addition to what has been transferred to the Provincial Government of Huambo through the direct operation. In this, SDC does not differ from most of the other agencies and donors in the international community until very recently. Since the early 1990s, the relationship with the GoA has been fraught with problems, accusations, and suspicion for various reasons.

The international community resented the apparent lack of interest of GoA in the wellbeing of its own citizens and its explicit abandonment of social services and humanitarian aid as a task that the international community would have to take care of[24]. The GoA on the other hand stated that the (Western) international community fuelled the continued fighting by supporting UNITA and permitting that its forces were reinforced and regrouped instead of being disarmed. This position began to change from 1999, but continued to have a huge impact.

[22] Alan Cain in interview, Sept. 2007
[23] ADRA-A alone has lost 80 employees to better paying organizations.
[24] See for example Danida 2003

In addition, a number of practical problems haunted the relationship, such as the cumbersome processes of obtaining visas for employees, getting goods through customs, and having NGOs legalized. Suspicions of corruption permeated expatriates' perceptions of government officials, while the insistence on the part of the officials on being recognized as representatives of a legitimate and autonomous government was often interpreted as arrogance[25].

Such enemy images, in addition to the resource flows known to be feeding into the state apparatus in less than transparent ways, have contributed to the rapid withdrawal of international agencies and donors from Angola after 2003 when the emergency seemed to be under control. Projects in Angola became "unfundable" whereas the Angolans resented the fact that there never was a donor conference for reconstruction of the country as has otherwise been the custom in other cases of post-conflict transition in Africa or elsewhere.

Main donors have explained their lack of engagement by means of the government's unwillingness and inability to live up to the conditionalities. But as Vines and others have pointed out, the GoA has actually moved some way since 2001, in approving the PRSP (in 2004), the law on budgetary decentralization (in 2007), and other milestones[26]. As the assessment of SDC funded projects shows, the GoA has taken over a number of social and humanitarian obligations from the agencies that are pulling out. Meanwhile, the government has found alternative allies in China and Brazil, and now the Western donor community may have lost an opportunity to influence the direction of Angola's future development.

This said, SDC has in fact had a reasonably good relationship with the GoA at the provincial level where working relations have been quite productive, considering the very limited capacities of a government which has been waging a war for much of the time of the humanitarian programme. Relationships improved in particular when OCHA introduced a new concept for coordination in Huambo in 2001, which gave the government institutions more responsibility and intensified the collaboration between them and the humanitarian community.

In interviews with the evaluation team, government representatives admitted that the post-war situation had been extremely chaotic until 2004 when they slowly regained momentum in terms of improving governance relations, which is a point where international and national efforts and interests may converge and represent opportunities for win-win situations[27].

Even though SDC left the education sector after 2003, the development of this sector serves as an example of the problems and possibilities of coherence. In 2003 the GoA worked intensely to reform and expand primary education by recruiting and training 29,000 new teachers, which led to the enrolment of an extra million children (up to ca. 2½ mill. in primary school).[28] UNICEF supported the effort by funding training modules and contributing to the inclusion in the curriculum of HIV/Aids and Mine Awareness components.

[25] As commented by an Angolan NGO representative
[26] Vines et al. 2005
[27] Vines et al 2005
[28] UN 2004. CAT Mid-tern review

This effort has to be matched by mapping, construction, and rehabilitation of schools in return areas, the mobilisation of construction companies, communities and parents committees for these tasks, and distribution of books. However, a shortfall in funding of more than 60% of the education bloc of the UN Consolidated Appeal for Transition (2004) severely affected planned rehabilitation of schools as well as literacy programmes in return areas. But the lack of capacity in the central and provincial administration also had a negative impact on education causing severe delays in payments of salaries to public servants, which most likely has contributed to the fact that free school books (as well as medicine) have been sold on the market with the effect of excluding the poor majority of the children[29].

Finally, a major problem of the development of responsible government structures in the transition from war to peace has been the lack of coherence at community and municipal level. The limited geographical and sectoral focus of donors and NGOs play together with the weak administrative capacity of local governments to impede integrated responses to development problems. But the decentralization underway represents an opportunity for NGOs and CBOs to engage with local government. Unfortunately the weak support of the return of IDPs represents a missed opportunity for supporting and facilitating this process.

[29] As evidenced in the case-study's beneficiary analysis

7 Assessment of main components of SDC aid

7.1 Introduction

The following assessment covers the most important components and sectors of SDC supported activities, including infrastructure, health, capacity building, food distribution, assistance for return and reintegration, and peace building. This division does not entirely match the categories of the budget but makes sense in terms of the aims and substance of the different components.

7.2 Infrastructure

Support for construction of infrastructure has been an important focus in SDCs humanitarian programme in Angola, implemented through the direct operation in Huambo. When the road and bridge rehabilitation programme in Huambo was suspended, the operational capacity was drawn upon by other agencies during the emergency as well as the transition phase, in particular in IDP camps and resettlements in and around Huambo and Caála towns. Hence, construction has spread beyond the original objectives to in particular education and health. Construction of health posts and hospitals are assessed in the section on health (6.3). The operational and technical capacity in construction was slowly being reduced through sale of machinery and cessation of contracts with engineers and technical personnel. Since 2004, engagement in infrastructure has been nil.

7.2.1 Roads and bridges

The idea of rehabilitating secondary roads and bridges in Huambo province was conceived during a SDC mission in mid-95 and suggested as part of a larger "community rehabilitation programme for basic infrastructure in Huambo" at the donor roundtable in September 1995. The main objective was to give the rural population in the Planalto region access to the market and thereby help Angola substitute imported food.[30] Other objectives included to provide work opportunities for local population and demobilized combatants, facilitate the access and work of aid agencies, and consolidate the fragile peace process by connecting UNITA and MPLA controlled areas, hence the name of the programme, "Bridges for Peace". Finally, the programme aimed at contributing to local governments' capacity to rehabilitate roads by transferring machinery, facilities, and trained personnel at the end of the project.[31] State capacity in Huambo was close to nil in 1995.

The programme was based on consultations with GoA and international agencies. It was relevant and promised to provide a visible peace dividend by constructing 400 km of roads and 15-30 bridges[32], which as the planning proceeded in early 1996 was downgraded to 146 km and 12 bridges over a two year period. At the end of 1998, however, only 28 km and 3 bridges had

[30] Steffen 1995 *Kurzbericht,* and Furrer 2005 *10 Jahre…*; The Planalto was always regarded as the breadbasket of Angola but the productivity is much overrated and the soil in fact rather poor in large part of the region according to Pacheco 2000.
[31] Steffen 1995 and HH/SKA 1996, 1st evauationsbericht
[32] ibid.

been rehabilitated and the programme was suspended due to the war, which furthermore partly destroyed one of the bridges and damaged another (indicating the strategic importance of the SDC bridges).

Thus, despite extensive human and economic investments the programme never came close to meeting the ambitious objectives. The main reasons are circumstantial but at the same time closely related to choices made in planning and implementation:

- The deteriorating security situation was stated as a risk factor from the first evaluation report (May 1996) and onwards, and ICRC information must have kept SDC/SHA updated. In February 1998 Bern wanted to suspend the project, but the Huambo office had its way, and finished the third bridge.
- SDC/SHA opted for the UNIDO-type bridge for its durability, its potential for using local resources and contributing to local capacities (equipment, know-how, installations, and capacity for productionm of essential goods). According to an initial exploration, an alternative option, the Bailey bridge, was discarded because other agencies fully occupied Angola's limited production capacity for metal bridge-elements for this type[33]. The UNIDO bridge requires a fairly advanced production of wood elements and since skilled labour and local enterprises were almost non-existent in war-ravaged Huambo, SDC/SHA decided to rehabilitate a deteriorated furniture factory (MUBELA), train skilled workers for production, train a local NGO (OISC) for its management, and become the main client of the new enterprise[34]. However, OISC was severely overmatched, numerous problems marred the organizational and practical set-up (see section in case study), the communication with Bern was slow as was the procurement and import of machinery, which altogether caused substantial delays and interference with the rainy season.
- Tree-trunk bridges are a less durable alternative to Bailey and UNIDO bridges, but by opting for this simple and manageable technology, SDC/SHA would have avoided a lot of problems, considerably lowered the investment, and enhanced possibilities for local ownership through community participation. Considering the risks represented by the security context, this would have been a wise choice.

This is not to say that the programme did not have an impact. The use of local labour provided salaries and further skills of skilled workers, while the impact on the livelihoods of unskilled workers was limited by the choice of using machinery rather than work-brigades for road rehabilitation[35]. Still however, SHA employed some 120 workers in bridge construction. As the partly destroyed bridge was re-rehabilitated by public entities in 2002, the SHA-bridges were important in opening up the areas beyond the bridges for trade, aid and other forms of transport, and have contributed to the development of livelihoods in the areas connected by the bridges. As of 2007, two of the bridges[36] and all the stretches of secondary road are in need of repair and maintenance (but in a better state than most other roads). This is the obligation of INEA and Public Works to which SDC handed over the infrastructure. No provisions were made for community or municipally based maintenance schemes.

[33] Steffen 1995 mentions Swedreliefs contracts.
[34] OISC controlled the premises of the factory and it's head claimed to be the owner.
[35] Furrer 2005. See also section on workers as beneficiaries in the case-study.
[36] The third bridge was replaced by a new metal bridge on the former foundation.

Furthermore, the huge build-up of construction capacity made SDC/SHA an important and responsive partner during the emergency phase 1999-2001 when the agency assisted government and humanitarian agencies in the construction and improvement of camp sites, resettlements, and general infrastructure in and around the crowded provincial capital AND Cáala[37]. Since then, machinery has gradually been sold off to relevant entities, such as the local NGO Okutiuka and their post-war agricultural project. The state institution for road rehabilitation and maintenance, INEA, has taken over SDC/SHA facilities, and its employees have had (limited) training through collaboration with SHA engineers.

In summary, the programme was extremely relevant and supported a strategic key region which however also increased the risks which were not sufficiently taken into consideration in the decisions regarding the appropriate methods and approaches. Therefore coverage, effectiveness and efficiency were low, but the programme has had an outcome and impact beyond the original plan. Sustainability depends on the capacity of the local state since community ownership to the bridges never was generated.

[37] This includes two minor, provisional bridges the relevance and impact of which has been limited. They served Church missions and small populations, and have since deteriorated.

7.2.2 Schools

Between 1996 and 2002, SDC supported the construction, rehabilitation or extension of 30 schools (excluding 4 make-shift emergency schools) in Huambo, in addition to a number of schools in Luanda, supported through DWs "Community Initiative Fund". Education was explicitly removed from SDCs programme in 2003.[38] However, construction and rehabilitation of schools never formed part of a strategy for the education sector support but was seen as:

a) micro-projects to increase the goodwill and image of SDC/SHA in 1996-97 (4 schools)
b) an integral part of standard emergency assistance for IDPs in and around Huambo in 1999-2001 (26 schools, 17 of which were constructed through DWs "Emergency School Programme"), and
c) an element of a co-funded programme which primarily aimed at strengthening community-based organization for improved social conditions in poor *bairros* around Luanda.[39]

SDC support for the education sector, which has taken up a mere 0.5% of the total budget, has been relevant as well as appropriate. Despite the fact that many schools were emergency schools for displaced populations, the surveys of the evaluation team shows that none of the schools have been in vain. They have all been staffed by the government and are still functioning in 2007. In the resettlements in Huambo/Caala the schools served a population of 80,000, but many schools were constructed in urban bairros where IDPs put existing schools under pressure and schools had been destroyed in 1993-94. Only two schools were constructed in rural return areas close to Caála; otherwise, support for school construction was terminated when most IDPs returned to the rural areas at war's end.

In lack of objectives, strategy or explicit criteria of selection, SDCs support for schools has been ad hoc, based on applications from Churches and NGOs and project-by-project decisions. Nevertheless, there have been certain synergies in terms of occasional construction of water-points by and supply of furniture from Mubela, pervasive use of WFP food-for-work programmes for school construction during the emergency, as well as WFP school-feeding programmes which have continued until 2006-7 when some of them are being taken over by the government.

Whereas SDC was actively involved in supervision and on-the-job-training in the early micro-projects and the 2001 projects included in the APOLO programme (see section 6.4), SDC's involvement in DW school projects was limited to funding. DW followed a methodology which emphasized the involvement of authorities, staff and community in planning, training of parents committees, and more formal reporting formats. In particular in Luanda, the community organizations developed around the schools have been able to survive, and in many cases to develop initiatives of school maintenance and improvement[40].

The evaluation team's survey of schools in Huambo showed that they are or will be in dire need of repair or rehabilitation within the next 5 years[41], but the responsibility for maintenance and rehabilitation is not entirely clear. Formally the provincial government to whom schools have been handed over are responsible for this, but the Provincial Government clearly stated that it has no resources for this and that parents committees have to commit themselves through work and contributions. This results in disparities between the state of the schools of poor and less poor areas.

[38] As suggested in the 2003 review
[39] The DW programme was co-funded with Comic Relief and later Novib.
[40] See case study
[41] In particular lack of termite protection and the use of wooden planks for windows represent problems of deterioration.

In summary: Despite the lack of objectives and strategy for school construction, the fact that all schools are staffed and functioning in 2007 suggests that this activity has been extremely relevant, mostly appropriate and more sustainable than could be expected in regard emergency schools. The 30 schools (of ca. 310 primary schools in Huambo and Caála) have been handed over to the government, but responsibilities for maintenance and rehabilitation remains unclear; by and large, the government expects communities to take care of school maintenance, while the communities expect the government to be in charge.

7.2.3 Water and sanitation

Between 1996 and 2004, SDC gave almost 2.4 mill. CHF in support of the Canadian NGO, Development Workshop's, water & sanitation program in Luanda and Huambo. SDC convinced DW to take over ICRCs engagement in the rehabilitation of the water supply in Huambo, where people increasingly relied on polluted surface water. Between 1997 and 2004, DW constructed ca. 600 water points covering the daily needs of 400-600,000 people. SDC funded the project fully for two years before reducing contributions to a maximum of 50%, while DW expanded the programme with other donors.

The first two year -programme (1997-99) aimed at creating an effective and replicable system of constructing and managing community based water points which would cover the needs of 156,000 people and be sustainable in the longer term. Departing from ICRC's emergency approach to water provision, DW worked on developing a community-focussed cost-recovery and maintenance system based on user groups (GAS, Grupo do Agua y Saneamento) at each water point. The programme was developed in cooperation with the Provincial Water Department in the hope of influencing public water provision and policy and having the department taking over responsibility for the system at a later point[42].

[42] DW 1997

The evaluation team's survey of 10% of DW's water points in Huambo suggests that more than 2/3 of them are still operating in 2007. This indicates that:

1) the type of pump chosen, the Village Level of Operation and Maintenance-type (VLOM) was appropriate,
2) DW's repair services have been sustained - partly through continued funding, but also with contributions from user fees[43], and
3) the community-based system of management has worked well. However, responsibility for the water point frequently rests with one individual – a teacher, priest or *soba* - rather than with the (5-person) GAS.

Following the assistance-for-free mode of implementation of ICRC, DW had problems introducing their approach based on community participation in construction and payment of user-fees, but through "intensive community training" DW changed attitudes somewhat and prepared the ground for a more sustainable water supply in the medium term. However, at the height of emergency, DW was pressured to adopt a more typical emergency approach, and in general SDC/SHA staff members expressed scepticism towards DW's "time-consuming" approach. Nevertheless, DW sustained construction rates (of 60-70 pr. year) that were superior to those of ICRC[44].

Together with DW, SDC/SHA participated with the provincial government in the Provincial Water Committee even before UTCAH coordinated the agencies in different sectors. Through the committee it was possible to forge certain synergies between construction of schools, health posts and water points. As of 2007, the Provincial Water Department has not yet been able to fully take over water supply and maintenance schemes, but at national level, DW, thanks to its experience, is deeply involved in the development of systems for decentralized, municipal water supply schemes.

In summary, the supported programmes for water points have been relevant, appropriate and surprisingly sustainable, thanks to DW's methodology and SDC's encouragement (according to DW's director). They have covered a substantial part of the needs in and around Huambo and Caála, also beyond the emergency. With DW's current involvement in long term planning issues, SDC's long term support of DW has had an impact which is far beyond the actual provision of water to poor populations in Luanda and Huambo during the war. In stark contrast, a water supply programme by the Italian NGO Intersos in Caxito, funded by SDC, seems to have been a complete failure but has not been assessed by the team.

[43] 41% of community based water-points, and 10% where institutions are responsible for management. See field report. A. Cain suggests that the 'rural model' unlike the urban, is not yet sustainable. It is possible to collect funds when the pump breaks down but not to build funds for regular maintenance. Interview, Sept. 2007.
[44] DW Director Cain, September 2007. DW took over ICRCs water-section staff.

7.3 Food distribution

SDC has contributed 20 mill. CHF for distribution of food and non food items through WFP. The evaluation will not attempt to assess this in any detail, but chapter 7 conveys an impression of how food distribution is remembered by the beneficiaries. Data on malnutrition and under-five mortality[45] justify the contribution, and WFP had problems getting their programmes fully funded which led to cases of abandonment at some points in the emergency operation (e.g. Cuando Cubango in 2000).

Problems of access constituted the largest hindrance to full coverage, and it appeared in 2002 that the worst humanitarian conditions were found in the newly accessible areas in former UNITA territories. In 2004 the situation had stabilized to some degree with large segments of highly vulnerable populations, but WFP had to cut back its activities drastically as only half of the programme was funded in 2004. In 2005, WFP almost had to close down operation and stop the development of its exit programme (2006-08).

SDC also contributed to food distribution through the construction of community kitchens and stoves in Huambo during the emergency. SDC supported the construction of at least 32 community kitchens and food centres with 80 large firewood stoves. Most of them were solicited and operated by Churches and NGOs, or constructed as part of school projects. There were no explicit objectives or criteria of prioritization for this component, but community kitchens allow for effective food distribution under conditions of limited space and access to fuel as in the overcrowded camps.

As the emergency situation passed, some of the food centres continued to be used, either for schools or for occasional food donations or for feeding vulnerable populations. At the schools, some stoves are still being used for the school feeding program which is in the process of being transferred from WFP to the GoA.

Finally, SDC delivered large volumes of Swiss milk products, primarily milk powder, as part of its humanitarian assistance in the first and last stages of the programme. The aggregate value of these deliveries has been given as 5.4 million CHF. This corresponds to 6% of the total expenditure on the programme (or 8%, if administrative and programme coordination costs are excluded). The milk products were primarily distributed through the two NGOs CARITAS and SOLE.

Deliveries of food aid from donor countries are sometimes scrutinized because of the element of self-interest that may be involved. In the case of SDC's humanitarian aid it is also emphasized that "food aid provided by Switzerland is mostly produced locally"[46]. Milk products are treated as an exception to this general rule, and an elaborate set of standards has been adopted for guiding the allocation and use of such products.

[45] UNDP Human Development Report 1999 states that 292 pr. 1000 children under five died in Angola.
[46] Standards Governing the Use of Dairy Products in the Context of Food Aid" (SDC August 2006 update of standards dated April 1990)

The evaluation team did encounter questioning of this part of SDC's humanitarian aid, both in terms of whether this had in all cases been the most effective aid, and in terms of the rather cumbersome procedures involved from procurement and import to delivery, the need to pay a duty of 30%, and the heavy claims on reporting (by SDC). SOLE distributed the milk products freely to patients and others, notably orphans; CARITAS used them both for hospital patients and undernourished children. A SDC field report from 2005 has summarized the use of milk products by both involved NGOs and found them much needed. The main criticism concerns insufficient quantities and logistical problems[47].

In summary, given the huge needs through all phases of SDC's programme, there is little doubt that the deliveries of milk products, like the other forms of food distribution, have been highly relevant. Whether milk products have also formed the most effective, including cost-effective type of food aid is another matter.

7.4 Health

From 1996-2003, and mostly as part of the temporary reprogramming during the emergency phase, SDC supported the construction of health posts and the rehabilitation of two hospitals (6.4.1). There was no explicit strategy or objectives for the health sector until 2004-06, and by then, the activities funded did not comprise construction. SDC has funded a range of health projects, including inoculation programmes, combat against the Marburg epidemic in 2005 (secondment to WHO and medical material support for MINSA), 4 HIV/Aids related programmes (6.4.2), and several primary health care programmes (6.4.3).

7.4.1 Health posts and hospitals

Between 1998 and 2001, SDC/SHA contributed substantially to the physical rehabilitation of the Central Hospital of Huambo province (800 patients and 58 doctors by 2007) and the Orthopaedic Hospital which has served war victims from large parts of Angola[48]. The projects were not part of an overall plan with clear objectives, but became an extremely relevant and timely way of putting obsolete SDC/SHA capacity to good use as the Bridges for Peace programme was suspended, and the number of patients increased dramatically due to the war.

Both facilities were severely damaged in the earlier phases of the war. Rehabilitation was requested by ICRC (managing the orthopaedic hospital) on a very informal basis leaving little paper trail, and the Ministry of Health (MINSA) that managed the central hospital and contributed 5-10% of the funds for both projects. SDC covered 60-80% of expenses, while ICRC, MOLISV, WFP, UNICEF and Caritas also contributed, even though they mostly focussed on medical supplies. The work was interrupted regularly by problems of supplies and by competing needs for machinery and expertise as WFP requested support for setting up IDP camps in 1999.

Sustainability is difficult or impossible to assess since both facilities recently have undergone substantial rehabilitation, funded by GoA and carried out by Chinese construction companies. Apart from 10% of the Orthopaedic hospital still funded by ICRC, MINSA has gradually taken full

[47] Bericht Milchpulver Projekt Evaluation (SDC September 2005, Patrik Olsson)
[48] The Orthopaedic hospital treated 4,000 patients between 1995 and 2007. Angola has an estimated 70,000 mine victims of a total of 105,000 disabled people (ICRC Annual Report 2006).

responsibility for the two hospitals since 2004. The main problem continues to be one of staffing, and 50 of 58 doctors at the central hospital are expatriates.

In Huambo, SDC/SHA also supported the construction of 11 health posts, the primary healthcare facility at the bottom of the Angolan health system. Two were rehabilitated as micro-projects in support of the Bridges for Peace project in 1996-97, while the rest were new health posts constructed between 2000 and -03, mostly in resettlement areas in and close to Huambo, where they formed part of the general emergency response. Two health posts were constructed in support of IDPs, who in 2002 had returned to rural areas at 60 to100 km from Huambo. Loosely estimated, the 11 health posts covered areas with 135,000 inhabitants (of 2.5 mill. in the province with a total of 75 health posts and 51 health centres).

With one exception, health posts were identified, applied for, and constructed by local NGOs (GAC, ADRA-A, CAD, Okutiuka, ASCA). SDC supervised construction, in particular in the case of 5 projects under the APOLO programme (2002-03) which aimed at developing the capacity of local NGOs. There was no explicit coordination regarding water, but some posts were equipped with furniture and ovens for garbage incineration through SDC's RISC program. Cement covered adobe bricks were used for the construction, which is an appropriate method as evidenced by the fact that in 2007 all visited health posts except one[49] were in fair conditions, although in need of an overhaul within the next 5 years.

[49] Casseque III in which the bricks were not covered by cement.

All health posts were officially handed over to the provincial tier of the MINSA. In 2007, all the health posts are still working, staffed, supplied, and managed by the state, but in 2002-04, due to lack of funds and skilled personnel, some of the posts had to wait 1-1½ year before they were staffed. In some cases, NGOs therefore managed the health post for a couple of years before handing over to MINSA. In other cases, SDC and the implementing NGO (CAD) engaged in advocacy activities in order to pressurize the provincial government to staff the health posts.[50]

As the only NGO, CAD worked explicitly with the organization of local health committees, using a rights based approach. Some health committees are still active, but only one has contributed to maintenance which otherwise is seen as the responsibility of the state. MINSA and Public Works have made repairs in a few cases, but in general, the provincial tier of MINSA which is responsible for primary health care, is much weaker in terms of resources than the central tier which is responsible for the hospitals.

In summary, support for construction in the health sector has been relevant, but in terms of the health posts, SDC has contributed to a pronounced unevenness in coverage of rural and urban areas. Different tiers of MINSA have taken over responsibility for posts and hospitals, but not without gaps. These have been caused by the lack of resources rather than lack of connections and coordination between agencies and GoA. Constructions have relatively successfully been handed over to the authorities – gradually in the case of ICRC. Sustainability has been acceptable, but the GoA will have to take, or has taken, responsibility for rehabilitation of constructions.

7.4.2 HIV/Aids related activities

Prevention of HIV/Aids is one of the objectives in SDC's 2004-6 programme. The combination of a few but alarming data from Angola[51], high rates of infection in neighbouring countries, and the reasonable assumption that increased mobility - as in the case of post-conflict Angola – will increase and spread HIV/Aids infection, justified SDCs support of preventive programmes and other responses to the disease.

At national level, SDC supported UNICEFs HIV/Aids educational project (551,000 CHF, 2003-6)[52] aimed at increasing knowledge and debate in Angola and diminish the discrimination of HIV/Aids infected persons in Angola. The programme reached out through secondary school teachers and their 600,000 students and created a boom of public awareness around the international HIV/Aids Day in 2005. According to an evaluation survey, 86% of parents had talked about the issue in the family after the event, most of them for the first time ever.[53] Since then, the Ministry of Education has included two weeks of HIV/Aids related activities in the curriculum and gradually taken over responsibilities for an annually recurring competition/event for secondary schools. Finally, the programme has fed into a series of recommendations for "good practices".

[50] See APOLO Schlussbericht 2002
[51] See ECHO 2003. Later data have suggested that only 5.5% are infected in Angola in comparison with 20-30% in the other countries in the region. But prevention activities are still relevant.
[52] The donation funded a few other activities as well.
[53] Ross, Melody 2006. Boom da educacão sobre HIV/Sida

In Huambo, SDC co-funded a project for improving general knowledge and capacity for testing and treatment of HIV/Aids (322,000 CHF, 2004-6). This was the first big project of Angolan Red Cross, Huambo, and carried out in partnership with RC-France. The management set-up was a bit awkward with RC-A being responsible for community mobilization and financial management while RC-F managed and staffed the rest of the project. Despite having received some training from IFRC, it is the impression that RC-A was not entirely up to the task. A part of the accounts has not been settled yet due to disagreements between the two organizations.

The project set up two testing stations and trained personnel for testing and treatment as well as local RC volunteers for outreach activities. The project targeted returning refugees, but this was not relevant since they received education and tests while in transit-camps. Therefore, the local youth and pregnant women have been the main beneficiaries, with tested positive rates around 5%. The main problem of the project has been a poor hand-over of the testing stations to the public health authorities, which were only considered "indirect beneficiaries" in the project document. Among several other problems[54], the entire professional staff left the project before hand-over, and MINSA had to train new staff to take over. Outreach activities in one of the two sites have continued thanks to USAid funding. The lack of outreach in the other site has caused a drastic decrease in voluntary tests, which shows that the number of people who want to be tested is a good indicator of the effectiveness of HIV/Aids education.

Finally, HIV/Aids awareness formed part of an IOM refugee reintegration program. An unintended consequence of this kind of component is the fact that in some areas, HIV/Aids campaigns created or reinforced the idiosyncrasy that this disease is a problem of foreigners and refugees returning from foreign countries.

In summary, while the engagement in general is relevant if Angola shall keep low rates of infection, the Red Cross project has been fraught with problems of effectiveness, limited coverage, connectedness and sustainability in terms of poor quality of construction and poor planning for the hand over to public health authorities. The UNICEF project on the other hand has been highly appropriate, has covered the whole country, and has had a sustained and deep impact[55].

7.4.3 Other health programmes

MSF-CH received funding for medical programmes in Namibe (387,000 CHF,1998-2000), and in Menongue in the remote and marginalized province of Cuando Cubango (720,000 CHF, 2002-05). The latter supported primary health care through the development of 6 health posts which were founded my MSF during the emergency in 2000, and complementary support for the Paediatric Ward at the provincial hospital. The largest challenges were to have MINSA recognize the health posts, and later, to encourage and convince MINSA to take over responsibility for the health posts in 2004, and for the paediatric ward after MSF's planned exit in 2005, but the result was good despite a very weak leadership in MINSA[56].

[54] The facilities of the San Paolo testing station was abandoned in a very poor state and left to MINSA to rehabilitate. See field report for other problems.
[55] MSF-S had a SDC funded HIV/Aids programme in Lubango, but the evaluation team has no information on this.
[56] MSF-Ch 2004. Final Acitivity Report, October 2004.

The other example of SDC supported activities is Medair's maternal health programme in Luena, Moxico. The programme was a response to the UN Consolidated Appeal for transition and aimed at developing the professional and institutional health structures in the province in order to improve women's health and reduce infant mortality. Together with MINSA, Medair developed support for traditional birth attendants, and for the provincial maternity hospital. The final report states that expectations for improvement in attitudes and skills levels had been disappointed, but that the programme had produced results, and that MINSA, finally in 2006, seemed to assume financial and practical responsibility[57].

In summary, these two examples of the more dispersed, SDC supported activities point to the problem of uneven geographical coverage in Angola, to the problems of capacity and funding of MINSA, but also to the eventual assuming of responsibility by the GoA in 2004-06 which indicates a shift, even in these remote and in many aspects abandoned Eastern and Southern provinces.

7.5 Capacity building

Capacity building was not an explicit, operationalized objective of the SDC/SHA programme before 2000. Transfer of knowledge through "on-the-job-training" of workers and NGOs was seen as a welcome but implicit impact of construction work in which SHA expatriate personnel took part. During 2000, capacity building became part of the overall SDC concept and objectives for the Angola programme. Two programmes – RISC and APOLO - were conceived for the purpose, in addition to general, targeted training activities for selected employees of SDC and local partners.

Despite being framed as a project for facilitating poor people's access to public services[58], RISC (2001-3) was always seen as a project to support the development of sustainable micro-enterprises among SHA/SDC employees to be laid-off in the process of moving away from direct implementation and handing-over of construction activities in Huambo. 3 enterprise groups were selected for support after internal competition and given training in technical and management skills in addition to a start-up grant up to 12,000 US$, counselling, and subcontracts for inputs to ongoing SDC projects, mainly in the health sector.

As of 2007, one enterprise has ceased to exist, one is barely surviving, and one is thriving, but most of the former employees have lost their jobs.[59] A major problem in the project design has been the binding to the health sector, in which the state soon, in the absence of international organizations[60], became the only provider of contracts. Micro-enterprises cannot make bids for tenders, and in the wake of the war, the business environment has changed with the booming presence of Brazilian, Chinese, South African and Portuguese construction firms with good political connections. The one thriving RISC enterprise managed to become licensed as a 'construction firm' and hence permitted to manage contracts with the GoA.

The APOLO project was designed in late 2001 to transfer operational means and capacities to local organizations, while simultaneously strengthening the permanent infrastructure, mainly in the health sector. NGOs were selected on the basis of clearly defined criteria regarding the

[57] Medair. Final Report, Maternal Health Programme, Luena, Moxico Province
[58] SDC. RISC Final Report
[59] But some of them found good use of their skills in the provincial 'Public Works' section.
[60] SDC, for example, has not funded health sector constructions in Huambo since 2003/4.

NGOs status and the relevance and appropriateness of proposed projects. 3 NGOs and a Mission were selected, while the NGOs were trained in project management through targeted courses, and accompanied during project implementation. Of these, 2 (Okutiuka and ASCA) have survived and expanded their activities, while one (CAD, focussing on IDP support) is suspended and in the process of being redefined by the members. The NGOs asses that APOLO was important for their development because of the training they received, because they received an overhead for institutional development for the first time, and because they were given full responsibility in the planning and management (including financial) of projects. For two of the NGOs, APOLO was only one of several training packages they have received since the late 1990s.

In summary, APOLO and RISC seem to have fulfilled their somewhat unclear objectives, and in the context of SHA/SDC's acitivites in Huambo 2001, both projects were relevant. However, they have been very limited in terms of coverage and prospects of replicating, and thereby benefiting, from the initial investment[61]. The linkage to the health sector and the inclination towards turning NGOs into construction companies are questionable elements of the projects. Thus, none of the surviving NGOs and enterprises are engaged in the health sector anymore.

[61] APOLO expenses in 2002 were close to 1 mill. CHF of which 23% were used for training, excluding the time of permanent SDC employees (SDC review 2003).

7.6 Return and reintegration assistance

As of May 2003, OCHA reported that some 2.25 million people had returned to the rural areas since March 2002.[62] In Huambo alone, an estimated 439,000 persons returned during the first year after the death of Savimbi, which is the largest number of all provinces and 20% of the total population of the province. Obviously, a movement on this scale, and the sudden opening of the enormous "Newly Accessible Territories" to government and international agencies, turned planning, implementation and follow-up of assistance and protection into a nightmare.

It seems that most organizations were caught by surprise by the sudden end of the conflict which presented them to the triple challenge of demobilizing and reintegrating combatants, assisting returning refugees from neighbouring countries, and assisting the population which hurried back from urban areas to their land in time for the planting season (October-November) despite poor security conditions and general absence of infrastructure and services. In addition, the conditions of people who had stayed in UNITA areas were bad, with general acute malnutrition rates between 10 and 25%[63].

Both representatives of GoA, international agencies, and NGOs, suggested in interviews that the situation in 2002-04 was chaotic and that the accompaniment of returning populations was patchy, *ad hoc*, and coincidental in varying degrees. Only 30% of the displaced people returned to areas that lived up to the minimal conditions established in the "Norms for resettlement of Displaced Populations" which became Law in 2001. By mid 2003, it was estimated that 900,000 households in the rural areas were in need of seeds and tools – a shortfall which was only to some extent covered by agencies such as USAid, FAO and EuronAid[64].

It seems that the GoA focussed on the demobilisation and disarmament of more than 100,000 ex-combatants plus their families in an operation, which was managed "surprisingly well"[65]. Organized repatriation did not start until well into 2003, after some 130,000 – one third of the refugees - had returned on their own account and initiative during the first year[66]. Reluctant donors were among the reasons for delays in getting the UNHCR repatriation operation up and running[67] (but SDC seconded staff for UNHCR from late 2002). UNHCR was ready for the repatriation-operation in mid 2003.

Apart from two health posts constructed as part of the APOLO program in the areas of return in Huambo (2002-03), SDC supported only two other projects in direct response to the massive return of IDPs in Huambo, one in agriculture and one in mine risk education (but see also section 6.7 and 6.8 for support for protection and peace building, in addition to general contributions to WFP and ICRC):

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[62] This number was far bigger than the number of 'confirmed', i.e. registered, IDPs that the UN otherwise used. This shows the high number of displaced people who lived dispersed in the towns and cities during the emergency without registering as 'IDP's.
[63] UN 2003. Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal.
[64] ECHO 2003
[65] As expressed by an INGO representative. GoA was criticised for the conditions in transit camps and for stopping food distributions too soon.
[66] UNHCR 2003. Repatriamento dos Refugiados Angolanos nos Países Limitrófes. Luanda, Abril 2003.
[67] Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003. Danish Assistance to Internally Displaced Populations in Angola 1999-2003. Copenhagen

In October 2002, ADRA-I received support (98,000 CHF, 2002-04) for a food-security project aiming at distributing food, tools, and seeds, training agricultural promoters, and extending horticulture in areas of return in Huambo and Huila. Another component aimed at improving livestock health, train "community sanitary agents", and increase the use of animal traction, a crucial factor of production in highland agriculture (see chapter 7). Both projects were extremely relevant and were carried out despite problems of access due to mines, lack of skilled labour, problems of procuring animals for the beneficiary groups, and initial resistance from villagers who demanded health care for themselves rather than the animals. However, the sustainability of the cattle-component may be questionable, but the team was not able to assess the status of the project[68].

While other mine clearance activities in Huambo were supported by Political Division IV[69], SDC funded Handicap International's Mine Risk Education (270,000 CHF, 2004-05) that forged and trained networks of teachers, health workers, *sobas*, churches, user committees etc. through local NGOs in Huambo. The relevant (though not entirely timely) project had developed appropriate and effective methods, but support was discontinued in 2005 after one year, with unfortunate consequences for the involved NGOs[70]. Almost 135,000 people participated in MRE sessions in Huambo, 117 mined or suspected areas were registered, and the number of 10 accidents during the year of implementation was lower than previous years. A large WFP survey in the highland showed that 11% felt their mobility limited by mine risk by the end of 2004[71].

At national level, SDC's seconded two experts in construction (and later a JPO) to UNHCR from late 2002 to 2006, while a construction expert came to WFP from 2003. Otherwise, general contributions to the emergency food programmes of WFP, ICRC and UNHCR continued more or less unchanged until the end of 2004. Apart from repatriation, UNHCR ran socio-economic reintegration programmes until the end of 2006, when repatriation officially ended. The programmes focussed on refugee return areas but assisted both repatriates and others in the same areas.

Finally, in 2004-05, SDC funded an orphanage for un-accompanied minors from among the refugee population, set up by IOM (225,000 CHF). The same organization was in charge of the "community revitalization program" in Huambo, Moxico and Cuando Cubango that aimed at strengthening the "absorption capacity" of mixed recipient communities (337,000 CHF, 2004-5). In the eyes of IOM's own, subsequent staff, the program was all-right but "too much was done too fast" and with too little consideration of longer term perspectives, such as ensuring that seeds can be reproduced and the quality of infrastructure.

[68] Due to (mis-?)information received, the team did not visit the area of implementation, and the final report does not contain information regarding how the Community Sanitary Agents will be supported in the future and how provision of medicine will be ensured.
[69] Not included in the evaluation
[70] The changes were due to changing country priorities at the Africa HQ. According to SDC/Luanda: "the funding for this project came from a special credit which is managed by the Humanitarian Aid Department Direction (for mine action projects), and not by the Africa Section / Southern Africa Desk. We were informed, at a later stage [after an initial green light from HQ], that priorities had changed and that the HI second phase was not considered".
[71] WFP/VAM Angola 2005

In summary: Considering the extremely vulnerable situation of a population in the millions returning without assets to areas with depleted agriculture and malnourished inhabitants, the response of SDC is not impressive. The different components were relevant, but it seems that too little was done too late, even though the mines, the rain, and the damaged infrastructure created extremely difficult conditions of access, assessment, planning, and implementation, which have to be taken into consideration.

Unfortunately SDC was not alone in providing a relatively slow and weak response to the acute situation, which points to a general problem of changing the pace and substance of emergency aid towards rehabilitation needs. The UN midterm review 2002 notes that: During the immediate post-conflict period, lack of funding was the main constraint on humanitarian operations. Limited resources forced agencies to prioritise among acutely vulnerable populations and slowed emergency responses (...) Efforts to promote an integrated approach addressing the multiple causes of vulnerability were undermined by skewed funding patterns. By the end of July, key sectors, including mine action, emergency response and resettlement, had received no funds and the water and sanitation sector, which is crucial for reducing morbidity and mortality, had received only 14% of requirements'[72].

7.7 Protection

Over the years, SDC's programme in Angola has contributed to protection activities in different ways. During the aborted peace process in the 1990s, SDC gave support for the Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process (expert, food, and earmarked support for DHA-UCAH, OCHA and UNDP), which became one of the bones of contention in the relations between MPLA and the international community. A similar engagement was not the case during the DDR process in 2002-03. In this regard it may be noted that the continued existence of 250,000 armed and organized civilians (mainly in the MPLA affiliated Civil Defence Organization

[72] UN 2002. Consolidated Interagency Appeal. Mid-term review, p.9

from 1992) is a major void in the Angolan peace process as it is in many other countries emerging from armed conflict.

Over the years, SDC has mainly supported protection through the general contributions to ICRC's Angola programme, comprising prison visits, advocacy and training activities in regard to the International Humanitarian Law, tracing activities and family reunification programmes, collection and distribution of "Red Cross Messages", and contribution to the development of a plan for the national mine response 2006-11.

Little or no documentation is available on objectives and indicators which seem to be given, and it is beyond the scope and capacity of this evaluation to assess the contribution in any detail. Family reunifications, for example, have been in the hundreds pr. year of a case load of maybe 100,000 in 2003[73]. In tracing activities ICRC relies on the cooperation with the National Red Cross in terms of "tracing points" and the tracing magazine "La Gazetta". ICRC remains a significant presence with currently an expatriate staff of 21, but annual budgets have been reduced from 23 to 11 mill. CHF from 2003-06[74].

UNHCR has also contributed to protection through the registration and monitoring of refugees and repatriates and the development with OCHA and the GoA of the decree on Norms for the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Populations (from 2001), to which returns have rarely lived up to in practice. It should be mentioned that UNHCR during the return operation missed an opportunity for increasing protection permanently as they did not facilitate the issuing of ID cards for returning refugees[75]. While the issuing of ID cards is an obligation of the state, the GoA, like the governments in many other conflict ridden countries, has not given priority to this task. As noted in chapter 7, the lack of ID cards is a major problem for people who seek jobs, and in general for the respect of the rights of citizens. In this regard, UNICEF engaged in a timely and relevant campaign for free birth-certificates, and the GoA has turned the issuing of birth-certificates into a legal obligation.

In summary, given the rights and security situation in Angola, SDC's support to protection activities has been relevant, but not all components have been appropriate and effective. The DDR operation in the 1990s may be seen as contributing to renewed war since the MPLA considered the operation inefficient and de facto providing a cover for the regrouping and strengthening of UNITA forces. The IDP Norms were inscribed in national law but they had a limited impact on the situation on the ground for returning IDPs. UNHCR omitted the foundation of citizenship in the return and reintegration of refugees. And which level of coverage can be considered satisfactory in regard to ICRC's tracing and family reunification programme?

[73] UN 2003. Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal. At the end of 2006, ICRC had 23,000 pending tracing requests.
[74] Of the 11 mill. CHF, 7.4 are used for protection activities.
[75] In 2007, UNHCR have tried to make up for this by running an ID program in the provinces with highest concentrations of repatriates.

7.8 Peace building activities

In the aftermath of the war, and in a division of labour with the Political Division IV, SDC supported two major peace building programmes at community level ("Track III"), mainly in Huambo:

DW's "Voices for Peace" (379,000 CHF 2002-06) has evolved around the publication of a monthly paper in Portuguese and Umbundo since 1998. "Voices for Peace" is distributed in 2,500 copies in communities in Huambo, and now also in 6 other provinces. The contributors are trained, voluntary barefoot journalists who focus on local conflicts, domestic violence, petty crime, sexual harassment and similar issues of huge relevance, not least in the aftermath of the war. The newspaper is an important source of information that brings conflict and violence into public debate. In times of political tension and occasional oppression, the paper seems to be protected by DW's status as a major agent of development.

DW also developed a literacy programme reaching 2,500 persons, mainly women, and using teaching materials tailored to the cultural and political context of Huambo in the immediate post-conflict period. Unlike the paper which has continued on the basis of DW's own funds since 2006, the literacy programme is now suffering from lack of economic incentives.

The other SDC funded programme comprised SFCG's reconciliation and conflict resolution activities in Huambo, partly directed at mid-level urban leaders through the Political Forum for Problem-solving in 2004, and partly directed at capacity building and conflict resolution through CBOs, Churches and traditional leaders in rural areas (320,000 USD, 2003-05)[76].

The Forum brought leaders of many different and opposed political, military and religious organizations together in a symbolically important, broadcasted event, followed by training activities. SFCG's methods have been adopted by several organizations, including a self-sustained student organization and a network of journalists, trained in peace journalism.

In summary: In a post-conflict environment fraught with tension, political and cultural intolerance and potential conflicts, the supported peace-building programmes have been highly relevant and appropriate, and aimed at individuals and organizations that have the potential for sustained impact in the region. The literacy programme is probably not sustainable without continued funding, but the targeting of illiterate women should be noted, and the concept for teaching materials and curriculum development could be promoted more broadly with entities of the GoA.

[76] SFCG received a total of 654,000 CHF for conflict resolution programmes from 1998-2005, but only the Huambo component has been assessed.

8 Impact on beneficiaries

8.1 Introduction

Aid impact is commonly described as "the positive and negative, primary and secondary, long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended"[77] As mentioned in chapter 2, impact assessment of humanitarian aid is a notoriously difficult task, the feasibility of which has been subject to much discussion as the demands of the new public management agenda has reached the humanitarian sector[78]. Thus, an assessment of the impact of SDC's humanitarian aid program in Huambo is complicated by a number of factors:

- SDC/SHA was one of many aid organizations. In 2000, when 300,000 registered IDP's were assisted in and near the towns of Huambo and Caála, a total of 61 organizations operated in the area, including 19 INGOs, 26 national NGOs, 6 UN and other international agencies and 10 church organizations (and excluding the different tiers of the GoA)[79].
- The SDC programme covered a large number of activities in a range of different sectors over a period of 10 years. Many of the activities had only a limited coverage or were linked into, complementary and often indispensable to the activities of other humanitarian organizations, such as WFP and ICRC.
- It is difficult to establish causal linkages between inputs and impact in terms of health, livelihoods and social-economic levels because a host of non-aid related factors intervene, such as the outbreak of war and peace, good or bad harvests, changes in market conditions etcetera.
- The prolonged emergency in Angola has involved repeated and massive population movements which complicates the tracing of beneficiaries and determining the possible impact of aid across the territory. But this fact, on the other hand, makes it obvious that migration should be one indicator of the impact of aid.
- Large parts of Angola have for practical purposes been "data-free environments" and baselines are largely non-existent. Furthermore, conventional methods of impact evaluation are complicated by the fact that control groups can be hard to establish. Food aid for example is highly fungible as it may be passed on through social networks beyond the immediate beneficiaries.
- The combination of rapidly changing, chaotic conditions and the organizational culture of humanitarian organizations (including SDC/SHA) emphasizing the "doing" rather than analysis means that documentation of inputs, process and outputs and how these relate to changing contexts is minimal.
- Finally, as the objectives of humanitarian aid are often poorly defined, it is difficult to establish indicators for measuring impact.

[77] OECD/DAC 2002
[78] See for example Hofmann et al. 2004
[79] OCHA 2000

What realistically can be carried out in the case of Huambo is an assessment of the composite, or system-wide impacts on beneficiaries rather than a project or agency specific assessment. Accordingly the modest aims of this chapter are:

1) to give an impression of the ways in which urban and rural inhabitants in the Province of Huambo have encountered, experienced and remembered different parts of the humanitarian aid,
2) on this background to learn about the relevance, coverage and possible impact of aid from the perspective of the beneficiaries, and,
3) to suggest relevant impact indicators.

The following is mostly based on a series of interviews and a survey of around 100 people in 10 sites in and around Huambo and Caála towns and up to 100 km away. The tables in this chapter include two former resettlement camps, one urban neighbourhood (*bairro*), and four sites in rural return areas, even though the latter are biased toward administrative centres (communes) connected to Huambo by road. Surveys and interviews were designed to give information on the experience with conflict and displacement, aid, and current socio-economic conditions, and the sampled sites cover two major routes of displacement, resettlement and return of IDP's. Most respondents had been displaced during one of the last two stages of the war, and more than 80% of the respondents had received some form of aid, mostly food aid between 1999 and 2002[80].

8.2 Displacement and food aid

Most of the displaced in the sample fled their home in late 1998. They lost their most important assets in the form of livestock (including draught animals) tools, and kitchen utensils, whereas their houses were destroyed or deteriorated over time.

Displacement was stepwise, and many stayed for weeks or months in several places before reaching a transit camp - such as the old factories Coalfa and the notorious "sausage factory" in Caála - or settled in an urban *bairro*. From 2000 IDPs from the transit camps were resettled in camps outside the towns where they in principle would have access to a small piece of land, as described below:

> In Coalfa Camp, Isahe and his people were living "under the open sky". It rained and no help was available at first. People died and they did not know what to do as more and more people arrived. The Government then told them to leave for (the resettlement) Kasseque III. Here it was at first difficult because there was no assistance, but they were given axes so they could make charcoal, which they sold so they could buy some food. After 6 months WFP started to distribute food – beans, fertilizers, maize, oil, blankets, soap …. They were then living in tents, but after a while they managed to build small houses. They collected water in a small river, but got sick. Later, a school was built and a water pump was installed – "we were all so happy", he said. (Fieldnotes, sept.2007)

[80] For comparison, the WFP Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping from Huambo province, 2005 found 67% formerly displaced in their samples, of which less than half were receiving aid as of 2005.

In general, displaced people in the sample experienced periods of 3 to 12 months without access to food aid. In the area of Caála only 30% of the IDPs received food in 1998-9981, while 75% did so in the area of Huambo. Some lived several months in the IDP camps without access to food. People recollected that WFP, ICRC and in some cases SCF had distributed food.

Those who lived in urban *bairros* in Huambo also had some, but more limited, access to food aid, either distributed in the bairros or picked up in the camps. The same was not the case in Caála, according to the survey. Food arrived before medicine and sanitation, while water, schools and health posts were long time under way from the perspective of the beneficiaries.

Table 4 Satisfaction with Humanitarian Food and NFI Aid

Site[82]	Cantão Pahula	Longove	Kasseque III	Sassoma	Sambo	Cuima	Kammu-samba
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban Bairro
Households Surveyed	5	10	20	10	10	20	20
Satisfied	50%	20%	5%	50%	62%	38%	93%
Not sufficient	50%	80%	95%	50%	38%	67%	7%
Arrived late		20%		30%			

Of former IDPs between 50 and 95% stated that they had not received enough food for the survival of their family. Dissatisfaction with the assistance was most marked in the former resettlement camps, where many IDPs continue to live. This coincides with the fact that WFP food rations usually contained no more than 1800 kcal pr. day[83]. Hence, families were forced to develop alternative survival strategies or cut back on daily calorie intake by reducing to one meal per day.

8.3 Survival strategies

Across the board, the most important means of survival were 1) selling firewood or producing/selling charcoal, 2) occasional labour (*biscatos*) in services or agriculture, paid in money or kind, 3) engaging in informal trade, 4) renting or borrowing minimal plots of land around the town or resettlement camps, or alternatively taking the risk of cultivating land back home, and, of course, 5) "harvesting aid" by registering in various camps or beating the system in other ways[84]. Usually, strategies entailed a combination of these forms.

The main distinguishing factor for a family's ability to survive was the access to wider family networks in the town. Family networks gave easier access to accommodation, borrowed land and occasional labour, and distinguished the poorest IDPs, who mainly lived in the camps, from the slightly better off IDPs who settled in the *bairros*. The survey and interviews also suggest

[81] In Chipipa in Huambo, OCHA found that people were eating grass and larvae to survive. OCHA 2000.
[82] The figures *only* cover those people who actually received aid. For example in Cantão Pahula there were 4 out of 5 households that received aid.
[83] For camps with no access to land or other livelihood options, rations were increased to 2100 kcal/day. OCHA 2000
[84] This coincides with the complaints over inadequate and differing registration systems. See OCHA 2000

that people who came to town with a diverse work experience were better off than people who had worked in agriculture only.

Finally, older people without family and female headed households with small children were among the most vulnerable, while skilled workers had an advantage over most others. Urban residents who used to have permanent jobs had severe problems as most enterprises and institutions closed during the war.

8.4 Return decisions

At wars' end, IDPs are usually expected to return home. In the case of Huambo, the government encouraged IDPs to go back to their villages before the first harvest. As a disincentive to stay, food distribution was cut off. The issue was debated among humanitarian agencies who argued that conditions were not in place for return.

The survey of the evaluation team suggests that return was the preferred option for those who returned as well as those who stayed. The decision to return was motivated equally by the desire to go back and repossess the land and thereby gain "freedom", and by being cut-off from food aid. The availability of aid in the return areas was not an incentive for those who returned during the first season.

In three resettlement camps visited, an estimated 8%, 18%, and 51% of the families had decided to stay despite food aid being cut-off. In the urban bairro 10% of the IDPs stayed.

Returning and rebuilding home and rural livelihoods takes a lot of resources and strength and it seems that the families who stayed in the resettlement camps were the most vulnerable and poorest who could not mobilize the necessary resources or enthusiasm. A few stated fear of return as UNITA supporters as motive for staying. Those who stayed in urban bairros on the other hand, were people with diverse skills, strength, and better than average education, while older agriculturalists preferred to return.

Interviews as well as experience from elsewhere suggest that many families have opted for the "both-and", or the "back-and-forth" solution. Families have split up, sending some members to the village to repossess and cultivate family land, while the rest stays in the town where the children have better access to schools and the family can benefit from trade or skills. The SDC/SHA bridges have contributed to this being an option.

8.5 Return and rehabilitation

According to interviews and the survey, 20 - 60% of the population in the return communities received food packages and sometimes also seed and tools at some point after return, but most of them did so after the first planting season. Hence many had to procure seeds themselves for the first planting season. As before, when the displaced reached the towns, the most important resource for survival has not been aid but family relations that give access to land, loans, etcetera. The result of the survey coincides with WFP's vulnerability mapping from the area which shows that less than half of the returning households had received food aid (as of 2005) while between 1/6 and 1/3 had received agricultural inputs.

Access to land is key to survival in the return areas, but surprisingly land has not been an issue of conflict, even though the return of large landowners in the wake of the war threatens to spark off land conflicts[85]. The following table lists how many in the sample have access to land, and how many own their land.

Table 5 Land Ownership and Agricultural Production

Site	Cantão Pahula	Longove	Kasseque III	Sassoma	Sambo	Cuima	Kammu-samba
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban Bairro
Agriculture total:	100%	70%	75%	90%	100%	95%	70%
Own land [86]	80%	40%	10%	80%	88%	85%	75%

The table shows that most families, even those who live in the towns, have access to and cultivate land, but that few people in the former resettlement camps have their own land. However, access to land may be enough for pure survival, but cannot provide cash, and much less a surplus for accumulating assets. Even though, as table 5 shows, most people engage in agricultural production, table 6 shows that only 0-20% sell produce in the market.

[85] See Parsons, Festo and Carvalho 2005

[86] Own land does not necessarily mean that people have formal papers/titles on the land. This was not the case in any of the households surveyed.

Table 6 Diversification of Household Economies

Site	Cantão Pahula	Longove	Kasseque III	Sassoma	Sambo	Cuima	Kammu-samba
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban Bairro
Households Surveyed	5	10	20	10	10	20	20
Only Subsistence agriculture	60%	0%	20%	50%	75%	25%	15%
Agriculture and selling of produce			5%	10%		20%	20%
Subsist. agricult. mixed w. non-agricultural activities.	40%	70%	50%	30%	12,5%	40%	25%
Only "Biscatos"	0%	10%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%
"Biscatos" mixed with other activities	40%	80%	45%	10%	12,5%	10%	20%
Only permanent job	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Permanent job mixed with other activities	0%	0%	10%	0%	0%	20%	45%
Only informal trade	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%
Informal Trade mixed with other activities	0%	10%	40%	0%	12.5%	25%	45%

Hence, in order to get hold of cash, households have to mix different sources of income, including day labour (*biscatos*), informal trade, and other activities. The most frequent way of getting access to cash is by producing and selling charcoal. Thus, in this sense, the situation is not that different from the time when people had to survive as IDPs.

In general, the nutritional and economic situation in the rural areas has stabilized at a low level compared to the pre-war situation. According to the WFP vulnerability mapping of 2005, more than 45% of the surveyed households in the rural areas were having only one meal per day and were categorized as food insecure or highly vulnerable[87]. Of the populations surveyed by the evaluation team, people in the urban *bairro* are better off than the rest, while the poorest are the ones who stayed back in the resettlement camps. Today, these camps constitute pockets of poverty because it was the poorest and weakest (in terms of able household members) that could not move back to their villages.

The recent investment in primary education is evidenced in the survey by the fact that between 70 and 100% of the kids attends school (1st to 4th grade) with an equal gender balance, while only a minority attends higher grades with one resettlement camp (Kasseque III) with a secondary school as the exception. There are still higher percentages of adults who have attended secondary school, suggesting that the level of education is still far from reaching the pre-war levels of secondary education. However, adult literacy rates are below 50%, predominantly constituted by males.

[87] See WFP/VAM 2005, p.30

In the countryside, the depletion of assets caused by the war has not been offset during the first three-four harvests after peace broke out. Accumulation is difficult and limited to a minority of traders, skilled workers and permanently employed. Several commented that the latter option was limited by their lack of ID cards. For the majority working in agriculture, accumulation is mainly constrained by the means to cultivate the land, rather than access to land as such. As a former displaced from Hungulo said: "The government has begun to build a school. It is good, but a school doesn't bring us any food. We were not asked – if we were asked, fertiliser, seeds and cows would have been our priority".

This is confirmed by an analysis of ex-combatants in Huambo province that shows that although many have access to 2 ha of land, which is necessary for the sustenance of a family, they can only cultivate 0.75 ha without access to drought animals, fertilizer or irrigation[88]. Several interviewees commented that their present life was not that much different from their time as IDPs, such as the woman quoted below.

"Today life is hard and it is difficult to sustain a livelihood after the end of help in 2004. We have our own piece of land for cultivation, but the land does not yield enough to sustain the family. It needs fertilizers which is too expensive. My husband participated in the ADRA-A micro credit (agricultural) programme, and we received seeds and equipment. But it did not last, because the production did not yield enough to repay the credit. Today we have less food to sustain the family than during the last period of food from Red Cross. There has been no other assistance since ADRA-A's programme, except food for the children in the school. This helps a lot, as does the health post (built by SDC and ADRA-A). But school and health post do not solve the problems of livelihood. To sustain the family we must engage in small *biscatos* like working on other people's fields in the harvest season. My husband has also made charcoal in an area very far away and sold this in Caála. Life is unstable, because there are no real jobs to get. Some days we only eat one meal." (Maria, Cantão Pahula. Resident in rural village and former IDP resettlement area)

8.6 Impact on authority structures

At community level, the figure of the *soba* has generally retained importance as a focal point for communication and decision-making. The soba was generally accompanying the displaced communities and were used by relief agencies as representative and mobilizer of the population. However, the concentration in camps and the aid-system seems to have modified and modernized the institution of the *soba*. Interviews revealed that *sobas* in the resettlement camps were elected rather than defined by lineage as in the rural areas, and there is a sense that *sobas* sympathetic to the MPLA have been preferred as linkages between government and population rather than those who were identified with UNITA.

Associational life in the communities is dominated by the Churches, while other forms of civil society remain limited to parent associations/school committees, water committees and in some cases health committees. In general, the humanitarian aid – and in particular the support for extension of infrastructure in terms of health, education, water and transport - has contributed to the extension of state institutions and increased expectations to the state as a provider of social services and hence as a guarantee of some kind of citizenship. Local administrations are still very weak, but decentralization is likely to strengthen them in the future.

[88] Parsons, Festo and Carvalho 2005

At the formal political level, UNITA has not been entirely erased from their former strongholds. The movement is visibly present as a party in only two of the surveyed communities where it functions as a kind of parallel leadership without major political influence. While politically motivated conflicts are currently invisible in the communities, they may well be subdued rather than solved as the war rapidly has become an issue of the past[89].

8.7 Impact indicators

The survey and interviews point to the importance of recognizing that the capacity of the population to generate livelihood strategies has been as important to their survival as the different forms of aid channelled through the humanitarian system. This suggests that one of the most important indicators of impact is the way in which aid influences the capacity of the beneficiary population to generate livelihood strategies and reduce vulnerability[90]. Lack of baseline information on assets, human capital and market relations remains a problem, but the approach opens up for more participatory assessments of the impact of aid. In the case at hand we can conclude that the overall impact of aid has not been negative in the sense of destroying livelihoods or increasing the vulnerability, but on the other hand aid has been marginal in assisting the regeneration of assets and reduction of vulnerability and thus to offset the effects of the war on rural livelihoods. SDC/SHA has specifically contributed to urban livelihoods through employment and support for enterprises in Huambo, but the impact has been dwarfed by the general economic development in this provincial capital.

Related to the use of livelihoods as an indicator of impact is the way in which aid has affected population movement as well as the balance between rural and urban areas. The bridge and road construction has contributed to enabling movement (and thereby to trade, work-related migration and double residence), but there is little evidence that aid has worked as a pull factor in generating rural-urban migration. On the other hand, the strong concentration of construction of schools, water-points and health posts in the urban and peri-urban areas of Huambo during and after the war has contributed to the increased attractiveness of urban areas relative to rural areas. However, the overall economic dynamics and the skewed price structures of the oil-driven economy have worked in the same direction that has resulted in a reversal of the pre-war situation when rural areas were wealthier than urban areas.

[89] For evaluation of SFCG projects and discussion of indicators, see http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/evaluations/angola.html

[90] See also de Waal in Hofmann et al 2004, p.22

9 Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

In view of the vast range of activities financed under SDC's programme and the changing modalities in different phases, it is not an easy task to sum up the conclusions of the evaluation. More nuanced and specific assessments are found in the previous chapters and in the case study report on SDC's aid in Huambo province. The evaluation has dealt with the coverage, relevance and appropriateness, coherence and coordination, effectiveness and efficiency, connectedness and sustainability, and outcome and impact of SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola 1995-2006. The conclusions here are structured according to these criteria.

9.2 Coverage

In a sense SDC's humanitarian aid in Angola was a drop in the sea of misery. But together with aid from other donors and humanitarian agencies, SDC's aid provided much needed assistance to thousands of victims of the civil war. Around half of the money spent was channelled through the big humanitarian agencies, particularly WFP, ICRC and UNHCR. This contributed to cover the immediate needs of large numbers of war victims, notably IDPs. There was a special emphasis on assisting IDPs in the emergency phase, but SDC took a pragmatic approach and also covered other, permanently settled, vulnerable people. Except in the most critical emergency phase, all had to supplement whatever relief they got with other means of subsistence. This reduced the risk of creating aid dependency, and after the civil war ended, the majority soon returned to their places of origin and were to a great extent left to fend for themselves.

There were considerable gaps time-wise as well as regionally. In the initial phase SDC tried to include UNITA controlled territory in Huambo province in the directly implemented programme. This, however, proved to be impossible, and as a consequence almost all activities in Huambo province were carried out in government (MPLA) controlled areas or on the perimeters of the "safe" zones. It was unfortunate but most likely unavoidable. In the wake of the war, the Eastern provinces have received much less assistance than the Altiplano. Time-wise, in the first stages of displacement as well as return, IDPs were largely left to fend for themselves.

9.3 Relevance and appropriateness

In the context of huge needs and limited aid resources, SDC's humanitarian aid was generally relevant and often appropriate. The programme's special emphasis on construction of infrastructure in Huambo province gave SDC a special niche role among the humanitarian agencies, and this was appreciated by other agencies as well as by the GoA. If SDC's activities are assessed on their own, it may be questioned whether there was the right balance between "hard" and "soft" interventions. Almost all SDC staff (apart from those in administration) were engineers and technicians. The approach was very technical and "hands on", and this did produce significant results, e.g. in the form of a few bridges and numerous schools, health posts and water pumps. Cross-cutting issues such as gender and environment were not really

addressed, although gender was explicitly introduced as such in the last phase strategy. Capacity building was limited, and so were efforts to create or support institutions around the physical infrastructure. The important NGO partner Development Workshop, however, did precisely that – with SDC funding.

Viewed over the different phases, the programme had many twists and turns, in fact quite a zig-zag course. This was partly in response to the changes in the context, primarily brought about by the civil war and its aftermath. SDC was praised by many for its flexibility and ability to adjust to the changing circumstances. But the zig-zag course also reflects an approach characterized by trial and error as well as the shifting priorities of the SDC mission heads in Luanda.

It is surprising that very little was done to support returning IDPs after the war ended. A bigger effort here – by SDC and the major humanitarian agencies – could have been very relevant and much needed.

Most of the rather diverse activities in the health sector were highly relevant, but both scattered and somewhat *ad hoc.* A more focused and strategic approach would probably have made the activities more appropriate and effective. The support for peace building and reconciliation was both relevant and appropriate, and the concrete activities were worthwhile but short-term.

9.4 Coherence and coordination

The Swiss engagement in Angola has overall been characterized by a satisfactory level of coherence and even of synergy between the programmes of different entities, in particular SDC and Political Division IV in terms of peace building. However, the evaluation team has come across two incoherencies: One is the fact that a Swiss embassy was closed at the time SDC started its operation, a fact which reduces the potential political impact of a technical programme considerably. The other is the massive donations of Swiss milk products which goes against the grain of general Swiss standards for food aid.

The UN has for practical purposes taken care of coordination of the multiple aid agents in Angola since the formally responsible Angolan entity has been very weak and limited to formal exchanges of information on plans. This changed somewhat with OCHAs decentralization of coordination to the provincial level, where the coordination with GoA was much more smooth and oriented towards problem-solving. Again, however, the return of IDPs, ex-combatants and refugees represented a challenge which the coordination of humanitarian community could not manage. The role of SDC has mostly been within the technical, operational, and policy-coordination rather than the coordination of political initiatives.

9.5 Effectiveness and efficiency

The fact that SDC financed a vast range of very different activities reduced the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of the programme. In humanitarian aid generally there is little time for strategic planning and preparation or for follow-up activities, but even so a stronger effort to analyse the context (especially in Huambo) could have contributed to better results. SDC's aid was characterized by *ad hoc* decisions as well as many twists and turns. In the first phases the programme concentrated on physical road and bridge infrastructure, but later this was

completely given up. It was notably not resumed after the civil war ended. Concomitantly, the programme shifted from a strong emphasis on direct implementation to working primarily through a large number of partners. Where the resources initially were used focused on physical infrastructure, they were later spread thin.

The ambitious "Bridges for Peace" programme accomplished only a fraction of its goals, the rehabilitation of a few stretches of road and construction of 3 UNIDO type bridges. While the main reason for this was the resumption of the civil war, clearly the approach adopted contributed to the meagre outcome. The approach involved a heavy investment – both in machinery, local staff and expatriate staff. The UNIDO bridge type was complicated to manufacture locally under the existing conditions, and technical problems, lacking capacity, weak management (of the MUBELA factory) and delays resulted in a huge discrepancy between the resources used and the results. The whole programme was far from being effective or efficient. A simpler choice of technology (similar to the two small bridges that were constructed) could have multiplied the number of bridges constructed at a fraction of the cost. A less machine-intensive approach to road rehabilitation could also have produced better results (larger coverage). The approach chosen could have been justified, if a long period of relative peace could be envisaged with a degree of certainty. But SDC was well aware that there was a risk of resumption of war, and that the heavy investment might be more or less lost.

Other construction activities, notably the schools, the health posts and the water pumps, were both effective (functionally) and efficient (in terms of the relation between costs and benefits). They served their purpose in the emergency phase and they remain functioning today.

The direct implementation contributed to the relatively large part of the expenditure used for administration and programme coordination (17%). Around 2000 there was a change in management, and the direct implementation was replaced by working in collaboration with and through partners. It would probably have been more effective and efficient to work in this way from the outset. However, the strong physical and human presence of SDC in Huambo was appreciated by other agencies as long as it lasted.

Among the NGO partners whose SDC funded programmes have been assessed, it appears that the preferred partner Development Workshop has demonstrated a relatively strong performance – both in the water & sanitation programme, in its school programme and in its peace building programme. Generally DW has been effective in accomplishing the programmes' objectives, but the generous SDC funding has also been very important for building its capacity, not least in Huambo.

Operating in areas of fragile statehood and armed conflict increases the operational challenges, the costs, and the unpredictability considerably. These facts must be factored in when considering the effectiveness of a humanitarian programme, but the risks and problems also have to be assessed and monitored accurately and continuously, which the programme in some cases failed to do.

9.6 Connectedness and sustainability

Despite its limited mandate as a humanitarian programme, SDC Angola has in many ways transcended the traditional short-sightedness of emergency operations. SDC's funding horizons for multilateral agencies and international NGOs have often been longer than the typical 6-12 months, and the emergency constructions in Huambo have had a considerable afterlife beyond the end of the emergency. It may not always be the outcome of an elaborate plan or strategy, but the quality of constructions, the pervasive needs for health, education, water, roads and bridges, and the fact that the GoA in Huambo, sooner or later, has taken over the responsibility, means that most of SDCs constructions still serve their purpose.

Less convincing is the sustainability of the "software", the community based organizations, local NGOs, and micro-enterprises involved in SDC's direct operation. Some of them have managed to survive the collective exit of donors and international NGOs after the emergency and have engaged in new projects with alternative customers or sources of funding. But considering the large interface SDC has had with local organizations and communities through its projects, the agency has missed an opportunity to achieve a higher impact by not giving the organizational side of its partnerships earlier, more focussed, and more sustained attention.

Most of SDCs multilateral and international NGO partners have managed concepts of connectedness and sustainability that aimed at handing over activities and assets to the GoA, or, in fewer cases, to CBOs and civil society organizations. Despite of a long-lasting, troubled relationship with the GoA, and despite gaps caused by the lack of human and economic resources of governmental entities, the hand-over has been surprisingly succesful, but (lack of) trust has been a key issue in the process of hand-over.

On the whole, SDC could have been better at addressing the transition from emergency humanitarian aid to rehabilitation and development with a longer perspective. The strategy of the last phase of the programme in principle had that aim, but this was only accomplished in a limited sense.

The late and feeble response to the return of more than 3 million IDPs to the rural areas represents the most serious problem of connectedness and sustainability in SDCs programme and in the humanitarian operation in general in Angola. This is a sign of continuing problems of reorientation from emergency to rehabilitation, but is probably also a symptom of the donors' eagerness to disengage from a long-lasting complex emergency in a country that became politically incorrect in the context of larger geopolitical changes.

9.7 Outcome and impact

The outcome and impact of SDC's humanitarian aid over the period 1995-2006 is found at different levels. There is no doubt that SDC's aid has provided relief covering basic needs for thousands of war victims, primarily through the funding of other agencies' programmes, notably WFP, ICRC and UNHCR. In the emergency phase SDC played an important role in setting up and servicing the camps for IDPs in and around Huambo and Caála. The interviews with former beneficiaries of these activities have brought to light their appreciation of the effort but also their view that the emergency aid was insufficient and sometimes came too late. Some of the IDPs remain in resettlement camps where they live under appalling conditions with limited access to

land and other means of sustenance. However, SDC funded schools, health posts and water pumps continue to provide relevant assistance to these beneficiaries, who are among the most vulnerable groups today. At a more general level it can be said that SDC's support to physical infrastructure in Huambo province has given a relatively large number of people -IDPs as well as permanently settled – continued benefits during the emergency as well as afterwards.

Another form of impact has been on the organizations funded by SDC, first of all the NGOs, both international and local. The funding in itself of course has been important for the NGOs. Moreover, some of them have received training and capacity building. But since the SDC programme has relied to a great extent on international NGOs (including Swiss NGOs), the capacity development among Angolan NGOs has been limited and confined to a short period (2000-2003). In an emergency situation it is probably justified to go for the "secure" option of channelling funds through international NGOs, but viewed over the entire period 1995-2006 more could have been done to build the capacity of Angolan NGOs.

While the unsuccessful DDR programme of the 1990s is a good example of an intervention that did harm by indirectly contributing to the return of the war, the evaluation team has not identified serious cases of harm done due to SDC's direct operation. However, it is the impression that the use of stakeholder- and potential conflict impact analysis has been very limited in SDCs planning and programming, which is particularly problematic for agencies operating under conditions of complex political emergencies.

Inadvertently, SDC's programme in Huambo strengthened one part in the conflict, GoA/MPLA, in spite of good intentions and attempts to target aid to UNITA controlled territory. Thus it is only the population in the GoA controlled areas who enjoyed the benefits of the programme (except in the last phase). There are indications that those who lived in UNITA territory suffered more but they were out of reach. It can be argued that SDC initially had a rather unrealistic view of the possibilities of linking the two arch enemies with the "bridges for peace". Only after UNITA's military defeat did it become possible to target assistance to former UNITA territory, e.g. around Bailundo. This was included in the peace building and reconciliation programme. The activities under this programme at a more general level have contributed to a much needed strengthening of independent and conciliatory voices in civil society. This in itself is an important form of impact.

10 Recommendations

On the basis of the evaluation of SDC's humanitarian aid programme in Angola 1995-2006, it is recommended that SDC more generally should:

1. **Rely less on expatriate staff.** In emergency situations, it can be very difficult to find qualified local (national) staff, and hence the use of expatriates can be unavoidable. But in humanitarian aid with a longer time horizon it should be possible to recruit and maybe train local staff who can replace expatriates.

2. **Ensure a proper balance between "hard" and "soft" interventions.** In emergency situations, the relief provided in cooperation among a number of humanitarian agencies can build on the comparative advantage of each agency. But in humanitarian aid with a longer time horizon, it is important to strike a proper balance between hard and soft interventions. The "soft" parts can both reduce the risk of creating lasting aid dependency and contribute to sustainability.

3. **Aspire to procure necessary food aid locally or in the same region.** Food aid (e.g. milk products) from Switzerland can serve the dietary purpose but will often be subject to cumbersome procedures. Usually food procured nearby will be a cheaper and faster alternative – as well as supporting agricultural development in a developing country.

4. **Do No Har**m. While the fear of doing harm should not discourage donors from engaging in emergencies and their aftermath, they need to place more emphasis on context-analysis and appraisal-practices. This includes appropriate forms of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment as a standard

5. **Ensure coherence between humanitarian aid and diplomatic representation in countries of operation.** Diplomatic representation increases the possibility for having a political impact, including improved protection of vulnerable populations. In countries without representation, humanitarian aid should mainly be channelled through international organizations.

6. **Clarify objectives of humanitarian aid programmes and develop indicators of desired impact.** Impact indicators can take many different forms, but the process of developing the indicators can help clarifying objectives and consider to which extent they are realistic. However, care must be taken that hard-to-measure aspects of humanitarian aid, such as protection, are not sidelined in the process.

7. **Develop capacities and reserve resources for working with national NGOs and governmental entities**. National NGOs and state institutions often have limited capacity, but they are the ones that stay back and they are the first to respond to emergencies. Hence they need investment in terms of training and organizational development.

8. **Avoid being caught up in direct implementation of major infrastructure projects.** Because of the complexities of such projects and the contextual challenges, such projects should be left to the specialised humanitarian agencies or the government, if and when the latter has the capacity. Small infrastructure projects may be relevant and feasible, but they should then use simple, appropriate technologies and build on community involvement to the extent possible.

9. **Promote a community-based approach to humanitarian aid.** This should include consultations with intended beneficiaries about their prioritised needs as well as supporting attempts to build institutions at community level that may gradually enable people to survive and develop without aid.

10. **Continue supporting coordinating mechanisms at national as well as provincial levels.** The experience of decentralizing the coordination of humanitarian aid was very positive in Angola and should be encouraged in other emergencies.

11. **Promote an understanding and practice of the "relief-development continuum" that goes beyond the linear and the binary.** Conflict transformation, peace-building, security, and other forms of international intervention and aid are complementary to relief as well as development aid, and longer-term considerations of reduction of vulnerabilities, building peace constituencies, strengthening government structures etcetera should be incorporated in some form at an early point in all emergencies.

12. **Support attempts of international agencies at launching medium term projects for rehabilitation and recovery when sudden shifts in conditions permit the launching of such projects.** In the case of Angola it was difficult to have rehabilitation projects funded in the immediate aftermath of war when they were most urgently needed. This is a recurrent problem which calls for the attention of donors and international agencies.

13. **Support rapid response mechanisms similar to the UN Emergency Response Fund in Angola.** Such mechanisms ensure the ability of national and international organizations to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to sudden changes in the context, in particular to the difficult post-conflict transition.

14. **Advocate for the respect of the UN guidelines for IDPs but provide support in terms of needs rather than classification.** While IDPs have special protection needs which for example calls for programmes in support of issuing of ID cards, IDPs make up a very diverse group of differently endowed households. Support should be given on the basis of needs assessment rather than membership of a category of beneficiaries.

15. **Support international attempts at developing approaches to support of sudden, large scale population returns/dispersals which seem to represent a particular challenge to humanitarian operations in areas of armed conflict.** Such initiatives should focus on the coordination and linkages between security, emergency and development aid, the re-establishment of local government and the de-concentration of social services, the recognition of emerging patterns of mobility and mobile livelihoods, including "staggered returns", split households and double residence, as well as the special problems of vulnerable households unable to move without support.

Annex A – Approach paper

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
«SDC HUMANITARIAN AID IN ANGOLA 1995 – 2006»

1 Background[91]

SDC has funded and implemented a humanitarian assistance programme in Angola during 1995-2006 with a number of different programme components. The main activities focused on basic health, physical infrastructure, food security, peace-building, national reconciliation and trainings. Along with this the programme sought to achieve some skill-based capacity building initiatives. The assistance changed over the years, marked by the different phases of the civil war and its aftermath. After the civil war ended in 2002 the assistance gradually changed from relief (temporary humanitarian Assistance) to rehabilitation and early-recovery with a development perspective (longer-term development assistance).

In cooperation with other agencies (multilateral and bilateral agencies) humanitarian assistance was given in different parts of the country (Huambo, Lobito, Bailundo) to victims of the war, notably internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, throughout the programme there was a special emphasis on assisting parts of the Huambo province, where a number of projects and programmes were implemented through direct interventions in collaboration with other agencies and NGOs.

The Swiss humanitarian Aid orients itself on the basic human values and the principle of the inviolable dignity of each human being. Its foundation is the international humanitarian law and internationally recognized humanitarian principles, repeatedly appealing for these principles to be respected in cooperative efforts. It helps victims, regardless of their race, sex, language, religion, political opinion or social status. Switzerland renders neutral and impartial humanitarian aid, independently and without any political conditions.

During its presence in Angola, the Swiss humanitarian aid went roughly through four different phases, which shall be referred to in the following:

1) **Phase of Direct Implementation 1995-1998.** At the “round table conference” in Brussels, in September 1995, the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Department promised an aid programme of several years consisting in the support of the reconstruction of the country.
   The Swiss humanitarian aid was based in the first three years of its presence in Angola on the provision of:
   a. Food assistance.
   b. Reconstruction on health infrastructure.
   c. Medical basic supplies.
   d. Drinking water and sanitation.

   The direct implementation concentrated on the rehabilitation of secondary roads, on the promotion of agriculture and retail trade in the central highland of Huambo province. The objective was to replace food imports by local production. Selected damaged roads to areas formerly isolated by the war, were reopened as a contribution to the consolidation of the still fragile peace process. Due to its main component – the reconstruction of bridges – the programme was named “Bridges and Peace”. In order to cope with the humanitarian principle of neutrality, Switzerland implemented activities on both sides of the, at this time of the conflict, still clearly defined front lines.

[91] Annex A allows people to better understand the context of SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola (available on request).

2) **Phase of Emergency Assistance 1999-2000.** The 1999-2000 Programme was aligned primary to the assistance of the humanitarian crisis in the intensified conflict. Because of the recurring war situation, a continuation of the direct actions was impossible. This phase was characterised by:
    a. The continuation of the operational preparedness of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Office in Luanda until the end of 2000.
    b. The concentration of the existing capacities to support the internally displaced persons.
    c. The gradual reduction of directly implemented activities in Humabo province until the end of 1999.
    d. The number of expatriate and local staff was likewise gradually reduced.
    e. Handing-over of vehicles, machines and materials to humanitarian organizations to support their activities.
    f. The continuation of contributions in favour of the most vulnerable people.
3) **Phase of Emergency Assistance and Reconstruction 2001-2003.** Because of the volatile situation in the country some directly implemented activcities had to be abandoned. The most important action lines were:
    a. ***Emergency and survival assistance:*** i) contribution of a flexible direct implementation scheme for the most vulnerable people in Huambo province; ii) financial contributions to various partners implementing humanitarian projects.
    b. ***Rehabilitation/reconstruction:*** i) reinforcement of capacity building for local NGOs and local staff of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Offices in Angola; ii) transfer of technical know-how.
    c. ***Peace promotion:*** initiation of financial contributions to grass roots projects to strengthen civil society.
4) **Phase of Transitional Humanitarian Rehabilitation 2004-2006.** Between 2004-2006, the main objectives of the Swiss implementation consisted in contributions to the improvement of the living conditions of the most vulnerable groups in the country. In line with the 2004-2006 strategy, the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Office in Luanda co-financed projects in the sectors of:
    a. Basic health.
    b. Food security.
    c. National reconciliation.

    The contributions focussed on transitional humanitarian rehabilitation projects implemented by local and international partner organisations. Besides cross cutting issues like advocacy and empowerment, most of these projects contained elements for longer term recovery and development.

The overall budget of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Department implemented in Angola from 1995 to 2006 exceeded 60 million USD.

More information on the SDC Humanitarian Aid activities are available in the Annex 1[92] (*"Milestones of Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Government in Angola"*)

[92] Available on request

2 Why an Evaluation and Why Now? – Rationale

After the long-standing preoccupation of SDC with Humanitarian Aid issues, there are several reasons to call for an examination of SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola:

- Have an evaluation after 10 years and at the end of the SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola.
- The respect of the Switzerland's political tradition of accountability.
- Have a first independent evaluation of a Swiss Humanitarian Aid programme.
- An interest to learn more about the continuum/contiguum process.
- A need of draw lessons from the evaluation, particularly for SDC Humanitarian Aid Department and for COPRET.

3 Purpose, Focus and Objectives

3.1 Purpose

The main purpose of this evaluation is to investigate the relevance, effectiveness and impact of SDC Humanitarian Aid measures in Angola (**accountability aspect of the evaluation**).

The evaluation is expected to provide findings, conclusions and recommendations on how to improve humanitarian aid measures and particularly the continuum/contiguum process, as well as strengthening the knowledge of the effects/impacts of ten years of Humanitarian Aid on beneficiaries (internally displaced persons, institutions - like NGOs, Hospitals, schools - staff, government and UNITA) (**learning aspect of the evaluation**).

3.2 Focus and Scope

The primary focus of this evaluation is the analysis of 10 years of SDC Humanitarian Aid measures in Angola. The evaluation includes the different results of projects, programmes undertaken by SDC, with other multilateral (like WFP, UNHCR, UNDP, FAO, ICRC, UNICEF; IOM) or bilateral partners (Swiss and not Swiss NGOs), and financed by SDC's funds.

Humanitarian Aid in Angola is understood as comprising all the activities coordinated by the SDC country office in Angola as well as multilateral activities (WFP, UNHCR, UNDP, FAO, ICRC, UNICEF; IOM) undertaken together with other donors or activities planned and implemented by other NGOs (Swiss and not Swiss NGOs).

The evaluation will focus at the level of beneficiaries (internally displaced persons, institutions - like NGOs, hospitals, schools - staff, government and UNITA) at the national and local context in Angola.

The evaluation will focus on the activities (emphasizing the products) of the Humanitarian Aid Department and probably will consider the role of the thematic support given by COPRET.

Other departments of the Federal Administration, like Division IV (Human Security) are also, but to a lesser degree, involved in activities in Angola (the contribution of the Political Directorate IV will not be evaluated).



3.3 Objectives

The objectives of this independent evaluation are:

- To analyze particularly the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and impact of SDC Humanitarian Aid approaches, projects and programmes in Angola on the population and on the political context.
- To analyze the capacity of SDC to identify, analyze and react upon changing contexts in strategic ways.
- To identify strengths (+ comparative advantage) and weaknesses of SDC Humanitarian Aid programme provided by SDC Humanitarian Division in Angola
- To formulate general recommendations for improving SDC's performance in Humanitarian Aid and particularly in the context of continuum/contiguum approach (relation of the management - conciliation and correlation - of SDC Humanitarian Aid objectives during the transition between humanitarian aid activities and early-recovery with a development perspective. It is necessary to focus on impact on peace building activities).

4 Key Questions

The key questions should contribute to responding to the central issue for SDC:
What has been the results (outputs, outcomes, impacts) on the population and on the political context of ten years of Swiss HA activities in Angola and how can future interventions be improved in cases like Angola, of transition from an emergency situation to a development cooperation context?

The evaluation will be structured around a set of *criteria*[93], mentioned below, which is relevant for the evaluation of humanitarian aid and its linkages to rehabilitation, peace-building and development aid objectives.

During the analysis the consulting team has to keep in mind the difference between the 4 different phases of SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola and between the different implementation modes. SDC is interested, where it is relevant, to differentiate the answers according to the phases. SDC is also interested, where it is relevant, to differentiate the answers according to the ways of implementing SDC programmes (programmes undertaken by SDC, alone or with other multilateral or bilateral partners, or programmes, financed by SDC's funds, undertaken by multilateral or bilateral partners).

4.1 Coverage

Coverage looks into the degree to which needs have been covered for different groups, segments of population and regions by SDC as part of the encompassing humanitarian operation, and how levels in Angola compare to other complex emergencies.

Sub-questions:
(1) What level and form of basic needs were covered for whom by humanitarian and rehabilitation aid? (2)
(2) Were there significant gaps? (3)
(3) To which degree beneficiaries depended entirely on provided inputs? (4)
(4) Have the aid-distribution criteria conflicted with local perceptions of need or have created others conflicts (Do No Harm principles) due to perceived injustice in distribution and allocation of aid or have excluded segments of population (problems of access or miscalculation)? (1)

4.2 Relevance/Appropriateness

Relevance and appropriateness determines if aid was useful to the beneficiaries and relevant institutions, which to some extent is indicated by their participation and ownership.

[93] The criteria have been developed by OECD/DAC on the basis of DACs standard criteria for evaluation of development aid. (OECD/DAC 1999 'Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies'. Paris: OECD).

Sub-questions:
(5) Was aid and SDC decisions relevant and appropriate in relation to local needs, priorities, standards as well as division of labour between SDC and other agencies? Why, or why not? (1)
(6) Did SDC humanitarian aid strike the right balance between “hard” and “soft” interventions? (3)
(7) Has SDC humanitarian aid contributed to enhance the overall peace-building efforts or on the contrary to enhance the level of antagonism/conflict? Why or why not? (2)
(8) To which degree and how were cross-cutting issues (gender, environment, protection/human rights, HIV/Aids) of Swiss development policies taken into regard in the humanitarian programme? (3)

4.3 Connectedness and sustainability

Connectedness deals with what happens when humanitarian agencies working in difficult contexts stop providing aid and *sustainability* relates to the long term perspectives of rehabilitation and development aid,.

Sub-questions:
(9) How were the transition from humanitarian aid to more development-oriented assistance taken into account? (1)
(10) Have partner-organizations and institutions been able to continue operation with alternative sources of funding and/or alternative areas of work? (1)
(11) Did the apparently strained relations between the programme and the Angolan authorities have consequences in terms of the sustainability of investments in health, education and physical infrastructure? (1)
(12) How SDC were connected with others donors (Paris Declaration) or Swiss actors?

4.4 Coherence and coordination

Coherence deals with the level of policies and the way in which different forms of aid, diplomacy actions relate to each other, "internally" in regard to Swiss engagement in Angola and cross-cutting issues of SDC policies, and "externally" in regard to the overall international response to the civil war in Angola. Similarly, *coordination* refers to relations at the operational level.

Sub-questions:
(13) Were there signs of incoherence at policy levels?
(14) How did mechanisms of coordination work at local and national level (formalized division of labour, exchanges of approaches?

4.5 Effectiveness

The *effectiveness* of the SDC programme is determined by the degree to which goals and objectives have been fulfilled,

Sub-questions:
(15) Were the output goals and objectives of the programme met (considering the time too) and if not, why? (2)
(16) Were the approaches (like in peace building activities) used in the programme effective? (2)
(17) Did the change in management around 2000 – with more emphasis on binding partnerships, ownership and capacity building – improve the effectiveness of the programme, and should/could it have been carried out earlier? (1)
(18) Would a different assessment of context and conditions have improved the effectiveness? Is there a lack of experience and preparation (like context analysis) on behalf of SDC? (2)

4.6 Efficiency

The *efficiency* refers to the management of the programme as well as the relation between costs and results. The evaluation will take into account whether SDC had control or not over events and factors that have jeopardized the efficiency of the programme, but will also consider if mechanisms that mitigate the effects of such events and factors were in place.

Sub-questions:
(19) Was the programme cost-effective? (2)
(20) What were the financial and other implications of SDC's decision to implement part of the programme itself instead of funding multilateral, governmental and non-governmental agencies? (1)
(21) Would additional strategic inputs or complementary projects have increased the benefits and efficiency of investments (like MUBELA, bridge- and road- rehabilitation/construction)? (1)

4.7 Outcome and Impact

Impact (positive and negative) refers to the overall effects of the program in the regions of operation, for beneficiaries as well as non-beneficiaries at household, community, policies, institutional, regional and national level.

Sub-questions:
(22) What were the socio-economic impacts at household and community levels (in terms of production, household income, trade, urbanization, as well as social, economic, and gender inequality)? (1)
(23) What were the impacts at regional level (like in the region of Huambo and between regions)? (2)
(24) What were the effects/impacts of the changes in the approaches of the different phases? (1)
(25) What may have been the effects of the aid programmes in terms of the legitimacy of GoA in an area which was a stronghold of UNITA for prolonged periods? (1)

(26) Have the SDC programme had a lasting effect on the capacities and initiative of private, public and non-governmental institutions (particularly in health and education) in the target area? (1)
(27) What were the peace and conflicts impacts? What have been the effects on local power relations and forms of collaboration in communities that have participated in SDC projects? (2)

5 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions of the independent evaluation:
- What are the recommendations for increasing the relevance, the effectiveness and the connectedness/sustainability of SDC's HA particularly in continuum/contiguum approaches?
- What are the recommendations for increasing the positive effect/impact and reduce the negative ones in a context of HA?
- What are additional findings or recommendations, for example regarding collaboration between SDC thematic support system (like COPRET), etc.?

6 Expected Results

6.1 At Output Level

By the consulting team:
- A fit to print evaluation report containing findings, conclusions and recommendations not exceeding 30 pages plus annexes and including an executive summary.
- A summary according to DAC-Standards not exceeding 2 pages produced by the evaluation team and edited by SDC Division E+C.
- The case study report.

By SDC:
- An agreement at Completion Point including the response of the CLP to the recommendations and, if essential, to the conclusions of the evaluation.
- Lessons drawn by the CLP
- Dissemination of lessons learned (like to DAC).

6.2 At Outcome Level

The independent evaluation "Ten Years of SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola" is expected to contribute:
- To the analysis on the Swiss Humanitarian Assistance to population at risk support.
- To the analysis of impacts of the Swiss Humanitarian Assistance.
- To the sharpening of SDC's understanding of Humanitarian Aid in continuum/contiguum context.

- To improve planning and implementation of new Humanitarian Aid measures everywhere.
- To the knowledge on SDC humanitarian support in general and for the topic humanitarian Aid in Angola in particular.
- To better position and focus humanitarian Aid support within SDC's portfolio.
- To increase coordination and coherence with others Swiss actors in place (exchange of lessons learned).

7 Partners

7.1 Organisational Set-up and Respective Roles

The **Core Learning Partnership (CLP)** ensures that the consultants have access to all necessary information (documents, interviews). The CLP comments on the evaluation design and the draft evaluation report. During the Completion Point Workshop, the CLP discusses the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations and negotiates and approves the Agreement at Completion Point (ACP) and the Lessons Learned. It decides who should be targeted for dissemination.

Department-level Management and the **Director General** of SDC comment in COSTRA on the Agreement at Completion Point.

Consultants contracted by SDC's E+C Division elaborate an evaluation work plan and methodology and an Inception Report, carry out the evaluation according to international evaluation standards, conduct debriefings with stakeholders as appropriate, present a draft of their Evaluators' Final Report to the CLP, follow up on the CLP's feedback as appropriate and submit the Evaluators' Final Report in publishable quality as well as an Evaluation Abstract according to DAC specifications. The evaluation team leader attends the ACP meeting in Switzerland as a resource person.

Division, E+C, SDC, commissions the independent evaluation, drafts the Approach Paper, drafts and administers the contracts with the evaluators, organizes remarks on the Inception Report, ensures that the evaluators receive appropriate logistical support and access to information and organizes the overall process with respect to i) discussion of evaluation results, ii) elaboration of the Agreement at Completion Point and Lessons Learned, iii) publication and iv) dissemination (contact: Valérie Rossi).

7.2 Core Learning Partnership (CLP)

The Core Learning Partnership will consist of the following members:

- SDC Department Humanitarian Aid
  H-Controller: Yves Mauron (1)
  H-Africa : Martin Jaggi et Thomas Frey (2)
  H-Asia America: Peter Steffen (1)
  Multi-H: Giacomo Solari (1)
- SDC Department Thematic and Technical Resources
  Division Conflict Prevention and Transformation (COPRET): Cristina Hoyos (1)
- SDC Department Bilateral Development Cooperation
  Division Eastern and Southern Africa: Max Streit (1)
- DP IV: Menschliche Sicherheit
  Henriette Eppenberger (1)

Valérie Rossi (E+C Division) will facilitate and coordinate de CLP.

8 Process

8.1 Methodology and Approach

The evaluation will employ the usual methods such as review of relevant literature and evaluation report about Humanitarian Aid and Angola, review of relevant SDC documents, interviews with staff at SDC headquarter and other NGOs involved in Angola previous activities, case study particularly in Huambo, analysis of data and report writing.

Care needs to be taken that the methods and approach chosen effectively capture the **results dimension (outputs, outcomes, impacts)** at the level of the **beneficiaries**.

The main steps of the evaluation are depicted in the graph “Sequence and Responsibilities” and in the table “Main Steps” (see below). The design of the evaluation is planned as an **iterative process**. Both key questions and methods presented in this paper and developed by the selected evaluation team in an approach paper, are to be adapted in close collaboration with the Core Learning Partnership (CLP).

The main inputs for the evaluation design are (see graph below):

- Approach Paper
- SDC Humanitarian Aid programmes and projects Documents.
- First Meeting of the CLP.
- Interviews in Switzerland.
- Inception Report
- Feedback of the Inception Report

Based on these inputs the evaluation team is expected:

- To finalize the evaluation design
- To finalize the ToR for the local evaluators.

- Sequence and responsibilities (for explanatory remarks see chapter 8.2.)



8.2 Main steps – Schedule

Activity	Date	Responsible
Evaluation Program approved by COSTRA	Sept. 2006	
Analyse of the first evaluation proposal and first feedback	February 2007	E+C (= SDC Evaluation + Controlling)
Constitution of the CLP	March	E+C
Analyse on the second evaluation proposal	March	E+C
Contracts signed with evaluators	March	E+C
1st CLP Meeting**:** presentation of the evaluation methodology (by the consultant) and CLP's input on the approach paper	May	CLP / E+C
Finalization of the approach paper	May	E+C
Documentary studies	May	DIIS
Inception Report	May/June	DIIS
SDC comments on Inception Report	June	E+C
Incorporation of SDC comments	June	DIIS
Qualitative interviews with stakeholders and former programme staff (expatriate and Angolan)	June	DIIS
Logistic and administrative preparation of the evaluation mission	June/July	E+C /DIIS
Case Study in Luanda and (mainly) Huambo	August-Sept.	DIIS
End of mission workshop in Luanda	End of Sept.	DIIS / E+C
Data analysis and writing draft report	October-Nov.	DIIS
2nd CLP Meeting: Discussion of Draft Report	December	CLP / E+C
Final Report, incorporation of final comments	January 2008	DIIS
3rd CLP Meeting: Discussion of Findings and Recommendations; Agreement at Completion Point	February	CLP / E+C
COSTRA	March	E+C
Publication	March	E+C

DIIS: Danish Institute for International Studies

8.3 Evaluation Team

The **evaluation team** is to consist of at least two international evaluators and two national evaluators for the case study. The team should comprise both genders. The evaluators are expected to have the following evaluation and subject matter expertise and regional experience:

- Up-to-date knowledge on Humanitarian Aid.
- Strong analytical and editorial skills and ability to synthesize.
- Professional evaluation experience, particularly on impact level.

The international evaluators are expected to have

- Field experience in Africa.
- Ability to work well in English and Portuguese
- Ability in steering complex processes in post-conflict context involving beneficiaries.

The case study evaluators are expected to have:

- Willingness to contribute to a team effort and to cooperate with the international team leaders.
- Field experience in their country.
- Not to be close associates of SDC.

Based on these criteria the **Danish Institute for International Studies** (DIIS), Denmark, were selected as international evaluators.

9 Reference Documents

9.1 SDC and Related

A documentation list will be prepared by E+C and HH.

9.2 Other Publications

The evaluation team will consider other publications relevant for the evaluation.

9.3 Resource Persons

A list of resource persons will be prepared by E+C and HH including backstopping institutions, consulting services, partners and researchers engaged in SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola and/or in the topic of Humanitarian Aid.

Annex B – Evaluation Team

Danish team members:
Lars Buur, Senior Researcher, Ph. D., DIIS
Steen Folke, Senior Researcher, DIIS, Team Leader
Helene Maria Kyed, Researcher, Ph. D. candidate, DIIS
Finn Stepputat, Senior Researcher, Ph. D., DIIS

Angolan team members:
Paulo Inglês, Consultant, M.A.
Jacinto Pio Wacussanga, Consultant, M.A.

Angolan field assistants:
Inocêncio Mutombo, Student, Agostiño Neto University, Huambo
Victorino Salopa, Student, Agostiño Neto University, Huambo
Otilio Miguel Samarsele, Student, Agostiño Neto University, Huambo

Angolan Engineer:
Manuel Alberto Isabel, Civil Engineer, Provincial Government, Huambo

Swiss resource person:
Arnold Furrer, Engineer, SDC Programme- and Project-leader in Angola 1996-2005 (Now WFP)

Annex C – SDC humanitarian aid to Angola 1995-2006: Budget and expenditure

70-06374	LOGISTIKER FUER IOM ANGOLA	Logistics	01.10.1995	31.12.1995	C	IOM	64'038	65'000
70-06375	LOGISTIKER FUER IOM ANGOLA	Logistics	31.10.1995	31.01.1996	C	IOM	34'035	65'000
70-06078	LOGISTIKER MATERIALBUDGET FOR UTCAH ANGOLA	Logistics	01.11.1996	31.12.1996	C	UTCAH	417'872	420'000
70-06087	NOTHILFEPROGR.WASSERVERS.KUITO/KUNJE	Watsan	01.12.1994	30.06.1995	C	ICRC	1'000'000	1'000'000
70-06082	ALLGEMEINE BETRIEBSKOSTEN	Admin	[illegible]	[illegible]	C	Direct Implementation	965'573	965'573
70-06085	DEMOBILISIERUNG REINTEGRATION	General sector support	01.01.1996	31.12.1996	C	UTCAH	371'500	400'000
70-06402	HILFSGUETER F. NOTLEIDENDE REGION HUAMBO	NFI	01.07.1994	30.09.1995	C	SRK	150'000	150'000
70-06403	FINANZIERUNG VON 900 TONNEN BOHNEN	Food	01.11.1994	28.02.1995	C	ICRC	913'000	913'000
70-06404	HUMANITAERES NOTHILFEPROGRAMM	General sector support	01.01.1995	31.12.1995	C	ICRC	1'000'000	1'000'000
70-06405	NAHRUNGSMITTEL FUER DEMOB.ZENTREN	Food	01.11.1995	31.01.1996	C	WFP	500'905	500'905
70-06412	AUFBAU LOGISTISCHE BASIS BENGUELA	Logistics	01.01.1995	31.03.1995	C	SAM / SOLE	50'000	50'000
70-06413	0.5 TONNEN WSM (WHEAT-SOYA-MILK)	Food	01.09.1994	31.03.1995	C	SAM / SOLE	7'718	7'700
70-06415	BASISMEDIZIN (OPHTHALMOLOGIE) BENGUELA	Health	01.07.1995	31.12.1995	C	SAM / SOLE	150'000	150'000
70-06422	HILFE FÜR VERTRIEBENE IN LUANDA	Watsan	01.04.1996	31.12.1996	C	DW	200'000	200'000
70-06424	CHOLERA-PRAEVENTION	Health	01.04.1996	31.03.1996	C	DW	200'027	200'027
70-06436	MILCHPRODUKTENHILFE 1994	Food	01.09.1994	31.08.1995	C	NGO	293'946	290'000
70-06437	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE 1995	Food	01.06.1995	31.12.1995	C	NGO	297'977	297'977
70-06439	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE 1996	Food	01.01.1996	31.12.1996	C	NGO	59'005	61'000
70-06440	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE 1996	Food	01.01.1996	31.12.1996	C	NGO	190'419	190'000
70-06441	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE 1996	Food	01.01.1996	31.12.1996	C	NGO	59'973	60'000
70-06443	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE 1997	Food	01.01.1997	31.12.1997	C	NGO	271'563	275'500
70-06444	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE 1997	Food	01.01.1997	31.12.1997	C	NGO	56'227	57'000
70-06445	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE 1997	Food	01.01.1997	31.12.1997	C	NGO	159'129	160'000
TOTAL							7'376'968	7'457'262
7F-00391	ADRA - Milchprodukte	Food	01.07.2000	30.06.2007	C	ADRA	187'445	189'000
7F-02224	Angola ADRA Nahrungssicherheit Huambo	Food	01.10.2002	30.09.2004	C	ADRA	98'306	100'000
7F-06446	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE-ADRA Angola	Food	01.01.1998	31.12.2000	C	ADRA	167'543	170'100

TOTAL						ADRA	458'293	509'100
7F-06416	Angola SAM-SOLE Luftbrücke Kalukembe	Logistics	01.07.1996	31.12.2003	C	SAM / SOLE	280'000	280'000
7F-06419	Angola SOLE Mehrzweckgeb.	Infrastructure	01.09.1998	31.12.2040	C	SAM / SOLE	15'000	15'000
TOTAL						SAM / SOLE	295'000	295'000
7F-00445	Angola DW Mikroprojekte	Livelihoods	01.07.1999	31.03.2002	C	DW	360'000	360'000
7F-01092	Angola DW MUBELA	Livelihoods	01.01.2001	31.12.2001	C	DW	187'176	290'000
7F-01150	Angola Externe Evaluation DA	Admin	01.09.2000	31.03.2001	C	DW	34'877	32'000
7F-01491	Angola Kobi Kleinaktionen generell	General sector support	01.06.2004	31.12.2006	C	Direct Implementation	170'880	300'000
7F-01523	Angola Kobi Kleinaktionen Frieden	Peace and Reconciliation	01.04.2001	31.03.2005	C	Direct Implementation	69'308	200'000
7F-01940	Angola Intersos Wasserver. IDP Camp	Watsan	01.11.2001	30.05.2002	C	Intersos	188'736	190'000
7F-02010	Angola Huambo Direktaktionen RGC	Infrastructure	01.01.2002	30.06.2003	C	Direct Implementation	249'197	300'000
7F-06381	Angola Direkt Mechanika	Logistics	01.11.1996	31.12.2040	C	Direct Implementation	57'373	75'000
7F-06416	Angola SAM SOLE Luftbrücke Kalukembe	Logistics	01.07.1996	31.12.2003	C	SAM / SOLE	90'000	90'000
7F-06422	Angola Direkt Vertriebene	General sector support	01.04.1995	31.12.2040	C	Direct Implementation	185'056	200'000
7F-06423	Angola Direkt Kleinaktionen	General sector support	01.04.1996	31.12.2040	C	Direct Implementation	528'366	600'000
7F-06425	Angola DW Cholera prävention	Health	01.05.1998	31.12.2040	C	DW	710'000	710'000
7F-06426	Angola DW WATSAN Huambo	Watsan	01.03.1997	31.03.2004	C	DW	2'374'235	2'370'000
7F-06427	Angola DW Plantoon Mikroprojekte	Livelihoods	01.03.1997	31.12.2040	C	DW	81'038	90'000
7F-06428	Angola CCC Friedensförderung	Peace and Reconciliation	01.02.1998	31.01.2005	C	CCC	900'000	900'000
TOTAL						Direct Implementation	6'183'745	6'747'000
7F-00394	Caritas - Milchprodukte	Food	01.07.2000	30.06.2007	C	Caritas	1'506'413	1'452'800
7F-06417	Angola CARITAS Vertrieb. Frauen	General sector support	01.10.1996	31.12.2040	C	Caritas	46'000	46'000
7F-06438	MILCHPRODUKTE 1995	Food	01.01.1995	31.12.2040	C	Caritas	82'491	87'000
7F-06442	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE 1996	Food	01.01.1996	31.12.2040	C	Caritas	243'960	243'960
7F-06447	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE Caritas Angola	Food	01.01.1998	31.12.2040	C	Caritas	518'062	554'000
TOTAL						Caritas	2'396'925	2'375'160
7F-00446	Angola Handicap Int. mine risk education	MRE	01.05.2004	31.12.2006	C	Handicap International	270'000	582'000
TOTAL						Handicap International	270'000	582'000

7F-01015	IKRK Beiträge Feldoperationen	General sector support	01.11.2000	31.12.2002	C	ICRC	2'000'000	2'000'000
7F-02837	IKRK Programmbeiträge Nothilfe	General sector support	01.01.2003	31.12.2006	C	ICRC	1'000'000	1'000'000
7F-06406	Angola IKRK Nothilfeprogr.	General sector support	01.01.1999	31.12.2000	C	ICRC	4'000'000	4'000'000
7F-07000	IRAK IKRK-NOTHILFEPROGRAMM	General sector support	20.07.1980	31.12.2005	C	ICRC	1'000'000	1'000'000
TOTAL						ICRC	8'000'000	8'000'000
7F-02155	Angola MEDAIR Unterstützungsprogr. Luena	Health	01.01.2002	31.07.2006	C	Medair	1'000'000	1'050'000
7F-04073	Afrika - Medair - Programmbeitrag MEDAIR	General sector support	01.01.2006	31.12.2007	C	Medair	180'000	180'000
TOTAL						Medair	1'180'000	1'230'000
7F-01820	Angola MSF-CH Meningitis Impfkampagne	Health	01.11.2001	31.03.2002	C	Médecins s. Frontières Swiss	37'065	54'000
7F-02225	Angola MSF-CH Mediz.Program Menongue	Health	01.09.2002	31.05.2005	C	Médecins s. Frontières Swiss	720'000	720'000
7F-04254	Angola MSF-CH HIV/Aids-Programm, Lubango	Health	01.03.2005	31.05.2006	C	Médecins s. Frontières Swiss	118'979	233'000
7F-06410	Angola MSF-CH mediz. Programm	Health	01.03.1998	31.12.2040	C	Médecins s. Frontières Swiss	387'030	500'000
TOTAL						Médecins s. Frontières Swiss	1'263'074	1'507'000
7F-06433	Angola GCG Friedensförderung	Peace and Reconciliation	01.09.1996	31.01.2005	C	GCG	530'000	530'000
TOTAL						Not applicable Partn. Org.	530'000	530'000
7F-00519	Angola OCHA Feldkoordination	General sector support	01.06.1999	31.12.2040	C	OCHA	200'000	200'000
7F-06309	Angola OCHA Koordination	General sector support	01.08.1995	31.12.2040	C	OCHA	208'760	200'000
7F-06391	Angola OCHA Demobilisation	Peace and Reconciliation	01.11.1995	31.12.2040	C	OCHA	1'495'362	1'500'000
TOTAL						OCHA	1'904'122	1'900'000
7F-03362	SFF - IOM Luanda / Kinderheim "MULEMBA"	Education	01.07.2004	31.12.2006	C	OIM	225'180	225'180
7F-03958	Angola IOM Community Rehabilitation	Livelihoods	01.10.2004	31.12.2005	C	OIM	337'500	337'500
TOTAL						OIM	562'680	562'680
7F-00445	Angola DW Mikroprojekte	Livelihoods	01.07.1999	31.03.2002	C	DW	392'450	545'000
7F-01091	Angola DW Vorschulen	Education	03.07.2000	29.06.2001	C	DW	223'500	213'000
7F-02226	Angola DW Voices of Peace	Peace and Reconciliation	01.12.2002	31.05.2006	C	DW	379'961	450'000
7F-02274	Angola Hilfsw.Liechtenst.Milchprodukte	Food	01.07.2002	30.06.2006	C	Hilfswerk Liechtenstein	15'436	15'800
7F-06480	Angola GCG Friedensförderung	Peace and Reconciliation	01.06.1999	31.01.2006	C	GCG	654'050	630'000

TOTAL						IONG	2'164'907	2'303'800
7F-03450	Angola/Angol.Rotes Kreuz, HIV/Aidsbek.	Health	01.01.2004	31.12.2006	C	Red Cross Org.	321'750	342'000
TOTAL						Red Cross Org.	321'750	342'000
7F-01430	Angola/50% Huambo Strukturkosten	Admin	01.01.2001	31.12.2003	C	Direct Implementation	1'744'393	1'660'000
7F-01426	Angola/Huambo HH Direktaktionen	General sector support	01.01.2001	31.12.2001	C	Direct Implementation	477'309	510'000
7F-01427	Angola/Huambo HH-Sitenaktionen	General sector support	01.01.2001	31.12.2040	C	Direct Implementation	111'570	100'000
7F-02018	Angola/Kobü Luanda, APOIO	Health	01.01.2002	30.06.2003	C	Direct Implementation	1'142'697	1'065'000
7F-02020	Angola/Kobü Mikroprojekte Wiederaufbau	Livelihoods	01.09.2002	31.10.2004	C	Direct Implementation	67'009	200'000
7F-06376	Angola/Kobü Luanda - Strukturkosten	Admin	01.11.1995	31.12.2006	C	Direct Implementation	12'831'670	13'918'250
7F-06377	Angola/Huambo Strukturkosten	Admin	15.02.1996	31.12.2006	C	Direct Implementation	9'143'105	9'082'210
TOTAL						Direct Implementation	25'523'626	26'755'460
7F-00802	Schweiz. Allianzmission - Milchprodukte	Food	01.07.2000	30.06.2007	C	SAM / SOLE	804'806	1'000'000
7F-06414	0.5 T WSM (WHEAT-SOYA-MILK)	Food	01.06.1995	31.12.2040	C	SAM / SOLE	2'210	10'000
7F-06416	Angola/SAM-SOLE Luftbrücke Kaluquembe	Logistics	01.07.1996	31.12.2003	C	SAM / SOLE	260'000	80'000
7F-06448	MILCHPRODUKTEHILFE-SAM/SOLE Angola	Food	01.01.1998	31.12.2040	C	SAM / SOLE	332'497	339'900
TOTAL						SAM / SOLE	1'399'101	1'425'700
7F-06407	Angola/SRK Gesundheitsprogr.	Health	01.04.1997	31.12.2040	C	Swiss Red Cross	187'000	187'000
TOTAL						Swiss Red Cross	187'000	187'000
7F-06380	Angola/UNDP Kommunikation	Logistics	01.10.1996	31.12.2040	C	UNDP	134'446	200'000
7F-06394	Angola/UNDP Reintegr. Soldaten	Peace and Reconciliation	01.06.1996	31.12.2040	C	UNDP	512'484	512'484
TOTAL						UNDP	646'930	712'484
7F-01556	UNHCR - Nothilfeprogramme	General sector support	01.01.2001	31.12.2007	C	UNHCR	2'000'000	2'000'000
7F-02228	Angola/UNHCR Dauerflüchtlinge	General sector support	01.08.2002	31.12.2006	C	UNHCR	1'623'269	1'800'000
7F-06378	Angola/UNHCR Logistik	Logistics	01.11.1998	30.06.1999	C	UNHCR	403'713	425'000
7F-06395	Angola/UNHCR Repatriierung	General sector support	01.01.1996	31.12.2040	C	UNHCR	500'000	500'000
7F-06396	Angola/UNHCR Repatriierung	General sector support	01.01.1996	31.12.1998	C	UNHCR	1'500'000	1'500'000
TOTAL						UNHCR	5'926'982	6'025'000
7F-03290	Angola/UNICEF HIV/Aids-Program	Health	01.12.2003	31.12.2006	C	UNICEF	551'000	651'000

TOTAL						UNICEF	551'000	851'000
7F-00050	Afrika - WFP - BARBEITRAEGE 2000-2006	Food	01.01.2000	31.12.2006	C	WFP	500'000	500'000
7F-00416	Angola / WFP Konfliktopfer (10054/6153)	Food	01.07.1999	31.12.2005	C	WFP	5'005'097	5'004'300
7F-00637	WFP/Angola-Nothilfe an Kriegsopfer (6159)	Food	01.10.1999	31.12.2000	C	WFP	1'638'647	1'630'770
7F-01498	Angola/WFP Transport of Non-Food Items	Food	01.01.2001	31.12.2002	C	WFP	1'672'500	1'672'500
7F-02154	Angola/WFP Passenger Air Service	Logistics	01.01.2002	31.12.2005	C	WFP	1'920'000	1'920'000
7F-02727	Angola/WFP Expertenmission	Food	01.01.2003	31.12.2006	C	WFP	993'818	1'810'000
7F-03071	Afrika - Getreide 2003-2006	Food	01.01.2003	31.12.2006	C	WFP	500'000	500'000
7F-03470	WFP/Angola-Resettlement (10054)	Food	01.01.2004	31.12.2004	C	WFP	1'000'000	1'000'000
7F-06030	ANG OEFFNUNG VON VERK. SACHEN HH	Food	01.01.1995	31.12.1996	C	WFP	2'000'000	2'025'508
7F-06247	450 T CORN SOYA-BLEND Z.G.DEMOB.SOLDATEN	Food	01.06.1997	31.05.1998	C	WFP	476'530	475'000
7F-06348	350 T ZUCKER Z.G.DEMOB.SOLDATEN	Food	01.08.1997	31.05.1998	C	WFP	298'597	299'000
7F-06369	Angola/WFP Logistik	Logistics	01.01.1997	31.12.2000	C	WFP	2'000'000	2'000'000
7F-06449	4794 T MAIS	Food	01.09.1995	31.03.1996	C	WFP	2'370'167	2'400'000
TOTAL						WFP	19'788'635	20'638'586
7F-04250	Angola/WHO Expertenmission (Marburg)	Health	01.04.2005	30.06.2005	C	WHO	31'243	50'000
TOTAL						WHO	31'243	50'000
							86'956'403	91'[illegible]

By partner

Government	1'269'372	1%
Swiss NGO	2'498'074	3%
National NGO	1'365'319	2%
International NGO	12'454'505	14%
UN Institutions + IOM	30'091'650	35%
Red Cross Orgs	11'571'760	13%
Direct input Structural Costs	14'939'537	17%
Programme Coord. Costs	[illegible]	9%
Admin Costs	2'021'582	3%
Direct input Project Costs	12'206'287	14%
Total	86'956'403	100%

Annex D – Questionnaire for SDC staff

Independent Evaluation: SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola 1995 - 2006

Questionnaire for former SDC Staff

1.) Personal data
1.1. Name:
1.2. Address
1.3. E-Mail/Phone:
1.4. Present work (position, firm/institution/organisation):
1.5. Work related to SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola (position, placement and activities/components):
1.6. Period(s) of work with the SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola (from-to year):
2.) Assessment of the SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola: Activities
2.1. What were the main strengths of the SDC humanitarian aid activities during the period of your employment (including direct intervention and support through NGOs and multilateral partners)?
2.2. What were the main weaknesses of SDC humanitarian aid activities during the period of your employment?
2.3. Can you give any example of a particular "success story" within the SDC humanitarian aid activities during the period of your employment?
2.4. Can you given an example of a particular failure within the SDC humanitarian aid activities during the period of your employment?

2.5. Did the SDC activities overall correspond to local perceptions of needs at the time of implementation?
YES____ NO____

Please specify, why/why not:

2.6. What were the main problems concerning project implementation during the period of your employment?

3.) Assessment of the SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola: Partnerships

3.1. Did the SDC programme have the right balance between direct SDC activities (mainly in Huambo) and support through partners (NGOs and multilateral agencies)?
YES_____NO_____

Please state why/why not:

3.2. How was the coordination and division of labour between SDC and the multilateral agencies?
VERY GOOD_____GOOD_____FAIR_____POOR_____

Please specify/give examples:

3.3. How was the cooperation between SDC and the NGOs?
VERY GOOD_____GOOD_____FAIR_____POOR_____

Please specify/give examples:

3.4. How was the relationship between the Government of Angola and SDC during the period of your employment?
VERY GOOD_____GOOD_____FAIR_____POOR_____

Please specify/give examples:

3.5. What advantages and disadvantages were there for SDC in having a relatively large amount of partners (Non-Governmental Organisations and Multilateral Agencies)?

4.) Assessment of the SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola: Effects/Impacts

4.1. What were the most important impacts/effects of the SDC humanitarian aid in Angola?

a.) During the armed conflict periods:

b.) During the peace periods:

4.2. Were there any significant differences between the approach of SDC and the approaches of other aid agencies?
YES____ NO_____

If Yes, what did this imply in terms of impacts/effects?

4.3. Who were the actual main beneficiaries of SDC humanitarian aid in Angola? (for example along the lines of age, gender, class, ethnicity, rural/urban, MPLA/UNITA, Internally displaced/permanent residents)?

4.4. Were there particular groups and categories of deserving people who were neglected by SDC humanitarian aid? (for example along the lines of age, gender, class, ethnicity, rural/urban, MPLA/UNITA, Internally displaced/permanent residents)?

4.5. Did SDC humanitarian aid activities contribute to enhance the overall peace-building efforts?

a.) During the armed conflict periods:
YES_____ NO_____DON'T KNOW_____

Please state how/how not:

b.) During the peace periods:
YES_____NO_____ DON'T KNOW_____

Please state how/how not:

4.6. Did SDC humanitarian aid activities have any impact on strengthening the organisation of local communities?

a.) During the armed conflict periods:
YES_____ NO_____DON'T KNOW_____

Please state how/how not:

b.) During the peace periods:
YES_____NO_____ DON'T KNOW_____

Please state how/how not:

4.7. Did any of the SDC humanitarian aid activities contribute to unintended conflicts between or within local populations (for example in the distribution of food relief, placement of schools, bridges and health posts)?
YES___ NO____DON'T KNOW_____

If, YES, please state how, why and which activities, where:

4.8. Did any of the SDC humanitarian aid activities contribute to enhance conflicts between the combating parties, UNITA and MPLA (for example in the distribution of aid or at the political or military level)?
YES____ NO_____DON'T KNOW_____

Please state how/how not:

5.) Specific Request:

5.1. Please indicate particular resource persons (Huambo or Luanda) that you think the evaluation team should consult (including name and contact details):

Annex E – SDC staff questionnaire survey report

Independent Evaluation: SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola 1995-2006

Questionnaire Survey Report

Introduction

This report presents the main results of a questionnaire survey that the DIIS evaluation team pursued among former SDC staff involved in various capacities in the humanitarian aid programme in Angola. The aim of the survey was two-fold. First, it was intended as an important source of information for the preparation of fieldwork in Angola, providing the team with an idea of where to look for key cases of interest and how to weigh the focus of attention, including the identification of key partners, projects and stakeholders. Secondly, the SDC staff's own views and assessments of the programme are in themselves seen as an important component of the evaluation. These views and assessments are presented in this report.

The answers of respondents presented in the report cover different periods of the programme, and are based on filled-in questionnaires from 13 former staff members who returned the questionnaires. In the annex the questionnaire is reprinted (in its English version). The questionnaire was disseminated to 23 persons, covering SDC core- and seconded staff (based on a list of selected persons provided by SDC, Bern). Six of the persons on the list were Angolan, and two were women. The survey was designed to enable the respondents to reply in Portuguese or English (in one case: German), using approximately an hour to answer the questions. The evaluation team ensured that respondents had adequate time to return the surveys, as well as made two successive reminders, which postponed the final deadline for submission. Regrettably, despite these efforts, none of the Angolans (and women) on the list responded. By implication this report is based exclusively on replies from male, expatriate/Swiss staff, over half of whom had past or present leadership positions in SDC-Angola.

The report covers three core themes: assessment of a) SDC activities (direct support and support through partners), b) SDC partnerships (NGOs, Multilateral Agencies (MLAs), GoA); c) Overall effects/impacts of SDC support (main approach, beneficiaries, peace-building, conflict risks/prevention, local capacity building). The main common tendencies across the surveys are presented in relation to these three themes, and the most significant differences between respondents are highlighted. All names are kept anonymous.

1 SDC Activities

The survey respondents were asked to give their views of the main strengths and weaknesses of SDC activities, including in relation to both direct support and support through partners (NGOs and MLAs). They were also asked to identify examples of a particular success story and failed activities, as well as to assess whether or not the SDC activities corresponded to perceptions of local needs at the time of their employment.

Two ***strengths*** of SDC activities stand out as particularly significant. First, the strong networks and good collaboration established by SDC with a variety of partners, including NGOs and MLA's, were emphasised as a key strength by over half of the respondents. Particular examples mentioned are DW, CCG, ICRC and in general UN-agencies. With only two exceptions, a large network of partners and the distribution of support to a variety of activities were valued as a key strength of SDC. These enabled broad-based information sharing, improved understanding of the wider and local situations, as well as flexibility in choosing/changing areas of intervention and in making a wider impact (see also Partnerships).

Secondly and partly related to the first main strength, the secondments of SDC staff to other aid agencies were emphasised by the vast majority of respondents as a key strength of SDC activities. These were also identified by half of the respondents as key success stories. Two successful examples raised were the secondment of SDC engineers to the UNHCR and WFP infrastructure construction projects in East and Northern Angola respectively. Secondments were viewed as contributing to the impact of SDC support through technical competences and know how. The point was also raised that secondments provided SDC with valuable networks and access to "insider" information about the overall situation of the country (see also Partnerships). Added to these two main strengths a few respondents highlighted SDC's clear strategy and vision, its focus on vulnerable groups in difficult areas, such as IDPs in Huambo, as well as its flexibility and capacity to adapt to changing conditions (see also impacts/effects).

Aside from secondments, respondents identified some ***success stories*** related to particular projects (Medair in Luena, bridge construction in Huambo during the conflict, support to aircraft services, promotion of peace in Cabinda, and women's groups). A number of respondents also pointed to capacity building of local staff as a success. This needs to be seen in light of one of the key weaknesses of SDC activities identified by respondents.

The survey reflects the shared view that ***weaknesses***, causes of failures and challenges to implementation of activities related predominantly to national/local staff problems. The key problem raised was lack of skills/capacities of national/local staff. Two other related problems were lack of motivation and stress due to job insecurity and inadequate staff management. Finally, a number of respondents mentioned the overall security situation. An example of failure raised, was that in 2003 the national staff worked for more than half a year without a contract. Another was the insecurity caused by uncertain exit strategies in conflict periods (i.e. whether offices should be closed or not). One respondent also pointed to lack of qualified staff in bridge construction as a particular example of failure.

In addition to staff problems, two thirds of the respondents shared the view that weaknesses and challenges to implementation of activities were due to lack of support from Angolan administrative and political authorities (see also partnerships). This problem related in particular to the lack of capacity and will of national government institutions to collaborate with and support SDC activities (only one respondent specifically mentioned the local government, i.e. in Huambo). Corruption, administrative costs and bad governance problems were explicitly raised by a few respondents. Some also mentioned the issue of the Angolan President's funds kept in Switzerland as a cause of problems between the GoA and SDC. One case of failure and problem with implementation was in particular identified, namely SDC material support to MinSA for Marburg epidemic. Aside from these two major areas of difficulty, a third of the respondents also viewed SDCs ability to play a significant role in and prepare for a transition to the post-conflict period as a core weakness (i.e. limited mandate in large-scale post-conflict development

programmes and weak implementation of Peace and Reconciliation). In this area there were however disagreements, with many respondents viewing SDCs contribution to overall peace-building as significant (see impact and effects).

Besides problems of staff and GoA support, respondents also identified a number of particular projects as examples of ***failures***: MSF in Lubanga (HIV/AIDS), Angolan Red Cross (RC) and French RC (HIV/AIDS in Huambo), a year delay of road rehabilitation in Huambo (but later a success), Project "Mubela" in Huambo during leadership of a priest. Only one respondent mentioned the problem of weak local partners as a challenge to implementation.

All respondents presented the view that SDC activities corresponded with ***local perceptions of needs***. Answers suggest that it was easy to meet local needs, because during the period of support any kind of aid and assistance in Angola was welcomed by local beneficiaries. Despite this shared view of respondents, some also indicated that there were few actual reflections on who needed most, when, where, and with what considerations of sustainability (see also impacts and effects). One also highlighted that SDC was not ambitious enough in meeting needs. Only two respondents explicitly stated that SDC projects were needs-driven, including being assessed in consultation with local authorities and/or selected Angolan assistants. Another on the contrary indicated that SDC staff did not have adequate evidence as to what the expressed needs of local populations were (i.e. it was based on assumptions).

2 SDC Partnerships

The survey participants were asked to assess the value of different types of partnerships (MLA's, NGOs and GoA), and to give their view of the advantages/disadvantages of SDC's relatively large number of partners. They were also asked to assess whether there was a right balance between direct support and support through partners.

Respondents" view of SDC's large network of partners as an overall, key strength of the humanitarian aid programme was reflected in the predominantly positive view of the collaboration with NGOs and MLAs. On the other hand, the less positive view of the collaboration with GoA reflected how activities were seen as challenged by lack of government support. With respect to ***MLAs*** the vast majority viewed coordination and division of labour as very good to good, in particular with UNHCR and WFP (to which SDC seconded staff). One exception was WHO (with two respondents also mentioning UNDP and UNAIDS). Whereas secondments were again raised by the majority, others also highlighted valuable dialogue, good funding possibilities and flexible division of labour as positive aspects. With respect to ***NGOs*** (Angolan, Swiss and International), all respondents viewed cooperation as very good to good (positive examples identified: CCG, DW, MSF-CH, Medair, Handicap International, SFCG, and of Angolan NGOs, ADRA and Mulemba). Predominantly non-Angolan NGOs were explicitly mentioned. In particular the exchange of information and experiences were identified as positive attributes of collaboration, with single respondents also mentioning the adding of value to the commitments and competences of NGOs, as well as collaboration to negotiate with GoA. Negative examples (see activities) included Angola RC and French RC collaboration as well as the MSF Lubanga project.

Two thirds of the respondents by contrast viewed the relationship between SDC and ***GoA*** as fair to poor, although the majority gave mixed answers (for example stating that local government

collaboration was good and that relationship with counterpart in Min. of foreign affairs was good). Whereas positive answers highlighted the consistent effort of SDC to maintain regular contacts with government authorities at national and provincial levels, including the involvement of GoA in annual planning exercises, most respondents also highlighted key difficulties in practice (see also activities). These related to lack of support and will, including lack of information, the cancellation of meetings, arrogance, difficult access of SDC to GoA decision-makers and bad governance practices. The main problem was not local, but national government authorities (notably MinSA).

All respondents viewed the ***balance between direct support and support through partners*** asappropriate, although some highlighted that conditions at times had not permitted this balance (e.g. lack of available partners forced SDC to pursue more direct support prior to 2003). The positive views expressed of the gradual increase in support through partners were also reflected in the mainly positive view of SDC's choice to have a relatively ***large number of partners***. Although both advantages and disadvantages were raised, all but two respondents agreed that it was more favourable to spread out support to many partners and areas than to concentrate it within a few sectors (see also main strengths under activities). Advantages raised included in particular the broad-based information on and understanding of local situations and the wider context that a large network of partners and secondments provided. Others also raised extensive presence, distribution of risk and capacity building of national NGOs, flexibility in changing areas of intervention and effective advocacy among vulnerable people, facilitated by local NGOs. A clear disadvantage shared by the majority of respondents was that many partners was time-consuming in terms of management and monitoring, requiring extensive SDC human and financial resources (one respondent mentioning how this triggered conflicts in the SDC-Luanda office due to lack of time for management). Only two respondents mentioned the disadvantage of spreading support to many sectors. Otherwise it was viewed as positive by the majority, despite the difficulties of monitoring.

3 SDC Effects and Impacts

The survey respondents were asked to assess the most important impacts/effects of SDC humanitarian aid during periods of armed conflict and peace. In particular, they were asked to identify the actual beneficiaries (including possibly neglected groups in need of aid), SDC's impact on strengthening local community organisation, and SDC's ability to enhance the overall peace-building efforts. They were also asked if they regarded the overall approach of SDC as different from other aid agencies, and if so, what the distinguishing features of SDC's approach were. Finally, respondents were asked if SDCs had contributed to unintended conflicts within local populations and between the warring parties (MPLA and UNITA).

The vast majority of respondents emphasised "saving lives" and food aid, in particular to vulnerable groups, as the most significant ***impact/effect during the armed conflict***. In particular support to MLAs' emergency relief programmes were highlighted, which can be seen as reflecting respondents' view of the collaboration with MLAs as a major strength of SDC (see activities). Some respondents explicitly referred to soup kitchens as having had an important impact. Fewer respondents mentioned the provision of health, schools, shelter and road/bridge construction as major impacts (on the latter see also success stories under activities). A couple of respondents were also convinced that SDC's support to saving the lives of vulnerable people during the conflict period had the effect of giving moral support and hope to these people (i.e.

give them hope of a better future and show them that they were not forgotten by the outside world). The extent to which this aspect also gave a better sense of security and protection was however only highlighted by one respondent.

When asked directly if SDC had contributed to the ***strengthening of local community organisation during the armed conflict***, the few answers that were given were affirmative, but they also suggested that this was in a narrow sense. It was predominantly the case in the area around the urban centre of Huambo, in particular in regard to CBOs there, as well as the effect of two particular projects (DW grassroots projects and the formation of construction work-groups of IDPs and permanent residents in Huambo). Similarly when respondents were explicitly asked if SDC contributed to enhancing ***peace-building during the armed conflict*** the answers were affirmative, but only one respondent attached this to efforts at the local level, in terms of SDC presence in Huambo and support to civil society activities (see also weaknesses under activities). Otherwise emphasis was placed on wider dialogue with partners and the two Swiss consultancy missions pursued (track 1 and 2). This supports the overall emphasis on "saving lives" through food aid as the most significant impact at the local level during the armed conflict periods. This observation can be contrasted with the peace periods.

Over half of the respondents identified support to peace-building/reconciliation as a significant ***impact/effect during the peace periods***. This emphasis was also reflected in the shared view of respondents that SDC did indeed enhance ***peace building during the peace periods*****.** In this regard a number of particular examples were given. In particular the peace building projects through CCG, SFCG and DW were identified, with a couple of respondents also mentioning the National reconciliation programme (with Political Division IV and partners). Single respondents also mentioned mine-risk education in Huambo, Radio Ecclesia and civil society activities in general. There were two exceptions to the largely positive view of SDC's efforts in peace building. One respondent emphasised that a main weakness of SDC was its peace and reconciliation programmes, and another raised the point that it was only very few partners who were actually able to contribute to peace building (such as DW).

Reinforced capacity building of local organisations/civil society and advocacy was another major impact/effect that was identified during peace periods, which can be contrasted with impacts/effects during conflict (see above). This was also reflected in the largely affirmative answers to the question of whether SDC had an impact on ***strengthening local community organisation during peace periods***. Only one respondent answered negatively. Apart from one respondent, who explicitly stated that an overall objective of SDC was to strengthen the local capacity of NGOs and communities, the remainder identified the impact of single projects in this area: community organised groups in reconstruction of social infrastructure programmes, including their capacity to lobby with local government authorities to take over responsibilities, community centres for IDPs, DW on Voices for Peace, ADRA veterinarian project, Activist groups (health, water education, culture and community service), and empowerment of local NGOs in Huambo (RISC and APOLO). One respondent also emphasised that it was *only* some projects that contributed to strengthening local community organisation.

Two other impacts/effects during the peace periods were mentioned by fewer respondents: reconstruction of infrastructure and support to the resettlement and returnees (health, education and humanitarian assistance), in particular vulnerable groups. Finally, single respondents identified HIV/AIDS, Marburg fever response, inputs and know-how as well as secondments as

significant impacts during peace (on the latter see also strengths and success stories under activities).

The marked emphasis on "saving lives" of vulnerable people directly hit by the conflict was clearly reflected in who the respondents identified as the ***actual beneficiaries of SDC humanitarian aid***. By far the largest category mentioned was internally displaced people – IDPs , in particular of rural origin. This category was also regarded as covering the poorests. Other respondents also identified in general the rural poor population (although it should be noted that during the conflict period this was mainly confined to the support of these people in areas surrounding urban centres). One respondent claimed that it was in particular the better educated poor who were the beneficiaries. A couple of respondents also identified women (i.e. special women's projects) and children and elders as beneficiaries. With the exception of one respondent, who claimed that ethnicity was irrelevant, the answers confirmed that there was a natural focus on two major ethnic groups among the beneficiaries: Ovimbundu (central) and Tchokwé (east). This focus on particular geographical areas and ethnic groups is also mentioned by a couple of respondents when asked to identify ***neglected beneficiaries in need***. Only one respondent coupled this bias with the war, emphasising that despite efforts by SDC, it was not possible to target groups in UNITA held areas (UNITA did not allow this). No respondent explicitly reflected on the political affiliations of actual and neglected beneficiaries, including the possible links between politics and ethnicity. Whereas the majority of respondents claimed that most people in need were targeted by SDC, one respondent explicitly stated that SDC did not make a systematic effort to examine whether some groups were neglected. Single respondents also mentioned demobilised soldiers and homeless street kids as neglected beneficiaries.

The lack of systematic examination of neglected beneficiaries and political affiliations is also reflected in answers to the question of whether SDC contributed to ***unintended conflicts between MPLA and UNITA camps***. Half of the respondents answered that they don't know. Others answered no. Only one respondent commented on this question, stating that SDC did try to take into consideration the avoidance of conflicts, such as during the "bridges for peace" project in Huambo. However, another respondent, when asked if the SDC contributed to ***unintended conflicts within local populations*** suggests that the burning/destruction of SDC constructed bridges did fuel conflicts, albeit outside the direct influence of SDC. The vast majority of respondents nonetheless express that they did not know whether SDC support actually contributed to unintended conflicts within local populations.

The answers given to whether ***the SDC approach differed from other aid agencies*** generally reflected what respondents regarded as the main strengths and successes of SDC humanitarian aid in Angola: a broad portfolio of projects and partners (including secondments, large network for the sharing of experiences and dialogue) (see also partnerships on negative effects of this). The vast majority agreed that SDC indeed differed from other agencies' approaches. Apart from the main reason given above, respondents also mentioned SDC's reluctance to claim credits, its lower budgets, less prestige and self interest (i.e. "not showing big signs that we did this"), rapid aid due to flexibility and SDC's continued lobbying for humanitarian aid even during periods of general "donor fatigue". The latter can be related to the point raised earlier about the significance of SDC's continued presence in Huambo, even during the conflict (i.e. saving lives and giving moral support and hope).

Annex F – Methodology note for fieldwork

Methodology note (revised)
Paradigm: The case of Casseque III IDP camp/settlement

SDC has assisted with an emergency school, a health post, and with water & sanitation (via DW). Based on this it is decided to make a case study, including the following elements:

1) Initial visit: Meeting with Soba(s) and other key informants. The IDP camp had 30,000 people, today 6,000 remain. Today's settlement is well planned and organized with 5 sections (each with a Soba) and linear streets. The majority live in adobe houses with zinc roofs.
2) Rapid Appraisal:

a) *Interviews with key informants* about the history of the settlement 1995-2007 (including those who left after 2002), livelihoods of inhabitants, numbers of men, women and children, facilities (wat/san, electricity, schools, health posts etc.) and assistance from humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the state.
b) *Transect (by walk)* through the settlement from one end to the other, making observations (houses, roads, groups of people) and interviewing (= chatting with) selected persons. Observations and interviews recorded.
c) *Group interviews* with a group of men and a group of women (their life and livelihoods during 1999-2002 and today, focus on assistance from humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the state).
d) *Optional: Mapping the settlement (with key informants),* including characteristics of main sections and well off and poorer households (incl. female-headed).

3) Mini-survey

a) *Random selection* of 2 of the 5 sections
b) *Questionnaire-based mini-survey* of 10 households in each of the two sections. Total number of surveyed households: 20. The households in each group are randomly selected, e.g. by selecting every fifth household along a couple of streets (not all on "main street"). If nobody is home in a selected household (or they do not want to be inter viewed), a note is made about this and the neighbouring household is selected as a substitute. Within the household the interview can be with the head of household or the wife.
c) *Questionnaire content:* Household data (persons' age, occupation, school attendance etc.), facilities (rooms, water, electricity, latrine, radio/TV etc.), history (focus on 1995-98, 1999-2002, 2003-07), support from state/agencies/NGOs in different phases.
d) In-depth interviews with 3 men and 3 women: Out of the 20 interviewed, 3 men and 3 women are selected for in-depth interviews about their life stories, their views on the humanitarian assistance they have received, their present situation and future hopes, etc.

4. Mini-study of school, health-post and wat-san: Physical status of buildings (rooms, equipment, maintenance), number of pupils/patients (male/female), staff (number, duration, salary, financial situation of school/clinic). Interviews with staff members about situation during 1999-2002 and today. Interview with one or two members of user committee (if any). Maintenance and function of hand pumps and latrines.

Annex G – List of persons consulted

Name	Position	Organisation	Place
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Independent Evaluation
SDC Humanitarian Aid in Angola 1995-2006

V CASE STUDY REPORT
Huambo Province

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DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
November 2007

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Acknowledgements

The Evaluation team relied on a range of individuals, institutions and organisations that were indispensable in facilitating the fieldwork and data-collection in Huambo Province. First of all, we would like to acknowledge the assistance that the evaluation team received from UTCAH/MINARS in Luanda, as well as in Huambo for ensuring liaison with the Provincial Government of Huambo (PGH). UTCAH supplied important information about the emergency and post-war coordination of Humanitarian aid and the movements of IDPs. Directors and staff members of the PGH need also be acknowledged for their helpfulness and good and open collaboration.

Several former partners of SDC, in particular DW, ADRA-A, ASCA, CAD, GAC and OKU-TIUKA, were extremely helpful with information and were always willing to discuss and collaborate with the evaluation team. The same can be said of those former SDC staff members, who the evaluation team was able to identify and interview. In particular we would like to acknowledge the very helpful assistance of Snr. Daniel Kubiuka, Snr. Toni Melo and Arnold Furrer.

The assessment of schools, health posts and other infrastructural constructions relied on the collaboration with various staff members and local organisations (for example teachers, nurses, church representatives, community workers, local leaders, etc.) The evaluation team is thankful of these people's willingness to take their time to provide their opinions and factual data on the projects assessed.

In the various project- and case study areas, the evaluation team depended on the collaboration of a large number of local residents of villages, *bairros* and former IDP resettlement areas. In all case study areas people were open and collaborative in answering questionnaires and interview questions. The evaluation team acknowledges that this kind of collaboration was indispensable for a successful assessment of SDC Humanitarian Aid. We are immensely grateful to people encountered for their assistance.

In the assessment of roads/bridges, schools and water points the evaluation team relied on the technical assistance of the Angolan engineer, Manuel Alberto Isabel. We would like to acknowledge his serious commitment to the work contracted to him.

Last, but not least the evaluation team would like to acknowledge the two drivers, Osorio Pakocu Jewa and Miron Florindo André, as well as the three local field assistants, Victorino Salopa, Inocêncio Mutombo and Otilio Miguel Samarsele, from the Augostinho Neto University of Huambo, who helped with translation, interviewing and data processing. Together with the Angolan and Danish consultants, the drivers and field assistants helped ensure the formation of a very well-functioning and effective fieldwork team, which is important when time is short and the areas covered vast.

List of Acronyms

ADRA-A:	Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (Angola NGO – rural development and environment)
ADRA-I:	Adventist Development & Relief Agency International (NGO)
ADPP:	Apoio de Desenvolvimento Povo a Povo (INGO – Development Aid People to People)
ANGONET:	Angolan Telecommunication Network
APOLO:	Apoio para Organizações Locais (SDC assistance to local organizations)
ASCA:	Associação para o Sorriso da Criança (Angolan NGO – help to children)
CAD:	Corpo de Apoio aos Deslocados (Angolan NGO – assistance to displaced people)
CAP2:	Coordination of Aid to Agriculture, Livestock, Industry and Social Action
CARITAS:	Caritas International
CBA:	Convenção Baptista de Angola (Angolan Baptist Convention)
CBO:	Community Based Organization
CCF:	Christian Children's Fund
CIDA:	Canadian International Development Agency
COIEPA:	Intereclesiastic Committee for Peace in Angola
CV-A:	Cruz Vermelha Angola (Angolan Red Cross).
CV-F:	Cruz Vermelha Francesa (French Red Cross)
CVN:	Cruz Vermelha Nacional (National Red Cross Society)
DPA:	Provincial Department of Water (Angola)
DPEA:	Provincial Department of Energy and Water (Angola)
DW:	Development Workshop
ENP:	Empresa National de Pontes (National Enterprise for Bridges)
ERRP:	Emergency Resettlement and Retun Programme
FAS:	Fundo de Apoio Social (Social assistance fund, Angola)
FONGA:	Angolan Forum of Non-Government Organisations
GAC:	Grupo de Apoio a Criança (Angolan NGO – help to children)
GAS:	Grupos de Agua e Saneamento (Water and Sanitation Groups)
GIS:	Geographical Information System
GoA:	Government of Angola
HA:	Humanitarian Aid
ICRC:	International Committee for Red Cross
IDEF:	Instituto de Desenvolvimento e Floresta (Institute for Development and Forestry Angola)
IDP:	Internally Displaced Person
IMES:	Angolan NGO
INEA:	Instituto Nacional de Estradas em Angola (National Institute for Roads in Angola)
INTER-MONDE:	French NGO on Communication
ISCED:	High Institute for Educational Sciences (Angola)
IST:	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
LED:	The Students League for Development (Angola)
MACA:	Angolan NGO
MINARS:	The Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (Angola)
MINSA:	Ministério de Saúde (Ministry of Health)
MOLISV:	Movimento Liberazione e Sviluppo (Italian NGO)
MONUA:	Missão de observadores de Nações Unidades em Angola (United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola)

MPLA:	Movimento Popular de libertação de Angola (ruling party in Angola)
MRE:	Mine Risk Education
MSF:	Médecines sans Frontières
NFI :	None-Food Items
NGO :	Non-Governmental Organization
NOVIB:	Sister Organisation of Oxfam located in the Netherlands
OCHA:	United Nation's Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OIKOS:	Portuguese NGO for development and cooperation
OIM:	Organização Internacional para Migração (International Organization for Migration)
OISC:	Fundação Obra de Inserção Social da Crianças (Angolan NGO – help to children)
OKUTIUKA:	Acção para a Vida (Angolan NGO – 'return' and help to life)
OVIPAKO:	Associação dos Agricultores e Criadores do Huambo (Agricultural association in Huambo)
PAR:	Programa de Apoio á Reconstrução Nacional (National reconstruction programme in Angola)
PGH:	Provincial Government of Huambo
RISC:	Reabilitação de Infraestruturas Comunitárias (SDC assistance to rehabilitation of community infrastructure)
SCF:	Save the Children's Fund
SFCG:	Search for Common Ground
SDC:	Swiss Development Cooperation
SFA:	São Francisco de Assis
SHA:	Swiss Humanitarian Aid
UN:	United Nations
UNDP:	United Nation's Development Programme
UNHCR:	United Nation's High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF:	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA:	União Nacional para a Independência total de Angola (Angolan opposition party)
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
UTCAH:	Unidade técnico para a Coordenação de Ajuda Humanitária (Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Angola)
VIDA:	Angolan NGO
VLOM:	Village Level Operation and Maintenance
WATSAN:	Water and sanitation project
WFP:	World Food Programme

1 Introduction

This case study report covers an assessment of the SDC-supported projects and programmes that were implemented in Huambo province from 1996 and until the end of 2005. In contrast to how emergency aid conventionally is conceived a high number of construction works implemented right from the beginning in 1996 until SDCs office in Huambo closed in 2005 has continued to be functioning. The report analyses this surprising phenomenon of emergency aid carried over into the present development phase. A main focus is on a selected sample of identifiable projects and programmes supported by SDC in collaboration with local, national and international partners. The report does not assess the support SDC gave to international humanitarian agencies such as WFP and ICRC. Support to international humanitarian agencies is primarily covered by the main evaluation report.

The report's assessment of the main beneficiary groups (internally displaced persons, urban poor and rural returnees) can nonetheless not be isolated from the direct support that SDC gave to the international humanitarian agencies. When evaluating the impact of direct SDC support on the main beneficiaries (Chapter 4 of this report), it was difficult to fully separate SDC impact from the overall impact of humanitarian aid. Many former beneficiaries could simply not distinguish SDC support from other forms of humanitarian aid. Direct SDC impact was easier to measure with respect to infrastructural constructions and rehabilitations (schools, health posts, roads/bridges, food centres, water/sanitation, and hospitals) where SDC was more visible and identifiable.

The report is divided into four chapters.

Chapter 1 is an introduction to the report, providing an overview of the methodology applied, the territorial project areas supported by SDC, and the changing context of Huambo during the different periods of support.

Chapter 2 provides an assessment of the different projects and programmes that received direct SDC support. The chapter covers support to infrastructural constructions (Roads / Bridges, Hospitals, Water and Sanitation, Schools, Health Posts, Food Centres and Community Kitchens), as well as other projects supported, such as Mine-Risk Education, Reforestation, and the HIV/AIDS Project. In each section of the chapter, there is a focus on the official objectives of the projects and programmes and an overview of the actual organisation of the projects' implementation. This is followed by assessments of the shorter- and longer-term impacts of the projects and the extent to which they have been sustainable in terms of the material state (hardware) and organizational capacity (software).

Chapter 3 provides an assessment of the organisational beneficiaries of SDC support, covered by the RISC and APOLO programmes and the support to MUBELA in Huambo, as well as a general assessment of the shorter- and longer-term impact of SDC employment of local community workers. The chapter also includes an assessment of the Luanda-based Community Initiative Programme. This is intended to provide a basis for comparison between the project model used in Luanda and models used in Huambo.

Chapter 4 contains an overall assessment of the impact of humanitarian aid for the main beneficiary groups that received SDC support, namely Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), urban poor and rural returnees. The chapter is based on 10 case studies, of which 7 cases include a questionnaire survey of 95 households. The chapter includes an assessment of the timing, coverage and relevance of humanitarian aid during the emergency phase, as well as the main livelihood strategies existing during that period. This is followed by and compared with the present (2007) socio-economic situation of the beneficiaries in different geographical areas (urban *bairros*, IDP resettlement areas and rural returnee areas).

The assessment of the different beneficiary groups, projects, and programmes covered in this report are all introduced separately at the beginning of each section in the report. A common thread is that different types and groups of beneficiaries will be assessed in relation to the organizational frameworks they interact with and operate through, sometimes referred to as the "software". The different sections constantly relate the organization of different types of hardware implementation (construction and rehabilitation) to software organizational developments. This is important, as sustainability of hardware construction and rehabilitation is intimately related to how local communities, national-, provincial- and local government bodies and different non-governmental organizations took - or did not take - responsibility for maintenance and upgrading.

To focus, as this report does, on the longer-term impact and sustainability of projects implemented under the heading of humanitarian aid within a context of emergency can be regarded as unusual. Assessments made in this report *should* be seen in light of the fact that SDC during the period between 1998 and 2001 operated with an explicit emergency relief objective that did not aim to ensure longer-term impact and/or development-oriented models of capacity building.

The evaluation team has, however, found that an assessment of projects and programmes based on a longer-term impact and sustainability is appropriate, as a very high number of the SDC-supported infrastructural projects and associated organisational structures have been carried over into the current development phase. This can in itself be considered a huge success and suggests that humanitarian aid has an impact and effects that exceeds the immediate objective of such aid provision. Some conclusions may thereby at first sight seem misguided when compared with SDC's official and operative objectives. The evaluation team does, however, find the approach relevant not at least in light of SDCs interest in strengthening the knowledge of the effects and impacts of ten years of humanitarian aid for the benefit of future emergency relief interventions.

1.1 Methodology and Overview

The methodology used by the evaluation team combined quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques, relating the assessment of individual projects, programmes and beneficiaries to the changing context of Huambo province. In addition, SDC and SDC partner documents, as well as other available publications on support to the Huambo province, were consulted and analysed.

In the assessment of **infrastructural projects**, the evaluation team combined inspection of the physical state of the buildings (hardware) with interviews with local clients and/or personnel of the infrastructure (teachers, parents of pupils, clients of health posts, nurses, users of roads and bridges and so forth). The latter was to ensure assessments of the 'software' aspects of the infrastructural constructions, including the past and present use of roads / bridges, schools, health facilities etc., in order to analyse the impact for beneficiaries. Interviews also served to provide information on different aspects of sustainability – i.e. what institutions and/or communities were responsible for and participated in repair and maintenance. All roads and bridges were inspected together with an Angolan engineer. The engineer also inspected 5 school buildings, as well as 4 water points and sanitation facilities. These professional inspections are included in the overall assessments of hardware, when it was found appropriate. Finally, interviews were made with local authorities as well as provincial directors of different sectors covered by SDC support (see annex 1 for consolidated list of interviews and meetings).

In the assessment of **organisational beneficiaries**, the evaluation team visited and interviewed past and present leaders and staff/workers from local, national and international NGOs, local micro-enterprises and MUBELA, as well as directors and functionaries from provincial sector ministries. Besides these groups of interviewees, former SHA/SDC staff was interviewed, and project and programme documentation provided by SDC and former SDC staff, and local NGOs and businesses consulted and analysed.[1] Impact on local community workers was pursued through interviews with former workers in selected areas, as well as with people who had not participated in SDC-supported constructions. NGO partners who had been responsible for mobilisation of local workers were also consulted (see annex 1 with consolidated list of interviews and meetings).

In the assessment of **beneficiary groups**, 10 case study areas were selected for a more detailed analysis of the beneficiaries' perceptions of humanitarian aid in the past and their current socio-economic situation. This consisted of in-depth interviews with key informants and observations (rapid appraisal) of the areas. In 7 of the 10 case studies, the evaluation team conducted a questionnaire survey with a total of 95 households (see section 4.2.1 for a more detailed account of the methodology applied). Finally, representatives of MINARS and local authorities were also interviewed on the impact of humanitarian aid and on the present (2007) socio-economic situation (see annex 1 with consolidated list of interviews and meetings).

1.1.1 Types and Number of Projects Assessed

Table 1 provides an overview of the total number of projects supported by SDC that the evaluation team could identify (based on documents, interviews in Huambo and inspections). It then lists those projects that were identified as still existing or functioning and finally the numbers that were sampled for inspections by the evaluation team. As noted in Table 1, not all projects visited still existed or functioned (for example food centres, forests and IDP camps). The evaluation team tried to cover all the identified projects where this was possible, but with respect to water points, schools, health posts and roads, time did not permit a full coverage of the very large number of projects. Information on projects not visited was included, where it was possible, through interviews with partner organisations, provincial authorities and former SDC staff members.

Table 1: Assessed Projects by Evaluation Team and total Number of Projects

Type	Total by SDC	Existing/functioning	Visited
Schools	**34**	**30**	**13**
Health posts	**9 (+ 2 assisted)**	**9**	**7**
Food Centers	**8**	**2 (+ 2 as schools)**	**5**
Roads	**8**	**3 (at least)**	**3**
Bridges (UNIDO)	**3**	**3**	**3**
Bridges (Simple)	**2**	**1**	**1**
APOLO partners	**5**	**4**	**4**
RISC	**3**	**2**	**2**
Hospitals rehabilitated	**3**	**3**	**3**
Reforestation	**4**	**2**	**3**
HIV/AIDS project	**1**	**1**	**1**
IDP resettlement areas	**5**	**5**	**5**
IDP Camp areas	**4**	**0**	**4**
WATSAN (pumps)	**Approx. 600**	**Approx. 70%**	**59**
Peace and Reconciliation	**4**	**2**	**3**

[1] Throughout the text do we use SHA/SDC, as well as SHA and SDC. For nearly all local staff, SDC activities were referred to as SHA activites. Where most SDC leaders were aware of strategic shifts local staff did not make the distrinction between SDC and SHA expect when referring to SHAs scaling down of activities in Huambo. This also applies to many NGO partners who generally referred to SHA independent of which phase in the engagement they participated.

1.1.2 Territorial Project Areas Supported by SDC

The core territorial areas of SDC support differed between the different phases of support (1996-1998, 1999-2001/2002, 2002-2003 and after 2003), which followed the changing contexts of war and peace in the Huambo area. However, a main conclusion is that the majority of support was given to areas within or close to the municipality towns of Caála and Huambo. It is clear that in terms of the coverage of support to beneficiaries, it was predominantly IDPs during the emergency phase (1999-2001/2) that were supported. Support to IDPs who had returned to their villages after 2002 was low. Below is an overview of the projects supported by SDC, excluding the various forms of support that SDC gave through international aid agencies (ICRC, WFP and so forth).

1996-1998: Peace/Rehabilitation

The plan was to support road/bridge rehabilitation in the Benguela corridor, as well as the municipalities of Bailundo (north) and Tchikala-Tcholohanga (south). Due to problems of negotiations with UNITA, which controlled the area of Bailundo, the support to this area never materialized. In Tchikala-Tcholohanga support became confined to one bridge (Satchitemo). The end result was that support was predominantly confined to the areas close to Huambo and Caála towns. Micro-projects were also supported in the Huambo town area and a few villages close to Huambo.

1999-2001/2: War/Emergency

Caála and Huambo Municipalities close to the main towns were the main support areas during the war period. These included: 1.) IDP transit Camps in Huambo and Caála towns (period 1999/2000); 2.) IDP resettlement areas in Huambo (2), Caála (2) and Ekunha (1) municipalities all within a maximum of 14 km from the main towns (period 2000/2001); 3.) Rural villages (3) in Caála within a maximum of 20 km from the main town (period 2001); 4.) Urban *bairros* in Huambo town (throughout the war/emergency period). Two projects were also supported in the municipality of Katchiungo (main town), including rehabilitation of a school and a leprosy clinic.

2002-2003: Returnee Period/Transition to Peace

Support to returnee villages in Huambo and Tchikala-Tcholohanga municipalities mainly in the form of health posts. The vast majority of these were in Huambo municipality (5) of a maximum of 20 km from the main town. Only one health post was supported, as well as ndirect support to a cooperative in Tchikala-Tcholohanga municipality (village of Hungulo). Support to two returnee villages in the municipality of Longonjo through the ADRA-Internationals agricultural support program (2002-2005). In 2002-03 SDC also supported two Peace-Building and Reconcilliation projects in Huambo province, the DW 'Voices of Peace' project and the SFCG Conflict Resolution project. The DW project covered 11 municipalities in Huambo province, thereby expanding the geographical scope of SDC support, hitherto confined to five municipalities. The SFCG project covered Huambo town, as well as a number of rural municipalities such as Katchiungo, Londwimbali, Bailundo and Ekunha

2004-2006*:* Transitional Phase from Emergency to Development

The Peace-Building and Reconciliation projects commenced in 2002 and 2003 continued in this period (i.e. the DW and SFCG projects) and ended in 2004 and 2005. Added to these was SDC support to Handicap International's Mine Risk Awareness project (2004-05) and to the Peace-Building and Reconciliation programme of ICRC (2004). The Mine-Risk Awareness project was implemented in Bailundo, Mungo and Tchikala-Tcholohanga municipalities of Huambo province. SDC also supported one HIV/AIDS project, which was implemented by CV-A and CV-F in Caála and Huambo between 2004 and 2006. Support was also given to the delivery of furniture for health posts and schools in various areas of the province (low cost-support).

1.2 The Changing Huambo Context 1995 – 2006

Huambo province, in the central part of Angola, has a geographical extension of 35,771 km^2 with an estimated population of around 2,257,000 habitants, distributed across 11 municipalities and 37 communes. It has one of the highest population densities of Angola estimated at 58 persons per km^2. Huambo province is limited by Bié and Kwanza-Sul province to the north, Bié to the east, Huíla to the south and Benguela and Kwanza-Sul to the west.

The most important ethnic group in Huambo is Ovimbundu, representing an amalgam of different sub-ethnic groups who came from North Africa until they settled into the highlands (Planalto) of Huambo. Apart from Ovimbundu, there are also some few Ovangangela and Tchokwe, as well as some Ovanyaneka. The name of Huambo was given after the Paramount Chief Huambo Kalunga (the Great Sea) who settled in present-day Caála municipality. During the colonisation process, there was fierce fighting between the white invaders and local people, which resulted in some serious disasters to the invaders. The last military expedition was carried out by the Portuguese against the Paramount Chief Mutu-ya-Kevela, with fights and skirmishes which lasted until 1902, the year Mutu was killed in an ambush. In 1912, the Portuguese General Norton de Matos founded Huambo city, named Nova Lisboa (New Lisbon).

The collective memory of struggle against colonial invaders has set a background for inspiration to UNITA leaders, most of them from Huambo, Bié and Benguela, who saw their war against the MPLA regime as the continuation of the war their forefathers waged for decades against intruders. This can explain why Huambo has been of great significance to UNITA during wartimes. Secondly, what made many people join UNITA ranks in 1975, and later in the 80s, was the social exclusion by the MPLA regime, which neglected the issues of local development and failed to address local grievances.

During the years of authoritarian rule in Angola (1975-1991) Huambo province was regarded as a breeding hide-out of UNITA guerrillas and opposition stronghold. There were some guerrilla members who took part in planting bombs directed at infra-structures. Many innocent leaders were also targeted by the government, and local elite cohesion was gradually destroyed by the Security Police control. There was some sense of discrimination towards being Ovimbundu, which meant to be a potential UNITA supporter. Even today it is current to hear in Huambo: if you contest, they (people from MPLA leadership) might say that you are a UNITA supporter.

UNITA won a landslide victory in Huambo during the 1992 general elections, but local expectations got shattered after the post-electoral crisis in 1992, when UNITA refused to accept the electoral results and the war resumed. In 1993, after 55 days of heavy fighting, UNITA came to occupy Huambo city. This brought disillusionment to local people whose life came to deteriorate compared to the previous years.

In 1994, UNITA was dislodged from Huambo city and came to set up the military headquarters in the symbolic town of Bailundo, the place of the Paramount Ovimbundu Kings and a strategic place from a military point of view.

Military recruitment after the emergence of armed struggle in 1961, plus the post-independence civil war combined with authoritarian rule, contributed to the depletion of the local elite, leaving Huambo people vulnerable, while living under the ghost of past prejudices. The post-electoral civil war, and the last and most fierce war between 1998 and 2002, left a huge deficit in terms of human resources and leaders, leaving Huambo almost decapitated, despite the emergence of local humanitarian NGOs which struggled for crumps at the donors' table.

1.2.1 No War – No Peace: 1995-1998

The Lusaka Protocol was signed in the capital of Zambia on the 22nd of November 1994. Unlike the 1961 Bicesse Accord, the Lusaka signing ceremony did not bring much enthusiasm on the side of the local population after so much starvation and devastation during UNITA occupation. The period ranging from 1995 to1998 can be best described as a “no war – no peace” time.

The post-independence war combined with the post-electoral war brought destruction on a massive scale with schools, hospital, roads, health posts, shops and markets destroyed. Even mission schools that provided the only available education services to local people were shut down or were unable to function well. Poverty was rife and small towns were dependent only on agriculture and limited marketing. There were local traders who bought and sold local products in neighbouring towns, and also provided provisional services like nursery, and transportation to health posts. The most useful trader who could perform all kinds of paid tasks was called *Kandongueiro* (some kind of unlicensed or a private provider of public transport) who used all types of vehicles from cars to homemade trolleys for transporting people and goods.

During this time span, movements to and from UNITA-occupied areas was limited to UN Agencies, NGOs and the churches. People with some friends and relatives in the UNITA ranks could carry out some trading movements. There were armed robberies across countryside roads, deaths and kidnappings. There were lots of unidentified armed soldiers looting villages, causing people to abandon their villages by night. Some roads were being mined.

Within the local population in Huambo, given the collective trauma brought by a recent war, political harassment of opponents and the sensation of being under a psychological siege, there was a widespread sense of insecurity. The vast majority of Huambo province was under UNITA military occupation, while the Government had only the Huambo and Caála cities.

On the side of NGOs, although there were many initiatives, the political environment did not allow NGOs to carry out a real development process. This was the time that the SDC started building the so-called “Bridges of Peace”, by building bridges in some pre-selected countryside areas, but given the political and military constraints, it was only possible to do half of the endeavour. In the meantime, under the umbrella of UTCAH, humanitarian NGOs and church institutions tried to channel humanitarian aid to poor people in countryside, through the so-called “Corridors of Peace”. There were also de-mining actions in some few areas.

It was during this period that OCHA at the national level started capacity building of the Angolan counterpart, the UTCAH (Technical Coordination Unity for Humanitarian Aid). At local level, they started capacity building of NGOs involved in humanitarian aid because UN agencies were considerably restricted in access to vulnerable populations. There was therefore a need to work through local NGOs in order to reach out to vulnerable population groups. OCHA and MONUA also started training NGOs and Government personnel on the issues of human rights and protection of the vulnerable and victims of war.

From late 1997 until November 1998, the situation started deteriorating and there were rumours of heavy weapons being transported to Bailundo which contributed to the increasing fear and mistrust in the Lusaka Peace Protocol. At the same time, systematic failures to try to restore state administration came to give a final blow to the fragile peace process. This entire standstill brought the situation to a breaking point with the region facing a new and deadly war.

Many IDPs in Huambo city refused to go back to their places of origin because of political and military instability in places like Bailundo, Mungo, Londwimbali Katchiungo, Tchikala-Tcholohanga and Sambo. Accompanying the opening session of the MPLA Party Congress on 5th of December 1998, two UNITA strongholds in Huambo (Bailundo and Mungo) were the first in Angola to be attacked in order to restore state administration by force.

1.2.2 Full-scale Civil War: 1999-2002

After the war resumed in December 1998, Huambo city was shelled by UNITA during several weeks, and the guerrilla managed to attack and occupy most of the countryside municipalities. Due to heavy attacks and fighting, the influx of a new wave of IDPs started flowing from the countryside to Huambo city. In the meantime, Angolan military, especially the special forces called *Caçadores* (Hunters), in their struggle against UNITAS guerrillas started driving thousands of families from their rural homes to the cities, as part of the scorched-earth policy, in order to cut off the food supplies and prevent young males from joining UNITA. For the first time, the number of IDPs shot up, to around 350,000 people, of whom around 75% were women and children. Many adults and young men were either waging war or had been killed during the war.

Humanitarian aid was confined to Government-controlled areas, which led people from UNITA-controlled areas to flee and seek help in the cities, given the level of human starvation and famine. International and national NGOs turned to emergency approach by providing food and shelter at the main IDP camps scattered around Huambo city.

To lessen the pressure of IDPs on land for cultivation, the Huambo Government started a resettlement from the so-called "inadequate" transit centres to locations nearby their home villages. This relocation programme brought controversy between the Provincial Government and UN agencies and international NGOs, given that the places where people should be moved to were lacking basic facilities like water, shelter and firewood as well as security and military protection. But the programme was implemented and donors had to contribute with humanitarian aid in form of food, shelter, latrines, schools and health posts.

Many IDPs lived in camps, while others settled with relatives and friends in the Government-controlled areas. The death toll in the IDP camps was high, given the shortage of clean water, shelter and sanitation conditions. According to some observers, every day 10 to 20 people were dying due to the appalling conditions.

Given the shortage of food supplies from international agencies, people would go back to their fields in long journeys and most of the time walking at night. Some would be caught in between combats or in ambushes from both sides, especially by UNITA forces, thus being killed or kidnapped.

Identity and Sense of IDP

Being an IDP means bearing the sense of shame and destitution and being without physical or psychological references. Forced dislocation is an abnormal situation and brings a sense of loss and disorientation and generates vulnerability. Most of the Huambo IDPs were from rural areas where they had land, and they had developed agricultural practices, which constructed their social and cultural references. In fact, with the loss of their land, their normal life and practices, an important part of their identity was also lost[2]. As the old *Umbundu* saying suggests: "it is rather better to be a slave then a visitor". To be a Displaced is worst. Nevertheless, the new environment helps to forge new identities. It means that the IDPs create new references, make new friends and find new opportunities and challenges. As the IDPs struggle to find their own way of social recognition by making new friends, setting up new communities and starting new professions, their identities become mixed, thus lessening the sense of loss, disorientation and social marginalisation.

In addition, the prolonged wars came to underline the differences between those who came earlier to the cities (*old Deslocados)* and the new arrivals (*new Deslocados)*. This classification is used by IDPs themselves, by NGOs and by Government representatives.[3]

[2] Birkeland, Nina M. & Gomes, Alberta Wimbo, Angola: Deslocados in the Province of Huambo, p.22.
[3] Ibid.

Access to Social Services: Education, Health and Water Points
Most of the IDP children were poorly educated and many NGOs, alongside with SDC, set up schools in IDP camps to help access to education. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), with other partners, was at the forefront of setting up schools in IDP camps. Although most schools were overcrowded, many children attended them. When the war came to an end, some families had set up two living places, one in Huambo city or nearby with children attending school, and the other in the countryside where the parents were able to cultivate and generate funds. All IDP camps also had health posts and water points, built during the time of emergency. There was also preventive education on sanitation in the camps, vaccination, and education on sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. Among the actors were international agencies and NGOs, local NGOs and the provincial Government.

To lessen famine in Huambo city for all vulnerable (IDPs, elderly, disabled…) there were community kitchens around IDP camps and churches, run by church NGOs like Caritas Huambo. Poor people could get at least one meal a day.

1.2.3 Peace Agreement and National Reconstruction: 2002-2006

On 22 February 2002, Jonas Savimbi was killed in an ambush by the Angolan army in Moxico province. This rapidly hurried the peace events with a cease-fire signed *in situ,* later followed by a signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding*,* on 4th April 2002, laying the ground for a peaceful settlement after the failure of the Lusaka Protocol.

The cease-fire had a tremendous impact on IDPs. As the immediate result, the vast majority of IDPs started on their own a slow movement towards their areas of origin, without an emergency plan on the side of the Angolan Government or the major international NGOs and humanitarian agencies. In fact, there was no contingency plan for the immediate aftermath of the Angolan civil war.

The State of Huambo Province in the Aftermath
After people started moving, humanitarian NGOs followed with emergency plans, making rapid assessments for immediate aid delivery projects. Later, municipal and communal administrative representatives came in place, from 2003 onwards.

The Huambo province was characterised by:
- Acute malnutrition amongst population under UNITA control;
- Widespread destruction of social infra-structures such as schools, health posts, water points;
- Quasi total absence of the state administrative infra-structures and services which would help the resettlement of IDPs;
- Entire villages wiped out due to the scorched-earth policy;
- Landmines disseminated across rural areas, which represented a real danger for the returning IDPs;
- Damaged roads due to lack of maintenance and landmines;
- Destroyed bridges making difficult the freedom of movement for the returning population to areas of origin;
- Lack of basic food supply to the returning population.

The magnitude of all the problems presented above posed an insurmountable challenge to the Angolan government. In fact, the Government of Angola, failed in Huambo to conduct a rapid and extensive evaluation on the resettlement programme for IDPs. Most IDPs reached their areas of origin on foot. They reached home in a pitiful state, with malnutrition contributing to a high death rate. IDPs were joined by UNITA ex-combatants and their dependents.

In the meantime, after the Tripartite Agreements between the Angola Government, UNHCR and host countries, Angolan ex-refugees started flowing to Huambo, from Zambia, Congo and Namibia. By September 2007, Huambo province has received a total of 14,111 returnees, with more than 50% accounted as Spontaneous Returnees, without any assistance. The highest figure of returnees belongs to Huambo city with 4405, followed by Bailundo with 3868. They are still facing social exclusion, political and social prejudices, without supportive projects of long term.

Policies and Practices in the Post-conflict

In short, the Angolan government was faced with a triple reintegration challenge: IDPs, ex-refugees and ex-combatants. At the national level, the Angolan Government came up with the Emergency Resettlement and Return Programme (ERRP), aimed at responding to the national crisis of IDPs, ex-refugees and ex-combatants, but this didn't reach the IDPs who got resettled in their own areas of origin.

At the same time, there was an ongoing process of capacity building for municipal administrations, funded by the European Union in partnership with local NGOs. This programme is called Reconstruction Support Programme (*Programa de Apoio à Reconstrução Nacional – PAR)*, which includes 35 municipalities of Huambo, Benguela, Huila and Bié Provinces. The identified social areas are:

- Health;
- Education
- Clean water and basic sanitation.

In addition to that, as part of the Strategic Reduction Poverty Paper and within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals, the Angolan Government has approved a total amount of 200 million USD, to be allocated during 5 years for local development, especially for agriculture and rural development.

Nevertheless, despite all these good efforts on the side of the Angolan government, there are huge challenges for local development. All of the above-mentioned projects are planned in offices, without the full participation and involvement of local people. As many donors and NGOs in Huambo are withdrawing from Huambo due to shortage of funds, the local population is left with uncertainties about its future. In the meantime, some local people perceive that NGOs are approaching them on behalf of unknown interests. As one inhabitant put it: "*They come with book notes, making a lot of interviews, asking for our pressing needs in terms of health, education, whatsoever, and after that they disappear in their cars without trace, leaving us behind. They will never come again and we are left more poor and desperate".*

The local people have their own perception of poverty and destitution. For them, the most urgent and empowering help are cattle for cultivation, seeds and agriculture in-puts. They are collecting 3 to 4 maize bags per year, which is seen as a meagre harvest. A few, especially the ex-combatants who benefited from Military Reintegration Programmes, have cattle and they harvest around 10 maize bags. In this scenario, widows, female-headed families, disabled people, the sick and elders are left on their own. War orphans must struggle to survive.

To supplement the meagre harvests, able-bodied people do charcoal burning, collecting 3 bags per month, which are sold in Huambo city at a price of 500 kwanzas (around 5.50 USD) each. In order to circumvent roadblocks and Forest Supervisors, they must pay a bribe. The charcoal burning can have devastating effects for the local environment. In addition, Huambo soils have been subjected to intensive cultivation which has led to soil degradation.

There are a number of social reconstruction projects going on in Huambo city and in rural areas. Main roads, especially those that link provincial cities, are under reconstruction, which will bring good prospects for economic development. Many schools and health posts, hospitals, and municipal and communal administrations are being reconstructed. All of this will contribute to local

development. But in the long run, in order for all these policies and projects to bring about development, it is crucial to rebuild the physical, infra-structural and social capacities lost during the war, given that the post-war humanitarian aid was focused on relief, not on capacity building.

For Huambo to develop and tackle the post-conflict heritage challenges in the long term, it is crucial to link development with good governance and political and economic decentralisation, which must take into account vibrant participation from local communities. The planned 2008 elections will be a starting point, followed by local elections at a later date.

2 Assessment of Soft- and Hardware Projects and Programmes

2.1 Roads and Bridges in Huambo Province

2.1.1 Introduction

SDC launched its programme in Huambo with the planning of a very extensive road and bridge rehabilitation coverage. This took place within a still fragile period of Angolan history, with formal peace reigning, but with a *de facto* dual administration of UNITA and the MPLA government in provinces like Huambo. The SDC programme turned out to be overly ambitious: first due difficulties faced by setting up the technical and practical aspects of the programme including formal agreements with the UNITA and MPLA authorities in the peace period; second due to heightened tensions between MPLA and UNITA ending with the return to war.

The initially planned objective by the beginning of 1996 was the rehabilitation of approximately 400 km of secondary road linking Huambo town to other municipalities in the province, as well as construction and/or rehabilitation of 15-30 bridges. This was by mid-to-late-1996 changed to the rehabilitation of 146 km of secondary road (totalling 8 stretches of roads) and the construction of 12 bridges as part of SDC's peace-time infrastructural support programme (1998 Evaluation Report).[4] However, due to the worsening security situation and the difficulties faced by the division of areas controlled by UNITA and MPLA, this was not realised. SDC in particular had problems with negotiations with UNITA. In Bailundo (UNITA-controlled area), agreements with UNITA failed after several attempts by SDC to obtain a formal permission to commence road rehabilitation and bridge construction.[5] The result was that roads were only rehabilitated on the MPLA side, and three bridges of the UNIDO type were constructed close to the frontier of UNITA/MPLA-controlled areas. By the end of 1998 all road/bridge constructions outside Huambo town and surroundings were terminated.

During the period of relative peace, problems were also faced in terms of procurement of construction materials and machines. Arrival of the latter was severely delayed, meaning that the initial plan was not upheld (the machines were planned to have arrived in the beginning of 1997, but only arrived later that year.[6] Until then SDC had to rely on light machinery such as tractors and trucks.[7] Procurement of timber for MUBELA and subsequent production of bridge elements also delayed the process (MUBELA was not ready for production until mid-1997).[8] Finally, problems with identification of state counterparts were a main obstacle, due to the lack of state capacity at the time.

[4] In the initial plan of May 1996, SDC planned 15-30 bridges as well as approximately 400 km of secondary road.
[5] Negotiations with UNITA were given up by June 1997, when UNITA officially said that it no longer wanted SDC to support road rehabilitation. It physically blocked the road to Bailundo, stating that it would do the rehabilitation on its own. UNITA had earlier been dissatisfied with SDC's suggestion that local workers would not receive a considerable salary, but mainly work for food. SDC was at the time not entirely sure, however, of the reason why UNITA withdrew the agreement.
[6] It is a general problem that no proper contextual analysis or appraisal have been done by SHA/SDC. We base this observation on interviews and the fact that no such documents have been forwarded to the evaluation team.
[7] Delay of heavy machinery was largely due to problems with administrative coordination between Luanda and Switzerland.
[8] On the impact on MUBELA and its employees, see Section 3.4 of this report.

2.1.2 Objectives

Even though the main objective of the ***Bridges for Peace and Secondary Road Rehabilitation*** programme (1996-1998) was the construction of bridges and rehabilitation of roads, a range of other objectives aimed at:

- Improvement of the free circulation of people and goods to improve the local economy, benefitting agricultural production, marketing possibilities and job creation;
- Secure job opportunities for local communities participating in road and bridge rehabilitation/construction;
- Enhance reintegration of demobilised soldiers through their participation in rehabilitation/construction;
- Ease the work of other international as well as national aid agencies in performing activities outside Huambo town;
- Have the psychological and symbolic effect of bringing people together and linking territories of UNITA- and MPLA-controlled areas, thereby contributing to the peace-building process.

The programme emphasised both the hardware (physical construction) and software (reintegration, organisation and psychological) aspects of support. Impact indicators in 1996 centred on: a) increase in amount of agricultural production and improvement of trade; b) improvement in livelihood of x number of people living by infrastructure; c) number of people benefited from income due to participation in construction/rehabilitation; and d) fostering of communication between UNITA and MPLA as an aspect of peace promotion. It should be noted that the Bridges for Peace programme was the only programme during SHA/SDC support until 2003/2004 that had clearly formulated objectives and impact indicators.

The programme did *not* have an explicit programme strategy for securing sustainability in terms of maintenance and repair. The involvement of local community workers was confined to the objective of job-creating opportunities in the short term and not concerned with the organization of local villagers to contribute to repairs in the future and/or to lay claims on the state to provide for maintenance (see also Section 3.5). However, the May 1996 evaluation report mentions the desirability of SDC to support the strengthening of officially responsible state institutions in road/bridge construction in order to secure sustainability. The report also makes it clear that this was difficult to achieve due to the division of administrative control between MPLA and UNITA during the period of planning. SDC would therefore wait until the state administrative responsibility with regard to roads was more clearly defined. In the mid-1998 evaluation report it is suggested that INEA should be capacitated to take over the constructions /rehabilitations as part of the SDC phasing-out strategy, but that this would depend on the GoA to strengthen INEA.

The May 1996 evaluation report (annex) mentions a sub-programme for rehabilitation of infrastructure with the title “community rehabilitation programme” (suggested at a round table conference of donors in 1995). In the programme paper the overall objective is to rehabilitate roads as well as support the reactivation of the INEA intervention squad to rehabilitate unasphalted primary roads and to re-equip the municipal structures with road maintenance machines (for secondary roads). Material was to be left with the municipalities after the rehabilitation work. The programme also included support to electricity and water supplies. To the knowledge of the evaluation team, this programme was not realised.

By the beginning of 1998, the objective from 1996 was reduced considerably in terms of number of bridges and roads. The new objective was construction of 4 UNIDO bridges and 2 provisional bridges and roads where possible. The change was due to the realisation that the security situation, delays in delivery of machinery, wood construction elements (MUBELA) and the achievement of formal agreements with Government (UNITA and MPLA) severely delayed the process.[9]

[9] By the beginning of 1998 one bridge had been constructed and 2 were in the making. Due to the ‘success’, the objective was then changed again now aiming at the construction of another 10 bridges, depending on the developing security situation, which shortly thereafter deteriorated considerably, and the objective was never realised.

Support to ***road rehabilitation and clearance during the emergency phase*** did not follow an explicitly formulated objective. It was part of *ad hoc* and spontaneous responses to requests from national and international partners in selected areas in and around Huambo town, where there were no large security risks, but where ongoing projects (including IDP camps) were in urgent need of road access.

2.1.3 Main Findings

The relevance of the planned support was high during the peace period (1996-98) due to deteriorated and destroyed roads and bridges.
The objective of physically and symbolically connecting MPLA and UNITA areas, and thereby contribute to the peace process, was well-intended.

- The choice of the *UNIDO* bridge model was a costly choice in terms of time, human and financial resources due to the advanced technology. While the UNIDO bridge model has a durability that is (relatively) above a simple tree-trunk bridge model, the latter could have been constructed within a shorter time frame, been less expensive and constructed with primarily local workers.[10]

Only 3 out of 12 planned bridges and 26 out of 400 km (later down-scaled to 146 km) of road was realised.

The coverage of roads and bridges planned by SDC from the beginning to mid-1996 turned out to be extremely ambitious and unrealistic taking into consideration the fragile security situation. The double administration and division between UNITA and MPLA areas made planning and formal agreements difficult and was not predicted in the plans of SDC. The programme turned out to be too ambitious. SDC had to end its originally planned road/bridge rehabilitation programme due to the return of war.

SDC showed high capacity to adapt to the changing security situation by supporting a range of spontaneous road rehabilitations in the safe areas in and around Huambo town during the emergency phase. Spontaneous support also included 2 provisional bridge constructions (simple model with tree-trunks) in cooperation with church partners. The wider relevance of these two bridges is, however, questionable (serving very few beneficiaries).

SDC showed little capacity and strategic overview of how to secure local ownership and sustainability in a context with fragile state institutions.

In all the 7 projects surveyed by the evaluation team, there was an urgent to relatively urgent need for rehabilitation today.[11] Only one bridge had received a full and permanent rehabilitation. Maintenance of roads and bridges, and in particular drainage systems crucial for the sustainability of gravel roads, is a major problem by 2007. INEA/Obras Publicas does not have the capacity to secure rehabilitation, but there also seems to be a lack of acknowledgement of the importance of maintaining drainage systems in those areas where INEA has in fact made repairs of the secondary roads.

There is no current sense of community responsibility for the maintenance and minor repair of roads and bridges. This is also the case where SDC involved local workers in rehabilitation and the making of drainage systems with local workers (2000-2001 projects with ADPP and DW). There was no follow-up and later organization of community members for repairs. SDC and partners left the responsibility fully in the hands of the state. This is unfortunate, because repair of drainage system could be done with the use of unskilled local workers and simple tools.

[10] An alternative bridge model would have been a metal bridge (Type Bailey), which would have been more sustainable in the long term.
[11] In total 4 bridges, where 3 were of the UNIDO model, and 3 roads.

Longer-term impact for workers (improvement of skills and income) has been the case in some areas and in particular for skilled workers (see Section 3.5).

2.1.4 Overview of SDC Support

The Bridges for Peace programme did during the ***reconstruction phase*** from 1996 until the end of 1998 only rehabilitate around 16 km of secondary road outside Huambo town, linking towns to SDC-constructed UNIDO bridges (Calima bridge and Caála Ekunha bridge). Another 12 km of road was rehabilitated in Huambo town and nearby *bairros* (covering 4 smaller stretches of road). One of these roads was of asphalt (6,4 km) and the project was done with INEA, as part of SDC's attempt at capacitating INEA technicians.

During the ***emergency phase*** from the end of 1998 and until 2002 only 2 provisional bridges were built from tree-trunks. These were situated close to Huambo town and based on requests from partners (Mission Trappa and a missionary co-op). The construction of these was done due to the fact that SDC had terminated other planned bridge construction and road rehabilitation. It was a means to use SDC know-how and machinery during the emergency phase.

Two roads were rehabilitated during the emergency phase within safe areas of Huambo town. These were spontaneous support, based on requests from partners (DW and ADPP). They involved the use of local work force as part of creating job opportunities and local ownership. Apart from these, there were numerous road rehabilitation and clearance works done by SDC in the emergency phase (including the central hospital, IDP camps and minor parts in and around Huambo town). This work relied on SDC know-how and heavy machinery for road rehabilitation. Table 2 lists the completed roads and bridge:

Table 2: Overview of Road and Bridge Constructions

UNIDO bridges (Planned 1997-8) (bridges for peace)	**Tree-trunk bridges** (ad hoc support w. partners during emergency)	**Secondary roads** (planned 1998)	**Secondary roads** (ad hoc support w. partners during emergency)
3 (frontier areas outside Huambo)	2 (Huambo area)	6 (28 km) (2 outside Huambo)	2 (1,7 km) (Huambo area)

Security Problems during Implementation

The UNIDO bridges were built under difficult security situations. Security issues related to the existence of mines in and around bridges, as well as criminal gangs. Later the security situation was directly related to the return of war. SDC was from the outset aware of the risks of a return to war. Security guards were necessary around bridge constructions, and no roads were rehabilitated in UNITA-controlled areas. This was partly due to the failed negotiations with UNITA. UNITA was reluctant to make agreements with SDC. Huambo-based SDC personnel also faced problems with the Luanda and Bern SDC offices during this period. The head offices wanted the Huambo office to terminate the work in security-prone areas before the last bridge could be finalised (Ekunha bridge). However, the Huambo office managed to convince Bern that the bridge needed to be finalised, despite the security situation. The Ekunha bridge was finalised in August 1998 despite increased security problems, only a few months before the war was resumed (interview with former SDC staff in Huambo, September 2007).

Due to the return to war, the objective of 'Bridges for Peace', linking UNITA- and MPLA-controlled areas, was severely compromised. In two cases the newly constructed bridges were partly destroyed within a year. This included the Sambo/Cunene bridge where the MPLA military destroyed 30 percent of the bridge in order to prevent UNITA from accessing Huambo. This meant that the bridge was no longer usable for local residents. It also included the Calima bridge, where UNITA damaged the bridge in an attempt to burn it. Larger tanks and trucks could no longer pass. However, this bridge could still be used for other transport. The roads rehabilitated included 2 roads between the town and the UNIDO bridges of Calima and Ekunha. However, in

the second case the security situation only allowed for the rehabilitation of 4 km out of 12 km. Besides these the rest of the 3 rehabilitated roads included parts close to Huambo town, which was possible during the resumed armed conflict.

2.1.5 Organization and Type of Construction

Bridges. The original idea of SDC was to build bridges by contracting construction to local companies having experience with bridge construction. However, no companies existed in Huambo by 1995 with adequate capacity and prices was extremely high (see Steffen 1995). The war had caused companies to dissolve and local technicians to flee. Instead SDC commenced a partnership with OISC to rehabilitate and make use of the former furniture factory MUBELA for the construction of bridge elements (from mid-1996). SDC also drew on an UNIDO consultant. The idea was to capacitate and train a local workforce to build the UNIDO bridge elements at MUBELA. The long-term idea was that SDC would capacitate OISC/MUBELA and then become a client of the enterprise. However, this was complicated by the slow pace of setting up MUBELA, as well as conflicts with the management. This led to ADRA-Angola (ADRA-A) and Development Workshop (DW) taking over MUBELA from OISC in 2000 (see also Section 3.4).

Added to this SDC coordinated the work with the government through INEA. After the end of construction, the bridges were officially handed over to the state (with an official contract and inauguration by the Provincial Governor). This left the state (INEA) with full responsibility for maintenance. During construction the original idea of having state institutions as local counterparts in order to secure sustainability and local support for the project was difficult. INEA did not directly contribute to the actual construction work. Instead during the actual construction of the UNIDO bridges, SDC relied on collaboration with local NGO partners (OIKOS and OKUTIUKA) for the mobilisation of local workers (see also Section 3.5).[12] The division of labour during the bridge constructions was as follows:

- Approximately 20% SDC technical staff, including Swiss and foreign expatriates and Angolans. The latter were trained by SDC expatriates. This team consisted of engineers, masons, carpenters and supervisors.[13]
- Approximately 30% MUBELA workers tasked with the making of bridge elements.
- Approximately 50% local workforce mobilised by local NGO partners (OIKOS and OKUTIUKA consisting of a mixture of skilled workers (a minority), non-skilled male workers and women for cooking food for workers (see Section 3.5). Contact with NGO partners was made during 1996 as part of the planning process.

The construction of ***provisional bridges*** during the beginning of the emergency phase was done alone by SDC workers without the use of a local work force.

Roads. There were a total of 3 construction models:

- Direct SDC rehabilitation with heavy machinery and no local work force. These roads were part of the originally planned roads/bridges programmes (1996-98). They included drainage systems: Huambo-Calima bridge (dirt road); Caála-Ekunha woods (dirt road); Angotel-Bairro Sanjuca (dirt and asphalt road); and SDC office-werkhof (dirt and asphalt road);
- Road rehabilitation with capacity building of INEA technicians, which worked with SDC to repair asphalt road (São João – Bomba Alta – Checkpoint). This was part of the planned roads/bridges programme prior to the emergency phase;

[12] It should be mentioned that in both road rehabilitation and bridge construction outside Huambo town, mine clearance was necessary prior to construction. SDC financed MECHEM, a South African company, to do this.

[13] By the beginning of 1997 SDC had 79 employees, including 3 engineers (expats). By the beginning 1998 there were 92 employees (84 Angolan, 3 Swiss expats, 4 other expats and a UNIDO consultant).

- Road rehabilitation during the emergency phase (2000-2001) with use of local workers and with light machinery in collaboration with NGO partners mobilising workers. Planning was based on ad hoc response to partners, when SDC's roads/bridges programme had been terminated due to the security situation. These roads included drainage systems (Cruzeiro-Cuando with DW and Bairro Chachindombe with ADPP). Both roads were rehabilitated in areas where the partner NGOs had other ongoing projects.

In none of the cases surveyed did SDC or partners train local workers and/or villagers to secure repairs and/or lay claims on state authorities for future maintenance of bridges (see also Section 3.5). However, this was outside the official objective of SDC (according to the 1996 project documents).

2.1.6 Relevance and Appropriateness

The choice of Huambo province for the 'Programme of National Rehabilitation', covering roads and bridges (1996-1998) was based on a SDC assessment of Huambo as a core site for having an impact on the peace process, given that it was a former war-torn area and an area where control was divided between UNITA and MPLA, with UNITA controlling large parts of the rural areas and in particular the area around Bailundo. Moreover the war period had meant a severe deterioration of secondary roads, which had not been rehabilitated, as well as war-related destructions of colonially built bridges on core roads connecting Huambo town with other towns in the province and beyond. Another argument for choosing Huambo was that it was a central area for basic agricultural production, as well as a site linking key areas (Lobito - Kuito – Luanda – Lubango). The choice was based on consultation with the GoA and international aid agencies.

Bridges for peace and secondary roads during 1996-98. The rehabilitation of roads and bridges was highly relevant, as the infrastructure linking the rural hinterlands to Huambo and Caála town was in a bad state, when SDC's "Programme for national rehabilitation" commenced. However, with hindsight, the programme was too ambitious taking into consideration that it was planned and executed within the context of a peace process that was highly fragile. The question is whether SDC during the planning phase was able of making the necessary thorough and realistic analysis of the context in which implementation would take place. It is clear from SHA reports that the prospect of a return to war was considered on several occasions throughout the entire planning process.

The aim of promoting peace with the construction of bridges was well intended but also highly risky and overly ambitious for a donor agency that predominantly had capacities within construction rather than peace building.[14] This is not to say that SDC was unaware of the security/military risks of bridge construction, as reflected in the 1996 evaluation reports, that included the development of a security concept and a LFA risk list by the end of 1996 (see SHA 1996 Evaluation reports). Solutions were sought in coordination with the two government parties (UNITA and MPLA), as well as ongoing communication with other international agencies. While these strategies were appropriate, SDC's capacity to analyse the peace process context was clearly not strong enough.

The construction and rehabilitation of roads and bridges was also compromised by the fragile and unrealistic planning of procurement and transport of machinery and the impact of the rainy season. Finally, SDC's capacity to negotiate with UNITA and MPLA within a relatively short time-frame in order to reach formal agreements was also unrealistic.

The relevance and appropriateness of the choice of the *UNIDO* bridge model can be debated. It was a costly choice in terms of time, human and financial resources due to the advanced technology. The UNIDO bridge model has a durability that is only marginally higher than the simpler tree-trunk bridge construction, which could have been done with good supervision by a local work force. The more sustainable, in the long term, metal type bridge (Type Bailey), which

[14] This included the expat staff that was employed to plan and implements the programme, mainly engineers and technicians.

SDC did consider during the 1996 planning phase - a model used by WFP in the eastern part of Angola - was disregarded (see also Furrer 2006). In the available SDC documents it is difficult to assess why these options were rejected. One reason could be problems related to the delivery of the metal bridge (see Steffen 1995), but the reason was most probably that SHA became captured by their own planning: the use of a simpler tree-trunk bridge construction and/or a metal bridge would not have involved the use of MUBELA to the same extent.

Provisional bridges during emergency phase. The relevance and appropriateness is not entirely clear. The bridges benefited few people. Support was *ad hoc* with few considerations of longer-term impact and coverage in terms of beneficiaries. The bridges mainly supported church missions and few ordinary people and no IDPs at all.

In both periods (pre-emergency and emergency) did SDC not place much emphasis on prospects for sustainability of roads/bridges in terms of maintenance. The lack of attention compromised the appropriateness of the support in the medium to long term. This is not least the case when taking into consideration that rehabilitations were of relatively short-term durability (in particular secondary roads, which need frequent maintenance, but also the UNIDO bridge, which can be expected to endure for 20-25 years, if maintained properly). All constructions/rehabilitations were given over to the state, and it was expected that the state would and could take responsibility. Minor repairs of drainage systems could have been done by the use of local workers, but the SDC made no effort to follow-up on these potentials for local organization of workers (see also Section 3.5).[15]

2.1.7 Impact in Period of Support and Beyond

UNIDO bridges and secondary road rehabilitation (1996-98). The UNIDO bridges had more impact on local livelihood possibilities than on peace promotion. The aim of symbolically and physically linking UNITA and MPLA areas in the peace period as an element of peace promotion was well-intended, but due to the return to war it did not have any impact.

In the case of the Sambo/Satchitemo bridge, **impact on livelihood possibilities** only lasted for one year, where after MPLA destroyed one third of the bridge so that it was no longer usable for vehicles. Thus the bridge became a war target rather than a peace promoter. However, it should be noted that the post-war state rehabilitation of the bridge was relatively easy, due to the fact that 2/3 of the UNIDO construction was still in a relatively good state. This - at least in the short term - has meant that since 2003 the bridge has again had a large impact on the livelihood possibilities of those people who live south of the bridge (Sambo as well as surrounding villages). Many people here depend, as they did previously, on selling agricultural products and charcoal in Huambo town, as well as trading fabricated products from Huambo town in the area south of the bridge. Moreover a number of IDP families from the area, who fled to Huambo during the 1998-2002 war period, had permanently settled in Huambo *bairros*, but kept a piece of land south of the bridge. By 2007 the females of these families would travel to the areas south of the bridge and cultivate food products. These were either for family consumption or for sale at the markets in Huambo. These people all depended enormously on the bridge to sustain a livelihood and access education in town.

In the case of the two other UNIDO bridges (Calima and Ekunha/Caála), impact has also been huge on local livelihood possibilities as well as on linking municipality capitals to each other. These two bridges were still usable during the emergency phase, albeit mobility was highly reduced due to the security situation. Impact on livelihood possibilities has therefore been greatest in the post-war period, when people could again use the bridge as an element of trading activities to sustain livelihood in lack of fertile land. These two bridges did not have an impact on peace promotion either. In fact the Calima bridge became a war target of UNITA. In the case of the Ekunha/Caála bridge, the impact was also significant with the formation of the IDP resettlement

[15] The question is if this is realistic without a state institution involved. Considering the impact WATSAN had on maintenance with scant local state involvement, the answer would be that it is possible.

area in 2000, ½ km on the Caála side of the bridge. It linked IDPs to Ekunha municipality as well as local villagers to the IDP resettlement area, where they could market their agricultural products.

Impact on the job opportunities of local villagers was mainly the case in the short term. It proved an extra, but minor, income and food as a supplement to agricultural production and livelihood more generally. As discussed in more detail in Section 3.5 of this report, the longer-term impact mainly regarded the skilled workers and not the unskilled ones.

As otherwise intended, the SDC support to bridges and roads did not have any direct impact on integration of demobilised soldiers. Whom the persons were from the local villages that were recruited for the work was random – anyone who had the skills and will to participate in construction. There was no systematic selection of demobilised soldiers in other words (this could perhaps have been the case, had SDC been allowed to fully carry out the planned programme, such as in the areas around Bailundo).

There has been no shorter- or longer-term impact on local community ownership of bridges and roads (for example no contribution to repairs or claims on state institutions to ensure repairs) (see also Section 3.5).

SDC **impact on capacity building of local NGOs** participating in bridge construction is clear in the case of the NGO OKUTIUKA. This NGO was entirely new (sprung out of ADRA-A) by the time of SDC collaboration. According to OKUTIUKA, the participation in the SDC projects allowed it to get valuable experience, build an initial staff basis and gain a foothold in Huambo with regard to community mobilisation (see also Section 3.2).

SDC had a limited impact on the capacity building of state employees such as of road/bridge technicians. Only in one case did SDC give capacity building to state employees (INEA) (the São João – Bomba Alta – Checkpoint asphalt road). The lack of support is unfortunate in the post-war period, as the state is left with full responsibility for maintenance but no capacity. However, the question is whether the inclusion of more state employees in SDC constructions/rehabilitations was possible during the 1997-98 period, because the provincial tiers of the state lacked human and financial resources.
Road rehabilitations during the emergency phase. Impact was high as it facilitated significant access routes in and around Huambo town where there was a massive influx of IDPs. Moreover it helped NGOs such as DW and ADPP to implement their projects by opening up transportation routes to project sites. The roads were more or less none-usable prior to SDC support. Impact on local villagers participating in rehabilitation is unclear. However, lack of subsequent contribution to repairs suggests that impact on nurturing local ownership has been low.

Provisional bridges. The impact of the two provisional bridges (Lufefena and Soque) in the short and long term has been low. It benefited a very small number of people, giving access to church missions and a mission co-op, rather than larger populated areas. The Soque bridge no longer exists. The Lufefena bridge exists, but is in a bad condition and connects the main road to very few inhabitants. An alternative road and bridge is used by the residents of the nearby *bairro*.

2.1.8 Sustainability

Hardware: Material State of Roads and Bridges
Of the 7 projects surveyed all were still in use by 2007, but 6 of these were in urgent to relatively urgent need of rehabilitation. The exception was the Calima bridge (UNIDO model), which had been fully rehabilitated by INEA/Obras Publicas in 2007 (an entirely new bridge of a strong metal quality). Added to the 7 projects surveyed was the provisional bridge in Soque, which was entirely destroyed.

The ***UNIDO bridges*** did not need urgent rehabilitation of the main carrying parts, but the surface of the bridge cover and handrails were deteriorating. In the case of the Sambo/Satchitemo bridge, the need for rehabilitation was due to the fact that 1/3 of the bridge had been destroyed by MPLA

military forces only a year after SDC construction. The eucalyptus tree trunks used to repair 1/3 part of the bridge by INEA in 2003 were clearly not sustainable in the long term, as the quality of the three trunks is low. Part of the old colonial cement foundation was also destroyed when the bridge was bombed, which means that the bridge probably needs to be entirely replaced sooner rather than later. The Ekunha-Caála bridge is also in need of rehabilitation (upper wooden parts and handrail), but the colonial foundation and the UNIDO construction is in a relatively good state. It has received no rehabilitation since SDC constructed it.

The ***provisional bridges*** were of a very low quality, using eucalyptus tree-trunks. One has been fully destroyed and the other was in urgent need of rehabilitation and can no longer carry heavy, loaded vehicles. No maintenance has been done since SDC constructed it.

Of the three ***secondary roads*** surveyed by the evaluation team all were in urgent need of rehabilitation. There were several parts with erosion and potholes. The drainage system was in urgent need of rehabilitation, which is critical for mitigating erosion. The state has only sporadically maintained the roads with heavy machinery, but has done no maintenance on the drainage systems. Having said this, the SDC-rehabilitated roads were still in a better state than those roads nearby that had not been rehabilitated by SDC prior to the emergency phase, which is a clear sign that the initial work by SDC was of a high quality.

Software: Organizational Capacity
INEA/Obras Publicas of the provincial tiers of the state are fully responsible for repair/maintenance of roads and bridges. SDC supported the transfer, as it handed over all roads and bridges through formal contracts after the end of constructions/rehabilitations.

In all projects surveyed there was no perception of local community responsibility for participation in repairs and maintenance. The state was seen by local villagers as fully responsible, and where local villagers had participated in rehabilitation work after SDC-support (Satchitemo bridge), then this was against payment of a relatively high salary for the participation of skilled workers. According to the provincial director of INEA, local community members cannot today be expected to provide voluntary work for rehabilitation or simply to receive food for work. They would expect a salary, unlike during the emergency phase. The failure to create a sense of local community responsibility for maintenance of bridge and road constructions is interesting. In all UNIDO bridge constructions, as well as in two road rehabilitation projects (with the ADPP and DW as partners), did SHA involve local workers. This suggests that the involvement of local workers did not have the effect of creating a sense of local ownership for bridges/roads. It was rather a way in the short term to gain an extra income or food packages to sustain the household (see Section 3.5).

It should be noted that neither SDC nor local partners (OKUTIUKA, OIKOS, DW and ADPP) made follow-up on community organization around contribution to repairs. The rehabilitations were entirely left with the state. The provincial representative of INEA expressed the view that after the donors left, such forms of local organization were dissolved. Also SDC and DW did not hand over any instructions, manuals or otherwise to INEA with regard to community mobilisation or any funds to pay or provide food to local workers. INEA does not have funds to pay local workers for such tasks (see more on this topic in Section 3.5).

In conclusion, SDC made no contributions to secure future sustainability of the local organization and contributions to repair and maintenance of roads/bridges. Even though SDC was aware that the state lacked capacity to take care maintenance and repair of the many roads that were in need of post-war rehabilitation, it expected the state to take over the full responsibility for repair and maintenance. This suggests a concentration by SDC on the hardware side of support.

2.2 Assessment of Central and Orthopaedic Hospital in Huambo

2.2.1 Introduction

Support to rehabilitation of the **Central Hospital** took place from late 1998 and was continued until the end of 2001 during the emergency phase. It was done in collaboration with the provincial government and the hospital directorship and coordinated with other international agencies. ICRC and MOLISV were third-party partners in two of the rehabilitation projects. Support covered rehabilitation of three departments, repair of the entire roof, as well as support to rehabilitation of the water/sanitation system, installation of electricity, and the buildings of new outdoor kitchen and laundry. In the last phase SDC also supported the rehabilitation of a sanatorium.

SDC support to the improvement and rehabilitation of the physical facilities of the **Orthopaedic Hospital** in Bomba Alta (a *bairro* in Huambo town) in 1999 was based on a direct request from ICRC, which at the time was running the hospital. Support was directly related to emergency relief (supporting war victims – in particular landmine injuries). Support included clearance of a helicopter landing place (3000 m^2), kitchen and two large charcoal stoves, dining hall (150 m^2), rehabilitation of water/sanitation system, improvement of sporting / training area for patients, and smaller repairs of hospital buildings.

2.2.2 Objective

SDC support to the two hospitals did not follow an explicit programme strategy for the support to the health sector during the period of support (1998-2001).[16] It was confined alone to the rehabilitation of buildings, expansion of physical facilities and gave no support to the improvement of the quality of medical assistance (medicine, training of staff etc.). It formed part of the general support to rehabilitation of infrastructure commenced during the first phase and soon became related to emergency relief priorities of international partners and the GoA's provincial tier. SDC know-how and material resources within construction and rehabilitation was drawn on by other humanitarian aid agencies and the state that benefited from SDC know-how and resources (including heavy machinery for clearing premises).

The initial rehabilitation of the **Central Hospital** in 1998 was planned with other international partners and the provincial government. This was a choice based on the increasingly critical security situation, which did not permit SDC to fully complete its Road/Bridges programme. As such, support to the central hospital was directly related to the need to re-organise the infrastructural support programme by the end of 1998.

There are no explicitly formulated objectives with respect to the **Orthopaedic Hospital** in Bomba Alta. It was based on a direct request from ICRC, i.e. urgent assistance to improve the physical facilities and an urgent need to construct a helicopter landing place for the reception of patients from war-affected areas.

2.2.3 Main Findings

- SDC support had the character of emergency assistance. It was a response to changes in its programme activities caused by the security situation, which did not permit SDC to complete its roads/bridges programme. SDC could use its skills and material resources for construction in the support to the hospitals.
- SDC support to the two hospitals did not follow an explicit programme strategy for the support to the health sector. It was confined alone to rehabilitation of buildings and/or expansion of physical facilities and gave no support to the improvement of the quality of medical assistance. It formed part of the general support to rehabilitation of infrastructure

[16] The financial costs of these different forms of support were not accessible to the evaluation team (see Annex 2.2).

commenced during the first reconstruction phase and later became related to emergency relief priorities of international partners and the GoA (provincial tier).
- SDC made no monitoring or follow-up on constructions after the handover to the ministry of health (MINSA) or ICRC in the case of the orthopaedic hospital. It is unclear if any contracts were signed where duties and responsibilities were presented.
- The rehabilitation central hospital was highly relevant and appreciated by local government and health authorities. Through the support the only large hospital in the province could be in operation under relatively good physical conditions (including electricity / water / sanitation) during the emergency phase between 1998 and 2002.
- The support to the Orthopaedic Hospital was highly relevant and appreciated by ICRC in that SDC support coincided with an increase in war casualties.
- The MINSA (central level) has taken responsibility for maintenance of the hospitals during the post-war period: rehabilitation and expansion is presently ongoing.

2.2.4 Organization and Type of Support

The support to the two hospitals can be considered direct SDC support. It involved direct SDC provision of materials and workers (the evaluation team was not able to access information about the type of workers used and the way that materials were procured).

In the case of the **Central Hospital**, rehabilitation was done in collaboration with the central hospital directorship and based on agreements with the GoA (provincial tier). In two cases SDC supported rehabilitation with international partners (ICRC and MOLISV), but also in these cases the GoA was a partner and shared 5-10% of the project costs. In the case of partners SDC stood for 60-80% of the project costs, with partners sharing the rest of the support with the GoA. In mid-1999 the rehabilitation of the central hospital was reduced and put on hold for a brief period. This was due to the changed priorities now focusing on emergency relief to IDP camps after a request from WFP to do construction work. As SDC had to share its efforts on many sites, the rehabilitation of the hospital had to be downscaled for a period. During 1999-2001 there were in addition delays due to the difficulty of procuring construction materials and paint. As a result the rehabilitation process was further prolonged.

In the case of the **Orthopaedic Hospital,** SDC support was done in collaboration with ICRC, which at the time of support was running the hospital. No documentation was available detailing the way support was organised (including workers).

2.2.5 Relevance and Appropriateness

The support to the **Central Hospital** was highly relevant. The hospital was dysfunctional and the buildings were in dire conditions due to the earlier war period (1993-94) and UNITA occupation. Water was penetrating the roofs in most parts of the buildings and the water, sanitation and electricity systems were not working. SDC support to these parts of the hospital was therefore a response to the need for urgent rehabilitation. The hospital received a huge increase in both direct and indirect war-caused illnesses during the time of SDC support (including also patients from the IDP camps in Huambo). This gave the support the character of urgent emergency relief. The hospital covers the whole province. Other agencies (ICRC, WFP, UNICEF, MOLISV and CARITAS) gave medical support, equipment and food. SDC support was coordinated with these agencies, giving the support the character of a joint support strategy to make the hospital operate in an emergency situation.

SDC support to the **Orthopaedic Hospital** in 1999 was highly relevant, as this was the period when the hospital had begun to receive an increased influx of patients with war inflicted injuries (including landmines).

2.2.6 Impact in Period of Support and Beyond

SDC support to the **Central Hospital**, along with various other international agencies, had the important impact of securing that the hospital was able to (re)operate under relatively good conditions during the emergency phase. In particular the rehabilitation of the roof was considered by hospital staff as an extremely important support by SDC. The SDC construction of a kitchen had a large impact on the capacity of the hospital to feed patients (with food donations from WFP during the emergency phase and MINSA in the post-war period). The outdoor laundry benefited family members of patients, who were and still were in 2007 responsible for cleaning the clothing and bed sheets of patients. The laundry and the kitchen were still fully operational by 2007.

SDC support to rehabilitation of buildings, roof, water-, sanitation-, and electricity systems had a direct impact during the emergency phase. During the post-war period, the GoA decided that the hospital needed to be fully rehabilitated and not just piecemeal repaired as had been the case from 1999 onwards. This process was initiated in 2006 by a Chinese construction firm, financed by the GoA.

SDC support to the **Orthopaedic Hospital** was a significant contribution to ICRC's programme of support to war-inflicted victims. It facilitated the operation of a helicopter platform by preparing the landing place, as well as improved the conditions of patients through the new constructions of a kitchen (including stoves) and a dining room. The impact of the repairs of the buildings was difficult to assess by the evaluation team, as these had been rehabilitated continuously since the SDC provided support. During the emergency phase, the hospital received victims of mines and amputations in general, including patients from numerous areas in Angola (e.g. Huambo, Moxico, Bíe, Lubango and Luanda). Patients also included civilians and soldiers from UNITA areas. Between 1995 and 2007 the hospital treated approximately 4,000 patients. By 2007 the hospital is still in operation and has good facilities for patients, as well as a well-functioning workshop for the fabrication of 'artificial limps' and clutches. By 2007 it still delivers crutches to many provinces throughout the country and has as such an impact beyond Huambo.

In none of the hospitals did SDC assist with software improvements such as improving the quality of medical treatment through training or the provision of equipment. SDC alone implemented interventions on the physical facilities.

2.2.7 Sustainability

Hardware: Material State of Buildings

The sustainability of SDC support to the **Central Hospital** buildings was impossible to assess, because the hospital by the time of the evaluation was undergoing rehabilitation by a Chinese construction firm: all roof tiles had been taken down; completely new water-, sanitation-, and electricity systems was being installed. The kitchen constructed by SDC was still in operation and in a relatively good material state (however with one stove broken). The laundry facility constructed by SDC was in a very good material state as it was made of concrete.

The material state of the **Orthopaedic Hospital** was very good. New buildings had been constructed with finance from MINSA and former buildings had been rehabilitated since SDC support. The sustainability of SDC rehabilitation was therefore impossible to fully assess. The kitchen and dining room constructed by SDC were, however, possible to assess. It was still in a relatively good state and used daily.

Both hospitals fall under the responsibility of the central level MINSA. Most probably this explains why the hospitals have received thorough maintenance during the post-war period. This can be contrasted with the health posts, which fall under the responsibility of the provincial government and where maintenance today is a problem (see Section 2.5).

Software: Organizational Capacity
The **Central Hospital** still exist with capacity for 800 patients that presently are placed in barracks during the rehabilitation of the hospital. The hospital formally services 11 municipalities. It has 58 doctors (8 Angolans and 50 foreigners). The hospital is today fully financed by MINSA (central level).

The **Orthopaedic Hospital** is well-functioning by 2007 with the exception that it lacks doctors. Doctors are borrowed from the Central Hospital, but there are plans in place for the employment of specialised doctors presently undergoing training in Brazil facilitated by ICRC. The hospital has been able to adapt to the post-war situation by:

- Gradually handing over the hospital from ICRC to MINSA, so that ICRC today only covers 10% of the total budget of the hospital, including one expatriate and one Angolan advisor.
- Gradually turning the hospital into a general rehabilitation centre for patients with physical problems (legs, backs, brain damages causing paralysation etc.).
- Establishing an ordinary health centre for nearby residents. In 2004 the hospital was renamed 'Agonstinho Neto Physical Rehabilitation Hospital' to indicate adjustment to the post-war situation and the treatment of other than war-related patients.

MINSA (central level) has shown high capacity to take over responsibilities after the gradual withdrawal of international assistance from 2004.

2.3 Assessment of Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) (1997-2004)

2.3.1 Introduction

By September 2007 Huambo encountered yet another "water crisis"[17] and relied once again on the hundreds of wells constructed by the Development Workshop (DW) since 1997. The main difference between earlier "water crises" and the present one is that the provincial government can today rely on a local water infrastructure, partly funded by SHA/SDC between March 1997 and March 2004. This support covered the various phases of reconstruction, war, emergency and transition to development. Whereas former "water crises" were caused by war and massive displacement of people, the present crisis is caused by a Chinese construction firm's attempt at installing a new and more extensive water system for greater Huambo. The aim is to replace the colonial water system, which so far has only been renovated sporadically in the 1980s, 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium.[18]

Until January 1997 the International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) was the leading agency addressing water needs in the town of Huambo and its surroundings, depending on the security perimeters. At first the ICRC became involved in water and later in sanitation as part of sustaining health and medical activities. Between 1985 and 1991 the main goal of the "water division" of the ICRC, which formed part of the Medical- and later Health Division, was to provide stable water sources to health facilities: hospitals, health posts, and the orthopaedic centre, as well as the houses of expatriates.

Besides opening new wells, the main work was aimed at protecting wells and springs for hygienic purposes. The main urban water system, which had been working sporadically, was destroyed after 1993, when UNITA took over Huambo. Consequently, ICRC increasingly relied on protected hand-dug wells, boreholes and water-carrying tankers, although new attempts at rehabilitating the water treatment station (Kulimahala) were undertaken. In 1991/92, after the Bicesse Peace Agreement, the ICRC attempted to hand over its operations to the MPLA government and sought

[17] A description made by the provincial director for energy and water August 2007.
[18] The Chinese construction firm hired to implement the new system were to construct a 'parallel' system allowing the city to use the old system until the new installations were ready for operation. Based on what was described as a "communication error", the Chinese construction firm, without warning, from one day to the other dug up and removed the old canalised system leaving major parts of the city without access to water.

in various ways to find a suitable partner within the nongovernmental sector that could make the investments sustainable. All attempts were fruitless.

Importantly, the benefits for the general population were until 1994 indirect (through better medical and health conditions) and limited to surplus water provisions "once 'medical' needs were covered" (Nembrini 2001: 5). The wider impact of the ICRC's intervention was therefore "quite limited" (ibid.). The general population of Huambo suffered from a lack of stable and clean water access. It was estimated that water consumption was well below the 30-35 litres a day recommended for adequate personal and domestic hygiene (SEDC 1991: 72). Consequently, in 1995, the ICRC launched a new Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) programme based on shallow public wells construction, in order to cater for towns' and barrios' need for safe water. While the programme in most other respects was a success it lacked capacity, as access to necessary materials and equipment was a severe problem (Nembrini 2001: 12).

After 1995 the ICRC water access programme made considerable gains, as water treatment at the Kulimahala station again became functional, but severely lacked capacity to cope with the increased water needs. The hand-dug well programme was extended to a variety of municipal communities including Caála, Bailundo, and Ganda. After 1995 the ICRC increasingly worked with the local water utility 'Direcção Provincial de Agua', which again became operational. In order to bridge the transition from emergency- to development-orientated implementation of programmes, several projects outside Huambo city were "delegated" to the national Red Cross Society (CVN), despite their limited capacity (see Section 2.7).

In 1996 the ICRC intensified its attempts at finding a solution to the transfer of its now significant and growing water department. It initiated negotiations with government entities, bilateral donors and national and international NGOs in order to hand over the programme. The mandate of ICRC was running out as the fragile peace agreement between UNITA and MPLA was being settled. *Empresa de Agua,* the local water utility, by October 1996 took charge of the management of urban water distribution, but "confusion" emerged over responsibilities for funding and supply of fuel, chemicals and wages for operators (Nembrini 2001: 11). This placed further strain on water provision where water distribution by far exceeded treatment capacity, making access to safe water rather hazardous, as increasing numbers of people in Huambo relied on polluted surface water.

The wells programme therefore became increasingly important, just as maintenance of wells and springs already constructed since 1995 totalled about 80 (ibid. 12). With funding from the SHA and the Canadian International Aid Agency (CIDA), DW (a Canadian NGO) moved to Huambo in 1997 and took over ICRC's water programme (including staff, spare parts and equipment). SHA's funding for the first two-year contract totalled 1,248,182 USD. New contracts were negotiated every second year and the programme expanded. There was a gradual reduction of SHA's input, as DW found other sources of funding. In total, SHA/SDC provided DW with 2,374,235 CHF for the Water and Sanitation project (WATSAN) between March 1997 and March 2004 (the full support for WATSAN activities was 3,762,973 CHF including projects in other provinces and in Luanda).

2.3.2 Objective

The **overall objective** of the project was "to establish an effective, replicable and quality system of construction and management of community-based water points in Huambo province" (DW 1997: 8). DW still addressed general public health concerns, but its approach differed from ICRCs with respect to sustainability. This difference represented a shift from a strict emergency concern towards a more development-oriented approach, emphasising community responsibilities for, and management of, water points. The ICRC emergency approach built wells and springs free of charge, with costs (manpower and materials) covered by the institutional budget and with no considerations for cost-recovery and maintenance. The most important **specific objectives** were:

- Safe and sustainable water supply for 156,000 people in the Huambo province alone during the first 2 years of the project, to be achieved through the construction of 100 protected water points, and ensuring that 70% of ICRC wells and springs were functioning and in hygienic condition;
- Introduction of "community-based maintenance and management systems" at each of the new water points, as well as at 70% of ICRC-initiated water points;
- Investigation of the possibility of implementing a cost-recovery system based on user fees and participating organizations;
- Liaison with the Provincial Department of Water (DPA) and sharing experiences gained by the project, aiming at influencing provincial water provision and policy;
- Establishment of a monitoring system including both technical and social aspects of the project;
- Improvement of the technology used, ensuring more efficient use of resources and more user-friendly installations (for all the above points see DW 1997:4-5).

The shift in emphasis of the water and sanitation project was not solely due to DW's input. The project document emphasises that the project was developed by DW in close collaboration with the DPA. According to former SHA staff, the support to the project and the inclusion of DW was a deliberate attempt to tap into DW's acknowledged experience from Luanda, concerning community-based water supply and -management developed in close collaboration with local government authorities. Reflecting these changes, the project established weekly briefing and planning meetings with provincial water authorities, and monthly meetings with the overall project committee based in Luanda, including the SHA, DW and government representatives.

While the overall objective remained relatively stable over time, the changing context of Huambo in particular and Angola more generally required adjustment of the objectives over time. The return to *de facto* war after March 1999, and the consequential influx of IDPs to the main towns of Huambo and Caála made SHA and DW change the project objectives. On the one hand, it was not possible to operate outside the security perimeters. On the other hand, the WATSAN project responded by increasingly catering for the needs of displaced people (in camps etc.), the needs of other multilateral and bilateral organizations, state and government institutions, individuals and national and international NGOs, as well as the general urban populations whose access to water had come under further strain.

2.3.3 Main Findings

SHA/SDC support to DW must be classified as a major success.[19] Despite the fact that some specific objectives have been implemented with greater success than others, in general, the project has performed extremely well, in particular when taking into consideration the changing security context of Huambo. The present water crisis also illustrates the impact of WATSAN in the sense that the provincial authorities today rely on the water points implemented by DW between 1997 and 2004.

The most important results have been:
- The construction of approximately 600 water points between 1997 and 2004, providing safe water to well over 400,000 people (some estimates suggest 600,000);
- The establishment of water committees (*grupos de agua e saneamento* or GAS, with 5 members in each) or other forms of public authority (traditional authorities, health personnel, school directors, political leaders, priests etc.) taking care of maintenance and management of water points at nearly all community-based water points;
- A high level of payment to the GAS or other public authorities for usage of water at community-based water points (estimated 41% payment), with a lower level of payment at institutionally-managed water points (estimated 10% payment);

[19] The percentages mentioned below refer to a survey conducted by the evaluation team in and outside Huambo, where 59 pumps were randomly selected for inspection based on the DW database (including the 1997 to 2004 period).

- The bonus of a not directly planned synergy between different DW- and SHA-supported interventions, where water points have been constructed and pumps installed, with local committees or public authorities responsible for management at health posts, schools, in IDP camps etc.;
- Presence of a relatively updated database accounting for all water points established by DW with the SHA and other donors;
- Successful shift to the 'Village Level of Operation and Maintenance (VLOM)' type of hand pumps that has allowed for a relatively high level of maintenance success, with an estimated 70% of all pumps (private, institutional and community-based) and 63% of community-based pumps operating by 2007;
- The project was able to change its priorities during the emergency phase between 1999 and 2002 without loosing track of the need for making access to water a sustainable enterprise;
- The WATSAN project has been able to attract funding after the SHA stopped funding the project in March 2004;
- Due to continued funding of WATSAN, DW has been able to continue its service provision of VLOM-pumps by providing the service teams and spare parts necessary for the repair of pumps.

Besides these notable results, the WATSAN project has been less successful with regard to:
- Influencing provincial water policy in order to make the provincial authorities take over from DW, thus making the project genuinely sustainable.
- Considerable confusion existed with regard to the responsibility for repairs of water points that had broken down (most frequently community-based pumps, as they were used by more people than private and institutional water points). DW maintained that it was the formal responsibility of the local provincial authorities. Water point managers overwhelmingly saw the constructor, DW, as the agent responsible for repair, and demanded that DW sent out repair teams in cases of a breakdown. Local provincial authorities were notoriously ambivalent, as they were well aware that they were formally responsible, but nevertheless relied completely on goodwill from DW for repairs.
- Even though the GAS were established the same year as the water points were constructed, their importance diminished over time, and other public authorities (traditional leaders, priests, local political leaders, school directors, health personnel etc.) took over management of water access in what is estimated to be 36% of community-based water points and 75% of all pumps. This increased the possibility for exclusion of particular groups of people and/or in many cases limited opening hours of the water points, as the manager locked the water point (evenings, weekends etc.) in order to safeguard the resource.
- While a comprehensive database was established with entries for each year, listing both technical and social organizational aspects of water management, the database seems to have been less well-managed over the last 2-3 years. First of all, the database did not have similar entries and setup every year, rendering it difficult to use. Secondly, considerable confusion existed with regard to the sources of funding for different projects accounted for in the database. Part of the reason for these limitations could be that DW during 2007 had dismissed the coordinator of WATSAN, and that the new coordinator had not had sufficient time to deal with the database. It should be mentioned that a copy of the database had been transferred to the provincial authorities during 2007, but they had not been given proper knowledge of the use and workings of the database.

Even though the WATSAN project was generally considered a success by former SHA/SDC staff, several myths circulated regarding the project and DW's involvement. The most important findings in this regard were:
- Several former SHA staff members criticised DW's methodological focus on organizational community-building for being a "miscalculation" and "too costly time-wise" during the emergency phase, where there was an urgent need for water and sanitation provisions "in order to save lives". Huambo-based DW staff acknowledged that there had been tensions and conflicts of interest. DW therefore changed its emphasis during certain emergency phases, but generally maintained its methodological approach even under considerable

pressure from SHA staff. Taking into consideration that a considerable share of emergency constructions have been transformed into reconstruction during the development phase, DW's approach seems justified and, in hindsight, appropriate.

- Former SHA staff criticised the DW project for failing to provide alternative access to water when pumps broke down (such as access from wells). It was consistently claimed that the concrete top of the pump installation did not have an extra entrance from which water could be accessed manually. In nearly all the pumps checked – 59 in total – such an entrance was available, but due to usage most of the iron ring allowing for removal of the side entrance had disappeared. The problem of alternative access seems to be somewhat solved, in the sense that older pumps from 1997 and 1998 often lack the alternative access point, whereas newer installations usually have alternative access points. In general people did not know how to use the side entrance. DW is aware of the ongoing shift in GAS members over the years (due to death, migration, return, etc.), and the fact that new members do not necessarily have a profound knowledge of the workings of the wells. DW will therefore take this into consideration in the new water strategy which is under elaboration for the Huambo province.
- Generally there was a strong conviction that DW-Luanda negotiated content and funding directly with SHA-Luanda, thereby bypassing the SHA-Huambo office. The first contract was signed in Luanda between DW and SHA/SDC. For subsequent contracts it is for the evaluation team not clear where they have been signed, but according to current DW staff (see also Nembrini 2001), the actual content of each project phase was discussed beforehand with SHA staff, national and provincial authorities and in some cases local NGOs and associations in Huambo.

2.3.4 Organization, Setup and Technology

Contract with SDC/SHA

The decision of SDC to sign a contract with DW probably owed to its strong capacity vis-à-vis the capacities of other NGOs, be they local, national or international. On the other hand, this has at least to some extent been promoted by the strong support DW has received from SHA/SDC over the years. Perhaps for this reason, local NGOs and former SHA staff suggested that DW was favoured by SHA support and funding. DW received bigger and longer-term projects, projects that in addition had a considerable overhead. DW was also, administratively and management-wise, allowed to run their projects without interference from SHA. There is no doubt that DW, compared to other NGOs (see also Section 3.2), was a favourable organization for SHA/SDC, and that the two organizations together made an important impact in Huambo province. DW nonetheless set up operations in Huambo, because they were asked to do so by the SHA/SDC. It therefore from the outset held a strong position when negotiating with SHA, because SHA needed a partner organization with capacity, an administrative setup they could trust, and a clear methodology on community involvement in service provision and management geared towards development needs. These aspects SHA/SDC did not have, because it was working within an "emergency" mindset. Consequently DW held a strong position from the outset, and was able to negotiate an initial contract, which catered for its desire to consolidate operations in Huambo province. As a DW employee from the Luanda office phrased it: "you can say we were professional and very good at negotiating. We had a product which was strong and with proved methodologies so maybe we were in a better position than other organizations". DW, with SHA support and confidence, was thus treated differently than other organizations, but they had to follow the same strict rules on reporting and financial management as other organizations.

Inception Survey
In contrast to many other SHA-supported projects, the WATSAN project was based on an "inception survey" (see Nembrini 2001). The survey identified the most significant shortcomings of the former ICRC projects, upon which WATSAN was built. Some of the problems identified were:

- Use of a pump technology that made it difficult to secure a permanent and reliable source of water, as it could not be repaired locally;
- Even though many of the ICRC wells and springs worked, they were not deep enough;
- Each water point was used by more than 125 households - well above the recommended number, as it placed strain on the water source (limited time for recuperation) and absorbed time needed for other tasks.

How some of the findings were used is described below and points towards the need to make adjustments – some of them considerable – even though the DW was taking over a "successful" (Nembrini 2001) project. It also points towards very different setups for "emergency" and "development" interventions but also clear possibilities for synergy.

Institutional Setup and Impact
The WATSAN was built up around:

- A Technical Support Unit consisting of two teams taking care of the production of concrete blocks for the wells construction and the concrete well rings;
- A Social Mobilisation and Hygiene Education Unit taking care of sensibilisation, training of GAS in management and repair, and of the populations in water use, sanitation and cost recovery;
- A Field Construction Unit taking care of the technical aspects of identification and construction.

The responsibility for planning and monitoring rested with the **WATSAN Project Management Unit** that met monthly and consisted of the project coordinator, the coordinator's assistant, DW´s provincial representative, the financial administrator, the head of the construction unit, the head of the technical unit and the social mobilisation coordinator. On a monthly basis, at the provincial level, the management unit was liaising with the **Provincial Water Committee**, consisting of a DW representative, the director of the DPA, representatives from UNICEF, Save the Children (UK), the SHA Huambo office, ICRC, and stipulated representatives from other NGOs and bodies which were not defined from the outset. At national level, the **Project Steering Committee** monitored the WATSAN project quarter-yearly. The committee consisted of the project coordinator, a SHA-Luanda representative, and DW's water project coordinator, community development coordinators, the Huambo Provincial Representative, as well as representatives from NGOs working in the water and sanitation sector.

SHA's representation in the Project Steering Committee and the Provincial Water Committee allowed for a certain synergy to emerge between the WATSAN and other SHA interventions (such as within the educational and health sectors). It also provided assistance during the emergency phase (1998-2001) at the different IDP camps, where water and sanitation were provided. For example, water points were commonly constructed at schools and health posts, just as water points were constructed as part of the various camp interventions. However, synergy was often coincidental and *ad hoc,* because SHA funding for each DW sector (water and sanitation, education etc.) and phase was negotiated separately and with separate budgets, targets, reporting formats, etc.

Plans had to be redrawn continuously, as priorities shifted during the different phases. SHA, just as other members of for example the Provincial Water Committee, made during the cause of time different requests to the WATSAN project on what, where, and when water and sanitation should be constructed.

The fact that SHA sector funding was “project orientated” with separate targets, budgets and reporting guidelines, made real synergy difficult. Sequencing, project circles and planning were not aligned: “each pillar operated independently, and reporting- and budget-wise it could be difficult to create synergy” (quote from interview with DW coordinator). Part of the problem related to the relatively weak state capacity to secure overall coordination, even after the UTCAH was created. Another problem was SHA’s specific project-orientated, piecemeal way of dispensing funds.

SHA approach was administratively difficult to handle, but DW staff nonetheless suggested that the SHA reporting framework had an enormous impact on DW: “I personally and the DW more generally learned to operate the “rigours” (also referred to as “excessive”), but also diverse report formats” related to the different types of funding mechanisms (Quote from interview with DW staff). In order to handle the administrative demands posed by SHA, they had to restructure their administrative and financial system in order to meet the demands. DW successfully managed to so, thereby ensuring a stable flow of SHA funding until 2004. This allowed DW to become a major player in Huambo.

Infrastructural Setup

As part of the handover DW took over ICRC’s technical team of 21 persons (nationals), as well as equipment and a variety of spare parts and construction materials. The transfer from the ICRC was nonetheless rendered difficult, because the production facility needed to be re-sited. It was based at the ICRC compound. The chosen site was the main premise of DPA. The site was not fit, so time and resources had to be spent on cleaning and renovation of the premises, workshop and offices, construction of separate entrances as well as a production site and installation of water and electricity.

From the outset, the infrastructural setup created problems. DW was so highly dependent on water supplies that it needed new supplies, as well as production of gravel for the concrete ring and brick production site to be delivered by truck once a week. Particularly during the initial phases of the project, DW relied on SHA support, such as transport of gravel and sand. This was because the ICRC hand-over of a promised truck was continually postponed. Also budget posts like rent and later procurement of 4x4 wheel drives, crucial for the community work and planning, which should have been provided by the ICRC as part of the take-over package, were not delivered (consequently, the construction of water points did not begin until June 1997). This obviously required some flexibility on behalf of SHA.

The placement of the production facility at DPA’s main facility – although separated from the DPA – suggested a clear intention of a gradual hand-over to DPA as it gained experience and capacity.

Technology

Whereas the ICRC used SWN 80 (van Rekkum) pumps for its installations between 1995 and 1996, the DW shifted to the VLOM pump made by AFIDEV based on the results from the Inception Survey. During the first year, a third type, the INDIA MK II, was installed at 10 wells, as the model had been part of the equipment handed over from the ICRC in 1997. But the model does not seem to have been used thereafter.

2.3.5 Relevance

Overall

Support to the water sector was highly relevant and an appropriate priority taking into consideration SHA/SDC’s health focus. This should be seen in light of the increasingly precarious water system: the operations of the Cuando hydropower station providing the power for the water distribution system and the Kulimahala water treatment station was increasingly dysfunctional and finally ceased to operate from 1992. Added to this there was within Huambo city and the ever-expanding suburbs an increasing population density. Even though the water system (distribution and treatment) was continuously repaired, it never became fully operational, as the present total renovation project confirms. In this situation the WATSAN project became increasingly important,

as safe water point construction came to provide the basic access to water for all groups and walks of life in Huambo.

GAS

The introduction of "community-based maintenance and management systems" at each of the new water points, as well as at 70% of ICRC-initiated water points, were by 1997 a novelty, aimed at creating a greater awareness and sustainability with regard to management of common scarce resources. It also mirrored the political context of Huambo, with its very weak state capacity and broader trend towards "self reliance", "public private partnerships", "self-governance" etc. usually depicted as intrinsic to neo-liberal reform agendas. The move towards a cost-recovery system based on user-fees and managed by a GAS (even when first formulated as an explorative objective) was fully consistent with the attempt at making water provision feasible and sustainable. Coupled with the VLOM technology, local communities could even - when the state was lacking in resources and management - secure access to a scarce resource.

Taking into consideration that the WATSAN project was formulated during the relatively peaceful and optimistic years after 1995, the shift from emergency implementation to(wards) a development-driven mode of implementation was generally relevant and considered a timely intervention by the fieldwork team. But the development of community responsibility for the management of water points and contributions towards their construction nonetheless encountered problems from the onset. Some of these problems were intimately related to the former emergency mode of implementation.

The ICRC construction of wells, boreholes and protected water points were built and repaired by the institution free of charge. All costs for construction materials, manpower and technical equipment were covered by the ICRC's general budget post for the project. DW's introduction of community-based participation in construction and introduction of user fees covering repair therefore ran into problems. From the outset local communities did not "understand why they had to contribute not only with their labour for the construction of the wells, but also financially, at least to support normal maintenance of the premises" (Nembrini 2001: 12). The "assistance-for-free-approach" used before by the ICRC (and other emergency and relief organizations and institutions more generally) was therefore at odds with the involvement of users of water. Through intensive community training the WATSAN project partly managed to change the tide (see below), but to fully appreciate and change the situation a new entity probably needs to take over from DW so that the constructing partner is different from the servicing partner. If not, the idea concerning a "donor" taking care of the utility will be difficult to change.

2.3.6 Impact

Alone during the first 2½ years of the SHA-supported DW project, 230 wells were constructed, benefiting an estimated 160,000 people, and support and materials for 64 latrines were provided (Nembrini 2001: 13). After the emergency phase between 1999 and 2002, the project reached out to former UNITA areas such as Bailundo and Hungulo, as the security perimeters now allowed for construction of water points outside former MPLA-held urban and peri-urban areas. The main obstacle was to transfer the DW expertise to provincial water authorities and thus *de facto* placing the local government authorities in charge of maintenance and management of water access. During 2007 negotiations between major multilateral donors, provincial and municipal authorities and DW have been initiated, in an attempt to come up with a new framework for cooperation.

Beneficiaries

The types of main target beneficiaries varied between the different phases of reconstruction, emergency and the return to reconstruction/development. It also depended on varying security perimeters (urban-rural divide), which is reflected in the specific WATSAN disbursements approved by the SHA (as contracts have not been given to the consultancy team, it therefore relies on verbal discussions with DPA actors, former SHA- and DW-staff). Within the water sector a mix of beneficiaries were included, illustrating the high dependence of the SHA-funded DW project from different walks of life. The beneficiaries included:

- Private persons or businesses including the governor, vice governor, business premises, the households of expatriates etc. (many of which - if they had access to generators - could fit the water point with a pump), who according to DW had to pay for the installation. But even though payment was obligatory, it was more generally up to the individual beneficiary's conscience and moral obligation. Because the water points were frequently constructed on "private property", the water points were not generally accessible to the wider public;
- Institutions ranking from provincial sector institutions, health posts, schools, faith communities, multi- and bilateral agencies, local, national and international NGOs etc. Water points could be fully accessible to the public/surrounding communities with restricted opening hours (for example during the opening hours of a school), or closed for the wider public;
- Usually, at least at the initial phases of a GAS, community-based water points benefited and were formally open to the wider public. Access could, depending on the authority in charge, be closed during nights or weekends.

As the project progressed and DW had developed an appropriate technology, sanitation facilities were often constructed along with for example water points at schools and health posts. All three types of beneficiaries had entries in the database, and during the first 2½ years of the project 230 wells were built, benefiting an estimated 160,000 people (see Nembrini 2001:13), with a total of approximately 600 water points for the entire period (February 1997 to March 2004), reaching a conservative estimate of app. 400,000 people (no final report for the whole WATSAN has been provided, so this is an estimate. SHA- and DW-staff referred to as many as between 500,000 and 600,000 people).[20]

The fieldwork team's 2007 survey of 59 water points suggests that community- and institutionally managed pumps were generally accessible to the general population.

Table 3: Organization of Water Pumps

Beneficiaries and opening period	Private	Institutional	Community based	Total
The whole community		14	34	48
		74%	*95%*	*81%*
Institution and community		4		4
		21%		*7%*
Only the institution or private entity	4	1	2	7
	100%	*5%*	*5%*	*12%*
Total	**4**	**19**	**36**	**59**

None of the private water points (hand-held pumps) were open for the general public except at special occasions like an emergency (obviously based on each owner's assessment of the situation). Even though, as described below, community-managed water points are managed by a whole range of public authorities and not only GAS, they are generally open for the wider population. This was also the case with institutional pumps (school, health posts etc.), which rarely have been exclusive.

69% of all visited water points in the survey functioned by September 2007. Nearly all pumps have been broken at least once and up to 7 times depending on the age of the installation, but most have since been repaired. One reason for the relatively high level of functioning water points can be attributed to caretaking. The fieldwork team's survey of water pumps suggests that at least

[20] The question of how many beneficiaries that have been reached depends on household size and how many households that are serviced by one water-point. If the formulae is based a conservative estimate of 7 persons per household: 7 persons x 128 households x 600 water points = 537,600 beneficiaries. DW tried to bring the amount of households serviced by one water point down from 128 households, as it was considered unfeasible. If the formulae is: 7x100x600 = 420,000 beneficiaries.

42% of institutional pumps and 53% of community-managed pumps are locked overnight. The most prevalent explanations were that it was done in order to protect the pump from "misuse" and "vandalism".

Table 4: Opening Hours

Opening period	Private	Institutional	Community based	Total
Opening all the time	3	11	17	31
		58%	47%	53%
Open during day time/fixed opening hours	1	8	19	28
		42%	53%	47%
Total	**4**	**19**	**36**	**59**

Taken together, high levels of repair and protection of the installations point towards the creation of a certain level of awareness of how to deal with and protect the common resource.

The WATSAN project also managed to make sure that water points have a certain density while at same time reaching out to local rural communities, an achievement which requires a considerable logistic setup. It also reflects high levels of adaptability.

The inception survey formed the basis for DW's interventions and was brought together with previous data from the ICRC and inserted in a database, which was updated monthly using the software from Geographical Information System (GIS).[21] This allowed DW to plan and track progress. Maps from the starting point in February 1997 and the end of 1999 (Nembrini 2001: 14) illustrates firstly, how results from the survey have been used to increase the density of wells, thereby bringing down the number of people dependent on the same water point, and secondly, how the DW intervention has extended the outreach of the project geographically to include communities outside the perimeters of Huambo city.

The evaluation survey points towards a good access to alternative water sources in case of a primary water point breakdown. In 70% of all surveyed water pumps, a walk of less than 10-20 minutes is necessary in order to reach a second water point. When it comes to community-based water pumps serving the largest population groups, the number is as high as 75%, a number closely matched by institutional water pumps, which in most instances also serve local populations.

Table 5: Distance to alternative Water Points

Distance (estimated in time)	Private	Institutional	Community based	Total
Close by (5-10 min. walk)	1	7	21	29
		37%	*58%*	*49%*
Medio (10-20 min. walk)	0	7	6	13
		37%	*17%*	*22%*
Far away (more than 20 min. walk)	3	5	9	17
		26%	*25%*	*29%*
Total	**4**	**19**	**36**	**59**
				100%

GAS

Nembrini (2001: 23) mentions that by 2000, 179 of 181 GAS or water committees at the return of war were "essential to the maintenance of the various premises" during the hostilities. The fact that there were local leaders trained in maintenance, hygienic principles, cleaning of the water points and with knowledge of where to procure spare parts and where to request assistance,

[21] It is unclear if the GIS is still used. The database to which the evaluation team was provided access did not include any GIS links.

secured access to water for large population groups when one could have feared another breakdown of water provision.

The GAS system is not a stable system, however. It requires a continual process of renewal. The fieldwork team survey suggests that, even though a clear methodology for the implementation of community-based management of water points through the GAS system, from the outset had a 5 person user and management committee, the management principle changes considerably over time.

Table 6: Responsibility for Management of Water Points

Responsible	Private	Institutional	Community based	Total
GAS	1	1	12	14
			33%	*24%*
Church authority	2	2	3	7
			8%	*12%*
Political authority		0	6	6
			16%	*10%*
Traditional authority/assistant		0	9	9
			25%	*16%*
School teacher/director		14	3	17
		74%	*8%*	*29%*
Other (or with no responsible for the management)	1	2	3	5
			8%	*9%*
Total	**4**	**19**	**36**	**59**

GAS are still important, but over time a range of other public authorities drawn from different spheres of society tend to take over the *de facto* management of water points. This is usually public authorities living next to the water point: traditional (*sobas*), political (usually MPLA, but also UNITA around Bailundo), health, school and church authorities. The lack of knowledge about repair and usage of the distributed kit etc. can easily be explained by changes in the management system. The initial 5 person management system seems to be heavy in personnel (see below), and death, migration etc. tend to reconfigure management of water points.

Taking into consideration the present situation in Huambo city with a total breakdown of piped water provision, the fact that there are groups and persons who take responsibility for repair and management nonetheless bears testimony to the impact of the approach pursued by the WATSAN project, even if the management system changes over time.

Wider Development Impact of DW Involvement

A probably unintended impact of SHA's support to the WATSAN project is the arrival and continual presence of DW in Huambo. The DW introduced operations in Huambo in 1997, when it was contracted by SHA to take over ICRC's water and sanitation program. The program initially ran for 2 years, but has since been prolonged several times with increasing funding from other sources such as CIDA, European Union etc. According to DW and former SHA staff they were invited by the SHA/Luanda office to start up the operations. Since then, DW has been involved with shelter construction, peace and reconciliation, school construction, health etc. in Huambo. In many ways DW became SHA/SDC's most important non-multilateral and non-Swiss partner, both with regard to participation in the different phases and types of projects as well as funding-wise.

From initially being funded solely by SHA, the DW has gained greater independence as other international donors have used their capacity and level of technical skill with the DW concurrently introducing various (social and humanitarian directed) commercial activities, including micro-

financing, as well as obtaining main partnership in MUBELA (see Section 3.4), operating the ANGONET telecommunication business (including a training centre) with UNDP, and so forth.

Other international NGOs supported by SHA/SDC have not had the same resilience – a resilience which in the future may become an important partner for the local government within the water and sanitation sector, as well as for local NGOs and CBOs.

2.3.7 Sustainability

Hardware

The fieldwork team's survey of 59 water points suggests that the VLOM pump used had been quite durable, with 69% of all pumps functioning and with a percentage as high as 100% for private pumps, 74% for institutionally managed pumps, and a slightly lower rate of 64% for community-managed pumps.

Table 7: Pumps in Operation

Function	Private	Institutional	Community based	Total
Yes	4	14	23	41
		74%	*64%*	*69%*
No	0	5	13	18
		26%	*36%*	*31%*
Total	**4**	**19**	**36**	**59**
				100%

What these statistics do not show is that nearly all pumps (the few exceptions were private pumps) has been broken at least once and some up to 7 times between 1997 and 2003. This is most frequently the case for community-managed pumps, as they have a wider population coverage rate and therefore are more exposed to "misuse" and "careless use", which may be difficult to control by those responsible for the management of the resource.

When pumps break, it is usually a small plug ("buchas") inside the pump and not the pump as such that falls apart. The "bucha" or plug is relatively easy to repair, ideally by the GAS or another public authority, but usually by the DW Field Construction Unit, which is called upon in case of problems. The pump installation usually has an alternative entrance where water can be accessed manually by way of buckets, if the hand-held pump breaks, or when waiting for the DW team to arrive (which may take considerable time depending on their planned work and the availability of spare parts). But in many instances the local communities, institutions and public authorities responsible for the management of the pumps are not aware of where the alternative entrance is situated. The wells seem generally to be deep enough, but can dry up during droughts like the one Huambo has experienced this year (2007). As the civil construction engineer described a water point in one of his assessments:

"School DEOLINDA RODRIGUES: There is a *manivela* (water pump) installed and the main problem faced every year is that the *buchas* (plugs) break. During the dry season the water level goes down and as a result the quality of water reduces" (extract from Manuel Isabel's report, authors' translation).

During droughts the management of water points becomes important because overuse needs to be minimised. Local communities and institutions generally explained that, if a water point "looses its water, we need to let it wait (not use the pump) so it can come back. When the water comes back we have to use it carefully until the rain comes, if not, it dries up and we have problems" (interview September 2007). This reflects a certain level of awareness of how the water point functions, even if put in a simple language.

Software
As described above, the DW runs the WATSAN project setup and trained GAS or local water management groups as part of installing wells and hand-held VLOM pumps in around 600 sites between February 1997 and March 2004. Over time, the *de facto* management of water points (cleaning, repair, user fee collection, control of water etc.) tends to become diversified, with a whole range of public authorities in the vicinity of the water points (often constructed in front of or next to their office, premise or homestead) taking up responsibility for the management. Only 9% of the visited water points had no responsible person for management. This points towards a resilience of community/institutional management of the common resource, which has a positive bearing on the overall sustainability of the community management approach pursued by DW.

When a pump breaks down, the question of who is responsible and who actually takes care of repairs becomes important. As described above the formal responsibility rested with the local government, but they and many local communities saw DW as *de facto* responsible because DW had access to spare parts. Locally, it may not come as a surprise that the agent responsible for the water management was the GAS and different public authorities who were considered responsible for repairs, as illustrated by the survey:

Table 8: Responsibility for Repair

Who is responsible for repair	Private	Institutional	Community based	Total
The responsible for the pump	3	11	27	41
		58%	*75%*	*69,5%*
Government		8	7	15
		42%	*19%*	*25,5%*
Don't know	1	0	2	3
			6%	*5%*
Total	**4**	**19**	**36**	**59**
				100%

What may be surprising is the fact that over 25% of respondents suggested that the government is responsible for repairs. This might point towards an expectation and persistent idea of the government[22] as the entity which should be responsible for repairs. Another possibility is that the government is conflated with DW due to their close cooperation and sharing of workshop space.

The reference to government as the agent responsible for repairs stands in sharp contrast to the concrete reality in which repairs take place. Here, the local responsible authority, or a messenger, usually contacts the DW technical unit. They either request or buy the spare part from DW, if they know how to do the repair, or, alternatively, they ask DW to send out a team to carry out the repair for them.

The main weakness in this setup is that the frequently broken "bucha" or plug is only available at the DW workshop. Availability thus depends on whether DW has sufficient stock. DW acknowledges that this reliance is unsuitable in the long term. DW does not have funds for procurement of repair components, which depends solely on its capacity to gain new contracts within the WATSAN sector.

In the present negotiations of a new setup for the Provincial Department of Energy and Water (DPEA – previously DPA) several models are being explored. Either the DPEA takes over the responsibility, or a public-private entity becomes the main service provider in the maintenance of hand-held VLOM pumps. None of the models propose a "free service provision". Therefore whatever model is chosen, it will need to rely on local communities' capacity to pay for repair

[22] Here referring to the understanding of government as combining the state, MPLA and the government as a unity, people rarely distinguishing between the different entities

components. Here the WATSAN's cost-recovery system, which earlier was attempted implemented, may become relevant.

DW was specifically asked to investigate the possibility of implementing a cost-recovery system based on user fees and participating organizations. The survey conducted by the fieldwork team suggests that this might be the weakest link in the DW project, as the vast majority (here 89%) of institutionally managed water points do not ask for payment from users. In contrast, 42% of community-managed water points seem to ask for user fees.

Table 9: Coverage of User-fees

Payment	Private	Institutional	Community based	Total
Yes	1	2	15	18
		11%	*42%*	*31%*
No	3	17	21	41
		89%	*58%*	*69%*
Total	**4**	**19**	**36**	**59**
				100%

The fact that 89% of institutionally managed water points do not require user fees can nonetheless be qualified. Schools can include repair of the water point as expenses covered by school fees or their general budget. They therefore do not have to ask local residents to pay for usage (one may ask if the school teachers or the director, as a public institution, should be doing so?).

More encouraging is the relatively high level of user fee payment (42%) at community-based water points. Several models are in operation:

- A monthly fee is paid to the GAS or public authority by each household using the common resource (50 KZS in urban areas and 20 KZS in rural areas). The GAS or public authority then spend the money as payment for repairs and cleaning, or additional costs such as new chains and locks for the wells etc.;
- A collection among users is instigated by the GAS or public authority when a pump breaks down.

Different staff members of DW and DPEA had diverse explanations for how water fees were to be distributed between the GAS and the DPEA. The most common explanation was that 20% of fees were to go to the management committee covering its costs, and the remaining 80% were to go to the DPEA. For those 80% the DPEA were to send out "brigades" of service and maintenance. This was a task that DW in reality ended up performing, because it was the only organization with spare parts. In the future, the model may become successful, depending on how the department manages the present reorganization. The very high level of functioning water points in rural and urban areas suggests that the foundation for organising and diffusing the usage of user fees have been laid out and is working.

The lack of full transfer to the provincial authorities of the WATSAN project is problematic, but also understandable. Considering the very low capacity of the local government water authorities, particularly during the different phases of the emergency periods, there was no functioning local state apparatus to hand over the project to. While the provincial government authorities recently have gained a new confidence and increasingly have become more involved in actual service provision, the water sector is still rather weak. The sector has gone through several rounds of restructuring, redefinition of responsibilities and renaming (from Water and Sanitation (DPA) to Energy and Water (DPEA).

Besides this there is a more general process of adapting to the overall deconcentration process (also called decentralisation in Angola), which will probably have a profound impact on the ways in which water resources are managed and services delivered in the future. Over the coming years,

responsibilities for funding, service, payment and extension of water utilities is to be transferred from provincial to municipal authorities. This is a process DW is deeply involved in at various levels (policy, planning and practice). Here DW functions as the most important partner of the provincial government. As such DW - due to its long term engagement in the sector - has become a key player and can take on a strategic role.

2.4 Assessment of School Constructions in Huambo Province

2.4.1 Introduction

During the period 1996-2003 SDC financed the construction/rehabilitation/expansion of 34 schools in Huambo province. The vast majority of this support to the educational sector took place in the emergency phase (1999-2001) with only 4 schools being built in the 1996-97 phase through micro-projects. 17 of the 34 schools were constructed as part of the Development Workshop (DW) Emergency School project running from 2000 to 2001. 4 of the 34 schools were emergency schools in IDP camps of Caála and Huambo municipalities, respectively. These were made of cloth and plastic and, apart from one school, constructed in and around ruins of old factories. None of these schools exist today. The remaining 30 schools (including 17 with DW and 13 with local partners) were made of more permanent, locally available construction materials. All of these are still functioning today, despite the fact that all but 4 of these schools were constructed or rehabilitated in the emergency phase.

The continued operation in 2007 of 30 out of 34 schools constructed with SDC support clearly points to a carrying over of emergency relief to the post-war development phase. However, it should be noted that SDC support was confined to the emergency period. In 2003 SDC decided to terminate support to the educational sector.[23] SDC therefore did not 'return' to rehabilitation of schools after the war.

13 of the 34 schools were inspected by the evaluation team (4 in peri-urban *bairros*, 3 in IDP re-settlement, 2 in town, 2 in rural areas, and 2 in camps).

2.4.2 Objectives

SDC/SHA support to school constructions did *not* follow an explicit educational sector support strategy with a clearly formulated project objective (including impact indicators and vision/mission). There is no mention in the annual reports and evaluations of an explicitly formulated objective with regard to support to the educational sector. This regards both phases of school constructions: the 1996-1997 rehabilitation phase and the 1999-2001 emergency phase (and projects supported by RISC, see Section 3.1).

Instead the impression is that SDC supported school constructions as a minor part of the overall infrastructural rehabilitation programme on roads/bridges in the first phase (1996-97). During the emergency phase (1999-2001) the impression is that school constructions formed but one element of support to IDPs and urban dwellers through the improvement of social infrastructure as such. The latter point can be related to the fact that SDC during and before the emergency phase was associated with having capacities within infrastructural constructions (technical support and provision of construction materials).

One exception to the lack of an overall and explicitly formulated objective was the SDC support to the DW Emergency School programme (2000-2001), which was co-financed with Canadian CIDA.

In the **first phase (1996-97)** support to school constructions took the form of micro-projects with SDC financial contributions to local NGO partners, amounting to an expenditure of USD 75,000.

[23] This was based on a recommendation of the 2003 evaluation report, which found it more appropriate for SDC to focus on the health sector.

According to interviewees, the micro-projects were intended to show quick results of SDC presence in Huambo as the core roads/bridges infrastructural programme was being planned and was rather slowly progressing (see Section 2.1). The rehabilitation of schools as micro-projects in this sense functioned to make SDC visible and to enhance its credibility amongst beneficiaries and government authorities. Rehabilitation of schools was therefore not part of the explicitly formulated objective to support the educational sector, but rather an 'added-on' activity to the roads/bridges programme. In fact in the May 1997 evaluation there is no mention at all of the school rehabilitations.[24]

In the **second phase (1999-2001)** SDC made a major contribution to school constructions with the overall objective being related to the general support to IDPs as well as urban settlers affected by the influx of IDPs. It formed part of the overall emergency relief activities, rather than a clearly formulated educational sector support strategy. In the beginning of this phase SDC support to schooling took the form of a quick emergency relief response to the Caála and Huambo IDP camps, based on short-term planning with the GoA and the international humanitarian organizations. This was followed by support to more permanent school constructions through: 1.) the DW Emergency School project with a clearly formulated objective, a fixed SDC financial contribution (142,000 USD), and a capacity-building component; 2.) singular projects with Angolan NGOs, related to emergency response in selected areas based on requests from and negotiations with the NGO partners rather than an overall or common programme strategy.

The main objective of the **DW Emergency School programme (2000-2001)** was to provide schools within or close to settlements having large IDP populations as well as peri-urban settings with no organised educational facilities. Community participation in school construction was a second objective, intended to secure local ownership of schools. A third objective was capacity building of locally skilled workers (construction skills) and local NGOs (management and project planning skills) through formal as well as on-the-job training. The schools were low cost (approximately USD 12,500), which was related to the objective of using locally available materials and local workers paid through the WFP food for work programme. The DW programme, in addition, had a training component for local NGOs and locally skilled workers to enhance construction skills. Finally, the programme had the objective of organising and training parents' commissions as an element of securing future community-based maintenance of school buildings and ownership.

The objectives of the DW emergency school programme having to do with community participation and capacity building clearly went beyond exclusive emergency relief support. This can be contrasted with the **SDC support to school constructions with Angolan NGOs** in terms of formulated objectives. In practice, however, these latter projects had clear similarities with the DW programme in terms of both the use of locally available materials and local workers, including on-the-job training of the latter. One core difference was that it was only DW that included capacity building and organization of parents' commissions. This difference reflects DW's explicit development methodology, the character of the emergency relief support period and the fact that SDC was predominantly associated with and had capacities within technical construction support and the provision of construction materials.

SDC itself did not have any formulated objective related to follow-ups on constructions as an element of securing organizational and material sustainability of schools. In this sense the objective was related clearly to an emergency relief situation and the provision of 'hardware'. According to interviews with former SDC employees in Huambo, this provision of hardware through a quick response strategy was considered the main objective.

Securing that buildings were finished within a relatively short time frame was viewed as more appropriate in the emergency situation than using the more time-consuming strategy of ensuring

[24] During the same period SHA supported DW projects in Luanda on building social infrastructure, in particular within the health sector. Here there was, as opposed to Huambo, a clearly formulated objective.

more broad-based community organization around the schools (interviews with former SDC staff in Huambo, September 2007). According to the evaluation team's assessment, this points to a clear difference between SDC and DW conceptualisation of support. SDC viewed the support as purely a response to the emergency situation. DW applied a longer-term perspective on school buildings, despite formulating the programme as emergency schools.

2.4.3 Main Findings

- Relevance of support was very high. There was a massive need for schools for IDPs in Huambo and Caála as well as for urban settlers due to population pressures during the emergency phase. There was also a need for rehabilitating urban-based schools that had been destroyed and still not repaired during the 1993-94 war period. Few schools were supported in rural returnee areas due to SDC termination of support to education after 2003. This is a major problem for returnees by 2007, in particular in remote areas.
- The support had high impact. The school constructions secured that thousands of IDP children, as well as urban settlers gained access to schooling. Furthermore many schools were improved through expansion and rehabilitation of existing schools in peri-urban and urban settings.
- 30 out of 34 schools constructed/rehabilitated/expanded by SDC support are still functioning by 2007, despite the fact that 88% of these were supported in the emergency phase.[25] The continued use of schools suggests that emergency provision generally was carried over into the development phase.
- There was no participation of local residents in the planning of school construction, but there was participation in the majority of constructions. Planning was done with government authorities and other NGOs.
- Impact on community organization (for example parents' commissions) was limited with exception of some DW Emergency Schools. This was not a clear or explicit objective of SDC, however.
- SDC was able to respond quickly and change its strategy during the emergency phase: IDP camps, IDP resettlement areas in Huambo and Caála and urban *bairros* in Huambo. This response was facilitated by SDC's knowledge and capacity within construction (related to the staff being drawn from road/bridge construction). SDC also proved capable of adjusting to a context where there was limited access to construction materials, such as cement, by ways of using local materials (wood and adobe bricks), as well as using local workers in a context where there was lack of skilled workers. The flipside are school buildings which last a maximum of 15-20 years.
- The vast majority of schools are in urgent need of rehabilitation by 2007 (particularly emergency schools constructed by local adobe bricks).
- SDC did not develop an 'exit-strategy' or any follow-ups with regard to maintenance, because all constructions were handed over to the state after termination of projects. SDC has confined its support to the construction phase alone. By contrast the DW projects had an inbuilt component directed at securing local community organization around maintenance in the form of parents' commissions. Today they do *not* all have the capacity to secure repairs.
- Responsibility for maintenance is unclear in practice by 2007, which is partly caused by lack of state capacity and funds to repair schools, and partly caused by NGOs such as DW and ADRA-A encouraging community responsibility for maintenance during the emergency phase. Future plans for decentralisation of funds to municipalities may solve the problem. The question is still how the division of responsibility between government authorities and communities or parents will be organised.
- By 2007 huge differences are appearing between schools where parents have the means to contribute to minor repairs, and poorer areas where parents do not have the means to contribute. This underpins high levels of inequality between the rural and urban/peri-urban areas.

[25] The evaluation team visited 13 of the schools. DW staff in Huambo confirmed to the evaluation team that the remaining schools were still existing.

2.4.4 Overview of SDC Support

The 34 schools constructed with SDC support can be divided into four categories: a.) new schools; b.) rehabilitation of already existing school buildings; c.) extension of already existing schools with additional buildings and; d.) 100% emergency schools in IDP camps. Table 10 illustrates the distribution of these different categories, including the number supported through DW:

Table 10: Overview of SDC-supported Schools

New	Rehabilitation	Extension	Emergency 100%
15 (11 with DW)	10 (4 with DW)	4 (2 with DW)	4 (Camps)

In Table 10 above it is significant to note that the school constructions prior to the emergency period (1996-97) all consisted of rehabilitations of already existing schools through micro-projects, including 3 in urban *bairros* and 1 in a rural setting. This was done in collaboration with local NGO partners (IMES, CAD, GAC and MACA) and was centred on rehabilitating schools that were more or less non-operational due to the effects of the previous war period. Support therefore had the character of post-war reconstruction of infrastructure. This was also reflected in the type of construction, consisting of more solid materials. Less use of local community workers characterised this period in comparison with the next phase.

During the emergency phase (1999-2001) SDC support to school constructions shifted towards a primary focus on war-affected victims, including IDP camps (Huambo and Caála towns) and IDP resettlement areas (Cantão Pahula (Caála), Kassoco (Cáala), Kasseque III (Huambo) and Cruzeiro (Huambo)). However, the majority of support was in fact given to urban *bairros* and settings where the war had meant an increased pressure on schools due to the influx of IDPs. The focus on these areas was due to the security situation, permitting NGOs to work only in and around the safe areas of Huambo and Caála towns. Urban-based schools both included the construction of new schools, as well as extension and rehabilitation of already existing schools.

Finally, Table 11 below illustrates that a few schools were constructed in rural returnee villages, all within a maximum of 25 km from the towns of Huambo, Longonjo and Caála. This can also be related to the security situation at the time of support (2000-2001) where more distant rural villages were under UNITA occupation.

Table 11: Overview of Schools Supported According to Area Categories

Urban *Bairro*	Urban setting	IDP resettlement	Rural villages	Camp
14 (12 in emergency)	5 (4 in emergency)	5 (all emergency)	6 (5 in emergency)	4

In contrast to the 1996-97 period, all construction of schools during the emergency phase was done with local and less durable construction materials (adobe bricks, thin corrugated iron roofs and wooden doors and windows). In the vast majority of cases it involved a high percentage of local community workers, including WFP food for work programme and minor salaries. All schools in the emergency phase were constructed/rehabilitated/extended in collaboration with international partners (4 in the camps), Angolan NGO partners (6), churches (3) or with DW as the implementing partner (17).

Organization and Types of Construction

SDC used three different models of support to school constructions during the period 1996-2003. These models differ in terms of: a.) SDC perception of the capacity of the implementing partner; b.) type of construction materials and models; c.) planning of projects; d.) use of local community workers/skilled workers; e.) support to the organization and capacity building of parents' commissions for ownership and future maintenance.

DW Emergency School Programme*:* based on a predefined and agreed package of 20 schools (17 in Huambo) between DW and SDC in Luanda. DW selected the areas of school constructions based on consultation with local authorities. Coordination was done with the provincial government of Huambo (PGH) as well as with OCHA (overall planning, but not directly construction). Regular contact was made with local educational staff, such as school directors, on the placement of the buildings and the (re)construction of the school. Partners were chosen through a screening process. Former partners of DW were preferred. Relation to the WATSAN programme was prioritised. Planning of construction was done with local partners as well as approved by Local Government authorities (no community consultation). DW was fully responsible for implementation, including construction activities, construction materials and mobilisation/organization of workers. SDC provided frequent on-the-site supervision in only 3 of 17 school constructions.

SDCs limited monitoring of DW activities was based on high confidence in DW knowledge of construction and capacity to implement programmes. Schools were predominantly built of compressed blocks without cement cover (one exception being School 54 where cement bricks was used), wooden doors, thin corrugated iron roofs, wooden roof pillars and small open windows or wooden window frames without glass. All school constructions but one (School 54 in Huambo town) employed local community workers (skilled as well as unskilled), which received WFP food for work. The model of DW was to work with a 3rd local partner: 8 out of 17 schools were constructed in collaboration with Angolan NGOs (ADRA-A, OIKOS and OVIPAKO), 1 with UNICEF/CCF, 1 with a church organization, 1 with the school director and 6 with local communities. In all cases DW trained so-called “Commissões de gestão e manutenção” (management and maintenance commissions), which today are referred to as “parents’ commissions”. They were trained in inspection of buildings, making of plans of actions and were explained about how to use the school in order to avoid deterioration. SDC had no direct involvement in these activities. DW provided follow-up and monitoring of constructions.

Micro-project rehabilitation of permanent schools (1996-97)*:* the initial idea was to contract local Angolan NGOs to take full responsibility for rehabilitation, SDC simply provided funding and materials. However, after experiences with capacity problems of local NGOs during the first project, SDC was forced to provide direct on-the-site support in construction, as well as assist with the procurement of construction materials. There was no training of local workers, but procurement of locally skilled workers. No capacity building/organization of parents’ commissions. No follow up on rehabilitation was done.

APOLO/RISC and emergency period support through Angolan NGOs and churches: based on requests from and negotiation with local NGOs and churches on a project-to-project basis. The local partner identified project areas and made a smaller application to SDC. All agreements were signed with the PGH. The local partner was alone responsible for mobilisation, organization and payment of local workers. SDC shared implementation with the partner to a high degree, providing frequent on-the-site supervision and construction materials as well as on-the-job training of locally skilled workers. There was no formal training of workers. Unskilled workers were also used. Skilled workers were paid a salary and food for work through WFP. Unskilled workers received only food for work. No capacity building/organization of parents’ commissions. All constructions were built of local adobe bricks and the majority with cement cover, thin corrugated iron roof with wooden roof pillars, wooden doors and windows. Latrines were provided in the majority of cases. Some partners like CAD and ADRA-A made follow-up on school constructions, but this was not an explicit strategy of SDC.

2.4.5 Relevance and Appropriateness

Overall Assessment

The support to the construction/rehabilitation/expansion of schools in and close to Huambo and Caála towns was highly relevant both prior to and during the emergency phase in the areas inspected. Lack of appropriate schooling facilities was a huge problem. This included both the IDP camps and resettlement areas where there were no schooling possibilities for the children of IDPs prior to SDC support. It also included the urban and peri-urban areas where the emergency phase had increased the pressure on school capacity due to the influx of IDPs and/or where the previous war period (1993-94) had caused deterioration, if not completely destroyed schools for town-based pupils. In some areas this meant that many pupils prior to SDC support were receiving classes outside school buildings.

SDC supported both children of IDPs based in Huambo and Caála towns as well as urban dwellers. Finally, two of the schools inspected benefited rural villagers in areas south of Caála town, where the school buildings had been destroyed during UNITA insurgency. Table 12 depicts the relevance estimates of the 11 schools (not including 2 camp areas) that were inspected.

Table 12: Overview of Types of School Constructions

New school (old destroyed due to insurgency)	**New school** (for IDPs and urban *bairros*. None before)	**Rehabilitation** (severely deteriorated/non-operational due to 1993-4 war period/IDP pressures)	**Expansion** (severely deteriorated and pupils taking out-door classes due to IDP pressure or destruction during 1993-4 war period)
Ndongua (rural village) Calueio (rural village)	Kasseque III (IDP resettlement - new) Cruzeiro (IDP resettlement – new) Cantão Pahula (rural village and IDP resettlement) Munda (poor peri-urban *bairro* and IDP pressures)	Kamunda (poor peri-urban *bairro* and IDP pressures) Deolinda Rodrigues (urban and severely deteriorated due to 1993-4 war period) S. Teresinhas (poor peri-urban *bairro*, IDP pressures and severely deteriorated due to 1993-4 war period)	Kammusamba (poor peri-urban *bairro*, IDP pressures, and previously non-operational due to 1993-4 war period) School 54 (urban and urban population pressures.)

Although it is clear from Table 12 that schools supported by SDC covered areas in great need of improved schools and new schools where these did not exist, there are no clear and documented assessments of the criteria for choosing some areas as opposed to others. Also there is no documentation of any beneficiary analysis and consultation. The wide variety of areas – ranging from IDP resettlement areas to urban-based schools – also suggests that there were no pre-defined criteria for selecting areas. School 54 is a clear example of this. It is urban-based and received no IDPs during the emergency phase. Although it is clear that this school was under huge pressure for expansion (pupils were receiving outdoor teaching), it entirely falls outside any category of support to IDPs.

Overall, the assessment suggests that choice of areas was based on requests from SDC partners (NGOs and churches) on a project-to-project basis, which according to interviewees was based on some prior consultation with local government authorities, including local *sobas* of *bairros* and villages. One exception to the lack of broad-based community consultation was School 144 of

Kamunda, where people explained that it was the local community that, with the help of the local church, had made a request to SDC for rehabilitation of their school.

A huge problem in the post-war period is the general lack of secondary schools (above 5th grade). SDC only supported the rehabilitation of one secondary school prior to the emergency phase (Deolinda Rodrigues). Two of the schools supported by SDC (Kammusamba and Kasseque III) have expanded to secondary levels, which was made possible by the size of the schools constructed by SDC. Besides these three schools, SDC only supported primary schools. Better planning of support to the educational sector during the emergency phase could have mitigated the current and urgent need for secondary schooling opportunities. By 2007 there is a huge pressure on existing secondary schools such as Deolinda Rodrigues and Kammusamba, which cannot admit all applicants.

Constructions and Materials

The use of local materials and workers during the emergency phase was highly relevant during the emergency phase in which it was difficult to gain access to fabricated materials, such as cement and termite resistant wood, and to professionally skilled workers. In the long term this, however, presents problems of sustainability, as most schools require frequent maintenance and can be expected to last a maximum of 25 years *if* they receive repairs. Alternatively SDC could have opted for the construction of less schools of a better and more permanent quality, but this would have meant less access to schools and fewer beneficiaries.

The lack of anti-termite treatment of wood presents a huge problem today. The wooden windows used are in the vast majority of schools with no glass parts. This was not favourable in non-electrified areas, depending on daylight. Windows need to be opened in order to provide light and this causes severe problems in the rainy season and means that windows quickly deteriorate.

In two of the 11 inspected schools the size of school was too small. They only serviced 1/3 of the pupils enrolled (the rest of the pupils received outdoor classes).

Problems were reported with regard to the appropriateness of the DW models of school constructions. SDC had confidence in DWs expert knowledge on locally adapted constructions, but in practice there were a lot of mistakes made. For example the 3 classroom buildings of DW were not adjusted to 4 classes per primary school. Local conditions also meant that the classrooms were too small. In other places the bricks were of poor quality because the mixture of adobe and cement in compressed bricks was not adapted to local soil conditions. Finally there were a number of cases where the roofs blew off during the winds (for example Kalundeio).

According to former SDC staff, a major problem with DW was that it showed little flexibility in adapting to local conditions and requirements. One example was the school Canhe in Huambo. The project was planned with DW, but it was never realised due to problems of coordination. The local church partner did not agree with the way that DW planned the construction. The rooms were too small. But DW did not listen and adapt the construction to the requests. DW began the construction of the foundation for the school without agreement with the partner. After this the local partner told DW to stop the construction work.

Furniture to new as well as to expanded schools was not systematically provided. In 6 out of 11 surveyed schools, furniture from MUBELA was provided (1 through DW, 3 through ADRA-A and 2 directly from SDC). In three of the remaining schools, furniture was provided by either UNICEF or the provincial government, but two were still without furniture by 2007 (Munda and Cantão Pahula). In the latter two cases pupils were sitting on the floor or bringing their own mats and chairs. SDC and partners (CAD and ADRA-A) had left the responsibility for provision of furniture with the state, but this had never materialised.

Better planning and follow-up on state provision of furniture would have been favourable. The same applies to teaching materials in general. This was left entirely in the hands of the state

authorities, with the result that many schools severely lack books and other teaching materials. These aspects point to how SDC support was confined to the hardware side of support to schooling as well as to the hard conditions of emergency, influencing project implementation.

2.4.6 Overall Impact

SDC immediate impact on support to school constructions varied between the types of areas supported (IDP areas, rural villages and peri-urban/urban areas), but has overall been related to improving the physical conditions for schooling. SDC support has not had an impact on the pedagogical quality of teaching, mobilisation of pupils (including gender balance) and the access to teaching materials.[26] The longer-term impact of the school buildings is high (30 out of 34 schools still function today). Apart from this overall assessment, there were five additional categories of impacts of SDC support:

- Construction of new schools for IDPs/permanent settlers where there were no schools before (4 schools surveyed)
- Increase in number of pupils and improvement of facilities (3 schools surveyed)
- Increase in pupils from other areas and improvement in facilities (4 schools surveyed)
- Improvement of physical facilities, but minor or no increase in pupils (3 schools surveyed)
- Securing schools could operate again under relatively good conditions after severe deterioration (5 schools surveyed).

Below is a summary of impacts and coverage of the schools surveyed:

SDC support facilitated the schooling opportunities for children of IDPs in IDP camps (1999-2000) and resettlement areas (2001) with the immediate impact of creating emergency period **schooling where there were no existing schools** prior to SDC support. Camps included: the Coalfa/Sodete in Huambo with capacity for 4,000 pupils (primary and secondary school) and Caála camps with capacity for 1,800 pupils. Resettlement areas for IDPs: Kasseque III with approximately a population of 30,000; Cruzeiro with approximately a population of 11,000; Cantão Pahula/Longove with approximately a population of 23,000; Kalia Mamo with approximately a population of 15,000. Added to these was the rehabilitation of a school for IDPs in Katchiungo town with a capacity for 1,000 pupils.

SDC support facilitated the improvement and/or expansion of the schools leading to **an increase in the number of pupils** of already existing schools: Kamunda, Kammusamba and Calueio. In the first two cases the increase in pupils was directly related to SDC expansion and rehabilitation of schools that were more or less non-operational by the time of support. In the latter case the increase in pupils cannot be directly related to SDC support, but must be seen against the background that the village was severely depopulated prior to SDC support, due to the war. Moreover increase in pupils was explained as owing to the fact that the school provides free food for pupils (firstly financed by WFP and now by the GoA). The increase in pupils at the Kammusamba school must also be seen against the background that this school was able to expand to and become a secondary school. Due to the general lack of secondary schools in Huambo, this means that the school today also receives pupils from other *bairros* and even from Huambo town. There is no other secondary school in the area. The Tables 13-15 depicts the statistics of number of pupils before and after SDC support, as well as by the time of the evaluation (2007).

[26] See also the section on sustainability, suggesting that SDC had minor impact on the organizational capacity of schools.

Table 13: Statistics, School Kammusamba, number of pupils

1998 (prior to SDC support)	**2001** (SDC support)	**2007** (time of evaluation)
1st - 6th grade. 2 class rooms Total no. of pupils: 558	6 classrooms: 1st - 8th grade Total no. of pupils: 1700	10 classrooms: 1st – 8th grade. Total no. of pupils: 2053

Table 14: Statistics, School Calueio, number of pupils

1998[27]	**1999**	**2000** (prior to SDC support)	**2001** (SDC support)	**2002**	**2007**
123 (f.31)	Closed	99 (f. 53)	226 (f.99)	286 (f.123)	419 (f.197)

Table 15: Statistics, School Kamunda, number of pupils

2000 (prior to SDC support)	**2001** (SDC support)	**2007** (time of evaluation)
350	532	544

SDC support to new schools and/or the improvement of already existing ones has in four cases (Ndongua, Kammusamba, Kasseque III and Calueio) given way to the longer-term impact of the schools covering a far larger area than initially intended. This means a relatively high level of **pupils from other areas.** In the case of the rural village school of Ndongua, the SDC expansion of the school has meant that today the school buildings in fact host two schools, the original village of Ndongua and the nearby village of Vicassa. In Kasseque III the secondary school today receives 70% of its pupils from surrounding *bairros* and even from Huambo town. This largely owes to the fact that many of the original IDP inhabitants have returned after the war. However, the fact that the school is still in a relatively good state as well as has the secondary level is also a reason why it has attracted pupils from other areas. In Kammusamba the reception of pupils from other areas owes not to the return of IDPs but to the good physical facilities and also to the fact that it is a secondary school. In Calueio it relates to the fact that the school has free food for kids and that there is a general lack of schools in nearby villages.

SDC support to the rehabilitation/expansion of already existing schools was in three cases alone related to **improving the physical conditions for pupils, but did not lead to an increase in pupils.** In all three cases it regarded schools in urban settings (Deolinda Rodrigues, School 54 and S. Teresinha). Prior to SDC support pupils received teaching outdoors or within buildings without proper roofing.

SDC support meant that five already existing schools were able to **operate again under relatively good conditions after severe deterioration** (Kammusamba, Deolinda Rodrigues, Calueio, Ndongua, Kamunda). In the case of Kamunda there was no roof, windows and doors prior to SDC support. In Kammusamba the school only had one building constructed during the colonial era, which had not been in operation for a couple of years during the 1993-94 period. SDC supported the Kapuzener Monks to ensure that the school could again operate. The Deolinda Rodrigues school was not functioning properly prior to SDC support due to a severely destroyed roof. Pupils received teaching in nearby churches. In Ndongua and Calueio both schools had been destroyed during the UNITA insurgencies.

[27] F = female students.

2.4.7 Sustainability

Hardware: Material State of Buildings

Of the 11 schools inspected, only one was in a very poor condition (Calueio) and it cannot be expected that it will endure another rainy season, even if it was rehabilitated. New buildings will have to be made within the next 5 years. This relates to the lack of cement cover for protection of the walls and huge problems with termites affecting the wooden windows, doors and pillars.

Five of the schools are in a relatively good condition, but in need of urgent rehabilitation to last more that 5 years more. The remaining five are in a good to fairly good condition, which owes to the fact that larger or minor repairs have been done since the SDC construction / rehabilitation or to the fact that the quality of construction materials and the construction itself was better (such as the use of compressed bricks and solid cement cover).

In the majority of the schools (8) there are huge problems with the wooden windows, which is partly due to problems with termites. This relates to the fact that the wood was not treated with anti-termite chemicals and that the local wood available (predominantly eucalyptus) is not resistant to termites. Many windows and doors also have problems with the locks that can no longer close. Also many windows have deteriorated because they need to be open during rain due to lack of glass parts for the penetration of sun light (the schools were not electrified). Only one school (Deolinda Rodrigues in Huambo) had problems with a severely deteriorated roof with water entering during the rainy season. In the remaining schools with thin-to-medium-thick corrugated iron roofs there are currently no problems with rain penetrating. This suggests that the roof constructions of the schools made of local material was relatively good. In five cases there are urgent problems with deteriorating bricks and cover in particular. During each rainy season these slowly get destroyed. In five cases there were also problems with concrete floors of poor quality.

A major problem currently is the lack of maintenance and repairs of schools, which can be expected to be critical within the next five years for the sustenance of the school buildings as such. Of the 11 permanent schools inspected by the evaluation team, 7 had not received any rehabilitation or maintenance after the SDC support period. Three of these schools (Munda, School 54 and Kammusamba) had been expanded with extra classrooms through parents' contributions, but the SDC constructions had not been rehabilitated. The expansions were done of low quality materials (adobe bricks with no cement cover) and thin corrugated iron roofs. In School 54 the expansion was a *jango* (open building) providing 3 classrooms without closed-off walls. Here parents also contributed to the repair of a few doors and furniture repairs. In Munda parents had also contributed to the payment of new wooden doors. In Cantão Pahula the school director had made a minor contribution to the repair of a broken door – that is from his own private pocket.

Only one of the 4 schools that had received larger repairs had received a full rehabilitation (School 144 in Kamunda, *Bairro* Macolocolo of Huambo), namely as part of UNICEF's school rehabilitation programme in 2004-2005. The Secondary School Deolinda Rodrigues (old colonial construction) was the only school that had received rehabilitation support from the state through the contracting of a private construction firm, however with minor improvements in practice. At this school parents had made annual contributions (150 kwanzas per pupil in 2006 and 250 kwanzas per pupil in 2007) to fund minor repairs of the school, such as new doors for latrines, repair of roof and salary to a carpenter, who repairs school furniture.

The rural school in Calueio (Caála municipality) had partly been rehabilitated (cement cover on the veranda floor and on the adobe brick walls in smaller parts) through personal contributions from teachers and the director.

Finally, the school S. Teresa in Kammusamba *Bairro* had been thoroughly and frequently rehabilitated by the church running the school, and the former partner of SDC (the Sisters Teresas). It had also received minor parents' contributions.

Software: Organizational Capacity

The general lack of systematic maintenance of school buildings cannot be divorced from the organizational capacity existing within individual schools, the lack of public funds set aside for schools and the unclear situation of responsibility for repairs. Officially the state (ministry of education at provincial level) is responsible for any material repairs of the state schools (including all the schools surveyed by the evaluation team). However, it was only in one out of the 11 schools surveyed that state funds had been invested in repairs.

In general the conclusion reached is that the ministry of education does not live up to its official responsibility. This was also supported by the provincial director of education, who argued that at present the provincial department does not have the funds and the capacity to maintain schools in the whole province. It is only able to provide technical support. A major problem is that funds for school building repairs are in the hands of the provincial governor's office rather than in the provincial department of education. Future plans for the decentralisation of funds to the municipalities might solve this problem.

At present the problem of state funds and capacity is in general not solved by external donor/NGO funding, which on the whole diminished severely after the end of the emergency phase. Only one of the 11 surveyed schools had received external funding (UNICEF) since the SDC support. Instead the lack of state repairs is partly solved by NGOs and the provincial department of education encouraging parents to contribute to minor repairs of schools. These repairs are supposed to be organised by the parents' commissions in collaboration with the school directors. However, this responsibility of parents is not at present official and it is not systematically functioning in all schools. It takes place on an *ad hoc* basis. The result is large differences between schools, based on the organizational capacity and material means of parents to contribute.

The official responsibility of the state to maintain schools was also supported by SDC-financed school-building projects in that all constructions were officially handed over to the government authorities immediately after the termination of construction. SDC made no follow-ups on the responsibility of the state to secure repairs, nor did it directly secure support to local capacity building of community-based organizations to make claims on the state to secure repairs. This underscores how SDC in general confined its support to the 'hardware' side of support to the educational sector. The exception to this was the DW Emergency School programme financed by SDC, which supported the capacity building of parents' commissions to engage in the making of annual plans for maintenance, based on the objective of creating local ownership of schools.

DW also made follow-ups on and monitoring of parents' commissions after the end of construction.[28] The support to these commissions was also based on a realisation during the emergency phase that the state in practice does have the capacity to secure repairs. However, the survey suggests that it is only in 50% of the schools constructed with DW that parents' commissions are active in organising repairs. The survey suggest that the capacity of parents' commissions to mobilise support for repairs amongst parents relate less to donor capacity building than to the material and economic conditions of parents to contribute to repairs.

In all the 11 schools surveyed there was a parents' commission. However, only in five of these had parents' contributed to minor repairs and were active in practice. These five schools were all situated in urban and peri-urban areas where the income of parents is much higher than in the rural villages (Calueio and Ndongua) and in the former IDP resettlement areas (Cantão Pahula, Kasseque III and Cruzeiro). The result is that schools in poorer areas had either experienced no repairs or had been repaired with minor contributions from teachers and directors (Cantão Pahula

[28] An interim progress report and a final report were produced by DW on the emergency school programme. This was not the case for other SDC-financed school projects. Monitoring of the schools was later financed by the Irish and Dutch embassies.

and Calueio). The same differentiation between poor and more well-off areas relates to school books and other educational materials.[29]

The *de facto* reliance on parents' commissions to mobilise parents' contributions for repairs / maintenance has also resulted in a general unclear understanding of who actually has the responsibility to repair schools. School staff and parents are quite clear that it is the state that has the official responsibility, but also realises that the state do not have the capacity. On the other hand NGOs and government authorities all presented the idea that the local community *ought* to share responsibilities for repairs of schools, as they were the beneficiaries of schooling. Therefore many school staff members (including NGOs like DW and ADRA-A) had the perception that the 'community' (for example through the parents' commission) has a responsibility for smaller repairs. However, in villages of Caála like Cantão Pahula, Ndongua and Calueio, parents were reluctant to contribute, because they do not have the financial means and because they argue that it is the state which is responsible.

These different perceptions suggest a certain clash between different ideas about ownership and division of public service responsibilities: on the one hand the idea that it is the state that has the full responsibility, relating to the socialist past; and on the other hand the idea that local communities should take responsibility for and have ownership of public institutions. According to interviews with local government authorities, it was in particular NGOs who had supported the latter idea during the school constructions in the emergency phase. The schools built by NGOs were presented as owned by the local community, which was then left with the responsibility for repairs of schools. This has later created unclear relationships, because at the same time the NGOs handed over the school constructions to the state.

Another problem, according to DW, is to ensure sustainability of parents' commissions in particular in former IDP resettlement areas. The parents' commissions received capacity building during the emergency phase, but the members have since been replaced several times (transfer of directors, movement of IDPs, general movements and the fact that in some schools, such as Kasseque, 70% of the pupils come from other areas today). The new members do not receive training from DW. The old members are supposed to transfer knowledge to the new ones. In very few cases this has happened. Another major problem with community-based maintenance is the current legal framework. While the ministry of education does not live up to its responsibilities and has unofficially left this in the hands of the parents' commissions, the law does not allow the directors of schools to collect and manage contributions from the community. It is only parents who can do that. However with parent commissions' weak capacity to manage funds, repairs are seldom made. DW has held meetings to try to solve these problems between the provincial government and directors of schools, but no solution has been reached by 2007.

The survey of schools also suggests a general problem with the capacity of parents' commissions and school directors to lay claims on the provincial and municipal authorities (including assistance to repairs, furniture, educational material and school food programme). One exception was the school Deolinda Rodrigues, where the director and the parents' commission had made explicit requests to the provincial ministry of education to expand the school with extra classrooms. A similar situation regards making requests to donors/NGOs for assistance. Of the 11 surveyed schools only one school (Kammusamba, Huambo) had made requests to NGOs (DW and UNICEF) for assistance to repairs. These two schools were characterised by having a well-organised school director and parents' commissions. Both were also secondary schools. At the same time the two schools were in less poor areas and received pupils from Huambo town. This also meant that the majority of parents annually contributed to school repairs (between 150 and 300 kwanzas per pupil per year). In these cases they differed from the rest of the schools where no requests for external and/or state assistance had been organised.

[29] All schools surveyed lacked books for pupils and in some cases also for teachers. The ministry of education has since 2006 begun distributing the new curriculum, but very few books have arrived at the schools, in particular in rural areas. The parents who have the financial means are able to buy books on the informal market for an elevated price of 3,000-4,500 kwanzas. This means that pupils with parents who have a steady income are able to procure books, whereas pupils of poorer parents have no books at all.

In conclusion, the lack of an explicit SDC strategy of securing organizational sustainability around schools has left a situation of unclear perceptions of responsibility for repairs and huge differences between schools. However, this cannot be divorced from a general transitional situation where there is no clear legal framework for the division of responsibility between the state and the local community with regard to the repair and organization of schools in general. NGOs did in part during the emergency phase contribute to this unclear relationship by both officially handing over the schools to the state, while at the same time leaving the perception that local communities had responsibility for repair.

2.5 Assessment of Health Posts in Huambo Province

2.5.1 Introduction

Prior to the emergency phase (1996-98) SDC gave limited support to health posts with only a minor financial contribution to the local NGO GAC for the rehabilitation of 2 health posts in Chianga. During this period SDC contributed to the health sector primarily through rehabilitation support to the central hospital of Huambo, beginning in 1998 and continuing until 2001. During the emergency phase support to the health sector expanded considerably. This included support to the improvement and rehabilitation of the orthopaedic hospital, Bomba Alta, in Huambo (1999-2000), support to the construction of 11 health posts in IDP resettlement areas and rural villages (2000-2003), and a minor micro-project contribution to a pharmacy in *bairro* Bom Pastor in Huambo (2002), as well as a whole range of projects related to the RISC programme and later on-off support to the CV-A and CV-F HIV/Aids project in Caála and Huambo (see Sections 3.1 and 2.7).

This section is based on an assessment of the 11 new health posts (9 of which involved direct SDC support) constructed between 2002 and 2003. Seven of these were surveyed by the evaluation team. All the health posts were still functioning by 2007 and buildings were still in a relatively good state. This continuity points to a clear carrying over of emergency aid to the post-war development phase.

2.5.2 Objectives

SDC/SHA support to health post constructions did *not* follow an explicit health sector support strategy with a clearly formulated project objective (including impact indicators and vision / mission). There is no mention in the annual reports and evaluations of an explicitly formulated objective prior to 2004. This regards all three phases of health post constructions: the 1996-1997 rehabilitation phase; the 2000-2001 emergency phase (with ADRA-A); and the 2002-2003 phase (APOLO programme). From 2004 there is an explicit objective of support to primary health care formulated, i.e. support provision of health care in remote areas as well as reduction of HIV transmissions. This regards the general national programme. For Huambo the HIV/AIDS project is mentioned, but not until after the end of the constructions of health posts. It is unclear whether SDC supported the training of medical staff for health posts in Huambo. The 2002 annual report mentions that this is part of the SDC future plans, but there is no later information of whether this actually materialised.

The impression is that SDC supported health post constructions as an minor part of the overall infrastructural rehabilitation programme on roads/bridges during the first phase (1996-97). During the emergency phase (1999-2001) the impression is that support to health posts formed but one element of support to IDPs (Kasseque III and Cantão Pahula) and rural villagers (Caála) through the improvement of social infrastructure as such. This is exemplified by the fact that all the health posts supported by SDC in this period formed part of the overall support to selected sites where schools had also been built with SDC support. All the constructions were done on a project-to-project basis in partnership with Angolan NGOs, rather than being based on a broader and clearly formulated programme objective. This was also the case during the APOLO programme (phase 2). Here the objective of SDC was expanded to include capacity building of local NGO partners

and more explicitly to the support to IDP returnee areas in the form of infrastructural developments (see also Section 3.2).

In none of the periods was SDC support concerned with the objective of improving the quality of medical treatment. Neither was SDC concerned with supporting community knowledge of health and/or community members' capacity to claim rights to public health facilities. The objective of support was confined to the hardware side of social infrastructural improvement. However, in the case of CAD (3 health posts under the APOLO programme) there was training of community members. Moreover, as it was the case with school constructions, the explicit use of local workers (skilled and unskilled) can be seen as clearly related to ensuring not only on-the-job training and local job opportunities in the short term, but also local ownership of health posts. This implicit objective was not attached to an overt strategy of follow-ups and monitoring of local organization capacity, however (see also Section 3.5).

2.5.3 Main findings

- After 2003 support to primary health care in Huambo was confined to 2 HIV/AIDS programmes as well as to the provision of furniture for 5 health posts, executed with the provincial health authorities in 2006. The latter fell under the small project credit line.
- All 7 health posts surveyed and constructed by SDC funding (out of a total of 11) were still functioning by 2007. They were fully equipped with staff (nurses of basic and medium education) and medical equipment. Medicine was only a problem in 3 out of 7 cases surveyed.
- One of the health posts inspected was in a bad material state and in urgent need of rehabilitation, caused in part by the type of SDC emergency construction. Rehabilitation is nonetheless necessary in the nearest future of all health posts with doors, windows and cracks in walls presenting a growing problem.
- SDC support to health posts did not follow an explicit programme strategy for the support to the health sector. It was confined alone to the hardware side (constructions of infrastructure) and gave no support to the improvement of the quality of medical assistance (medicine, training of staff etc.). SDC did not monitor or follow-up on constructions after the handover to the ministry of education (MINSA). However, from 2004 there is an explicit objective of support to primary health care formulated, but this did not in practice include health posts.
- SDC support benefited a large number of people (estimated to cover 135,000 people) in particular within the categories of IDPs and returnees. The infra-structure has since benefited many permanent rural dwellers. The support to the construction of health posts presents the largest direct support to returnee villages made by SDC (even if this only includes 2 health posts directly). No prior systematic beneficiary analysis was made as part of the selection of support areas. Selection of intervention areas was based on NGO partner assessments until 2002. During the second phase of the APOLO programme projects supported by SDC had to cater for returning IDPs.
- By 2007 the responsibility of all health posts fall under the MINSA (provincial department of health) who is regarded as fully responsible for repairs of the health posts. Only in 1 of 7 cases surveyed were local community members responsible for minor contributions to repair.

2.5.4 Overview of SDC Support

In the period 2000-2003 SDC supported the construction of 11 new health posts. There were no rehabilitations of already existing health posts in this period. 9 of the 11 health posts included full SDC financing and direct SDC participation in supervision of construction and provision of materials. These were all done with local construction materials (adobe bricks with cement cover) and participation of local workers. One of the 9 health posts (Kasseque III) was through direct SDC support without an NGO implementation partner. 8 of the 9 health posts formed part of the APOLO programme: 4 in the first phase (2001-2002) and 5 in the second phase (2002-2003) (see

Section 3.2 on APOLO).[30] Another two health posts were supported by SDC, but only through financing a smaller part of the construction materials to NGOs (CBA and VIDA) during the emergency phase between 2000 and 2001. The latter are both situated in larger rural villages close to Huambo town. These are not included in Table 16, which gives an overview of SDC support to health posts from 1996 to 2003.

Table 16: Overview of Support to Health Posts

Period	**Micro-projects (1996)** (Partner GAC)	**Emergency (2000)** (Direct SDC)	**Emergency (2001)** (APOLO 1. Partner ADRA-A)	**APOLO 2 (2002-3)** (Partners CAD, OKUTIUKA, ASCA)
Construction	2 (rehabilitation)	1 (new)	3 (new)	5 (new)
Site	2 rural villages	1 IDP resettlement	1 IDP resettlement 2 Rural villages (former war-torn areas: 1998-2000)	2 remote rural villages (IDP returnee areas) 3 peri-urban villages (IDP permanent re-settlement)

As depicted in Table 16, the support to health posts in the emergency phase and during the APOLO programme benefited in particular IDPs, including support to IDP resettlement areas (Kasseque III, Njongolo and Cantão Pahula) and IDP returnee areas (Hungulo, Kalikoque, São Tacisio). Added to these are the two rural villages (Calueio and Ndongua in Caála) supported by SDC with the partner ADRA-A, which were former war-affected areas in a shorter period of UNITA insurgency, leading to short-term population displacements (late 1998 to late 1999). The construction of health posts in IDP returnee villages differs from SDC support to emergency schools, which tended only to benefit IDPs in resettlement areas and in urban/peri-urban settings. This can be related to the fact that the health posts in IDP returnee areas were constructed at a later stage (2002-2003) than the schools (2000-2001), namely at a time when the security situation permitted support in returnee areas.

As was the case with school constructions, it should, however, be noted that SDC did not continue support to health posts after the constructions were terminated (for example follow-ups and monitoring of the state of buildings and the operations of the health posts). SDC confined itself to the hardware side of this support during the actual construction periods. All health posts were officially handed over to MINSA (ministry of health) after the termination of support. Follow-ups on constructions after they had terminated was nonetheless pursued by the partners CAD and ADRA-A. Only in the case of the three health posts constructed with CAD through the APOLO programme was there an explicit focus on the software side of the support. This was done through the training and mobilisation of community members on issues of rights to health services and on how to claim these rights from the state (see also Section 3.2). In the remaining health posts, support by SDC partners was confined to the physical constructions and the provision of furniture. In two cases there had been a period immediately after the war when international NGOs (MSF and French Red Cross) had provided support in terms of human and material resources (in Cantão Pahula and Hungulo). By 2007 all the surveyed health posts were under the full responsibility of MINSA (medicine, staff, maintenance of buildings).

[30] The evaluation team is aware that there exists a discrepancy in definitions of the APOLO programme. According to some former SDC staff the APOLO programme only had one phase from 2002 until 2003. However, according to the final evaluation of the APOLO programme there were two phases: a first phase from 2001-2002 and a second phased from 2002-2003. We have chosen to apply the last interpretation even though we are aware that the reporting can be caused by SHA/SDC staffs need to order projects at time of reporting and not as following a particular startegy. This interpretation is supported by the Final Report of the APOLO programme.

2.5.4 Organization and Type of Construction

Type of Construction

All but one (Kasseque III) of the 7 health posts inspected were built according to a common model of construction, using locally made adobe brick walls with cement cover, medium thick corrugated iron roof, wood roof pillars, wood doors and windows and a covered veranda for patients. A health post contained 6 rooms and a bath room (modern toilet and zinc with sanitation system). Apart from these similarities there were three minor, but significant differences between construction models.

First, in 3 of the 6 health posts there were windows with an upper glass part, which means that windows do not have to be opened to facilitate light (none of the health posts are electrified). This is very significant during rains/winds.

Secondly, in two of the inspected health posts there was an extra residential building for staff members. These were all constructed in remoter areas.[31]

Thirdly, in the case of Kasseque III there was no cement cover on the adobe brick walls, which means that the adobe bricks are not protected from rains to the same extent as the other buildings. In general the quality of this health post was of a much lower quality than the rest, most probably relating to the fact that it was built as part of the emergency relief to the IDP resettlement area. It resembled the model of construction used for emergency schools more generally.

In three of the health posts SDC had provided water pumps through the DW/WATSAN programme (in one case OXFAM had provided a water pump). In the remaining cases DW had failed to set up a functioning water pump for reasons unknown. SDC/RISC programme also provided ovens for disposal of garbage in 4 cases, whereas APOLO provided outside latrines in 5 cases. In 4 cases SDC had supported the provision of furniture (all from the MUBELA factory). The remaining 3 health posts had received furniture from MINSA (2) and from French Red Cross (1).

Organization of Construction

With the exception of SDC support prior to the emergency phase in the form of a micro-project, all but one (Kasseque III) of the constructions of new health posts was done with Angolan NGOs as the implementing partners as well as based on agreements with the provincial level tiers of the GoA. The Angolan NGOs chose the site of construction and made an application to SDC describing the area and character of support. This regarded both the emergency phase (with ADRA-A) and the APOLO programme phase 2. The latter differed in the sense that it had an explicit focus on capacity building of the NGO chosen as implementing partner (see Section 3.2).

In all the 7 surveyed cases the construction was done with the use of local workers (skilled and unskilled). These were paid minor salaries with SDC financing skilled workers, as well as WFP food for work programme (skilled and unskilled). With the exception of Kasseque III, the Angolan NGO partner was responsible for the mobilisation, organization and payment of local workers. SDC technical staff provided frequent on-the-site supervision and on-the-job training of workers including inspection of site prior to construction (the only exception was the health post in Hungulo - Samboto Commune). In some cases SDC also provided permanent construction technicians (for example Chilembo).

Frequent supervision by SDC was necessary due to NGO partners' low capacity and knowledge with regard to construction work. In Hungulo SDC supervision was not possible due to the continued precarious security situation at the time of construction (it was a former UNITA-occupied area where SDC staff was not permitted to travel). SDC was aware that this was a risky

[31] Of health posts not inspected there was an additional two health posts with a residential building. All the constructions of residential buildings were part of the APOLO programme.

project. SDC made no prior or ongoing inspection of the construction site.[32] SDC, however, had high confidence in the NGO partner, OKUTIUKA, with whom SDC had worked previously in relation to road/bridge construction. The project was in the end a major success, albeit it had to be temporally stopped due to landmine problems in 2002.

After termination of constructions and the official handover to the GoA, SDC made no monitoring of constructions or of local workers. The partner NGOs (UKUTIUKA, CAD and ADRA-A), however, made frequent on-the-site visits after the end of constructions.

2.5.5 Relevance and Appropriateness

Beneficiaries and Areas

Relevance of support during the emergency phase as well as during the APOLO programme was very high. In 5 out of the 7 health posts inspected there was no health post in the areas prior to SDC support. In the remaining two there were only emergency clinics (made of tent material and of a very low medical support quality). In both periods (2000-2001 and 2002-2003) SDC support targeted the flow of IDPs, which shifted between these periods, as well as two rural villagers within safe areas.

Relevance of support in the emergency phase (through ADRA-A and SDC directly) was in particular large in two IDP resettlement areas health posts (Cantão Pahula and Kasseque III) where there was a very quick and massive influx of IDPs. There was an urgent need for health provision, which was entirely lacking prior to SDC support. In the two rural villages supported by SDC with ADRA-A as partner, emergency relevance was less clear (the populations are small – between 2,000 and 3,000) and there is a relatively short distance to nearby health facilities (maximum of 20 km).

Relevance of support was high for returnees and permanently settled IDPs in villages close to Huambo during the APOLO phase. Two health posts were built in previously isolated and remote returnee village areas, where people previously had to travel up to 80 km to reach the nearest health post/centre or hospital. The SDC-supported health posts provided the only access to health provision within the entire commune. Most of the beneficiaries in these areas were former IDPs. In this sense SDC support during the post-war period covered returnee beneficiaries (many of whom had received prior support by SDC in IDP resettlement areas such as Kasseque III). In fact when measured against other forms of infrastructural support, the SDC-supported health posts account for the most significant and direct support to returnees in rural areas (albeit still minor, accounting for 2 health posts alone). The remaining 3 health posts constructed during the APOLO programme (phase 2) benefited in particular IDPs, which had settled permanently in villages relatively close to Huambo town (i.e. they had chosen not to return to original villages). These areas had an expanded population and were therefore in urgent need of improved health facilities.

Despite the clear relevance of support, there is no explicitly formulated SDC strategy for the selection of the chosen sites (for example as opposed to other sites in need of improved facilities). Many returnee villages in remoter areas in for example the municipality of Caála received no SDC health post support. The reason for this is unknown to the evaluation team, but the impression is that the choice of sites was based predominantly on a project-to-project assessment and on the exclusive choices made by NGO partners, rather than on a thoroughly planned strategy of support and selection. It was not possible to assess whether local community members, not covered by the APOLO programme, had been involved in planning/selection of construction.

Constructions

The choice of using local NGO partners, local workers and local construction materials was appropriate at the time of support (emergency and transition from emergency). Better quality and anti-termite treatment of wooden windows, roof pillars and doors would have been favourable. Systematic use of windows with glass would have been appropriate too.

[32] In fact the first time a former SDC staff member visited the Hungulo health post was during this evaluation. .

The construction of residential buildings for staff members in remote villages was important, due to the fact that all staff permanently resides in Huambo town. However, this was not systematically done, with Caluieo in Caála creating problems today, particularly during the rainy season.

The choice of the size of health posts was not appropriate in remoter villages, covering large populations (20,000-40,000 people).[33] The choice of constructing a health centre (with hospital beds for patients) would have been more appropriate. In Hungulo the same problem arose, but here the French Red Cross contributed to an extra building with hospital beds for patients. The original SDC-supported health post was thereafter up-graded to a health centre. The impression is that SDC used the same construction model irrespective of the areas in question. It would have been appropriate to use different models for remote villages with a large population and for villages closer to urban settings.

There was no systematic provision of water in all places, partly due to the fact that WATSAN provisions did not materialise. Better follow-up by SDC on this would have been favourable. Today there are three health posts without easy access to water (need to walk 1-2 km to access water). The provision of modern toilets and zincs in the health posts was not appropriate, given that no running water was provided.

Organization

The handover process to the GoA caused considerable problems. In 4 of the 7 health posts inspected, the actual functioning of the health services was delayed for 1-1½ years after the end of construction. This was due to the slow pace with which the MINSA provided staff, medicine and equipment. A more thorough SDC follow-up and planning with MINSA prior or during constructions would have been more appropriate.

In two of the cases where the health posts were opened immediately after the end of construction it was due to the fact that international NGOs *de facto* were in charge of the operation (MSF in Cantão Pahula and French Red Cross in Hungulo). MINSA officially took full responsibility for these health posts in 2005.

2.5.6 Overall Impact in Period of Support and Beyond

The SDC support to the construction of health posts in IDP resettlement areas, rural returnee areas and former war-torn rural villages has benefited an official estimate of 135,000 people. A large number of these are either IDPs who have remained in resettlement areas or IDP returnees, but the health posts also benefit people who remained in rural villages during the 1998-2001 war period (Cantão Pahula, Ndongua, Calueio and Hungulo). In addition, the official figures do not reflect the current beneficiaries of the health posts.

With the exception of Kasseque III, all health posts covered a much larger area than the official areas registered by the health post administration. In the case of Hungulo the health post (upgraded to a health centre) even received patients from the neighbouring province of Huila (the border is 25 km from Hungulo). An estimate of 40,000 people benefited from this health centre alone. In the case of Cantão Pahula, the health post also received patients from the *bairros* of Caála town (6 km away). This has been the case since the population of Cantão Pahula/Longove has been reduced due to the return of IDPs living here during the 2001-2003 period. In only one case (Kasseque III) has the number of beneficiaries reduced since the SDC construction (from approximately 300 patients to 100 patients per day). This owes directly to the return of the vast majority of IDPs living in Kasseque III during the emergency support by SDC.

[33] One example is the health post in Chilembo with a distance of 40 km from Huambo town and with the coverage of a whole commune.

Table 17: Overview of Number of Beneficiaries and Patients of Health Posts

Cantão.[34] **Pahula**	**Kasseque III**	**Njongolo**	**Ndongua**	**Calueio**	**Hungulo**	**Chilembo**
Period of constructio n: 23,000 (evaluation estimate)	Period of constructio n: 30,000 (evaluation estimate)	Period of constructio n: 10,000 (SDC estimate)	Period of constructio n: 6,000 (SDC estimate)	Period of constructio n: 6,000 (SDC estimate)	Period of constructio n: 40,000 (SDC estimate)	Period of constructio n: 20,000 (SDC estimate)
2007: 2.300 (official)	2007: 6,000 (official)	2007: 2000 (official)	2007: 2.650 (official)	2007: 3.135 (official)	2007: 6,000 (officially)	2007: 1.690 (official)
2007: other villages and Caála town	Only Kasseque III	2007: one more neighbour *bairro*.	2007: 3 other villages nearby.	2007: other villages (10-12 patients per day).	2007: the whole commune and people from Huila province (ca. 40,000).	2007: the whole com-mune and some from the neigh-bouring commune.
Patients per day: Dry: 30-50 Rainy: 150	Patients per day: Dry: 80 Rainy: 110	Patients per day: Dry: 20 Rainy: 28	Patients per day: Dry: 10-20 Rainy: 35	Patients per day: Dry: 50 Rainy: 65	Patients per day: Dry: 25 Rainy: 40	Patients per day: Dry: 15-20 Rainy: 20-50

The large coverage of the health posts in terms of beneficiaries owes both to the lack of other health posts in the surrounding areas (Hungulo, Chilembo and Calueio) and/or to the fact that the health posts are functioning better than in other areas (Cantão Pahula and Ndongua). These insights suggest that SDC support to health posts had huge impact on improvement of health facilities. This was particularly the case in the remoter and former war-torn areas occupied by UNITA in for example Chilembo and Hungulo. Prior to SDC constructions there were no permanent and well-functioning health posts within the entire commune of these two sites. In the remaining areas health posts have meant that people have to travel fewer kilometres to received health care and that the facilities have improved.

SDC has had no direct impact on the quality of health care services as such, which was beyond its objective. However, implicitly the good physical facilities of the health posts (including the residential houses for staff) have made it more attractive to the urban-based staff to work in the remoter areas and villages distant from towns.

In remoter villages, previously isolated due to the war and UNITA occupation, the support by SDC in 2002-2003 also had the secondary impact of opening up these areas for other types of post-war assistance. For example in Hungulo there was no prior assistance before SDC supported the NGO OKUTUIKA to construct the health post (now centre). The planning and commencement of the construction attracted WFP (food for work programme and food distributions). After the construction French Red Cross took over support to medical care, including furniture, equipment, a new building for patients as well as a nurse to train other staff. In Chilembo SDC with the partner ASCA was also the first to commence infrastructural development in the post-war period (see also Section 3.2 and Chapter 4).

[34] All figures of 2007 are based on estimates according to staff members of the health posts, not based on systematic statistics. The construction period figures are based on estimates by SDC prior to construction as well as on the estimates of the evaluation team.

2.5.7 Sustainability

Hardware: Material State of Buildings

Of the 7 health posts surveyed, 5 were in a good to relatively good material state. Compared with schools, the quality of constructions was much better. This might also owe to the fact that the majority of the health posts were constructed later.

One exception was the health post in Kasseque III, which was in dire need of rehabilitation due to deteriorating walls made of adobe bricks and with no cement cover as well as problems with wooden doors and windows. Another exception was the Ndongua health post where there were large cracks in the walls, problems with windows and doors as well as problems with water entering through the roof.

Of the 5 health posts that were in a relatively good state, there were emerging problems with termites, cracks in walls and broken locks on doors and windows (the wood was not treated with anti-termite chemicals). In 5 cases there were also problems with water entering by the windows during the rains. This was because the cement construction by the lower part of the windows was horizontal, rather than bending (allowing water to flow off). Another problem was the fact that windows in half of the health posts did not have any glass parts, which means that windows have to be open during working hours in order for light to penetrate (there was no electricity in any of the health posts – only during the evening in Hungulo). Table 18 depicts the problems of the material state of 7 health posts.

Table 18: Problems with Material State of Buildings

Termites (walls)	Water enter by windows	Termites (doors and windows)	Broken locks (windows and doors)	Crack in walls
3 health posts	5 health posts	3 health posts	4 health posts	4 health posts

Official responsibility for the maintenance of the health post buildings rests with the MINSA (ministry of health). This has been the case since the end of the construction of buildings where official contracts were made with the MINSA ('entregas oficiais'). SDC did not have as part of its objective an 'exit-strategy' or follow-ups with regard to maintenance of buildings. SDC confined its support to the construction phase alone, and SDC did not after 2003 engage in rehabilitation of health infrastructure.

Three of the 7 health posts surveyed had received some form of repair after the constructions. In two cases this was provided by MINSA funds with the assistance of *Obras Publics* (Public works).[35] In Chilembo *Obras Publicas* had repaired the lower cement part by windows (water was penetrating due to horizontal cement construction). In Hungulo rehabilitation had included repainting of walls and repair of windows. The health post of Njongolo had also received repairs of windows (similar problem as in Chilembo), but with the support of CAD (the NGO partner of SDC).

The fact that MINSA had in practice taken responsibility for repairs of two health posts illustrates a greater *de facto* responsibility and capacity of the MINSA than of the ministry of education with respect to repair of schools. However, all health posts do not receive the same level of support from MINSA. The assessment of the health posts suggests that it is those health posts with a more active and well-organised staff team (in particular the chief nurse) that are able to request repairs from the provincial government. A similar point can be drawn from the capacity to procure medicine and equipment. This was particularly the case in Hungulo, which had a well-organised

[35] Officially, larger repairs of health posts have to be planned with Obras Publicas by the provincial director of health. The provincial department does not have its own funds for repairs. Funds must flow from the provincial governor's office. Minor repairs are the responsibility of the provincial department of health in liaison with the municipality governments.

chief nurse, who was also politically active in the ruling party. Here the health post had never lacked medicine and had from MINSA received a generator, motor bikes for staff members as well as plentiful medical equipment.

Software: Organizational Capacity

Of the 7 health posts surveyed, all were well functioning by 2007 with fully equipped staff (according to official MINSA regulations). The health posts, however, have no doctors, only nurses with basic and medium training. Severe problems with staff were confined to the 2003-2004 period immediately after the constructions. This meant a delay of the actual functioning of the health posts. According to the provincial director of health, this was a general problem in the whole province and still presents problems in some areas today.[36] In some cases NGOs or foreign agencies continued supplying medicine for another 6 months after the state took over. In other cases, particularly in areas with a high numbers of refugees such as Hungulo and Cantão Pahula health posts, this also included the provision of staff from international agencies such as MSF and Red Cross until 2003-2004.[37]

Withdrawal of international assistance corresponded with periods of return. Since 2005 all health posts had been under the full responsibility of MINSA (salaries, staffing, equipment, medicine and maintenance of buildings). Only two health posts had received some medicine directly from international agencies after 2005. The withdrawal of SDC from support to health posts after 2003 therefore reflects a general picture of withdrawal by international agencies, that is, at least in terms of direct support (name tags on medical kits do suggest that MINSA distributes medicine from international agencies).

As noted above, the responsibility for maintenance/repair lies with the provincial department of health in liaison with Obras Publicas. The official responsibility was also reflected in the expressed views of health post staff and beneficiaries in general. Local communities were not by 2007 (or previously) regarded as contributors to smaller repairs. This view was both expressed in general, locally as well as by the provincial director of health.[38] This differs from schools where there is a much higher perception of community (i.e. parents' commissions) responsibility for and participation in repair/maintenance. One exception to this rule was the health post of Calueio where the staff members had once mobilised community contributions for the repair of doors. In Hungulo the local residents were from time to time mobilised to assist with cleaning the outdoor premises of the health post, but community contributions to repair of buildings was not common.

Community-based health committees existed in 3 of the 7 health posts inspected (Hungulo, Calueio and Njongolo). However, none of these were engaged in maintenance/repair, nor were they expected to do so. In Hungulo and Calueio the health committees were entirely new by the time of inspection (from mid-2007). Save the Children Fund had mobilised the committee in Hungulo. The objective was solely to engage community members in campaigns (HIV/AIDS, vaccinations and other illnesses). In Calueio the objective was similar, but with the difference that it was MINSA that had organised the committee. In Njongolo the health committee differed from the other two in that it had been established during the SDC/CAD construction of the school by CAD. They had then received training in human rights, including knowledge of the legal system, how to claim their rights to health from the state and knowledge in general about illnesses. Similar committees were also established in the two other health posts constructed by SDC with CAD as partner.

[36] This was a general problem, as many professional staff from different social sectors had fled the Huambo area during the 1993-1994 and the 1999-2001 war periods.

[37] One example of this was the Calueio health post in Caála municipality (end of construction 2001 and opened in 2004). This can be compared with Cantão Pahula health post which opened shortly after end of construction with staff assistance from MSF.

[38] The provincial director of health nonetheless expressed the view that community contributions to minor repairs should ideally be the case. Today local conditions do not permit this, however (the war is given as reason). On the other hand the lack of community participation in construction today, as opposed to during the emergency phase, could also be related to the fact that constructions are today made of stronger material and cement rather than of local materials and adobe bricks produced by local people.

In conclusion, with the exception of the health posts constructed with CAD (3 in total) SDC had not contributed to any software aspects. SDC's focus on construction today differentiates communities in terms of those with capacity (awareness of the possibilities) to lay claims on MINSA and communities without such capacity. This has consequences for their ability to secure repair of health posts as well as provision of medicine and high quality medical assistance. Improvements of health post facilities relies in general on individual health post staff members' capacity to request assistance from the provincial department of health, which in turn does not have its own funds for repairs and other improvements.

Kasseque III health post provides a good example of what happens when health post staff members' capacity is low. Here they do not have the capacity to secure support for improvements. Combined with the lack of avenues and/or awareness of local community members to lay claims on the state, this health post is today in a very critical state. As was the case with the schools, the decentralisation of funds to municipalities in the future might help to improve this situation.

2.6 Assessment of Food Centres and Community Kitchens

2.6.1 Introduction

During the emergency phase (1998-2002) SDC constructed a range of large kitchen stoves for firewood and facilities for community kitchens and food centres aimed at IDPs, as well as other vulnerable people in urban-based *bairros* (including children and elders).

There is limited documentation on SDC support to food centres and community kitchens. According to the information obtained, SDC supported during 1999-2001 the provision of 80 large kitchen stoves to a total number of 32 community kitchens or food centres in various sites in and close to Huambo town. These were done with partners such as MSF-F, SCF-UK, ADRA-A, and MOLIVS. Aside from the delivery of stoves to kitchens, SDC supported the construction of 5 kitchens in the Coalfa IDP camp in 1999 with the partner SCF-UK. In 1999 another 3 kitchens were supported with the partner Concern, with SDC building kitchen stoves. Two kitchens (each with 2 large stoves) were also constructed by SDC at the central hospital and the orthopaedic hospital (see Section 2.2). Finally, SDC supported the construction of a total of 8 food centres (buildings for kitchen and dining room, large kitchen stoves and latrines) in the urban-based *bairros* of Huambo. These were supported in the period 2000 to mid-2001. They included the construction and/or rehabilitation of buildings also (not merely provision of stoves).

It is not clear whether the different types of support to the construction of community kitchens / food centres are included in the figure of 32 (no sites/locations are mentioned in any of the reports). If this is not the case, then the sum of SDC support is a total of 50 community kitchens.

Table 19: Overview of Support to Kitchens and Stoves Distributed by Sites

Community kitchen (Camp)	Food Centres (Urban *bairros*)	Stoves to kitchens (alone) (In and around Huambo)	Kitchen and stoves (Urban)
5	8 (5 of these with DW)	32 (+ 3 with Concern)	2 (hospitals)

The evaluation team was able to assess the 8 food centres supported by SDC in collaboration with partners. Documentation existed on these, and the support by SDC was also considerable in that it went beyond the construction of stoves alone. 6 of the food centres were surveyed by the evaluation team.

2.6.2 Objective

The support to community kitchens and the support to food centres formed part of the general support to emergency relief in Huambo urban *bairros* and IDP camps. They operated predominantly in the emergency phase when food provisions from for example WFP were available. There was no particular strategy or any formulated objective for this kind of support, including expectation that kitchens would continue after the end of the emergency phase. All support was on a project-to-project basis and done in collaboration with international/national NGOs (kitchen stoves) and local churches (food centres).

2.6.3 Main Findings

The main findings are based on a survey of food centres (6 out of 8), which the evaluation team was able to locate and inspect:

- Even though the support was emergency driven 2 of the 8 food centres are still working as community kitchens, but only one operates relatively frequently. In two cases the buildings were used by schools in lack of classrooms. This point to long term unintended impact of the support provided by SDC.
- SDC support to community kitchens and food centres did not follow an explicit programme strategy. It was confined alone to the hardware side (constructions of buildings and provision of stoves).
- When food aid from WFP and other international organizations ended, most of the food centres stopped operating or down-scaled considerably despite their importance for different beneficiary groups.
- Buildings and stoves are still in a good to relatively good state (only in one case is there an urgent need for rehabilitation). With free food provisions after the end of the emergency phase, the food centres could have continued. The evaluation team has not able to find any need assessment report with information on why the food centres were closed.[39]

2.6.4 Overview of SDC Support to Food Centres

All 8 food centres were situated in urban *bairros* close to Huambo city centre during a period when there was a massive influx of IDPs combined with a precautious livelihood situation for permanent residents. Support for food centres was exclusively confined to the emergency phase, with all constructions being built in 2000 and 2001. All 8 food centres were constructed with churches as either direct partners of SDC or as partners of DW with SDC support. The centres were all exclusively operated by churches and the premises were owned by these. The buildings were handed over to the churches after the construction.

5 of the 8 food centres formed part of the DW Emergency School Programme and were financed by SDC as part of the general support package. The remaining 3 food centres were were setup through direct partnership with churches: *Mission S. Francisco* in Kammusamba, where SDC also supported a school; *Mission Trappa* in Bom pastor *bairro*, where SDC also supported the missions' pharmacy; and *Irmas Salesias* in Macolocolo *bairro*, where SDC also supported the rehabilitation of a school, however with another partner).

2.6.5 Organization and Type of Construction

Constructions

The type of construction provided by SDC (5 with DW as responsible for implementation) depended on the site supported and the needs presented by the partners. In two cases the support was part of a larger package including the construction of a building for kitchen, dining hall, stoves, and latrines and in one case an outdoor laundry. In other cases support was confined to the building of food storage rooms (2), kitchen (1), stoves (5) and rehabilitation of already existing buildings (1). All constructions were done with locally available, emergency-type materials

[39] The churches that organise the food centres still have the human resources to operate the centres, but lack funds.

such as adobe bricks, thin corrugated iron roof and wooden doors and windows. Only in one case was adobe brick walls covered with cement (*Bairro Macolocolo* food storage room).

Organization
Projects were based on requests from DW and/or locally-based churches. All constructions were done in collaboration with local church partners (3 directly with SDC and 5 through DW), which owned the premises, as well as organised the provision of food. In the case of DW, local workers were used in construction, receiving WFP food for work. Here DW was in charge of implementation. In the case of SDC working directly with local church partners the constructions were done directly by SDC contracted workers and supervisors and with a limited amount of church members participating. The latter were organised by the local church partners.

There was no organizational support to the community kitchens, for example the formation of community-based user committees. SDC support was confined to the hardware side: construction of buildings and stoves.

2.6.6 Relevance and Appropriateness

All 8 food centres were based in urban *bairros* around Huambo town, with 4 supporting children, 2 elders and 1 IDP. The influx of IDPs to the *bairros* during the emergency phase as well as the general hardship of permanent *bairro* residents during the emergency phase made support to food centres highly relevant. Many elders incapable of sustaining themselves had lost family members who could support them and/or had family members who did not have the capacity to feed their elders. The food provision to children of both IDPs and permanent residents formed part of DWs emergency school programme and secured that children had a better learning capacity (food for pupils also results in an increase in children attending school).

The choice of support to urban *bairros*, rather than simply to IDP camps or resettlement areas was appropriate. IDPs are often perceived as more vulnerable than permanent residents, but in the case of Huambo people living in urban *bairros* included large vulnerable groups such as children and elders. Moreover, many IDPs in fact resided in *bairros* during the emergency phase.

The choice of supporting churches during the emergency phase in all the 8 food centres can be seen as appropriate, as churches already had the organizational capacity to provide food for vulnerable groups and were considered legitimate by the target populations.

Despite the clear relevance of support, there is no explicitly formulated SDC strategy for the selection of the chosen sites (for example as opposed to other sites in need of improved facilities).

2.6.7 Overall Impact

The number of beneficiaries during the emergency phase was difficult to assess by the evaluation team, as the people who had directly worked with food provisions were not identifiable. Only in 2 out of 8 food centres that were still operating by 2007 was it possible to assess the number of beneficiaries.

In the case of Kammusamba (partner *Missão Francisco*) beneficiaries during the emergency phase accounted for 260 elders (receiving 2 meals a day). In 2004 this had been reduced to 160 elders (receiving 2 meals per day). The figures in 2007 were not available due to the fact that the food centre only operated sporadically when there was access to food donations.

In the case of 'A Semente' food centre in Bom Pastor (partner *Mission Trappa*) beneficiaries after the SDC support (2001) and until 2004 accounted for 150 elders (receiving 2 meals per day). Prior to SDC improvements of the facilities (including stove) the food centre had serviced 90 elders, 80 of which were women. In 2007 the beneficiary group accounted for 80 elders (60 males and 20 females). The reduction in beneficiaries had to do with lower food donations, as well as fewer

elders in need of support. During the different phases, the majority of beneficiaries had been permanent residents.

In these two cases SDC support to the facilities (including stoves) has as such had a long-term impact exceeding the emergency phase objectives. Today the centres rely on the provision of food donations. In 2004 food donations from WFP ended. In Kammusamba this meant that the centre could no longer work on a daily basis. It only operates when smaller donations are given by church groups (Catholic as well as Protestant). By the time of the assessment of the evaluation team, the kitchen had not provided food for four months. In 'A Semente', Bom Pastor, provisions are more stable, with food donations being received from MINARS.

The remaining 6 food centres do no longer function according to the original purpose. This is largely due to the lack of external food donations (since 2003-2004). Whereas four of these food centres no longer benefit the community at large (the buildings are used entirely by the churches), there are two food centres that are currently being used for pupils of nearby schools. The dining halls constructed by SDC are used as classrooms (in the case of Fatima II, benefiting 160 primary school pupils per day). Again this points to a longer-term ***unintended*** positive impact of the support provided by SDC (although the stoves are no longer in use).

2.6.8 Sustainability

Hardware

The buildings constructed by SDC are in general good (2) to relatively good (2). Only one is in urgent need for rehabilitation (adobe brick walls without cement cover are deteriorating). All the ovens are still in a good state (albeit only used in two of the food centres). Latrines are still working, albeit in one case the adobe brick walls were deteriorating. The lack of use for the original purpose of food centres in 6 out of 8 cases is therefore not due to the lack of sustainability of buildings. In one case parts of the facility have been rehabilitated by the church (Kammusamba).

Software

All 8 churches (Missions, Sisters and Monks) in charge of the original food centres still exist in the *bairros* by 2007, but there is a general lack of external funds to sustain the food centres. This explains why 6 out of 8 food centres no longer operate, and the 2 that do no longer operate on a daily basis. Lack of funds is a direct result of the end of the emergency phase and the transition to development (around 2003-2004). WFP provided the vast majority of food contributions until 2004. The churches themselves do not today have the means to donate food for the daily operation of the food centres. According to interviewees, the food centres would have continued to benefit vulnerable groups had it not been for the lack of external food donations. One exception was the case of Macolocolo (Sisters Salesias) in which the food centre closed after the majority of IDPs had returned. The food centre was opened explicitly to benefit this group of people.

2.7 Assessment of other Projects Supported in Huambo

2.7.1 Introduction

This section provides an assessment of some of the projects supported by SDC in Huambo Province which somehow falls outside the categories of projects analysed so far. It refers to those types of projects that were supported only once by SDC, either because SDC changed its strategy or because it decided to leave Huambo in 2005. The section covers an assessment of the following projects:

- Reforestation (CAD and ADRA-A);
- Mine Risk Education (Handicap International-F);
- Reproductive Health and HIV/Aids (CV-A and CV-F).

Several other projects could have been included, if time and resources had permitted it. Most notably the evaluation does not assess the projects implemented by OIKOS, ADRA-International (ADRA-I) and Save the Children-UK. A change of personnel at OIKOS and change of focus left it with no possibility to engage in the evaluation. For Save the Children-UK all documentation seems to have been destroyed and staff engaged in the project was not available. This made it impossible to carry out a proper assessment.

ADRA-International's food security project targeting return and reintegration of IDPs would have been a relevant choice for the beneficiary analysis. It was the only agricultural project for returnees that SDC directly supported. The exclusion of the project from the assessment was due to three interrelated factors:

- First, ADRA-I has after the end of the projects left Huambo town, and the former staff we could gain access to (see consolidated meeting list) have only a very rudimentary understanding of the project;
- Secondly, the fieldwork team was only provided with the Final Report for one part of the ADRA-I intervention related to food security (fertiliser, seeds, farmer schools etc.). The report for the other part on a micro-credit type of domestic animal provision was not available;
- Thirdly, SHA's contribution to the two components or projects is in the SDC budget list items stated as 98,306 CHF (reference number ANG 1.10.2002-30.09.2003 and 1.10.2003-30.09.2004).
- Compared to the total budget for the food security project it was a relative modest contribution solely referring to the payment of an agricultural technician and no operational costs (see the available Final Report).

At the end of the mission we managed to meet the former director of ADRA-I who suggested that the facilities that were constructed and rehabilitated during the project implementation phase are now being used as the main-base for a new veterinary project run by German Agro Action and ADRA-I and funded by the European Commission. The aim is to improve Food Security in ten municipalities of Huambo and Benguela Provinces. The project has established a sustainable system of vaccination against the Newcastle disease.[40] The former director suggested that SDC was interested in supporting a second phase of the project, but only if and when ADRA-I brought in a new donor who could take over when SDC closed down its operations in Huambo. It took ADRA-I a year to identify a new partner and in the mean time SDC had closed its Humabo office. In the new setup ADRA-I does not have an office in Huambo.

Of the above-mentioned assessed projects on-site visits were made to the Reforestation projects and the HIV/Aids project (several meetings with CV-A and assessments of the two health centres). The Mine Risk Education (MRE) project involved interviews with HI-Belgium staff.[41] Since SDC stopped supporting the MRE activities, these were downscaled. During 2007 HI-Belgium, who took over from HI-France, has received new funding and will continue the project in an adapted form. All documentation has either been destroyed or moved to Luanda and France. Most staff has since the project left HI, except for one person who is the coordinator of the new MRE project.

Due to the dispersed manner in which SDC support has been provided to these projects, findings will be provided separately for each of the projects.

[40] The former ADRA-I staff we managed to interview in Huambo strongly suggested that the project(s) was ridden by corrupt practices, most notably black market selling of seeds, fertiliser and livestock which should have been distributed to returning IDPs as part of different types of micro-credit schemes. As the ADRA-I left Huambo town shortly after the completion of the project, it was not possible to verify the circulating rumours about the project.

[41] Confirmation of MRE activities was made for example during the beneficiary analysis in Sambo.

2.7.2 Mine Risk Education (MRE)

Introduction

The SDC-supported project "Raise Awareness among the Angolan population about the danger of landmines" had for the first period, March 2004 to February 2005, an operational budget of 545,160 CHF for the three provinces of Huambo, Benguela and Bié and a majority contribution of 270,000 CFH from SDC.[42] The project was budgeted for two years (270,000 CHF for the first year and 312,000 CHF for the second year), but the SDC budget list (Actual Total) indicates that only the first-year budget was spent. This was confirmed by HI staff, who only had recollections of SHA contribution for the first year: "then they suddenly stopped funding, I don't know why and we (HI-staff) were not given any explanations by HI-F. We managed with the other contributions to continue some of the activities" (Interview HI staff).

The project was a continuation of former HI-France MRE activities dating back to 2003. At that time the MRE activities had aimed at targeting vulnerable groups and securing that MRE was grounded in local community structures: *sobas* (traditional leaders), user committees, churches, women's groups, associations and various groups of state employees (teachers, health works, etc.). Several networks had been established internally among the types of target groups and between groups. Even though time and resources had been used on capacitating these groups, they soon ceded to exist when HI-F did not provide strategic inputs.

Objectives

The general objective of the project was broad and aimed at enabling vulnerable populations to manage the risk of mines in order to contribute to a reduction of landmine victims. More interestingly the specific objectives were:

- Promote efficient and sustainable MRE networks at community level;
- Strengthen MRE capacity among local organizations, including support for their activities;
- General distribution of developed MRE tools and methods.

Main Findings

- The project made an important contribution to developing more sustainable MRE activities that tried to use local service providers during implementation. This could ensure an integration of MRE activities with health, education, and local state practices in collaboration with local community structures such as sobas, churches etc.;
- The use of not only community structures but the embedding of MRE activities in service provision networks and among professional networks (teachers, health personnel, local state functionaries) had a significant outreach function and made sure that MRE activities were "mainstream" and "integrated" in the most important developmental exercises;
- When SDC stopped support after the first year, this influenced the activities negatively as HI-F had to downscale;
- The failure to release funding for the second phase had negative consequences for HI-F partners such as GAC, which took care of community outreach implementation for HI-F;

To train and secure well-functioning networks require considerable trust. Beginning and then suddenly ending project implementation has negative influence on the participants' engagement with projects, as they face considerable insecurities with regard to aim and value of participation, which is based on voluntary participation. Key donors therefore are faced with an ethical obligation to make sure that their engagement and disengagement are considerate and well planned. SDCs engagement with the MRE project has failed, as no information suggests that there were problems with the implementation.

[42] Other contributors were: Mettler Foundation (108,000 CHF), Japan Embassy (102,813 CHF), French Embassy (45,772 CHF) and an own contribution from HI-F amounting to 18,574 CHF).

2.7.3 Reforestation

Introduction

SDC supported 4 reforestation projects at the end of the emergency phase in 2001. These all took the form of SDC financing partner organizations that were in full charge of implementation. SDC only played a role in the planning phase. The projects were a direct response to the massive deforestation that had taken place during the war periods (exploitation for firewood and charcoal). The support was in this sense highly relevant. The impact was nonetheless limited.

By 2007 two of the four projects had failed (trees had burnt or been eaten by animals). This partly owes to a general lack of community ownership and thereby protection of the trees, albeit ownership was attempted nurtured by SDC partnership organizations. In one of the successful cases it is the state authorities that are responsible for protection (IDEF – *Instituto de Desenvolvimento e Floresta*). In the three other cases it is the community that is responsible.

Overview of Support and Objectives

SDC supported 4 reforestation projects in 2001 (totalling 166,000 trees). **3 projects with ADRA-A** was supported in villages south of Caála (Calueio, Ndongua and Cantão Pahula), which were all attached to the SDC/ADRA-A construction of health posts and schools in the areas.[43] A total of 150,000 trees were planted with the majority being eucalyptus trees for forests outside villages, with a minor part being fruit trees for planting within the selected villages. The total cost was 33,000 USD. The objective was to support the improvement of the natural environment in returnee areas, as well as to train the local population in rational use of natural resources (including acknowledging the importance of forests and learning planting technologies). Fruit trees were envisioned to improve village food security.

SDC supported **1 project with CAD** in the area of Vilinga, which was attached to CAD's overall programme of creating job opportunities to IDPs. A total of 16,000 eucalyptus trees were planted. The cost was not accessible.

SDC financed projects based on applications from partner organisations. Partners chose the areas of support and were fully responsible for implementation. Reforestation involved the use of local workers (permanent residents in areas of support in the case of ADRA-A and IDPs from resettlement areas in the case of CAD). SDC had no explicitly formulated programme objective for the support to reforestation. Support was entirely based on request from the two partners.

Main Findings

- SDC had no project strategy for reforestation activities. Support was based on partner requests, selection of areas and implementation;
- High relevance due to massive deforestation during the war, but low impact and questionable beneficiaries. Two out of four projects failed in the long term (trees have disappeared);
- The use of local workers was appropriate, but longer-term impact of acquired skills and knowledge is questionable as there was no follow up.

Relevance

Overall relevance of the support was high. Due to massive exploitation of trees for the consumption of firewood, not least around IDP resettlement areas such as Cantão Pahula (ADRA-A support), there was an urgent need for reforestation to take place (livelihood, construction materials, erosion etc.). In the permanent villages ADRA-A supported south of Caála town (Calueio and Ndongua), uncontrolled exploitation of trees close to the village had laid the landscape bare, due to the fact that areas further away had been high-security risk zones. This, however, also owed to the fact that villagers made an income from the production of charcoal, which was sold in town.

[43] In the same period DW financed a reforestation project in the area known as km 25 kilometers, also in Caála municipality where ADRA-A had also supported health posts and school buildings (without SDC support in this case).

The direct involvement by ADRA-A of local villagers in the planting of trees was relevant, taking into consideration that there were no pre-existing practices of reforestation amongst the local populations. One complication around the planning of the project emerged. ADRA-A wanted to confine support to eucalyptus trees, but SDC was of the view that villagers would benefit more immediately from fruit trees. A mixture of trees was the result. In the case of CAD an explicit objective with reforestation was the creation of job opportunities for IDPs in resettlement areas more so than reforestation as such. The choice of support was based on consultation with the provincial government on priorities for support activities.

Organization of Support
SDC gave financial support alone to partners to plant trees with direct involvement of local community members or IDPs. CAD mobilised only displaced people in need and from other areas than the reforestation area. CAD wanted to implement this project not because the area was inhabited by displaced people, but because CAD was looking for employment to displaced people that it had recruited. The choice of site was based on recommendations from the government institute for trees (IDEF). The project was financed 100% by SDC (equipment and trees) and done in collaboration with IDEF, which provided a technician and sold the trees to the project partners. CAD provided a coordinator, as well as mobilised the displaced people it had identified as beneficiaries. The displaced people did the planting and were taught how to do it. They received WFP food for work in return. Due to problems with rain, the project also included the implementation of irrigation systems.

ADRA-A supported reforestation in three villages where it was already constructing schools and health posts (with SDC support). One of these areas was next to the Longove resettlement area for IDPs (Cantão Pahula). The remaining two villages were permanent settlements with no IDPs. In contrast to CAD, ADRA-A used local residents for the planting of trees. These were given WFP food for work in return. People were also given training in reforestation and the importance of forest protection.

Impact in the immediate and longer Term
Two out of four reforestation projects have failed (the trees no longer exist). It is difficult to assess the longer-term impact of the remaining forests. According to local residents interviewed, they did not see any impacts of the trees for the community as such. There have been no follow-up on the extent to which workers participating in the tree planting have been able to use the skills later on. The fact that there has been no tree planting after the projects suggests that skills acquired have at least not made former participating workers plant trees on their own initiative.

Calueio (w. ADRA-A): eucalyptus trees have all burnt down during the slash and burn season. Fruit trees have been eaten by domestic animals. **Ndongua (w. ADRA-A)**: all trees have been eaten by local cattle. **Cantão Pahula (w. ADRA-A)**: the eucalyptus forest on the other side of the river is still existing. Fruit trees of lemon are still there in the village, but some have fully dried out. According to local villagers there have been no benefits from the projects for the villages. As one villager argued: “the trees are too small for firewood yet”! What this suggests is that the original objective of ADRA-A’s intervention has not necessarily been shared by local villagers.

Vilinga (w. CAD): the forest of eucalyptus trees still exists. This owes to the system of irrigation implemented by CAD (as opposed to the ADRA-A projects). IDPs engaged in the work do not benefit from the forest directly. There have been no follow-up on the extent to which they have been able to use the acquired tree-planting skills.

Sustainability and ownership
With respect to the one project of ADRA-A that still exist, the sustainability of the project is questionable. This is due to the lack of community ownership of the project, as well as due to the lack of new community-based forests initiatives. The training activities of ADRA-A have not been sustainable in the long term. The sustainability of the CAD project owes to two factors: the making of irrigation systems and the fact that responsibility for protection was taken over by the state (IDEF). A core difference is that CAD from the outset closely involved IDEF in selection of site, planning and implementation. ADRA-A alone involved the local communities.

2.7.4 Reproductive Health and HIV/Aids (2004-2006)

Introduction
This section assesses the Project for Reproductive Health and the fight against Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD) and HIV/Aids, which was implemented in the municipalities of Huambo (San Pedro) and Caála during 2004 and 2006.

Angolan Red Cross (CV-A) in Huambo received in 2004 in partnership with French Red Cross (CV-F) its first and only "big project" from SDC with a total budget of 456,600 EUR. SDC paid half of this budget. The project aimed to support and improve the responses to STD as a way of avoiding the transmission of HIV/Aids. The project covered the formation and capacity building of personnel in the field of medical treatment of STD through the formation of mobile testing stations for HIV/Aids. It also covered mobilisation of a network of voluntary activists catering for sensibilisation and dissemination of information on HIV/Aids.

The main components of the project included:
- The rehabilitation and construction of annexes at the two health centres (Caála and San Pedro) for testing and counselling (the original project document mentions the rehabilitation of 4 health posts).
- Capacity building of personnel for conducting tests, distributing medical treatment and counselling. Tests included, according to staff, vaginal test, syphilis and HIV/Aids.
- Setting up networks of volunteers (2 x 20 as a minimum around each testing station and further 10 in each of the 4 communes targeted) capable of disseminating information about STD (particularly HIV/Aids, but also syphilis etc.).

The project used TV/video, theatre, slogans, pamphlets, T-shirts etc. as media for information, dissemination and communication as well as the distribution of preservatives and information about usage of different types of protection.

There were problems with the financial records of the last three months of the project. 8,000 EUR were not accounted for. For this reason, according to CV-A staff, all documentation related to the project (financial records, tri-monthly reports, yearly reports etc.) has been transferred to Luanda where SDC, CV-F and CV-A head office is in charge of solving the issue.[44]

Main Findings
- The CV-A/CV-F project seems to have been operating detached from the provincial health system, although it shared premises with the hospital in Caála and the health centre in San Pedro (use of offices, consultancy rooms, testing rooms etc.) and partly shared laboratory personnel.
- The control of the project was firmly in the hands of the CV-F expatriate personnel, who *de facto* took care of testing, types of testing, laboratory analysis, information gathering and elaboration. They operated separately from the administration of the two health authorities,

[44] The CV-A has no recollection of capacity training supplied by the APOLO programme, but as part of the partly SDC-funded project institutional capacity was provided by CV-F in the fields of accountability, budgeting, and administration, just as internal workshops on how to capacitate HIV/Aids activists formed part of the project. This obviously was not sufficient.

which hosted them. There was little knowledge transformation from CV-F to the public health authorities.
- As the program document clearly indicates, the project only saw the provincial health department (MINSA) as an "indirect beneficiary". This is untenable within the wider donor aid framework of the Paris Declaration (approved in 2005) stressing coordination and alignment to national programs.
- The project did not seem to have a clear plan in place for handing over community mobilising activities to local partners (Caála seems to be an exception, but this exception can be related to USAID activities there allowing for a continuation of some of the activities).
- Construction work on the San Pedro health post is ridden with construction errors. In particular the roof is in a bad state. This has multiple consequences for not only the annex, but the health post as such;
- No final report seems to exist.

Relevance and Appropriateness
It was relevant to support CV-A and the timing was good with CV-A captured in the no man's land of the transition from humanitarian aid to development. CV-A Huambo was not geared to run the project in institutional terms. This was the case, despite the fact that its personnel had received training in Luanda from the Federation of Red Cross (including administration and project design) and some training on disaster preparedness with reference to Red Cross general goals.

The CV-A had not been part of the APOLO programme (2001-2003) and therefore was not geared to implement a relatively large and comprehensive project with substantial funding. Furthermore the institutional setup between CV-A and CV-F seems awkward. The project was primarily controlled by the CV-F, but the financial management was catered for by CV-A. Former SHA and present SDC staff indicated that they were aware of CV-A's limited financial and administrative capacity. They hoped that the involvement of CV-F could limit possible damage caused by CV-A's limitations, as they work as a "shadow administrator".

No proper institutional context analysis seems to have been included before releasing funding for the project. It was not possible to find any appraisal documents either. The above considerations make the assessment team question the appropriateness of the arrangement.

Material Status of Annexes and Rehabilitated Constructions
Caála: the property is in good condition and furniture is still relatively well maintained. TV/VCR has been replaced by MINSA, because the old one did not work. **San Pedro, Huambo**: the annex built onto the health centre is not well-functioning. The roof is leaking from all fitting areas and points of connection between the new and old buildings due to construction errors. This has consequences not only for the new annex but also for the health centre where water enter several rooms during the rainy season. Furthermore, the roof on the annex has been constructed with a minimum of corrugated iron plates making the roof itself leaking. The concrete coverage around windows and doors are of such poor quality that it has begun to fall apart. The project should have provided the testing station with a TV/VCR for dissemination of information about STD, but no TV/VCR was available in San Pedro.

Beneficiaries
The project document states that the main target group is returned refugees from Congo and Zambia. According to volunteers from the 2004-2006 period, as well as present workers at the testing station in San Pedro, this was not an appropriate target group. Refugees had already received good training and HIV/Aids testing in the refugee camps. Consequently, the actual main beneficiary group became the general population in the two localities. The project specifically targeted young people and pregnant women. MINSA is according to the project document only considered an "indirect beneficiary". This had consequences for the sustainability of the project.

Sustainability
The handover of the project to MINSA has been far from smooth. At the Caála hospital the testing station was handed over by the end of 2006. The transference to MINSA was problematic, because the technical staff (mainly expatriates and trained volunteers) of the CV-A/CV-F project had either left (expatriates), or was not integrated within MINSA (Angolans), when the programme was handed over to MINSA. Without a proper plan for inclusion of Angolan trainees in MINSA, the project did not have any trained staff. The result was that the programme was closed for seven months (December, 2006 to June, 2007). It only re-opened with activities in June 2007, when MINSA provided 4 new trained technical staff. Thus the CV-A/CV-F project only left behind furniture, education materials and boxes of preservatives, while not ensuring that there was staff to continue the activities and a proper plan for continuation of the project. Also the CV-F did not leave behind the statistics of patients, testing results, etc. After June 2007 the testing centre became an integrated part of the hospital.

At the San Pedro health post similar problems left the testing centre closed for well over 4 months. The testing station did not open until the director called up 2 former volunteers who had received some training during the CV-A/CV-F phase. They have since received further training provided by MINSA (in collaboration with Save the Children) and the national programme for HIV/Aids.

The fact that the testing station was closed for a prolonged period, has had several serious consequences: in San Pedro few local tests are conducted and all voluntary networks have broken down making mobilisation of local activists for information campaigns rather difficult. Furthermore, there are only two staff members working from 8 am to 14 pm taking care of testing, laboratory work and counselling.

In Caála the community-based campaigns have been resumed since June 2007 with 8 meetings in Caála town and suburbs covering approximately 3,000 people. People are encouraged to take tests. The current programme is also collaborating with USAID which has a HIV/Aids programme in Caála today. USAID does not finance the hospital programme, but collaboration takes place around public campaigns (for example USAID has a theatre group, which MINSA does not have). Plans have been made to extend campaigning to the rural areas also, but this work has not been initiated yet. In Caála the programme now operates with 8 staff members (4 persons for counselling, 1 laboratory person, 1 doctor, 1 technician for testing pregnant women and 1 pharmacist). Opening hours are all weekdays from 8 am to 3 pm.

Tests are at both testing stations given for free, just as medicine and preservatives are available for free, but the two testing stations differ in how tests are processed. Medicine was during the CV-A/CV-F project period provided by the project keeping a stock in the office of CV-A. Part of this stock is still available, but who *de facto* has access to it is unclear, just as arrangement of requisition is unclear. Current CV-A staff indicated that the stock was not given to urban health centres, only to rural health posts. CV-A was not able to provide information on how requisition is managed in any greater detail. The two project centres, which are urban-based, receive medicine and material from MINSA.

In Caála tests results are procured from Huambo hospital, because the Caála hospital does not have the technology to treat the tests. This means that test answers are only procured after about 2 days. In San Pedro this model was applied too, but due to gossip stigmatising potential positive clients, both testing and laboratory analysis was conducted at San Pedro. This was done in order to minimise stigmatisation. Furthermore, members of the political and economic elite from Huambo use the San Pedro testing station, which besides the fixed opening hours is flexible with regard to opening hours for such clients.

According to staff members at the two testing stations, the amount of clients coming forward for testing is intimately related to local mobilisation. Caála therefore conducts more tests than San Pedro today. In Caála 56 persons were tested from June to early September 2007 (27 of these were females). Currently 4 persons receive medicine and are consulted on the use of medicine,

e.g. the intake of the right meals while on medicine. There is no food provision linked to the program. In Caála there were no statistics available from the CV-A/CV-F project period.

In San Pedro a report from the CV-A/CV-F period was kept by one of the present employees (former volunteer) indicating that 175 tests were conducted from September 2005 to 22 January 2006 (130 females, 45 males with a negative rate of 94,85%). Since the testing station reopened in late 2006 few tests are conducted. Most tests are due to internal transferrals from the San Pedro health post or due to the reception of high-profiled clients coming to San Pedro from Huambo town (in order to be anonymous).

Due to the low turn-up for testing, the San Pedro health post has rearranged the usage of the annex space. Furthermore, while the CV-F tested for a whole range of sexually transmitted diseases (syphilis, etc.) due to lack of training and capacity, it is only HIV/Aids testing that takes place today. As local staff suggested, this is unwise due to the intimate relationship between different types of STD and treatment.

Equally problematic is the fact that the information management system used by CV-A/CV-F was not aligned to the MINSA reporting system. This meant that after the delayed handover to MINSA, the staff of the testing stations had to learn and operate a new reporting system. The CV-F reporting system was very detailed, required computer elaboration and multiple entries aimed at detailed and sophisticated statistical analysis. The MINSA system is simpler, and weekly reports are transferred to the province directorate, which is in charge of the wider statistical elaboration.

Impact on CV-A

Institutionally, the impact of the SDC-funded project was by the CV-A considered “high”. It made it possible for CV-A to operate with a staff of 9 (including the 5 stable staff) and augment the number of more than 80 Red Cross volunteers operating in 6 localities of Huambo and Caála municipalities. Nonetheless, since the end of the SDC-funded project, the relationship to the two health posts and the relatively large group of volunteers that the project brought in has by and large relinquished.

The project seems primarily to have been conceived by the CV-F, which took care of the overall leadership and monitoring of the project, the technical input on the various types of testing related to STD etc. and oversight of the construction/rehabilitation of annexes to the health centres. CV-A took care of community mobilisation of volunteer activists and the financial management of the project.

CV-A also received 4-5 Toyota 4WD as part of the SDC-funded project. 4 of these vehicles are standing in the backyard under or in need of repair. Besides the cars the CV-A received 2 computers from SDC as an element of building up institutional capacity. The computers are working with some problems (lack of electricity and anti-virus protection). Generally, most of the institutional support (material) is today not functioning.

The CV-A is considered institutionally “weak” by the ICRC, which would like to hand over its “tracking project” of disappeared and displaced persons and children to the CV-A. However, ICRC fears a breakdown of the project, if CV-A is the sole responsible for the project. For the same reason the CV-A is not involved in the unique and long-term Orthopaedic Hospital project (see Section 2.2), which the ICRC wants to fully hand over to the GoA as part of pulling out from Huambo by the end of the year. CV-A is not considered independent and/or capable enough to take on the role as government counterpart.

2.8 Assessment of Peace-building and Reconciliation Initiatives in Huambo

2.8.1 Introduction

The end of the civil war – after the death of Jonas Savimbi on 22 February 2002 and the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding on 4 April 2002 – set a new stage for peace building and reconciliation. Four main initiatives in this area were included in SDC's programme. Two of these are assessed in this section. In addition, the 'Political Division IV' of Switzerland funded five activities in this area. These are included in the table below, but fall outside the scope of this evaluation. It can be seen that among these, the de-mining activities carried out by HALO Trust were in terms of funding particularly significant.

Table 20: Swiss-funded Peace-building and Reconciliation Activities

Denomination	Partner	Time	Funds USD)
SDC			
• Voices of Peace	DW	01.12.02 – 31.12.04	129,600
• Conflict Resolution	SFCG	01.10.03 – 31.10.05	320,000
• Mine Risk Awareness	HI	01.01.04 – 28.02.05	192,000
• ICRC – multilateral	ICRC	01.01.04 – 31.12.04	400,000
Political Division IV of Switzerland			
• Constitutional Reform	Ebert Stiftung Found.	01.03.02 – 01.03.04	1,578
• Extension of COIEPA	DM	01.01.02 – 31.12.03	86,400
• De-mining in Huambo Province	HALO TRUST	01.10.02 – 28.02.05	518,400
• Disarmament of Civilians	Angola 2000	01.09.03 – 30.06.05	78,390
• Democracy & Governance	AIP – NDI	01.03.03 – 30.11.03	46,200
Total			**1,772,568**

The aftermath of the civil war was characterised by the following:

- Deep-rooted hatred between ex-belligerents, deep wounds between people, and mistrust. During war times, the belligerents resorted to victimise civilians thought to be sympathisers of the opponent side, which led many innocent people to be targeted by physical punishments, kidnappings or murder. Disappearances were the order of the day. This was led by military officers, but some civilians were also part of the complot against their country fellows, neighbours and friends;
- Immediately after the war, the process of disarmament and demobilisation of UNITA ex-soldiers began. Huambo also started witnessing the slow but growing freedom of movement, especially with the returning of IDPs, UNITA demobilised soldiers and some ex-refugees, MPLA and UNITA militants, war-disabled, female victims of violence, etc. This mix of people from different enemy lines was a breeding environment for further conflicts. That environment was more likely to be a kind of time-bomb, rather than a space for building a common ground for everybody to feel safe and esteemed.

Within this context, SDC decided to support peace building and rebuilding of community relationships, to encourage the emergence of civil society actors, strengthen human capacity building, and struggles for political, civil, social and cultural rights. SDC funded four partners: the American NGO Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and the International/Canadian NGO Development Workshop (DW) for peace building and reconciliation, Handicap International for Mine Risk Awareness, and ICRC for a multilateral approach, which included the location of disappeared family members.

Handicap International's Mine Risk Education project has been dealt with in Section 2.7. Although grouped together with the peace-building and reconciliation projects by SDC, it is essentially of a rather different nature than the activities highlighted in this section. The assessment here will concentrate on the activities of the first two partners mentioned above:

- **DW** already in 1998 initiated a "Voices of Peace" project, which edits a newspaper in local Umbundu language and in Portuguese, aimed at fostering the freedom of speech at community levels, combined with literacy sessions, and conflict resolution training sessions. This was supported by SDC (and CIDA) from 2003 onwards.

- **SFCG** supported reconciliation by providing training in negotiations- and mediations skills to local leaders in order for these to become the key leaders in solving local conflicts between people of different backgrounds. SFCG also set up a local civil society forum for bringing the leaders of different backgrounds together, with special emphasis on those from UNITA and MPLA, church leaders, civil society members and journalists within a Conflict Resolution and Transformation Project.

2.8.2 Development Workshop: Voices of Peace Project

Overview

The 'Voices of Peace' project was initiated in 1998 with a community assessment on the trends and tendencies in terms of needs, values, skills and local capacities. After the research, DW decided to set up a local newspaper, owned by local communities, with their full participation in bringing and making local news. The project was funded by SDC and CIDA between 2003 and 2005. SDC has given a total amount of 320,000 USD, CIDA 300,000 USD. The first and important component of Voices of Peace was the publishing of the *Ondaka* newspaper (*Ondaka* means Voice in Umbundu language). This has continued to the present day. DW publishes 2,500 copies every month, sent to 12 communities within Huambo city and to 11 countryside municipalities, and six Angolan provinces (Luanda, Bié, Kuando Kubango, Benguela and Kwanza-Sul). It can also be accessed through the DW website. The project started with just four communities (Sambo, Samacau, Nzaji and Vilinga), but now covers 12. The *Ondaka* newspaper started with just 4 pages, but now has 16 pages.

The whole Voices of Peace process starts with the training of community journalists on a voluntary basis (unpaid), chosen from within the local communities, especially amongst the most enlightened people, like teachers and nurses. After the selection, the candidates are trained in basic journalist skills, how to identify and collect local news and how to write them. The collected news are written in *Umbundu* and brought to two editors who, after reading them, select those thought to be focal and important and translate them into Portuguese. The main reporting and editorial themes have to do with local conflicts, domestic violence, petty crimes, witchcraft, land conflicts, sexual harassment against women, and alcohol abuse. Political intolerance is also addressed in *Ondaka* news. The impact of the *Ondaka* Newspaper at the local level has been significant. This is contributing to the changing of the behaviour of some community members.

Apart from *Ondaka* newspaper, there are other 'Voices of Peace' components such as 1,500 literacy modules and 2,000 copies of a book with stories linked to peace and conflict resolution, based on a traditional storytelling approach and living case study experiences. There is also a research unit which monitors the rise of new conflicts, collects stories from the townships and rural communities and the impact of natural disasters, especially heavy rains in local communities. The *Ondaka* newspaper has completed 21 editions since its foundation in 1998. 44,450 copies have been produced and distributed to all 11 Huambo municipalities and 6 Angolan provinces.

There are moreover 44 small libraries distributed across local communities. The main library is at DW's Peace Programme Office with 628 books. Another 356 books are distributed to local communities, especially into the schools constructed by DW. There is also an archive of 1,351

Angolan newspapers ranging from *Jornal de Angola* (state-owned newspaper) to private newspapers.

Another extremely important component of the 'Voices of Peace' project is the literacy campaign. It has reached 2,456 beneficiaries. 78% of these are women. There are 79 teachers who were paid at the beginning of the project but are now volunteers. The initial enthusiasm is by 2007 fading, due to lack of salary to motivate the teachers. Despite all odds, 95% of the teachers are still working on a voluntary basis.

Impact of DW's 'Voices of Peace Project'

- It is a consolidated assumption that the local community members of the 'Voices of Peace' project, especially those linked to *Ondaka* newspaper, feel a sense of ownership of the project.
- *Ondaka* newspaper has been a novelty in rural communities whose richness, opinions, skills and freedom of speech have been humiliated since colonial times and whose language has been despised. During colonial rule, local language was derogatorily known as *The Language of Dogs!* Moreover, during war periods, if a person talked Umbundu in cities like Luanda, s/he could be dubbed as a UNITA spy or supporter.
- The impact in terms of freedom of speech has been significant. The newspaper has incorporated important local events. People at least have some opportunity to channel their dreams, news, sorrows, and frustrations.
- The newspaper has also had some impact in tackling social vices like alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and sexual harassment. It has been a major vehicle for conflict resolution.
- There is an ongoing debate on whether this local newspaper can be transformed into a modern, national and private newspaper (like *Folha 8,* and *Semanário Angolense*), because of its local symbolic meaning. This would be worthwhile, given the range of beneficiaries and readers that the newspaper has all over Angola.
- The Literacy Campaign has also gone a step forward by composing local texts embedded in local culture and using local symbols.

Challenges and Weaknesses

The short-term impact of the 'Voices of Peace' project, with significant emphasis on the *Ondaka* newspaper, has been achieved in an environment deeply marked by political, social and cultural conflicts, social destitution, mistrust and broken relationships. *Ondaka* has contributed to strengthening a new culture of peace, respect for differences and community coexistence, where people from different backgrounds must strive for a common ground. This has been a remarkable achievement in the immediate aftermath of the Angolan war.

There are some weaknesses and challenges which should be taken into account if the project is to be sustained:

- Since 2006, DW has been running 'Voices of Peace' with internal funds, given the shortage of international funding. There is a widespread perception that Angola is a rich country, which is able to fund its own initiatives. This can represent a serious challenge to civil society initiatives in the long term.
- The shortage of wages is already having a negative impact on the teachers linked to the Literacy Campaign. They have less motivation to continue teaching without any financial support. This is not least a real concern in an environment of destitution and poverty. There is lack of a serious and strategic debate on how to make the project survive in the long term.
- The juridical and political framework is oppressive and suffocating, because the private press is increasingly targeted with suspicion from the GoA. This is due to the role the private press plays in raising people's awareness on issues of corruption, mismanagement, and lack of accountability of the GoA. The private press can come under some kind of curfew as the time of elections is coming closer. The only political safeguard for DW and the 'Voices of Peace' project is that DW has been one of the major international NGOs with a lot of social infrastructures to their credit, especially schools, health infrastructures and water points.

- Around 60% of the Angolans are illiterate. The available programs are not well fitted to people of different social and cultural backgrounds. It means that alongside short-lived literacy campaigns, it is urgent to discuss a wider national policy for curbing illiteracy.

2.8.3 Search for Common Ground: Reconciliation

In order to deal with the widespread conflictive issues in the immediate aftermath of the civil war, SFCG came up with a two-level strategic plan for contributing to reconciliation and peace-building as well as reducing the risk of new conflicts. At one level the programme targeted the middle-range urban leadership. At another level it targeted grassroots in the countryside. SFCG was funded by SDC with a total amount of 320,000 USD for the period 2003-2005.

Reconciliation among middle-range Leaders in Huambo City

Among the middle-range leadership in Huambo, there was a special emphasis on MPLA and UNITA provincial leaders, but also journalists from the Huambo provincial radio, university students, and church leaders. In 2004 SFCG established a Political Problem-Solving Forum (*Forum de Consertação Política*). This was done after SFCG had mobilised provincial representatives of UNITA and MPLA. It was quite an achievement, given the mutual suspicion between the two main contenders, MPLA and UNITA. Immediately after the end of the war Huambo was a boiling pot with a lot of assaults, arsons, beatings and political harassment of UNITA members and those dubbed to be opposition supporters. Many people lived under permanent fear. This was especially the case for those who lived under UNITA banners or who where forcibly recruited to serve as labour for UNITA. It even included those people living in areas thought to be UNITA strongholds. The Political Problem-Solving Forum comprised civil society actors, church leaders and political parties. It was used to send a strong message throughout Huambo Province that reconciliation could be achieved, although still a difficult and long-term endeavour.

Local journalists were invited as a bridging point. They were used to bring everybody together and to broadcast the impact of the Political Forum. SFCG conducted a week-long seminar on conflict resolution training skills. The aim was to empower the Political Forum members on how to tackle the political divide in the aftermath of the civil war. At the same time, the members of the Forum embarked on discussions of a Code of Conduct for political parties and civil society members. The aim was to deal with issues of politically induced violence and how to prevent it. The Code of Conduct was seen as a way to mitigate the high level of political intolerance that existed in Huambo.

Among the prominent members of the Political Problem-Solving Forum two groups that were interviewed are highlighted:

1. **Liga dos Estudantes para o Desenvolvimento (LED)**
   The Students' League for Development (LED) was started after local students were invited to be an active part of the Political Forum. After discussions, the young students wanted to renew the old and prejudiced Huambo with new and peaceful purposes. To that end they set up the students' league comprised of members from the Faculty of Agronomy, High Institute for Educational Sciences (ISCED), Faculty of Law, Faculty of Economics and the Open University. They were around 318 members. They are now a regional organisation which covers Huambo, Kuando Kubango and Bié provinces. The members of LED are young people, members of church organisations, political institutions, and party members from all backgrounds.

LED requested SFCG to assist its members with training. This was divided into five modules on Peace and Conflict Resolution. The first LED-organised Forum was titled: “The Participation on the Process of Consolidation and Maintenance of Peace”. SFCG funded it with 600 USD. It was a real and first-time success.

LED came up with a strategy of self-sustainability. This implies independence from external donors, which is made possible by LED’s own internal collections and contributions. LEDs partnership with SFCG is methodological, including gaining lessons, experiences and practices from SFCG. In order to avoid donor dependency, LED has planned to produce local materials for sale such as t-shirts, diaries, and calendars.

In the beginning LED was confronted and challenged by internal divisions between its members. They were divided along religious and political lines, which meant that the Catholics would be with Catholics, the Protestants with Protestants, the MPLA sympathizers with their comrades, and so on. After the SFCG training, LED members became aware of the internal fragmentations, and thereafter addressed them.

2. **Journalists within the Political Forum**
   Huambo is still a sensitive place for independent journalists, who are not entirely free to exert their freedom of expression. SFCG decided to set up within the Political Forum a group of journalists, especially those linked to National Radio at provincial level. They were trained by SFCG on how to report on the theme of peace building. After the training, the journalists started visiting countryside areas, where they could witness the impact of war and political division.

The journalists have reported some good examples and case studies, but in fact they are in need of more technical support and guidance from SFCG. SFCG has produced audio materials in Luanda which were supposed to be broadcast in Huambo. But negotiations between the provincial Radio and SFCG at national level are still going on. If the provincial Radio authorities accept the proposal, the audio material could prove effective in addressing the embedded culture of hatred and political divisions.

Reconciliation at the Grassroots Level in the Countryside

The grassroots level comprised CBOs and church representatives with strong influence over their constituencies. They represented IDPs, ex-combatants, recently demobilised soldiers, and women of different background, Christians and non-Christians, traditional leaders, etc.

SFCG intervened through local partners, giving them capacity-building skills for promoting peace, trust, confidence and coexistence of people with different backgrounds.

SFCG gave the local partners tools on conflict resolution and assisted them in activities aimed at building confidence. Two local organisations that were interviewed are highlighted:

1. **Coordenação das Ajudas para Agricultura, Pecuária, Indústria e Acção Social (CAP2)**.
   Coordination of Aid to Agriculture, Livestock, Industry and Social Action (CAP2) is a local NGO with head office in Huambo and outreach in the rural areas. It covers 4 municipalities: Katchiungo, Londwimbali, Bailundo and Ekunha. CAP2 has received some financial aid from SFCG to intervene in Galanga Comuna, municipality of Londwimbali. The aim was to curb the political intolerance here, but that experience has been shared with other beneficiaries in the above-mentioned municipalities. In Galanga Comuna there was deep-seated anger, because it was believed that UNITA had killed a young male and then thrown him into a water well. Some UNITA MPs who went there were assaulted and their cars attacked and broken. In light of these events, the municipal authorities requested CAP2 to address the deep-rooted anger and resentment. CAP2 has also conducted open community forums with traditional authorities and people from different backgrounds attending those meetings. This experience has been

passed on to other municipalities. Now, it seems that local wounds are healing at a slow, but sure pace. There are intermarriages between people from different backgrounds. This is a good sign that reconciliation dynamics are at work.

CAP2 has also been active in the process of electoral registration, heading the civic campaign in Longonjo, Tchindjendje, Ucuma and Ekunha Municipalities.

2. Etokekiso Ly'Owingi (The Reconciliation of People).

This organisation emerged under the auspices of the Congregational Evangelical Church of Angola (*Igreja Evangélica Congregacional de Angola*). It has been active in Bailundo, an area which since the old Ovimbundo Paramount Kings has been one of the most strategic places in Huambo province. It is a place full of real and symbolic meaning. After UNITA was ousted from Huambo city in 1994, shortly after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA set up its main headquarters in Bailundo. After the resumption of war in 1999, UNITA was expelled from Bailundo. When the war ended, Bailundo was a place for people with different backgrounds, especially UNITA ex-combatants, IDPs, and ex-refugees. This brought a lot of challenges and political divisions after the signing of the Luena Memorandum (April 2002). It also brought victims of war, especially sexually harassed women, people whose relatives had disappeared after political accusations, etc. Shortly after the signing of the Luena Peace Accord, there were widespread signs of violence with UNITA flags and some houses being burned.

SFCG intervened in Bailundo through the Evangelical Church. The intervention focused on training and empowerment, with special emphasis on women who had suffered the brunt of war and who have been targeted because they were female.

After training and capacity building by SFCG two main groups emerged, which later became united in one group. The result was the creation of community forums (*Ondjango)*, with four in Bailundo town and four in the countryside. These *Olondjango* (plural of *Ondjango)* held meetings and counselling sessions for people who were still suffering from the war post-traumatic effects. At the same time, SFCG sponsored the first community marriages of low-income people whose lives and families were broken due to war. The sponsorship included buying paper, registration procedures, as well as food and cash for starting a new life. Those activities brought a significant symbolic and real impact into the community. It has also helped people to create trust in *Etokekiso Ly'Owingi.*

The *Etokekiso Ly'Owingi* has also been involved in the electoral registration campaign.

2.8.4 Conclusion

- The first actions on peace building and reconciliation were aimed at 'apagar fogo' (turn out the fire) in the immediate aftermath of the war, when relationships were still very tense. The involved NGOs tried to build confidence so that the peace process could take hold. This was highly relevant, but somewhat short-sighted.
- DW's 'Voices of Peace' project has been successful in sustaining the publication of the journal 'Ondaka' in Umbundo and Portuguese and using this and related activities to strengthen the civil society in general and its handling of conflicts in particular.
- SFCG's initiatives aimed at reconciling the former adversaries, in particular MPLA and UNITA, e.g. by establishing a Political Problem-Solving Forum. These initiatives have been highly relevant and had considerable impact. A number of initiatives have survived to the present day.
- All the peace-building activities were aimed at focused impact on specific groups, the so-called sensitive groups (ex-military, IDPs, ex-refugees, etc.), but this left out the vast majority of the people who suffered from the social fragmentation and trauma brought about by the war.
- The peace-building and reconciliation activities, combined with the reconstruction of local infrastructure, helped people to return to their areas of origin or choice.

- The post-conflict environment is an opportunity for strengthening peace and reconciliation, but also a window for building new and evolving conflicts. In fact, although there are no widespread violent conflicts, there are indicators that the peace and reconciliation process is far from a finished task.
- The issue of political intolerance, especially the relationship between MPLA and UNITA militants and sympathisers in some countryside areas, remains sensitive. With the forth-coming elections, political intolerance can become an issue of concern.
- The short-focused peace initiatives did not take into account the link between peace and development or between conflict and poverty. This will have to be dealt with in the long run.

3 Organizational Beneficiaries

3.1 Assessment of RISC Micro-enterprise Capacity Building

3.1.1 Introduction

The general objective of the Rehabilitation of Public and Community Infrastructure programme (RISC) running between 2001 and 2003 was to improve conditions for the most disadvantaged groups in Huambo by facilitating access to local social services.[45] In order to achieve this, the programme aimed at rehabilitation of infrastructure within the health sector. The methodology differed from the usual SHA/SDC approach, because it attempted to make the intervention sustainable by reinforcing the small commercial sector in Huambo town and its periphery.[46] For this purpose, independent private micro-enterprises were formed with technical and administrative assistance from SDC to build their operational capacity. In total 3 micro-enterprises was established in 2002, with 2 enterprises still in operation by September, 2007.

3.1.2 Objectives

The principal objective of the programme was to make health services available to disadvantaged Huambo province residents, through a series of "small interventions within community-based structures". From the beginning of 2002 and into 2003, the programme participated in the rehabilitation of schools and of the main hospital, and the construction of community kitchens and washing facilities. In 2002, the health sector was identified by SDC as the principal sector for interventions.

The main programme activities were designed to:

- Renovate school buildings, to ensure quality access to schooling for 400 pupils and teachers;
- Construct 12 smaller health facilities – ovens to incinerate garbage - in order to eliminate 1,290 identified contagious bacteria[47] and thus to make the provision of health services safer for both patients and health personnel;
- Improve support structures at the main hospital in Huambo though improved plumbing and by enlarging the hospital kitchen and washing facilities;
- Support the establishment of 3 sustainable micro-enterprises in Huambo capable of offering renovation and construction services on the local market.

[45] This presentation of the RISC programme's general and principal objectives is drawn from the 2003 Final Report, kindly provided to the team by Daniel Kubioka, the former SHA/SDC coordinator of the RISC programme. Daniel Kubioka generously allowed the team to look though and use his invaluable set of project documents and personal minutes.

[46] Where some SHA/SDC leaders didn't see any difference between SHA and SDC, as the names refereed to the same organisation, local staff and leaders did see the change in naming as instituting a change and a transition of the Swiss engagement in Huambo. For them, with the naming of activities as SDC activities, the organisation changed and the content of the Swiss engagement changed.

[47] The final report of RISC mentions the number of 1,290 identified bacteria. Where the number comes from is unknown.

The different types of activities corresponded fairly well with the shift of emphasis in the RISC programme. Construction of health facilities and support structures at the main hospital directly address the principal aim of the programme. In practice, staff members viewed the establishment of 3 micro-enterprises as the central objective of RISC, albeit officially this had only been a means through which the principal objective of health provisions was to be achieved.

Overlaying the principal objective and providing the global context for the programme was what SHA/SDC staff at all levels saw as the "real" objective of the programme: the setting up of micro-enterprises with and for SHA staff, so they would have employment when SDC's humanitarian intervention would eventually come to an end. The programme was considered a transitional measure (along the lines of APOLO for local NGOs) for the sustainable hand-over of SHA activities to SDC, a point that involved a considerable scaling down of SHA staff.

Regardless of their status as staff or leaders, expatriates or Angolans, none of the former SHA staff referred to RISC's objective as making appropriate health services available to dis-advantaged Huambo residents. For them it was the other way around: the micro-enterprises were the principal objective while the construction of facilities (schools, health posts, ovens etc.) was seen as politically defined "public works" that SHA/SDC could offer the micro-enterprises.

This confusion of official objectives on paper and programme objectives in practice is reflected in the Final Report of the programme, which echoes an engineer's focus on meeting required technical standards (in this case, for ovens to incinerate garbage) and on providing micro-enterprises with the necessary capacity: technically, financially and administratively. Further consequences result from this confusion, as illustrated and discussed later in this section: one can question whether this singular focus on building ovens was appropriate for building and developing sustainable micro-enterprises. After the programme, this small business would have only one customer, namely the local government represented by the health sector. The activities might have provided the pretext for training in specific technical methods and construction principles as well as tender processes, administrative and financial management, but did they really provide the micro-enterprises with the right skills and client base?

3.1.3 Main Findings

- SDC's identification of health as the principle sector for SHA interventions from 2002 on-wards gave the programme a direction and limited in many ways the sustainable outcome of what staff considered the "real" aim of the programme – the setting up of micro-enterprises that could provide SHA/SDC staff with employment when SDC pulled out of Huambo. One single sector could not provide sufficient contracts in the future for micro-enterprise survival. As such, SDC's narrowing down of sector involvement in order to make an identifiable impact had detrimental consequences for what SHA/SDC staff in Huambo generally considered to be the real aim and content of the RISC programme. One specialisation (sector) led to another specialisation (within private micro-enterprise development) that was unfeasible.
- After 2003 did SDC not use the specialisation in the health sector embarked on from 2002. Despite having gained a competitive advantage in that sector, it moved into new types of programme activities. As such, the attempt to streamline SDC's profile seemed instead to be piecemeal, fragmented and lacking in clear direction.
- Two out of three micro-enterprises established by RISC are still in operation: one enterprise is just surviving; the other surviving enterprise applied to become a "construction firm" shortly after it was formed and is today relatively well-off. The initial classification as "micro-enterprise" cut the companies off from the local state and government tender process, because bidders have to be able to manage the whole construction process, not just a specific aspect, such as carpentry or metalwork for roof construction. The micro-enterprises were geared to smaller construction jobs provided by private rehabilitation, where the profit margin was low, and work for international NGOs engaged in capital investment. As humanitarian agencies began to pull out of Huambo after 2003 and even more so after

2005, and bilateral development agencies did not bridge the gap, the market for the SDC-supported micro-enterprises was limited and for long periods close to non-existent.
- Almost all of the SHA/SDC staff initially employed by the three micro-enterprises have lost their jobs, as the small businesses have struggled to survive in the changing economy.
- Several former SHA/SDC staff, including the owner of the micro-enterprise that ceased to exist, have been employed by Public Works in Huambo, using skills developed during the years with SHA/SDC there. This is positive, as the local state and government is currently the biggest investor in social investments.

3.1.4 The Context for Micro-enterprise Development

From the beginning in 1996, SHA involved itself in building infrastructure, providing training for numerous staff members in different construction skills (metalwork, carpentry and masonry) and other technical skills, such as architecture, design, management, storage, supervision and so on. A fair number of the shop floor staff from the carpentry sector initially found employment, when the MUBELA enterprise was set up in 2000 (see separate section of the report). However, by 2001 SHA/SDC still employed a sizeable work force in various types of humanitarian emergency construction (shelters, schools etc.), including many semi-skilled and middle-management leaders with limited prospects of finding a job after SHA eventually pulled out. The “reintegration of socio-economic personnel of the population (in economic activities) was important for the national reconstruction”, as “SDC was one of the principal employers in the construction sector” (RISC Final Report 2003: 4).

Driving through Huambo today one gets the impression of a booming city with several international construction firms (Brazilian, Portuguese, South African and Chinese), which have been integrated into the local economy along with a number of Angolan construction enterprises. More than 20 wholesale construction suppliers are operating today, in many cases on their own former premises or in renovated buildings. This gives the impression of continuity in the supply of both materials and services in the construction sector. However, this picture disguises a significant change in the evolution of the commercial sector and private business in Huambo. In fact the commercial development of Huambo was close to being non-existent from 1993 until 2003, with nearly all workshops destroyed or depleted (RISC Final Report 2003:4). This was mainly due to the war, long periods of isolation, insecurity related to the outcome of the conflict, UNITA occupation and the resulting lack of supplies and exodus of most skilled persons from Huambo after 1993.

The resurgence of war in 1998 enhanced the insecurity of the area, undermining any incentive for local enterprises to return to Huambo. Many businesses did emerge or recover in areas less affected by the war, especially parts of the country with access to supplies from harbours or over the border to Namibia. After the first peace agreement during the early 1990s, the Angolan Constitution no longer defined the state as the prime economic agent. The ruling party MPLA had other priorities, especially winning the war against UNITA. Huambo, however, situated on one of the principal war frontiers, was excluded from this groundswell of emerging local enterprises.

At the end of the war in 2001 SHA/SDC was still one of the main employers within the construction sector (RISC Final Report 2003: 4). SHA/SDC recognised that its finance, provision of materials and technical service provision with its direct implementation approach was part of the problem creating “an impasse” in the “long term” (ibid.). It was recognised that its approach did not contribute to the development of small- and medium-scale companies. On the contrary, it implicitly contributed to the failure of such companies to emerge. It was based on these observations that SDC at the beginning of 2002 decided that all construction and reconstruction activities should be handed over to “operational partners” (ibid.). Where such “partners” did not exist, they would be set up.

3.1.5 Training Programme for Micro-enterprise

As the final report of the programme points out, no training for micro-enterprise was offered before the end of 2001 (RISC Final Report 2003: 2). When the RISC started, it offered an "intensive programme" (ibid.: 2), training possible candidates in technical aspects of "reconstruction" projects and stock management, as well as the business and administrative aspects of running a private company. These were all aimed at establishing a group of micro-enterprises to take over reconstruction efforts, when SDC left. The intention was to mark the change to peace in concrete terms (RISC Final Report 2003: 4), much as the 1995 "Bridges for Peace" reconstruction programme had attempted. The programme was run by three staff members, with input on business expertise from external consultants from the Technical Institute Fadário Muteka. The training programme involved:

- An open phase to which any interested SHA/SDC staff member could apply;
- A selection component with several rounds of testing in order to screen candidates before awarding them a "training certificate";
- A phase of setting up micro-enterprises, involving choice of venue, acquisition of materials and equipment, and hiring of staff from SHA/SDC's pool of workers;
- Candidates' applications for the official permission to run a legal micro-enterprise.

The training programme initiated in 2002 was organised by theme:

The first thematic training consisted of three sessions, each 11 days long (including holidays and weekends) between February and July 2002. It dealt with how to start a micro-enterprise and how to steer public tender processes. The objective was to give the participants an introduction into the technical and administrative functioning of small businesses. The training was run by staff from the Technical Institute Fadário Muteka and included 12 participants from SHA, of whom one person did not pass the first phase.

The second thematic training involved three external financial counsellors and ran between March 1 and June 2, 2002. It dealt with planning activities, budgetting and estimating quantities. The main objective was to give the participants skills for the practical organization of tenders.

The third thematic training involved external trainers and members of the Technical Institute Fadário Muteka. The course ran over two months (September and October 2002). The main issues were how to understand a business plan, execute architectural plans, plan work processes and do mathematical calculations (in order to measure stock and assess quantities). Only 4 of the initial 12 participants who started the course were considered suitable for continued involvement in the programme.

The costs of the three training courses amounted to around 12,000 USD for external consultants and trainers, with SHA/SDC providing the venue and three staff that also provided training sessions (see RISC Final Report 2003). One course participant added that they had all received their ordinary "SHA salary" during the training, which means that the costs were in fact substantially higher. Of the four suitable candidates, three were accepted and went though the screening process; got the official permission to run a micro-enterprise; was allowed to apply for SDC funding to set up a small business and submit application during the internal SDC tender process. As part of this process they had to present business plans and when necessary had to change them to comply with SDC standards. These projects were to be supervised by RISC staff during the execution phase.

It is not clear if this presents an accurate picture of the process in practice. Interviews with two of the three micro-enterprises suggest that the project took the form of on-the-job-training (SHA's usual model) with the first project (rehabilitation of a school) implemented during June and July 2002. According to one of the persons allowed to establish a micro-enterprise, there was an announcement that those SHA-employees that wanted to create a company could do so, if they were participating in a capacity-building programme and passing "a series of tests".

According to the owner of one of the micro enterprises, 12 people came to the first RISC workshop. The end result was that 3 groups were allowed to established micro-companies with "SHA assistance". From the owner's point of view, APOLO and RISC was the same thing: at RISC they leaned how to establish a business and through APOLO they got their initial jobs with supervision. Thus the boundary was fluid. The same person considered the RISC training in administration, application writing etc. to have been valuable. What was missing, in retrospect, was a better introduction to the "real world" of financial reporting, because as he expressed it "we pay a lot for that and we lose lots of money because we don't know how the finance department operates". Furthermore, he suggested that information on how to procure contracts from the state would have been useful.

That issues of financial management were difficult, is illustrated by the fact that none of the two surviving enterprises supported by RISC could provide their financial statements. One company suggested that financial records are done by the former SHA accountancy person, but these records were not available. The other acknowledged that financial records were not available. The director received a laptop as one element of RISC's transitional support. When it stopped working due to lack of update and virus infection, the company could no longer produce yearly financial records. Budgets and cost estimates are at present all calculated on the back of old envelopes and other scrap paper. For this reason, only one company had paid the 3½% rates required by the Province Finance department. Nonetheless, "commission" has to be paid from time to time on any work that requires approval by the Angolan authorities (referred to above as "how the finance department operates", see also underneath).

3.1.6 Support Structure

Each of the three micro-enterprises were granted an initial amount of 7,000 USD, which they could use to acquire a workshop, materials, specialised tools and transport (materials, tools and transport were bought at favourable prices from SDC's stock and substantial vehicle pool). For capital injections of between 7,000 and 12,000 USD, the businesses signed a contract agreeing to pay back 33%, while for capital injections above 12,000 USD, 66% was to be repaid, all without interest. Two of the three stayed within the 33% limit and one took out a modest loan at the 66% level.

The sustainability of the programme was based on the premise that suitable candidates were available and that both "local stock" and "a client base external to SDC" (ibid. 3) existed. These were the basic requirements and indicators. For the initial phase of the programme, material assistance to the micro-enterprises took the form of second-hand equipment for carpentry, construction and metal work, and supplies available or specially ordered from SHA/SDC's "famous" stock facility. In Huambo, SHA/SDC's stock facility based next to what became MUBELA was famous for having "everything we needed", according to the leader of one local NGO. As SHA provided both stock and the client base from the outset, one important "indicator" (ibid.: 3) was that after the end of the programme both stock and client base should be available externally to SDC. The aim was that the micro-enterprises instead of relying on SDC should establish a client base from the non-governmental sector, as well as, at least initially, from the state sector. As the RISC programme came to an end, SDC financed a promotion campaign in order to bring the three micro-enterprises to the attention of the wider public.

Out of the three micro-enterprises awarded RISC projects, two were still operating by 2007. Of those two one is struggling for survival, while the other, soon after the end of RISC's support, applied to be classified as "*Empreiteiro de Obras Publicas e Construcsáo Civil*". The new classification formed the basis for participation in public tender processes run by Public Works instead of working in partnership with other firms (for less financial gain) or surviving on smaller jobs, as would have been the fate of an ordinary micro-enterprise.

It was not possible to contact the micro-enterprise that had ceased operation. Initially, it was the most successful of the three, which according to the RISC Final Report (2003: 4) had an annual budget of 110,000 USD, where only 35,000 USD came from SDC contracts. A combination of personal problems and lack of control over “commissions” caused the micro-enterprise to close down.

However, the two surviving micro-enterprises, which both by 2003 were considered “economically independent” (Final Report 2003: 4) provided evidence of how they have in general fared and how they view the support provided by the RISC programme. One was by 2003 considered to “prosper” and the other to be “surviving” by “doing a little bit of everything” (ibid.). In many ways this is still how the two enterprises can be classified 4 years after the end of SDC support.

3.1.7 Micro Company 1: Surviving

History: The business started within the RISC as an association between three former SHA employees. One died early in the process. Subsequently, the two others split the business after disagreements over the use of the company car, work input and general mistrust. According to people close to the process, this split was “guided by the SHA” who “recommended a split-up in order to save the investments”. When intact, the company worked on construction involving metalwork and carpentry. After the split, one initially tried to set up his own carpentry business, but the machines have since been sold to a third party.

Between 2002 and 2003, the company was described by the sole surviving partner as ‘successtul’. It won several tenders in competition with the other two established companies within the RISC programme. RISC planned the work and gave technical input on the construction side as well as financial guidance on the use of funds. During this period, the company was 100% dependent on the SDC/APOLO tenders and produced numerous incinerators for health posts. After 2004, no more incinerators or “ovens” have been requested.

After the company split, the sole owner struggled, because he depended on electricity to deal with iron work and because he lacked transport. As part of the transitional support, the company received 2 generators (one small and one large) and a car from RISC. With the split, the Nissan pick-up and the big generator were given to the other partner, but with the 1,100 USD that the sole owner received as compensation he could not buy a good generator.

During 2004–2005 he managed by borrowing generators and spending money on repairing old generators, while the company survived on small, casual jobs and some slightly bigger NGO construction projects, usually facilitated by SDC. Contracts involved French Red Cross (latrines), the Italian Development Corporation, rehabilitation of a part of the airport roof, and constructing roofs on schools, health posts/centres. However, by 2006 he could not do any work that required electricity on a larger scale. The small household-based jobs that he could do did not produce enough profit to pay for a strong generator.

In 2007, OIM (Organização Internacional para Migração) gave the company a contract (more than 13,000 USD) to construct the roof on two schools and to make the windows, doors and a large quantity of school tables. This has allowed the owner to reinvigorate the company and employ 7 workers. Overall, however, survival is difficult for a micro-enterprise authorised only to take care of part of a construction project, but not the whole enterprise.

Competition: From 2002 to 2003, the company encountered little competition. Competion took place alone between SHA/RISC micro-enterprises in terms of acquiring APOLO jobs. After 2004, unable to bid for larger jobs, the micro-company was not in a position to compete with new, emerging companies. Larger companies had whole departments for carpentry, construction, ironwork, plumbing and so on. Even though it was established to provide specialised ironwork, the company has not been able to participate within larger consortiums. With the emergence of Brazilian, Portuguese and Chinese companies, often in consortiums with larger Angolan

companies with good political connections, it has become even more difficult for a specialised metal micro-enterprise. In order to cover costs, the workshop is shared with other, smaller companies (carpentry and car spare dealer). At present, work is purely a question of survival from project to project, struggling to pay the current share of the workshop rent (300 USD per month, which is very cheap).

Former SHA work force: Originally, the company employed more than 9 former SHA workers. Of the 9 only 1 former SHA worker is employed today as casual worker (a carpenter making the wooden table top for the OIM school tables). The reason given for not employing former SHA workers was “problems with authority”. The SHA structure involved multi-level supervision and control. The director of the micro-enterprise had been a low-level worker within the SHA structure, and as a result his directions were not respected by the work force in the new company. Furthermore, the fact that SDC/RISC was considered the sponsor of the micro-enterprise and continued as company supervisor until 2004, meant that the workers would go to SDC employees with complaints, thus undermining the director’s authority.

Conclusion

The micro-enterprise 1 was by 2007 struggling; only managing to survive on smaller loans and by renting generators to supply power. The OIM contract has reinvigorated the company, but does not generate enough profit for investment in the equipment and materials that are necessary for development of the company and its participation in larger consortiums. It lacks a stable client base and survives from project to project with long dormant periods in between. The specific projects it was involved in, particularly the oven constructions (to incinerate garbage from health service sites), were “demand-driven” (with SDC/APOLO being the driver of the demand). The demand for incinerator ovens for health posts inevitably dried up. This casts doubts upon the appropriateness of the specific support, tailor-made as it was for SDC’s strategy of making a difference within the health sector. The alignment to the APOLO programme is clear, because the incinerators were built next to APOLO-funded health posts. Here the problem was who were to be considered the main beneficiaries.

Incinerator construction was lucrative, usually delivered at a fixed rate of 3,500 USD per unit depending on distance to the construction site. The lucrative business nonetheless trapped the micro-enterprise, which did not develop its portfolio in accordance with the way the economy developed in Huambo. The local government and state were, after the RISC programme, the major players and source of construction contracts. Based on rising oil and petrol prices, the local economy produced high and stable revenues available for construction and rebuilding. Even though the health department approved the incinerator ovens for the RISC jobs, it did not prioritise such facilities after 2003.

Without access to local state and government tenders, the micro-enterprise currently survives on construction work provided by international NGOs, whose real investment in Huambo has declined considerably since 2003. But it was not only the specificity of the projects offered through the RISC that jeopardised the sustainability of micro-enterprises. It was also the promotion of “micro-enterprises” instead of a “business sale and construction firm” that would have allowed the company to engage in local government contracting. This point is clearly illustrated by the second micro-enterprise.

3.1.8 Micro Company 2: Changing the Playing Field

History: Between 2002 and 2003, the company first completed construction of a school and health post left unfinished by SHA. During the same period, the company finished building more than 8 incinerator ovens at health posts. During this time, they could buy construction materials (cement, corrugated iron etc.) from SDC’s workshop. Since RISC stopped, the company has only built 1 or maybe 2 incinerator ovens, with 1 more requested by MOLISV in Bomba Alta. The owner realised that he needed to get bigger contracts if the company was to survive, once the small but lucrative demand for incinerator ovens dried up with the closing of APOLO/RISC. He invested his capital in applying for permission to establish a “business sale and construction firm”

which, unlike a micro-enterpise, may bid for lucrative full-construction contracts from the Public Works through tender processes.

The tedious process of getting the permission required substantial paper work at Public Works and later the payment of 1,000 USD to the authorities in Luanda. This investment, leading to classification as “Empreiteiro de Obras Publicas e Construção Civil” or construction firm, which must be renewed every 2 years, has paid off. Since 2004, the company has managed to win a continuous series of contracts: 3 with *Fundo de Apoio Social* (FAS) for health posts; 2 more in 2005 for health posts and laundries; construction of a school in 2006, and in July 2007 construction work for Save the Children at the Central Hospital. Building health posts has further spin-off effects, as the company was later contracted to build housing for health personnel. The company now subcontracts to other companies to produce windows and doors for its constructions.

Competition: The company has managed to establish itself, but at considerable cost. To win provincial government contracts, it is well-known that ‘commission’ is taken (at least 10% of the contract’s total amount, while the province finance department deducts 3.5% in tax). This means that at least 13.5% of the total contract is deducted in non-productive costs. Add to this the need to keep a former SHA/SDC employee from the accountancy as broker for contracts at a fixed rate of 10%, and the result allows for limited accumulation of capital for larger investments. The newly arrived large construction groups from China, Brazil and Portugal can operate on a different economy of scale, backed by or in association with high-level state officials who do not have to operate through the present commission procedures. The owner sees this as threatening his now relatively well-established business.

Former SHA work force: When the company started in 2002, it employed 8 former SHA workers. Over time, they have left the company, because it only pays for casual work for the “effective time worked”. Under the old system, “we had to pay even though we did not have any contracts.” The company currently employs 2 former SHA workers on a casual basis and 1 former SHA worker from the accountancy department to broker deals and draw up the financial statements.

Conclusion
A key survival strategy for micro-enterprises has been to have the company up-graded to a “business sale and construction firm”. This upgrading means that the company can bid for projects from the state. Earnings as a “micro-enterprise” did not allow the company to accumulate capital to reinvest in materials or upgrade equipment. The owner of micro-enterprise 2 soon realised that the only solution was to become the “bidder”, because the company holding the bid could, if managed well, tap into potential surpluses. Once it qualified to bid for local state and government projects, such surpluses could be accumulated. This also involved risks, because training and preparation of micro-enterprises had not prepared the company for the unofficial system of “commissions” involved in local state and government tenders. But if micro-enterprise 2 wanted to survive, it needed to tap into potential profit margins, and these were only available to the company holding the tenders.

3.2 Assessment of the APOLO Programme

3.2.1 Introduction

At various points in time and with different mechanisms of support, the SHA/SDC combined its infrastructural construction/rehabilitation focus, which was fairly consistent until 2002, with other types of intervention. One such combination can be found in its engagement with civil society. Even though SHA staff generally conceived of its activities in Huambo and elsewhere as those of “a construction firm”, concerns related to legitimacy, immediate impact, and the legacy and sustainability of its interventions were present, to varying degrees, in its plans, strategies and activities.

Assistance to civil society was included in SHA operations right from beginning with the "Bridges for Peace" programme (including the establishment of MUBELA). This was less out of a concern for building the capacity of a broad array of civil society organizations than as a way of "immediately reaching out to communities and showing them results" as several former SHA and SDC staff framed it. There was awareness that bridge and road rehabilitation would be a slow process before results were immediately visible. Therefore, to "gain the support" of government(s) immediately (primarily the MPLA government but also that of UNITA) as well as to prove itself to local populations, SHA included various other support modalities alongside the rehabilitation of roads and bridges. This first covered "micro projects", which included funds for local and international NGOs and faith groups that sensitised and mobilised local communities and specific population groups such as IDPs in infrastructural construction.

The *Apoio para* Organizações *Locais* programme (APOLO) running until 2003 was conceived during November 2001. As part of the emergency action plan, APOLO covered the transfer of operational means and capacities to local NGOs in order to strengthen locally available capacity. The APOLO programme was later formulated by former SHA staff as a "transitional programme" aimed at preparing local NGOs either for the withdrawal of SDC from Huambo or for a change in the aims and focus areas of SDC. The approach was "flexible", since the project was an answer to the emergency situation, as well as to the later resettlement of IDPs after the end of the war in 2002. As such, the programme attempted to feed into and contribute to the reconstruction phase that began to evolve after 2002. Initially, the emphasis was on social infrastructure in education and health, but by March 2002 this had changed, leaving education out in order to strengthen capacity building and advocacy in the health sector (Minutes 2002:2). The change first took effect during the second phase of the programme after March 2002.

3.2.2 Objectives

Objective: The first Phase[48]

During the first phase, the programme concentrated its attention on:

- Finishing projects that had not been finalised by end 2001 due to logistical and security problems;
- Ensuring and strengthening capacity building, through "intensified didactic" project accompaniments, which did not in practice add up to anything beyond the usual practice of on-the-job-training.

The programme did not change the flexible practice of "partner-agreements" that defined the division of labour and responsibilities; for public construction jobs, this involved a tripartite agreement signed by SDC, relevant local government authorities, and the implementing local NGO partner. In contrast to the Community Initiative Fund in Luanda (see section 3.3), "partnership" had a relatively 'loose' character, which was reflected in: problems of keeping timeframes that forced SDC to catch up by using more time/resources to avoid problems of quality or further delays; less involvement of local government authorities; and the fact that, at least initially, projects were defined by SHA/SDC instead of being defined according to local priorities.

Objectives: The second Phase

The situation changed for the second phase of the APOLO programme which saw NGOs or faith-based organizations (1 church mission) receive some training in project formulation, administration and financial management. The process was formalised in this phase with a formal call for, and identification of, projects proposed by national NGOs (January 2002). SHA also established a set of criteria of selection which aimed to:

[48] As noted earlier in the report there are descripancies on whether this first phase was part of the APOLO programme or a forerunner hereto. We follow the classification of 1st and 2nd phase used in reports and various minutes.

- Strengthen the permanent health infrastructure;
- Integrate the development plan with health authority plans;
- Require good references from partner organizations;
- Evaluate the location identified for health post construction to establish whether it would be at the centre of permanent settlement of returning populations.

3.2.3 Main Findings

Despite the APOLO programme's two-phase trajectory, it is clear that the programme became truly effective in 2002, once it established lucid criteria and defined the intervention more clearly as enhancing capacity. From the programme's own partnership criteria, it can be classified as a success:

Project Partnership Criteria

- It participated successfully in "strengthening permanent health infrastructure", as all the visited health structures are operating today;
- In contrast to many other infrastructure projects, it managed to "integrate the development plan with health authority plans", thus ensuring a high degree of sustainability;
- All the organizations supported by the APOLO programme had established links to SHA/SDC well beforehand, thereby fulfilling the criteria of "good references from partner organization". The only local NGO that is doubtful in this regard is ASCA that was a relative new NGO when the APOLO programme started up and had no prior collaboration with SDC;
- It is clear from the projects visited that the programme has been successful in "evaluating whether the chosen site for health post construction would likely to be at the centre of permanent settlement of returning populations", as all the locations visited did play a part in the (apparently permanent) return of displaced populations.

Organizational sustainability

When assessing "the transfer of operational means and capacities to local NGOs in order to strengthen the locally available capacity", the impact is mixed.

- None of the local NGOs have continued their activities within the health sector, casting doubt on the local availability of operational capacity within that sector. The main problem seems to be that SDC conflated its infrastructural health sector objective with the objective of supporting the development of sustainable Angolan NGOs;
- If "locally available capacity" refers to that of NGOs, then the result is fairly successful, as 2 out of 3 supported NGOs during the second phase are still operating, while the third may re-emerge in a new form. All the local NGOs benefited from the engagement with the APOLO programme, either institutionally or by being given the means to take the initial project intervention further. The one church organisation that was supported (Kapuzener monks) still exists, but its capacity to pursue projects has been reduced after the death of the Italian priest who was the driving force of the organisation.

3.2.4 Background

SHA/SDC's engagements with local NGOs, in contrast to International NGOs, were often based on "mistrust" and "disappointment", primarily because of perceived and often real problems of:

- Lack of institutional capacity;
- Limited human resources;
- Misappropriation of funds;
- Failure to deliver;
- Doubts with regard to the relationship to the Angolan MPLA state.

The relationship between SHA/SDC and local NGOs was always based, *a priori*, on an expected fear of having to use too many resources on local NGOs in order to ensure the primary objective of emergency infrastructural projects. While this was indeed often the case, misappropriations (disappearance of funds and failure to deliver) were common, although seldom mentioned,

directly in the reports. Misappropriations were often "disguised" as "postponements" and "delays" in project implementation or as the involvement of another NGO or RISC partner in finalising a particular project.

Support to local NGOs was often not the primary strategic aim of SDC/SHA interventions. Nonetheless SDC did give support to different types of local, national and international civil society organizations and faith groups. One clear example was the involvement of Development Workshop (DW) in water and sanitation (WATSAN) (see section 2.3), which implied that DW could open up its operations in Huambo. SDC chose DW as partner because of its documented community methodology, known administrative and financial management capacity and because it had worked together with DW as part of the Luanda-based Community Initiative Fund programme.

The support to local and national NGOs besides certain shortcomings had its effects and impact and played itself out against the background of a particular historical configuration of the relationship between civil society organizations and the evolution of the Angolan state (see main evaluation report).

3.2.5 The First Phase

Projects for the 1st phase comprised:

- Completed construction ('definitive mudstone-building') of health posts in Cáala (12,000 beneficiaries, half of them IDPs) with ADRA-A (31,000 USD);
- Completed construction ('definitive mudstone-building') of 2 village schools in Cáala with ADRA-A (33,000 USD);
- Construction of a 'school extention' in Huambo suburbs as the last phase of a public school project by the Franciscaner-mission (missão Francisco) (25,000 USD);
- Rehabilitating provisional schools in IDP camps with ADRA-A (costs unknown);
- Reforestation of 150,000 trees (SDC alone has cut down and used more than 10,000 trees for constructions since 1999) with ADRA-A (33,000 USD);
- Logistical support for local organizations (transport, repair, provision of building materials, renting machines and tools etc. (12,000 USD incl. international personnel).

3.2.6 The Second Phase

According to some recipient NGOs, the process was run by ADRA-A with SDC staff providing inputs. As CAD (one of the recipients) suggested, ADRA-A complemented the chosen projects with a "capacity building and advocacy component in four villages for which SDC paid 8,000 USD" (Interview CAD staff, September 2007).

Projects for the second phase comprised (SDC, Finanzieller & Operationeller Schlussbericht, 2004):[49]

- Health post construction with residency in Kalikoque with CAD (41,000 USD);
- Health post construction with residency in Njongolo with CAD(41,000 USD);
- Health post construction with residency in Chilembo with ASCA (48,000 USD);
- Health post construction without residency in Sao Tarcisio with CAD (41,000 USD);
- Health post construction with residency in Hungulo with OKUTIUKA (31,000 USD);
- Continue Construction of a 'school extention' in Kamussamba (suburb of Huambo) as part of the last phase of a public school project by the Franciscaner-mission (25,000 USD).

[49] The 3 CAD projects had a total cost of 123,000 USD. Besides these projects, one report mentions an emergency project for the temporary infrastructure at a transit camp for IDPs and ex-combatants, with CAD as implementing local NGO at the net cost of 24,000 USD.

Partnership
In the second phase of the programme, the "partner-concept" put more emphasis on participation, including that of the beneficiary community in the partner agreement. Thus, this phase included SDC, local government authorities, local NGOs and the beneficiary community usually represented by a recognized traditional leader or community coordinator. For several of the NGOs, their original proposal had referred to schools as local community priority number one. On further consultation with the local communities, this was changed to 'health post construction' after APOLO intervention. The reason seems to have been that local NGOs' previous experience was mainly with building schools, so they proposed this for APOLO. According to SHA staff members who had participated in the selection processes, the change was due to further consultation with local communities, which revealed that health provisions were their primary concern. This was by and large confirmed during interviews made by the evaluation team with local community members in Chilembo and Hungulo. But the choice of health posts cannot be understood independently from the overall shift in SDC's focus from schools and health posts to an exclusive focus on health from March 2002.

For the implementing local Angolan NGOs, the new type of partner agreement was more binding, as they carried a heavier responsibility from planning to finalisation of the project. NGOs thus became the focus for coordination between the 4 parties. As Zehnder (2003) points out in his evaluation of APOLO, "flexibility" was a key feature of the APOLO programme. He applauds the programme for the flexibility that makes it useful for emergency aid (rapid construction of transit-camps etc.) and development of infrastructure. Perhaps the most important aspect of the APOLO programme was that it facilitated close involvement with the state and government institutions.

This was the case during the late phase of the emergency and humanitarian crisis, where the link between state/government and Angolan NGOs became a bridging experience for rehabilitation and development. It seems to be the only SHA/SDC programme in Huambo which allowed SDC to do "advocacy" and to encourage government institutions to make priorities together with local NGOs. With CAD, SDC lobbied the provincial government. The result was that the governor made an official visit and inaugurated one of the CAD-constructed health posts. It was said at the time: "Society has a voice and the voice has been heard in high circles" (SDC Schlussbericht 2002).

Zehnder (2003) is doubtful about the "sustainability" of the state taking over the health posts, a concern that in hindsight seems misguided, at least with regard of the health sector.[50] While approving the use of locally available construction materials and the provincial government's promise to staff the clinics after 5 months, Zehnder doubted if the local government would honour its part of the agreement. Today, however, all the health posts are in operation, staffed and supplied with medication. Some have even been upgraded to the level of health centre (see below and Section 2.5).

Capacity Building
The programme's capacity building can best be characterized as "learning by doing" and "on-the-job-training" through sharing and exchange, with APOLO staff as technical experts providing inputs during the actual construction phase. The evaluation and adjustment of APOLO was undertaken through discussions between the parties, visits/missions from SDC-HQ, 3 SDC-ADRA-A workshops, and an external evaluation (Zehnder 2003). The most important training areas were the organization of the community, transfer of technical knowledge, project planning and management. Zehnder (2003) remarks that the "art of partnership" has mostly taken the form of training-on-the-job, but it has been a dynamic learning process for SDC as well as for partner NGOs, core-groups and the wider community. In his view, capacity has definitely been enhanced.

Local communities were primarily involved in decisions as to who should be included as part of the local workforce. CAD however made more efforts to capacitate local communities than the

[50] In the case of school constructions and water posts there are no such clear agreements with the government institutions (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4).

other SDC partners. In the realm of health prevention and advocacy for health services, human rights and capacity training for making proposals, CAD's description of their own "pioneering action of consciousness-work" may be an exaggeration, but it was no doubt a milestone. In each of the villages where they implemented health posts (3 in total), villagers (primarily IDPs) as primary beneficiaries constituted the core group, together with a health technician from CAD who organized 2 workshops per week (a total of 25) as an attempt to transmit knowledge on health, sanitation and right (see also Section 2.5). This type of local training could not be confirmed more generally for ASCA- and OKUTIUKA-funded projects. It should also be noted that CAD did not construct more health posts after the APOLO programme ended. This raises questions about the longer-term impact of the APOLO programme for the main beneficiaries, the local NGOs?

As a former SDC staff member pointed out (minutes April 28, 2003), the impact of training was that the implementing agency gained in self-confidence and improved its relationship with the community: "The art of cooperation with higher responsibility and autonomy fostered creativity and the pleasure of initiative" (April 28, 2003). But what happened to the local NGOs and how did they themselves see the support?

3.2.7 Impact of the APOLO on local NGOs

The experience of the three second-phase beneficiary organizations has been different; some have managed to survive, one has vanished. The direct strategic aim of supporting local NGOs and faith-based groups needs to be seen in relation to these organizations' and groups' longer-term relationship to SHA. The specificity of the APOLO programme, with its focus on health post construction, institutional training and support, in some important ways presented an important break in the modus operandi of SHA and SHAs relationship to local NGOs. In order to illustrate the different experiences of the APOLO programme selected experiences from first and second phase of the APOLO programme is presented underneath.[51]

ADRA-A

According to the main recipient of support during the first phase of APOLO – ADRA-A – they did not conceive of their first phase projects as part of the APOLO programme, as they did not receive any specialised training. They recognised that it was the first time that they received "a big project" (the reforestation of 150,000 trees) with overhead from SHA. According to ADRA-A, it was only the reforestation project that they conceived as "their own" project, because the impetus for the other projects came primarily from SHA. This could be accurate or not. For partner institutions like ADRA-A, the concept of capacity building was not clearly defined. The programme phase was seen more as 'business as usual' except for the issue of 'overhead'.[52]

History and relationship to SDC: ADRA-A began their operations in Huambo in 1998 and became involved with SHA in Huambo around 1999. In 2000, the relationship was formalised when ADRA-A became a partner with Development Workshop in the MUBELA enterprise and received half of the machinery as a formal donation. In 2001, when building infrastructure and return facilities for IDPs were pressing issues for donors such as SHA, ADRA-A built and rehabilitated schools. After 2003, ADRA-A's formal relationship to SDC ended, but through the MUBELA enterprise contact was maintained. According to ADRA-A, SHA in Huambo was known for its "big and good plans for bridge construction", plans that were destroyed by the return of war. ADRA-A had 3 offices outside Huambo town. 2 are still operating in Cáala and Bailundo by 2007.

In 1998, ADRA-A employed 5 people, and this number rose to 11 in 1999. In 2000, the organization became involved with DW and staff increased to 20. With SHA and project implementation from the Spanish cooperation, it rose further, to 24 in 2001. By 2002, it employed more than 32 staff but then ran into an administrative and management crisis which saw the organization cease

[51] In the APOLO programme SDC distinguished between "beneficiary organizations" and "beneficiaries" (being the populations). Both types of beneficiaries were important for the programme. The impact of APOLO on population "beneficiaries" is mentioned in other chapters.

[52] All the projects mentioned here were implemented (see section 2.7.3 and annexes 2.2 and 2.5 of this report).

and refocus its work. After the crisis, ADRA-A is again gaining momentum and in 2007 employs around 45 staff. Today, ADRA-A operates in 5 provinces with a membership basis of 135 paid members. It is governed by its *Conselho Directivo* (directory council) consisting of 9 people, each elected for 3 years at a time. The leadership consists of the President, the Vice-President and the Secretary General, who at present is also the director of the Huambo office.

Transitional support: ADRA-A does not see itself as part of the APOLO programme, as the division of work followed SHA's usual way of operating, with ADRA-A taking care of community mobilisation and sensibilisation of workers from different communities, and SHA taking care of the actual construction.[53] Because ADRA-A did not have to pay the workers and did not receive money for the work, except for the pay for the coordinator reporting to SHA, this was considered "easy". Because they dealt directly with the workers and local communities, ADRA-A saw its role as "the face" of the building work.

ADRA-A considered the support from SHA and its work in general as "responsive and relevant", and the SHA Huambo-coordinator was an active participant in coordination with UTCAH and always ready to assist. However, SHA's work would often "lack a good analysis" and they ended up calling on ADRA-A and other local NGOs to "apagar fogo" (put out the fire) when construction projects ran into problems. The school buildings in Cáala were a case in point, as SHA had technical knowledge but lacked an understanding of the wider cultural, social and political context in which projects were implemented. As such, ADRA-A suggested that SHA "used" (in a positive sense) local NGOs such as ADRA-A for work in areas in which it could not operate directly.

This changed with the 2001 reforestation project (see also Section 2.7.3). For the first time, ADRA-A took care of the full project cycle and was paid directly by SHA for the work, including an overhead of 3% (according to ADRA-A). According to ADRA-A, the organization received no capacity training from SHA (besides participating "in many meetings where cocktails were served"), but ADRA-A trained other organizations and other local NGOs were referred to ADRA-A by SHA. With the reforestation project, reporting became stricter, but ADRA-A found itself geared to it. ADRA-A staff also recognised that the SHA Huambo-coordinator "taught us many things with regard to report writing, financial reporting, technical analysis and transparency, but more in the sense of 'personal learning' and less of 'institutional learning.'"

Over the following years, ADRA-A submitted various project proposals to SHA/SDC, but all were turned down, including a civic education and an IDP return programme involving the distribution of agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertiliser.

Relevance and appropriateness: Even though ADRA-A does not see itself as part of the APOLO programme, it is reported as such in SDC documents for the programme (see SDC 2002). This disjunction is probably due to the fact that the APOLO programme first took a more visible form from 2002, at a time when ADRA-A did not receive support. The support was relevant, as ADRA-A is an important institution in the wider landscape of NGOs in Angola.

CAD

CAD is one of the local NGOs with a relatively long history with SHA, going back to some of the first micro projects in 1996. In several ways the APOLO programme initiated a different relationship with SDC, as CAD received "overhead" for the first time, allowing it to build up some institutional capacity. "Overhead" became a marker of the changed relationship and was seen as a sign of "trust" in the organization. CAD, which received the largest input, has vanished.

[53] In general ADRA-A´s engagement with SDC primarily referred as mentioned to Phase 1. ADRA-A terminated the unfinished common projects of 2001 that needed the support and funding of APOLO from January 2002 onwards. Of this reason ADRA-A did not become part of the capacity building of APOLO. SDC was ambivalent towards ADRA-A. Some SDC leaders suggested that SDC never considered ADRA-A a strong and competent organization, which it considered strengthening organisational even though SDC supported ADRA-A projects. It was ambivalent because it drew on ADRA-A capacity, supported projects and as a matter of fact ADRA-A in some cases was a partner to give capacity building for other organizations working with and for SDC and even capacitated SDC staff, including workshops that were organized together with common funding.

Relationship to SDC: CAD's relationship to SHA started with its participation in the rehabilitation of the Deolinda Rodrigues School in 1996, which had three phases (see Section 2.4). CAD's responsibility was to identify and mobilise workers and train them, if necessary. Workers were paid partly with WFP food provisions and partly with smaller salaries provided by SHA (see more in Section 3.5). Primary responsibility for reconstructing the roof fell to SHA which had the technical knowledge, the financial means and access to materials. The work was later handed over to government, but rain destroyed the roof once again. After the initial work on the school, CAD participated in the two subsequent phases of the rehabilitation of the school. In these latter phases SHA was more directly involved, because the 1st phase had taught SDC that CAD did have capacity. CAD saw its participation in the first phase of the rehabilitation as "a test of us and our potential capacity". SHA was considered "the father of CAD", as it was through the initial work with SHA that CAD's name and capacity was cemented. The former director of CAD told the evaluation team that the provincial government had thought that the rehabilitation of the school had been done alone by CAD and SDC left the government with this idea. This considerably strengthened CAD's position within the provincial government (Interview, 14 September 2007).

CAD became part of the APOLO programme during SDC's transitional phase in 2002 and received some training by DW. Former CAD staff members recalled being part of a UNICEF and SHA coordination meeting. Before the APOLO programme, WFP provided food-for-work, while SHA provided the funds used to pay locally organised workers and also the subsidies for the CAD coordinator. Instead of funds for overhead, SHA made available some material benefits such as office stationary for the CAD administration. This changed with APOLO, where funds were made available for CAD administration in the form of overhead for each project it was awarded.

History: CAD was created in 1994/95 after the first elections. It was started by young people, most of them trained in agriculture but without work. It had a smaller office in Luanda but its main activities were in Huambo. It started out with roughly 22 volunteers who were not paid a salary, but instead received subsidies from the organizations CAD worked with. Its primary target group was IDPs. CAD first worked with ICRC to distribute seeds and other necessities related to the returning of displaced persons from the war (1994/5). CAD specialised in the identification of needs amongst IDPs. Based on lists provided by humanitarian organizations, it identified potential IDP beneficiaries. As such, CAD emerged out of the specific context of post-war reconstruction.

In 1996, it worked with SHA for the first time and, through the Deolinda Rodrigues School rehabilitation, WFP became an important partner providing 'food for work' for various projects. In 1997, CAD became involved with UNDP, providing community-based rapid rural appraisal for a variety of projects. The same year, it developed contacts with World Learning and PACT, two US-based organizations from whom CAD received training (administration and financial management) and funding for running the administration. It became part of projects with ADRA-A, Save the Children (UK), DW, UNICEF and INTERMONDE.

The first capacity training in 1997 was provided by PACT (institutional support and capacity training in financial management and administrative handling of funds and reports). As CAD became more organized, the voluntary basis of 22 persons changed to 12 paid staff in 1998 with fewer and fewer voluntaries. But building the capacity of CAD's staff had negative consequences, as they became attractive to international NGOs who paid better salaries and offered better work conditions. Consequently, CAD lost valuable staff at critical moments when the organization should have consolidated its performance.

In 2002 CAD became part of the APOLO programme and had 2 good years with many projects and a high activity level. Since the APOLO programme, CAD has slowly disintegrated, as its primary focus on displaced people has become redundant since the departure of international donors along with the government's focus on mainstream development. Without funds from international donors, CAD lost 6 or 7 staff to ADRA-A after 2003. The shift away from IDPs (their comparative advantage) means that CAD has begun a process of restructuring, with a new name

(AGRO-Emprex) under consideration, and a new mandate being developed by a commission of 4 persons. The idea is to focus on rural agricultural development and environment, providing what seems to be technical extension services possibly funded by the state. The focus will be on the provinces of Huambo and Bíe, concentrating the intervention on "commercialisation of agricultural products", inputs on the implementation of the "land law", "veterinary service provision" and the "development and introduction of new agricultural products".

Transitional support: Even though CAD did not know "what the essence of APOLO was", members recalled that its aim was to give the NGO "consolidated knowledge, to deal with the technical aspects of the projects it was awarded". They also recall that the approval of the projects and later "fiscalisation" by Public Works became more elaborate. With the APOLO programme, CAD moved away from solely "mobilising and sensitising workers" to taking charge of the "full project circle". That meant "a greater responsibility and definition of projects including the financial management". APOLO secured for CAD:

- A series of projects in the form of 3 health posts combined with DW implementation of water posts;
- Overhead ranging from 2 to 12% of the project costs, allowing CAD to buy office equipment and;
- A Toyota Land Cruiser (still there but now worn out) bought from SHA for 3,000 USD.

With the greater responsibility for projects, CAD experienced a more rigorous control and reporting regime from SDC. This was considered important, because "we learned to do it correctly. Every mistake was pointed out, but they were fair." The APOLO programme allowed CAD to consolidate, as it could establish an office and maintain a staff. Before APOLO, CAD's capacity to maintain staff was limited, as it depended on projects. With limited capacity to develop its own projects, it depended on other organization's good will and interest in incorporating CAD into their plans: "The problem for national NGOs was sustainability. We did not have our own funds so we depended on donations. This made it difficult to develop, to maintain knowledge, to build the administrative capacity, to develop new projects. With limited funding we had to constantly move office in order to save money."

Relevance and appropriateness: The support to CAD was relevant, but a better analysis of the wider rehabilitation and development context would have been important, not only for SDC but also for CAD. A better analysis might have enabled CAD to adapt more rapidly to the changing context, thus ensuring the survival of the organization. The investment in CAD has at present been lost.

Building health posts was important for SDC's aim of influencing the sector and providing crucial infrastructure. It is clear that APOLO combined this focus with the return of IDPs. As such APOLO tapped into CADs competitive advantages in the wider NGO landscape as a specialised IDP NGO. From an institutional perspective and based on a good analysis of the NGO it would have been relevant to consider CADs future prospects not at least how support could be secured from other funding agencies. The NGO became guided into a blind ally. Importantly, CAD was not equipped to deal with the changing funding context created by the switch from humanitarian aid to development, in which local NGOs functioned less as builders than as capacity- and change agents; where the focus shifted from IDPs and return of IDPs to new target populations. CAD has not been involved in health post constructions after the APOLO programme terminated, nor has it used its knowledge of and presence in the three communities as a bridge for further project implementation.

This casts doubt on the feasibility of local NGO support (not the health sector support which seems to have been well-integrated with the local government authorities) (see Section 2.5). The support to OKUTIUKA and ASCA shows similar patterns, but the experience of those organizations is strikingly different.

ASCA

ASCA was a relatively new NGO in Huambo, when the APOLO programme was implemented. Even though there are similarities, ASCA's experience has been different from that of CAD. After struggling to raise funding during the post-APOLO period, it has recently gained new momentum due to funding for new projects.

Relationship to SDC: ASCA received support from the APOLO programme in 2002 to build a health post and residency in Chilembo, and was involved in various other projects after 2003, according to the Monograph for Tchikala-Tcholohanga municipality funded by SDC. The APOLO project allowed ASCA to raise funding for the monograph (in 2003/2004), which in turn allowed ASCA to become involved in a new series of projects in the study area, as well as being contracted by other International NGOs to produce similar studies. According to ASCA, the monograph has been used widely by government and international NGOs, and reprinted and copied, even though the copyright (strangely) rests with SDC! ASCA members consider SDC their "father": the organization, which allowed their own to grow and establish itself.

History: ASCA was founded in 2001 by ASCA President Rai Mundo Santa Rosa with the aim of supporting children. Initial funding came from UNICEF, for whom ASCA produced project proposals for playgrounds and recreational spaces for children using local materials. Early on, ASCA worked in areas with large groups of displaced people, primarily Cantão Pahula, Kasseque III, and Cáala *sede*, as well as with School 144 in Huambo.

In 2001 ASCA employed 11 people on a temporary basis. With the APOLO project in 2002, 30 staff members were employed on a more formal basis. In the following years, ASCA maintained this staff profile with few changes, but in 2005 it lost most of its staff, as funding dried up. As the local funding context changed and the humanitarian agencies left Huambo, it finally employed only 8 people. ASCA was not equipped to respond to the changes, but nonetheless managed to pick up new projects in 2006: projects for Save the Children (UK), Concern (under its capacity-building programme) and the EU (civic education aimed at forthcoming elections). On the basis of these projects ASCA employed up to 36 people. ASCA later won EU funding to host the Electoral NGO network, and has moved into new offices and increased its staff to around 40. Winning the Electoral Network grant has, however, caused some problems, as many other organizations wondered why ASCA was granted the project, when it was weak institutionally and administratively. As a result, many people questioned ASCA's relationship to the government.

Transitional support: Becoming part of the APOLO programme in 2002 made it possible for ASCA to consolidate and take off. According to ASCA members' recollections of the process, the organization received capacity building from ADRA-A focusing on how to develop project proposals, financial management, rapid rural appraisal techniques etc. As part of the training, it developed the Chilembo proposal which ADRA-A submitted to APOLO, who then provided technical inputs. ASCA's original idea for the health post differed from APOLO's model, so ASCA had to learn APOLO's approach. APOLO assisted ASCA with the budget process and technically, as the project was ASCA's "first big project" funding- and construction-wise.

Through the project, ASCA became part of the wider partnership network that SDC had formed as part of APOLO, so this enabled the organization to develop new contacts. The project was also ASCA's first real engagement with local government, which had to approve the project proposal and the completed project. ASCA did not have a lot of experience with community mobilisation, so the project enabled them to enter communities outside the urban areas, where they had mostly worked before.

For ASCA, the Chilembo project did not involve food-for-work, but local communities that ASCA mobilised received certain incentives (in money or in kind) instead of a direct salary. The government was to provide corrugated iron plates for the roof (although ASCA members were sure the plates came from the SDC depot), while ASCA with funding from APOLO was responsible for planning, mobilising workers, doing the actual building work, and engaging other

companies that were involved (these were drawn from RISC projects, mainly that of building the incinerator oven but also other construction work). APOLO's role was to support ASCA and provide technical inputs. During the APOLO project, ASCA used a SDC vehicle. ASCA received the Toyota Land Cruiser as part of the later work on the monograph on Tchikala-Tcholohanga. Besides access to transport, ASCA received office supplies and a percentage of the full budget as overhead, amounting to around 5,000 USD, according to ASCA.

Relevance and appropriateness: As a new local NGO, it is doubtful that ASCA had "good references from partner organizations", as it had little time to prove itself. Nonetheless, it was appropriate to support ASCA as a local NGO working within fields of action that SDC had previously supported. As a relatively new local NGO, ASCA has not been dodged by the past. Its name nonetheless poses problems, as it does not fit the projects it is now involved in (much like CAD). Since the APOLO programme, health post construction has not formed part of its portfolio, nor did the particular project site of Chilembo provide ASCA with futher incentives to continue work in that community. Nonetheless, ASCA managed to use the experience from the APOLO successfully to attract new projects and change its focus.

Most importantly, the APOLO support allowed ASCA to:
- Consolidate its activities and take off;
- Engage in activities outside its primary field (support to orphans);
- Receive administrative and financial training;
- Receive project management training.

The main problem was that ASCA became engaged in health implementation, an area in which it had neither prior experience nor subsequent work. This does not cancel out the positive aspects of the APOLO support, but it does cast doubt on SDC's strategy of combining health sector implementation (their own and government priorities) with local NGO capacity building.

OKUTIUKA
The most successful local NGO has been OKUTIUKA, which made direct used of the APOLO programme support to enter the project area of Hungulo, and has managed to establish a range of new (non-health sector) projects in the area of intervention with considerable success.

Relationship to SDC: SHA supported OKUTIUKA in Huambo in 1997 by hiring the newly established NGO to mobilise the local population for participation in the Bridges for Peace programme, because OKUTIUKA members had experience with rural development before they broke away from ADRA-A (see underneath). OKUTIUKA participated in 2 bridge projects in 1997 and 1998 – one where they participated from the beginning over a project period of 6 months and one where they were drafted in (1 month), as the project had stalled due to rising tensions between MPLA and UNITA in Huambo (see also Sections 2.1 and 3.5).

In 2001 OKUTIUKA received a grant of 5,000 USD for rehabilitation of a kitchen and dormitory for orphaned children and in 2002 OKUTIUKA became part of the APOLO programme and received a grant to build a health post in Hungulo. The project in Hungulo opened up the municipality of Tchikala-Tcholohanga, commune of Samboto, for OKUTIUKA projects. By 2007 OKUTIUKA was running a major agricultural production cooperative ("Tchipangalua") with funding from French and Spanish development corporations. In 2004, as SDC closed down its operation in Huambo, OKUTIUKA received office supplies and bought 2 tractors from SDC (2x3,000 USD) and a Scandia lorry (5,000 USD), which are presently in operation as part of the Tchipangalua cooperative. A considerable amount of 'trust' was placed in OKUTIUKA. One factor is that, besides the current General Secretary, Sonia Ferreira, the organization has employed several former SHA staff members, including one expatriate, and this has facilitated the linkage to SHA, as technical knowledge and administrative capacity was available within the organization.

History: OKUTIUKA, which means “return” in Umbundu, is now a Huambo-based NGO emerging from a Benguela ADRA-A splinter group in 1995 that established itself in Huambo in 1997, when the present General Secretary moved to the town. OKUTIUKA was formed because of a perceived lack of will on the part of ADRA-A to take a risk and begin development projects instead of the more safe and common humanitarian engagement that characterised NGO engagement throughout the 1990s. The first projects were cultural events, dance festivals and book fairs primarily aimed at street children, orphans and civic education for the general public. OKUTIUKA’s first main donor in Huambo was SHA, which hired locally-based NGOs for community mobilisation in the Bridges for Peace programme. The first bridge project in 1997 allowed OKUTIUKA to invest in the rehabilitation of its office in the old dairy factory where it keeps its office to this day and, in addition, runs a home for orphans. Initially, OKUTIUKA lacked stable funding and relied on volunteers. “Staff” members were paid a symbolic salary of 50 USD, when there was money.

In 1998, the home for orphans was established in the ruins of the old dairy factory which, in 2001, received a grant of 5,000 USD from SHA for rehabilitation and office construction. Today, around 120 children and youth live there, with funding from TOTAL, but the premises require further rehabilitation in order to meet state requirements. Despite this, the project is well-established in Huambo, and OKUTIUKA’s dance troupe wins the local competition every year. Also in 1998, OKUTIUKA became part of World Learning’s capacity-building programme for emerging human-rights-based NGOs, providing training and monitoring in terms of administration and management. By 2007, OKUTIUKA reached level 4 (the highest level of the WL programme methodology and testing) of the 10-year programme and, if it passes the 2007 tests, will be eligible for direct USAID funding.

In 2002/3 OKUTIUKA became part of the APOLO programme as well as commenced the agricultural co-op in Hungulo (see above).

Shifts in OKUTIUKA’s staff profile reflect slow but stable progress, from around 7 staff paid minimal salaries in 1997 and 1998, to a staff of 10 in 2000 and 2001, and then 14 in 2002, 16 in 2003 and, by 2007, around 39 staff. Because no staff member earns more than 1,000 USD per month, it is difficult to attract and retain the highly skilled staff needed to consolidate the organization. During 2007 OKUTIUKA will hold a General Assembly to restructure the organization.

Transitional support: According to staff members of OKUTIUKA, they did not participate in APOLO training programmes, but did participate in network meetings hosted by SDC with other NGOs. The organization also participated in some capacity building or training meetings hosted by ADRA-A, but due to its history with ADRA-A this was infrequent. APOLO programme support for the Hungulo health post had a huge impact on OKUTIUKA, and on the commune of Samboto more generally.

- APOLO allowed OKUTIUKA to establish itself in the area of Samboto;
- OKUTIUKA played an integral part in triggering the return of IDPs to Samboto;
- The wider institutional support granted in 2004 (tractors and lorry) has facilitated OKUTIUKA’s intervention in the area in setting up an agricultural cooperative – Tchipangalua – which has gone on to receive substantial funding from other sources (see Section 4.4.2).

Relevance and appropriateness: The support provided to OKUTIUKA has been both relevant and appropriate. The support to build the health post in Hungulo was seen as ‘risky’ at the time, as the area was classified as a “red zone” by UN, and OKUTIUKA had little or no presence there before the intervention. SDC/APOLO staff could not visit the area to provide technical support but had to monitor the project from the distance. As the only supported local NGO to use health post construction as a springboard for further project development, OKUTIUKA has made a huge success. The investment in tractors and the lorry was classified by former SHA staff as “a gamble”, one which has certainly paid off, as the equipment is an integral part of the cooperative’s infrastructure today. It has been well maintained and is still working.

OKUTIUKA has been very successful in using the concrete project it won from APOLO to establish a presence in the commune of Samboto, even though health sector constructions have not been part of the organization's subsequent portfolio. The organization seems to be sustainable, as long as it can retain the present staff, as it has an established record of receiving funds from different donors for different aspects of its engagement in Samboto.

3.2.8 Outstanding Issues

First, and perhaps surprisingly, it has not been possible to find any context papers or appraisal documents related to the APOLO programme. This is a general feature of the work of SHA/SDC: the work does not seem to be based on well-documented processes of conceptualisation, defining the methodology and analysis. While these steps may be difficult during strictly humanitarian interventions under pressure of time constraints and the need to respond fast in order to save lives, the APOLO programme did not operate solely under the constraints of uncertainty and exceptionality that characterise humanitarian interventions.

Secondly, none of the APOLO documents mention the RISC programme (see Section 3.1), nor do any of the staff members or documents of the local NGO partners. This is surprising, as the RISC micro companies that were visited all conceived of themselves as being part of the APOLO programme, because their initial construction jobs were all aligned to APOLO-supported projects.[54]

A related SHA/SDC programme established in Luanda, which aimed to develop CBO's and associations using the pretext of humanitarian infrastructure construction, offers an experience-based model for how support could have been provided for local CBOs and NGOs with a longer time span (see Section 3.3). One wonders why SHA/SDC did not adapt this approach for use in Huambo. The fact is that the APOLO programme had a very limited time span and included few local NGOs.

3.3 The Luanda Community Initiative Programme

3.3.1 Introduction

The community initiative fund was established in 1997 by SHA and Comic Relief (new donors such as NOVIB were added later) and aimed specifically at strengthening community-based organizations (CBOs) in the greater Luanda area. The funding mechanism allowed NGOs and CBOs to receive up to 10,000 USD for smaller community-based projects addressing urgent social problems. Funding was based on a strict application procedure, provision of technical support and training throughout the project period provided by Development Workshop (DW).

The community projects were specifically intended to align with DW's participatory methodologies and with CBOs in different parts of the wider Luanda area. One objective was to develop collaborative activities bringing CBO/NGOs and municipality authorities together around common objectives and projects in order to ensure sustainable activities.

3.3.2 Main Findings

Based on data gathered during field visits, it is possible to identify the following main findings:

- All the inspected projects seem to have been sustainable and to have been carried over from the initial humanitarian impetus to become an integrated part of the social and political life of the areas visited. This finding might be based on a bias in the sample of projects, which could not be carried out totally independently of DW. However, the evaluation team

[54] We have later learned that the reason for the confusion is that in the beginning of the APOLO programme RISC projects were contracted by APOLO to send specialized workers in support of the termination of unfinished projects from the year 2001. APOLO furthermore ordered from RISC the installation of a number of incineration stoves for its health posts towards the end of the programme. It is quite surprising, even inconceivable, that such close engagement is not mentioned in the available reports.

does not consider this a significant bias, as DW staff seemed equally interested in finding out what had happened to the projects they had implemented 5 to 9 years earlier;
- In many cases, the local organization has been able to raise additional funds or attract new projects to provide other services (sanitation, schooling, health, electricity etc.);
- Compared to those in schools run by civil society groups (private, church or CBO), state school parents' committees seem less dynamic in sustaining the initial activity, for example by applying for and implementing new developmental activities or maintenance. This is probably because state school councils are elected anew each year, while dynamic teachers and school directors are regularly transferred to new posts within the state sector,
- State schools seem to be less capable of raising contributions from the surrounding community, compared to civil-society-based school councils, most of which have taken action by building verandas or protecting playgrounds.
- In contrast to the micro-projects in Huambo, community initiative projects have been well conceptualised, running through several phases where adjustment to the strategy has been fine-tuned based on experience and monitoring. Moreover the project has been a joint endeavour between government, different donors and NGOs.
- The project model and funding mechanism are today considered the best-practice model for support to local community projects by national and international NGOs and bilateral donors, and there are attempts at applying the model developed throughout the country.

3.3.3 Organization

A project committee was set up with members from UTCAH, the Ministry for Woman and Family, SHA (initially the principal donor), FONGA (an organization representing CBOs and national NGOs in Angola) and DW. The aim of the committee was to provide strategic inputs on the objectives of the fund, evaluate and select project proposals after they had been processed by DW's unit, give technical advice, ensure communication between CBO/NGOs and local administrations, facilitate contact with other funding mechanisms held by international agencies and government, review project reports to ensure feedback on implementation experiences, review project problem areas and seek discussion and consultation, and make yearly recommendations on the structure and functioning of the fund.

In 1997, the project committee had a relatively fixed schedule, meeting 7 times during the first year and more seldom the following years as projects were reviewed and approved/rejected, and reports were assessed. After initially spreading the funding on evaluating a variety of projects in 1998 (Brown 1998) and 2000 (see Brown and Neves 2000), project funding was focused on health and education, and geographically concentrated to the municipalities of Cazenga, Cacuaco and Sambizanga, which became the main beneficiaries.

The aim was to create the highest levels of synergy between DW activities and community initiatives and to ensure a higher level of impact. By 2000, 66 projects had been approved, with 18 of 25 projects for 1999 directly related to urgent needs within the educational sector, as school enrolment lagged behind government targets. The committee also approved the operative criteria for defining NGO/CBOs, and for selection and approval procedures.

Brown and Neves (2000) considered the project highly cost-effective, and emphasised the links between the government of Angola (GoA), local government institutions and NGO/CBOs as a particular strength of the project. The present evaluation can only confirm this conclusion.

3.3.4 Sample

This section contains the assessment of 8 projects sampled from a total of 144 community initiative projects listed by DW. The criteria for selection were:

- The projects should cover a range of initiatives but with a concentration on support to the education sector (as this is the most common type of support activity);
- The projects should cover both civil society (church, private and CBOs) and state initiatives with some kind of public participation (parents' commissions/committees).

The evaluation team assesses the projects selected by DW in accordance with these criteria and what was possible. Many projects were inaccessible, as many roads are closed due to un-controlled urbanisation and building. This was particularly true of vast *bairros* like Sambizanga and Cazenga. After 1999/2000, many projects were situated in Cazenga (estimated population: over a million) as part of DW/SDC's attempt at concentrating its activities in order to maximise impact (after Brown and Neves' 2000 evaluation of the programme). Large sections of Cazenga (half of the surveyed projects) first came into being with the arrival of displaced people during the various phases of the war and humanitarian crisis, which created demands for basic service provision (health, water, sanitation and schooling) for both newly arrived and already settled populations in order to mitigate the effects of the influx of people.

While many displaced people (60%, Cazenga interviewees estimated) did return home, families commonly left some family members behind as a rearguard base in case of any future need to return and in order to have a base in the city for education and employment etc. This created an apparently insatiable need for extended state service provision as newly urbanised populations settled in. As such, many of the proposed community initiatives aimed to "bridge" the humanitarian-development aid divide before it was strategically programmed by SDC (or international and national NGOs more generally). In this sense, the Community Initiative Programme became part of the process of ordinary developmental state extension and service provision that, over time:

- Has come, practically and symbolically, to make the state visible in areas where it had little presence before;
- Has played a part in linking state and society in a whole range of partnerships, most of them still ongoing.

Difficulties in Assessing Impact

The impact of the community initiatives can be assessed in relation to education by considering:

- School enrolment figures;
- Continuation of the activities planned;
- Capacity of the implementing organization to continue its work and even expand it;
- Present status of the constructions and facilities (maintenance, deterioration etc.).

Each of these dimensions were in different ways assessed, but not consistently due to lack of time to ensure accurate data and/or changes in the context of the activities. Consider for example enrolment figures. Only one of the schools (State School no. 805 (8005), *Municipality of Cacuaco, Bairro dos Pescadores*) had accessable records for school enrolment. The following figures were available:

Table 21: School Enrolment

2000	2001	2003	2004	2005	2007
694	658	675	681	584	780

State School no. 805 (8005) constructed 3 extra class rooms, beginning in 2000 and completing the work in 2001. The construction of 3 extra classrooms made 5 classrooms available, which surprisingly has had a negative effect on enrolment, as the number of pupils attending school fell and it was only in 2007 that enrolment reached the same level as in 2000. Nonetheless, what the figures conceal are several changes in the context: the return of displaced people; new legal frameworks; and local attempts at mitigating very high levels of children wanting to access schooling.

For example, in 2003 the school sector was restructured, making the maximum class size 35 pupils per classroom, down from 45, probably to meet standards set by global frameworks related to the MDGs. No new schools were constructed or classrooms added, so in order to allow the same number of children to attend school, State School no. 805 (8005), from *Bairro dos Pescadores,* switched from 2 to 3 sets of classes per day. So, although 694 pupils attended school in 2000, they spent less time in class. With only 2 classrooms available, classes ran from 8 to 9; 9 to10; 10 to 11; 11 to12; 13 to 14 etc. The new framework of 35 pupils per classroom and 5 classrooms allows the school to plan for proper breaks for pupils and teacher, and time for planning and administration. Even though the switch to 3 sets of classes (and many schools visited operated with more than 35 pupils per classroom in order to include all pupils) stretches scarce human resources, it was generally considered favourable and positive for the quality of teaching.

Evaluating enrolment was difficult. It proved easier to assess the 'continuation of the activities planned'; the 'capacity of the implementing organization to continue its work and even expand it'; and the 'present status of the properties constructed or built (maintenance, deterioration etc.). All constructions and the activities for which they were built were still in operation, even though extensive usage has taken its toll on the material condition of the buildings.

Organizationally, civil society (private, church and CBO) seems to address better maintenance and, most importantly, to have been better positioned to use the skills gained by being part of the programme as they learned to raise funds for new projects for the organization from DW or other funding sources.

3.4 Assessment of the MUBELA Enterprise

3.4.1 Introduction

The MUBELA enterprise has been a "problem child" for SHA/SDC since its inception in 1996 and has since it was handed over to Development Workshop (DW) and ADRA-Angola (ADRA-A) in 2000 continued to cause considerable problems for the new partnership. Today MUBELA has come to a *de facto* standstill as a productive training facility leasing out its machinery to local firms.

When the Bridges for Peace programme was first formulated in 1995 the idea was that production of bridge elements for the UNIDO wood bridge model favoured by SHA's technicians (see Section 2.1 on Bridges) would be "outsourced" to local enterprises.[55] When SHA began its operations in Huambo, it soon realised that the expected commercial landscape did not allow for outsourcing.

The most important factors were:

- War and long periods of isolation and dependence of "protected transport corridors" and for some time airborne supply lines, hindered economic recovery, as material supplies brought in from the coastal towns were extremely costly and stable supplies highly precarious;
- Insecurity related to the outcome of the conflict with UNITA occupation between 1993 and 1994 and UNITA control of most rural hinterlands after 1995;

[55] The UNIDO bridge model was developed by the United Nation unit for Development Industry.

- *De facto* exodus of most skilled persons and local owners of workshops and retail shops from Huambo after 1993;
- Commercial development of Huambo was close to non-existent with nearly all retail shops and workshops destroyed or depleted.

SHA therefore decided to find a local partner and setup and fund the establishment of a local (Huambo) enterprise that could manufacture the necessary elements for the Bridges for Peace programme and train the necessary carpentry and metal workers.

The field of possible candidates with whom SHA could form partnerships was by 1996 still limited. The International NGO Development Workshop, which SHA later on established a strong partnership with, was not present in Huambo before 1997, and the national NGO ADRA-A was not well (re)established yet in Huambo. None of the smaller local NGOs (see Section 3.2 on the APOLO programme) present in Huambo (GAC, CAD, OISC etc.) had experience within the productive sector or professional and technical training of carpentry and metal workers.

It is for the evaluation team unclear how and why the faith-based NGO *Fundação Obra de Inserção Social da Crianças* (OISC), *São Francisco de Assis* (SFA) was identified as the most appropriate partner. OISC/SFA (hereafter OISC) did not have any experience within the field, but it was in Huambo known for its close links to UNITA, which could have been of strategic interest for the Bridges for Peace programme. OISC nonetheless became known by SDC/SHA from a range of small-scaled reconstruction projects, none of which required an elaborate administrative, financial and management setup or the technical and professional requirements that a production and training centre entailed. We have later learned that the reason SDC/SHA selected OISC was the fact that OISC claimed to have the official full licence from the owner of the premise to use and exploit the former factory MUBELA. However by late 1998 this proved to be a bluff. To the management of SHA/SDC it seemed to be the best option at that time, but of course SHA/SDC based its decision only on trust and confidence in terms of honesty and capacity instead of controlling the informations it received from OISC.

3.4.2 Objectives

MUBELA started out with the name of *Centro de Formação Professional e Produtivo* (centre for professional training and production) under the leadership of OISC. It was later renamed *Fábrica* de MUBELA and handed over to DW and ADRA-A. MUBELA went through different phases, which each reflected the changing circumstances of SHA's engagement in Huambo province. For each phase new objectives were adopted:[56]

- Bridges for Peace programme (1996-1998): the primary objective was production of bridge elements for the UNIDO wood bridges. A secondary objective was to train demobilised soldiers and young unemployed persons in carpentry, as well as retrain people who had some training in carpentry. These forms of training was to ensure that a "new industry was created" (Massy 1996:23).
- Return to war and emergency (1998-2000): change of the primary objective from production of bridge elements to the production of office equipment for humanitarian and development ends, such as schoolbenches and -tables, windowframes and doors for schools and health posts.
- Handover to DW and ADRA-A (2000-2002): the primary objective was production of office equipment for humanitarian and development ends on a semi-commercial basis, where the surplus should be used as a fund for humanitarian and development projects. A secondary objective was to ensure the sustainability of the investments made by SHA in equipment, technology and human resources.

Since SDCs formal relationship to MUBELA ceded after 2002, the production unit has been renamed MUBELA Wood Factory, and has become a Division of *HabiTec Comercio e Industria,*

[56] No documents containing clear statements on objectives has been handed over to the evaluation team, so the list presented here reflects different key players' ideas about what the objective was for each phase.

SA, which is a social and humanitarian investment entity controlled by DW. The Wood Factory is at present negotiating with a Brazilian private enterprise. The aim is to establish business cooperation and ensure possible takeover of the factory by the Brazilian enterprise, so it can become economically sustainable, with a share of the surplus going into a fund for social and development projects. The formal detachment of MUBELA from ADRA-A is nonetheless still pending. It is the topic of ongoing – or rather lack of - discussion, as no formal agreement between DW and ADRA-A seems to have been signed.

3.4.3 Main Findings

When the MUBELA enterprise is assessed over the three phases identified above, it is striking that:

- The professional and administrative basis for identifying OISC as the most appropriate partner to lead "*Centro de Formação Professional e Produtivo* MUBELA" is unclear;
- The relationship between OISC and SHA was characterised by vague cooperation and partnership agreements, which caused considerable delays for an already ambitious and risky Bridges for Peace programme;
- MUBELA managed with considerable delays to produce bridge elements for 4 UNIDO bridges (3 have been set up and elements for 1 bridge is still at the MUBELA facility) before the war restarted in 1998;
- Unclear partnership agreements between SHA and OISC seems to have been reproduced during the third phase when DW and ADRA-A took over MUBELA creating a deadlock between the two co-owners;
- A careful reading of the donation act between SHA, DW and ADRA-A suggests that SHA was fairly consistent with regard of its overall objectives - with its focus on the health and educational sectors, training and production of bridge elements - as these objectives were carried over into the new MUBELA after 2000. This had severe consequences for how MUBELA could operate in a new market situation. One consequence was that the MUBELA enterprise after 2000 was dependent on an "emergency"-generated market and not an open market economy;
- Where MUBELA, which was based on humanitarian and development ends, after 2000 operated in a business environment without real competition, the enterprise became over time less and less able to operate in a competitive business environment;
- Today all former SHA/SDC workers have lost their jobs, and struggle has emerged over the size of their unemployment packages, as SHA/OISC did not pay the obligatory social insurance policy. This means that former SHA workers solely are legible for unemployment packages from the time when DW and ADRA-As took over MUBELA and workers were placed under DW regulations for social insurance policy;
- MUBELA has today been *de facto* dissolved, and DW is trying to find a new business partner to secure the substantial investments in new equipment that the organisation has made over time;
- SHA/SDC's investment in a productive training facility has *de facto* been lost.

3.4.4 Overview

First phase

After it in 1996 was decided to use the UNIDO wood bridge model for the rehabilitation of destroyed bridges, the sheer scale of the necessary logistic arrangement caused SHA considerable problems. As no industries and well-stocked retail shops existed in Huambo, all materials, equipment, machinery, lubricants, vehicles and diesel needed to be brought in from Lobito and Benguela, roughly 300 Km from Huambo.

A former furniture factory MUBELA was rented from the industrial group *Nova York Social Modas S.A.R.L.* who owned various properties and factories in Huambo. The former factory MUBELA was renovated (roof, walls, gate, electrical installations, water, stock and warehouse etc.) at the cost of 130,000 USD.[57] As all machinery was either stolen or destroyed, new machinery needed to

[57] The renovation of the MUBELA factory was estimated to 130,000 USD in a Resumo de Transacções 2000/2001 (SDC 2003: 1)

be bought and transported to Huambo and installed. Particularly, the drying of wood for the bridge elements caused considerable problems, as appropriate ovens were not available. The usage of local wood was considered one of the most important aspects of the project, as it would contribute to the sustainability of the bridge project because it fitted the "local conditions" (Massy 1996:21).

OISC had previously been hired to manage the "*Centro de Formação Professional e Produtivo* MUBELA", or sometimes referred to as the "OISC training centre MUBELA" factory, and organising the "training of trainers and workers" (Massy 1996:6; 24). This had to be constantly postponed, as the agreement with UNIDO was not signed. Before the machinery was identified and installed, training of workers would be waste of time and resources. The agreement with UNIDO and rehabilitation of the factory was finalised by the end of 1996 and enabled the installation of machines etc. in order to begin production of wooden elements, or so it was hoped (2nd Evaluationsbericht, November 1996). What was missing was the procurement of an engineer from UNIDO who could supervise the production setup.

Despite progress made during 1996 and well into 1997 the institutional setup of MUBELA was continually questioned. Four factors impeded progress:

- Due to slow progress, tiresome institutional setup and the many uncertain factors that SHA did not have control over, the project was internally questioned. In order to produce "tangible results" (Massy 1996:6) it was throughout 1996 suggested that SHA "should prepare (in Europe or Africa) the wooden and metal parts for prefabricating 45 meters of bridge […] Putting this material in sea containers" (ibid.). This would allow for the delivery the same year of a sizable demonstration bridge to be used for training of the production and launching teams;
- Due to the precarious peace process, doubts about the considerable risks associated with bridge construction and MUBELA projects were constant (see Evaluation 1996, Risks: Losing investment if peace process fails);
- The "lack of technical local staff" (Massy 1996: 7) at MUBELA (management and financial personnel, as well as production unit staff) created constant bottlenecks, which hampered progress. When the factory was established, machinery installed and the work and training began during 1997, it became increasingly clear that OISC needed support in the commercial and administrative areas (3rd Evaluationsbericht May 1997);
- Even after SHA on 9 May 1997 signed an agreement with OISC on bridge production, OISC seemed unable to lead the "*Centro de Formação Professional e Produtivo* MUBELA". This was due to unclear definitions of each organisation's tasks.

The objective of the May 9, 1997 agreement between SHA and OISC was to flesh-out the terms for technical cooperation and equipment for a factory that could produce bridge elements using the UNIDO technology. The agreement was scheduled to be effective for 5 years.[58]

SHA's most important responsibilities were:

- Finance the project with a contribution of 1,2 million USD, which included the funding of the first 13 UNIDO bridges;
- Buy, transport and install the MUBELA equipment;
- Finance the training of personnel and the competencies and responsibilities related to UNIDO (SHA signed a special agreement with UNIDO);
- Contribute to the rehabilitation of the equipment installed at MUBELA with technical assistance, labour and supply of different materials for construction and installation of equipment;
- Cover production costs for the first preparatory phase until the end of the production of the third bridge, as well as the cost of a number of qualified workers defined by the Director of MUBELA, the SHA representative and the UNIDO consultant.

[58] For the information provided in this section, see copy of the signed agreement: "Acordo entre a Ajuda Humanitária Suiça (SHA) e a Fundação OISC/SFA/ Huambo, referindo á Fábrica de MUBELA" dated, May 9, 1997.

OISCs most important responsibilities were defined as:

- Prioritise production of bridge elements for SHA. Other production activities should comply with the objectives defined by the statute of OISC/SFA;
- Provide SHA with bridge elements at the production cost from the fourth bridge;
- Recruit the necessary personnel for the good functioning of the factory directed at production and the professional training objectives, principally technicians, permanent workers and trainers (for example demobilised soldiers etc. who needed such skills);
- Full responsibility for the legal obligations pertaining to insurance, labour licence (Ministry of Industry and Trade), legalisation of equipment (Public Register) and legalisation as an NGO;
- Be in charge of finance, administration and the good organisation of the commercial aspects of MUBELA guaranteeing transparent management and allowing SHA to request an audit at whatever moment the circumstances required such an audit;
- Elaborate annual reports and financial statements revised by an external agency to be handed over to SHA not later than three months after the end of a commercial year.

In case of problems, the two partners agreed to settle disputes between them, but most importantly the very last paragraph of the agreement stated that "if major circumstances emerged SHA could suspend the programme" (May 9, 1997 agreement between SHA and OISC).

Despite the attempt at defining each party's responsibilities and tasks, various details remained unsettled. Important issues such as procurement of wood, sale prices, administration, production schedules etc. were lacking. These later on continued to haunt the OISC/SHA partnership. Even though OISC from mid-1997 did begin to settle some of the mentioned requirements, the whole setup proved problematic. For example, OISC did elaborate a "Regulamento de Trabalho" (work regulative) in 1998 (see April 7, 1998 document) and defined the staff setup for the different production units. But OISC did so only after it had received considerable critique and significant technical assistance from SHA (see 4th. Evaluationsbericht, March 1998:9).

SHA was placed in a double-bind situation. On the hand it was not satisfied with the progress and quality of the produced bridge elements, the training of workers, the lack of administrative and financial leadership, and thus control with MUBELA (see the 8 bullet points mentioned in the 4th. Evaluationsbericht, March 1998:9). On the other hand, SHA urgently needed the bridge elements produced, as the political tensions between UNITA and MPLA increased in Huambo and threatened to undermine SHA's overall Bridges for Peace programme and already significant investments. SHA therefore, despite problems, continued to invest in the necessary equipment for MUBELA. For example a new band-saw was bought in order to make sure that MUBELA technically and operationally was capable of satisfying SHA's needs (see the 5 bullet points mentioned in the 4th. Evaluationsbericht, March 1998: 10).[59]

MUBELA managed to finalise the wood and metal elements for 4 bridges, of which 3 (Satchitemo, Calima and Ekunha) during 1997 and 1998 were duly installed (see Section 2.1 on Bridges). Despite this achievement SHA saw OISC as inherently "corrupt" and MUBELA as run by the "private interests" of the OISC's (ir)responsible leadership.[60] SHA constantly asked: is OISC willing to become responsible?

SHA's concerns with MUBELA not only referred to the production of bridges, but also to the transfer of competences and know-how to workers and technicians. This was especially a matter of concern for a future situation where SHA would pull out, which was planned to have taken place after 1998 with the completion of the first three bridges (according to the 1997 agreement).

[59] The double-bind situation SHA had placed itself in is illustrated by the fact that when UNITA during 1996 and 1997 requested that the production of bridge elements for bridges constructed in areas under its control had to be produced in Bailundo, OISC stepped in and broke a compromise where demobilised soldiers from the area could be trained at MUBELA in Huambo.

[60] Conversations with former SHA staff suggests that issues like "corruption" and private "embezzlement" besides administrative and management problems were common at MUBELA, and both SHA's Huambo and Luanda office used considerable time and energy on settling disputes over financial transactions.

Second Phase
The return of war at the end of 1998 brought the Bridges for Peace programme to a standstill and required SHA to change its operational strategy. The changing context also provided SHA with the pretext to activate the last paragraph of the 9 May 1997 agreement with OISC (i.e. "if major circumstances emerged SHA could suspend the programme").

On 2 December 1998 SHA sent out two letters. One letter was sent to *Fundação* OISC/SFA and another to *Nova York Social Modas S.A.R.L.* The letter to OISC informed that a scheduled meeting for December 7 would take place at a later stage, as SHA was "looking into alternatives for the continuation of the MUBELA […] in order to procure viable solutions" (Letter to *Fundação* OISC/SFA, 2 December 1998). The letter makes clear that SHA did not see OISC as the future partner, because experience gained "from the first phase of the project" had not been positive, SHA therefore asked for time to "develop new ideas" (ibid.).

The second letter asked *Nova York Social Modas S.A.R.L.* to clarify its contractual and legal relationship to OISC. It furthermore makes clear that it was SHA who rehabilitated the factory and installed the machinery at the MUBELA facility. It also makes it clear that it was SHA that had paid the workers salaries and been economically responsible for the technical and financial management training at MUBELA: "it is our organisation that paid for everything that has secured the good functioning of MUBELA" (Letter to *Nova York Social Modas S.A.R.L.* December 2, 1998). The letter also spells out that SHA's engagement is anchored in its agreement with the GoA, and that the agreement with OISC is a separate agreement, which SHA has the right to revoke. The letter did not hide the plan for changes with the MUBELA setup, and it was with such changes in mind that SHA wished to clarify the contractual relationship between *Nova York Social Modas S.A.R.L.* and OISC.

Besides these two letters the evaluation team has scant documentation of the various steps that took place during the second phase.[61] However, available documentation and interviews with former and present representatives/employees of PGH (provincial government of Huambo), OISC, SHA, SDC, DW, ADRA-A and MUBELA suggest that:

- SHA initiated negotiations during 1999 with the PGH, DW and ADRA-A of the future of MUBELA;
- OISC threatened SHA with taking the renouncement of the contract to court. This was a threat that was going to be repeated several times over the years, but which never materialised;
- SHA changed the administrative and financial setup of MUBELA;
- SHA redirected the production from UNIDO bridge elements towards educational equipment (school tables) and building products for use at schools, health posts, emergency kitchens, emergency constructions and so fort (such as window and door frames);
- The PGH by February 12, 2000 accepted that the contract with "OISC was renounced" (see Despacho 00034/2000);
- An agreement on the MUBELA project was signed on April 14, 2000, between SHA, DW and ADRA-A after elaborate discussions with the PGH (see Acta, Governo da provincial do Huambo, Gabinete de Estudos, Planeamento e Estatística, Huambo 13 April 2000);
- Discussions between SHA, DW and ADRA-A as well as between DW and ADRA-A about how to concretise the MUBELA project as a SHA donation (see undated Resumo; and Encontro relativa á parceria DW – ADRA no projecto Mubela, August 29, 2000);
- A "Donation Act" was signed on October 24, 2000 between SHA, DW and ADRA-A with GPH as witness (Acta de Doação, October 24, 2000);
- An inventory over machinery was forwarded to *Empresa National de Pontes* (ENP), DW and ADRA-A by SHA on November 7, 2000 (see SHA, Ref: 0149/00-DP);
- A "Coordination Meeting" was held on November 29, 2000 between DW, ADRA-A, the MUBELA director and SHA representatives, discussing storage of surplus UNIDO elements within the new setup; revision of wood inventory; staff composition; transport, generator and

[61] The evaluation team acknowledges ADRA-A's fine record, which the team was given access to.

security (night watch) (see Acta Sobre a Reunião de Coordenação Sobre Assuntos de MUBELA, November 29, 2000);
- On November 30, 2000 the keys to the factory was officially handed over to DW and ADRA-A with a transitional period of two years;
- The final Acta de Doação (donation agreement) was signed between DW, ADRA-A and SDC in Luanda on December 3, 2002 (see Acta de Doação, December 3, 2002). It was here made clear that the agreement was binding for the different partners and that it could not be revoked before the end of 2005.

The most important objectives, as stated in the donation agreement of October 24, 2000, were that the MUBELA enterprise under the leadership of DW and ADRA-A would:
- Manufacture school tables and chairs, doors, windows and different types of furniture and wooden bridge elements for use in social investments;
- Promote work opportunities;
- Provide training of national groups though training courses or on-the-job-training;

The real novelty was the overall objective of producing for social investments or as it later was described "for humanitarian and development ends" (SHA, Resumo de Transaccoes 2000/2001, 2003:1). This meant that while MUBELA would become a commercial enterprise, the production of different types of products for the school and health sector would not be done on a purely commercial basis. The idea was that the surplus should be used as a fund for humanitarian and development projects, which ADRA-A and DW could draw on for social investment projects or for funding projects proposed by other NGOs. As such a certain degree of financial independence could be reached, where NGOs had their own resources instead of relying on outside funding.[62]

The period between 2000, when the keys were handed over to DW and ADRA-A, and end of 2002, when the final donation act was signed, was used by SHA to 1.) prepare, arrange and intensify the production; and 2.) finalise the details of the donation and the institutional setup.

Besides hiring a director, who had earlier been director of a construction firm in Bengela, a range of technical consultants were brought in on short-term basis assisting the interim leadership with directing and intensifying the production and management side of the enterprise (see the detailed but undated "Projecto MUBELA – Resumo", which seems to have been from 2001). Specific targets was set up for the production aiming at the production of 3,000 high-quality school chairs, 4,000 school tables, besides doors and windows all made of wood.

The direction of the production still followed SHA's global emergency objective aimed at making a difference within the educational and health sectors, but as a specific objective "maintenance of the capacity to produce bridge elements" from the former rehabilitation phase was present. Part of this was an attempt at creating a special unit within the new MUBELA setup for such production.

Problems related to raw wood stock continued to cause problems just as drying of wood, crucial for making high quality production, continued to haunt MUBELA as it would do over the years to come, but a considerable stock of both kinds of wood was built up before the handover to DW/ADRA-A.

In order to create a client base outside the SDC framework, which was the principal recipient of MUBELA products between 2000 and 2002, considerable energy was put into the "identification of partnership organisations with planned projects within construction and rehabilitation of schools and health posts […] which could be considered clients of MUBELA products in the future" (ibid.).

According to the director, the workforce at MUBELA was retrained so it became geared towards production of the new portfolio. Where MUBELA employed 25 workers in 2000, staff was raised to

[62] It has not been possible to find any documents describing these aspects of the agreement, but this was how both DW and ADRA-A explained the wider idea behind MUBELA.

35 by 2001 consisting of former SHA employees who wanted to stay on and new workers that fitted the production profile. By 2002, when the transition period ended, it had again been trimmed to 27 more specialised workers, with casual workers being hired on demand that fitted the direction MUBELA was taking.

A complex and confusing institutional setup was presented where:

- DW, with support from SHA, agreed to buy the MUBELA factory from Loja Nova York for 200,000 USD;
- The machine park and all equipment bought and installed by SHA were donated to ADRA-A and DW so that they each received a half part (50%);
- As owner of the property and as co-owner of the equipment and the machine park, DW on their side would take sole responsibility for the administration of MUBELA;
- ADRA-A on their side would in partnership with DW be responsible for the concretisation and implementation of the project;
- SHA on its side participated in the arrangement by donating its investments and productive capital, as well as funding the former project. It also committed itself to continued support by buying wood products for other projects;
- The PGH represented by Empresa National de Pontes (ENP) would officially function as facilitator of the arrangement as member of the Advisory Council (Conselho de Referencia) due to ENP's strategic interest in bridges;[63]
- DW and ADRA-A agreed that they could not remove their part of the equipment or property.

The institutional setup was confusing with DW owning the property and half of the equipment besides being in charge of the everyday management of MUBELA, and ADRA-A, while owning half of the equipment, would provide strategic inputs without any *de facto* decision-making power. The two directors from DW and ADRA-A together with the Director MUBELA formed a Council of Directors, which had to sign checks and monitor the progress of MUBELA (Interview with director of ADRA-A, Huambo). This confusing setup, as it was presented in the Donation Act, was also reflected in the cash value of SHA's donation, as the table underneath illustrates.[64]

Table 22: SDC MUBELA Donation Costs

Description	DW	ADRA-A	SHA Total
Acquisition of the MUBELA property: 2000 2001	 100,000 USD 50,000 USD		150,000 USD[65]
Donation of equipment (approximate value)	150,000 USD	150,000 USD	300,000 USD
SHA's initial investment (estimated value)	130,000 USD		130,000 USD
Donation of Scania lorry (estimated value)	10,000 USD		10,000 USD
Transaction costs			30,000 USD
Total	**440,000 USD**	**150,000 USD**	**620,000 USD**

[63] The inclusion of ENP as members of the Advisory Council representing the GoA was due to SHA's continued hope that the UNIDO bridge, which it had invested considerable human-, financial-, and material resources in since 1996, would in the future be produced by MUBELA and set up by ENP. This nonetheless would never happen. The first test was when it was decided that the UNIDO model Bridge Sambo/Satchitemo in 2003 should be repaired. Only one section of the bridge had been destroyed and could relatively easily have been repaired using the 6 meters of UNIDO bridge elements already produced and stored at MUBELA. The PGH/ENP decided to repair the bridge using tree trunks instead of the available UNIDO elements.

[64] The amounts presented here are drawn from SDC, Resumo de Transacções 2000/2001 (2003: 2)

[65] On top of 150,000 USD DW paid 50,000 USD to meet the price of MUBELA which was set at 200,000 USD. It is not clear if DW had to pay the 150,000 USD back to SHA in three instalments, as minutes from August 2000 suggest that this had been discussed (see Acta Encontro Relativo á Parceiria DW – ADRA no Projecto MUBELA, August 29, 2000:2)

DW and ADRA-A had disagreed up to the signing of the agreement about how the decision-making power should be distributed. ADRA-A had been of the opinion that it should be owned equally by the two NGOs, because it was a donation. DW had maintained that the distribution should be ADRA-A 25% and DW-75% due to the "considerable time and resource" DW had invested in the projects (Acta, Encontro Relativo á Parceiria DW – ADRA no Projecto MUBELA, August 29, 2000). DW insisted that one of the organisations had to lead MUBELA in order to secure good management, and that the share of one of the partners should not be less than 25%. The minutes from August 2000 do not indicate ADRA-A's response to this suggestion, but the argument would later be repeated by DW, when by 2006 it decided to invest heavily in new machinery for MUBELA.

Despite these earlier disagreements, the management setup was at first not considered too problematic, as both organisations shared the overall humanitarian and development ends of the MUBELA project. The idea about a "social investment fund" generated by the commercial surplus from MUBELA was taken for granted by all the partners in the transaction, as MUBELA was the only enterprise of its kind in Huambo between 2000 and 2002.

Third Phase

Despite the transitional measures taken by SHA, MUBELA under the new leadership of DW and ADRA-A soon encountered problems. With the peace agreement in 2002, products from outside Huambo started to emerge and it soon became clear that MUBELA's specialised products were dependent on an "emergency"-generated market.

Where MUBELA during the emergency phase and the first year thereafter could sell its main product, school tables, over the whole year, as rehabilitation and constructions took place, this changed when the situation became more normal. As MUBELA became more and more dependent on procurements from the educational sector, school tables were sold during the last part and first part of a budget year, when schools and the Provincial Department of Education had budgets to spend. Furthermore with the opening of the market MUBELA lost it's (close to) monopoly in Huambo.

In order to make sure that the production apparatus was used, MUBELA had to redirect the production. From 2005 it began to "diversify" the production to office equipment, beds and other types of household furniture in order to attract new customers. While this broadened the client base, MUBELA could not compete due to the low volumes of specialised products and increasing production costs.[66]

As a social investment entity with a humanitarian development profile MUBELA had an obligation to train carpenters, which it did, but it was difficult to do so with costs covered, when the market for demobilised soldiers dried up and funding for training programmes dried out. Furthermore staff salaries were according to the MUBELA director "excessive" - up to 3-4 times above the market price (around 170 USD). One problem was, according to the Director of MUBELA, that it had to take over SHA's staff and salary structure, as part of the transitional agreement. Even though MUBELA could not compete on the free market, the work force was not trimmed appropriately the first years. But slowly it started to fire workers and by March 2007 all productive MUBELA workers were fired, and workers were rehired as "casuals" at the market cost when there was a need, for example at the end and at the first part of the year.

[66] Quality-wise wood products were considered second range in comparison with for example tables and chairs made with a combination of iron and wood. Even though MUBELA products were solid, they were considered "unsophisticated and old-fashioned" and less durable than new products that started to emerge on the market.

When DW took over management of MUBELA, all workers got DW contracts and became covered by the obligatory national social and health insurance. When MUBELA began firing its staff, the compensation package covered only the years when the social insurance had been paid and not the years that a particular worker had been employed. Former staff workers, therefore, even though they had been employed first by SHA and then by DW, only got compensation from 2000 when DW took over the management of MUBELA, as it turned out that SHA and later OISC had not paid the social insurance. This created tensions and now former workers still claim that they have been cheated by DW, even though it has upheld its obligations.

Administratively, everything was not well with MUBELA. The following problems materialised over the years:

- Even though the director of ADRA-A, who was member of the Council of Directors, had to sign checks, she had no say over how MUBELA was run, this was an internal matter between DW and the MUBELA director, who was paid directly by DW (1500 USD a month);
- MUBELA struggled continuously to produce financial accounts (no proper accounts were available from 2002 to 2005);
- DW restructured the management setup and developed/implemented a new financial system, but all in vain as the administrative staff at MUBELA despite training in it could not understand it and for the financial year of 2006 produced a rudimentary and rather incomprehensible financial statement;
- The draft financial statement for 2006 indicated that MUBELA had lost 145,548 USD during the financial year due to low productivity, excessive overhead costs (long time before produced products were sold), and serious problems with control and monitoring of the production;
- It was also pointed out that there was a discrepancy between the value of stock and equipment , with a huge fall in the value of stock and equipment;
- Market analyses and a business plan were elaborated in order to find out what MUBELA's competitive advantage was.

The last aspect of the original agreement prevented any of the two partners from removing donated equipment from MUBELA, and that the agreement had to be respected by all partners until the end of 2005. By 2006-2007 these clauses would become contentious. DW decided after successive years of losses and a round of investments in new equipment in 2006 to make MUBELA a Division of *HabiTec Comercio e Industria, SA*, an investment entity controlled by DW, and explore a new business setup with an external private business.[67]

ADRA-A, according to the donation agreement, owned half of the equipment donated by SHA back in 2000, but due to new DW investments and MUBELA's incapacity to even break even, running with continuous losses, meant that ADRA-A's 50% stake was lost according to DW. As DW had invested heavily in MUBELA, it rearticulated the former statement that the share of one of the partners should not be below 25% (Acta, Encontro Relativo á Parceiria DW – ADRA no Projecto MUBELA, August 29, 2000).

As no proper financial statements were elaborated, ADRA-A declined to sign checks after 2006. The Director of ADRA-A recalled that the lasts checks related to the DW investment in new machinery. After this communication between the two partner organisations seems to have stopped until March 2007, when ADRA-A responded to the circulating "rumours that Fabrica MUBELA had ceded to exist as a company and that the work force including the director had been fired" (see ADRA-A 2007). It therefore asked DW to respond and clarify what was happening to MUBELA. By September 2007 DW has not formally responded and the situation seems to have reached a stalemate.

[67] DW invested according to several employees around 500,000 USD in new machinery during 2006 and 2007 in order to make MUBELA attractive for foreign investments.

Symbolically the decline of MUBELA can be illustrated by its relationship to the Provincial leadership. During the first years the Provincial Governor brought official guests to MUBELA, as it was the province's "star enterprise" (MUBELA Director), a sign of the progress that the province had made and its capacity to attract investment. But this did not make the state invest in MUBELA products, which primarily were procured by international NGOs and bilateral donors engaged in rehabilitation of the education and health sectors. The high-profiled visits became less frequent after 2005, and today MUBELA is no longer shown off to visitors, as there are no activities to put on show.

3.5 Assessment of Local Community Workers

3.5.1 Introduction

In a clear majority of SDC-supported construction works, NGO project partners drew on local workers from the communities close to or surrounding the construction sites (villages, IDP resettlement areas or *bairros*).[68] This ranged from school and health post constructions to the earlier Bridges for Peace programme. A few exceptions to the use of local community workers included the Central Hospital, the Orthopaedic Hospital, and a couple of school rehabilitations in the town of Huambo and the roads rehabilitated with heavy machinery during 1996-1998.

The recruitment of local workers included a combination of males who had some experience with construction work (carpentry and masonry predominantly) and unskilled males (adobe brick production, transport and preparation of sites). Women were drawn on to collect water and prepare food for workers during working hours.

Remuneration of local community workers varied between the different projects. Free food during working hours and 'food for work' in the form of monthly packages (oil, maize, beans etc.) were given to workers in all projects. The food for work remuneration was done in collaboration with WFP. Salaries in cash were given in all projects with the exception of the DW Emergency School Programme, which only used the 'food for work' model. As a general rule skilled workers were paid a fixed monthly salary, whereas unskilled workers were paid according to the tasks they performed.

As a general rule SDC staff was not responsible for local community workers. NGO partners were drawn on to mobilise, organise and remunerate workers. SDC staff did however in the majority of construction projects have direct influence on the workers through 'on-the-job training'. An exception to this was the Emergency School Programme of DW, where SDC technical staff was only involved directly in 3 out of 17 projects.

Training of local workers did not involve classroom-based capacity-building exercises, only 'on-the-job training' during construction work. One minor exception was the SDC-supported training programme for construction workers carried out by DW in 2000. This training programme was attached directly to the Emergency School Programme and based on the realisation that local partners of DW did not have the knowledge and capacity to supervise and manage constructions. Training was predominantly given to members/employees of DW's NGO partners and *not* to local community workers as such.

SDC made no follow-up on the community workers after the end of a particular construction work or ensured that workers were recruited for new construction projects. Support was confined to creating here-and-now work opportunities and 'on-the-job training' during individual projects. Some of SDC's NGO partners did follow-up on workers. This included DW, which used the model of 're-circulating skilled workers', so they got employment in new construction projects, including those that were not financed by SDC. CAD did during the APOLO programme use some of the

[68] This section is based on interviews with former community workers as well as with national and international NGOs, such as ADRA-A, DW, CAD and former SDC staff.

IDPs workers they had employed before, for example as 'stand-by labour' for rehabilitation work. ADRA-A kept contacts with a few former workers, but has not used them for new construction works.

3.5.2 Objectives

According to interviews with partners and former SDC staff members in Huambo, the use and capacity building of local workforces was considered a priority of SDC throughout the support periods. It is therefore surprising that it is only the first Roads/Bridges rehabilitation programme that includes the use of local workers as part of an explicit objective. In other SDC programme documents there are no explicit reflections or statements on or any strategies related to an objective of including local workers. Such explicitly formulated objectives are confined to two of SDC's NGO partners, DW and CAD.

In the ***Road/Bridge rehabilitation programme (1996-98)*** one sub-objective was to involve local community workers (skilled and unskilled) in order to create short-term job opportunities. This would provide supplements to livelihood in poor villages surrounding bridge construction sites. There is no mention, however, of longer-term capacity building of local skilled workers as an 'explicit objective', although this was in some cases the outcome due to the 'on-the-job-training' local workers received. SDC did not organise workers for participation in future repair or participation in construction work.

When speaking with former SDC staff, these aspects were however considered an 'implicit objective' of SDC. Another implicit objective involving local community workers had to do with the lack of organised skilled workers during the periods of support. The idea was to identify, amongst local villagers, people who had some prior skills and experiences with construction work. This model could reduce the costs of labour used during bridge constructions.

The ***DW Emergency School programme*** had the explicit objective of securing community participation in construction work, and DW saw local craftsmen as a core beneficiary group. Four sub-objectives adressed the issue of local community workers:[69]

- First, the involvement of community members in construction and planning was aimed at securing sustainability. Participation was seen as a means to foster notions of ownership, which implies that community members are more likely to have interests in sustaining constructions in the long term.
- Second, the short-term objective was to assist IDPs with employment and/or access to remuneration in the form of 'food for work' through the WFP programme.
- Third, the aim was to foster a sense of community belonging through voluntary contribution of time and labour in school construction. This was viewed as relevant in IDP-populated areas, which were seen as 'instant communities', that is, communities where individuals or families do not necessarily share common ties with others that they have to live with within a given territorial space.
- Fourth, the objective was to reactivate 40 craftsmen (already skilled local workers) through training and provision of tools. DW's objective was less to directly train local community workers than to capacitate and train members of local NGOs and church organization in supervision and management of construction work.

CADs key objective was to create job opportunities for IDPs. Its objective mode of organisation was less ambitious than that of DW, because it did not include classroom training or any systematic capacity building of local community worker skills. CAD nonetheless shared with DW the objective of facilitating the integration of IDPs into permanent settlements by including IDPs as workers in construction works.

[69] The four objectives should be seen as part of the overall objective of improving schooling possibilities for IDP children.

3.5.3 Main Findings

- No figures are available on the total number of local workers employed in construction works (skilled as well as unskilled) by SDC. Figures available from the APOLO programme and the construction works done with ADRA-A suggest that an average of 21 salaried workers were employed per month. This figure does not, however, include those unskilled workers (men and women) that were temporarily employed and received remuneration in kind (i.e. food for work).
- The lack of SDC follow-up on and reuse of workers in new construction works reflects a culture of emergency without a longer-term vision of impact. The same can be said about the lack of any attempt at including local community workers in the maintenance of construction and rehabilitation works.
- SDC was under pressure to use local workers due to a lack of available construction firms in Huambo from 1996 until the end of the emergency phase. This created important short-term incomes and/or supplements to family food supplies for people in a vulnerable socio-economic situation. No systematic considerations were, however, made of the longer-term impact of the construction skills acquired.
- The use of local community workers (skilled and unskilled) could have been more ambitious in terms of securing longer-term impacts of the investments in training/capacity building of skilled workers. Participation in construction work provided local workers with knowledge and capacities, which could have been employed more systematically. No attempts were made at organising a local community-based 'resource base' for rehabilitation/maintenance of health posts, schools and secondary roads/drainage systems. Longer-term organizational capacity was difficult to envision in areas with a large number of IDPs participating in constructions, as they would be expected to return to their home villages after the emergency phase. However, there were high potentials for such organization in urban-based *bairros* during the emergency phase and in returnee areas, where construction work was carried out during the APOLO programme.
- An assessment of former local community workers in 2007 shows that skilled workers in general were capable of using the new skills acquired during the SDC supported constructions. This took the form of temporary employments and/or own informal business, such as construction of houses for private persons, and the making of doors and windows for sale. A major problem is getting permanent employment.
- Unskilled workers had as a general rule not been able to engage in construction work after the end of SDC-supported projects. Participation was seen as a short-term supplement to family-based livelihood survival strategies.
- Remuneration in kind (food for work through the WFP programme) was held out as appropriate in the emergency phase due to a general situation of hunger and lack of market access. However, the evaluation team found the models used during the bridge constructions and the APOLO programme more appropriate. Here a combination of remuneration in kind and cash was given to workers. Cash incomes allowed workers (and their families) to make more lasting investments for improvements of their livelihood situation. It also mitigated the development of a culture where local, poor community members, were regarded as a pool of relatively cheap voluntary labour in the construction of public infrastructure.
- It is surprising that there are no explicit reflections in the SDC and SDC partner documents of the pros and cons of the models of remuneration used in the short as well as long term – for example on the economic and psychological effects of paying skilled workers in kind and/or with salaries that are lower than the ordinary payment of skilled labour. Where some reflections are made, only positive aspects are highlighted, such as the nurturing of ownership through partly voluntary work.

3.5.4 Overview of SDC Organization and Use of Community Workers

Below is an overview of the different models of organization and use of workers in the different phases of support and during different types of partnerships.

Micro-projects 1996-1997: SDC's initial intention was to contract construction work to local NGOs, where SDC covered financial costs and materials. The first experiences showed the need for much more SDC technical supervision than was planned. Also the lack of skilled local staff made SDC turn to a more community-oriented model, drawing on local workers. There was no explicit training of these workers or any subsequent organization of them for future construction work.

Roads and bridges in 1997-1998: Approximately 50% of the labour-force working on the UNIDO bridge construction was local workers drawn from villages up to 7 km from the construction sites. These were mobilised by the local NGO partners (OIKOS and OKUTIUKA) in collaboration with local leaders such as *sobas*. It consisted of a mixture of skilled workers (a few carpenters and masons), non-skilled male workers and women for cooking food for workers and fetching water. Skilled workers received a fixed monthly salary, as well as monthly food packages and a meal during work hours. Unskilled workers received salary according to the individual tasks done, as well as food (on the job and monthly packages).

Their work included tasks like cutting stones from the nearby rocks, transporting stones to the construction site and mixing stones with cement. Females only received food on the job. Guards were also recruited to protect the construction site at night and they were paid a monthly salary. There was no formal training of local workers prior to their employment. The model used was 'on-the-job training'. SDC also attempted to select a group of workers who had prior experience with construction work. Salary was paid out by the partners. WFP did not provide food for work in these cases.

There were no figures available on the number of skilled and unskilled workers used. According to interviews with former workers at the Ekunha-Caála bridge there had been a total of 102 workers drawn from two villages. People did not recall how many of these included skilled workers, but they were in a minority. According to interviews with former workers in the Sambo/Satchitemo bridge, there had been a total of 27 workers from 3 villages (with approximately 5-6 skilled workers). Salary figures were not available in the SDC documents. According to interviews with former skilled workers in the Ekunha-Caála bridge construction, skilled workers had received 25,000 kwanzas per month and the guard 60,000 kwanzas per month. Skilled workers in the villages near the Satchitemo bridge only recalled receiving 4,000 kwanzas per month. These differences in salary figures suggest that they are not reliable.

There was no reuse of workers (skilled or unskilled) in other construction works. Neither SDC nor the local NGO partners provided follow-up on the fate of the workers after the end of a particular construction. No tools were left with local workers for minor repairs in the future. Road rehabilitations during this period were done alone by heavy machinery and without the use of local workers.

Road rehabilitation during the emergency phase (2000-2001). Local workers drawn from the community living next to a road under rehabilitation were used in two road rehabilitation projects during the war period. These works were carried out by SDC partners (DW and ADPP), which mobilised the local work force and paid the monthly food for work packages. Workers were unskilled and used to construct the drainage systems. There was no organization of local workforce for future maintenance work or training of the work force.

DW Emergency School Programme (2000-2001): In all DW construction works local community workers were involved (no figures of number of workers were available, but the cost of local workers was estimated to be 4,028 USD per construction).[70] Local community workers were remunerated with WFP food for work (based on partners and DW making an application to WFP, which then approved the construction plans and registered the workers).

DW in the majority of projects (22 out of 27) used a 3 line model where local NGOs or local church partners of DW provided the direct link to the local communities and the workers participating from these communities. The local partners were in charge of providing local inputs and mobilising community participation in construction work, usually unskilled labour. Members of the local partners were trained by DW to secure permanent on-the-site supervision of construction works and 'on-the-job training' to local workers. DW provided external inputs (tools, materials), training of NGO partners in construction knowledge, technical assistance on the construction sites and capacity-building support. DW's technical team visited the construction sites 2-4 times a week and was supported by 6 DW-trained supervisors (such as those of SDC and local organizations).

SDC financed a large part of the expenses through DW, as well as gave on-the-site technical assistance in a few instances. In 3 exceptional cases (there were 5 such cases), the local communities were the direct partners of DW and members hereof with some prior construction work experience received technical training along with the NGO and church partners. In the remaining 2 cases it was government institutions that were DW's implementation partners (the Prison Board in the construction of a health post in Aviacão and MINARS in the building of a do-it-yourself model home). DW used a model which combined 'classroom' and 'on-the-job' training as well as emphasised the use of locally available materials and technology to suit the level of skills in the local communities.

It was only the skilled workers of the three communities that were direct partners with DW, who received classroom training. Otherwise it was only NGO partners and a few government employees that received classroom training. Such training was considered one element of the stated DW objective aimed at capacity building of local partners in order to ensure local ownership and sustainability. It was also a response to the general lack in Huambo of professional local expertise to supervise and manage construction projects at the time of support. This laid the basis for a training programme, which was attended by partners prior to the commencement of construction works.

The ***DW Training Programme*** catered for 4 categories of skilled workers: supervisors, masons, carpenters and maintenance personnel. In 2000 the total cost of the programme was 29,800 USD (4,000 USD from SDC, 22,000 USD from CIDA-Canada and 3,800 USD from DW itself). Training was provided in seminars prior to a construction work by a team of DW experts (1 architect, 1 construction engineer, 1 carpenter and 1 construction technician). Training was provided to the employees of local NGOs such as OIKOS, ADRA-A, CAD and GAC that were DW partners. Participants paid a symbolic fee for attending.

Some members of local communities, who had some prior skills, were also trained and the Department of Education of the Provincial Government of Huambo was also invited to attend courses. Some SDC employees also received training in level 1 and 2 (supervision and masonry). Added to these three levels was the training of 'maintenance commissions' or 'parent commissions', as they are locally referred to today. This fourth component took place *after* construction. SDC also provided finance for the fourth component. The objective was to prepare local communities for minor repairs after construction work was finalised (in realisation that the state did not have the capacity).

[70] It is not clear what this cost covered. According to conversations with DW staff and former local workers, the local workers were only paid in kind in the form of monthly 'food for work' packages. Whether the cost covered payment to WFP for these packages or whether the cost referred to payment of NGO partner staff (trained by DW) is not clear.

The training programme did give the participants formal diplomas, but was intended to capacitate local NGOs so they could engage in construction work using local materials and technologies. A total of 14 organizations (10 partner-organizations, three communities and the Department of Education of the Provincial Government of Huambo) sent a total of 55 participants to the training courses. Another 16 persons from local communities (men and women) had received training in the making of compressed blocks (BTC - using a held hand machine from Belgium). The total number of trained workers per category, number of course days and number of organizations are depicted in Table 23:

Table 23: Training Course Outputs

Course[71]	**Participants**	**Course days**	**Organizations**
Supervisors	17	11	11
Masons	20	12	11
Carpenters	18	15	9
TOTAL	**55**	**38**	**14**

As a general rule, the local workers in DW constructions only participated in one construction project. However, DW did reuse 6 trained artisans who were viewed as exceptionally competent in other construction projects as building foremen. This freed DW's own technicians so they could supervise other construction sites. Moreover, 2 craftsmen who had received training and performed exceptionally well in the practical application of skills were training as 'mobilizadores' or 'pathfinders', and were used to prepare the opening of new building sites. Another 2 craftsmen were used to help assist inexperienced communities which were facing difficulties with construction works.

APOLO programme: CAD, OKUTIUKA and ADRA-A. Local workforces were used in all the constructions in the 1st and 2nd phases of the APOLO programme. NGO partners were left with full responsibility for mobilising and remunerating local workers drawn from the community close to the construction site in the case of ADRA-A and OKUTIUKA. In the case of CAD, workers were only drawn from groups of IDPs. This could both be IDPs who had settled in the areas of construction (unskilled) and from other areas (skilled workers). The latter were drawn from a provincial list of IDPs held by MINARS and their recruitment announced by radio or through traditional leaders. The construction workers were all males. Some females also provided voluntary work such as collecting water, cooking for workers and doing cleaning work.

SDC provided funds for salaries to workers. The NGO partners in addition made proposals to WFP for the 'food for work programme' as part of remunerating workers. The procedure was that the NGOs presented a project to WFP in collaboration with SDC. WFP then assessed the project and inspected the construction site to confirm and register the number of workers mobilised by the NGOs. The NGOs then received the food packages from WFP and distributed it amongst workers at the end of each month. In the case of CAD, SDC and WFP helped with transport of the food to the construction site, but the food was kept in a storage building of CAD. In CAD APOLO constructions unskilled workers received approximately 30 USD per month and a WFP food package per month (sack of maize, oil, salt and beans). Skilled workers received approximately 230 USD per month and a food package. No exact figures were available on the payment of workers by OKUTIUKA.

[71] The figure is drawn from DW's final report on the Emergency School Programme from 2001.

In the case of the ADRA-A the salary figures were: 3.00 USD per day for chiefs of construction, 2.00 USD per day for foremen and 1.50 USD per day for assistants. For schools the expenses of workers amounted to an average of 835 USD per month and a total of 5,840 USD for the entire construction. For health posts the expenses were slightly lower amounting to approximately 700 USD per month and a total of 4,668 USD. According to ADRA-A staff members the salaries to local workers corresponded approximately to 50% of ordinary salaries within construction work. The aim was to establish a sense of community-sharing so they were partly paid and partly provided voluntary work.

There was no classroom training of the local workers. APOLO programme only provided "learning-by-doing" and "on-the-job-training" for local community workers through sharing and exchange, with SDC staff as technical experts providing inputs during on-the-site visits on a weekly basis. One exception to this technical input by APOLO was the OKUTIKUA health post construction in Hungulo. Here the security situation did not permit SDC staff visits.

CAD has done no follow-up on the working groups (i.e. where they are today and longer-term benefits). This was never an objective, according to a former CAD staff member. However CAD members did after the APOLO programme provide frequent follow-ups through visits to the constructions (health posts) when possible It also has contact persons attached to the APOLO health posts in the villages today. The same applied to ADRA-A and OKUTIUKA.

3.5.5 Relevance and Appropriateness

The employment of local community workers (skilled/unskilled) in constructions was highly relevant in the first two periods of SDC support (1996-1998 and 1999-2003) in which SDC direct interventions were predominantly concerned with infrastructural constructions. It was relevant for six reasons:

- Lack of available organized labour,
- Income and/or supplement to alimentation to vulnerable people,
- Existence of skilled workers that needed to reactivate skills,
- Cost-effectiveness,
- Community integration,
- Local ownership and training.

First, there was ***a general lack of availability of organised skilled labour*** and construction firms in general, due to the many years of war and displacement in Huambo province. This applied not only to the war period, but also to the initial phase of support where a re-organization of construction workers had still not taken place. A similar situation applied to the early post-war phase (2002-2003), in which the APOLO programme was engaged in health post constructions, mainly in returnee areas.

SDC was able through partners to mobilise local community members (including IDPs residing in IDP camps) who had some prior experience with and skills in construction work, but who were not organised nor employed in readily identifiable construction firms. These workers could easily be mobilised due to a general lack of work opportunities. Because SDC-supported constructions were predominantly done using local materials and technology,[72] it was also possible to draw on a pool of unskilled workers, who could relatively easily been drawn into doing simple construction work.

[72] Such as adobe bricks and timber roofing systems with locally available eucalyptus poles, as well as the use of locally available stones.

Second, the use of local workers was highly relevant as a general element of ***humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people,*** whose livelihood situation was directly and indirectly affected by the war. During the periods of support there were few, if any, opportunities for permanent employment in construction work. Participation in constructions gave, albeit in the short term, a supplementary income to the family economy in the form of alimentation and in some cases also cash. Due to the 'on-the-job-training' that participation in constructions involved, the use of local workers could also be seen as relevant for rehabilitating and improving the skills of already experienced workers and/or unskilled workers, which they could draw on for subsequent income-generating activities or even job employment (such as in masonry and carpentry).

Third, the use of local community workers was a ***cost-effective*** way of doing constructions during the emergency phase. This was particularly the case in the war period, where the WFP Food for Work Programme was the main, and in some cases only, model of remuneration. When salaries were paid in cash (such as the bridge constructions and the APOLO programme), it followed a model where salaries were lower than ordinary salaries for construction workers. This was based on the idea that when workers were mobilised from the community (village, *bairro* or IDP resettlement area) where constructions were made, they would have an interest in partly contributing with voluntary work in order to improve the infrastructural situation of their community.

The use of low-cost labour could also have potentially ***negative effects on the ability to ensure time-effectiveness***. According to interviews with former SDC staff and partners, the use of local labour was time-consuming due to the need for constant supervision, on-the-job training and organization. Particularly during an emergency situation, where there was an urgent need to rapidly ensure the improvement of infrastructure, this could cause problems. In particular DW was criticised by former SDC staff for prioritising the use alone of free community labour. This followed a development-oriented model, based on the idea that it would support community ownership and integration, but it did not adequately suit an emergency situation where there was a need for quick results. On the other hand, the ability to pay workers alone in kind followed an emergency situation logic.

According to DW staff, workers were satisfied with food for work during the emergency phase (until around 2003) due to hunger, lack of possibilities for cultivation as well as the lack of alimentation available on the market. In this sense remuneration in kind was appropriate, because people could not buy food on the market. However, assessments of the projects where workers also received some remuneration in cash (for example the bridge constructions and the 1st and 2nd phases of the APOLO programme) suggest that a combination of remuneration in kind (food for work) and in cash was more appropriate for the future capacity of workers (and their families) to secure a livelihood. Salaries enabled workers (and their families) to make future investments in improvement of their livelihood situation, such as investment in means of transport, domestic animals, agricultural tools and so forth.[73]

The choice of SDC partners like ADRA-A to pay salaries that were approximately 50% lower than ordinary salaries for skilled workers was appropriate seen from the perspective of a philosophy that holds that voluntary work creates a sense of ownership. However, it is also appropriate to measure such a presumption against the effects that ***underpayment of skilled workers in an 'emergency phase'*** can have on the labour market in a 'development phase'. It can potentially have the negative effect of creating a culture where local, poorer community members are seen as less worthy of appropriate salaries. The same can be said of the model of exclusive payment in kind. In the documents of SDC and SDC partners there are no reflections of these potentially negative effects of the models of remuneration used.

[73] From 2004 DW itself moved to a new model of remuneration in cash of local skilled workers. The argument was that this was now more appropriate than food for work due to the fact that 2004 marked a transition to the development phase.

Fourth, SDC partners like DW and CAD also highlighted the relevance of organising local IDP workers during the emergency phase and the early post-war period as an element of ***creating a sense of community within new IDP settlements*** and/or of ***integrating IDPs within established communities***. In the case of the DW Emergency School Programme there was an explicit emphasis on organising work-teams in urban *bairros* that consisted of both IDPs and permanent residents. This can be seen as a highly appropriate method of ensuring that IDPs are accepted by and establish ties with permanent residents. The actual effects of these efforts were however not possible to assess by the evaluation team.[74]

CAD only organised workers from the group of IDPs, even within permanent settlements. The relevance of mobilising IDPs, which can be considered a highly vulnerable group, was high, but it also created conflicts in some areas. According to the former leader of CAD, the permanent residents were often dissatisfied because they were not invited to participate in construction work and thereby earn an income and/or receive food. CAD held meetings with permanent residents to explain why this was the case, and that the project was intended to benefit the displaced.

In one site, problems emerged because permanent residents believed that the project was a government project and thereby felt that they were excluded at the expense of displaced people living in their area. In the end CAD managed to convince people about the objective of assisting IDPs. According to the CAD representative, the lack of participation of permanent residents did not mean that these did not feel responsibility for the health posts. The *soba* helped to ensure this and explain people the situation. One could, however, question whether CAD's own objective of bringing together displaced and permanent residents was not compromised by merely recruiting IDP workers.

Fifth, SDC financial support to the ***DW Emergency School Training Programme*** on different types of construction skills was highly relevant in a context where there was a general lack of workers who had up-dated skills and few local organizations which had supervisory skills and knowledge of constructions. The programme nonetheless benefited only a few local community members directly. It would have been more appropriate to invite a higher number of local community members into the training programme as an element of securing sustainability of local-based skills for future use. But in an emergency situation that required a quick-response participation in training, courses could have delayed the construction period. According to former SDC staff, the effectiveness of the training programmes was also questionable. The point was made that NGO/Church members learned more during the constructions (i.e. 'on-the-job training') than by attending classes.

Sixth, the use of workers from villages/*bairros* close to or surrounding the construction sites was in theory relevant as a means of creating ***local ownership of infrastructure***. Local ownership can in theory have the potential of ensuring that community members have an interest in preserving and maintaining infrastructural constructions. The participation of community members in constructions also ensures that they have some knowledge of how to do minor repairs in the future. These are presumptions that SDC implicitly took for granted as a consequence of using local workers. No efforts were made by SDC to make follow-ups on whether local ownership and the organizational capacity of community members to do repairs were in the short-, medium- and long term effective. To have done so would have been highly appropriate, in particular in a context where SDC was aware of state institutions' limited capacity to maintain construction works.

[74] The team was not able to identify any former workers from this group of IDPs. The message was that these had returned to their areas of origin after the end of the war or that they had moved to entirely new places to obtain jobs.

3.5.6 Impacts

There exists no impact assessment of the employment of local workers (short-term and long-term) in any of the SDC documents or in any documents by local NGO partners. DW is an exception, but even in this case there is no systematic assessments done. DW documents briefly mention the number of craftsmen trained and make statements on the impact that community participation has had on community integration and supplementary incomes for workers. However, this is not substantiated. The lack of any actual lists of number of workers used in total in SDC documents is also revealing that little was done to measure and/or assess the impact for local community workers in the short and particularly in the long term.

It is clear, as also pointed out by former DW staff, that an assessment of the longer-term impact for workers (their families and the community at large) is difficult in a situation of emergency as well as in a transition from war to peace. Construction work in IDP settlements, where many of the former workers had moved back to their home villages, makes such assessments a daunting task. Furthermore, many young males, who had participated in construction work, have moved from urban *bairros* in Huambo to search for jobs in Luanda or elsewhere after the war.

However, even taking into consideration these difficulties, it would have been a possibility to: a.) Assess the short-term impact of workers (and their families) while still in the areas of construction; b.) Assess the longer-term impact of workers drawn from permanent settlements in urban *bairros* and rural villages, and c.) Assess the extent to which local community participation had fostered a sense of ownership over constructions by measuring future participation (or lack hereof) in repairs.

Due to the lack of any such documentation, the impact of using local workers in this report is therefore alone based on interviews that the evaluation team did during September 2007 with those former workers that it was able to identify in five construction sites: the bridge of Ekunha/Caála, the bridge of Sachitemo, the school in Cantão Pahula, the health post in Calueio, the school in Kalundeio. Assessment was also based on conversations with former SDC partners and staff.

Short-term Impact: Workers and Community

The short-term impact of participation in constructions for local workers can be regarded predominantly as supplement to livelihood and survival of families in periods of high levels of vulnerability. This was the case within villages and IDP resettlement areas in particular. However, the livelihood supplement was in itself short-term, confined predominantly to the immediate duration of the construction period. Participation in construction works, including 'on-the-job' training, did not immediately open up for permanent jobs and/or other temporary employments in construction projects. This had more to do with the situation at the time of SDC support, where permanent employment in itself was a major lack. DW was the only SDC partner that used the model of reusing some skilled workers at other construction sites within the short-term timeframe.

In general those who continued to use the skills after the constructions were those who already had and used their skills prior to participation in construction works, namely skilled workers. Some former skilled workers also highlighted that they had been able to improve their skills through on-the-job training, which improved their ability to continue work afterwards. Due to the lack of permanent job opportunities and/or displacements due to the war, such use of skills was confined predominantly to *biscatos* (temporary working tasks for other people, such as constructing houses). Unskilled workers as a rule did not use any skills acquired after the end of constructions. A few exceptions included unskilled workers who had participated in bridge construction in their home areas and who 1-2 years later were IDPs in resettlement areas where they were able to participate in SDC-supported constructions (see the case of Sassoma and Ndandulo below).

Some skilled workers who received a substantial salary (with the exception of the DW Emergency School Programme) were also able to make investments aimed at improvement of their livelihood situation (for example domestic animals, means of transport and tools). This was not possible for unskilled workers. The small salaries, if at all any, did not allow for investments. They were used to buy soap, clothing and other smaller items. A few workers had been able to buy a small radio, and one had put aside money from other income to buy a bicycle. These general points are reflected in the case of Kakoio village below.

Kakoio, Ekunha-Caála Bridge

The village of Kakoio Alto lies on the Ekunha side of the bridge made by SDC in 1998. Most people remained in this village during the war (only temporarily fled). The workers drawn from here for the SDC bridge construction were largely elderly or middle aged men and only consisted of unskilled labourers (such as cutting stones from rocks, transporting stones to the bridge, and doing the mix of stones and cement). No women were recruited from this area. There were a total number of 36 workers. They were organised by OKUTIUKA through the local *soba*. There was space for all who were interested, so there was no selection process or anyone who were left out. They worked for about 8 months in total. They received no fixed salary, but were paid according to the number of stones transported. They also received monthly packages of food. People did not remember the amount received, but made the point that it was a small income that gave a few pennies for food/seeds and smaller things like radios. But it helped some families to survive during the period of construction. One man had also bought a bicycle. However, the income was too low to make any longer-term investments. The workers had not participated in construction work since. They received no training prior to work, nor did they express that they had learned anything usable for the future during the construction work. They expressed some envy of the workers drawn from Kalia Mamo – the other village that SDC drew workers from. Here there were plenty of skilled workers who were recruited along with unskilled workers. The skilled workers received a 'high' fixed monthly salary – some 25,000 kwanzas. One of these workers was able to buy cattle for future investments. Others bought bicycles and tools for agricultural production. The bridge had been rehabilitated since the work stopped, because it was the government alone that was responsible for the repairs. It was not their responsibility to do so.

According to DW's own evaluation, the participation of local workers in the construction of schools benefited not only children and local workers (with food and skills), but also contributed to community integration through IDPs working side by side building the school together. Many IDPs came from different communities. Joint-participation created ties between IDPs and members of permanent residents. CAD representatives made the same point. There does not seem to have been ongoing conflicts between IDPs and permanent residents in the areas visited in 2007. However, whether this can be attributed to construction works alone, is far from clear.

Longer-term Impact: Local Workers and Community

It is difficult to fully access the longer-term impact of workers' participation in construction works, as other factors and experiences during the course of time may have influenced former workers' ability to continue to carry out work within the construction sector. Our surveys suggest that the majority of skilled workers still make a living from carpentry or masonry by 2007, but that none of the skilled workers interviewed have obtained permanent, salaried jobs. Those former workers that people knew had obtained permanent jobs where of the younger generation, and permanent jobs had been secured by migration to other towns after the war had ended. Elders, who were still present in the areas of the original construction work, were not attractive to construction firms or workshops in the post-war period.

Of the unskilled workers interviewed there was only one person who by 2007 used the skills acquired. The rest lived of agriculture or informal trade. The exception to the rule was a young man from Sassoma, who in 2007 made a living from producing window frames, based on skills he had acquired during school constructions in Kasseque III (see case below.).

Sassoma and Ndandulo villages, Sambo/Satchitemo bridge

OKUTIUKA recruited skilled and unskilled workers for the bridge construction in 1998: 2 villages from the Satchitemo/Huambo side of the road and 1 village from the Sambo side of the road. We visited the former, known as Sassoma and Ndandulo. In Sassoma we spoke to 3 former workers – 1 skilled and 2 unskilled. The skilled worker still worked as a carpenter, producing wooden windows and doors for villagers as well as churches. He had his own little workshop by the house. The 2 unskilled workers had used the skills acquired during the bridge construction in Kasseque III, where they had participated in the construction of the school and health post (also with SDC support). They did this construction while still living in the Coalfa Camp. They received food for work during this period, but no salary. Their wives assisted the construction by collecting water. Later they moved to Kasseque III and stayed there until 2002. Today one of the formerly unskilled workers uses the skills acquired during SDC constructions to produce window frames of wood to sell to people in the nearby area. The other unskilled worker does not engage in construction. He lives of agriculture and charcoal production. In Ndandulo we spoke to two workers - one skilled and one unskilled. The skilled worker had experience with carpentry from the colonial period and for this reason he had been employed by SDC. By 2007 he did some smaller construction work. He claimed to have learned nothing new during the SDC bridge construction. Nonetheless, his participation in the rehabilitation of the bridge in 1998 had helped him to get employed by INEA and Obras Publicas, when they came to rehabilitate the bombed bridge in 2003. He had received a good salary of 16,000 kwanzas for two months' of work there. The second worker had not been engaged in construction since. Participation in SDC construction was a short-term supplement to livelihood alone.

Overall the cases surveyed suggest that the longer-term impact for former workers participating in constructions was conditioned by individual strategies and opportunities of the former workers. It was also conditioned by the wider context of war and peace transition, displacements and job markets. It was not conditioned by any explicit efforts on behalf of SDC to secure that former workers were organised and gained access to future job opportunities. DW made some efforts in these respects, but the number of direct beneficiaries was relatively small. The case of Alexander presented below is one example of a direct DW-facilitated longer-term impact of participation in constructions. However, it also underpins the huge problems presented by the lack of permanent employment in post-war Huambo.

The case of Alexandra, Kalundeio

Alexandra was born in 1953 in Lubango. When in Lubango, he had as a young man worked as a carpenter for a colonial company. He arrived to Huambo in 1975 and was a MPLA soldier from 1978 and until 1992. When he returned, he moved to his current home in *Bairro* Kalundeio on the outskirts of Huambo town. This *bairro* had some IDPs during the war, but they were not distinguished from permanent residents. The 1990s were difficult with no permanent jobs. Alexandra did smaller construction works for a living. In 2000, when DW came to the *bairro* to construct a school, the *bairro* was in a miserable condition with many people lacking food to feed their families. Alexandra therefore immediately volunteered himself to the school construction with DW, which through the local *soba* had informed about the need of local workers. Alexandra was satisfied with the WFP food packages, because then there was not enough food to feed his family and no work to find. He therefore did not complain about the lack of salary, despite the fact that he was a skilled worker. The only problem was that the packages from WFP did not last a whole month. The packages were based on families with 5 members, and Alexander's family consisted of 10 members. However, there was not much to do about this, because WFP decided without flexibility the size of the food packages: "In the period of emergency people had to be happy for

what they got", Alexandra says. It was not possible to ask for a salary. Alexandra participated in two training courses provided by DW: one in carpentry and another in masonry. He attended these courses for 3 months, twice a week, parallel to engaging in the construction of the school. His main job was to design and construct the wooden parts of the roof. After the Kalundeio construction Alexandra was asked by DW to assist in the construction of schools in other areas. He thereby travelled for a whole year to other areas, beginning first in Kasseque III and then moving on to three school constructions in villages outside Caála. For his participation in the last two construction works Alexandra received a salary, approximately 2,000 USD per month. This was an important help for him and his family. Since the end of DW construction works Alexandra has had no permanent job. Former DW workers had formed a "grupo de trabalhadores". The idea was to create a small firm or micro-credit group, which could do construction works based on local contracts. However, due to the fact that many of the younger members left the area for work elsewhere, this group was soon dissolved. Today Alexandra is too old to be employed by the companies in Huambo, which want young and strong workers. Some of the young people who participated in DW construction works have found jobs. Alexandra lives off small *biscatos* – building ordinary houses in the *bairro*. An adobe house gives approximately an income of 35,000 kwanzas. In 2006 Alexandra participated in the rehabilitation of the local school roof. He did this for food as well. He has one kid and some grandchildren in the school.

The long-term impact of using local labour for nurturing community ownership of construction works can be measured in relation to the extent to which a.) community members have made contributions to repairs (in kind, labour or cash) and b.) their expressed views of community responsibility for repairs. In respect to bridges, roads and health posts, neither of these two elements were common in the areas visited. People viewed the government as responsible, and former workers and/or other community members had not contributed to any repairs. Neither had they made efforts to organize themselves for the making of claims on the government to do repairs. In one area former skilled workers had participated in bridge rehabilitation, but against the payment of an ordinary salary for skilled workers.

The case of the Cruzeiro-Cuando road is illustrative of the lack of sustainability of locally organised community repair. Here the DW mobilised with SDC financial support, technicians and light machinery, local workers to dig drainage systems. There have been no repairs since, although with a few local workers it could easily be rehabilitated (see also Section 2.1).

In two areas former workers had participated in repairs of school buildings (see the case of Alexander, Kalundeio above). This reflected a better organization of community members around schools (i.e. through parents' commissions) than around roads, health posts and bridges. This partly owed to the effort of DW and other NGO partners to organise people around schools immediately after construction work had finished. The question is whether a systematic organization and follow-up by SDC of local workers in other areas could have enhanced local community involvement in repairs. The fact that quite a large number of schools had not been repaired by former local workers makes this question difficult to answer. The core point that can be drawn with certainty is that SDC did not have any direct impact on any durable organization of local workforces.

3.5.7 Sustainability

The involvement of local workers in SDC-supported infrastructure constructions has *not* been sustainable in the sense of actually systematically organised repairs of existing infrastructure or the building of new infrastructure. However, the massive use of local community workers during the emergency phase has had the effect of fostering perceptions amongst state employees that local communities should ideally participate in repairs of social infrastructure.

The problem by 2007 is that mobilisation of local workers and remuneration according to the food for work principle and underpayment is difficult in what can now be considered a development

phase. A representative from INEA suggested that after the end of the war people are no longer satisfied with food for work or minor salaries. Also the time has gone when the local *soba* can encourage people to do repair or construct public buildings and roads without payment. The point was also made that community participation in road/bridge construction was a method appropriate only to the emergency phase, when there were less public resources and when people would work for small salaries and food for a shorter period of time. “Today we have entered the phase of development …..a higher level” (INEA representative), where the public professional employees and private companies provide the rehabilitation of a higher quality.

The views expressed by the INEA representative not only contradicted the views of many development donors across the developing world, but also the view of the educational and health directors of Huambo province. The latter firmly held that local communities should make contributions to minor repairs, although the ideal was that it was the state that was responsible. However, they both expressed the view that there should ideally in the future be a shared division of labour between state and community.

Despite these disagreements, interviewees shared the point that the local community worker organizations that were established during the emergency phase were largely dissolved, after the work was finalised. Donors like SDC and DW left no instructions to state departments on how to organise community mobilisation or any funds to pay or provide food to local workers. The comments of the people from the Calueio case below in addition reflects the general view of local communities that it is now the state or the government, rather than the community, that is responsible for repairs and maintenance of infrastructure.

Calueio, Health Post (SDC with Partner ADRA-A).
In Calueio there were 10 skilled workers who participated in the construction work. They all received on-the-job training, some salary and food for work. Matteus was one of these workers. He tells us that he benefited from participation in the construction work, although he never again did any work with SDC. He had some skills prior to participation, but improved these during the construction. Today he sustains his family by travelling around to other areas and provinces where he constructs houses, earning somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 kwanzas per house. None of the former workers have been part of rehabilitating the health post. “Repair is the responsibility of the government today”, the former workers told us, adding that “we were never organised to do those repairs after the construction was done. The health post was given over to the government when we finished with ADRA-A and White Cross (SDC). We could work on the buildings, but then we need to have a salary to sustain an income”.

The views expressed above suggests that voluntary labour is not considered a given thing, and that local community workers will tend to work only if they are paid.

4 Impact and Perspectives of Beneficiaries

4.1 Introduction

In 2000 there were according to UN-OCHA figures approximately a total of 300,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Huambo province. 100,147 of the IDPs had taken refuge in Caála town, whereas approximately 200,000 had fled to Huambo town. People had fled during the late 1998 when the rural areas south and north of the towns of Caála and Huambo on the Benguela corridor came under siege. During 2002 the vast majority of these IDPs returned to their home villages, but some also chose to remain in the towns or permanently settle in the IDP resettlement areas that were established in Huambo and Caála outside the towns from early 2000.

SDC supported IDPs together with other international agencies and national NGOs in the transit camps, in the IDP resettlement areas as well as in the urban *bairros*, where some IDPs had also settled.[75] Interviews with former IDPs in 2007 reveal different experiences of direct and indirect beneficiaries of SDC humanitarian aid in the Huambo and Caála areas during the emergency phase and the early returnee period. Their stories reflect lives of constant displacement, and the difficulties faced by poor rural dwellers not only during the war, when they were forced to leave their homes, but also in the present post-war development phase.

During the war period aid was not always accessible or timed in such a way as to meet the urgent needs of displaced people. Even when aid became accessible, not everyone received sufficient food to sustain their families, or were able to register at the right time to receive food packages. People constantly had to supplement aid with whatever kinds of activities they were able to engage in at the time, such as cultivate small pieces of land, make and sell charcoal and firewood or work for food at the construction sites of SDC or other agencies. This mitigated the assumption that IDPs become highly aid-dependent, and as a result loose the ability to creatively restart a livelihood when they again return home after the war.

The vast majority of people received some sort of aid between 1998 and 2004, but they received it at different times and in different kinds and quantities. One common experience, however, is that support from Humanitarian Aid Agencies was abruptly terminated in 2004 when the 'situation' was redefined from 'emergency' to 'development'. The people who had remained, for various reasons, in the IDP resettlement areas near the towns of Caála and Huambo, were left with an important, but over time deteriorating social infrastructure, and with no assistance to improve their livelihood situation. In some returnee villages where people had received returnee packages to rehabilitate their agricultural production and livelihood in general, NGOs launched micro-credit agricultural programs, but this did not include all agriculturally productive areas.

On the whole returnees, as well as people living in resettlement areas, were by 2007 still suffering from daily struggles over the ability to sustain their families, lack of access to jobs, and low literacy rates. The return to agricultural production has been difficult, and there is seldom a surplus production that allows people to increase their livelihood level. Lack of fertilizers and draught animals is a major obstacle for increasing the agricultural production. The land has become "lazy" as the saying goes, and people lost their livestock during the war. The majority of people must therefore combine, as they did during the emergency period, agricultural production with various informal and temporary income-generating activities for survival.

Those who were able to settle permanently in peri-urban *bairros* of Huambo have been more fortunate. Children have better access to schools and a greater variety of income-generating possibilities. However, to remain in town is also a challenge, because it requires good networks and knowledge of the rules of the game in town to engage in a whole range of livelihood activities. Those who for the most part of their lives have survived on agricultural production in the rural areas, or who are too old to trade products and get a job, cannot make it in town.

Differences between rural and urban settings in terms of livelihood levels and access to basic services are emerging in the post-war period, with the former in a much worse situation than the latter. Return to rural villages has heightened land security and feelings of freedom in comparison with life in the IDP areas, but livelihood is always insecure. The most 'forgotten' areas by 2007 were however the former IDP resettlement camp areas, where many people remained, despite government and donor expectations that people would return home after the war. This group of people was left without assistance after 2004 and with limited access to land and to social and family networks to sustain a decent living.

[75] Support covered shelter, food provisions, emergency schools, health posts and water.

This chapter provides an analysis of the main beneficiary group supported by SDC: IDPs and people who were or have become permanent settlers in the peri-uban *bairros* of Huambo town. Based on **10 case studies** (of which 7 involved questionnaire surveys) conducted by the evaluation team in rural, peri-urban and urban areas, the section analyses the histories of beneficiaries since the period of SDC support and until 2007, their perspectives on the aid received, their livelihood strategies and their current socio-economic situation. These stories and the quantitative data that the surveys have resulted in, provide an assessment of the impact of SDC and other aid agencies on the past and present lives of the beneficiaries. Before presenting the main results, a note on the methodology and the cases selected is provided.

4.2 Methodology for Case Studies

4.2.1 Data Collection

The methodological approach consisted of a combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques. One aim was to analyse former SDC beneficiaries' experiences with aid during the emergency phase, including both IDPs and permanent residents in the *bairros* of Huambo that had received aid. This required first an understanding of the beneficiaries' histories of movements and resettlements; secondly a need to quantify the aid they had received; thirdly an account of beneficiaries' own perceptions of the coverage and timing of that aid; and fourthly, an analysis of the return movements and people's choices: Should they return to their home areas or remaining in IDP settlements? On top of these perspectives we assessed the current socio-economic situation that past beneficiaries encounter today, in order to identify possible relations between changes in livelihood after the war and Swiss aid during and after the war. This assessment included surveying the coverage and functioning of infrastructure, levels of schooling/literacy, and livelihood levels and strategies.

To assess these aspects, the evaluation team used four steps of data collection, which were applied in 7 case study areas. An additional 3 case studies were made applying only the first and fourth step of data collection. These steps are outlined below (see also Annex 3)

1) **Rapid appraisal:** Qualitative interviews with key informants on the past and present situation of the area; Transect of the area through observations and smaller conversations; Group interviews with males/females and a mapping of the area with key informants.
2) **Mini-survey with questionnaires:** Random selection of households; Questionnaire-based mini-survey of 5-20 households, the number depending on the size of the area in question. The questionnaires included: household data (age, occupation/livelihood, place of birth, number of children, school attendance and literacy), facilities (no. of houses/ rooms, electricity, radio, TV, mobile phones, bicycles/mopeds), access to water and latrines, land ownership, history of movement/resettlement, history of support from aid agencies (before 1998, 1999-2002, 2003-2007) (see Annex 4 with questionnaire sample).
3) **In-depth interviews with questionnaire respondents:** based on the questionnaires a number of respondents (based on gender distribution) were chosen for in-depth interviews about their life stories of movement, their views of humanitarian assistance, their present livelihood situation and aspirations for the future). The number of persons chosen for these interviews depended on the size of the area in question (6 persons when 20 questionnaires, 4 persons when 10 questionnaires and 2 persons when 5 questionnaires).
4) **Mini-study of SDC-supported infrastructure:** In those areas where SDC had provided infrastructural support, the survey of beneficiaries was combined with a mini-study of the physical status of the infrastructural buildings and of their current operation and coverage (see Chapter 2 of this report).

A total of 95 households were surveyed. 32 in-depth interviews were made with an equal distribution of women and men. In each area interviews were made with the local leaders and other key informants (*sobas* and *sobas'* council of elders, party representatives, teachers / school

directors, nurses and state officials). 1-2 group interviews with males and females were also conducted in each of the areas.

The different types of data were triangulated and have been compiled in a matrix for each of the areas surveyed (see Annex 5). The matrixes include 6 categories of information, based both on quantifiable and qualitative data: 1.) Type of site; 2.) Displacement history; 3.) Return movements (time/rhythm and humanitarian assistance before/after); 4.) Present infrastructure; 5.) Present livelihood and socio-economic situation (including schooling/literacy); and 6.) Present socio-political relations. Additional information on the history of the areas surveyed and the humanitarian assistance provided was drawn from various reports, interviews with key stakeholders in Caála and Huambo, and for some areas the monographs produced with SDC support. Moreover, part of the methodology has been to make a context analysis of Huambo over time, which provides the framework for the impact analysis (see Section 1.2 of this report).

Access to the areas surveyed and the interviewees was without major obstacles. The evaluation team did not encounter any access problems. This was probably do to contacts with the local leaders – *soba* and party secretaries – as well as informing the provincial and municipality authorities about our plans. In the areas surveyed, the vast majority of randomly selected households were willing to answer the questionnaires. In fact, non-selected households were often disappointed that they had not been selected, because they thought that the evaluation team had come to register people for future aid distributions or enrolment in projects. This problem was solved by carefully explaining the purpose of the survey.

In Kasseque III (IDP resettlement area) obstacles were initially faced, because people feared to answer questions without the presence of a local leader. This was solved by ensuring people that the evaluation team had formal permission from the local leader. A few obstacles included houses where people were not at home at the time of visit or where the present household members were sick. In these cases the neighbouring household was selected as a substitute.

4.2.2 Selection of Case Study Areas

The selection of case study areas was done on a step-by-step basis after the arrival to Huambo. Based on SDC project documents, it was relatively easy to identify IDP resettlement areas and urban *bairros,* where SDC beneficiary groups were located during the emergency phase. However, as expected, a large number of beneficiaries had returned by 2007 to their home villages or moved to other locations. Not all of these people had received assistance from SDC after the return movements in 2002-2004. The evaluation team therefore had to identify the most significant returnee areas, as well as assessing to what extent it was possible to identify former beneficiaries who had remained in the peri-urban IDP resettlement areas and urban *bairros*.

The first step consisted in making interviews with key stakeholders (MINARS and former SDC NGO partners) as well as visiting project areas where information of returnees and stayees could be obtained. It soon became apparent that the main support areas to IDPs were in Huambo and Caála municipalities. Thus initial visits were made to one IDP resettlement area near Huambo (Kasseque III) and one near Caála (Cantão Pahula/ Longove). In both areas SDC had supported health and educational infrastructure. These visits were used to trace the most general routes of movement. The information obtained formed the basis of the selection of returnee areas.

Case studies were furthermore selected amongst the IDP resettlement areas in which it turned out that a relatively large group of former SDC beneficiaries were still living by 2007 (i.e. they had never returned). The evaluation team also selected one urban settlement and one rural settlement, which were not defined as IDP settlement/returnee areas, but which had experienced periods of IDP influx during the various phases of the war. For this reason they had also benefited from Swiss aid.

Efforts were also made to identify people who had not been beneficiaries of SDC support (i.e. as control groups). This was an impossible task, as the vast majority had received aid at some point

during the different phases of the war, either directly by SDC or by one or more of the international, national or local agencies that had received funding from SDC (i.e. ICRC, WFP, SCF, DW, ADRA-A, MCF and so forth). However, in the data obtained there are clearly points which can be drawn from the differences between direct/indirect beneficiaries of SDC, as well as between returnee areas which have obtained substantial aid after return, and those that did not.

The selected case studies followed 2 different general routes of movement during the 1998/p9-2002/03 periods:

1) **Huambo route:** Tchicala Tcholohanga municipality => IDP transit camps in Huambo => IDP resettlement areas near Huambo => Tchicala Tcholohanga municipality.

2) **The Caála route:** Cuima commune in Caála municipality => IDP transit camp in Caála => IDP resettlement area near Caála => Cuima commune.

Table 24: Routes and Selected Cases Surveyed
(with/without questionnaires)

Routes	**Huambo**	**Caála**
Transit Camps	Coalfa/Sodete (factory)	Salchicharia (factory)
Resettlement Areas	**Huambo:** Kasseque III (20 questn.) Cruizeiro	**Caála:** Longove (10 questn.)
Rural Returnee areas	**Tchicala Tcholohanga:** - Sambo commune town (10 questn.) - Sassoma village (10 questn.) - Hungulo commune town **Katchiungo:** - Katchiungo town	**Caála:** Cuima Commune town (20 questn.)
Urban settlement	**Huambo:** Kammusamba *Bairro* (20 questn.)	
Rural settlement		**Caála:** Cantão Pahula (5 questn.)

As depicted in Table 24 above, the evaluation team selected the following areas for questionnaire surveys: 1.) Caála route: 1 resettlement area, 1 returnee area, and 1 permanent rural village; 2.) Huambo route: 1 resettlement area, 2 returnee areas (1 rural village and 1 commune capital), and 1 permanent urban *bairro*. Those areas selected where questionnaires were not conducted were used as a way to triangulate and check data from the other cases. The choice to select more case studies on the Huambo route was based on the fact that SDC had provided more direct support to people on this route than on the Caála route. The number of IDPs received in Huambo (approximately 200,000) was also larger than the number of IDPs received in Cáala (approximately 100,000).

The main characteristics of the 10 areas selected for surveys and assessments are provided below.

Huambo Route:

1) **Kasseque III (with survey):** an IDP resettlement area 12 km outside Huambo town. It was established in late 1999 by the GoA (provincial) and International Aid Agencies. People from primarily Katchiungo and Tchikala-Tcholohanga municipalities were moved to the area from the Coalfa transit camp in Huambo town, where they had lived since the beginning of 1999. In the emergency phase (2000-01) it had a population of 34,000. This was reduced to 6,000 after the return movement in 2002. The area received massive humanitarian aid (social

infrastructure and food) until 2002/03. SDC supported: school, health post, 6 water pumps, food assistance and planning of house constructions.

2) **Cruzeiro (without survey):** an IDP resettlement area 14 km outside Huambo town. It was not planned by the GoA, but a spontaneous settlement by displaced people from late 1998 to the beginning of 1999. During 1999-2000 it was classified as an IDP resettlement area and began to receive support from aid agencies. In 2000 it had a population of 11,326. This was reduced in 2007 to 5,726 due to the large return movements from 2002. The majority of the inhabitants came originally from Katchiungo and Tchikala-Tcholohanga municipalities. SDC supported one emergency school and 6 water pumps.
3) **Kammusamba *bairro* (with survey):** a permanent *bairro* as part of Huambo town, established by labour migrants from 1934. Grew in size in the 1960s and 1980s due to influx of migrants. Many people fled in the 1993-94 war period, when UNITA occupied Huambo town (including refugees to Zambia). In 1998-2001 the *bairro* received a large influx of IDPs from insecure villages and returnees from the 1993-94 war period. After 2002 the majority of IDPs returned to their home villages. There were by 2007 a total of 4,042 inhabitants (no earlier figures were available). During the war period the *bairro* received food aid from WFP and ICRC. The area is the *bairro* in Huambo which has received most aid from SDC (2 school rehabilitations/extensions, 1 food centre, 1 micro-project for pharmacy, 5 water pumps).
4) **Sambo (with survey):** Rural returnee area and capital of the commune of Sambo in the municipality of Tchikala-Tcholohanga. The area has a long history of forced displacements, from the colonial era and the different post-independence war periods. It was a frontier area during the 1980s and 1990s struggles between UNITA and MPLA forces. MPLA controlled the town of Sambo until 1992 (however with two periods of forced removal), and UNITA held on to many of the rural areas. 1992-2001 UNITA controlled the town. In the 1993-94 war period people fled temporarily to the bush due to MPLA air attacks. In the 1998-2002 period, the town was practically depopulated due to massive IDP movements to Huambo town and IDP camps/resettlement areas. People began to return in 2002. SDC supported people from Sambo who had been IDPs in Kasseque III, Cruzeiro and the Coalfa/Sodete camps. SDC gave no direct support to Sambo after the return movement in 2002. WFP gave returnee packages in 2003/94.
5) **Sassoma (with survey) and Ndandulo (without survey):** Small rural returnee villages in the commune of Sambo, municipality of Tchikala-Tcholohanga. The villages are situated on the Huambo side of the Rio Cunene approximately 12 km from Sambo town and 66 km from Huambo town. By 2007 Sassoma has a population of 60 households and Ndandulo of 65 households. The security situation of the villages was relatively good during the 1993-94 war period, where the villages received IDPs from war zones in the south. In the 1998-2001 war period the villages were practically depopulated due to intense struggles between MPLA and UNITA forces. The vast majority of the people fled collectively to the IDP camps and later resettlement areas in Huambo. Most ended up in Cruzeiro. SDC rehabilitated the bridge over Rio Cunene in 1998 and involved local workers from the villages in the work. SDC also supported the people of the villages while in the IDP camps in Huambo. No support from SDC was given after the return movement from 2002. People received WFP returnee packages from 2003 (collected in Sambo town). All aid ended in 2004.
6) **Hungulo (without survey):** Rural returnee area and the capital town of the commune of Samboto, Tchikala-Tcholohanga municipality. It lies approximately 100 km from Huambo town. In 2007 there was a total population of 63,000 in the commune, which had increased from 23,000 in 2002 and 45,000 in 2003 due to the massive return movements from 2002. The security situation was relatively good during the 1993-94 war period, although also influenced by UNITA presence in terms of recruitment of soldiers. Fewer people fled to Zambia. In the 1998-2001 war period the area was a UNITA-occupied zone. The vast majority of the people fled collectively to the IDP camps and later resettlement areas in Huambo. Some women and children of UNITA soldiers remained. IDPs predominantly ended up in Kasseque III. SDC supported those IDPs who had fled to Huambo (Coalfa and Kasseque III). SDC also supported the construction of a health post during the returnee movement in 2002-03, as well as gave support to the local NGO OKUTIUKA which set up a co-operative in the area. WFP gave returnee aid packages in 2003. French Red Cross (CV-F) and MSF supported the health

post and nutrition. After 2004 it has only been OKUTIUKA that has provided assistance to the area and co-operative with funding from the French and Spanish development corporations.

7) **Katchiungo (without survey):** Peri-urban returnee area and capital of the municipality of Katchiungo, 68 km from Huambo town. In 2007 it had a population of 150,720 (the whole municipality). It was a high-risk zone during the 1993-94 war period, as it comprised the war frontier between UNITA and MPLA due to its closeness to Bié province. This was also the case during the 1998-2001 period, where a large part of the population fled to the IDP camps and resettlement areas in Huambo. The majority ended up in Kasseque III. The return movement began from 2002, with approximately 80% IDPs returning (according to MINARS figures). SDC supported the IDPs from Katchiungo in Kasseque III as well as Coalfa Camp. SDC also supported rehabilitation of a school in Katchiungo in 1999 and of a leprosy clinic in 2001. SDC gave no direct support to the people after the return movement, but SDC partners did (ADRA-I, WFP, OIKOS, DW and HALO TRUST).

Cáala Route

1) **Longove (with survey):** IDP resettlement area 31 km from Huambo town and 6 km from Caála town. It was formed in 2000 based on a GoA (provincial) decision to move people from the IDP camps in Caála town. In 2000/02 there were a total of 19,000 inhabitants, which was reduced to 1,587 in 2007 due to a strong return movement from 2002. The majority of the inhabitants were originally from Cuima and Catata communes (Caála municipality). The area was supported from its establishment by international aid agencies (ICRC predominantly). SDC indirectly supported the area by building a health post and school in the permanent village of Cantão Pahula just on the other side of the road. SDC gave no support after the return movement. DW directly supported a school and water pumps in the area. There has been no aid since 2004.
2) **Cantão Pahula (with survey):** Rural village 31 km from Huambo town and 6 km from Caála town. It was formed during the colonial period as a labour pool for railway construction. In the 1980s there was a wave of migrant labourers from the municipality of Tchikala-Tcholohanga. During the 1993-94 war period the village was on the frontier of the war, resulting in massive displacements. People predominantly left for Caála town. During the 1998-2001 war period the area was a safe zone controlled by MPLA. It received many IDPs and was influenced by the establishment of the Longove IDP resettlement area on the other side of the road. This gave people a ticket to receive food aid (ICRC food packages). In 2000-01 there were approximately 4,000 inhabitants. This had reduced to 419 inhabitants in 2007 due a strong return movement from 2002. SDC supported (through ADRA-A) a health post, school and reforestation in 2001. SDC gave no support after the return movement. ADRA-A after 2002 launched an agricultural micro-credit project there, which failed. MSF supported health. After 2004 there has been no aid.
3) **Cuima (with survey):** Rural returnee area and commune capital in Caála municipality, approximately 55 km from Huambo town and 30 km from Caála town. In 1992 the commune had a total population of 73,975, which increased to 85,252 in 2003 after the first returnee movements and reduced again to 54,905 in 2007 due to poor conditions. The area has a long history of insecurity and risk due to its strategic placement on the route between Huambo and Lubango. In the 1970s and again from the mid-1980s it was a temporary war zone with displacements of people to various areas of the country and the province. In 1998-2001 it was an intensive war zone, resulting in massive displacements of people. The majority fled to Caála IDP camps and later the IDP resettlement area of Longove. Some also fled to the IDP camps of Huambo. A major return movement began in 2002. There was no aid to the returnee areas at the time of return. SDC only supported the people of Cuima while they were in the IDP camps and resettlement areas. Some international donors and national NGOs supported Cuima after the return movement. Only ADRA-A (agricultural support) remained with support after 2004.

4.3 Impact of Humanitarian Aid: The Perspective of the Beneficiaries

This section assesses the impact of humanitarian aid (from hereon HA) during the emergency and return movement phases, based on the perspectives of the IDP beneficiary groups as well as permanent residents in Huambo town. It focuses on the main types of aid given during the emergency phase: schools, health, food, water/sanitation and shelter / housing. Emphasis is placed on the timing, coverage and relevance of HA. It should be noted that it has been impossible to isolate the support given by SDC and that provided by other aid agencies. During the emergency phase the vast majority of support was based on joint efforts. Today beneficiaries could seldom separate aid from SDC and aid form other agencies.

4.3.1 Timing

The movements of IDPs from war-intensive zones of Caála, Huambo, Tchikala-Tcholohanga and Katchiungo began in the end of 1998. In all cases these movements were spontaneous. As a rule people did not immediately settle in the IDP camps that were assisted by International Agencies in Huambo and Caála towns, but made temporary settlements in areas outside Huambo for shorter or longer periods. These groups did not receive any aid, with the exception of the Mission of Cuando on the Huambo route where the priests gave food and shelter. This Mission received people from areas like Sambo, Hungulo, Katchiungo and Sassoma. After having stayed at the mission station, people were encouraged to move by the provincial government either directly to the IDP transitory Camp of Coalfa or to temporary shelters in School 103 and CFB (old ruins of the railway buildings close to a hospital). At the new sites they received some shelter and food, but no systematic assistance. In early 2000 around 30,000 IDPs in Huambo were moved to the resettlement area of Kasseque III.

On the Caála route, people from the south made a temporary settlement in the rural village area known as '25 km'. Here they received no aid. Due to the security situation they moved to the IDP transit camps in Caála town were approximately 30,000 IDPs gathered in Caála town (during December 1998, according to an April 2000 OCHA report). In June 1999 there was an attack on Caála, which caused many to flee to other provinces or to Huambo town. In December 1999 there was again an influx of IDPs to Caála, residing predominantly in the old ruin factories of Salchicharia, a sausage factory (there was a total of 12 IDP centres, but Salchicharia was the largest one). In late 2000 a large number of IDPs (approximately 19,000) were moved to the resettlement area of Longove some 6 km from Caála town.

Table 25: Examples of Movements

Caala Route: Cuima (1998) => km 25 (1998/9) => Salsicharia Camp (1999/0) => Longove (2000) => Cuima (2002/3)
Huambo Route: Sambo (1998) => Missão do Cuando (1998/9) => CFB (1999) => Coalfa camp (1999/0) =>Kasseque III (2000) => Sambo (2002/3).

International Aid agencies' response to the influx of IDPs came - during the beginning of 1999 in Huambo and in late-1999 in Caála - *after* people had moved into the IDP transit camps in and around old ruined factories. In Huambo beneficiaries recalled that food aid had arrived relatively timely after their arrival to the Coalfa Transit Camp.

In Caála the response was much slower, with IDPs having to wait up to 6 months without aid or shelter, according to interviewees. Aid to medical treatment and sanitation arrived later than food aid. The conditions in the camp were extremely bad with people dying daily of malnutrition and illnesses. Interviewees' 2007 recollections are also confirmed in the April 2000 OCHA report, which states that the shelter and sanitary conditions were extremely poor in the Salchicharia camp. It also states that the emergency response from the 13 humanitarian agencies operating in

Caála was limited due to lack of funds (OCHA 2000: 18). IDP registration lists were also inaccurate.

The late arrival and poor capacity of response of HA to IDPs on the Caála route is reflected in Table 26 where only 30% of the surveyed Cuima households and 0% of the Longove households had received aid in the early period of displacements. This can be compared with the Huambo route where up to 75% of the surveyed households had received aid during this period. Having said this there was still a large number of people on the Huambo route who first received aid towards the end of 1999 when they had become settled in the formal transit camps. After the establishment of the transit camps, joint donor efforts secured a quick response to the urgent need for food and shelter, as well as emergency schools and health provisions.
As reflected in Table 26 the high percentage of aid received in the 1999-2002 period illustrates a relatively good timing of aid to those IDP resettlement areas that were planned and established by GoA and International Aid agencies in 1999 (Huambo) and 2000 (Caála). This included aid to the permanent village of Cantão Pahula, in which vicinity the Longove IDP resettlement area was established. Beside food aid, emergency schools were constructed from late 2001, and in 2001 the schools were turned into more permanent constructions with the assistance of SDC.

Table 26: Humanitarian Aid Received during the different Phases

Site[76]	**Cantão Pahula**	**Longove**	**Kasseque III**	**Sassoma**	**Sambo**	**Cuima**	**Kammu-samba**
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban *Bairro*
Households Surveyed	5	10	20	10	10	20	20
Before 1998	**75%** 1993-4 war	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**55%** 1993-4 war
1998-1999 – fleeing period	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**30%** WFP, ICRC	**75%**	**30%** ICRC	**55%** WFP, ICRC
1999-2002 – IDP camp/rest.	**75%** ICRC	**100%** ICRC	**80%** SCF, WFP, ICRC.	**100%**	**100%**	**70%** WFP, WV	**40%** WFP
2002-2003 – return	Agriculture	Food aid	**20%**	**40%** WFP	**63%**	**55%**	**5%**
After 2003/4	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**	**0%**

According to UNOCHA (April 2000 report), the support to shelters and water access was critical in the first period of movement to the IDP resettlement camp of Kasseque III. The movement was a sudden action decided by the state administration, leaving no time to adequately prepare appropriate conditions apart from food aid. In April 2000 there were still 4,000 families living without shelter. The area was also ill equipped with one health post, four wells, two latrines, but no food centre. OCHA also criticised the registration procedures for being inadequate, making it difficult to plan and time interventions. These observations are clearly reflected in the story of Isaha below.

Isaha, returnee to Hungulo and former IDP in Kasseque III
In Coalfa Camp, Isahe and his people were living “under the open sky”. It rained and no help was available at first. People died and they did not know what to do, as more and more people arrived. The Government then told them to leave for Kasseque III. Here it was at first difficult because there was no assistance, but they were given axes so they could make charcoal, which they sold so they could buy some food. After 6 months WFP started to distribute food – beans, fertilizers, maize, oil, blankets, soap etc. They were then living in

[76] The figures do not include infrastructural improvements, as they were not highlighted by interviewees as humanitarian aid. Interviewees saw food, blankets, smaller agricultural inputs and oil packages as aid, because they were free.

tents, but after a while they managed to build small houses. Water was collected at a small river, but got sick of it. Thereafter a school was built and a water pump was installed – "we were all so happy", he said. "In 2002 we heard that things were happening in Hungulo, so we decided to go back. When we came back, OKUTIUKA was there building the health post - some got work on the OKUTIUKA construction site. After some months there was also a round house where we could get food once a week. We don't get food any longer, but it is good to have the health post. We were all poor. Today there are not enough animals and the land is "tired" – we need fertiliser in order to make good harvests. The government has begun to build a school. It is good, but a school doesn't bring us any food. We were not asked – if we were asked, fertiliser, seeds and cows would have been our priority.

Good timing of HA was more difficult in IDP resettlement areas that were not planned by the GoA and International agencies. This included for example the case of Cruzeiro in Huambo, where IDPs had settled spontaneously and where HA did not arrive until 2000. Albeit coverage was lower, timing of aid to IDPs and permanent residents in the urban *bairros* of Huambo was also good, with aid distributions beginning in the early war period.

Timing of HA to **returnee areas** from 2002 is difficult to fully assess, as people moved back both spontaneously but also encouraged by the government in IDP resettlement areas. The most critical case was Cuima (Cáala) where no HA in the form of food or infrastructure was in place by the time of return in 2002. By 2007 only one school was rehabilitated. In Sambo and Sassoma returnee packages were provided from 2003, more than a year after the first people had returned. The late response was partly caused by the security situation where international agencies had to follow UN risk classifications. In Hungulo the same security risk situation applied, but, as noted in the story of Isaha, the local NGO OKUTIUKA, with assistance from SDC/APOLO, constructed a health post. With OKUTIUKA followed WFP food packages in 2002 and French Red Cross with health assistance.

Food and non-food items (NFI) aid was in general better timed than infrastructural rehabilitation. In areas like Cuima, Sassoma and Hungulo the timing of school provision was slow and by 2007 the last two areas still do not have schools. Health posts were timed better in these areas during 2002-2003.

As depicted in Table 26, none of the areas received food and non-food items (NFI) aid after 2004. Few people received assistance through agricultural micro-credit programmes during the 2003/04 period. According to interviews with beneficiaries, the abrupt termination of support was unfortunate as people still did not have the means to restore their livelihoods.

4.3.2 Coverage

General coverage in terms of numbers of needy people supported directly was largest in the **emergency phase of 1999-2002** (reflecting overall coverage of HA as depicted in Table 26). This included support to IDPs (shelter, food, schools, health and water) in Huambo and Caála towns and surroundings (totalling according to OCHA figures approximately 300,000 IDPs). It also covered permanent residents of the *bairros* in Huambo, which experienced an influx of IDPs, but who could be regarded as vulnerable people due to years of war, earlier displacements and economic hardship.

Aid flows, however, tended to follow the movements of IDPs (Camps, resettlement areas and *bairros*). This was reflected in the cases of Cantão Pahula and Kalia Mamo, both old villages, which were situated next to the IDP resettlement areas that were established in 2000. When the latter were established, the permanent rural village dwellers also received aid (including food, health and schooling).

In the emergency phase the actual number of direct and indirect beneficiaries is impossible to estimate correctly due to waves of displacements and the chaotic situation in periods of support.

However, some figures were available: Kasseque III (34,000 people in the period of support), Cantão Pahula/Longove (23,000 in the period of support) and Cruzeiro (11,300 in the period of support). These figures suggest a substantial coverage in quantitative terms.

Coverage is also reflected in the Table 26 above, where between 75 and 100% of the surveyed households of IDPs had received aid during the 1999-2002 period. Added to this was the support to at least 11 known *bairros* of Huambo town during the emergency phase (schools, food centres and water pumps). In the *bairro* of Kammusamba aid had covered 55% of the households surveyed, which suggests that at least in terms of food aid, the support was lower than for designated IDP areas.

Coverage during the emergency phase was low or non-existent outside Caála and Huambo towns due to the security situation. The exceptions included two projects in the municipality of Katchiungo (main town) in 1999 and 2001, including rehabilitation of a school (1999) and a leprosy clinic (2001), and one IDP resettlement area in Ekunha municipality close to Ekunha town (emergency school and shelters in 2001). It should be noted that the provisions in Caála were limited to IDPs in the designated camp and resettlement areas (Cantão Pahula/Longove and Cassoco). No support was given to permanent residents (and IDPs) in the town-based *bairros*. This is surprising given the fact that support was given in the Huambo *bairros* (for example Kammusamba and Macolocolo), and Caála *bairros* received many IDPs.

In the **late emergency period** (2001) SDC's outreach gradually expanded in geographical terms to villages between 10 and 20 km from Caála town. However, the coverage was relatively low. It took the form of support through ADRA-A for health posts, schools and reforestation in two villages (Calueio and Ndongua). The support covered roughly 5,600 beneficiaries (health) and 800 pupils.

It should be noted that none of those who remained in present returnee areas received any aid before the major return movements in 2002 and 2003. This was due to the security situation that did not permit aid agencies to work in UN-classified "red zones" during the war. After return some of the stayees received, along with returnees, WFP or ICRC food and tool packages. This was for example the case in Hungulo, where households of UNITA ex-combatants had received aid, when IDPs returned during 2002/3.

SDC support to infrastructure and projects in general was in the **period of return movements (2002-03)** limited to the construction of health posts (see Section 2.5) and peace and reconciliation programs (see Section 2.8). This is surprising, because people were in urgent need of support after return (including agricultural support as well as schools, but the latter was no longer a priority of SDC). Moreover even the construction of health posts covered, with one exception, only areas within the municipality of Huambo. The exception was the health post of Hungulo 100 km south of Huambo town. No returnee areas were supported by SDC in Caála municipality, where SDC had given support to many IDPs. The low coverage reflects (see Table 26) the overall reduction in aid received after return amongst the surveyed households. An exception to this overall picture was SDC support to ADRA-I (including distribution of seeds, fertilizers, tools and animals) in Longonjo municipality (see also Section 2.7).

As depicted in Table 26 none of the surveyed households received any aid **after 2004**. This reflected the general reduction in aid, as agencies redefined the situation as one from emergency to development. However, it should also be noted that survey respondents conceptualized aid as those kinds of support that were given for free (for example agricultural micro-credit programs were not included).

When surveyed households and other interviewees were asked whether they believed aid had been sufficient, the answer was mixed. In all case study areas (with and without surveys) there was a general appreciation of the food and NFI aid received during the war period, but the majority claimed that this had not been enough to sustain the livelihood of families. On the whole

people had to be actively engaged in combining food aid packages with other kinds of activities, in particular cultivation of small fields in safe zones as well as the selling of firewood and charcoal (more on this in Section 4.4.1). The need to combine aid with other kinds of activities diminished the aid dependency, but it also meant highly insecure livelihoods, as reflected in the stories of Eduardo and Mariana below.

Eduardo, permanent resident of *bairro* Kammusamba.
Eduardo's wife and children fled to an area close to Cuando in 1993, when UNITA occupied the town. It was safer there to give birth to their 4th child. They stayed in Cuando for 5 months. Cuando was occupied by UNITA, and the family did not receive humanitarian aid, despite lack of food. Life was extremely hard. Conditions got a bit better during 1995-1998, but Eduardo was still not able to get a permanent job. The family lived off small *biscatos* and cultivation of own and rented fields. During the 1998-2001 war period, the conditions again worsened, but this time they were helped by WFP food packages (1999-2001). It was not enough for the whole family to survive, so they combined food packages with cultivation in their own fields. But it was difficult due to the security situation, as the fields were situated outside the town. There were periods of hunger during this phase. Eduardo and his wife did not receive any IDPs from their family during this period, as other permanent residents did, but they took care of the orphans of the sister of the wife, who had died during the war years. This meant that the food packages were not large anough, although they helped.

Mariana, Hungulo, *Bairro* Capava I. Returnee and former IDP in Kasseque III.
Mariana left her home village of Hungulo in 1998 together with her family and other people from the village. They had left at 5 o'clock in the morning, when MPLA military forces arrived. Many people had already died during government attacks. Mariana's family did not want to be killed too, so they decided to flee and hide. Some men died when fleeing and some were taken by UNITA forces. First they hid at a mission station in Cuando, but when it was no longer safe they went to the Coalfa transit camp in Huambo. Here the conditions were very difficult. People had to live in small shelters with up to seven people. People had to sleep with the sick people. Sanitation was a major problem. Illnesses such as dysentery and malaria were rampant and the nutritional stage of children was bad. After some months the Red Cross and WFP came to help them with food. In 2000 Mariana and her family were sent by the government to Kasseque III. Mariana's husband participated in the construction of houses and for this he received food for the whole family. In Kasseque III they were helped with food from WFP and cultivated a piece of land. This was necessary in order to sustain the family, because the food packages from WFP were not enough for all the children in the household. Mariana sold charcoal at the market in Huambo. But this was difficult because she was not used to selling things. In Kasseque III the children were able to go to school, which they had not been able to back home where the school had been destroyed by the war.

Timing of aid was, as already noted earlier, subject to dissatisfaction. It was part of people's arguments for why aid had not been sufficient and satisfactory. As depicted in Table 27 this was particularly the case amongst the complaints of the households surveyed in Sassoma (Huambo camps) and in Longove (Caála Camps).

The highest level of dissatisfaction was amongst those IDPs, who had remained in the IDP resettlement areas of Longove and Kasseque III after the war and whose current livelihood situations were fragile. Dissatisfaction reflected the fact that these people had been left suddenly without any aid from 2003 and onwards. It also had to do with the low possibilities for alternative means of livelihood in IDP areas where access to land was scarce.

It is revealing that in Kammusamba the satisfaction with aid was higher than amongst those who had resided in IDP camps. In Kammusamba the periods of food/NFI aid were brief, and less people received aid. Perhaps their satisfaction with aid provisions owes to the fact that livelihood possibilities were slightly better here than in the IDP Camps. It may also be the case that perceptions of past aid is coloured by the present post-war situation. As will be discussed in Section 4.5,

those who resided in Kammusamba were in a much better livelihood situation than those residing in the other case study areas.

Table 27: Satisfaction with Humanitarian Food and NFI Aid

Site[77]	Cantão Pahula	Longove	Kasseque III	Sassoma	Sambo	Cuima	Kammu-samba
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban *Bairro*
Households Surveyed	5	10	20	10	10	20	20
Satisfied	50%	20%	5%	50%	62%	38%	93%
Not satisfied	50%	80%	95%	50%	38%	67%	7%
Not sufficient	50%	80%	95%	50%	38%	67%	7%
Arrived late		20%		30%			

As reflected in the story of Isaha from Hungulo in Section 4.3.1, the former IDPs in general regarded the first WFP returnee food and NFI packages as sufficient to sustain livelihood in the immediate period **after the return movement in 2002/3**. However, complaints were raised about the abrupt termination of aid after 2004 and the lack of means to return to a level of living consistent with the period before displacement (such as recuperating draught animals) and/or to go beyond subsistence agriculture. This dissatisfaction reflects limited support to agricultural production after the war.

4.3.3 Relevance

Former IDP in Caála Camp: *"If we got the right help during the war? Well any kind of help was good because we had nothing. No food, no houses …. and the children could not go to school and many people were sick. Many also died because they were hungry or sick … especially before the help came."*

The relevance of the HA given during the **war period (1999-2001)** was high. It helped thousands of IDPs to survive, as also noted by many former IDPs in Huambo and Caála. SDC support in collaboration with a large group of other agencies to shelters (plastic covers and wooden pillars), kitchens, food, emergency schools and health posts ensured that at least minimum conditions were catered for, as well as for school children and elders in permanent *bairros* of Huambo. The critical question was concerned with the timing of aid and the extent to which aid was sufficient to sustain livelihood, as discussed above.

The choice of SDC (with partners) to support not only formal IDP camps and resettlement areas, but also urban *bairros* in Huambo town was highly relevant (including schools and food centres/kitchens for children and elders). Although a large number of people in the *bairros* did not belong to the category of IDPs, they were suffering in terms of low access to food, as well as deteriorating infrastructure, such as schools. These people could not cultivate their fields outside Huambo town due to the security situation, and the land plots in safe areas were overused and small. Income from informal trading and permanent jobs was also reduced in this period (see story of Eduardo in Section 4.3.3). Food packages from WFP and ICRC were therefore highly relevant. However, not everyone received such packages during the war period, for reasons that are unknown to the evaluation team. There were no reliable data on the methods of selection and registration of people for food aid.

[77] The figures *only* cover those people who actually received aid. For example in Cantão Pahula there were 4 out of 5 households that received aid.

The use of local workers (IDPs and *bairro* residents) in construction work was a highly relevant method to reduce the potentially negative effects of aid-dependency and perceptions of aid as entirely free. It gave people a sense of being able to contribute to their own livelihood situation (see also assessment of workers in Section 3.5) as well as improving skills in a period were there were no access to ordinary employment.

During the war period of 1999-2001 more efforts could have been done to mitigate the environmental effects caused by the need for firewood and search for alternative means of cooking. Help to IDPs in terms of access to land for cultivation in light of lack of sufficient food aid (see more below) would also have been highly relevant. Lack of sufficient land access to IDPs for agricultural production was criticised by the April 2000 OCHA report. This regarded both Kasseque III and Caála. For example, the report states that in Kasseque III the local administration only made available 22 hectares of land for agricultural purposes, which did not live up to the needs of IDPs. It also recommended that seeds, tools and fertilisers were given to IDPs in Caála (OCHA 2000: 18).

In the **return movement period (2002-2003)** the choice of SDC support to the construction of health posts in rural villages (returnee and IDP settlements) was according to beneficiaries highly relevant and a priority (more than access to schools). One person in Chilembo for example said: "How can we go to school if people are sick? And how can we cultivate our fields, if there is no help to the sick people?" Having said this many interviewees highlighted that there had been little assistance, beyond the WFP food and tools packages, to returnees to restart agricultural production and marketing of products back in the villages (such as lack of draught animals in Sambo and Cuima, which people had lost during the war). SDC supported only such programs in Longonjo (ADRA-I), as mentioned earlier, as well as indirectly in Hungulo (OKUTIUKA co-op).

There could have been a better transition from emergency to development aid. This was not least the case in IDP resettlement areas, which were overlooked and forgotten after the return movements in 2002. Although the provincial government encouraged and aid agencies seem to have expected everybody to return, this was not always the case. Many people remained in IDP areas like Cruzeiro, Kasseque III and Longove. Although left with school, health post and water pumps, these areas were by 2007 dominated by low access to land, poor literacy levels and high levels of poverty. Infrastructure was also suffering from lack of repair (see also Section 4.5). It would have been relevant to continue support in these areas, taking into consideration that those who stayed were often those who lacked means and social and family networks to return to their home villages (according to interviews). This is not to say that aid agencies should have continued to provide to these areas, but that projects related to creating job opportunities and agricultural production would have been highly relevant as a transitional modality of assistance.

As noted earlier, none of the surveyed beneficiaries had received SDC support after 2003/04, so relevance cannot be assessed here.

4.4 Past Livelihood Strategies and Network Resources

This section analyses the different types of livelihood strategies used by IDPs and urban dwellers during the emergency phase, including the choices and possibilities for return after the end of the war. The aim is to provide a more in-depth understanding of the impact of aid flows during the emergency phase and the early post-war period.

One main conclusion is that while food was provided, it was not sufficient to cover needs. IDPs and urban dwellers had therefore to employ a range of livelihood strategies. Although a large group of IDPs followed the model of movement and reception of aid in IDP transit and resettlement camps, there were numerous IDPs who drew on family networks in town and diverse livelihood strategies to access aid and engaged in other kinds of income-generating activities to survive.

4.4.1 Livelihood Strategies beyond Aid: Emergency Phase

As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the food and NFI packages provided to the majority of IDPs during the war period had not been sufficient to sustain the livelihood of each household. This regarded both IDPs in the formal resettlement areas, as well as those living in urban *bairros* who received the packages. According to interviews and surveys, food packages would run out before the end of the month when new packages were distributed. As a result people had to develop strategies to combine aid packages with other kinds of, mainly, informal economic activities in order to survive. Livelihood strategies beyond aid mitigated full aid dependency, but also underpinned high livelihood insecurity, as well as differences between those households that were capable of engaging in extra-aid livelihood activities, and those that were not.

The most common extra-aid livelihood activities for **IDPs in resettlement camps** were selling firewood, producing charcoal for sale, renting or borrowing land to cultivate for subsistence consumption and informal trading of fabricated products at the local market or in the street. Access to formal jobs was not an option in general. Some IDPs also secured extra food aid by participating in infrastructural constructions (for example SDC). Particularly skilled workers were able to secure such extra support. Access to arable land was a major problem for IDPs in resettlement areas, who had made a main livelihood from agricultural production in their home areas. The territorial space surrounding IDP areas was small, and the security situation did not permit people to cultivate further away from the resettlement areas. Also the soil close to the IDP areas was poor due to overuse and/or lack of preparation. This set limits to IDPs' capacity to supplement HA with agricultural production.

There were no systematic differences in livelihood strategies and - levels between the IDPs who came from the 5 different rural areas Sambo, Sassoma, Hungulo, Cuima and Katchiungo. Differences existed instead at the individual and household level. Those who only came with agricultural skills were in a worse situation than those who had a.) earlier experience with informal trading and b.) some prior skills in construction work or other kinds of handicraft. According to informants there were also generational differences. Elderly people who had lost family members during the war or whose families were too poor to support their elders were the worst off, because they did not have the strength to engage in extra-aid activities.

As suggested by Celine and Clementino below, there were also IDPs who were able to draw on family networks in town *bairros* to secure a better livelihood. IDPs who lived in urban *bairros* usually had better networks than those IDPs that settled in IDP resettlement camps. Family networks gave access to arable land, albeit small spaces, as well as access to temporary work ('biscatos') and shelter/housing in the urban *bairros*. The significance of family networks cannot be underestimated. As a general rule those IDPs that settled in urban *bairros* were slightly better-off than those who settled in IDP resettlement camps, and this owed predominantly to access to family networks.

Celine, resident of *bairro* Kammusamba

In the 1993-94 war period they received food aid from WFP, but to sustain the family it was necessary to cultivate a small piece of land near the *bairro*. The food aid was a great help, because cultivation did not yield much. The land close to the *bairro* is very poor and it was unsafe to cultivate further away at that time. During the 1998-2001 war period many of Celine's extended family members were IDPs in Kasseque III and in the *bairro* Kammusamba. Celine and other permanent family members helped these IDPs with housing in the *bairro*. They received food aid in Kasseque III, where they had obtained cards from WFP. Every month they collected the food there. Celine did not receive any food aid in this period. It was only for IDPs. And even the IDPs did not have enough for their families. They also had to find ways to cultivate fields or sell some things like firewood or charcoal.

Clementino, Hungulo. Returnee and former IDP in Huambo.
When IDP in Huambo, Clementino had gone with his wife and kids to a family member living in São Pedro (a *bairro* of Huambo). The family member helped Clementino find a job doing 'biscatos' – there was not work every day, but it was better than doing nothing. There was no land to cultivate in the city, so he had to 'work' for money, but the money was 'small' and they suffered. The wife got a job at a bakery selling bread. She had not tried that before and it was difficult. She had to walk from place to place with the bread and the money was 'small'. The family member arranged so all the children could go to local schools. They sometimes got food there – for them it was better because there was help at the school. When they came back in 2002 everything was destroyed and they struggled until OKUTIUKA came and began building the health post. With OKUTIUKA came WFP, so there was work-for-food. Because WFP distributed food to all the households, the whole village came back. Now they can cultivate enough to survive and can even sell to traders at the market.

Another common livelihood strategy of **IDPs in urban *bairros*** as well as villagers close to IDP resettlement areas (such as Cantão Pahula and Kalia Mamo) was to creatively achieve registration for food aid in IDP resettlement camps (for example with ICRC or WFP). As noted in the story by Celine above, there were IDPs who went to Kasseque III to register for food aid while actually living under better housing conditions with family members in the *bairro* of Kammusamba. Some permanent urban *bairro* residents had also been able to do the same, but this was more difficult and risky.

IDPs were in general prioritized over **permanent urban residents** with food aid by international agencies, as also reflected in the story by Celine above. They were by and large left to their own devices, with the exception of food for elders and children as well as school constructions where food aid packages were paid out to the participating community workers. The combination of diverse extra-aid livelihood strategies was the order of the day for the urban permanent residents. The pieces of arable land that they had used during the peace period were not accessible due to the security situation, so small plots close to town with poor soil was the only option, along with informal trade and biscatos. Moreover those residents who used to have permanent jobs, such as in the public sector or in private companies, were in a difficult situation, because such jobs were hardly ever available during the war. Post-war livelihood conditions of urban *bairro* residents, however, suggest that they were more capable than IDPs in recuperating a decent livelihood after 2002.

In conclusion, conditions were in general very difficult for all persons interviewed, and there was a huge need for food aid in order to survive. However, due to the fact that people had to actively work to survive meant that dependency on humanitarian assistance cannot be generalised. While aid was provided, it was not sufficient to sustain family households.

4.4.2 To Return or not to Return: Choices of Returnees and Stayees

The vast majority of IDPs who had resided for up to 4 years in IDP resettlement camps and/or urban *bairros* in Huambo and Caála returned to their home villages in 2002 and 2003. Some people returned only in 2004 and 2005. However, contrary to the expectations of the GoA and international agencies, there were also a relatively large number of people who became permanent settlers in the Caála and Huambo IDP resettlement areas, and who were still there by 2007.

For example in Kasseque III 18% of the inhabitants remained. In Longove the figure was 8,4%, and in Cruzeiro 51% of the IDPs remained. These stayees challenge the general perception or model of humanitarian aid agencies, according to which IDPs are expected to return home after the end of a war period. This perception informed the redirection of aid flows considerably, i.e. from IDP resettlement camps to returnee areas.

Of those IDPs who had come to the urban *bairros* of Huambo, the majority returned after 2002. However no exact figures were available. The survey conducted by the evaluation team in Kammusamba *bairro* suggests that approximately 10% of the IDPs, who came in 1999, remained in the *bairro* until 2007.

The evaluation team conducted an assessment of the reasons for return movements and the reasons for staying in IDP resettlement areas as well as urban *bairros* - including the choices, strategies and possibilities informing returnees and stayees. This assessment can give an idea of the impact of aid flows in the immediate post-war period and beyond.

Two general conclusions have been reached:

- The relationship between return movements and shifting aid flows could not be generalized. People in IDP resettlement camps left partly because aid stopped or was drastically reduced, but not because aid was necessarily present in returnee areas by the time of return. Return was influenced by people's desire to return to their (home)land.
- In IDP resettlement areas it was those who were worst-off in terms of skills, economic resources and in particular family networks who became stayees, whereas in urban *bairros* it was those with diverse skills and physical strength allowing them to 'make it in town' who became stayees.

Reasons for Return: IDP Resettlement Camps versus urban *Bairros*

Amongst the IDPs who resided in **IDP resettlement camps,** the preferred option was to return to the home villages from 2002 and onwards. This was both the opinion expressed by returnees, as well as stayees, who for various reasons had not been capable of returning. There were 5 main reasons given for the choice of return:

- Better access to own land in returnee areas (all interviewees in all areas, including stayees).
- The livelihood conditions at the resettlement camp were bad and worsened due to the increased shortage and/or termination of HA after 2002/03 (all interviewees in all areas, including stayees).
- The provincial government encouraged return movement (all interviewees that had been in Kasseque III and Cruzeiro as well as returnees in Cuima).
- Improved sense of freedom. By this returnees meant that they in their home villages had their own land and could construct houses and cultivate where they wanted to do so, as opposed to the IDP resettlement areas where movements, housing and access to land was restricted (returnees in Sassoma, Cuima and Sambo).
- Redirection of aid flows to returnees by way of transportation, food/tool packages and re-habilitation of infrastructure (only returnees in Hungulo as aid came up to a year after return in Cuima and in Sambo).
- Lack of firewood due to over exploitation of forests (stayees in Cantão Pahula).
- Only one interviewee (Sassoma) highlighted that in Cruzeiro there was high risk of crime, as opposed to the home village.

It should be noted that the impetus for return did not as a general rule follow directly in the footsteps of aid to returnee areas. Rather the relationship between return and aid flows had to do with diminishing aid and poor alternative livelihood possibilities in IDP resettlement areas. In the majority of cases returnee food/NFI packages came up to a year after return. Moreover returnees highlighted that the health and school infrastructures in the IDP resettlement areas were better and closer to the users than in returnee areas. Rehabilitation of health posts, and in particular schools, came much later (if at all) than for the return movements.

It was only in Hungulo where returnees highlighted that the main impetus for return had been the construction of a health post by OKUTIUKA (financed by SDC) from 2002 and onwards. As reflected in the story of Mariana below, the construction of the health post had been a sign to the people that developments were taking place back home, and that the security situation was good. With OKUTIUKA followed the WFP returnee packages (food and NFI) as well as an agricultural co-op and micro-credit program. For Cuima the situation was the opposite. Here people returned

before any rehabilitation and/or food assistance was provided. The reasons for return related to the bad conditions for agricultural production in Longove IDP resettlement camp. Furthermore the government had encouraged people to return due to easy access to land back home. A similar situation applied to the rural villages of Sassoma and Ndandulo. By 2007 the schooling conditions were still very poor and many families sent their children to school in Kasseque III and Cruzeiro.

Mariana, Hungulo, *Bairro* Capava I. Returnee and former IDP in Huambo
In 2002 Mariana decided to return to Hungulo with the family. This was thanks to OKUTIUKA, who had started up projects there to help the returnees. They were building a health post (with SDC). When they came back there was nothing. The houses were destroyed. Only some walls were left. The land plots were full of grass and the land had become "lazy". OKUTIUKA helped some people with jobs at the co-op and with some seeds. "It is today much better here than in the camps in Huambo", Mariana says. "Here we at least have our own land and don't lack food. The biggest problem is that due to lack of fertiliser we cannot produce a lot to sell. It is only people that have cattle that can have a large agricultural production. They buy these cattle in Lubango – bit by bit – because like us, they lost everything during the war".

In Sassoma, Ndandulo and Cuima the impetus for return related predominantly to access to land, even though this, as it turned out, did not translate into higher food security. All interviewees in Sassoma and Ndandulo held that there was more food security in Huambo, because the land in the village does not always yield enough for the families. In particular maize production is unstable, which means that families in periods live of sweet potatoes and manioc. The land is in need of expensive fertilizers.

On the whole, however, return was the preferred option for IDPs in resettlement camps. This differed from **IDPs who had resided in urban *bairros.*** Here the choices of staying or returning were more complex and differed between households. Those with good trading skills, skilled workers and persons with sufficient education to obtain jobs tended to choose not to return. Those who chose to return were mainly those who lacked such skills and who had knowledge of agricultural production and/or who were too old or weak to 'make it in town'.

Reasons for Staying: IDP Resettlement Areas versus urban *Bairros*
A key difference existed between the reasons for staying for IDPs in urban *bairros* and for those in IDP resettlement areas. In **IDP resettlement areas** it was those with fewer resources, family networks and strength that were able to follow the preferred option of return. To remain in IDP resettlement areas was *not* due to the persistence of aid, as this ended with the return movement. It was rather lack of opportunities to return. An additional set of reasons were given for staying in the resettlement areas:

1) Lack of resources (transport and means to rebuild a home), family networks for security and access to land, and physical strength (all stayees).
2) Fear of return to war (people preferred to wait with return after the first elections, which still by 2007 had not been held) (some stayees in Kasseque III and Cruzeiro).
3) Fear of return to villages by people who could be seen as affiliated with or with a prior history of affiliation to UNITA (i.e. fear of stigmatization) (some stayees in Kasseque III and Cruzeiro).
4) Physiological conditions of individuals traumatized by the war (some stayees in Kasseque III and Cruzeiro).

In **urban *bairros*** the number 2-4 of the reasons listed above were also highlighted by a few interviewees. However the first reason was not given. By contrast it was the people with physical strength and skills who remained in town. Access to better schools, markets and health facilities were also mentioned as reasons for staying, which correspond well with the actual conditions after return (see more in the Section 4.5). The differences between reasons for staying between urban *bairros* and IDP resettlement areas come forth in the two stories below.

Florinda, Kammusamba *bairro*. Former IDP and now permanent resident of the *bairro*.
Most of the villagers who came here in 1999 returned to the village in 2002. Many elders went back. It is difficult in the *bairro* for old people who do not have the strength to engage in various income-generating activities. To stay in town you must be young and strong. You must have the skills to be able to engage in various businesses and sell things … otherwise it is better at home in the village. For those with skills it is better in town, because there are more ways to earn an income … and the kids can go to better schools and attend higher levels of schooling.

Soba, Longove. Permanent resident in the IDP resettlement are of Longove
People moved back when the help was reduced in 2003. It was the 'better off people' who were able to return … those with money for transport and means to restart a life back in the villages. It was those with relatives who could support each other. To go back was what everyone wanted. People could better cultivate the land back home, because the land is better. But not everyone could go back. Those who have remained are those who were the worst off … especially those who had lost family members due to the war, who could assist them with return and the land.

It should be noted that a relatively large number of stayees in the *bairros* of Huambo made a livelihood after the war from cultivating their old pieces of land in their home villages, while living permanently in Huambo. Women and small children would go to the fields and stay during the week in small huts in their home village areas. During the weekends they returned to town to the husbands and children who attended school. Products were used for family consumption and for sale at the markets in Huambo. These practices challenges the strict categories of either returnee or stayee, as well as reflects creative livelihood strategies in the present, which are based on a mixture of livelihood experiences from different periods of peace and war.

4.5 Present Socio-economic Situation and Livelihood Strategies

Rural-urban socio-economic differences dominate the present post-war situation for former SDC beneficiaries. In urban *bairros* the economy is growing and job opportunities are emerging. Materially people are better-off than in the rural areas, and the level of schooling is substantially higher. Parents also have the means to contribute to improvement and repairs of schools. This is not the case in the rural areas and in some of the former resettlement areas.

Rural villagers did not regret having returned home, and food security had also improved for the majority after re-gaining access to land. However, the soil is poor and yields hardly enough to sustain the family. Lack of draught animals, seeds and fertilizers is a huge problem. Health care is relatively good in those returnee villages where SDC and others have built health posts (some later upgraded to health centres), but access to good 1st level schools is difficult and for many it is impossible to send their kids to 2nd level schools (above 4th grade), which are often far away.

Worst off are, however, those who remained in the peri-urban IDP resettlement camps of Longove/Cantão Pahula, Kasseque III and Cruzeiro. The schooling levels and health care provisions are better than in the rural villages, but access to land and income is limited. Today these areas present the 'forgotten zones', once the recipients of massive amounts of aid, but left to their own devices after the return movements in 2002/03. As noted earlier, those who remained in these areas were already those worst-off by the end of the war. The lack of assistance to improve livelihood has created a lose-lose situation for these former, or one could say, permanent IDPs. The large differences between the livelihood situation of urban *bairro* residents and those who live in former IDP aid-receiving areas are clearly reflected in the stories of Florinda and Maria below.

Florinda, Kammusamba *bairro*. Former IDP and now permanent resident of the *bairro*.
In 2002 Florinda and her husband had gathered enough money from smaller informal businesses to buy a piece of land for the construction of their own house. It has taken some years, but today Florinda's family has a nice homestead with 2 houses, a closed patio and an annex for the kitchen. They also have a generator and a TV. In 2002 her husband got a permanent job in a private company that does construction work, and his income has helped them to expand the home. They have 4 children and take care of 4 children (Florinda's sister died during the war). Florinda supplements the husband's salary with agricultural production for family consumption in a small field they own outside the *bairro*. At times she also sells vegetables at the market, which she buys in São Pedro from rural traders. The family is doing very well today. There is no food shortage and they also make enough surpluses to secure that their kids have nice clothing and the house is equipped with furniture.

Maria, Cantão Pahula. Resident in rural village and former IDP resettlement area.
"Today life is hard and it is difficult to sustain a livelihood after the end of help in 2004. We have our own piece of land for cultivation, but the land does not yield enough to sustain the family. It needs fertilizers which is too expensive. My husband participated in the ADRA-A micro credit (agricultural) programme, and we received seeds and equipment. But it did not last, because the production did not yield enough to repay the credit. Today we have less food to sustain the family than during the last period of food from Red Cross. There has been no other assistance since ADRA-A's programme, except food for the children in the school. This helps a lot, as does the health post built by SDC and ADRA-A. But school and health post do not solve the problems of livelihood. To sustain the family we must engage in small *biscatos* like working on other people's fields in the harvest season. My husband has also made charcoal in an area very far away and sold this in Caála. Life is unstable, because there are no real jobs to get. Some days we only eat one meal."

The remainder of this section looks at the present socio-economic levels in the 4 types of case study areas. It deals with present livelihood strategies and means of income, household material levels, education/literacy rates, and access to infrastructure/services and community organization around these. The aim is to assess if there are any systematic differences between the areas and the type of aid received during the course of time.

4.5.1 Livelihood: What Do People Do today?

Agricultural production was in all areas the most widespread type of livelihood. This even regarded the urban *bairro* of Kammusamba, as well as the semi-urban commune centres of Sambo and Cuima. Table 28 illustrates the percentage of people surveyed who were engaged in agriculture, with the highest percentage of 90-100% covering the rural returnee areas of Sambo, Cuima, and Sassoma, as well as the rural village of Cantão Pahula. This reflects both a longer history of agricultural production in the areas prior to displacements as well as a high percentage of land ownership.

Access to land after return was not seen as a problem in the returnee areas. However, as depicted in Table 28, access to land remained an obstacle for stayees in the IDP resettlement areas Longove and Kasseque III. This was reflected in a lower percentage of people engaged in agricultural production. Many of the people who did engage in agricultural production had to rent or borrow land elsewhere. For Kammusamba *bairro* it was not access to land and land ownership, which held agricultural production back, but instead the presence of jobs and other sorts of more stable urban incomes.

Table 28: Land Ownership and Agricultural Production

Site	Cantão Pahula	Longove	Kasseque III	Sassoma	Sambo	Cuima	Kammu-samba
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban *Bairro*
Agriculture total:	100%	70%	75%	90%	100%	95%	70%
Own land[78]	80%	40%	10%	80%	88%	85%	75%

Despite the high levels of engagement in agricultural production, the vast majority of people combined agricultural production with other kinds of economic activities. While people from all categories engaged in diversified household economies, the highest percentage was for people residing in urban settings and the peri-urban IDP resettlement areas (see Table 29).

In the **rural areas** the economies were less diversified. The reason for diversifying related to the fact that agricultural production did not yield enough to sustain the family with food and enough surplus to generate cash incomes from sales. The soil was considered poor, and people did not produce enough to buy fertilizers or seeds. However, in places like Sambo and Cuima there was also a long history of combining agricultural production with informal trading, which was carried over into the present, as illustrated below.

Table 29: Diversification of Household Economies

Site	Cantão Pahula	Longove	Kasseque III	Sassoma	Sambo	Cuima	Kammu-samba
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban *Bairro*
Households surveyed	5	10	20	10	10	20	20
Only Subsistence agriculture	60%	0%	20%	50%	75%	25%	15%
Agriculture and selling of produce			5%	10%		20%	20%
Subsist. agricult. mixed w. non-agricultural activities.	40%	70%	50%	30%	12,5%	40%	25%
Only 'Biscatos'	0%	10%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%
'Biscatos' mixed with other activities	40%	80%	45%	10%	12,5%	10%	20%
Only permanent job	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Permanent job mixed with other activities	0%	0%	10%	0%	0%	20%	45%
Only informal trade	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%
Informal Trade mixed with other activities	0%	10%	40%	0%	12.5%	25%	45%

As depicted in Table 29 there was between 60-70% of the surveyed households in rural villages and returnee areas that alone were engaged in agricultural production. Few of these and none in Cantão Pahula were, however, able to sell products, due to lack of surplus production. This explains why between 12.5 and 45% combined agricultural production with other kinds of non-

[78] Own land does not necessarily mean that people have formal papers/titles on the land. This was not the case in any of the households surveyed.

agricultural activities, such as informal trade (Sambo and Cuima), biscatos (informal temporary jobs for others) (Cantão Pahula, Sambo, Cuima and Sassoma), and permanent jobs (only Cuima).

In former **IDP resettlement areas** there were between 0-25% who alone could make a living from agricultural production. The vast majority had to combine various temporary and insecure income-generating activities referred to locally as *biscatos* - such as selling charcoal, transporting goods for others, doing laundry for others, making adobe bricks and so forth. In Kasseque III these activities were also combined with informal trade activities, such as buying and selling fabricated goods at the local market or in the street. These means of livelihood resembled those that dominated the emergency period, with the exception that people today did not receive aid packages.

Informal trading was less prevalent in Longove where marketing possibilities are lower. The same relates to access to permanent jobs. No one in Longove had obtained this, whereas 10% had in Kasseque III, which is closer to Huambo town. In Longove a major obstacle to obtaining jobs is the lack of ID cards, which are required for employment. People have either never had ID cards or lost them during the war. It costs a little over kwanzas 2,600 to obtain a birth certificate, which people cannot afford. Another obstacle is the extremely low level of literacy amongst adults, as low as 7% of the surveyed persons(see Section 4.5.3).

By far the most diversified economies existed in the **urban *bairro*** of Kammusamba, which also stood out as having much higher socio-economic levels than any of the other areas. Only 25% engaged alone in one type of activity (informal trade or subsistence agriculture). However, the higher level of living standards in this area cannot be explained alone as a result of diversification. It also related to access to permanent jobs, accounting for 45% of the households surveyed - as opposed to between 0% and 20% in other areas surveyed. This gave a more stable livelihood than in the equally highly diversified economies of Kasseque III.

The relationship between livelihood strategies in 2007 and the reception of humanitarian aid during the war and after the return period is difficult to assess due to the contextual changes that have happened independently of aid. 3 aspects can however be highlighted with some certainty:

- The general lack of assistance to recuperation of agricultural production after return to rural areas. In places like Cuima and Sambo this may explain why economic activities are diversified by 2007. Interviewees suggested that they would prefer to engage in agricultural production and marketing of products, but this was not possible due to lack of draught animals (lost during the war) and fertilizers, which cannot be bought unless there are prior cash incomes. The same views were expressed by people in Longove and Cantão Pahula.[79]
- Humanitarian aid in the form of free food/NFI packages does not seem to have created a culture of 'sit and wait and see if the aid comes'. Rather the diversified economies that already existed during the war period have continued in most areas by 2007.
- The higher living standards in the urban *bairro* of Kammusamba when compared with the rural areas cannot be explained as a result of more aid during the war period. In fact a much lower number of people received aid, when compared with the IDPs that have returned or remained in resettlement areas. Also none of the households surveyed in the *bairro* had participated in any post-war development projects. Higher living standards seem rather to be due to higher levels of education and better job and trade opportunities. It should be recalled that it was exactly those with better skills that remained in the *bairro* rather than returned.

[79] Mixed household economies are not new. They also existed in places like Cuima and Sambo before the last war period and during colonial rule as well. However, prior to displacement more people were able to make a living from agricultural production, and yields were higher.

4.5.2 Material Level of Households

Table 30 presents an overview of the material level of the households in each of the areas surveyed. The percentages indicate average size of housing relative to the average members of each household, access to water, latrines and electricity, as well as ownership of means of transport and communication.

Table 30: Material Conditions of the Households and average Size of Households

Site	Cantão Pahula	Longove	Kasseque III	Sassoma	Sambo	Cuima	Kammu-samba
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban *Bairro*
Households Surveyed	5	10	20	10	10	20	20
Household size	2,6 rooms 5,4 persons	1,9 rooms 6,0 persons	3,0 rooms 5,9 persons	2,4 rooms 6,2 persons	2,1 rooms 6,6 persons	2,9 rooms 6,3 persons	3,5 rooms 5,9 persons
Com. media	40% radio 0% TV 0% phone	50% radio 0% TV 0% phone	55% radio 5% TV 15% phone	30% radio 0% TV 0% phone	25% radio 0% TV 0% phone	40% radio 5% TV 0% phone	70% radio 50% TV 20% phone
Electricity	0%	0%[80]	5% generat[81]	0%	0%[82]	5% generat	25% generat
Own means of Transport	0% bikes 0% moped	30% bike 30% moped	20% bikes 15% moped	10% bikes 0% moped	0% bikes 0% moped	30% bikes 0% moped	20% bikes 10% moped
Latrines	40% own 40% com.[83] 20% none[84]	60% own 40% com.	70% own 20% com. 10% none	50% own 10% com. 40% none	50% own 28% com. 12% none	70% own 30% com.	80% own 20% com.
Water access	100% wells	100% wells[85]	75% pump 25% river	10% wells 90% river	27% wells 63% river	88% wells 12% river	60% river 40% well[86]
Land	80% own	40% own	10% own	80% own	88% own	85% own	75% own

The survey clearly indicates (see Table 28) that the households of the **urban *bairro*** of Kammusamba, along with higher levels of household economies, also had the highest material level, including ownership of generators and access to latrines. The majority of people had more than one house and a lower number of persons per room compared to other areas. The households were also much better equipped (furniture, cooking stoves etc.) than in the rural and IDP areas. Although the majority of houses were made of local adobe bricks, and some with cement, they were painted and/or covered with cement.

The most outstanding problem in Kammusamba *bairro* was lack of access to clean water. The water pumps that had been built by DW were primarily "institutional water points", situated within or on the premises of schools and churches. This limited the accessibility for the sourrounding populations. Particularly, church-managed water points could not be used by the *bairro* residents. People also complained about lack of access to formal electricity. Those who had access had bought their own generators, but this raised the costs considerably as fuel was expensive.

[80] One household outside the survey in the village has a generator, a TV and a mobile phone.
[81] Generate. refers to generators for energy that people had in their own houses for private consumption.
[82] Some shops had generators, as had the hospital and school.
[83] Com. means access to shared community latrines.
[84] When 'none' latrines are described, it means that people use the bush in the nearby surroundings.
[85] All 8 water pumps provided by DW were broken in 2007. When they were working, 100% of the people used the pumps, we were told.
[86] There were 4 DW water pumps in the *bairro*, but only 1 of these was accessible to the whole community.

The **rural villages, capitals of rural communes** and the **rural IDP resettlement area of Longove** had very low household material levels, as well as low levels of access to water (wells and/or rivers). None of the water pumps in Longove and Cantão Pahula were working. In Sassoma and Sambo water points had never been installed. The differences that existed between these areas were minor. Houses looked alike, made of adobe bricks and the majority with thatched rather than corrugated iron roofs. The vast majority of households had only one house. Only around half of the households had their own latrines, and no one, except for Cuima, had access to electricity.

The largest difference between these areas was the extent to which people had means of transport (bikes and mopeds). In the two neighbouring villages of Cantão Pahula and Longove, it was only in Longove that people had access to means of transport. This had to do with the fact that people in Longove were engaged in informal trade, which was not the case for Cantão Pahula. In Sassoma the presence of more bikes compared to Sambo had to do with the fact that Sassoma was a village further away from markets. Means of transport was therefore a priority and people invested in means of transport in order to access markets. The material levels of the households reflect a low income situation with little or no surplus for purchases of material items. It is, however, noteworthy that 25% to 50% of the households had radios (small ones with batteries), which testifies to rural residents prioritising access to information.

The **IDP resettlement area of Kasseque III** somewhat stands out, along with Kammusamba *bairro*, as a special case when compared to the other areas, including the Longove IDP resettlement area. In terms of house sizes, access to communication and media, latrines as well as water access, it was better-off than the rural areas. Access to latrines, water and housing can be directly related to the fact that the area received high levels of aid and was a planned IDP area during the emergency phase. Longove received for example no assistance with housing and latrines. The higher levels of material items owned in Kasseque III is difficult to explain, but one possible explanation could be that the area is situated closer to Huambo town than Longove, and income from petty trade is therefore potentially higher.

Compared to other IDP resettlement areas such as Cruzeiro, Kasseque III was better-off in terms of material level and incomes. Interviewees suggested that this was due to the fact that Cruzeiro had not been a planned camp and received aid much later than Kasseque III. The household level in Cruzeiro resembled that of Longove. Both areas looked miserable to the eyes of visitors, with no trees amongst the houses and highly deteriorating adobe brick houses. This stood out in stark contrast to Kammusamba *bairro* in particular.

4.5.3 Education and Literacy

Table 31 gives an overview of a.) the level of schooling (total% of adults and children who have or are attending the 3 different levels of schooling or more), and b.) the level of literacy (reading and writing Portuguese) amongst adults (above 18 years).

The table clearly indicates that the level of schooling in the urban *bairro* of Kammusamba far exceeded any of the other areas, and that the level of adult literacy as well as school attendance of children above 1st level (or 4th grade) was by far the lowest in the rural IDP resettlement area of Longove.

Table 31: Survey of Schooling and Literacy

(A = adults; C = children in school age)

Site	Cantão Pahula	Longove	Kasseque III	Sassoma	Sambo	Cuima	Kammu-samba
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban *Bairro*
Surveyed	Adults (11) Kids in school age (10)	Adults (25) Kids in school age (22).	Adults (36) Kids in school age (30)	Adults (22) Kids in school age (23)	Adults (11) Kids in school age (13)	Adults (34) Kids in school age (35)	Adults (46). Kids in school age (48)
1st – 4th grades	A: 45% C: 60%	A: 24% C: 100%	A: 47% C: 83%	A: 50% C: 82,5%	A: 54% C: 77%	A: 32% C: 66%	A: 30% C: 75%
5th - 6th grades	A: 9% C: 10%	A: 7% C: 0%	A: 22% C: 3%	A: 0% C: 8,7%	A: 18,2% C: 0%	A: 17% C: 17,5%	A: 20,5% C: 14,4%
7th – 8th grades	0%	0%	A: 2,7% C: 0%	0%	0%	A: 6% C: 3%	A: 9% C: 8,7%
More than 8th	0%	0%	A: 2,7% C: 0%	0%	0%	A: 3% C: 0%	A: 9% C: 0%
Literacy	A: 45% (100% male)	A = 7% (100% males).	A= 34,7% (53% males)	A: 32% (86% males)	A: 28,6% (67% males).	A: 50% (52% males)	A: 50% (52% males)

Few children had or were attending education above 4th grade in all the **rural areas and IDP resettlement areas**. One exception to this rule was the commune capital of Cuima, but even here the figure was low, despite the fact that there was a secondary school. The literacy level amongst adults was also higher in Cuima. This was explained as a result of good schooling opportunities during the colonial period (access to missionary schools).

In Sassoma 8,7% of children had attended 2nd level schooling (5-6th grade). They did so when the families had been IDPs in Kasseque III. In 2007 there were no children attending 2nd level schooling, due to the large distances to the nearest secondary school (12 km to Sambo).

In Cantão Pahula the 10% of kids that were attending 2nd level did so in Caála, approximately 6 km away. However not all families could send their kids there, because it was difficult to get admitted. Furthermore the costs were higher for the parents, because they had to contribute to the parents' commission, and household economies did not allow for kids attending school above 5th grade, because they needed older kids to help at home. These obstacles reflected the general situation in all the rural areas and IDP resettlement areas visited (including school assessments without questionnaire surveys)

A core point is that there was not necessarily congruency between close access to 2nd and 3rd level schooling and the number of children that had or were attending those levels. In Kammusamba and the commune capital Cuima the attendance of children at these levels were the highest, which did correspond with close geographical distance to secondary schools. However, both in Sambo and Kasseque III there was similar access to secondary schools, but with 0% of the surveyed in Sambo that attended and with only 3% on the 2nd, but not 3rd level in Kasseque III. The random selection of households may go some way in explaining these differences, but as suggested by interviewees it also had to do with the economic situation of households in the areas surveyed.

In Kasseque III it should also be noted that around 60% of the pupils at the school came from others areas than Kasseque III, because it had 2nd and 3rd level. Some of these pupils came from

the more well-off *bairros* of Huambo town. Access to secondary schooling was in general limited in Huambo town, and it was difficult for children of poorer families to get admitted. In Kasseque III parents were expected to pay school fees to the parents' committees as well as school materials.

The high figures of attendance of children in primary school gives ground for optimism for the future, albeit as noted above, the possibilities for continuing schooling after 4th grade and in particular after 6th grade are limited in the rural areas and the former IDP resettlement camps. It nonetheless shows that when there is a primary school children did as a rule attend. These insights also applied to those areas were the evaluation team made assessments of schools, such as the rural villages in Caála.

In terms of gender balance, our assessments of schools suggest that 40-60% of the pupils were females. The number of female adult literates was slightly higher in urban, peri-urban and IDP resettlement areas, whereas between 86% and 100% of the literate adults in rural areas were males.

In terms of school materials (books, furniture and so forth) all schools faced deficiencies. The most prevalent problem in 2007 was the lack of school books, in particular after a new curriculum had been introduced in 2006. Some schools only had enough books for the teachers, but in some subjects there were no books at all. In other schools there were few books so pupils share them in groups. Despite the common lack of school books, there were more pupils that had books in Kammusamba than in the rural and IDP resettlement areas. This was because the books, for unknown, but certainly illegal reasons, had ended up on the informal market where they could be bought for relative high sums compared with the household incomes. Better-off households were able to buy books on the informal market. In the rural and IDP areas people could not afford to buy school books on the informal market.

Lack of teachers was not raised as a problem, but lack of furniture was an issue in some areas like Cantão Pahula, where no furniture had ever been provided (see also Section 2.4).

The physical state and capacity of schools varied between the areas surveyed. In Cuima, Sassoma and Hungulo the situation was critical. In Cuima only the school in the commune capital had been rehabilitated, with 69 schools relying on outdoor classrooms. In Sassoma a failed school construction project of SCF and ASCA meant that the small school of adobe bricks was in a very poor condition and with no roof. These conditions necessarily diminish possibilities for teaching during the rainy season. In Hungulo the school construction program by the government had been delayed for two years for unknown reasons, which meant that pupils received classes within church buildings and war ruins. In the remaining areas the schools were in a relatively good state, but in need of repairs, with the exception of Sambo where the school was rehabilitated in 2006.

4.5.4 Infrastructure and Community Organization

Infrastructure and Services

Access to basic health services was generally very good in the returnee areas visited, which was directly related to the post-war rehabilitation or new construction of health posts. This regarded also the case studies without surveys, such as Hungulo and Katchiungo. Health post were as a rule always situated in commune capitals, with the exception of IDP resettlement areas where SDC or other aid agencies had constructed health posts during the emergency phase due to the massive increase in inhabitants.

In places like Cantão Pahula people still benefited from emergency period constructions (see Section 2.5). Other rural villagers had to walk relatively long distances to receive health care. In IDP resettlement areas like Kasseque III and Cruzeiro, health posts were present, but were in a very poor material state, due to the fact that they were built as emergency health posts of low-quality materials. No repairs had been done, despite the state's responsibility to do so (see Section 2.5).

As discussed elsewhere in this report, there was in general sufficient staff in the health posts, but lack of medicine presented a problem in most areas.

Table 32 gives an overview of access to **markets, means of transport and condition of roads** to the towns of Caála and Huambo.

Table 32: Access to Health, Transport and Schools and Level of Functioning

Site	Cantão Pahula	Longove	Kasseque III	Sassoma	Sambo	Cuima	Kammu-samba
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban *Bairro*
Health service							
Distance	Very close	Very close	Very close	12 km	Very close	Very close	Very close
Functioning	Very good	Very good	Poor	Ok	Very good	Very good	Ok (but pay)
Transport							
Distance to town	6 km	6 km	12 km	62 km	73 km	20 km	½ km
Distance to markets	100 m.	100 m	100 m.	12 km	100 m.	100 m.	100 m.
Means	Foot	Foot, bike or moped	Foot, bike, moped, taxi-busses	Foot, bike, trucks (pay)	Foot, bike, trucks (pay)	Foot, bike, trucks (pay)	Foot, bike, taxi-mopeds (pay).
Roads	Very Good (tarmac)	Very Good (tarmac)	Ok (dirt and tarmac)	Poor	Poor	Good	Poor within *bairro*
Schools							
Distance to primary	Very close	Very close	Very close	Very close	Very close	Very close	Very close
Functioning	Good	Ok	Good	Very poor	Very good	Poor	Very good
Distance to secondary	6 km	6 km	Very close	12 km	Very close	Very close	Very close
Functioning	Lack of space	No one attend	Good	No one attend	Good	Good	Good, but lack of space

The Cuima-Caála-Huambo road (covering also Longove and Cantão Pahula) was in a good condition, but for all the other areas roads were in a poor condition due to lack of rehabilitation.

Access to markets (smaller, informal type) was good and considered close or relatively close to all the areas surveyed. However, trading and marketing opportunities only existed in Huambo and Caála. This implied long travel distances for the rural villages of Sassoma, Sambo, Hungulo and Cuima areas. Some men made a partial living from selling charcoal in Huambo and bringing back goods for trade or personal consumption. They usually did this on bikes (up to 80 km), but also sometimes organized in groups to rent a truck. Another possibility was to pay a taxi fee to trucks travelling to Huambo or Caála. Women selling agricultural products in town would also use the trucks, but did not, as men did, organize the rent of an entire truck.

Table 32 gives an idea of the existence of schools in the areas surveyed. As depicted, all areas had primary schools close by. Those that were functioning were schools that had been rehabilitated after the war. As noted earlier, there was much lower access to secondary schools.

Organizational Capacities of Communities

The evaluation team was not able to assess the significance of the different types of associations/committees listed in Table 33 for the capacity of community members to organize around common tasks. The relatively low presence of agricultural associations, however, reflects lacking abilities to organize collectively around production and sales in the areas surveyed (this can be caused by postcolonial attempts to organise collectively which was not favoured by rural communities). Churches in general have a much more widespread presence than community organizations that are not church-related. This is clear in the case of Longove. Areas in or close to towns also tended to have more associations than rural communities, which underpins the point that family networks are more significant in rural areas than communal ones.

Table 33: Associations Working in the Areas surveyed

Site	**Cantão Pahula**	**Longove**	**Kasseque III**	**Sassoma**	**Sambo**	**Cuima**	**Kammu-samba**
Category	Rural village	IDP Resett.	IDP Resett.	Rural village (return)	Commune capital (return)	Commune capital (return)	Urban *Bairro*
School commission	X		X	X	X	X	X
Water committee			X				X
Football association			X				X
Traditional midwives					X		
Agricultural ass. or co-op						X	
Churches	1	4	4	3	4	3	2

The evaluation team assessed the functioning of water committees (where these existed) and those of school or parents commissions. In respect to the former we refer the reader to Section 2.3 in this report. As depicted in Table 33, parents' commissions of schools were widespread (also in areas surveyed without questionnaires). The only exception encountered was Longove. However, the capacity of these commissions to engage actively in improvements of school buildings and teaching differed immensely from area to area.

Active parents' commissions existed in those areas where parents were actually able to make cash contributions to repairs or extensions of schools. Repair of schools and organizational capacity therefore follow the levels of household economies. Kammusamba was the only case where parents had contributed financially and where the parents' commission was relative active. In Sassoma, some parents had once assisted with the rehabilitation of a roof. In Cantão Pahula and Longove, contributions to the school had been confined to the period of SDC/ADRA-A construction, when local workers were invited to and received payment in food and kind (see more in Sections 3.5 on workers and Section 2.4 on schools).

In all the areas surveyed the dominant form of political organization was the local *sobas* who worked in collaboration with MPLA secretaries and the municipality and/or commune state administration. A general insight is that UNITA has been 'pushed' back from taking up any leadership positions and in most areas even party representation. UNITA representation only existed in Hungulo and Sambo, where it had its own committees in *bairros* known as 'UNITA areas'. These formed a kind of parallel leadership structure to the formal government, and MPLA-dominated local leadership structures. One main difference between rural areas and IDP resettlement areas was that the local *sobas* followed rules of lineage inheritance in the former, and were elected by the community members and/or selected by the MPLA party in the latter.

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Annexes

Annex 1 Consolidated meeting report

Name	Organisation	Position	Date	Place
Peter Steffen	Southern Africa, SDC	Former Desk Officer	19/04/07	Bern (telephone interview)
Valérie Ross	Evaluation + Controlling Division, SDC	Programme Officer	13/05/07	Bern
Gerhard Siegfried	Evaluation + Controlling Division, SDC	Head	14/05/07	Bern
Giacomo Solari	Multilateral Division, SDC	Programme Officer	14/05/07	Bern
Christina Hoyes	Conflict prevention Division, SDC	Head	14/05/07	Bern
Max Stret	Bilateral Division, SDC	Programme Officer	14/05/07	Bern
Martin Jagg	Southern Africa, SDC	Desk Officer	14/05/07	Bern
Matthias Anderegg	SDC	Former Head, Luanda	14/05/07	Bern (telephone interview)
Andrei Slavutckij	Médicins Sans Frontiéres Suisse	Medical doctor	14/05/07	Bern (telephone interview)
Mark Screeton	Medair	Director	14/05/07	Bern (telephone interview)
Mayazi Luyanzi	SDC-Luanda	Administrative Assistant	21/08/07	Luanda
Arnold Furrer	SHA/SDC	Former deputy head of Delegation	21/08/07	Luanda
Cupi Baptista	Development Workshop, Huambo	Coordinator	22/08/07	Maianga, Luanda
Maria Camia Moises	Development Workshop, Luanda	Administrative Assistant	22/08/07	Maianga, Luanda
Fabrice N. Beutler	Development Workshop-Luanda	Gestor de Programas	22/08/07	Maianga, Luanda
Marie-Claude Bréchet	Solidaridad Evangelica (SOLE)	Administrative Head	22/08/07	Luanda
Jean Pierre Bréchet	Solidaridad Evangelica (SOLE)	Leading Medical Doctor	22/08/07	Luanda
Willy Piassa	Iniciativas Locais, Development Workshop	Coordinator	23/08/07	Maianga, Luanda
Luis Abino	Iniciativas Locais, Development Workshop	Assistant	23/08/07	Maianga, Luanda
Celso Catumbela	Iniciativas Locais, Development Workshop	Assistant	23/08/07	Maianga, Luanda
João Gomes da Silva	ADEBCA	Director	23/08/07	Cazenga Municipality
Gerson da Costa	Colégio Gerseman da Igreja Evangélica	Director	23/08/07	Cazenga Municipality
Antonio Panzo	Colégio Gerseman da Igreja Evangélica	Administrative Head	23/08/07	Cazenga Municipality
"João"	Health Clinic O Bom Samaritano	Head of Administration	23/04/08	Cazenga Municipality
Henrique Vieira	Health Clinic O Bom Samaritano	Nurse	23/04/08	Cazenga Municipality
Feliz Samuel	School 7057 O Bom Samaritano	Head of Administration	23/08/07	Cazenga Municipality
Herulia Campos	School 7057 O Bom Samaritano	Teacher	23/08/07	Cazenga Municipality
Ester Kamande	Medair	Former Country Director	23/08/07	Luanda
Pascoa Leandoso	ICRA	Library Assistant	24/08/07	Maianga, Luanda

Name	Organisation	Position	Date	Place
Alexandrina Avopenga	ICRA	Library Assistant	24/08/07	Maianga, Luanda
Veronica Paula	State School no. 805 (8005)	Director	24/08/07	*Bairro* dos Pescadores Cacuaco
Jeinanda José Pascaal	Igreja Metodista Unida	Pastor	24/08/07	*Bairro* dos Pescadores Cacuaco
"Maria"	Sociedade de Mulheres	Former Head of SM MU	24/08/07	*Bairro* dos Pescadores Cacuaco
A. L. Bernardo	State School no. 417 (4017)	Vice-Director	24/08/07	*Bairro* da Madeira, Sambizanga
Cupi Baptista	Development Workshop, Huambo	Coordinator	27/08/07	Huambo
João Chicoa	Provincial Hospital, Huambo	Director	27/08/07	Huambo
António Tchihenda	Local administration	Secretary of soba	27/08/07	Huambo
Inocêncio Mutombo	Universidade Agostinho Neto	Student	27/08/07	Huambo
Júlio Paulo Quintas	Development Workshop	Programme Director	27/08/07	Huambo
Miguel Cirilo	Universidade Agostinho Neto	Student	27/08/07	Huambo
Francisco António Pedro	MUBELA Development Workshop	Director and Coordinator	28/08/07	Huambo
João Emílio Baptista	UTCAH	Delegado	28/08/07	Huambo
Group Interview	Residents	Former displaced people	28/08/07	Caala
Domingo Angelo	Resettlement area	Soba	28/08/07	Longove, Cantão Pahula
Gabriel Cammusamba,	Resettlement area	Assistant soba	28/08/07	Longove, Cantão Pahula
Soba's council of elders	Resettlement area	Various authorities	28/08/07	Longove, Cantão Pahula
Municipality personnel	Municipality of Caala	Administration	28/08/07	Caala town
Dr. Justin Tchimbanci	CAAMC Provincial Government	Director	29/08/07	Huambo
William Lenoir	Handicap International Belgium Huambo	Head of Office	29/08/07	Huambo
	Red Cross International	Administrative Head	29/08/07	Huambo
Fabrice N. Beutler	Development Workshop, Luanda	Gestor de Programas	29/08/07	Huambo
Manuel da Costa	MINRAS	Director	29/08/07	Huambo
Sobas	Kasseque III	Public Authorities	29/08/07	Kasseque III Huambo
Gabriel Tchivissi,	CAD school project	Parent *Bairro* Munda	29/08/07	Munda, Huambo
Feferino Nicolau Sofalo	CAD school project	Parent *Bairro* Munda	29/08/07	Munda, Huambo
Eugenio Laucuti	CAD school project	Parent *Bairro* Munda	29/08/07	Munda, Huambo
Constantino G. Bend	SDC emergency school in refugee camp	Lupra /Kalundo resident	29/08/07	Kalundo, Huambo
Luciana Tchiacussoca	School 144	Resident Kamunda	29/08/07	*Bairro* of Macolocolo, Huambo
Isaias Chilela	School 144	Resident Kamunda	29/08/07	*Bairro* of Macolocolo, Huambo
Two sisters of Salesias	Food centre	Sisters	29/08/07	*Bairro* Macolocolo, Huambo
Father P. Sakovorgele	Peace & Justice Commission	Director	30/08/07	Huambo
Pedro Baanza	Save the Children-UK, Huambo	Administrative Head	30/08/07	Huambo
	Okutiuka	Head of Finance	30/08/07	Huambo

Name	Organisation	Position	Date	Place
João Faustino	Red Cross Angola	Delegado	30/08/07	Huambo
João Emilio Baptista	UTCAH	Delegado	30/08/07	Huambo
"Samos"	Public Works, Huambo	Technical Assistant	30/08/07	Huambo
Vanancia Ngueve	School Camussamba, Kapuzener Monk	Director of school	30/08/07	*Esirro* Camussamba. Huambo
Domingas Choveleza	School Camussamba, Kapuzener Monk	Parent	30/08/07	*Esirro* Camussamba. Huambo
Chipiano L. Sanguere	School Camussamba, Kapuzener Monk	Parent/clerk at school	30/08/07	*Esirro* Camussamba. Huambo
Júlio Paulo Quintas	Development Workshop	Programme Director	31/08/07	Huambo
Firmino Antiaga	Public Works, Province	Head of Section	31/08/07	Huambo
Adolfo Gomes	Provincial Department. Energy and Water	Director	31/08/07	Huambo
Alexandre E. D.Albind	Provincial Department. Energy and Water	Head of Section	31/08/07	Huambo
Elsa Maria Pinto	Provincial Department. Energy and Water	Coordinator	31/08/07	Huambo
Francisco Antonio Pedro	MUBELA and Development Workshop	Director and Coordinator	31/08/07	Huambo
Maryse Limoner	Comité Internationl de Cruz Vermelha	Chefe de Delegação	31/08/07	Huambo
Arnold Furrer	SDC, Huambo	Former head of delegation	31/08/07	Huambo
Berta Wimbo Gomes	ADRA Angolana	Provincial Director	31/08/07	Huambo
Leonardo Ngunga	School Cantão Pahula	Director	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Maria Domingas	School Cantão Pahula	Teacher	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Gabriel Chinoca	School Cantão Pahula	Teacher	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
João Baptista Inaia	School Cantão Pahula	Teacher	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Florauro Soupebo	School Cantão Pahula	Teacher	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
deze Batombelo	School Cantão Pahula	Teacher	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Joachim Vicente	Cantão Pahula	Soba	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Ernesto Dumbo	Cantão Pahula	Resident/ADRA coordina.	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Mariamo Jendu	Cantão Pahula	Assistant of Soba	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Antonio Segundo	Cantão Pahula (Health post)	Sekulu	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Doimel Luiva	Cantão Pahula (School)	School Guard	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Clemecomu Cosilla	Cantão Pahula (Church)	Catecista	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Asfal Gostar	Cantão Pahula	Resident	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Eugino Chigoia	Cantão Pahula	Resident	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Group Interview	Cantão Pahula	Residents	31/08/07	Cantão Pahula (aldeia)
Group Interview	Residents Sambo area	Campesinos	01/09/07	Bridge Sambo
Arnold Furrer	SHA/SDC	Former Head of Delegation	01/09/07	Huambo Province
Kimino Cuapita	Health post Chilembo	Nurse	02/09/07	Chilembo
Elena Chinga	Health post Chilembo	Nurse	02/09/07	Chilembo

Name	Organisation	Position	Date	Place
Group of local residents	Health post Chilembo	Residents	02/09/07	Chilembo
João Calembe	Cruzeiro IDP camp	Local Leader	02/09/07	Samboto
Tomas Fortes Bernado	Health Centre in Hungulo (Samboto)	Technico medio de Saude	02/09/07	Hungulo Samboto
Groups of local residents	Health Centre in Hungulo (Samboto)	Returnees	02/09/07	Hungulo Samboto
Group of workers	Co-op project	Guards	02/09/07	Co-op project Samboto
Benjamin A. Kayanga	Resident, Chilembo	Campesino	02/09/07	Chilembo
Group interview	Residents. Chilembo	Campesinos	02/09/07	Chilembo
Clementino Chamati	Hungulo, Samboto	Soba	02/09/07	Hungulo Samboto
Isahe Nahere	Hungulo, Samboto	Former Soba. Cassequel III	02/09/07	Hungulo Samboto
Group Interview	Returnees	Various authorities	02/09/07	Hungulo Samboto
André Domindo	Development Workshop, Huambo	Coordinator WATSAN	03/09/07	Huambo
António A. Koya-Kaia	Development Workshop	Literacy Teacher	03/09/07	Huambo
Sónia S. M. Ferreira	Okutiuka Huambo	Coordenadora Geral	03/09/07	Huambo
Lossambo Focus Group	Development Workshop	Literacy Beneficiaries	04/09/07	Huambo
"Carlos"	GAC	Assistant	04/09/07	Huambo
André Domindo	Development Workshop, Huambo	Coordinator WATSAN	04/09/07	Huambo
"Bernadette"	Development Workshop, Huambo	Coordinator	04/09/07	Huambo
Pastor Cajú	Etokekiso Ly'Owngi	Co-ordinator	05/09/07	Bailundo
Luis Garcia Kaika	MINARS	Head of Project	05/09/07	Bailundo
Group Interview	Escola Primaria de Olinda Rodrigues	School Teachers	05/09/07	Huambo
	Igresia Fatima	School director	05/09/07	Fátima 1. Huambo
Group Interview	Chatolic Church School	School teachers	05/09/07	Fátima 2. Huambo
Gilberto Alfredo	ADRA International	Former Program Assistant	05/09/07	Huambo
Elias Vidal Estêvão	ADRA International	Former Program Assistant	05/09/07	Huambo
Group Interview	Escola Primaria 144	Women	05/09/07	Camundo. Huambo
Yves Van Loo	Comitê Internationale de Cruz Vermelha	Chefe de Sub Delegação	05/09/07	Huambo
Rosebia Nunguio	School 144 Kamunda (SDC 2001)	Teacher	05/09/07	*Esirro* Macoloco, Kamunda
Ana Meneso	School 144 Kamunda (SDC 2001)	Teacher	05/09/07	*Esirro* Macoloco, Kamunda
Oviras Chipaca	School 144 Kamunda (SDC 2001)	Teacher	05/09/07	*Esirro* Macoloco, Kamunda
Justo Sassoma	School Deolina Rodrigues	Assistant director	05/09/07	Huambo
Group Interview	Fatima food centre	Teachers	05/09/07	*Esirro* Fatima II. Huambo
Veronica Nangumbe	School 57. Huambo town	School Secretary	05/09/07	Rua commercio. Huambo town
Maria da Grace	School 57. Huambo town	School Secretary	05/09/07	Rua commercio. Huambo town
Tony Meio	Public Works	Former SHA/SDC	06/09/07	Huambo
Feliciana Ngueve	Resident, Ndongua	Wife of soba	06/09/07	Ndongua. Huambo

Name	Organisation	Position	Date	Place
Group interview	Residents	Returnees and stayees	06/09/07	Calulo, Huambo
Group interview	Health Post	Health personnel/patients	06/09/07	Ndongua village, Caála
Theodor Kasinga	School Ndongua, Caála	School Director	06/09/07	Ndongua village, Caála
Berta Wimbo Gomes	ADRA Angolana	Provincial Director	06/09/07	Huambo
Domingos Shicale	School Ndongua, Caála	Teacher	06/09/07	Ndongua village, Caála
Edunalund Nabanga	Health post	Chief Nurse	06/09/07	Calulo village, Caála
Moises F. Ichicata	Health post	Nurse	06/09/07	Calulo village, Caála
Maria de F. Sucondo	Health post	Nurse	06/09/07	Calulo village, Caála
Group interview	Health post and School in Calueio	Women	06/09/07	Calulo village, Caála
Matteus Tenaciao	Health post and School in Calueio	Former ADRA/DW worker	06/09/07	Calulo village, Caála
	School Calulo	School director	06/09/07	Calulo village, Caála
	Public Authority	Soba	06/09/07	Calulo village, Caála
Group interview	School Calulo	Teachers	06/09/07	Calulo village, Caála
Group interview	SDC and ADRA	Former workers	06/09/07	Calulo village, Caála
Benedicto Omellas	Instituto Médio Agrário do Huambo	Director	07/09/07	Huambo
nácio Marchello	GAC	Director	07/09/07	Huambo
Ra Mundo Santa Rosa	ASCA	Director	07/09/07	Huambo
Gonçalves Segunda	CAPD I	Director	07/09/07	Huambo
Ruth Catanha	CAPD I	Assistant	07/09/07	Huambo
	Caala	Former IDPs	07/09/07	Caala
José Hipólito Joaquim	Instituto nacional de estradas de Angola	Former Road workers	07/09/07	Caala
António da Silva	Instituto nacional de estradas de Angola	Former Road workers	07/09/07	Caala
Eurico Tropa	Caliamamo	Former SDC workers	07/09/07	Caliamamo, Huambo
António Mário	Caliamamo	Former SDC workers	07/09/07	Caliamamo, Huambo
Tomas Chicenjo	Municipality of Caála	General Secretary	07/09/07	Caála town
Rodrique Martins	HIV/AIDS programme	Coordinator	07/09/07	Caála town
Group interview with	Caála-Ecunha bridge	Former bridge workers	07/09/07	Village Kakolo, Ecunha
Paulo José	LED	Executive Director	07/09/07	Huambo
Abílio Kaiki	Civil Society Forum	Leader	07/09/07	Huambo
Toni Mea	Public Works	Former SDC staff	08/09/07	Huambo
Fr. Alberto Ilidio	COIEPA	Provincial Director	08/09/07	Huambo
Faustino João	Red Cross, Huambo	Delegado	10/09/07	Huambo
Elias Finda	Health Provincial government	Director	10/09/07	Huambo
Angelina Xaca Xilingu	Education Provincial Government	Director	10/09/07	Huambo
Emanuele Lini	Oxfam, Intermón	Program Officer	11/09/07	Huambo

Name	Organisation	Position	Date	Place
Sheena C. McCann	Concern	General Director	11/09/07	Huambo
Inácio Guilherme	School teacher	Former head of APOLO	11/09/07	Huambo
Daniel Kubioka	Director of a Carpentry	Former head of RSC	11/09/07	Huambo
Alfredo Chimalanga	OIKOS	Administrator	11/09/07	Huambo
Félix Manuel	Igreja Evangélica do Sul de Angola	Priest	11/09/07	Kanchungo, Huambo
"Pascoal"	Lomungo Vilage	Soba	11/09/07	Lomungo, Kanchiungo
Julieta Tchitombi	Residents	Returnee	11/09/07	Kanchungo, Huambo
Júlia Makengula	Residents	Returnee	11/09/07	Kanchungo, Huambo
"Germano"	leprosy clinic	membership	11/09/07	Kanchungo, Huambo
Inácio Sarambue	INEA	Director	11/09/07	Huambo
Paulo Luz	INEA	Chief Engineer	11/09/07	Huambo
Francisco C. Sassoma	Serralharia Sassoma	Director	12/09/07	Huambo
Angelina Xaca Xilingu	Education Provincial Government	Director	12/09/07	Huambo
José Chioka	Ortopeadic hospital	Director	12/09/07	Bomba Alta *Bairro*, Huambo
Armando Lombo	Ortopeadic hospital	Ass. Technical director	12/09/07	Bomba Alta *Bairro*, Huambo
Alexandra Manue	Former worker	Carpenter	12/09/07	Kalundeio *Bairro*, Huambo
Afonso Rodrigues	Former worker	Chefe do grupo	12/09/07	Kalundeio *Bairro*, Huambo
Venancio Paulino	Venancio Paulino & Filhos. Lda.	Director	13/09/07	Huambo
Group interview	Residents	Various authorities	13/09/07	Tchicala Tcholoanga
António Calongo	Municipality of Katchiungo	Administrator	13/09/07	Kanchungo
Group Interview	Residents	Returnees	13/09/07	Sambo
Gabriel Kakando	Administration	Soba	13/09/07	Municipality of Sambo
Pompeu Kawenche	SDC Bridge construction Cruzeiro	Former worker	13/09/07	Village Ndandulo, Sambo
Angelo Mukenda	SDC Bridge construction Cruzeiro	Former worker	13/09/07	Village Ndandulo, Sambo
Jesui Muvande	Bridge construction	Former worker, Carpenter	13/09/07	Village Sassoma. Sambo
Joachim Vasco Esteva	Bridge construction	Former worker, Carpenter	13/09/07	Village Sassoma. Sambo
Belchior Chipindo	Bridge construction	Former IDP	13/09/07	Village Sassoma. Sambo
Group interview	Sassoma	Residents and returnees	13/09/07	Village Sassoma. Sambo
Luis K. Jimbo	Search for Common Ground	Programme Manager	14/09/07	Luanda
Lucia Paula	Centro de Saude, Amilcar Cabral	Technical assistant	14/09/07	San Pedro. Huambo
Group interview	Secondary School	Teachers	14/09/07	Cuima
Manuel Fernandes	Government Administration of Cuima	Secretário	14/09/07	Cuima
Benedicto Ornelas	CAD	Former Director CAD,	14/09/07	Agricultural centre, Caála
"Juri"	WFP	Programme Officer	14/09/07	Huambo
Rodrigues Mochengo	Cammusamba	Soba	15/09/07	Zona D, *Bairro* Cammusanba

Name	Organisation	Position	Date	Place
Celestino Chiala	Cammusamba	Secutio	15/09/07	Zona D, *Bairro* Cammusanba
Joao Emilio Baptista	UTCAH	Delegado	16/09/07	Huambo
Miguel Santos	Handicap International (Belgium)	Coordinator	17/09/07	Huambo
Cupi Baptista	Development Workshop, Huambo	Coordinator	17/09/07	Huambo
Maria Lucilia	MINARS	Director	18/09/07	Huambo
Elsa Maria Pinto	Provincial Department. Energy and Water.	Coordinator	18/09/07	Huambo
Bradley Bas Guerrant	WFP	Country Director	18/09/07	Luanda
M. A. Africano	UTHCAH	Adjunct General Director	19/09/07	Luanda
Dr. Luis Biserra	UTCAH	Coordinator	19/09/07	Luanda
Miguel Cordeiro	ADRA- International	Former Director	19/09/07	Luanda
Maryse Limoer	ICRC	Chief of Delegation	19/09/07	Luanda
Water Rethebuch	SDC	Chief of Mission	19/09/07	Luanda
Jenny Neville	SFCG	Country Director	20/09/07	Luanda
Geoff Wiffin	UN CEF	Senior Programme Officer	20/09/07	Luanda
Gabriella Conen	UN CEF	Programme Officer	20/09/07	Luanda
Enrique Valles	UNHCR	Reintegration Officer	20/09/07	Luanda
Katharina Schnöring	OIM	Chief of Mission	20/09/07	Luanda
Fernando Pacheco	ADRA Angola	Former director	20/09/07	Luanda
Alan Cain	Development Workshop	Director	20/09/07	Luanda

Annex 2 Evaluation Team members

Danish team members:

Lars Buur, Senior Researcher, Ph. D., DIIS

Steen Folke, Senior Researcher, Team Leader, DIIS

Helene Maria Kyed, Researcher, Ph. D. Candidate, DIIS

Finn Stepputat, Senior Researcher, Ph. D., DIIS

Angolan team members:

Paulo Inglês, Consultant, M.A. (Madrid)

Jacinto Pio Wacussanga, Consultant, M.A. (Bradford)

Angolan field assistants:

Inocêncio Mutombo, Student, Agostiñho Neto University, Huambo

Victorino Salopa, Student, Agostiño Neto University, Huambo

Otilio Miguel Samarsele, Student, Agostiño Neto University, Huambo

Angolan Engineer:

Manuel Alberto Isabel

Swiss resource person:

Arnold Furrer

Annex 3 Methodology note

Paradigm: The case of Kasseque III (IDP resettlement Camp)

SDC has assisted with an emergency school, a health post, and with water & sanitation (via DW). Based on this it is decided to make a case study, including the following elements:

1) Initial visit: Meeting with Soba(s) and other key informants. The IDP camp had 30,000 people, today 6,000 remain. Today's settlement is well planned and organized with 5 sections (each with a Soba) and linear streets. The majority live in adobe houses with zinc roofs.
2) Rapid Appraisal:

a) *Interviews with key informants* about the history of the settlement 1995-2007 (including those who left after 2002), livelihoods of inhabitants, numbers of men, women and children, facilities (wat/san, electricity, schools, health posts etc.) and assistance from humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the state.
b) *Transect (by walk)* through the settlement from one end to the other, making observations (houses, roads, groups of people) and interviewing (= chatting with) selected persons. Observations and interviews recorded.
c) *Group interviews* with a group of men and a group of women (their life and livelihoods during 1999-2002 and today, focus on assistance from humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the state).
d) *Optional: Mapping the settlement (with key informants),* including characteristics of main sections and well off and poorer households (incl. female-headed).

3) Mini-survey

a) *Random selection* of 2 of the 5 sections
b) *Questionnaire-based mini-survey* of 10 households in each of the two sections. Total number of surveyed households: 20. The households in each group are randomly selected, e.g. by selecting every fifth household along a couple of streets (not all on 'main street'). If nobody is home in a selected household (or they do not want to be inter viewed), a note is made about this and the neighbouring household is selected as a substitute. Within the household the interview can be with the head of household or the wife.
c) *Questionnaire content:* Household data (persons' age, occupation, school attendance etc.), facilities (rooms, water, electricity, latrine, radio/TV etc.), history (focus on 1995-98, 1999-2002, 2003-07), support from state/agencies/NGOs in different phases.
d) In-depth interviews with 3 men and 3 women: Out of the 20 interviewed, 3 men and 3 women are selected for in-depth interviews about their life stories, their views on the humanitarian assistance they have received, their present situation and future hopes, etc.

4. Mini-study of school, health-post and wat-san: Physical status of buildings (rooms, equipment, maintenance), number of pupils/patients (male/female), staff (number, duration, salary, financial situation of school/clinic). Interviews with staff members about situation during 1999-2002 and today. Interview with one or two members of user committee (if any). Maintenance and function of hand pumps and latrines.

Annex 4 Questionnaire Sample

I. Dados do Casal

Nome	Idade	Ocupação	Escolaridade		Alfabetização				Nascimento -Comuna
					Umbundo		Português		

II: Nivel de Vida

1. Auantos curados tem a casa?	
2. Tem electricidade em casa?	
3. Tem Rádio?	
4. Tem Televisão?	
5. Tem bisicleta	
6. Tem Motorisada	
7. Onde vai buscar agua?	
a.) Cacimba	
b.) Rio	
c.) Tanque	
d.) Outros	
8. Uso de latrinas	
a.) Próprias	
b.) da communidade	
9. Tem terra própria?	
10. Trabalha na terra de outra pessoa	
a.) patrão	
b.) família	

III: Historia do trajecto

1.Onde esteve em:	
a) 1995-1998	
b.) 1999-2002	
c.) 2003 -2007	

IV: Ajuda Huminataria

1. Receberam algum tipo de ajuda?	
2. Que tipo de ajuda receberam?	
3. Momentos em que receberam ajuda	
a) Antes da guerra	
b) Durante da Guerra	
c) Depois da guerra	
4. Pertence a alguma organização ou associação?	
5. Qual?	

Entrevista em profundidade

1. História de vida
    a) De que terra vieram?
    b) Como chegaram até aqui?
    c) Têm familiares que já regressaram às terras de origem?
    d) Como se sentem aqui no novo *bairro*?

2. Como vêem a ajuda humanitária
    a) Se não fosse ajuda humanitária conseguira sobreviver?
    b) Ajuda humanitária chegou ou faltou mais?
    c) Como é que se encontra neste momento?
    d) Que gostaria ter/fazer no futuro?

Annex 5 Matrix of Case Studies

1. SITE	
Name	
Km from Huambo	
Type	
Adm. level	
No. of inhabitants	
SDC support	
2. Displacement history	
Background	
Routes of movement	-
Comments	-
3. Return	
Time and rhythm	-
Assistance before/after	-
State of return	
Comments	-
4. Infrastructure	
Schools	-
Heath posts	-
Water	-
Roads/Bridges	-
Administration buildings	-
Electricity and media:	-
Transport	-
Toilets	-
Comments	-
5. Livelihood and socio-economy	
Land	-
Houses	-
Schooling	-
Skills/Capacities	-
Markets	-
Economic diff.	-
Comments:	-
6. Socio-pol. Relat.	
Sobas	-
Government/Parties	-
Churches	-
Associations/Committees	-
Comments:	-

Recent SDC Evaluations

EVALUATION 2007/2	DECENTRALISATION IN SDC'S BILATERAL COOPERATION Relevance, Effectiveness, Sustainability and Comparative Advantage
EVALUATION 2007/1	SDC'S PERFORMANCE TOWARDS EMPOWERMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS FROM THE RECIPIENTS' PERSPECTIVE
EVALUATION 2006/1	EVALUACIÓN INDEPENDIENTE DEL PROGRAMA REGIONAL DE AMÉRICA CENTRAL 1999–2005
EVALUATION 2005/3	INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE SDC/seco MEDIUM TERM CONCEPT 2002–2006 IN SERBIA & MONTENEGRO
EVALUATION 2005/2	INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF SDC NEPAL COUNTRY PROGRAMMES 1993–2004 Building Bridges in Nepal – Dealing with deep divides
EVALUATION 2005/1	AUFGABENTEILUNG ZENTRALE – KOBÜ
EVALUATION 2004/4	SDC'S INTERACTION WITH THE SWISS NGO'S (for internal use only)
EVALUATION 2004/3	QUALITY ASSESSMENT OF SDC'S EXTERNAL EVALUATION REPORTS (not published)
EVALUATION JR 2004/2	SWISS-SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROGRAMME 2000–2003 Joint Review
EVALUATION 2004/1	SDC'S HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS INFLUENCE, EFFECTIVENESS AND RELEVANCE WITHIN SDC
EVALUATION EE 2003/6	SDC – COUNTER TRAFFICKING PROGRAMME MOLDOVA
EVALUATION EE 2003/5	SDC – HUMANITARIAN AID IN ANGOLA
EVALUATION EE 2003/4	12 JAHRE OSTZUSAMMENARBEIT BAND 1 DIE TRANSITION UND IHR SCHATTEN BAND 2 BILANZ DER ÖFFENTLICHEN SCHWEIZERISCHEN ZUSAMMENARBEIT MIT OSTEUROPA UND DER GUS 1990–2002
EVALUATION 2003/3	PROGRAMME DE LA COOPERATION SUISSE AU NIGER 1997–2002
EVALUATION 2003/2	SDC'S INTERACTION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)
EVALUATION 2003/1	SDC'S BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER (PRSP) PROCESS
EVALUATION 2002/1	EIN JAHRZEHNT CINFO 1990–2001

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April 2008

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